

RESTORE, REFORM, REACT, REVOLT: LEOPOLD II AND THE RISORGIMENTO  
IN THE GRAND DUCHY OF TUSCANY, 1814-1859

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The Risorgimento or “resurrection” of Italy united a collection of independent Italian kingdoms, duchies, and principalities under the auspices of the Piedmontese House of Savoy. No longer was Italy a mere *expression géographique*, as Austrian Chancellor Klemens von Metternich snidely remarked in 1847, but a united nation state. Studies of the Risorgimento successfully highlight the role of famous Piedmontese and Italian nationalists in demonstrating the success of the movement. However, the smaller states of the peninsula have largely disappeared from these histories. Among these overlooked states is the Grand Duchy of Tuscany and Tuscany’s last grand duke, Leopold II of Habsburg-Lorraine. Both are consistently omitted from broader surveys of the peninsula. In rare situations when Leopold II enters the historical narrative he is dismissed as a reactionary, although he maintained a reputation as an enlightened and relatively liberal ruler for the majority of his rule. Especially in anglophone literature, little to no discussion of his thirty-five-year reign is available. This omission creates an unfortunate lacuna in the historiography of the Risorgimento. It is in studies of these smaller Italian states that the intricacies of statecraft, nationalism, and localism are most visible. To understand the extent of the Risorgimento’s success, it is imperative to delve deeper into the affairs of states like the Grand Duchy of Tuscany. This examination of Tuscan politics takes a top-down approach, emphasizing the role of Tuscany’s highest officials and the influence that their equivalents in other European states had on the course of the Risorgimento in Tuscany. In particular, it seeks to provide a more accurate and fair assessment of Leopold II’s actions and his impact on Tuscany’s participation in the unification of Italy.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
LIST OF FIGURES .....	iv
INTRODUCTION: THE RISORGIMENTO, A HISTORY WRITTEN BY THE VICTORS.....	1
CHAPTER 1. THE SEARCH FOR STABILITY: THE RESTORATION IN THE GRAND DUCHY OF TUSCANY .....	13
CHAPTER 2. BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE: LEOPOLD, REFORM, AND THE CONSERVATIVE STATUS QUO .....	38
CHAPTER 3. THE REVOLUTION OF 1848 AND CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY IN TUSCANY.....	63
CHAPTER 4. FROM ENLIGHTENMENT TO AUTOCRACY, THE END OF LEOPOLDINE LIBERALISM.....	88
EPILOGUE: DECLINE AND FALL OF THE LORENESE.....	110
CONCLUSION.....	125
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	133

## LIST OF FIGURES

	Page
Figure 1.1: The Italian peninsula in 1815 .....	11
Figure 2.1: The Italian Peninsula in 1848 .....	62
Figure 3.1: The Grand Duchy of Tuscany .....	87

## INTRODUCTION: THE RISORGIMENTO, A HISTORY WRITTEN BY THE VICTORS

Following the conclusion of the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the map of the Italian peninsula returned to the *status quo ante bellum* of 1792. The victorious powers erased the modern republics Napoleon Bonaparte established during his tenure as general and emperor and restored the dynastic duchies and principalities of the *ancien régime*. While the Congress sought to repair war-weary Europe by restoring the rulers of Italy to their states, the nationalist enthusiasm sparked by the principles of the French Revolution endured. The Risorgimento, or “resurrection,” of Italy had begun. The egalitarian ideals of the French Revolution and the bureaucratic reforms of the Napoleonic period propelled nationalist visions of a united Italy. However, the restored monarchs set the tone of political life in their respective territories based on the principles that emerged from the Congress such as the marriage of throne and altar. Many responded harshly to the enthusiasm of their reform-minded subjects, and through swift and conservative governance earned reputations as severe and reactionary sovereigns. In these countries, notably the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, revolutionary groups such as the Carbonari vigorously struggled against oppressive regimes. Meanwhile, a select few, notably the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, chose to support the active reformism of their people and emerged as enlightened, modern monarchies. In their response to liberalism, Restoration-era sovereigns determined the course of the coming revolutions, notably those of 1848.

By the mid-nineteenth century, many Italian patriots believed the time had come to assert more control over their homeland. After enduring centuries of foreign domination, they decided to create an independent Italy. However, unifying the various independent Italian states was not a simple task. Following the collapse of the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century, the various regions of Italy imploded to form a multitude of independent city-states, duchies, and

kingdoms. After centuries of fragmentation, the romantic idea of a single Italian nation-state seemed a distant dream to many. Further, popular interest in a unified Italian state remained limited to urban radicals and intellectuals. Nationalists did not have the necessary popular support to achieve their goals during the early years of the Restoration. As exemplified at the Congress of Vienna, the European powers routinely dismissed patriotic calls for an Italian nation. Perhaps most famously, Austrian Prince Klemens von Metternich referred to “Italy” as “un expression géographique,” a mere “geographical expression.”<sup>1</sup> “The Italian peninsula,” he wrote, “is made up of sovereign states that are independent of each other. The existence and territorial constituency of these states are founded on principles of general public law and corroborated by the political transactions that are the least subject to dispute.”<sup>2</sup> Both history and the European political order, Metternich claimed, maintained that multiple Italies, not one, existed on the peninsula. Further, the pursuit of the idea of Italy threatened the hard-earned peace and stability secured by the Congress of Vienna. As such, Austrian policy in the Italian peninsula aggressively enforced adherence to the status quo. Through a comprehensive network of dynastic and political alliances, Metternich ensured that Vienna’s stance on the question of Italian “liberation” and unification dominated.

The rise of nationalism, liberalism, and republicanism in the mid-nineteenth century profoundly challenged the Austrian-sponsored peace and de-facto protectorate Vienna had established over the Italian peninsula. Regardless, the pace of the Risorgimento quickened, and by 1848 the entire peninsula was engaged in struggles between radicalism and conservatism,

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<sup>1</sup> Given the frequency of his use of the term, one can assume that he found it to be quite a clever and demeaning term for dismissing the increasing possibility of an “Italian” state. He uses the term in multiple letters to other European diplomats in 1847. Metternich to Apponyi, 6 August 1847, Klemens von Metternich, *Memoirs of Prince Metternich* (1815-1829) ed. Prince Richard Metternich, trans. Mrs. Alexander Napier (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1881), no. 1610; Metternich to Apponyi, 6 August 1847, Metternich, *Memoirs*, no. 1611, 7: 414-22.

<sup>2</sup> Metternich to Apponyi, 6 August 1847, Metternich, *Memoirs*, no. 1610, 7:415.

unification and particularism, and liberation or conformity. Due in part to the diversity of the many constituent parts of the peninsula, the Risorgimento provides an interesting opportunity to examine the development of the modern nation-state. As Italy remained a collection of multiple independent states in the 1830s and 1840s, the complexities of Italian unification provide numerous cases that demonstrate its transition from parts to unified whole. The Grand Duchy of Tuscany emerges as a crucial center of action for observing the change and conflict of this age of nationalism.

This work demonstrates the impact of Tuscan policies and actions on the course of the Risorgimento, thus deepening historical understanding of the role of one of the smaller Italian states on the unification of Italy. Home of the Renaissance and renowned scholars including Dante Alighieri, Galileo Galilei, and Niccolò Machiavelli, Tuscany is popularly regarded as the center of Italian art and culture. While the Medieval and Renaissance periods consistently receive serious and thoughtful scholarly attention, few works examine Tuscany during the Risorgimento. This omission has produced a lacuna in current interpretations of this complex process. This study asserts that the specific example of the last grand duke of Tuscany, the Habsburg-Lorraine Leopold II, demonstrates the difficulties Italy faced in transitioning from the Restoration to the modern era. Both Tuscany and its last grand duke remain largely absent from studies of the Risorgimento. This thesis seeks to remedy this omission.

To understand the broader historiographical lapse that excludes small states such as the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, the outcome of the Risorgimento itself must be considered. In 1860, the Risorgimento culminated in the unification of Italy under the authority of the Piedmontese House of Savoy. In a manner consistent with the old adage that ‘history is written by the victors,’ the actions of Piedmont dominate the historiography of the Risorgimento. Scholars of the



Risorgimento have excelled in demonstrating Piedmont's crucial role in combatting Austrian hegemony in the Italian peninsula during the wars for Italian independence. Simultaneously, the efforts of the visionary politician Count Camillo Benso di Cavour and the renegade military man, Giuseppe Garibaldi, receive detailed and excellent scholarly attention. Understanding the labors of these men and the impact of their actions is, as historians consistently demonstrate, imperative for understanding the outcome of the Risorgimento. However, the unification of the Italian peninsula was not brought about solely by their efforts. The states and ruling dynasties absorbed by the new Kingdom of Italy, in both their positive and negative contributions, significantly impacted the path to unity. This influence is often overlooked, and thus many crucial facets of the political, diplomatic, and social life of the Italian peninsula have been consistently neglected. By highlighting the Tuscan example, this thesis strives to demonstrate the importance of examining these overlooked states.

Trends in historiography have perpetuated the emphasis on the Piedmontese program. Broad analyses of the entire peninsula dominate anglophone literature on the Risorgimento. Among these studies, historians including Lucy Riall, John A. Davis, and Christopher Duggan have made enormous strides in shedding light on the shifting political dynamics of nineteenth-century Europe. However, the broad strokes that comprehensive histories of the peninsula require in turn omit discussions of the intricate local developments that more focused studies provide. Italian scholarship demonstrates similar trends. Like anglophone histories, Italian-language studies of the Risorgimento highlight the role of Piedmont and analyze common developments that unite the disparate regions of Italy in a single history of Italy. This is especially prominent in earlier studies of unification that played a significant role in demonstrating similarities across the peninsula rather than the differences between various cities

or regions. On the other side of the spectrum, the academy has produced numerous studies that focus on individual cities or towns during the Restoration and Risorgimento. This is partly due to a long tradition of Italian *campanilismo*, which emphasizes the importance of local identity and events rather than regional or national history.<sup>3</sup> In an article from 2002, historian Enrico del Lago notes that “we still lack – in [the] face of a continuously increasing body of literature on several aspects of life in pre-unification states... detailed regional synthesis [or] up-to-date scholarship on Restoration governments.”<sup>4</sup> While advances on this front have been made, the bulk of scholarship on pre-unification states during the Risorgimento is almost exclusively in Italian. As such, even the most excellent studies of this topic remain inaccessible to readers beyond Italy.

The Grand Duchy of Tuscany stands apart as a particularly grievous omission from broader examinations of the Risorgimento. Several excellent case studies have emerged recently that highlight specific cities, trades, or commercial enterprises in Tuscany during the early nineteenth century.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, the broader Tuscan experience and the grand duchy's place in the European diplomatic balance during this time remain understudied. Further, the grand dukes of Tuscany have all but disappeared from even the best surveys of nineteenth-century Italian history.<sup>6</sup> Tuscany, regarded throughout Europe as the “most liberal of the Italian states,” played a

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<sup>3</sup> *Campanilismo* is a term derived from the Italian word for bell tower. It is a mentality that derives from individuals' focus on their local reality and surroundings, and nods to the reality that historically, an individual identified more with their church or parish than a “constructed” national identity.

<sup>4</sup> Enrico del Lago, “Society, Economy, and Politics in Restoration Italy: Towards a Regional Synthesis,” *The Historical Journal* 45, no. 1 (March 2002): 180.

<sup>5</sup> Notable examples include Thomas Kroll, *La Rivolta del Patriziato: Il liberalismo della nobiltà nella Toscana del Risorgimento*, trans. Loredana Melissari (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki Editore, 2005), and Antonio Chiavistelli *Dallo Stato alla nazione: Costituzione e sfera pubblica in Toscana dal 1814 al 1849* (Roma: Carocci editore, 2006).

<sup>6</sup> The last Grand Duke of Tuscany, Leopold II, is one such ruler. While scholars in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century made use of the grand duke's extensive archives to examine his life and works, Leopold II remains largely absent from contemporary and otherwise excellent examinations of the Risorgimento. Those few early works that exist are almost exclusively in Italian and thus remain inaccessible for anglophone audiences. Two notable

crucial role in shaping the course of Italian unification. To demonstrate the influence of Tuscan policies on the Risorgimento, this examination highlights the actions and policies of the ruling dynasty of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, the house of Habsburg-Lorraine.

Specifically, this thesis emphasizes the rule of the last Habsburg grand duke of Tuscany, Leopold II. Leopold's reign began in 1824 following the death of his father, Ferdinand III. Viewed by many as the successor to the legacy of his grandfather, Peter Leopold, Grand Duke Leopold II favored modernization and reform. Widely regarded as a fair and enlightened ruler, he believed his duty as sovereign was to "maintain Tuscany in its traditional forms of life and watch over it with patriarchal goodness and serenity."<sup>7</sup> However, as revolution erupted across Europe in 1848, the changes of the modern age tested Leopold's enlightened reputation. His policies, decisions, and reactions to the growth of liberalism and radicalism altered the Tuscan experience of the Risorgimento.

In highlighting Leopold's role in Tuscan affairs, this thesis necessarily focuses on the experience of the rulers rather than the ruled. Leopold II was an Austrian Archduke and head of a sovereign state. Accordingly, the majority of his interactions were with those in Europe's highest social and political stratum. This work therefore joins the ranks of what is commonly referred to as "Great Men" history. While perhaps an unfashionable approach, this method provides the

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works on the Lorenesse dynasty include Paolo Bellucci, *I Lorena in Toscana: Gli Uomini e le Opere*, Third Ed. (Firenze: Edizioni Medicea, 1985) and Romano Paolo Coppini, *Il Granducato di Toscana: Dagli "anni francesi" all'Unità* (Torino: UTET, 1993). The sole complete and biography of Leopold II not written by his contemporaries remains Franz Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II di Lorena: La Vita dell'ultimo Granduca di Toscana (1824-1859)*, trans. Marco Nardi (Firenze: RCS Sansoni Editore, 1989).

<sup>7</sup> Franz Pesendorfer, trans. Marco Nardi, *Leopoldo II di Lorena: La Vita dell'ultimo Granduca di Toscana (1824-1859)* (Firenze: RCS Sansoni Editore, 1989), 115. It is crucial to note that in Leopold's understanding, Tuscany's "traditional way of life" was a combination of a classical, conservative agricultural society and relatively liberal political structures. Again, Tuscany was considered the "most liberal of the Italian states." Of this, Leopold was firmly convinced. He did not view his policies, or those of his father and grandfather as "conservative," but rather as enlightened.

most direct path to understanding Leopold's interactions with his fellow princes and determining their influence on his decisions.<sup>8</sup>

To understand the importance of Leopold's actions, we must first consider the ruling *mentalité* and legacy he inherited as Grand Duke of Tuscany. The Habsburg-Lorraine dynasty first acquired Tuscany following the War of Polish Succession and the subsequent Treaty of Vienna in 1738.<sup>9</sup> Franz Stephan, husband of the Habsburg empress Maria Theresa, was forced to surrender his hereditary claim to the Duchy of Lorraine during the territorial negotiations that followed the war.<sup>10</sup> As compensation, he received the recently-vacated Tuscan throne. Franz Stephan then established the grand duchy as a secundogeniture of the Habsburg dynasty, thus securing a ruling position for the second son of the house of Habsburg-Lorraine. This arrangement helped stabilize the Viennese dynasty by securing a subsidiary branch of the Habsburg-Lorraine dynasty and an alternate line of succession.

As the birthright of the Habsburg emperor's son, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany held a special status among the Italian states. After a brief regency period, Franz Stephan's second son, Peter Leopold, assumed the Tuscan throne. During Peter Leopold's reign (1765-1790), Tuscany gained international recognition as the most enlightened of the Italian states, and in some formulations, the most enlightened European state. Peter Leopold himself numbered among the most liberal of Europe's absolute monarchs. He famously implemented principles of free trade,

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<sup>8</sup> Unfortunately, this top-down approach largely excludes the perspective of the common man. Where possible, this research includes insight into the perspective of the Tuscan lower- and middle-classes' perspective of these events. However, for a more comprehensive examination of the experience of the popular classes, see Benjamin Kehoe, "*Viva l'Italia, Viva la Repubblica: Popular Political Engagement and Participation in Tuscany during the Italian Risorgimento, c. 1830-1861,*" PhD diss., University of Oxford (2019).

<sup>9</sup> Previously, Tuscany was ruled by the famous Medici dynasty. The last Medici died in 1737, thus opening the throne of the duchy for another ruling house.

<sup>10</sup> Lorraine passed to the former king of Poland, Stanislaw Leszczynski. A secondary reason for Franz Stephan's forced cession of Lorraine was his pending marriage to Maria Theresa, which took place in 1736.

encouraged scientific research, overhauled the penal code, eradicated torture, and in 1786 abolished the death penalty.<sup>11</sup> However, his brother, Holy Roman Emperor and Archduke of Austria Joseph II, died in 1790 without successors, and Peter Leopold returned to Vienna to assume the imperial throne. As emperor Leopold II, he issued a decree that overrode Franz Stepan's designation of Tuscany as a secundogeniture. In doing so, he ensured Tuscany remained the patrimony of his second son, Ferdinand II, and his descendants. Thus, Tuscany remained a possession of the Tuscan Lorenese, regardless of politics in Vienna.<sup>12</sup>

The close ties between Florence and Vienna ensured that Tuscany, even more than the other Habsburg-associated states of the peninsula, held a special status. Beginning in the mid-eighteenth century, the Austrian Habsburgs exercised a dominant interest over most of the peninsula, whether through dynastic allegiance or political collaboration. The Grand Duchy of Tuscany, with its capital in the famous city of Florence, was the crown jewel of the independent Italian states. As such, Tuscany's policies and diplomacy held a significant impact on the course of the Restoration and, ultimately, the Risorgimento. Comprehending Tuscan politics is thus particularly crucial for understanding the extent to which the Risorgimento upended the existing European political order. To demonstrate Tuscany's impact on the critical revolutionary years of the Risorgimento, this thesis examines the little-mentioned events that took place in Tuscany between the restoration of the Habsburg-Lorraines in 1814 and the invasion of the Austrian army in 1849. As is demonstrated, the life of Leopold II, from his early reign to the Revolution, provides a unique lens through which historians can observe Tuscany's unpredictable and

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<sup>11</sup> With this decree, Tuscany became the first modern nation to abolish the death penalty. Among Peter Leopold's many reforms, this was perhaps the most enlightened.

<sup>12</sup> In Italian documents, the Habsburg-Lorraines are referred to simply as the Lorenese. Both terms are used throughout this thesis.

tumultuous path to modernization, reform, and unification.

John A. Davis asserts that “the French Revolution and its aftermath profoundly and irreversibly changed the political and cultural contexts of modernization in Italy...[and] marked the close of an unprecedented period of peace and relative political independence.”<sup>13</sup> The changes brought by the French occupation made a significant impact on the development of liberal and radical nationalist groups in the grand duchy. However, the policies of the Habsburg-Lorraines during the Restoration played the dominant role in shaping nineteenth century Tuscany. Chapter 1 discusses these crucial years of stabilization and reform that followed Grand Duke Ferdinand III’s restoration in Tuscany in 1814. It examines Ferdinand’s actions and the impact of his policies and decisions on the beginning of his son’s reign. More specifically, it observes the early rule of the last Grand Duke of Tuscany, Leopold II, and his crucial role in successfully managing and stabilizing Tuscany during the Restoration. In the Italian peninsula, the Restoration period marked an intensification of the struggle for Italian liberation and unification. Ferdinand’s actions directly impacted Leopold’s ability to navigate the rising tensions of reform and revolution. This chapter analyzes the importance of his legacy on Leopold’s successful weathering of the Revolution of 1830.

Chapters 2 and 3 highlight the period of reform that culminated in the birth of a new and constitutional Grand Duchy of Tuscany. Chapter 2 examines Leopold’s policies and actions with an eye toward Tuscany’s place in the international balance of power. In particular, the central concern of chapter 2 is the decline of Austro-Tuscan relations. This faltering relationship between two branches of the Habsburg dynasty presents a fascinating study for examining

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<sup>13</sup> John Anthony Davis, “Introduction” in *Italy in the Nineteenth Century, 1796-1900* (London: Oxford University Press, 2000), 7.

Austria's declining hegemony in the Italian peninsula. The tensions between Vienna and Florence are unique among the many states of the Italian peninsula with ties to the Habsburg throne. While the duchies of Modena and Parma subordinated their interests to Austria during the 1840s, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany asserted its autonomy. An exception to the status quo of Restoration Italy, Tuscany stands to deepen our historical understanding of Austrian hegemony in the Italian peninsula and shines a light on the intricacies of European diplomacy. This chapter concludes with an analysis of Leopold's pivot toward other great powers that led to his break with Austria in the spring of 1848.

