

BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION: THE EVOLUTION OF UNITED STATES
ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS IN THE
PHILIPPINES FROM 1898 TO 1945

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The history of the United States' occupation and administration of the Philippines is a premiere example of the evolution of the American military's civil administrative approach as it evolved from simple Army security in 1898, through an evolving 'whole-of-government' method, to what was practically the full military administration of the country by March 1945. The second liberation and subsequent administration of the Philippines by the United States Army was unique, not simply because of the physical characteristics of the operations, but more so because of the theater commander, General Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur used a rather self-reliant approach that rejected much of the direction from various authorities in Washington and adopted independently authored local solutions, but he took advantage of external resources when necessary. Ultimately the United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) under his command had to accept external direction to gain external resources. The Army's civil administrative planning and execution in the Philippines in 1944-1945 was the direct result of the social, political, economic, and military relationships between Americans and Filipinos from 1898 to 1944, much of which involved MacArthur, and the institutional changes that developed from these interactions. The result was civil administration that met the local and immediate requirements suitable for the conditions at hand. By August 1945 the Army ended civil affairs operations and transferred responsibility to the Commonwealth government of the Philippines and the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA).

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INTRODUCTION

In 1947 John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War to Henry L. Stimson, and United States High Commissioner for Germany in 1949, said:

I believe the military have never been given sufficient credit for the imaginative foresight with which, beginning in 1942, they planned for the administration of occupied and conquered areas. This was a task for which there was no precedent in our history, and no other agency of government was even remotely prepared or equipped to handle it. It involved setting up the rudiments of law and government, policing, feeding, sanitation, prevention of epidemics, and a host of other matters.... The achievements in this field were momentous, as I think anyone who was in the position to observe the great overall demands and the manner in which they were met will recognize.¹

With respect to the absence of precedent, McCloy had to have been aware that United States Army civil affairs and military governance operations were key to securing the desired outcomes in the Mexican American War, the American Civil War, the Spanish American War, and World War I. He likely was referring to the greatly expanded scope and magnitude of such operations in World War II. The American military and its Allies in that conflict conducted what they described as civil affairs operations in the liberated areas of North Africa, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the Philippines. At the same time, these forces after the war also implemented military governance in occupied areas of Italy, Germany, Austria, Japan, and Korea. In all, civil administration was global in magnitude.

McCloy was also likely referring to the nature of the operations themselves. Destruction in World War II was truly without precedent, greatly affecting amenities that people had come to expect. Modern advances in power and communications, sanitation and health care, water and food distribution, transportation, and manufacturing not only modernized militaries, they created systems that improved the quality of life of people in general. But, broader adoption of these advances into municipal telephone, transportation, water, sewer, gas, electrical, and health care

¹ John J. McCloy, "In Defense of the Army Mind," *Infantry Journal* 60-61 (15 June 1947), 23.

infrastructure initiated dependencies that increased societies' brittleness. Destruction of these systems through modern warfare magnified the impact of combat far beyond the end of the war, greatly complicating the task of military governance. Approximately 66% to 90% of structures in various Moscow districts were destroyed by the great fire that accompanied the French invasion in 1812, yet shelter and resources scavenged from cellars or foraged nearby proved to be sufficient to enable the French to remain in the city for a month after the fires died, and Muscovite society to return and immediately begin rebuilding after the soldiers' departure. Unlike reports of the Moscow fire, which appear to focus on loss of buildings and life alone, World War II accounts of destruction also describe the loss of infrastructure systems, the impact of destroyed medical facilities, the consequences of damaged sewer systems, and the urgency of restoring water and food delivery systems. What was truly unprecedented in civil affairs operations during and after World War II was the scope of the rebuilding efforts undertaken by Allied civil affairs and military government personnel, the organization of those troops, and the doctrine and training they received.²

American civil affairs and military governance capabilities grew and organized in parallel with the United States military. Initially, under General Winfield Scott in Mexico City in 1847-1848, civil administration was a task executed on direction of the executive branch to its commander in the field with no specialized staff or troops, according to a loose guidance and the commander's best instincts. By World War II, almost one century later, the Army had developed and published its first manual on military government, *Field Manual 27-5*, to guide operations based upon doctrine that had been evolving since the American Civil War. Civil affairs and military governance activities had become the concern not only of national and international

² Alexander Mikaberidze, *The Burning of Moscow: Napoleon's Trial by Fire 1812* (Yorkshire: Pen & Sword, 2014), 268-283.

joint military staffs, but also the entirety of the federal executive departments. Far from being the sole responsibility of the theater commander, in World War II the War Department established a staff division focused solely on planning and preparing for civil affairs operations in liberated and occupied countries – the Civil Affairs Division (CAD). Rather than an additional duty assumed by soldiers and officers in the regular course of their wartime activities, military governance became the focus of extensive training programs at the School of Military Government (SMG) and the Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATS), which created units of specialists to plan and execute civil affairs and governance activities. These changes constitute an innovative approach to post-combat governance issues that had become a larger part of United States military responsibilities since 1860. Developments in civil administration were partly the result of the simultaneous efforts of the Progressive Era to bring order and structure to the military, and the pragmatic adaptation to the Army’s experiences in war and worldwide expansion in an increasingly modern world.

The history of the United States’ occupation and administration of the Philippines is a premiere example of the evolution of the American military’s civil administrative approach as it evolved from simple Army security in 1898, through an evolving ‘whole-of-government’ method, to what was practically the full military administration of the country by March 1945. The second liberation and subsequent administration of the Philippines by the United States Army was unique, not simply because of the physical characteristics of the operations, but more so because of the theater commander, General Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur used a rather self-reliant approach that rejected much of the direction from various authorities in Washington and adopted independently authored local solutions, but he took advantage of external resources when necessary. Ultimately the United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) under his

command had to accept external direction to gain external resources. The Army's civil administrative planning and execution in the Philippines in 1944-1945 was the direct result of the social, political, economic, and military relationships between Americans and Filipinos from 1898 to 1944, much of which involved MacArthur, and the institutional changes that developed from these interactions. The result was civil administration that met the local and immediate requirements suitable for the conditions at hand. By August 1945 the Army ended civil affairs operations and transferred responsibility to the Commonwealth government of the Philippines and the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA).

Published military histories of America in the Philippines during the Spanish-American war period provide mixed perspectives on military governance that omit many key details. John M. Gates' *Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1899-1902* and Stuart C. Miller's *"Benevolent Assimilation": The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903* form the nucleus of a debate over the character of the United States' actions in the Philippine-American War. Though Gates acknowledges military impropriety throughout the conflict, he asserts that the Army's active civil affairs efforts were beneficial and a significant contributor to the American victory by advancing General Elwell Otis's and General Arthur MacArthur's efforts to attract Filipino support. Miller condemns Gates' interpretation and, using suspect news reports from the time, characterizes the Army's operations as atrocity laden efforts at racist subjugation. The addition of Brian M. Linn's *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902* and later *The Philippine War, 1899-1902*, which tend to support Gates' interpretations, form a significant portion of the canon supporting the American military's counterinsurgency and pacification debate in the early 21st century that emphasizes the

significance of civil affairs.³

Most historians ‘bookend’ their consideration of the American-Filipino military relationship with the Spanish-American War and World War II without fully evaluating how that relationship developed between the wars. Taken together, Theodore Friend’s *Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines, 1929-1946* and Peter W. Stanley’s *A Nation in the Making: The Philippines and the United States, 1899-1921* provide a good overview of key events in the two nation’s developing relationship, though Stanley focuses on legislative and economic issues with little attention to defense topics. Friend’s insight and emphasis on the Philippine leaders - Manuel Quezon, Sergio Osmeña, Manuel Roxas, and José Laurel – provides much needed context to events leading to the creation of the Commonwealth and its actions in World War II. The best comprehensive historical overview is journalist Stanley Karnow’s very readable *In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines*. Karnow’s single-volume overview traces the entirety of the Filipino-American relationship from 1898 to 1986 through a largely American lens, with little discussion of military affairs, including governance, beyond the wars.⁴

Likewise, the military histories of World War II in the Philippines discuss very little of the role of civil affairs in securing the victory. The official United States Army histories--M. Hamlin Cannon’s *The War in the Pacific, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines*, and Robert R. Smith’s *Triumph in the Philippines*--hardly mention the planning and execution of civil relief and military administration. Smith devotes less than two pages to a discussion of civil affairs

³ John M. Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1899-1902* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973); Stuart C. Miller, *"Benevolent Assimilation": The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); Brian M. Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989); Brian M. Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000).

⁴ Stanley Karnow, *In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines* (New York: Ballantine, 1989); Peter W. Stanley, *A Nation in the Making: The Philippines and the United States, 1899-1921* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974); Theodore Friend, *Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines, 1929-1946* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

planning, relief logistics, and Philippine Civil Affairs Unit (PCAU) disposition, and much of this is erroneous. Cannon's six pages are a decent overview of some issues involved in planning for and operating on Leyte, but he fails to discuss any of Eighth Army's civil affairs operations. The memoirs of the Sixth and Eighth Army commanders, respectively Walter Krueger's *From Down Under to Nippon* and Robert L. Eichelberger's *Our Jungle Road to Tokyo*, are similarly poor records of civil affairs. Krueger devotes a half page to the organization of civil affairs that, unsurprisingly and mistakenly, credits his Civil Affairs Officer with the creation of the PCAUs. Eichelberger makes no mention of civil affairs, or his truly remarkable Civil Affairs Officer, Colonel Donovan Vance. Secondary scholarship is no better. Ronald H. Spector's *Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan*, John Prados' *Storm Over Leyte: The Philippine Invasion and the Destruction of the Japanese Navy*, and Ian W. Toll, *Twilight of the Gods: War in the Western Pacific, 1944-1945*, while wonderful histories, ignore civil affairs in typical fashion.⁵

General Douglas MacArthur features prominently in most of the histories of the United States military in the mid-twentieth century, particularly those discussing the Pacific region and the Philippines in particular. Indeed, the General's career influenced much of what the Army is today, from his impact as superintendent of the United States Military Academy (the topic of an upcoming book by West Point Command Historian Sherman Fleek), to his time as Army Chief of Staff, MacArthur's intelligence, hubris, and courage left an indelible mark on the institutions

⁵ M. Hamlin Cannon, *United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954); Robert R. Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963); Walter Krueger, *From Down Under to Nippon: The Story of Sixth Army in World War II* (Washington: Zenger Publishing, 1953); Robert L. Eichelberger, *Our Jungle Road to Tokyo* (New York: Viking Press, 1950); Ronald H. Spector, *Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan* (New York: Macmillan, 1985); John Prados, *Storm Over Leyte: The Philippine Invasion and the Destruction of the Japanese Navy* (New York: New American Library, 2015); Ian W. Toll, *Twilight of the Gods: War in the Western Pacific, 1944-1945* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2020).

that he touched. Indeed, his legacy in Filipinos' military history is peerless – historian Samuel Eliot Morison described him as “the greatest single figure in the military history of the Philippines.”⁶ Yet MacArthur's time in the Philippines prior to World War II is not heavily considered. Accounts of the General's time in the decade from 1935 to 1945 are checkered with self-serving accounts and objective brilliance. MacArthur himself, in his memoir *Reminiscences*, devotes about three pages to three pre-war tours in the Philippines, and just over five pages to his time as military advisor to President Manuel Quezon. More than most, MacArthur's memoir should be referenced with caution. The best biography of MacArthur is probably James D. Clayton's three-volume set *The Years Of MacArthur*. Clayton is generally balanced in his praise and criticism of MacArthur, but his understanding of the Philippines and the Army's impact there are his weaknesses. Walter R. Borneman's *MacArthur at War* is a critical look at the General that contains seeming begrudging respect. Borneman gives some attention to MacArthur's early years, but his focus on MacArthur's time in the Philippines before 1935 is mostly devoted to his political ambitions. One particularly interesting book is Carol M. Petillo's *Douglas MacArthur: The Philippine Years*. Petillo uses atypical sources – MacArthur's poetry for example – to build a psychological profile of the man. Though this particular approach is less valuable to historians, her use of Philippine sources, and focus on MacArthur's time in the Philippines and relationships with Filipino leaders Quezon, Sergio Osmeña, and Manuel Roxas provided important context to analysis of his later decisions regarding civil administration and Philippine independence.⁷

⁶ Samuel Eliot Morrison, *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume III, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April 1942* (Boston: Little Brown & Company, 1948),150.

⁷ Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964); James D. Clayton, *The Years of MacArthur, Volume 1, 1880 – 1941*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970); James D. Clayton, *The Years of MacArthur, Volume 2, 1941-1945*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975); James D. Clayton, *The Years of MacArthur, Volume 3, Triumph and Disaster, 1945-1964*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985); Walter R. Borneman, *MacArthur at War*:

Esoteric civil affairs and military government histories fall short in their treatment of the Philippines in World War II. William E. Daugherty and Marshall Andrews' *A Review of US Historical Experience with Civil Affairs, 1776-1954*, was commissioned in 1960 to review and codify the United States Army's experiences with civil affairs and military governance. Their fifteen pages devoted to civil administrative events from 1898 to 1902 are excellent, but they offer no historical connection between the events following the Spanish-American War and the civil administration of the Philippines in 1944 and 1945, to which they give six pages that repeat some of the errors of Krueger, Smith, and Cannon.⁸

In 1964, the most prominent work on military government was published: Harry L. Coles' and Albert K. Weinberg's *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*. Their work is largely an edited collection of official messages, memoranda, and military communications that are organized chronologically and collated into topical groups. *Soldiers Become Governors* focuses exclusively on Africa and Italy and the liberated nations in the European theater, with no mention of Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Germany. The book's strongest point is its insight into the debates among senior leadership – including Franklin D. Roosevelt, George C. Marshall, and Dwight D. Eisenhower – regarding the initial planning for and conduct of military government, particularly the development of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department.⁹

Stanley Sandler, the former command historian for the United States Army Special Operations Command – the agency responsible for the promulgation of modern civil affairs operations – published *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S.*

World War II in the Pacific, (New York: Little Brown & Company, 2016); Carol Morris Petillo, *Douglas MacArthur: The Philippine Years* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981).

⁸ William E. Daugherty and Marshall Andrews, *A Review of US Historical Experience with Civil Affairs, 1776-1954* (Bethesda, MD: Operations Research Office, 1961).

⁹ Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, eds., *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*, (Washington: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1964).

Army Tactical Civil Affairs/Military Government, 1775-1991 in 1994 as a text to assist in training civil affairs soldiers. Much like Daugherty and Andrews, Sandler gives much attention to governance during the 1898 to 1902 period, and he neglects to connect events over time to World War II, to which he devotes only a single page to civil administration in the Philippines.¹⁰

In her fine history *War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Success Into Political Victory*, Nadia Schadlow asserts that the United States Army should always have responsibility for governance duties in a war as it is the only organization “capable of decisively acquiring, holding, and stabilizing territory in sufficient scale for ample duration to provide a foundation for a transition to the reestablishment of political order.” Her comprehensive history fills many of the analytical gaps in the historiography with this argument, but her narrative remains focused at the strategic and policy level, with little analysis tying actions on the ground to political results. Schadlow gives a short treatment of civil affairs in the Philippines during the Spanish-American and Philippine-American wars, but makes no mention of events there in World War II.¹¹

This dissertation seeks to fill several gaps in the historiography. It attempts to link events of the Spanish-American War and subsequent actions to the civil administration and liberation of the islands in 1945 as a continuum of events and makes the argument that the United States Army’s civil affairs efforts of 1944-1945 were greatly affected by four decades of interaction, and not simply the isolated result of eighteen months of planning and execution. To accomplish this, this work also comprehensively traces the civil affairs efforts of the United States Sixth and Eighth Armies from Leyte to Manila, the record of which only currently exists in archived reports. Likewise, it discusses the process of strategic and operational planning for civil affairs

¹⁰ Stanley Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Tactical Civil Affairs/Military Government, 1775-1991* (United States, 1994).

¹¹ Nadia Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory* (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2017), 14.

for the Philippines and how friction among the various stakeholders and interests shaped the final plans – accounts of which are also relegated to unpublished memoirs and archives. As a case study, this work also demonstrates the development of American civil affairs and military government doctrine and institutions from 1898 to 1945 as a pragmatic consequence of the military’s experience. In doing this, it addresses several often overlooked themes, including tension between American military and civilian leaders, the importance of creating and following coherent national strategy in all aspects of military operations, the impact of colonialism, and the difficulties of developing civil affairs policy during combat operations.

CHAPTER 1

THE FOUNDATIONS OF CIVIL AFFAIRS

In an atypical comparison in the weeks prior to Operation Overlord, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower equated the mission and organization of the Civil Affairs Department with a relatively new but already proven technology by declaring that it was “as modern as Radar and... just as important to the Command.”¹² In discussions today, innovation in World War II is normally associated with advances in technology such as the development of tanks like the German Panzer IV, the British Cromwell, the Russian T-34, and the American M4 Sherman, as well as bombers like the British Stirling and Lancaster, and the American B-17, B-24, and B-29. Likewise, the creation of radar, aircraft carriers, and portable push-to-talk radios, are also in the forefront in the minds of those who contemplate evolutions or revolutions in warfare.¹³ Yet this focus on technology constrains discussion of the broader possibilities in innovation, often ignoring changes to doctrine. While weapons and equipment are the tools of destruction in war, it is the means of employment, the doctrine and tactics, which result in destruction, devastation, and defeat of the enemy. As many historians of the European Theater in World War II note, it was not France’s lack of technology that led to its rapid defeat in 1940, but rather the relative weakness of its military doctrine.¹⁴ Far from being focused on technology, military innovation is

¹² Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Remarks to ECAD & SHAEF Officer Personnel at Civil Affairs Center, APO 645, May 9, 1944,” Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Museum and Boyhood Home, http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/all_about_ike/speeches/pre_presidential_speeches.pdf (accessed November 2, 2015), 12.

¹³ David Johnson, *Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the United States Army, 1917-1945* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 1-15. Johnson effectively encapsulates the historical discussion of innovation, but limits his discussion to technology.

¹⁴ The surprising victory of the Germans over the French in 1940 has inspired countless volumes. Among the best discussions of the role of technology and doctrine in the outcome are: Robert M. Citino, *Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004), Robert A. Doughty, *The Seeds of Disaster: the Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1985), Alistair Horne, *To Lose a Battle: France 1940* (London: Penguin, 1990), and Eugenia Kiesling, *Arming Against Hitler: France and the Limits of Military Planning* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996).

the result of changes in any organization, technology, tactics, techniques, procedures, or doctrine to address a characteristic of war in a new way. If the result is surprisingly effective, it is often heralded as revolutionary. Along these lines, one of the greatest military innovations in the twentieth century is the development of United States Army military government.

The technological leap in air power in World War II, specifically strategic bombing, brought with it unprecedented physical destruction. From west to east, a sampling of the numbers in Europe alone are staggering: 202,000 homes destroyed and 4.5 million more damaged in the United Kingdom during the nine months of “the Blitz.”¹⁵ Three quarters of Caen, Le Havre, and Saint Lo were assessed as destroyed before the Allied amphibious operations starting on 6 June 1944,¹⁶ with overall claims for 460,000 homes destroyed and 1.9 million damaged in France.¹⁷ Germany lost 3.8 million homes, or twenty percent of its living spaces countrywide,¹⁸ with estimates for Berlin at fifty percent, Hamburg at fifty-three percent, and Cologne at seventy percent.¹⁹ Warsaw popularly holds the black title of World War II’s ‘most destroyed city’, with ninety-three percent of its living spaces destroyed.²⁰ Destruction in the Soviet Union was so widespread that historian Keith Lowe measured it not in terms of houses, but towns destroyed,

¹⁵ Winston Churchill, *Statistics Relating to the War Effort of the United Kingdom* (London: HMSO, 1944), 9.

¹⁶ William I. Hitchcock, *The Bitter Road to Freedom: A New History of the Liberation of Europe* (New York: Free Press, 2008), 44.

¹⁷ J. P. Rioux and G. Rogers, *The Fourth Republic, 1944-1958* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 471.

¹⁸ Adam Tooze, *Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy* (New York: Penguin, 2006), 617.

¹⁹ Keith Lowe, *Savage Continent: Europe in the Aftermath of World War II* (New York: Saint Martins Press, 2012), 6.

²⁰ *Warsaw Accuses: Guidebook to the Exhibition Arranged by the Office of Reconstruction of the Capital Together with the National Museum in Warsaw, May-June 1945* (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1945), 19-24. While so-called “definitive” comparisons abound, the title of “most destroyed” city repeatedly is awarded to Warsaw, without any meaningful objective standards of evaluation. Douglas MacArthur is most frequently attributed as the expert source for many of the subjective evaluations, allegedly saying: “Manila is the most devastated city in the world, next to Warsaw.” Unsurprisingly the documentation for this quote is hard to isolate, and equally unsurprisingly Filipinos most often promulgate it.

with 1,700 across the USSR.²¹ East Asia saw similar destruction. A congressionally ordered survey of the Philippines revealed over 738,000 private property claims alone, with destruction of some areas in Manila estimated as high as ninety-three percent.²² Likewise, application of modern technology in war meant that “approximately 30 percent of the entire urban population of Japan lost their homes.”²³ These numbers only represent an evaluation of the destruction of living spaces and private property – a fair measure of one direct impact on the population writ large. A comprehensive description of the comparable impact on industry, transportation, infrastructure, and agriculture would consume far more space than is prudent; the numbers presented here should suffice as a demonstration of ‘unprecedented destruction’ resulting from innovative technological developments in the war. Such unprecedented destruction was an anticipated, if not intended, feature of World War II.

Developments in civil affairs and military government operations in World War II were an innovative attempt to ameliorate the hyper-destructive effects of modern war upon populations caught in the path of conflict; however, this advance was not an *ex nihilo* development in military thinking, but rather the product of nearly a century of education, reflection, and experience. This experience led to three important innovations that directly demonstrated a change in how the Army thought about the conduct and outcome of war: the codification of Army Civil Affairs doctrine in a field manual, the establishment of a school to formally train soldiers in civil affairs duties within distinct units, and the establishment of the

²¹ Lowe, *Savage Continent*, 6.

²² War Damage Corporation, *Survey of War Damage in the Philippines: Report of the Special Investigating Mission Sent to the Philippines in June 1945 by the War Damage Corporation and Completed in September 1945* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1945), 3, 14. This report does not clearly delineate the types of private property destroyed, conflating homes, private businesses, and automobiles.

²³ United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *Summary Report (Pacific War)* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946), 18.

Civil Affairs Department (CAD) in the War Department to integrate and coordinate civil affairs and military government planning efforts.

Though aided in great measure by the State Department and to a lesser degree other federal agencies, throughout World War II the Army had the greatest role in developing and executing plans to conduct long-term governance operations in the liberated and occupied territories around the world. The civil affairs and military government officers executing these plans day-to-day made countless decisions outside the anticipated scope of the plans based on their training and the doctrinal guidance provided by the Army. The foundations of this doctrine relied on the Army's institutional experiences with governance, which tenuously reach back to its days as the Continental Army under George Washington but really began with the challenges faced by the Army in its campaigns of conquest, beginning with the Mexican War.²⁴

There are a multitude of definitions for military doctrine. In this context, military “doctrine” is the codified common frame of reference that directs military action. It differs from military “theory” in that theory lacks the imprimatur of institutional approval – it is merely a good idea. For the purpose of this chapter, doctrine is the officially approved corpus of knowledge an army distributes via publications that represent the institution's approach to the conduct of war.²⁵ Doctrine is not necessarily prescriptive. It may dictate ideas that are critical for harmonious operational synchronization – such as having an army lead with one third of its artillery forward, or requiring all corps stay within a day's march of each other – but it typically does not dictate actions that are not required for coordination of efforts across the broader force. Doctrine facilitates what is now called ‘mission command’ by creating a common language and

²⁴ William E. Daugherty and Marshall Andrews, *A Review of US Historical Experience with Civil Affairs, 1776-1954* (Bethesda, MD: Operations Research Office, 1961), passim.

²⁵ Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860 - 1941* (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2003), 5.

parameters for action, fostering a “common understanding of individual and unit actions to be undertaken when necessary.”²⁶ Thus, a commander can issue instructions much more efficiently, only needing to define the desired end, not necessarily explaining how to get there or specific actions to take, and leaving localized details (e.g. – determining when an action is necessary) open for subordinates to address. The latter can then execute military actions confident that they are operating in a way that is understood and supported by other commanders, as well as those charged with logistical, intelligence, and communications support. Good doctrine thus creates a common understanding of the battlefield that helps reduce the effects of friction and the fog of war, without prescribing actions that create a hidebound, constrained force incapable of reacting to uncertainty.²⁷

Prior to World War II, the Army’s codified doctrine was sparse and focused primarily on the core functions of combat tactics, maneuver, and logistics. Much information on the panoply of then non-doctrinal subjects was acquired through ancillary study of past and contemporary military theorists, as well as contemporary studies in diverse subjects including ethics, law, engineering, medicine, and communications. Army officers discussed and pondered these writings, and passed their thoughts and experiences person-to-person in a quasi-apprenticeship situation.²⁸ Doctrinally, the pre-World War II lineage of civil affairs and military governance

²⁶ Walter E. Kretchik, *U.S. Army Doctrine From the American Revolution to the War on Terror* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 1.

²⁷ Birtle, *Counterinsurgency*, 4-11; Mark Attrill, "NATO Doctrine: Joint Warfare Center's Role in Its Development," *The Three Swords* (May 2015), 14; Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine*, March 03, 2021, <https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/Joint-Doctrine-Pubs/> (accessed March 03, 2021).

²⁸ For a comprehensive discussion of Army doctrinal development, see Walter E. Kretchik, *U.S. Army Doctrine From the American Revolution to the War on Terror* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011), in particular pages 1-55, Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860 - 1941* (Washington: U. S. Army Center of Military History, 2003), United States War Department, *Rules And Regulations for the Field Exercise And Manoeuvres of Infantry*, 4th ed., corrected. (New York: W.A. Mercein, 1820), and Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson, *Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1982), 27-40.

operations extends through all its early endeavors, particularly its time as a frontier constabulary force during westward expansion, but it is most conspicuously seen in the major conflicts of the Mexican War, Civil War, and World War I. The Army prior to the invasion of Mexico in 1846 was little more than a frontier fighting force, but it would emerge from World War I, if not larger, then at least with sound staff, doctrine, and training infrastructures in place.

James K. Polk won the presidential election of 1844 with the explicit intent of expanding the United States – south through Texas and west to the Pacific Ocean – using the Army.²⁹ The war with Mexico reified his intent. Polk’s military strategy was to seize and hold New Mexico and California while waiting for what became a gradually increasing amount of military pressure to force the Mexican government to accede to the loss of territory.³⁰ Though the Army invaded Mexico marching at the rate prescribed by the French-based *Infantry Tactics* – in development since 1815 – there was no doctrine for military governance or civil affairs to guide their efforts once they got there.³¹ What actions they took to govern relations with the Mexican population were largely based on commanders’ personal dictates and vague but precedent-setting orders issued by Secretary of War William Marcy.

On 3 June 1846, Marcy instructed Gen. Stephen W. Kearny that, in taking possession of California and New Mexico, he would “establish temporary civil governments therein,...[in which] it would be prudent to continue in their employment all such of the existing officers as are known to be friendly to the United States.”³² Marcy thus established what has been a fundamental principle in nearly all Army military government operations: indirect rule. Indirect

²⁹ K. Jack Bauer, *The Mexican War 1846-1848* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1974), 7-9.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, xix – xx.

³¹ Kretchik, *Army Doctrine*, 57-58.

³² As reproduced in William E. Birkhimer, *Military Government and Martial Law* (Kansas City, MO: Franklin Hudson Publishing, 1892), 102.

rule allows the indigenous population to govern itself under the oversight of Army officers. Later that August, Comm. Robert F. Stockton implemented the same policy. Much of the motivation behind the introduction of indirect rule was twofold. First, the policy was designed to undermine Mexican charges that Americans were engaged in “rapine and plunder.” Second, it sought to pacify the territory by “allay[ing] the fears and win[ning] the confidence of the conquered people by adopting toward them a line of conduct which they can see is calculated to guard their rights and liberties, civil and religious, and render them secure in person and property.”³³ Both Kearny and Stockton issued proclamations declaring military government and reassuring the people of their security in persons, property, and religion. Without a doctrinal basis for implementing military government, Kearny exceeded his authority and promised annexation to the occupants of New Mexico, absolving “all persons residing within the boundaries of New Mexico from any further allegiance to the Republic of Mexico,” without presidential or congressional approval.³⁴

Generals Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott were likewise issued ambiguous orders. Their objective was clear: compel the Mexican government to consent to the loss of territory by way of military force. Their constraints and limitations were murky. Marcy’s instructions to Scott did not “propose to control [Scott’s] operations by definite and positive instructions,” but rather, “left [him] to prosecute [operations] as [Scott’s] judgement [sic]... shall dictate.”³⁵ Taylor’s occupation of Monterey and defeat of the Mexican army at Buena Vista were militarily significant, but did not accomplish Polk’s strategic end, thus Scott occupied Mexico City,

³³ United States Congress, "Mexican War Correspondence," Library of Congress, April 28, 1848, p. 157, <https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llss&fileName=0500/0520/llss0520.db&recNum=14> (accessed February 12, 2017); Birkhimer, *Military Government*, 101-102.

³⁴ As reproduced in Appendix A of Daugherty and Andrews, *Review of US Historical Experience with Civil Affairs*, 158-168. Kearny is quoted on p. 161.

³⁵ “Mexican War Correspondence,” 372.

placing his forces in a position that potentially threatened to completely seize the country.³⁶

Secretary Marcy's guidance provided the justification for both expansionist and occupation military governments but gave no operational direction. Because "The management of these delicate movements [was] confided to [commander's] discretion," all operational details were left to the local commander.³⁷ As with all operations so vaguely directed, this had the predictable results of confusion and internal friction. Though tactically victorious, Taylor's troops were infamously depredatory and alienated the population.³⁸ After his similar tactical success, Scott published what is in essence the first doctrinal American document on military governance, his General Order Number 20 (GO 20). GO 20 established a legal framework defining criminality and punishing infractions by both American military personnel and Mexican civilians equally. Scott may have been motivated by the imperative to secure his long lines of communication, but he did so with an innovative if extra-legal approach that secured the population by providing for their immediate economic, health, and security needs. He levied taxes, secured religious freedom and property, and put into practice the best public health measures known at the time. With these policies, and the equitable dispensation of justice, he won the support of the population.³⁹

Scott's approach to military government – martial law – addressed the judicial, economic, and medical requirements of both his troops and Mexican citizens alike. He realized that the military situation necessitated that both soldiers and civilians be tried and punished for extra-military infractions, something existing military code at the time did not allow. The concept of

³⁶ Bauer, *Mexican War*, xx.

³⁷ "Mexican War Correspondence," 156-157.

³⁸ Daugherty and Andrews, *Review of US Historical Experience with Civil Affairs*, 75.

³⁹ GO 20 was initially issued at Tampico on 19 February 1847. It was republished at Veracruz as General Order 87, and again as General Order 287 with minor expansion in Mexico City. These orders are reproduced in Appendix A of Daugherty and Andrews, *A Review of US Historical Experience with Civil Affairs*, 85, 469 – 474.

martial law ran counter to the American concept that the rule of law directed civil government, and that civil authority transcended military power. Thus, martial law was viewed as tyranny, and could therefore not receive the imprimatur of the Polk administration. Scott thus acted of his own accord.⁴⁰

Lack of doctrine directly led to confusion between civilian authorities and military commanders. Vague guidance led Kearny to exceed his constitutional authority. Scott took a militarily important calculated risk that could have ended badly for him personally had the outcome been poor. Yet the Mexican War set a precedent for doctrinal civil affairs and military government operations that formed the foundation of a greatly expanded effort less than twenty years later in the American Civil War, which demonstrated the continued need for civil affairs and military governance operations to consolidate and reify the political and strategic objectives of war. It also demonstrated the Army's continued challenges in achieving this unity of effort. Though the war spawned one of the key documents in international military law--the Lieber Code, also known as General Order Number 100 (GO 100) -- direction from President Abraham Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton continued to be vague, and Army commanders continued to act autonomously, though usually within the constraints of the code.⁴¹

The United States military entered the Civil War without a codified, coherent civil affairs and military governance doctrine. The armies of the Union invaded the Confederacy with seemingly as many approaches to military governance as there were Union commanders. The governance challenges posed during the Civil War largely arose from clashes between the latter

⁴⁰ Scott appealed to President Polk and Secretary Marcy to amend the articles of war, such as they were, but due to post-Jacksonian political considerations the administration demurred. The concept of martial law was anathema to adherents of Jacksonian individualism. See Ralph H. Gabriel, "American Experience with Military Government," *The American Historical Review* 49 (July 1944), 633-634.

⁴¹ Robert J. Futrell, "Federal Military Government in the South, 1861-1865," *Military Affairs* 15 (Winter 1951), 181-191.

and the presidentially appointed military governors (civilians, who had the rank of brigadier general).⁴²

The principles of military governance followed by the Regular officers of the Union army in 1861 were founded on what they loosely termed “the rules of war,” the legal foundations of which had been solidly taught at the United States Military Academy and were grounded in international law.⁴³ By 1862 the various interpretations of these rules were wide-ranging. One side, typified by Gen. George B. McClellan, urged that Confederates be extended legal status of full belligerency rather than that of rebellious traitors – squarely placing them under the protection of international laws. On the other side were generals like John Pope and Benjamin F. Butler, who viewed the South as engaging in rebellion against legal authority, and as such its citizenry had forfeited their civil rights. A subset of abolitionists in this group of generals viewed Confederates as criminals and wanted their property confiscated – their slaves freed – without compensation.⁴⁴ These diverse interpretations of law, and the influx of volunteer officers not formally schooled in war, necessitated the development and publication of a code of conduct to govern the behavior of Union interactions with Confederate civilians. Lincoln thus appointed a committee that created the “Code of War for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field,” which on 24 April 1863 was published as GO 100.⁴⁵

GO 100 was also known as the Lieber Code after its principal author, Francis Lieber. The

⁴² Daugherty and Andrews, *A Review of US Historical Experience with Civil Affairs*, 94-95; Nadia Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory* (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2017), 44-45, 76-77. The tension inherent in the division of command between civilian and military control of governance operations has been a perennial to challenge to the US Army throughout its civil affairs history.

⁴³ Futrell, “Military Government in the South,” 181.

⁴⁴ Daugherty and Andrews, *A Review of US Historical Experience with Civil Affairs*, 94-95.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 96. The Lieber Code here described is reproduced in *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 130 vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880-1902), Series III, Volume 3, pp. 148 – 164.

order was the first formal effort by an American or European nation to codify “laws of war” into a workable published doctrine.⁴⁶ The Lieber Code began with a phrase the borrowed heavily from Scott’s GO 20, “A place, district, or country occupied by an enemy stands in consequence of the occupation, under the Martial Law of the invading or occupying army, whether any proclamation declaring Martial Law, or any public warning to the inhabitants has been issued or not.”⁴⁷ The code solidly placed responsibility for the wellbeing of all residents in an occupied territory on the commander, though the order did not constrain Union generals in their military actions, or dictate the specifics of how they should adhere to it. As General Halleck explained, GO 100:

was intended to embody the general principles of the laws of war, or the general rules by which the commanders of armies... are to be governed in their treatment of the inhabitants of the Country militarily occupied. The application of these principles... will be left mainly to the judgment and discretion of the commanders whose knowledge of the circumstances of each case, it is presumed, best qualifies them to decide.⁴⁸

The principle of military necessity and the primacy of military operations were thus preserved. Union generals’ approaches were varied under the latitude granted by GO 100, and their efforts expanded beyond those in Scott’s Mexican experience into areas that could be categorized as public administration, justice, public finance, public education, and public health. Much of this expansion can be explained as a result of the greater sense of civic responsibility some Union officers felt, largely due to the ‘domestic’ nature of the Civil War. GO 100 was praised by one later writer as being superior to all subsequent codes in that it was inherently practical – designed to be a pragmatic implementation of high-minded ideals– because it was

⁴⁶ Gabriel, "American Experience with Military Government," 638.

⁴⁷ *War of the Rebellion*, III, 3: 148.

⁴⁸ Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck to Maj. Gen Stephen A. Hurlburt, June 22, 1863, reproduced in Futrell, "Military Government in the South," 181.

immediately required to be “Instructions for Armies in the Field” during an intense on-going conflict.⁴⁹

Responsibility for civil administration was an anticipated consequence of the larger political and strategic aims of the North. In order to restore the Union with the least amount of long-term effort, Southerners had to be returned to a self-sustaining but compliant condition. This was best accomplished by the efforts of loyal local public servants. Though the principle of indirect rule established by Scott was well known, and generally desirable, across the South, Union generals assessed the loyalty of existing public servants, and frequently replaced those whose loyalty was lacking, regardless of their vocational qualifications. The preferred method for acquiring allegiance was the loyalty oath, and officers were liberal in their application of such. Federal commanders who could not otherwise appoint loyal replacements often found themselves responsible for local elections.⁵⁰ Likewise, administration of justice fell to Union commanders by virtue of martial law. As with Scott in Mexico, in order to secure rear areas, foster the rule of law, and encourage a return to civil discourse, Union commanders found it necessary to broaden their judicial influence to include civil jurisprudence. Where civil courts were nonexistent, crimes normally falling under their jurisdiction became the responsibility of either military commissions or provost courts. Even where civil courts remained viable, Union officers or presidentially appointed provisional judges oversaw their actions in everything from criminal cases to estate settlement and divorce resolution.⁵¹

As slaves were freed and Confederate dollars outlawed, Union commanders found they had to stabilize local economies in order to promote a return to self-reliance, reduce criminality,

⁴⁹ Birkhimer, *Military Government and Martial Law*, 5-6.

⁵⁰ Daugherty and Andrews, *Review of US Historical Experience with Civil Affairs*, 105.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 107.

and pacify the population. Provost marshals regulated the hours worked and wages paid to freedmen, as well as their contracts. Cotton and other commodities again fell under federal regulation and merchants had to prove loyalty and willingness to abide by regulations in order to engage in commerce. Commanders compelled Southern banks to pay their debts in Treasury notes, gold and silver, or private bank notes that had been certified by a military commission. Military personnel collected taxes, and in some cases the military governor levied special taxes. In one particular example, Butler imposed special taxes on financiers of the Confederate army and used the funds to relieve poverty in New Orleans.⁵²

In what were clearly measures intended to protect their own troops, but also to promote the general welfare and foster a return to self-management, Union officers instituted public health and education programs. Where necessary, the military inoculated Southerners against smallpox, initiated policies to address the spread of venereal disease, and instituted sanitation programs to clean up sources of disease. Army personnel distributed thousands of military rations to starving refugees. By the end of the war, the Union army was experienced and well prepared to enact the Reconstruction policies of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, created by an executive order in March 1865.⁵³

The scope, location, scale and purpose of the Civil War forced Union commanders and their troops to assume unprecedented levels of responsibility for civil affairs and military governance. While much of this was anticipated in the objective of restoring the Union by

⁵² Daugherty and Andrews, *Review of US Historical Experience with Civil Affairs*, 108-110.

⁵³ Stanley Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Tactical Civil Affairs/Military Government, 1775-1991* (United States, 1994), 71; Daugherty and Andrews, *Review of US Historical Experience with Civil Affairs*, 110; Burrus M. Carnahan, "Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The Origins and Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity," *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 92, no. 2 (1998): 215; S M Reid-Henry, "Humanitarianism as Liberal Diagnostic: Humanitarian Reason and the Political Rationalities of the Liberal Will-to-Care," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, vol. 39, no. 3 (2014): 423; Tanisha M. Fazal and Brooke C. Greene, "A Particular Difference: European Identity and Civilian Targeting," *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 45, no. 4 (October 2015): 839.

military force, the Army lacked a solid doctrinal foundation on which it could base civil operations, so it initially relied on the education, ethics, and judgment of its commanders. The inconsistent outlook and abilities of Union officers quickly forced doctrinal development to unify civil affairs efforts. The key civil affairs and military government doctrinal development of the American Civil War, the Lieber Code, was short lived in its actual implementation because it was rendered obsolete when Congress implemented its own rules for Reconstruction in 1867. Its legacy remained however, as GO 100 formed the codified basis for the Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907.⁵⁴

Subsequent to the Civil War, between 1865 and 1916, the Army participated in numerous expeditions against Native Americans in westward expansion, fought the Spanish American War in Cuba and the Philippines, and sent soldiers to various ventures in the Caribbean and Mexico. During this era the Army organized military governance in Cuba twice (once in 1898 and again in 1906), as well as in the Philippines, Mexico, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic.⁵⁵ Military commanders thus gained valuable experience in labor procurement, tax policy, public safety, public health and sanitation, education, public works, and public finance. Due to the nature of communications at the time, commanders frequently found themselves making ad hoc decisions based on their understanding of general principles and policy, and just as often they found those decisions countermanded by authorities in Washington – a situation that one historian blames for extending the Philippine Insurrection.⁵⁶ Though commanders, and the military institutionally, gained significant experience, there were few meaningful doctrinal developments. Thus, the principles initiated by General Scott in Mexico City were used by the Army in France in World

⁵⁴ Daugherty and Andrews, *Review of US Historical Experience with Civil Affairs*, 111.

⁵⁵ Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come*, 89, 97, 106, 109, 114-125.

⁵⁶ Daugherty and Andrews, *Review of US Historical Experience with Civil Affairs*, 153.

War I. But exactly how these principles were passed on changed as those associated with Army civil governance began to codify their experiences in books and through instruction in formal professional development courses and institutions.⁵⁷

As the nineteenth century ended, there were two significant, intertwined developments that helped further the institutionalization of military government: first, the historical codification of the Army's experience with military governance; and second, the formal installation of military government pedagogy in Army officer education. In the mid-1880s, President Grover Cleveland ordered the Commanding General of the Army, Philip Sheridan, to assist Gov. Watson C. Squire of the Washington Territory, who was struggling to end a widespread series of anti-Chinese labor protests. To protect the Chinese and disperse mobs, Governor Squire activated the local militia and ordered martial law. General Sheridan eventually provided federal troops to assist. When the situation resolved, both Squire and Sheridan found themselves defendants in lawsuits. This prompted Sheridan to seek the aid of his acting Judge Advocate General, Lt. William E. Birkhimer, who began his military career in 1864 at the age of sixteen as a private with the 4th Iowa Cavalry. He had received a commission from West Point in 1870 and eventually would receive the Medal of Honor in 1899 for actions at San Miguel in the Philippines. Birkhimer's legal acumen was respected enough that he was appointed as the Judge Advocate in 1886 and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines in 1899. To aid Sheridan and Squire, he dug deep into historical martial law and military government case law. Though the lawsuit was dropped before it came to court, Birkhimer continued his research, ultimately publishing *Military Government and Martial Law* in 1892, the first published compendium of military governance. Clearly intended as a philosophical and legal justification

⁵⁷ Gabriel, "American Experience with Military Government," 420.

for the practice, rather than a purely historical analysis, his work delivered primary insights into the development of military government that formed the basis for subsequent military government philosophy.⁵⁸

The study published by Birkhimer in 1892 – there is a longer 1914 edition - accomplished two objectives: legal justification for military government and definition of its broad responsibilities. Birkhimer defined not only the term but also the legal justification for military government. In his lengthy introduction, the author traces what he refers to as a “revolutionary” effort to develop a legal theory of military governance based on the laws of war.⁵⁹ He begins with the raw claim that property is a right of conquest, which he argues has existed “from the earliest times down through Napoleonic period.”⁶⁰ Birkhimer wrote that the 1856 Declaration of Paris was the start of a formally codified effort to minimize the “evils which attend the prosecution of hostilities,” which continued through the first Geneva convention to the St. Petersburg Convention of 1868. These agreements were varied in their scope, addressing privateering, treatment of victims of war, and restrictions in the use of certain types of ammunition, and they show a commitment to ameliorate the effects of war. Birkhimer asserted that military governance was first formally mandated in the international community by the 1874 Brussels Conference, the declaration of which he argued was primarily based on GO 100, the effort to standardize military governance and responsibilities during the American Civil War.⁶¹

⁵⁸ Charles B. Hall, *Annual Report of The Commandant: U.S. Infantry and Cavalry School, U.S. Signal School, and Army Staff College for the Year Ending August 31, 1907* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Staff College Press, 1907), 128. The annual reports from 1907 to 1935, herein cited, were provided to the author by Timothy Nenniger of the National Archives and Research Administration at College Park, Maryland, and Elizabeth Dubuisson of the Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. See also Birkhimer, *Military Government and Martial Law*, 6-7.

⁵⁹ Birkhimer, *Military Government and Martial Law*, 4.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 4-6.

He ultimately argued that armies have a legal mandate to establish military government over occupied areas in foreign territories (which he differs from martial law, defining that as being over loyal territory).

Three main elements of Birkhimer's work are of particular note for their influence on the development of military government doctrine. First is his legal justification and mandate for military government, which he reminds readers was founded in the United States Constitution, as it established the right and responsibility of the armed forces to form military governments "in time of foreign war without the boundaries of the United States, or in time of rebellion and civil war within states or districts occupied by rebels treated as belligerents."⁶² Derived from the 1866 Supreme Court decision in *ex parte Milligan*, the duty to impose military government was, according to Birkhimer, an executive branch power extending from its war-making authority. Subordinates engaged in military governance were accountable to their chain of command, and ultimately to the president. Thus, he deemed that commanders of armies (and therefore armies) were legally responsible to provide governmental security for the 'constituents' in the territory they occupied after the former government was displaced. He justified this argument based on examples from English Common Law, and historical examples from the American Revolution, the American Civil War (specifically cases arising from the occupation of New Orleans), and the Franco-Prussian War.

Intriguingly, Birkhimer asserted that citizens of a newly occupied area owe obedience to the military occupiers, a concept he referred to as the theory of "temporary allegiance":

The establishment of military government is considered to be, primarily, for the advantage of the invader; but this is more in appearance than reality, arising from the circumstance that the occupying army alone has the power at the time to maintain

⁶² United States Supreme Court, "Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2," *Justia US Supreme Court*, 1866, <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/71/2/> (accessed June 17, 2019).

government of any kind; in fact, such government is of most advantage to the inhabitants of the territory over which it is instituted. Without it they would be left a prey to the uncertain demands of a dominant military, which, without perhaps intending it and through mere want of system, might oppress them; with it, so long as they conform to the will of their new rulers, they generally are left unmolested in ordinary domestic and business relations, and largely in municipal affairs.

Birkhimer declared that citizens are legally and morally bound to support that governance of the occupier until such time as a permanent government is established. He argued that this is in their best interest as the occupation government could protect their personal and property rights, and resistance would only lead to their submission after “millions of dollars, the devastation of fair provinces, the destruction of flourishing towns, and many hundred lives” led them to realize their error. This is a remarkable argument, but it does reveal why some Americans at that time felt justified in their westward expansion and efforts to expand an ‘American Empire’ outwards to territories gained in the Spanish American War. This mindset also partially explains how many Americans, as occupiers, liberators, or conquerors, seemed to expect loyalty from native citizens. Though American ardor for colonies subsided prior to World War II, Birkhimer’s argument for temporary allegiance echoes at least until 1949, where it appears as a doctrinal concept in the Command and General Staff College’s eponymously titled textbook on military government:

The occupier has the right as limited by international law and established custom to demand and enforce from the inhabitants of the occupied area the obedience necessary to achieve the following:

- (1) The security of his forces, and accomplishment of the objectives of war.
- (2) The maintenance of law and order.
- (3) The administration of the area.

In return for such obedience the inhabitants should be granted freedom from all unnecessary or unwarranted interference with their individual liberty and property rights⁶³

This clearly demonstrates the reach of Birkhimer’s concepts and likely is an ideological

⁶³ E. C. Bergquist, *Military Government* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1949), 3-4.

antecedent to the ‘liberator mentality’ discussed in many circles today.⁶⁴

As a second principal topic, Birkhimer discussed the purpose and conduct of military government. He argued that military government’s primary goal is to promote the operations of the occupying army, the security of occupied society being second. Citing examples primarily from the Mexican War, American Civil War, and Franco-Prussian War, Birkhimer’s consistent argument was that the belligerent occupier is obligated morally and legally to install a system of governance to protect the security of the occupied country, the military is the only element of the occupying power capable of effectively meeting this requirement, that the occupied people owe their allegiance (however temporary it may be) to the occupier providing security, and thus in exchange the occupying force is entitled to enact what rules or laws it deems necessary and take what resources it requires to enable it to successfully carry out its war effort, bound by internal regulations and international law. Birkhimer avoids prescriptive specifics for military government doctrine or policy, preferring analysis of its legal and moral justification, except in the case of the declaration of military government, which he declares is vital to the initiation of legitimate governance.

The final element of Birkhimer’s discourse that had a major influence on later military government doctrine is its duration and extent. Primarily citing examples from the American Civil War and Reconstruction, Birkhimer recognized that the military necessity for governance did not end across all theaters of war simultaneously. He concluded that “military government ceases at the pleasure of him who instituted it upon such conditions as he elects to impose.”⁶⁵ As such, he codified the theoretical duration of military governance as being the sole provenance of

⁶⁴ Birkhimer, *Military Government and Martial Law*, 1-4, 19-20, 37-41.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 290.

the occupier, a concept that will ultimately become the doctrine of ‘military necessity’ used as the limiting factor for civil affairs and military government operations ever since.

Birkhimer’s *Military Government and Martial Law* likely would have been relegated to the realm of forgotten esoterica had it not been adopted as the primary textbook for the Army Staff College’s course in Military Government. As ‘institutional memory’ only exists as long as a member of the institution has the memory, Birkhimer’s book served as an excellent foundation for a course to transfer the essence of the Army’s nineteenth-century experiences in military governance to those who would found the twentieth-century military government organization. The reopening of the Army Staff College in 1902 at Fort Leavenworth as part of the military education reforms of Elihu Root was the natural opportunity to imbue the military with an understanding of the historical and theoretical underpinnings of military governance. Under Brig. Gen. Tasker Bliss, the Army Staff College sought to impart a thorough and broad education to an Army seasoned by combat in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines.⁶⁶

Part of the Army education effort was a course in law. By no later than 1907, the law course provided sixty half days of instruction dedicated to the following subjects: Constitutional Law (28 half-days), the Military in Aid of the Civil Power (3 half days), Martial Law (5 half-days), and Military Government and the Laws of War (13 half-days), with the balance of time dedicated to research on martial law subjects. Army Staff College instructors believed this course was “to be the most exhaustive [study of military government and martial law] given at any institution, native or foreign,” and unsuccessfully requested an increase to 75 half days.⁶⁷

Birkhimer’s book was the primary textbook for the study of military governance, though it was

⁶⁶ Timothy K. Nenninger, *The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States Army, 1881-1918* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), 53-55, 65.

⁶⁷ Frederick Funston, *Annual Report of The Commandant: U.S. Infantry and Cavalry School, U.S. Signal School, and Army Staff College for the Year 1909* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Staff College Press, 1909), 96.

used as a reference source for case study and discussion, and not as a “book of study.”⁶⁸

The culminating exercise of the law course was the preparation of papers on assigned topics in governance or martial law. The essays were bound by Capt. Edward A. Kreger (an instructor in the Law Department) for future reference. The resulting book is important for two reasons: first, the essays, when contrasted with Birkhimer’s work (which they all cite heavily), offer an interesting insight into the development of thought on civil affairs and military governance and show an evolution to a more modern concept of the topic prior to the end of World War I (which is commonly considered the modern start of civil affairs and military governance); second, the authors themselves are notable, or many would become so in the first and second world wars, and the fact that their thoughts on the subjects assigned are recorded in such a way makes the collection of essays invaluable in any assessment of their contributions to Military Governance policy in either conflict. Some of the most notable include: Charles D. Herron, Deputy Chief of Staff for First Army in World War I during the occupation of Saint-Mihiel, Chief of Staff of the Philippine Department in the 1920s, and head of the Army Hawaiian Command from 1938 to 1941; Dennis H. Currie, company commander during the Vera Cruz occupation in 1914 and member of the General Staff in France in 1918; Walter Krueger, Chief of Staff of the American Tank Corps in France in 1918, Commander of the Third Army at the Louisiana Maneuvers in 1941, and Commander of the Sixth Army during the invasion and liberation of the Philippines in 1944-45; and George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff and United States Secretary of State.

Marshall’s essay on the administration of justice under military government is worth noting here, not as much for any brilliant insights into the nature of occupation policy as for its

⁶⁸ Funston, *Annual Report 1909*, 95.

insight into the development of the man who would be the senior Army officer in World War II:

The modern tendency of nations to soften, as far as possible, the harsh effects of war, particularly with regard to the ordinary civil society of a conquered district, places an obligation on the state which recovers a portion of its domain that had been conquered and subjected to the military government of the enemy, to give full faith and credit to the judgments of the tribunals created by the hostile power in an effort to prevent the complete disorganization of the community. Were this not done there would be little incentive for an enemy, in exercising military government over a conquered territory, to provide any means for the inhabitants to settle questions of personal rights, property, etc. Only such tribunals would be created as necessary to punish or prevent acts damaging to the cause of the conqueror...

Where some provisions regarding the question are stipulated in the treaty of peace between the contending states the matter is definitely settled, but in any event, it will redound to the credit, and evidence the high state of civilization, of a nation that sanctions all acts of its enemy which are calculated to better the condition of civil society subjected to the calamities of war.⁶⁹

Marshall's words reflect the thoughts of Birkhimer regarding the responsibilities of the occupier to the occupied but are tempered by the experiences of the Army in the Spanish American war. The requisite fealty of the occupied advocated by Birkhimer is replaced with a stronger emphasis on occupiers to maintain civil society through equitable military governance. As such, Marshall's essay is an indicator of the shift of perspective on military government from a purely legalistic one founded on GO 100, to one founded on a 'higher' set of moral principles focused on the 'bettering' of occupied nations.

The sixty half-days continued through at least 1909 and represented 13% of the 466 half-days allotted for the entire course.⁷⁰ The amount of time dedicated to these subjects likely is reflective of the nation's interest in colonies and represents an emphasis on colonial administration in the wake of the Spanish-American War. By 1920, the Army's governance experience increased and the nation's colonial ambitions waned in the wake of World War I.

⁶⁹ George C. Marshall, "Military Government," in *Military Government*, ed. Edward A. Kreger (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Service Schools, 1908), 32.

⁷⁰ Funston, *Annual Report 1909*, 4.

This shift in attitudes and experience was reflected in the amount of time allocated to the study of military governance; by 1920 the course dropped to six hours of lecture on governance. The period from 1921 to 1928 included an average of nine hours of instruction on legal principles, Law of War, and domestic disturbances. In 1929 the course emphasis on military government returned, but the hours were cut to five, and the course remained such through 1935.⁷¹

The course content throughout this fifteen-year period is marked by an emphasis on lecture, given primarily by officers with practical experience in occupation and governance. One such officer was Brig. Gen. Harry Alexander Smith, Third Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs in Occupied Territory, and later the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs in Occupied Territory in the Advance General Headquarters in Germany beginning in 1918.⁷² His 1920 lecture at the Army Staff College embodies the shift first hinted at by Marshall, of military thought on governance shifting from a legal obligation intended to advance military objectives, to the betterment of an occupied society as an objective itself. This is evident not only in his off-hand comparisons of American military governance in the Rhineland to the contemporary ones of Germany and Britain, but also in his historical comparisons to the Germans in Paris in 1870-71 and the Americans in Mexico, the Civil War, and the Vera Cruz occupation of 1914.⁷³ It is clear that the underpinnings of American military thought on governance and civil affairs grew with institutional and individual experience and education. As such, by World War I the Army had an evolving military governance concept to guide its actions during occupation.

⁷¹ Conversation with Timothy Nenninger, 24 November 2014; Annual Reports of the Commandant: Infantry and Cavalry School, Signal School, and Army Staff College for the Years 1907-1909 and 1920 – 1935, Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library Archives, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

⁷² Gen. Harry A. Smith was also Col. Irwin L. Hunt's direct supervisor during the occupation of the Rhineland. Hunt's report is often cited as the impetus for the development of civil affairs and military governance training and organizations throughout World War II and beyond.

⁷³ Lecture by Gen. Harry A. Smith provided to author by Elizabeth Dubuisson of the Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Due to the static nature of the conflict on the Western Front, civil affairs and military government operations were not in scale to combat operations during World War I. In France, Allied armies rightfully left the handling of refugees and administration of territory largely to French authorities. Armies transiting France on their way to bases of operations and front lines engaged in civil affairs tasks like disease control, civilian employment, and billeting. As free-spending Americans transited the country, American Expeditionary Force (AEF) leaders worked with French authorities to reduce inflationary effects on prices of consumer goods.⁷⁴ Apart from these interactions, AEF leaders had little experience with what normally could be characterized as civil affairs or military governance. The Army's experience in military governance was thus generally limited to the post-war timeframe and the Western Front.⁷⁵ While military governance and civil affairs efforts were conducted during the expedition to Siberia and along the Dalmatian coast, it is the truly the AEF's effort at Coblenz during the Allied occupation of the Rhineland that is most noteworthy.⁷⁶ On 11 November 1918, the Allies rushed to seize key towns in the Rhineland to better position themselves for a resumption of hostilities should peace efforts fail, and also to pressure the Germans to sign the treaty.⁷⁷

Unlike the detailed planning and preparations preceding World War I, the abrupt end of the hostilities in 1918 caught the Allies without a plan for occupation. During the preparation for an armistice, up to November 1918, the French, via their commander Marshal Ferdinand Foch, attempted to persuade the Allies to mark the new German western border at the Rhine River. This move would have greatly weakened Prussia – the most influential German state – by

⁷⁴ Daugherty and Andrews, *A Review of US Historical Experience with Civil Affairs*, 175.

⁷⁵ Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come*, 143-158.

⁷⁶ For more information, see William S. Graves, *America's Siberian Adventure, 1918 - 1920* (New York: Jonathan Cape & Harrison Smith, 1931) and Gabriel, "American Experience with Military Government," 417-438.

⁷⁷ Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come*, 144.

creating a separate state in the Rhineland. A secret agreement between Russia and France in February 1917 called for the creation of just such a state. The area was to be occupied by the French until Germany fulfilled all the terms of the peace treaty. This would have removed the industrial heartland from Germany and expanded French military influence to the Rhine. While the idea was understandably popular with the French, British and American authorities refused to support a separate Rhenish state due to reasonable fears that such a move would precipitate a future war.⁷⁸

If the Allied armies were caught short by the need for occupation, the American people were completely blindsided. As late as 17 September 1918 the *New York Times* declared, “We have no intention of seizing and holding German cities or forts” and decried the idea of holding territory “in pledge” as “beyond the pale of reason.”⁷⁹ Thus, the 1918 announcement of the establishment of an American Army of Occupation (AMAROC) was something of a surprise to the American public.⁸⁰ As the reality of occupation hit home, the American people embraced the Army’s new role, quickly organizing relief efforts like the United War Work Campaign, which was dedicated to raising soldier morale. This shift in attitude is reflected in the editorial tone of the *New York Times*, which reversed its position of two months prior. On 14 November the editors urged all Americans to support the Army of occupation via relief organizations, claiming, “The American Army is now on the point of beginning an essential part of the conduct of the

⁷⁸ For more information on the debate over armistice and peace treaty terms see Keith Nelson, *Victors Divided: America and the Allies in Germany, 1918 - 1923* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 1 – 10, Margaret Pawley, *The Watch on the Rhine: The Military Occupation of the Rhineland, 1918 - 1930* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 1 – 3, and Henry T. Allen, *The Rhineland Occupation* (Indianapolis: The Bobs-Merrill Company, 1927), 1 – 5.

⁷⁹ *New York Times*, 17 September 1918.

