

THIRD PARTY ACTOR INTERESTS, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT APPROACHES,
AND INTRASTATE CONFLICT OUTCOMES

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This dissertation examines the role of third parties in civil war mediation and peacekeeping efforts. The dissertation makes two primary contributions to the literature. First, it builds upon existing literature by applying state-level arguments of third party involvement in mediation and peacekeeping efforts to the United Nations Security Council and regional IGOs. Second, it investigates the role of communication and coordination between third parties in their conflict management efforts.

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By

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Dissertation Motivations and Contributions

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a noticeable increase in the supply and demand for conflict managers in civil wars. The proliferation of conflict meant that there was now more demand than ever for conflict managers in civil wars. In the past three decades, a few waves of civil wars have occurred, including the conflicts in Eastern Europe following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s and the Arab Spring in the 2010s. While civil wars are costly to the disputants and civilians residing in the state in terms of casualties and resources, these conflicts also have negative externalities, such as increases in refugees, conflict spillover, and region instability (Kathman 2011). The negative externalities of these intrastate conflicts draw the attention of external actors, also known as third parties. Third parties can take on different roles in a conflict, such as an intervenor, mediator, peacekeeper, or peacebuilder, and over the past thirty years, there has been a shift in roles third parties take. Following WWII, the UN began deploying peace operations to conflicts around the world, including the Arab-Israeli war in 1948 and the Korean War in 1953. Over the next forty years, the UN remained the primary entity tasked with peace operations. However, as regional organizations developed and the number of conflicts increased in the 1980s, there was a dramatic shift in the supply of peacekeepers. Beginning in the 1990s, there were far more instances of third parties, especially IGOs, mediating civil wars, and there was a rise of regional organizations, such as the European Union (EU) (Greig et al. 2019). Between 1990-2014, the UN was responsible for roughly one-third

of new peacekeeping operations (PKOs), while regional organizations were responsible for nearly 50% of new PKOs (Mullenbach 2017). The increase in usage of mediation and peacekeeping in civil wars has been a focal point in international relations research in the twenty-first century (e.g., Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Greig and Rost 2013). This dissertation builds upon the existing conflict management research by studying actors often overlooked in the conflict management literature, including the elected members of the UN Security Council and regional IGOs. Additionally, I investigate the role of communication and coordination between third parties in their conflict management efforts. Before further discussing the contributions of this dissertation, it is first necessary to explain how conflict management approaches differ from one another.

1.2 Distinguishing Conflict Management Approaches

Conflict management is a term used to refer to a variety of approaches aimed at mitigating the negative effects of conflicts or ending conflicts. Conflict management strategies include, but are not limited to, negotiations, mediation, intervention, and peacekeeping. These approaches differ in important ways, such as some strategies being more coercive in nature while others are consensual among the parties involved. In this dissertation, I focus on two conflict management strategies, mediation and peacekeeping.

Mediation is a tool third parties use in both interstate and intrastate conflicts. Negotiations and mediation do share some common characteristics. First, both negotiations and mediation are voluntary processes where disputants consent to the use of them. Second, both processes are aimed at using this voluntary diplomatic

process to help settle contentious issues, which can help prevent further violence, end ongoing conflicts, or address underlying issues that caused the conflict between the parties in the first place. However, saying that mediation is simply an extension of negotiations does not capture the important contributions that mediation efforts bring to the conflict management process.

The primary difference between negotiations and mediation is that mediation requires the presence of a third party that is agreed upon by the disputants. The role of the mediator is flexible in that some mediators can simply relay information between disputants, while others can take a more active role in the process. Taking on an active role as a mediator can mean several things. First, a mediator can verify facts and conduct independent analyses. Second, the mediator can play an important role in the passing of information between disputants, where they help reframe and contextualize issues and positions. Lastly, mediators can bring in outside resources to encourage the disputants to negotiate, using either carrots or sticks to incentivize agreements. Mediation is more than simply introducing a third party to negotiations. Instead, the motivations, preferences, resources, and identity of the mediator have an impact on the process. Several scholars discuss the bias of third parties (e.g., Kydd 2003; Favretto 2009) and their leverage over the disputants (e.g., Bercovitch and Gartner 2006; Crocker et al. 1999).

Peacekeeping is a term that is used to describe a few conflict management practices (Sandler 2017). Traditional peacekeeping typically includes armed troops enforcing an agreement or ceasefire between the disputants. An example of traditional peacekeeping would be the UN forces in the Bosnian civil war, who were only allowed

to use force if they were threatened. PKOs can enforce several different components of agreements in civil wars, including the disarmament of the rebels, demobilization, and reintegrating combatants back into society while giving them protection from the government. In the 1990s, there was an expansion of these PKOs that handled peacebuilding missions, which targeted long-term stability and nation-building. Both peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions are conducted with the consent of the disputants and are usually the result of a formal agreement between the warring parties. However, there is another type of peace operation known as peace enforcement, which can use military forces to stop hostilities between parties without the consent of the disputants. These were not widely used until the 2000s, following the perceived failures of UN peacekeeping in conflicts such as Bosnia and Rwanda in the 1990s. Each of these peace operations focuses on separate tasks and address different problems that plague conflict management efforts in civil wars. However, these various peace operations are not mutually exclusive, and many of them are used to reinforce one another. For example, peace enforcement missions are often paired with components of peacekeeping missions, such as providing humanitarian relief and establishing safe zones (Doyle and Sambanis 2000).

Mediation and peacekeeping are crucial to conflict management efforts in civil wars. There have been several studies that investigate the factors that predict the use of these tactics by third parties (e.g., Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Greig and Regan 2008; Greig and Rost 2013) and their effectiveness in managing civil wars (e.g., Hultman 2013; Sandler 2013; Svensson 2009). Both mediation and peacekeeping can have pacifying effects in civil wars because they help disputants overcome the issues

that plague civil wars, which are information asymmetries and the credible commitment problem (Fortna 2004).

1.3 Providers of Conflict Management

Conflict management strategies are carried out by a variety of actors. These actors include global organizations (i.e., UN), regional organizations (i.e., EU, AU, OECS), coalitions of states, or individual states. Each of these international actors is acting as a third party to serve some sort of interest. In the case of international organizations, the interest may be promoting peace in a specific country or region. These interests are often outlined in the organization's charter, such as the UN, whose first purpose stated in Article 1 is "*to maintain international peace and security... for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means... adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.*" This first purpose of the UN is stated clearly, but the overall structure of how the organizations should be equipped to address threats to international peace is not nearly as clear. Since the details of the charter are vague, this allows for more flexibility in how and when the charter is deployed. In the case of the UN, this often means that the implementation of conflict management strategies is under the discretion of the Security Council and, on rare occasions, the General Assembly (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004, 35). The enforcement and implementation of conflict management are not fully based on the charter but instead are still dependent on the decisions of individual states and groups of states. Therefore, to understand the decisions of IGOs, there needs to be a better understanding of how individual state interests translate to the actions of IGOs.

In this dissertation, I develop two ways to model IGO interests and their decision-making process to test against each other. I split these two models into two categories, the IGO's strength of interests and the IGO's similarity of interests. The strength of interests argument adapts theories made about the motivations for individual states to serve as third parties (e.g., Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Kathman 2010, 2011) and some research about decision making in the UN Security Council (UNSC) (e.g., Beardsley and Schmidt 2012). The similarity of interests argument is the more novel contribution to the existing literature. In this, I argue that while the interests of individual states matter, it is the overall similarity of interests or the dissimilarity of interests among member states that are likely to matter more in determining when and where conflict management strategies are implemented by IGOs. In general, the interests and desires of member states are the driving force behind IGO action and inaction, and this dissertation provides two theories to describe the IGO decision-making process in relation to conflict management

1.4 Outline of the Dissertation

This dissertation consists of three chapters that are intended to be original scholarly articles. All three chapters contribute to our understanding of the providers of mediation and peacekeeping in civil wars. Furthermore, this dissertation offers original theories that aim to further our understanding of when conflict management strategies will be utilized and what makes the strategies more effective. The rest of this section provides a brief overview of the aims and findings of each of the remaining chapters.

In chapter 2 of this dissertation, "Incentives to Mediate: The Effect of Third Party Interests on Mediation Efforts," I introduce an original theory about how individual

member states within IGOs influence the organization's decision-making process. I provide a more in-depth discussion of the strength of interests and the similarity of interests arguments. I then apply these arguments to the UNSC and regional IGOs and compare how the structures of different organizations influence their decision to mediate in some civil wars but not others. In the case of the UNSC, I incorporate the elected ten member states (E10) into the study and argue that even though they lack a unilateral veto power that the permanent five members (P5) possess, their ties to states experiencing the civil wars do influence the UNSC's decision to engage in mediation with the disputants. Additionally, I argue that their ties to conflict states also impact their overall effectiveness.

To test these arguments, I use data from the Civil Wars Mediation (CWM) dataset (DeRouen, Bercovitch, and Pospiesna 2011) and the Uppsala's Armed Conflict Termination data (Kreutz 2010). The sample includes intrastate conflict years spanning from 1946 to 2004. I then test the strength and similarity theories on regional IGOs and the UNSC. The findings from chapter 2 suggest that there are different kinds of state interests that predict regional IGO mediation than UNSC mediation. More specifically, the analysis shows that higher levels of refugees from the civil warring state to regional IGO members help predict the onset of mediation and the likelihood that the disputants reach an agreement as a result of the mediation effort. On the other hand, the best predictors of mediation occurrence by the UNSC is the number of alliances that the conflict state has with the E10 members and the civil warring state's economic ties with the P5 members.

In chapter 3, I extend a similar argument to the one presented in the second

chapter, and I apply the theory to IGO peacekeeping operations (PKOs). I focus on the occurrence and effectiveness of UN and regional IGO PKOs. While the second chapter focused more on theoretical arguments about how ties can impact mediation efforts, in this chapter, I use more tangible examples of PKO success and failure to supplement the arguments. The reason for this is that there is more information regarding the decision-making process that occurs in PKOs because there are publicly available UN resolutions and mandates for many PKOs. In addition to providing some anecdotal evidence for the strength of interest and similarity of interests arguments, I employ a large N analysis, using data from the Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) (Sundber and Merleander 2013) and the Third Party Peacekeeping Missions Dataset (Mullenbach 2017). I test four hypotheses linking the onset and effectiveness of PKOs to the strength and similarity of interest arguments and apply them to intrastate conflicts in Africa from 1989-2008. The results of the analyses indicate that the conflict characteristics are consistently better predictors of both regional IGO and UN PKOs, but there is some support for the regional IGO hypotheses. More specifically, I find some support for IGO member states sharing borders with the conflict state to help predict the de-escalation of conflict.

Chapter 4 presents a different original theory regarding the actors who take on the role of conflict managers in civil wars. I build upon the reinforcing argument made by Beardsley et al. (2019), which states that simultaneous mediation and peacekeeping have a reinforcing relationship. I argue that this is due to mediation and peacekeeping addressing different problems that plague civil wars, namely the information asymmetries between the disputants and the credible commitment problem. While

mediation and peacekeeping can independently address these concerns, I argue that conflicts where the PKO and mediation efforts share a similar actor that should have a more profound reinforcing relationship between the two conflict management strategies.

To test this argument, I again use data from GED and the Third Party Peacekeeping Missions dataset. I create a dichotomous variable indicating if there was a shared actor who served as both a mediator and peacekeeper in the prior month. While the shared actor hypothesis does not find support, the chapter still has several policy implications. First, there are consistent findings across all models that show PKOs and mediation both have independent, pacifying effects in civil wars. Second, I also find that other forms of diplomacy, such as bilateral talks where the third party talks to one disputant and not the other, provoke more hostilities between the disputants.

As a whole, the dissertation addresses several gaps in the conflict management literature, especially with the inclusion of regional IGOs. Together, the analyses in this dissertation clearly show the importance of including regional IGOs and the elected members of the UNSC. Furthermore, I provide several original theories that can serve as a basis for future research in the study of conflict management.

CHAPTER 2

INCENTIVES TO MEDIATE: THE EFFECT OF THIRD PARTY INTERESTS ON MEDIATION EFFORTS

2.1 Introduction

The first purpose of the United Nations (UN) stated in its charter is to maintain international peace and security, and the Security Council can call parties to settle their disputes through means of negotiation, arbitration, judicial settlement, or mediation. While the UN's charter allows for the Security Council to call for parties to settle their disputes peacefully, there are many conflicts that the Security Council chooses not to become directly involved. So why does the UN decide to mediate in some intrastate conflicts and not others? Are the variations in actions toward disputing states the function of the dispute's characteristics and how the conflict threatens international peace and stability? Or is it the product of the conflict affecting the interests of the individual Security Council members?

Since 1945, the UN has been the primary provider of mediation by international organizations (Greig & Diehl 2012). However, there are several unknowns regarding how the UN selects the cases it mediates and what makes some UN mediation efforts more successful than others. The UN does provide mediation more than other international governmental organizations (IGOs), but there are still a variety of actors in the international system that mediate intrastate conflicts, such as the African Union (AU), ECOWAS, and ASEAN. While there has been a large amount of work that has focused on the onset and outcome of mediation (e.g., Gent 2011; Savun 2008; Svensson 2009), there has been less work that has recognized the unique forces

associated with IGO mediation outcomes and occurrences, especially in cases of UN mediation. I argue that IGO mediation efforts can be better understood by looking at the relationships between the IGO members and the state experiencing the civil war.

The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, I provide a summary of the civil war mediation literature. Then I provide my theoretical argument describing how the interests of individual IGO members impact the likelihood of IGO mediation occurrence and success. More specifically, I look at member state interests in the UN Security Council (UNSC) and regional IGOs and compare how the structures of the different organizations influence the decision to mediate. In the case of the UNSC, I argue that while the elected ten member states (E10) do not have an individual veto power, their ties to states experiencing civil wars do influence the UNSC's decisions to engage in mediation efforts with disputants and also impacts their overall effectiveness in mediation efforts. I test these arguments using data from the Civil War Mediation (CWM) dataset (DeRouen, Bercovitch & Pospiesna 2011), using a sample of conflict years from 1946-2004. Then, I discuss the findings of the study, which suggest that regional IGOs that have more member states receiving refugees from civil warring states are more likely to mediate conflicts and that UN mediation is more likely to occur when the elected members of the Security Council have alliances with the state experiencing a civil war.

2.2 Civil War Mediation

Over the past two decades, there has been a wealth of research conducted on conflict management in the context of civil wars (e.g., Clayton 2013; Kathman 2007, 2010; Melin 2011, 2015). Conflict management can take many different forms,

including, but not limited to, negotiations, peacekeeping, military intervention, and mediation. Each of these actions faces unique challenges in terms of onset and success. For example, direct military intervention and peacekeeping operations both require substantial resources from the third party in terms of troops and economic contributions. Tactics such as negotiation and mediation require fewer tangible resources since troops and financial support are not necessarily required. However, negotiation and mediation do encounter the issue of cooperation between the disputants because these are voluntary diplomatic processes. It is also important to note that negotiation and mediation do not end when disputants decide to participate, but instead, it requires continued cooperation to be successful, and disputants can walk away or reject potential arrangements.

Civil wars are plagued with information asymmetries between disputants (Greig & Regan 2008; Walter 2009), and tactics such as negotiation and mediation are used as information gathering tools, which can ultimately help with the distribution of the resources that are preferred to continued fighting (Greig & Regan 2008). While negotiation and mediation are similar in that the disputants are participating in the diplomatic process voluntarily, mediation is unique because it requires the involvement of a third party that must be agreed upon by the disputants. There are several types of actors that act as mediators in conflicts, including individuals, states, IGOs, and non-government organizations (NGOs). Prior research has discussed the incentives for providing mediation for various kinds of third parties, but ultimately argues that actors provide mediation because it is in their self-interest to provide mediation (e.g., Greig & Diehl 2012; Zartman 2008). However, before delving into the motivations for third

parties to mediate civil wars, it is important to establish the current state of mediation research.

The process of mediation in civil wars faces the difficult challenge of overcoming information asymmetries (Greig & Regan 2008; Walter 2009). Rebels fighting governments have an incentive to misrepresent their true capabilities to portray themselves as stronger and more of a threat to the government to improve the bargaining position (Walter 2009). Information asymmetry is an issue in bargaining for all conflicts, but it is especially problematic in civil wars because both sides have a strong incentive to defect from agreements. Both rebels and governments must coexist in close proximity to one another following an agreement, meaning that trust between the parties is essential to building strong, lasting agreements. Rebels are often hesitant to disarm following an agreement and governments would rather have a military victory over the insurgents instead of a negotiated settlement (Bapat 2005; Werner & Yuen 2005). Governments are reluctant to negotiate with rebels because it gives the rebel groups legitimacy, and it potentially shows a lack of resolve by the government, which may signal weakness (Beardsley 2010; Clayton 2013; Greig & Regan 2008; Melin & Svensson 2009). However, continued conflict is costly, especially if either or both sides are uncertain of the prospects of achieving a victory on the battlefield.

Conflict is costly, and it reveals information about the disputants, and certain characteristics of the conflict have been shown to increase the likelihood of mediation onset. Longer conflicts both drain resources from the warring parties and shows that both sides have the capabilities and resolve to withstand attacks by the opposition, which decreases the information asymmetry between the disputants (Walter 2009).

These protracted conflicts turning into hurting stalemates are more likely to emerge in prolonged conflicts, making efforts to find an end to the conflict more attractive (Zartman 2000). In addition to the duration, the strength of the rebel group is an important factor in determining the likelihood of mediation occurrence. Governments avoid mediation efforts because it brings international attention to the conflict and gives legitimacy to the rebel movement, and a government accepting a mediation effort sends a message that the government is not strong enough to control its own territory (Clayton 2013; Melin and Svensson 2009). However, stronger rebel groups are more likely to experience mediation onset due to their ability to exploit the government's weaknesses and withstand the government's efforts to quell their movement, which decreases the likelihood of a decisive government victory. Therefore, governments are more willing to accept the costs of mediation when facing stronger rebel groups, and they are more motivated to find a durable peace agreement to avoid continued fighting (Clayton 2013). Prior research also indicates that the motivation of rebel groups, such as territorial control or government control, can impact the likelihood of mediation onset and success. Clayton (2013) explains that rebel motivations can often be linked to the rebel group's capabilities, so weaker rebel groups may be fighting for smaller pieces of land that are outside the state's reach, while stronger rebel groups are more likely to challenge the state for government control because they view their chances of gaining partial, if not total, control of the government as realistic. Lastly, another consistent predictor of mediation onset is prior mediation experience between the disputants. Disputants that have experienced mediation are more likely to use mediation in the future. However, only successful mediation attempts help predict the likelihood of

success in subsequent mediation attempts (Clayton 2013; Greig & Regan 2008).