Chapter 3 turns inward to examine the grand duchy's internal politics following the promulgation of the Tuscan constitution in February 1848. Leopold's approval of the constitution, or *Statuto fondamentale*, was a crucial turning point in Tuscan politics. Chapter 3 thus begins with the adoption of the Statuto and provides a close examination of internal Tuscan affairs during the "constitutional" period of Leopold's rule. With the birth of Tuscan constitutionalism, liberal and radical factions battled for the support of the masses.

By January 1849, republican nationalists controlled the Tuscan legislature. As they implemented progressively radical policies and advocated Italian nationalism, Leopold recognized the danger their goals posed to his authority. By early February, he clearly understood that the radicals viewed his opinions as obsolete and inconsequential. Chapter 4 discusses the end of Leopold's willing cooperation with the new constitutional government. Rebuffed and insulted by radical politicians, Leopold abandoned the constitutional government and joined the ranks of the anti-nationalist reactionaries. In April, he requested the support of the Austrian army to regain control of his state. He returned to Florence in July 1849 and resumed the throne. However, the continued presence of the Austrian army and his newfound fear of

radicalism ended the enlightened phase of his rule. He revoked the Statuto fondamentale in 1852 and joined the ranks of the reactionaries. Although Leopold remained sovereign until 1859, it was his actions in the spring of 1849 that cost him his birthright as the successor of Franz Stephan, Grand Duke of Tuscany. The loyalty he secured in the first two decades of his rule disappeared, and the goals of Italian nationalists gained popularity among his former supporters.



**Figure 1.1: The Italian peninsula in 1815**

At the beginning of Leopold's reign in 1824, Tuscany was the most liberal and enlightened state on the Italian peninsula. However, Leopold's paternalistic mentality hindered his ability to adapt to the new principles of the nineteenth century such as nationalism. Further, like many of his contemporaries, Leopold failed to recognize the reality of his position until nearly one year of constitutional government had passed. While his mistakes were not unique



among Italian sovereigns, his conduct during the tense years of the late-1840s and his grievous misstep in April 1849 stand apart as a crucial moment in Tuscan history. His years of enlightened rule provide a framework for understanding the difficulties of the Italian liberation and unification project. Thus, the history of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany between 1814 and 1849 demonstrates the crucial changes in both society and politics that made Italian unification in 1861 possible.

## CHAPTER 1

### THE SEARCH FOR STABILITY: THE RESTORATION IN THE GRAND DUCHY OF TUSCANY

The first battles of the French Wars (1792-1815) immersed Europe in a new age of military and diplomatic conflict. As the armies took the field, the peace of Europe, the legitimacy of the *Ancien régime*, and the continent's stability were at stake. The legitimacy of the old order came under attack as the battle cry of the Revolution – *liberté, égalité, fraternité* – reverberated across the continent. “Stability,” Henry Kissinger notes, “has commonly resulted not from a quest for peace but from a generally accepted legitimacy.”<sup>1</sup> With their legitimacy threatened, monarchs formed coalitions against France to preserve the stability of the existing balance of power. As the armies of the French Revolution advanced across Europe, the established states of the *Ancien régime* faced not only war but a threat to their existence.

In 1793, Ferdinand III declared Tuscany's neutrality while many of his neighbors found themselves engulfed in the War of the First Coalition against France. He prudently discerned that war was not in the state's best interest, especially as Tuscany possessed neither an abundance of liquid wealth to fund a war nor an army to fight one. In February 1795, with the war still in the balance, Ferdinand reiterated this neutral status.<sup>2</sup> While his brother, Holy Roman Emperor and Archduke of Austria Francis II, disapproved of this decision, the coalition powers reluctantly accepted Tuscan neutrality.<sup>3</sup> With this matter settled, Ferdinand addressed pressing domestic

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\* The translations of all Italian and French documents used in this research are my own, and as such any errors should be faulted to the present author.

<sup>1</sup> Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822* (London: Ebenezer Baylis and Son Ltd., 1957), 1.

<sup>2</sup> Franz Pesendorfer, *Ferdinando III e la Toscana in età napoleonica* (Firenze: G.C. Sansoni Editore Nuova S.p.A., 1986), 126-7.

<sup>3</sup> Livorno (Leghorn), one of Tuscany's most prominent trade hubs, vehemently asserted its centuries old status as an

affairs, content for the great powers to settle the questions of revolution and order.<sup>4</sup> However, this neutrality proved short-lived. As General Bonaparte's *Armee d'Italie* drove across the Italian peninsula in 1796, Ferdinand and the other rulers of central Italy found themselves in an increasingly difficult situation. For decades, they had relied on the Austrian military as their means of defense. With the Austrians defeated and a brilliant young general rampaging through Italy, their states were in jeopardy.

In a series of sweeping battlefield victories across the plains of northern Italy, Bonaparte challenged Austrian hegemony in the peninsula and ushered in a new era of political and social change. In the wake of the retreating Austrian army, he experimented with state-building and created a series of Italian states tied to France as allies and sister republics. The changes wrought during this "Revolutionary Triennium" (1796-1799) played a crucial role in transforming the peninsula. Bonaparte's statecraft ousted long-established dynasties across the peninsula from their traditional seats of authority, replacing them with liberal, bourgeois regimes. With the obstacles of the old regime removed, French agents and their Italian collaborators transformed local government and political life.

In an effort to preempt a French invasion, Ferdinand and his council of ministers strove to leverage Tuscany's status as "the most liberal of the Italian states" in their favor.<sup>5</sup> During his reign as grand duke, Ferdinand's father, the enlightened Peter Leopold, had been recognized throughout Europe as a liberal, progressive sovereign. While Ferdinand's rule did not reflect that

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"open port." French, British, and neutral vessels sailed in and out of the port, but Livorno remained a hotbed of non-neutral activity. Soon, both French and British voices commented on and condemned Tuscany's blatant manipulation of its neutrality.

<sup>4</sup> Throughout 1795, civil unrest resulting from a poor harvest and rising grain prices remained Ferdinand's most pressing concern. See Pesendorfer, *Ferdinando III*, 130-1.

<sup>5</sup> Christopher Duggan, *The Force of Destiny: A History of Italy since 1796* (Boston, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2008), 168.

of his father, the government hoped that this reputation would be enough to discourage the French from interfering in Tuscan affairs. In early 1797, minister Vittorio Fossombroni met with General Bonaparte to dissuade him from invading the Grand Duchy. He argued that an invasion would be “useless,” because “in Tuscany, democracy already exist[ed] under the scepter of the grand duke.”<sup>6</sup> As proof of the freedoms of the Tuscan people, he sent a copy of his journal, *L'Oracle sur la Toscane*, and emphasized the hallmarks of Leopoldine rule, including free trade and Tuscany’s modern penal code. These overtures proved fruitless. Shortly thereafter, French troops invaded the busy port city of Livorno, shifting the tone of negotiations. Now, with the invasion of Tuscany a *fait accompli*, ministers in Florence strove to convince Bonaparte of the benefits afforded by an independent Tuscany.<sup>7</sup> Ferdinand and his government managed to maintain control of Tuscan affairs for almost two years following the end of the War of the First Coalition in 1797. Nevertheless, the grand duke and his family fled to Vienna on 25 March 1799 as the French army marched on Florence during the War of the Second Coalition.<sup>8</sup>

For the next fifteen years, a carousel of governments cycled through Florence. A brief period of local rule under the *Senato Fiorentino* emerged in the immediate aftermath of 1799. This institution filled the void left by the absent Ferdinand III until the French invaded Tuscany again in October 1800.<sup>9</sup> General Joachim Murat, the successful commander of this operation, supervised the new provisional government with his wife, Carolina Bonaparte, until 1801.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Carlo Mangio, “Rivoluzione e riformismo a confronto: La nascita del mito leopoldino in Toscana,” *Studi Storici* 30, no. 4 (October - December 1989): 955.

<sup>7</sup> Pesendorfer, *Ferdinando III*, 164-7. Minister Vittorio Fossombroni was especially active on this front.

<sup>8</sup> Paolo Bellucci, *I Lorena in Toscana: Gli Uomini e le Opere*, Third Edition (Firenze: Edizioni Medicea, 1985), 111.

<sup>9</sup> Norman Davies, *Vanished Kingdoms: The Rise and Fall of States and Nations* (New York: Penguin Group, 2011), 509.

<sup>10</sup> Davies, *Vanished Kingdoms*, 509.

Following Napoleon's victory in the War of the Second Coalition and the conclusion of the Treaty of Lunéville on 9 February 1801, the son of the Duke of Parma, Lodovico di Borbone, and his wife, Maria-Luisa, infanta of Spain, assumed rule of Tuscany as the king and queen of Etruria.<sup>11</sup> Ultimately unpliant to Napoleon's wishes, they too were deposed in 1807. Shortly after, Princess Elisa Bacciocchi, *née* Bonaparte, presided over Tuscan affairs. As Napoleon's European empire neared its zenith, Ferdinand and his supporters had little reason to hope for a Habsburg-Lorraine restoration.

Ultimately, Bonaparte's actions initiated the first phase of the process that culminated in the birth of a unified Kingdom of Italy: the *Risorgimento*. However, after two decades as the master of Europe, Napoleon's good fortune ended. In 1814, coalition forces captured Paris. A year later, the man that had revolutionized the political, military, and diplomatic history of the western world met his defeat at Waterloo. As he departed for exile on the remote island of Saint Helena, Bonaparte's allies and enemies alike faced a pressing issue: what to do next. Specifically, the diplomats contemplated the best approach to reconfiguring the political borders of Europe, long-ravaged by war and revolution. The period of "restoration" that followed sought to reconcile the old and new regimes. While some of the reforms introduced by the French overlords remained, the map of Europe reverted to its 1789 status.

Based on the legitimacy of rulers and the reconfiguration of states as determined by the victorious powers at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the Restoration focused on *stabilizing* war-weary Europe. To do so, borders were redrawn to resemble the arrangement that had existed before the French Wars. As Christopher Duggan observes, "the rulers of the Restoration wanted to rebuild a world in which hierarchy and order were respected, ... [so] that they could win the

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<sup>11</sup> Bellucci, *I Lorena in Toscana*, 112-3.

hearts and minds of the common people and bind them to their regimes.”<sup>12</sup> For its role in defeating Napoleon, the Habsburg-Lorraine dynasty obtained a dominant and uncontested position in Italian affairs. As compensation for territorial losses in Germany and the Netherlands, Vienna acquired control of much of northern Italy. Dubbed the Kingdom of Lombardia-Venezia, these territories fell under the direct rule of the emperor, supervised by a regent.<sup>13</sup> The duchies of Lucca, Modena, and Parma and the Grand Duchy of Tuscany were granted to members of the Habsburg family. The Papal States, while not under direct Austrian influence, were also linked to Vienna as the Austrian military assumed the role of Pope Pius VII’s *de facto* stabilizing force.<sup>14</sup> In each of these states, the principal task was to return to the social, political, economic, and military structures that existed before 1796. Each state’s ability to navigate the tensions between the conservative principles of the Restoration and the modern, liberal developments of the Napoleonic system defined its domestic affairs for decades.

Prince Klemens von Metternich, Austrian diplomat, foreign minister, chancellor, and architect of the Concert of Europe, played a crucial role in Italian affairs between 1814 and 1848. During the 1820s and 1830s, he assumed the role of enforcing the conservative principles outlined at the Congress of Vienna. His constant intervention in Italian affairs, notably through the 1821 Congress of Verona, did much to shape Italian history. However, his ambitious involvement isolated many Italian sovereigns, including the young Leopold II.<sup>15</sup> The course

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<sup>12</sup> Duggan, *The Force of Destiny*, 76.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 75.

<sup>14</sup> David Laven, “The Age of Restoration,” in *Italy in the Nineteenth Century*, ed. John A. Davis (London: Oxford University Press, 2000), 52.

<sup>15</sup> Leopold II attended the Congress of Verona in 1821, which convened to discuss the affairs of Italy in light of the revolution in the Kingdom of Naples. Metternich dominated the meeting; Leopold and the other rulers of the smaller Italian states played only a minor role. The most crucial development at Verona was Russia’s approval of a provision that granted Austria agency to interfere in the affairs of the Italian states. Leopold and his officials left Verona with growing distrust of Austrian intentions. For more on the Congress, see Alan Reinerman, “Metternich,

Metternich charted for Italian affairs during the Restoration provides crucial insight into the development of early nineteenth century Italy.

Following Napoleon's fall from power in 1814, Ferdinand received sovereignty over the Grand Duchy of Tuscany during the Congress of Vienna. A commission representing the Grand Duke arrived at Florence on 1 May 1814 to proclaim his return.<sup>16</sup> The announcement "raised joy in all orders of the citizens [and] aroused deep and dear memories in the souls of Tuscans."<sup>17</sup> Ferdinand's arrival on 28 September marked the beginning of the Restoration in Tuscany. Along with the sovereign came the traditional Tuscan model of government.<sup>18</sup> Ferdinand immediately announced a reversal to the policies of 1799. On 17 November, he reinstated free trade: a vital component of Tuscan commerce. The restoration of the Catholic Church also emerged as a priority for returning Tuscany to its pre-Napoleonic status. Through extensive negotiations with the Curia in Rome, Ferdinand reinstated religious orders expelled by the French and sought to restore monastic and ecclesiastical property sold to fund the Napoleonic state.<sup>19</sup> In a memorandum from the British Secretary of State in Tuscany, it was noted that by this time, "the existing laws of Tuscany, previous to the year 1799...have been again put in force since the happy restoration of this government."<sup>20</sup>

On paper, Tuscany was uniquely positioned among the restored Italian states to emerge

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Italy and the Congress of Verona, 1821-1822," *The Historical Journal* 14, no. 2 (June 1971): 263-287.

<sup>16</sup> Giovanni Baldasseroni, *Leopoldo II Granduca di Toscana e i suoi tempi; Memorie del Cavaliere Giovanni Baldasseroni* (Firenze: Tipografia all'Insegna di S. Antonino, 1871), 38.

<sup>17</sup> Baldasseroni, *Leopoldo II*, 38.

<sup>18</sup> Bellucci, *I Lorena in Toscana*, 115.

<sup>19</sup> Note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Tuscany to Lord Burghersh, 6 March 1816, *Reports from Committees: Fifteen Volumes. (14.) Roman Catholics, Session 4 February to 8 August 1851. Vol. XX*. Ordered by The House of Commons, to be printed 25 June 1816 and 28 March 1817, Reprinted 14 February 1851 (London: H.M. Stationary Office, 1851), 20:114-115.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 20:114.

as the exemplar of the successful integration of old and new. However, the revitalization of Tuscany as a liberal state remained unaccomplished under Ferdinand. In the early years of his reign, Ferdinand III halted many of his father's reforms and ushered in a period of "gray oppression" and stagnation.<sup>21</sup> Following his expulsion from Tuscany in 1799, a new wave of nostalgia for the Habsburg-Lorraine legacy of enlightened rule emerged. Ferdinand had an opportunity to capitalize on this resurgence of public admiration after his restoration in 1814. Yet, due to the many material challenges of the post-war period, he failed to do so.<sup>22</sup> From Metternich's perspective, the reputation of Lorenese rule and the many natural resources of Tuscany should have played a role in stabilizing the state after Ferdinand's return. Despite these perceived advantages, the difficulties faced by all Restoration governments is evident in the initial years of Ferdinand's rule. Metternich's shock that "a land so highly favoured [sic] by nature should have lost even the hope of a happier existence" under the restored Ferdinand III attests to the impact of the French Wars on the Tuscan state.<sup>23</sup>

Moreover, Ferdinand's immediate return to the "existing laws of Tuscany" during the Restoration was viewed by many as reactionary.<sup>24</sup> However, as both the grand duke's contemporaries and some modern historians have noted, this criticism may be unfounded. Giovanni Baldasseroni, a government minister and advisor during Leopold II's reign, noted that

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<sup>21</sup> "Gray oppression" is a term from Carlo Mangio's article on the legacy of the enlightened Peter Leopold and his influence on the policies of Ferdinand III. This "gray" or "sleepy" period under Ferdinand was dubbed so for the slower pace of reforms and the generally calm atmosphere that prevailed during this uneventful period. Carlo Mangio, "Rivoluzione e riformismo a confronto: La nascita del mito leopoldino in Toscana," *Studi Storici* 30, no. 4 (October - December 1989): 947-967.

<sup>22</sup> Much of Ferdinand III's efforts were directed toward securing enough food for Tuscany in the post-war years. The negative impact of the French Wars on the Tuscan economy paired with several consecutive years of poor harvests increased the difficulty of economic and social recovery during his rule.

<sup>23</sup> "The Internal Condition of Italy, and Metternich's Desire for a National Government of the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom," Metternich, *Memoirs*, no. 245, 3:94.

<sup>24</sup> Mangio, "Rivoluzione e riformismo a confronto," 956. Ferdinand had gained this reputation even prior to his expulsion from Tuscany in 1799.



the image of Ferdinand as a reactionary only emerged “with the ideas of forty-years later, [which] were condemned *en masse* by some historians.”<sup>25</sup> He claims that Ferdinand’s responses to developments during the Restoration were “in the public spirit, to which certain abolitions and restorations were welcome...such as the abolition of various municipal acts or the reestablishment of religious orders.”<sup>26</sup> Under Ferdinand, “the reopening of a convent in some provincial towns and in the countryside was the subject and occasion for public joy.”<sup>27</sup> Thus, while post-unification accounts of Ferdinand’s rule have grounds for condemning him as a reactionary on the basis of Italian nationalist ideologies, his reign is better understood through a more nuanced lens. Michael Broers’s work on Napoleonic Italy also supports a more lenient assessment of Ferdinand, noting that “there was no witch-hunt of collaborators” following Ferdinand’s return.<sup>28</sup> He continues: “however reactionary in some respects, [Ferdinand] restored the Leopoldine codes and abolished capital punishment. In general, the Tuscan restoration proved successful.”<sup>29</sup> If the Restoration’s goals of returning European political affairs to the 1792 status quo and stabilizing a war-torn continent are considered in a wide context, it is clear that Ferdinand adhered to the ideals of the Congress of Vienna. Although perhaps flawed, Ferdinand’s policies fit the basic model Metternich envisioned. While few commentators outside of Tuscany regarded Ferdinand as the ideal heir to his enlightened father, his primary role was to reestablish his dynasty. In this, he succeeded.

Nevertheless, many accounts offer valid criticisms of his regime, notably the corruption

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<sup>25</sup> Baldasseroni, *Leopoldo II*, 40.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 40.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> Michael Broers, *The Napoleonic Empire in Italy, 1796-1814* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 290.

<sup>29</sup> Broers, *The Napoleonic Empire in Italy*, 290.

of his ministry and his shortcomings in managing post-Napoleonic Tuscan affairs. Enrico Montazio, a liberal journalist and constant critic of the grand-ducal regime, highlighted Ferdinand's many failures.<sup>30</sup> For Montazio, Ferdinand's failures to curb ministerial corruption and financial mismanagement ranked high among the grand duke's many failures. Paired with Ferdinand's conciliatory tendencies, the difficulties his government faced during this period lend themselves toward negative interpretation.<sup>31</sup> Ferdinand's deferential attitude to Austrian interests manifested as a dangerous tendency toward reactionary backwardness in the opinions of liberals. Radicals further considered his policies "authoritarian." It is accounts of this nature that have colored modern studies of Ferdinand's rule.

Similarly, in Vienna, Metternich lamented that as "unpleasant as the picture of the present state of Tuscany is drawn, of the weakness of the ministry, of the individuals composing the [grand]ducal ministry, and of the sadly altered feeling in this country, I cannot but feel that it is quite true."<sup>32</sup> In an 1817 dispatch to Emperor Francis of Austria, Metternich commented that "my conversations with the Grand Duke and his ministers convinced me that no State in the world is more easy to govern and make happy than Tuscany."<sup>33</sup> Ironically, Ferdinand's policies largely reflected his deference toward the desires of his brother, Emperor Francis. Nonetheless, Ferdinand's return to pre-revolutionary policies left the state in dire straits. "The Archduke's treasury is always empty," concludes Metternich, "[the] loans to the fiscal board make twelve percent, [many] useful public institutions lie idle, [and] all classes of the population are more or

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<sup>30</sup> Enrico Montazio, *L'ultimo granduca di Toscana* (Firenze: Editori P. Sudrie e C., 1870). His negative view of the Lorenese is present throughout the work, but chapter III is particularly demonstrative of this perspective.

<sup>31</sup> Unlike his father Peter Leopold, Ferdinand III showed no interest in being the enlightened "first citizen" of the Tuscan state. Pesendorfer, *Ferdinando III*, 135.