⁸⁰ The acronym AMAROC is used to refer to American forces throughout the entire period of occupation from 1918 to 1923.

war,” and that “this work (occupation duty) is just as necessary to complete victory as was the fighting itself.”⁸¹

The 250,000 men of the newly formed Third Army, AEF, became the AMAROC under the command of Maj. Gen. Joseph T. Dickman. They moved north down the Moselle Valley to the Rhine and their positions at Coblenz to “keep watch on the Rhine, while at Versailles statesmen were gathering in from the furthestmost corners of the earth to redraw the map of the world.”⁸² The American sector, comprised mainly of the Eifel agricultural district, was largely rural and thinly populated – of the over seven million inhabitants of the Rhineland, fewer than 900,000 lived in the American sector. Coblenz, capital of the province, was the largest population center with over 65,000 people. Trier, originally in the American zone, had a population of about 55,000 inhabitants.⁸³ The only guide for the organization and doctrine for the initial phase of American military government operations was the Hague Convention of 1907. However, while the Hague Convention was inspired by the Lieber Code, its focus was on making war more humane and limiting its impact on civilians – compassion and chivalry were the guiding principles, not military necessity.⁸⁴

By 13 December 1918, Gen. John J. Pershing’s AEF headquarters had produced the first of two documents that formed the fundamental charter for military government, the *Anordnungen* or ‘ordinances.’ The *Anordnungen* outlined regulations for the civil population in the occupied territory and effectively defined the relationship between the occupying army and the native inhabitants. The ordinances addressed such items as the sale of liquor, the prohibition

⁸¹ *New York Times*, 14 November 1918.

⁸² Irwin L. Hunt, *American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920: Report of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army and American Forces in Germany* (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1943), vi.

⁸³ Hunt, *Military Government of Occupied Germany*, 4.

⁸⁴ Daugherty and Andrews, *Review of US Historical Experience with Civil Affairs*, 193.

of the sale or carrying of deadly weapons, communications including telegraph, telephone, post, and carrier pigeons, fraternization, and procedures for billeting troops in local homes. The staff understood that these initial regulations were made without direct knowledge of the enemy economic and political situation, and so they expected them to undergo revision. The Office of Civil Affairs at Advance General Headquarters (AGHQ) was established at Trier to represent General Pershing and publish and oversee the initial orders of the military government. Brigadier General Smith was made Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs in Occupied Territory at AGHQ with Colonel Hunt as his assistant. Pershing designated the Office of Civil Affairs at AGHQ as the “supreme civil authority within the American Zone,” with Smith as his direct representative. The Office of Civil Affairs at AGHQ promulgated further *Anordnungen* and undertook to direct the activities of the chief civilian official of the occupied territories, the *Oberpräsident* of the Rhine Province.⁸⁵

The Office of Civil Affairs at AGHQ was comprised of five sections: Public Works and Utilities, Fiscal Affairs, Sanitation and Public Health, Schools and Charitable Institutions, and the Legal Department. The Public Works and Utilities section supervised railroads, telephones, and light and gas plants under authority of Article 53 of the Hague Convention. Under Article 48, the Fiscal section was initially given responsibility for the supervision of banks, treasuries, and financial institutions. However, the Germans quickly proved themselves better able to handle their own financial affairs and thus the section was given the duty of collecting fines imposed by the American Provost Courts. The Legal section was directed to supervise all provost courts and maintain court records, as well as advise the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs. Ultimately, the Legal section was responsible for all the actions of the German civil courts. The Sanitation and

⁸⁵ Robert S. Thomas, ed., *The United States Army in the World War, 1917 – 1919, Volume XI: American Occupation of Germany*, ed. Robert S. Thomas (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1991), 150.

Public Health section was tasked with the identification and elimination of any threat of disease from the population. It was responsible for the sanitary conditions of German villages and towns, including the food supply. This section was also responsible for efforts to eliminate the threat of venereal diseases from the local prostitutes, a threat that expanded as the occupation progressed. Finally, the School and Charitable Institutions section supervised German schools as well as coordinated the efforts of German and international relief organizations. Other sections would be created as necessity arose.⁸⁶

The second key document outlining military government was “Orders No. 1” of the AGHQ. Orders No. 1 delineated the military government that would enforce the *Anordnungen* and other ordinances. It called for army, corps and division commanders to appoint a staff officer to be in charge of civil affairs but failed to outline their duties and responsibilities. Division commanders were responsible for military government in their area of control and ordered to assign a suitable officer to handle civil affairs in each occupied town. Officers like Colonel Hunt and Maj. Gen. Henry Allen recognized early the error in using tactical formations for military government but could not rectify it until July 1919. The mistake was due in large part to the Army’s failure to recognize the structure of German government as one amenable to adaptation by an occupying army – each level of German administration had a civil commander and supporting staff – an error the French and British, with better understanding of the Germans, did not make.⁸⁷

Problems arose because the AGHQ tasked corps headquarters to appoint an Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs without defining the duties of the office. Since divisions were held responsible for civil affairs, not corps, corps commanders simplified their responsibilities by

⁸⁶ *United States Army in the World War*, 159 - 160.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 158.

appointing Officers in Charge of Civil Affairs but permitting Third Army to direct the activities of the divisions directly through them. Thus, corps-level civil affairs officers contributed nothing to the administration of military government and in reality were nothing more than an extra step in communications between division and the Army.⁸⁸ Frequent transfers of division elements obstructed effective administration of military government. Constant troop transfers from town to town within division areas created high turnover in civil affairs officers – who were typically detailed infantry officers. Each transfer required a new civil affairs officer to familiarize himself with local circumstances. Likewise, civilian administrators had to accustom themselves to each new officer’s proclivities in administration. The resulting inconsistency disturbed the civilian population and severely hindered efficient administration.⁸⁹

The possibility of a resumption of hostilities ended when Germany signed the Versailles treaty, as did the need for a large offensive capability. Consequently, the bulk of American troops now began to return home, and both the AEF and Third Army were dissolved. On 2 July 1919 the American garrison in the Rhineland was designated the American Forces in Germany (AFG), with General Allen in command. By October, the AFG consisted of about 15,000 men.⁹⁰ According to Allen, the reduction in American troop strength improved military government: “it was... with the departure of the Third United States Army that [military government] was at its best.”⁹¹ This was primarily because peace freed military government operations from problems associated with tactical unit control. The withdrawal of American troops led to a reduction in the size of the American zone. France took control of Trier and the surrounding counties (*Kreise*),

⁸⁸ Hunt, *Military Government of Occupied Germany*, 75-76.

⁸⁹ *United States Army in the World War*, 167.

⁹⁰ Pawley, *Watch on the Rhine*, 37, though numbers as high as 19,000 are cited in other studies.

⁹¹ Allen, *Rhineland Occupation*, 47.

while the focus of the occupation shifted from tactical control to direct supervision by military government organized along native administrative lines rather than American military ones. The result was far more efficient and alleviated much of the conflict due to the bifurcation of native German governmental regions among tactical elements. The new organization placed American "Kreise Officers in Charge of Civil Affairs" over the seven *Kreise* in the American zone: Cochem, Adenau, Ahrweiler, Mayen, Coblenz, Unterwesterwald, and Neuwied.⁹²

Assessments of the performance of the AMAROC are mixed. One assertion is that while General Allen and his Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs played an important moderating role on the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission (IAHRC), the presence of AMAROC soldiers in the Rhineland was essentially superficial, since they largely amused themselves with attending horse shows and playing polo and other games, all of which contributed little to the improvement of the occupied zone. Allen admitted that since he viewed AMAROC soldiers as "undersized and ill-shapen," he ordered to them to spend their days in physical and military training, including long marches, shooting practice, maneuvers, and readiness drills.⁹³ Further analysis leads to the conclusion that the occupation was successful since the Army viewed its performance positively enough to codify the lessons of the AMAROC in its 1940 field manual on military government, *Field Manual 27-5: Military Government*. That manual stated that one of the hallmarks of successful military government was "convert[ing] enemies into friends."⁹⁴ International press accounts from the era are replete with accounts of German-American comity, but they are hardly convincing enough to be termed a conversion.

As was seen in previous efforts, Army commanders of military governance efforts in the

⁹² Hunt, *Military Government of Occupied Germany*, 85.

⁹³ Pawley, *Watch on the Rhine*, 33 – 38; Allen, *My Rhineland Journal*, 39 – 44.

⁹⁴ United States Army, *Field Manual 27-5: Military Government* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940), 3.

Rhineland received little direct guidance. Like military governance in the American Civil War, occupation of the Rhineland was punitive, intended to continue until Germany fulfilled its treaty obligations. Unlike previous occupations, governance operations were not tied to any national efforts at territorial expansion. Colonel Hunt was charged with evaluating Army civil affairs and military governance in World War I. He realized that exercising governmental authority, even over a defeated enemy, required preparation. His *American Military Government of Occupied Germany* was an indictment of American efforts. He wrote, “The American Army of Occupation lacked both the training and organization to guide the destinies of the nearly one million civilians whom the fortunes of war had placed under its temporary sovereignty.”⁹⁵ Furthermore, “no corps of specially trained officers existed to handle civil matters and, in consequence, each American policy had to be developed bit by bit, with the inevitable mistakes and failures which must ever follow in the wake of lack of organization and inexperience.”⁹⁶ The Army, he urged, should not wait until the responsibility was thrust upon it but should develop training in civil administration among its officers during peacetime.

It is important to note that Hunt’s critique of the dearth of civil affairs and military government training applied only to the lack of practical education of officers and soldiers who conducted governance operations. The legal department of the Army Staff College had been teaching officers a course in military government for at least a decade by 1918. However, it was not until 1940 that the Army codified an official doctrine on military government and began to train soldiers in its application.⁹⁷ American isolationism and anti-war sentiment after World War I made another conflict – let alone the possibility of occupying foreign territory – seem remote.

⁹⁵ Hunt, *Military Government of Occupied Germany*, 65.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 346.

⁹⁷ Troy Thomas, “Control Roaming Dogs: Governance Operations in Future Conflict,” *Military Review* 86 (February 2006), 78.

Because it was the only practical report on military governance, War College students working on civil affairs projects occasionally referred to Hunt's report as well as to the experiences of the Army's senior leadership, and these folded into the curriculum of the Army War College. The courses drew on lessons from operations in central and South America and World War I. However, these students in the 1920s again tended "to look at civil affairs and military government entirely as they related to military law, the assumption being that they were not much more than the functions of observing and enforcing law." After the 1935 Army Personnel Committee at the War College prepared a draft military government manual, and the 1939 class produced a manuscript on administration of occupied countries, the subject began to take on greater significance.⁹⁸

War College committees had repeatedly recognized the need for a field manual on military government. The responsibility logically belonged to the Judge Advocate General due to the close relationship between military government and military law. In 1939, the Judge Advocate General, Gen. Allen W. Gullion, refused the task because his office had recently published *Field Manual 27-10: The Rules of Land Warfare*, which included a section on civil administration. However, war had just begun again in Europe, and studies by several War College committees had recently highlighted the increasing importance of military government. The next year, at the urging of the Army Operations and Training staff and Personnel staff, Gullion's office began writing a manual using War College studies and Hunt's report as guidance. *Field Manual 27-5: Military Government* (1940 edition) was the result. Concurrently, a Marine Corps *Small Wars Manual* emerged in 1940, incorporating a single chapter on issues of military government. These, along with *Field Manual 27-10: The Rules of Land Warfare*,

⁹⁸ Earl F. Ziemke, *U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944 - 1946* (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), 3.

became the early canon of military government. The three manuals established practical doctrine for governance operations, recognizing that they are required even in situations “where the inhabitants of the country were not characterized as enemies and where war was neither declared nor contemplated.”⁹⁹

Even with the emerging awareness that governance was an inevitable requirement stemming from modern war, mainstream military institutions remained reluctant to embrace the mission. Although there was now official doctrine, military government remained the theoretical domain of an enlightened few. Military institutions are conservative, slow-moving creatures reluctant to embrace changes no matter how obvious the benefit. As a result, any planning for institutional improvements often falls to a powerless few who must await an appropriate time to bring an idea forward.¹⁰⁰ But World War II was in many ways a very different conflict from its predecessor. By late 1941, Germany and Italy occupied nearly all of Europe. The *Wehrmacht* was driving into the Soviet Union and across North Africa. Many governments had disappeared, gone into exile, or collaborated. When Allied ground forces fought the Germans, they had to deal with local civilian populations. The British already had civil difficulties in Africa, leading them to develop training for their officers in reconstruction and military government.

It was not the British program, however, that sparked American preparations. As one historian noted, “Army field manuals, even those in as little demand as *FM 27-5* was in 1940 and 1941, have stature, for unless superseded, declared obsolete, or rescinded they represent the Army's intent to do something in a specified way.” *Field Manual 27- 5* established a schedule for procurement and training of military government personnel in Section IV.¹⁰¹ In keeping with this

⁹⁹ U.S. Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940), Chapter 13, p. 1.

¹⁰⁰ Thomas, “Roaming Dogs,” 80.

¹⁰¹ United States Army, *Field Manual 27-5: Military Government*, p. 37.

guidance, in September 1941, General Gullion, as Judge Advocate General, recommended that the Army initiate a training program.¹⁰² Since 1939, the Army had recognized that it needed to prepare for the physical and economic destruction that came with modern war and the attendant plagues of refugees, disease, starvation, and lawlessness.¹⁰³ *Field Manual 27-5* assigned responsibility for training military government personnel to the Army Personnel Staff (G-1). In September, the G-1 proposed to start training officers in military government. Other Army staff sections objected. The idea of military government of occupied and liberated territories must have seemed distant in 1941, months before Pearl Harbor. They could not justify diverting officers who were needed to train the expanding Army. After bickering over resources, all sides reached a compromise in which the G-1 planned contingency courses to be given on short notice when a need arose.

On 3 December, the G-1 asked the Chief of Staff, Gen. George Marshall, to authorize military government training in a school to be operated by the Provost Marshal General. As the Japanese overran the southwest Pacific, military government must have seemed less essential than ever to the Army. It is noteworthy that, in spite of the situation in the Pacific, Marshall approved the G-1's request on 6 January 1942. Marshall had served under Gen. Hunter Liggett on occupation duty in Germany after World War I, where he had experienced first-hand the failings that Hunt wrote about in his report. These experiences must have influenced his foresight at a time when Army resources were thin. In light of the scarce resources available to the Army in 1942, it is doubtful that a Chief of Staff without direct experience in occupation would have realized the lessons of the Rhineland Occupation and understood the importance of training.

In January 1942, Gullion, now Provost Marshal General, decided that training in civil

¹⁰² Ziemke, *U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany*, 5.

¹⁰³ Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come*, 167-168.

affairs and military government should be outside standard military channels. He made Jesse I. Miller (a civilian at the time, later commissioned as a colonel) his adviser on military government training and asked him to design a curriculum. Miller had served in World War I in the Judge Advocate General branch and practiced law in Washington. He worked from *Field Manual 27-5* and a few reports from American students in the British military government school. He decided to include a broad area orientation, like the British, but added a “program directed at developing skills in handling practical problems of civil government.” His program “undertook to train officers in technique and practice, as well as to give them a certain area [of] expertise.”¹⁰⁴

By February 1942, General Gullion obtained authorization to establish a school. Based on the British use of institutions like Cambridge, Gullion looked for a university. The University of Virginia in Charlottesville was selected, as it was little more than two hours from Washington. The university offered to provide all the necessary facilities for \$75 per month.¹⁰⁵ Low expense was the school’s strongest feature, as “The largest item of expense, professional personnel, was \$11,000 in 1942, and the total budget for 1943 was \$98,680, increased somewhat by expansion during the year.” The budget was miniscule compared to the \$238,329 cost for just one B-17 bomber, but Gullion could not get more.¹⁰⁶ In an effort to stretch the budget, more savings were generated as neighboring households provided locations to board officers attending the courses.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, eds., *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*, (Washington: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1964), 10.

¹⁰⁵ Arnold G. Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands (Army Historical Series)* (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1988), 9.

¹⁰⁶ Peter Bowers, *Fortress in the Sky* (Granada Hills, CA: Sentry Books Inc., 1976), 73.

¹⁰⁷ Stuart O. Van Slyke, *The Life of Stuart O. Van Slyke: An Autobiography, Book One: Memories of a Forgotten Age May 1916 - May 1946* (Bloomington, IN: Authorhouse, 2006), 327. In a conversation with the author in 2010,

In April 1942, an order from Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson established the School of Military Government at the University of Virginia, and Brig. Gen. Cornelius W. Wickersham became its commandant and director.¹⁰⁸ Wickersham was chosen for his experience as a lawyer; he also had been the G-2 (Intelligence Section) of the First Army. Colonel Miller became associate director. Wickersham began visiting universities and government departments, looking for lecturers. He hired three civilian experts, one each for Germany (Arnold Wolfers from Yale), Italy (Henry Powell from Johns Hopkins), and Japan (Hugh Borton from Harvard). His staff included twelve officer and civilian instructors as faculty, twenty-five other civilians, and one enlisted man.¹⁰⁹

The first class of forty-nine officers began the four-month course on 11 May 1942. Since some students had recently been civilians, Army organization and regulations were also on the curriculum. The students attended lectures and worked on assigned problems as members of a committee. This method enabled the school to research and solve problems.¹¹⁰ A European bias was clearly evident, and surprising in light of the situation in the spring of 1942. The Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor, and the United States was naturally focusing war fervor against them. It is interesting to note that the school would ignore various Asian cultures while recognizing the differences between two European cultures, Germany and Italy. Japanese language would not be taught until the fifth class matriculated – due to a lack of instructors. Asia would not become a major focus until the eighth class – well into the program.¹¹¹ Perhaps this stemmed from a general ignorance of Asian culture, which led to overall lack of understanding. School officials

Van Slyke emphasized that officers were required to pay for their own room and board.

¹⁰⁸ Cornelius W. Wickersham, "The School of Military Government," *Military Review* 23 (January 1943), 37 - 39.

¹⁰⁹ Ziemke, *U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany*, 8.

¹¹⁰ Wickersham, "School of Military Government," 37.

¹¹¹ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands*, 10.

readily acknowledged that Americans' "acquaintance with Far Eastern languages, institutions and points of view [was] practically nonexistent."¹¹² Whatever the reason, it is clear that later American difficulties in Asia resulted from cultural blindness, particularly in China and Korea.

One of the first problems assigned to students at Charlottesville was to try to determine the necessary number of future officers trained in military governance. Colonel Hunt's Rhineland occupation after World War I only involved a population of about one million and required 213 military government officers, or 0.1 percent of the occupation force. The study concluded that an Army of four million men, without considering the civilian population, would need 4,000 trained officers. This was a serious problem since it would require ten years for the School of Military Government to train this many candidates.¹¹³ The Army had to train the officers or let another agency do it. If another agency assumed the responsibility, operational commanders would have to contend not only with the enemy but also with high-ranking American civilians, creating an extra layer of Clausewitzian friction.

The most important challenge to the Army's control of the School came from the Board of Economic Warfare. The Board worked directly with Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt in directing all government economic activities related to the war, and the Board's directives bound together all facets of the government, including the War Department. Army military government operations were clearly the domain of the Board, thus Miller and Gullion were relieved when members of the Board recommended, after visiting the Charlottesville campus, that the Army

¹¹² Allen Gullion to John Hilldring, Chief, Civil Affairs Division, 31 December 1943, reprinted in Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs*, 83.

¹¹³ Ziemke, *U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany*, 8.

retain control of the program. These members even offered to help identify qualified individuals to participate in the training.¹¹⁴

The Army was still at a disadvantage. In early 1942, while the Army was busy planning OPERATION TORCH against Axis holdings in North Africa, the Board of Economic Warfare had time to plan for post-war occupation and develop plans that would infringe on Army control. In June 1942, Gullion decided to assert Army leadership in military government by creating a department in his office. “Since the primary responsibility for the administration of any military government rests with the Army,” he stated, “it follows that *the Army should take the initiative* in the preparation of policies and plans, including the procurement and training of personnel” [italics added].¹¹⁵ On 28 June, Gullion requested the authority to expand his program to avoid conflict between interested military and civilian agencies. The next month, Arthur Ringland of the War Relief Control Board told Roosevelt that he did not believe the War Department could train the requisite number of personnel in time. Ringland recommended that civilian resources be applied to the personnel problem. The Undersecretary of War, Robert Patterson, forwarded Ringland’s memo to Miller.¹¹⁶ It alarmed Gullion and his staff, but, as historian Earl Ziemke points out, “The Ringland memorandum immediately accomplished what Gullion, working through several staff levels, might have needed months to do; it made civilian involvement a War Department concern.”¹¹⁷ Though occupied with North African operational planning, military government would need War Department attention if it wanted to retain control of training and post-war operations. Another impact of the Ringland memo was Secretary Patterson’s support

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 7; Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs*, 13.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 15.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 15.

¹¹⁷ Ziemke, *U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany*, 9.

for Gullion. Patterson agreed in principle with Gullion and recommended to Roosevelt on 20 July that exploration and development of a training plan be conducted "informally and with no publicity whatsoever."¹¹⁸

The authors of the Army's official history of military government, Harry Coles and Albert Weinberg, declared, "because of the American tradition against the military exercise of civil power under any but desperate circumstances, the civil affairs function of the United States Army evoked bitter debate."¹¹⁹ As historian Arnold Fisch wrote, "Professional officers [of the era] considered civil affairs assignments little more than accidents of war."¹²⁰ Roosevelt's view of military government as "strange and abhorrent" was consistent with General Eisenhower's desire to turn responsibility over to civilian authorities as soon as possible.¹²¹ But after a Military Government Division on the Army Staff was established and the School of Military Government opened at the University of Virginia, planning for governance operations began in earnest. In 1943 Roosevelt shifted the responsibility for any occupation from the State Department to the War Department. The *Handbook for Military Government in Germany* appeared in December 1944, intended to provide operational level commanders in Europe with instructions on how to administer military government. Due to the foresight of key individuals, inspired by Hunt's report, personnel trained to execute those instructions were also available. These officers had been trained in the School of Military Government.¹²²

Early in World War II, the United States was unprepared, both in terms of organization and numbers of trained personnel, for the civil affairs and military government operations to

¹¹⁸ Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs*, 15.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹²⁰ Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands*, 7.

¹²¹ Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs*, 5.

¹²² Thomas, "Roaming Dogs", 80.

come. The Army had less than one hundred officers trained in military government, and only twenty-two individuals on its military government planning staff at the Military Government Division by the start of the following year. Eisenhower highlighted the situation in February 1943 when he asked for guidance regarding civil affairs and military government related to OPERATION HUSKY, the invasion of Sicily. As Ziemke explained, “What concerned him most were the relationships between civil and military authorities, the handling of the civilian population, and the arrangements with respect to both which would have to be made with the British.”¹²³

Eisenhower’s inquiries laid bare the War Department’s lack of adequate civil affairs planning and coordination capability. In mid-February 1943, General Marshall, Secretary Stimson, and other key officials met to discuss various solutions. By the end of the month the War Department tasked Gen. John Hull, Chief of Theater Operations Division, to create a Civil Affairs Division (CAD) on the General Staff. The CAD was established on 1 March, with Gen. John Hildring as its director. By creating the CAD, the War Department retained control of both civil affairs and military government. The main responsibility of the CAD centered on detailed planning regarding occupation of enemy territory.¹²⁴

Early in World War II, the Allies made the complete dismantling of the German, Italian, and Japanese governments a strategic objective. Drawing on lessons learned from the occupation of Germany after World War I, American military leaders began planning for the occupation and governance of enemy countries. It is worth noting that they began planning for military government long before the need arose – “a true innovation in the conduct of military affairs.”¹²⁵

¹²³ Ziemke, *U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany*, 17.

¹²⁴ Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs*, 66-68.

¹²⁵ Ziemke, *U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany*, vii.

Occupation and military government are related military operations that require extensive planning and preparation. It is ironic that the forces most often tasked to carry out the rehabilitative operations of military government are often those that most recently participated in the carnage. As early as 1939, veterans of the Great War recognized that supplanting enemy social and economic systems required extensive training and preparations. The War Department's answer was the creation of the School of Military Government to train and prepare soldiers to administrate, and the CAD to plan at the operational and strategic level.

Though it had an adequate planning organization, the War Department was still dramatically short of trained personnel. The original estimate produced by the first class at Charlottesville was revised upward to reflect an expected need for 6,000 trained officers. As Charlottesville could only graduate four hundred fifty officers per year, the War Department proposed expanding the program to additional locations. To meet the more immediate need, Wickersham and Gullion suggested that 2,500 specialists should be directly commissioned from the civilian sector. The motivation appears to have been great concern on the part of Wickersham and Gullion, that the officers selected from the Army would be of poorer quality since operational commands would not let their best leave. In the end, the War Department chose both solutions. In order to meet the need for officers trained to handle civil affairs, the Army established the Civil Affairs Training School (CATS). They recruited civilians and trained them for one month in basic military government at Fort Custer, Michigan. The new officers then attended an additional three months' training at one of several universities. The training was technical rather than administrative like the School of Military Government. A CATS graduate was expected to work directly with people in occupied areas, thus they learned languages and

foreign area studies. The basic curriculum allowed rapid expansion of the program as needed.¹²⁶

The invasion of Sicily in the summer of 1943 dramatically increased the demand for officers trained in civil affairs and military government. In August 1943, General Hilldring, Chief of the CAD, ordered Gullion to “bring 2,500 additional officers into civil affairs training programs by the end of the calendar year 1943.” The growing need for properly trained officers forced the War Department to make major changes to civil affairs acquisition policies, including allowing direct application of individuals, accelerated civilian recruitment, and direct commissioning of older civilians and those with specialized skills to the field grades. With these policy changes and dramatically improved recruitment, the Charlottesville program expanded to 175 students per month and CATS to 450 per month. The rapid expansion allowed these programs to train over 2,000 officers during just the last four months of 1943, meeting the Army’s projected European requirements. Importantly, and impressively, the dramatic increase in civil affairs and military government personnel did not entail a major drop in quality. The Army filled these positions from a formidable pool of more than 75,000 military and civilian applicants. This indicates that recruitment and publicity by the CAD and School of Military Government had been heavy long before the War Department relaxed its relevant policies, indicative of Gullion and Wickersham’s foresight.¹²⁷

The distillation and codification of the United States Army’s extensive experience with civil affairs and military government into a governing doctrine indicated a formal acknowledgement of its responsibilities and role in governance after almost a century of such

¹²⁶ Ibid., 18-20.

¹²⁷ John Hilldring, Chief of Civil Affairs Division, to Provost Marshal General, 27 August 1943 reprinted in Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs*, 83; Ziemke, *Occupation of Germany*, 18-20; Wickersham, “School of Military Government,” 37 – 39. In light of the negative press surrounding the school in early 1943, Wickersham’s explanatory article is clearly part defense and part recruiting tool.

operations. This also led to the establishment of formal training to prepare soldiers to enact this doctrine. Finally, in order to coordinate civil affairs planning within the larger war-planning establishment of the War Department, the Army created the CAD. The CAD elevated civil affairs and military governance to a level necessary to allow such operations to successfully transition from military control to a broader ‘all-of-government’ effort. These developments represent a key innovation – one that did not emerge out of nothing, but rather was borne from decades of experience and necessity.

Considering General Eisenhower's statement at the opening of this chapter, it is worth noting that innovative developments in Army civil affairs and military government never required advancements in technology, yet they expanded in scope roughly in parallel to technological advances. The preponderance of advances in war seem to rely on acquiring an advantage in some technical aspect of combat. Advances in explosives, armor, aircraft, submarines, and radar - all bestow an advantage in the means to achieve war's ends through an increasing capacity for destruction in an ever-shorter time. Ultimately, twelve men were able to devastate the entire city of Hiroshima in just a few minutes, killing and wounding tens of thousands and leaving tens of thousands more homeless. Corresponding advances in civil affairs and military governance came as a response. Technology could end a war, but as seen in the American Civil War and World War I, it could not secure a victory. To that end, increasing the capacity to ameliorate the effects of war was the answer. Developments in doctrine, education, and organization improved the capacity of civil affairs officers to counter the scale of destruction seen in World War II, including in the Philippines.

Unsurprisingly, America’s military governance and civil affairs capacity and ability developed from the last half of the nineteenth century in tandem with the nation’s emerging

Progressive tendencies, and its expansionist ideology. Representative of what would later be termed “benevolent assimilation” America’s move to control greater area, and organize that territory in accordance with contemporary American ideals naturally drove the need for military government doctrine, training, and organization. America’s involvement in overseas wars compelled the Army to make practical changes in civil affairs and military government doctrine. This development was continuous and organic rather than iterative. A prime case of this development is the United States involvement with the Philippines. From 1898 to 1945 the Philippines represented a unique challenge to United States military governance and civil affairs that was central in developing policy and doctrine, and training for the Army in civil administration.

CHAPTER 2

BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION

United States Army civil affairs and military government principles and doctrine developed in response to the military's experiences during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By the end of World War II, these concepts had been exercised, tested, and developed--to an extent that was probably not anticipated by military government practitioners during and after the American Civil War and subsequent legal theorists--by the early students of the subject at the Command and General Staff College. By 1945, the Civil Affairs Department was operating in support of combat operations, providing relief to millions of people all across Europe, Africa, and Asia. Military governance operations largely worked toward stabilization of war-ravaged countries with the objective of creating a foundation for a peaceful future. For Axis countries, this required elimination and replacement of the governmental, educational, industrial, and media institutions that encouraged or supported the war. For many liberated Allied countries, this meant an effort to return to the political situation to the *status quo ante bellum*. However, the Philippine Islands were different in that in 1942, during the process of their liberation from the control of the United States, the Japanese invaded and disrupted their American-tutored progress toward independence. Victory for the United States in the Pacific was far from certain at the outset; even if the Americans won, the post-war status of the Philippines was dependent on variables in its social, economic, and political relationship with the United States that had roots in long-ago events. Thus in 1942, the Philippine independence promised by the United States since 1934 faced an uncertain future.

As with all invasions, political and economic chaos and instability followed the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. The nascent executive leadership, embodied in Commonwealth

President Manuel Luis Quezon and Vice-president Sergio Osmeña, were exiled to the United States, and the Philippine legislative and judicial bodies were replaced with a Japanese-organized council of state. Faced with a local, regional, and national leadership crisis, many Filipinos faced the choice of a prolonged guerrilla war of insurgency against the occupier – a lifestyle in which many had extensive experience – or the pragmatic path of collaboration. Those who chose the latter did so for a wide spectrum of personal reasons: some for opportunities to advance into positions of power in the Japanese puppet republic, some for their own safety as they lacked the courage or opportunities to fight back (known and suspected resistors were imprisoned or shot, as was Philippine Chief Justice Jose Santos, President Quezon’s representative in territory not occupied by the Japanese), and some for altruistic reasons as they sincerely believed in a Pan-Asian Philippine Republic. A third group of Filipinos chose to join the Allies and fight for Philippine liberation as expatriate forces under the leadership of Gen. Douglas MacArthur. Again, Filipinos’ decisions to remain in their homes and towns or flee and fight with Americans or collaborate with the Japanese were influenced by their perceptions of an American occupation that began in 1898. The events and attitudes that surrounded the United States’ creation of the Commonwealth of the Philippines in 1898 contributed materially to the successful military landings by United States forces in the Philippine Islands in 1944, and the establishment of an independent Republic of the Philippines two years later.¹²⁸

Independence was a powerful subject in Philippine history and served as a contentious central theme to the commencement of Philippine-American relations. After fighting against

¹²⁸ Kent Holmes, *Wendell Fertig and His Guerrilla Forces in the Philippines: Fighting the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2010); Government of the Philippines, *The Execution of Jose Abad Santos*, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/about/gov/judiciary/sc/cj/jose-abad-santos/the-execution-of-jose-abad-santos/> (accessed July 10, 2018); David Steinberg, *Philippine Collaboration in World War II* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967); Jose P. Laurel, "Address of His Excellency Mr. Jose P. Laurel, Representative of the Philippines," *Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact*, November 5, 1943, <http://www.sdh-fact.com/essay-article/401/> (accessed 10 March, 2020).

Spanish oppression in various major and minor revolts for over 300 years, the 1896 Philippine Revolution erupted in response to more broken promises of reform after centuries of colonial rule. While there had been previous revolts with varying degrees of success, the rise in 1872 of the Propaganda Movement, established by a more secular, liberal class of nationalists, paved the way for an effective revolution. The Propaganda Movement developed directly from the great popular disappointment in failed Spanish reforms. After Queen Isabella II was deposed in 1868, the new Spanish government appointed the liberal General Carlos María de la Torre as governor of the Philippines. De la Torre promised changes that included reforming the power structure of the Catholic Church, which relied on friars to control Philippine society. This pledge, more than any other, raised both the hopes of Filipinos and the ire of Church officials, ultimately leading to de la Torre being replaced by the more conservative Rafael de Izquierdo in 1870. Izquierdo rescinded the reform laws and dashed the hopes of the Filipinos. After a series of revolts, the government exiled Filipino educated elites – *ilustrados* – who advocated for reform, and publicly executed three Filipino priests associated with the reform movement – a move that sparked outrage and raised questions about the legitimacy of Spanish rule. Inspired by Spanish outrages and broken promises, the Propaganda Movement formed to publish Spanish atrocities to the world and call for real reforms.¹²⁹

Propagandist essays and novels gained worldwide readership and empowered the pre-revolution nationalist movement by broadening popular awareness of Spanish abuses and the potential of a unified Filipino response to correct these injustices. Promulgated by students, intellectuals, and political exiles that had settled in Europe, the Propaganda Movement strove to promote equal standing for the Philippines within the Spanish empire, rather than independence.

¹²⁹ Federal Research Division, *Philippines: A Country Study*, ed. Ronald E. Dolan (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993), 16-17.

They advocated for basic political equality of Filipinos with Spaniards, and strove for Philippine representation in the Spanish parliament, secularization and liberalization of the school system, secularization of the Philippine parish system, freedom of speech and association, and the same opportunities in government service accorded Spaniards. The most notable of the Propagandists was Dr. Jose Rizal, whose novels attacking the abuses of the church's friar system in the colony gained him international notoriety but made him many powerful enemies in both the Spanish government and Catholic hierarchy. Spain's continued refusal to adopt colonial reforms helped amplify and spread the concepts of Philippine nationalism advocated by the Propaganda Movement, which laid the intellectual foundations for the 1896 revolution.¹³⁰

In June of 1892, Rizal returned to the Philippines to assist his family, who had been evicted from the land they leased from Dominican friars. Shortly afterward, he established the *Liga Filipina* (the Philippine League) as a nonviolent nationalist organization that aimed to unify the archipelago to gain social, educational, and criminal justice reform. Among the members of the League were Andres Bonifacio and Apolinario Mabini, who became key leaders in the 1896 revolution. On 14 July 1892, Rizal was arrested and deported to Dapitan in northwestern Mindanao, a move that collapsed the nascent League and hastened the disintegration of the Propaganda Movement, but inspired groups like *Los Compromisarios*, which shared the League's peaceful intent, and the *Katipunan*, which was committed to winning national independence through military revolution rather than peaceful reform.¹³¹

After Rizal was exiled, the *Liga Filipina* collapsed, and Andres Bonifacio's *Katipunan* rose to prominence. Founded in Manila at about the same time as Rizal's League, the *Katipunan*

¹³⁰ Dolan, *Country Study*: 18-23; Sonia Zaide, *The Philippines: A Unique Nation* (Quezon City: All-Nations Publishing, 1994), 221-229.

¹³¹ Dolan, *Country Study*: 18-20; Peter W. Stanley, *A Nation in the Making: The Philippines and the United States, 1899-1921* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 45-46; Zaide, *Philippines*: 227-230.

was a covert society modeled in part on Masonic practices. Unlike other nationalist groups, and probably owing to its founder's indigent background, membership was not restricted to the elites. This attracted broad membership, although the "radical" violent nature of the organization, and its "latent class orientation," deterred those from a Filipino upper class who were invested in Spanish society.¹³² Men and women from all backgrounds were eligible to join – a policy that attracted the lower and lower-middle classes of Filipino society, and which contributed to the organization boasting around 30,000 members at the outset of the revolution in 1896.¹³³

After the failed Cuban independence movement of 1895, Spain's imperial excesses in suppressing even the most conservative voices for colonial reform, such as Rizal, as outright seditionists estranged the propertied upper-class *principales* and educated *ilustrados*, creating more sympathy among the elites for extreme nationalistic measures.¹³⁴ During August 1896 the revolutionary fight against Spain began when the *Katipunan* was betrayed to Spanish authorities. They reacted violently against not only the secret society but also any elite person perceived as sympathetic, creating a cycle of repressive violence that destroyed the *Katipunan* organization, spreading revolutionary sympathy and fervor throughout the ethnic Tagalog regions of Luzon. Bonifacio fled to the Balintawak region of Manila in the last week of August and called for revolution.¹³⁵ Spanish authorities imprisoned Rizal, who had sought a position with the Spanish

¹³² Stanley, *Nation in the Making*: 46.

¹³³ Dolan, *Country Study*: 20; Zaide, *Philippines*: 229. Zaide notes that women were allowed to join after they became suspicious of their *Katipunero* husband's "nocturnal absences". Female membership was restricted to those who were family of male *Katipunan* members, and while there were only about 25 female members, their participation was key to the prolonged stealth and growth of the organization – the group was able to remain clandestine for nearly four years – as they would provide cover to meetings, courier documents, distract Spanish authorities, and aid in recruiting.

¹³⁴ Stanley, *Nation in the Making*: 46.

¹³⁵ There is much disagreement among modern Filipino historians about where and when, precisely, the revolutionary call, originally known as the "Cry of Balintawak" and now named the "Cry of Pugad Lawin", occurred. For reference, the importance to Filipinos is similar to that of Americans' determining the precise location of the Battle of Bunker Hill.

army in Cuba as a physician, and executed him in December. This cemented his status as a martyr and national hero, and it fomented further armed action against the Spaniards.¹³⁶

Though they had some initial success, infighting weakened the revolutionaries. Rivalries among factions in the *Katipunan* led to a power struggle in 1897 that resulted in the death and replacement of Bonifacio with Emilio Aguinaldo as the overall leader of the revolutionary movement. Though revolutionary forces under Aguinaldo initially had some success, his military efforts stalled in the face of continuous Spanish victories. Under constant Spanish pressure, Aguinaldo and his leading revolutionaries fled with about 2,000 supporters to the mountain wilderness of Biak-na-bato, about 40 miles north of Manila. Both Spanish and revolutionary forces were too depleted at this point to compel their opponents by force of arms. The Spanish therefore focused on restoring security to the more tractable populated areas. Though Aguinaldo and his small band were confined to the mountains, where they suffered greatly from hunger and disease, they decided to “continue the libertarian war at all costs.” In November 1896, Aguinaldo proclaimed the Philippines to be independent, ceased conventional warfare aimed at seizing and controlling key territory, and shifted to a protracted war focused on creating instability by calling for widespread general uprisings.¹³⁷

Barely a month later in December 1897, Spanish authorities tried to restore a semblance of control by paying Filipino revolutionaries to stop fighting and revolutionary leaders to go into exile. Spanish Governor Primo de Rivera, in an effort to forestall a prolonged and costly military effort to suppress the revolution, negotiated the Pact of Biak-na-bato, which called for the exile of Aguinaldo and his leadership to Hong Kong and the end of fighting in exchange for money

¹³⁶ Dolan, *Country Study*: 21; Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 17.

¹³⁷ Zaide, *Philippines*: 251 [quotes]; Linn, *Philippine War*, 19; Dolan, *Country Study*: 21.

and social reforms. The solution was pragmatic but temporary. Neither side completely fulfilled the bargain. Aguinaldo departed, but revolutionary activity in Luzon never fully ended; Spain paid some of the promised sums, but never implemented reforms. In the end, the fundamental abuses that gave rise to the 1896 revolution were never resolved as the Spanish preferred to buy a temporary lull in conflict from the revolutionaries rather than work with the more influential conservative members of the Filipino community to pursue meaningful colonial reform.¹³⁸

The truce or pact of Biak-na-bato marks the end of the first phase of the Philippine revolution of 1896. Aguinaldo and his *katipuneros* were unable to secure their goals by force: Filipino-Spanish equality and an end to discrimination, Filipino representation in the Spanish parliament, and removal of the friars. What they did accomplish was the provocation of the Spanish authorities to take actions that further alienated the *principales* and *ilustrados* – the wealthy and skilled influential class of merchants, tradesmen, and educated elites. As Spanish authorities sought to defeat the rebellion, they struck at not only members of the *katipunan*, but also those elites they believed held revolutionary sympathies. It appears that Spanish authorities targeted many of these leading citizens for their material wealth rather than their revolutionary fervor as their property was seized in what amounts to official theft. Actions like these further enhanced reformist and nationalist sympathies in the upper and upper-middle class, a situation which Aguinaldo's revolutionaries were unable or unwilling to exploit.¹³⁹

The Filipino elites wanted a change that would put them into the positions of power that Spanish society had denied them, but they were largely unwilling to risk all they had on a foolish insurrection with a low probability of success. Propagandist literature, in particular the writings of Rizal, codified the nationalist aspirations of Filipinos, but especially appealed to the elites.

¹³⁸ Zaide, *Philippines*: 251-254; Stanley, *Nation in the Making*: 51-53.

¹³⁹ Stanley, *Nation in the Making*: 46, 51.

The ideas of legislative representation, broadly available secular education, social equality, termination of friars' abuses, and acknowledgement of basic liberties like freedom of speech and assembly were appealing to those Filipinos literate enough to read such words. Rizal's advocacy for a conservative approach to reform rather than revolution was also attractive since the elites were invested in Spanish socio-economic governmental structures and hesitated to challenge the system that secured their higher station. But abuse by the Spanish alienated the *principales* and *ilustrados*. Revolutionaries' advances exposed Spanish weakness and reified popular nationalist hopes for independence, fueling the aspirations of the elites to positions of power within a not yet formed, imagined government. However, what were perceived as Aguinaldo's dictatorial tendencies also left the elites hesitant to embrace his leadership. This hesitance combined with Spanish weakness to lead many elites to contemplate and pursue their own post-Spanish agendas and made them excellent potential allies for invaders from the United States, especially if they promised support for the reforms that the Filipinos sought.¹⁴⁰

Though the 1896 revolution stalled, violence continued. While Aguinaldo claimed leadership and used Spanish funds gained from the Pact of Biak-na-bato to purchase arms, his exile left him unable to direct revolutionary activities. He became increasingly detached even as violent revolution continued to spread across the archipelago from its point of origin in Luzon. The exile of Aguinaldo and his inner circle of revolutionary leaders allowed the Spanish military, with the assistance of Filipino volunteers, to regain control of Luzon and take steps to reassert colonial control, particularly across the Visayas where revolutionary dissent was beginning to grow. Their efforts ignited violence in Cebu.¹⁴¹

¹⁴⁰ Stanley, *Nation in the Making*, 51-60.

¹⁴¹ Zaide, *Philippines*: 254; Linn, *Philippine War*: 20; Rudy Villanueva, *The Vicente Rama Reader* (Manila: Ateneo De Manila University Press, 2003), 54.

On 2 April 1898, as Aguinaldo was traveling to Europe from Hong Kong, Spanish authorities arrested Cebu's revolutionary leaders, Florencio Gonzalez and Teopisto Cavan. Vicente Rama – a Visayan journalist, politician, and principal author of Cebu's city charter -- recorded that the arrest of these *Katipunán* leaders “was like a bomb exploding at the feet of the *Katipuneros*. All of Cebu shook; panic was seen in every face.” Rebels advanced their plans for an uprising from Good Friday to Palm Sunday and attacked the civil guard in the town of Talisay before taking control of Cebu City and forcing the Spanish garrison to retreat to Fort San Pedro on 4 April. The siege continued for three days, when about 500 soldiers from the Spanish army arrived and, with support from naval gunfire, relieved the fort and pursued the rebels into the mountains, capturing Cebu and other primary cities.¹⁴²

Perceptions of the extent, intent, and effectiveness of revolts outside of Luzon were various and subject to wide interpretation. Filipino nationalists in Luzon tended to interpret the outlying revolts – regardless of their size, intent, and efficacy – as widespread validation of their support for a Luzon-led archipelago-wide push for a Philippine republic. However, the Visayans had a broad spectrum of objectives, ranging from the establishment of independent republics to the creation of a federal system with their various islands as sovereign states. The difference in objectives between the Luzon revolutionaries and the Moros in Mindanao was even more stark.¹⁴³

Mindanao and its Sulu archipelago, at the southern end of the larger Philippine archipelago, were home to Islamic people commonly known as Moros, who had been resisting Spanish colonial authority and Christian dominion for three centuries. Spanish military and diplomatic efforts to impose colonial authority on the Sulu and Mindanao areas by force in the

¹⁴²Villanueva, *The Vicente Rama Reader*, 54-60, 194 [translation mine].

¹⁴³ Stanley, *Nation in the Making*: 51; Linn, *Philippine War*: 18-22; Zaide, *Philippines*: 234-254.

1870s and 1880s had made scant progress in subjugating the region, extending colonial authority no further than the area immediately surrounding their blockhouse garrisons. The eruption of the 1896 revolution and looming conflict with America led the Spanish to pull military resources from the area without truly subjugating the Moros. Spanish officials never tried to integrate the Moro population into Spanish society, thus while their areas were largely spared the negative direct aspects of Spanish colonialism to which the northern regions were subjected, such as the depredations of the friars, they were denied valuable benefits like economic development, public education, and health resources. In all, by the spring of 1898, the Moro populations of Mindanao were largely independent of Spanish authority and disinterested in Aguinaldo and the revolution, an attitude that left them isolated and vulnerable when the Americans arrived.¹⁴⁴

The declaration of war between the United States and Spain in late April 1898 found the Filipinos in various states of loyalty, ambivalence, and revolution. Those who were directly subjected to the colonial rule of Spain were largely unified in opposition to a continuation of the Spanish status quo, but they held a vast array of views about how to approach change – ranging from cooperative advocacy for gradual reform to full revolution. Filipinos also varied greatly on what their reform objectives were and what a Philippine nation should be. Conservative elites with the most to risk naturally tended to favor less risky approaches. Those with more to gain from significant change tended to be more radical. Neither was there an agreement on leaders. While Aguinaldo claimed to lead a nationalist movement, many Filipinos, particularly elites and those outside of the Manila region, viewed his governmental pronouncements suspiciously, as the aspirations of a potential dictator. Interpretations of his character, capabilities, motivations,

¹⁴⁴ Peter G. Gowing, *Mandate In Moroland: the American Government of Muslim Filipinos, 1899-1920* (Quezon City: New Day, 1983), 335-342; Max L. Gross, "A Muslim Archipelago: Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia," *CARL Digital Library*, National Defense Intelligence College, 2007, pp. 171-172, <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll11/id/695> (accessed July 18, 2020).

and actions stirred lively debate then and later, but the objective facts are that while he was able to inspire his devotees, he had little meaningful military success as a commander. He assumed leadership of an insurrection against Spanish authority that appealed to a faction of Filipinos and alienated others, as evidenced by the readiness of many to join forces opposed to him and his organization. When his situation became untenable, he went into exile, and at the time of the outbreak of the American war with Spain, Aguinaldo was traveling to Europe.¹⁴⁵

Reflecting the influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan on American strategic thought, the United States' initial concept for war with Spain was heroically sterile. Primarily naval, the initial plan called for "blockades, bombardments, harassments, raiding on exposed colonies, and naval actions." Later, under influence of discussions with the Naval War College, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt advocated for the seizure of Manila, a complicating factor. The addition of the seizure of Manila as a naval objective is interesting since the Asiatic Squadron lacked a meaningful ground component, and such a change implied that the Navy would have to find an allied army.¹⁴⁶

The United States Navy began discussing a war with Spain over Cuba as early as 1894. Plans developed in 1896 incorporated supporting attacks in the Philippines to reduce and hold Manila. By June 1897, the plan recognized three things: the strategic value of engaging Spain's

¹⁴⁵ Historical views of Aguinaldo vary greatly. Captain John R. M. Taylor, veteran of the Philippine war and invaluable compiler of the Philippine Insurgent Records, opined that Aguinaldo was ambitious if opportunistic and easily manipulated by his advisors. Modern popular Filipino historians tend to overlook Aguinaldo's failings in favor of sustaining his image as a nationalist hero of the revolution – though there is healthy debate over his character and role. American historians, particularly modern ones, seem to have a balanced evaluation of Aguinaldo as a mediocre military commander who was talented at unifying those of common interest to support him. For further information, see Linn, *Philippine War*, 18-21; Stanley, *Nation in the Making*, 52-54, 58; John R. M. Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States, 1898-1903: A Compilation of Documents and Introduction*, 5 vols. (Pasay City: Eugenio Lopez Foundation, 1971), 10-14; and Zaide, *Philippines*, 273-277.

¹⁴⁶ Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, 21 September 1897, and Roosevelt to William W. Kimball, 19 November 1897, as quoted in Gregg Jones, *Honor in the Dust: Theodore Roosevelt, War in the Philippines, and the Rise and Fall of America's Imperial Dream* (New York: New American Library, 2012), 42. See also Stanley Karnow, *In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines* (New York: Ballantine, 1989), 106-107; Linn, *Philippine War*, 7-8.

navy across the breadth of the Spanish empire, the ambiguity and uncertainty of future United States' strategic aims, and the potential source of an allied ground component in the Philippine revolutionaries. With respect to the Philippines, the plan stated:

For the purpose of further engaging the attention of the Spanish navy, and more particularly in order to improve our position when the time came for negotiations with a view to peace, the Board thinks it would be well to make an attempt to assist the insurgents in the Philippine Islands. It is understood, that the insurgents have possession of considerable areas in those islands, including some important points in the neighborhood of Manila; and it is thought that if the Asiatic Squadron should go down and show itself in that neighborhood, and arrange for an attack upon that city, in conjunction with the insurgents, the place might fall, and as a consequence, the insurgent cause in those islands might be successful; in which case, we could probably have a controlling voice, as to what should become of the islands, when the final settlement was made.¹⁴⁷

Naval action against the Philippines would deny Spain the ability to concentrate all her forces near Cuba and reduce its income and resources, thus applying economic pressure to compel accession to American demands without the potential logistical and political complications that could arise from putting ground forces in a conflict within Spanish territory. The plan satisfied American martial desires to address the publicly perceived depravity of Spanish colonial power but marginalized the risk of a protracted conflict with a less certain outcome. It capitalized on years of fleet modernization while avoiding the problems resulting from the deployment of an ill-prepared army. Taking and holding both key ports and commercial areas required the landing of an army by a combined naval and ground force, and placed troops in physical contact with the Spanish army, Aguinaldo's revolutionaries, and ordinary, ambiguously aligned, Filipino civilians.

On 26 February 1898, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt telegraphed Commodore George Dewey that, "In the event of declaration of war Spain, it will be your duty

¹⁴⁷ Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC), *Plan of Operations Against Spain (1897)*, <https://www.history.navy.mil/research/publications/documentary-histories/usa-navy-s/pre-war-planning.html> (accessed July 29, 2020).

to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave [the] Asiatic coast and then offensive operations in Philippine Islands.”¹⁴⁸ This cable, sometimes considered evidence of Roosevelt exceeding his authority in order to escalate the war, motivated Dewey to accelerate war preparations. Though the telegram was sent from Roosevelt, it is clear from the previous planning mentioned above that the Navy as an organization had decided to attack the Philippines. Had this not been the case, or had Roosevelt’s instructions been considered provocative, Secretary of the Navy John Davis Long, Roosevelt’s boss, could easily have revoked or modified it. In any event, Dewey’s Asiatic Squadron began to assemble, and increased food, coal, and ammunition were acquired.¹⁴⁹

Prudently, Dewey sought out intelligence on both the Spanish defenses and the Filipino revolutionaries. Casting a wide net for information, he helped create broad misunderstandings, intentionally or not, that shaped the attitudes of the factions participating in future events. From the information gathering efforts of Oscar Williams, the United States consul general in Manila, Dewey learned the disposition of the Spanish fleet, Manila’s defenses, and the state of the insurgency – particularly that the Filipinos enlisted into native regiments of the Spanish army were deserting in increasing numbers. However, Williams proved unable to keep his intelligence collection efforts secret, so both the Spanish authorities and Filipino public were aware of his purpose. The Spanish moved their fleet and prepared their defenses, and the rebels stepped up their attacks. Eventually, Williams made the assertion that Filipinos were clamoring for British or American power to overthrow their Spanish overlords, and that the revolutionaries “would gladly aid our fleet *and submit to our flag.*”¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸ Roosevelt to Dewey, 26 February 1898. NHHC, <https://www.history.navy.mil/research/publications/documentary-histories/united-states-navy-s/pre-war-planning.html> (accessed July 29, 2020).

¹⁴⁹ Jones, *Honor in the Dust*, 42-46.

¹⁵⁰ Emphasis mine, as quoted in Ronald H. Spector, *Admiral of the New Empire: The Life and Career of George Dewey* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974), 46-47; Karnow, *In Our Image*, 103.

Dewey's information collection efforts likewise led to communication with Aguinaldo and other exiled revolutionary leaders. His intermediaries, Captain Edward P. Wood, commander of the *U.S.S. Petrel*, and United States consul general Spencer Pratt both contacted Aguinaldo, first in Hong Kong and then Singapore. Through these middlemen, Dewey and Aguinaldo each heard exactly what they hoped for. Aguinaldo received verbal assurances that he interpreted to mean that America would recognize and defend Philippine independence. Dewey understood that Filipino rebels would support his military efforts, and thus Navy planners' hopes. The foundation was thus established for future accusations of broken promises and betrayal.¹⁵¹

The complications that arose from the decision to take the Philippines clearly underlie President William McKinley's exasperated comment, "If old Dewey had just sailed away when he smashed that Spanish fleet what a lot of trouble he would have saved us."¹⁵² On 24 April 1898 Secretary Long, with McKinley's approval, telegraphed Dewey, ordering the Asiatic Squadron to attack. By using its "utmost endeavor," Dewey's fleet departed from Mirs Bay on 27 April, arriving at the opening to Manila Bay in three days. Braving ineffective fire from shore batteries and the Spanish fleet, the Asiatic Squadron dispatched the Spaniards in about six hours, sinking three enemy ships, setting fire to seven more, and inflicting hundreds of casualties. The Americans suffered about seven wounded. The corner stone was laid for an American empire, as the Philippines became a potential arena for the expansion of control and influence. Dewey's May Day eviction of the Spanish fleet from Manila Bay in 1898 marked the end of meaningful Spanish control of the islands and both renewed and reinforced the possibility of an independent Philippine republic in the minds of many Filipinos. But it also mired the Philippines in the

¹⁵¹ Jones, *Honor in the Dust*, 45; Linn, *Philippine War*, 20-21.

¹⁵² As quoted by McKinley confidant and publisher Herman H. Kohlsaat in H. Wayne Morgan, *William McKinley and His America* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1963), 388.

American strategic irresolution, setting conditions for the Philippine-American War.¹⁵³

Americans, upon hearing the victorious news, became both energized and more sharply divided regarding the disposition of the Philippines. Anti-expansionists counted within their ranks such notables as Mark Twain, Andrew Carnegie, Samuel Gompers, Grover Cleveland, Benjamin Harrison, and William Jennings Bryan. Anti-expansionist arguments declared colonies immoral and warned that claiming the overseas territory violated the treasured principle that just government was a product of the consent of the governed. Most argued that the Filipinos were a unified people anxious for and capable of independent self-government. Some argued the colony would become a veritable Pandora's box of trouble including race mixing, disease, and economic stagnation, and that colonialism was tantamount to slavery. Expansionists like Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, and ultimately most American voters looked at the faraway archipelago as a great opportunity. They declared that expansion provided chances to extend the reach of American ideals of civil government, prospects to expand markets and economic prosperity, and chances for American missionaries to spread Christianity. Many subscribed to Rudyard Kipling's thought that America must "Take up the White Man's Burden" and discharge its duty to spread western civilization globally. This internal domestic turmoil prevented McKinley from issuing definitive strategic statements with respect to United States' objectives in the Philippines. This indecision complicated plans for both Aguinaldo and the American military, yet it allowed many Filipino revolutionaries to retain hope for a peaceful resolution – buying time for Dewey's forces.¹⁵⁴

In May 1898 the revolutionary Filipinos had problems. Aguinaldo needed to regain

¹⁵³ Jones, *Honor in the Dust*, 47; H. W. Brands, *Bound to Empire: The United States and the Philippines* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 23-24; Stanley, *Nation in the Making*, 51; Linn, *Philippine War*, 18-22.

¹⁵⁴ Jones, *Honor in the Dust*, 105-108; H. Wayne Morgan, *America's Road to Empire, The War with Spain and Overseas Expansion* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), 65-72; Brands, *Bound to Empire*: 26-33; Karnow, *In Our Image*: 111-113.

control over disparate revolutionary forces, establish legitimate government over a diverse society, and convince the Spanish, Americans, and international community (read: European colonial powers and Japan) to concede to his rule. The simplest way forward, perhaps the only way, was for the Americans to support his revolution and then defend Philippine independence. Though the American navy's elimination of the Spanish fleet at Manila simplified the military challenge by removing the source of external support for and communication to Spanish ground forces, there was little chance of Aguinaldo immediately capitalizing on the situation to create an independent Philippines. Dewey had returned him to Luzon to provide a ground component to his campaign. While the Philippine revolutionary forces were disjointed, composed of forces of various skills and equipment, and led by men of disparate motivations and capabilities, they were united by disdain for their former colonial masters and visions of Philippine independence, which motivated them to push the Spanish forces into the walled city of Intramuros in Manila – accomplishing both Dewey's and Aguinaldo's military objectives. Accomplishing their political objectives was harder.¹⁵⁵

Lack of accord persisted among the Filipino people. Far from being the homogenous people “forever welded” in unity, and free of “race cancer” (racism) as described by many American anti-expansionists at the time, the Filipino people of 1898 were a heterogenous mix of Malay, Chinese, and Hispanic ethnicity divided along tribal, linguistic, and religious lines, and holding prejudices as commonly as any other people, particularly against Chinese immigrants. The Philippines in 1898 had a polyglot population of roughly eight million, divided ethnically into at least eight significant groups and geographically scattered on an archipelago of more than 7,000 islands separated into three main regions, Luzon in the north, the Visayas in the center, and

¹⁵⁵ Linn, *Philippine War*, 21-23.

Mindanao at the far south. These divergent and often competitive groups maintained deep social rivalries that inhibited their ability to unify, especially as a nation.¹⁵⁶

The fundamental ideological divide in the archipelago is most clearly seen by the Moros in the southern regions of Mindanao, who fought against religious control by both Spanish and rebel authority and continue opposing Christian domination to this day. Tribal ethnic rivalries created deep friction; as an example, the bulk of the revolution's members in Luzon were from the Tagalogs, who were mistrusted and held in disdain by both Negronese and Macabebe people. This animosity not only stifled Filipino unity but also actively undermined the revolutionaries' objectives. A prime example were the people of Negros, who abandoned the Philippine Republic and declared loyalty to the United States in March 1899. Likewise, in September of that year, Macabebes formed the core of the first native auxiliary to the American forces, the Macabebe Scouts, who were particularly effective at hunting down revolutionary guerrillas, and eventually Aguinaldo himself.¹⁵⁷

A similar source of friction that worked counter to revolutionary aims was the social structure of the Philippines. The Philippines' socioeconomic situation under Spanish rule was stratified, with elite landowners and businessmen, *principales* or *ilustrados*, at the top and *taon* or peasants at the bottom. The *ilustrados* were educated and had means, and they used a system of patronage to build loyalty and spread their influence across the poor and middle sectors of the populace. Their support was invaluable for anyone interested in controlling the population, but they had their own concerns and agendas, which did not always agree with those seeking power and influence. Though the *ilustrados* comprised the intellectual core of the Propagandist

¹⁵⁶ Dolan, *Country Study*, 11-14; James A. Blount, *The American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1912* (New York: Knickerbocker Press, 1912), i-iii.

