BASE VISIT REPORT
RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT, TEXARKANA, TEXAS
JUNE 21, 2005

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**BASE'S PRESENT MISSION:**

Red River Army Depot -- located 18 miles west of Texarkana, Texas, in the northeast corner of Texas -- is one of our nation's largest defense depots in terms of people and workload with a combined population of almost 2,822 employees including tenants. The workforce on the Red River complex is drawn from throughout the Four States region -- Texas, Arkansas, Oklahoma and Louisiana.

The depot's maintenance mission includes the repair, rebuild, overhaul and conversion of tactical wheeled vehicles, as well as the Army's light tracked combat vehicle fleet, including the Bradley Fighting Vehicle System, the Multiple Launch Rocket System, and their associated secondary items. Vehicles depart the depot's modernized maintenance facility in "like new" condition. Among their technical resources are the capability to design, fabricate and manufacture a wide
range of intricate items, ranging from specialty parts to unique prototype vehicles needed by customers.

The depot also serves as a vital ammunition storage center, with approximately 174,000 tons of ammunition valued at over $5.3 billion in a 9,000 acre area. In this secured area, the primary activities are ammunition storage, renovation and demolition of conventional munitions, repair and storage of missile systems and receipts and shipment of stock to customers throughout the world.

Red River Army Depot is also the home of the Missile Recertification Directorate, a separate specialized activity that monitors and certifies the readiness of Hawk and Patriot missiles. The Army's only road wheel and track shoe rebuild and manufacture facility is located at Red River. The depot is host to ten tenant organizations, with the largest being the Defense Logistics Agency's Distribution Depot with about 1,000 employees that stores approximately 180,000 line items valued at over $6 billion.

In recent years, Red River Army Depot has been recognized as a leader in developing and implementing quality-based processes into daily activities, as encouraged by the National Performance Review for all Federal activities. With its largely blue-collar workforce, the depot was a recipient of the National Partnership Award for 1996, reflecting the growth and involvement of the union-management partnership in effect at the base. Red River was also named one of 13 winners of the Army Communities of Excellence Award in 1996, and ACOE Runner-Up in 1998. RRAD earned a Quality Improvement Prototype Award from the National Performance Review in 1995. The awards are part of an on-going quality journey at Red River, intended to maintain the depot's position as a competitive industrial complex excelling in quality products and services to our customers.

Red River Army Depot was identified for realignment during the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process in 1995. In its final action, as approved by the President and Congress, the BRAC Commissioners voted to maintain workload pertaining to the Bradley Fighting Vehicle System and Multiple Launch Rocket System at Red River. Other work scheduled to remain at the depot as a result of the BRAC decisions will include the ammunition storage and maintenance mission, the missile recertification mission, and the Rubber Products facility, which produces road wheels and trackshoes for armored vehicles.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION:

Close Red River Army Depot, TX.

1. Relocate the storage and demilitarization functions of the Munitions Center to McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, OK.
2. Relocate the munitions maintenance functions of the Munitions Center to McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, OK, and Blue Grass Army Depot, KY.
3. Relocate the depot maintenance of Armament and Structural Components, Combat Vehicles, Depot Fleet/Field Support, Engines and Transmissions, Fabrication and Manufacturing, Fire Control Systems and Components, and Other to Anniston Army Depot, AL.
4. Relocate the depot maintenance of Powertrain Components, and Starters/Generators to Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, GA.
5. Relocate the depot maintenance of Construction Equipment to Anniston Army Depot, AL, and Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, GA.
6. Relocate the depot maintenance of Tactical Vehicles to Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA and Letterkenny Depot, PA.
7. Relocate the depot maintenance of Tactical Missiles to Letterkenny Army Depot, PA.
8. Disestablish the supply, storage, and distribution functions for tires, packaged Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants, and compressed gases.
9. Relocate the storage and distribution functions and associated inventories of the Defense Distribution Depot to the Defense Distribution Depot, Oklahoma City, OK.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION:

This recommendation supports the strategy of minimizing the number of industrial base sites performing depot maintenance for ground and missile systems. The receiving depots have greater maintenance capability, higher facility utilization and greater opportunities for inter-service workloading. This recommendation reinforces Anniston's and Letterkenny's roles as Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence for Combat Vehicles (Anniston) and Missile Systems (Letterkenny).