<sup>32</sup> "The Internal Condition of Italy, and Metternich's Desire for a National Government of the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom," Metternich, *Memoirs*, no. 245, 3:93.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

less discontented.”<sup>34</sup>

The first decade of the Restoration in Tuscany was passively accepted by most Tuscan social classes and special interests. Regardless, small pockets of opposition to Lorenese rule emerged during Ferdinand’s reign. For liberals whose political philosophies drifted toward more radical revolutionary ideologies, Ferdinand’s reactionary tendencies left much to be desired.<sup>35</sup> In the cities, many of the disappointed and reform-minded coalesced in intellectual salons. Often, these social clubs also served as a front for underground revolutionary societies. The most common group was the Freemasons.<sup>36</sup> As members of social clubs discussed reform and liberalism, so too did whispers of Italian nationalism emerge.<sup>37</sup> However, neither these groups nor their radical ideas secured a large following during this time. As revolution shocked Europe in 1820 and 1821, Tuscany remained largely unshaken.<sup>38</sup> So recent were the trials of war and revolution that the vast majority of Tuscans preferred to enjoy the calmness associated with life in Ferdinand’s Tuscany rather than risk upheaval. Further, it is crucial to note that “the atmosphere in Tuscany did not favor conspiracy against the Government.”<sup>39</sup> While Ferdinand’s government did not offer all of the freedoms and liberties the liberal clubs desired, the laws and practices of the Tuscan government remained the most progressive of the Italian states. Thus, the

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<sup>34</sup> Metternich, *Memoirs*, no. 245, 3:94.

<sup>35</sup> The middling merchant and professional classes benefitted most from Napoleon’s bureaucratic and social reforms. This is discussed below.

<sup>36</sup> Freemasonry was present in Tuscany throughout the French Wars and into the Restoration Period. Annina Baretta notes that membership expanded during French rule because of local opposition to French control. “There was not a city in Tuscany that did not have one or more [masonic] lodges,” Annina Baretta, *Le società segrete in Toscana nel 1° decennio dopo la Restaurazione, 1814-1824* (Torino: Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese, 1912), 24-5.

<sup>37</sup> “The Internal Condition of Italy, and Metternich’s Desire for a National Government of the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom,” Metternich, *Memoirs*, no. 245, 3:99.

<sup>38</sup> “Livorno,” ever a center of radical ideologies and popular agitation, “was the first city in Tuscany that reacted to the announcement of the Spanish Revolution in 1820.” However, no major events occurred during this time. Baretta, *Le società segrete in Toscana*, 51.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 68.

majority of Ferdinand's subjects retained a fond affection for their paternalistic *babbo Granduca* "who let them live in peace as long as they limited their desires to simple aspirations."<sup>40</sup> As such, Ferdinand III's Tuscany remained a stable state among a broad constellation of revolution in the 1820s. This success, perhaps Ferdinand's most significant, enabled his successor to progress beyond stabilization.<sup>41</sup>

On 18 June 1824, Ferdinand III died in Florence, ushering in a new era of Tuscan governance.<sup>42</sup> That day, his eldest son, Leopold II, assumed the title of Grand Duke of Tuscany. In his first statement as grand duke, Leopold declared in a *motu proprio* that he would retain all of his father's laws and civil servants.<sup>43</sup> Despite this initial statement of continuity, Leopold quickly initiated reforms to improve the Tuscan bureaucracy. In his memoirs, Leopold relates that as Ferdinand had advanced in age, he offered to take on some of his father's administrative responsibilities. He hoped to both make himself useful and learn more about the state he would one day rule, but his father consistently declined.<sup>44</sup> Denied the opportunity to gain direct experience governing Tuscany, Leopold dedicated himself to studying his grandfather's reign. Especially useful for this undertaking were Peter Leopold's memoirs, the *Relazioni sul Governo della Toscana*, written as a manual of "instruction and guidance for his successors."<sup>45</sup> He observed, in particular, his grandfather's habit of surrounding himself with experts in various industries and trades, his intentional study of his state, and his skills as an administrator. Leopold

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<sup>40</sup> Baretta, *Le società segrete in Toscana*, 51.

<sup>41</sup> Baldasseroni, *Leopoldo II*, 68.

<sup>42</sup> Leopold II, ed. Franz Pesendorfer, *Il governo di famiglia in Toscana: le memorie del granduca Leopoldo II di Lorena (1824-1859)*, (Firenze: Sansoni, 1987), 52-3.

<sup>43</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 55.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 51.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

sought to emulate his grandfather's rule and "contribute...to the prosperity and happiness of Tuscany."<sup>46</sup> Before his father's death, Leopold became acutely aware of the regime's weaknesses.<sup>47</sup> Buoyed by the example set by his grandfather, Leopold II resolved to forge a different path.

The aristocracy and ministerial elite, urban merchant class, rural peasantry, and artisans and urban working class each played a part in tempering the return to normalcy promoted by the Restoration. Each of these special interest groups, regardless of political leanings, had supported the restored grand-ducal regime for the sake of stability. Their reward was embodied by the young Leopold II and his enthusiastic and genuine promotion of the Tuscan state. Even before assuming the throne, Leopold distinguished himself as an advocate for change and advancement. He invested heavily in the arts and sciences, sponsoring compilations of the works of Galileo Galilei and Lorenzo de Medici, "the Magnificent."

After assuming power, he cultivated the reputation of an enlightened ruler by initiating policies to enhance infrastructure and improve the commoner's standard of living. Like Peter Leopold, he was soon regarded as an open-minded, enlightened, progressive ruler. Even Leopold's most ardent critics acknowledged that the young grand duke was a vast improvement over his father.<sup>48</sup> Long after his decline and fall, Leopold was remembered for "his indisputable righteousness, [and] his severity in preventing others from being dishonest."<sup>49</sup> For his supporters, Leopold fulfilled his grandfather's legacy in his openness to modernization and "liberal" reform.

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<sup>46</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 55.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid. Again, ministerial corruption was the foremost of these issues.

<sup>48</sup> Montazio, *L'ultimo granduca*, 289. Montazio, while maintaining his typical criticism of the grand ducal regime, concedes that progress was made despite "the worm infiltrating all the institutions of the state."

<sup>49</sup> Lorenzo Grottanelli, *I moti politici in Toscana nella prima metà del secolo XIX: studiati sopra i rapporti segreti inediti della polizia* (Prato: Tipografia Successori Vestri, 1902), 9.

Early in his reign, his subjects viewed the grand duke as “young in years, but mature in his wits.” According to Baldasseroni, Leopold “immediately understood the seriousness of his duties as sovereign.”<sup>50</sup> Later, his tolerance of public discourse and active encouragement of scientific, commercial, and infrastructural developments bolstered the Grand Duchy’s reputation as a modern state. While the reforms he implemented resembled those of the “great Napoleon,” Leopold understood his legacy as stemming from the enlightened Peter Leopold, not the French Revolution or Empire.<sup>51</sup>

Both my father and I governed Tuscany as my grandfather [Peter Leopold] had done, and Tuscany was free, happy, and prosperous. Many shrewd advances were made, always with attention to that which was best for Tuscany. The government was a content and calm observer of these developments. Our merits as rulers lay only in removing obstacles for Tuscans to live good and peaceful lives.<sup>52</sup>

Both ruler and ruled valued the liberal and modern traditions of Tuscany. Leopold’s emphasis on the legacy of Peter Leopold served to add legitimacy to his reign.

As life in Tuscany continued to improve, enthusiasm for Leopold’s reforms could be seen in all strata of Tuscan society. His earliest acts focused on streamlining the bureaucracy and improving the health of his people. Notably, in November 1824, he removed the tax on meat, making it affordable for the farming and working classes to improve their diets.<sup>53</sup> In spring 1826, Leopold increased the autonomy of the Council of Ministers to allow the heads of finance,

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<sup>50</sup> Baldasseroni, *Leopoldo II*, 60.

<sup>51</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 68.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 69.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 59. This tax on the “seal of meat and proceeds from slaughterhouses,” was based on older traditions of “slaughtering rights.” The tax on slaughtering, much like mill taxes and fees, increased the price of meat beyond the reach of the average peasant. By eliminating this tax, which Leopold believed “opposed both the interests of proprietors and consumers,” the meat “industry” was modernized. Bellucci, *I Lorena in Toscana*, 119-21. The tax Leopold revoked previously applied to any animal that was taken to a butcher for slaughter. If an animal were slaughtered by its owners, the tax did not apply. *Repertorio del diritto patrio toscano vigente ossia Spoglio alfabetico e lettera delle più interessanti disposizioni legislative veglianti nel granducato*, Second Edition (Firenze: Per Aureliano Giuliani, 1837) 5:255-6.

war, domestic, and foreign affairs to assume greater control and “speed in the handling of ordinary matters.”<sup>54</sup> This, in turn, “increased time for [Leopold] to focus on larger projects and the study of his country.”<sup>55</sup> He established the corps of engineers, thus streamlining the process for improving roads and planning Tuscan’s infant rail system.<sup>56</sup> Most famously, Leopold initiated the reclamation of the Maremma. This marshy region, long plagued with malaria and unsuitable for agriculture, became a central priority for Leopold. In 1828, he declared the “remediation” of the Maremma and initiated projects for irrigation, drainage, and other infrastructure.<sup>57</sup> As these ventures progressed, Leopold observed that “Tuscany grew in prestige and consideration among the civilized nations, as well as in internal prosperity.” Life in Tuscany, he noted, “was getting easier and easier.”<sup>58</sup>

The support of the Tuscan peasant and artisan classes played a significant role in securing Leopold’s reign. In 1841, the population of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany was approximately 1,500,000. According to the census, nearly fifty-six percent was employed in agriculture, twenty-eight percent in industry, twelve in commerce, and the remaining four percent fell under miscellaneous professions.<sup>59</sup> As had been the case for the Leopoldine and Napoleonic regimes, the support or opposition of the small peasant farmer had a decisive influence on the state’s stability. During Peter Leopold’s reign, revolts had erupted after the initial implementation of free trade caused an increase in grain prices. While the revolts of the 1790s developed primarily

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<sup>54</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 78.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 79.

<sup>56</sup> Bellucci, *I Lorena in Toscana*, 121.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 121. In Italian, the “bonificazione della Maremma.”

<sup>58</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 95.

<sup>59</sup> Marion S. Miller, “Communes, Commerce and *Coloni*: Internal Divisions in Tuscany 1830-1860,” *The Historical Journal* 21, no. 4 (December 1978): 839.

due to hunger and fear for basic needs, the revolts during the French period took on a more political character.

Ironically, as Ferdinand and Fossombroni sought to appease the French by emphasizing the *liberal* qualities of Tuscan politics in 1799, political conservatives remained the government's most ardent supporters. As the grand duke and his family fled into exile, their authority was upheld not by the educated and monied classes but by the peasant and urban working classes.<sup>60</sup> For the Tuscan lower class, church and crown were the pillars that sustained and stabilized everyday life. The elimination of the reigning grand duke, regarded as the protector of the poor, posed a threat to their world.<sup>61</sup> The second pillar fell after the grand duke's replacements implemented anticlerical policies inspired by the rationalism of the Enlightenment. As liberal reform continued, the peasantry coalesced into a formidable counterrevolutionary bloc throughout the countryside. While wealthy merchants and other members of the "propertied classes benefitted from many of the Napoleonic policies," the difficulties of the lower class only increased.<sup>62</sup> Peasants romanticized Lorenese rule as they bore the brunt of new conscription laws and increased taxation. The French brought changes that affected church, state, and society in addition to trade and production. Thus, while Peter Leopold's policies had seemed revolutionary in 1790, the more radical French policies far outpaced his reforms. In hindsight, the peasantry preferred the reforms and changes of earlier Leopoldine policies to the upheaval and change of French rule. As the ideological successor of the Leopoldine legacy, Leopold II benefitted from the romanticization of Peter Leopold that occurred during the Napoleonic period. Such nostalgia

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<sup>60</sup> Alexander Grab, *Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 165; Broers, *The Napoleonic Empire in Italy*, 67-8.

<sup>61</sup> This understanding was common throughout the *Ancien régime*.

<sup>62</sup> Grab, *Napoleon and the Transformation*, 165.



secured and maintained the support of the conservative lower class.

For the Tuscan peasantry, well known for its counterrevolutionary and conservative tendencies, the end of Napoleonic rule and the restoration of the Lorenese provided the desired outcome: a return to what had been before. After the Restoration, this demographic remained the largest base of support for the Tuscan House of Habsburg-Lorraine. Further, it indicated stabilization of the state that ensured them an opportunity to return to their everyday lives. Conscription ceased, and throne and altar were restored. In the countryside, all was well. One of Leopold II's earliest reforms demonstrated the balance between modernizing the economy and preserving familiar social dynamics. The sovereign was restored as the defender of the poor. Leopold's genuine desire to care for his subjects as a father bolstered his subjects' approval and admiration. With the exception of the occasional grain riot during times of famine, the lower classes remained a stronghold of support for Leopold through the first two decades of his reign.

The middle class responded to the reforms of the French Revolution differently than did the peasantry. Tuscany's strong merchant class had defined urban life since the late Middle Ages. As Jacobin clubs spread throughout the peninsula in the 1790s, their revolutionary ideas found adherents in liberal Tuscany.<sup>63</sup> The French Revolution's emphasis on property rights appealed to the propertied *galantuomini*, or *petit bourgeoisie*.<sup>64</sup> After Ferdinand fled in 1799, the French turned to the propertied, literate, and wealthy, looking for enthusiastic citizens to serve in their new government. Seeking social advancement, the middle class formed a solid core of support for Napoleonic rule.<sup>65</sup> Compared to the "gray oppression" of the authoritarian Ferdinand

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<sup>63</sup> However, Stuart Woolf notes that true Jacobinism "did not exist" in states "where reformism had been most successful, as in Tuscany." While the term was used by conservatives to discredit reformers as radicals, Jacobinism was not prominent in Tuscany. Stuart J. Woolf, *A history of Italy 1700-1860: The Social Constraints of Political Change* (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1979), 167, 183.

<sup>64</sup> Marion S. Miller, "Italian Jacobinism," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 11, no. 2 (Winter 1977-1978): 248, 251.

<sup>65</sup> The French found more support among the urban middle class than it did the rural, who were generally "hostile to

III, the French appeared to offer greater opportunities for realizing the “political-constitutional guarantees glimpsed in the work of the ‘sovereign philosopher,’ [Peter Leopold].”<sup>66</sup> However, pro-French Tuscans failed to “offer a possible bridge to alliance with the masses.”<sup>67</sup> Paired with French attacks on the church, the consistent emphasis on property rights only served to alienate the conservative peasantry further.<sup>68</sup> The peasants considered anyone who collaborated with the French regime to be *giacobini*, regardless of the individual’s political ideology. Further south, it was said that “whoever has bread and wine, / Must be a Jacobine [*sic*].”<sup>69</sup> Powerful, urban conservatives encouraged this stigmatization and sought to include all reform-minded Tuscans in this group of collaborators to discredit earlier Leopoldine reforms.<sup>70</sup> This rift in Tuscan society, born in the first decades of the nineteenth century, defined political and economic affairs through the 1850s.<sup>71</sup>

The Tuscan aristocracy exhibited both positive and negative responses to French rule. Not unlike the wealthy merchants, many liberal nobles fully supported the changes brought by the French Revolution. Under Napoleon, the *amalgame* distinguished both wealthy *galantuomini* and members of the nobility as a new class of “notables.” Those aristocrats who supported the regime, frequently the less wealthy lower nobility, were rewarded for their loyalty with

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the French.” Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*, 183.

<sup>66</sup> Mangio, “Rivoluzione e riformismo a confronto,” 956.

<sup>67</sup> Miller, “Italian Jacobinism,” 249.

<sup>68</sup> Stuart Woolf notes that throughout Italy, the shift “towards more capitalist forms of agriculture was encouraged by the Italian governments despite the...negative effects on the smallholding peasantry. ... The peasants were despoiled of their traditional communal rights, while the division of the demesial lands into small plots...was blocked by the owners of the vast grain estates and sheep-runs or misappropriated by the bourgeois and noble landowners.” Whereas in France, the peasantry reaped the benefits of the division of seigneurial lands, most Italian peasants were despoiled of their traditional privileges as modern production favored large commercial estates. Woolf, *A history of Italy 1700-1860*, 318.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, 184.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, 183.

<sup>71</sup> Miller, “Communes, Commerce and *Coloni*,” 838.

government posts traditionally reserved for the elite.<sup>72</sup> Thus, much like liberal members of the middle class, the nobles who supported the French regimes did so out of a spirit of enthusiasm for liberal reform and hope for personal advancement. Some aristocrats who had served the grand duke in 1799, including Fossombroni and Count Neri Corsini, retained their ministerial posts through the entirety of the French Wars and well into the Restoration.<sup>73</sup>

The early years of the Restoration brought little change for those who had enthusiastically welcomed and benefitted from French reforms. While Ferdinand III revoked many French reforms in favor of returning to Leopoldine policies, he upheld laws reducing or eliminating seigneurial privileges and secured the support of the new administrative class created by the French system.<sup>74</sup> For those with a sustained interest in reform, the enlightened policies of Leopold II demonstrated “hope in favor of a liberal evolution of the grand-ducal regime.”<sup>75</sup> Many continued the same work they had begun in the 1810s, now under the banner of the leopoldine legacy rather than that of the French Revolution. Further, the consistency of the bureaucracy and council of ministers manifested by the long careers of men like Fossombroni and Corsini lent an air of consistency that further secured Lorenese rule.

Conversely, many more conservative members of the upper nobility staunchly opposed the changes brought by the French, primarily due to the threat that the new social order posed to their traditional aristocratic privileges. After Napoleon established Elisa Bonaparte as the ruler of Tuscany, many of the “great patrician families revoked their support of the Napoleonic regime,

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<sup>72</sup> Thomas Kroll, *La Rivolta del Patriziato: Il liberalismo della nobiltà nella Toscana del Risorgimento*, trans. Loredana Melissari (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki Editore, 2005), 27.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 27.

<sup>75</sup> Mangio, “Rivoluzione e riformismo a confronto,” 967.

retiring from public life and refusing positions of honor.”<sup>76</sup> The sale of *beni nazionali*, or “national assets” – primarily land previously held as clerical and monastic estates – enabled many notables to increase their social status in displays of wealth, further threatening the status of the ancient nobility. The equality under the law established by Napoleon’s judicial reform only served to solidify the upper nobility’s passive opposition to the Napoleonic state. After Ferdinand’s restoration in 1814, many hoped that their privileges would be restored and laws that facilitated the shifting social dynamics revoked. However, these hopes were disappointed. First, Ferdinand announced in May 1814 that he would retain public servants in the posts they had acquired under Napoleon. Second, on 6 July, he upheld the abolition of seigneurial privilege.<sup>77</sup> Under Leopold II, the same ancient families offended by Napoleonic social reform balked at the elevation of bourgeois public servants in the grand-ducal court.<sup>78</sup> Famously, Giovanni Baldasseroni’s nomination as chamberlain of the royal household caused outrage in the upper echelons of Tuscan society.<sup>79</sup> Throughout Leopold’s reign, the upper nobility perceived these appointments as threats to their traditional influence and prestige. Ultimately, Leopold’s promotion of a more liberal and modern government cost him the “dynastic loyalty [of] large sectors of the Tuscan nobility.”<sup>80</sup> Nevertheless, the relative stability offered by the restored regime ensured the passive support of even the most disaffected nobles.

Whether Tuscans had supported or opposed the French, the return of the Lorenese in 1814 brought much-needed stability to all sectors of society. In Vienna, Metternich noted the

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<sup>76</sup> Kroll, *La Rivolta del Patriziato*, 26.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 29, 27.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, 55.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, 55.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, 58.

general improvement of Tuscan affairs under Leopold compared to Ferdinand's rule. Following a trip through the Italian peninsula in 1829, some five years into Leopold's rule, Metternich notes that in Tuscany, "the villages are numerous, and industry is everywhere highly developed."<sup>81</sup> Similarly, Baldasseroni claims that under Leopold's rule, "Tuscany was then profoundly calm...the rule [was] mild and not arrogant; obedience easy and not servile; great tolerance [was] reciprocated with general affection. The country was prosperous."<sup>82</sup> As Leopold improved roads, industry, and local bureaucracy, his success gained international attention. He proudly notes that even "England, the teacher in matters commercial, had already in the first years of my rule asked for the Tuscan ration laws for use in the discussions in Parliament."<sup>83</sup> Baldasseroni emphasizes that "the state of sweet and profound tranquility was essential" for the success of Leopold's early reign, as he "had hitherto remained completely extraneous to public affairs."<sup>84</sup> Even contemporaries noted that Ferdinand's rule facilitated Leopold's emergence as an enlightened and modern ruler. His success rested on the stability secured by his father's uneventful and successful rule.