¹⁵⁷ Dolan, *Country Study*, 11-14; Linn, *Philippine War*, 128.

movement, the Filipino elite were often tepid revolutionaries, preferring peaceful reform, as this was less disruptive to their interests. The revolution, particularly Aguinaldo, needed these men's education and influence to function as a legitimate government, but struggled to reconcile their various ambitions, concerns, and agendas into a cohesive body of leadership. This worked to the United States' military's benefit, as many of the key members of Aguinaldo's government eventually became disillusioned and began working in earnest with the Americans.¹⁵⁸

In addition to the lack of any unifying ethnic, geographic, or sociopolitical leadership, Filipinos lacked the military resources needed to unilaterally secure an independent new nation against the predations of world powers. A fine example of such a predator was the Germans, who were hardly intimidated by the United States navy and thus unlikely to be talked into respecting Philippine independence. Eager to expand their colonial reach, the German fleet aggressively challenged the American blockade of the Philippines until confronted by the threat of a unified Anglo-American naval force. The best long-term answer to this challenge was an internationally recognized and capable Philippine military, but building such a force required time, resources, and victory. An international agreement regarding the Philippines could have secured Filipino sovereignty, but nineteenth century diplomacy advanced at a very slow pace, and Aguinaldo recognized that without American guarantees, he did not have much time. To gain internationally recognized Philippine independence, he needed to establish a government and an army, defeat the Spanish, and have the United States guarantee Filipino autonomy until the new republic could unite the disparate Filipino peoples and defend itself. American representatives with the authority to make such promises did not do so in any legally binding form, so Aguinaldo had to work with the Americans against the Spanish while carefully positioning the revolution to pivot

¹⁵⁸ Stanley, *Nation in the Making*, 53-54; Karnow, *In Our Image*: 116; Milagros Camayon Guerrero, *Luzon at War: Contradictions in Philippine Society, 1898-1902* (Mandaluyong City: Anvil Publishing, 2015), 2-3.

against the United States if it did not support Philippine independence.¹⁵⁹

In an effort to build unity among the disparate revolutionary elements and hopefully gain recognition for his leadership both internationally and across the archipelago in a *fait accompli*, Aguinaldo declared the establishment of the Philippine Republic on 23 May 1898 and assumed dictator-like powers for the duration of the crisis. On 12 June, against the advice of Mabini, he again proclaimed the independence of the Philippines in a long declaration in front of about one hundred people in his hometown of Cavite. By the following week Aguinaldo and Mabini had organized a Revolutionary Government and drafted a plan for local administration. On 20 June, in order to assert control over the various revolutionary military groups, Aguinaldo developed a military organizational concept consisting of a regular force - the Army of Liberation – and a volunteer militia. To promulgate this plan, he sent many of his best and most trusted military leaders as emissaries to the various factions across the provinces – a move one modern analyst calls a “serious military mistake,” since they were not at hand when opportunities to take control of the strategic military situation presented themselves.¹⁶⁰

In May 1898 the American military had a problem. Though victorious over Spain’s navy, they lacked the forces and related logistics to unilaterally seize and secure Manila, the capital of the Philippines, from the Spanish. They lacked supplies to independently operate a land force on the rest of Luzon, the largest island in the Philippine archipelago. Even if they had had the forces

¹⁵⁹ Zaide, *Philippines*, 257-258; Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860 - 1941* (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2003), 100-112; Linn, *Philippine War*, 16-25; Brian M. Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 163-169; Manuel Luis Quezon, *The Good Fight* (New York: Appleton-Century, 1946), 24-73; Stanley, *Nation in the Making*, 51-74; Villanueva, *Vicente Rama Reader*, 54-61.

¹⁶⁰ Karnow, *In Our Image*: 117; Linn, *Philippine War*, 22-23; Linn speculates that Aguinaldo may have been able to defeat the Spanish and seize Manila unilaterally in June 1898 by seriously changing the military dynamic had he retained trusted leaders near him. It is uncertain how this would have changed the fundamental problems the revolution had in uniting the archipelago under Tagalog rule, the challenge of holding the *ilustrados* loyalty, or the threats it faced from international colonial powers.

and resources for autonomous action, they lacked definitive guidance about what they were to accomplish. What they lacked most was clear strategic direction that impacted the looming second challenge – what to do about the revolutionaries, especially after Aguinaldo’s declarations?¹⁶¹

Aguinaldo had repeatedly discussed with American military representatives the question of whether the United States would recognize an independent Philippine Republic. American military commanders, specifically Dewey and Brigadier General Thomas M. Anderson, were unable or unwilling to give an unequivocal response – at one point Dewey reportedly instructed Anderson to give “no indication to Aguinaldo that we take his government seriously.”¹⁶² Much of their dithering with Aguinaldo appears to be from a combination of a lack of a clear statement of President McKinley’s strategic aims, and fear of losing access to Filipino material resources they required to effectively carry out the expulsion of the Spanish army from Manila. Their hesitation did buy time for American and revolutionary forces to organize, and for McKinley to organize a clear policy.¹⁶³

Having campaigned as an anti-expansionist, President McKinley’s initial vague objective in the Spanish-American War, vis-à-vis the Philippines, was to “keep all we can get” during the

¹⁶¹ Thomas M. Anderson, "Our Rule in the Philippines," *The North American Review* 170 (February 1900), 275-76.

¹⁶² Karnow, *In Our Image*, 120.

¹⁶³ Anderson, "Our Rule in the Philippines," 275-276. It is not the intent of this work to deeply analyze the various arguments for and against the 19th century imperial ambitions of the United States, except insofar as the American domestic debate became an influence on Filipino revolutionaries. For further information on the debate over American imperialism writ large see Brands, *Bound to Empire*, 3-19. Expansionism was hotly contested by Americans at the time, as it is today, and newspapers of the time capitalized on this with sensationalist articles intended to drive readership and revenue; for a particularly good example see *San Francisco Call*, "Dewey's Sensational Pledge to Aguinaldo," 26 November 1899, which attempts to cast the initial dialog between Filipino and American leadership in scandalous tones. For a thorough discussion of the internal debate over American imperial aims in the Philippines, see Karnow, *In Our Image*, 128-130; Stanley, *Nation in the Making*, 52-80; and Brands, *Bound to Empire*, 23-25.

war, and afterwards “keep what we want.”¹⁶⁴ The gains were to be used as leverage to get an improved settlement in the peace. However, the completeness of the naval victory in Manila Bay energized the American public, both expansionist and anti-expansionist, and altered the military situation to such a degree that McKinley had to provide a definitive answer to the question of the final disposition of the Philippines. In his messages following his official reporting of victory, Dewey requested 5,000 troops to “control the Philippine islands” against a Spanish force that he estimated to be 10,000 strong, in cooperation with what he thought would be 30,000 Filipino revolutionaries.¹⁶⁵ Recognizing the immediate military requirement, McKinley approved the expedition under Major General Wesley Merritt, increasing its authorized strength to 15,000 after he learned the size of the Spanish and Filipino forces. Of this number, less than 11,000 arrived before the First Battle of Manila on 13 August 1898.¹⁶⁶

Reflecting the zeitgeist in America in the months before the presidential election, and the uncertain path and outcome of both the war and peace negotiations, McKinley advised Merritt to focus primarily on eliminating the Spanish forces and establishing good military government. McKinley described in detail the intended aims and character of the latter in terms and phrases that clearly reflected the influence of *ex parte Milligan*, the Lieber Code, and William E. Birkhimer’s *Military Government and Martial Law* (1892). McKinley’s directive established the legal and moral responsibility the United States had to provide security and order by means of military government. He continued under an assumption that the population would acquiesce, in what Birkhimer called “temporary allegiance,” to the efforts of Americans to administer their towns, cities, and country. He further directed the Army to use indirect rule via local officials as

¹⁶⁴ Handwritten note from McKinley quoted in Karnow, *In Our Image*, 138.

¹⁶⁵ Dewey to the Secretary of the Navy, 13 May 1898, as quoted in John M. Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1899-1902* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973), 4.

¹⁶⁶ Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 5; Linn, *Philippine War*, 15, 25.

much as possible and to the extent they complied with American directives; if they failed to do so, they should be replaced. He then detailed the military's limitations with respect to private and public property, and taxes, before instructing Merritt to coordinate his actions with the Navy. In sum, McKinley's directive was that American military government was to be both authoritative and beneficent, and "as free from severity as possible."¹⁶⁷

Some later analysts condemned McKinley's directive as too vague, failing to answer the questions of how to accomplish the stated objectives, or to what extent those objectives were to be pursued. In fact, they were precisely the type of orders the military needed to operate in an ambiguous situation. The immediate objectives were clear: defeat the Spanish and provide order and security. The means were provided: a joint army and navy combined arms force of more than 15,000 artillery, cavalry, and infantry. The way to remove the Spanish was combat, the details of which would depend on the situation on the ground, which was rapidly developing and required the response of a skilled and trusted commander. The method to provide security was military governance, again dictated by the situation, but guided by the principles outlined at the time of the American Civil War and more detailed guidance provided by McKinley. Anderson was skilled, and trusted by McKinley and other American military leaders, who gave him the latitude to "do the best [he could]." As Secretary William L. Marcy did for his commanders in 1846, McKinley provided justification for military government and left the operational details up to the commander. Unlike American generals in previous conflicts, Merritt, Anderson, and their contemporaries had doctrine, their own experience, and the experiences of predecessors to guide them. Because of the Navy, the challenge for the Army in May 1898 was less of how to defeat

¹⁶⁷Center of Military History, *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, Volume 2* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993), 676-678 (hereafter *CWS*); Of note, McKinley's orders of 19 May did not arrive to Merritt in San Francisco until 28 May, 3 days after Anderson and his troops had sailed. The legal reasoning behind McKinley's directive, as well as the sources cited here, are discussed more fully in Chapter 1.

the Spanish, and more of how to win over the Filipinos, as any effort to impose American rule would immediately spark conflict with revolutionary nationalists. The challenges created by centuries of Spanish rule had to be addressed skillfully.¹⁶⁸

In May 1898, the Spanish Governor-General of the Philippines, Basilio Augustín, also had problems. The defeat of the Spanish fleet by the American navy isolated him and those loyal to Spain. As his forces were overextended in pacifying the Moros and suppressing banditry by *ladrones*, he lacked the loyal resources to decisively resist the Americans or to effectively quell the revolutionaries. Appeals to the Spanish government for aid were heard, but his hopes were dashed when a fleet sent to relieve Manila was diverted to Cuba, the higher priority. Isolated, the best course of action for him to salvage some sort of victory from the situation was to drive a wedge between the two nascent allies.¹⁶⁹

Aware of the approach of the American fleet as early as 23 April 1898, Augustín had unsuccessfully appealed to natives' sense of patriotism, calling on all Filipinos to rally to unite in the struggle to defend the Spanish flag. By midsummer, the native auxiliary units of the Spanish army dissolved as the Filipinos deserted. He also promulgated anti-United States propaganda, claiming the Americans had "pretend[ed] to be loyal friends," but were now coming to despoil the Spanish colony. The Governor warned that the Americans would substitute "Protestantism for the Catholic religion," and that they would steal property, kidnap, and enslave Filipinos as laborers, and rape their women, old and young. But this propaganda, though it stoked suspicion and mistrust against the Americans, did not overcome Filipino disdain for the Spanish.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁸ Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 6; Anderson as quoted in Linn, *Philippine War*, 13.

¹⁶⁹ Linn, *Philippine War*, 17, 22; Karnow, *In Our Image*, 103-104, 123.

¹⁷⁰ Quotes from the proclamation of Governor-General Basilio Augustín, 23 April 1898, as published in Conrad S. Babcock, *Reminiscences of Conrad S. Babcock*, ed. Robert H. Ferrell (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2012), 11-12.

Augustín also failed with an eleventh-hour appeal to the *ilustrados*' calls for reform when he created the short-lived Filipino Consultative Assembly. The opportunity for peaceful reforms had passed. After his appeals to Filipino loyalty yielded nothing, Augustín fruitlessly attempted to negotiate surrender with Aguinaldo. These efforts angered the Spanish parliament, which replaced Augustín with Fermín Jáudenes on 24 July, as Spanish loyalists retreated into their fortifications. Years of fighting the revolution had weakened Spain in the eyes of colonials and strengthened the resolve of disparate Filipino nationalists. Spanish efforts to kindle patriotism and anti-American sentiment failed because reforms came too late, and followed a long history of abuse, oppression, and broken promises. The Americans in 1898 may have been everything that Augustín said they were, but Filipinos had little understanding of the United States beyond the fact that its navy had crushed the Spanish and helped force them into a veritable siege. As such, Spanish-stoked fear of the unknown could not overcome Filipino colonial experiences and hopes for the future.¹⁷¹

Over the summer of 1898, tension between the barely allied Filipinos and Americans increased in parallel with Spanish fear of the revolutionaries. Anderson and Dewey met often with Aguinaldo to help procure support and arrange the disposition of their ground forces in preparation for a confrontation with the Spanish. In these meetings, the Americans talked around ever-increasing Filipino questions about United States' recognition of Philippine independence. Aguinaldo's suspicions of American intentions grew with every United States soldier that arrived in Luzon. By late July the situation at Manila presaged combat in the coming world war. Spanish, Filipino, and American forces had reached an entrenched standoff. Raids and snipers caused casualties but never made meaningful changes to the tactical situation. Loyalists taking

¹⁷¹ Luis Moreno Jerez, *The Spanish Prisoners Held by the Tagalogs: A Historical Narrative of Their Captivity and the Measures taken for Their Freedom* (Manila: National Historical Institute, 1998), 16-17; Zaide, *Philippines*, 256.

refuge behind the defenses of the walled city lost hope for victory when news of the Americans' rout of the Spanish military in Cuba reached Manila. Dreading a retaliatory massacre at the hands of the revolutionary Filipinos, Governor-General Jáudenes reached an agreement with Dewey and Merritt concerning a surrender, but not before a final battle and some crucial political mistakes that undermined the Filipino-American alliance.¹⁷²

On 13 August, three days before word of the Spanish-American peace protocols reached the Philippines, soldiers from Merritt's Eighth Corps attacked the Spanish at Manila. With naval gunfire in support, the Americans overcame Spanish defenses and pushed into the city, meeting little resistance on the outskirts before finding a white flag of surrender raised over the old walled section of the city. Merritt then turned his soldiers' attention to preventing the Filipino revolutionary army from entering the city. Merritt had previously told Aguinaldo to keep his forces out of the city to prevent looting, rape, and other retribution. This also had the effect of limiting potential fratricide between Americans and Filipinos, and the more subversive result of limiting the revolutionaries' ability to claim possession of politically legitimizing key terrain. Despite this, thousands of revolutionaries entered the Manila suburbs before Americans could shift attention from defeating the Spanish to blocking the revolutionaries. Filipino indignation at being relegated to merely a supporting effort in vanquishing their oppressors, and then being denied triumphal entry into their capital, soured Filipino-American relations.¹⁷³

The tension resulting from these American slights very nearly sparked a widespread conflict. Merritt and Dewey worked to diffuse the situation, which required them to both protect the citizens of Manila and conciliate the offended Filipino revolutionaries. The latter had cut off Manila's water supply as part of the siege and thus had a tactical advantage in any discussions.

¹⁷² Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 16-21; Linn, *Philippine War*, 22-26.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 24-25; Merritt to Corbin, 13 August 1898, *CWS* 2:754.

However, Aguinaldo's ambitions put the new republic at a strategic disadvantage as he was still hoping and striving for international if not American recognition of his government's authority. The Spanish-American peace talks would determine the disposition of the archipelago, and his legitimacy could be jeopardized if the situation there decayed further.¹⁷⁴

On 13 August, as strain between revolutionaries and American soldiers was looming in the wake of victory, Merritt and Dewey sent a joint telegram to Washington asking for guidance with respect to "insurgent demand[s] for joint occupation of the city," and their limits in "using all means" to pacify the Filipinos.¹⁷⁵ Four days later McKinley's response was unequivocal: there would be no joint occupation of Manila, and the revolutionaries must cease hostilities and join with all residents of the Philippines in recognizing "the military occupation and authority of the United States."¹⁷⁶ The President alliteratively emphasized the United States' legal and moral obligation to "preserve the peace and protect persons and property" in the areas they controlled, and gave Merritt latitude to use his best judgment while repeating his previous calls for equal treatment for all people.¹⁷⁷

One modern historian cites this conversation as an example of the friction caused by differences in situational understanding between leaders in Washington and those in Manila, and he implies that the President did not give adequate direction to his two commanders at the time. Merritt and Dewey, warned about an impending tactical crisis, had asked for guidance on their limits of self-defense. The President and his staff minimized the local conflict and focused on the strategic issues of the control of Manila and disposition of the Philippines. McKinley's apparent

¹⁷⁴ Linn, *Philippine War*, 24-27; Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 26.

¹⁷⁵ Merritt and Dewey to Corbin, 13 August 1898, *CWS* 2:754.

¹⁷⁶ Corbin to Merritt, 17 August 1898, *CWS* 2:754.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

failure to grasp the severity of the situation confronting his military commanders and his lack of detailed direction regarding his goals for the Philippines are cited as sources of frustration for soldiers and leaders in Manila.¹⁷⁸

While there were undoubtedly stark differences in understanding between McKinley and his military leaders, differences that would compound the difficulty of pacifying the Philippines over the following four years, this particular exchange is an example of McKinley's awareness of the limits of his means of communications and grasp of the details, of the uncertain outcome of the peace negotiations, and of his trust in the field commanders. He outlined a clear, limited, objective: security of the legal possessions of the United States. He plainly underwrote whatever means were used to accomplish that objective when he deferred to Merritt's discretion. In sum, the President's response on 17 August was adequate and suitable to the situation. In conjunction with the directions sent prior to Merritt's arrival in the islands, McKinley provided the military with sufficiently flexible guidance to use their resources to resolve crises as situations developed; a more detailed set of instructions could just as easily have caused problems for the military as it requested and waited for guidance as each issue arose. The decentralized nature of the command arrangement between Washington and Manila was optimal for a fluid situation with undefined objectives, as it allowed for effective responses to emerging threats, but it required commanders comfortable with ambiguity and skilled at adaptation. Merritt availed himself of this latitude in negotiations with Aguinaldo, and eventually the erstwhile allies came to tenuous terms. The revolutionaries agreed to restore water, withdraw their forces from Manila, and allow unarmed Filipinos to enter the city. Regardless of Aguinaldo's pledge, his revolutionary army continued to surround the city and harass American troops, creating the tense atmosphere that would lead to

¹⁷⁸ Linn, *Philippine War*, 26.

open war less than six months later.¹⁷⁹

Merritt seized the opportunity to remove himself from the looming Philippine crisis and its associated strategic ambiguities, as the Spanish were defeated, and the war was all but over. On 25 August, the General requested to be relieved, either to join the Paris peace commission or return home directly, and he recommended that Major General Elwell S. Otis take command as his replacement. The next day his request was granted, and he joined the peace delegation in Paris. Otis assumed command on 29 August 1898.¹⁸⁰

For all the complexity of dealing with the revolutionaries in an atmosphere of strategic ambiguity, General Otis's command began promisingly. The revolutionary leaders wanted to secure international recognition and support, so they restrained, as far as they were able, any provocative moves against the Americans. Aguinaldo's revolutionaries were somewhat occupied consolidating control across Luzon and propagating their legitimacy across the archipelago, but they still encroached in the suburbs of Manila and conflicts with the Americans were common. Like Aguinaldo, Otis also had to consolidate a disparate force that had been hastily assembled and deployed. Numbers and strategic guidance restricted the Americans to Manila, as Otis lacked the means to expand further and the Spanish peace protocol defined the United States area of responsibility as Manila, Manila Bay, and its harbor. The Americans worked with what they had, and what they had was direction to use a mostly volunteer army to benevolently govern a filthy, overcrowded, starving, disease-ridden city while an adversarial regime perpetuated anti-American propaganda. With a limited area of operations, limited resources, and a clear need, Otis's way forward was obvious: put Manila in order.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁹ Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 26; Otis to Corbin, 3 September 1898, *CWS*, 2:786.

¹⁸⁰ Merritt to Corbin, 25 August 1898, Corbin to Merritt, 26 August 1898, *CWS* 2:764-765.

¹⁸¹ Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 30-32; Linn, *Philippine War*, 33.

Otis, although fairly criticized for being moody, sarcastic, and micromanaging, proved to be an able military governor and competent commander. On 3 September 1898 he replaced his adjutant general, the newly promoted Major General Arthur MacArthur, with Brigadier General Robert P. Hughes. Otis directed Hughes to bring order to the city. As Provost Marshal, Hughes policed the city, with three regiments serving as a provost guard. He enforced existing laws that did not conflict with military government, established a system of jurisprudence, and worked to improve health and sanitation. The Army tried unsuccessfully to have Spanish justices serve as local courts for civil cases, but they refused, and so military courts tried criminal cases. At the same time, American troops released more than 2,000 prisoners being held without records and paid them to build cots for the Army.¹⁸²

Anxious to eliminate the filth and contagion that were causing more American casualties than the conflict, Otis moved to clean up the diseased city. Following McKinley's guidance and Army military governance doctrine of indirect rule as much as possible, Otis and Hughes created a Filipino-Army Board of Health. This inspected residences, markets, dispensaries, hospitals, and slaughterhouses – any place that could impact public health – and hired garbage collectors. They registered the increasing population of prostitutes and instituted a hospital for their care. The board also established a leper hospital and provided free health care for indigent Filipinos. The Army also initiated a program of improving public works and infrastructure, particularly with respect to water purification.¹⁸³

The Army also gave attention to reforming public education. Long on the Filipino's list of desired reforms, the expansion and secularization of the education system was popular with Filipino families. Before he departed, Merritt assigned the 1st California Volunteers' Catholic

¹⁸² Linn, *Philippine War*, 29, 31; Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 57-59.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

chaplain, W. D. McKinnon, to the task of opening and secularizing the schools. He had seven schools open by September. Facing a shortage of native teachers, Chaplain McKinnon enlisted the aid of educated soldiers as English teachers and, though he eliminated religious instruction, recruited many members of the Catholic teaching orders to assist. In a short time, McKinnon had increased the number of functioning schools more than five-fold, to thirty-nine. Otis continued education rebuilding and reform after the Paris Peace treaty was ratified, and by 1900 there were more than 1,500 fully staffed and resourced schools operating across the provinces of Luzon.¹⁸⁴

A post-war increase in trade combined with American efforts to reform taxation resulted in a commercial boom. Increased commerce, school and public works construction, education, and improved health and sanitation demonstrated to Filipinos the potential benefits of American rule. Otis's efforts in this respect were impressive, yet he failed in some respects by not fully incorporating the principle of indirect rule, as many construction projects were simply handled by Army engineers rather than local contractors, a more complicated approach, but one that would have better improved the Filipino economy. United States administrators tried to impose their mores on Filipinos by eliminating the cultural past time of *sabong* – cockfighting – and the associated 'vice' of gambling, as well as closing opium dens. At their worst, American soldiers' interactions with locals ranged from patronizing to racist, further undermining the appeal of American rule. At its best, Otis's administration, while competent and even beneficent, gave the impression of condescension by progressive reformers. Had the Americans been devoted to the idea of uplifting the Filipinos without patronizing them, perhaps they would have compensated for Otis's larger failing – his inability to effectively address the increasing insurgency.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁴ Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 61.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 63-68; Anderson, "Our Rule in the Philippines," 279, 282.

Compounding the burgeoning crisis was McKinley's apparent indecisiveness during the Paris peace negotiations. Having been introduced into American strategy in 1897 as merely an acquisition with which to leverage the Spanish, the Philippines had taken on somewhat outsized political, moral, economic, and military value by the middle of August 1898. By September, the anti-expansionists were pressing their case hard with not only the American public, but also the international community, including Aguinaldo and the Revolutionary *Junta* in Hong Kong – contact which led the revolutionaries to place at least part of their hope for independence on the outcome of the 1900 presidential election. Aguinaldo still recognized that the best way forward was recognition by the United States, but his hopes for American acknowledgement were fading. Expansionists made exaggerated claims of the archipelago's economic potential and the need for Americans to bring United States-style governance and culture to the Philippines. Some like Roosevelt and Mahan argued that the United States needed the colony in order to take its rightful place as a world power. By November, many *ilustrados*, disillusioned by Aguinaldo's apparent dictatorial ambitions and failure to stabilize the interior provinces, began adding their voices to the call for continued and expanded American rule. Responding to expansionist voices, public pressure, and his own impulses, McKinley's demands from Spain evolved from merely a naval base in the Philippines to retaining Luzon and then, by October, the entire archipelago. This demand upset the Spanish until the Americans added \$20,000,000 to the offer. By 10 December the Paris Peace Treaty was signed, and the United States Senate ratified it on 6 February 1899.¹⁸⁶

By early 1899, Otis claimed he had subdued the insurrection, clearing revolutionaries from many towns, and that “insurgent armed forces [were] not to be feared.”¹⁸⁷ In reality, the

¹⁸⁶ Stanley, *Nation in the Making*, 54.

¹⁸⁷ Elwell S. Otis, *Report of Major-General E. S. Otis On Military Operations And Civil Affairs In the Philippine Islands, 1899* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899), 160.

arrival of American forces led revolutionaries to temporarily abandon villages, only to return once the Americans were gone – a problem that persisted throughout the war. Clearly Otis was overly optimistic in his evaluation. This is partly due to his sanguine reliance on information from friendly *ilustrados*, who assured him that the mass of Filipinos rejected the revolutionary government and were anxious for benevolent American rule, words that confirmed Otis’s own biases that Filipinos were not yet prepared for self-rule. It is also partly because Otis devoted more attention to governance. Otis, recognizing the demand governance issues made on his attention, later circumspectly stated:

The experience of the past year has conclusively demonstrated that the labors demanded to organize, supply, command, and exchange an army engaged in hostilities are small in comparison to those which are required to supervise the business, social and political interests, and the individual rights of several millions of people without established government.¹⁸⁸

In 1900, Anderson generously evaluated Otis’s performance: “Restrained by diplomatic and philanthropic considerations, we had given them time to organize their revolutionary government and to consolidate their power.”¹⁸⁹ It is interesting to speculate how the initial occupation could have been if Otis had done things differently, had the McKinley administration formulated a definitive Philippine policy earlier, or had some Americans comported themselves in a less demeaning manner. However, it was the Filipinos who ultimately had to make the choice of following the Revolution and Aguinaldo’s nascent republic, or the Americans and their efforts to build a Filipino capacity for American-style self-governance, and they were still undecided.¹⁹⁰

In light of the expansion of the insurgency during his tenure, Otis’s efforts are sometimes criticized as at best naïve, or at worst a failure. His military governance of Manila demonstrates

¹⁸⁸ Otis, *Report*, 157.

¹⁸⁹ Anderson, “Our Rule in the Philippines,” 282.

¹⁹⁰ Otis, *Report*, 160; Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 31-32, 69-70.

an understanding of the pragmatic value of military governance's gradual expansion of direct rule that balanced the security needs of his forces with the ambiguous strategic objectives of McKinley. Otis's approach reflected a familiarity with the Army's earlier experience with military governance in Mexico and the American Civil War, however, he failed to appreciate the limits of attraction policy in rapidly overcoming not only nationalist desires, but also, the natural hesitance of the Filipinos to trust a new conqueror. Neither the Revolutionaries, nor the Americans could assume that multi-ethnic, polyglot Filipinos of diverse economic motivations who had tired of Spanish rule would immediately and unanimously embrace a new administration while other alternatives existed. Otis displays an understanding of Army military government doctrine as outlined in the Lieber Code, and, though there is no direct evidence of his ever reading it, the legal principles and arguments outlined by Birkhimer in his *Military Government and Martial Law*. His administration should be seen as a successful demonstration of competent governance that worked to demonstrate to Filipinos the contrast between potential American governance and that of the Revolutionary Government, but this approach was fated to be exceptionally time consuming as long as other alternatives existed. Otis's efforts may not have been attractive at first, but they existed as proof of the Army's administrative competence.

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Critiques of Otis's military acumen tend to ignore the General's conventional accomplishments and, not incorrectly, focus on his failure to prepare for the insurgency that emerged once the revolutionary army was destroyed. Otis as a military commander deserves more nuanced criticism. Otis's approach to pacification by way of destruction of the conventional force combined with a policy of attraction was not stupid, but rather incomplete. In destroying the Filipino Army while offering benevolent administration, Otis hoped Filipinos

¹⁹¹ Linn, *Philippine War*, 115, 129-130.

would abandon their designs for independence. He did not, as he should have, acknowledge the realities of Filipino nationalism, and prepare for alternative methods Filipino nationalists could use to achieve their objectives. By March 1899, Aguinaldo's senior military commander, General Antonio Luna, advocated a shift to a guerrilla war to harass the Americans, barely a month after friction between the Philippine Republic and the American military government had exploded into open war. As defeats in conventional battles became common, more revolutionary generals echoed Luna's call. By the end of the year, Otis had destroyed the Filipino army, but this only led to the greater problem of guerrilla warfare. The Japanese would face a similar problem in 1942.¹⁹²

The American offensive in November 1899 destroyed the Army of Liberation's ability to fight as a conventional organization. On 13 November, Aguinaldo acknowledged defeat and belatedly shifted to guerrilla tactics – a shift Otis had predicted but missed when it happened. Otis continued conventional operations to expand American authority across the islands and eliminate the remains of the Filipino army. With the help of his generals, Aguinaldo restructured the remnants of his forces into small, mobile, elements assigned to a sub-zone commanded by a major. Sub-zones were organized into zones commanded by a lieutenant colonel, zones formed provinces led by a colonel, and the provinces made up guerrilla districts commanded by generals. The guerrillas were directed to harass the occupiers, only fighting when they outnumbered the Americans, and never becoming decisively engaged. They were also to treat the people with respect and thus regain popular sympathy and demonstrate capacity for self-rule. Aguinaldo's objective was to prolong the war in a way that degraded the American ability to administer the country, but was beneficial, or at least not harmful, to the Filipino people. With an eye on the

¹⁹² Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 97.

1900 presidential election in the United States, he hoped guerrilla warfare would increase the cost of the war beyond what Americans were willing to pay and wear down their desire for colonial expansion. His hopes were tied specifically to the election of anti-imperialist William Jennings Bryan, whom he believed would unconditionally withdraw from the islands.¹⁹³

This transition from conventional to insurgent fighting created an illusory sense of victory in many Americans, who saw the disappearance of large forces as a sign of Aguinaldo's impending capitulation. In reality, his shift to guerrilla warfare made the Army's task much more difficult. Battle deaths for the United States increased 40% during the subsequent six months, from 104 between June and November 1899 to 150 between December 1899 and May 1900. Insurgent tactics included ambushes, traps, sabotage, assassinations, and efforts to sow mistrust in the Americans among the Filipino people. After engaging the Americans, guerrillas would run away and change clothes to blend in with the people, leaving the soldiers uncertain who was a friend and who was an enemy.¹⁹⁴

The guerrillas and the Americans each recognized that popular support was the key to their victory at all levels. Guerrillas needed the people for recruiting and information, as well as logistical support. Both Otis and Aguinaldo needed the people's recognition of the legitimacy of their government. Recognizing this, Aguinaldo continued a propaganda campaign that amplified American missteps, spreading rumors about war crimes and exaggerating casualties and defeats. In order to buoy Filipino hopes for independence, he also increased efforts to gain international support and recognition, spreading stories about impending European military relief and how independence would be granted once Bryan was elected president. But by November 1900 his diplomatic efforts in Japan and Europe had all failed and McKinley was reelected. His efforts to

¹⁹³ Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 156-158, 171.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 158, 171; Linn, *Philippine War*, 210.

rally the Filipino also ultimately failed because they were not truly united. Regional, tribal, and social differences led to varying degrees of support for or opposition to the guerrillas. Where there was a lack of support, the insurgents often used terror and reprisals. By the end of 1900, the Americans reported 350 assassinations and 442 assaults against people who were thought to have collaborated with the United States Army. Assaults and destruction of property instilled fear in people but did not win the insurrection their support.¹⁹⁵

In May 1900, as the guerrilla war was beginning to increase in tempo and effectiveness, Otis relinquished command to General MacArthur. MacArthur recognized that Otis's reliance on a policy of attraction had undermined the American position in the Philippines, and he predicted a surge in guerrilla activity aimed at influencing the upcoming presidential election. As military governor he did little until after the election when, in December 1900, he announced a dramatic shift in policy that emphasized the more drastic, punitive elements of the Lieber Code. In articles 21, 22, and section X of this, civilians who supported the hostile state were considered enemies. MacArthur clearly defined support for the insurgency as illegal, and he authorized "exemplary punishments," including execution, for those guilty of aiding the guerrillas. The policy forced Filipinos to decide which side they would support.¹⁹⁶

MacArthur's policy reprioritized military efforts at benevolent assimilation to second place behind security. Many of the restrictions that limited local commanders were removed. Americans engaged in depredations similar to those of the guerrillas: burning insurgent homes and areas near ambush sites, torturing suspected guerrillas for information, destroying crops, and arresting, imprisoning, or deporting those suspected of supporting the insurrection. This effort, combined with aggressive and continuous pursuit of the guerrillas, was intended to isolate the

¹⁹⁵ Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 102, 160-161, 165-166; Linn, *Philippine War*, 211-214, 268.

¹⁹⁶ Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 175; Linn, *Philippine War*, 256-258, 265, 281-286.

insurgents from the support of the people. Alone, this policy would likely have further alienated the people, but when combined with an American civilian commission's continued policy of attraction that included open support for municipal governments and public health, education development, and expansion of commerce and public works, it worked to demonstrate the United States' capacity to create stability and provide for people. This policy of attraction expanded upon Otis's efforts and the advice and policies of two presidentially appointed commissions.¹⁹⁷

On 4 March 1899, within a month of the ratification of the Paris Peace Treaty and the outbreak of the Filipino-American War, American-Philippine War, or Philippine Insurrection, the Schurman Commission, chaired by President Jacob Schurman of Cornell University, arrived to investigate the "growing differences between Americans and Filipinos," and then make recommendations to shape future policy.¹⁹⁸ The Commission's report reflected the opinions of the *ilustrados* it consulted, and echoed Rizal's and the Propagandist's calls for reform, by declaring that the Filipinos desired religious freedom, protection of basic civil rights, and home rule. The commissioners called on McKinley to end military government, but in what became a recurring assessment of American observers, asserted that the Filipinos were unable at that time to govern themselves. Schurman estimated that, eventually, "the diverse peoples of the Philippine Islands may be molded together into a nationality capable of exercising all the functions of independent self-government," but he did not define when that might happen.¹⁹⁹

In response, McKinley commissioned federal judge William H. Taft in 1900 to lead a second team to the Philippines to design a civil government based on the United States' model

¹⁹⁷ Linn, *Philippine War*, 211-214.

¹⁹⁸ Stanley, *Nation in the Making*: 54.

¹⁹⁹ David J. Silbey, *A War of Frontier and Empire: The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), xi-xvi, 207-218; *Report of the Philippine Commission to the President, Volume 1* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1900), 113; Stanley, *Nation in the Making*, 59; Brands, *Bound to Empire*, 54.

that would replace the current military government. With the same American biases and having consulted the same elite Filipinos as previous observers, the Taft Commission reported that a “great majority” of the Philippine people did not oppose American rule, but simply wanted an end to military government. This is unsurprising, considering the military situation in 1900. In addition to repeating an overly optimistic evaluation of Filipinos’ views of America and the call to end military government, Taft echoed Schurman’s assessment that they were unfit to rule, describing the natives as “ignorant, superstitious, and credulous [to a] remarkable degree.” On 1 September 1900, just after the report was released, the Taft Commission assumed all legislative functions in the islands.²⁰⁰

Taft’s commission sought to build native capacity for self-governance by establishing functioning civic institutions with gradually increasing Filipino participation. In spite of, and perhaps because of, his condescending views of Filipinos, he proposed an insular government comprised of a “Governor General and a legislative body, consisting of the [Second Philippine] Commission [with] possibly one or two reliable Filipinos to act as a provisional legislature for eighteen months or two years,” or until a larger civil government could be built. Taft’s inclusion of Filipinos in the legislature, regardless of motive, marks the beginning of what one historian described as “collaborative empire.” The term is accurate, but it is not as insidious as may be inferred. The Filipinos had long wanted more inclusion in government. While they had native leadership at the local level from *datus* or chiefs, and both Spanish and Americans had leveraged tribal rivalries to work for pacification by including native auxiliaries in their militaries, Taft’s inclusion of Filipinos in the highest levels of national leadership gave them an unprecedented level of influence in their government, and it marked the beginning of a three-decade shift to

²⁰⁰ Stanley, *Nation in the Making*, 61–64; Karnow, *In Our Image*, 68–169, 173; Lewis E. Gleeck Jr., *The American Governors-General and High Commissioners in the Philippines: Proconsuls, Nation-Builders, and Politicians* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1986), 22.

self-rule. Taft also planned for public works, educational reforms, and capital investment. On 2 March 1901, the United States Congress approved Taft's plan for civil government with minor adjustments. On 4 July, American military government of the archipelago was terminated, and Taft became the first Governor General of the Philippines.²⁰¹

Taft's civilian rule, the end of military governance, and the inclusion of Filipinos in national government did not have an immediate pacific effect, but it did undermine unity in revolutionary leadership, highlighting the schism between the irreconcilables who would settle for nothing less than full independence and those with goals for incremental reform more aligned with benevolent assimilation. This divide within the revolution, and among the Filipino people, had already contributed to the capture of Aguinaldo on 23 March 1901 by eighty-four Macabebe Scouts led by Brigadier General Frederick Funston. His operation was based on information that was provided by a guerrilla courier who was persuaded to surrender by a Filipino municipal president. The information he carried enabled Funston to use a select group of Tagalog speaking Macabebe Scouts to nab Aguinaldo. He was brought to Manila and held in *Malacañang* Palace, where he renounced the guerrilla war and swore allegiance to the United States. He called for a cessation of hostilities and acceptance of a peaceful existence under American rule, sparking a surge in surrenders by erstwhile guerrillas, including Manuel Quezon, the future president of the Philippine Commonwealth.²⁰²

The capture of Aguinaldo, while significant, was not the sole cause for the end of the war. Effective campaigns by the United States military worked in tandem with credible policies of attraction to encourage *insurrectos* to surrender and Filipinos to support American officials.

²⁰¹ Stanley, *Nation in the Making*, 76–77, 88; Michael Cullinane, *Ilustrado Politics: Filipino Elite Responses to American Rule, 1898–1908* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2003), 1-3, 52 [quotes from 1-3].

²⁰² Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 233-236; Quezon, *The Good Fight*, 73.

Effective politicking by Taft led to even more elite Filipinos siding with the United States. Recognizing their personal ambition, social status, and influence, Taft and his commissioners, much like Bonifacio and Aguinaldo, reached out to *ilustrados* to ask them to participate in the new government. A great example, and one of the first to accept, was a senior member of the revolution, Benito Legarda.²⁰³ A man of recognized status and influence, he had made his fortune in the tobacco and alcohol trade under the Spanish. When the revolution erupted, he advised Aguinaldo in his efforts against Spain, and later acted as vice-president of the Malolos congress. Fundamentally a Manila businessman, and far from irreconcilable, Legarda recognized war made business difficult. When the Americans shifted to civilian-led occupation government, he chose to participate in American shaping of future Philippine government.²⁰⁴

Legarda was one of many *ilustrados* who shifted their loyalty from the revolutionaries to the Americans. Recognizing their broad social influence, like Otis and in contrast to MacArthur, Taft's policy of attraction had focused on winning over elites whose ambitions and goals aligned with American objectives in order to convince the general population to abandon revolutionary ideals and side with the United States – thereby shortening the war. The policy was pragmatic and mutually beneficial, as ambitious Filipinos were rewarded for their loyalty and support of pacification aims with unprecedented governmental influence and power in the new regime that were unobtainable by Filipinos under Spanish rule – one of the objectives of the revolution itself. Otis began the policy -- Cayetano Arellano became the first Filipino to hold a position in national government when he was appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on 28 May 1899, and Gregorio Araneta became Secretary of Justice and Finance. Taft expanded upon this effort by including Filipinos in the national legislature. Far from being an ad hoc expedient, this policy is a

²⁰³ Cullinane, *Ilustrado Politics*, 1–2; Stanley, *Nation in the Making*, 65-67.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 67-69, 72; Cullinane, *Ilustrado Politics*, 51-54.

prime example of the methods advocated by United States military governance doctrine. From Major General Winfield Scott's policies in Mexico City, to the Lieber Code in 1863, the United States had promoted the participation of loyal local leadership in administration to aid in the transfer from military to civilian rule. This was a military expedient that should have been used more devotedly from the outset of military government in the Philippines, as it freed the Army from civic responsibilities in order to focus on combat operations, expediting the termination of hostilities and moving toward the American ideal of government by the people. While it is true that the use of *ilustrados* may have been, as one historian termed it, "the only means available" to gain the loyalty of the people it, was far from the least preferred means.²⁰⁵

The Taft commission's pragmatic and forthright implementation of the policy of attraction worked in synchronicity with military operations to bring American victory. As *ilustrados* abandoned Aguinaldo and worked with the Americans, they had increasing input into American efforts to restructure the national government. This input not only began to satisfy Filipino desires for a measure of self-rule, but also gave credibility to American's claims of benevolent assimilation. This credibility attracted more elites, and the loyalty of more people away from the revolution, as they witnessed the Americans keeping their promises and realized, in part, their aspirations for reform. In conjunction with the American Army policy of concentrating peaceful civilians, and relentless pursuit of revolutionaries, attraction supported a cycle that was working toward the goal of isolating the revolution from its base of popular support, leading the revolutionaries in many instances to take actions that further alienated them from the people. Eventually, by the end of 1900, enough elites supported the United States that they were able to organize the pro-American *Partido Federal*, or *Federalistas*. Taft shrewdly

²⁰⁵ Stanley, *Nation in the Making*, 67.

blocked the creation of any opposition parties, and the *Federalistas*' pro-American influence spread even as the harsher approach of MacArthur was expanding. The long sought-after participation in government gave Filipinos a legitimate alternative to revolutionary activity.²⁰⁶

Regardless of the moral correctness of the concepts of self-determination and self-government of peoples, without an American intervention in the Philippines, the independent Philippine republic as envisioned by Aguinaldo and Mabini was likely not going to come to fruition. The Filipinos were socially, ethnically, linguistically, culturally, and tribally diverse. Trust among various groups was slim, and regionalism and sectionalism were manifest, as evidenced by the 'defection' of the Negroneses to the Americans at the beginning of the war. Although this does not mean that the Filipinos were "unfit" to pursue self-government, it does indicate the revolutionary government would have to overcome divergent objectives among regions or potentially risk civil war.

As seems to be common in revolutions, there was a lack of common objective among the revolutionaries themselves. Though it sought national unity, Aguinaldo's government mistrusted both the elite and peasant classes – the people it hoped to bring together. Some of the latter, who resented the Republic's failure to bring about social change, its excessive taxation demands and military repression, formed their own secret revolutionary societies that rose up across Republic controlled areas of Luzon, burning government offices and destroying documents – becoming a problem the Republic had to divert military resources to quell these movements. Some Filipino elites also worked to undermine or co-opt the revolution. By promulgating the National Loan Bill and Foreign Loan Bill, they wanted to establish a Board of Treasury that they controlled both as creditors and collectors. While this effort was ostensibly to provide generous financial

²⁰⁶ Cullinane, *Ilustrado Politics*, 58, 66-72; Stanley, *Nation in the Making*, 71-73.

support to the Republic, it placed control of the Republic in hands of select *ilustrados*. American victory over the revolutionaries forestalled this shift in control.²⁰⁷

Had the revolution survived the regional and internal challenges, it seems unlikely the resulting nation would have retained independence for long – an argument President McKinley used on multiple occasions to justify American custody of the Philippines. As the Spanish empire was in collapse, the expansionist or imperial designs of various world powers would likely have ensured that a post-Spanish Philippines was at the very least a protectorate, if not outright colony. Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium all had colonies in Southeast Asia and would have sought to at least shape Philippine policy (as the British did by encouraging the United States to retain the Philippines to keep it out of German hands). German *Weltpolitik* drove their rapid colonial acquisitions across the sunny south Pacific, including Kaiser-Wilhelmsland, the northeastern quadrant of New Guinea, and a vulnerable Philippines would have been a good acquisition. Not exclusive to European states, Japan under the Meiji restoration also had expansionist policies, ones that would eventually bring the Japanese to the Philippines four decades later. As was seen in the result of the American-Philippine war, the new Republic lacked the ability to forcibly dissuade nations with colonial ambitions, making independence improbable without further development.²⁰⁸

When Taft officially assumed the governorship of the Philippines on 4 July 1901, he appointed Benito Legarda, as well as the physician, historian, and former Propagandist Trinidad Pardo de Tavera and judge Jose Luzuriaga, to serve on the commission. With Filipinos on the commission, Taft launched an aggressive plan to collaboratively Americanize Philippine society.

²⁰⁷ Stanley, *Nation in the Making*, 53-54. For deeper insights into the various factions' objectives within the revolution see Guerrero, *Luzon at War*, particularly the author's preface and introduction.

²⁰⁸ Brands, *Bound to Empire*, 25.

This legislative agenda included efforts to secularize the government and education, improve infrastructure, reform currency, trade, and monetary structures and policies, and create a plan for the fundamental organization of the government of the Philippines. Under this, a commission headed by the Governor General, and divided between four Filipino and four American commissioners would govern the Philippines.²⁰⁹

On 1 July 1902, the United States Congress passed Wisconsin Representative Henry A. Cooper's Philippine Bill, what became known as the Philippine Organic Act. The act kept most of Taft's plan intact and provided for an elected assembly to rule alongside the commission. It designated the Philippines as an American protectorate, and uniquely, gave the Filipinos non-voting representation in Congress in the form of two Resident Commissioners. On 4 July, President Theodore Roosevelt declared victory in the Philippines and granted amnesty to all revolutionaries, provided they swore an oath accepting "the supreme authority of the United States in the Philippine Islands." Though the revolution failed to dislodge the Philippines from colonial control, it did serve as a reference point of shared nationalistic struggle and hardship that helped overcome many tribal, ethnic, religious, linguistic, and social divisions to form the later foundation of 'Filipino' as a national identity – helping to define what it meant to be Filipino.²¹⁰

President Roosevelt's general amnesty enabled newly pardoned, erstwhile insurgents to use American political models as an outlet for their nationalist ideology. They formed political parties aligned with their views on the immediacy of independence. In reaction to the strength of this nationalist movement, the *Federalistas* reformed into the *Partido Nacional Progresista*

²⁰⁹ Dolan, *Country Study*, 29-30; Stanley, *Nation in the Making*, 77, 79, 82-99; Philippine Organic Act, Public Law 57-235, 32 Stat. 691 (1902); Brands, *Bound to Empire*: 99. On the commission's work, see: Celestina P. Boncan, "The Philippine Commission, 1900-1916," in *Philippine Legislature: 100 Years*, ed. Cesar P. Pobre (Quezon City: Philippine Historical Association with New Day Publishers, 2000), 27–62.

²¹⁰ Philippine Organic Act, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1902/07/04/proclamation-on-u-s-president-theodore-roosevelts-pardon-of-the-people-of-philippine-archipelago/> (accessed April 13, 2021).

(National Progressive Party) and called for gradual independence over time in order to allow a new government to establish itself. The new *Partido Nacionalista* (Nationalist Party) demanded unequivocal, immediate independence.²¹¹

In hindsight, the outcome of the American-Philippine war in 1902 was unsurprising. The challenge for Americans was to convince a people, who had been colonized for three centuries and who wanted a vision of independence promulgated by nationalist heroes, that temporarily continued colonization under a new and beneficent regime was preferable to continued struggle, and that Americans were not the predatory monsters depicted in both Spanish and Revolutionary propaganda. The challenge for Filipino revolutionaries was to convince a people who had been colonized for three centuries, and who wanted the independence promulgated by nationalist heroes, that an immediately attainable version of the revolutionaries' vision of freedom and independence was as good as or better, the Americans were monsters, and the revolutionaries were angels of deliverance. In the competition for popular Filipino support, the challenge was that the Americans had to be better than demons, the revolutionaries had to create a society fit for heaven, and neither could capitulate before their opposition. In the end, Americans met the lower standard with a policy of attraction and benevolent assimilation that demonstrably reformed the country in line with Filipino aspirations, and they made visibly kept promises that ultimately led the United States to grant the nation its independence.

²¹¹ Stanley, *Nation in the Making*, 116, 128-129.

CHAPTER 3

PACIFICATION

A review of the complicated economic, political, and interpersonal relationships between Filipinos and Americans over the four decades between 1902 and 1942 demonstrates the United States was successful at pacification, but not quite “benevolent assimilation,” of the Philippines. The capture of Emilio Aguinaldo in 1901 followed by the capture or surrender of the Filipino revolutionaries’ remaining key leaders – Colonel Quintin Salas in Iloilo, Generals Pedro Sason and Miguel Valmorin in Bohol, General Vicente Lukban in Samar, and perhaps most notably General Miguel Malvar, “the guiding spirit” of the remaining revolutionaries, in Batangas – ended the revolution, but not the fighting. Though President Theodore Roosevelt officially declared the war over on 4 July 1902, fighting with the Moros in the southern region of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago erupted in 1903 and continued for eleven years. From 1904 until 1907, the United States Army engaged in suppressing *pulahanes* uprisings across Samar, Leyte, and Cebu in the Visayas. To promote stability and order, Army personnel, and later the Philippine Scouts and Constabulary, had to address the problem of *ladrones* – large bandit gangs – in remote and rural areas. Against this backdrop, President William H. Taft and General Arthur MacArthur and their successors had the unenviable task of fulfilling the promises of benevolent assimilation first hinted at with General Elwell S. Otis’s policy of attraction.²¹² Military governance faded into the background of developing the Philippines and preparing the Filipinos for independence, but the Army, especially General Douglas MacArthur, remained involved in activities that directly affected the resumption of military government responsibilities in 1944.

²¹² Sonia Zaide, *The Philippines: A Unique Nation* (Quezon City: All-Nations Publishing, 1994), 275-276 [quote]; Edward M. Coffman, *The Regulars: The American Army 1898 - 1941* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2004), 39. *Pulahanes*, described by Zaide as “anarchists”, were members of a violent religious revival centered in the Visayas.

Formal efforts by United States authorities to secure the victory in the Philippines largely focused on developing Filipino capacities for self-government and self-defense, although the American effort in these areas was inconsistent over the decades. This is understandable given the ebb and flow of a mercurial domestic public opinion in the United States driven by changes in economic, local, and international events. American development of the Philippines began during the Spanish-American War with social, economic, and infrastructure improvements. Control of local government was given to Filipinos for the first time since before the arrival of the Spanish; Filipino participation in national government subsequently expanded but was still limited by American indecision regarding the desired relationship with the new colony and their perceptions of Filipino capacity. Created largely out of expedience, the Philippine Scouts and Philippine Constabulary incorporated local manpower into the defense structure much as the Spanish had, but colonial economics, World War I, and American domestic opinion made the development of these organizations inconsistent and their future uncertain. Fundamental to all United States' efforts to improve the government, defense, and economic capabilities of Filipinos was education, and efforts to improve education in the Philippines brought the direct influence of individual Americans in mundane interactions that altered Filipino culture and ultimately helped change the character of both nations and modify their relationship. This interaction involved Army personnel in tasks that greatly affected its resumption of military governance in World War II.²¹³

Civilians, some filled with an ideological zeal to spread American ideals, began arriving *en masse* in the Philippines in 1901. The first group of five hundred, travelling on the *Thomas*, a

²¹³ Richard B. Meixsel, *Frustrated Ambition: General Vicente Lim and the Philippine Military Experience, 1910-1944* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2018), 9, 11-13; Zaide, *Philippines*, 282-284; Stanley Karnow, *In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines* (New York: Ballantine, 1989), 278-279; Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 327.

converted cattle ship, landed in Manila in August – a vanguard of what ultimately became tens of thousands of American educators, doctors, engineers, swindlers, grifters, adventurers, army wives and children. Teachers arriving on the ship became generally known in the Philippines as ‘Thomasites’ after the ship they arrived on. These Thomasites spread across the country to establish schools and act, as one teacher wrote, as “emissaries of good will.”²¹⁴

Likewise, as early as 1898 wives and children began accompanying their soldier husbands and fathers to their assignments in the Philippines. By January 1900 there were more than 200 wives in Manila. These families’ interactions with Filipinos were typical for the time and involved countless mundane daily conversations, transactions, and activities that gradually built a rapport based on mutually congeniality. Families and soldiers hired houseboys, cooks, gardeners, and laundry women. Soldiers with the means lived in local neighborhoods in rented rooms. Troops in general prized free time, and after payday, found a large number of Filipino merchants willing to take their money. As with all army bases, Americans’ commerce was a key factor, for ill or good, in the economy of the neighboring communities.²¹⁵

Many officers’ wives worked as teachers in support of General Otis’s educational program. One woman, Ida Burr Parker, began organizing the schools in Tanauan in early 1900. She recorded that “it was plainly evident that every new school established out in an outlying *barrio* meant an effective extension of lawful authority deeper not only into the territory, but also into the hearts of the Filipinos.” Respect for these civilians’ educational efforts was evidenced in 1901 as, after moving to Taal, Batangas, a central “hot bed” location for the insurgency at the time, Parker reported being met by “only friendly people.” American children were in school while their parents were involved in governing, fighting, construction, or teaching. The

²¹⁴ Karnow, *In Our Image*, 276 [quote]; Coffman, *Regulars*, 55.

²¹⁵ Coffman, *Regulars*, 64, 67-68.

interactions between Filipino and American children were mixed but typical. American girls reported finding friendship – admiration from Filipino boys – as they were called on to help their peers learn American social customs and English. American boys, typical of their age, tended to get into fights. Social mores protected women and children from violence during the war. One officer reported that even during hostilities, “no woman or child was injured by Filipinos or Moros.”²¹⁶

As with soldiers in later conflicts and occupations in Germany, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, common American-Filipino interactions led to familiarity, which led to fraternization and often courtship; each relationship increasing the ties between countries in their small incremental degree. Many of these relationships were likely formed based on expedience, however, a meaningful number were like those of one Corporal Cobb, who began teaching at a school in Puerto Princessa, Palawan, continued teaching there after he was discharged, and eventually married a local girl. Not every interaction or cross-cultural experience was pleasant or productive. There were many fights, abuses, and epithets. Gambling, drunkenness, and loneliness were the root causes of many terrible Filipino-American interactions. Military wives reported having to sleep with guns in hand. Families sometimes had to pull beds away from the walls to avoid the blind thrusts of bolo knives through the palm-frond walls. It is likely impossible to quantify the effect Filipino – American interpersonal relationships had towards the goals of pacification and benevolent assimilation, but it is clear that these individual and family relationships across cultural lines strengthened ties between the two nations.²¹⁷

During this period of volatile cultural interaction, until 1934, the United States Army’s responsibilities in the Philippines were to “restore and maintain internal stability throughout the

²¹⁶ Coffman, *Regulars*, 64, 67-69 [quote], 73-7.

²¹⁷ Meixsel, *Frustrated Ambition*, 25; Coffman, *Regulars*, 73, 80-82.

archipelago and to train in preparation for possible invasion by Japan.” During the height of the American–Philippine War as much as sixty percent of the Army at one time was stationed in the Philippines. Nearly the entire officer corps at one point or another fought against the Filipino revolutionaries, and after 1902 many campaigned against the Moros. These fights proved to be one of the fundamental educational experiences prior to World War I for soldiers like Henry T. Allen, Robert L. Bullard, John J. Pershing, Peyton C. March, and Charles E. Kilbourne (Medal of Honor Winner and Superintendent of the Virginia Military Institute). Likewise, multiple tours with the Philippine Scouts, Philippine Constabulary, or simply on overseas garrison duty with the Army in the Philippines was a common developmental experience of officers in the inter-war period, including World War II luminaries as Douglas MacArthur, George C. Marshall, Benjamin O. Davis, Henry “Hap” Arnold, Dwight D. Eisenhower, James M. Gavin, Lyman Lemnitzer (Army Chief of Staff in 1959-1960), Lucius Clay, Walter Krueger, and Lewis Brereton (MacArthur’s air chief in 1941). MacArthur, Marshall, and Krueger, of course, would become deeply involved in military governance in the Philippines during World War II.²¹⁸

The continued presence of soldiers in the islands brought and perpetuated venereal diseases. In 1912, according to United States Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, the number of cases in the Army writ large was greater than that of all other significant diseases combined. The rate for the Army on average was 165 cases per 1000 soldiers – the rate in the Philippines was the highest subset at 305 per 1000. The army in the Philippines implemented regular medical examinations, publication of infection rates, and punishment for infections if prophylaxis was not used, including loss of pay for each day a soldier was incapacitated. By 1914 the rate in the Philippines had dropped below the rate for the same demographic in American cities. Venereal

²¹⁸ John M. Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1899-1902* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973), 287; Richard B. Meixsel, *Philippine-American Military History, 1902-1942: An Annotated bibliography* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2003), 7-8; Coffman, *Regulars*, 33-35, 55[quote].

disease continued to follow American forces in the Philippines for the duration of their presence. In 1925 Marshall identified “cheap liquor and cheaper women” as explanations for why punitive measures, prophylaxis, and medical examinations could not eliminate the problem. By the 1930s, the United States War Department assigned a venereal disease specialist to help address the problem. By 1933, heavy emphasis on unit athletic programs, medical lectures, and the aforementioned medical and punitive measures brought the rate down to 56 per 1000.²¹⁹

American medical efforts in the islands treated more than venereal diseases. Efforts to improve health and medicine followed soldiers’ movements across the Philippines as units taught and implemented sanitary measures to prevent cholera, typhoid, dysentery, and other diseases. Mosquito, fly, and rat eradication measures, boiling water and other sanitary cooking measures, latrine construction and use, hand washing and inoculation programs were all health measures promulgated by the Army that spread to Filipino daily life. Ironically, when the United States Army returned to the Philippines in 1944, medical personnel struggled with many of the same issues as military governance resumed in fact if not exactly in name.²²⁰

Formal development of the armed forces in the Philippines between 1899 and 1934 centered on the Philippine Scouts and Constabulary, with an abortive effort at creation of a Philippine National Guard. Most histories credit Lieutenant Matthew Batson with the idea to recruit native forces to assist the United States Army in its extended fight against Philippine revolutionaries. Batson himself noted that others were already doing this prior to his 16 July 1899 letter suggesting the idea to higher headquarters. Regardless of the originator, and as previously discussed, the recruiting of members of the Macabebe tribe to assist the Army was

²¹⁹ Coffman, *Regulars*, 79-81, 335 [quote], 341. Henry L. Stimson also served as a governor-general of the Philippines from 1927 to 1929.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, 82-83.

critical to the capture of Aguinaldo and the termination of the war.²²¹ These Macabebe scouts became the nucleus of the Philippine Scouts. By 1901, the Army Reorganization Act authorized the use of a maximum of 12,000 Filipinos in the force. The Army recruited and formed battalions of native “scouts” from the thousands of Tagalogs, Ilocanos, and Visayans who volunteered to assist the Americans. These soldiers offered the immediate advantages of knowing the language and culture, familiarity with the terrain, and tolerance of the tropical climate. Their existence within the American military undermined nationalist claims of Filipino unity and common cause. This lesson would be fully understood by leaders such as MacArthur, who pushed to incorporate both Filipino soldiers and civilians in his operations when he returned in 1944.²²²

During July 1901, as the head of the Philippine civilian governing commission, Taft promulgated, and the commission enacted, legislation establishing the Philippine Constabulary. Since his first arrival in 1900, Taft had held the view that the presence of the United States Army in the Philippines generated anti-Americanism in Filipinos, and he advocated for the creation of a native force of Filipinos whose leadership accepted American administration. The Philippine Constabulary, a national police force, was thus created with an American officer at its head who reported to the Philippine Commission.²²³ Thus by 1902 a bifurcated Philippine armed force was established with part answerable to the army, and part reporting to the civilian administration.