Another important aspect of mediation is who is playing the role of mediator. Mediators are now thought of as more active parties in conflict management, meaning they actively work with the disputants to find solutions instead of being a non-partisan passer of information. Since third parties have their own interests and goals, there has been considerable research that has looked at how these interests can create mediator bias. However, the role of bias is not entirely clear when it comes to its effect on mediation outcomes. The uncertainty surrounding the term bias stems from vague definitions and the different operationalizations that scholars have used throughout the debate. For example, Kydd (2003) defines mediator bias as a third-party's preferences aligning with one party or the other, which indicates they are biased in favor of that party. Kydd continues to define an unbiased mediator as one that is indifferent between the two parties. This conceptualization of bias and unbiased third parties has been a point of debate in mediation research.

Bias has been a focal point in mediation research, largely because many of the early mediation scholars perceived impartiality as a prerequisite of potential mediators (Wallensteen & Svensson 2014, 320). Some of the early scholars even went as far as to say that mediators should have no interest in the conflict (Ott 1972). This was a commonly held position in the early mediation literature. However, there were some that argued that biased mediators could be more effective at times because biased actors can have leverage over at least one of the disputing parties (Touval 1975).

Some research has argued that unbiased third parties are more likely to be accepted as mediators and bring the disputants to the table (Carnevale & Pruitt 1992;

Rauchhaus 2006; Svensson 2009). On the other hand, several scholars have argued that biased mediation can be more effective. Kydd (2003) argues that mediators that are biased toward one of the disputants are more effective because they have more complete information and credibility to make the actor they are biased toward to make the necessary concessions to reach an agreement. Other scholars since Kydd (2003) have found evidence to further support the argument that biased mediators can be effective (Favretto 2009; Maoz & Terris 2006; Melin 2011, Melin 2015; Savun 2008). However, scholars such as Bercovitch (1996) are less sure about the role of bias and instead argue that it is a mediator's resources and ability to leverage those resources over the disputants is the more important factor in successful mediation.

The definition of bias and unbiased mediator described above is intuitive, but it does suffer from a lack of specificity for operationalization. In essence, bias is a phenomenon that is widely recognized by scholars but measuring bias has been difficult because it is not something that is directly observable. Instead, one can find evidence of potential interests that can influence a third party's behavior, but bias is not inherently falsifiable. In addition to the issues of operationalization existing in the literature, the bias literature largely does not account for another form of bias, which is a bias of outcome. As Vukovic (2015, 418) states, "Although mediators aim to promote an outcome that is in line with their self-interest, their interests are not as restrictive in terms of potential outcomes as those of the conflicting parties are." In other words, a third party may be impartial in terms of not preferring one warring party over the other, but the third party may have a broad interest in ending hostilities or having input on the terms of an agreement between the warring parties. Conceptualizing bias as a bias of

outcome allows for us to look beyond the false dichotomy of biased versus unbiased mediator and to expand what interests prompt a third party to take on the role of mediator in civil wars. IGOs have largely been left out of the discussion of biased mediation, but with Vukovic's conceptualization of bias and bias of outcome, it is important to investigate how IGOs fit into this context. To understand the role of IGOs, mediation, and state interests, it is important to consider a few questions. First, whose interests are important in shaping mediation efforts by an IGO? In other words, the IGO can be motivated by its own charter and policies, but this begs the question of why do IGOs offer mediation in some civil conflicts but not others? If the IGO's charter does not explain the discrepancies in mediation occurrence, could it be that the interests of the member states are the motivation for the IGO to offer mediation? While the interests of third party states have been acknowledged in prior research (e.g., Greig and Regan 2008; Svensson 2009), there has not been a focus in seeing how these interests translate into IGO mediation in civil conflicts. This chapter argues that understanding the role of IGO structure and preferences of the member states IGOs will give a more accurate and nuanced understanding of mediation occurrence and success in intrastate conflicts. Before explaining how the interests of IGO members translate to actions taken by the IGO, it is important to first discuss how an IGO's structure influences the actions taken by the agency.

2.3 Structure and Decision-Making in IGOs

States have a variety of tools at their disposal to pursue their interests in foreign intrastate conflicts. The tools for third party states include direct intervention (i.e., troops), indirect intervention (i.e., military supplies, financial assistance), economic

sanctions, and other conflict management roles, such as mediators or peacekeepers. Each of these actions is associated with costs and benefits that states consider when determining which course of action suits their national interests best. For example, if a third party has a good working relationship with the current regime in a civil warring state, they will be more likely to provide one-sided intervention in the form of direct or indirect intervention because the third party has a preferred side in the conflict. However, one-sided intervention can be risky for a state because it can require substantial resources, such as troops and financial support, and it can negatively impact their international reputation, especially if they are supporting a disputant who is not viewed unfavorably in the international community. While these costs are evident in the case of one-sided intervention, there are still costs for third parties who take on roles in conflict management and conflict resolution. Mediation does not require the third party to allocate the same kind of tangible resources as one-sided intervention or peacekeeping operations, but there are still costs such as time commitment and reputational costs. Unsuccessful mediation attempts can damage a third party's reputation as reliable conflict managers, which negatively impacts their ability to take on the role of mediator in future conflicts. Third parties are selective of the cases they opt-in to based on the possibility of success, and in some cases, they can build a reputation for being good mediators, such as Norway.

There is an advantage to states acting as unitary actors outside the context of IGOs. The primary reason states would prefer to act alone as a third party is that they have more control over the influence and action they take in the conflict. Third parties who are acting outside of the context of an IGO are going to have more flexibility in the

intervention or conflict management process and take actions that more closely align with their interests. In mediation, the mediator often plays an important role in shaping the perceived parameters of the talks between disputants. Third parties are self-interested actors, and the mediator's interests are going to affect the scope of the negotiations (Lax and Sebenius 2006). The influence over the range and scope of the negotiations can be attractive to a third party, especially if there is a possibility of an outcome that is advantageous for the third-party, such as a peaceful resolution that allows for the opening up of trade within the conflict region or the strengthening of border security to prevent more refugees from fleeing the conflict. However, the costs of acting alone can be costly to states, both in terms of tangible resources and audience costs. In the case of civil wars, a major part of the peace process is getting the rebel group to disarm or getting the disputants to deescalate tensions. Mediators often become guarantors to mediated agreements (Quinn et al. 2006; Walter 2002), and in this role, mediators facilitate agreements between disputants is by offering incentives for cooperation (e.g., aid) and or punishments for non-cooperation (e.g., sanctions). This strategy works in mediation as long as the mediator remains engaged in the peace process and has enough resources to make cooperation between the disputants worthwhile.

The costs of mediation can add up quickly for an individual state. In cases where states lack either the resources or the level of commitment necessary to be effective mediators, it may be in the state's interest to find others to help shoulder the cost of mediation. For example, if a state does not have the leverage necessary to effectively entice the disputants to reach an agreement. One way that states share the costs

associated with being a third party is by acting through IGOs. By acting through an IGO, states lose some control in the decision-making process, but they still have influence in the process. The specific role a member state plays in the decision-making process is dependent on the structure of the IGO.

2.3.1 United Nations Security Council

The motives of international organizations and the motivations of states in the conflict management literature are often not directly compared. Individual state motivations for mediating are often considered to be self-serving, while the motivations of international organizations are often considered to be more complex. Many of the global and regional international organizations have peace and security at the heart of the organization. For example, the first of the four main purposes of the UN is to maintain international peace and security and to collectively prevent potential threats to peace. While many international organizations have a charter that promotes peace or mandates that call for intervention in conflicts, these international organizations are still subject to the policies and interests of their member-states (Bercovitch 2002; Greig and Diehl 2012; Zartman 2008).

The UN is composed of 193 states, but the structure of the UN does not allow for all participating states to have an equal say in the actions the UN takes. Instead, there is a structure in place that allows for some states to have more influence within the UN, such as the permanent five (P5) members on the Security Council who have veto powers that other states do not possess. The veto power that the P5 members possess allows them to have more influence over the actions taken by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) because it only takes one of the five members to veto to stall

any Security Council resolution.

The UNSC is the primary organ responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. The UNSC can make recommendations to resolve the dispute through peaceful means, or the UNSC itself can mediate. In other cases, the UNSC may appoint special representatives, or they can request the Secretary-General to use their good offices to help the parties reach a peaceful settlement. The Secretary-General can also bring issues to the attention of the UNSC, which can prompt further action from the council.

In this chapter, the focus is on states within the UNSC, including both the P5 and the ten elected member states (E10). The P5 states consist of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia (Soviet Union), and China, which have remained the same since the institution was formed post World War II. On the other hand, the E10 members serve two-year terms, with five seats rotating every year. While there are twice as many non-permanent seats, none of them can single-handedly veto resolutions, meaning their power is limited in comparison. However, to pass a Security Council resolution, 9 of the 15 members must vote in favor, which means the elected members still have a voice. In addition to resolutions, the UNSC also recommends a Secretary-General, where the candidate must receive at least nine votes as well. The Secretary-General is ultimately appointed by the UN General Assembly, but they do need the support of the majority of the UNSC members prior to being appointed, including no vetoes from the P5.

The E10 seats on the Security Council are highly sought after, with countries often announcing their campaigns for the seats nearly a decade in advance (Malone

2000). Several argue that these seats are coveted due to the prestige that comes with the seat on the Council (e.g., Hurd 2002; Malone 2000; Monteleone 2015). Others have pointed out that E10 members are also more likely to receive World Bank project loans and International Monetary Fund loans with few conditions (Dreher et al. 2009; Dreher et al. 2014). While the E10 members do not have the ability to unilaterally veto resolutions, they still play an important role in the decision-making process of the UNSC. The E10 states bring influence and knowledge from the regions they represent, along with their interests. Since the states only serve a term of two years, the characteristics and interests of the member states change along with representation. This could be because states from the same region can have opposing positions on issues and serve on the Council in consecutive terms. States with different interests and positions will also bring new information to the Council, which may change voting behavior on resolutions. The E10 presents different information and new interests to the Council every year, which can impact the Security Council's awareness and willingness to become involved in intrastate conflict mediation.

The UN does not get involved in all civil conflicts, and even in the conflicts the UN does involve itself, there are varied results. The occurrence of mediation needs the consent of the disputants and the UN, which is often a difficult barrier. The government involved in a civil war typically prefers to avoid mediation because it can be interpreted as a sign of weakness or incompetence. However, a government will be more likely to accept mediation from a third party that is interpreted as more sympathetic to their cause. In the case of potential UN mediation, the government may be more comfortable accepting mediation if the member states of the UNSC have closer ties to

the conflict state (e.g., trade, alliances, shared borders). While international organizations do prioritize state sovereignty, which can be interpreted as a bias in favor of the government, there are varying levels of support. For example, alliances between states are typically the result of negotiations between individuals within regimes or administrations, so if a member state has an important defense pact with a state, they may be more inclined to present the disputants with peaceful terms that favor the current administration. While this example illustrates state interests and interactions with the disputants instead of a government's relationship with an IGO, one can assume that state-to-state relationships impact IGO decisions. A state that has an interest in a foreign intrastate conflict will provide information and arguments to the IGO or IGO organ that aligns with those beliefs. While a single state in the UNSC cannot unilaterally decide to carry out a UN resolution, they can influence the opinion and votes of other member states. Understanding the level of interest of a group of states is difficult, but there are ways to see how intertwined the members of the UNSC and the conflict state are.

2.3.2 Regional IGOs

While the UN does bring some positive qualities to conflict management, such as giving international legitimacy to the conflict, regional organizations have some advantages over the UN. Bercovitch and Fretter (2004) identify several potential advantages of regionalizing conflict management. First, regional organizations in the same area as the civil war state may have more knowledge of the dynamics of local conflicts, and they have stronger incentives to resolve them due to their proximity which makes them more adept at managing the conflict. Second, they are located closer in

proximity, so they may be able to act quickly and stop the hostilities before they gain momentum. Last, regional organizations, in comparison to global IGO's such as the UN, have a more homogenous membership and a shared culture that gives them a deeper knowledge of the norms of the conflict state. For example, the members of ECOWAS are made up of fifteen countries that are all located in West Africa, and many of them have the shared experience of colonialism. Knowing the land and the culture of the conflict state can provide potential conflict managers with more useful information that can help inform effective conflict management. Each of these are pieces of information can help the regional IGO be an effective mediator because they will have a better understanding of the range of negotiation for the disputants in an intrastate conflict.

While there are several potential advantages to regional IGOs taking, the role of regional IGOs in conflict management efforts is more complex than that of the UNSC for two reasons. First, it is unclear whether regional organizations are challenging or complementing the UN in conflict management efforts (Bjurner 2015). Chapter VIII of the UN Charter outlines the relationship between the UN and regional IGOs, and it makes clear that regional organizations can make efforts to pacify disagreements and that these regional agencies should be considered before being referred to the UNSC. Article 54 of the charter also notes that any activities taken by regional organizations should keep the UNSC fully informed on the issue. While these agencies are required to keep the UNSC fully informed of actions being taken, it is unclear how effectively information is relayed between the entities.

The second reason why the role of regional IGOs is more complex is that they

have different hierarchies and structures. In some ways, regional IGOs are similar to the UN. Organizations such as the AU and the Organization of American (OAS) have similar objectives and organs to the UN, but their scope of action is more limited. Many regional organizations have their equivalent to the Security Council within their structure, but their functions and make-up vary between organizations. For example, the AU has the Peace and Security Council, which has 15 elected members that are elected, five serve three-year terms, and ten serve two-year terms. These members are elected by the general, and there are no permanent members, but there are no restrictions on immediate re-elections. In the OAS, there is the Permanent Council of the Organization, which is composed of a single representative for each member state. While the representation and structure of these two organs are different, they do share a similarity in that the members of these councils have a motivation to be more responsive to the general assemblies in their respective organizations than the P5 of the UNSC. In the OAS, since all member states are represented in the council, there is a clear connection between the Permanent Council of the Organization and the other organs. In the case of the AU, members of the Peace and Security Council are regularly up for re-election, so any state that is represented in the council can be held accountable, which means they have to be strategic if they want to continue being on the council. This is why it is more important to investigate the interests of all member states within regional organizations when it comes to decisions regarding conflict management efforts, such as mediation. The councils will either have representatives from all member states, or they will have elected members that will be more hesitant to go against the preferences of the majority of member states within the organization.

2.4 IGO Member State Interests in Civil Wars

There is a debate in the literature over what motivates states to intervene in foreign conflicts. While some argue that third parties intervene for the purpose of conflict resolution (e.g., Regan 2002), others argue that third parties are rarely willing to pay the costs of intervention for purely humanitarian reasons and often have extra-civil war goals, such as extracting resources, when they do intervene (e.g., Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Morgenthau 1967). These interests may vary depending on the state being investigated or the characteristics of the conflict. However, there must be a motivation for an actor to act. There are several interests that third party states may have, but they can be categorized into two types, opportunity for the third party to improve their own position and threat reduction (Kathman 2010, 2011).

One of the primary goals of any state is to promote its security and well-being. While there are several components of security that states must address, one of the more evident components is border security. Conflicts do not occur in isolation from other countries, regardless of whether it is an interstate or intrastate conflict. States that share borders with conflict are often at risk of conflict spillover because conflicts are often not constrained to the conflict state(s) (Kathman 2011). Civil wars can also disrupt trade and commerce within a region and create regional instability, which can have long-lasting effects (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Gleditsch 2007). States neighboring civil warring states may lose a trade partner in the warring state because trade routes are compromised, or the state cannot part with vital resources. States outside of the warring region may be more hesitant to invest or trade with a state neighboring a conflict due to the possibility of the conflict spilling over into their territory. Since states bordering civil

wars are the most likely to experience these negative side effects, they are going to be more likely to want to get involved in the conflict to mitigate the potential negative side effects. States may offer assistance, such as offering to mediate, as in the case of both Gambia and Guinea-Bissau offering to mediate in the conflict in Senegal through the 1990s and the early 2000s.

States are also motivated by pre-existing relationships between themselves and the country experiencing a civil war. Even if the potential third party does not border the warring state, they may have other ties to the country, such as trade ties. Prior literature has shown that shared economic ties with a disputing state can motivate third parties to intervene in civil wars (Kathman 2007) and interstate disputes (Regan and Aydin 2006). Third parties are motivated to promote peace to preserve the flow of resources between themselves and the warring state. Conflict can often impact a state's ability to continue regular trade with other states. First, the state may be unable to part with critical resources during times of crisis, which impacts outside states who typically trade for those goods. This sudden disruption of trade flows can put a large burden on outside states, which may prompt a state to become more directly involved in the conflict.

Another potential motivator for a state to take on the role of the third party in a conflict is a common alliance between themselves and the warring state. States that share alliances, especially defense pacts, have a vested interest in promoting the well-being of their allied state. If a potential third party sees an ally experiencing an intrastate conflict, it is in their interest to promote stability in their ally's state. States

experiencing hostilities within their borders are going to be less likely to uphold their treaty obligations in the future.

Other types of linkages are not as tangible, such as shared norms between states. States often share common ethnic kin and political ideologies with other states. It is also common for some states to interact with some states more than others. For example, states that share borders are going to be far more likely to share repeated interactions than states that are separated by any sizeable distance. States have also formed several regional IGOs to serve their shared interests, such as ECOWAS, which is concerned with the security, cooperation, and development of the West African States. Other IGOs, such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), are created to link populations that share ethnic or religious similarities. IGO memberships increase the number of interactions between member states, so it would make sense that states that share multiple common IGO memberships may develop shared norms that would make them more inclined to promote the well-being of another member state.