This recommendation decreases the cost of depot maintenance operations by consolidation and elimination of 30 percent of duplicate overhead structures required to operate multiple depot maintenance activities. This recommendation also increases opportunities for inter-service workloading by transferring maintenance workload to the Marine Corps.

This recommendation relocates storage, demilitarization, and munitions maintenance functions to McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, and thereby reduces redundancy and removes excess from Red River Munitions Center.

This recommendation allows DoD to create centers of excellence, generate efficiencies, and create deployment networks servicing all Services.

This recommendation relocates the storage and distribution functions and associated inventories to the Defense Distribution Depot Oklahoma City at Tinker Air Force Base. It also contributes to the elimination of unnecessary redundancies and duplication, and streamlines supply and storage processes.

The disestablishment of the wholesale supply, storage, and distribution functions for all packaged POL, tires, and compressed gas products supports transformation by privatizing these functions. Privatization of packaged POL, tires, and compressed gas products will eliminate inventories, infrastructure and personnel associated with these functions and products.

MAIN FACILITIES REVIEWED:

- Building 345, Tactical and Combat Production Lines
KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED

1. If approved, the timing and implementation of this recommendation will be critical given the MILCON projects at several gaining installations and the time required to establish and prove out those facilities at each new location.

2. With the expectation that most personnel will not relocate to any of the gaining installations, there will be a significant loss of intellectual capital related to those weapon systems and capabilities.

INSTALLATION CONCERNS RAISED

A copy of the installation briefings will be included with this report.

1. With the recommendation to move the DLA facility there is a cost of about $14M in COBRA to move supplies from Red River to Tinker AFB. Is that just for the Class IX supplies? Is that all associated inventories? Where will all of the DLA Class VII stocks go?

2. The timeline for the DLA move is planned mostly for 2009 with MILCON dollars in COBRA. What is the planned timing and integration for this move? There are currently 4 million square feet of covered storage at Red River DDRT and it appears that the building to be built in Oklahoma will only be about 60% of that size. Where will all the assets go that are currently stored at RRAD?

3. The COBRA data erroneously lists the number of doors at the DDRT as 34 instead of the actual 52 doors. Does this have any impact to the planned COBRA MILCON at Tinker AFB? Does this impact military value?

4. Supply and Storage scenarios in August 2004 planned for four Strategic Distribution Platforms (SDP) - San Joaquin, Warner Robbins, Red River and Susquehanna. In February 2005 Scenario 48 disestablished the Red River location with the closure of Red River Army Depot. It was stated that 80% of the DDRT mission is not related to the Red River Army Depot, and the two remaining SDP of San Joaquin and Susquehanna are not collocated with any maintenance facility. Why did the S&S group decide to close the Red River DLA operations? Could it not have remained a viable operation even without the maintenance depot?

5. What is the genesis of the recommendation to privatize tires, POL and compressed gasses? Does this impact just the storage, receipt, and issue of tires? Does it take into consideration the Red River DLA mission to kit tires for shipment to Theater? Will Tinker AFB assume the mission to kit and ship kitted tires, or is the intent for the Army to no longer ship kitted tires to the Theater?

6. The DDRT is actually the last step in the road wheel and track process with their application of the preservative and bundling missions as was directed by Defense Reform Initiative Directive (DRID) 1992, but there does not appear to be any cost in COBRA to recreate this mission at Anniston Army Depot. How will Anniston execute and finalize this portion of the rubber mission? Is this cost included with the MILCON for the rubber facility? Will the Supply and
Storage DLA recommended moves impact the ability of the Anniston DLA facility to execute this mission? Does this conflict at all with DRID 1992 that pushed this mission to DLA?

7. Within the COBRA there is no discussion of the type of munitions storage that will need to be built at McAlester, i.e. Category 1 and 2 storage igloos for missiles. How is this mission integrated into the existing McAlester infrastructure?

8. Beginning in FY06 Stinger stockpile reliability workload is scheduled to begin at the Red River Munitions Center (RRMC). Where would this workload now be performed?

9. The projected FMS support for Hawk, Patriot, and Chaparral is approximately a 10-year workload. How was U.S. support to Foreign Military Sales (FMS) workload considered in the evaluation of workload? Does this mission transfer to one of the gaining installations?

10. How were the RRMC facilities in Weilerbach, Germany, Korea, Kuwait and Israel incorporated into the evaluation of the installation? If they were not considered, why not?

11. Does the recommendation assume demilitarization of assets in place? The depot reports that the demilitarization of all assets could not be completed within the BRAC implementation timeframe. Does some of this demilitarization workload move? Where?