By 1907, Taft expanded his efforts to replace American soldiers with Filipinos to include the officer corps of the Philippine Constabulary. American leadership since 1900 had willingly accepted the use of native troops, but with the proviso that they be led by American officers. The

²²¹ Meixsel, *Frustrated Ambition*, 9-11. Meixsel identified a letter among Batson’s private papers referring to a Captain William Wren’s mission to recruit Macabebes, and notes that other officers had similar ideas, and that as early as February 1899 members of the Macabebe tribe had approached Otis and offered to assist.

²²² Meixsel, *Philippine-American Military History*, 2; Meixsel, *Frustrated Ambition*, 14-16.

²²³ *Ibid.*, 13.

1901 Army Reorganization Act had allowed the appointment of qualified Filipinos as lieutenants in Scout companies, resulting in the commissioning of four Filipinos between 1902 and 1907. Army leaders of the time generally held that Filipinos, much like African Americans, were not worthy of commissions. However, much like Benjamin O. Davis, some Filipinos' determination and grit elicited the patronage of American officers, leading to commissions. On his 1907 visit to the United States House of Representatives, Taft asked the Committee on Military Affairs to allow Filipinos to be appointed to the United States Military Academy. The request initiated a somewhat heated debate along old expansionist, anti-expansionist lines. Some legislators viewed the potential appointments as further cementing important ties between the United States and the Philippines. Others saw the move as a way to better develop Filipino capacity for independence through indigenous defense. Alabama representative Richmond Hobson noted that if Americans "would hasten the day when the Filipinos could be safely entrusted with the responsibility of self-government, [it] must carry forward their education in the science and art of self-defense." Legislation passed that authorized appointments for four Filipinos, one for each Academy class year. When Army officials later asked for clarification of the number, supposing that ONLY four Filipinos would ever enter the academy, Taft as president confirmed that it was his intention to have Filipinos be an enduring part of the academy. In 1910 Vicente Lim was the first Filipino to enter West Point. He graduated in 1914, the first of seventeen Filipinos to graduate and be commissioned between 1914 and 1934, and later completed courses at the Infantry School at Fort Benning, the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, and the Army War College in Washington, D.C.²²⁴

²²⁴ Meixsel, *Frustrated Ambition*, 11-16; House of Representatives, *Hearings before the House Committee on Military Affairs 1908-09*, 60th Congress, 1st Session (1908), 243-245 [quote]; United States Military Academy Association of Graduates, *Register of Graduates and Former Cadets* (Association of Graduates, United States Military Academy, 2002), 23 [copy provided to the author by the West Point Historian, Sherman Fleek].

Regardless of their education background or experience, Filipino officers consistently found their promotion and leadership options limited. The colonial administration, federal government, and Army worked to create opportunities for advancement, but the supply lagged behind demand. Eventually, by the 1920s there were enough senior Filipino military officers to generate concern among Army leader that American officers in command of Philippine Scout Companies could be placed subordinate to a Filipino battalion commander. The Army coped with this problem by not assigning Filipinos to these leadership positions, but the continuous, though small, influx of commissioned officers into the Philippine Scouts continued. Eventually the numbers would force a decision, so in 1930 Army officials decided to stop granting Filipinos commissions to the Philippine Scouts. Career progression for Filipinos was effectively stopped. Officers who wanted to continue to advance their careers attempted to transfer to the Philippine Constabulary, even though progression in what was supposed to be a policing organization was problematic. To prolong their careers, many senior Filipino officers accepted assignments in Philippine Reserve Officer Training Corps programs that began to emerge in the mid-1920s.²²⁵

The American capture of the Philippines presented strategic defense challenges for the War Department that were recognized as early as 1904. After the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 the threat to American strategic interests became clear, and planners began considering options to address Japanese aggression against the islands. In the 1920s, planners on the Joint Planning Committee (JPC) of the War Plans Division (WPD), including then Lieutenant Colonel Krueger, identified that the Philippines were the United States' center of gravity in the Far East, but also acknowledged privately that America did not have the forces to adequately defend the islands – a fact they, or American politicians, could not publicly admit. In 1924 the

²²⁵ Meixsel, *Frustrated Ambition*, 54-55, 60.

War Department modified plans for a conflict with Japan (War Plan Orange) in the Philippines by enlarging its defensive objectives from merely Manila Bay to the larger surrounding area. The related expansion of ROTC programs in the Philippines came as result of the Philippine Department's recognition that the United States lacked sufficient resources to successfully defend their objectives, so they began to plan for more support from indigenous forces. Later planning focused on Japan in the latter half of the 1920s removed reliance on Filipino manpower from consideration. General Charles Summerall, then Chief of Staff of the United States Army, stated the "troops stationed in the Philippines would retire to Corregidor, without resistance or losses, and hold fortifications until relieved.... These did not include Filipino troops, whom no one could have considered as effective."²²⁶ By 1936 the JPC, at this time under the direction of Brigadier General Krueger, began considering flexible options in the Pacific that de-emphasized the value of the Philippines to American strategic aims. This de-emphasis was the result of the Philippines new status as a commonwealth and the economic realities of the Great Depression, typified in JPC discussions that referred to the balance of foreign and domestic priorities that placed the Philippines clearly in the 'foreign' category. The 1938 version of War Plan Orange sacrificed the military commitment to the Philippines to create strategic flexibility. Though the planning requirement for Filipino troops withered, between the 1920s and 1930s, ROTC and other training programs continued for years to produce Filipinos with at least some measure of military training.²²⁷

While the Army did little to prepare a Filipino military component that might have been useful in the military governance of the Philippines late in World War II, economic as well as

²²⁶ Meixsel, *Frustrated Ambition*, 63.

²²⁷ Ibid.; Henry G. Gole, *The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War, 1934 - 1940* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003) 20-22, 63; Kevin C. Holzimmer, *General Walter Krueger: Unsung Hero of the Pacific War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007), 39, 54-57.

interpersonal ties were created and strengthened during the colonial period. Six years of war had devastated much of the agricultural, commercial, and industrial capacity of the Philippines by 1902. Under American administration, the Philippine gross domestic product subsequently grew at an average annual rate of 4.20%, about 2.15% per capita, far outpacing other Asian nations during the same period. These growth rates were led by average annual increases in agriculture (4.0% growth), industry (4.9% growth), and manufacturing (5.1%). Philippine exports expanded an average of 4.6% per year from 1902 to 1940, a period that includes the Great Depression.²²⁸

In 1903, due to drought and pestilence, the Philippines imported about 40% of its rice, and rice prices were three times that of a decade prior. That same year the United States Congress approved \$3 million for a relief fund to purchase rice, as well as livestock to replace the draft animals on which Filipino farmers relied. Also that year, the American government negotiated with the Vatican for the purchase of church lands, and sold that property to Filipino people on 25 years terms, though not always equitably. Governor Taft led an agricultural modernization and development program that standardized weights and measures, introduced the modern steam thresher, constructed and improved irrigation. In 1909 Congress passed the Payne–Aldrich Act, which eliminated tariffs between the Philippines and the United States. The net effect of these policies was a 50% increase in rice production from 1910 to 1920, and another 20% increase from 1920 to 1930. By 1925 the price of rice had fallen and the Philippines imported just 5% of its needs. Overall, Filipino agricultural production expanded at an annual rate of 4.5% during the 1902 to 1910 period, and 5.4% between 1910 and 1920 – increases that could be credited to American agricultural modernization programs. By 1930 rice production was three times the

²²⁸ Richard Hooley, "American Economic Policy in the Philippines, 1902–1940: Exploring a Dark Age in Colonial Statistics," *Journal of Asian Economics* 16 (June 2005), 465, 467, 469-470; Zaide, *Philippines*, 294; Peter W. Stanley, *A Nation in the Making: The Philippines and the United States, 1899-1921* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 96-97.

1910 level. Agricultural improvements resulted in improved incomes in general, and this led to broader economic benefits to industry and commerce. Interestingly, when the Army returned in 1944, a primary economic focus in military governance would be rice production.²²⁹

The Philippines historically had an agricultural economy, but American administrators introduced the islands to the industrial age. Agricultural-based manufacturing exploded as sugar mills, cigar factories, coconut mills, abaca and hemp cordage mills, and fishing-related plants blossomed. Due to direct investment by Americans, mining, a minor industry in the Philippines under Spanish control, led industrial growth. Overall, the industrial capacity of the Philippines grew at an average annual rate of 4.9% from 1902 to 1940. By 1940, the Philippines had become a major exporter of iron, copper, silver, zinc, and it was the world's fifth largest gold producer. Likewise, manufacturing during this period grew at a rate of 5.1% per year.²³⁰

The Philippines performed well in comparison to other Asian countries of the time. In constant millions of 1990 dollars, the Philippines had a per capita income of \$1033 in 1900 that was second only to Japan. By 1913, the Philippine gross domestic product was growing by 2.4% annually, increasing per capita income to \$1418, which led the region. Much of this growth is credited to the agricultural modernization program and recovery from the war. The Philippine economy grew faster, between 1913 and 1929, than any Asian country but Japan. Its volume of exports grew between 4 and 6% annually during the period. The Filipino population increased by over 2%, but agricultural land expanded by almost 3%.²³¹

²²⁹ Hooley, "American Economic Policy in the Philippines," 467; Zaide, *Philippines*, 292; Stanley, *Nation in the Making*, 82. Sale of church properties, the so-called "Friar Estates," tended to benefit the rich for obvious reasons, but also because they had been able to register their claims to ancestral properties, forming the basis of legal claims under programs intended to benefit generational land holders.

²³⁰ Stanley, *Nation in the Making*, 90-92; Zaide, *Philippines*, 294-295; Hooley, "American Economic Policy in the Philippines," 469-470.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, 475.

Under American auspices, the Filipino standard of living was raised to unprecedented levels. Growth of agriculture, development of natural resources, and expansion of commerce brought material prosperity to most Filipinos. During this period the Philippines erected modern concrete structures, installed infrastructure for electricity and gas, built movie theaters and playhouses, and improved transportation. Cars, planes, boats, and trains were all supported with new transport facilities. Radio, telegraph, and teletype were erected to improve communication. Affluent Filipinos purchased gas stoves, washing machines, refrigerators, and electric fans. This prosperity was founded on, in large measure, American investments in Philippine public health and education. By 1940, colonial administrators' focus on literacy brought Filipinos a literacy rate of 84%, one of the highest in Asia, a secondary school enrollment rate of 50%, and a life expectancy over 60 years that was second only to British administered Malaysia. The United States paid all military expenses for the Philippines, estimated at over \$700 million between 1902 and 1940. Trade with America was so lucrative during this period that Filipinos neglected to develop other trading partners, so trade with Europe and even their Asian neighbors declined significantly. All these changes meant that the Army faced a very different set of expectations in military governance when it returned in 1944, especially in urban areas.²³²

Incorporation of Filipinos into the governance of their country fulfilled the vision of reformers like José Rizal. The appointment of Resident Commissioners raised Filipino hopes for promised independence. These two Filipino representatives in Congress gave the islands direct access to American legislators, increasing support for temporary American administration among Filipinos who eventually wanted independence. It also gave them what many Americans viewed as necessary tutelage in good government. Taft described his hopes for the Filipino assembly and

²³² Zaide, *Philippines*, 294, 299-300; Hooley, "American Economic Policy in the Philippines," 477-478; Meixsel, *Philippine-American Military History*, 1.

representatives thusly: “a popular assembly with delegates to Washington gives to the Filipinos all the practice in self-government and a popular government that it is possible to give.”²³³ But Congress did not allow the Resident Commissioners to vote or sit on committees. Many of them therefore learned to excel in lobbying, testifying before committees, and working behind the curtains of the legislative process to influence legislation. The Commissioners understood how to best use their new positions; as Benito Legarda stated in 1907: “We do not expect to have much weight when political questions are being discussed, but when economic matters pertaining to the Philippine Islands arise in either house of Congress we expect to fully inform the homeland legislators.”²³⁴

Filipinos in Congress soon learned from debates over tariff legislation to use what little influence they had to leverage both the Republicans’ and Democrats’ interests to the Philippines’ advantage. In 1909 Manuel Quezon was appointed as a Resident Commissioner and influenced a shift in focus from tariff policy to the question of the Philippines’ eventual independence. He worked with William Jones, the chairman of the House Insular Affairs committee, to draft an independence bill. In order to meet concerns about the Filipinos’ readiness for self-rule and their military preparedness, the draft bill included an eight-year transition period and a twenty-year commitment for the United States to defend the islands from international predation. After years of negotiating, Quezon was able to advance a third draft of the legislation through approval by Congress and to the independence-friendly Woodrow Wilson administration for signature on 29 August 1916. The final version of the Jones Act replaced the 1902 Philippine Organic Act, so it replaced the Philippine Commission with a popularly elected Philippine Senate, putting the

²³³ *Hearings before the House Committee on Insular Affairs, Statement of Conditions in the Philippines, by Hon. William H. Taft, 57th Cong., 1st sess. (26 February 1902), 43–44.*

²³⁴ “‘We Will Do Our Duty,’ Says Legarda,” *Manila Times*, 20 December 1907 [quote]; Stanley, *Nation in the Making*, 168-169.

legislative branch wholly under Filipino control. Controversially subjective, the Jones Act also promised that Philippine independence would be granted as soon as “stable” government was established.²³⁵

The ambiguity of the phrase “as soon as stable government was established” prompted an outgoing President Woodrow Wilson to declare in 1920 that the Philippines had “succeeded in maintaining a stable government,” and that America had a “duty to keep our promise to the people of those islands by granting them the independence which they so honorably covet.”²³⁶ Congress ignored the lame-duck President’s request, but incoming President Warren G. Harding dispatched General Leonard Wood and former Governor General W. Cameron Forbes on a fact-finding mission to evaluate the suitability of the Philippines for independence. The Wood-Forbes mission recommended against independence and instead called for a strengthened United States presence in the islands and expanded powers of the American governor-general. The report, and Wood’s appointment as governor-general, sparked a crisis in the Philippines, as Filipinos feared the United States was backsliding towards renegeing on its promises of independence, and inching toward a return to military government. In 1923, the Filipinos sent an independence mission to meet with the Harding administration and members of Congress to protest against Wood and his expansion of American control. The result was a flurry of proposals that did nothing.²³⁷

In 1931 pro-independence Democrats once again gained control of Congress. Butler Hare of South Carolina, chairman of the House Insular Affairs Committee, and Senators Harry Hawes

²³⁵ Stanley, *Nation in the Making*, 172-173, 212-215, 219; H. W. Brands, *Bound to Empire: The United States and the Philippines* (New York, New York: Oxford University press, 1992), vi; Federal Research Division, *Philippines: A Country Study*, ed. Ronald E. Dolan (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993), 32.

²³⁶ Woodrow Wilson, “Eighth Annual Message,” 7 December 1920, in *American Presidency Project*, ed. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/8th-annual-message> (accessed 20 October 2020).

²³⁷ *Condition in the Philippine Islands: Report of the Special Mission to the Philippine Islands to the Secretary of War*, 67th Cong., 2nd Sess., H. Doc. 325 (1922), 10–12, 45–46. Brands, *Bound to Empire*, 133; Theodore Friend, *Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines, 1929-1946* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), 4.

of Missouri and Bronson Cutting of New Mexico jointly sponsored the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill. Rather than a sincere desire for Philippine sovereignty, the bill was motivated more by economic protectionism during the Great Depression and potential conflict caused by Japanese expansion. The bill limited Philippine trade and immigration, but it also granted independence after a brief transition period of ten years. Congress approved the bill at the end of December 1932, and it overrode President Herbert Hoover's veto the next month. Having become law, the legislation's promised independence only required the approval of the Philippine legislature.²³⁸

The Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill arrived in the Philippines to a mixed reception. It should have been fairly simple for the Philippine legislature to vote in favor of independence; however, personality conflicts and Filipino politics undermined the bill. Resident Commissioner Sergio Osmeña was a key advocate in the passage of the bill in Congress, and he lobbied heavily for its passage at home. Philippine Senate President Quezon viewed Osmeña as a political rival and opposed the bill, primarily to prevent Osmeña from getting credit for Philippine independence. Quezon raised concerns about tariff rates and military basing rights in the bill, but the debate in the Philippine legislature was about the verbiage of a potential plebiscite, not the merits of the act. After much political wrangling, the Philippine Senate rejected the offer of independence.²³⁹

Quezon, by far the most powerful Filipino politician of his time, departed for America in November 1933 to get an independence bill that met his approval and for which he could claim credit. The result was the Hare-Hawes-Cutting bill minus provisions for American Army bases. The new legislation, named for Senator Millard Tydings of Maryland and Representative John

²³⁸ Labor unions sought to eliminate immigration of cheap Filipino workers, and agricultural unions were anxious to place Philippine products under the resulting tariffs. Rufino C. Pabico, *The Exiled Government: The Philippine Commonwealth in the United States During the Second World War* (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2006), 36; Karnow, *In Our Image*, 252-254.

²³⁹ Friend, *Between Two Empires*, 50-53, 127-131; Pabico, *Exiled Government*, 34-37.

McDuffie of Alabama, passed on 24 March 1934. The Philippine legislature approved it in May. A plebiscite was held, and the measure was approved overwhelmingly. The Philippines became a commonwealth under the auspices of Congress for the transition phase, with independence itself scheduled for 4 July 1946. America had nearly fulfilled its promise of liberation.²⁴⁰

Americans expressed concerns about Japanese expansion as a threat to the Philippines as early as 1898. Once Philippine independence became a strong possibility in 1916, United States military planners feared that expansion would occur as soon as they left. In 1941 those fears and concerns became a reality. Shortly after passage of the Tydings – McDuffie Act, recognizing the alarming reality of the Asian geopolitical situation, Quezon in 1934 asked General MacArthur if the Philippines could defend itself. The General reportedly replied with an emphatic yes and outlined his ideas. Quezon then asked him to become his military advisor. With the permission of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, MacArthur accepted the job and arrived in the Philippines in time for the Commonwealth's inauguration.²⁴¹

Quezon's selection of MacArthur to be his military advisor was not happenstance, nor was it exclusively based on the general's professional qualifications. MacArthur and Quezon first met during the General's first tour in the islands as a lieutenant in 1904. MacArthur returned as a brigadier general in 1922 just as Governor-General Wood was beginning to clash with the Filipino members of his cabinet and the Philippine legislature, led by Quezon and Osmeña. Assuming responsibility from outgoing Governor-General Francis B. Harrison, Wood had been told by President Harding to slow the Philippine move to independence. Wood had attempted to reassert control that had been informally ceded to Filipinos, creating a political crisis, which led

²⁴⁰ Friend, *Between Two Empires*, 137, 147; Rudy Villanueva, *The Vicente Rama Reader* (Manila: Ateneo De Manila University Press, 2003), 97-98.

²⁴¹ Friend, *Between Two Empires*, 160-161, 163-164.

to the resignation of his cabinet and Filipino calls for his replacement with a Filipino governor-general.²⁴² During this tour, MacArthur navigated the political storm between Wood and Quezon until the 1924 Philippine Scout strike. In July, members of the 57th Infantry Regiment and 12th Medical Regiment, both Philippine Scout units in MacArthur's brigade, conducted a sit-down strike to protest pay disparities between American and Filipino troops. Wood thought Quezon, Osmeña, and Manuel Roxas instigated the strikes as an outgrowth of their discontent with his administration. Though MacArthur headed the resulting courts-martial, he was able to maintain friendship and mutual respect with Filipino leadership throughout the period and beyond, and ultimately took command of the Philippine Department. Army investigations recommended pay increases for the Philippine Scouts and cultural training for Americans, although budgetary constraints made neither likely and salary disparity again became a political problem in 1944. Meanwhile, MacArthur, promoted to major general, left for the states in 1925.²⁴³

Assigned to command the Philippine Department, MacArthur returned again to the islands in 1928. In charge of the military forces in the entire archipelago, MacArthur was able to institute changes he felt were long due. Whether due to his influence or not, the War Department increased the Philippine Scouts pay and established their equitable retirement age at thirty years. When Governor-General Stimson departed in 1929, MacArthur unsuccessfully campaigned to be selected as his replacement. It was during this effort that MacArthur fully cultivated his Filipino

²⁴² Villanueva, *Vicente Rama Reader*, 87-88. Vicente Rama, then a representative from the third legislative district from Cebu, recounts that he had "opposed removal of General Wood,... because it was not true that he was a cruel man and oppressive of Filipinos, particularly the legislature. Neither was it true that the Filipinos hated general Wood. The truth was that General Wood had earned the hatred of a mere handful of the ruling party leaders, who resented an American secret operative raiding their gambling den, for which they had asked for said operative's dismissal – a request that Wood refused to honor. What Wood wanted abolished instead were the abuses and cruel treatment of (people) who had allegedly committed some mistakes."

²⁴³ D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur: Volume I, 1880-1941* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970), 90; Carol Morris Petillo, *Douglas MacArthur: The Philippine Years* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 75, 129-130, 132, 135; Meixsel, *Frustrated Ambition*, 49; Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1964), 34.

political friendships that would result in being offered a post in the Commonwealth government in 1934. When the economic decline following the stock market crash of October 1929 reduced his personnel and resources, MacArthur considered augmenting the force with a Filipino militia. Though that never materialized, the General's relationship with the Philippine legislature and Governor-General Dwight F. Davis did yield legislation that encouraged field training for ROTC cadets, and created taxes to fund construction of military training camps. Throughout 1929 and 1930, MacArthur continued to develop his Filipino political friendships, frequently meeting with Quezon. In October 1930, MacArthur was appointed as Chief of Staff for the United States Army and again returned stateside, but he maintained the Filipino friendships he had cultivated, particularly with Quezon, who he thought had "brilliantcy and power of leadership."²⁴⁴

MacArthur began his tenure as military advisor to Quezon in 1935. His plan for the defense of the Philippines called for the creation of a guerrilla-like force of small air, naval, and land units. He requested 250 light bombers and 50 to 100 torpedo boats. Ground forces would be organized into a standing army of 19,000, with a reserve of trained citizens of 400,000. With this force, and ten years to train them, MacArthur estimated that he could defend the islands for three years. Unfortunately, the Philippines did not have ten years, or the funds, to enact MacArthur's vision. One indication of their recognition of the true situation is Quezon and MacArthur's trip to Washington in 1937. During this trip, American and Filipino leaders discussed, and rejected, both early independence and neutralization of the Philippines. The War Department then told MacArthur that he had to return to the United States, to a position that MacArthur correctly viewed as marginal. He chose retirement over marginalization and by 1 January 1938 was "only" a field marshal of the Philippine Army. Poor visible results in the development of the Philippine

²⁴⁴ Petillo, *Douglas MacArthur*, 141, 145-146; Meixsel, *Frustrated Ambition*, 66; James, *Years, Volume I*, 343; Joseph R. Hayden, Notes on Discussions with Douglas MacArthur, 4 August 1944, Joseph R. Hayden Manuscripts, Box 42 (Typescript, n.d.), p.1 [quote], Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.

military strained his relationship with Quezon. MacArthur's army recruitment and training programs never reached the 40,000 soldier per year goals required for his plan, nor did they develop a Filipino officer corps able enough to effectively lead the forces they did have. By 1939 MacArthur's influence in the Philippines began to wane. Quezon, unwilling to dismiss him, ignored and marginalized him. Unwilling to return home, MacArthur sought opportunities that never fully materialized. Fortune changed in 1941 as German and Japanese aggression presaged the coming conflict with America. In June, MacArthur was recalled to the army and appointed a major general in charge of United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), the command responsible for all American and Filipino military forces.²⁴⁵

As part of an effort to secure oil resources in the Dutch East Indies, Japan attacked the Philippines from Formosa on 8 December 1941, in concert with its attacks on Pearl Harbor. The bombing lasted for nearly a week, forcing the United States Navy to withdraw, and destroying or scattering the air forces. This permitted Japanese landings at Luzon, north and south of Manila. MacArthur's forces numbered about 115,000 Filipinos and 30,000 Americans, but these were outmatched and began to withdraw to the Bataan Peninsula. MacArthur withdrew his staff and other principal leaders, including President Quezon, to the island fortress at Corregidor. MacArthur declared Manila to be an open city on 26 December, and the Japanese seized it on 2 January 1942. In March, MacArthur was ordered to evacuate to prevent the propaganda coup coming with the capture of one of America's most famous generals. He escaped to Australia with Quezon and other key staff. The last defenders surrendered at Corregidor on 6 May and were

²⁴⁵ Friend, *Between Two Empires*, 160-161, 163-164; Petillo, *Douglas MacArthur*, 192-194; Meixsel, *Frustrated Ambition*, 84-88, 129-131; Walter R. Borneman, *MacArthur at War: World War II in the Pacific* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2016), 56-58.

taken prisoner. America's presence in the Philippines was ended, but not its influence.²⁴⁶

In contrast to the Filipino reaction to the American arrival during their revolt against Spanish rule, the Filipino reaction to the Japanese arrival was much more supportive of the Americans. Filipinos resisted the Japanese in large numbers, demonstrating the goodwill they had towards America and the value they placed on their independence. Much of this military support provided by the Filipinos to the Americans was the direct result of the policies of the previous forty years. The entirety of the United States relationship with the Philippines from 1898 to 1945 represented the full cycle of military governance, from direct military rule, through mentorship, to independence. The four-decade presence of Americans in the Philippines yielded meaningful advantages as the United States contemplated retaking the Philippines in the summer of 1944. The policy of attraction, benevolent assimilation, and keeping American pledges for independence produced military results. The benefits of these policies and promises were not the *ex cathedra* result of proclamations of military governors and governor-generals, they were the result of countless interactions between American soldiers and Filipinos. All the benefits accrued to the United States and Filipinos in World War II sprang from the goodwill generated from their erstwhile colonial relationship.

Some *ilustrados* opportunistically collaborated with the Japanese regime. Others who were more hesitant were known by name to the Japanese, and their business and other ties to physical locations often inhibited their flight and made them very susceptible to pressure to collaborate. Filipino elites who wished to resist had to rely on more subversive methods in government, business, support to guerrillas, or other ways that undermined Japanese rule. If their resistance was discovered, they could at best hope to be imprisoned. Elite collaboration with the

²⁴⁶ Louis Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines* (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1953), 77–84, 90–92, 138–144; Karnow, *In Our Image*, 288–290, 297–305, 312–313; Brands, *Bound to Empire*, 190–195, 199, 201.

Japanese was understandable given the circumstances. While counterfactual, it is not hard to envision circumstances in which most Filipinos, rather than resisting, either collaborated with the Japanese or at least remained passive and neutral as they waited to see the result of the Japanese-American conflict.²⁴⁷

Foremost among the benevolent assimilation policies during the American occupation that contributed to military success in 1944 was education reform. The Filipinos highly prized education, and they flourished when given educational opportunities. Under Spanish rule, most Filipinos were given a primarily religious education, and not taught Spanish – the language of power and control. The Catholic friars controlled education because they, correctly, regarded it as potentially destabilizing to society. American soldiers interacted with the Filipino families in many roles, including teachers. In the early days of occupation, establishing a school was likely the first project the Army would undertake. The Americans built thousands of schools during their administration, educating hundreds of thousands of students. One estimate has placed the number of people educated in those schools by 1925 at over 1.1 million students. The secular education included reading and writing in English, lessons that were enthusiastically received.²⁴⁸

Education in general, and English instruction in particular, later enhanced intelligence collection as it greatly facilitated communications between Allied forces and Filipino guerilla elements. Education enabled Filipinos to perform at a higher level than mere manual laborers. At its most basic, English-speaking Filipinos were able to communicate Japanese strength and disposition to Americans, answer questions about specific details, and more importantly, understand directions and requests for specific pieces of information without the need for

²⁴⁷ Villanueva, *Vicente Rama Reader*, 116, 121-124.

²⁴⁸ Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*: 87, 137-139; George S. Counts, "Education in the Philippines," *The Elementary School Journal* 26 (1925), 98, 100; "The Soldier Teacher in the Philippines," *Harper's Weekly* 46 (January 1902), 74.

translators. English communication also helped in more technical ways. One example is that of Gerardo Almendres, who, upon graduation from high school, enrolled in a correspondence course in radio communications. Following the Japanese invasion, Gerardo joined Wendell Fertig's anti-Japanese guerrillas and attempted to build a transmitter using scraps and following the diagrams in his books. The resulting device was used to establish contact with American forces, sent the first message from Fertig's group to General MacArthur's headquarters on 20 February 1943.²⁴⁹

Likewise, the story of Manuela Orquejo, who served in the guerrilla resistance as a spy and nurse, demonstrates the long-term result of a policy of attraction that emphasized education. She entered military service as a second lieutenant immediately after high school, beginning her training as a nurse in July 1942. While learning medical techniques, she also learned to be a spy and was given a detachment of twelve men to monitor and report on Japanese troop movements. Manuela performed superbly and was commended, promoted, and placed under Colonel Hugh Straughn, overall commander of Filipino-American Irregular Troops (FAIT), as an intelligence operator. In 1945 she was attached to General Krueger's Sixth Army Alamo Scouts, a unit formed of Philippine Scouts, who fought as part of the Sixth Army from its inception. Here she saw significant combat and participated in the liberation of the *Los Banos* internment camp. While the examples of Almendres and Orquejo are likely partially embellished, they represent the myriad ways countless Filipinos provided aid and assistance to the Allies simply by being educated and able to communicate effectively²⁵⁰

While education and prosperity encouraged many Filipinos to immediately resist the

²⁴⁹ John Keats, *They Fought Alone* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1963), 153, 171-175, 186, 188.

²⁵⁰ Abraham Garcia, "Nurse, Spy, Guerrilla Leader – Remembering First Lt. Manuela Orquejo," July 2, 2018, <https://www.warhistoryonline.com/history/remembering-manuela-orquejo.html> (accessed November 13, 2020).

Japanese, many initially welcomed and collaborated or actively supported the invaders. Many of these began to turn against the Japanese as the cruel nature of the occupation revealed itself. A captured letter dated 20 April 1942 reveals stark differences between perceptions of the Japanese approach to occupation and the American approach, and it may serve as a fitting assessment of the American period of control from 1898 to 1901. The letter, from Cabusao Candeido to “His Excellency, Commanding General, Japanese Army,” thanked the General for freeing the Filipinos from the “oppressive and dictatorial Quezon government,” and condemned Quezon’s party’s misuse of the people’s money in extravagant expenditures on roads, bridges, and improvements to Quezon’s home, while contributing “nothing to the country’s welfare, or to the completeness of national defense.” The letter gave examples of Japanese cruelty, including beatings, torture, and starvation, before noting that “the former rulers of the Filipinos, the Americans, even at the time of the war with America in 1900-1901, positively did not commit such cruel acts.” The letter outlines Filipino doubts of Japanese benevolence, highlighting perceived unfairness in Japanese administrative rules, before concluding:

The Filipinos positively do not like the Americans, because of their extreme racial discrimination. But until Japan replaces the present cruel and inhuman, treatment of the Filipinos with just the humane treatment, the Filipinos will probably hope for the rule of individualistic America.

With the exception of racial discrimination, being ruled by America was pleasant, though not simple, it was also easy to endure. Control by Japan has existed no longer than four months and, from experience, it is extremely harsh. Not even dogs and carabao should be treated so. Upon recollection of past experience, we cannot help concluding that the Japanese idea of justice is based on inhuman and brutal punishment.

The reason we Filipinos chose America as our sovereign power is that America paid the expense of stationing American forces to govern the Philippines. However we cannot expect this from the Japanese Garrison Forces. It is probable that the Filipinos would pay for the expense of supporting them.

But America paid in money accepted throughout the world, when she bought materials, and how is it with the Japanese Army? They pay with money that branches of Japanese banks in the Philippines refuse to accept when it becomes soiled. Payment [sic] were formerly made at will.

As long as it cannot be proved that the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is for the benefit of all participating countries and not for Japan alone, the cooperation of the Filipinos will continue to take the form of armed resistance.²⁵¹

The hard cruelty of the Japanese, quickly experienced by Filipinos, cast a stark difference from the racism of the Americans.

Where it was effective, the American focus on convincing Filipinos to adopt American ideals and cultural elements strengthened Philippine-American ties on an interpersonal level in Philippine elements of government, military, and civilian life. American efforts to expand and improve education fulfilled one of the fundamental desires of Filipinos from the Spanish colonial period, and established a literacy foundation for Filipino upward social mobility and lifestyle improvements that led the region. Likewise, improvements in health and infrastructure lowered mortality rates and raised life expectancies, advancing the islands to the forefront of Asia. Investment in Philippine human capital by the United States was recognized as helping to create a labor force of outstanding quality; while it never fully overcame the Filipino desire for independence, it laid the foundation for much more effective, and shorter-lived, military governance by the Army beginning in 1944 than in 1898.

Incorporation of Filipinos into the American government from the earliest days of occupation in 1898 as part of a policy of benevolent assimilation addressed many of their revolutionary aims, and it proved the United States could be trusted in the main to fulfill its promises, including pledges of future independence. The incorporation and development of the Philippine Constabulary, Philippine Scouts, and Philippine government in general encouraged

²⁵¹ Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, Southwest Pacific Area, "Enemy Publications", 12 August 1944, pp. 1-4, reproduced in General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific, "Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines, Documentary Appendixes, Volume I, Intelligence Series," *Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library*, 20 March 1948, <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/2791/rec/6> (accessed 3 April 2018).

and enabled the Filipinos to resist Japanese occupation and materially contribute to their own liberation. Both the Philippine Scouts and Philippine Constabulary formed the nucleus of units in MacArthur's forces, and that experience shaped his perspective on Philippine involvement in his military governance policies from 1944 forward. Filipinos used their communication skills in English to contribute to intelligence work and operate effectively in administrative, managerial, supervisory, medical, clerical, and all types of assistance that required some education. In sum, the advantages that Filipinos brought with them in education, loyalty, and trust immeasurably contributed to the decision to return to the Philippines, and how that campaign was conducted. The promise to return made by MacArthur, and the larger promise of independence enshrined in the Tydings-McDuffie act, combined with the potential ramifications of not keeping those promises, shaped military governance when MacArthur landed once more in the Philippines.

CHAPTER 4

STRATEGIC PLANNING

To break down the distinction between strategy and policy would not matter much if the two functions were normally combined in the same person, as with Frederick or a Napoleon. But as such autocratic soldier-rulers have been rare in modern times... the effect was insidiously harmful. For it encouraged soldiers to make the preposterous claim that policy should be subservient to their conduct of operations... and drew statesmen on to... interfere with his military employees in the actual use of their tools.

Liddell Hart, *Strategy*

Earl F. Ziemke, a noted historian of military government in World War II, wrote that:

“What strategy is to military operations, policy is to civil affairs and military government. Policy lends form and purpose to the government of occupied and liberated territory and is ultimately as much concerned with winning wars as the military strategy itself.”²⁵² The challenge of formulating policy, much like strategy, hinges on a nation’s ability to articulate its objectives and the internal and external obstacles that have to be overcome to meet those objectives. A poor policy, like poor strategy, may have the intended outcome but will result in an increase of negative unintended consequences that always attend the coordinated efforts of large numbers of people. These consequences often have an impact on military operations, and thus, if not taken into consideration, can lead planners along a course that appears strategically sound but neglects civil policy considerations critical to securing total military victory. Yet human considerations – politics, ideology, culture, and emotion – are tricky as they potentially lead planners to popularly palatable, subjectively appealing ends. Henry Morgenthau’s pastoralization plan for Germany, which called for the destruction of all industry in that country, is an example of an emotionally

²⁵² Earl F. Ziemke, *U. S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944 – 1946* (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), 34.

appealing policy that backfired, in this case by prompting Germans to fight harder during the last months of World War II.

Military and political leaders must consider both strategy and policy in making their decisions during wartime to secure a complete victory. Simple facts like the distance of the Japanese homeland from American bases, the range of a B-29 heavy bomber, or the number of troops available for an offensive, were some data points used to formulate strategy in the Pacific Theater during World War II that would satisfy the American public's desire for revenge, justify the Allied nations' varying levels of commitment, unity, and objectives, and meet the unknown timetable of the public's will to see the war through to the end. Beyond the natural elements of geography and weather, three additional major forces shaped the development of strategic military and civil affairs policy planning in the Pacific: political and popular desires, logistical limitations, and manpower constraints. This was especially true for the Philippines, where strategic and policy considerations had been evolving for decades until the movement toward independence was halted by a Japanese invasion.

Strategic and policy planning for the liberation and administration of the Philippines occurred in an emotionally charged political environment. Unlike other liberated and conquered countries in World War II, the Philippines had been American territory. The United States did not have relationships with North Africa, Italy, France, Germany, and Japan, developed under forty years of American administration. The nature of such a association with the Philippines meant that many of the American planners for civil affairs in the Philippines had spent meaningful time there in the course of their professional lives and had developed their own personal relationships, for good or ill, with the islands and their inhabitants. Douglas MacArthur was clearly in this group that also included George C. Marshall, Henry L. Stimson, and Paul V.

McNutt. United States control over the island meant agencies of the government had statutory relationships with the Philippines. The United States Departments of Agriculture, Treasury, State, Commerce, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and the War Department all had some measure of legal interest in the management of the Philippines. Indeed, after Japanese occupation Secretary of State Harold Ickes would be named the United States High Commissioner to the Philippines. Competition among these various personalities and agencies presented unique challenges to planning as relationships with the Philippines and Filipinos gave outsized importance to some issues as planners vied to ensure their objectives were addressed.

The Japanese seizure of territories in the western Pacific Theater in late 1941 and early 1942 posed a significant but clear strategic challenge to the United States, which responded by resolving to retake the territories occupied by the Japanese and force their unconditional surrender. The Pacific Theater ranked second to Europe in priority, so the military forces there faced constant manpower and logistical shortages that constrained operations and shaped planning. Desire to reclaim the Philippines was widespread among Americans in general, and notably in military decision makers. Soon after their defeat at the hands of the Japanese, American leaders prepared for the reoccupation of the Philippines. In June 1942, the Office of War Information disseminated plans for propaganda operations in the Philippines. This plan sought to preserve the “Philippine national spirit and the people’s will to resist” as well as promote the development of “volunteer warfare” by the Filipinos through guerilla or resistance fighting. The plan proposed to accomplish this, in part, by highlighting the past few decades of friendship between Filipinos and Americans, emphasizing the threat that the Japanese posed to Filipino freedom and independence, and, at every possible opportunity, reiterating, “with all the

vigor of which we are capable, our determination to free the Philippines and carry out the independence program of 1946.”²⁵³

Planning for a return to what was widely recognized internationally as American territory, American leaders sought Allied support for future efforts of reconquest. As early as 24 August of 1943, Generals George C. Marshall and Douglas MacArthur considered joint staffing options for operations in the Islands, discussing the trustworthiness and regional expertise of both British and Australian officers for future operations. Most importantly, American leadership communicated to the Filipinos that the liberation of the Philippines from Japanese control was a high priority. On 6 January 1943, United States Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson wrote to General MacArthur, congratulating him for the successful operations in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) and adding, “I am in constant touch with President Quezon here and we are both beginning to think with encouragement of the time, which now really seems to be approaching, when we shall be marching back to redeem our promise to the Filipinos.” The consistent messaging at all levels, and in direct and indirect ways, created a clear emphasis that a return as soon as practicable was a planning priority.²⁵⁴

The Allied victory at Midway in June 1942 halted Japanese momentum, and over the next year, further victories like that at Guadalcanal began to push the Japanese back. By May 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which had both American and British officers, developed a strategic plan to remove the Japanese, island by island, by way of offensive action by Allied forces in the Pacific Ocean Area (POA) under Admiral Chester Nimitz, in the SWPA under

²⁵³ Basic Propaganda Plan for Philippines: Revised Copy, 2 June 1942, pp. 2, 8, Box 16, Record Group 4, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA (MMA).

²⁵⁴ Memorandum from Douglas MacArthur to George C. Marshall, 24 August 1942, Box 16, RG 4, MMA; Henry L. Stimson to MacArthur, 6 January 1943, Box 16, RG 4, MMA [quote].

MacArthur, and the China, Burma, India Theater (CBI) under Admiral Lord Mountbatten.²⁵⁵ The Combined Chiefs' initial intent was to push the Allied lines forward to isolate the Japanese from their supplies of war materials, and to open Allied logistical lines to facilitate routine heavy bombing of Japanese home islands from China. To secure these forward bases, intermediate bases for land-based air support were required – potentially Luzon, Formosa, or both. Identified in the Trident Conference in May 1943 as an objective in phase two of the strategic plan for the defeat of Japan, the Philippines were logically of obvious strategic and operational value due to their central position in Japanese logistics – ships and planes based in the Philippines could interdict the flow of oil, rubber, and other supplies to Japan from New Guinea and the Indies. Once secured, Mindanao, Leyte, and then Luzon would provide areas for land-based aircraft that could support operations in Formosa and China. But, in August 1943, the Quadrant Conference failed to confirm the Philippines as an objective, or even formally discuss the Philippines or objectives beyond New Guinea at all. This deletion sparked concern in MacArthur and his staff that the Allies were preparing to bypass the Philippines in favor of seemingly better options.²⁵⁶

The shift in stated objectives in the months between conferences is reasonable because plans shift over time with the vagaries of war. In hindsight, the advantages provided by the interpersonal and political relationships between Filipinos and Americans, developed during almost forty years of occupation, made the Philippine Archipelago an appealing approach to Japan rather than other alternatives that appeared better from a traditional military viewpoint.

²⁵⁵ Command relationships in the CBI Theater are uniquely complex due to the interactions of the British commanders in India, the Chinese under Chiang Kai-shek, and the Americans under control of General Joseph Stilwell. For a detailed discussion, see Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944* (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1994), 433-442.

²⁵⁶ Office of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Chiefs of Staff," *Trident Conference May 1943: Papers and Minutes of Meetings*, 1943, <https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/WWII/Trident3.pdf> (accessed December 7, 2020), 30-36; Office of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Chiefs of Staff," *Quadrant Conference August 1943: Papers and Minutes of Meetings*, 1943, <https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/WWII/Quadrant3.pdf> (accessed December 3, 2020), 35-44, 64-70.

The debate over these competing plans lasted throughout the war and was central to the now famous rivalry between the Army and Navy of the United States, personified in the tension between General MacArthur and Admirals King and to a somewhat lesser extent Nimitz in the Pacific Theater.²⁵⁷

American and British naval planners in the Combined Chiefs of Staff prudently considered alternatives to the Philippines as a strategic objective. From their perspective, a direct move to Formosa, the Chinese mainland, or even one of the Japanese islands could potentially save time, and lives, by avoiding the complications of advancing through a defended archipelago. Moving to Formosa or China theoretically cut Japanese logistical lines to the East Indies, and isolated their forces occupying the Philippines, leaving them unable to interfere with Allied operations against the home islands. This concept appears reasonably sound from a military standpoint, though the elongated lines of supply from the Pacific into Formosa for the Allies could potentially be exposed to attacks from both the Japanese home islands in the North, and the Philippines in the South.²⁵⁸

In response to this potential shift in strategic objectives, MacArthur penned a reminder to General Marshall and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States counterpart to the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, reminding them why the Philippines were objectively of sound military value in the fight against Japan. Because MacArthur hoped to provide “positive objectives for

²⁵⁷ The rivalry between the United States Army and United States Navy in the Pacific, and to a somewhat lesser extent between Pacific theater commanders and Washington planners, is a key component in the many analyses of Pacific strategy and key personalities in World War II, significant among these are: Ronald H. Spector, *Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan* (New York: Vintage Books, 1985), 73, 277-280; Thomas B. Buell, *Master of Sea Power: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1980), 172-189; Louis Morton, “Germany First,” in *Command Decisions*, ed. Kent Greenfield (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987), 47; Robert Smith, “Luzon Versus Formosa,” in *Command Decisions*, ed. Kent Greenfield (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987), 461; Grace P. Hayes, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War Against Japan* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982), 141-147; E. B. Potter, *Nimitz* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1976), 55.

²⁵⁸ Smith, “Luzon Versus Formosa,” 466-474; Buell, *Master of Sea Power*, 466; Potter, *Nimitz*, 55.

the entire future war effort of Australia” at a meeting with the newly elected Australian government of Prime Minister John Curtin, he sought official reassurance that the Philippines was the “ultimate objective” of efforts in the SWPA. It has been common to interpret MacArthur’s dogged focus on reoccupation of the Philippines as unilateral and motivated by a personal quest for revenge, that somehow operations in the Philippines were a distraction from better options and the result of clever manipulations by the General to maintain his personal honor. However, MacArthur was not so single-minded that he refused to consider other options. After reminding Marshall that the “Quadrant decisions did not alter the fact that the ultimate objective of the Southwest Pacific Area [was] the seizure of the Philippine Islands,” the General did concede that, “...should conditions be propitious for a decisive smash at the [Japanese] homeland at or before the time of such seizure the decisive blow would take full precedence.”²⁵⁹

Marshall’s response of 2 October 1943 attempted to assuage MacArthur’s concern. While stating the Quadrant decisions “were projected only as far into the future as the situation permitted when the decisions were made,” the Chief of Staff acknowledged that the Philippines appeared to be “the next logical objective for the Southwest Pacific Area” after operations in New Guinea, but noted the rapid successes of the Navy created evolving opportunities that needed to be evaluated. Marshall advised MacArthur to encourage the Australians to continue their effort to shorten the war, and to “perfect [his] plans for the reentry into the Philippines... as quickly as possible,” so that the SWPA could be ready to capitalize on events following the reconquest of New Guinea.²⁶⁰

Throughout the remainder of 1943 and into 1944, Allied operations continued westward in the POA against Japanese holdings in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, and northwestward in

²⁵⁹ Memorandum from MacArthur to George Marshall, 28 September 1943, p. 2, Box 16, RG 4, MMA.

²⁶⁰ Memorandum from George Marshall to MacArthur, 2 October 1943, pp. 1-2, Box 16, RG 4, MMA.

the SWPA along the New Guinea coast and through the Solomon Islands. By the spring of 1944, the parallel offensives had been so successful that the Combined Chiefs began considering definitive options to reach the Japanese mainland and ordered MacArthur in March to begin planning a return to the southernmost Philippine island of Mindanao. MacArthur and his staff planned a return to the Philippines via an invasion of Mindanao at Sarangani Bay in October to establish ground-based air power to support a subsequent landing at Leyte in November. Leyte was viewed as an important objective because it was expected to extend the range of land-based airpower to cover further operations, potentially in early 1945, at Luzon, Formosa, or Mainland China.²⁶¹

By June 1944, more Allied victories inspired the Joint and Combined planners to consider other ways of accelerating their offensives, again potentially bypassing previously identified objectives and alarming MacArthur and his staff, who had been ‘perfecting’ their plan for months. The Joint Chiefs asked both MacArthur and Nimitz for their assessments of potential options to shorten the war by bypassing stated objectives (like the Philippines) – a constant topic in discussions of Pacific strategy. Both commanders agreed that the timing of operations against Japan was dictated by logistical constraints rather than enemy action, and while MacArthur found options to bypass the Philippines specious, Nimitz remained tentative, preferring to defer a decision until the situation in the Pacific developed further. In July, President Franklin D. Roosevelt met with MacArthur and Nimitz at Pearl Harbor to discuss a final resolution of the military strategy in the Pacific. Their discussion settled the question about a return to the Philippines – it was agreed that SWPA forces would reenter the islands – but left open the details

²⁶¹ M. Hamlin Cannon, *United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954), 1-2; Spector, *Eagle Against the Sun*, 419.

about timing, location, and extent.²⁶²

The conference at Pearl Harbor did not resolve the problem of how to accelerate the timetable for operations against Japan. The timing for operations in the southwestern and western Pacific was dictated by seaborne capacity to move troops and supplies. Planners' desires to shorten the war were constrained by the available number of soldiers to conduct operations, ships to transport these troops, and the time it took those ships to refit, rearm, and resupply for subsequent operations. Though troop numbers were prioritized to Europe first, MacArthur and SWPA were able to make relative gains by incorporating local natives into support roles and expanding the SWPA organization by combining indigenous forces into the force structure. But there was no way to shrink the timeline of Pacific operations without more combat shipping – numbers that were limited by European Theater priority – or eliminating intermediate objectives. Elimination of objectives posed a risk in that a bypassed enemy location could potentially pose a threat to rear areas.²⁶³

Logistical restrictions thwarted Allied planners until a breakthrough was realized in early September. In the second week of September 1944, Admiral William F. “Bull” Halsey’s carrier-based air operations against the Japanese in the Palau Islands and Mindanao successfully crippled Japanese airpower and petroleum supplies in the region, significantly reducing the Japanese ability to resist. Subsequently, upon Halsey’s recommendation, the Joint Chiefs

²⁶² Detailed accounts of overall planning discussions about the Philippines between the Joint Chiefs and Combined Chiefs, and the SWPA and POA commanders and staff, are best seen in Cannon, *Leyte: The Return to the Philippines*, 1-9, and Smith, “Luzon Versus Formosa,” 466-474. Edgar G. Crossman, a member of MacArthur’s Civil Affairs staff and friend to Secretary of War Stimson, later wrote: “I have never known what decided the issue in favor of Luzon, but have always thought it was the fact that only 250,000 troops were estimated as needed as against the then estimate of 500,000 each for Formosa or Kyushu.” See Edgar G. Crossman, “My Experiences in World War II” (Unpublished manuscript, 1966), 16, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7f/Edgar_Gibson_Crossman_-_My_Experiences_in_WWII.PDF, (accessed 31 March 2021). A copy of this was originally provided by David Smollar.

²⁶³ Smith, “Luzon Versus Formosa,” 469-472; Crossman, “Experiences,” 15-16.

cancelled intermediate operations at Yap, Talaud, and the Sarangani area of Mindanao, significantly shortening the previous timeline. On 15 September 1944, the Joint Chiefs ordered MacArthur and Nimitz to synchronize their efforts for a 20 October invasion directed at Leyte.²⁶⁴

This decision of the Joint Chiefs came during planning meetings held at Quebec in the weeks prior to the Octagon Conference, also known as the Second Quebec Conference. Brigadier General Richard J. Marshall, MacArthur's Deputy Chief of Staff, attended as a representative of SWPA to discuss the "directive for the next phase of operations in the Pacific," which MacArthur and his staff thought should focus on Luzon. Though in Hawaii the President had settled the debate between the Army and Navy over either Formosa or the Philippines as the next objective in the path to Japan, the discussion at the conference revolved around the subsequent steps. According to Marshall, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest J. King had called a surprise meeting of the Joint Chiefs on 1 September to decide on either Luzon or Formosa as the next major objective. Central to the argument at this meeting was the numbers of troops that SWPA had requested for operations in Luzon. Navy planners were hoping to find a source of troops for operations in Formosa, or, in the words of Marshall, "prove that [operations at] Luzon [were as] equally impracticable as [operations at] Formosa." On 5 September, King pressed the Joint Chiefs for a decision on Formosa operations, either in lieu of operations at Luzon or as a follow-up to them. Under questioning from senior planners, including George Marshall, Richard Marshall highlighted the "modest" size of SWPA's request for troops for operations in the Philippines, stating that, "we could get along on this small additional allocation thru our proposed use of Filipinos."²⁶⁵

²⁶⁴ Cannon, *Leyte: The Return to the Philippines*, 8-9.

²⁶⁵ Richard J. Marshall to MacArthur, 9 September 1944, Box 16, RG 4, MMA.

The planned use of native troops in support was critical to ground operations in the Pacific, not only to preserve combat forces for critical missions, but also to facilitate a more rapid shift to normalcy from the period of ‘military necessity,’ i.e. a faster transfer of civil responsibilities from army to civilian authorities. In New Guinea and the East Indies, SWPA had planned and executed the transfer of post-combat stability and relief operations – civil affairs – to British, Australian, and Netherlands civil authorities by deliberately reinstating antebellum governmental structures based on the “formerly constituted civil authority” of those countries. This was only practical as a planning assumption for liberated areas where the civil government was known and acceptable to Allied leaders and also had recognized authority over a significant number of native people in reconquered areas.²⁶⁶ In 1944, based on experiences in other liberated areas, contacts with anti-Japanese resistance groups, and Philippine leaders, it was a reasonable assumption that Filipinos would serve as support troops. Filipino capability and reliability in this regard was also a known quantity based on the previous decades’ relationship between the American military and Filipinos.

The American-Filipino relationship was central in the mind of General George Marshall during the Joint Chiefs’ deliberations of potential Luzon or Formosa operations:

General Marshall said that he had one or two comments to make with regard to the proposed directive. It seemed to him that the concept of the Formosa operation had changed. The present plan calls for the capture of a small portion of the island with more resources than are at present available, and he desired to examine certain features of the operation before attempting to make a decision. He desired to know: (1) if to meet our requirements it would be necessary to take all or part of the island; (2) if we occupy part of the island will we require additional forces and resources to complete the occupation of the entire island; (3) if forces from the Southwest Pacific Area are liable to be

²⁶⁶ Memorandum from MacArthur to George Marshall, 25 January 1944, p. 1, Box 16, RG 4, MMA. The legitimacy of reinstated governments posed a significant challenge in post war recovery not only in colonial areas like Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Algeria, and India, where nationalist movements had gained influence, but also countries like Belgium, where governments-in-exile struggled at times to reassert control in the face of established left-wing resistance movements. See Harry L. Coles and Albert K Weinberg, eds., *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Washington: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1964), 797-798, 801-819.

available for the operation; (4) what would be the cost in casualties in the Formosa operation compared to an operation against Luzon; (5) **what assistance can be expected from the local inhabitants in the Luzon operation as compared to the Formosa operation**; (6) what would be the possibility of being drawn into a long campaign in Formosa with the resulting immobilization of forces in the Philippines; (7) what would be the value of Formosa as a base for very long range bombers as compared to Luzon.²⁶⁷

The fact that Formosan natives had been under Japanese rule for five decades was key to Marshall's fifth question. While it was not unreasonable to assume Formosan resistance, Filipinos had proven their loyalty and were already integrated into American planning. Once the question of native assistance was asked, and given the American-Filipino political, economic, and military relationship, it was unlikely that Formosa would be chosen without offering an obvious, staggering military advantage.

As Marshall's other questions indicated, Formosa troop requirements and time commitments were critical, as the Joint Chiefs were anxious to define a firm operational timeline for the defeat of Japan. General Richard Marshall indicated to MacArthur that General George Marshall was inclined to support an operation against Luzon and a rapid follow-up against the Japanese home islands. One telling question from Richard Marshall's exchange with the Joint Chiefs was, assuming success at Luzon, "how many divisions can be released by 31 March [1945] for employment in an operation against Kyushu?"²⁶⁸ Marshall responded with the SWPA planners' estimate of four to six. In the end, the urgent need to accelerate operations influenced the final decision of the Joint Chiefs, as SWPA forces had the ability to conduct the Luzon operation within their desired timeline. On 3 October 1944, the Joint Chiefs decided to follow Leyte with an invasion of Luzon. As a result of Halsey's successes, and the relative anticipated

²⁶⁷ George Marshall quoted [with emphasis added] in letter from Richard Marshall to MacArthur, 9 September 1944, Box 16, RG 4, MMA.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

ease of working alongside the Filipinos, the Joint Chiefs directed General MacArthur to occupy Luzon on 20 December 1944.²⁶⁹

Complicating the objective of liberating conquered areas was the political aspect of the Japanese invasion. The Japanese had veiled their invasions in the southwestern Pacific with the thin guise of liberation, occupying the colonies of Western Europe with the stated objective of establishing a pan-Asian hegemony over the liberated states. The appeal of the Japanese claim to many Filipinos was clear, particularly given their decades-long struggle for independence. However, aspects of America's policy of benevolent assimilation, and their efforts to fulfill promises of independence that the Japanese cut short, complicated the situation. Given the comity between the Philippine Commonwealth and the United States, planners considering the reoccupation and liberation of the archipelago could rightly assume levels of cooperation from the civilian populace unknown in other areas. But the United States' recent history of unmet expectations, sometimes heavy-handed military governance, and inconsistent policies in the islands had created conditions that easily could have overcome good feelings and turned against the Americans, potentially unleashing a second Philippine Insurrection.²⁷⁰

The basic challenge for the Allies was to remove Japan from the Philippines and restore the Commonwealth government to power. The level of destruction and subsequent civilian relief crises witnessed in North Africa, Italy, France, and Belgium, from 1942-1944 made clear the governance challenge, which was daunting even in the countries with well-established traditions of civil administration. The United States' military's civil affairs and military governance

²⁶⁹ Teletype from Richard Marshall to Richard Sutherland, 26 September 1944, Teletype from Joint Chiefs of Staff to Commander in Chief, SWPA, 3 October 1944, Box 16, RG 4, MMA.

²⁷⁰ Smith, "Luzon Versus Formosa," 474; Ronald K. Edgerton, "General Douglas MacArthur and The American Military Impact in the Philippines," *Philippine Studies* (Ateneo de Manila University) 25 (1977), 422-430; Crossman, "Experiences," 8-9.

doctrine called for a period of military control of civil administration in order to address the needs of the civilian population and keep them from interfering with combat operations until the restoration of legitimate civilian authority. American military leaders sought to avoid “the immense frictions between civilian and military leaders experienced during the Civil War and [occupation of] The Philippines.”²⁷¹ The heterogeneous ethno-social nature of the Philippine people, the nascent authority of the exiled Commonwealth government and its inexperienced administrative agencies, and the potential revival of revolts in Mindanao and Luzon, created challenges for Allies pondering the course forward. The problem for Americans was to assert control over the population in order to meet relief needs, but in a way that legitimized a Commonwealth Government that was at the time incapable of managing the crisis itself. The Philippine-American War was still in living memory, so the United States military had to maintain control without appearing to reimpose a colonial status or revive old insurgencies, or at least give the Japanese the propaganda to rally the people against the Allies. Doctrine gave the Army tools, and history gave the military experience, but the formulation of a policy, a plan for civil affairs in the Philippines was a challenge nonetheless

As stated earlier, advantages provided by the interpersonal, economic, and political relationships between Filipinos and Americans made the Philippine Archipelago an appealing approach to Japan over military alternatives that conventionally appeared better. Ultimately, General MacArthur’s approach to defeating Japan by way of a return to the Philippines capitalized on the Filipino-American relationship to facilitate acceleration of the strategic timeline while addressing logistical and civil affairs challenges inherent in Pacific Theater operations. MacArthur had campaigned for a return to the Philippines long before the 28 July

²⁷¹ Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs*, 16-17.

1944 meeting with President Roosevelt that resulted in the decision to attack Japan by way of the liberation of the Philippine Commonwealth.

Like the final decision concerning military strategy, American civil affairs policy for the liberated Philippines was determined, almost solely, by General MacArthur. Having been part of the Commonwealth government as the military advisor to President Manuel L. Quezon, and the Field Marshal of the Philippine Army from 1935 to 1941, MacArthur was in a unique position to formulate a plan that addressed the dual challenges of reoccupation and rehabilitation. Indeed, according to his senior advisor on Philippine matters, Joseph R. Hayden, the General viewed himself as “more competent than any other American, or than any other Filipino” to address relief and rehabilitation requirements in the Philippines.²⁷² MacArthur’s policy was based on his unique, decades-long, experiences in the Philippines, his understanding of Army history in military governance and civil affairs, and principles of governance codified as Army doctrine. Though the military governance efforts in the SWPA faced struggles with civil relief and logistics similar to those faced in North Africa, Italy, and elsewhere, General MacArthur’s plan for civil administration for the Philippines was simple and addressed many realities that shaped the situation beyond the political and popular desires of Filipinos and Americans. His basic strategic plan for governance was indirect rule. He wanted to have the heads of the Philippine government join his headquarters, and reinstate the Commonwealth government “as rapidly as possible, province by province, and the provincial officials will function under the respective military commanders only so long as there is combat in their provinces.”²⁷³ This concept capitalized on advantages built over decades of Philippine-American comity to address logistical

²⁷² Joseph R. Hayden, Notes on discussions with MacArthur, 4 August 1944 (TS, n.d.), Joseph R. Hayden Papers, Box 42, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.