While the interests of third-party states discussed above are generally accepted in the existing literature, it should also be noted that the list is not fully exhaustive. For example, third parties, such as Norwegian mediation in the Israeli and Palestinian conflict, may not appear to have any of the interests discussed above. However, that does not mean that Norway should be considered an unbiased mediator in the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Norway still has an interest in the outcome of the mediation, but it is more closely tied to their own reputation in the international community rather than their ties to the warring state or the parties involved in the conflict. In this case, failed mediation would negatively impact their international image

as effective mediators, which impacts their influence in future conflict management efforts. However, third parties like Norway are not viewed as the norm in international mediation but instead are seen as the exception to the rule.

2.5 Conceptualizing IGO Interests

State interests impact decisions within IGOs, but the group dynamics of member states within IGOs make the decision-making process less clear than state-led mediation. Previous research has shown that states with interests related to civil warring states increase their likelihood to mediate in the civil war (Greig and Regan 2008). However, in the case of the IGOs, one must consider multiple states, each with different ties to the conflict state. I propose two different ways of conceptualizing the general interests of a group of states toward a civil warring state. The first is the group's similarity of interests toward a conflict state, or in other words, do the states have similar or dissimilar relationships with the conflict state. Another way of framing this is to think about how dispersed are the member states' interests. For example, if multiple states within the IGO are receiving refugees from a state experiencing a civil war, then they would have a shared interest. In organs such as the UNSC, if the dispersion of interests is high, indicating dissimilarities in ties to the conflict state, then the likelihood of UNSC involvement in the conflict will decrease because the P5 members can use their veto power to prevent a rival state from achieving a lopsided interest. However, if the dispersion of interests is smaller, then we can expect a higher likelihood of mediation because the member states have more similar interests, which can help establish the UN's objectives and parameters as a mediator within the conflict. For example, if there is a civil conflict in a state where one of the major powers shares a border with the

warring state, such as Russia's shared border with Ukraine, then that major power will be more likely to intervene outside the context of the UN directly.

H1: The more similar the interests among IGO members with a civil warring state, the more likely the conflict will experience mediation.

The dispersion of interests can impact the decisions of the UNSC, especially when considering the veto power of the P5 members, but it is also important to consider the strength of the ties between IGO members and the conflict states. As mentioned before, the UNSC needs at least 9 of 15 votes to pass a resolution, which means a 60% majority should have an interest in a conflict or conflict state to pass a UNSC resolution and regional IGOs also need a majority of states to pass a resolution. However, the question becomes, how does one gauge the level of interest among a group of states when it comes to issues such as trade ties, IGO memberships, and refugees? One could look at the average amount of any of these indicators for all the states in the UNSC, but the average is sensitive to both high and low outliers, which would relate more to the dispersion hypothesis. One could also consider the maximum or minimum values, but this would not relate to the majority threshold needed to pass a resolution because it would only be looking at the high and low extremes of the IGO members. The other possibility is to consider a different measure of central tendency, such as the median, which is less susceptible to the high and low extremes present within a group setting. The median identifies the middle value of each of the members, meaning that half of the observations will be at least as much if not more than the identified value. This gives some insight into what the overall relationship is between the majority of the members and the conflict state. For example, if more than half of the IGO members are receiving thousands of refugees from a conflict region, the median will reflect the

severity of the issue for most of the member states. If the tie or interest is strong enough for most member states, one can assume that the majority of states would vote in favor of mediation to help bring stability to the conflict state.

H2: The higher the level of interests among the majority of IGO members with a civil warring state, the more likely the conflict will experience mediation.

Prior research indicates that the interests of third party states motivate them to both offer and accept the role of mediators in civil conflicts (e.g., Greig and Regan 2008). However, the same characteristics that impact the likelihood of mediation occurrence are going to affect the outcome of mediation. Belligerents must overcome several challenges that plague the bargaining process in civil wars to reach a negotiated peace. One of the challenges a mediator must overcome to be successful is the problem of credible commitments from the disputants. Credible commitments are difficult because disputants have incentives to misrepresent their strength and resolve in hopes of achieving an outcome that favors their goals. Mediators help overcome these information asymmetries by relaying information between the disputants and using leverage to achieve negotiated outcomes. IGOs that have more interests in a conflict state will have more information about the nature of the conflict and the disputants, which will improve their ability to communicate accurate information between the belligerents. Also, IGOs with more interests will be more credible stakeholders in the conflict, increasing expectations that they will assist in the implementation of the terms of any agreement reached.

In addition to having more information, mediators that have higher levels of interest are also more likely to enforce peace settlements. IGOs with more interested more states will be less averse to pooling resources to use as leverage as a mediator or

to enforce the settlement once it is reached. If IGO members have similar levels of interests in a conflict state, they will be better able to find measures that member states can adhere to and put pressure on the disputants to make credible commitments through the threat of sanctions or offering positive incentives for peace to the belligerents. In the case of IGOs, both the level of interest and the variance of interests between member states is important to consider. The level of interest should help the IGO determine the level of urgency that is needed to reach an agreement in a conflict, while the dispersion of interests will impact an IGO's ability to have a consistent response by all member states. For example, to exert pressure on the disputants to negotiate, IGOs can enforce an arms embargo, but this only works if all member states adhere to the embargo.

H3: The less dispersion of interests among IGO members with a civil warring state, the more likely the conflict will experience successful mediation.

H4: The higher the level of interests among the majority of IGO members with a civil warring state, the more likely the conflict will experience successful mediation.

2.6 Research Design

To test the hypotheses posited in this paper, I use the Civil War Mediation (CWM) dataset (DeRouen, Bercovitch & Pospiesna, 2011). The dataset was built upon Uppsala's Armed Conflict Termination data (Kreutz 2010), and the CWM includes all civil war episodes that meet the UCDP/PRIO definition of civil war (UCDP 2011). For each year of a civil war, I construct an IO/civil-war state dyad between the country in which the civil war is taking place and all relevant IO's. An IO is considered relevant if the IGO is in the same region as the state experiencing the civil war or if the IGO has the capability to act outside its region. Since there are often multiple mediation attempts

during a civil war episode, I separate each conflict episode into individual years. If an actor has several mediation attempts within a year, I take the most successful attempt by the actor during that conflict year. A civil war is considered active if the conflict produced more than 25 battle-related deaths in a given year. I test regional IOs and the UNSC separately, resulting in 1,532 observations for the UNSC and 2,898 for regional IOs.

2.6.1 Dependent Variables

There are two dependent variables to test both the onset and outcome of mediation attempts. The first is *Mediation Onset*, which is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if the conflict experienced a mediation effort that involved an IGO as either a lead or supporting role in the mediation efforts. This variable is coded based on the 'name of third party' data from the CWM's dataset. The other dependent variable is *Mediation Success*, which is another dichotomous variable that draws upon the CWM dataset. This CWM data codes mediation processes as either unsuccessful, a ceasefire, process settlement, partial settlement, or full settlement. From this data, I construct a binary measure of success by coding all mediation attempts by an IGO that result with at least a partial settlement as 1 and all other cases that are unsuccessful as 0 (Clayton 2013; DeRouen, Bercovitch, & Pospeisnza 2011). Ceasefires are not included in the success category in the reported models. Although this measure of success does not provide a comprehensive evaluation of the mediator's effectiveness in the process, it does provide an important step in the peace process. Peace agreements do not always bring an end to hostilities, but prior research indicates that prior mediation

success helps predict future mediation onset and future mediation success (Clayton 2013; Greig & Regan 2008).

2.6.2 Independent Variables

Given that the focus of this chapter is how state interests impact an IGOs decision to mediate intrastate conflicts, I consider several measurable indicators of state interests in foreign civil wars. These indicators include various ties between a state and the state experiencing the intrastate conflict. The five indicators used in this study are shared borders, alliances, trade, refugees from the conflict, and common IGO memberships between the two states. For each of the five indicators, I begin by creating a member state – conflict state dyad for each of the indicators. However, I want a single observation for the IGO and the conflict state in a year, so I collapse the dataset by the conflict state, IGO members, and year. This results in an IGO-conflict state dyad year for each observation. In the final dataset, I have the median observation and standard deviation within the IGO-conflict state dyad for continuous variables (trade, refugees, common IGO memberships) and the mean for dichotomous indicators to give the percentage of states in the IGO who have the interest (shared borders and alliances).

The first two indicators are based on dichotomous measurements between the IGO member states and the civil warring state. *Shared borders* is a variable taken from COW's Direct Contiguity (3.2) dataset (Stinnett et al. 2002) and is the percentage of states who share a direct land border with the state experiencing civil war. The *alliances* data is taken from COW's Formal Alliances (4.1) dataset (Gibler 2009) is the percentage of states in the IGO that have an active defense pact with the warring state.

The remaining indicators of IGO interests are based on continuous variables. *Trade Change* is a variable based on data taken from COW's Dyadic Trade (4.0) dataset (Barbieri and Kesckes 2016). The variable is based on the percent change in trade in the past year. Data on *Refugees* is taken from the UNHCR. Specifically, I use the "Refugees (incl. refugee-like situations)" variable, which accounts for the total number of people who have been forced to leave the civil warring state and relocated to an IGO member state. Lastly, *Common IO's* is a variable taken from COW's dyad Intergovernmental Organizations (3.0) dataset, and it takes into account the percentage of similar IGO memberships between the IGO member and the civil warring state. For each continuous variable, I take the median value to test the "level of interest" of the IGO and the standard deviation to test the dispersion of interests among IGO members.

2.6.3 Control Variables

Prior research indicates that there are several variables that impact mediation onset and effectiveness. One of the more important things to consider when studying mediation is the characteristics of the conflict itself. Disputants are more likely to engage in mediation when conflicts are more costly. There are several reasons why conflicts incur higher costs to the disputants, such as the strength of the rebel group, the intensity and duration of the conflict, and the type of conflict (e.g., territorial, secessionist). To account for these conflict factors, I control for several variables that have previously been found to affect the onset and outcome of mediation attempts. First, I include a measure for several characteristics of the conflict episode, including incompatibility type, conflict intensity, and conflict duration. Incompatibility type is a dichotomous variable that is coded as 1 if a conflict is over territorial issues and as a 0

in all other cases (UCDP, 2011). The intensity level is another dichotomous variable that is coded as 1 if a conflict reaches 1,000 deaths per year and as 0 in all other cases (Lacina & Gleditsch 2005). There are two conflict duration variables. The first is *duration*, which records the number of years since the onset of the conflict episode. Second, there is a duration-squared variable, which is included to account for the diminishing effect of duration over longer periods of time (Clayton 2013).

There are other variables that are unique to civil wars that are also considered. The first is relative rebel strength, which is based on the relative strength of rebels variable in the non-state actor (NSA) dataset (Cunningham, Gleditsch, & Salehyan 2009). The measure in the NSA dataset uses a 5-point scale, but following the work of Clayton (2013), I use a 3 point ordinal scale to indicate whether the rebel group is weaker (1), evenly matched (2), or stronger than the government (3). Prior research indicates that conflicts with stronger rebel groups are more likely to experience mediation onset and are more likely to experience at least a partial settlement as a result of the mediation attempts. The second variable related to civil wars is *parallel conflicts* within a state. *Parallel conflict* is a dichotomous variable that accounts for states that are experiencing more than one conflict in a given year. If a state is experiencing more than one conflict, the observation is coded as 1. The rationale for including this variable is that states experiencing multiple rebel movements may be less likely to agree to mediation with one group because the costs of recognizing one group in the context of a civil war may be too high.

In the last set of control variables, I include an account of the prior conflict management attempts in the conflict episode. The first is a dichotomous variable to

indicate if there was an attempt at *mediation last year*. If there was a mediation attempt in the prior year, the observation is coded as 1. Prior research indicates that once a dialogue has been opened between the state and rebel groups, the two parties are more likely to agree to future mediation attempts (Clayton 2013; Greig & Regan 2008). If there was mediation in the previous year, I account for if the mediation attempt was successful (Clayton 2013).

2.6.4 Methodology

To test my hypotheses, I run several bivariate probit models with Heckman corrections. I utilize this model to account for selection bias and to acknowledge that mediation success is not independent of the conditions in which mediation occurs. Prior to bivariate probit regressions, I estimate logit models for the occurrence of mediation to construct the selection stage of the final models. The purpose for first estimating the logit models is to find the model that best predicts the likelihood of occurrence, which increases the validity in the bivariate probit models outcome stage.

2.7 Findings

The results from the analysis described above are divided into two groups, regional IGOs, and the UN. Regional IGOs and the UN are tested separately due to the different functions and organs, primarily the UNSC. The UNSC needs to be tested separately for two reasons. First, the UN has jurisdiction over all regional organizations and member states of the UN. Second, the UNSC has unique power dynamics that need careful consideration when testing for the hypotheses proposed in this chapter, namely the difference between the P5 and E10 members. The findings for regional IGOs are found in Table 2.1, and the findings for the UN are found in Table 2.2.

2.7.1 Regional IGO Findings

The theoretical argument for this chapter argued that IGOs that have member states with more similar interests (less dispersion) and stronger ties with the conflict state would be more likely to mediate in a conflict. The results of this can be found in the selection phase (mediation occurrence) in Models 1 through 3. Model 1 reports the complete model with both the level of interest measures and the measures of variance for regional organizations. In Model 1, there is support for Hypothesis 2, which argues that a higher level of interest by the majority of member states will increase the likelihood of IGO mediation. More specifically, the number of refugees leaving a conflict state to IGO member states has an impact on the likelihood of IGO mediation in a civil conflict. This finding suggests that refugees create a sense of urgency to act within IGOs because refugees can be costly to the member states, but higher numbers of refugees may also indicate a more severe conflict, which has been shown to attract more mediation offers (e.g., Greig and Regan 2008).

There were two hypotheses related to IGO mediation outcomes. I predicted that IGO member state ties (e.g., alliances, contiguity, and trade) to the warring state would increase the likelihood of successful mediation. More specifically, I argued that less variance and higher levels of interests between IGO members states and the conflict state would increase the likelihood of successful mediation. In the outcome stage, I find support for Hypothesis 4, which argues that higher levels of interests will increase the likelihood of success.

The variable *shared borders* is statistically significant in Model 2, indicating that IGOs that have more member states that are contiguous with the conflict state will be

more likely to reach at least a partial agreement. The other indicator that is significant is the refugees variables, which also suggests that more refugees to IGO member states will increase the likelihood of a mediated agreement. There are a couple of potential explanations for this finding. First, member states that receive refugees may be more determined to push the IGO to demand concessions from the disputants due to the costs that the conflict is putting on the surrounding region. Refugees can have a destabilizing effect on states due to the economic and security risks that can be associated with them, especially in regions that are already prone to conflict spillover and contagion. Second, if more IGO member states are receiving refugees, they may have more information regarding the disputants in the conflict. Since the refugees are able to get outside of the conflict zone, they may be able to spread more information that can be brought by the mediator to the negotiating table.

Another interesting finding is that the higher level of variance in IGO memberships between IGO members and the conflict state increases the likelihood of mediation occurrence and success. This is contradictory to the dispersion hypotheses, which indicates that having different levels of interests among member states is not necessarily a negative in terms of mediation. It is also important to note that IGO membership variance is different from *Refugees* and *Trade Change* in that it is trying to measure cultural norms, shared identities, and information between IGO members and the conflict state instead of tangible costs to the IGO members. This finding warrants further investigation into how norms and connections transfer between IGOs and impacts decisions.

The control variables, which account for the characteristics of the civil war,

perform as expected in all models as well. In both the selection and outcome phase, the variables conflict intensity, rebel strength, territorial conflict, another ongoing conflict, and mediation in the previous year are all statistically significant and positive, indicating that these conflict characteristics increase the likelihood of mediation occurrence and success. One interesting finding here is the distance the conflict is from the state capital is statistically significant and negative across all models, indicating that mediation occurrence and success by regional IGOs are less likely as the rebels approach the capital. One reason for this is that mediation may be less attractive to the disputants, especially the rebels if they are able to project their power against the state near their home.