In his analysis of the Congress of Vienna, Henry Kissinger cites Metternich in his assertion that "to be a conservative...required neither return to a previous period, nor reaction, but carefully considered reform. True conservatism implied an active policy."<sup>85</sup> While Kissinger's interpretation highlights the initial years of the Restoration, well before Leopold II assumed rule, his observations clarify much about the situation in Tuscany. Further, they can

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<sup>81</sup> Metternich to his son Victor, 5 June 1829, Metternich, *Memoirs*, no. 933, 4:580.

<sup>82</sup> Baldasseroni, *Leopoldo II*, 59.

<sup>83</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 68.

<sup>84</sup> Baldasseroni, *Leopoldo II*, 59-60.

<sup>85</sup> Kissinger, *A World Restored*, 195.

help modern readers understand the difficulties that both Ferdinand and Leopold faced. Ferdinand's conservatism caused him to commit the critical error of responding to the difficulties of recovery with an immediate attempt to turn back the clock to before the French conquest. He was neither original nor unique in this reaction, as contemporary observers from across the political spectrum noted.<sup>86</sup> His critics decried his personal flaws as the root of Tuscany's problems. While Tuscany's Restoration experience was not identical to that of other small Italian states, the difficulties Ferdinand's critics faced resembled those of subjects of the Papal States or the Duchy of Modena. In fact, the average Tuscan likely fared better than their neighbor, as even under Ferdinand Tuscan rule was more open and liberal than the other Restoration regimes. The difficulties Metternich noted in Tuscany in 1817 had been widespread in Europe since 1815.<sup>87</sup> Nevertheless, those that had supported Napoleonic reform attributed the economic recession and agricultural misfortune to the Restoration system itself.

Alternatively, Leopold II's success rested on his recognition of the need for carefully considered reform. A "true conservative," Kissinger notes, "knows that a stable social structure thrives not on triumphs but on reconciliations."<sup>88</sup> Thus, by encouraging agricultural growth, industrial development, and economic and bureaucratic reform, Leopold distinguished himself from the "old regime." While still a conservative, he successfully reconciled the structures of his absolute authority as grand duke with gracious concessions to the popular classes through local improvement and modernization. His penchant for reform helped him collaborate with his ministers, and his openness to change allowed him to maintain a stable government. Meanwhile,

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<sup>86</sup> Baldasseroni, *Leopoldo II*, 39-40.

<sup>87</sup> "The Internal Condition of Italy, and Metternich's Desire for a National Government of the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom," Metternich, *Memoirs*, 3:245. Metternich's criticisms of Tuscan affairs are not unlike those he voices of the other Italian regimes.

<sup>88</sup> Kissinger, *A World Restored*, 193.

rulers of neighboring states struggled to manage social unrest and general discontent. By observing the errors of his father's ministry prior to assuming the throne, Leopold successfully secured the authority and legitimacy of his dynasty. In his declaration that he would preserve the laws and strictures of his father's rule, he assured the Tuscan people of the government's continued commitment to stability. By enhancing social and bureaucratic stability and allowing for the modernization and improvement demanded by the changing times, he succeeded in bringing Tuscany forward into the changing world of the nineteenth-century.

Leopold's early success enabled him to preserve his rule as revolution racked other Restoration states in 1830. Leopold was in Saxony visiting his wife's family when news of the Parisian revolt arrived on 3 August 1830. Following Charles X's abdication on 10 August, Prince Louis-Phillippe, Duc d'Orleans replaced him as king. As the people of France reveled in the birth of their constitutional monarchy, Leopold rushed to Vienna to confer with his uncle, Emperor Francis, and Prince Metternich.<sup>89</sup> Forty years prior, such events had signaled the beginning of decades of war and chaos. Tensions were high in the imperial court, as all feared the end of the Concert of Europe. Further reports of uprisings in Naples and Bologna unsettled the young grand duke. Italy, it seemed, would not be spared by these new developments. After receiving counsel at Vienna, Leopold anxiously departed for Florence. His concerns proved unwarranted, as he found his country relatively peaceful. Despite the unrest throughout the peninsula, "Tuscany remained comparatively quiet and idle."<sup>90</sup> Baldasseroni noted that the shocks of the French Revolution of 1830 disturbed Tuscany much less than it did the other states of Italy.<sup>91</sup> However, "such happiness must not endure long. The French Revolution [of 1830], as

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<sup>89</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 124.

<sup>90</sup> Montazio, *L'ultimo granduca*, 37.

<sup>91</sup> Baldasseroni, *Leopoldo II*, 90.

is known, moved the various parts of Italy; Tuscany, which had remained the quietest of all, did not fail to give small signs that even there the revolutionary yeast was rising.”<sup>92</sup>

Revolt remained far from the minds of most Tuscans in 1830, as notables focused on continued reforms after the grand duke’s return. The Tuscan regime weathered the storms of 1830 with only minor disturbances. In the early years of his rule, Leopold had fulfilled not only the conservative goals for the Restoration but also his subjects’ desire for stability. His restoration of “throne and altar” secured the respect of over fifty percent of the population. His investment in commerce and industry appealed to the wealthy, whether dependent on agriculture or trade for their wealth. The stability his regime provided led many to reflect on the happiness to be found in Tuscany, especially compared to the turbulence of the French Wars. While other governments, notably that of the Duchy of Modena, relied on the Austrian army to reassert their rule in the 1830s, Leopold successfully steered Tuscany through yet another period of widespread upheaval.<sup>93</sup>

As Baldasseroni noted, this happiness would not last forever. It is appropriate now to return to Kissinger’s examination of the Council of Vienna and the Restoration. In Metternich’s model for Restoration-era Europe, “reform had to be a product of order and not of will.”<sup>94</sup> This crucial point, which highlights the role of authority and legitimacy in the midst of reform, is key to understanding the Restoration. Leopold’s early rule embodied the conservative restorationist model of measured and intentional reform. However, external pressures threatened to replace these reforms from above, based on order, with reforms from below, conceded in response to

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<sup>92</sup> Baldasseroni, *Leopoldo II*, 94.

<sup>93</sup> Montazio, *L’ultimo granduca*, 36-37; Modenese affairs were dominated by a reactionary tone from the first years of the Restoration. See also, Laven, “The Age of Restoration,” 55-6, 59.

<sup>94</sup> Kissinger, *A World Restored*, 195.



popular agitation and violence. While successful in stabilizing states caught in the throes of latent Jacobinism, reform from below presented challenges to stable regimes as nationalist and liberal enthusiasm grew. This reform-centered tension became the central conflict between Vienna and Florence in the years preceding the 1848 Revolutions. Yet, for the moment, the balance of legitimate authority, intentional reform, and public works stabilized Tuscany in a sea of change. Building on the stability secured by Ferdinand III, Leopold's liberal affinity for reform fulfilled popular desires for both stability and progress. For now, Tuscan governance demonstrated the effectiveness of Metternich's Restoration model.

In conclusion, the turbulence and uncertainty of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods predisposed most Tuscans toward a desire for stability that surpassed any interest in burgeoning nationalist movements. Tuscans "willingly witnessed the return of their sovereigns, as the Restoration seemed to them appropriate rest after such great and rapid ruin."<sup>95</sup> After two decades of war and change, the restored and respected House of Habsburg-Lorraine presented the most obvious option for securing the peace Tuscans desired. Even considering the general dissatisfaction and poverty that dominated the early years of the Restoration, stability remained the top priority in Tuscan social, economic, and political spheres. The restoration of the Lorenese under Grand Duke Ferdinand III represented a return to the policies and enlightened traditions that shaped life in Tuscany prior to the French invasions. Conservatives hoped that Tuscany would emerge as an example of successful reform by highlighting the long tradition of Tuscan liberalism. However, for more radical liberals, the post-war years from 1815 to 1824 were only a return to the "gray oppression" that had defined Ferdinand's pre-revolutionary reign.

With the beginning of Leopold II's reign in 1824, Tuscan society emerged from the

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<sup>95</sup> Baretta, *Le società segrete in Toscana*, 9.

malaise that had dominated his father's rule. As the young grand duke's initiatives for promoting growth and modernization materialized, many rejoiced at the prospect of another Tuscan "philosopher king."<sup>96</sup> David Laven notes that under Leopold II, "the Grand Duchy of Tuscany...bec[ame] a byword for good government."<sup>97</sup> . While Ferdinand III successfully reestablished his dynasty following the Congress of Vienna, his son, Leopold II, fulfilled the essence of the Restoration. This was due in large part to his government's success in emphasizing not the legacy of "the *monarchia amministrativa* of French domination...but the enlightened Leopoldine government of the late eighteenth century."<sup>98</sup> This success enabled the Tuscan monarchy to weather the storms of revolt that delegitimized the rule of its neighbors.

As noted, the quest for stability guided Metternich's hand during the Restoration. Essential to his plans for Tuscany was the stability of the restored Lorenese regime. For Ferdinand III, reestablishing his line as sovereigns of Tuscany remained paramount. His close relationship with his brother, Emperor Francis II of Austria, meant that the issue of Lorenese legitimacy remained inexorably tied to the Viennese dynasty.<sup>99</sup> In some cases, his deference to Emperor Francis only exacerbated local criticisms, thus stoking the embers of revolutionary desires that the French Wars had kindled. Nevertheless, Ferdinand ultimately succeeded in the task set before him by the Congress of Vienna – even if revolutionaries quietly waited for their day to take action.

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<sup>96</sup> In Italian, *sovrano filosofo*.

<sup>97</sup> Laven, "The Age of Restoration," 57.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, 57-8.

<sup>99</sup> Archduke of Austria Francis I was crowned Emperor Francis I in 1804 to preempt Napoleon Bonaparte's assumption of the imperial title in France, presumably as a claim to Charlemagne's crown. Francis remained Holy Roman Emperor Francis II until the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, by Napoleon, two years later in 1806.

## CHAPTER 2

### BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE: LEOPOLD, REFORM, AND THE CONSERVATIVE STATUS QUO

The French Revolution of 1830 sparked an increase in calls for liberal democracy and reform throughout most of Italy. While Tuscany did not experience revolt or agitation during France's transition to constitutional monarchy, the ideas espoused by French reforms gained popularity and sparked discourse among Leopold II's subjects. During the 1830s and 1840s, educated circles in Florence planned for the future liberalization of their state. Meanwhile, the port city of Livorno emerged as a center of more radical ideologies. By the mid-1840s, political demands in Tuscany reflected the trends visible throughout Europe: civil liberty, individual rights, and popular sovereignty, all of which were viewed as keys to successful government. Compared to liberal and radical political philosophy, the stability offered by the patriarchal Restoration regimes no longer satisfied reformers. Soon, the tension between "administrative monarchy" and liberal democracy initiated a new wave of reform and revolution that defined the nineteenth century.<sup>1</sup>

As the formerly conservative, restorationist states of Metternich's "Concert of Europe" modernized and liberalized their governments, the agreements that had stabilized the continent after the tumult of the French Wars met their end in the Italian peninsula. While the system would limp along for several years outside of Italy, the rise of Italian nationalism following the Revolutions of 1830 and 1831 signaled the beginning of the end for the Metternichian system. The relationship between Austria, the one-time guarantor of stability in Italy, and its former

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<sup>1</sup> Duggan, *The Force of Destiny*, 75. Duggan uses "administrative monarchy" to define the Restoration-era monarchies that implemented the centralized bureaucracy introduced by the French.

client states was forever changed. By 1848, the tensions between Vienna and the peninsula escalated to the point of war. To understand the rupture between Austria and the various states of Italy, it is necessary to first examine the period of reform that preceded the "Year of Revolutions."

Leopold II and the Grand Duchy of Tuscany provide an exemplary case study for understanding the decline of Austrian hegemony in the Italian peninsula. The close familial ties between Florence and Vienna ensured that Tuscany, even more than the other Habsburg states of the peninsula, held a special status in Vienna's Italian policy. As such, the decay of the relationship between Tuscany and Austria in the mid-1840s presents a particularly interesting study for examining the diplomatic and political developments of the mid-1840s. The tensions between Vienna and Florence are unique among the many states of the Italian peninsula with ties to the Habsburg throne. While the duchies of Modena and Parma continually subordinated their interests to Austria during the 1840s, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany asserted its autonomy during Leopold II's rule.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, it emerges as an exception to the status quo of Restoration Italy.

An examination of the breakdown of Austro-Tuscan relations begins with the period of intense reform and social unrest in late 1846 continuing through early 1848. These years rank among the most chaotic of Leopold II's thirty-five-year reign and did much to define the course of the Risorgimento in Tuscany. Leopold's willingness to pursue liberal initiatives drove a wedge between Florence and Vienna, as his progressive tendencies and openness to liberal political ideologies exceeded Metternich's tolerance. By January 1848, the two states were estranged and on a collision course that culminated in the declaration of the *Statuto fondamentale* and the First

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<sup>2</sup> Both Modena and Parma were shaken by the revolutions of 1831 in Italy while Tuscany remained unaffected. As such, the 1830s and 1840s were defined by their harsh and reactionary policies. Austrian troops remained in both Parma and Modena to discourage revolutionary uprisings, further contributing to the repression of liberal ideas. Harry Hearder, *Italy in the Age of the Risorgimento, 1790-1870* (London: Routledge, 2014), 75-9.

War for Italian Liberation.

As Leopold's relationship with Vienna deteriorated, he looked elsewhere for diplomatic support. This search for allies revealed Leopold's plans to reconfigure Tuscany's international position and diplomatic strategy. Britain, a near-constant mediator, and Piedmont, the emerging Italian power, stood apart as the most crucial strategic relationships for the Tuscan state. The development of these relationships provided the synergy that led to the origins, course, and outcome of the First War for Italian Liberation. Liberalization and reform fueled the popular nationalism that spurred Piedmont and Tuscany toward war with Austria in March 1848.<sup>3</sup>

In 1846, the Italian peninsula was home to eight independent or semi-independent kingdoms, duchies, and states.<sup>4</sup> Each, including the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, remained dependent on the support of the Austrian empire. The Congress system established in 1815 had allowed for a degree of reform and local initiative to maintain peace and calm, but Austria dictated the policies of the Italian states. Acceptable reforms were those ordered toward maintaining the restored *Ancien régime* states, not following the course of liberalization that the French Revolution had initiated. Therefore, "Austrian policy in Italy, as in the rest of its empire, was opposed to all change."<sup>5</sup>

While some Italian states willingly subordinated their interests to Vienna, Tuscany did not. Leopold was especially proud of Tuscany's long tradition of autonomy and enlightened rule. Following his experience at the Congress of Verona in 1821, he tacitly resisted Austrian

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<sup>3</sup> King Carlo Alberto of Piedmont bore the brunt of the responsibility for the War for Italian Liberation. However, both Leopold and King Ferdinand of Naples supported the war effort. Duggan, *The Force of Destiny*, 171.

<sup>4</sup> In October and November 1847, tension between Tuscany and Modena escalated due to disagreements over the legality of Tuscany's annexation of the Duchy of Lucca. The number of states in the Italian peninsula was thus reduced from eight to seven late in 1847.

<sup>5</sup> Woolf, *A History of Italy*, 295.

intervention in his state. This rejection of Vienna's guidance contrasted starkly with his father's deference to the head of the Habsburg dynasty. Ferdinand III's conciliatory responses to the more assertive policies of his elder brother, Emperor Francis, had significantly enhanced Austria's influence on Tuscan affairs.<sup>6</sup> However, Leopold II chose to solidify Tuscan autonomy, as his grandfather, Peter Leopold, had done. As domestic tension increased during the 1840s, his opposition to Vienna's oversight likewise increased. Regardless, Leopold's direct familial ties to the Austrian emperor defined Tuscany's interactions with Vienna. Nevertheless, the Lorenese held a unique status among the Austrian satellite states because the grand duke remained a candidate for succession to the imperial throne.<sup>7</sup> As such, Vienna maintained a heavily vested interest in the wellbeing of the grand duke and his duchy.

Leopold's early rule was distinguished by his efforts to improve infrastructure and stabilize his state. During his reign, Tuscany became a haven for artists and scholars whose work was deemed too controversial elsewhere.<sup>8</sup> Notable among this group was the author Gian Pietro Vieusseux, editor of the liberal-democratic journal *Antologia*.<sup>9</sup> Leopold established an annual congress of scientists and inventors, fostered infrastructural and scientific progress, and cultivated modern economic reform, notably the idea of free trade. His reign witnessed relatively open venues for academic discussion and less restrictive censorship laws than in neighboring states. Unfortunately for Leopold, his progressive outlook brought unwanted attention. In

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<sup>6</sup> While Emperor Francis "was fond of Italy and admired its culture," his priority was his empire. As such, Austrian policies involving the Italian peninsula centered on reducing French influence. Duggan, *The Force of Destiny*, 78. After Francis's death in 1835, his son Ferdinand ascended to the throne. Ferdinand I was a weak ruler, and as such Metternich dominated Austrian affairs during his reign.

<sup>7</sup> As it was, Leopold II was third in line for the Habsburg throne.

<sup>8</sup> Notable among these enlightened intellectuals was Gian Pietro Vieusseux. During the 1830s and 1840s, Tuscany emerged as the center of liberal political discussion and theory. Duggan, *The Force of Destiny*, 146. The *gabinetti*, or *salons*, he organized are discussed more in the following chapter.

<sup>9</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 55-61.

particular, the reports Metternich received from the Austrian envoy at Florence, Count Louis de Bombelles, “revealed the extent of liberal tendencies in Tuscany.”<sup>10</sup> Regardless, Tuscany – “the most liberal of the Italian States” – weathered the shocks of the 1830 Revolutions with few disturbances. Leopold retained the faith of the Tuscan people as he remained steadfast in his desire for modernization.<sup>11</sup>

However, this situation changed in the 1840s as cries for liberalism and liberation overpowered calls for continued local development. During Carnevale in 1846, an “antigovernment” operative slipped a pamphlet into Leopold's carriage as it drove through Florence. The anonymous author declared that while he “did not desire the declaration of a constitution in Tuscany...the times call for laws, there is a need for helmsmen in these difficult times and a means for forming statesmen, which are lacking. This is a common and general opinion.”<sup>12</sup> Although it does not appear particularly revolutionary, this anonymous criticism of the grandducal regime represented the moderate political bloc's desires for reform. Far from a radical, the author nevertheless desired major changes in the Tuscan ruling establishment. The pamphlet's demand for “helmsmen” and the “statesmen,” that were “lacking” reflects a common point of dissatisfaction among Tuscany's politically conscious intelligentsia.

During the Restoration, ministerial corruption ranked among the highest concerns of reformers. Traditionally, the grand duke's advisors were faulted for the errors of government rather than the grand duke himself. Thus, this call for reform continued a long pattern of popular

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<sup>10</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 68-9. Count de Bombelles notes his concern that constitutional France was emerging as the standard of government among all sectors of Tuscan society. He notes that, “Above all, it is important to prevent the discontented...from gathering, agreeing and forming a league of which France becomes the soul.”

<sup>11</sup> Duggan, *The Force of Destiny*, 168.

<sup>12</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 292.

discontent with the ministers of the Tuscan government.<sup>13</sup> Even under Ferdinand III, the most consistent complaint against the grandducal regime was the corruption of government ministers and their mismanagement of state funds. This pamphlet and the opposition to the status quo it promoted called for the replacement of the traditional, hereditary elites in favor of new leaders drawn from the emerging political class. Further, it indicates that despite some mild unrest in the cities, the situation in Tuscany remained peaceful at this time. Moderate and liberal, but not radical, ideology dominated Florentine political discourse. Not long after this episode, Leopold noted that “the agitation in Florence seemed to die down, the agents of unrest [remained] unknown.”<sup>14</sup> As such, Leopold continued along this charted course of reform. If the people did not desire a constitution, as the pamphlet declared, he believed that his sustained improvement of local affairs and insistence on ethical governance was satisfactory and would suffice to deter further agitation.<sup>15</sup>

However, the situation changed in less than one year. On 10 January 1847, Leopold received a report from Ottaviano Lenzone, his minister in Vienna, communicating Metternich’s reluctant acknowledgment of the irredeemable advance of representative government in Europe.<sup>16</sup> This report drove Leopold to ask: “If the goal [of republican activists] is to gain useful freedoms, which ones will we give [them]?” Specifically, as he reflected on Metternich’s aversion to liberalism, Leopold considered the increased freedoms codified during his reign. His

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<sup>13</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 292. Leopold describes such complaints as “clandestine lies that seek to sow distrust in the sovereign’s advisors.”