²⁷³ Memorandum from MacArthur to George Marshall, 25 January 1944, p. 2, Box 16, RG 4, MMA.

and manpower shortcomings, navigated the unique socio-political variables and sensitivities of the erstwhile colony, and maintained focus on military priorities.²⁷⁴

It was nearly a foregone conclusion that the United States would decide, resource, and execute civil affairs policy for the Philippines. The decision to proceed with planning was made without a dispute from the Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCAC). However, development of this policy was complicated not only by MacArthur's unyielding manner but also due to the many different American governmental agencies with a stake in the Philippines. Nearly every agency with a stake began developing its own plan as soon as the fortunes of war in the Pacific began to swing in favor of the Allies, but in May 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff resolved various burgeoning disputes and validated the official assumption that the United States alone would take responsibility for civil affairs administration in the Philippines, as it had done in the recent past before the Japanese invasion.²⁷⁵

General MacArthur's civil administration concept of incorporating combined governance operations with Filipinos mimicked the combined organization of his command in 1941-1942 during the defense of Manila and eventual retreat from the Philippines. In January 1944, he told General George Marshall that he planned to include the head of the Philippine government in his headquarters. Complete integration of American military and Philippine civilian authority would facilitate the reinstatement of Philippine civil government in each province as the offensive progressed. Local Filipino officials would operate with military direction under the principle of indirect rule for a period as a military necessity in areas where combat continued. The advantage of trust and long-time integration between Filipinos and Americans gave MacArthur assurance

²⁷⁴ Cannon, *Leyte--The Return to the Philippines*, 2.

²⁷⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 89/2: Planning Assumptions for U.S. Civil Affairs in Pacific Ocean Area, SWPAC, CBI, and SEA, 13 May 1944, Box 150, Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Record Group 218, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD (NARA).

that this simple plan for civil affairs would prevent the complications seen in other theaters. The presence of the Philippine president on his staff would help assure Filipinos their independence was not at risk. As the senior military commander responsible for operations in the Philippines, other interested government and military planners had to reconcile their plans with MacArthur.²⁷⁶

The inception of General MacArthur's detailed planning for the reoccupation of the Philippines can be marked with his 27 June 1943 request that Hayden officially join his staff due to his "intimate knowledge of the Philippines."²⁷⁷ Hayden had twice been a visiting professor at the University of the Philippines in 1922-1923 and 1930-1931, was appointed Vice-Governor and Secretary of Public Instruction of the Philippines by Governor-General Frank Murphy in 1933, and served as acting Governor-General during Murphy's periodic absences in 1934-1935. In 1941, Hayden was recruited to the Board of Analysts in the Office of Strategic Services, and at MacArthur's request, was transferred to the War Department as a staff adviser on civil affairs. As a result of MacArthur's June 1943 request, Hayden joined MacArthur's headquarters in Australia and began working closely with General Bonner Fellers to develop a civil affairs plan for administering civilians under military government. He followed MacArthur's headquarters to New Guinea in September 1944, and then landed at Red Beach in Leyte on 20 October. On 23 October Hayden became the Civil Adviser to the newly restored Commonwealth of the

²⁷⁶ Cannon, *Return to the Philippines*: 2; MacArthur to George Marshall, 25 January 1944 Box 1787, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific (World War II), Record Group 496, NARA.

²⁷⁷ Memorandum from MacArthur to Adjutant General, War Department, 27 June 1943, Box 16, RG 4, MMA.

Philippines. He returned to consult with the War Department in April 1945, but fell ill and died unexpectedly on 19 May 1945.²⁷⁸

MacArthur's focus on the Philippines made planning for reoccupation a War Department imperative by early 1944. On 15 February, Major General John H. Hilldring, Chief of the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) of the War Department, warned the Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, of the urgency of initiating a plan to ensure unity of command under War Department auspices. Hilldring found out the Department of the Interior was moving forward with planning, which was not surprising since the Secretary of the Interior, Harold L. Ickes, had been given authority over the Philippines on 16 September 1942. In the memorandum alerting McCloy to the Department of the Interior's efforts, Hilldring emphasized that the Joint Chiefs had primary control over re-establishing civil affairs in reoccupied areas and thus should have leadership in planning. In an effort to prevent future conflicts, Hilldring noted that representatives from the Department of the Interior would likely dispute War Department coordination of reoccupation actions at the outset, but he recommended that the Department of the Interior be reminded that it was unwise to separate military operations and civil affairs in combat zones.²⁷⁹

Within a week the Assistant Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Interior began discussing how to work more closely at senior levels to address civil affairs considerations in the Philippines. McCloy noted the War Department was tasked with leadership in planning for civil affairs administration and recognized that coordinating activities of other agencies with interests

²⁷⁸ Harley H. Bartlett, Arthur E. R. Boak, Robert B. Hall and Evertt S. Brown, "Memorial to Joseph Ralston Hayden," *University of Michigan Faculty History Project*, <http://faculty-history.dc.umich.edu/faculty/joseph-ralston-hayden/memorial> (accessed Feb 8, 2020).

²⁷⁹ President Franklin D. Roosevelt transferred authority from the United States High Commissioner to the Secretary of the Interior in Executive Order 9245, 16 September 1942. See Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1127 to Commander In Chief, SWPA, 1, Records of the Joint Chiefs, Combined Civil Affairs Committee, Box 151, RG 218, NARA; Memorandum from John H. Hilldring to John J. McCloy, 15 February 1944, Box 1787, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

in the Philippines was imperative. By the end of February 1944, they agreed to the formation of an ad hoc committee chaired by McCloy, with representatives of the Departments of State, Navy, and Interior, as well as from the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA), to discuss Philippine civil affairs planning. This diverse composition reflected an initial, superficial recognition of the Philippines' geopolitical complexities, which would change as the committee became aware of different challenges.²⁸⁰

The minutes of the first meeting of the ad hoc committee on civil affairs in the Philippines show that the members recognized that the most critical challenges were financial. To address the monetary crises in the islands, McCloy decided to invite a representative from the Department of the Treasury to future meetings but excluded a delegate from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), directing that consultation with UNRRA would be done through the FEA. UNRRA was the international organization, largely controlled by the United States, that had been chartered to “plan, coordinate, administer or arrange for the administration of measures for the relief of victims of war in any area under the control of any of the United Nations through the provision of food, fuel, clothing, shelter and other basic necessities, medical and other essential services.” Perhaps directing his comments to the State Department representative, Abe Fortas, the Under Secretary of Interior, stressed that the United States should give no assurances to the Philippine Commonwealth unless approved by the ad hoc committee. Control of messaging prevented any misunderstandings from perceptions of broken promises. The committee also excluded representation from the Philippine government. Recognizing that an overly large committee would become its own challenge during planning, the exclusions of UNRRA and the Philippine Commonwealth are interesting as, perhaps, better

²⁸⁰ McCloy to Ickes, 23 February 1944, Box 1787, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

communications with those entities would have improved planning that potentially made relief efforts more efficient and effective over the course of military operations.²⁸¹

In July 1944, the ad hoc committee sent a draft directive on civil affairs in the Philippines, entitled Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1127, to General MacArthur. After reviewing the plan, he sent a letter to General Hilldring outlining his main concern: that reestablishing the United States High Commissioner to the Philippines would interfere with administration of civil affairs during military operations. He argued:

Throughout the military period, the Commonwealth Government operates under my supreme authority. It would hardly seem advisable for the High Commissioner's Office to be placed in a similar role. It would appear preferable that the High Commissioner should not be introduced into the local scene until he can assume his primary function as the personal representative of the President of the United States and thereby be the senior American Official present. For military reasons, it would be a mistake to reestablish the normal relationship between the Commonwealth Government and the United States High Commissioner during... military operations. The presence of the High Commissioner might be detrimental to the prosecution of the war in that it could easily lead to divided authority.²⁸²

MacArthur was correct in recognizing that the military authority for civil affairs and military governance devolved from the President of the United States, as did the High Commissioner's. The General's concern was well founded given the struggles the American military had with divided authority in North Africa in 1942.²⁸³

General MacArthur addressed his concerns in a revised draft he sent to the ad hoc committee in early September 1944. His draft removed their restoration of the authority of the

²⁸¹ Minutes of Ad Hoc Committee on Reoccupation of the Philippines, 7 March 1944, Box 1787, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA; "Agreement for United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, November 9, 1943" as reprinted in *Pamphlet No. 4, PILLARS OF PEACE: Documents Pertaining To American Interest In Establishing A Lasting World Peace: January 1941-February 1946* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Book Department, Army Information School, 1946), 20.

²⁸² MacArthur to Hilldring, 2 September 1944, pp. 2-3, Box 1788, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

²⁸³ For a thorough review of the difficulties and hazards of executing civil affairs with a divided command structure, see the discussion of North Africa in Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs*, 30-60.

High Commissioner in areas and in conditions where military necessity would transfer authority for civil administration to the Commonwealth. Likewise, he eliminated their assumption that the Commonwealth government would automatically exercise civil authority in liberated areas that were free of combat. The General's plan vested all supreme civil and military authority in the Theater Commander (MacArthur himself) and allowed him to delegate civil functions to the Philippine government at his discretion. Hayden later recounted why MacArthur chose to retain control, writing that the General explained to him that "Quezon was right in the big things – but would have given a lot of trouble in ordinary matters. I [MacArthur] could control him in major policy – he would have followed me there."²⁸⁴ MacArthur further changed language that required government power to be relinquished eventually to the High Commissioner and Commonwealth government by deleting the reference to the High Commissioner. He planned to exercise "full authority and responsibility" during reoccupation. He also struck their requirement of his command to address collaborators, believing removal and punishment of collaborationists to be a function of the Philippine government. MacArthur also softened language in the plan regarding economic and civilian relief matters, changing them from directives to suggestions, giving the commander more flexibility.²⁸⁵

Civilians on the ad hoc committee found MacArthur's revisions objectionable, most particularly Fortas, who claimed MacArthur's revisions had "the effect of setting up a full-fledged military government and governorship in the Philippines of indefinite duration."²⁸⁶ The Department of the Interior opposed all the General's changes, but especially his opposition to the

²⁸⁴ Hayden, Notes on discussions with MacArthur, 4 August 1944, Hayden Papers.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.; Memorandum from Abe Fortas, Under Secretary of Interior, enclosed in Memorandum from Brigadier General Andrew McFarland to Colonel David Marcus, 23 October 1944, Box 1788, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

participation of the High Commissioner in civil administration. Contrary to MacArthur's desire to keep the High Commissioner out of the situation until after combat had ended, the Secretary of the Interior, Ickes, wanted the office involved in all phases. MacArthur's somewhat overstated but not illogical concern was the perception that the United States could be renegeing on promised independence. As the General told Hayden regarding plans to restore the High Commissioner, "civil affairs and civil government will be in the hands of the Filipinos. If we send a big staff of outsiders in there to tell those people how to run their affairs, there'll be another 1898. The Guerrillas will go to war with them."²⁸⁷ The dispute went unresolved until October 1944, when Roosevelt sided with MacArthur. The presidential intervention resulted in a subtle shift in the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive to General MacArthur regarding civil affairs in the Philippines:

To take such steps as will enable you to pass on, as provided in paragraph 3 hereof ("as soon as, in your opinion, the military situation permits the resumption by the civil authorities of the responsibility and authority for civil administration in any area or areas under your command"), to civil authorities the responsibility for civil administration as soon as military operations will permit.²⁸⁸

This emphasis reassured Ickes that the High Commissioner would continue to have a meaningful relationship with the Philippine government after the crisis of war had passed. The directive also revised instructions regarding collaborators, clarifying that civilian authorities were responsible for the disposition of all civilian collaborationists. On 10 November 1944, after incorporating minor revisions suggested by the Navy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued Directive 1127/3 for the administration of civil affairs in the Philippines.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁷ Hayden, Notes on discussions with MacArthur, 4 August 1944, Hayden Papers.

²⁸⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1127 to Commander in Chief, SWPA, 21 October 1944, p. 3, Box 151, Records of the Joint Chiefs, RG 218, NARA.

²⁸⁹ Memorandum from CAD to Chief of Staff, 17 October 1944, Memorandum from Fortas enclosed in memorandum from McFarland to Marcus, 23 October 1944, Memorandum from Marcus to McFarland, 23 October 1944, CAD to Commander in Chief, SWPA, 4 October 1944, Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1127/3 to Commander in Chief, SWPA, 10 November 1944, Box 151, Records of the Joint Chiefs, RG 218, NARA.

Evidence of the increased strategic importance of civil administration in the Philippines came not only from the finalization of the Joint Chief's directive, but an expansion of the Civil Affairs Section of MacArthur's SWPA headquarters, and in civil affairs staffing in general for the Philippines. By late September 1944, the War Department expanded the authorized strength of the civil affairs element of SWPA to 236 officers, 4 warrant officers, and 384 enlisted men (a ratio of 1.6 enlisted to 1 officer). MacArthur noted that the estimate upon which this increase was based was made prior to the decision to expand and accelerate operations in the Pacific. The new requirement was for 343 civil affairs officers and 384 enlisted men, and MacArthur stated the majority of those personnel would have to be provided from sources outside the theater. In a series of messages between the Operational Plans Division of the War Department (OPD), and MacArthur and his headquarters, the War Department agreed to increase the authorized strength for SWPA further by reducing the strength of some other combat element of MacArthur's choosing. The General elected to cut two anti-aircraft battalions, a decision that was significant considering the air threat posed by the Japanese to any invasion in late 1944.²⁹⁰

The Philippine Civil Affairs Units had a ratio of 3.9 enlisted men for every civil affairs officer. In the Mediterranean and European Theaters, the accepted ratio was the above-mentioned 1.6 to 1. General Hildring justified this based upon the geography of the archipelago, which complicated communications and logistics, and its underdeveloped infrastructure that made administration more difficult. Likewise, he rationalized that the delivery of relief supplies, a significant aspect of the civil affairs mission in the Philippines, was labor intensive. The Philippine Civil Affairs Units (PCAU) were intended to be autonomous and self-supporting, providing their own cooks, carpenters, doctors, engineers, police, security, and vehicle

²⁹⁰ Messages from OPD to Commander in Chief, SWPA, 21 September 1944 and 5 October 1944, from Rear Echelon, General Headquarters, SWPA to War Department, 5 October 1944, and from SWPA to War Department, 23 October 1944, Box 1788, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

maintenance. Ten soldiers were assigned to each PCAU just for policing, as combat units were unable to provide military police. MacArthur later pointed to the success of civil affairs at Leyte as justification for the higher ratio.²⁹¹

The basic aim in planning for civil affairs administration in the Philippines was to return the islands to a condition at least as good as that prior to the Japanese invasion. The Joint Chiefs' third directive to MacArthur, 1127/3, stated: "The basic economic objective of the United States Government during the period of military control is to assist in the restoration, to the extent practicable, of the normal Philippine economy."²⁹² Under this guidance, wherever he exercised military control and authority, MacArthur's tasks were: a) to allocate supplies to the Filipino people as required to advance military operations, sustain the health and "working capacity" of civilians, maintain order, maintain lines of communication, and "develop fighting partners" (this included distributing supplies for sale under military direction, preferably through commercial channels, except in situations where supplies were required for direct relief); b) to reduce demands on non-combat related logistics resources by obtaining saleable and relief supplies locally where practical, and increasing insular agricultural production where possible; c) to protect the population by instituting and administering health and sanitary regulations; d) to develop supply requirements necessary for the directed mission and report the estimated amounts required for import; and e) to work with federal agencies and the Philippine government to furnish, by whatever means were practicable, any other supplies that would return Filipino standards of living to that which existed before the Japanese invasion.²⁹³

²⁹¹ Message from Commanding General, United States Forces in the Far East, to War Department, 27 November 1944, and Hilldring to OPD, 1 December 1944, Box 2271, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

²⁹² Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1127/3 to Commander in Chief, SWPA, 10 November 1944, p.e 18, Box 151, Records of the Joint Chiefs, RG 218, NARA.

²⁹³ Ibid.

Planning for civilian relief on the scale directed above required the War Department to engage in extensive interagency and intergovernmental coordination. In late May 1944, CAD's draft approach for developing relief requirements was to have the War Department confer with representatives of the Commonwealth government, develop requirements, and submit the draft to MacArthur for his approval and comment. The theater command's concept, sent in reply three weeks later, was simpler and shifted responsibility: have the Commonwealth government present its requirements for rehabilitation and relief to MacArthur for review. General Hilldring agreed with this concept but stated the urgency of having any estimates completed, as War Department planners had been working for weeks to prepare the rehabilitation and relief requirements for the Philippines and needed detailed requirements for each area to determine the priority of need for each region. As the force that would have direct responsibility for the combat and relief situations, and in direct contact with the Filipinos requiring help, the SWPA staff was best capable of estimating their initial relief supply requirements in a way that insured least interference with combat operations.²⁹⁴

The cause for delay and apparent shift in responsibility is partly the result of comments from Philippine Commonwealth representatives regarding responsibility for civilian relief. President Quezon stated that the provision of relief supplies for the Filipino people was a responsibility of the Commonwealth government. Later President Sergio Osmeña added that, "All relief supplies actually utilized will be accounted for and paid for by the Philippine Treasury. Only when our resources are exhausted will we appeal to the United States for assistance."²⁹⁵ These statements, and others like them, likely continued to influence later

²⁹⁴ Hilldring to Richard Marshall, 29 May 1944 and 8 July 1944, Richard Marshall to Hilldring, 21 June 1944, Box 1788, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

²⁹⁵ Sergio Osmeña to Stimson, 4 October 1944, Box 2270, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

planning, regardless of changes in planning assumptions and agreements.²⁹⁶

Planning for civilian relief continued through the summer and fall of 1944. In August, representatives of the Philippine Commonwealth government and the War Department met to discuss civil affairs relief assumptions. The War Department representatives declared that they would provide all basic necessities – food, clothing, and medical supplies – when the theater commander requested them. They also expressed the desire for the Commonwealth government to initiate actions that would allow it to assume responsibility, as soon as possible, for all relief activities and the revival of the Philippine economy. To this end, the War Department would share logistics plans aimed at meeting theater demands and collaborate with Commonwealth representatives to reconcile the planning assumptions of the War Department and Philippine government, as the Commonwealth’s relief program was redundant to the Army plan in many respects. In keeping with civil affairs doctrine, the Army planned to transition responsibility for civilian supply to the Commonwealth and emphasized the use of normal commercial transactions as the primary means of distribution. The War Department emphasized that implementation of the program was the responsibility of the theater commander. The Philippine Commonwealth representatives stated that their government’s concept for relief supply would supplement the Army program, rather than to assume responsibility for it. The Filipinos wanted the Army to act as their procuring agency. The representatives also indicated they had held few discussions with the theater commander, but that the War Department’s concept would be received favorably.²⁹⁷

On 21 September 1944, General Hilldring, citing an agreement reached on 18 September, notified the Philippine Commonwealth government that the War Department would identify the

²⁹⁶ Edgerton, “The American Military Impact in the Philippines,” 432-435.

²⁹⁷ E. A. Palmer Jr., Notes of Meeting with Philippine Representatives, 22 August 1944, Box 1788, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

items and quantities acceptable for relief and rehabilitation procurement planning and notify the Philippine government through the International Division, Army Service Forces (ID, ASF). The General further stated that CAD had recommended the War Department should assume initial financing and procurement responsibilities for the program. Hilldring noted that MacArthur would make the final determination of which supplies, in what quantities, and at what rate relief would be provided. If a military requirement developed for items not included in the program, he would requisition such materials from the War Department. Finally, Hilldring confirmed that the extent to which the Commonwealth government would reimburse the War Department, if at all, for supplies procured and financed under the program would be determined at some future point. Two days later the Secretary of Finance for the Philippine Commonwealth confirmed that the agreement was acceptable, provided that the amount of supplies procured via the program included the numbers the Philippine government had estimated for its relief program.²⁹⁸

As promised, the ID, ASF submitted the initial estimate for six months of civil affairs supply needs to the Philippine Commonwealth government on 22 September 1944. The six-month timeframe used for the estimate was the assumed duration of military control, after which the Army planned to transition to civilian control. The ID, ASF notification stated that the War Department recognized that the Commonwealth government likely desired a wider inventory of relief supplies than that items contained in the list. The Division suggested that the Philippine government should provide these additional supplies. The ID, ASF also strongly recommended that Filipino authorities begin preparations at once to assume civil affairs relief duties when the responsibility shifted from the military to the Commonwealth. The Division noted the estimates provided should be sufficient for the Philippine government to begin planning for assumption of

²⁹⁸ Hilldring to Secretary of Finance, Commonwealth of the Philippines, 21 September 1944, and Secretary of Finance, Commonwealth of the Philippines to Hilldring, 23 September 1944, Box 1788, Records of Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

civilian relief duties, either unilaterally or in cooperation with United States civilian agencies. MacArthur concurred with the proposed program, and the estimate of supplies, except for medical supplies for which he ordered a review of the totals.²⁹⁹

By the end of January 1945, the Philippine Commonwealth government was not satisfied with the management of relief and rehabilitation in the Philippines, or how their representatives were kept apprised of related developments. Though physically present in the Commonwealth, President Osmeña requested updated information from Assistant Secretary of War McCloy and General Hilldring about the status of relief and rehabilitation in the Philippines. The request was disappointing to those who had thought the Philippines "... would be one place in the world where there was a close tie-in with the military commander and the head of local government."³⁰⁰

General MacArthur confirmed to the War Department that Osmeña and his representatives had been fully briefed about Army civil affairs relief and rehabilitation planning throughout the phase of military control. The ID, ASF stated 20,637 long tons of supplies were shipped to the Philippines for civilian relief in November and December 1944 but noted the numbers did not reflect the final disposition of the supplies, as the theater commander had the authority to divert supplies to meet operational needs or may have used local procurement in one region to meet requirements in another. The report noted 19,967 tons of food and other subsistence, 21 tons of bicycles, 17 tons of hardware, and 285 tons of miscellaneous supplies were shipped in that two-month period.³⁰¹

²⁹⁹ Glen E. Edgerton, Director, ID,ASF to Secretary of Finance, Philippine Commonwealth, 22 September 1944, and telegram from Commander in Chief, SWPA, to Adjutant General, War Department, 11 October 1944, Box 2270, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

³⁰⁰ Memorandum from Hilldring to Colonel Paul Davis, 29 January 1945, Box 1788, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

³⁰¹ Telegram from Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East, to War Department, 25

By February 1945, planning for supplies for the transition period from the military to civilian administration of civilian relief and rehabilitation became more urgent. The Director of the Office of War Mobilization, James Byrnes, advised the FEA to plan to assume responsibility for supplying the requirements of the Philippines after the impending conclusion of the military phase. He directed the FEA to approach United States and Philippine government representatives to obtain a statement of requirements. In late February, the FEA asked CAD for an estimate of the date that the Army expected the FEA to assume responsibility for civilian supplies, how much shipping tonnage the Army would make available, and if the Army would endorse FEA requests for supplies from the War Production Board and the War Food Administration. The ad hoc committee created an FEA-chaired subcommittee responsible for developing and recommending a plan for coordinating civilian relief and economic rehabilitation in the Philippines.³⁰²

By March 1945, the last major Japanese stronghold had fallen in Manila, and civilian authorities resumed their attempts to control, or at least influence directly, rehabilitation efforts. That spring, as the military worked to meet the requirements of Directive 1127/3, a problem emerged with the economic administration stipulations of the document. Appendix A stated: “arrangements should be made to reestablish the control of foreign financial and foreign trade transactions under regulations established by the appropriate authorities.”³⁰³ The issue was related to making the “arrangements” with the undetermined “appropriate authorities.”

February 1945, Box 2270, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA; Memorandum of Acting Director ID, ASF for Director, CAD, 23 February 1945, Box 1789, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

³⁰² War Department liaison to FEA, 20 February 1945 Acting Executive Director, Bureau of Supplies, FEA, to Hilldring, 28 February 1945, Acting Director, CAD, to Acting Executive Director, Bureau of Supplies, FEA, 15 March 1945, Box 1789, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

³⁰³ Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1127/3 to Commander in Chief, SWPA, 10 November 1944, p. 18, Box 151, Records of the Joint Chiefs, RG 218, NARA.

According to the Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, his department had statutory responsibility for arranging and managing a foreign funds control program in the Philippines. The restoration of the Commonwealth thus required the Department of the Treasury to reinstate effective foreign funds control. Morgenthau argued that history had demonstrated that effective foreign funds control programs needed people with extensive experience in the United States Treasury, and that Treasury representatives should be established in the Philippines before opening the banks.³⁰⁴

General MacArthur found Morgenthau's arguments unacceptable. The General did not want reestablishment of foreign funds control to delay the opening of banking in the Philippines, particularly since all transactions with countries other than the United States and the Philippines would be secured by clearing them through United States. This routing of any foreign transfers would greatly inhibit regrowth of the Philippine economy by delaying the flow of foreign capital. MacArthur also noted that the destruction in the Philippines did not permit the return of any federal officials other than those essential to achieving the objectives established in Directive 1127/3. He did acknowledge that he would send for Treasury representatives when the situation had stabilized, and their presence was required. True to his word, within two weeks he requested authorized travel to the Philippines for nine civilian bankers.³⁰⁵

On 17 April 1945, Morgenthau resolved the matter with a letter he wrote to Stimson in response to MacArthur. Morgenthau repeated his request for Treasury representatives to travel to the Philippines to establish foreign funds controls. The Secretary noted that the aim of foreign funds control was to prevent looting of financial instruments (currency, checks, etc.), discover

³⁰⁴ Henry Morgenthau to Stimson, 5 March 1945, Box 1893, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

³⁰⁵ Telegram from Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East, to Adjutant General, War Department, 24 March 1945, Box 1789, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

and freeze Japanese wealth in the islands, and examine foreign financial activity. Morgenthau argued that only routing foreign funds transfers through the United States would not accomplish these objectives, and that proper controls had to be instituted and administered in the Philippines. In a forthright if not threatening statement, he informed the War Department that until effective foreign funds controls were established and administered by authorized Treasury representatives, there would be delays in authorizing any financial and commercial transactions involving the Philippines. He further assured Stimson (and thus MacArthur), that the facilities in use by the bankers MacArthur had authorized would also accommodate Treasury representatives.³⁰⁶ In summarizing Morgenthau's letter to MacArthur, Stimson found that in light of the General's admittance of civilian bankers it was necessary to accept Treasury officials, and noted that as soon as MacArthur desired, the travel for all of the bankers and Treasury representatives would be approved. MacArthur responded that he no longer objected to the creation of a Treasury foreign funds control office in the Philippines.³⁰⁷

In May 1945, the Army sought to transfer civil affairs responsibilities to the Philippine Commonwealth government. General Hilldring and other War Department representatives from the Budget Division and ID, ASF, approved a program for termination of military responsibility for civil affairs relief supply based on five points. First, the Army would cede responsibility for civilian supplies after the supply ships of August 1945 were loaded. Second, the Army would not oppose efforts by Commonwealth government or federal civilian agencies to gain shipping space for civilian supplies, to and from the Philippines, from the War Shipping Administration (WSA). Third, the Army would provide all data regarding civilian supplies provided to the Philippines to

³⁰⁶ Morgenthau to Stimson, 17 April 1945, Box 1893, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

³⁰⁷ Telegram from Stimson to MacArthur, 28 April 1945, and telegram from Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East, to War Department, 1 May 1945, Box 1789, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

the Department of Treasury to help develop an accounting of support. Fourth, the Army would make supplies procured for civilian relief, but not shipped or otherwise consumed by the start of September 1945, available to whatever agency assumed responsibility for civilian relief in the Philippines, provided that agency reimbursed the Army and facilitated rapid termination of Army responsibility for civilian supply. Finally, after the Army transferred responsibility for civilian relief, funds made available to the Commonwealth government should be used to fund whatever program for civilian relief that it chose to promulgate.³⁰⁸

Through the ad hoc committee, FEA, the State Department, and the Department of the Interior recommended that FEA should coordinate procurement and shipping arrangements to maintain continuity of supplies for civilian relief after 1 September 1945. To finance this, they also recommended the War Department release sufficient Sugar Funds earmarked for Philippine relief purposes once the Commonwealth government presented an adequate plan for assumption of relief responsibilities, one approved by the theater commander and Secretary of War. The theater commander approved the plan for termination of military responsibility for civilian relief supplies in the Philippines on 6 June 1945. He assured the War Department that by the time of the transition of responsibility, the infrastructure available for relief operations was expanding and would be greater than it currently was.³⁰⁹

At the end of July 1945, the War Department initiated the transfer of responsibility to the FEA in spite of doubts about whether the agency had the ability to assume those responsibilities. CAD informed the theater commander that the military needed to cooperation with the FEA, but that the agency had full responsibility for providing civilian supplies upon the completion of the

³⁰⁸ Memorandum from Hilldring to the Assistant Secretary of War, 10 May 1945, 15 March 1945, Box 1789, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

³⁰⁹ Minutes of the Ad Hoc Committee, 24 May 1945, Box 1789, Records of General Headquarters, RG 496, NARA.

Army's August supply ship loading. Responsibility for the distribution of those supplies, or any others procured by the FEA and other private groups, rested on the FEA, not the Army. Though the fighting was not yet over, the United States military had completed its planning for the civil administration of the Philippines.³¹⁰

On 1 May 1945, the United States Army secured the Luzon plains and established the air bases required to isolate Japan from its East Indian resources. Adolf Hitler was dead, victory in Europe was close but not yet realized, and planning for OPERATION OLYMPIC, the invasion of Japan that would compel the end of World War II, was nearing a critical point. Yet the fate of the Philippines commanded, for another brief moment, the attention of the president of the United States and two of his top generals. President Harry S. Truman summoned General George Marshall to the White House to discuss the status and future of the Commonwealth government of the Philippines. Marshall brought with him his education, experience, a map, and three typed pages of notes. These notes covered five areas of concern for Truman regarding the Philippines: civil affairs and transfer of responsibility to the Philippine government, the background of the decision to not appoint a High Commissioner, post-war basing options for United States forces, paying the Philippine army, and an overview of Philippine reconstruction needs. As a result of this meeting, and at the direction of Truman, Marshall issued an "eyes only" radio telegram to MacArthur, requesting the General's expert opinion on the status and future of civil affairs in the islands, and a recommendation from him regarding the appointment of a special United States Commission to the Philippines with Senator Millard E. Tydings serving as High Commissioner. MacArthur's response the following day expressed full support for the President's plan, a sharp

³¹⁰ Leo Crowley, Administrator, FEA, to Secretary of War, 12 July 1945, Under Secretary of War to Administrator, FEA, 20 July 1945, telegram from CAD to Commander in Chief, Armed forces, Pacific, 28 July 1945, Box 1789, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

contrast to his previous opposition to civilian ‘interference’ in military operations and a sign that the General regarded the period of military necessity as over.³¹¹

During at least one point in his discussion with the President, Marshall asserted that military government had not been established in the Philippines. While Marshall technically could assert that there was no formal military government created in the Philippines, the reality was that the entirety of the United States relationship with the Philippines from 1898 to 1945 represented a full cycle of military governance, from direct rule through mentorship, which laid the foundations for independence. Filipinos hated the concept of “military governance,” and President Osmeña approved or disapproved American decisions and issued proclamations. However, under the United States Army’s doctrinal principles of indirect rule and military necessity, generals and their staffs determined civil affairs policies, actual governance, that in many instances never saw Osmeña’s desk for approval. During the period of military necessity, when exigencies of the moment drove decisions with respect to governance, Army commanders made decisions without respect to the principle of indirect rule of Osmeña. Marshall’s statement is only true through a narrow, legally semantic interpretation limited by the military definition of the term and his experience in World War II. This is understandable in light of the Filipino history with military government, and their probable reaction to a formal declaration of military government would likely have raised concerns and trouble Marshall prudently wished to avoid. Fortunately, the goodwill and trust engendered by the close relationship between Americans and Filipinos obviated the need to develop a more formal governmental hierarchy of indirect rule. Similar to General Scott in Mexico City, the questions of Philippine governance were answered

³¹¹ George C. Marshall, *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, Volume 5: “The Finest Soldier,” January 1, 1945-January 7, 1947*, Larry I. Bland, ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 164-165.

by the local commander, MacArthur, and his staff in adherence to their understanding of the situation, history, and doctrine, rather than dogmatic adherence to the chain of command.

In the course of military government and civil affairs operations, control should be centralized at a level that has sufficient understanding of the military situation and authority to direct civil administration policy in order to provide a modicum of consistency across a territory. General MacArthur's insular approach to civil affairs and military governance in his interactions with the Joint Chiefs, the War Department, the Civil Affairs Division, and other agencies of the federal government in Washington, is representative of this approach. Likewise, authority for execution of this policy should be delegated to the lowest level possible, wherever possible, such that units engaged in civil administration can efficiently and rapidly address unique operational circumstances and variables as they appear, without the need to send unnecessary requests for guidance to higher command levels. As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, MacArthur's delegation of civil administrative responsibility to his staff and subordinate commands – and after a fashion even the Commonwealth government – was a decentralized approach that facilitated rapid problem solving, though it led some to criticize the General for his apparent disinterest in civil administration, and created some turmoil among subordinate civil affairs organizations.³¹²

³¹² United States Army, *Field Manual 27-5: Military Government and Civil Affairs* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943), passim; Crossman, "Experiences," 65.

CHAPTER 5

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

...the best generals are those who arrive at the results of planning without being tied to plans.

Churchill

Strategy and policy at the grand, international level does little to immediately direct actions of forces on the ground in contact with the enemy.³¹³ In most modern militaries, as Louis-Alexandre Berthier did for Napoleon Bonaparte, it is the staff and subordinate commands that take the grand visions of the senior commander and turn them into workable, pragmatic, operational directives, tactical concepts, and local policies to accomplish the senior commander's goal. The strategic aims of Philippine liberation and independence involved two monumental tasks: the defeat and removal of the Japanese army and their allies occupying the islands, and the reinstatement and rehabilitation of Filipino civil administration. Though Presidents Sergio Osmeña and Franklin D. Roosevelt, General George C. Marshall, Admirals Ernest King and Chester Nimitz, the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, the War Department, State Department, and Department of the Interior had worked to develop strategy and policy for the civil administration of the Philippines from reconquest to liberation, their efforts amounted to regulatory guidance filtered through General Douglas MacArthur. Efforts to transform this guidance into operational plans and direct action would be taken by Army units and individual soldiers in remote locations, without the benefit of direct communication with strategic planners. Their contact with strategic guidance would come through plans, policies, and decisions promulgated by their immediate chain of command. These plans and decisions would be

³¹³ Winston Churchill, *My Early Life: A Roving Commission* (London: Scribner, 1987), 212-213.

reviewed and refined by their senior leaders and ultimately the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) commander, General MacArthur.

General MacArthur wanted a period of military civil administration after liberation that was brief and aimed at “restoring to the Philippines a degree of freedom at least equal to that in existence before 1942.”³¹⁴ In a memorandum to General John H. Hilldring, the chief of the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) of the War Department, MacArthur argued that,

in any plans for the control of civil affairs. . . the measure of freedom and liberty given to the Filipino people [should] be at least comparable to that enjoyed under the Commonwealth Government before Japanese occupation. It would be a matter of grave concern if restrictions were imposed, whether by direct or indirect means, in excess of those existing before the war. The only restrictions which should be imposed are the minimum required by military necessity and these should be removed as quickly as possible.³¹⁵

This devotion to Philippine independence and autonomy is understandable given General MacArthur’s personal relationship with the Philippines both as an Army officer stationed in the islands before the war and as a Commonwealth government official. His sentiment above is a clear statement of his intent regarding any plans for civil administration of the Philippines.

The SWPA staff was responsible for translating MacArthur’s intent into a workable operational plan. The Civil Affairs Section of the SWPA staff developed and wrote the operational plans, memorandums, general orders, standing operating procedures, circulars, and instructional notes that organized forces and directed soldier’s actions and decisions in the face of the complex challenges that arose in the daily tasks of providing civil administration to Filipinos in the storm and aftermath of combat.

³¹⁴*Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific Volume I* (Washington: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1994); 193.

³¹⁵ Douglas MacArthur to John H. Hilldring, 2 September 1944, 1-2, Box 1788, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific (World War II), Record Group 496, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (NARA).

Civil affairs leadership in the SWPA staff initially fell to brigadier generals Bonner Fellers and Courtney Whitney. Their responsibility was to use their staff to transform MacArthur's strategic concept into a workable plan that included tasks and responsibilities assigned to create action that achieved the overall mission of Commonwealth independence. Both Fellers and Whitney worked with MacArthur to develop a civil affairs strategy for liberation, but the task of writing the plan fell to two ideologically opposed lieutenant colonels on the SWPA staff who were lawyers in their civilian lives, and Joseph R. Hayden, former Vice-Governor of the Philippines under Governor-General Frank Murphy from 1933 to 1935. Lieutenant colonels Joseph Rauh and Edger G. Crossman joined Hayden to plan for civil administration in the Philippines. Rauh had clerked for Supreme Court justices Benjamin Cardozo and Felix Frankfurter, worked on New Deal issues, and later became President of Americans for Democratic Action. Commissioned in the spring of 1942, he joined MacArthur's staff in Australia, working for Fellers, who had initial responsibility for Civil Affairs. Later that responsibility was transferred to Whitney. Rauh identified Whitney as MacArthur's "speechwriter" who gave Rauh a free hand in civil affairs work.³¹⁶ Edgar G. Crossman was a corporate lawyer with experience in the Philippines in 1928 and 1929 as legal advisor and friend to Henry L. Stimson, a relationship that facilitated an introduction to both Quezon and MacArthur, at Crossman's wedding in Manila. In 1944, Crossman was commissioned and served Hilldring and Colonel David "Mickey" Marcus in the CAD, where he read reports and directive pertaining to military government in Sicily. He was tasked by Hilldring to participate in Joint Chiefs of Staff planning for the Philippines, and in July he joined the SWPA staff at the request

³¹⁶ Neil M. Johnson, "Harry S Truman Library and Museum," *Oral History Interview with Joseph L. Rauh Jr.*, June 21, 1989, pp. 7-10, <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/oral-histories/rauh> (accessed March 6, 2015).

of MacArthur.³¹⁷

The civil affairs elements of Southwest Pacific Area forces were formally organized to execute three functions: planning and coordination, training, and civil affairs operations. The Civil Affairs Section of SWPA, and later United States Army Force Far East (USAFFE), planned and coordinated all civil affairs operations. The Civil Affairs Detachment, USAFFE was responsible for training, and the Philippine Civil Affairs Units (PCAUs) were responsible for operations. USAFFE was the high command created in 1941 to direct the combined efforts of American and Philippine Commonwealth forces. With MacArthur's evacuation from the Philippines in March 1942, the USAFFE designation became United States Forces in the Philippines (USFIP) under the control of General Jonathan M. Wainwright. In February 1943, MacArthur reconstituted USAFFE in order to coordinate Army forces in SWPA and guerilla forces in the Philippines. SWPA became the headquarters responsible for control of all Allied forces. From a Philippine civil affairs operational perspective, these designations made little practical difference.³¹⁸ The Civil Affairs Detachment supervised training, and the Philippine Civil Affairs Units conducted civil affairs operations at what could be termed the tactical level – the interface between the Army and Filipino civilians.

An arrangement for grassroots implementation and direction of civil affairs in the Philippines was not formalized until the last year of the war. In August 1944, Memorandum Number 35 formally designated the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, as responsible for planning

³¹⁷ Edgar G. Crossman, "My Experiences in World War II" (Unpublished manuscript, 1966), 2, 5, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7f/Edgar_Gibson_Crossman_-_My_Experiences_in_WWII.PDF. Crossman had a very high opinion of Rauh, writing that when asking how he (Crossman) was supposed to procure supplies in the Philippines, the response in CAD was "ask Joe Rauh." Once he arrived in SWPA, Crossman realized that was the right answer. Copy provided to the author by David Smollar.

³¹⁸ For more information on higher headquarters organizations and designations, see Louis Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953); 14-30; *Reports of General MacArthur*, 3-4, 22, 28-33, 109-110.

civil affairs. In September 1944, Memorandum Number 40 consolidated all civil affairs responsibilities and assigned them to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5; this was Whitney, formerly the chief of the SWPA Philippine Regional Section.³¹⁹ General Order Number 9 formally established the G-5 section on the same day. The Civil Affairs Section responsible for Philippine planning underwent several changes in assignment – SWPA, USAFFE, and AFPAC – but these did not change the section’s staff composition or responsibilities.³²⁰

Memorandum Number 40 assigned the following tasks to Whitney as the G-5:

1. Assist the Commonwealth Government in carrying out its responsibilities for civil administration and relief.
2. Assist in the dissemination of information to the Philippines. [sic]
3. Prepare plans for the recruitment, training, assignment and control of Philippine Civil Affairs Units (PCAU); for the handling of financial and economic matters, including currency, banking, rationing, price and wage control; for public safety and the administration of justice.
4. Recruit civilian labor.
5. Plan and supervise health and sanitation matters.
6. Plan and supervise the rehabilitation of Americans and Allied Nationals.
7. Assist in the restoration of public utilities of the civil population.
8. Prepare proclamations and other legal papers.
9. Prepare technical and policy instructions for Task Forces and Philippine Civil Affairs Units.
10. Keep himself fully informed on all matters relating to civil administration and relief in order that the overall plan can be properly effected under direction of the Chief of Staff.³²¹

The Civil Affairs Section’s planning was codified in several key policy and planning documents.

Foremost among them are Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) Number 26 from 9 October

³¹⁹ *Reports of General MacArthur*, 309.

³²⁰ GHQ, SWPA, Memorandum Number 35, 30 August 1944, p. 3, and Memorandum Number 40, 28 September 1944, pp. 1-5, Box 1794, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA. Communications from this organization regarding the Philippines use GHQ, SWPA and GHQ, USAFFE interchangeably from 1944 to July 1945, with no pattern discernable to the author.

³²¹ SWPA, Memorandum Number 40, pp. 2-4.

1944 and accompanying Instructional Notes of 10 October, SOP Number 27 from 15 November and Instructional Notes of 22 November, and then Circular Number 7 and Instructional Notes of 13 January 1945. SOP Number 26 and its Instructional notes, which incorporated the concepts in Memorandum Number 35 and Memorandum Number 40, were the first plans published for civil affairs operations in the Philippines.³²²

The Civil Affairs Detachment directed the training of PCAUs according to plans and policies drafted by the Civil Affairs Section. On 14 September 1944, SWPA created the Civil Affairs Staging Area (CASA) at Oro Bay, Papua New Guinea, to train the first PCAUs for the Leyte invasion, designated Operation KING. On 28 September CASA became the Civil Affairs Detachment. On 30 September PCAUs #1 through #8, composed primarily of soldiers taken from the First Filipino Regiment, the Second Filipino Battalion, and a few officers supplied by the Fifth Replacement Depot, departed Oro Bay. Between 1 October 1944 and February 1945, the Civil Affairs Detachment trained twenty-two additional PCAUs. Training for these later PCAUs was defined in a memorandum entitled “Plans and Policies for Procurement, Organization and Training of Philippine Civil Affairs Units for Musketeer III.” This prescribed a training curriculum that included: theater policy; Philippine terrain, climate, resources, and history; civil administration; operation and maintenance of equipment; weapons use; first aid; and map reading. Instruction was by lecture, theoretical problem solving, and practical exercises.³²³

Officially, PCAUs were assigned to the Civil Affairs Detachment, and attached to Army

³²² GHQ, SWPA, SOP Number 26, 9 October 1944, Instructional Notes, 10 November 1944, SOP Number 27, 15 November 1944, and Instructional Notes, 22 November 1944, USAFFE Circular Number 7, 13 January 1945, Box 2281, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

³²³ GHQ, SWPA, Memorandum, 1 October 1944, Box 1794, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

or area commands for operations. The Civil Affairs Detachment thus, after training was complete, held administrative responsibility for the units. This meant that all requests for promotions, transfers, rest and recuperation duty, and other administrative actions, while initiated by the command to which a PCAU had been assigned, had to be approved by the Civil Affairs Detachment. At the same time, the Civil Affairs Detachment could initiate requests for leaves and passes, but those had to be approved by the command to which a PCAU was assigned. Finally, General Headquarters (GHQ), USAFFE directed PCAU activation, designation, reorganization, and disbandment, while its Civil Affairs Section planned the operations of PCAUs. Thus, the nature of combat operations, and civil affairs operations specifically, suggests that the Civil Affairs Detachment's significant responsibilities essentially ended when PCAU training was completed. On 28 April 1945, the Civil Affairs Detachment was dissolved, and the thirty PCAUs were assigned directly to GHQ, USAFFE.³²⁴

To create a direct interface between Filipino civilians and American forces, to distribute relief supplies, as well as all other tasks involving working with civilians or directly aiding Philippine officials, the SWPA staff created the innovative (at least to the Army) PCAU. Said to be McArthur's brainchild, the PCAUs were probably based on an Australian concept for civil administration created in February 1942 by the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU). ANGAU was comprised of civilian officials from New Guinea who were commissioned in the Australian army. They were responsible for maintaining policing and health services in New Guinea territory not occupied by the Japanese, and for recruiting, organizing, and directing local native labor in support of the Australian and American military. ANGAU reported to Australian army officials, and their stevedores, scouts, laborers, and police were well

³²⁴ Civil Affairs Section, Army Forces, Pacific, "Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1" 25 August 1945, p. 30 (Copy provided to the author by staff of the Hoover Institution Library & Archives, Stanford, CA).

respected.³²⁵ The PCAUs emulated this pattern and used Filipinos to assist in civil relief and governance efforts.

Inspired by the ANGAUs or not, MacArthur created the PCAU in the SWPA. They were an innovative creation, a mix of native Filipinos and Americans made possible due to the unique, five-decade long socioeconomic relationship between the United States and the Philippines. PCAUs were composed of 10 officers and 39 enlisted. The officers were mostly Americans and the enlisted mostly Filipinos, drawn from the 1st Filipino Regiment and 2nd Filipino battalion, many of whom came from the farm areas of California. The officers' positions were the Unit Commander, Medical Officer, Labor Officer, Supply Officer, Transportation Officer, Relief and Welfare Officer, Finance Officer, Public Safety Officer, and Engineer Officer. Each PCAU got six ¼ ton jeeps, three 1-½ ton trucks, and three trailers. As with most civil affairs personnel, officers were drawn from the higher end of the age demographic. This was partially in deference to a perception of physical limitations, but also took advantage of a greater wealth of experience in a broader range of educational and vocational talents, including medicine, law enforcement, engineering, labor, supply, and transportation. As the medical officer of PCAU number 17 wrote, "there is quite a nice crew of lawyers, judges, prosecutors, doctors, college teachers, fellows who have been abroad, quite a contrast from the 'dese and dosers' of other units," before adding that the enlisted Filipinos "are good-natured, have a sense of humor, are clean, intelligent and make good soldiers."³²⁶ The incorporation of Filipinos into the formation gave these units a distinct advantage in relating to local civilians, allowing them the

³²⁵ GHQ, SWPA, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, Informal Notes on Talk by Major R. H. Hopper, 18 October 1944, p. 1, Box 2288, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

³²⁶ David Smollar, "A World War II Story of the Philippines: Letters of the Medical Officer of Philippine Civil Affairs Unit #17," *The Journal Of History* (The Philippine National Historical Society) 61 (2015), 6. Copy provided to the author by David Smollar.

ability to quickly overcome language and cultural barriers.³²⁷

After training by the Civil Affairs Detachment, PCAUs were attached to Army and area commands by Civil Affairs Section directors and tasked to administer civil affairs policies on the operational level. Each Army and area command and Corps headquarters had its own organic Civil Affairs Headquarters Section responsible for coordinating its assigned PCAUs' actions within the area of operations. In combat, PCAUs promoted military objectives by preventing civilian interference with operations – essentially a policing function. They also provided emergency relief and medical care, and procured labor for combat unit requirements – primarily as porters and guides. Circular Number 7 emphasized that PCAUs were not combat units, and they were not to be given combat role except in extreme emergency.³²⁸ Thirty PCAUs were created and operated in every major island of the Philippines. In each location, they met unique difficulties not addressed in guidance from higher headquarters. PCAU commanders relied upon, and adjusted, Civil Affairs Section plans and the guidance provided in SOPs, Instructional Notes, and Circulars to solve the problems peculiar to the particular area in which they were operating.

Operational plans were based on Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1127 and MacArthur's desire to have the heads of the Philippine Government integrated with his headquarters in order to reinstate the Commonwealth government "as rapidly as possible."³²⁹ MacArthur's plan for indirect rule through Commonwealth leadership resolved the command unity problems the Army experienced in North Africa with civil affairs responsibility divided between civilian and military leadership. The remaining challenges had to be addressed through staff planning. MacArthur's staff crafted civil affairs plans with full awareness of Army history in civil affairs. They were

³²⁷ Crossman, "Experiences," 21; Smollar, "Medical Officer," 5.

³²⁸ "Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1," 32.

³²⁹ Memorandum from MacArthur to George C. Marshall, 25 January 1944, p. 2, Box 16, Record Group 4, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, VA (MMA).

informed by current doctrine, their experiences in World War I, American-Philippine relations from 1898 to 1941, and the contemporary invasions of North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and France.³³⁰ Along with Crossman's knowledge of operations in Sicily gained from his time in CAD, he, MacArthur, and Whitney had all served in the Philippines prior to the war. Fellers had served in North Africa prior to coming to the Pacific. According to Rauh, he based the order for Philippine civil administration on novelist and war correspondent John Hersey's book about the invasion of Italy, *A Bell for Adano*: "It had all of the problems in civil affairs like roads being clogged by peasants when soldiers wanted to move to the front and so forth. I read it three times; I read it and read it. A marvelous book; it taught you how to do it."³³¹

The staff's wealth of understanding and experience facilitated the implementation of MacArthur's policy for civil administration of the Philippines, which was codified during August of 1944 with the release of SWPA Memorandum Number 35 and other basic documents. Memorandum Number 35 structured the SWPA civil affairs organization, established leading policies, and assigned roles and responsibilities in planning and operations.³³² Most of the policies established in Memorandum Number 35 endured from its inception until the transfer of civil responsibilities to Philippine civil authorities but over time, SWPA commanders and senior leaders worked to refine it. Circumstances in war are varying and rarely optimal, and so the SWPA civil affairs staff was in a regular cycle of refining the organization as operations progressed, from planning in August 1944 until final transfer of responsibility to the Commonwealth government, forestalling critical events that could have led to starvation, disease,

³³⁰ For information on relief and governance issues in North Africa and Italy, see communications republished in Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, eds., *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Washington: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1964), 31-42, 240-241, 266, 322-327.

³³¹ Johnson, "Harry S. Truman Library and Museum.," 7.

³³² SWPA, Memorandum Number 35.

or unrest that might derail military operations and the establishment of the civil Philippine government.³³³ In early October, Fellers, Rauh, Colonel Andres Soriano (appointed to the SWPA staff by MacArthur) and Crossman, with input from Hayden, drafted SOP Number 26 in order to refine Memorandum Number 35. MacArthur's Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland, directed them to break the SOP into two sections: the SOP, and Instructional Notes.³³⁴ The final SWPA operational civil affairs plan had four main objectives: reestablish the legitimate Commonwealth government, organize resources for civilian supply and emergency relief, restore the Philippine economy, and restore public health and medical services.³³⁵

Reestablishment of the Commonwealth government required four actions: repudiation of the Japanese-installed government of Jose Laurel, establishment of a collaborationist policy, direction for Army responsibility for administration, and restoration of pre-war Philippine authority. In accordance with civil affairs doctrine and experiences from World War I, MacArthur prepared a proclamation to be issued at the time of the initial landings in the Philippines. This proclamation provided a formal recognition of Osmeña's government, declaring, "the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines [to be] the sole and only government having legal and valid jurisdiction over the people of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control." The decree also repudiated all actions taken by Laurel's government, and it declared all laws, regulations and processes of any government other than the

³³³ A review of civil affairs correspondence in Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA shows that most of the communications, orders, SOPs, circulars, memorandums and directives to lower echelons between 1944 and 1945 were signed by Fellers, Whitney, Hayden, Crossman, or Rauh.

³³⁴ Crossman, "Experiences," 18-19. Crossman writes that he regretted splitting SOP Number 26 and wished it had been issued as a single order, adding, "much of what they thought was detail in the Instructional Notes turned out to be very important. Sixth Army, whose civil affairs section was hard to deal with, paid little or no attention to the Instructional Notes because they didn't have to." This is obvious in the Instructional Notes themselves, as the first five words on the covers of the various iterations read: "This is not a directive," and explain that the notes were intended as instructions to PCAUs, leaving the subordinate armies, corps, and divisions nearly free to do as they wished.

³³⁵ "Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1," ii.

Commonwealth government null and void.³³⁶

Integrating the President of the Philippines into the SWPA headquarters and bringing him ashore at Leyte at MacArthur's side granted the Filipino politician the imprimatur of the United States Government and an initial modicum of legitimacy. It also publicly demonstrated the President's involvement in his country's liberation, putting a Filipino face on it. However, the SWPA staff's perception of the President and his government's capacity to resolve the unique challenges attendant to a war of liberation were more pragmatic, even harsh. Rauh and Hayden both voiced their concerns that Quezon had a feeble staff for civil administration, just a half-dozen men.³³⁷ This shortage created issues for planners as estimates for relief requirements that were supposed to be provided by the Commonwealth government never emerged, forcing logisticians at SWPA and the War Department to make assumptions without Filipino input.³³⁸ Likewise, during operations, there were significant delays in the appointment of civilian leaders, appointments that were critical to the transfer of authority from the Army to the Commonwealth, leading commanders to rely on temporary appointments. Filipino governmental structure, nascent at the time of the Japanese invasion, difficulties in communications and coordination, and the immensity of the challenge of post-war relief and rehabilitation, all combine to help explain the apparent inability of the Filipino government. A paucity of Commonwealth input into operations and planning persisted until about May 1945, when a sufficient number of Filipino pre-war officials were found and intra-governmental communications restored.³³⁹

Renunciation of the "puppet" Laurel government's actions elevated concerns about

³³⁶ SWPA, SOP Number 26, pp. 4-5.

³³⁷ Memorandum from Bonner Fellers to Commander-in-Chief, SWPA, with attached memorandum from Joseph Rauh and Joseph R. Hayden to Fellers, 22 July 1944, Box 1720, Records of U.S. Army Operational, Tactical, and Support Organizations (World War II and Thereafter), Record Group 338, NARA.

³³⁸ Informal Notes on Talk by Hopper, 2-3.

³³⁹ "Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1," 48-52.

potential collaborators in the denounced government. MacArthur had given minimal response to this question in strategic and policy level discussions with the War Department and various civil relief committees, stating to Hayden, his advisor on Philippine affairs, that collaboration was “not a legal question,” and he deferred actions and decisions to the Commonwealth government.³⁴⁰ The SWPA staff had little first-hand experience, historical experience, or even doctrine from which to create a policy, but they did not have the luxury to demure. The SWPA Civil Affairs Section thus relied heavily on observations of Civil Affairs Officers in Italy to formulate their policy.³⁴¹ The resulting SWPA policy dictated that collaborationists in administrative offices were to be removed from positions of economic or political influence. The fact that a person was a “puppet” official was not acceptable as sufficient proof that a person was a collaborator. Officers in the Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) would decide if a possible collaborator would be detained based on an investigation into the official’s records. Detention was an indicator of potential threat to military security, and not a final determination of their guilt or innocence as a collaborator.³⁴²

Determination of ‘collaboration’ was left to the Commonwealth government –military courts would not try collaborators. This policy was clearly reiterated in all civil affairs policy statements, but none stated precisely when the Commonwealth government would begin to process this responsibility. General MacArthur, to weigh in publicly, eventually stated that

³⁴⁰ Joseph R. Hayden, Notes on discussions with MacArthur, 4 August 1944, Hayden Papers.

³⁴¹ HQ, USAFFE, Civil Affairs Detachment, Appendix: Administration of Civil Affairs in Italy, 23 November 1944, pp. 2-4, Box 1794, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA. Though the author and provenance of the information contained are unidentified, this was an attachment prepared by the SWPA staff to assist in the training of Philippine Civil Affairs officers. It demonstrates a clear understanding of the challenges of administration in Italy and is evidence of strong communication links between theaters regarding civil affairs lessons and observations. Critical to the SWPA planners was the section dealing with the removal of Fascist administrators. This section cautioned that simple membership in the Fascist party was not an indicator of loyalty, and that other methods had to be used to determine suitability for removal or prosecution.

³⁴² USAFFE, Circular Number 7, p. 1.

citizens of the Philippines who gave voluntary aid or comfort to the enemy in violation of allegiance to the United States and Philippine Commonwealth would be detained until the war ended and then remanded to the Philippine government for adjudication. CIC officers were left to their discretion as to what activities constituted giving aid and comfort to the enemy.³⁴³

MacArthur's hesitation with regard to collaborators is notable. In conversations with Hayden he made a fine distinction between the behavior of Jorge Vargas and his leadership during the Japanese Executive Commission for the Philippines of January 1942, and that of Laurel as president of the Republic from October of 1943. Opining as Vargas had been directed by Quezon, he held no grudge against "people who held office at the time of the Executive Commission," particularly because "the Japs had a right to demand that." But Laurel "didn't have to set up his 'republic,' and the others didn't have to join him."³⁴⁴ By failing to clarify his position, MacArthur was able to address individual cases as he wished, based on whatever circumstances he saw fit. This allowed him to shape the eventual composition of the Philippine government, as was seen with his exoneration of Manuel Roxas.³⁴⁵

The 1943 edition of *Field Manual 27-5* designated civil affairs as a "command responsibility." This meant that "In occupied territory the commander, by virtue of his position, has supreme legislative, executive, and judicial authority, limited only by the laws and customs

³⁴³ "Proclamation Of General Douglas MacArthur," *Official Gazette*, 29 December 1944, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1944/12/29/proclamation-of-general-douglas-macarthur-providing-for-military-measures-to-be-taken-upon-the-apprehension-of-citizens-of-the-philippines-who-voluntarily-have-given-aid-comfort-and-sustenance-to-th/> (accessed January 11, 2021).

³⁴⁴ Hayden, Notes on Discussions with MacArthur, 24 November 1944, Hayden Papers.

³⁴⁵ Roxas had been in the Commonwealth government, then fought alongside guerrilla forces until he was captured. He then became part of the Laurel government until his capture by the Americans, after which he became part of the USAFFE G-2 staff. For more on MacArthur's views on collaborators, see Ronald K. Edgerton, "General Douglas MacArthur and The American Military Impact in the Philippines," *Philippine Studies* 25 (1977), 420-440. According to Edgerton, MacArthur maintained an ambiguous definition of loyalty and collaboration to enable him to select those he felt were loyal to him, and America by default, for positions of authority or for disdain, whether they were impressed collaborationists like Roxas, or anti-Japanese guerrillas of the *Hukbalahapon*.

of war and by directives from higher authority.”³⁴⁶ Thus the SWPA and area commanders would direct civil affairs in their separate areas of responsibility until Commonwealth officials assumed those responsibilities. Army commanders exercised this responsibility through their assigned (PCAUs). PCAUs assumed the primary responsibility for reestablishing the pre-war administrative processes of government in their areas of operations, and for distributing emergency relief. The normal functions of government included police, fire, health, and education, as well as reopening stores and rebuilding infrastructure until Filipinos assumed control.³⁴⁷

The process for reestablishment of the Commonwealth government followed a simple pattern. The Army, via the PCAUs, would enter an area and take over relief and civil affairs. During combat, they would conduct civil administration with as much help from Filipinos as possible. After the combat phase, and the community began to normalize, responsibility for civil administration and relief would transfer gradually to Filipino administration until the Commonwealth government assumed total responsibility for administration in the area. During this transition period, Commonwealth government officials who had arrived in the Philippines would observe and assist the transfer in consultation with civil affairs authorities, and in particular through the appointment of civil officials to assume responsibility for key positions.³⁴⁸

To speed the transition process, Army commanders were authorized to make temporary appointments of Filipino officials to provincial and municipal positions until the Philippine government could make permanent appointments. Temporary officials were to be paid by PCAUs at their 1941 rates, which would be reimbursed by the Commonwealth to the United

³⁴⁶ United States Army, *Field Manual 27-5: Military Government and Civil Affairs* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943), 5.