Table 2.1: Bivariate Probit Analyses (Regional IGO Mediation)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Stage 1: Mediation Occurrence			
Shared Borders	0.559 (0.42)	0.805 (0.44)	0.52 (0.44)
Alliances	-0.062 (0.19)	0.026 (0.18)	-0.081 (0.19)
Common IOs (Median)	0.302 (0.44)		0.585 (0.4)
Refugees (Median)	0.584** (0.2)		0.584** (0.18)
Trade Change (Median)	0.001 (0)		0 (0)
Common IOs (SD)	3.403* (1.35)	3.216* (1.34)	
Refugees (SD)	0.095 (0.36)	0.434 (0.33)	
Trade Change (SD)	0 (0)	0 (0)	
Conflict Intensity	0.834*** (0.2)	0.859*** (0.22)	0.784*** (0.22)

(table continues)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Rebel Strength	0.429*** (0.11)	0.413*** (0.1)	0.455*** (0.11)
Post Cold War	0.029 (0.16)	0.08 (0.14)	0.039 (0.13)
Log Conflict-capital	-0.132* (0.05)	-0.117* (0.06)	-0.127* (0.06)
Another Ongoing Conflict	0.343* (0.15)	0.302* (0.15)	0.354* (0.15)
Territorial Conflict	0.532** (0.17)	0.556*** (0.17)	0.503** (0.16)
Duration	-0.032 (0.02)	-0.028 (0.02)	-0.027 (0.02)
Duration (sq)	0.001* (0)	0.001* (0)	0.001* (0)
Mediation Last Year	0.452 (0.26)	0.418 (0.26)	0.477 (0.26)
Outcome Mediation Last Year	-0.071 (0.11)	-0.07 (0.11)	-0.085 (0.11)
Constant	-3.407*** -0.56	-3.380*** -0.54	-3.309*** -0.57
Stage 2: Mediation Success			
Shared Borders	0.935* (0.43)	1.158** (0.44)	0.851 (0.72)
Alliances	-0.192 (0.26)	-0.099 (0.25)	-0.162 (0.27)
Common IOs (Median)	0.09 (0.61)		0.464 (1.2)
Refugees (Median)	0.656** (0.25)		0.560* (0.24)
Trade Change (Median)	0 (0)		-0.001 (0)
Common IOs (SD)	3.661* (1.67)	3.445 (2.24)	
Refugees (SD)	-0.16 (0.52)	0.228 (0.41)	
Trade Change (SD)	0 (0)	0 (0)	

(table continues)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Conflict Intensity	0.602** (0.21)	0.562* (0.25)	0.517* (0.22)
Rebel Strength	0.429*** (0.12)	0.405* (0.17)	0.454** (0.14)
Post Cold War	0.16 (0.25)	0.215 (0.27)	0.131 (0.29)
Log Conflict-capital	-0.230*** (0.07)	-0.219** (0.07)	-0.212** (0.07)
Another Ongoing Conflict	0.429* (0.2)	0.379 (0.24)	0.466 (0.3)
Territorial Conflict	0.558** (0.18)	0.548* (0.24)	0.503* (0.23)
Duration	-0.013 (0.02)	-0.011 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)
Duration (sq)	0.001 (0)	0.001 (0)	0.001 (0)
Mediation Last Year	0.752** (0.26)	0.692* (0.28)	0.759** (0.28)
Outcome Mediation Last Year	-0.312* (0.13)	-0.291* (0.13)	-0.319* (0.14)
Constant	-3.058*** (0.65)	-3.033*** (0.56)	-3.002*** (0.8)
N	2678	2678	2783

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001

2.7.2 UN Findings

The findings in Table 2.2 show the results of the bivariate probit analyses for UN mediation. The measures of interests are split into two categories for the UNSC, the P5 and the E10 members. The rationale for this is to account for the disproportionate power of the P5 members in terms of both resources and the veto power. Hypotheses 1 and 3, which argue that less variance in interests between member states will increase the likelihood of mediation occurrence and success, find minimal support. The variance Common IGO membership between the E10 members and the conflict has a

negative coefficient, indicating that higher levels of variance are negatively associated with mediation occurrence and mediated agreements. The reason why this is minimal evidence for the dispersion hypotheses is that the statistical significance is not consistent across models, and it is the only dispersion variable that has any significance across the models. However, this does warrant further investigation into the shared ideas and norms between members states and how their diplomatic relationships in other organizations impact their relationships and decision making in the UN.

The level of interest hypotheses (H2 and H4) find more support in the statistical models. In the case of P5 members, the results suggest that if more members have defense pacts with the warring state or have refugees from the state, the likelihood of mediation occurrence decreases. However, if there is a positive change in trade between the P5 members and the warring state, there is a higher change of mediation occurrence and at least a partial settlement. While the theory argued that negative trade change would have a stronger impact, the finding here may be a preemptive mood by the UNSC to protect their trade partners or investments. It also could be that the lags in yearly trade data do not account for the sudden changes in trade levels between states during a civil war, so what is being captured is that trade ties with disputants predict mediation occurrence and success.

While the P5 of the UNSC typically attract the most attention in conflict management research, there is one notable and interesting finding in regard to the E10 members. These results suggest that if more elected members of the UN Security Council have defense pacts with the warring state, the likelihood of mediation increases. There is also some evidence in Model 4 that civil warring states with alliances with more

E10 members will be more likely to encounter successful mediation. This supports the claim that E10 member states can influence UN decisions and actions.

One other notable finding in the UN analyses was the differences in how the control variables performed. Conflict intensity and previous mediation are still positive and statistically significant, but other variables such as rebel strength and territorial conflict are not significant. The discrepancies between these variables in Tables 1 and 2 indicate that some conflict characteristics are better at predicting regional IGO mediation than UN mediation. The one difference between the two analyses that was expected was the finding that UN mediation was more likely to occur in the post-Cold War era, which reflects the changing role of rivalries between the United States and Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Table 2.2: Bivariate Probit Analyses (UN Mediation)

	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
UN Mediation Occurrence			
P5 Shared Borders	0.087 (1.32)	-0.17 (1.34)	0.344 (1.2)
E10 Shared Borders	-2.398 (1.61)	-1.547 (1.61)	-2.601 (1.57)
P5 Alliances	-1.999* (0.89)	-2.109* (0.84)	-1.522 (0.86)
E10 Alliances	4.435*** (1.14)	3.907*** (1.17)	3.482** (1.13)
P5 Common IOs (Median)	-0.731 (1.59)		-0.4 (1.51)
E10 Common IOs (Median)	-0.977 (1.69)		-1.506 (1.37)
P5 Refugees (Median)	-0.602* (0.3)		-0.529 (0.27)
E10 Refugees (Median)	-0.009 (0.6)		0.003 (0.63)

(table continues)

	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
P5 Trade Change (Median)	0.007**		0.007**
	(0)		(0)
E10 Trade Change (Median)	-0.002		-0.002
	(0)		(0)
P5 Common IOs (Std. Deviation)	-1.462	-2.762	
	(2.79)	(2.51)	
E10 Common IOs (Std. Deviation)	-4.761	-6.950**	
	(2.59)	(2.47)	
P5 Refugees (Std. Deviation)	-0.374	-0.405	
	(0.48)	(0.47)	
E10 Refugees (Std. Deviation)	0.32	-0.184	
	(0.56)	(0.47)	
P5 Trade Change (Std. Deviation)	-0.001	0	
	(0)	(0)	
E10 Trade Change (Std. Deviation)	0	0	
	(0)	(0)	
Conflict Intensity	0.518*	0.501*	0.486*
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Rebel Strength	0.108	0.136	0.083
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Post Cold War	1.108***	0.979***	1.022***
	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.2)
Log Conflict-capital	0.167*	0.122	0.149
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Another Ongoing Conflict	-0.095	-0.03	-0.115
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Territorial Conflict	0.026	-0.076	0.093
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Duration	-0.063**	-0.055*	-0.066**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Duration (sq)	0.001	0.001	0.001*
	(0)	(0)	(0)
Mediation Last Year	1.040**	1.008***	1.136***
	(0.32)	(0.3)	(0.33)
Outcome Mediation Last Year	0.061	0.121	0.035
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Constant	-2.583***	-2.523***	-3.083***
	(0.64)	(0.65)	(0.62)

(table continues)

	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
UN Mediation Success			
P5 Shared Borders	-1.527 (2.72)	-4.986 (2.95)	-3.05 (3.17)
E10 Shared Borders	1.572 (2.08)	1.937 (2.39)	-0.072 (2.59)
P5 Alliances	-0.33 (1.17)	-0.281 (0.77)	0.675 (1.02)
E10 Alliances	5.224*** (1.59)	3.81 (2.22)	2.502 (1.34)
P5 Common IOs (Median)	-2.067 (2.17)		-1.892 (2.74)
E10 Common IOs (Median)	1.827 (1.97)		1.458 (3.05)
P5 Refugees (Median)	-0.488 (0.44)		-0.42 (0.33)
E10 Refugees (Median)	0.684 (0.59)		0.593 (0.6)
P5 Trade Change (Median)	0.011** (0)		0.010** (0)
E10 Trade Change (Median)	-0.001 (0)		-0.003 (0)
P5 Common IOs (Std. Deviation)	-3.534 (5.88)	-5.141 (5.28)	
E10 Common IOs (Std. Deviation)	-8.702*** (2.52)	-10.307* (4.4)	
P5 Refugees (Std. Deviation)	0.771 (0.67)	0.212 (0.89)	
E10 Refugees (Std. Deviation)	-0.191 (1.09)	-0.24 (0.69)	
P5 Trade Change (Std. Deviation)	-0.001 (0)	0 (0)	
E10 Trade Change (Std. Deviation)	-0.001 (0)	0 (0)	
Conflict Intensity	0.553 (0.3)	0.648 (0.35)	0.576* (0.28)
Rebel Strength	0.497* (0.24)	0.349 (0.27)	0.348 (0.2)

(table continues)

	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Post Cold War	0.503 (0.37)	0.536 (0.43)	0.948** (0.36)
Log Conflict-capital	0.194 (0.15)	0.164 (0.1)	0.091 (0.11)
Another Ongoing Conflict	0.264 (0.27)	0.368 (0.3)	0.242 (0.32)
Territorial Conflict	-0.337 (0.32)	-0.499* (0.25)	-0.297 (0.25)
Duration	-0.053 (0.03)	-0.054 (0.03)	-0.052 (0.03)
Duration (sq)	0.001 (0)	0.001 (0)	0.001 (0)
Mediation Last Year	1.133** (0.37)	0.804* (0.33)	1.206*** (0.34)
Outcome Mediation Last Year	0.178 (0.15)	0.294 (0.16)	0.118 (0.16)
Constant	-4.163*** (1.16)	-3.021*** (0.86)	-4.652*** (1.39)
N	1381	1381	1436

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001

2.8 Conclusion

The results of this study do support the initial claim that the interests of the member states in IGOs should be addressed in the mediation literature. IGOs are complex organizations, and researchers should consider the power dynamics between the member states. The differences in roles and abilities of the member states may either empower a state to pursue their interests through the IGO or to pursue their interests through other means. While not all of my hypotheses were supported, there is evidence that states outside the permanent five members of the Security Council can affect mediation policies and action.

There are several questions that future research on mediation can focus on.

First, what are the effects of individual state preferences on other forms of conflict management undertaken by IGOs and the UN, such as peacekeeping and peacebuilding? This could also account for the other tactics that the third parties use to deescalate conflict in the context of civil wars. Second, how does the theoretical argument in this paper apply interstate conflicts? Addressing interstate conflict in future research may clarify what IGO members interpret as interference with international peace and security and to see if IGOs and the UN are more reluctant to involve themselves in intrastate conflicts due to the question of state sovereignty. Each of these questions should be considered in future research within the conflict management literature.

CHAPTER 3

THIRD PARTY INTERESTS AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: PREDICTING PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

3.1 Introduction

As the Cold War came to an end, there was a drastic increase in the number of peace operations conducted by the United Nations. From 1988 to 1993, the United Nations (UN) conducted more peace operations in those five years than it had done in the previous forty years combined (Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin 2010, 93). In addition to the increased number of peace operations undertaken, the UN was also asked to take on more complex missions, which saw varying levels of success. However, even though there was a large increase in peace operations by both the UN and regional organizations, there were also several conflicts that all international organizations (IO) avoided. This is surprising given the UN's charter states that the UN is 'to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace' (UN Charter, Chapter I, Article 1). The purpose of the UN is clearly stated in their Charter, but why are not all conflicts deemed as threats to 'the peace'? Why would regional international organizations with similar principles also avoid peacekeeping in their respective corners of the world? In this study, I argue that IOs are motivated by the interests of their member states and that states are more likely to be motivated to act when there are greater threats to their well-being.

The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, I provide a summary of the existing peacekeeping literature. Then I elaborate on my theoretical argument that state interests are the motivating factors that prompt IOs to initiate peacekeeping missions. I

then test this argument empirically by creating a state-interest index score to develop a measure of IGO interest in civil wars. In the end, some IGOs depart from my theoretical expectations, which may be in part due to the model being unable to account for selection effects (Fortna 2004). However, when limiting the analysis to region IGOs, there is some support to suggest that state interests do impact the effectiveness of PKOs. More specifically, the geographic proximity of the regional IGO members has a pacifying effect on battle-related deaths.

3.2 Literature Review

There are currently fourteen active UN peacekeeping operations taking place on four different continents. While the UN is usually the primary supplier of peacekeeping operations, there are a variety of organizations that engage in peacekeeping efforts, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), African Union (AU), European Union (EU), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). However, the UN and other regional organizations have not always been as active in peacekeeping efforts. Before 1990, the UN was involved in under twenty PKOs, and in the post-Cold War era, the UN has partaken in over fifty PKOs (Sandler 2017). In the past 30 years, there has been both a rise in demand and supply for peacekeeping operations, both of which are attributed to the systemic changes that took place following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin 2010; Diehl and Balas 2014; Meiske and Ruggeri 2017). The increase in both supply and demand was a result of the increased number of conflicts in the former Soviet states, the willingness of UNSC members to use their own resources and troops to contribute to PKOs (Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin 2010).

There has been a shift in the kind of conflicts in which PKOs are deployed. In the early years of the UN, PKOs were deployed to interstate conflicts, such as the conflict between Israel and its many neighbors and the conflict between India and Pakistan. However, interstate conflicts after WWII were becoming increasingly rare, and intrastate conflict began to rise drastically in the mid-1970s (Sandler 2017). As the number of intrastate conflicts rose, so did the amount of attention they received from the international community. PKOs in intrastate conflicts face a variety of challenges that impact both the costs and implementation of PKOs. PKOs in intrastate conflicts are tasked with more than drawing a ceasefire line between disputants because both the government and the rebels reside in the same state, and the civilian population is at much higher risk of being targeted in terrorist violence or being caught in the crossfire between disputants. This distinct challenge forced providers of PKOs to reconsider their approaches in intrastate conflicts.

In addition to the increased use of PKOs, there has also been a change in the types of missions PKOs are tasked with. There are several different kinds of PKOs, which are grouped into four broad categories. These categories include monitoring and observer missions, traditional peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peace enforcement (Sandler 2017). Monitoring and observing missions are often implemented to oversee and report ceasefire violations. Traditional peacekeeping is different than monitoring missions in that there are armed troops that are in place to enforce and maintain ceasefires between disputing parties. These missions can include a variety of tactics, such as disarmament, demobilization, and the reintegration of rebel forces in the context of civil conflicts. Peacebuilding missions are a bit more complex and broader in

general. Peacebuilding demands stronger commitments to the disputing parties and often requires more time and resources. Generally, peacebuilding activities include the establishment of free elections, the rule of law, and judicial and legislative branches of government. Lastly, there are peace enforcement operations, which involve the active use of military forces to stop hostilities between the warring parties (Sandler 2017).

While these four categories imply that PKOs have different tasks, these are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, missions that require peace enforcement are often followed by peacebuilding and nation-building efforts (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). PKOs are traditionally thought of as monitoring ceasefires and reporting violations. However, IGOs during the post-Cold War period have been more explicit in their mandates and will often allow more direct involvement and enforcement from the personnel that are deployed. Getting and maintaining a stable peace in the context of a civil war often requires a multidimensional effort that includes humanitarian aid, disarmament of the rebels, and some level of peace agreement enforcement in the case of negotiated settlements.

3.3 The Onset and Effects of Peacekeeping

Prior academic work has shown that PKOs have mixed effects in conflicts. Fortna (2004) notes that prior research had found that the presence of peacekeepers increases the duration of peace (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001), that only certain types of PKOs improve peace duration (Doyle and Sambanis 2000), and that there are no positive associations between PKOs and peace duration. However, much of the research was finding mixed results based on selection bias and overlooking the fact that PKOs are usually implemented in the most difficult conflicts (Fortna 2004). There are

several studies that discuss when PKOs are likely to be deployed. Beardsley and Schmidt (2012) argue that UN missions are deployed due to the private interests of the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council, but they also find evidence that the UN also responds to the level of crisis severity. Hultman (2013) finds that UN missions are more likely to be initiated when there is violence against civilian populations. Others have also found that states that are suffering costs, such as an influx in refugee inflows, from the ongoing conflict are going to be more likely to support and contribute to PKOs (Uzonyi 2015).

The effects of peacekeeping have been long debated in the literature as well. Earlier work on the topic found that outside intervention in civil wars may reduce the level of hostility among warring sides (Regan 1996). However, Regan (2002) finds that the presence of neutral intervenors can prolong the duration of intrastate wars. Regan argues that this finding can be the result of one of two things. First, his choice of neutral intervenors in his analysis, such as IGOs, actually have preferences in the conflict. Second, neutral intervenors lack the ability to convince the disputants that stopping fighting is in their own best interests, which future research argues as well (e.g., Kydd 2003). Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel (1996) find that UN intervention of any kind in an international conflict was no better than no intervention in preventing future militarized interstate crises. However, it is argued that these findings may be the result of their standard for success, which was no militarized conflict within ten years of UN involvement (Sandler 2017). Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild (2001) find that conflicts that reach settlements with a third-party enforcer present, such as the UN, have a better chance of success, which is measured as a peace that is maintained for five years.

While the standard of 5 years of no conflict is still a high standard of success, it understates the effectiveness of PKOs in relation to their other goals. As mentioned earlier, PKOs are tasked with more than enforcing peace agreements. Other measures of success, such as reduced battle-related deaths or reduced violence against civilians, may be better suited for capturing the de-escalation of conflict instead of a rigid dichotomous measure (e.g., Beardsley, Cunningham, and White 2019)

Scholars have also noted that to understand the effectiveness of PKOs, it is important to consider the selection bias (Fortna 2004, 2008). PKOs are not applied to cases of war randomly, and many of the conflicts where PKOs take place have common characteristics that need to be taken into account before studying their effectiveness (Fortna 2004). PKOs are more often deployed in conflicts that have experienced prior interventions by a major power, earlier interventions by IOs, and if the country does not have an alliance with a major power (Mullenbach 2005). Fortna also finds that UN PKOs were not dispatched in states that experienced a conflict that ended in a victory or a signed peace treaty (2004) and that high-casualty intrastate conflicts were more likely to have a PKO (2008). In other words, PKOs are more likely to be deployed in states that are more likely to experience conflict recurrence, such as conflicts that ended in stalemates. In fact, Fortna (2004) finds that there are no instances of multidimensional UN PKOs in conflict states that had a clear victory by either side.

In addition to addressing the selection bias in PKO deployment, it is also important to acknowledge that there is a multitude of ways to measure the effectiveness of PKOs. Most studies focus on one aspect of PKO effectiveness, such as peace duration (e.g., Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild

2001), reduced battle-related deaths (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2014), or reduced civilian casualties (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013). However, other scholars, such as Diehl and Druckman (2010), have argued that measuring PKO success with a single criterion may be problematic for a couple of reasons. First, not all PKOs have the same mission. Therefore, a single criterion across all PKOs may not accurately depict whether PKOs are effective. Second, while some missions may not be successful at eliminating conflict, they still may be effective in other areas, such as reducing the level of intensity in the conflict or violence against civilians.