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> As noted in the previous chapter, Leopold is remembered for “his indisputable righteousness, [and] his severity in” combatting ministerial corruption. See Lorenzo Grottanelli, *I moti politici in Toscana nella prima metà del secolo XIX: studiati sopra i rapporti segreti inediti della polizia* (Prato: Tipografia Successori Vestri, 1902), 9.

<sup>16</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 293. Ottaviano Lenzone (1805-1878) served as the Tuscan envoy to the court of Vienna and as Minister of Foreign affairs toward the end of Leopold’s reign. He played a significant role in normalizing relations with Vienna after Leopold’s restoration to the grandducal throne in 1849.



government had “already granted freedom of trade, individual security, increased autonomy of local government [facoltà di amministrare le sostanze comunali], transparency of governmental decisions [pubblicità di giudizi], and restrictions on the actions of the police.”<sup>17</sup> However, Leopold did not accurately gauge either the reception of his reforms by republicans or the political atmosphere of Europe. By mid-March, ideas of Italian liberation again surged and calls for political and social reform increased. Despite Leopold’s hopes, it seemed local reform would not quench the peoples’ liberal-nationalist zeal.

Aware of these developments, Metternich encouraged Leopold to maintain the status quo in the face of increasing demands for liberal reform and heightened cries of Italian nationalism. The Revolution, Metternich wrote, has a justified and “violent hatred of Austria... Those princes who would be driven from their states by the triumph of these subversive parties are wrong to join the mob.”<sup>18</sup> He urged Leopold to exercise caution, especially as the grand duke supported liberal and increasingly radical reforms. “Anything that promotes the Revolution cannot profit the [existing] governments... I beg your imperial highness not to make any distinction between the [liberal and radical] parties.”<sup>19</sup> Understanding Leopold’s genuine desire to work for the good of his people, Metternich concluded his letter by reminding the grand duke of his duty to his dynasty. “The interests of Tuscany are inseparable from those of the Austrian monarchy. The

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<sup>17</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 294. Municipalities in Italy are commonly known as *comune*.

<sup>18</sup> This statement from Metternich is in reference to Austria’s physical presence in Italy, specifically its military. Nonetheless, the sentiment it conveys also applies to Vienna’s political involvement in Tuscan affairs. Liberal nationalists reviled the hegemony of Austria in the peninsula, whether that presence was physical or political.

<sup>19</sup> In his letter to Leopold, Metternich warns against following the political trends of the time. He asserts that “*liberalism* was developed under the Bourbons, and it brought about the July Revolution; under the latter, *radicalism* has replaced hollow liberalism; today, the states are engaged in a struggle, more or less universal, with reality and appearance; the reality is radicalism; the appearance is liberalism. Italy is courting the appearance, behind it is the reality!” Metternich to Leopold II, 24 April 1847, Klemens von Metternich, *Mémoires Documents et Ecrits Divers Laissés par le Prince de Metternich, Chancelier de Cour et D’Etat. Deuxième partie: L’Ere de paix*, ed. Prince Richard de Metternich, arr. M.A. de Klinkowstroem (Paris: E. Plot et Co., Imprimeurs-Editeurs, 1883), no. 1607, 7:406-7.

[radical] factions know this, and this is why they wish to separate these two interests.”<sup>20</sup>

Nevertheless, the influence of the “liberal” politicians in Tuscany remained significant.<sup>21</sup> As popular agitation increased in Livorno as well as Florence, Leopold’s ministers proposed relaxing censorship regulations.<sup>22</sup> They argued that by reducing grandducal oversight of printed material, the number of politically conscious would expand. By allowing open debate on political topics, previously prohibited by Restoration-era censorship regulations, law-abiding liberals could also publish materials grounded in more moderate political philosophies to counter those of the radical underground press.<sup>23</sup> Doing so, they argued, would push “moderate” liberals like themselves – those who prioritized law and order – away from the radicals.<sup>24</sup> Thus, the government could secure their cooperation in stabilizing Tuscan affairs.

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<sup>20</sup> Metternich, *Mémoires*, no. 1607, 7:407-10.

<sup>21</sup> “Liberal” in this context refers primarily to adherents of classical liberalism, which emphasized individual rights and liberties, but maintained reservations as to the extent of popular participation in government. See Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 16. So-called “moderate-liberals” represented a conservative-leaning reformist political ideology. Their efforts focused on improving the standard of living and slowly educating the Tuscan population to prepare individuals for increased political responsibilities. Further, they deemed radical demands for a constitution to be “needlessly provocative of Austria.” Hearder, *Italy in the Age of the Risorgimento*, 80. “Liberals” included those who consciously chose to adjust their social and political expectations and behaviors to appeal to the opinions and desires of the bourgeois political class. Liberals also more actively advocated for the immediate implementation of the elimination of censorship and the drafting of a constitution. Kroll, *La rivolta del patriziato*, 81, 113-4.

<sup>22</sup> Restoration-era censorship regulations in Tuscany were based on the idea of “preventative censorship.” All printed and public material, both religious and secular, was reviewed and approved by censors connected to the Tuscan police – or *Buongoverno*. No discussion of politics, government, or the regime was permitted. Censors ensured that any ideas communicated through the printed or performed material – plays, operas, and other artistic pieces – avoided potentially divisive or “dangerous” topics. Further, any printed materials had to be produced by government-approved printing houses and presses. This streamlined the government’s oversight of intellectual material, as anything printed by a non-approved press was automatically contraband. During Leopold II’s reign, this responsibility passed from the police to the office of the Secretary of State, thus tying public discourse closer to the Tuscan grand dukes rather than the *Buongoverno*. Antonio Chiavistelli, *Dallo Stato alla nazione: Costituzione e sfera pubblica in Toscana dal 1814 al 1849* (Roma: Carocci editore, 2006), 84-93, 172. See also, Domenico Maria Bruni, “L’organizzazione della censura preventiva nel Granducato di Toscana dal 1814 al 1847,” *Archivio Storico Italiano* 160, no. 3 (July - September 2002): 515-554.

<sup>23</sup> The new law of 6 May 1847 required that state censors approve the *topic* of an article or other published piece prior to its release. The content of the article did not have to be approved or reviewed in full.

<sup>24</sup> “Radicals” in this context, included advocates of the principles of republicanism, democracy, socialism, and nationalism. Their emphasis was on political equality and universal participation in government. See Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 16.

Both moderate and liberal members of Leopold's cabinet disagreed with this strategy. Notably, Leopold's close advisor, Giovanni Baldasseroni, and the liberal scholar, Gino Capponi, counseled the grand duke to rely on the advice of more moderate cabinet members, continue the work of local improvement, and not succumb to pressures from the left. Torn between these two positions, Leopold chose to support his liberal ministers. "I objected to [Baldasseroni]," he recalled, "I thought that ceding a bit to the wind might be less dangerous than facing it by not acting."<sup>25</sup> In May 1847, Leopold loosened censorship and granted limited freedom of the press. Unfortunately for the grand duke, this concession only served to further radical agitation. Capponi comments in his memoirs that "following the law on the press...the language of the unrestrained newspapers and the collusion of the censors immediately proved that both the country and the grand duke's government were finished."<sup>26</sup>

The significance of censorship during the Restoration cannot be understated. As historian John A. Davis notes, "censorship was co-terminous with the history of the Restoration régimes, and it was the faltering of censorship in the 1840s that provided the first clear signals that the autocracies were entering into crisis."<sup>27</sup> It would be unfair to fault Leopold for failing to see the severity of this misstep, especially given the plenitude of advice he received to move forward with this "crucial" and "prudent" reform. However, it is clear from his memoirs that he understood the gravity of the issue. "Like a ship against the elements," reflects Leopold, "so also a state cannot be governed against the forces of time: one anticipates the shipwreck. It remains to be seen if the makeshift sail one raises will be able to hold, and if it will be enough to carry us

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<sup>25</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 296.

<sup>26</sup> Gino Capponi, "Settanta giorni di ministero," *Scritti editi e inediti di Gino Capponi*, ed. Marco Tabarrini (Firenze: G. Barbera, editore, 1877), 2:64.

<sup>27</sup> John A. Davis, "Politics of Censorship" in Laven, David and Lucy Riall, eds. *Napoleon's Legacy: Problems of Government in Restoration Europe* (Oxford: Berg, 2000), 238.

away from the danger.”<sup>28</sup> Primarily due to the relaxation of censorship, the ideologies of liberalism, republicanism, nationalism, and socialism gained popularity. Consequently, Leopold found himself forced to play a high-stakes game of balancing concessions to the liberals while preserving his authority. Cautiously, he navigated the dangerous waters of reform.

This moment stands apart as a turning point for the grand duke. Enthusiasm for reform and public works initiatives defined the first decades of his rule. During that period, he oversaw the improvement of Tuscany’s roads, the establishment of the Corps of Engineers, and the start of preliminary work to improve the malaria-ridden Maremma. His earliest reforms emphasized increasing the standard of living, education, infrastructure, and humanitarian concerns. Leopold traveled extensively throughout his territory, inspecting infrastructure, meeting with local officials, and conversing with his people. In the countryside, Leopold’s efforts to know and understand the rural population increased his popularity. This bolstered the grand duke’s traditional base of support among the peasantry and agricultural nobility.<sup>29</sup> While the cities emerged as centers of liberal and radical enthusiasm during the reforms of the 1830s and 1840s, the countryside remained a bastion of conservatism.<sup>30</sup> Life had improved for the average Tuscan citizen, and thus many remained satisfied with Leopold’s reign. Due largely to these efforts, Tuscany had successfully navigated the shockwaves caused by the French revolution of 1830. Therefore, it seemed equipped to weather the challenges presented by the increase of nationalist agitation.

However, the situation Leopold faced in 1847 differed immensely from that of 1830. In

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<sup>28</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 298.

<sup>29</sup> In Tuscany, “agricultural nobility” specifically refers to the lords of large wine and grain producing estates.

<sup>30</sup> This split between the “center” and “periphery,” visible throughout Europe during this period of change, remains throughout the Revolution of 1848 and the counterrevolutionary activity of 1849.

1847, classical liberalism dominated politics in Florence. Meanwhile, radicalism was steadily gaining adherents in other urban centers. The easing of press censorship served to increase and strengthen democratic opposition to the old order. Liberated by the relaxed restrictions on content that could appear in print, both the liberal and radical press harnessed public excitement and encouraged popular demonstrations in favor of their policies.<sup>31</sup> Although Leopold's more liberal ministers had hoped the concession on censorship would suffice to quell demands for increased political participation, radicals viewed this development as crucial for attaining their goals of "free and universal suffrage, popular representation [in government], [and] a constitution of state establishing a parliament."<sup>32</sup> The confidence of radical agitators such as democrat Francesco Domenico Guerrazzi and socialist Enrico Montazio captured the attention of urban workers. As radicals emphasized the importance of popular participation in government and social reform, impoverished urban populations gravitated toward radicalism.<sup>33</sup> As their followings increased, their compelling rhetoric encouraged more numerous and frequent popular demonstrations in favor of their platforms, especially in Livorno.

Despite radical criticism, Leopold remained devoted to making improvements for the good of his people and state. In his biography of Leopold, Baldasseroni notes that "the Grandducal government was honest and faithful in its intentions, it had not prepared alternative means of defense."<sup>34</sup> He notes a similar attitude that compelled the grand duke to allow greater

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<sup>31</sup> Woolf, *A history of Italy*, 354.

<sup>32</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 129.

<sup>33</sup> The grandducal regime had long sought to resolve problems of densely-populated urban areas such as Livorno by increasing humanitarian efforts. However, the government remained focused on measures designed for agricultural communities and did not address the problems of modern industrial societies. Meanwhile, democrats, socialists, and other radicals promoted more aggressive responses to solve the problems of industrialization and population growth that captured the attention of impoverished workers in the cities. Woolf, *A History of Italy*, 325-7.

<sup>34</sup> Baldasseroni, *Leopoldo II*, 219.

transparency in governance.

Leopold, *without pretensions to perfection or infallibility*, had no reason to fear when his acts came into open light and discussion; moreover, *it gave him excitement to remove from himself that air of mystery*, by publishing all of his actions, though that air of mystery only ultimately benefitted the mischief of those who, through ignorance or malice, reviled that which was unknown or imperfectly known.<sup>35</sup>

Ultimately, Leopold and his advisors naïvely underestimated the zeal of the political left.

The grandducal regime remained fixed in its moderate, humanitarian mentality. It did not comprehend the extent of popular dissatisfaction with its largely “outdated” ideas of paternalistic government. Further, it remained blind to radical preparations to exploit opportunities and advance their political agenda. A few more concessions from Leopold, thought the radicals, and their goals would be achieved. The most radical opponents of the grandducal regime had long considered Leopold a weak ruler.<sup>36</sup> With the loosening of censorship, they gained the power to exploit this perceived weakness.<sup>37</sup> After this concession, the tide of Italian nationalism could not be stemmed in Tuscany. Urged on by the radical press, leftist leaders summoned the working class to join the fight for rights and freedoms. No longer should they be content with simple improvement along the lines of the *Riformisti*, the pamphlets claimed. The cause of the “*Costituzionali*, who desired independence from Austria,” beckoned all to the true path to liberty.<sup>38</sup>

The most notable of the ensuing concessions was Leopold’s approval of a “Civic Guard.”

In September 1847, with nationalist agitation in Livorno increasing exponentially, moderate-

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<sup>35</sup> Baldasseroni, *Leopoldo II*, 213. Emphasis mine.

<sup>36</sup> Montazio, *L'ultimo granduca di Toscana*, 29.

<sup>37</sup> Davis, “Politics of Censorship,” 238.

<sup>38</sup> Montazio, *L'ultimo granduca di Toscana*, 59. Prior to 1848, the political “left” in Tuscany – republicans, democrats, and socialists – tended to occupy similar circles and even combined efforts to push the regime away from the conservative reformism of Leopold II and his cabinet. It was only after the Statuto was granted that left-leaning platforms obtained a wider audience beyond Livorno.

liberal demands for a civilian-led defense force became a central public issue. After much urging from his ministers and in consultation with his Council of State, Leopold determined that “peace was the first necessity.”<sup>39</sup> To quell the masses and restore stability, he approved the creation of the *Guardia civica* on 11 September.<sup>40</sup> However, this concession did little to calm the storm of revolution.<sup>41</sup> Not long after receiving its charter, the *Guardia civica* became a proponent of unrest and agitation rather than an agent of stability and moderation. As liberal reforms continued, radical elements in Livorno encouraged the urban masses to demand a constitution.<sup>42</sup> The Governor of Livorno, Neri Corsini, went so far as to assert that the “only escape from the fire of turmoil” was a constitution. He threatened to resign if the demands for further reform were not met.<sup>43</sup>

As the discussion of a constitution increased, the precedent Leopold set by his constant support for liberal policies encouraged reformers. Given his willingness to proceed on the liberal course, chances for the success of liberal and democratic policies remained high. However, many moderate-liberals underestimated Austria’s influence. In July, Leopold received a letter from Metternich that served as a reminder of Tuscany’s position in the greater schema of European affairs. This letter, which demonstrates the relationship between Leopold and the emperor’s cabinet, is well worth citing at length.

I would like the Grand Duke to keep in mind that this hatred manifested against Austria comes mostly from the idea that it was [Austria’s] power in Italy that frustrated the designs of the revolutionaries against the Princes, as well as prevented the radicals from

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<sup>39</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 302.

<sup>40</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 130.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 131.

<sup>42</sup> Francesco Domenico Guerrazzi was a leading figure in the radical political scene. He played a prominent role in exciting demonstrations in Livorno in 1847 and 1848. His role is discussed more extensively in the following chapters.

<sup>43</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 130; Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 301, 307.

taking over. In any case, the Sovereign of Tuscany would do well to remember that neither he, an Austrian Archduke, nor the King of Naples, of Bourbon blood, will ever be considered Italian Princes by those who have already proclaimed their desire to expel from the peninsula those who are foreigners. *In this time, he should take care not to demonstrate weakness by condescending to the demonstrations and commotion of the ideas in his state.* Austrian intervention would always be enough to crush those in open rebellion, but were these to be spontaneously approved by him [the Sovereign], they would cost him the burden - and the necessity - of having his dominions occupied by a German garrison.<sup>44</sup>

Leopold understood that approving a constitution would push Vienna to act. Thus, granting a constitution would guarantee direct Austrian military intervention. Baldasseroni noted that Leopold “suffered under the opinion that a substantial change in the form of government would not be *tolerated quietly by Austria.*”<sup>45</sup> The duke also reflected on his difficult position. In Tuscany, “anarchy was only a step away,” as Livorno erupted in revolt and radicals demanded a constitution. “On the other hand,” he knew that “a constitution would divide [Tuscany] from our allies and [we] would remain alone, perhaps facing foreign occupation.”<sup>46</sup> Knowing that Metternich’s threats were far from empty, Leopold continued to resist the demands for a constitution. After all, the Austrian army had occupied Papal-held Ferrara to check the ambitions of Pius IX.<sup>47</sup> Vienna would not hesitate to do the same to Tuscany.

Metternich followed these developments closely from Vienna. As he reflected on the Tuscan situation, as well as the similar course of events unfolding in the Papal States, he determined both countries to be “in the grip of a flagrant revolution.”<sup>48</sup> Both rulers were actively

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<sup>44</sup> Quoted in Nicomede Bianchi, *Storia della politica Austriaca rispetto ai sovrani ed ai governi Italiani dall’ anno 1791 al maggio del 1857* (Savona: L. Sambolino, 1857), 243.

<sup>45</sup> Baldasseroni, *Leopoldo II*, 241. Emphasis in original.

<sup>46</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 307.

<sup>47</sup> See Miroslav Sedivy, “The Austrian ‘occupation’ of Ferrara in 1847: its legal aspect between myth and reality,” *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 23, no. 2 (2018): 139-155.

<sup>48</sup> Metternich to Apponyi, 7 October 1847, Metternich, *Mémoires*, no. 1585, 7:344.



encouraging or, at a minimum, participating in efforts to liberalize their states. Metternich was convinced that this tacit approval and encouragement would lead to open revolt. He recognized what Leopold and Pius IX were unwilling to admit: their efforts to gain their people's support through continued reform might soon be in vain. Nothing would be able to stop the momentum that had built over the previous two years. "What resembles reform has no value, in Rome and Florence, other than that of milestones set by the leaders of a party that governs the two countries under the counter-signature of the Pope and the Grand Duke."<sup>49</sup> He concluded, "now, as it is not in the nature of revolutions to stop, the one that has gained a foothold in both States of central Italy will not stop until the conclusion of the drama."<sup>50</sup>

The beginning of Leopold's reign was defined mainly by his ability to balance his relationship with Vienna and rule his state. For two decades, he had successfully managed the expectations of Metternich and the emperor as well as the expectations and wellbeing of his subjects in Tuscany. The breakdown of this balance distinguishes the latter part of his rule from these relatively peaceful decades preceding 1847. As demands for radical reform and constitutional government increased, Leopold's ability to appease his subjects and Vienna decreased. He was caught squarely between two seemingly irreconcilable positions.

As Tuscany and the Papal States began their "descent" in late 1847, Metternich predicted that the larger, seemingly more stable states of the peninsula would play a decisive role in the unfolding drama. "As for the Peninsula," he wrote, "what will decide many questions will be the future of the Sardinian and Neapolitan States, which is, in short, in the hands of the armies of the two countries. If they remain faithful to their oaths, these countries can be preserved from an

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<sup>49</sup> Metternich to Apponyi, 7 October 1847, Metternich, *Mémoires*, no. 1585, 7:344.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

internal upheaval, and this fact will influence the States of central Italy. If the armies forget their oaths, the Revolution will immediately triumph on the peninsula.”<sup>51</sup> As the largest monarchies on the peninsula, both Piedmont and Naples appeared equipped to resist popular pressure for radical reform. Thus, Metternich remained confident that between their military strength and support from Vienna, they would assist in discouraging states like Tuscany from capitulating to radicalism <sup>52</sup>

Although independent, Tuscany was far from self-sufficient in terms of self-defense. Previously, Austria’s guaranteed military intervention or defense of Tuscany secured the state. Yet should relations with Austria rupture, Leopold would be dangerously exposed. Thus, the influence of the Papal States, Piedmont, and Great Britain increased in importance in Leopold’s political calculations.

The Pope, as the spiritual leader of the Roman Catholic Church and the temporal ruler of the Papal States, occupied a unique position in the balance of European power dynamics during this period. While neither a great power like France and Great Britain nor an “emerging” power like Piedmont-Sardinia, the policies and decisions of the Pope as ruler of the Papal States held disproportionate influence in Italian affairs during the Risorgimento. After his election in 1846, Pius IX had quickly distinguished himself as a reform-minded leader, and even as an advocate of Italian liberation or unification. His liberal support for modern ideas fueled nationalist neo-guelphist hopes for an Italian state unified under the Pope's rule in Rome.<sup>53</sup> In his letter of 24

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<sup>51</sup> Metternich to Apponyi, 7 October 1847, Metternich, *Mémoires*, no. 1585, 7:344. Turin had signed a treaty with Vienna in 1831 promising to uphold the Restorationist order. For the time being, King Carlo Alberto remained opposed to the changes taking place in central Italy. Duggan, *The Force of Destiny*, 171.