³⁴⁷ SWPA, SOP Number 26, pp. 1-8.

³⁴⁸ “Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1,” 11.

States at some future point.³⁴⁹ Pre-war Filipino administrators found to be currently serving, either in guerilla-controlled areas, or who were not found to be collaborators, were regarded as temporary appointees until confirmed. Civil officials serving in temporary positions could be removed and replaced by Army commanders until permanently appointed by the Commonwealth government.³⁵⁰

Promotion of independent Commonwealth authority was a key element of initial planning for reestablishment of Commonwealth governance. Early plans acknowledged that the Commonwealth government could appoint provisional officials, but it was not until operations commenced that it was recognized that the Philippine government could and should appoint permanent administrators prior to the assumption of control in an area. With this realization, the early directive for PCAUs to establish their headquarters in the same location as the provincial and municipal leadership was rescinded in order to promote the perception of Commonwealth authority having independence from American influence.³⁵¹

Particularly important to civil administration was the reestablishment of the Philippine judicial system. Filipino primacy here was vital as SWPA wished to avoid using the military justice system to try Filipino civilians. Initially, General Order Number 10 authorized commanders to try any violations of Commonwealth law in military courts. Crossman modeled the judicial plan on the Sicilian example, which allowed civilians to be tried by military courts, but Sutherland hesitated to approve this without MacArthur's affirmation. MacArthur was in Brisbane, and would not rejoin the staff until Leyte, thus SOP Number 26 initially authorized

³⁴⁹ USAFFE, Circular Number 34, 8 April 1945, pp. 1-2, Box 1794, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA. Circular Number 34 was an update to Circular Number 7 that merely replaced or added passages; it was not a complete rewrite.

³⁵⁰ SWPA, SOP Number 27, pp. 6-7; "Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1,"12.

³⁵¹ *Ibid.*

civilian criminal cases to be tried in military courts established by the Commander in Chief, SWPA, until the Commonwealth system was reestablished.³⁵² On 22 October, Fellers and Crossman were summoned to the *USS Nashville*, MacArthur's headquarters for the invasion. Sutherland told them that "MacArthur didn't want any military courts whatsoever, that the Filipinos were 99% loyal and that he wanted no part in administering Philippine criminal or civil law."³⁵³ Thus on 28 October, just a week after the invasion of Leyte, General Order Number 10 was rescinded. By late November, SOP Number 27 eliminated any mention of military courts and stated that Commonwealth courts, when opened, would try violations of Philippine law. By January, this document was refined again to state flatly that, "the trial of violations of Philippine Law will be conducted by the Commonwealth courts."³⁵⁴

The January missive suggested that Filipino justices of the peace could be useful in establishing civil order. To this end, commanders were encouraged to find such men, as they were appointed for life and represented the Filipino courts that had the most direct influence on daily life. If they took office before the war, and had not resigned, they could resume normal functions after they were cleared by CIC officers. If none could be found or cleared, commanders were restricted from appointing justices and had to request via PCAU channels that the Commonwealth government appoint one. Osmeña hesitated to appoint new justices quickly because they were appointed for life, but Crossman was able to cajole him into ordering the incumbent justices to "get to work".³⁵⁵ Restoration of the Filipino justice system met two SWPA objectives; it reified a collaborationist policy, and it represented steps towards transition to

³⁵² SWPA, SOP Number 26, p. 1; Crossman, "Experiences," 20.

³⁵³ Ibid., 30-31.

³⁵⁴ USAFFE, Circular Number 7, 1.

³⁵⁵ Crossman, "Experiences," 31.

Commonwealth control of civil affairs. By trying violators of Commonwealth law in Commonwealth courts, Filipinos would decide the fate of collaborators, and Filipino officials would be visibly empowered, regardless of the outcome of any trial.³⁵⁶

The measure of effectiveness of civil affairs personnel in the Philippines was how rapidly they could transition their areas of responsibility from military control to Commonwealth control. One of the most important functions of PCAUs is to help the provincial and municipal officials to assume full measure of responsibility for civil government as promptly as possible. The performance of PCAU, other than one accompanying actual combat units, will be largely judged by the speed with which effective and unaided civil government by civilian officials is established in areas in which the unit is operating.³⁵⁷ According to SWPA staff, this standard was established to bolster constitutional democracy in Asia and refrain from undermining progress made by Filipinos in building constitutional government. While these lofty decrees may have been worthwhile, and perhaps even inspired some civil affairs officer at Leyte, the reality was that the Commonwealth government could only take control as fast as reliable people could be found and effective communications established. The sheer enormity of the relief problem alone, combined with the crippled state of the Commonwealth government, meant that until a sizeable quorum of pre-war Philippine government officials could assemble in Manila, the Commonwealth assumption of responsibility was likely going to be sporadic and localized.³⁵⁸

Civil affairs relief plans for the Philippines had three mutually supporting objectives: keep civilians from interfering in military operations, reestablish the economy, and prevent

³⁵⁶ GHQ, SWPA, General Order Number 10, 11 October 1944, General Order Number 12, 28 October 1944, Letter from Civil Affairs Section, USAFFE, 23 January 1945, Box 1794, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA; USAFFE Circular Number 7, p. 6.

³⁵⁷ SWPA, Instructional Notes, 22 November 1944, p. 1.

³⁵⁸ "Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1," 13-14.

human suffering. Loosely stated, civil affairs operations had to prevent disease and unrest – lessons learned from Allied experiences with civil relief in operations like those North Africa and Italy. SWPA planners knew logistical preparation was a challenge, particularly in the complex transport environment of the Philippines, where waterborne resources and overland infrastructure were in short supply. They understood that hunger and medical needs would be endemic and relief supplies inadequate in newly liberated areas. Intelligence reports from guerrillas inside the Philippines indicated a massive need for food, clothing, and medical supplies. An effective relief effort required the staff to make an accurate estimate of relief requirements, procure necessary supplies, and create an effective distribution network as separate from combat logistical channels as possible.³⁵⁹

Responsibility for estimation of relief requirements was designated to the Civil Affairs Section of GHQ, SWPA. Working with members of the logistics staff, civil affairs planners prepared estimates of quantities and types of supplies required for the MIKE operation (Luzon), LOVE operation (Mindoro), and VICTOR operations (Visayas and Mindanao). To prepare for a potential humanitarian crisis that could overwhelm and delay combat forces, SWPA staff recognized the urgency to provide emergency relief and established the goal of maintaining the health and working capacity of the people while also alleviating malnutrition caused by the Japanese occupation.³⁶⁰ Further directives restricted military responsibility for relief supplies, refining the definition for military procurement to “the furnishing of minimum quantities of food, fuel, clothing, emergency shelter, medical, sanitary and other essential supplies necessary to maintain the health and working capacity of the population and preserve public order,” and eventually designated the USAFFE to estimate the required amounts, using 90% of the urban

³⁵⁹ “Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1,” 48-52; Crossman, “Experiences,” 2.

³⁶⁰ SWPA, Memorandum Number 35, p. 4.

population as a base and requiring 2000 calories per person per day.³⁶¹ This number was revised downwards to 1800 calories per person per day in January as preparations for civil relief outside of Leyte progressed. Clothing was estimated at one shirt and one pair of trousers for five percent of the males, and one dress for five percent of the females. Tools were estimated based on requirements for twenty two percent of the population. Only emergency relief – that necessary to prevent disease and unrest from impacting military operations – was to be the responsibility of the army, and for planning purposes considered a temporary obligation estimated to last only six months.³⁶²

Responsibility for procurement of relief supplies fell entirely to the United States Army Service of Supply (USASOS), later renamed Army Service Forces, an autonomous component of the Army under General Brehon B. Somervell. USASOS had access to a limited number of intra-theater sources to meet these requirements: Australian resources (which were already nearly fully utilized), stocks on hand exceeding ninety days supply, excess and salvaged stocks, and stocks on hand for East Indies operations. They were also given access to all the theater's stock of rice (except that designated for Philippine military units). During the initial military operations in the Philippines, USASOS had access to whatever Chinese labor and hospitals were required for emergency relief.³⁶³

Once combat operations commenced, prior to the arrival of relief supplies, commanders were authorized to use military supplies for emergencies, and once operations progressed, USASOS supplies would make relief supplies available. Use of captured and salvaged stocks were approved for relief purposes, and the use of native supplies was strongly encouraged.

³⁶¹ USAFFE, Circular Number 7, p. 3.

³⁶² "Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1," 7; Informal Notes on Talk by Hopper, 4.

³⁶³ "Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1," 7; Informal Notes on Talk by Hopper, 2-4.

Advanced procurement of supplies from the United States began in September 1944, and stock inventories were confirmed by 15 November. The War Department initiated a special Philippine relief stockpile, but those supplies were not planned to be available until after the Leyte campaign concluded. Army rations and medical supplies were authorized for use if the special relief stockpile was not available. Planners emphasized that relief supplies had to be available as soon as the military situation permitted, “to prevent uneconomical use of Army rations and Army medical supplies for civilians.”³⁶⁴

Army and area commanders were tasked with responsibility for distribution of relief supplies. Armies requested supplies from USASOS directly and provided their own transportation and distribution by way of their assigned PCAUs. Later instructions directed that the distribution of relief to civilians was restricted to the PCAUs and a few other authorized units. Indiscriminate giving of relief supplies to civilians by individuals and some units at Leyte reduced the available labor pool by disincentivizing people to work. SOP Number 26 encouraged Army units to refrain from giving supplies away; as soon as possible, Filipinos were expected to pay for relief supplies. Not only was this intended to create a demand for jobs and expand the labor pool, but it was also aimed at improving the economy by expanding the commercial base – supplies were to be sold by PCAUs to “civilian commercial agents for distribution.” SOP Number 27 went even further, requiring PCAUs, as soon as possible, to sell supplies to stores, which would resell supplies to the public. This was to be a cash on delivery process with no credit extended, and stores had to accept price ceilings determined by SWPA and the

³⁶⁴ SWPA, SOP Number 26, pp. 11-12; “Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1,” 7; SWPA, SOP Number 27, p. 7; USAFFE, Circular Number 7, p. 4 [quote]. SOP Number 27 included a requirement for Army and Area commanders to immediately guard concentrations of supplies due to civilian looting of captured supplies at Leyte – this requirement was problematic as there was not enough excess combat power to devote sufficient manpower to security of relief supplies in the early phases.

Commonwealth government.³⁶⁵

Since the Commonwealth government committed to reimburse the Army for relief costs, but did not initially negotiate an amount, combat commanders and the Commanding General of USASOS were required to maintain accountability of relief supplies. Reports enumerating supplies acquired from all sources, supplies given away, supplies sold, and supplies turned over to the Commonwealth government, had to be submitted to SWPA monthly.³⁶⁶

As reflected in the administration of civil relief via commercial outlets, beyond simple emergency arrangements, civil affairs planning for the Philippines incorporated policies intended to create a long-term, self-sufficient Commonwealth economy. The stated goal of SWPA civil affairs policy was to make the Philippines economically independent as rapidly as possible. Planners intended to foster the development of domestic farming, fishing, and transportation by the distribution of farm and fishing equipment, including seeds – particularly rice. Likewise, SWPA used locally produced supplies to the maximum extent possible. Finally, planners attempted to guide financial matters such that prices and wages were sustainable after transition to Commonwealth responsibility.³⁶⁷

SWPA planners, as noted, set price ceilings for relief food items and fixed wages for basic laborers in SOP Number 26. While planners had access to all types of pre-war data, and input from Commonwealth officials in Hollandia, the initial planning did not address the unknowable realities encountered after the landings. Crossman recalled that the planners initially based labor rates on the pre-war minimum wage in Manila of 1 peso per hour. After some discussions, they advocated for, and won, a rate of 1.25 pesos per hour, but even that proved to

³⁶⁵ “Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1,” 8; SWPA, SOP Number 26, p. 12; USAFFE, Circular Number 7, pp. 5, 8; SWPA, SOP Number 27, p. 7.

³⁶⁶ USAFFE, Circular Number 7, p. 7.

³⁶⁷ SWPA, SOP Number 26, pp. 8-10.

be too low in the inflationary condition of war.³⁶⁸ In reaction to the actual economic situation, SOP Number 27, published on 15 November, modified the plan to allow for varying conditions, by stating that price ceilings and wage rates would be “set forth from time to time in instructional notes.”³⁶⁹ Instructional notes adjusted both price ceilings and wages on 22 November and again on 13 January 1945. This appears to be a relatively, quick adjustment of a plan to operational conditions, and reflects the civil affairs staff’s dedication to the long-term economic goals of SWPA.³⁷⁰

Price ceilings for relief supplies and wages for Army labor were linked and had the potential to create dependency on the military at a level that hindered the development of the Commonwealth government. If prices were too low, at pre-war rates, supplies would have to be sold below cost, creating a troublesome deficit. Eventually, though the Army bore the initial cost, the Commonwealth would have to pay the difference, as they had agreed to pay for the civilian relief program. It was ultimately decided in conference between the Commonwealth government and the Army that the Filipino people should not be asked to bear the burden by paying more than pre-war rates for necessities. This decision traded a future economic burden that could be negotiated for near-term stability by removing a potential source of civil unrest. The Army could legally give away relief supplies or dispose of them in any way seen fit to further the military mission, and it was determined that stability was in its best interest. Price ceilings were set substantially below cost, and wages were set at pre-war levels.³⁷¹

Though the Army lost money in sales of relief supplies, it saved money by paying lower

³⁶⁸ Crossman, “Experiences,” 19. Crossman lamented that they could not really fight inflation, but he believed that they had deferred it for a few months.

³⁶⁹ SWPA, SOP Number 27, p. 2.

³⁷⁰ “Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1,” 15.

³⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 15-16; Crossman, “Experiences,” 20. Crossman states that they later found rice was being sold for a quarter of its value but argued the saving in wages more than paid for the cost of the subsidy.

wages. The balance is not codified in any study, but the immediate benefit of enabling workers to sustain themselves through productive work was increased civil stability. In the long term, depressed prices and wages did inhibit the commercial importation of food required to help sustain the Filipino population. By the war's end, the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA) told the Commonwealth government to raise prices to encourage imports from American producers. FEA likewise had been aggressively advocating for increases in Philippine exports of war materials as early as 16 November 1944, including abaca, copra, lumber, sugar, tobacco, chrome, manganese, iron, and copper. Abaca was a source of hemp fiber particularly important for rope production, and copra was a source of coconut oil and other agricultural products, both important military commodities. FEA wanted to rehabilitate the Philippine economy while meeting war production requirements. The growth resulting from these policies is subject to interpretation, but ultimately yielded civil stability and economic confidence within a crisis environment of destruction and supply shortages, thanks to civil affairs planners.³⁷²

A corollary of fixed wages was the SWPA instruction to PCAUs to make maximum use of Filipino labor. PCAUs were directed to recruit or assist in the recruitment of labor for all military concerns. Again, the intent of this direction was to grow the economy; however, the creation of "make-work" as a relief measure was forbidden: "The idea of some PCAU's that they should make work to get money into circulation is erroneous. This is inflationary and will not be done."³⁷³ Workers were to be paid directly by the PCAU weekly, or upon completion of a job. This measure prevented the potential skimming of wages by intermediaries.³⁷⁴

³⁷² Memorandum from H.A. Powers to Fellers, 16 November 1944, pp. 1-4, Box 2275, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

³⁷³ SWPA, SOP Number 27, p. 7.

³⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 5-6.

MacArthur, in SOP Number 26, instituted a debt moratorium. This suspended all payments and monetary obligations contracted after 31 December 1941. His order was temporary, and applicable to any area freed from enemy control, pending action by the Commonwealth government. President Osmeña validated this action with Commonwealth Executive Order Number 25 on 18 November 1944. This order likewise ordered all banks and provincial treasuries to seal their books pending review by Commonwealth officials. Banks were ordered to reopen, as soon as conditions permitted, with new emergency books for safekeeping of new deposits. Provincial and municipal treasurers were directed to accept “non-interest bearing savings deposits for safekeeping” and provide resources for the exchange of American dollars for Victory pesos.³⁷⁵

The United States and Commonwealth governments issued the Victory series of Philippine treasury certificates and coined currency. It was legal tender and had an exchange rate of two Victory pesos to one American dollar. All payments were initially made in Victory pesos. Pre-war currency was recognized, but all currency issued during the Japanese occupation – Japanese currency and Philippine bank notes (except emergency currency) alike – was declared invalid. Emergency currency issued during the occupation was investigated and exchanged for Victory pesos at face value if valid. President Osmeña endorsed the SWPA policy in Commonwealth Executive Order Number 25. This also established a process for monitoring currency levels and making monetary adjustments by establishing a Currency Committee in each liberated province. The committee would be appointed by the Army and Commonwealth government to study, investigate and report on the emergency currencies issued by duly

³⁷⁵ "Commonwealth Executive Order Number 25," *Official Gazette*, 18 November 1944, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1944/11/18/executive-order-no-25-s-1944/> (accessed January 10, 2021); GHQ, SWPA, Instructional Notes, Annex B, 13 January 1945, p. 13, Box 351, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

authorized currency boards.”³⁷⁶ This combined committee evaluated the boards, the amounts of money created and distributed, and made recommendations regarding emergency currencies. This policy remained in effect until 6 June 1945, when Osmeña issued Executive Order Number 46, which removed the Army members from the committees while extending their authority over all provinces. MacArthur supported this and told Osmeña that the Army would make available the amount of all authorized military expenditures, in Victory pesos, to support any approved redemption policy. These monetary efforts protected the Commonwealth from counterfeiters and hindered the looting of Philippine wealth by fleeing Japanese or collaborators. As discussed in the previous chapter, the issue required experts in financial forensics to fully ascertain, thus MacArthur accepted the assistance of Treasury officials.³⁷⁷

SWPA planners established the objectives for the PCAUs’ role in the support of public health on 10 October 1944. In the Instructional Notes provided in support of SOP Number 26, they set three primary goals: control of communicable diseases, delivery of immediate medical relief prior to the establishment of health facilities by the Commonwealth government, and creation of an effective public health system for transfer to the Commonwealth government when the situation permitted.³⁷⁸

Civil affairs planners envisioned medical operations in three phases: combat, transition, and Commonwealth. The combat phase began eponymously as soon as troops arrived in an area and fighting was imminent. PCAU medical troops would establish provisional medical facilities – or operate existing ones – to provide care for civilians. PCAU was directed to recruit local

³⁷⁶ "Commonwealth Executive Order Number 25."

³⁷⁷ SWPA, Instructional Notes, Annex B, 19-20; "Commonwealth Executive Order Number 46," *Official Gazette*, 6 June 1945, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1945/06/06/executive-order-no-46-s-1945/> (accessed January 11, 2021); Telegram from Commanding General, USAFFE, to War Department, 1 May 1945, Box 1789, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

³⁷⁸ SWPA, Instructional Notes, 10 October 1944, p. 5.

medical workers for employment in these facilities as assistants. The medical officer in the PCAU was also charged with reestablishing communicable disease detection, prevention, and control measures with indigenous health resources. Likewise, the medical officer was to locate and employ local health and sanitation officials to initiate sanitation and immunization programs. Top priority was given to cholera, typhoid, and smallpox vaccinations, which were to begin immediately and remain in force through all phases. During the combat phase, PCAU was expected operate all health facilities, store, care for, and distribute all medical and sanitation supplies, and pay all civilian health workers. The planned wages for doctors were, depending on skills and experience, 150 to 200 Victory pesos per month (\$75 - \$100); nurses were to receive 75 Victory pesos per month (\$37.50).³⁷⁹

Once combat, or the threat of combat, ceased in an area, PCAUs had to begin the transition phase. SWPA and Commonwealth leadership established the formal date of the start of transition. The medical section was to create “an efficient health organization,” using local “physicians, nurses, and helpers,” to be “transferred to the Commonwealth government when the military situation permitted.”³⁸⁰ Until that transition, facilities were to be improved, and local health officials were to assume leading roles in administration and management. PCAUs were to continue providing supplies, advice, and assistance to these facilities until the Commonwealth phase.³⁸¹

SWPA Headquarters and Commonwealth officials determined a specific date for full Filipino assumption, and then PCAUs were to cease all functions in support of health services.

³⁷⁹ SWPA, Instructional Notes, 10 October 1944, p. 5; SWPA, Instructional Notes, 22 November 1944, pp. 4-6.

³⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

³⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 5; “Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1,” 21.

The Commonwealth government would take responsibility for all hospitals and dispensaries, sanitation, vaccination, and any other health services in the area.³⁸²

Due to the distinctly technical nature of health services, the medical sections of PCAUs had a separate line of reporting than other sections. The medical officers worked with the Chief Public Health Officer, Civil Affairs Section, GHQ, Armed Forces, Pacific Theater. They submitted weekly communicable disease reports through technical lines, with a copy directly to the Chief Public Health Officer. They were also required to submit a monthly report of communicable diseases, medical facility development, sanitation program status, and medical supply status through normal command channels. This dual reporting system ensured that diseases were identified rapidly and a response initiated by medical teams as swiftly as possible, without overwhelming commanders with information on which they could not directly take action; this was particularly critical as disease was the top cause of casualties in the war.³⁸³

SWPA planners knew from guerrilla-provided intelligence reports and radio intercepts that the Filipino health and sanitation system had broken down through neglect and scarcity of supply. In the best areas, medical facilities were in disrepair and supplies were inadequate. At worst they were non-existent. Planners expected that most hospitals would be destroyed or non-functioning and all medical supplies would be expended immediately after an area was reoccupied. As an initial estimate for operations, medical logisticians requested 450 Basic Medical Units, four 200-bed hospital units, seventy 40-bed hospital units, 80 sanitation systems, 160 obstetrical systems, 11 x-ray systems, 12 basic laboratory systems, 80 ambulances, and “substantial quantities” of cholera, smallpox, and other vaccines.³⁸⁴ Army units were authorized

³⁸² “Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1,” 21.

³⁸³ Ibid.

³⁸⁴ Ibid., 22.

to use their medical supplies where civil affairs supplies had not arrived. PCAUs departed the staging area for combat operations with one ton of medical supplies as part of its basic load in order to provide care to civilians in the initial days of combat³⁸⁵

One final, interesting, episode from the planning phase of civil affairs in the Philippines involved Fellers. On 12 January 1945, Marshall sent MacArthur a letter with a copy of a newspaper article by Richard W. Johnston, a war correspondent who would later co-found *Sports Illustrated Magazine*. Johnston's article was sent to Marshall by the Bureau of Public Relations, and it recounted a conversation with Fellers on 15 October, in which the General disclosed dangerously accurate details of the civil relief plans for the Philippines and the PCAU organizational concept, for which he ascribed sole authorship to MacArthur. He also made disparaging remarks about Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes and his desire to appoint a new High Commissioner for the Philippines, and the United Nations rehabilitation and relief Agency (UNRRA). Fellers added that, regarding collaborators, "the General intends to hang a few outright." Fellers concluded with his belief that Japan would capitulate and establish a government ruled by four or five non-military industrial families. Marshall's letter pointed out the political difficulties Fellers' statements created in Washington, particularly in the War, State, and Interior departments, where efforts in Philippine relief had been viewed, albeit reluctantly, as collaborative. Marshall also noted the potential damage to the War Department's relationship with Ickes. He added, "from both military and political points of view, the statements attributed to General Fellers in the last paragraph of the manuscript regarding the conquest of Japan are also unfortunate for obvious reasons." Although there is no indication Fellers' words ever had an impact on any of the subject events he disclosed, his lack of confidentiality somewhat validates

³⁸⁵ "Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1," 21; SWPA, Memorandum Number 35, pp. 18-19; SWPA, Instructional Notes, 22 November 1944, pp. 4-5.

suspicious some had of Fellers as a source of British information for the Italians and Germans during the General's time in Egypt from 1940 to 1942.³⁸⁶

The purpose of civil affairs operations in World War II was, ostensibly, to keep civilians from interfering in combat operations. Civil affairs units accomplished this by restoring local government while providing necessary food, clothing, and medical supplies. The military could then work with a local government that would control the people, and people with their needs met would stay away from combat. Two additional objectives of civil affairs, corollaries to the first, are restoration of the economy, and humanitarian aid. In reality, the restoration of functioning local government during combat operations is impossible, and only the smallest gains can be made in the immediate post-combat period. SWPA's strategy for civil affairs in the Philippines attempted to address this reality in two phases. During the combat phase, the PCAUs assumed responsibilities for civil relief with as little interference with combat units as possible. They augmented their small numbers by recruiting Filipino assistance, keeping civilians away from fighting, and meeting their food and medical needs. In the post-combat phase, PCAUs worked with local leadership to restore the many functions of the Commonwealth government – shouldering these responsibilities themselves until the Filipinos could assume responsibility. The success of this plan rested on the abilities of the Commonwealth government. To facilitate this plan, MacArthur brought President Osmeña from exile in the United States to Tacloban, Leyte, and officially turned the government of all non-occupied areas over to him on 23 October 1944. This did much to allay Filipino misgivings that Americans might reassert control over the country, but the Commonwealth government had little control over the actions of the Filipino people. The stability of the Philippines would have to be won by the Army in cooperation with

³⁸⁶ Classified Message from Marshall to MacArthur, 12 January 1945, pp. 1-5, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA.

Filipinos, and then handed to a nascent Commonwealth government as they restored their country. American forces retained control of many administrative functions, via the PCAUs directly and indirectly, for nearly a year. MacArthur's vision of a short period of military control was well resourced and planned. PCAUs supported his idea that "the utmost care should be taken that an imperialistic attitude not be introduced under the guise of military operations and necessity."³⁸⁷ However, the execution of the plan, and the destruction that accompanied liberation, created obstacles that were not easily overcome.

³⁸⁷ Crossman, "Experiences," 2-30.

CHAPTER 6

SIXTH AND EIGHTH ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS

No plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy's main strength.

Helmuth von Moltke the Elder

General Douglas MacArthur's concept for Philippine civil affairs was best captured in one of the first discussions regarding codification of the General's vision for restoring civil administration. In an interview with Lieutenant Colonel Edward G. Crossman in August 1944, MacArthur outlined his intentions for the Philippines. Crossman recounts that the General's principle was best captured in:

a telegram he sent to Quezon in 1944 saying "we will go in as we came out." By this he meant that the Philippine Government in exile would take over immediately and effectively as soon as we went in. I told him what I had seen of that government in Washington, consisting only of President Osmeña and one or two other able men, and raised a question of whether they could do quite the job he visualized. I said "it would be fine if they could, but can they?" MacArthur said "I see, you think the Army should be prepared to do the job if the Philippine government can't." I said "exactly." He said "I should like to think that over. You may be right."³⁸⁸

Commanders often underestimate the challenges of restoring civil authority and administration in liberated areas, and they often overestimate the ability of local governments to reconstitute and address those challenges. These miscalculations are, in part, due to a cultural hesitation in the Army that defers to civilian primacy in government, particularly for liberated, friendly areas. Perhaps due to confirmation biases, they believe that being 'greeted as liberators' will lead to a rapid release from unwanted civil administration responsibilities.

Official Army civil affairs historians Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg explained that the Army's bitter, internal philosophical debate over its civil affairs functions was due to

³⁸⁸ Edgar G. Crossman, "My Experiences in World War II" (Unpublished manuscript, 1966), 8-9, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7f/Edgar_Gibson_Crossman_-_My_Experiences_in_WWII.PDF. Copy provided to the author by David Smollar.

“the American tradition against the military exercise of civil power under any but desperate circumstances....”³⁸⁹ Civilian perspectives have reinforced this. President Franklin D. Roosevelt viewed military government as “strange and abhorrent,” and his opinion that “The governing of occupied territories may be of many kinds, but in most instances it is a civilian task and requires absolutely first-class men and not second-string men,” derisively echoes this sentiment.³⁹⁰ Much of this same attitude is expressed in General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s expressed desire, during his 1942 operations in North Africa, to turn responsibility over to civilian authorities as soon as possible, in spite of a lack of United States State Department and indigenous civilian capacity and capability for administration. In spite of, and in part perhaps because of, his own observations of these errors, his participation in these debates, and his previous experiences in civil affairs, it should not be surprising that MacArthur nearly repeated the error of underestimating the size and scope of the challenges posed to militaries confronted with post-combat civil administration responsibilities.³⁹¹

The tasks confronting civil affairs and military governance operations grow inversely to the challenges confronting combat forces. In theory, as offensive combat operations progress, enemy numbers, capabilities, and options decrease. But as more territory is gained, municipalities and civilians are liberated, and destruction occurs, the challenges facing civil affairs soldiers increase. Ultimately, combat ends once the enemy capitulates or is vanquished. Civil affairs efforts continue until a different set of criteria are met, the most ideal being the

³⁸⁹ Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, eds., *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Washington: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1964), 4.

³⁹⁰ Memorandum from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Henry L. Stimson, 29 October 1942, reprinted in Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs*, 22. The editors opine that Roosevelt wanted earlier civilian control over liberated territories, before combat was resolved.

³⁹¹ Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs*, 5.

competent assumption of civil administration responsibilities by legitimate indigenous authorities.³⁹²

Civil affairs operations in the Philippines, at all levels, from the invasion in October 1944, through liberation, until the Commonwealth government assumed responsibility for civil relief and administration, grew in many interrelated areas: civil governance, public safety, education, finance, public health and sanitation, public welfare, labor, agriculture and fishing, industry, transportation, and general operational coordination and administration. Though MacArthur underestimated the size and scope of these problems, and initially miscalculated the number of civil affairs personnel required to address them, he did correctly assume that the amicable relationship between Filipinos and Americans would be the foundation for resolution of these civil administration challenges to restoration of Commonwealth administration of the Philippines.

The 15 September 1944 decision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to forego operations at Sarangani Bay in Mindanao and move Leyte operations to 20 October (A Day) likely caused anxiety in Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) staffs, but it did not catch them unprepared. SWPA staffs at higher echelons had prepared for operations in Leyte for months as part of the overarching MUSKETEER plans for a return to the Philippines. But acceleration of the timeline at once focused the planning effort by eliminating options and constrained the planning time available. MUSKETEER was composed of four major combat operational series: KING, the main and supporting operations against Leyte; LOVE, supporting operations in Mindoro and Northern Luzon; MIKE, the main operations in Luzon focused on the recapture of Manila; and VICTOR, supporting operations to eliminate enemy strength in bypassed areas of the

³⁹² United States Army, *Field Manual 27-5: Military Government and Civil Affairs* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943), 4.

Philippines. MUSKETEER also included WILLIAM, a supporting operation to bring land-based air support from units released from combat responsibilities in Europe. As SWPA and then United States Armed Forces Far East (USAFFE) staffs had worked for months developing the plan for Leyte, the foundational work for these operations was already done. Faced with a known operational date, the USAFFE and subordinate staff sections worked to update the plan in three areas: confirm their ‘hard’ data – the factual geographic, logistical, and temporal information regarding Leyte; update ‘soft’ assumptions and estimates of enemy strength and disposition, civilian population size and locations, and estimates of logistical requirements; and refine the operational plan, including finalize loading plans, units’ objectives and operational locations, and most importantly, personnel requirements and manifests. SWPA staff published this updated work on 28 September 1944, as the revised basic outline for MUSKETEER III.³⁹³

Against the persistent advice of many on his staff and the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department, MacArthur had been loath to using school-trained civil affairs and military government officers from the states. He preferred to use those selected and trained by his SWPA personnel. However, in early September 1944, the potential acceleration of operations, a shortage of civil affairs officers, and a more apparent inability of Commonwealth officials to rapidly take responsibility for civil administration prompted him to send Crossman and a small group of his staff to Washington to advocate to the War Department on behalf of his strategic vision, and to recruit 200 to 250 officers for Philippine civil affairs.³⁹⁴

³⁹³ *Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, Volume 1* (Washington: Center for Military History, 1994), 170-174, 178-191; Crossman, “Experiences,” 18-23; General Headquarters, SWPA, MUSKETEER III: Basic Outline Plan for Revised Philippine Operations, 28 September 1944, pp. 1-13, Box 609, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, Record Group 165, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (NARA). USAFFE was a subordinate command under SWPA composed of United States and Filipino military elements. MacArthur commanded both SWPA and USAFFE.

³⁹⁴ Crossman, “Experiences,” 11, 14-18.

Crossman was in Washington working to help refine the War Department's civil affairs directive for the Philippines, discussing MacArthur's plans for Luzon with Secretary Henry L. Stimson, and recruiting civil affairs officers for Philippine operations from the various Schools of Military Government (SMG) and Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATS), when word came that the JCS had accelerated operations. General Richard J. Marshall informed Crossman of the change in plans and ordered him to return to SWPA in New Guinea to finish the Theater Civil Affairs Directive. Crossman went after visiting the SMGs at Harvard, Yale, Chicago and Northwestern universities, and the CATS at Fort Ord, California. At each location he interviewed potential civil affairs officers being trained for Japan and found them eager to accept assignments to immediate operations. His recruiting resulted in the reassignment of more than 100 officers from training for the occupation of Japan to the Civil Affairs Detachment at the Civil Affairs Staging Area at Oro Bay. Crossman arrived at Hollandia on 2 October in time to help refine the SWPA civil affairs directive.³⁹⁵

Upon notification that the JCS had accelerated the invasion of Leyte by two months, the SWPA Civil Affairs Section hastened preparations. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Rauh was sent from Brisbane to the Civil Affairs Staging Area at Oro Bay to assess and expedite Philippine Civil Affairs Unit (PCAU) training and readiness. In the last week of September 1944, Rauh evaluated and assigned unit designations to all thirty PCAUs. He further gave PCAUs 1 through 8 their initial unit attachment, as they were the first to be organized – with personnel drawn largely from within the SWPA formation. They were also the first to deploy to Leyte. PCAUs 1 and 2 were attached to Sixth Army, 3 and 4 to Army Service Command (ASCOM), 5 and 6 to X Corps, 7 and 8 to XIV Corps. These first eight PCAUs would be the lead civil affairs elements at

³⁹⁵ Crossman, "Experiences," 11, 14-18; Theodore L. Sendak, *A Pilgrimage Through the Briar Patch: Fifty Years in Indiana Politics* (Carmel, IN: Guild Press, 1997), 61-62.

the Leyte and Luzon landings, and for the Allied entrance to Manila. Rauh reported they were “enthusiastic” to have the opportunity.³⁹⁶ The remaining PCAUs were in various states of manning and would wait until the recruits from Crossman’s sweep arrived and were trained before they would activate and deploy. Their anticipated readiness schedule was: PCAU 9 on 1 November, PCAUs 10-17 on 15 November, PCAU 18-22 on 20 November, and PCAU 23-28 on 30 November 1944. PCAU 29 and 30 were specially trained for operations with the Moros in Mindanao and were not deployed until February 1945. Rauh returned to SWPA at Hollandia to begin the final work of refining the Theater Civil Affairs Directive on 1 October 1944, the day that he and Crossman were assigned to the USAFFE Advance Echelon Civil Affairs Section in direct support of operations at Leyte.³⁹⁷

During the first week of October 1944, Philippine President Sergio Osmeña arrived at SWPA headquarters in Hollandia with a small staff. Though Osmeña was disappointed at not being able to meet there with MacArthur, he provided advice on the policies in the civil affairs directive published as Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) Number 26 on 9 October. By 13 October 1944, Rauh, Crossman, and General Bonner Fellers, along with the rest of the USSAFE Advance Echelon, had drawn field equipment, including weapons and helmets, and boarded the *USS Blue Ridge* to join the assault convoy bound for Leyte.³⁹⁸

In 1943 and 1944, the north-central Leyte Valley of Leyte Island, roughly in the center of the eastern side of the Philippine archipelago, was believed to offer excellent sites on which to

³⁹⁶ Coded memorandum from Joseph Rauh to Bonner Fellers, 29 September 1944, Box 2288, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific (World War II), Record Group 496, NARA.

³⁹⁷ Memorandum from Rauh to Fellers, 29 September 1944, pp. 1-2, Memorandum from Fellers to G-5, 1 October 1944, Box 2288, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA; Civil Affairs Section, Army Forces, Pacific, “Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1,” 25 August 1945, p. 25 (Copy provided to the author by staff of the Hoover Institution Library & Archives, Stanford, CA). It is interesting to note that Fellers’ memorandum has Joseph R. Hayden identified as part of the Advance Section as well, but his name crossed out.

³⁹⁸ Crossman, “Experiences,” 23.

construct airfields to support future air and logistical operations in Luzon and the rest of the Commonwealth. The valley lay between the significant central mountain ridge to the west and the smaller eastern ridge running north from the provincial capital of Tacloban. The road network was ill-suited for military use, as rain and heavy traffic made the roads nearly impassible. Of the estimated 140,000 troops the Japanese were believed to have in the Philippines, intelligence estimates of Japanese strength at Leyte were low at 24,000. At the same time, SWPA staff estimated more than 900,000 Filipinos lived on Leyte.³⁹⁹

General Walter Krueger, commander of the Sixth Army, was in charge of KING II – the return to the Philippines at Leyte. He assigned civil affairs planning responsibilities to the Judge Advocate and an *ad hoc* staff section until 8 October 1944, when he designated a permanent Civil Affairs Officer. As the Judge Advocate had “familiarity with advance planning,” the Sixth Army plan called for him and two other officers to land on A+2 (22 October 1944) to coordinate civil affairs activities between X and XXIV Corps.⁴⁰⁰ Eight PCAUs and one Naval Civil Affairs Unit were assigned to the Leyte Landings – PCAUs 5 and 6 would land with X Corps, and PCAUs 7 and 8, and the Naval Civil Affairs Unit, would land with XXIV Corps. PCAUs 1 – 4 and the remainder of the Civil Affairs Section would land on A+4. PCAUs 1 and 2 were in reserve to assume responsibilities in heavily populated areas as PCAUs attached to divisions advanced. The first 2500 tons of civilian relief supplies would arrive at Leyte on A+9 (29 October), and 3000 tons on A+23 (12 November). ASCOM was assigned to receive, store, and

³⁹⁹ G-2, SWPA, Situation Forecast to Accompany MUSKETEER-TWO, 27 August 1944, p. 1, Box 609, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA; M. Hamlin Cannon, *United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954), 13; *Reports of General MacArthur, Vol. 1*, pp. 198-201.

⁴⁰⁰ Headquarters, Sixth Army, Report of the Leyte Operation, 20 October 1944 - 25 December 1944, p. 278, *Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library*, 1945, <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/3170> (accessed February 2, 2019).

issue civilian relief supplies at Base K once it was established, as well as recruit, organize, and administer civilian labor.⁴⁰¹

The invasion of Leyte began on 17 October 1944 with the initial landings of the 6th Ranger Battalion on the small islands of Homonhon, Suluan, and Dinagat east of Leyte Gulf (refer to Figure 1). The major landings on A Day (20 October) followed a two-day naval bombardment, with the main force of X and XXIV Corps arriving on the eastern side of Leyte. The landing beaches covered an eighteen-mile-long area between the town of Dulag to the left, on the south, and Tacloban – the provincial capital – on the right, to the north. The 7th and 96th Divisions of XXIV Corps secured the left side, and the 1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions of X Corps the right side. The boundary between the two corps ran from the beach town of Tanauan west to Dagami, with XXIV Corps responsible for both towns. A Regimental Combat Team of the 21st Infantry from the 24th Infantry Division secured both sides of the Panoan Strait at the southern end of the island.⁴⁰²

Civil affairs operations began to deviate from the plan immediately. The Landing Ship Troops (LST) carrying PCAUs 1 and 2 and the main body of the Civil Affairs Section of Sixth Army was delayed for a full day, and while attempting to land on A+5 (25 October) was hit by a bomb and strafed, resulting in 124 casualties; this ship did not complete unloading until 26 October. X Corps did not allow PCAUs 5 and 6 to accompany its combat troops into Tacloban, and Major General Verne D. Mudge, commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, ordered his troops to withdraw from Tacloban after they seized it on the night of 23 October, leaving it unguarded.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid.; Headquarters, Sixth Army, Annex 6A to Sixth Army Field Order 25: Assignment of Shipping, Sixth Army Troops, 23 September 1944, p. 2, Administrative Order 14, Sixth Army Field Order 25, Logistic Responsibilities, 30 September 1944, p. 2, Annex B to Administrative Order 14, Sixth Army Field Order 25, “Civil Affairs Plan,” 30 September 1944, p. 4, Box 2075, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

⁴⁰² *Reports of General MacArthur, Vol. 1*, pp. 199-202; Sixth Army, Report of the Leyte operation, 32-34; Cannon, *Leyte: Return to the Philippines*, 54-61.




Figure 1: Sixth Army Plan for Leyte⁴⁰³

⁴⁰³ Sixth Army, Report of the Leyte Operation, 21.

Crossman attributed to Mudge's simplistic interpretation of a caution by MacArthur to avoid rape. The result was that Filipino civilians looted the capitol building and several storehouses. Depleted by casualties from the attack on their LST, PCAUs 1 and 2 assumed control of Tacloban on 26 October, and were nearly overwhelmed by the refugee situation, with more than 6,000 displaced persons roving in and out of Army-controlled areas. With the assistance of USAFFE and Sixth Army support units, PCAUs 1 and 2, were finally able to control, feed, and medically treat these refugees.⁴⁰⁴

An example of the chaotic relief situation faced by X Corps soldiers before PCAUs assumed responsibility comes from a report by Lieutenant James O. Brooks:

Our [20 October] landing found about 100 Filipino civilians all huddled together in rater holes, shell shocked after two days of Navy and air shelling and bombing.... During the night they streamed through our lines. By morning we had a camp of about 1,000 men, women and children... by noon we had over 5,000 in our midst; by nightfall we had 10,000 in one place and 40,000 in another. These people were homeless and had come for protection, food, etc. Within the week, our assault team alone was handling 75,000 civilians.

We had been advised that our job would be temporary, and that on [22 October] the Army Civil Affairs "PCAU" would be ashore to take over. They did not arrive... until [27 and 28 October]. When they did come in, they were adequately supplied in trade goods, money, rice and personnel. From that day forward, we merely took an assistance role.⁴⁰⁵

Filipino civilians, affected by the confusion and disorder of combat, could not wait for appropriately tasked and trained Civil Affairs Units to arrive before asking for aid. Combat units were instructed to render temporary immediate assistance, but that consumed Army supplies at a prodigious rate. There was equitable exchange, however, as Filipinos were not passive in their liberation and relief. As Lieutenant Brooks records, "I think it is worthy of particular note that by

⁴⁰⁴ Sixth Army, Report of the Leyte Operation, 278; Crossman, "Experiences," 32. Crossman does opine that the looted supplies were not likely wasted.

⁴⁰⁵ Report of James O. Brooks for Leyte, 22 January 1945, reprinted in Civil Affairs Holding and Staging Area, "Cases and Materials On Military Government," 18-19, *Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library*, September 15, 1945, <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/2227> (accessed February 2, 2019).

the afternoon of [21 October], we had over 1,000 [Filipino] male laborers assisting in unloading the beachhead – supplies and articles of war.”⁴⁰⁶ Filipino-American comity enhanced military support during combat as well. On 24 October, the Filipino Bishop offered PCAU 5 the use of the church at Palo as a temporary field hospital for soldiers. The unit recruited nurses and doctors to assist the Army surgeons, while the church continued worship services as usual during medical treatments.⁴⁰⁷

To the south, in the XXIV Corps area, the town of Dulag was mostly destroyed, resulting in nearly 17,000 refugees. Though PCAUs 7 and 8 were attached to XXIV Corps, they landed on 20 October about ten miles away from Dulag at RED beach in the southern end of the X Corps landing zone. Due to the combat situation (X and XXIV Corps’ beachheads were not securely joined until 31 October), they were unable to contact American forces at Dulag until 25 October, when they procured water transportation. Unlike the situation in Tacloban, XXIV Corps secured captured supplies, and their attached Naval Civil Affairs Unit maintained control of the civil affairs situation until PCAUs 7 and 8 arrived with Filipino doctors. Colonel Andres Soriano and Crossman inspected Dulag on 29 October and reported that, though the town was “an unholy mess” due to a Japanese bomb hitting a fuel dump that had been too close to an ammunition supply point in the town, the civil affairs units were “doing a good job.” Displaced people were sleeping on the beach, but they were fed, and medical facilities established by the Filipino doctors had treated the civilian casualties.⁴⁰⁸

⁴⁰⁶ Report of James O. Brooks for Leyte, 22 January 1945, 19.

⁴⁰⁷ Crossman, “Experiences,” 37.

⁴⁰⁸ Sixth Army, Report of the Leyte Operation, 278; *Reports of General MacArthur, Vol. 1*, p. 228; Crossman, “Experiences,” 41-42 [quotes]. Crossman writes that Dulag was so completely destroyed that the XXIV Corps Civil Affairs Section began planning the construction of a new town in another area, however, after the combat situation passed, the Filipinos rebuilt their homes, obviating the need.

On 23 October MacArthur arrived ashore with Osmeña to formally transfer government of the Philippines. Before a crowd of, at most, dozens of Filipinos, an American broadcaster announced, “in the presence of thousands of wildly cheering Filipinos, General MacArthur will now turn over the Philippine Government to President Osmeña.”⁴⁰⁹ MacArthur thus established indirect rule in accordance with Army military government doctrine. As Osmeña had little or no resources to manage the day-to-day administrative responsibilities of government, he relied on support from the Americans. MacArthur, through his USAFFE civil affairs personnel, actually administered the Philippines until Osmeña was able to restore Filipino capability.

By November 1944, Sixth Army forces were driving inland, working to control all of Leyte and Samar. PCAUs attached to X and XXIV Corps moved forward and transferred responsibility to PCAUs 1-4. PCAUs recruited and employed more than 8,000 Filipinos as porters and stevedores, moving supplies from ship to shore, and from depots to combat troops. PCAU medical supplies brought ashore during the assault were soon consumed, but captured Japanese supplies were redistributed throughout the Sixth Army area, and Army medical facilities cared for civilians until PCAUs were able to establish Filipino facilities. As Sixth Army forces drove north and west across the island, the PCAUs attached to the Corps became overextended. USAFFE and Sixth Army Civil Affairs reassigned ASCOM PCAUs 3 and 4 to XXIV Corps to assist with the entire rear area from Tacloban to Dulag. Crossman reported that he, Soriano, and Rauh confronted the ASCOM Civil Affairs Officer (CAO) about why he was not using those PCAUs to the extent dictated by the USAFFE civil affairs directives, instead limiting them to labor procurement. The ASCOM CAO argued that the PCAUs only responsibility was labor procurement. Crossman, Rauh, and Soriano later updated civil affairs

⁴⁰⁹ Crossman, “Experiences,” 33. MacArthur attributed the poor turnout to the machinations of the collaborationist governor, but Crossman attributed it to poor communication, as there was free food, and he found it unlikely a “collaborator could have kept the Filipinos away from free food.”

directives to assign labor procurement to ASCOM, as its officials were more suited to labor procurement in rear areas. By the end of the month, PCAUs 2 and 6, and the Naval Civil Affairs Unit, were operating in Samar, where they restored the municipality of Basey, procured labor for a naval base, and established stores and medical facilities.⁴¹⁰

Apart from the western area near Ormoc that had been reinforced by the Japanese 1st Division, the civil administration situation on Leyte had stabilized by December 1944. Civil affairs units began reestablishing Commonwealth control through the appointment of temporary officials in all the Sixth-Army-occupied municipalities. PCAUs rebuilt and opened more than 500 schools, and they began mimeographing primary textbooks authored and illustrated by a Sixth Army soldier, although not in sufficient quantities to meet demand. PCAUs likewise supplied and opened temporary health facilities, staffed with Filipino doctors and nurses. As medical supplies arrived, permanent Filipino-staffed hospitals were opened at Tacloban, Baybay, and Carigara. Sixth Army PCAUs opened twenty-seven clinics across Leyte and Samar, and these facilities provided dental treatment to 2,000 Filipinos. These facilities also provided smallpox, typhoid, typhus, and cholera inoculations to 8,000 civilians.⁴¹¹

Contrary to the planned delivery of civilian relief supplies on A+9 (29 October), the first shipment did not arrive until A+28 (17 November). Captured Japanese food stores and indigenous production supplemented Army supplies so that PCAUs were able to meet relief requirements. During Sixth Army operations, relief supplies were never critically short, partly due to the agricultural nature of the island but also, according to Colonel George D. Sears, Sixth Army Civil Affairs Officer, because the Leyte population was far lower than estimated. A smaller population and indigenous production enabled the PCAUs to meet requirements in the

⁴¹⁰ Sixth Army, Report of the Leyte Operation, 279; Crossman, "Experiences," 36-37.

⁴¹¹ Ibid.

face of an undependable, irregular supply chain. From 20 October to 25 December 1944, 10,000 tons of relief supplies, including food, were distributed by PCAUs.⁴¹²

Throughout November, the Civil Affairs Section of SWPA was working to revise SOP Number 26 based on the practical experiences the unit had gained over the first four weeks of the Leyte operation. They completed SOP Number 27, which was published on 21 November. Then suddenly, on 26 November, the G-5 section of SWPA under Fellers was deactivated and reestablished as G-5 of USAFFE under Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, with Fellers merely a member of the section. Crossman, in an interview with MacArthur shortly after the veritable demotion of Fellers from the primary staff leadership position, learned that MacArthur made the realignment because Fellers “couldn’t control his section.” MacArthur claimed that several senior officers, Krueger among them, had complained about the Civil Affairs Section interfering in their conduct of civil affairs. As the conversation progressed, MacArthur revealed that the impetus for the move was the Civil Affairs Section’s first monthly report to the War Department on civil affairs activities, which had been too honest for MacArthur’s taste, acknowledging shortcomings, mistakes, and lessons learned. The General considered it to be a “disloyal report” and suspected there was a “sinister New Deal purpose to undermine him behind it all.”⁴¹³

Though the new arrangement degraded morale, it had little effect on the Civil Affairs Section’s work. Throughout December 1944, the section busily directed and coordinated

⁴¹² Sixth Army, Report of the Leyte Operation, 279; Crossman, “Experiences,” 36-37.

⁴¹³ Crossman, “Experiences,” 61-63. Earlier in the conversation Crossman records MacArthur saying, “That was a disloyal report. If it had gone to the War Department, Drew Pearson (the influential journalist) would have got it and would have published it as a serious criticism of me. When I read that report my first impulse was to send your whole section, except you, right back to Washington.” This entire encounter explains, in large part, why high-level civil affairs reporting for the Philippines, and the Pacific in general, had such a different tone than that from other areas. It is interesting to note that this event, more than Fellers’ violation of operational security discussed in the previous chapter, drew the ire of MacArthur.

rehabilitation efforts. One inspection trip to Ormoc in mid-December led Rauh to direct Sixth Army to assign a PCAU to the rather significant town – an assignment that did not happen until Eighth Army assumed control. Crossman accompanied the Philippine Secretary of Defense on a visit to Catbalogan, Samar, to identify a provincial governor. The interviews produced “inconclusive results,” but the event marks the earliest recorded effort of the Commonwealth government to exercise control in reestablishing the provincial governments. The USAFFE Civil Affairs Section coordinated civil affairs support to the 15 December LOVE operation at Mindoro, south of Luzon, designed to obtain a lodgment and establish ground based air support for impending MIKE operations – the invasion of Luzon. Though PCAU 9 was tentatively assigned to Mindoro, hesitation in the Sixth Army Civil Affairs Section again prevented direct PCAU support at Mindoro until Eighth Army assumed control of the area. The USAFFE Civil Affairs Section concurrently planned and directed the 26 December transfer of responsibilities for civil affairs on Leyte from Sixth Army to Eighth Army and Base K. Division of civil affairs responsibility between Eighth Army and Base K required “considerable coordination” by the USAFFE Civil Affairs Section in order to monitor not only the PCAUs’ ongoing civil administration efforts in Leyte, Samar, and Mindoro, but the impending efforts in support of the KING, LOVE and VICTOR operations by Eighth Army, and Sixth Army’s MIKE operations on Luzon - encompassing the entirety of the Philippine archipelago.⁴¹⁴

To facilitate a smooth transition of responsibility, Crossman, Soriano, and Rauh approached Sears about possible options. Their proposal was that the Sixth Army’s experienced PCAUs would be relieved by newly arrived PCAUs from Oro Bay, and the experienced PCAUs sent forward to Luzon.

⁴¹⁴ Crossman, “Experiences,” 72; Memorandum from Civil Affairs Section, USAFFE, to Chief of Staff, USAFFE, 21 December 1944, pp. 1-2, Box 2288, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.




Figure 2: PCAU Areas of Operation on Leyte⁴¹⁵

To do this, Sixth Army would have to arrange the transportation of PCAUs from Oro Bay. Sears had not considered the possibility of advancing to Luzon with the experienced PCAUs and accepted the proposal. But Sixth Army failed to arrange transportation, and the new PCAUs only arrived within a few days of the departing PCAUs. To help overcome this failure, PCAUs 1–8

⁴¹⁵ Eighth Army Map as published in David Smollar, “A World War II Story of the Philippines: Letters of the Medical Officer of Philippine Civil Affairs Unit #17,” *The Journal Of History* (The Philippine National Historical Society) 61 (2015), 9.

transferred to Eighth Army until relieved by PCAUs 9–28, though this reassignment was likely too short to be effective, particularly for green units. PCAUs 1 and 2 were replaced on 28 December, and PCAUs 3-8 were relieved on 30 December. All eight of these first PCAUs began to prepare for impending operations at Lingayan, Luzon on 9 January.⁴¹⁶

By 26 December 1944, Eighth Army assumed responsibility for all military operations in the Philippines outside of Luzon, including civil affairs. Over the next five months – January to May 1945 – Eighth Army planned and directed VICTOR operations across 240,000 square miles of islands and ocean against approximately 100,000 Japanese troops.⁴¹⁷ Colonel Donovan Vance, the Eighth Army Civil Affairs Officer, coordinated all PCAUs’ civil relief activities not only in support of VICTOR operations, but also their continued efforts to provide civil relief and rehabilitate the Commonwealth government after the KING and LOVE operations in Leyte and Mindoro respectively. He and his subordinates worked with Commonwealth officials to meet the needs of all Filipinos.

Under Eighth Army direction, PCAU 9 was assigned to Mindoro, PCAUs 10, 11, and 28 to Samar, and the remaining PCAUs across Leyte. (See figure 2) The Commonwealth government appointed permanent officials for Abuyog and Baybay, Leyte municipalities. PCAU commanders appointed temporary officials, except for judges, in all areas where they were operating in Western Leyte. These temporary officials were paid by PCAUs to administer local government activities until the Commonwealth made permanent appointments. The Commonwealth also appointed permanent Leyte Provincial officials, but these restricted most of

⁴¹⁶ Smollar, “Medical Officer,” 9; Crossman, “Experiences,” 63-65.

⁴¹⁷ Stephen J. Lofgren, *Southern Philippines: The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II* (Washington: U. S. Army Center for Military History, 2013), 7.

their activities to the eastern side of the Province.⁴¹⁸ Incumbent justices of the peace were located in most liberated areas and began carrying out their duties. A justice could not be found in Ormoc, and since PCAUs could not make a temporary appointment, an application for appointment was made via USAFFE to Commonwealth officials. Black market activity and price ceiling violations had led to a critical need for a justice in the area. In areas with a court system, convictions of well-connected individuals for black market activity and price ceiling violations were problematic, however, PCAUs were able to use their control over supplies to encourage convictions.⁴¹⁹

The island of Mindoro had no permanent provincial government appointed by the Commonwealth, thus PCAUs had to appoint temporary officials for most of its municipalities. The justice of the peace in San Jose enforced all Commonwealth laws, as well as city ordinances and price and wage restrictions. PCAU 9's reports praised his "excellent" performance but noted that to facilitate a transfer of responsibility to the Commonwealth, they had requested appointment of permanent provincial and municipal officials. The Commonwealth government made no appointments in Samar Province, despite PCAU and other officials making repeated requests through personal and official channels. PCAU 28 assigned and paid temporary officials, while justices of the peace were "generally cooperating" with Army forces in the area.⁴²⁰

⁴¹⁸ Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 31 December 1944 to 31 January 1945, p. 6, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA. There is a clear increase in Civil Affairs activity and improvement of the civil situation under Eighth Army. While this is likely due to a combination of increased stability, decreased combat operations, growing Commonwealth government capability, and an increase in the number of PCAUs, USSAFE Civil Affairs Section communications show a clear respect for Eighth Army civil affairs efforts. Likewise, Crossman makes no effort to dull his criticism of Sixth Army civil affairs, the failings of which he assigns to Colonel Sears. Clearly senior leadership was at least a small factor in the improvement.

⁴¹⁹ Report of PCAU #26 for the Period 31 December 1944 to 31 January 1945, p. 5, Box 2291, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA. The threat of withholding supplies from certain individuals was enough to force compliance in most cases. PCAU reports indicate that some individuals required "judicious methods" beyond this to change behavior or get convictions, but they never explain the nature of those methods.

⁴²⁰ Report of PCAU #28 for the Period 31 December 1944 to 31 January 1945, pp. 2, 3, Box 2291, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

PCAU's were generally successful in restoring the local police force in military operational areas. As was anticipated, some areas had less than desirable police who were soon replaced. The chief of police and his men in Catbalogan, Samar, refused to enforce Commonwealth law, so they were replaced by the commander of PCAU 28. Conversely, in Western Leyte and Mindoro, the police were reestablished and began functioning satisfactorily under PCAU administration, though the proximity of the Japanese in Western Leyte prevented "efficient" operations.⁴²¹

As combat persisted in and around most areas, figures for schools opened and students enrolled could not be exactly calculated. January reporting showed 135 schools opened with 307 teachers teaching about 15,750 students. The number of teachers was not considered a problem, as more were located and hired daily. The critical limiting factor in reestablishing educational services at that point, much as in 1898-1899, was the inadequate supply of teaching materials. Too, the Army had occupied many of the civil buildings, including schools, for headquarters and administration offices. PCAU and Commonwealth advocacy initiated an evacuation of potential school buildings and the location of sufficient furniture to equip them. The Army, again similar to efforts in the Spanish-American War, initiated collection of all possible books and supplies, though this still proved to be inadequate. In order to meet the educational need with the equipment and supply shortage, many teachers held two school sessions per day.⁴²²

USAFFE policy directed PCAU Finance Officers to maintain "cash books" to keep account of sales and labor expenses, in Victory pesos, and to submit regular monthly reports of

⁴²¹ Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 31 December 1944 to 31 January 1945, p. 4, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA.

⁴²² *Ibid.*, 6.

balances through civil affairs communications channels.⁴²³ The majority of cash receipts came from the sales of relief supplies to civilian “PCAU stores,” and the greatest expenses were in wage payments for civilian labor. Eighth Army PCAUs reported total receipts for January 1945 of ₱239,184.99 and total expenditures of ₱363,371.72. One other significant duty of PCAUs, during the first months before the reestablishment of the banking system, was revitalization of the monetary system through the exchange of legitimate currency for Victory pesos. At least one PCAU finance officer reported exchanging ₱3,000 per day.⁴²⁴

Initially, PCAUs in the Eighth Army area of operations were primarily focused on finding facilities and personnel for health services. For January they reported the operation of 10 hospitals and 21 dispensaries. They likewise reported personnel on hand of 21 doctors, 4 dentists, 30 nurses, and 52 other civilian health workers. The latter included pharmacists, nurses’ aides, surgical technicians, midwives, sanitary inspectors, and cooks. Five tons of medical supplies were distributed to civilians in hospitals and dispensaries. PCAUs also provided equipment for a 50-bed surgical hospital at Valencia, and a 30-bed convalescent hospital at Baybay, both in Leyte.⁴²⁵

Poor sanitation habits directly lead to disease, however; as a medical officer wrote to his family, “Planes terrify, disease doesn’t. One day after the first air raid, every civilian dug a foxhole, but they still have to be forced to dig latrines.” To encourage latrine use, the commander of PCAU 17 had fourteen people arrested, imprisoned and fined for public defecation. This action brought immediate compliance in the community, which the PCAU hoped would continue

⁴²³ PCAU 18, Memorandum on Standing Operating Procedure, 1 December 1944, p. 3, Box 1794, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

⁴²⁴ Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 31 December 1944 to 31 January 1945, p. 7, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA.