While prior studies on peacekeeping have provided the field with insight as to how PKOs may impact conflict, many of the studies have been limited in scope. Many studies focus on one type of PKO, often focusing on the UN (e.g., Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel 1996; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013, 2014). If studies do include all types of PKOs from global IOs, regional IOs, and coalitions of states, they are often treated similarly and do not take into consideration the characteristics that may influence both the onset and effectiveness of PKOs from any of the specific actors. However, this fails to address how IOs make decisions, which is another selection process that matters in determining where PKOs are deployed. The role of the member states in IOs, outside of the UN Security Council's permanent five members (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012), are not considered in the literature, and it is the member states that determine how and where PKOs are deployed. The remainder of this paper addresses these concerns with a more robust theory regarding how state preferences influence PKOs led by IOs

3.4 Theory

Peacekeeping operations are costly endeavors, which has created a demand for peacekeeping that far outweighs the supply available in the international community. Because international actors have finite resources, they must be strategic in choosing when and where to intervene. This is true for both state-conducted peacekeeping operations as well as operations that are carried out by IOs, such as the UN or the African Union (AU). Before discussing the role of IOs in the decision-making process of PKOs, it is necessary first to establish why states get involved in conflict management. Although conflict management tactics have been carried out more frequently by IOs since the end of the Cold War, state motivations need to be considered in conflict management processes because they influence an IO's decision to intervene in foreign conflicts. While IO charters typically outline the instances in which the organization can intervene in the conflict, any single organization's deployment of peacekeeping forces is a rare phenomenon. For example, in the Peace and Security Council of the African Union protocols, they are to "promote peace, security and stability in Africa ... anticipate and prevent conflicts. In circumstances where conflicts have occurred, the Peace and Security Council shall have the responsibility to undertake peace-making and peacebuilding functions for the resolution of these conflicts." However, the African Union does not send peacekeepers to all intrastate conflicts, indicating that the charter may be more of a guide rather than a clear mandate for where peacekeeping goes and where it does not. One explanation for this inconsistency is that member states have different interests in the conflict state.

3.4.1 Third Party State Interests in Civil Wars

Interests motivate states to act. While this is not a controversial statement, there is often a debate over what specific interests motivate states to participate in conflict management efforts in foreign civil wars. In general, these interests can be summarized as states looking for opportunistic influence, such as affecting regime change or gaining access to resources, or reducing threats to their security (Kathman 2010, 2011; Rost and Greig 2011). It is often assumed that state decisions are motivated by their interests in the international arena. It seems irrational for states to become involved in a situation that is not in their interest. In the case of a state's decision to become involved in a foreign civil war, there are several potential factors that could prompt a state's action. Shared economic ties, security concerns, military alliances, and the prospects of continued interactions with the state experiencing the conflict could all motivate a third-party state to seek a take on a role of a conflict manager.

Civil wars do not occur in vacuums, and the conflicts often negatively impact other states (Kathman 2010). Civil wars pose security concerns not only for the conflict state but also for the countries that are in the same geographical region as the conflict, especially those that share borders with the state experiencing the conflict. States that share borders are typically more interested in the other's affairs due to the increased exposure and repeated interactions between the states. States that border civil wars are going to be interested in the events of the conflict for several reasons. First, the state may be concerned about the possibility of the conflict spilling over into their own territory. Even if the conflict is not approaching the physical border between the states, the state is also aware of the contagion effects that accompany civil conflict. In other

words, civil wars have been shown to cluster in geographical regions, and the spread of violent groups or the ideas of revolution are able to spread rapidly. States are concerned with both the spillover and contagion effects, and they typically increase military expenditures when bordering civil conflicts (Phillips 2014).

In addition to the potential spillover and contagion effects of civil wars, civil wars have a destabilizing effect not only in the warring state but the region as a whole. Civil wars cause regional instability and disrupt trade not only for the disputants but also for neighboring states (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Gleditsch 2007). States lose valuable trading partners if they border a civil conflict because trade partners from other regions see the relationship or investment as too risky. Incentivizing neighboring states to then advocate for international intervention to help bring stability to the region.

States from other regions can also be negatively impacted if they trade partners with the conflict state or the with others in the surrounding area. The greater the economic burden placed upon the third party state, the more likely they will advocate for action to stabilize the conflict region, such as a peacekeeping mission. Peacekeeping missions can provide stability for states and contain conflicts in smaller areas, which can help protect areas of economic interest, such as ports or oil fields. Foreign states who rely on exports, such as oil, from conflict regions want to protect their trade partners and investments (Greig and Regan 2008). This concern for a loss of assets and the need to protect their investments can be a strong motivator for states to advocate and contribute (e.g., troops or economic aid) to peacekeeping efforts.

While the fear of conflict spillover and economic downturn are strong motivators for international intervention, states are also more inclined to offer help to states with

similar traits, such as geographic location, ethnic ties, or shared cultural norms. States that have repeated interactions and perceive themselves and the civil warring state as more interdependent are going to be far more motivated to advocate for peacekeeping efforts. States that have little to no interaction are going to be less likely to have the knowledge or incentive to support foreign intervention in any form in foreign civil wars. However, states that share similar spheres of influence as the civil warring state, such as common IGOs and geographic proximity, are more likely to have knowledge of the conflict and understand the impact that the conflict has on the international community.

While there are several motivations for states to advocate or supply peacekeepers to foreign civil wars, there are also costs associated with acting. To better understand how the interests of individual member states impact IO decision-making, we must first examine why acting through IOs may be preferable to acting alone in the case of PKOs.

3.4.2 Achieving State Goals in International Organizations

States are self-interested, but there are several factors that contribute to their decision to advocate or participate in peacekeeping operations. While states want to protect their interests abroad, they also have to consider the costs associated with peacekeeping missions. In general, third party involvement in civil wars brings reputational, political, and resource costs for the third party. Peacekeeping is a costly endeavor in each of these categories for a multitude of reasons.

The reputational and political costs associated with peacekeeping are closely tied to the charter of the mission and the overall effectiveness of the operation. For example, in the Bosnian War, the UN undertook a peacekeeping operation

(UNPROFOR), and the operation itself was overseen by the United States, France, Britain, and Russia. Before the peacekeeping operation was expanded to the conflict in Bosnia, the Russians had offered diplomatic support to the Bosnian Serbs, who shared strong linkages to the former Yugoslavian government. This explicit support for one of the disputants limited the range that Russia was willing to negotiate in terms of the role the UN peacekeeping forces would play in the conflict. The result was the UN security council agreed not to use force against the Bosnian Serbs, which severely limited the peacekeeping force's ability to gain leverage in the conflict. The decision led to a disproportional amount of supplies going to the Bosnian Serbs, roughly one-third more than that of the Bosnian Muslims, as well as UN forces unintentionally aiding Bosnian Serb siege efforts by preventing civilians from leaving Sarajevo (Maass 1996, 167-170).

It can be argued that the ties and interests of the permanent members (P5) of the UNSC prevented the peacekeeping operation from being effective, but the operation was viewed as a UN failure instead of the blame falling to the member states. The UN was viewed as ineffective, not the United States or Russia, which illustrates the benefits for member states to act through IGOs. States that carry out peacekeeping operations outside of IGOs are going to be less able to share the blame or responsibilities for any perceived failures in a peacekeeping operation. PKOs that are deployed by IGOs provide political cover for the member states. If a PKO is seen as a failure in the international community or domestically, the state leadership can point to the UN's bureaucracy, which provides an outlet for the blame that is not available to state lead PKOs.

Another benefit of supporting a PKO through an IGO instead of acting alone is

the ability to share the costs of the operation. There are two primary costs associated with PKOs, financial and troops. In addition to these costs, there is a political cost associated with deploying one's own military personnel. For example, the United States government is looked at more critically by its own citizens when U.S. troops are deployed on a mission than when the U.S. donates money to the UN for another country to send their troops under the UN flag as blue helmets. Initially, UN PKO expenses were financed through the regular budget and voluntary contributions. However, this practice proved to be too dependent on voluntary contributions and encouraged some member states to be free riders and gain the benefits of PKOs (e.g., increased stability, reduced conflict) while paying less than other member states (Sandler 2017; Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu 1998). The UN General Assembly attempted to address this problem in 1973 by establishing peacekeeping assessment accounts, which assign all UN members a fixed share of the annual peacekeeping costs. The amount each member contributes is determined by a few factors. For example, the P5 of the UNSC pay significantly more than their budget assessment, the wealthier and more developed countries who are not a part of the P5 pay their regular share, and the remaining members pay significantly less than their budget assessment, which is dependent on the member's per capita income (Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Shimizu 2009).

In addition to the financial costs of PKOs, there are costs in terms of troops and personnel who are deployed to conflict regions. The money allotted for troop reimbursement to the states that supply peacekeeping forces impacts states differently. In developed states, the reimbursement offered for peacekeeping forces is far less than

the cost of keeping the personnel properly equipped, trained, and paid. On the other hand, the same amount of money per troop could be an incentive to contribute a large number of troops for less developed countries. For example, the United States in May of 2021 had 31 personnel deployed in UN PKOs, most of which were senior-level officers, mission experts. Meanwhile, Bangladesh was the largest contributor of forces in the same month, with over 6,500 personnel deployed to various UN missions. One reason why the Bangladesh government would be more willing to send military personnel and supplies to UN missions is that they are compensated \$1,410 (USD) per month for every troop that is deployed on a mission, and that reimbursement far exceeds the average monthly income of a Bangladesh soldier. The adjusted annual net income per capita in Bangladesh was just under \$1,800 (USD) in 2019, which is the equivalent of \$150 (USD) a month. In addition to the reimbursement subsidizing the military, they also often receive training from military advisors from more experienced armies or developed states, which can help modernize a military at a lower cost to the state.

There are several incentives for states to act through IOs. However, it does come at a cost, especially to the major powers. States that would otherwise have the resources to intervene outside IOs may have to make concessions in the decision-making process, both in terms of where to deploy PKOs and in terms of the specifics in the mandates. This can make achieving specific objectives for the third party state difficult because they would need the approval of others when acting through an IO. Although states with more resources have an incentive to act on their own, it is still seen as a risk. Acting alone can impact the government's domestic reputation and

international reputation, which makes justifying future actions more difficult. Therefore, the costs of acting alone are often seen as too steep for most states, and they instead opt to act through international organizations, which allow for states to share the burden of costly peacekeeping missions. While the incentives to act through IOs are similar for members in the UN and regional organizations, there are some important differences that need to be considered.

3.4.3 The UNSC and Peacekeeping

The UN is one of many international organizations that establish PKOs. While there are a few ways for the UN to establish PKOs, what makes the UN unique is that most of the routes to establishing a PKO go through the UNSC. The UN Secretary-General is often a central figure in peacekeeping efforts because their office is responsible for generating a report. The report generated by the UN Secretary-General's office is related to the agenda for the current UN session, or it is a report called for by a UN resolution. The Secretary-General's report is often the result of UNSC resolution, and the Secretary-General is appointed by the UNSC, which illustrates the importance of the UNSC members. Although other IGOs have security councils, the UNSC is distinct in that it has both permanent and elected members. The five permanent members (P5) consist of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Russia, and China, which have remained consistent since the beginning of the organization. The ten elected members (E10) serve two-year terms and are representative of different regions throughout the world. There are five elected from African and Asian states, one from an Eastern European state, two from Latin American states, and two from Western European and other states. Another factor that sets the

UN apart from other IGOs is the scope, both in terms of its global reach and its mission. The UN's global reach is especially important when discussing the implementation of PKOs because it is the only organization that has both the jurisdiction and the potential to pool the resources necessary to establish a PKO in any member state.

The differences in power and influence between the P5 and the E10 members are quite clear. In addition to having a permanent seat on the Security Council, the P5 members also have veto power that can be used to stall or derail any resolution put before the council. This meant that the P5 members, especially during the Cold War, had to sanction all actions in terms of conflict management. There are rare occasions that conflicts had been brought before the General Assembly to initiate mediation or PKOs, but these are exceptions to the well-established norms of actions going through the Security Council. Another point to make a note of regarding the P5 members is their overall influence in world affairs outside of the UN. The P5 states have a wealth of strength and resources that many other members do not have, and this affords them the ability to intervene, support combatants, or provide humanitarian aid in foreign civil wars outside the context of the UN. Therefore, it is essential to take into consideration the interests of the P5 because of their unique characteristics, both in terms of their veto power and their individual resources. The ability to veto and their disproportionate contributions to the UN gives the P5 members a great deal of leverage with regards to PKO deployments and the specifics that are included in the PKO mandates.

The influence of the E10 members in the PKO resolutions is more subtle than that of the P5 members. This is largely due to their limited time on the Security Council, two-year terms, and their lack of veto power. However, the E10 members do have a

few features that impact UNSC decision-making. First, since the E10 do serve short terms on the council, there are five newly elected members of the Security Council every year, which brings a variety of preferences, resources, and information to the council. For example, in 2021, there was an election for two seats open for Africa, one for the Asia-Pacific, one for Latin America and the Caribbean, and one for the Eastern European group. The two newly elected members from Africa are Gabon and Ghana, which will replace Niger and Tunisia beginning in 2022. Tunisia has more ties with the other states who were impacted by the Arab Spring movements in the 2010s due to its location on the northern tip of Africa. However, Gabon has more ties with the states who have experienced conflict in Central Africa, such as Congo, due to their close proximity. These ties can be positive, such as defense pacts and trade, or they can be negative, such as an influx of refugees from the conflict state. Regardless, a state nearby a conflict is more likely to have a vested interest in supporting stability in a nearby conflict state. Even in the case of regimes having negative views of one another, states are not likely to risk their own security to see a regime falter.

The E10 members are also more likely to have shared ties with states experiencing civil wars because of the regions they represent. Most intrastate conflicts take place in the global south, which is where the majority of elected members are located. Their proximity to the conflict regions means that they have more opportunities to interact with the conflict state, whether diplomatically through regional IGOs or through state-state interactions. The increased interactions with the conflict state give the E10 members an opportunity to gather and share information with the UNSC. With more information, the UNSC gets a clearer picture of the severity of the conflicts and

potentially gets a better sense of the factors that contributed to the outbreak and the continuation of violence in the state. As the UN gathers more intel about the conflict, they can determine if a PKO is a necessary step in their conflict management strategy. The information provided by E10 members can help the UNSC determine if a peacekeeping or a peace enforcement mission is necessary for the conflict state. With more information about the conflict, the UNSC can tailor the PKO mandate to the conflict, which may increase the UNSC's confidence in that course of action and have a positive impact on the PKOs effectiveness.

H1a: The occurrence of a UN peacekeeping mandate is positively associated with the overall level of interests of the P5 members of the UNSC.

H1b: The occurrence of a UN peacekeeping mandate is positively associated with the overall level of interests of the E10 members of the UNSC.

Higher levels of interest should be associated with a greater desire of the members of the UNSC to achieve peace or stability in the conflict state. However, UN resolutions can be controversial, and they need a consensus amongst all the P5 members and 9 of 15 all members. The need for broader support means that if relations are highly conflicted between the P5 members regarding policy toward the civil war state, there is the possibility of a unilateral veto by one of the members. In addition to the P5, at least four E10 members need to agree to the resolution, so the less controversy in their relationships with the conflict state, the more likely the members will support the resolution.

Varying levels of interest also impact the effectiveness of the PKO mandates. When the UNSC member states have competing interests in a conflict state, the resolutions can become confusing and contradictory. For example, in the early 2000s,

the UNSC adopted over fifty resolutions on the Ivory Coast. The numerous resolutions stemmed from the competing demands of the international community, but more specifically, the opposing views on the conflict within the UNSC (Schori 2014). The multiple resolutions also created issues with allocating the necessary material, financial, and human resources to carry out the various conflict management tasks, including PKOs. While the conflicting interests of the UNSC members should make PKO deployments less likely, there are some instances where PKOs are still deployed, such as the Ivory Coast and Bosnia. The issue is in these cases that the divided members in the UNSC attempt to build a mandate that does not run afoul of what any member will accept. However, to get an acceptable mandate, it tends to create mandates that are less well-developed, which means the mandate is not tailored to the specific conflict, which reduces its effectiveness. Having a more united UNSC in terms of opinions and interests in foreign civil wars should reduce miscommunication and help with the gathering of the necessary resources to implement an effective PKO.

H2: When there is less variance of interests amongst UNSC members, the more effective UN Peacekeeping will be.

3.4.4 Regional IGOs and Peacekeeping

Since the late 1980s, regional IGOs have been responsible for about half of PKOs (Greig, Owsiak, and Diehl 2019). However, PKOs conducted by regional IGOs have received less attention than the UN (e.g., Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013; Uzonyi 2015). Much of the lack of attention can be attributed to the complicated relationship between regional IGOs and the UN. While chapter VIII of the UN Charter details the arrangement the UNSC has with regional IGOs, there is often tension between the UNSC and the regional actors. Article 52

states, “the Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlements of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.” In Article 53, there is a clause that forbids any enforcement action by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council. The relationship detailed in the UN charter points to the UNSC as being the predominant actor in PKOs, but there is some evidence to suggest otherwise.

While the UNSC requires regional organizations to report to them, there is also a movement in various IGOs to regionalize conflict management. For example, former AU Commissioner for Peace and Security Said Djinnit stated, “Africans cannot ... watch the tragedies developing in the continent and say it is the UN’s responsibility or somebody else’s responsibility” (Schori 2014, 176). The motivation for these movements comes from a general lack of faith in the UNSC in the developed world. In Africa, the failure of the UN to have a meaningful response in Rwanda and a protracted conflict in Angola, there were some questions of the UN’s ability to properly respond to conflicts in Africa. The change in attitude in Africa can be seen in the difference between the OAU and the AU’s charters. The OAU’s charter did not allow for intervention in a member state, and the organization’s legal framework made it difficult to raise funds necessary to enact meaningful PKOs. Once the AU was formalized in 2001, there was a new legal framework that allowed for the IGO to intervene in member states in the case of international crimes or when members request intervention (Sharpe 2017). The change in the charter allowed for the AU to take more direct and

meaningful action in Africa, and this spread to the sub-regional IGOs, such as ECOWAS.