<sup>52</sup> If not through political influence, Metternich was confident that the Neapolitan and Piedmontese armies would provide sufficient deterrents to liberalism and radicalism.

<sup>53</sup> Piedmontese minister Vincenzo Gioberti founded the “neo-guelphist” movement in the early 1840s. Neo-guelphism was a plan for Italian unification based on the formation of a single kingdom with the Pope as the head of

April 1847, Metternich warned Leopold against the Papal States' difficult situation under the new Pope.<sup>54</sup> Conceding that important and useful reforms were needed in the Papal States, Metternich urged Leopold to consider that the Pope's advisors "did not want to hear about reforms." Instead, according to the Austrian chancellor, they sought "the upheaval of the existing legal and political state, and they desired that it comprise not only the states of the Church, but all the countries of Italy."<sup>55</sup>

Due to the geographical proximity of the Papal States to the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, unrest in the Papal territories often and frequently spread into Tuscany and influenced Tuscan reactions to contemporary events. Metternich regarded this infectious influence as extremely dangerous. During the intense reforms of 1846 and 1847, Tuscan affairs were easily swayed by the violence, opposition, and zeal in the Papal territories. It was often the case that after the Pope granted a desired reform, Leopold felt especially compelled to grant similar concessions to avoid the escalation of unrest in his state. This was true during debates on the issue of censorship, establishing a Civic Guard, granting a Constitution, and – later – participating in the war against Austria. For Metternich, this influence was negative insofar as it served to further Leopold's subservience to radical liberalism. As John A. Davis notes, after Leopold "followed Pius IX's lead and relaxed censorship, [he] was immediately forced to make deeper political concessions."<sup>56</sup>

However, while Leopold noted the policies and decisions of the Pope, he did not consider the Papal States a viable candidate as an alliance partner. As such, the likelihood of Leopold

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state.

<sup>54</sup> Metternich to Leopold II, 24 April 1847, Metternich, *Mémoires*, no. 1607, 7:408.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>56</sup> Davis, "Politics of Censorship," 238.

renouncing his Austrian ties to support the Pope's vision for Italy was low. Further, like Tuscany, the Papal States were dependent on Austria for defense. Thus, the Pope became increasingly unwilling to take any large risks as the war with Austria progressed. Although a faithful Roman Catholic, Leopold did not believe he was required to defer to papal authority in matters of state. His reactions to political developments in the Papal territories were primarily practical. Leopold's pattern of "follow[ing] Pius IX's lead" was pragmatic rather than ideological, and more a reflection of his attitude that he must "sail with the winds" to avoid shipwreck rather than blindly obey Papal authority. To further illustrate this point, according to British diplomatic dispatches from 4 January 1848, Leopold made efforts to encourage the "three *progresista* States of Italy to establish an identity of action between themselves, in order that each of their Governments should not precede the others in future in the march of political reform."<sup>57</sup> The Papal States, consistently the first to make such concessions, was the target of these comments.

The author of the dispatch, the Honorable Richard Bingham, envoy to the court at Turin, found that Leopold's action was inspired by "the uneasiness which he has felt in consequence of the late deliberations of the Consulta of Rome...I understand that the Grand Duke of Tuscany has already taken steps with the view of urging the Sovereign Pontiff not to allow himself to be carried away in his present misunderstanding."<sup>58</sup> The hope behind these overtures, was to "frustrat[e] the designs of the factious party, whose efforts tend...towards institutions far too liberal, as well as dangerous, for Italy."<sup>59</sup> This dispatch supports the observation that while

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<sup>57</sup> The "*progresista*" states referenced herein are Tuscany, Piedmont, and the Papal States., Bingham to Palmerston, 4 January 1848, *Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Italy*, no. 13, 2:13.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

Leopold did, out of necessity, factor the Papal States into his diplomatic strategy, he did not seek Rome as an ally in the same capacity as Vienna. Following in the tradition of his reform-minded grandfather, Peter Leopold, he maintained and respected the authority of the Church in his state but did not subordinate his state's interests to those of Rome. This was a point all too familiar to him from his study of the "manual" Peter Leopold left for future rulers of Tuscany, the multi-volume *Relazioni sul Governo della Toscana*.<sup>60</sup> The Papal States were a necessary liability, but would be of little use should the growing tension come to armed conflict.

Meanwhile, British reports from Turin confirmed the strengthening of the relationship between Tuscany and Piedmont. King Carlo Alberto, Lord Abercromby reported from Turin, "seems to be willing frankly to identify himself with Tuscany, which is committing himself to support the liberal cause."<sup>61</sup> From Leopold's perspective, while the Papal States were a liability, Piedmont presented an opportunity. Although less enthusiastically, Piedmont had started on a path of limited liberalization similar to Tuscany's and was home to many of the most enthusiastic proponents of Italian "liberation." Combined with its relative military strength, these qualities made Turin an ally worth courting. On 3 November 1847, Leopold took a step closer to his fellow "Italian sovereigns" and, seemingly, the cause of nationalism by signing a preliminary agreement with the Papal States and Piedmont-Sardinia to establish a customs union, the *lega doganale*. This pet-project of Pope Pius IX began as a federalist effort to create a free-trade zone within the Italian peninsula and presented an opportunity to streamline the dealings of the

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<sup>60</sup> This "how to guide" for future rulers of Tuscany was edited by Arnaldo Salvestrini and republished in 1977 by Casa Editrice Leo S. Olschki. The Lorenese grand dukes frequently came into conflict with Rome on issues of jurisdiction and temporal authority. This was especially true on the question of whether the Tuscan sovereign or the pope would select bishops and archbishops in diocese within Tuscan borders.

<sup>61</sup> Abercromby to Minto, 20 October 1847, *Gran Bretagna e Italia nei Documenti della Missione Minto, II Serie: 1830-1848*, ed. Federico Curato (Roma: Istituto Storico Italiano per l'Eta Moderna e Contemporanea, 1970), no. 54, 1:117.

various autonomous states. On 11 November, Leopold “began diplomatic negotiations for the affairs of Italy” and sought a direct alliance with Piedmont.<sup>62</sup>

To negotiate the details of both the *lega doganale* and the treaty with Piedmont, Florence sent its own representative to the Piedmontese court. Leopold selected *Cavaliere* Giulio Martini to represent Tuscan interests.<sup>63</sup> This decision demonstrated Tuscany’s shift away from Austria and toward Piedmont. Up until this point, Austria had always provided representation for Tuscany through its own ministers. Such forfeiture of its autonomy had served both as a symbol of Florentine dependence on Austria and as an indication of the client status of the Tuscan state. Paired with Tuscany’s consistent pivot toward liberal reform, this diplomatic decision sent a clear signal to Vienna that Tuscany was an Italian rather than an Austrian state.

However, not all Italian states were interested in participating in the reform and rejection of Austrian hegemony. Modena, dependent on the support of Austria in a manner that surpassed all other Italian states, shared no interest in jeopardizing its relationship with Vienna over these new-age reforms.<sup>64</sup> By October 1847, Duke Francis V and Leopold were engaged in an active conflict concerning the annexation of Lucca.<sup>65</sup> As the situation escalated, and Francis ultimately failed to gain his desired result, little could be done to encourage his participation in the *lega doganale*.<sup>66</sup> Liberal schemes would find no home in Modena. Further, as Leopold cultivated a closer relationship with Piedmont, his relationship with Modena soured. In mid-November,

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<sup>62</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 315.

<sup>63</sup> Hearder, *Italy in the Age of the Risorgimento*, 81.

<sup>64</sup> In Modena “even the acquisition of a beard or a moustache made one suspect as a revolutionary.” Hearder, *Italy in the Age of the Risorgimento*, 80.

<sup>65</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 131-2. Conventions following the Congress of Vienna had established that the Duke of Modena would acquire the territories of Lucca after the reigning duke’s death. However, Leopold negotiated with Duke Carlo Ludovico di Borbone to arrange for the immediate annexation of Lucca to Tuscany in exchange for a generous pension.

<sup>66</sup> Bingham to Palmerston, 30 December 1847, *Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Italy*, no. 9, 2:7.

Piedmontese troops *en route* to Tuscany were denied passage through Modenese territory.<sup>67</sup> This clearly expressed that while Tuscany might be shifting away from the Austrian bloc, Modena would not embarrass Austria. Smaller and more vulnerable than even Tuscany, Modena became increasingly dependent on Austrian influence and intervention as Tuscany distanced itself from Habsburg power. Francis V expressed no qualms about summoning Austrian military assistance should the need arise. In the last weeks of 1847, he invited Austrian troops under Marshall Count Joseph Radetzky von Radetz to strengthen the garrison in the duchy, much to Tuscany's discomfort.<sup>68</sup> As this territorial conflict escalated, pulling Piedmont as well as Tuscany deeper into the mire, Lord Abercromby expressed his concern "that this obstinate young Duke of Modena is preparing much trouble for himself and certainly for his neighbors."<sup>69</sup>

As the dominant naval and economic power in Europe, Great Britain also held significant sway over the development of any new alliance system in Italy. Following the end of the French Wars, Britain assigned itself the role of moderator and peacekeeper, especially in the Italian states. As a liberal constitutional monarchy, the British government approved of the progressive reforms Tuscany pursued. The port of Livorno had long served as a hub for trade with the peninsula, serving as a crucial point of interaction between Tuscany and Great Britain. As negotiations for the *lega doganale* commenced, the British Foreign Secretary, Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston, expressed his approval and optimism, stating "that Italian Commercial League will be an excellent thing if it is placed upon a proper footing commercial and political."<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 315.

<sup>68</sup> Hamilton to Palmerston, 25 December 1847, *Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Italy*, no. 3, 2:1 and Bingham to Palmerston, 30 December 1847, no. 9, 2:7.

<sup>69</sup> Abercromby to Minto, 12 November 1847, *Documenti della Missione Minto*, no. 99, 1:185.

<sup>70</sup> Palmerston to Minto, 29 October 1847, *ibid.*, no. 64, 1:128.

Aware of both Tuscany's anxiety over the Austrian military presence in the peninsula and Metternich's stated willingness to intervene directly in Tuscan affairs should he find it necessary, Britain encouraged the budding relationship between Tuscany and Piedmont. According to Gilbert Elliot, Earl of Minto, "Prince Metternich, they say, has disclaimed any design of invading the Papal or Sardinian states, but has made no such declaration respecting Tuscany, and considerable anxiety has been shewn [*sic*] to ascertain the feeling of Her Majesty's government as to any such distinction which it might be intended to make against the Grand Duchy."<sup>71</sup> In the uneasy months of 1847, Minto informed Palmerston of his conversation with the grand duke, during which he communicated full British support of Tuscan reforms. This support was essential, as Britain remained one of, if not the preeminent world power. "British support," Minto notes, "encourages and enables them [Tuscany] to proceed with the great reforms in which they are engaged, and which at the same time tends to tranquilize the people with the assurance of our powerful protection, so long as they refrain from dangerous excesses or unreasonable demands."<sup>72</sup>

While willing to intervene directly if necessary, the British *modus operandi* was to encourage others to act and to support their operations in advisory and monetary capacities. Britain was not interested in war. Instead, London hoped to engage in these affairs from a distance by encouraging positive developments along the lines of alliance building by the principal players.<sup>73</sup> The steady conversion of Piedmont to the "great cause of Italian

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<sup>71</sup> Minto to Palmerston, 29 October 1847, *ibid.*, no. 65, 1:128. Earl Minto, Lord Privy Seal and Extraordinary Minister to the Court at Florence, was dispatched to Italy on a special mission from late-1847 to early-1848. He circulated among the various Italian courts to act as an advisor as the situation in the peninsula escalated.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>73</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 305. France's role in this period of reform is less defined than that of Austria, Piedmont, or Great Britain. However, as liberal reform blossomed in Tuscany, the example of the seemingly stable constitutional monarchy of Louis-Philippe offered encouragement. Further, it exemplified the opportunities afforded



independence” strengthened British hopes for liberal Italian states free of Austrian influence.<sup>74</sup> Further, Piedmont’s participation in the *lega doganale* and the reforms sweeping the peninsula encouraged London. In his reports on the situation developing in the peninsula, Lord Minto notes that “the stress which the Grand Duke lays upon the great benefit which the accession of Sardinia to the liberal cause is calculated to confer upon Tuscany and Rome.”<sup>75</sup> From the Tuscan perspective, it was clear that Britain would provide defense and support if the need arose, but could not be counted on to intervene directly in the fight for autonomy and Italian liberation. Peace remained the top priority. Despite its enthusiasm for a liberal and independent Italy, “England would not oppose an Austrian intervention in Tuscany, where it was requested by the Grand Duke.”<sup>76</sup> Regardless, by courting Britain and collaborating with Piedmont and the Papal States, Leopold had broken Austrian hegemony in the Italian peninsula. Comprehending this shifting power dynamic is crucial for understanding the Tuscan experience of the Risorgimento.

In conclusion, calls for liberalization had increased throughout Europe, not least in Tuscany, following the establishment of the July Monarchy in France. As tensions continued to build, Leopold's genuine desire to modernize clashed with his responsibilities as a Habsburg to promote Austrian interests in Italy. As he strove to balance these opposing duties, Leopold found himself caught between the conservative European establishment and the emerging liberal political class. From Metternich's perspective, inclinations toward reform equated to *liberal* or even *radical* reform. While the diplomats at the Congress of Vienna had anticipated and even encouraged measured and rational reform, any change driven by the will of the people rather

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by reform.

<sup>74</sup> Minto to Abercromby, 6 November 1847, *Documenti della Missione Minto*, no. 82, 1:156.

<sup>75</sup> Abercromby to Minto, 6 November 1847, *ibid.*, no. 83, 1:160.

<sup>76</sup> Baldasseroni, *Leopoldo II*, 251.

than the sovereign's sagacity was considered dangerous. For Metternich, “reform had to be a product of order and not of will.”<sup>77</sup> For Italian liberals and radicals, any resistance to proposed reform was reactionary and excessively conservative. Thus, questions of reform and autonomy came to define Leopold's interactions with both parties for years to come. The tension between Austrian conservatism and the liberal Italian demand for popular sovereignty emerged as but one manifestation of the difficult position in which Leopold found himself between a rock and a hard place.

With decades of experience on the diplomatic stage of Europe, Metternich skillfully deciphered the motives of other political players. Further, he remained adept at anticipating the potential missteps they might take. Consequently, the Italian nationalist movements that steadily grew following the 1830 Revolutions prompted him to criticize the naïveté of some of the younger and less experienced sovereigns. Metternich viewed Leopold II and the newly elected Pope Pius IX as particularly vulnerable to crafting their own demise in their embrace of progressive tendencies. The liberal politicians they increasingly welcomed into their cabinets posed a considerable threat. Italian nationalist demands for representative government, the expulsion of foreign tyrants, and the unification of Italy appeared to prove him correct.<sup>78</sup> Acceptance of these “modern” and “liberal” developments, Metternich predicted, would only lead to ruin and decline.

Leopold found himself in an especially delicate position. Born in Italy and ruler of a proud Italian state, Leopold considered himself a true Italian sovereign. However, Italian

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<sup>77</sup> Kissinger, *A World Restored*, 195.

<sup>78</sup> Metternich, “Coup d’œil rétrospectif sur la situation de l’Italie pendant l’année 1846,” in *Mémoires*, no. 1568, 7:300.

nationalists and republicans did not consider the Austrian archduke one of their own.<sup>79</sup> As anti-Austrian sentiments flourished in pro-Italian literature, Leopold did not realize the weakness of his position. At the ports of Pisa and Livorno, placards and graffiti called for “the independence of Italy and the expulsion of the barbarians,” namely the Austrians.<sup>80</sup> Leopold incorrectly assumed this referred only to the Austrian armies in occupied papal territory and in the northern Kingdom of Lombardia-Venezia. Although Leopold was beloved by many of his subjects, radicals did not foresee him having a role in a future independent Italy.



**Figure 2.1: The Italian Peninsula in 1848**

<sup>79</sup> Despite differences in political ideology, “the revolutionaries and the monarchs tended to agree” on the issue of eliminating the conservative influence of Vienna. Frederick C. Schneid, “War and Revolution in the Age of the *Risorgimento*,” *The Projection and Limitations of Imperial Powers, 1618-1850* (Boston: Brill, 2012), 197.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*

## CHAPTER 3

### THE REVOLUTION OF 1848 AND CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY IN TUSCANY

The year 1848 encompassed the climax of liberal reform and revolution in Europe. Most often, discourse surrounding this “Year of Revolutions” is dominated by discussions of the French uprising against the constitutional monarchy of King Louis-Phillipe d'Orléans. The French Revolution of 1848 is rightly regarded as the spark that ignited the tinderbox of Europe. However, while important, the French Revolution of 1848 was not the first uprising along liberal and nationalist lines to erupt during this fateful year. In his diplomatic history of Europe, René Albrecht-Carrié notes that while "events in France may be regarded as having given the revolutions of 1848 their European character, [...] the first specific outbreaks occurred in Italy."<sup>1</sup>

The year began with popular revolt in the states Prince Metternich hoped would remain bastions of moderation and stability, Piedmont-Sardinia and Naples. In both cases, the issue of a constitution drove popular unrest. In January, both Palermo and Naples exploded in upheaval to cries for a constitution. Shortly thereafter, King Ferdinand II of the Two Sicilies announced his intentions to comply with their demands.<sup>2</sup> This announcement triggered similar declarations from rulers throughout the peninsula, with Carlo Alberto of Piedmont, Leopold II, and Pius IX promising to prepare similar statutes. From Vienna, Metternich noted that, “the worst of the situation has not yet arrived...but it will not take long to emerge. The Roman and Tuscan Governments can no longer move forward or backward on the paths they have chosen. They will therefore have to *laisser faire* or throw themselves from this course.”<sup>3</sup> The “Year of

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<sup>1</sup> René Albrecht-Carrié, *A Diplomatic History of Europe since the Congress of Vienna* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), 67.

<sup>2</sup> Duggan, *The Force of Destiny*, 170.

<sup>3</sup> Metternich to Ficquelmont, 23 January 1848, Metternich, *Mémoires*, no. 1664, 7:556.

Revolutions” had begun. Metternich’s prediction that the actions of Piedmont and Naples would define the peninsula's future had been accurate, although not in the manner he anticipated.

After the news reached Tuscany that King Ferdinand of Naples promised to grant his people a constitution, Florence and Livorno exploded with cries of “*Viva la Costituzione!*”<sup>4</sup> The moment for constitutionalism had come. On 1 February, Leopold received a copy of the new Neapolitan constitution and immediately considered his response to this new development. For two weeks, he contemplated the best course of action, weighing the good of his county, his family, and his allegiances in the balance.<sup>5</sup> “Not giving [a constitution] meant the loss of the state in chaos. It was not that I did not consider the fall of my household [or] my limited ability to effect change [in my deliberations]...It was sad but necessary, an event long foreseen for which the day had now come.”<sup>6</sup> Soon, Leopold would have to choose between supporting his fellow “Italian” rulers and his dynastic allies.

On 17 February 1848, Leopold II announced the promulgation of the Tuscan constitution, the Statuto fondamentale, as church bells rang and celebration filled the streets.<sup>7</sup> Many rejoiced as the enlightened prince of Tuscany heeded the desires of the masses and listened to the requests of his faithful subjects.<sup>8</sup> Thus did Tuscany enter the fateful “Year of Revolutions.” By granting

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<sup>4</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 323.

<sup>5</sup> In January 1848, the Grand Duke and his family feared that the fates of Louis XIV and Marie Antoinette awaited them. Leopold’s wife wrote in a letter that “Here we find ourselves in an unspeakable position; all is lost and we are at the mercy of the populace. The fate that awaits us is that of Louis XVI and his family.” Metternich to Colloredo, 14 January 1848, Metternich, *Mémoires*, no. 1664, 7 :557.

<sup>6</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 325. After granting the Statuto, Leopold “returned to applying himself day and night to the affairs of his state with his usual tireless concern” Baldasseroni, *Leopoldo II*, 277-8. With or without a constitution, he remained the father of his people and resolved to continue his role of guarding and guiding the state.

<sup>7</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 326.