⁴²⁵ *Ibid.*, 8-9.

after the unit moved on.⁴²⁶ Venereal disease in militaries is common. The relationship between the United States and the Commonwealth, however, gave the American military an unusual amount of control over the population. As a result of Army troops reporting that they contracted venereal disease in Baybay, the Baybay municipal council ordered examinations and treatment of all persons confirmed with venereal infections.⁴²⁷

Public welfare provided by PCAUs to indigent families varied with conditions in an understandable pattern. PCAUs following combat units into liberated areas were inundated by displaced persons unable to obtain food from their homes or local stores. These people would use PCAU provided relief supplies for a time. As combat moved away, some people returned home and others arrived, thus numbers fluctuated significantly. An average of 6,199 people per day received some relief in January. From the beginning to the end of the month, the total number dropped by 15,603 people. Most relief cases came from the Camotes Islands, the Ormoc hill region, Valencia, and Palompon. The relocation and return of dislocated people was an immense task; had the PCAUs not assumed that duty, combat units could easily have lost their effectiveness as they focused on managing civilians.⁴²⁸

To address these needs, across the Eighth Army area in January, 1,100 tons of relief food--and hundreds of thousands of other sundries like matches, buttons, axes, cloth, candles, towels, pots, and even rattraps-- were issued by the Civil Affairs Section, USAFFE, for distribution or sale by the PCAUs. Approximately 80% of these goods were sold through commercial venues as relief supplies. The remainder was given away as direct relief. This usually occurred in proximity to combat operations and tapered off over time. But procuring and distributing relief supplies

⁴²⁶ Smollar, "Medical Officer," 18.

⁴²⁷ Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 31 December 1944 to 31 January 1945, p. 9, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA.

⁴²⁸ Ibid.

remained the most important and difficult task for civil affairs personnel in the Philippines. This challenge was compounded by the problem of transportation, as shipping was in short supply even for combat forces.⁴²⁹

Many goods procured for relief supply were less than optimal. Toilet paper and rattraps were simply not purchased in many instances because they were not part of Filipino culture. Likewise, powdered milk and canned meat were also not purchased if there were other food alternatives. Filipinos preferred fish – dried, canned, or otherwise – to beef, as well as the fact that the meat came in a six pound can, far too much for the typical Filipino family. Though the needy gladly preferred relief supply of any type to starvation, the shortage of shipping created a premium for space for these items, particularly the space for toilet paper, which could have been used more effectively had planners been more culturally aware.⁴³⁰

Labor also remained a constant challenge. Eighth Army PCAUs recruited 50,833 laborers in January 1945. Most of them worked as stevedores and porters, unloading ships and carrying ammunition and supplies to combat troops. Some laborers were recruited to repair roads, schools, docks and municipal buildings, others to dig latrines and other sanitary projects in support of military and civilian health. As more labor was available than work, PCAUs divided the work and rotated labor to enable all available laborers to earn money.⁴³¹

PCAU's made the restoration of agriculture a significant priority in economic rehabilitation. Farming and fishing met nutritional needs and revitalized indigenous trade, leading areas to become more self-sufficient. As with most initiatives in the initial weeks of

⁴²⁹ Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 31 December 1944 to 31 January 1945, p. 13, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA.

⁴³⁰ Sixth Army, Report of the Leyte Operation, 279.

⁴³¹ Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 31 December 1944 to 31 January 1945, p. 10, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA.

liberation, PCAU efforts to revitalize this sector were hampered by supply shortages. For agriculture, the shortage of seed, particularly rice seed, could have been devastating. PCAUs wisely instituted the exchange of refined, or polished, rice for unhusked rice. Known locally as palay, this unrefined rice could be used as seed. This scheme enabled the PCAUs to gather sufficient seed rice in their operating areas to spark indigenous production. Another key shortage was farm machinery. The Japanese took or destroyed most of the useful seeding, plowing, and harvesting machinery. PCAUs also reported that most of the rice mills were not functioning due to being in disrepair. To spark recovery, PCAUs requisitioned parts and equipment. Municipal leaders enacted rules forbidding the slaughter of carabao for food (a breed of domesticated water buffalo), in order to grow a supply of draft animals.⁴³²

Though corn, camotes (sweet potatoes), and other vegetables and fruits, were cultivated in the Allied-occupied Leyte, Samar, and Mindoro regions, rice was the main agricultural crop. In January 1945, PCAUs reported both the planting and harvest of rice there, and they anticipated supplies would soon meet requirements in the Leyte region. They believed that Mindoro, with a more varied climate, would take longer to be self-sufficient. On Samar, the limiting factor was the continued occupation of significant portions by the Japanese. PCAUs anticipated that rice production there would be sufficient once the Japanese were driven away.⁴³³

The primary method PCAUs used to rehabilitate the Philippine economy was the distribution of relief supplies via retail stores. This enabled Filipinos to use their wages – often provided by military labor – to buy relief goods from a Filipino store. The stores' prices were monitored by PCAUs to hinder gouging and black market activity. In January 1945, 42 stores

⁴³² Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 31 December 1944 to 31 January 1945, p. 14-15, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA.

⁴³³ Ibid.

were opened in liberated areas of Leyte, Samar, and Mindoro, and they sold the bulk of relief supplies provided by the PCAUs. This was an all-cash supply chain, with retailers purchasing and selling in cash at a pre-determined markup. In order to prevent hoarding or black market activity, public purchases were limited by ration card. Filipino courts prosecuted cases of price ceiling violations discovered by authorities. However, some PCAU officers displayed Solomonic levels of wisdom in meting justice in ways that were potentially more effective than court fines. PCAU 26 reported they were informed that fishermen from other islands were violating the price ceiling when selling in Baybay. The PCAU commander confronted the men, who insisted they sold only at ceiling prices. The commander then publicly announced that the fish were available at authorized prices and watched as the people purchased the entire supply. One of the sellers protested he had paid “300 pesos for a load and been forced to sell it for 92 pesos.” PCAU 26 reported this type of enforcement helped curb black market activity.⁴³⁴

Transportation remained a significant difficulty confronting the PCAUs. Difficulties moving supplies, indeed moving anything, was a foundational problem for many challenges they faced. PCAUs were designed to operate independently from other Army units, in fact they were directed to. However, road conditions in the central Leyte hills created almost insurmountable obstacles to movement, particularly for those assigned to western Leyte in January 1945. PCAUs on Leyte overcame the problem by arranging space on XXIV Corps convoys from Tacloban to Ormoc. PCAUs in Baybay, Ipil, and Valencia would then pick up those supplies in Ormoc and return.⁴³⁵ Waterborne transportation of supplies was undesirable as saltwater and rain caused

⁴³⁴ Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 31 December 1944 to 31 January 1945, p. 16, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA; Report of PCAU #26 for the Period 31 December 1944 to 31 January 1945, p. 7, Box 2291, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

⁴³⁵ Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 31 December 1944 to 31 January 1945, p. 17, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA.

spoilage, however, in areas like Palompon, where truck transportation was extremely difficult because of poor roads and enemy activity, seaborne shipping was required. X Corps provided four surfboats to ferry supplies from Ormoc to PCAU 17 at Palompon and the Camotes Islands. Likewise, PCAU 28 was issued five surfboats for Catabalogan, Samar, and more boats for PCAU 9 and 11 on Mindoro.⁴³⁶

Each army in USAFFE had its own Civil Affairs Section that coordinated PCAU efforts. This coordination could have taken the form of detached administration by messages and memoranda, but the Eighth Army Civil Affairs Section was much more aggressive in directly influencing the situation. That Section, often accompanied by USAFFE civil affairs representatives, visited all PCAUs to inspect, assess, and report on civil affairs activities. As the bulk of Eighth Army operations were largely in Leyte and Samar, PCAUs 10 through 17 inclusive, 26, and 28 received the preponderance of this attention. Due to their proximity and ease of access, in January 1945, PCAUs on Leyte and Samar were visited between one and three times per week, and the more remote PCAU 9 on Mindoro received two visits during the month. These visits, identified logistical and supply issues that the Section was able to help remedy. In one example, Section personnel identified a potentially critical shortage of supplies in Western Leyte, requisitioned the supplies independent of a PCAU request, and then procured and supervised the labor to help load and ship supplies to Ormoc. Likewise, the same Section provided personnel to inventory and sort medical relief supplies. This type of direct interaction by the staff at an echelon above corps may have been unusual but is understandable given the urgency and enormity of the work to be done and the relative lack of manpower to do it.⁴³⁷

⁴³⁶ Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 31 December 1944 to 31 January 1945, p. 17, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA.

⁴³⁷ *Ibid.*, 1; Crossman, "Experiences," 82.

The coordination across the Civil Affairs Sections in Leyte – Eighth Army, ASCOM (Base K), and USAFFE – was facilitated with regular conferences regarding logistics, procurement, and distribution of relief supplies, as well as more mundane complications in reporting and administration. Army-level Civil Affairs Sections interacted directly with the USAFFE Civil Affairs Section to provide reporting that helped refine overall civil affairs policy. In January 1945, Eighth Army Civil Affairs worked with the USAFFE Civil Affairs Section to identify a conflict in fiscal directives published by USAFFE. These were unclear about PCAU authority to pay temporary officials, and teachers whose positions were not confirmed by the Commonwealth government. PCAU Finance Officers had paid these civilians because their work was necessary, but the disbursing officials would not honor the emergency vouchers and refused to reimburse the Finance Officers. The Eighth Army Section proposed a revision that Crossman and Rauh adopted into USAFFE directives published the following month.⁴³⁸

In February 1945, Eighth Army began to expand operations across the Visayan Islands and Mindanao. As a result, PCAUs were relocated and the difficulty of coordinating civil affairs increased, necessitating the transfer of control of civil affairs operations to the PCAUs, who had to operate independently. This could have resulted in chaos as PCAUs struggled to resolve local problems without sufficient resources and found solutions that created Filipino dependencies that could have delayed the Commonwealth government's assumption of responsibility. Excellent coordination on the part of the Eighth Army Civil Affairs Section prevented potential disarray. PCAU 12 was moved to Palawan, PCAU 13 to Leyte, PCAU 23 in support of VICTOR IV

⁴³⁸ Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 31 December 1944 to 31 January 1945, p. 1, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA; Crossman, "Experiences," 82-83.

operations, and PCAUs 29 and 30 shipped to Leyte for the upcoming VICTOR operations on Mindanao.⁴³⁹

On 5 February 1945, Eighth Army began planning for VICTOR IV operations in Mindanao and Palawan. As the civil affairs responsibilities expanded with the advance of combat across the archipelago, the USSAFE Civil Affairs Staff became more active in coordination. Crossman met with representatives of Eighth Army and Base K to discuss the validity of a rice bonus that Base K had been giving its laborers working seven days a week. Rauh, particularly active, talked with representatives of the Theater Fiscal Officer about the necessity for a certification by a Purchasing & Contracting officer on emergency purchase and payment vouchers and the payments for temporary local officials, visited with the President Osmeña's secretary to propose that Australian cloth could be made available to the Commonwealth government for relief and an economic stimulus, and met with the Office of the Governor to review proposals for improving fishing in Leyte. Rauh also coordinated with Base K leadership to obtain a generator for the Commonwealth-owned rice mill on Leyte, and he discussed with representatives of the Commonwealth their need for plowshares.⁴⁴⁰

In the second week of February 1945 Rauh began preparing a plan for the merger of some civil affairs functions as well as the development of future plans. He conferred with representatives of G-4, SWPA, concerning the number of PCAUs that were required for each of the VICTOR operations' phases. He and others in the Civil Affairs Staff met with G-4, USAFFE, and Eighth Army officers about the inadequacy of relief supplies for current and impending operations. As a result, he worked with multiple levels to revise the emergency payment and

⁴³⁹ "Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1," 35.

⁴⁴⁰ Lofgren, *Southern Philippines*, 10; "Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1," 34.

purchase vouchers approved the previous month. Tentative agreement was reached on adding P&C certification once Sears, the Sixth Army Finance Officer, concurred.⁴⁴¹

Crossman, as Executive Officer of the Civil Affairs Section, was no less active. In February 1944, he accompanied Colonel R. J. Laux, Executive Officer to General John H. Hilldring, on an inspection trip to PCAUs on Leyte. Crossman knew Laux from his previous work in the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department. He took Laux to Palompon on the northwest coast, which was close to the last active combat on Leyte, as units of the 23rd “Americal” Division cleared the last Japanese positions. The inspection revealed that relief supplies were badly needed in some areas, and it also confirmed the necessity for a leadership change in an unidentified PCAU in the region.⁴⁴²

The Theater and Army Civil Affairs Sections continuously sought the means to provide the Commonwealth with vital resources, usually in coordination with Commonwealth officials. As an example, in February 1945 Major Jackson Balch of Supply Subsection of the USAFFE Civil Affairs Section met with Commonwealth and provincial officials and others to discuss the need for blacksmithing equipment that had been offered to the Theater by the War Department. Coordination was one part of rehabilitating the Commonwealth, which sometimes had to be prompted to take responsibility. Civil affairs officers sometimes did this by informing Commonwealth officials after plans were already made. Though responsibility was not handed over as a result, the announcement of the plan prompted the attention of Commonwealth officials. In one example, Balch, accompanied by Laux, attended a meeting at Base K Civil Affairs Office, which included representatives of the various PCAUs in the Base K area. They made final plans for the turnover of local administration of the Base K area (see figure 2) to

⁴⁴¹ “Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1,” 34-35.

⁴⁴² Crossman, “Experiences,” 83-85.

Commonwealth and provincial officials. PCAU commanders agreed that the transfer could be successfully accomplished, although black market practices would probably increase in both scope and intensity. The Commonwealth accepted the plan, though it distracted them from appointing permanent officials in the region.⁴⁴³

In general, the Civil Affairs Section of USAFFE was notably more active in coordination during the Eighth Army period than during the Sixth Army period. Lieutenant Colonel Herman P. Goebel Jr., from the legal section, worked with the Transportation Corps of the United States Army Services of Supply concerning the application of Philippine Workmen's Compensation Act to maritime employees on ships owned and operated by the Army. Likewise, the Public Safety section prepared a plan for the gradual reduction of police forces in Leyte by eliminating those listed on PCAU muster rolls as assistants. An officer from the Medical Subsection oversaw the repair of civilian mobile hospital units shipped from Australia to Leyte. These units went to Sixth Army for use in Luzon as the creation of fixed installations in Leyte obviated their need.⁴⁴⁴

During January and February 1945, as civil affairs operations matured and the number of civil affairs personnel grew, the administrative requirements for civil affairs personnel that were understandably lower priority during the initial phases of combat increased in volume and importance. A personnel officer for the Civil Affairs Section, USAFFE, developed procedures for promotions, replacements, and reassignments. He also prepared a detailed plan for the administration of PCAU and Civil Affairs personnel under a proposed merger of the Civil Affairs Section and the Civil Affairs Detachment. On 11 February, as civil affairs operations in

⁴⁴³ "Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1," 35.

⁴⁴⁴ Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 31 December 1944 to 31 January 1945, p.1, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA; "Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1," 35.

Luzon began to grow with the expansion of Allied control, he processed orders sending Crossman and others to Luzon.⁴⁴⁵

The capacity of the Commonwealth government for civil administration did not expand quickly to address new priorities. It made no appointments in February 1945 in any of the Eighth Army operating areas, and so “little if any action was taken toward the assumption of responsibility for civil government and relief.”⁴⁴⁶ Acting in their unspoken roles as indirect military governors, Eighth Army and PCAU officials again found and appointed temporary officials, this time in northern Mindoro and northern Samar, to keep administration efforts moving into Filipino hands. These temporary appointees generally proved to be effective, although the mayor of Albuera, in Leyte, was noted as a poor performer and was expected to be replaced by a permanent Commonwealth appointee “in the near future.”⁴⁴⁷

Eighth Army civil affairs officers reported that subordinate commanders had made repeated requests for permanent appointments, and they lamented that the Commonwealth government had taken no action. The USAFFE Civil Affairs Section acknowledged that the requests had moved through their office to Commonwealth officials, who were considering the requests. They also noted the Commonwealth government’s failure to make permanent appointments was “probably the greatest stumbling block in the way of early turn over of civil government to local officials.”⁴⁴⁸ While justice of the peace courts functioned satisfactorily in almost all the PCAU- administered areas, unfortunately this was not due to Commonwealth

⁴⁴⁵ Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 31 December 1944 to 31 January 1945, p.1, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA; “Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1,” 35.; Crossman, “Experiences,” 85.

⁴⁴⁶ Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 1 to 28 February 1945, p. 2, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA.

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid., 3.

action: nearly all these areas had pre-war justices. Because MacArthur refused to try civilians in military courts, and Army commanders could not appoint temporary justices, in areas where the incumbent justice was missing or dead, the judicial system was nonexistent.⁴⁴⁹

PCAU's continued to successfully reestablish police in their operational areas as they pushed forward. As there were continued Japanese raids, PCAU 15 and the Albuera Chief of Police established a volunteer guard equipped with captured arms and ammunition. The guard reported directly to the Chief and was primarily used to provide security for farmers during the harvest. Civilians other than the guard had to register their firearms with, and obtain a permit from, the Chief. Commonwealth officials indicated they would eventually reestablish the Philippine Constabulary, but they did not give a timeframe.⁴⁵⁰ PCAUs reported that current police forces were handling public safety satisfactorily, so there clearly was not a pressing need for the Constabulary.⁴⁵¹

Though soldiers had been enterprising in helping to reestablish schools, the shortage of schoolbooks and supplies continued to be a limiting factor for education operations in February 1945. 259 schools were operating in the Eighth Army areas with 543 teachers. Lack of clothing kept some children from attending school, but this condition was more easily remedied by PCAUs through relief supplies than the book shortage. Filipino educators began to recommend a halt to reopening schools as the summer vacation period approached.⁴⁵²

⁴⁴⁹ Report of PCAU #9 for the Period 1 to 28 February, pp. 2-3, Box 2291, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

⁴⁵⁰ The Philippine Constabulary was a national police force created in 1901 by William H. Taft as Governor General of the Philippines to fill the void created by the elimination of the Spanish *Guarda Civil*. Henry T. Allen, later the United States Commissioner on the post-WWI Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission, was the first commander.

⁴⁵¹ Report of PCAU #15 for the Period 1 to 28 February, p. 4, Box 2291, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

⁴⁵² *Ibid.*, 5. The traditional Philippine school year runs from June to March, with a vacation period in April and May.

As the Eighth Army civil affairs forces and their assigned PCAUs matured in their responsibilities, they refined their reporting to better reflect overall capacity in medical facilities. PCAU reported 10 hospitals with 346 beds, and 27 dispensaries. They likewise had personnel on hand of 25 doctors, 4 dentists, 29 nurses, and 121 other civilian health workers, which again included pharmacists, nurses' aides, surgical technicians, midwives, sanitary inspectors, and cooks. PCAUs reported a marked improvement in overall sanitation, with some areas allegedly back to pre-war conditions. Sanitation efforts were focused primarily on community and family education programs, construction of latrines, and recruiting of sanitation inspectors. Displaced families were relocated from overcrowded areas and provided education in disease prevention that included concepts like boiling drinking water and proper waste disposal.⁴⁵³ Venereal disease rates in the Army continued to climb in Leyte, particularly in soldiers operating in the Ormoc – Valencia region, the last combat area. PCAU 14 established a Venereal Disease Detention Home in Ormoc to address this. All Filipino contacts that could be located were tested and, if infected, were held and treated until cured. PCAUs instituted this policy in all areas they controlled.⁴⁵⁴

With the end of combat operations and the resulting stabilization of Leyte, Filipinos with access to transportation began to migrate to areas with PCAUs, which Crossman explained was due to their perception of PCAUs as charity organizations. Eighth Army thus recorded a daily average of 10,674 people receiving relief during February, an increase of 4,475 from the previous month. Most relief cases arrived from outlying islands and the combat areas in northwestern Leyte; however, Eighth Army reports show the surge occurred at the beginning of the month, with numbers dropping steadily over the remaining days. PCAUs relocated 756

⁴⁵³ Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 1 to 28 February 1945, p. 4, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA.

⁴⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 5.

families during the month, primarily from Ormoc, Leyte and Guiuan, Samar, to make way for building naval facilities. Displacement of families was also a concern on Mindoro. PCAU 9 and the Civil Affairs Staff of USAFFE met with Brigadier General William C. Dunckel, the commander of the 19th Regimental Combat Team of the 24th Infantry Division. He was concerned about the families displaced by the construction of airfields on the island and wanted the Army to build homes for them.⁴⁵⁵

Economic rehabilitation in the Philippines was fueled, in large part, by the financial stimulus of the sale of Army relief supplies and wages paid for Army labor requirements. Total Eighth Army receipts for February 1945 were ₱186,646.97, and expenditures were ₱415,901.87. PCAUs recruited 38,223 laborers that month. Eighth Army reported all requests for labor were filled except for those at Guiuan, Samar, where naval construction requirements exceeded the local labor supply. They also noted that indigenous efforts such as farming and souvenir manufacture were becoming a drain on the labor pool. PCAUs distributed approximately 682 tons of food and thousands of sundry items. The decrease from the previous month was partly explained by a diversion of supplies in support of operations in Luzon, partly because of the short month, and mostly by the lack of shipping from Allied ports. Eight tons of medical supplies were distributed to medical facilities. PCAUs reported 256 retail stores and seven bakeries operating in Eighth Army areas. While most of the merchandise sold was relief supplies from the Army, a limited amount of locally produced goods was for sale. Price ceiling violations and black market activity reportedly flourished in locations outside the PCAUs' operating areas. Municipal and provincial enforcement allegedly curbed, but did not eliminate, black markets. In

⁴⁵⁵ Crossman, "Experiences," 51, 76; Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 1 to 28 February 1945, p. 6, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA. Crossman records that Dunckel understood the Filipino people "better and (had) more interest in them than any other regular officer (he) met during the war."

Mindoro, PCAU 11 cannibalized salvage machinery to repair a sawmill. PCAUs surveyed other mills, such as the Samar rice mills, and reported most could be restored if correct parts were obtained. PCAU 14 began a study of the Ormoc power plant to determine what parts or equipment were required to restore it to operation.⁴⁵⁶

Agriculture slowly recovered in early 1945. PCAU 9 in Mindoro reported enough corn, bananas, and vegetables were harvested to meet local requirements until rice planting began in May. They further assessed that southern Mindoro could meet civilian needs if they began a carefully regulated slaughter of carabao, cattle, and hogs, though local authorities had not begun to issue permits for that. According to PCAU 11, northern Mindoro had sufficient agricultural supplies to meet civilian requirements, and Filipino officials started a garden initiative with available seed in the Calapan area. Much of the growth in stability in Mindoro can be attributed to the close relationship between Dunckel, the PCAUs, and Filipino residents of Mindoro.⁴⁵⁷

In Samar, PCAU 28 reported sufficient agricultural supplies in their area. The unit also was optimistic that, if fear of the Japanese could be overcome, an ample rice harvest would begin on 15 March in northern Samar, noting that there was already enough rice seed for planting in April. Conversely, PCAU 10, in the southern region of Samar, reported very little food production in the Guiuan area, and that Filipinos there were still dependent on relief supplies.⁴⁵⁸

⁴⁵⁶ Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 1 to 28 February 1945, pp. 3, 6, 13, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA.

⁴⁵⁷ Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 1 to 28 February 1945, pp. 11-12, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA; Crossman, "Experiences," 76-77; Basilio J. Valdes, "Diary of Basilio J. Valdes," *The Philippine Diary Project*, January 21, 1945, <https://philippinediaryproject.wordpress.com/tag/william-caldwell-dunckel/> (accessed September 24, 2020). Valdes as Chief of Staff of the Philippine Armed Forces under President Osmeña had a particular interest in many civil affairs efforts, including those at Mindoro. He met with Dunckel and the PCAU leadership to discuss civilian needs there.

⁴⁵⁸ Report of PCAU #28 for the Period 1 to 28 February, p. 2, Box 2291, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

Economic growth paralleled with growing Commonwealth efforts to increase self-sufficiency. The Commonwealth Department of Agriculture sent Eulgario Lolis to survey the farming situation in western Leyte. His report confirmed the January civil affairs report that agriculture in the area was primarily limited by a lack of equipment and seed. The Commonwealth government had committed to providing sufficient seed for agricultural needs but had only delivered a “small amount of vegetable seed” by February.⁴⁵⁹ PCAUs and local officials planned to give the seed to schoolteachers to start community planting and then distribute the seedlings to families and individuals. PCAU 14 reported many residents were planting corn and camotes but the harvest in the Palompon area would depend on the elimination of the Japanese threat.⁴⁶⁰

Eighth Army also began to take an interest in reviving the Filipino fishing industry, requesting reports from PCAUs on the industry’s status. PCAUs in Mindoro noted that most of the fishermen in that area were employed by the military, and that nets and other fishing equipment requested to restart the fishing industry had not arrived. In the Samar area, many people were fishing, but the lack of equipment limited production. On Leyte, fishing equipment was generally sufficient for areas where the United States Navy did not prohibit the activity. Lack of nets, lines, hooks, buoys, and processing equipment prevented further growth of the industry beyond anything more than mere subsistence fishing, another weakness in the estimates of relief needs made during planning.⁴⁶¹

In seeking to understand the civil affairs situation, Colonel Vance and his staff in the Eighth Army Civil Affairs Section did not limit themselves to reading reports or the usual

⁴⁵⁹ “Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1,” 60.

⁴⁶⁰ Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 1 to 28 February 1945, pp. 11-12, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA.

⁴⁶¹ “Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1,” 60.

inspections of PCAUs. The Eighth Army Civil Affairs Section Medical Officer and Public Welfare Officer conducted a focused survey inspection of medical facilities and supplies across the Leyte region, including areas not routinely assisted by PCAUs. The inspection revealed that while there were sufficient medical personnel, there was a critical shortage of facilities and supplies to meet needs in more remote areas. As a result, the Civil Affairs Section directed the delivery of emergency medical relief to smaller municipalities on Leyte, Dinagat Island, and Panson Island.⁴⁶²

Similarly, at civil affairs meeting hosted in Luzon by USAFFE CAS, the Eighth Army Civil Affairs Section presented a plan to transfer civil relief responsibility to the Commonwealth government. The plan called for the Commonwealth to assume responsibility for Leyte province except in the area west of the north-south line between Carigara and Ipil. Eighth Army would retain 20% of civil relief supplies. USAFFE Civil Affairs Officers, likely Crossman and Joseph R. Hayden, cognizant of the importance of developing the Commonwealth government's capabilities, and sensitive to the significance of Filipino leadership wherever possible, responded that the Commonwealth should initiate the plan with a request to USAFFE for a transition of responsibility for the area. Colonel Vance also raised concerns about the Commonwealth's continued delay in appointing permanent officials for Eighth Army areas. He was told that the Commonwealth government was relocating to Manila and would soon be operational. Once it was functioning, the congress would be assembled, and the appointment of new officials would be expedited.⁴⁶³

⁴⁶² Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 1 to 28 February 1945, p. 1, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA.

⁴⁶³ Ibid.

Eighth Army civil affairs operations continued to grow as the Army expanded its VICTOR combat operations. In March 1945, Eighth Army made initial landings in the central Visayan islands of Cebu, Panay, and Negros, as well as Zamboanga and Palawan – a 45,000 square mile area dominated by the Sulu Sea. PCAUs thus had to take responsibility for greater geographic areas, which created a significant supply transportation challenge. The Commonwealth government, however, demonstrated greater administrative capacity. USAFFE and Eighth Army tutelage and assistance improved its capabilities. Over time, as more Commonwealth officials were found and Filipino administrative numbers increased, their capacity to take charge greatly improved. Eighth Army Civil Affairs Section adjusted the following PCAU areas of responsibility: PCAU 9 added responsibility for Marinduque; PCAU 12 landed and took responsibility for Puerto Princessa, Palawan; PCAU 13 was assigned to Iloilo, Panay; PCAU 14 assumed responsibility for the entire Ormoc-Ipil-Valencia area of western Leyte; PCAU 15 moved to Cebu City, Cebu; PCAU 23 landed and assumed responsibility for Zamboanga, Mindanao; PCAU 24 departed Leyte for impending VICTOR II operations; PCAU 26 moved to Bacolod, Negros Occidental; PCAUs 29 and 30 were in San Jose, Leyte, staging for VICTOR V operations in Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago.⁴⁶⁴

Shortly after the start of the VICTOR III operation, the Commonwealth government appointed Gaudencio E. Abordo as Governor of Palawan Province. This was the Commonwealth's first permanent appointment of a provincial official in the Eighth Army area of operations. The appointment apparently came easily, in part because Gaudencio had been serving as governor of the provincial government of Free Palawan, the resistance government loyal to the Commonwealth established there in January 1942 to oppose Japanese rule. Major General

⁴⁶⁴ Lofgren, *Southern Philippines*, 13-15; "Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1," 36.

Roscoe B. Woodruff, commander of the 24th Infantry Division, approved temporary appointments in Calapan, Mindoro, and Marinduque for both provincial and municipal offices. To expedite more permanent appointments, the Commonwealth government assigned two special representatives to fill vacancies in provincial and municipal offices. The two attorneys, Jose M. Aldeguer and Teopisto Guingona, arrived in the Eighth Army area on 17 March 1945. Aldeguer worked with PCAUs in the Visayan Islands, and Guingona with PCAUs in Mindanao. The combat commanders in the respective areas approved permanent appointments made by these special representatives.⁴⁶⁵

Commonwealth and Army officials, in light of the approaching summer vacation, made little effort to reopen schools, instead focusing on addressing the persistent shortage of school supplies. Likewise, municipal police forces continued to meet the stability needs of the people to the satisfaction of PCAUs. Both Eighth Army and Commonwealth officials were satisfied that municipal police had the ability to uphold the law and maintain order in civilian areas such that, again, no effort to revive the Philippine Constabulary was considered.⁴⁶⁶

Eighth Army in March 1945 reported the regular operation of 22 hospitals, with 547 beds and 52 dispensaries. They likewise listed 45 doctors, 6 dentists, 69 nurses, and 170 other civilian health workers employed in health facilities in the area. The expansion of medical facilities was a good marker of a return to pre-war conditions, but it was still short of local requirements. The problem of venereal disease in Eighth Army soldiers persisted, apparently due to their proximity to larger cities that had pre-war prostitution problems. The PCAU response was to “confine

⁴⁶⁵ Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 1 – 31 March 1945, pp. 2-3, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA; Elizabeth Clark Alba, *War and Reconstruction*, <http://puertoprincesa.ph/?q=basicpage/iii-war-and-reconstruction> (accessed 27 November 2020).

⁴⁶⁶ Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 1 – 31 March 1945, p. 5, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA.

infected prostitutes, take smears, treat them with penicillin and then release them when they are clinically cured.” PCAUs reported that their efforts at improving community sanitation were finally beginning to produce results. Public education via posters, billboards, and communications from Filipino health workers had resulted in the construction of many new public and family latrines and urinals. Sanitation inspectors were employed and reported directly to the PCAU Medical Officer to expedite reporting and remediation of unsanitary conditions. The earlier endemic practice of unrestrained public defecation was now reportedly considered socially unacceptable and under control, with violators fined.⁴⁶⁷

Eighth Army reported that an average of 9,944 people received relief during March 1945. New combat operations led civil affairs units to anticipate a surge in relief needs. However, the end of combat operations in Mindoro and Marinduque, and resultant stabilization, prompted many families from these areas to return home, offsetting the anticipated surge. PCAUs also relocated 797 families during the month to make more room for naval construction in Guiuan, Samar.⁴⁶⁸

PCAU reported that 52,659 laborers were recruited in March, again meeting military labor requirements except for those related to naval construction in Guiuan, Samar. They likewise distributed 686 tons of food and thousands of sundry items, including diesel fuel, grease, and kerosene. 77% of these items were sold through retail methods, the remainder in direct relief. Ten tons of medical supplies were distributed to health facilities via medical

⁴⁶⁷Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 1 – 31 March 1945, p. 7-8, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA.

⁴⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 9.

channels. This resulted in total receipts for March 1945 of ₱146,581.76 and total expenditures of ₱340,741.36.⁴⁶⁹

Some economic improvement was noted during March 1945. That month, PCAU 9 reported great progress towards agricultural self-sufficiency in Mindoro, pointing to the appearance of increasing amounts locally grown produce in markets as an indicator. Likewise, the units anticipated a surplus of 10,000 tons of rice from the harvest in Northern Samar. This led the Civil Affairs Section to instruct PCAU 28 to buy and store the excess for distribution to other regions. Fish were also reported in markets in greater numbers, however, PCAUs noted that supplies could not meet requirements, and that the fishing industry was still retarded by naval restrictions and a lack of equipment.⁴⁷⁰ PCAUs reported extensive price ceiling violations across the Eighth Army area, but they also noted a significant increase in the amount of indigenous goods available in local stores. PCAU 23 opened a sawmill on Basilan Island. In Iloilo, PCAU 13 assisted local authorities in rehabilitating public utility infrastructure.⁴⁷¹

After a survey of transportation requirements, probably sparked by the expansion of Eighth Army's area of operations, the Eighth Army Transportation Section found the civil affairs resupply transportation resources inadequate for waterborne resupply. The section acquired an F boat for Civil Affairs Section use, while captured Japanese barges were repaired for use by the Section and PCAUs.⁴⁷² Eighth Army Civil Affairs Section also addressed an unforeseen complication with the emergency relief supply of the Culion leper Colony in Palawan. As part of

⁴⁶⁹ "Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1," 57, 59, 62.

⁴⁷⁰ Report of PCAU #9 for the Period 1 to 31 March 1945, p. 6, Report of PCAU #28 for the Period 1 to 31 March, p. 2, Box 2291, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

⁴⁷¹ Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 1 – 31 March 1945, p. 16, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA.

⁴⁷² "Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1," 62. Though not recorded definitively, this was likely a flying boat, as F-boat was a common name for them. It was probably a PBY-5 Catalina, as this was ubiquitous, would have been available to the Eighth Army, and had the capacity to transport at least two tons of supplies.

the Palawan Task Force, PCAU 12 was assigned responsibility for the supply mission once the military situation permitted access to the colony. Eight tons of relief and medical supplies were airdropped to the colony on 23 March. Eighth Army Civil Affairs Section worked with the Army G-4 and 13th Air Cargo Resupply Squadron to coordinate the drop. The air resupply missions continued until 9 April, when the reduction of the enemy threat permitted PCAU 12 to meet all relief needs directly.⁴⁷³

In April 1945, Eighth Army continued its expansive VICTOR operations, moving further north and south of Palawan, further south on the Sulu archipelago, and into the central Mindanao areas of Cotabato and Malabang – the beachhead for an assault on the last Japanese stronghold in Mindanao. Civil affairs challenges grew apace, as did the Commonwealth government’s ability to meet them. PCAUs once again had their areas of responsibility expanded, but the Eighth Army’s capacity to supply them likewise expanded. PCAU 17 took responsibility for Palompon, Leyte, and Masbate island. PCAU 25 relieved PCAU 14 of responsibility for the Ipil-Ormoc-Valencia area of Leyte. PCAU 14 moved to Cotabato, Mindanao. PCAU 24 added Bohol Island. PCAU 29 assumed responsibility at Digos, Mindanao, and PCAU 30 did the same at Parang, Mindanao.⁴⁷⁴

As the Commonwealth government became more capable of assuming responsibility, the USAFFE Civil Affairs Section began working more closely with Filipino officials in complicated matters, foremost of which was finance. To provide accurate accounting for upcoming payment talks between the Commonwealth and United States governments, the USAFFE Civil Affairs Finance Section drafted an SOP for the audit, by PCAUs, of civil relief

⁴⁷³ Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 1 – 31 March 1945, pp. 1-2, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA.

⁴⁷⁴ Lofgren, *Southern Philippines*, 20-21; “Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1,” 37.

commodities issued by them. The section also worked with the USAFFE Finance Officer to draft directives for the payment of local municipal officials by PCAUs. A banking division of the Philippine National Treasury opened with a capital of 30,000,000 pesos, 20,000,000 of which was transferred to the credit of the Commonwealth government. This enabled them to accept deposits, make loans, and pay for telegraphic transfers from the United States – providing the impetus to restart the Commonwealth’s international commerce. With little more assistance, Commonwealth officials conducted an examination of local banks and the branches of foreign banks.⁴⁷⁵

Crossman initiated a broad inspection of civil affairs activities across the Philippines in the spring of 1945. He personally visited the provinces of Pangasinan, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, Pampanga, Bulacan, Rizal, Bataan, and Zambales. His assistant executive officer inspected civil affairs activities in Leyte, Panay, Cebu, Negros, and Palawan. Much of what they saw informed their discussions with Filipino officials, who were becoming eager to assume responsibility for civil relief. Because of the inspections, Crossman told Tomas Confesor, newly appointed Philippine Secretary of the Interior, that “he had no organization capable of replacing overnight” the capabilities of the current civil affairs organization of the Army.⁴⁷⁶

After the occupation of Manila, the USAFFE Civil Affairs Supply Section received, warehoused and distributed all relief supplies there. Distributions went to the Sixth and Eighth Armies and Commonwealth officials for consumption outside of Manila. In the city, except for the area of Manila turned over to the Commonwealth government, relief supplies were distributed through PCAUs attached directly to USAFFE, who sold commodities on a rotation

⁴⁷⁵ “Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1,” 36.

⁴⁷⁶ Crossman, “Experiences,” 108.

basis through PCAU stores. PCAU centers also provided direct relief to homeless and indigent civilians.⁴⁷⁷

The Commonwealth government announced an extraordinary session of the Congress of the Philippines as soon as the military situation allowed for members to assemble in Manila. USAFFE Civil Affairs Section was asked to locate senators and congressmen from the provinces. This was the critical first step in solidifying true control of Commonwealth governance.⁴⁷⁸ Meanwhile, the Commonwealth appointed Mateo S. Pecson as provincial governor of Masbate, and he assumed responsibility immediately after the island was liberated. Samar Province's Court of First Instance was fully reestablished and fully functioning. Under the direction of Confesor, Jose M. Aldeguer and Teopisto Guingona, special representatives of the Commonwealth government, worked with the commanders of the VICTOR I and V operations to appoint acting civil administrators in their respective areas of operations. Aldeguer and Guingona's appointees were well received by most Filipinos; however, guerrilla leaders were not "pleased," particularly on Panay Island. As with many resistance movements, and similar to the situation from 1898 to 1902, guerrillas had enjoyed their autonomy in the leadership vacuum that existed in the more remote provinces. MacArthur, in his role as USAFFE commander, approved a Commonwealth request that American military officers be appointed as provincial governors of the "Moro provinces" of Lanao, Cotabato, and Sulu, where guerrillas had become powerful.⁴⁷⁹

Due to the summer vacation period, in April PCAUs reported there were still only 274 schools opened in the provincial areas of the Philippines, and most of the schools on Panay had

⁴⁷⁷ "Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1," 58.

⁴⁷⁸ Report of PCAU #17 for the Period 1 to 30 April, pp. 2-3, Box 2291, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA; Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 1-30 April 1945, p. 2, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA.

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid.

been destroyed in fires. The operating schools employed 775 teachers, while 607 teachers were identified as available but not employed. School supplies continued to be the top concern of Commonwealth and civil affairs officials across the islands.⁴⁸⁰

Eighth Army Civil Affairs Section in April 1945 reported the operation of 33 hospitals with 1123 beds and 71 dispensaries. The medical personnel included 71 doctors, 13 dentists, 85 nurses, and 262 other civilian health workers. Continued Army health inspections found civilian health facility capacity inadequate to meet the required need. Accordingly, three 50-bed dispensary units were established in Cebu, Zamboanga, and Iloilo City. A single 25-bed dispensary unit opened at Puerto Princessa, while fourteen 6-bed dispensary units were dispatched across the area of operations: one each to Cotabato, Digos, Parang, and Iloilo Province; six to Negros Oriental; and two each to Palawan and Zamboanga Provinces. PCAU Medical Officers continued to emphasize sanitation, initiating clean up days to demonstrate sanitary habits and their importance to the population. Public and family latrine numbers increased dramatically. Municipal authorities no longer allowed families to move into new homes without building a latrine. Water supplies improved as pipe and other materials become available. The immunization program for civilians was irregular until April, when the Civil Affairs Section, USAFFE, established a Civil Affairs Medical Depot for the storage of inoculations for civilian use. PCAUs were directed to requisition required items. A continued increase in venereal disease cases in the Eighth Army generated little concern. PCAUs simply extended the detain, test, treat, and release policy.⁴⁸¹

⁴⁸⁰ Report of PCAU #17 for the Period 1 to 30 April, pp. 2-3, Box 2291, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA; Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 1-30 April 1945, p. 5, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA.

⁴⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 6, 9; "Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1," 47.

The Eighth Army reported an average of 24,426 people per day received relief in April 1945 in their area of operations. Most of these people were from the Cebu and Zamboanga areas, which were still feeling the impact of recent combat operations. PCAUs relocated 14,548 families during the month, primarily in the Zamboanga area of Mindanao. PCAU 10 developed a plan to eliminate further relocations in Guiuan, Samar for naval construction.⁴⁸²

A total of 93,121 laborers were recruited across the Eighth Army area of operations in April 1945. Departure of Army combat forces from Northwest Leyte caused a spike in the number of available unemployed workers. In Mindanao, friction between different religious sects was overcome as PCAUs built separate Christian and Muslim work camps and provided acceptable food for the Muslims. The recruiting of experienced stevedores at ports in Cebu and Iloilo expedited cargo handling at those facilities. In agriculture, the Northern Samar rice harvest was abundant and nearly complete. The amount of excess rice PCAU 28 was able to purchase was hindered only by transportation difficulties. Lack of trucks and poor roads, and lack of shipping and port facilities in the area, constrained the potential load volume and prolonged delivery times. The overall agricultural situation on Mindoro, Leyte, and Samar improved as military labor requirements declined, allowing more farmers to return to their fields. The fishing industry continued to be hindered by lack of equipment.⁴⁸³

In Eighth Army areas other than those involved in VICTOR operations, PCAUs distributed 403 tons of food supplies; 99.5% of these supplies were sold via trade channels, indicating the virtual elimination of a relief problem. Within the VICTOR operational area of Eighth Army, 1,750 tons of relief food was distributed, with 81% being sold through retail

⁴⁸² Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 1-30 April 1945, p. 8, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA.

⁴⁸³ *Ibid.*, 11-12.

stores. Captured Japanese supplies significantly increased the available supply. 11 tons of medical supplies were distributed through medical channels, however, due to Luzon operations, the bulk of these came from Army stocks. PCAUs reported a total of 912 retail stores and nine bakeries were opened during April. The expansion in the number of outlets was credited with helping to suppress black market activity, which was still common, but which had fallen due to the abundance of supplies. The resulting Eighth Army receipts for April 1945 were ₱491,474.23, and expenditures were ₱816,285.34.⁴⁸⁴

Transportation continued to pose a significant challenge to civil affairs operations, though units were able to find solutions. Eighth Army Civil Affairs Staff continued to coordinate for relief of the Culion Leper Colony. On 9 April, the 13th Air Cargo Resupply Squadron made the final air drop to Culion Leper Colony. Two tons of supplies were delivered, and as the enemy situation had changed, the Civil Affairs Section decided PCAU 12 was able to meet future needs from their base in Puerto Princessa. The Civil Affairs Section F-boat greatly expanded and expedited delivery of relief supplies, while PCAUs continued to repair and use captured Japanese boats for inter- and intra-island transportation. Due to the geography of the archipelago, an L-5 observation plane was assigned to Vance to improve his ability to coordinate the entirety of Eighth Army civil affairs activities. The Civil Affairs Section Medical Officer took advantage of this resource and inspected all areas, surveying civilian medical needs. Based on his recommendations, more, smaller dispensaries were dispatched to remote locations around the Eighth Army operational area. This was believed to restore near pre-war medical capabilities for the region.⁴⁸⁵

⁴⁸⁴ Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 1-30 April 1945, p. 5, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA.

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid., 1-2.

The final phases of the VICTOR operations by Eighth Army into Mindanao came in May 1945. Though significant numbers of Filipinos throughout the region needed civil affairs assistance, the Eighth Army Civil Affairs Section and the PCAUs were experienced enough, and the Commonwealth government improved enough, to address the challenges more skillfully. PCAU areas of responsibility in the Eighth Army area of operations expanded and adjusted once more. PCAU 25 took control of Northwest Leyte and Masbate; PCAU12 gained responsibility for the Culion Leper Colony; PCAU 13 added responsibility for Capiz and Antique; PCAU 17 absorbed responsibility for all of Misamis Oriental and Bukidnon; PCAU 23 added Misamis Occidental and Sulu; PCAU 24 moved to Negros Oriental; PCAU assumed control in Davao; and PCAU 30 moved to Northern Cotabato.⁴⁸⁶

Though the extraordinary session of the Congress of the Philippines had not yet met, Eighth Army transported congressmen from the Visayan and Mindanao provinces to Manila. The Commonwealth appointed Ricardo Nepomuceno as the governor of Marinduque Province, and he assumed full responsibility there. PCAUs 9, 10, and 25 prepared to relinquish control in Mindoro, Masbate, Leyte, and Samar to the Commonwealth. In Samar and Masbate, much as in Panay the previous month, guerrillas resented the reestablishment of Commonwealth authority and the lack of official recognition by MacArthur. Though Aldeguer continued to appoint provincial and municipal officials in the western Visayan Islands, his counterpart, Guingona, returned to Manila. This stunted the progress of reestablishment of Commonwealth authority in Mindanao and Sulu. PCAU 13 worked to eliminate guerrilla hostility to Commonwealth authority in Iloilo, Capiz, and Antique but, although conditions improved, animosity still

⁴⁸⁶ Lofgren, *Southern Philippines*, 23; "Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1," 37.

existed.⁴⁸⁷ In an indication that pre-war normalcy was imminent, PCAUs erected traffic signs on highways and in towns, alerting Filipinos to new traffic regulations. Likewise, Eighth Army reported in May 1945 there were a total of 896 schools open, employing a total of 3,051 teachers in their area.⁴⁸⁸

PCAUs reported the operation of 25 hospitals, with 1705 beds, and 108 dispensaries in May 1945. They likewise reported employing 98 doctors, 18 dentists, 133 nurses, and 347 other civilian health workers. Sanitation took great strides forward as Commonwealth officials prevented families from returning to homes without a latrine and required that latrines be built first as part of any new home construction. In some areas, guards were posted at public latrines to ensure their proper use and cleanliness. Sewage disposal infrastructure was built, repaired, or maintained in most areas under the direction of both PCAU and Commonwealth officials, but pipe shortages hampered water supply improvements. Vaccinations for cholera, dysentery, typhoid, and smallpox became available for civilians.⁴⁸⁹ PCAUs continued to detain prostitutes and others suspected of carrying venereal diseases, then testing, treating, and releasing them if cured. However, Eighth Army cases of gonorrhea increased in May, and syphilis cases rose 30% over April. Officers anticipated further increases as fewer troops were expected to be in combat.⁴⁹⁰

The Eighth Army reported an average of 21,969 people received relief each day in May 1945. This represented a decrease of 50% in refugees in the Visayas, but there was a corresponding increase in Mindanao. 7,137 families in Eighth Army locations were relocated,

⁴⁸⁷ Report of PCAU #9 for the Period 1 to 31 May, pp. 2-3, Report of PCAU #13 for the Period 1 to 31 May, p. 1, Box 2291, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA; Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 1-31 May 1945, p. 6, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA.

⁴⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁴⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 7.

with about 40% coming from Cotabato, 30% from Cebu, and the remainder from all other provinces combined. PCAU 24, in Dumaguete, reported civilians from outside the town donated more than 7.5 tons of relief food supplies to feed the indigent. This was the first report of this type of charitable assistance coming from Filipinos to their fellow citizens. In Eighth Army areas other than those involved in VICTOR operations, PCAUs delivered 539 tons of food and other sundries, with 88% reaching civilians through retail stores. In the VICTOR operational area, 1,826 tons of relief food was distributed, with 86% being sold through retail stores. Fifty tons of medical supplies reached civilians from PCAUs by way of medical facilities supervised by PCAUs. By May, significant quantities of relief supplies from the United States began arriving, greatly easing the challenges in food and medical equipment. PCAUs recruited 168,104 laborers from Mindanao and nearly the entire Visayan Islands, while the movement of Army forces out of Leyte and Mindoro caused an increase in unemployment, complicating local relief efforts. Though the naval construction projects at Guiuan, Samar, continued to be short of required labor, military labor requests were met in all other areas.⁴⁹¹

Agriculture and fishing presented a brighter economic picture during May 1945. PCAU reports indicated that farm productivity reached near pre-war levels, limited only by a lack of equipment and seed. PCAU 28 purchased 155,000 pounds of seed rice (palay) in Northern Samar for distribution to other regions. Nearly all pre-war crop production was in an advance stage of restoration, although sugar, which had a more complicated refining process, remained unprofitable for cane farmers. Rubber plantations in Mindanao were almost ready to resume. Creation of new traps resulted in extensive amounts of fish for sale in local markets, particularly in Negros Occidental, according to PCAU 26. By the end of May, 1,166 stores were open in the

⁴⁹¹ Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 1-31 May 1945, pp. 8, 10, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA; Report of PCAU #24 for the Period 1 to 31 May, p. 1, Box 2291, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

Eighth Army area, with total receipts for May 1945 of ₱633,968.77 and total expenditures of ₱1,510,012.61.⁴⁹²

By May 1945, the failure of the Commonwealth government to produce meaningful responses to the problem of Japanese occupation emergency currencies began hindering stabilization of the Victory Peso. To prepare provincial treasurers to assume responsibility for regular wage payments, the Commonwealth provided funds to the provinces. PCAUs transferred administrative responsibility as these funds were received, and treasurers demonstrated ability.⁴⁹³

The Eighth Army Civil Affairs Section continued to use the L-5 plane to conduct inspections of all civil affairs units and activities in the area of operations. Though policy restricted PCAUs to current and former combat areas, the Civil Affairs Section monitored areas free of combat for potential emergencies, something only done efficiently by air. Individual PCAUs acquired trucks for provincial officials' use, in order to alleviate transportation challenges. On Panay, PCAU 13 assisted the Philippine Railway Company to restore operation of the Iloilo-Capiz railway line with one locomotive, three passenger cars, and multiple freight cars.⁴⁹⁴

Civil Affairs personnel in the SWPA planned for the invasion and liberation of the Philippines for months, and in some cases years. MacArthur's plans to indirectly manage the Commonwealth until the Osmeña government could take charge was the correct approach, though MacArthur may have misjudged the Commonwealth's ability and preparedness to

⁴⁹² Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 1-31 May 1945, p. 12, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA; Report of PCAU #24 for the Period 1 to 31 May, p. 1, Box 2291, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

⁴⁹³ "Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1," 63.

⁴⁹⁴ Report of PCAU #13 for the Period 1 to 31 May, p. 2, Box 2291, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA; Consolidated Report of Eighth Army PCAUs, 1-31 May 1945, p. 13, Box 38, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA.

assume responsibility. In spite of this, PCAUs and Civil Affairs Sections at the Army level and above proved adaptable in confronting the civil affairs relief challenges that accompanied liberation, and in working with the developing Commonwealth government. They were not perfect. Estimates of civil relief needs were adequate, but scarce shipping space was not optimally used. Civil relief supplies were not given a high enough priority in the initial shipping plan to ensure they were on hand when they were needed. Similarly, Sixth Army did not recognize the critical need to have civil affairs forces land as close, in time, to its combat forces as possible. This meant combat strength was diverted to civil relief issues at a critical point. This was likely caused by communication challenges. SWPA civil affairs personnel understood the urgency of having PCAUs in the first assault formations, but Sixth Army did not recognize this priority until Filipino refugees met them on the beach. The units' relative inexperience with civil affairs cannot wholly explain this, as MacArthur claimed, hyperbolically, that Krueger "had served for years in the Philippines and has forgotten more about civil affairs here than [the USAFFE Civil Affairs Section] will ever know."⁴⁹⁵ This demonstrates that MacArthur misunderstood the practical realities of civil affairs operations in combat, a fact that led to his concern about sharing reports that could be perceived as derogatory with anyone outside his organization.⁴⁹⁶

Civil affairs personnel did have their bright spots. Crossman, Rauh, Soriano, Vance, and countless other soldiers and officers in civil affairs did learn and adapt. They identified problems and their solutions. Working together, they overcame the physical challenges of geography, illness, injury, and hunger. They also managed to work through the weaknesses of their own leadership, and the undermanned and inexperienced Commonwealth government. Their greatest

⁴⁹⁵ Crossman, "Experiences," 62.

⁴⁹⁶ Sixth Army, Report of the Leyte Operation, 279.

asset was the willingness of Filipinos and Americans to work together at all levels, typified by the thousands of Filipinos who rushed to help unload combat supplies on the Leyte beaches. The civil affairs problems that confronted the Sixth and then Eighth Army in Leyte, the Visayas, and Mindanao, were generally geographic. Venereal disease certainly was present, but never got beyond tolerable levels, while starvation was never a serious concern. Distance, underdeveloped transportation infrastructure, and a very long waterborne supply chain hindered nearly every solution to the challenges of civil relief. But lack of supplies, while narrowly avoided, never materialized. In Luzon, at Manila, the Army would face these problems again in the largest urban combat of the Pacific Theater.

CHAPTER 7

MANILA AND THE END OF CIVIL AFFAIRS

Modern wars are not internecine wars, in which the killing of the enemy is the object. The destruction of the enemy in modern war, and, indeed, modern war itself, are means to obtain that object of the belligerent which lies beyond the war.

US Army General Orders Number 100

Civil affairs efforts in Manila represented the apogee of governance operations by the United States Army during World War II. Doctrinally, the object of civil affairs in 1944-1945 was to maintain order and promote security, prevent interference with military operations, relieve combat troops of civil administration, mobilize local resources in support of military objectives, and carry out the relevant governmental policies of the United States. The Army was to administer humanely, minimizing suffering and controlling the population indirectly through local civilian authorities as much as possible. Civil Affairs guidance from the Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff (CCS/JCS) for the Philippines directed that Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) forces should transfer the responsibility for civil administration to the Commonwealth government as soon as military operations permitted. In keeping with this directive, General Douglas MacArthur intended to restore “a degree of freedom at least equal to that in existence before 1942.” The degree of difficulty of administration and relief for the large civilian population in Manila was enhanced by the complexity of military operations in urban areas, the challenges of logistics in the Pacific Theater, some Army leaders’ failure to anticipate these difficulties, and these leaders’ unrealistic expectations of the nascent Commonwealth government. To transfer civil responsibility to the Commonwealth, Manila had to be freed from Japanese control, the Filipinos’ basic food, shelter, and medical needs had to be met, and the infrastructure supporting government services had to be restored. And to fulfill the promise of

autonomy established in the Tydings-McDuffie act, as well as the Filipino people's hopes for independence, the Commonwealth's capacity and capability for autonomous rule had to be reestablished.⁴⁹⁷

On 9 January 1945, General Walter Krueger's Sixth Army landed on Luzon at Lingayen Gulf, the protected beaches in northwestern Luzon on which the Japanese had landed in 1942. Sixth Army leaders divided their landing area between the I and XIV Corps, landing more than 175,000 soldiers over the first three days. I Corps on the left (north) protected XIV Corps' flank as it drove south, before pushing east to secure intersections and roads leading into the mountains of north central Luzon. XIV Corps landed to the right (south) to seize Clark Field air complex before driving south to seize Manila. Opposing Krueger's Sixth Army were about 265,000 soldiers of General Yamashita Tomoyuki's Fourteenth Area Army. Poorly equipped relative to the Americans, Yamashita divided his force into three groups: *Shobu*, with about 155,000 soldiers centered in northern Luzon; *Kembu*, with about 30,000 in western Luzon with responsibility for Clark Field and the Bataan Peninsula; and *Shimbu*, with about 80,000 soldiers in southern Luzon from Manila east along the Bicol Peninsula. Yamashita's overall defensive plan was to fight an attritional series of delaying battles that would inhibit the Americans' ability to launch an invasion of the Japanese home islands by prolonging operations in Luzon.⁴⁹⁸

General Yamashita's order to General Yokoyama Shizuo, commander of the *Shimbu Group*, was to demolish bridges and key infrastructure and then abandon Manila once significant

⁴⁹⁷ United States Army, *Field Manual 27-5: Military Government and Civil Affairs* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943), 3, 7, 10; JCS Directive 1127: Administration of Civil Affairs in the Philippines, p. 14, Records of the Joint Chiefs, Combined Civil Affairs Committee, Box 151, Record Group 218, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD (NARA); *Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, Volume I* (Washington: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1994), 193.

⁴⁹⁸ For more information on the military dispositions and plan for the invasion and defense of Luzon, see Clayton K.S. Chun, *Luzon 1945: The Final Liberation of the Philippines* (London: Osprey, 2017), 19-30; Dale Andrade, *Luzon: the U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II* (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2013), 7-10; Robert R. Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), 73-103.

Sixth Army forces arrived, which occurred on 3 February 1945 when elements of the United States 1st Cavalry Division crossed the Tuliahan River into the northern suburbs of the city. However, Rear Admiral Iwaachi Sanji of the Japanese Navy had direct responsibility for the defense of Manila. For this, he had about 16,000 men in the Manila Naval Defense Force, which included aviation and naval maintenance and support troops. Without planes or ships to maintain and support, these troops became *de facto* infantrymen. Committed to the defense of Manila, Iwabuchi countermanded Yamashita's order and, because of the Japanese military's confusing command structure, Yokoyama's *Shimbu Group* was obligated to provide three battalions of regular army infantry to defend the city. The Japanese decision to fight rather than abandon Manila resulted in the most significant urban combat faced by United States military forces in the Pacific Theater during World War II, and it caused the destruction of the city and disruption of its inhabitants and their life support systems. The resulting civil affairs problem in Manila was the most significant yet faced by the American military in the Pacific Theater, and likely the equivalent of those the Allies faced anywhere up to the spring of 1945.⁴⁹⁹

Approximately one million people lived in Manila and the immediate area in January 1945. Then occupying approximately one hundred square miles to the east of Manila Bay, Manila was the economic and commercial hub of the archipelago. In the fifty years since Emilio Aguinaldo and his forces laid siege to the Spanish within the walled city, Filipinos, with American assistance, had developed Manila into a cosmopolitan city with a modern infrastructure, including electricity, water, sewer, gas, and public transportation. As the economic center of the Philippines, Manila's telegraph and telephone exchanges prior to the Japanese invasion in 1942 served as the backbone of communications for the banking and

⁴⁹⁹ Chun, *Luzon 1945*, 20, 31; Andrade, *Luzon*, 14; Smith, *Triumph*, 92-93.

financial life of the country. Before 1941, the city had had functioning, modern, fire and police organizations, as well as excellent public health and education systems.⁵⁰⁰

The month-long fight for control of Manila in February 1945 damaged an estimated ninety-three percent of the city.⁵⁰¹ A civil affairs evaluation at the time reported that approximately one third was destroyed outright, one third heavily damaged, and the remainder at least slightly damaged. Due to the nature of urban combat, the majority of more modern solidly constructed concrete buildings in the public and wealthy sections of the city were destroyed as soldiers of both sides sought cover in the sturdy structures and subsequently made those buildings targets for modern weapons, while the primitive huts made of palm and bamboo in the poorer sectors that offered no significant cover suffered the least damage. Urban combat from 3 February to 1 March 1945 disrupted or destroyed the city's infrastructure, too. United States soldiers entering Manila found there was no running water or functioning sewer system, no electricity or gas, and no operating public transportation or medical systems. The police and fire organizations were disorganized and only marginally effective in isolated areas. About 100,000 to 200,000 people were homeless. Manila residents in general had little food, or fuel with which to cook. They, like those in most significant urban areas, depended on agricultural production from rural areas to feed them, but the movement of the XIV Corps south from Lingayen, and the operations of Japanese forces across Luzon, disrupted local harvests and the transport of food to the city. The fighting also inflicted more than 100,000 civilian casualties. Thus, upon its entry to

⁵⁰⁰ Civil Intelligence Section Operations (Philippine Research & Information Section), Civil Affairs Report, 7 August 1945, p. 5, Box 2275, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific (World War II), Record Group 496, NARA [hereafter cited as Manila Civil Affairs Report]; Zygmunt Deutschman, "Public Health and Medical Services in the Philippines." *The Far Eastern Quarterly* 4 (February 1945), 148-157.