Regional IGOs lack the vast resources of the UN, but they do have several distinct advantages when dealing with local conflicts. Regional IGOs have more local knowledge of the conflict, the actors involved, and the terrain itself. In addition to their local knowledge, they have equipment that is adapted to local environments. Regional IGOs also have the ability to reach decisions on deployment and terms quicker than the UNSC due to the lack of a unilateral veto power and the greater likelihood of common interests among the members. The ability to make quicker decisions and their closer proximity to the conflict allow for regional IGOs to intervene in the earlier stages of conflict and take preventative actions to keep the conflicts from escalating (Wallenstein and Heldt 2008). Regional IGOs are also going to typically respond to conflicts in member states within the region, which means there are more incentives for the members to address the conflict before it gets out of hand. Earlier responses to the conflict provide stability, which would prevent the negative regional effects of the larger, less controlled conflicts. The combination of a greater number of interested states and the ability for regional IGOs to act promptly can greatly impact the effectiveness of their PKOs. More interested actors are likely to establish credible commitments to the warring parties, which is crucial for promoting stability within a conflict region. While not all regional powers will always have the same interests in a conflict, however, one can expect that those similar interests are more likely to be present in regional organizations than in the UN.

H3: Regional IGO peacekeeping is positively associated with the overall level of interests of the IGO's member states.

H4: When there is less variance of interests amongst IGO members, the more effective their PKO will be.

3.5 Research Design

In this chapter, I use monthly data of African intrastate armed conflicts from 1989 to 2008, which is taken from the Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) (Sundber and Merleander 2013) and the Third Party Peacekeeping Missions Dataset (Mullenbach 2017). To test the four hypotheses, I build two different datasets, one to test the UN hypotheses and the other to test the regional IGO hypotheses. The unit of analysis in the UN PKO dataset is conflict month and has 7,353 conflict months. The unit of analysis for the regional IGO dataset is a bit more complex. Since I am looking at the relationship between the IGO members and the conflict state, I have to use an IGO-conflict-month unit of analysis, and I limit my sample to relevant IGO-conflict state dyads. An IGO is considered relevant in the dyad if the state in question is a member of the IGO. This means that the analysis is limited to regional IGOs in Africa that have provided peacekeeping at least once between 1989 to 2008, including the AU (formerly OAU), CEMAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, and the SADC. The AU is considered relevant in each state because every conflict state in the data is a member of the AU.

3.5.1 Dependent Variables

There are two primary dependent variables in this study. The first dependent variable is *PKO onset*, which is taken from Mullenbach (2017). PKO onset is a dichotomous measure that is coded as 1 for the first month of a new PKO initiated by an IGO. The months following the PKO onset are dropped from the onset analyses because the factors that cause a PKO to enter into the first month of the PKO are not

the same factors that drive the process of opting into future months or years of the operation. In other words, once a PKO has started, the decision to maintain the PKO is related to the original decision to opt into peacekeeping and what subsequently happens as a result of the PKO's presence.

The second dependent variable is *battle-related deaths*, which is used to measure the PKO's effectiveness in deescalating the conflict. This variable is taken from replication data from Beardsley et al. (2019). The variable in their dataset is based on the Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon (2014) measure of monthly counts of battle-related deaths in a government-rebel conflict dyad. To obtain monthly battle-related deaths, Hultman et al. (2014) use the UCDP GED dataset, and they aggregate the dyad level counts of battle-related deaths to the conflict month. The variable ranges from 0 to 9793 monthly battle deaths.

3.5.2 Independent Variables

The focus of this chapter is on how state interests impact an IGO's decision to provide peacekeeping for an intrastate conflict. To measure state interests in IGOs, I use five indicators to measure the strength and dispersion of interests among IGO members. The indicators are shared borders with the civil warring state, defense pacts, refugees from the conflict state, trade changes, and common IGO memberships between the IGO member and the conflict state. I use the dispersion of these five indicators because it gives insight as to how the conflict impacts the relationships that differ among the IGO member states with the conflict state. If there is greater dispersion among these interests in an IGO, there is likely to be less motivation for the IGO members to pursue action through the IGO because they will have to make more

compromises to achieve their goals. However, if the dispersion is smaller, one can expect to see more cohesion amongst the member states, which will create more specified mandates or resolutions regarding the conflict with fewer contradicting interests. A couple of examples an IGO's dispersion of interests interfering with effective IGO mandates and PKOs are the UN's conflict management efforts in the Bosnian civil war and the Ivory Coast.

The first two indicators are based on dichotomous measures between the IGO members and the conflict state. Shared Borders is a variable taken from the Correlate of War (COW) Direct Contiguity (3.2) dataset (Stinnet et al. 2002). The measure indicates the percentage of member states who share a direct land border with the civil warring state. The second dichotomous measure is defense pacts, which is taken from COW's Formal Alliances (4.1) dataset (Gibler 2009). Defense pacts is also a measure of the percentage of states within the IGO that have an active defense pact with the state experiencing the civil war.

The remaining indicators of IGO interests are based on continuous variables. To capture the IGO members' economic interest in the conflict, I use a measure of the percentage trade change between the IGO member and the conflict state. I use trade change instead of overall trade to capture how the conflict is negatively or positively impacting the member state's trade relationship with the civil warring state, and I use percentage change to prevent states with larger economies and more trade from completely canceling out the member states with smaller economies. The trade data is taken from COW's Dyadic Trade (4.0) dataset (Barbieri, Keschk, and Pollins 2009). Data for the refugees variable is taken from the United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees (UNHCR). Specifically, I use the variable labeled “Refugees (incl. refugee-like situations),” which accounts for the total number of people who have been forced to leave the conflict state and relocate to the IGO member state in a given year. Last, I measure the percentage of common IGO memberships between the IGO member state and the conflict state. The data for common IGOs is taken from COW’s Intergovernmental Organizations (3.0) dataset.

To build the IGO strength and dispersion indicators, I begin by creating a member state – conflict state dyad for each of the indicators. I then collapse the data by the conflict state, IGO members, and year, resulting in an IGO-conflict state dyad year for each observation. In the collapsed dataset, I have both the median observation and the standard deviation for each IGO-conflict state dyad year for the continuous variables (trade change, refugees, and common IGO memberships), and the mean for dichotomous indicators to give the percentage of states in the IGO who share the interest (shared borders and defense pacts).

I use the median as a measure of an IGOs strength or overall level of interest. I use the median instead of the mean to avoid having the value skewed by high or low values for the continuous variables. While extreme high or low values can indicate individual state interests, this chapter argues that a single state’s interests will not predict an IGO’s decision to enter into peacekeeping with a conflict state. Instead, it will be the result of a consensus amongst the member states, so using a measure of central tendency that is less susceptible to outliers is a better representation of general levels of interests among the “average” member state. To measure the dispersion of interests

among IGO members, I use the standard deviation of each indicator for the given IGO-conflict state dyad year.

3.5.3 Control Variables

In addition to the IGO interests, based on the individual IGO member states, there are several other factors that contribute to the onset and effectiveness of PKOs, which I control for in the analyses. The most important things to control for when studying the occurrence and effectiveness of peacekeeping are the characteristics of the conflict and the history of the disputants with conflict management efforts. I use four measures to control for conflict severity. First, I include a lag of the battle-related deaths variable that is used for the dependent variable in the effectiveness models. Second, I include the relative strength of the rebel group to the government, which is a 5 point scale, with a 1 indicating a weak rebel group and a 5 indicating a rebel group that is much stronger than the government. The rebel strength variable originates from the Non-state actors (NSA) data (Cunningham et al. 2013). I include a variable that accounts for the number of total rebel groups active in the conflict month, which also comes from the NSA dataset. The number of rebel groups is expected to impact both the onset and effectiveness of PKOs because multiple rebel groups are usually associated with more intense conflicts. With more rebel groups being active, there are more opportunities for violence escalation, which can make the prospects of deploying a PKO daunting and complicate previously deployed PKOs because they may have to deal with controlling multiple belligerents simultaneously (Beardsley et al. 2019; Cunningham et al. 2013). I also control for the conflict duration, which is coded in conflict months, to test for the ripeness of the conflict.

Another important indicator of PKO occurrence is the disputants having a history of prior mediation attempts (Grieg and Rost 2013). States experiencing a civil war are more likely to agree to a PKO if they have already engaged in other forms of conflict management. Therefore, I control for the conflict's history with mediation, using a dichotomous variable to indicate when a conflict has experienced at least one mediation effort in the last six months. This data is taken from Beardsley et al. (2019). Lastly, I control for the prior ceasefire agreements between the disputants. This is coded as 1 if the conflict had an agreed upon a ceasefire in the prior month.

3.5.4 Methodology

To test the four hypotheses presented in this chapter, I utilize two different statistical methods. To predict the occurrence of PKOs, I employ a rare events logit due to the nature of the dependent variable. In the regional IGO models, there are 26 occurrences of a new PKO out of 7,165 IO conflict months. In the UN models, I focus on UN mandates rather than UN PKOs for two reasons. First, there are only ten occurrences of UN PKOs in the dataset, while there are 30 observations of UN mandates occurring out of 4,875 observations. Second, UN mandates include missions that are headed by the UN, regional IGOs, and states, but the fact that there is a mandate suggests that the UNSC has an interest in how the PKO is carried out.

To test the impact of IGO members' interests on the effectiveness of PKOs, I use an OLS model due to the continuous nature of the dependent variable, which is monthly battle-related deaths. I also limit the sample for PKO effectiveness models to only conflict months with a PKO, leaving 410 observations in the regional IGO models and 782 in the UN models. In both the rare events logit models and the OLS models, I

cluster the standard errors on the conflict to account for the impact of the conflict's history on future observations.

3.6 Results

3.6.1 UN Results

Table 3.1 reports the findings for the UN analyses. The left column reports the independent variables, and the dependent variables are listed under the model number. Models 1 and 2 report the results of the UN mandate tests, which test Hypotheses 1a and 1b. The results of these tests do not support the hypotheses, which state that the overall level of interests would be positively associated with UN PKO mandates. Instead, the results from Models 1 and 2 reports that the best indicators of UN PKO mandates are the conflict characteristics. Both Models 1 and 2 report positive coefficients for battle-related deaths, which supports prior arguments that UN PKOs are deployed to the most difficult cases (Fortna 2004). In addition to the conflict intensity, prior mediation attempts and ceasefire agreements are also positively associated with UN PKO mandates.

Models 3 and 4 in Table 3.1 test Hypothesis 2, which states that UN PKOs will be more effective if there is less variance or more symmetry between the UNSC members' interests in the conflict state. Results in Models 3 and 4 do not support the hypothesis, and the models do not perform well as a whole. This is largely due to the models' inability to account for the selection effects. Fortna (2004) argues that UN PKOs opt into the most difficult of cases, which explains the inconsistent results. Another contributing factor could be that while there are 782 conflict months in the analysis, there are only 6 conflicts in which UN PKOs were deployed in Africa between 1989-

2008. While there is no support for the UN hypotheses in this analysis, the study itself does warrant further investigation.

Table 3.1: UN Peacekeeping Results

	Model 1 UN Mandate	Model 2 UN Mandate	Model 3 BRD Counts	Model 4 BRD Counts
BRD (t-1)	0.004***	0.004***	0.167**	0.115
	(0)	(0)	(0.05)	(0.09)
Population (ln)	0.075	0.168	-12.634	8.957
	(0.22)	(0.32)	(17.06)	(12.96)
Rebel Strength	0.482	0.632	-52.043	-11.261
	(0.38)	(0.34)	(29.85)	(14.68)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.159*	0.081	-10.806	-7.682
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(8.71)	(6.89)
Ceasefire	2.242**	2.234***	107.008	76.631
	(0.76)	(0.63)	(53.68)	(37.73)
Mediation Legacy	2.563***	2.973***	-18.259	-0.427
	(0.59)	(0.56)	(20.62)	(15.55)
Conflict Duration	-0.014*	-0.004	0.114	0.174
	(0.01)	(0)	(0.27)	(0.21)
PKO Duration		4.192	-0.616	-0.501**
		(4.2)	(0.38)	(0.16)
Number of PKOs			11.126	9.939
			(13.27)	(15.8)
P5 Defense Pact	3.777		-387.359	-331.653
	(3.97)		(200.45)	(240.38)
P5 Median IO Membership	11.086		876.238	
	(10.5)		(626.59)	
P5 Median Refugees	1.224		-86.136	
	(0.9)		(80.58)	
P5 Median Trade Change	0.004		-0.589	
	(0.01)		(0.64)	
E10 Shared Border	3.538	4.558	-78.954	-79.572
	(4.63)	(4.75)	(180.19)	(156.71)
E10 Defense Pact	1.526	0.337	111.842	87.258
	(4.67)	(3.98)	(103.47)	(120.47)
E10 Median IO Membership	-8.572		-391.736	
	(10.44)		(258.89)	

(table continues)

	Model 1 UN Mandate	Model 2 UN Mandate	Model 3 BRD Counts	Model 4 BRD Counts
E10 Median Refugees	-0.169 (0.43)		42.369 (39.56)	
E10 Median Trade Change	-0.002 (0.01)		0.104 (0.23)	
P5 St. Dev IO Membership		16.546 -36.5		-697.892 -471.19
P5 St. Dev. Refugees		2.954 -2.79		-1.207 -51.12
P5 St. Dev. Trade Change		-0.001 0		0.002 -0.21
E10 St. Dev. IO Membership		12.466 -10.85		97.684 -293.37
E10 St. Dev. Refugees		0.731 -1.84		69.136 -81.47
E10 St. Dev. Trade Change		0 0		0.001 0
Constant	-9.161** -3.53	-15.009*** -3.82	182.791 -164.88	-84.752 -185.82
R-Squared			0.064	0.105
N	4875	4875	782	782

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001

3.6.2 Regional IGO Results

Table 3.2 reports the findings for the regional IGO analyses. The left column reports independent variables, and the dependent variables are reported underneath the model number. Models 5 and 6 reports the results of regional IGO PKO occurrences. The results in Models 5 and 6 do not support my hypothesis, which stated that the overall levels of interests of IGO member states would be positively associated with occurrence of regional IGO PKOs. The only notable findings in Models 5 and 6 are the significant results of prior battle-related deaths and the positive correlation between the history of mediation in the conflict and PKO occurrence.

Models 7 and 8 test Hypothesis 3, which states that IGO members with more similar interests (less variance) with the conflict state will be more effective. The logic here is that when IGO members have similar interests, they will be more likely to have a more coherent and cohesive strategy when PKOs are deployed. In general, there is very minimal support for this hypothesis. The one finding that supports the PKO effectiveness hypothesis is that the more IGO members that share a border with the state, the more effective the PKO will be. This result does support two of the arguments made in this chapter. First, it supports the idea that states in the region have more knowledge of the conflict and the terrain and are better equipped to deal with the issue in a timely manner. Second, it also supports the idea that IGOs with more states with higher levels of interests are more effective in PKOs because they have more stakeholders. States neighboring civil wars are concerned with conflict spillover and conflict contagion, so there are more states that are motivated to have an effective PKO. While the results in Models 7 and 8 suffer from the same issues as Models 3 and 4 regarding selection bias, the results do warrant further investigation in the relationship between regional IGO member states and the deployment of PKOs.

Table 3.2: Regional IGOs

	Model 5 PKO Occurrence	Model 6 PKO Occurrence	Model 7 BRD Counts	Model 8 BRD Counts
BRD (t-1)	0.001***	0.001***	0.314***	0.319***
	(0)	(0)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Population	-0.875**	-0.874*	2.912	8.823
	(0.33)	(0.35)	(7.94)	(8.14)
Rebel Strength	0.325	0.146	-17.387*	-21.732**
	(0.33)	(0.34)	(6.37)	(6.92)
Number of Rebel Groups	-0.188	-0.13	-15.732	-7.878
	(0.13)	(0.1)	(8.81)	(6.89)

(table continues)

	Model 5 PKO Occurrence	Model 6 PKO Occurrence	Model 7 BRD Counts	Model 8 BRD Counts
Ceasefire	-0.773 (0.65)	-0.883 (0.65)	13.792 (12.5)	12.743 (11.3)
Mediation Legacy	2.603*** (0.54)	2.769*** (0.46)	-13.791 (22.1)	-16.61 (21.88)
Conflict Duration	0.009 (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)	0.115 (0.13)	0.127 (0.13)
IGO Shared Borders	-1.608 (2.52)	-0.543 (3.24)	-91.664 (50.39)	-94.965** (30.56)
IGO Defense Pacts	0.106 (0.65)	0.127 (0.58)	2.47 (25.77)	64.430* (22.58)
IGO Median IO Membership	2.93 (3.08)		95.508 (79.02)	
IGO Median Refugees	0.821 (0.85)		36.330* (15.54)	
IGO Median Trade Change	-0.017 (0.01)		-0.444* (0.18)	
IGO SD IO Membership		-13.2 (10.34)		709.456 (346.92)
IGO SD Refugees		0.519 (1.64)		-64.838 (34.6)
IGO SD Median Trade Change		0.000*** (0)		0.008 (0.01)
Duration (months)			-0.232 (0.25)	-0.117 (0.15)
Number of PKOs			-5.435 (4.67)	-5.446 (4.11)
UN MANDATE			51.932** (16.71)	43.715** (11.52)
Number of Troops			0.003 (0)	0.002 (0)
Constant	-1.839 -3.59	1.797 -3.54	-1.797 -67.72	-46.286 -87.11
r2			0.224	0.222
N	7165	7153	410	410

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001

3.6.3 Interpreting Null Findings

The statistical analyses in this chapter largely did not support my hypotheses. First, it is important to acknowledge data issues. PKOs are rare events, and the data limitations to Africa in the limited time frame may be skewing the results. For example, the UN only participated in six active PKOs in Africa between 1989-2008. Another possibility for the null results in the effectiveness models is the operationalization of the dependent variable, battle-related deaths. While we are interested in how PKOs impact the overall death count in a conflict, just taking the count of deaths may not be the best way to observe the impact of PKOs. For example, a conflict experiencing high counts of battle-related deaths may see a decrease in deaths after a PKO is present, but the overall count can still be high. Therefore, it may be better to operationalize the dependent variable as the change in battle-related deaths from the previous month to better capture the conflict de-escalation effects of PKOs.