12. How was Red River Army Depot given credit for the relationship between the Army Depot, Munitions Center, and Distribution Depot? Was this considered as one location, or three separate stand alone activities? If these relationships were not considered, why were they not considered? How was the Lear Siegler facility taken into consideration?

13. The standard factor in COBRA is that 75% of the personnel will relocate, however, the installation quotes that only 16% of previous personnel relocated with BRAC 1995. Was any consideration given to changing this standard factor for this recommendation based on previous Red River history? If not, why not?

14. It appears that other installations were given credit in military value for unique one-of-a-kind capabilities - Rock Island's foundry and Watervliet's gun tubes capabilities. How was the rubber facility uniqueness within the DoD incorporated into the Red River military value? If not, why was it not considered?

15. How was the upcoming Bradley partnership workload incorporated into the evaluation? If not, why was it not incorporated? What is the funded Bradley workload in dollars and quantities that is planned for Red River Army Depot for FY05-11?

16. There should have been more military value assigned to Red River in criteria 23 for having more partnerships. On what basis was the RRAD value determined for this criteria?

17. Within the Census Bureau database Red River is classified as an urban area which lowered the military value for this criteria, however, the installation claims this should be a rural area. How was the determination made that the area is urban?

18. Criteria #37 in the military value relates to brigade training space. For this element, all the maintenance depots forwarded a "0" input, yet there is a numerical answer for each installation. How was this value determined?

19. Criteria #6 relates to restricted airspace. What was the intended interpretation of this element? Was it airspace for training? Both Anniston and Letterkenny received credit for restricted airspace because they have airspace which cannot be flown into. How was airspace treated, scored and interpreted?

20. Red River did not get credit for the jointness which is there - they are the producer of M1 road wheels for all services. How was this factored in to the Red River value?

21. The recommendation builds 2.2 million direct labor hours of capacity at Anniston and .4 million direct labor hours of capacity at Letterkenny factored at a one shift operation, however,
the scenario states that work is calculated at one and a half shifts. How does this recommendation eliminate excess capacity if it is being rebuilt at two separate locations?

22. How does this recommendation decrease the cost of depot maintenance operations by consolidation and elimination of 30 percent of duplicate overhead structures?

23. Why is there no MILCON at McAlester for the Patriot program Category 1 and 2 storage igloos, and for other munitions?

24. Was any consideration given within the military value criteria to installations with Title 10 U.S. Code 2474 Center for Industrial Technical Excellence (CITE) designations? If not, why not?

25. Were any scenarios explored that migrated Army or other service workload to existing CITEs?

COMMUNITY CONCERNS RAISED:

1. Military value is the primary consideration to support the Combatant Commander; ignoring this constitutes a substantial deviation.

2. The Army must retain all depots to support the Warfighter.

3. The Industrial Joint Cross Service Group deviated from DoD parameters for capacity and "created" 2.6 million direct labor hours in Anniston and Letterkenny to permit closure over Army objections.

4. There is insufficient ammunition storage capacity within the Army to accommodate the Red River Munitions Center and Lone Star Ammunition Plant's current stored ammunition.

5. The top ranked Red River DDRT was slated for disestablishment due only to potential RRAD closure.

6. The economic impact from this closure would be devastating with a projected unemployment rate that exceeds 14%.

REQUESTS FOR STAFF AS A RESULT OF VISIT:

The installation will provide the following:

- Details of the estimated costs of $150M to move the missile facility and $50M to move the Rubber facility
- A list of all the tenants and the current staffing levels at each organization
- A complete package of all information provided to the Government Accountability Office as a result of their site visit in relation to BRAC 2005
- A breakout of Red River Munitions Center workload by Service and the equivalent percentages
- An updated number of partnerships and a brief description and dollar value of each partnership

Elizabeth Bieri/Army/25 June 2005
George Delgado/Joint Cross Service/25 June 2005
ADDENDUM:

Ms. Bieri returned to Red River Army Depot with Chairman Anthony J. Principi for a base visit on Sunday 10 July, 2005. Similar briefings were presented to Chairman Principi as well as a tour of the rubber facility. Additional attendees included Senators Kay Bailey Hutchison and John Cornyn of Texas, Senators Blanche Lincoln and Mark Pryor of Arkansas, Representative Ralph Hall (Texas 4th), and Representative Mike Ross (Arkansas 4th).

Elizabeth Bieri/Army/14 July 2005