⁵⁰¹ War Damage Corporation, *Survey of War Damage in the Philippines: Report of the Special Investigating Mission Sent to the Philippines in June 1945 by the War Damage Corporation and Completed in September 1945* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1945), 3, 14.

the city, the Army became the principal source of medical care, food, and water for the residents of Manila.⁵⁰²

The situation at Manila in the spring of 1945 could have become critical due to a previous miscalculation if the headquarters staff of the United States Armed Forces Far East (USAFFE) had not been actively aware of the situation. Likely the result of appreciably underestimating the population in need of immediate relief, rather than an intentional act or the end product of incompetence, Sixth Army planners significantly miscalculated relief requirements, and only intervention by the USAFFE staff avoided potential humanitarian disaster.⁵⁰³ During the first week of January 1945, Lieutenant Colonels Joseph Rauh and Edgar G. Crossman, the key planners in the USAFFE Civil Affairs Section, became concerned about an apparent lack of civilian supplies for relief operations in Manila. General Richard J. Marshall, the USAFFE Deputy Chief of Staff, advised them that this was the logistics section's (G-4) concern. When Marshall and the advanced staff left for the Lingayen landing, Crossman and Rauh discussed their supply concerns with General Charles P. Stivers, the acting Chief of Staff, and subsequently General Richard K. Sutherland, Chief of Staff for MacArthur, who agreed that there might be a potential problem and told Crossman to investigate. Crossman and Rauh found just one supply ship bound for Luzon in January, with another in February, but nothing afterwards, which was not nearly enough to meet the expected need. Alarmed, Crossman and Rauh published their findings in an urgent report and recommended the procurement of additional supplies and shipping. The immediate result was the scheduling of an additional ship for January, two more

⁵⁰² Manila Civil Affairs Report, 5; Civil Affairs Section, Army Forces, Pacific, "Report on Philippine Civil Affairs, Volume 1," 25 August 1945, p. 67 (Copy provided to the author by staff of the Hoover Institution Library & Archives, Stanford, CA).

⁵⁰³ Stanley Karnow accuses MacArthur of delaying relief supplies for personal aggrandizement, to the detriment of Osmeña. This author can find no evidence of intentional delay in any record. Delays in logistics and relief supply all appear to be from those sources one would expect of wartime conditions in the Pacific. Stanley Karnow, *In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines* (New York: Ballantine, 1989), 455.

for February, and a further two for March. Major General James L. Frink, the commander of United States Army Services of Supply (USASOS) and thus responsible for civil relief in Manila after combat there had passed, became alarmed at the report and added an additional ship from Australia for March. The total amount of relief supplies ultimately almost quadrupled from the original 36,000 tons to 139,200 tons.⁵⁰⁴

Although the narrowly averted shortfall could have been the result of direct negligence or laziness, it seems more likely the result of a poor understanding by the Sixth Army leaders of the situation they would find in Manila. Sixth Army civil affairs staff assumed the number of people needing relief in Manila would be just 200,000.⁵⁰⁵ Their small logistical request makes sense for this planning estimate, but the reality was far from this assumption and should have been anticipated. The fact that both USASOS and USAFFE officers identified and rectified the Sixth Army deficiency in advance of its entrance to Manila shows Sixth Army had access to more accurate estimates and should have been able to plan accordingly. Clearly planning cannot account for every variable or contingency, but Colonel George D. Sears, the Sixth Army Civil Affairs Officer, placed the blame for the miscalculation solely on the XIV Corps Civil Affairs Officer, who was also the Corps Judge Advocate, and the assigned Philippine Civil Affairs Units (PCAUs). In any case, Sixth Army's failure to resource the units responsible for civil relief sufficiently could have led to a disaster, but the report by Rauh and Crossman, and their

⁵⁰⁴ Edgar G. Crossman, "My Experiences in World War II" (Unpublished manuscript, 1966), 74-75, 86-90, 99, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7f/Edgar_Gibson_Crossman_My_Experiences_in_WWII.PDF [Copy provided to the author by David Smollar]; Sixth Army, "Report of the Luzon Campaign, 9 January 1945 - 30 June 1945: Volume IV, The Engineer," pp. 269-270, *Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library*, 1945, <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/2288> (accessed 13 February 2019). While 12,000 tons of relief supplies were initially scheduled for 24 January and 24,000 tons for 7 February 1945, the efforts of USAFFE and USASOS staffs added additional shipments of 27,000 tons on 23 February, 27,600 tons on 10 March, 24,300 tons on 25 March, and 24,300 tons on 9 April 1945.

⁵⁰⁵ Sixth Army Plan for Civil Relief of Manila, 5 February 1945, Box 2281, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

consistent commitment to the entirety of civil affairs operations in the Philippines, contributed to the shift of responsibility for post combat civil affairs from the Army level to the Theater level, which solved the problem.

One anonymous observer reported that civil affairs planning for Manila was nearly non-existent, and was “rather a series of last-minute improvisations which were successful because they were skillfully devised by personnel experienced in Philippine Civil Affairs who had the great advantage of being on the scene of action at the time.”⁵⁰⁶ This observer is likely describing the series of planning discussions and last-minute orders published during the Sixth Army’s January 1945 offensive to liberate Manila, and the resulting extemporaneous solutions that its Civil Affairs Section and PCAUs developed to respond to unfolding crises. Civil affairs staffs at the theater, army, and corps level had recognized that unique challenges would be posed by the aftermath of the liberation of Luzon, whether Manila was contested or not. The civil affairs staffs of both USAFFE and Sixth Army had discussed civil relief in Luzon and Manila as early as November 1944. Various ideas had been proposed, evaluated, and rejected. One idea was the establishment of a Manila Command, a separate agency designated to operate the entire city. Another was the creation of a special supervisory staff of civil affairs officers that would have operated as a unit to supervise civil affairs activities. Yet another was the development of a headquarters PCAU that would manage tasks such as warehousing supplies and supervising PCAUs that needed to be centralized and could not be delegated to the separate PCAUs. Though these organizational ideas were rejected, conceptual elements of centralized administration and decentralized execution ended up in the structure that ultimately controlled civil affairs in

⁵⁰⁶ Manila Civil Affairs Report, 7.

Manila.⁵⁰⁷

The planning considerations for the civil affairs organization in Manila recognized three main characteristics about the challenge of operating in the city. The nearly one million Filipinos in the city were liberated allies who had long been promised self-governance and independence and could not be treated as conquered foes with “work or starve” policies. Manila was the key port and supply base for subsequent operations against Japan, and thus disease, starvation, and civil unrest had the potential to disrupt vital offensive operations more than enemy activity. Similarly, as the financial hub of the Philippines, Manila was the economic key to the rebuilding of the country, and thus the United States had a long-term interest in its rehabilitation. By 3 February 1945, planners likewise knew that control of the city would be contested, which would result in significant destruction and disruption of infrastructure, which would greatly affect Manila’s role as a transport hub. Finally, planners knew they had to rebuild the city and restore the population’s vitality as rapidly as possible without resorting to harsh control measures common in military government operations in conquered enemy countries. The variety of conditions the Army would encounter in the city, particularly during combat, combined with poor communications and logistical infrastructure, led the planners to delegate the actual execution of civil relief efforts to a decentralized organization of mostly autonomous PCAUs in order to facilitate responses to unpredictable crises. The need to control supplies to curb black market activity, the need to synchronize PCAU activities, the importance of coordinating government functions to smoothly rehabilitate the city, and the incapability of the Commonwealth government to provide that coordination in February 1945, indicated the need

⁵⁰⁷ Manila Civil Affairs Report, 7.

for a higher-level civil affairs administration organization.⁵⁰⁸

Initial planning for civil administration of Manila gave responsibility for administration and relief of the city to the Sixth Army, with control transferring to USASOS once the Japanese were expelled. On 24 January 1945, during the offensive down the Lingayen Valley, USAFFE published an outline plan that gave supervisory responsibility to the Sixth Army to coordinate the activities of all the civil affairs elements responsible for civil relief planning and administration (PCAU, and the Civil Affairs Sections at the army, corps, and division levels). Sixth Army was to have direct responsibility in Manila during the early combat phase, and then it would be responsible for continuity during an anticipated transfer of responsibility to USASOS once the fighting in the city ended.⁵⁰⁹

On 5 February 1945, two days after entering Manila, Sixth Army published an order detaching the 37th Infantry Division from XIV Corps and attaching it directly to the Sixth Army to be primarily responsible for the execution of civil affairs during the liberation of Manila. The directive gave the 37th Infantry Division responsibility, under the control of Sixth Army, for the preservation of law and order, rehabilitation of essential utilities, relief of the civilian population, and overall administration. The order doing this also attached eight PCAUs to the 37th Division for local execution of civil relief. The order did not explicitly state the disposition and responsibilities of the XIV Corps Civil Affairs Officer, but a later report on civil affairs mentioned that he was responsible for controlling the Manila PCAU districts, possibly indicating this administrative structure was an informal arrangement. Though the Sixth Army Civil Affairs

⁵⁰⁸ Manila Civil Affairs Report, 5, 7, 13.

⁵⁰⁹ USAFFE Manila Civil Affairs Outline Plan, 24 January 1945, Box 2281, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA. Communications between USAFFE Civil Affairs Section and Sixth Army Civil Affairs Section were tense and irregular, so much so that at one point Crossman requested that Brigadier General Courtney Whitney of USAFFE explain the Sixth Army Civil Affairs responsibilities to Colonel Sears, as there was significant doubt concerning the latter's understanding. See Crossman to Whitney, 7 January 1945, Box 2281, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

Officer was assigned the responsibility of supervising civil relief operations, Crossman wrote that during his 13 February 1945 inspection visit to Sixth Army, Colonel Sears was disengaged from relief and exhibited little to no awareness of the civil relief situation in Manila. When Crossman asked why more PCAUs were not being moved forward to provide relief in combat areas, Sears allegedly responded it was not up to him, and said XIV Corps was responsible for the movement of PCAUs. Regardless of the administrative structure, Sears as the Sixth Army Civil Affairs Officer should have been aware of the situation in his area of operations, and the emerging and ongoing challenges as XIV Corps and the 37th Infantry Division expanded their control over the city. He also should have been an active participant in any crisis resolution, particularly in the dynamic, chaotic, early stages of Sixth Army control.⁵¹⁰

While MacArthur was “uninterested in civil affairs” and unwilling to interfere with Krueger’s management of what “MacArthur considered a most unimportant activity [civil affairs],” it is likely that Sears’ detachment as well as Crossman’s and Rauh’s active engagement was noted, as Marshall informed Crossman that the plan for civil affairs operations had been changed, and USAFFE would have direct control over civil affairs in Manila once active combat in the city ended. This administrative organization for Manila civil affairs reflected high-level acknowledgement of the need for centralized direction of relief and that the scale of the operation and the difficulty of situation required decentralized execution. To a certain extent, the USAFFE Civil Affairs section would act as a ‘Manila Command’ and ‘Headquarters PCAU’, as the section had demonstrated it had the ability to meet the centralized control requirements identified in earlier planning.⁵¹¹

⁵¹⁰ Letter of Instructions from Headquarters Sixth Army to Commanding General 37th Division, 5 February 1945, Box 2281, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

⁵¹¹ Crossman, “Experiences,” 65 [quotes], 86-88; Manila Civil Affairs Report, 7.

The initial, or combat phase of organized civil affairs in Manila began on 5 February 1945 when the first of eight PCAUs entered the city. Much like the “Carpet Plan” for Germany, PCAUs had their areas of responsibility in Manila designated beforehand, and they moved in as combat troops liberated those areas.⁵¹² USAFFE Civil Affairs Section estimated that more than 100,000 people were homeless by the second week of February. Two thirds of the city was destroyed or damaged to the point of being unusable. Water, sewer, electricity, and telephone utilities became inoperable. PCAUs were responsible for food distribution, public health, refugees, recruitment of civilian labor, and any problem that fell under a loose definition of civil affairs, which for example, included caring for roughly 4,000, mostly American, liberated internees from Santo Tomás Internment Camp.⁵¹³

Each PCAU was largely autonomous in its assigned district. Although more than a million ration cards had been ordered for Manila from a printer in Australia, they were destroyed by water during transport. The result was that, while they remained subject to general supervision by headquarters, each PCAU had to devise its own rationing system and method of operation. Public safety during combat was the direct responsibility of the Provost Marshals and Military Police. The Manila Fire Department was unsupervised in this phase, but the PCAUs paid its members. The Sixth Army G-4 logistics and supply section managed the transportation, storage, and distribution of relief supplies to the PCAUs. In this early phase, until the port in Manila was liberated and restored, supplies had to be trucked overland from the ships in Lingayen. Projects to restore public utilities, in areas of direct support to military operations,

⁵¹² In the Carpet Plan, military government units were assigned German villages and provinces, up to a year in advance, and as the Allied armies rolled across Germany, they moved into their assigned towns in a way that was analogous to unrolling a carpet. See Earl F. Ziemke, *U. S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944 – 1946* (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), 164-165.

⁵¹³ “Report on Philippine Civil Affairs,” 67.

were initiated by corps and division engineers. There were eight PCAUs assigned to Manila – Units 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, 20, 21, and 27. Once the final unit moved into its assigned district on 25 February, they had direct responsibility for the relief of 1,040,000 people.⁵¹⁴

The collapse of organized Japanese resistance in Manila ended the combat phase of civil affairs in that city on 1 March 1945, and on 2 March responsibility for local civil relief and administration transferred to the USAFFE Civil Affairs Section. A new command, the Manila Police Command, operated the Police Department. The Commonwealth government controlled the courts. The USAFFE Civil Affairs Section operated the Fire Department and the Department of Health and Welfare, as well as the relief supply warehouses initially established by Sixth Army. The SWPA Chief Engineer directed the Department of Engineering and Public Works. USASOS took responsibility for procurement and pay of all civilian labor not directly employed by the PCAUs. The latter began reporting directly to USAFFE Civil Affairs Section. During this phase, the Commonwealth government began to take responsibility for civil relief and rehabilitation through an organization that it established, called the Emergency Control Administration (ECA), and its small subordinate units, called Emergency Control Administration Units (ECAUs). These units were intentionally similar to the PCAUs and were intended to replace them, and they eventually took over for all PCAUs by 10 June 1945. The widespread destruction of transportation and communications infrastructure in Manila had necessitated the decentralization of food relief distribution. This was not the case with public health. USAFFE took charge of the Public Health Department, controlling not only the PCAU Medical Officers but also the policies and operations of civilian health facilities. Coordination of all these organizations' efforts remained the centralized responsibility of the USAFFE Civil Affairs

⁵¹⁴ "Report on Philippine Civil Affairs," 67; Manila Civil Affairs Report, 8-10.

Section until the Commonwealth government gradually assumed responsibility for all civil administration.⁵¹⁵

The USAFFE Civil Affairs Section estimated between 100,000 and 200,000 people's homes were destroyed in the battle for Manila. Many of these fled the city, while many moved in with friends and family, and others remained and constructed shelter from whatever materials they could find. On 1 March 1945, about 60,000 people received food and shelter from PCAUs in refugee homes established in school buildings or whatever whole buildings could be found. The PCAUs employed civilian administrators for these facilities, who supervised the residents and enforced strict sanitation discipline. By 1 April the population of these facilities was 37,000; one month later there were 18,000. By 1 June just 6,000 people remained in the refugee homes.⁵¹⁶

Food relief distribution was the most critical and immediate responsibility of the USAFFE Civil Affairs Section. Until the food supply logistics chain was restored and secured, no other element of civil administration in Manila, civilian or military, could truly be stabilized. Ships from United States and Australian ports supplied the preponderance of relief supplies, particularly food. The PCAUs purchased locally grown vegetables and fruit, and the Sixth Army procured rice from farmers in the Lingayen Valley, but these supplies did not significantly contribute to civilian relief during the period of USAFFE administration. Black market activity undoubtedly made up any difference between legitimate supplies and the people's needs, but obviously at a destabilizing high cost.⁵¹⁷ Until the port in Manila reopened, Army-procured supplies were unloaded at Lingayen and trucked to warehouses in Manila by USASOS. To better

⁵¹⁵ Manila Civil Affairs Report, 13-14.

⁵¹⁶ "Report on Philippine Civil Affairs," 76; Crossman, "Experiences," 113.

⁵¹⁷ Army investigators estimated black market items cost an average of six to ten times as much as price-controlled items. See Manila Civil Affairs Report, 18.

control these supplies, and to curb black market activities, USAFFE rapidly consolidated from three warehouses to a single central location, providing better security. Three Army officers, who supervised a workforce of about 900 Filipino civilians, operated the warehouse. Each week the Civil Affairs Section determined the rationed allotment for each item. PCAUs (later ECAUs) then drew their allotted amount on a per capita basis. For example, as of 22 March 1945, the PCAU population distribution was: PCAU 1 – 105,000, PCAU 4 – 189,000, PCAU 5 – 70,000, PCAU 6 – 85,000, PCAU 8 – 84,000, PCAU 20 – 225,000, PCAU 21 – 213,000, and PCAU 27 – 69,000. The population served by each PCAU fluctuated significantly over time, and allotments shifted as necessary. As in earlier operations in Leyte, the Visayas, and Mindanao, PCAUs either sold these supplies to Filipino wholesalers and retailers (selected by the PCAUs and later ECAUs) for cash or delivered them to relief stations operated by PCAU personnel for free.⁵¹⁸

Using numbers taken from USAFFE Civil Affairs Section reporting, Table 1 describes the daily figures averaged over one-week periods, according to USAFFE reports for both PCAUs and ECAUs. It reflects both free relief and that sold via stores, and the quantities in thousands of pounds of food delivered. The period covered, 15 March to 7 June 1945, was the only data available. The data clearly shows that more people received aid than even the most generous estimates expected. This is partly reflective of the migration of the population, but it is mostly due to duplication in the earlier months of operations as people registered at multiple locations. One direct result of decentralized execution was fraudulent registration, which was estimated at one early point to be as high as thirty percent. Civil affairs organizations in Manila worked to reduce this problem and appeared to have some success, but this apparent reduction may simply

⁵¹⁸ Manila Civil Affairs Report, 8-9, 16-17.

be the result of a sharp increase in population (estimated as high as 300,000) as people migrated to the city in larger numbers as stability increased.⁵¹⁹

Table 1: Reported Daily Average Relief in Manila ⁵²⁰

7-Day Daily Average Period Ending:	People Assisted (in thousands)			Food Distributed (in thousands of pounds)			
	Via Stores	Direct Relief	Total	Through Sales	Free	Total	Ratio of Free to Total
22-Mar-45	639	496	1135	430	258	688	38%
29-Mar-45	760	442	1202	465	251	716	35%
5-Apr-45	881	369	1250	587	221	808	27%
12-Apr-45	815	292	1107	501	184	685	27%
19-Apr-45	897	207	1104	535	155	690	22%
26-Apr-45	892	184	1076	682	120	802	15%
3-May-45	914	147	1061	753	110	863	13%
10-May-45	968	119	1087	761	99	860	12%
17-May-45	994	109	1103	823	83	906	9%
24-May-45	1004	92	1096	884	58	942	6%
31-May-45	1030	85	1115	814	56	870	6%
7-Jun-45	1095	70	1165	926	50	976	5%

Black market activity was the natural outgrowth of two important factors, both of which resulted from the presence of the United States military in and around Manila. The first was the ready availability of cash. The Army and Navy hired more than 100,000 workers in the area, and both branches of service bought goods from city vendors. Manila, as a capital city, also became a hub for soldiers, sailors, and marines stationed there, or on liberty or passes, and flush with cash. These facts mean that money was easy to obtain. The second factor was the supply shortage. The United States military had limited logistical capacity and only distributed about eight tenths of a

⁵¹⁹ Manila Civil Affairs Report, 18. An unedited version of the report used the figure of 300,000.

⁵²⁰ Ibid., 17-19.

pound of food per person per day.⁵²¹ This prevented starvation, but it did little to allay concerns based upon the widespread deprivation and hunger of the Japanese occupation. After the Americans took Manila, the civilian flow of food from the country into the city supplemented the market to an unknowable degree. Much of this was bought and hoarded by Filipinos out of fear of a return to what they had experienced under Japanese rule. This created conditions where demand for food, at the very least for food security reasons, was high and legal supply was low, driving up the price of black-market goods.⁵²²

Black market activity was combated, but nearly impossible to stop. The value of food on the black market often prevented the legitimate procurement of staple goods like rice. Crossman recorded an attempt to purchase rice from farmers in Paniqui, to the north of Manila in the Lingayen Valley, which initially stalled because farmers would not sell at the lower government rate. USAFFE reported that a ten-pound bag of sugar sold for \$10 on the black market (equivalent to \$146 in 2021).⁵²³ The profit incentive was staggering, and the mere forty-nine soldiers of a PCAU trying to police 50 to 100 stores with over 125,000 customers did little to dissuade movement of food to illegal areas. Likewise, when a loaf of bread sold for four pesos (\$8), it is understandable why a local bakery would produce more loaves than was theoretically possible from the amount of flour legally purchased from PCAUs.⁵²⁴

Brigadier General William C. Dunkel, who commanded the 19th Regimental Combat Team of the 24th Infantry Division during the January landings, took charge of the Manila Police Command at its creation. This special command operated the city's Police Department and

⁵²¹ Manila Civil Affairs Report, 18-19, 22.

⁵²² Crossman, "Experiences," 117.

⁵²³ Manila Civil Affairs Report, 19; Crossman, "Experiences," 111. The currency equivalency was calculated at <https://www.in2013dollars.com/us/inflation/1945?amount=10> (accessed March 28, 2021).

⁵²⁴ Manila Civil Affairs Report, 19.

enforced Commonwealth laws in cooperation with the local civilian courts. The police were charged with the enforcement of price ceilings, and violators caught by the PCAUs were often turned over to them. However, PCAUs and later ECAUs had an even more powerful tool available: they could withhold all supplies from retailers and wholesalers who violated the ceiling. This effectively put violators out of business. While it made food distribution in the affected areas more inconvenient, this power was credited as the most effective tool in the enforcement of price controls to ensure affordable access to relief supplies.⁵²⁵

The decline in the ratio of free relief to total food distributed depicted in Table 1 is probably the result of an aggressive enforcement of relief policy. Filipinos seeking relief had to convince PCAU investigators (who were civilian employees) of their inability to pay. Once investigators were convinced, the family would get a free relief ration of 75% of the purchased ration amount. The head of household had to come in person to get the ration; this allowed an evaluation of a family's continued destitution. Later, the head of household had to show a certificate from USASOS that the Base Labor Office could not find work for the family.⁵²⁶

Table 2 depicts the total amount and type of rations distributed by PCAUs and ECAUs over an eleven-week period in 1945. The USAFFE Civil Affairs Section determined the composition of the ration available to each person by forecasting the amounts due to port in the next shipment. The warehouses held supplies for about two weeks, and relief supplies were not given high priority in shipping. As the Army was understandably loathe to allow Filipinos to starve for moral, political, and military reasons, any difference in the required need and the available supply was resolved by drawing food from Army supplies.⁵²⁷

⁵²⁵ "Report on Philippine Civil Affairs," 82-83.

⁵²⁶ Manila Civil Affairs Report, 20.

⁵²⁷ *Ibid.*, 23.

Table 2: Types and Amounts of Rations Distributed from 1 April to 16 June 1945⁵²⁸

Type	Amount (Tons)	Percent of Total
Rice	17643	56%
Canned Meat	4459	14%
Canned Fish	4333	14%
Flour	2050	7%
Corn	675	2%
Sugar	555	2%
Canned Milk	545	2%
Salt	500	2%
Peas & Beans	273	1%
Fats & Lard	233	1%
Wheatmeal	167	-
Soups	25	-
Coffee	9	-
Total:	31467	

Restoration of health services was of parallel importance to supplying food relief in stabilizing Manila. The Japanese began confiscating medical equipment from the Philippine Health Department in late 1944. Once the fighting for Manila erupted in February 1945, the Department and most of its clinics were abandoned, leaving only three functioning hospitals. Most of the medical forms and records were destroyed, and the Public Health Laboratory was dismantled. Sanitation trucks were taken and later destroyed. Lack of electricity kept the sewage lift pumps out of commission, resulting in a citywide sewage system crisis. Pipes in the city water system ruptured, resulting in contamination and low water pressure. Medical supplies were inadequate. Vaccines were practically non-existent. Destruction of houses increased the problems as displaced families overcrowded available homes, creating more refuse, sewage, and

⁵²⁸Manila Civil Affairs Report, 22.

communicable disease hazards. The USAFFE Civil Affairs Section Medical Officer, Colonel Maurice C. Pincoffs, with support from Civil Affairs Section and PCAU Medical Officers, had the mission of reestablishing the Philippine Health Department, restoring its main functions of providing sanitation and medical care to Filipinos before transferring that essential responsibility to the Commonwealth government.⁵²⁹

While the battle for Manila raged, the medical treatment of civilians was an Army priority. PCAU medical sections focused on treating the sick and wounded in existing and improvised hospitals, and on supplying these facilities with food, water, and medical supplies. XIV Corps units, with civilian help, hauled drinking water, removed garbage, and began burying the dead. Once the battle subsided, Pincoffs and USAFFE medical staff began to function as an interim Department of Health in supervising medical services and supporting public health. Pincoffs restaffed the Department with Army officers, along with Filipino doctors and nurses located, recruited, and hired by the PCAUs. An administration reporting and records system was rebuilt, and appropriate forms were adopted and ordered. Until the normal communication systems could be restored, PCAUs established a courier system to deliver laboratory, communicable disease, and other reports. The Army Laboratory assumed public health laboratory requirements. Though initially in short supply, the PCAUs found and distributed relief medical supplies sufficient for civilian requirements.⁵³⁰ Army engineers restored power to the sewage system, but trucks had to be acquired to supplement sewage collection and garbage removal. The medical staff established a venereal disease control section and an immunization

⁵²⁹ Manila Civil Affairs Report, 23-26; "Report on Philippine Civil Affairs," 76.

⁵³⁰ With regard to the initial shortage of medical supplies, Pincoffs recalled: "It is an interesting commentary on human nature that in the courtyard of the big contagious disease hospital, SanLazaro, I found later a warehouse containing many valuable medical supplies, and at its portal one of those faithful guardians who, when all authority disappeared, stuck rigidly to his instructions. These supplies were only to be given out in an emergency. No one had declared an emergency." Maurice C. Pincoffs, "Health Problems in Manila," *Transactions of the American Clinical and Climatological Association* (American Clinical and Climatological Association) 58 (1946), 18-30.

program. Because tuberculosis remained a persistent health concern, the staff also restored a 400-bed tuberculosis ward.⁵³¹

Pincoffs, through the Health Department, emphasized disease control to protect both the civilian and military populations. This effort focused on sanitation and immunization. Sanitation focused on inspections of public areas like schools, nightclubs and bars, restaurants, and other communal areas. Sanitation inspectors supervised these areas' operations and performed regular inspections. The public health program for sanitation also emphasized the resumption of garbage and night soil collection services, fly control, and repair of water and sewage systems. The medical staff immunization programs included typhoid, dysentery, and cholera, but they also implemented isolation and home care policies for anyone suspected of having typhoid or other diarrheal diseases. Many of these diseases had a significant nutritional component, so the staff worked with Civil Affairs Sections and PCAUs to obtain supplementary food rations for the hospitals. This food was purchased from outlying provinces as access became available.⁵³²

By the end of June 1945, the USAFFE Civil Affairs Section Medical Staff had, through the administration of Pincoffs' Department of Health, established and operated 42 free clinics (which acted as dispensaries), and restored 3 provisional hospitals, 11 private hospitals, and 7 government hospitals, with a total capacity of 4,962. By 1 June the Army Laboratory transferred all public health work, as well as the Filipino laboratory staff, to the Public Health Laboratory. The Department of Health had become fully functional, administering programs for immunizations, sanitation, schools, maternal, and infant hygiene, and food inspections. It also had tuberculosis clinics and administered communicable and venereal disease control programs. Although 1,654 Filipino civilians had done much of the work, 135 Army officers, including

⁵³¹ Manila Civil Affairs Report, 23-27.

⁵³² "Report on Philippine Civil Affairs," 78.

Pincoffs, supervised the department until a full transition took effect on 1 July 1945. After the Commonwealth assumed responsibility, the Health Department was advised by a medical board of Army officers formed by USAFFE to act as liaison.⁵³³

Throughout the liberation of Manila, there were no reported epidemics. This is remarkable, as epidemic disease normally attended urban combat in World War Two. North Africa, Russia, and Germany all had outbreaks during the war. In Naples, a city roughly the size of Manila, there was a significant typhus outbreak in 1943-1944 that was likely caused by the destruction of water and sewer systems, and a poor public health response by the military government. Disease has long been recognized as the greatest casualty producer in war, responsible for as many as two thirds of all casualties in some conflicts. The efforts of the USAFFE and Philippine Health Department staffs contributed significantly to the prevention of an outbreak that likely would have occurred if not for their work.⁵³⁴

The lack of public transportation in liberated Manila had the potential to cripple relief efforts. Many trucks and buses had been turned over to the United States Army in 1941 to help defend against the Japanese. The remaining vehicles were in poor shape. USAFFE Civil Affairs Section requisitioned a large number of trucks for their operations in 1945, and it decided to sell a significant number of these to private companies to help them revive. However, few private companies had sufficient funds to buy the trucks outright, and the complexities of the Army selling on credit or installment payments was too great, so the Army ultimately sold trucks to the Philippine government to enable their legal sale on installments to pre-war transportation companies. Tomás Confesor, Commonwealth Secretary of the Interior, and *de facto* mayor of

⁵³³ "Report on Philippine Civil Affairs," 80; Manila Civil Affairs Report, 28.

⁵³⁴ Máire A. Connolly and David L. Heymann, "Deadly Comrades: War and Infectious Diseases," *The Lancet* 360 (December 2002), 23-24; Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, eds. *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Washington: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1964), 324-327.

Manila asked that the Commonwealth government retain a few to start a municipal bus service, but the remainder were sold to private companies and quickly converted into buses.⁵³⁵

At the end of February 1945, as Japanese resistance in Manila collapsed, Manila was left with eleven pieces of firefighting equipment. Of these, only three were fully operational, and one of these was used as a water pump at Santo Tomás. Fire Department headquarters and most of the fire stations located in Manila were destroyed, and those that remained were in disrepair. Traditional Filipino building methods in poorer areas relied on dried palm fronds as roofing. In the dry season in Manila this created a fire hazard, and a huge potential risk to the already weakened water system. The Japanese destroyed Filipino fire equipment and killed many fire fighters when that equipment was used to combat fires that erupted from combat in the city or were intentionally set by the Japanese. Captain Wallace H. Smith of the USAFFE Civil Affairs Section, recruited by Crossman from the Harvard School of Military Government, was put in charge of rebuilding the Fire Department. Filipino Fire Chief Cipriano Cruz, though a known collaborator, was capable and willing and was therefore retained. The need for water to fight fire was critical enough that the Civil Affairs Section suggested pumping river water into the drinking water system to build the required pressure. The Civil Affairs Section medical staff objected, and the Army engineers worked out a way of laying invasion pipe on the ground surface and protecting it from vehicle traffic so that it could provide the much-needed water supply at the required pressure to fight fires.⁵³⁶

Under the leadership of Smith and Cruz, the Fire Department was restored to better than pre-war condition. Original prewar equipment was repaired by the end of March 1945. The

⁵³⁵ Crossman, "Experiences," 128.

⁵³⁶ Crossman, "Experiences," 103-104, 116; Jerry Daly, "Chief C. Cruz of Manila F.D. Takes Navy Firefighters Course," *Fire Engineering*, August 1, 1945, <https://www.fireengineering.com/leadership/chief-c-cruz-of-manila-f-d-takes-navy-firefighters-course/> (accessed January 3, 2021); "Report on Philippine Civil Affairs," 81.

Army provided personal protective equipment. The Navy sent new hoses, foam generators, auxiliary pumps and fog nozzles. The Department even acquired a firefighting ship to service the more remote riverside areas of the city. A training school opened and graduated fifty new firefighters by 1 June 1945. A new radio network was established to connect all the fire and police stations. Between March and September 1945, 60% of all alarms, and 90% of the serious fires, were on United States military installations. The Manila Fire Department responded to every one of these calls and none of the fires got out of control. According to USAFFE, the savings from these events alone more than reimbursed the military's investment. The Fire Department under Chief Cruz transferred to Manila administration on 1 July 1945.⁵³⁷

The Philippine Department of Public Works and Communications, the construction arm of the Commonwealth government, was all but abolished by the Japanese, from whom it received little funding, materials, or equipment. By 1945, the original pre-war organization and manpower were nonexistent. Though the USAFFE Civil Affairs Section was given responsibility for the Manila Department of Engineering and Public Works, Army engineers assumed the responsibility for its operation, and they operated somewhat autonomously outside the purview of Civil Affairs Section. The engineers collected all serviceable equipment and employed any available workers from the former department to help restore city infrastructure. USAFFE prioritized water, sewer, and electrical systems for repair; rehabilitation of natural gas utilities was left as a Commonwealth government responsibility. Until water mains were repaired engineers, established water points around the city and serviced them with tank trucks. Sewage pumping stations resumed operations using portable generators for power. Restoration of electricity took far longer as much of the primary power generation in Luzon was from

⁵³⁷ "Report on Philippine Civil Affairs," 82.

hydroelectric plants sabotaged by retreating Americans and Filipinos in 1942, and then again by retreating Japanese in 1945. The engineers were able to repair two relatively small diesel power plants and acquire two more from the Army. A Navy destroyer escort was later wired into the electrical grid. By June, this configuration was able to provide 5,400 kilowatts to the city, approximately 15% of pre-war requirements. Thanks to the rehabilitation of utilities, Press Wireless Incorporated, an American telecommunications company founded to meet the needs of “the news-gathering media,” had restored wireless international communications by 25 February 1945.⁵³⁸

General MacArthur and Philippine President Sergio Osmeña agreed prior to the invasion of Luzon that while the United States Army would be responsible for food, clothing, housing, policing, fire, and public works, the Commonwealth would have all “political responsibility” in Manila. In the chaos that attended liberation of the city, Tomás Confesor, Commonwealth Secretary of the Interior, and pre-war former member of the Commonwealth House of Representatives, became the *de facto* Mayor of Manila. Likely recognizing that the Commonwealth government’s legitimacy could not increase until it assumed responsibility for the administration of some type of rehabilitation activity, Confesor suggested to Crossman in mid-March 1945 that the Commonwealth take charge of relief supplies. Crossman responded that the Commonwealth did not have the infrastructure in place to assume full responsibility from the eighty officers and three hundred enlisted men assigned to the eight PCAUs in Manila, but he added that they should establish an organization and take responsibility in a small area to

⁵³⁸ Republic of the Philippines, *Department of Public Works and Highways History*, <https://www.dpwh.gov.ph/dpwh/about/history> (accessed February 22, 2021); General Headquarters, SWPA, Letter: Rehabilitation of Civilian Transportation, Communications, Public Utilities, and Means of Production in the Philippines, 12 January 1945, Crossman to G. H. Clifford (Stone & Webster Service Corporation, New York City), 4 April 1945, Civil Censorship Detachment to USAFFE Civil Affairs Section, Memorandum: Telecommunications from Manila, 25 February 1945, Box 2275, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA. “Report on Philippine Civil Affairs,” 82; Crossman, “Experiences,” 87; Manila Civil Affairs Report, 30-31.

develop experience. Confesor then established the Emergency Control Administration (ECA) to begin assuming administrative responsibility for relief activity. The ECA assumed responsibility for local procurement, and using equipment supplied by the Army and mentored by two officers from the USAFFE Civil Affairs Section, cajoled rural farmers into providing coconuts, camotes, corn, and rice for relief supply at prices far below those available on the black market. The ECA thus delivered far in excess of 700 tons of food per week.⁵³⁹

Under the ECA, the Commonwealth government developed the Emergency Control Administration Units (ECAUs) as a replacement for the PCAUs. On 26 March 1945, PCAU Number 8 transferred responsibility to the first ECAU before leaving for the Bicol peninsula. This ECAU, led by Miguel Cuaderno, who later became the Commonwealth Finance Minister, initially lacked sufficient equipment to function, as PCAU Number 8 had to take their gear with them. Eventually, the USAFFE Civil Affairs Section was able to find enough equipment, primarily trucks, to make the ECAU viable. This first ECAU also struggled with staffing and funding, which made the Philippine government “somewhat” reluctant to assume more direct relief responsibilities or establish more ECAUs. Confesor had established the ECA and the first ECAU without much financial support, intending to fund the ECAU with profits from the sale of relief supplies. This violated Army regulations, so he and Osmeña appropriated one million pesos for ECAU operations. Eventually, by mid-June, the ECA took full responsibility for relief administration, and its subordinate ECAUs were distributing more than 450 tons of food per day, which was enough to supply the entire population of Manila with $\frac{3}{4}$ pound per person per day.

⁵³⁹ Crossman, “Experiences,” 87 [quote]; “Report on Philippine Civil Affairs,” 74.

Combined with the supplies coming in through the open market, the city was fully supplied, though still dependent on relief imports.⁵⁴⁰

The need to open banks became more urgent in March and April 1945 as life in Manila began to stabilize but the lack of capital inhibited further improvement. Though it recognized the need, the Commonwealth government required American assistance as it was insolvent and not capable of or prepared to open banks. The Army was also anxious to open the National City Bank (an Ohio-based company). Its Manila branch opened, which helped stabilize the finances of the Commonwealth as banking enabled savings, investments, and loans necessary for the reconstruction of the city and nation, but the bank managers soon discovered that they needed federal assistance. The need to reestablish a stable financial foundation for the Philippines finally broke through the SWPA staff's reluctance to cooperate with those elements of the government viewed as a threaten to MacArthur's autonomy in the region.⁵⁴¹

The United States Department of the Treasury requested permission from SWPA to send foreign funds control experts to Manila to assist in the prevention of looting of financial instruments (currency, checks, etc.), the discovery and freezing of Japanese wealth in the islands, and the examination of foreign financial activity in the Philippines. Marshall, Deputy Chief of Staff for USAFFE, asked Crossman to find a legal reason they could not come. Their conversation is telling:

I asked Marshall why he objected to their coming. He said, "don't you realize that it is the policy of this theater to buck Washington." I told him that I did, but saw no point in it when what Washington wanted would help us. Nevertheless, Marshall prepared and MacArthur approved the stock radio [telegram] for refusal of undesired personnel... i.e. lack of housing, messing, and transportation facilities.

⁵⁴⁰ "Report on Philippine Civil Affairs," 73; Crossman, "Experiences," 87, 108-110 [quote].

⁵⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 111.

When Army officers began requesting personnel for the National City Bank, Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War, replied, to the great amusement of Crossman, Rauh, and others, with what Crossman summarized as: “don’t bother me with requests to send out representatives of a private bank so long as you are unwilling to accept financial representatives of your own government.” Treasury representatives were allowed in, followed by the National City Bank representatives. This restoration of banking gave the Commonwealth government the ability to control its finances and begin assuming further responsibility for administration of the country.⁵⁴²

The final key element necessary for the restoration of the Commonwealth government’s administration of the country was reestablishment of the Philippine legislative branch. The rapid restoration of the legislature was risky to the Osmeña administration because many members were known or suspected collaborators, and Osmeña, along with Confesor, had taken a punitive stand against collaborators. Direct pressure from MacArthur, who continued to push for a rapid transfer from military to civil administration, appears to have been the decisive factor in Osmeña’s reopening of the legislature, a decision that eventually ended his presidency.⁵⁴³

In an effort to expedite the restoration of the civilian political system in the Philippines, MacArthur in April 1945 told Osmeña to convene the Commonwealth legislature, including those whose terms had expired. The Philippine Congress had been elected in 1941 but never assembled due to the Japanese invasion. During the subsequent occupation, some members, like Senator Vicente Rama from Cebu, had gone into hiding in the wilderness. Others collaborated with the Japanese, often due to real or perceived threats to their personal or family safety. Wealthier members in Manila and elsewhere, fearing that “bandit guerrillas (not true guerrillas)

⁵⁴² Hans Morgenthau to Henry L. Stimson, 17 April 1945, Box 1893, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA; Crossman, “Experiences,” 112-113.

⁵⁴³ Karnow, *In Our Image*, 458; Crossman, “Experiences,” 127.

would confiscate their property,” remained in their homes and fell under Japanese control. Some, like Manuel Roxas and Vicente Rama, fled and joined resistance elements, but the Japanese found them and, under varying levels of compulsion, made them join the collaborationist government. While others worked with the Japanese believing that was the best way to protect their people, some were simply opportunists who gravitated to whatever source of power existed at the time.⁵⁴⁴ The broad range of Filipino reactions to the Japanese occupation made Osmeña reluctant to comply quickly with MacArthur’s directive, and it certainly complicated military civil affairs in the Philippines.

Collaboration was a significant element of the many directives from the JCS to MacArthur regarding the civil administration of the Philippines. As late as 11 November 1944, the JCS required him to remove collaborationists. Yet MacArthur and his staff avoided direct responsibility for this requirement by reasoning that “there [was] no legal definition of “collaborationist,”” and deferring the responsibility for identification and removal of such to the Commonwealth government.⁵⁴⁵ Yet it is clear the Commonwealth government of Osmeña, being marginally staffed in a chaotic combat environment, was poorly equipped to unilaterally define and act on collaboration. Likewise, it is clear that MacArthur held influence over Osmeña such that the General had the final say in any decision on the matter. Before returning to the Philippines, MacArthur joined with other American leaders in declaring that he would bring to justice all collaborators and remove them from power. However, as most of the *ilustrados*, or

⁵⁴⁴ Karnow, *In Our Image*, 457-459; Rudy Villanueva, *The Vicente Rama Reader* (Manila: Ateneo De Manila University Press, 2003), 116-140; Joseph R. Hayden to Courtney Whitney, Memorandum on Conditions in Manila in Late 1944, 31 December 1944 [quote], Box 2281, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, Record Group 496, NARA; Jose S. Arcilla, "The Origin of the Philippine Political Elite," *Illes i Imperis* 8 (Spring 2006), 133-144. In 1942 Roxas went to Mindanao to lead the resistance, but he was captured by the Japanese and imprisoned at Bukidnon, Mindanao. Interrogated for 15 weeks, Roxas was rescued by the Laurel government, which he joined and remained with despite various Allied attempts to extricate him.

⁵⁴⁵ Bonner Fellers to Deputy Chief of Staff, General Headquarters, SWPA, 16 November 1944, Box 2275, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

prominent Filipino leaders, were collaborators, including Osmeña's own sons, their removal would create a power vacuum that would herald chaos, further delaying the United States promise of Philippine autonomy.⁵⁴⁶

After a two-month nationwide search, only 83 of 128 legislators were found who could come to the session in June 1945, but this was sufficient to constitute a quorum. Two senators and eleven representatives had died. The remainder were missing or incapable of travel. All of the legislators that formed the quorum were suspected collaborationists. Foremost among them was Roxas, USAFFE colonel in 1941, the administrator under the José P. Laurel government responsible for protecting the food supply of the Filipino people from Japanese confiscation, and now the Commonwealth President of the Senate. Most importantly, Roxas was MacArthur's friend. He had been captured on 15 April 1945 with a large group of collaborationists who entered the American lines as the Army approached the Japanese-held city of Baguio. All these collaborators were imprisoned, pending Commonwealth resolution of their potential collaboration, except for Roxas, who was publicly greeted by MacArthur and reinstated as a colonel on the USAFFE staff. On 9 June the legislature convened, Roxas returned to the Presidency of the Senate, and he subsequently through personal influence largely controlled both houses of the Commonwealth Congress, effectively enabling him to direct all rehabilitation legislation. Because Roxas controlled the appointments committee, both Confesor and Tomás Cabili, members of Osmeña's cabinet and vocal anti-collaborationist critics of Roxas, were forced out of the government. Osmeña did have a chance to legally dissolve the collaborationist-dominated congress as a third of the senators' terms had expired, but MacArthur dissuaded him.

⁵⁴⁶ Karnow, *In Our Image*, 457; Crossman, "Experiences," 127; Arcilla, "Philippine Political Elite," 139-141.

With Roxas in charge, the final piece of the Commonwealth government was in place. Few were surprised when Roxas ultimately unseated Osmeña as president in 1946.⁵⁴⁷

On 10 June 1945, USAFFE Civil Affairs Section released all the PCAUs to a staging area at San Esteban, Ilocos Sur, in northwest Luzon. Here the deactivated PCAUs began preparing for military governance in Japan. Commonwealth officials assumed full responsibility for relief through the ECA, which operated through the ECAUs. The deactivation of the PCAUs enabled the Army to transfer much of their equipment and transportation to the ECAUs. Likewise, USAFFE released control over their relief warehouses to USASOS. Sixth Army attempted to seize the supplies for distribution to rural areas, but MacArthur intervened at the staff's request, and priority was given to Manila; Sixth Army could only draw after Manila's needs had been met.⁵⁴⁸

Representatives of the United States Foreign Economic Administration (FEA) arrived in June 1945 to survey the economic situation prior to their assumption of responsibility for importing relief supplies. Their arrival provoked a response from the ECA that importation of relief supplies for civilian use was not an Army concern. USAFFE and the FEA explained in great detail how the stability of the Philippines was crucial to anticipated operations in Japan, as Luzon was the logistical epicenter for the invasion and subsequent occupation. Civil instability in Luzon could threaten the security of the Army supply line, which was a critical military concern. The FEA and USAFFE Civil Affairs Section then reviewed the ECA-developed plan for civilian

⁵⁴⁷ Arcilla, "Philippine Political Elite," 140; Crossman, "Experiences," 124-127, 147; Karnow, *In Our Image*, 458-459. Karnow asserts that there was no evidence to support MacArthur's claim that Roxas had worked with the guerrilla resistance, but Crossman wrote that an American guerrilla leader, Lieutenant Colonel Edwin Price Ramsey, told him he had worked with Roxas extensively during his covert visits to Manila under Japanese occupation, and that Roxas had always provided "much assistance." Crossman's evaluation of Roxas was that he was wrongheaded, but loyal to the United States and the Commonwealth. Likewise, Crossman believed that MacArthur's actions that helped Roxas gain the presidency were unintentional. Though critical of the General, he believed that MacArthur was trying to stay true to his belief in democratic principles, but that by so doing, he undermined Osmeña.

⁵⁴⁸ Crossman, "Experiences," 142, 146.

importation and distribution of supplies. After a few minor suggestions, the Army was satisfied.⁵⁴⁹

The FEA however, was interested in more than simply preventing “disease and unrest,” which was the aim of the Army. The FEA objective was to create an economically “stimulating incentive inherent in private trade activities,” which were to increase within the constraints of the military situation. Under agreements with the FEA, the Army terminated its responsibility for civilian supply after the ships scheduled to depart in August 1945 were loaded, and made all supplies on hand but not shipped prior to 1 September available to any civilian agency responsible for Philippine relief. United States responsibility for distribution of those supplies, or any others procured by the FEA and other private groups, therefore came to rest on the FEA, not the Army. Though the war was not quite over, the Army completed the transition of civil administration of the Philippines by 1 August 1945.⁵⁵⁰

Military civil affairs administrative responsibility in the Philippines in 1944-1945 was focused on the rapid reestablishment of the Commonwealth government. Luzon, particularly Manila, was central to the fulfillment of this objective. Manila served as the financial, commercial, governmental, and population center of the Philippines. The battle to wrest control of the capital city from Japanese control devastated it, leaving it vulnerable to disease, unrest, and chaos if the population starved or was otherwise neglected. Civil Affairs Officers in USAFFE planned and administered relief operations that not only included feeding, clothing, and sheltering the population of Manila, but also the restoration of medical, electrical, water, sewer,

⁵⁴⁹ Crossman, “Experiences,” 149.

⁵⁵⁰ War Department to Commander in Chief, Army Force in the Pacific, Letter on Termination of Military Civil Affairs Supply Responsibility, 2 August 1945, p. 4, Box 2275, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA: 4; John H. Hilldring to Assistant Secretary of War, Memorandum: Program for Termination of Military Responsibility for Provision of Civilian Supplies in the Philippines, 10 May 1945, Box 1789, Records of General Headquarters, SWPA, RG 496, NARA.

and public transportation infrastructure, as well as financial systems. This was all part of an effort to create a basis for reestablishing the Commonwealth. The government itself was rebuilt, first with the reintroduction and expansion of the executive branch, then the judiciary, and finally, in June 1945, the legislative. Once the foundation and structure of a stable government was established, the transfer of administrative responsibility quickly followed. Within the six months between the entrance of the United States Army to Manila and the transition of administrative responsibility in August 1945, the civil affairs staff of USAFFE set the foundations for the inauguration of an independent Philippine nation on July 4, 1946, less than one year later.

EPILOGUE

In 2013, Leon Panetta, former United States Army Intelligence Officer, White House Chief of Staff under President Bill Clinton, and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and Secretary of Defense under President Barack Obama, described the civil reconstruction problem in Iraq as separate and distinct from combat operations. Panetta said, “The U.S. military was in Iraq to fight a war. They were not USAID. That’s not their role.”⁵⁵¹ Nearly seventy years earlier, the Army had a similar mission in the Philippines: invade, overthrow the regime, stabilize the country and transfer power to a new government. In World War II the military accepted its role as civil administrator of the Philippines. The Joint Chiefs, War Department, State Department, and other executive departments all contributed significantly to the planning and execution of governance operations, and in fact vied for ‘ownership’ of the task. The Army argued for and won the responsibility to liberate the Philippines and transfer responsibility for governance to the Commonwealth government as rapidly as possible, and by August 1945 it had successfully transferred all administrative responsibilities to Sergio Osmeña’s government. Eleven months later, on 4 July 1946, President Harry S Truman’s proclamation of the independence of the Republic of the Philippines was broadcast to a crowd in Manila that included General Douglas MacArthur, newly inaugurated Philippine President Manuel Roxas, Senator Millard Tydings, and Emilio Aguinaldo.

Was the Army’s civil administration mission in the Philippines during World War II successful? Military success is usually measured by evaluating how well and to what extent an army accomplishes its objectives. The Army in the Philippines succeeded in establishing security and stabilizing the country while providing relief to the Filipinos. In spite of the magnitude of

⁵⁵¹ Ernesto Londoño, “Report: Iraq Reconstruction Failed to Result in Lasting, Positive Changes,” *Washington Post*, 5 March 2013.

destruction, United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) civil affairs units met the needs of the people while fostering the capacity of the Commonwealth government to assume full responsibility and independence. There were no reports of riots or starvation, no epidemics, schools and businesses reopened, and fundamental water, sewer, power, and communications infrastructure were reestablished. The Japanese were defeated, the Philippine executive branch was restored, the Legislature was reestablished, and the Judiciary was renewed. All happened mostly according to General MacArthur's vision for civil administration and relief of the Philippines, and was eased in great part because the Filipinos understood and accepted the American presence as liberators since their original landing and first experiment in military governance during the Spanish-American War.

In terms of the unstated objective of creating a solid foundation for an independent Philippines, however, both the Army and the United States in general fall short. MacArthur's hubris in insisting that Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) and USAFFE forces operate in isolation from "Washington interference" prevented outside interference, but also outside assistance that should have been used to help put the Commonwealth on a better economic footing prior to its assumption of responsibility. USAFFE's delay in accepting Treasury Department assistance was one example. Another came during December 1944 when representatives from the United States Commercial Corporation (USCC), which operated as a subsidiary of the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA), arrived in Leyte to meet with Commonwealth officials about abaca procurement. Abaca was a fiber like hemp or sisal used for making rope and cord, a critical commodity during World War II. Due to military control, the USCC had to meet with both Commonwealth and USAFFE representatives rather than a simple bilateral meeting. While this is somewhat understandable because of the military situation, it slowed the negotiation process,

particularly when it was realized that the lack of Commonwealth financial institutions meant that abaca would have to be purchased with relief supplies provided to the Philippine Civil Affairs Units (PCAUs).⁵⁵²

While it may be superficially admirable that the United States kept the date of 4 July 1946 for Philippine independence promised in the Tydings-McDuffie Act, it is also debatable whether the Philippines were ready for it at that time. As early as 26 February President Osmeña formally requested assistance from Army forces in the management of administration of Manila, which MacArthur granted (see Appendix herein, Documents 1 and 2). The request was unsurprising, coming as it did upon the advice of the General, but given the long timeline for reestablishing the Commonwealth branches of government, it should have been an indicator that the United States should have re-evaluated the pace with which independence would be granted.

Likewise, on 22 May 1945, a congressional mission led by Senator Tydings arrived in Manila to assess war damage and make recommendations to the United States Congress about aid for the Philippines. They stayed for a week and never left Manila. In a closed session with General Courtney Whitney, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Rauh, and Lieutenant Colonel Edgar G. Crossman, Tydings appeared to be mainly interested in the percentage of destruction of Manila, though it was clear to Crossman and the others that the damage to the city was extensive enough to make an estimated percentage unimportant – the city was not functioning. Toward the end of the tour, Crossman recorded the following exchange with Tomas Confesor, Commonwealth Secretary of the Interior and Mayor of Manila:

⁵⁵² General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Abaca Mission Journal, 15 December to 22 December 1944, Box 2275, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific (World War II), Record Group 496, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (NARA); Edgar G. Crossman, "My Experiences in World War II" (Unpublished manuscript, 1966), 72-73, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7f/Edgar_Gibson_Crossman_My_Experiences_in_WWII.PDF. Copy provided to the author by David Smollar.

Tydings, upon invitation, attended a session of the Philippine cabinet. Confesor told me that he asked Tydings what the reaction of the United States Congress would be if the Philippine Government asked for a postponement or reconsideration of independence. Tydings instantly replied that the United States Congress would pay no attention to such a request and that independence on July 4, 1946 was a settled matter.... I [Crossman] cannot say whether the Philippine Government would ever have made such a request, but Tydings' reply may well have put an effective damper on the desire for delay or reconsideration of independence in view of the then rather prevalent fear of the responsibilities of independence in 1946 because of the almost total disruption of the Philippine economy by the war.... Filipinos were entitled to their independence if they really wanted it, but I had never thought that it should be forced on them.⁵⁵³

Crossman's evaluation of economic conditions is fair. It is obvious that the Philippines were wrecked economically, and delayed independence with continued rehabilitative support from America would have been prudent, particularly given the graduated tariffs that began once independence was granted. Assuming Confesor's account of his conversation with Tydings is accurate, the Senator's dismissal of an informal query was presumptuous, but likely reflective of the attitudes of many American legislators. It is also unlikely that a Commonwealth request to delay independence, no matter how pragmatic, would have met with popular support from Filipinos at the time. Later generations of Filipinos would voice their anger that Japan, the perpetrators of heinous wartime cruelty and destruction in the islands, received greater postwar reconstruction assistance than the Philippines, which they reasonably considered a betrayal of their friendship with America.⁵⁵⁴

Finally, America falls somewhat short when one considers Philippine independence as the climax of a nearly five decade-long effort to tutor the Filipinos in American-style democracy and prepare them for self-rule. As other critics have noted, the United States brought prosperity, technology, roads, education, and improved health care. But they pragmatically built this progress on the old social foundation of the elite *ilustrados*, ignoring class, ethnic, and religious

⁵⁵³ Crossman, "Experiences," 137-138.

⁵⁵⁴ Paul A. Rodell, "Image Versus Reality: A Colonialist History." *Philippine Studies* 37 (1989), 509-16.

divisions that continue today. Americans' interaction on an interpersonal level generally created comity between the two nationalities, but Filipino-American international friendship, noted by most historians, was likely heavily influenced by economic dependence of the Philippines on the United States. This criticism must be tempered with an acknowledgement that the United States' experiment with colonialism was far more benevolent than European or Japanese colonial rule. Japanese domination of Korea, formally begun in 1910, wiped out Korean culture, language, and native ability so effectively that, when American officials arrived in 1945, they found Koreans "incapable of ever taking over their own government." One military government officer in Korea commented, "the Koreans had been under domination of the Japanese since 1905, any initiative or creative ideas were severely suppressed. Education for the Koreans was severely limited." He later noted that under Japanese administration, very few Koreans had been allowed positions of authority; when the Japanese left, they lacked the training and understanding to operate Korean factories. This was not the case in the Philippines under American rule, which, though hardly perfect, left behind an educated and functioning society that was ready to determine its fate.⁵⁵⁵

⁵⁵⁵ Stuart C. Miller, *"Benevolent Assimilation": The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 1-2; Stuart O. Van Slyke, *The Life of Stuart O. Van Slyke, An Autobiography, Book One: Memories of a Forgotten Age, May 1916 to May 1946* (Bloomington, IN: Authorhouse, 2006), 353-355 [quote]. Van Slykes' recollections echo those of this author's grandfather, who was in Korea with the United States Army from 1945 to 1947.

APPENDIX

LETTERS BETWEEN PRESIDENT OSMEÑA AND MACARTHUR

Document 1
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
of the PHILIPPINES

February 26, 1945

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur
Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific

My dear General MacArthur:

In order to facilitate the reestablishment of the Government of the city of Greater Manila, which will be considered to include the Chartered City of Quezon City, and the municipalities of Caloocan, San Francisco del Monte, San Juan del Monte, Mandaluyong, Makati, and Pasay, I am requesting your assistance in the following aspects:

First, to appoint U.S. Army officers to take charge and institute measures for the reestablishment of the following city departments in Greater Manila:

1. Police Department.
2. Department of Health and Welfare.
3. Department of Engineering and Public Works.
4. Fire Department.

Second, to distribute civilian relief supplies in Manila.

Third, to continue the operation of Philippine Civil Affairs Units (PCAU's) in Manila.

I have authorized the Secretary of the Interior to take charge of the reorganization of the City of Manila. He will take the responsibility for the reestablishment of the other Departments of the City and will work with your Staff to coordinate the work of the different Departments. Should the above request meet with your approval, we would extend to your men in charge of the above Departments the fullest cooperation possible. In the meantime, we would be organizing and training the personnel for each Department above enumerated so that we would be ready to take over their responsibilities as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours,

Sergio Osmeña⁵⁵⁶

⁵⁵⁶ Civil Intelligence Section Operations (Philippine Research & Information Section), Civil Affairs Report, 7 August 1945, p. 11, Box 2275, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific (World War II), Record Group 496, NARA.

Document 2

APO 500

26 February 1945

Dear Mr. President,

In accordance with the request contained in your letter of even date, I will be glad to place the activities therein named under military direction until such time as the government of the City of Manila shall be in position to assume the full responsibility therefore. As you know it is my purpose to render every possible assistance to your government within the capabilities of my command.

Very sincerely,

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

HONORABLE SERGIO OSMEÑA

PRESIDENT, COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES⁵⁵⁷

⁵⁵⁷ Ibid., 12.

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