While the null results may be at least in part driven by data limitations and the operationalization of the dependent variables, there is a strong possibility that the null results are driven by the theory proposed in this chapter. The theory in this chapter suggested that the interests of IGO member states would impact the occurrence and effectiveness of PKOs, which is identical to the argument presented about IGOs and mediation in Chapter 2. However, the null findings here suggest that the motivations for IGOs to initiate PKOs may be different than an IGOs motivation to take on the role of a mediator in a civil war. One reason for this is that PKOs are more expensive and require more contributions from member states than mediation. Therefore, one could argue that states that contribute more to the IGO in terms of money and troops may

have more leverage in determining when and where IGOs participate in peace operations. Finding a way to account for the weight of an IGO member's interest or opinion may be a crucial piece of the puzzle to help predict the occurrence and effectiveness of PKOs.

Another contributing factor to the null results may be the differences in regional IGO structures. Regional IGOs do not have permanent security council members in the same way that the UNSC does. However, even within regional IGOs, there are different hierarchies and organs that are responsible for decision-making in conflict management efforts. This chapter treats regional IGOs as actors that are similar to one another, but the null results suggest that a more in-depth examination of the inner working of individual regional IGOs is needed to better understand the decision-making processes. In general, the null findings presented in this chapter illustrate the need for more research to be conducted on regional IGOs in the peacekeeping literature.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter argued that the interests of individual member states within IGOs will impact the onset and effectiveness of IGO PKOs. I test four hypotheses linking the onset and effectiveness of PKOs to the strength and dispersion of interest arguments and apply them to intrastate conflicts in Africa from 1989-2008. The results of the analyses indicate that the conflict characteristics are consistently better predictors of both regional IGO and UN PKOs, but there is some support for the regional IGO hypotheses. More specifically, I find some support for IGO member states sharing borders with the conflict state help predicts the de-escalation of conflict.

While most of the hypotheses in this study were not supported, there are several

reasons for the null findings. First, it is important to note the data limitations and the model specification. PKOs are rare events, which are inherently difficult to predict. Second, future analyses should control for the selection bias, which suggests that PKOs are usually deployed to the most difficult cases, meaning that the true impact of the independent variables may be difficult to decipher. Regardless, the arguments presented in this chapter warrant further investigation. Future research should continue to address the differences between regional IGOs and the UN, but more importantly, future research should continue to investigate the role of the member states within an IGO's decision to deploy PKOs to some conflicts and not others.

CHAPTER 4

ALL FOR ONE OR ONE FOR ALL?: INTERACTING EFFECTS OF MEDIATION AND PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS

4.1 Introduction

In the past three decades, the international community has devoted substantial resources and attention toward resolving intrastate conflicts. International actors, both states and international organizations, are regularly involved in intrastate conflicts. In the Bosnian civil war, there were dozens of mediation attempts made by various third parties between 1992-1995. The UN, in response to the conflict, deployed peacekeepers in 1992 and was one of the many mediators in the early stages of the conflict. In addition to the multiple mediators and UN peacekeepers, there were also other third parties that were supporting the warring factions, such as the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats, which emboldened the disputants and intensified the conflict. There were also multiple peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement missions, which often contradicted one another. The case of the Bosnian Civil War is an example of an internationalized intrastate conflict, and it illustrates why conflict management efforts are difficult to study. It would be relatively simple to look at each individual component of conflict management and look at the successes and shortcomings of each tactic, but studying mediation and peacekeeping efforts independently of one another does not give an accurate depiction of the complexities of the conflict.

In this chapter, I argue that conflict management techniques can reinforce one another and should therefore be studied together. While others have made similar observations (e.g., Beardsley et al. 2019; Greig et al. 2019; Owsiak 2014), this chapter

builds upon their theoretical framework. Prior work that has focused on the reinforcing argument treats all third parties as similar. However, I argue that third parties who take on the responsibilities of both mediator and peacekeepers will be more effective at deescalating conflict due to their ability to better coordinate efforts in the context of civil wars. To test this argument, I use data from UCDP's Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) and apply the argument to intrastate conflicts in Africa between 1989-2008. In the end, the hypothesis presented does not have statistically significant results. However, this can be due to data limitations, or it can be an important policy implication suggesting that having different third parties provide peacekeeping and mediation does not have a negative impact on the conflict management process. Consequently, this chapter provides support for the claim that there is a need for more research investigating the identities of third parties in conflict management roles and the sequencing of conflict management tactics.

4.2 Challenges of Violence Reduction in Civil Wars

International actors play an important part in conflict management efforts in intrastate state conflicts. Civil wars have several challenges that international third parties can help the disputants overcome, such as information asymmetries and the credible commitment problem. First, one of the biggest obstacles is overcoming the incomplete information or the information asymmetry problem that both parties face. Incomplete information creates a barrier because the warring parties are unsure of their opponent's true capabilities, which hinders their ability to deescalate hostilities because there is uncertainty surrounding the other party's power and how they intend to use their strength (Fearon 1995; Walter 2009). Both sides have an incentive to exaggerate their

strength and resolve because it is advantageous in gaining general support for one's own side as well as gaining leverage at the bargaining table. From the government's point of view, giving in to a rebel group's demands can undermine their authority, and even entertaining the notion of peace talks can be seen as a sign of weakness by both rebel groups and the international community. Governments, therefore, have an incentive to either put on a strong front at the bargaining table and misrepresent their strength and intentions or to avoid peace talks altogether.

The lack of communication and reliable information shared between warring parties also contributes to the credible commitment problem. The credible commitment problem refers to the lack of cooperation and trust between the disputants. Disputants struggle to find a balance where they get enough of their demands in the negotiations without conceding too much to the opposition. While this is a challenge in both interstate conflicts and civil wars, civil wars have the additional challenge of disarming the rebel group. Rebel groups are wary of disarming because it requires a level of trust between the rebel group and the government that is difficult to achieve in the context of a civil war. Rebel groups fear that laying down their arms and conceding the monopoly on violence back to the government leaves the group in a vulnerable situation. For the disarmament process to work, two things need to be accomplished. First, the government needs to trust that the rebels will fully disarm and disband after an agreement is reached. Second, the rebel group needs to trust that the government will keep its promises to not kill and imprison the former rebels. However, both the government and rebel groups have an incentive to renege on their agreements. The rebel group has an incentive to keep at least some of their military capacity and

organization in order to protect themselves in the case of continued violence, and the government has an incentive to take advantage of a weakened rebel group and to reduce the likelihood of strong resistance in the future.

Information asymmetries and commitment problems are key factors in a disputant's choice in allowing third party involvement in the conflict management process. While there are multiple forms of conflict management, this chapter focuses on mediation and peacekeeping, which both require the participation of a third party.

4.3 Mediation

One of the most common strategies for disputants to address the information asymmetry problem is to seek the help of a mediator. While negotiations and mediation are both voluntary processes undertaken by the disputant, mediation is distinct from negotiations because the presence of a third party adds a new dynamic to the bargaining table. Third parties enter the process with their own biases and interests that can influence the bargaining process between the disputants (Kydd 2003, 2006; Savun 2008). One of the most important functions of the mediator is to facilitate the flow of information between the disputants, which helps the warring parties overcome the issue of information asymmetry. The exchanging of information between disputants alters their relationship and builds a rapport amongst the participants along with the mediator, which is why disputants who enter into mediation are more likely to use mediation again in the future (Clayton 2013; Greig and Regan 2008).

The identity and the characteristics of the mediators also play an important role in the mediation process. Mediators are active participants in the negotiation process, meaning they help shape the outcomes of the deal. Mediators can promote certain

outcomes and influence the spread of information between the parties. This is important because third parties also have their own interests and goals in the mediation process. The goals and interests of the mediator are often referred to as mediator bias within the literature. For example, Kydd (2003) defines mediator bias as the mediator having preferences that align with one disputant or the other, meaning that the mediator is biased in favor of that disputant. However, this definition of bias suggests that a mediator that does not have preferences for one party in the conflict is unbiased. While not all mediators have preferences for one disputant over the other, they have a preference over the outcome of the mediation attempt, which impacts their role as a mediator (Vukovic 2015). Regardless of what the preferences of the mediator are, it will influence how they present the range of options to the disputants at the negotiating table.

Mediators also introduce the possibility of outside resources to provide incentives for information sharing and cooperation to the disputants. Mediators can use their resources to help alter the perceived costs and benefits of reaching a negotiated settlement by offering “carrots” and “sticks” (Beardsley et al. 2019). Prior research finds that mediators with more resources, or leverage, are more likely to be successful in mediation efforts (Beardsley et al. 2006; Bercovitch 1996; Wilkenfeld et al. 2003). Mediators with more resources can offer the disputants something favorable, such as development aid, as an incentive for the disputants to come to terms with a peace agreement. On the other hand, mediators can also threaten to put sanctions on the disputants for continued violence. Both approaches are utilized to make the alternative to continued violence more appealing to the warring parties.

Another important aspect of mediation is that it can create short-term episodes of peace between the disputants (Beardsley et al. 2019). Mediators can use their outside influence to put external constraints on the disputants. If a third party wants the parties to pursue peace talks, they can use punitive measures, such as sanctions or publicly blaming parties in the international community. The threat of punitive actions against the disputants or the incentive of aid for cooperation can create a much-needed window of peace for the parties to pursue more substantive peace talks. Successful peace talks are an iterative process, where trust between the disputants can grow over time, and the actors establish a pattern of cooperation. Reaching an agreement is only the first step in a successful mediation attempt. Many negotiated settlements break down over time due problem of achieving credible commitments from the disputants (Beardsley 2011). This is where third parties can also contribute to the process by proving enforcement of the negotiated peace terms by utilizing their leverage over the disputants or using by deploying a peace operation.

4.4 Peacekeeping

There are several kinds of peacekeeping operations that third parties can utilize to aid in the peace process in civil wars. These peace operations include observer missions, traditional peacekeeping missions, peacebuilding, and peace enforcement (Sandler 2017). Each of these types of missions is tasked with different objectives and gives the peacekeepers different guidelines. Observer, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding missions all require consent from the disputants, but each has different parameters based on the stages and characteristics of the conflict. Observer missions are deployed to oversee and to report violations of ceasefire agreements, with no force

used by the peacekeepers unless in the act of self-defense. Traditional peacekeeping includes more actions by armed troops and police to help end hostilities and maintain peace in a conflict area. These actions can include disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of rebel forces into society (Diehl, Druckman, and Wall 1998).

Peacebuilding missions are more complex and include efforts to provide humanitarian and development aid and are seen as long-term missions committed to nation-building.

While observer, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding missions require the consent of the disputants, peace enforcement missions do not. These missions that are more complex involve more heavily armored personnel and the expanded use of military force to end hostilities between the warring parties, such as the NATO missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s. Peace enforcement missions are more complicated, costly, and risky because they require enough force to separate and pacify the warring parties without the consent of the belligerents (Sandler 2017).

The different types of peacekeeping operations help disputants overcome the credible commitment problem. The presence of outside observers or peacekeepers provides an external constraint for the disputants. Observers can name and shame those who attempt to spoil the terms of the agreement, while peacekeepers can provide a physical barrier between the warring sides. There is also a recent trend where the UN has utilized more peace enforcement missions, which have their mandates rooted in chapter VII of the UN Charter, which authorizes the use of force against entities that attempt to disrupt the peace process (Hultman 2013). Peacekeepers can also provide protection for the former rebels during the disarmament process. The peacekeepers

also provide information to the government and give them more certainty that the rebels are, in fact, disarming and disbanding.

Peacekeepers have a restraining effect on the belligerents, reducing the commitment problems and making it more difficult for the disputants to use force, which should reduce the level of violence between the disputants. However, the peacekeepers are often deployed to the most difficult of cases (Fortna 2004, 2008; Mullenbach 2005). As Fortna (2004) notes, PKOs are rarely dispatched in states where there is a decisive victory. Instead, PKOs are deployed to states where there are still intense hostilities between disputants or where there are negotiated settlements, which commonly break down over time. While prior research has found mixed results on the effectiveness of PKOs in terms of peace duration (e.g., Doyle and Sambinis 2006; Hartzell et al. 2001; Mason et al. 2011) and reaching peace agreements (Clayton and Dorussen 2021; Kathman and Benson 2019), there is evidence that peacekeeping reduces conflict intensity and battle-related deaths (Beardsley et al. 2019; Hultman et al. 2014). Reducing battle-related and civilian deaths creates an environment where mediation attempts are more likely to succeed, so measuring the effectiveness of PKOs through conflict intensity instead of conflict duration or conflict recurrence makes the most sense for this analysis.

4.5 Coordination of Mediation and Peace Operations

The different forms of peace operations each serve a particular purpose in conflict management and are usually based on the level of cooperation between the disputants and the stage of negotiation the parties are currently engaged in. If the disputants have a peace agreement, the peacekeepers will be tasked with overseeing

and enforcing the terms of the agreement. Both Peacekeeping and mediation have independent effects on intrastate conflicts, but they also have additive effects.

Beardsley (2013) finds that mediation in the absence of peacekeeping fails to address the commitment problem, which is associated with conflict recurrence. Beardsley et al. (2019) find that mediation and peacekeeping efforts reinforce one another and reduce the level of violence in intrastate conflicts.

While there is some research that investigates the relationship between mediation and peacekeeping, there has been a lack of research looking into the relationship between the third parties who take on those roles. For example, in the Ivory Coast in the early 2000s, there were representatives from ECOWAS, the AU, and the UN involved in the mediation and peacekeeping process. ECOWAS and the AU both lead peace operations with varying levels of involvement and support from the UN. At the outbreak of the civil war in the Ivory Coast, the UN had not widely implemented peace enforcement missions, and the intensity of the conflict did not provide an opening for the deployment of traditional peacekeepers. The first peacekeepers present in the Ivory Coast were deployed by the French, followed by ECOWAS troops a few months later. This meant that the first PKO present in the Ivory Coast was not directly present at the first mediation attempts.

In the Bosnian conflict, there were mediation attempts made by the UN, the European Council, Russia, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and many others. Meanwhile, the peace enforcement missions were headed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the more traditional peacekeepers were deployed by the UN. In both the Bosnian and Ivory Coast conflicts,

there appeared to be little coordination between the mediation efforts and the peace operations being deployed. Conflict management efforts in both conflicts were largely seen as unsuccessful, especially in the early stages of the conflicts. Even with all of the resources behind multiple IGOs and individual state contributors, it did not appear that the disputants were compelled to overcome the commitment problem. I argue that the lack of effectiveness in these missions is due to the lack of communication between the third parties that undertake the roles of mediators and peacekeepers.

The coordination of mediation and peacekeeping is a difficult task. Gaining the trust of the disputants at the negotiating table is far different than gaining the trust of the armed forces and civilians on the ground. Trying to negotiate a settlement while another organization is carrying out a peace enforcement mission can create new tensions and barriers between the parties involved. However, with more coordinated efforts between the peace operation and the mediators, there is more certainty between the disputants, the mediator, and the peacekeepers, which I argue should result in lower conflict intensity.

Hypothesis: Civil wars that have shared actors as mediators and peacekeepers will experience a conflict-reducing effect.

4.6 Data and Methodology

4.6.1 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable for my analysis is the number of battle-related deaths in a conflict month*. I use replication data from Beardsley et al. (2019), who use

* While a count of battle-related deaths captures overall conflict intensity, I recognize that changes in monthly battle-related deaths is an important way of understanding PKO effectiveness in terms of conflict de-escalation.

government-rebel conflict dyads from the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) dyadic data set (Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008). To get the monthly counts of battle-related deaths, I use data from the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) (Sundber and Melander 2013; Hultman et al. 2014). For each government-rebel dyad, the counts of battle deaths are aggregated to the conflict month, the unit of analysis, since many of the control variables are coded at the conflict level. Months during an active conflict in which there are no battle deaths observed in the GED are coded as having 0 battle deaths. Conflicts are treated as active until twelve months after the most recent month with at least one battle-related death (Beardsley et al. 2019). Given this criteria, there are 2,642 conflict months in the data, with 1,213 (46%) experiencing at least one battle death, and has a maximum value of 3005 battle deaths. This means that a larger proportion of the active conflict months in the data do not observe any battle-related deaths. The standard deviation (148.1) relative to the mean (43.7) indicates the dependent variable is over-dispersed.

4.6.2 Independent and Control Variables

The focus of this chapter is on the coordination and communication between the agents that conduct mediation and peacekeeping missions in civil wars. I use data from the Managing Intrastate Conflict (MIC) data (Merlander and Uexkull 2011) to identify the actors who are responsible for the mediation effort. The data for PKOs is taken from the Third Party Peacekeeping Missions dataset (Mullenbach 2017). To measure if a conflict month had at least one actor serve as both a mediator and peacekeeper, I create a dichotomous variable that is coded as 1 if there is a shared actor in mediation and peacekeeping in the last month. For example, if the AU mediated a conflict in

Burundi and also had an active PKO in the same month, the variable would be coded as 1. If the AU was not involved in mediation but had an active PKO, the variable would be coded as 0. In cases of state lead PKOs and PKOs made up of a coalition of states, then I use the lead state that is listed as the lead state in the Third Party Peacekeeping Missions dataset. The Lead State variable lists the name of the state that contributed the most personnel to the PKO or the name of the state that contributed the Force Commander of the PKO troops in cases where one state did not substantially contribute more troops than the other contributing states. There are 461 conflict months (17.5%) that experience a shared actor serving as both a mediator and peacekeeper in the preceding month.