<sup>8</sup> Baldasseroni notes, “Ancient in Tuscany was the desire for a constitution, and many times authority was given to learned men to compile it, but without fruit.” Baldasseroni, *Leopoldo II*, 220. Commissions on constitutions and legal codes convened several times during the tenure of the Habsburg-Lorraines, most notably during the last years of Peter Leopold’s rule in 1789-90. As such, this development represented the fulfillment of decades of efforts.

his people this long-awaited concession, Leopold quelled the disturbances that erupted following the Neapolitan and Sicilian revolts of January. Tuscany began the year with new allies, a new customs union, and a new constitutional government. Although Europe again erupted in revolution, in Tuscany, “everything remained materially calm, even in Livorno.”<sup>9</sup>

The proclamation of the Statuto fondamentale marked a crucial development in Italian political affairs. Long regarded as the most liberal of the Italian states, Tuscany had previously remained within the bounds of acceptable reform. Tuscany commenced its transformation into a constitutional monarchy, thus making a definitive move away from the *Ancien régime*. By capitulating to the liberals and radicals demanding political change and bestowing a constitution, Leopold cemented his break with Austria.

As the War for Italian Liberation against Austria erupted in the northern regions of Lombardia and Venezia, Leopold solidified his place among the rebellious rulers of the Italian peninsula.<sup>10</sup> In March 1848, official diplomatic correspondence between Austria and Tuscany ended with the beginning of the First War for Italian Liberation.<sup>11</sup> Several other factors contributed to this break in diplomatic relations. The first and most simple reason was that as Tuscany was swept into the constitutional fervor, Austria was confronting manifestations of nationalist revolt in its home territories. Uprisings in Vienna, as well as revolts in Hungary, Bohemia, Lombardia, and Venezia, attracted the urgent attention of the Austrian government. Metternich resigned his post and fled Vienna with Emperor Ferdinand. Shortly thereafter,

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<sup>9</sup> De La Rochefoucauld to Lamartine, 7 March 1848, *Le Relazioni Diplomatiche fra la Francia e il Granducato di Toscana, III Serie: 1848-1860*, ed. Armando Saitta, (Roma: Istituto Storico Italiano per l'eta moderna e contemporanea, 1959), no. 1, 1:23.

<sup>10</sup> As early as September 1847, Leopold had recognized “the first voice of war [coming] from Turin: the war of Italian liberation!” Ibid., 304.

<sup>11</sup> *Le Relazioni Diplomatiche fra l'Austria e il Granducato di Toscana, III Serie: 1848-1860*, ed. Angelo Filipuzzi, (Roma: Istituto Storico Italiano per l'Eta Moderna e Contemporanea, 1969), 1: ix.

Ferdinand abdicated in favor of his nephew, Franz Joseph.

After breaking with Austria, the importance of Leopold's relationships with other states grew exponentially. Liberal states like Great Britain lauded Tuscany's progressive advances. Although surprised by Leopold's "solemn and...spontaneous promise" to grant a constitution, reports from foreign correspondents of *The Times* in London viewed these developments as "satisfactory" progress toward modern governance.<sup>12</sup> Praise for Leopold surfaced after news that "the Grand Duke of Tuscany spontaneously ordered a representative form of government for his states" with the Statuto.<sup>13</sup> Sir George Hamilton, plenipotentiary of the British Government to the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, commented in a dispatch to London that "of the three constitutions which have lately appeared in Italy, the one which Tuscany has obtained appears most complete and ably drawn up, although perhaps it is the most liberal."<sup>14</sup>

Following the creation of the Second Republic, French diplomats also responded positively to the new constitutional government. In his letter to the First Secretary of the Florentine Delegation Adrien Théodore Benoit-Champy, Foreign Minister Alphonse de Lamartine communicated his directions for the Florentine delegation's interactions with the grand duke and his ministers. "We have and can only have feelings of sympathy and goodwill for Tuscany," explains Lamartine." The Grand Duke is a wise, judicious and lawful prince,

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<sup>12</sup> "The contents of the Paris papers of Saturday," 14 February 1848, *The Times* (London, England), Issue 19785. Much of the surprise that editors of *The Times* expressed was due to the rapidity of the shift made in Tuscany. Many had expected Piedmont to lead the charge in granting constitutions, as it was the largest and arguably more influential state.

<sup>13</sup> "Express from Paris," 19 February 1848, *The Times*, Iss. 19790. Similar wonder and excitement was expressed in France, although by mid-February it too was engulfed in a new wave of revolution. Paris erupted in revolt on 22 February 1848. This revolution overturned the so-called "July Monarchy" of King Louis-Philippe d'Orléans and resulted in the birth of the French Second Republic.

<sup>14</sup> Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston, 18 February 1848, *Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Italy*, Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty, 31 July 31 (London: Harrison and Son, 1849), no. 96, 2:84. As noted, the monarchs of both Naples and Piedmont issued similar constitutions in early 1848. Pius IX did not approve a constitution for the Papal States until 14 March 1848.

animated by the most laudable intentions, full of concern for the happiness of his people. He sincerely entered the path of constitutional reform and deserves that his people take this into account.”<sup>15</sup> He instructed Benoit-Champy to convey only the most cordial affections from the new provisional government of the French Republic and to cultivate a close relationship with the new Tuscan ministry.

Tuscany’s constitution set the tone for the structure and function of the first representative government of the state. Like the other Italian constitutions of 1848, the *Statuto fondamentale* drew considerably from the French *Charte constitutionnelle* of 1830.<sup>16</sup> Leopold’s proclamation of 17 February stated that following the election of deputies to the new legislative assembly, the entirety of the *Statuto*’s provisions would be activated.<sup>17</sup> An electoral law promulgated on 3 March 1848 extended suffrage to all propertied men over the age of thirty.<sup>18</sup> The *Statuto* comprised nine “titles” and eighty-three articles. Title I began with a declaration of ten rights and “fundamental principles” of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany. Among them were freedom of religion, equality before the law, and protection of personal property, both real and intellectual.<sup>19</sup> Leopold upheld his loosening of censorship laws from 6 May 1847 and formally

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<sup>15</sup> Lamartine to Benoit-Champy, 29 March 1848, *Le relazioni Diplomatiche fra la Francia e il Granducato di Toscana*, no. 5, 1:29. Although a great admirer of Italy, and Tuscany in particular, Lamartine was not interested in intervening should conflict with Austria arise. He allowed a French fleet to deploy to the Italian coast but remained more interested in preserving the peace. Under Lamartine’s guidance, France would not go to war over the issue of Italian independence. The Second Republic needed time to stabilize its affairs. Lawrence C. Jennings, “Lamartine’s Italian Policy in 1848: A Reexamination,” *The Journal of Modern History* 42, no. 3 (September 1970): 332.

<sup>16</sup> The *Charte constitutionnelle du 1830* established the constitutional July Monarchy of Louis-Philippe d’Orléans. In the face of widespread unrest and upheaval in early 1848, Louis-Philippe had counseled Leopold to “proceed frankly with the desired reforms in Italy, [as] that was the way to save” his position. However, not long after receiving the letter with this advice, news arrived that Louis-Philippe had abdicated and the people declared the Second Republic. Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 328.

<sup>17</sup> *Statuto fondamentale del Granducato di Toscana*, 15 febbraio 1848, IX.83. The *Statuto* was approved by Leopold and the drafting committee on 15 February 1848 and promulgated on 17 February.

<sup>18</sup> Chiavistelli, *Dallo Stato alla nazione*, 260; *Statuto fondamentale*, II.31. This provision was for indirect suffrage, as eligible voters selected electors rather than the delegates themselves.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, I.1, 2, 8. 9. Article 1 established the Roman Catholic Church as the official state religion yet the same provision permitted free exercise of religion and the next granted equality before the law regardless of religion.



established freedom of the press.<sup>20</sup> Free trade, the independence of local government, and the *Guardia civica* were reaffirmed and validated as institutions and fundamental principles of the state.<sup>21</sup> These provisions managed the more philosophical components of the Tuscan state.

The practical mechanisms composing the structure, functioning, and purpose of government, followed in Titles II through IX. Title II addressed the status of executive authority and general matters surrounding the relationship between the grand duke and Tuscan legislative authority. Leopold II, as grand duke, retained executive authority over Tuscany as the “supreme head of state.”<sup>22</sup> Specific duties and powers designated to the grand duke included matters of war and peace, the right to designate appointed positions in government, and approval of legislative measures. He alone reserved the right to declare war and negotiate peace agreements, as well as the command of all armed forces. He similarly retained the power to enter alliances with other states and political entities.<sup>23</sup> As a defense against foreign intervention, Article Fourteen declared that no foreign troops could bear arms in Tuscany, unless specifically sanctioned by the legislative assemblies. This provision specifically targeted the threat of future Austrian invasion or occupation; it illustrates the constant anxiety concerning the deterioration of Austro-Tuscan relations.<sup>24</sup>

The majority of the Statuto defined the rights and duties of the new legislative branch of the Tuscan government. Titles III through V established a bicameral legislative assembly to

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“Real” property included all land, structures, mineral holdings, and any other deeded rights associated with said property. Residential, commercial, and agricultural properties all fell into this category.

<sup>20</sup> *Statuto fondamentale.*, I.5.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, I.6, 7, 10.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, II.13.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> This provision was deemed necessary in part because both Modena and Parma had been occupied by Austrian troops since the 1830s.

represent the people in the new political institutions, a structure that “the public good has deemed necessary.”<sup>25</sup> The upper house, the *Senato*, was composed of senators appointed by the grand duke for a life term.<sup>26</sup> The lower house, the *Consiglio generale*, included deputies elected by regional electoral colleges.<sup>27</sup> These committees, chaired by the *Gonfaloniere* (municipal magistrate), would elect eighty-six deputies to serve four-year terms.<sup>28</sup> The right to verify the validity of the elections process and results rested with the *Consiglio generale*.<sup>29</sup> Both houses and the grand duke could introduce legislation for discussion.<sup>30</sup>

The Statuto also included provisions for the creation of a *Consiglio di stato* (Council of State). Although the process for forming this council was not included in the initial constitution, its structure is crucial for understanding the proceedings of 1848. Following the election of delegates to the *Consiglio generale*, the majority party formed a cabinet or council of ministers to manage the affairs of the state. The president of the council, much like a prime minister in British politics, would select ten cabinet members after securing the support of a majority of deputies. With the approval of the grand duke, he and his allies formed a government.<sup>31</sup> This

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<sup>25</sup> *Statuto Fondamentale*, preamble.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, III.1.24. The Statuto also included a process for nominating worthy citizens to consideration for position in the senate, III.1.27.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, III.2.28.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, III.2.32. Tuscany was divided into eight-six regional constituencies, each of which selected a single delegate to attend the first meeting of the legislature. Chiavistelli, *Dallo Stato alla nazione*, 283. Electoral districts were primarily designated by municipalities, each including some of the smaller *commune* in its vicinity. The electoral law that governed the elections of June 1848, promulgated on 3 March 1848, provides a comprehensive list of the electoral districts and the process that governed the elections within each voting district. See “Legge elettorale di Toscana (3 marzo 1848)” in Pietro Lacava, *Sulla riforma della legge elettorale* (Napoli: Cav. Antonio Morano, editore, 1881), CXLIX-CLXVI.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, III.2.34.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, V.49. For a provision to become law, both houses of the legislature had to pass the bill. The Statuto required a simple majority, one half plus one, both for a quorum and for a bill to pass. *Ibid.*, V.47-48.

<sup>31</sup> Leopold also received the right to invite ministers to form a government in addition to simply approving their proposals. However, his role in this process was largely a formality. Chiavistelli, *Dallo stato alla nazione*, 241.

chief minister is referred to throughout this chapter simply as the president.

The final section of the constitution discusses the “transitional provisions” that governed the state’s conversion to true constitutionalism. Again, Leopold II as grand duke retained the right to assist in forming the Council of State and developing laws for the “swift and prompt enactment of the *Statuto fondamentale*.”<sup>32</sup> The principal issues he would address prior to the convening of the first legislature were the integration of an electoral law, a law on the freedom of the press, “organic articles” governing municipal government, and the incorporation of the territories of Lucca into the Tuscan bureaucratic structures.<sup>33</sup> Topics reserved for the deliberation of the legislature in its first session included electoral processes for municipal government, public education, duties of civil servants and other government officials, and proposals for laws on public lands and utilities.<sup>34</sup>

Compared with its model, the French constitution of 1830, a number of interesting differences emerge that demonstrate the particular Tuscan character of the *Statuto*. Not merely a verbatim copy of its French counterpart, the Tuscan constitution accommodated Tuscan traditions. Marchese Gino Capponi, one of the members of the constitutional committee, highlighted the importance of tailoring the *Statuto* to Tuscan traditions and society.<sup>35</sup> While the bureaucratic structures established by both documents are nearly identical, distinct national priorities emerge in each. The first article of each analyzes the differences between the socio-political environment in Tuscany and France. In the *Statuto*, the first principle declared is that

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<sup>32</sup> *Statuto fondamentale*, IX.79.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, IX.80.

<sup>35</sup> The framers of the *Statuto fondamentale* discussed the appropriate form for the Tuscan constitution at great length before finalizing the document. See Chiavistelli’s *Dallo Stato alla nazione*, Chapter 6.3 for a more detailed discussion of the deliberations surrounding this choice.

“The Catholic, Apostolic and Roman religion is the religion of the state.”<sup>36</sup> The first article of the French *Charte* of 1830 highlights the equality of all Frenchmen before the law, regardless of title or rank.<sup>37</sup> The primacy of religion in the Tuscan document points toward both Leopold’s Habsburg background and the unique situation of the states of Italy. Support for or opposition to papal policies had long influenced the affairs of the central Italian states. Further, the politics of the Church played a crucial role in the calculations of Tuscan government. In the middle ages, disagreements on the temporal authority of the pope had sparked a series of wars that racked Florence and the other cities of Tuscany for nearly two centuries.<sup>38</sup> Later, the anticlericalism of the French-led regimes of the 1790s and early 1800s had sparked peasant uprisings against the new secular government. As such, the framers of the Statuto understood that securing the support of the pope helped ensure the support of conservative, religious Tuscans.

In February 1848, Pope Pius IX remained a crucial ally in the liberalization and liberation of the Italian peninsula, both as leader of the Roman Church and as ruler of the Papal States. In February, Leopold received the pope’s blessing for the adoption of the Statuto. In his memoirs, he notes that the pope “was of the opinion we should gently walk with the people.” Pope Pius indicated that pragmatically, supporting constitutional measures would “leave in [their subjects] memories of the benefits [of our rule], so that they would desire a return to it should circumstances interrupt it for a time.”<sup>39</sup>

Another significant difference between the French and Tuscan constitutions involves the

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<sup>36</sup> *Statuto fondamentale*, I.1.

<sup>37</sup> *Charte constitutionnelle du 1830*, art. 1.

<sup>38</sup> Conflict between the Guelfs and Ghibellines, as well as the so-called “White” and “Black” Guelphs dominated politics in the twelfth century. Dante Alighieri is perhaps the most public figure affected by this conflict among Anglophone audiences.

<sup>39</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 329.

issue of censorship. As noted, on 6 May 1847, Leopold had loosened censorship restrictions.<sup>40</sup> This facilitated the liberal push for continued reform that ultimately resulted in the granting of the constitution itself. Although weakened, censorship remained a state institution, including a special department dedicated to religious censorship. However, in France, the Constitution of 1830 declared not only the right to publish or have one's opinions published, but also that "censorship can never be re-established."<sup>41</sup> The importance of censorship, as discussed by John A. Davis, remained a crucial check for managing public opinion in Tuscany.<sup>42</sup> While France resolved the question of free public discourse and censorship decades previously, the Tuscan government retained this limited power as a trace of its previous authority.

Leopold and the constitutional committee's reliance on the basic model of the French Constitution of 1830 also demonstrates his continued failure to read the signs of the times. As he enacted the Statuto, revolution again erupted in France, dismantling the very structure Italian liberals sought to emulate. Minister and coauthor of the Statuto, Marchese Gino Capponi, recognized this predicament with concern. "On 24 February, France repudiated the model for our statute and adopted a new [form of government] that undid all of our progress. As soon as they blossomed, our beautiful hopes for obtaining independence and freedom collapsed."<sup>43</sup> Developments in Tuscany were "out of phase" with the political advances in the rest of Europe.<sup>44</sup> By 1848, the spirit that motivated the reforms of the French Revolution of 1830 had been

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<sup>40</sup> As discussed in the previous chapter, Leopold approved a provision that expanded publishable material to include matters of government and politics.

<sup>41</sup> *Charte constitutionnelle du 1830*, art. 7.

<sup>42</sup> See chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion of censorship in Tuscany. See also, John A. Davis, "Politics of Censorship" in Laven, David and Lucy Riall, eds. *Napoleon's Legacy: Problems of Government in Restoration Europe* (Oxford: Berg, 2000).

<sup>43</sup> Capponi, "Settanta giorni," *Scritti editi e inediti*, 2:65.

<sup>44</sup> Woolf, *A History of Italy*, 370-1. Stuart Woolf describes the Italian situation in 1848 as being "out of phase" with the revolutions in the rest of Europe.

usurped by the now widespread cries for “free and universal suffrage, popular representation [in government], [and] a constitution of state establishing a parliament.”<sup>45</sup> Rather than provide a model for the success to be found in a liberal constitutional monarchy, the French Revolution of 1848 encouraged radicals to push for further concessions.<sup>46</sup>

Ironically, Leopold’s gracious agreements to limit censorship and incorporate the voice of the people in government may have succeeded in satisfying the demands of reformers in the 1830s. Further, Leopold’s approval of a constitution as “proof of the trust we have placed in the wisdom and maturity of our people to share with us the weight of duty” might have been welcomed.<sup>47</sup> As it was, the ideologies of the times called for the abolition of monarchy, republican government, universal suffrage, and freedom of the press. Instead, the Statuto established constitutional government, limited suffrage, and weakened censorship. While the Statuto of 1848 satisfied the hopes of many moderate and liberal reformers, radicals asserted that the constitution did not fulfill the desires of the masses. Nevertheless, the structures created by the constitution provided radical republicans with an opportunity to advance their political agenda from within.

Before turning to the ministries of 1848, a word on the political factions that dominated the affairs of constitutional Tuscany is necessary. Due to the grandducal regime’s mild attitude toward political discourse during the Restoration, many literary and philosophical circles emerged throughout Tuscany, most prominently in Florence.<sup>48</sup> These *gabinetti*, or *salons*,

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<sup>45</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 129.

<sup>46</sup> Reports to Paris from the new French ambassadors claimed that the “great event which has just taken place in Paris has produced an immense impression here [in Florence] and throughout Tuscany.” Celebrations in Livorno were particularly lively. De La Rochefoucauld to Lamartine, 7 March 1848, *Le relazioni Diplomatiche fra la Francia e il Granducato di Toscana*, no. 1, 1:23.

<sup>47</sup> *Statuto fondamentale*, preamble.

<sup>48</sup> These groups often had ties to Freemason lodges. See Baretta, *Le società segrete in Toscana*, 24-5.

quickly emerged as hubs of classical liberalism. Key government figures, including Marchese Cosimo Ridolfi and Marchese Gino Capponi, first entered the political sphere through their activity in these academic circles.<sup>49</sup> The so-called “liberals” advocated for enlightenment-inspired individual liberties and rights, and emphasized the importance of education. However, they valued the rule of law and thus did not insist on universal participation in the affairs of government. Their distrust of “mass politics” and support for Leopold’s constitutional regime gained them the designation “moderate-liberals.”<sup>50</sup> In 1848, disagreements over the use of popular support in advancing liberal policies caused fractures in the moderate-liberal bloc, which in turn facilitated the rise of radical politicians.

As Florence occupied the center of liberal politics, the city of Livorno dominated radical activity.<sup>51</sup> This urban port city welcomed a constant flow of foreign merchants, travelers, intellectuals, and exiles from other Italian states. As such, facets of all leftist political philosophies of the early nineteenth century manifested among the port’s politically conscience. Although significant ideological differences separated the radical factions, the restrictions of censorship and their common emphasis on Italian nationalism nominally united these groups in opposition to the grandducal government.<sup>52</sup> Prominent radicals included republican-democratic

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<sup>49</sup> Capponi and Ridolfi frequented the circle of Giovan Pietro Vieusseux, who published the liberal journal *Antologia*. Their publication was censored in 1833. Chiavistelli, *Dallo Stato alla nazione*, 157. In addition to serving both the Grand Duchy of Tuscany and the Kingdom of Italy as a statesman, Capponi was a distinguished historian. He is best known for his *Storia della Repubblica di Firenze* (1875). Ridolfi was an agronomist and scientist in addition to a politician. He served as the first president of the Cassa di Risparmio bank of Florence.