To account for the influence that peacekeeping and mediation can have independently of one another on conflict severity, I add control for other mediation efforts and PKOs in a conflict month. To test the effect of PKOs (*PKO Troops per 1000*), I include a measure of the number of peacekeeping troops that are deployed in a mission, which is taken from Mullenbach (2017). Based on prior research, one can expect larger troop deployments to be associated with decreased battle-related deaths (Beardsley et al. 2019; Hultman et al. 2014).

For mediation efforts, I include several dichotomous measures of different forms of peace talks, each of which is taken from the MIC data. First, I include a dichotomous measure for a *direct mediation* attempt in the prior month. A direct mediation attempt is when the two disputants in the dyad have face-to-face talks in the presence of a third party. Second, I include another dichotomous measure of *indirect mediation*. In an indirect mediation attempt, the two disputants in the dyad do not meet face-to-face, and

the mediator relays information between the two warring parties. Lastly, I include a binary measure of *other diplomatic actions*, which are actions outside of mediation, such as bilateral talks with disputants, unclear third party participation, and fact-finding missions. I include a measure of these various forms of communication between the disputants and third parties because different forms of communication can impact the level of trust between disputants. As mentioned earlier, trust between disputants is essential to overcome the commitment problem. A major factor in creating trust is to address the inherent information asymmetries that plague civil wars (Walter 2009). One can expect more direct talks between disputants to be more effective in achieving this goal of information sharing and also a sign that the disputants are seriously considering negotiations. Indirect talks and other diplomatic actions are indicators that the conflict may not be ripe for traditional mediation efforts, so it is expected that these efforts will be less effective than direct mediation.

To account for other factors that contribute to changes in the number of battle-related deaths within a conflict, I control for several conflict characteristics. The first of these conflict characteristics is a lagged dependent variable, battle-related deaths, to account for the recent levels of violence in the dyad. I also control for the average level of intensity in the conflict by using Hultman et al. (2019) measure of *prior battle-related violence rate*. Hultman et al. measure this variable by adding the number of battle deaths in the conflict to that point and dividing it by the number of conflict months to that point. I control for the *rebel's strength* relative to the government, which is a five-level ordinal variable, with 1 representing a rebel group that is much weaker than the government and a value of 5 representing a rebel group that is much stronger than the

government. I also control for the total *number of rebel groups* in the conflict, as civil wars oftentimes have multiple rebel groups opposing the government simultaneously. Civil wars with multiple rebel groups have been associated with more intense conflicts. Rebel group data is taken from Hultman et al. (2014). Lastly, I include a natural log of the state's population because states with lower populations have less potential to escalate.

4.6.3 Methodology

To test the hypothesis posited in this chapter, I use the monthly counts of battle-related fatalities in Africa from 1989-2008. I use replication data from Beardsley et al. (2019), who use government-rebel conflict dyads from the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) dyadic data set (Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008). The unit of analysis is conflict-month, which is to control for conflict-specific characteristics. I utilize an OLS regression due to the continuous nature of the dependent variable (battle-related deaths). The summary statistics of the variables included in the main analysis are provided in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Battle Related Deaths	2,641	43.7217	148.1042	0	3005
Same Mediator and PKO Agent	2,632	0.1728723	0.3782087	0	1
Mediation and PKO (t-1)	2,637	0.0394388	0.1946733	0	1
PKO troops (per 1,000)	2,641	2.260791	5.626106	0	37
Mediation (t-1)	2,641	0.102234	0.3030132	0	1
Indirect Mediation (t-1)	2,641	0.0386217	0.1927282	0	1

(table continues)

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Other Diplomacy (t-1)	2,641	0.2801969	0.4491804	0	1
Rebel Strength	2,641	2.239682	0.8107426	1	5
Number of Rebel Groups	2,641	3.264294	2.564289	1	15
Population (ln)	2,641	9.411974	1.044456	6.345636	11.80385
Battle Related Deaths Rate	2,641	65.3784	74.62596	0.75	397
Peace Duration (months)	2,641	2.607346	3.494033	0	12

4.7 Results

The argument presented in this chapter stated that conflicts that have a mediation and a peacekeeping operation being conducted by a single actor would see more effective conflict management. While there are several ways to measure conflict management effectiveness, arguably the most important factor is the reduction of battle-related violence between the disputants. Peace agreements, ceasefires, and other arrangements are only successful if there is a decrease in the hostilities, so a reduction in battle-related deaths should be correlated with other measures of conflict management effectiveness, including peace-years and other peacebuilding factors. The results of the OLS regression analyses are presented in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2 contains four statistical models with battle-related deaths as the dependent variable. Model 1 is a base model, which is used to compare the results of the other models. Model 1 finds that PKOs and mediation attempts have independent and negative effects on the level of violence experienced in the civil war. The negative coefficient for PKO troops indicates that there is a decrease of approximately 2 casualties per 1000 troops that are deployed to the conflict. The mediation variable in

Model 1 suggests that civil wars that had mediation in the prior month suffer fewer battle-related deaths than conflicts that do not have mediation in the prior month.

Table 4.2: OLS Regression Models (Mediation and PKOs)

	Model 1 BRD Counts	Model 2 BRD Counts	Model 3 BRD Counts	Model 4 BRD Counts
Same Mediator and PKO Agent (t-1)		4.452 (10.95)		5.165 (13.15)
Mediation and PKO (t-1)			-17.851 (19.42)	
Same Med & PKO X PKO troops				-0.223 (0.829)
PKO troops (per 1,000)	-2.091* (0.97)	-2.275* (0.96)	-2.010* (0.87)	-2.108* (0.858)
Mediation (t-1)	-17.413* (6.6)	-18.847* (8.7)	-11.042 (8.38)	-18.983* (9.11)
Indirect Mediation (t-1)	14.946 (26.08)	16.615 (26.41)	14.35 (25.96)	16.544 (26.42)
Other Diplomacy (t-1)	16.985* (7.25)	16.578* (6.74)	16.029* (7.03)	16.551* (6.71)
Battle Related Deaths (t-1)	0.089 (0.06)	0.089 (0.06)	0.089 (0.06)	0.089 (0.06)
Rebel Strength	5.161 (4.09)	5.2 (4.22)	5.301 (4.02)	5.204 (4.21)
Number of Rebel Groups	1.384 (0.99)	1.348 (1.02)	1.31 (0.93)	1.328 (1)
Population (ln)	8.387 (4.19)	8.465* (4.14)	8.256 (4.16)	8.467* (4.14)
Battle Related Deaths Rate	0.359*** (0.06)	0.361*** (0.06)	0.373*** (0.06)	0.361*** (0.06)
Peace Duration (months)	-14.503*** (2.98)	-14.612*** (3)	-14.237*** (2.95)	-14.640*** (3.03)
Peace Duration (months) (sq)	1.024*** (0.23)	1.032*** (0.23)	0.999*** (0.22)	1.034*** (0.23)
Constant	-59.892 (43.09)	-60.544 (42.74)	-59.476 (42.68)	-60.563 (42.67)
R-Squared	0.133	0.134	0.134	0.134
N	2641	2632	2637	2632

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001


Model 2 contains the primary independent variable to test the coordination hypothesis. The variable is a dichotomous variable indicating if the prior month of conflict had a similar actor act as both a mediator and peacekeeper in the conflict. The argument suggests that there should be a negative correlation between coordinated conflict managements strategies and battle-related deaths, or in other words, coordinated efforts should see a decrease in hostilities between the disputants. However, the finding in Model 2 suggests that there is no statistically significant correlation between coordinated conflict management and battle-related deaths. This result can be for one of two reasons. First, it can be an issue with the coding criteria with the variable, which did not distinguish between individual states being the actor and an IGO. The identity of the actor may play an important role in the passing along of information. An individual state who acts as both the mediator and the lead state in a PKO may be better able to communicate and coordinate actions than an IGO. It is also possible that PKOs and mediations headed by IGOs are more effective because they bring more resources and credibility to the conflict management process.

Second, it could be that the size of the PKO matters more than just a simple dichotomous measure of its presence. To address this potential argument, I created an interaction term in Model 4 to see if there is a relationship between coordinated conflict management and the number of PKO troops. Figure 4.1 shows that there is no significant difference between coordinated and non-coordinated conflict management strategies.

While the argument presented in this chapter is not supported, there are still several notable findings. First, PKO troop levels and mediation efforts have consistently

pacifying effects, independent of one another. This suggests that both forms of conflict management are not dependent on one another to be beneficial to conflict de-escalation. Beardsley et al. (2019) also find that PKOs and mediation have independent effects on battle-related deaths, so this finding is consistent with prior research. While Beardsley et al. (2019) did find support for mediation and peacekeeping reinforcing one another, this could be due to the data only using the presence of UN troops instead of including all PKOs.

Figure 4.1: Marginal Effects of Coordinated and Non Coordinated Conflict Management



The other interesting finding that is consistent across all models is the effect of “other diplomacy.” Other diplomacy, in this case, refers to bilateral talks, fact-finding missions, and other forms of diplomacy outside of indirect or direct mediation. There is a consistent positive coefficient, which indicates that other forms of diplomacy contribute

to an increase in violence between the disputants. This supports the portion of the argument made earlier stating that trust and communication between the disputants is fundamental to conflict de-escalation. Third parties who communicate with one party and not the other can further the divide between the disputants and provoke further conflict.

4.8 Conclusion

The argument made in this chapter suggested that having similar actors in employing different conflict management strategies simultaneously would create an environment where conflict would be more likely to deescalate. To test this hypothesis, I used data from the MIC and Third Party Peacekeeping Missions dataset and applied them to intrastate conflicts in Africa. While the statistical analysis to test this hypothesis showed null results, there are still important policy implications. First, the null finding suggests that having different actors fulfill the duties of mediation and peacekeeping in the same does not have a negative impact on the efficacy of these strategies. Second, mediation and peacekeeping both have significant pacifying effects in intrastate conflicts that are independent of one another. The findings of this chapter support the idea that more actors can potentially be effective conflict managers, however further research is needed.

Future research into the topic of conflict management sequencing and the actors who take on the various roles within conflict management is needed to get a better understanding of the complexities of managing intrastate conflicts. However, currently available data for PKOs headed by individual states, a coalition of states, and regional organizations is limited. One possible way to improve upon this study is to collect more

monthly data on non-UN PKOs. Most data for non-UN PKOs is done at the mission level, which does not allow researchers to establish a strong temporal argument when analyzing the sequencing of conflict management tactics.

While there are limits to the generalizability of the findings presented in this chapter's analysis, the findings do warrant further research regarding conflict management sequencing and the coordination of third parties. While the findings for the main hypothesis are null, there is significant support for the effectiveness of mediation and peacekeeping in intrastate conflicts. Future research should build upon the foundation provided by this chapter and continue to further our understanding of conflict management.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

5.1 Summary of Findings

In this dissertation, I examined three distinct topics related to conflict management in civil wars. In chapter 2, I focused on mediation efforts of the UNSC and regional IGOs, while arguing that member states within the IGOs are responsible for making decisions, which are motivated by the state's interests. In chapter 3, I investigated how member states within IGOs impact the onset and effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. Lastly, in chapter 4, I examined the relationship between mediators and peacekeepers in the same conflict. Together, these chapters demonstrate the complexity of conflict management strategies.

In chapter 2 of this dissertation, I discussed the role of individual member states within IGOs and how their interests can, in turn, influence the organization's decision-making process. I discuss my theoretical argument, the strength of interests, and the dispersion of interests arguments for IGO member states. I applied these arguments to the UNSC and regional IGOs and their decisions to mediate intrastate conflicts. One of the important contributions of this chapter is the incorporation of the elected ten member states (E10) into the study of the UNSC. Prior research has primarily focused on the P5 members of the UNSC, but the results of this analysis indicate that the E10 plays an important role in the use of UNSC mediation in civil wars.

To test these arguments, I used data from the CWM dataset and Uppsala's Armed Conflict Termination data (Kreutz 2010), with a sample spanning from 1946-2004. I then tested the strength and dispersion theories on regional IGOs and the

UNSC. The findings from chapter 2 support the claim that different kinds of state interests predict regional IGO and UNSC mediation. More specifically, the analysis shows that higher levels of refugees from the civil warring state to regional IGO members help predict the onset of mediation and the likelihood that the disputants reach an agreement as a result of the mediation effort. However, the best predictors of mediation occurrence by the UNSC are the number of alliances that the conflict state has with the E10 members and the civil warring state's economic ties with the P5 members.

In chapter 3, I applied the strength of interests and the dispersion of interests arguments to PKOs. I focused on the occurrence and effectiveness of UN and regional IGO PKOs. I conducted a large N analysis, using data from the Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) (Sundber and Merleander 2013) and the Third Party Peacekeeping Missions Dataset (Mullenbach 2017). I tested four hypotheses linking the onset and effectiveness of PKOs to the strength and dispersion of interest arguments and applied them to intrastate conflicts in Africa from 1989-2008. The results of the analyses showed that the conflict characteristics are consistently better predictors of both regional IGO and UN PKOs, but there is some support for the regional IGO hypotheses. More specifically, I found that when an IGO PKOs where more member states share borders with the conflict state is associated with the de-escalation of conflict.

Chapter 4 shifted the focus to the sequencing of conflict management approaches. I built upon the reinforcing argument made by Beardsley et al. (2019), which states that simultaneous mediation and peacekeeping have a reinforcing relationship. I argued that mediation and peacekeeping address different problems that

plague civil wars, namely the information asymmetries between the disputants and the credible commitment problem. While mediation and peacekeeping can independently address these concerns, I argued that conflicts, where the PKO and mediation efforts share a similar actor should have a more profound reinforcing relationship between the two conflict management strategies.

To test this argument, I again used data from GED and the Third Party Peacekeeping Missions dataset. I created a binary measure coding whether or not there was a shared actor who served as both a mediator and peacekeeper in the prior conflict month. While there was no support for the shared actor hypothesis, the chapter still has several policy implications. First, there were consistent findings across all models that showed PKOs and mediation both have independent, pacifying effects in civil wars. Second, I found that other forms of diplomacy provoked more hostilities between the disputants.

5.2 Contributions and Implications

This dissertation makes several contributions to the existing conflict management literature. First, it offers a first attempt at theorizing and measuring how IGO member state interests translate into IGO actions in civil wars. There is some support for the argument in Chapter 2, which discusses member state interests and mediation efforts, but there was very limited support for the arguments in Chapter 3, which focused on peacekeeping. The null findings in Chapter 3 illustrate the need for more research in the role of member state interests and peacekeeping. In chapters 2 and 3, I applied similar arguments about how member state interests would impact mediation and peacekeeping efforts, and only found support for the argument when applied to

mediation. This finding suggests that the role of interests and the decision-making processes are different in IGOs for mediation and peacekeeping. This is an important contribution to the literature because it establishes the IGO member hierarchies may play more of a role in determining the occurrence and effectiveness of PKOs than in mediation efforts.

Another significant contribution of this dissertation is the comparison of the United Nations and regional IGOs. Prior research has focused primarily on the UN (e.g., Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Diehl et al. 1996; Uzonyi 2015), but this dissertation highlights the importance of including regional IGOs in the study of conflict management. Since the end of the Cold War, regional IGOs have increased their role in conflict management efforts, but their increase in conflict management practices has not necessarily translated to more research being done on the topic. This study highlights the importance for the inclusion of regional IGOs in future research in two ways. First, this dissertation calls attention to the differences between the UNSC and regional IGOs. The UNSC has a unique power dynamic between the P5 and E10 members that is not present in other IGOs. Other IGOs have security councils, but they do not have members with veto powers. At first glance, this would suggest that the decision-making process is more evenly distributed amongst the member states in regional IGOs. Chapter 2's analysis of mediation efforts does find some support for this claim, but chapter 3's null findings suggest a more complicated relationship between the member states may be present. In situations where fewer resources are needed to take action, such as deciding to take on the role of a mediator in a civil war, the decision-making process may be more evenly distributed among the member states. However,

when deciding to take more costly actions, such as deploying a peace operation, the states who contribute more to the IGO may have more leverage in the process. The role of IGO member contributions and the IGO's decision-making process needs to be more closely examined in future research.

Lastly, this dissertation illustrates the need to differentiate between various regional IGOs. This dissertation treated all regional IGOs as if they had similar structures and organs. However, regional IGOs come in all different shapes and sizes. For example, the AU has a Peace and Security Council that consists of 15 elected members, but the OAS has a Permanent Council that is composed of one permanent representative of each member state. The differences in these structure can have important implications for our understanding of conflict management efforts in civil wars. Also, regional IGO memberships vary as well. Some regional organizations like the AU have a large membership that covers a large geographic space, while other regional organizations, such as ECOWAS, are sub-regional organizations with fewer member states located in close proximity to one another. The differences between these organizations may help explain the mixed results found in this dissertation, which warrants closer examination.

5.3 Future Research

This dissertation demonstrates the complexities of conflict management in civil wars. The findings in this dissertation suggest that the role of individual member states in IGOs should be considered in future analyses. Many of the hypotheses had minimal or no support in the statistical analyses, but there are still meaningful findings in these null results. First, the null results may indicate that IGO present more barriers than

initially anticipated for individual states to pursue their interests. Second, the results from this dissertation suggest that other factors may need to be taken into consideration when discussing state interests in the context of IGOs. One factor may be the state's power relative to the other members states. This dissertation treated member states in regional organizations as with equal weights, but just because regional IGO members lack individual veto power does not mean that the interests of all member states are considered equal. In general, the implications of this dissertation are that individual state interests matter, but the relationship between state interests and IGO needs further investigation.

Although this dissertation made important contributions in the understanding of IGOs and their member states, there is still much work to be done. One of the key takeaways from this project is that there are several unanswered questions regarding the decision-making process of regional organizations. In future work, I intend to more thoroughly investigate the differences in regional IGO structures. I also intend to investigate other ways in which individual states can impact group decisions in IGOs, such as leveraging state resources to influence conflict management implementation.

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