<sup>50</sup> Radicals considered moderate-liberals “conservatives” in many respects. Enrico Montazio refers to this group as the “*riformisti*” or reformers. Montazio, *L’ultimo granduca di Toscana*, (Firenze: Editori P. Sudrie e C., 1870), 59. On the liberal-moderate distrust of the masses, see Woolf, *A History of Italy*, 354.

<sup>51</sup> For more on the revolutionary period in Livorno, see David G. LoRomer, *Merchants and Reform in Livorno, 1814-1868* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

<sup>52</sup> Encouraged by the famous Genoese expatriate Giuseppe Mazzini, radical groups were encouraged to highlight issues of nationalism over questions of the form of government. While, as Stuart Woolf notes, “it is impossible to estimate how many followers Mazzini had in this period,” the near-constant agitation in Livorno between 1814 and 1848 indicates the breadth of his following. Woolf, *A History of Italy*, 355. Livorno was also a hub for groups such

demagogue Francesco Domenico Guerrazzi, nationalist-democrat Giuseppe Montanelli, and the socialist journalist Enrico Montazio.<sup>53</sup> Each represented a significant threat to the liberal-moderate platform.

The war with Austria also had a significant impact on Tuscany's transition to constitutionalism. As the fires of revolution spread across Europe in early 1848, Lombardia and Venezia revolted against Austrian rule. The city of Milan erupted in revolt in early March. The Austrian viceroy, Archduke Ranieri Giuseppe d'Absburgo-Lorena, responded by calling on the Austrian army to confront the rioters. On 18 March, Baron Karl Schnitzer-Meerau, Austrian chargé d'affaires in Florence, predicted that "not fifteen days would pass and there would be war."<sup>54</sup> News of the spread of revolution from Milan to Venice, Padua, and Trieste arrived on 21 March. War was nearer than he predicted.<sup>55</sup>

On 23 March, King Carlo Alberto issued a decree declaring support for the Italian patriots: "People of Lombardia and Venezia! [We] come to offer you the help which brother expects from brother and friend from friend."<sup>56</sup> Piedmontese forces crossed the Ticino river into Lombardia on 24 March.<sup>57</sup> The War for Italian Liberation had begun. Patriotic excitement following Carlo Alberto's proclamation soon pulled Tuscany, Naples, and the Papal States into the conflict as well – albeit reluctantly. Nationalists in each of these states agitated for permission to join the Piedmontese cause. As news of revolution against Austria reached Tuscany, liberal clubs lobbied Leopold for permission to send volunteers to aid their "Lombard

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as the Freemasons and the Carbonari. For more on secret societies, Baretta, *Le società segrete in Toscana*.

<sup>53</sup> All three men studied at the Università di Pisa, another hub for liberal political philosophy.

<sup>54</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 330.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 330.

<sup>56</sup> Abercromby to Palmerston, 24 March 1848, *Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Italy*, no. 161, 2:205

<sup>57</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 333.



brothers.”<sup>58</sup> Leopold and his council of ministers approved this request and so quelled the mounting disturbances that stemmed from fear of a reactionary crackdown.<sup>59</sup> On 26 March, the Tuscan government issued a formal decree creating an “army of observation...to co-operate with the Pontifical and Sardinian troops.”<sup>60</sup> At a blessing and review of the troops on 9 April, crowds greeted Leopold with cries of “*Viva Leopoldo!* Long live the hereditary prince!”<sup>61</sup> By supporting the Italian patriots’ fight against Austria, Leopold successfully retained his people’s support and preserved stability in his state as the government worked to enact the Tuscan constitution.

The war and the issue of nationalism are intimately connected. Over the course of 1848, radicals successfully overcame moderate-liberals to secure control of the new constitutional government. As radicalism gained popularity among urban populations, so too did more extreme visions of nationalism. While nationalism emerged separately from other political ideologies in Tuscan politics, most groups promoted either Tuscan or Italian nationalist aims. Liberal, republican, and democratic groups all had members who varyingly supported or opposed nationalist aims.<sup>62</sup> Local, or Tuscan, nationalism dominated liberal circles, and emphasized

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<sup>58</sup> Papal and Neapolitan involvement in the War for Italian Liberation proved short-lived. Pius IX revoked his support for the war on the grounds that he “was the head of all Christendom, not just Italy” only three weeks after declaring his support. Similarly, King Ferdinand in Naples revoked his constitutional concessions and recalled his troops in May 1848. Duggan, *The Force of Destiny*, 172-3.

<sup>59</sup> Both the Tuscan and Neapolitan governments remained hesitant to support Piedmont’s war against Austria out of fear of inviting Austrian intervention in their own affairs and due to their suspicions of King Carlo Alberto’s intentions. Duggan, *The Force of Destiny*, 172.

<sup>60</sup> Hamilton to Palmerston, 1 April 1848, *Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Italy*, no. 222, 2:304. Hamilton clarifies that the initial approval only granted permissions for troops to deploy to the Tuscan frontier, see page 296.

<sup>61</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 336. The Tuscan divisions that served in the War for Liberation are most known for their efforts in the battles of Curtatone and Montanara. Key players in the Tuscan nationalist movement, including Giuseppe Montanelli, served in the war.

<sup>62</sup> It is difficult to define one group as the “nationalist” party during this period. Radical groups generally had the highest percentage of nationalist supporters, whereas liberals tended to have a higher number of followers who supported the grandducal regime and thus were less interested in schemes of unification. The common liberal perspective, even among those who supported Italian nationalism, was that the first step was political modernization on the local level.

strengthening and securing the independence of Tuscany from external influences. Politicians who supported this brand of nationalism spearheaded the reforms of the 1840s and managed the first ministries of the new constitutional system. Meanwhile, radical circles, whether republican or socialist, emphasized true “Italian” nationalism. Leaders of this platform vigorously promoted the creation of a single Italian state built on a republican model. The tensions between these two versions of nationalism exacerbated the ideological differences between liberal and radical groups, fueling the intensity of radical opposition to the established regime.

The elections on 15 June 1848 represented Tuscany’s first major step toward implementing the Statuto fondamentale. However, even this advance toward representative rule met criticism. Due to the restrictions on voting eligibility, suffrage in the first Tuscan election only extended to approximately 19,000 men.<sup>63</sup> Radicals objected to the results of the election with claims that the government had unjustly “falsified the composition of the Chamber of Deputies and therefore undermined the constitution.”<sup>64</sup> They asserted suffrage had remained too restricted, and as such the results did not accurately convey the will of the people. After conservative-leaning politicians dominated the first cohort of deputies, this supported their reservations about the extent of the Statuto’s democratic principles.<sup>65</sup>

Although critiqued as such by the far left, the first legislative assembly was not “conservative” by Restoration-era standards. Tuscany had long been distinguished as the most liberal of the Italian states, and those whom the radicals considered “conservatives” were more accurately described as classical liberals. Beginning in June 1848, Cosimo Ridolfi served as the

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<sup>63</sup> Pesendorfer, 162-3. The population of Tuscany in 1848 was approximately one million, meaning that only approximately two percent of the population was represented in the March election. As noted, the constitution limited suffrage to property-holding males over the age of thirty.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 163.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 162-3.

first president of the Consiglio generale, Formerly the minister of the interior in Leopold's cabinet, Ridolfi was a driving force in promoting the reforms of the mid-1840s. In particular, Ridolfi tirelessly advocated the abolition of censorship: a reform that facilitated Leopold's approval of the Guardia civica and Statuto fondamentale.<sup>66</sup>

Despite his record of liberalism, Ridolfi's tenure as president was defined not by advances in strengthening Tuscany's constitutional government but by the ongoing War for Italian Liberation. The moderate party's priority was peace and national security. However, moderate-liberals did not believe that participating in the war against Austria promoted Tuscan stability.<sup>67</sup> As Florence was not on good terms with Vienna, playing an active role in the War for Liberation put Tuscany at risk and invited Austrian retribution in the event of defeat. This was entirely contrary to their desire for stability. Regardless, Leopold and the first council of state, chaired by Ridolfi, approved of Tuscan participation and allowed a volunteer corps to join the Piedmontese army. However, the perception spread in Tuscany that the new government only reluctantly agreed to participate. Both radicals and liberals criticized Ridolfi for his apparent and unenthusiastic effort to support the war against Austria.<sup>68</sup> The situation worsened following the Italian army's defeat at the Battle of Custoza on 22-27 July 1848.<sup>69</sup> Riots erupted in Livorno on 31 July, sealing the fate of Ridolfi's ministry. The radical demagogue Guerrazzi and his followers stormed the prisons and filled the streets of Livorno with cries of "Long live the

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<sup>66</sup> As noted, Ridolfi contributed to G. P. Vieusseux's *Antologia* prior to its dissolution in 1833.

<sup>67</sup> Hearder notes that Ridolfi's reluctance to support the war drew from "the long anti-militarist tradition of Tuscany," Hearder, *Italy in the Age of the Risorgimento* 83.

<sup>68</sup> Woolf, *A History of Italy*, 838. A notable critic from the liberal party was the *gonfaloniere* of Florence, Bettino Ricasoli. The loss of his support was devastating for the liberal party. Ricasoli would play a crucial role in Tuscany's assimilation into the Kingdom of Italy in 1859. During the period the present survey examines, Ricasoli was primarily influencing matters through his absence and abstention from political life. He plays a more active role in the affairs of Tuscany beginning in 1849-50 and 1859.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, 382.

Republic!” and “Down with the Lorraines!”<sup>70</sup> Ridolfi’s seemingly non-nationalist coalition could not sustain the popular support necessary to control the legislature, and he resigned that same day. Thus fell the first ministry of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany.<sup>71</sup>

The issues that plagued Ridolfi’s brief tenure as president of the council of state similarly affected his successor, Gino Capponi.<sup>72</sup> Like Ridolfi, Capponi was a liberal and served as a minister in Grand Duke Leopold’s cabinet during the reforms of 1847. In January 1848, Leopold appointed him a member of the *comitato quinqueviro* that drafted the Statuto.<sup>73</sup> Due to the failure of Ridolfi’s government, the reputation of liberal rule rested on the success of Capponi’s ministry. The physically blind Capponi only reluctantly accepted Leopold’s invitation to form a government following Ridolfi’s resignation.<sup>74</sup> His ministry entered office on 17 August 1848.

With the war against Austria all but lost, Capponi directed the bulk of his efforts toward securing Tuscan autonomy. His primary goal was to solidify Tuscany’s legitimacy as a constitutional monarchy among the other states of Europe, namely France and Great Britain.<sup>75</sup> Marshal Joseph Radezky’s success against Piedmontese forces in Lombardia highlighted the urgency of this task. Capponi recognized the danger of restored Austrian authority for the

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<sup>70</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 178. Guerrazzi was also a deputy to the Consiglio during this time.

<sup>71</sup> Chiavistelli, *Dallo Stato alla nazione*, 304.

<sup>72</sup> Leopold first appealed to Bettino Ricasoli, a less-moderate liberal, to form a government following Ridolfi’s resignation. He refused, stating that he did not wish to get involved in the affairs of government. Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 178 and Chiavistelli, *Dallo Stato alla nazione*, 305.

<sup>73</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 142. Ridolfi, as a cabinet member, also offered corrections and advice on the Statuto prior to its publication. Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 326.

<sup>74</sup> Capponi, “Settanta giorni,” *Scritti editi e inediti*, 2:65.

<sup>75</sup> Ridolfi travelled to both France and Great Britain as an “extraordinary minister” of the Tuscan government in September to secure the independence of Tuscany and negotiate territorial gains following the end of the war. He traveled to Britain specifically to petition that it allow Tuscany to participate in the Congress of Brussels and the ensuing negotiations to end the war between Austria and Piedmont. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 23 January 1849, *Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Italy*, no. 59, 4:54.

rebellious Tuscan state.<sup>76</sup> He skillfully courted both France and Britain to acknowledge the independence of the Tuscan state and worked to reestablish Tuscan neutrality. Additionally, he strove to reignite federalist efforts for a league of Italian states.<sup>77</sup> Although ultimately unsuccessful, his foreign policy efforts received praise from other liberal politicians.<sup>78</sup>

Capponi met little success in internal affairs as well. During the first months of constitutional rule, the radicals remained disorganized and divided. Disagreements on whether the priority of the left should be advancing Italian nationalism or controlling local government divided their efforts.<sup>79</sup> By late August, the apparent weakness of the liberal coalition indicated that the issue of securing Italian independence from Austrian influence was the key to winning the support of the urban masses. Guerrazzi's riots had demonstrated that the key to overtaking the moderate-liberal hierarchy was harnessing popular support. By utilizing both popular demonstrations and unifying leftist opposition to Capponi's government in the legislature, radicals completely blocked the president's domestic initiatives.<sup>80</sup>

Livorno remained the center of radical activity as upheaval significantly handicapped domestic affairs. Guerrazzi and other radicals continued their assaults on Capponi's ministry by mobilizing the public on the issue of Italian independence from the "Austrian barbarians."<sup>81</sup> Riots and demonstrations continued throughout the fall of 1848. Capponi asserts in his memoirs that "without Livorno, I am positive Tuscany would never have entered into revolution. However, as the government had no means of opposing it, the city itself was enough to subvert

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<sup>76</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 179.

<sup>77</sup> Capponi, "Settanta giorni," *Scritti editi e inediti*, 2:80-1.

<sup>78</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 179.

<sup>79</sup> Woolf, *A History of Italy*, 383.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, 392.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*

our state.”<sup>82</sup> By late August, the situation was severe enough that Guerrazzi, the populist maestro of the chaos, offered to use his influence to assist the government in quelling Livorno.<sup>83</sup> His proposal was rejected.

Instead, Capponi appointed another popular political figure to the governorship of Livorno: Giuseppe Montanelli. On 30 September, Montanelli assumed the office of the governor of Livorno and solidified the democratic party’s hold on the affairs of the rebellious city.<sup>84</sup> Leopold remarks in his memoirs that it was “a sad affair” to willingly promote the radical law professor Montanelli.<sup>85</sup> At the time, he seemed the most viable alternative to Guerrazzi. Long an icon of the nationalist-democratic cause, Montanelli began his political climb following his return from the War for Liberation. He earned notoriety after being wounded and captured by the Austrians at the Battle of Curtatone.<sup>86</sup> In the autumn of 1848, he returned to Tuscany and established himself as a pillar of the nationalist democratic cause.<sup>87</sup> An advocate of a republican model of Italian unification, Montanelli roused the people with his demands for the formation of a national constituent assembly, or *Costituente*. His popularity in Livorno increased

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<sup>82</sup> Capponi, “Settanta giorni,” *Scritti editi e inediti*, 2:104. Capponi notes that the Ridolfi ministry abolished the presidency of the *Buongoverno* (secret police). He links this development directly to the government’s inability to control popular uprisings. Capponi, “Settanta giorni,” *Scritti editi e inediti*, 2:111.

<sup>83</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 182.

<sup>84</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 358-9; Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 182-3.

<sup>85</sup> Leopoldo II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 359.

<sup>86</sup> The Battle of Curtatone and Montanara (29 May 1848) was one of the most significant conflicts that the Tuscan volunteer corps participated in during the War for Liberation. After six hours of vicious battle, the contingent of Tuscan and Neapolitan troops were defeated by three columns of Austrian troops under the command of Marshall Radetzky. By four p.m., the Italian coalition counted 166 dead, 518 wounded, and 1178 prisoners. Though defeated, the many students and volunteers who fought the Austrians in this battle were regarded as martyrs for the Italian cause. The clash at Curtatone and Montanara enabled King Carlo Alberto’s Piedmontese forces sufficient time to outmaneuver the advancing Austrian troops along the Mincio River on 30 May. Marco Scardigli, *Le grandi battaglie del Risorgimento* (Milano: BUR Biblioteca Università Rizzoi, 2011), 120-2.

<sup>87</sup> For details of the coalition’s defeat by Austria, see Duggan, *The Force of Destiny*, 172-5. Pope Pius IX revoked his support for the war in late April 1848. King Carlo Alberto signed an armistice with Austria after his army’s defeat at the Battle of Custoza in July 1848. The war resumed in the spring of 1849 following unsuccessful negotiations at a peace conference at Brussels.

exponentially. While Capponi hoped this selection would moderate the volatile Livornese revolution, Montanelli's rise stoked the fires of the democratic movement. Later, Capponi called this decision "the greatest mistake of his ministry."<sup>88</sup>

As Capponi's ministry faltered, his Tuscan-centric emphasis on a federal coalition of Italian states clashed with Montanelli's celebrated calls for a unified Italian republic. However, Montanelli did not attack the existing structures of government immediately. Rather, he worked within the system to build his reputation with the goal of attaining the office of the presidency. While Guerrazzi's populism presented a real and volatile threat to the government, Montanelli's cunning *realpolitik* was especially deadly for the tottering liberal regime. Among other politicians, Montanelli presented his idea for a national constituent assembly as "a practical step toward creating a national government."<sup>89</sup> By omitting the more radical components of his vision for the Costituente, he secured the support of wider audiences and successfully rebranded his radical nationalist cause as a seemingly "moderate-liberal" enterprise.<sup>90</sup>

Encouraged by Montanelli's rise, radical unrest spread to other urban hubs, notably Arezzo, Lucca, and Pistoia.<sup>91</sup> Exhausted and disheartened by the impossibility of the task before him, Capponi resigned on 12 October. His exit from office ended the moderate-liberal era of Tuscan politics.<sup>92</sup> Following the dissolution of Capponi's ministry, demonstrations demanding a government that reflected the "will of the people" erupted. Ceding to the demands of the masses, Leopold approved the creation of a ministry under Montanelli. Guerrazzi was installed as the

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<sup>88</sup> Capponi, "Settanta giorni," *Scritti editi e inediti*, 2:139.

<sup>89</sup> Woolf, *A History of Italy*, 395.

<sup>90</sup> Capponi, "Settanta giorni," *Scritti editi e inediti*, 2:137. LoRomer, *Merchants and Reform*, 233.

<sup>91</sup> Woolf, *A History of Italy*, 395.

<sup>92</sup> Capponi, "Settanta giorni," *Scritti editi e inediti*, 2:150. Bettino Ricasoli, the liberal *gonfaloniere* of Florence, also resigned at this time. This furthered opportunities for a radical takeover. Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 186.

minister of the interior.

The radicals entered office on 27 October, marking “the first success of the democrats in breaking the moderate monopoly in political power in the monarchical states” of the peninsula.<sup>93</sup> With Montanelli and Guerrazzi at the helm of the state, “Tuscany became the focal point for [Italian] democrats.”<sup>94</sup> Soon, Giuseppe Mazzini, the radical nationalist and republican, and other advocates of an Italian republic shifted their efforts toward Florence and Livorno. Political developments in Tuscany and the Papal States appeared to favor success for the Mazzinian platform.<sup>95</sup> Mazzini’s efforts toward unification had previously centered on Lombardia and Venezia, the sites of the initial revolutions against Austrian influence. However, following Piedmont’s defeat at the Battle of Custoza in July 1848, the war for liberation stalled. With the northern provinces again in Austrian hands, the success of radical groups in Tuscany inspired hope. Following Pius IX’s flight from Rome on 24 November, Mazzini and his followers traveled to Rome to establish a Republic, entrusting further progress in Tuscany to Montanelli.<sup>96</sup>

Montanelli now controlled the government, but even his closest ideological allies remained hesitant to pursue any major advances toward unification. Even Guerrazzi, the former rabble-rouser, grew wary of the effects of Montanelli’s policies on Tuscany’s security.<sup>97</sup> His intense emphasis on nationalism and popular involvement in the creation of a united Italy

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<sup>93</sup> Woolf, *A History of Italy*, 396.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>95</sup> Mazzini’s vision of a united Italy promoted a non-federalist, democratic republic that operated on popular civic participation and universal suffrage. His model for unification prioritized encouraging unity and dismantling long traditions of localism, or *campanilismo*. Ronald S. Cunsolo, *Italian Nationalism* (Malabar: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Co., Inc., 1990), 58.

<sup>96</sup> Woolf, *A History of Italy*, 397.

<sup>97</sup> Early in Montanelli’s ministry, Guerrazzi met privately with Leopold II to affirm his loyalty to the Tuscan state and to the grand duke. He warned Leopold that he “ran the risk of losing his crown if Montanelli’s constituent assembly” became a reality. Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 189.



sparked fear in both liberals and radicals, as the constant promotion of a national constituent assembly fueled demonstrations in Livorno. Guerrazzi and other members of Montanelli's ministry now focused on curbing his policies and containing popular uprisings.<sup>98</sup> Despite his cabinet's advice to moderate his aims and focus on internal matters, Montanelli on 7 November formally proposed the creation of a national constituent assembly elected through universal suffrage.<sup>99</sup>

Although his republican rhetoric inspired Livorno's urban masses, such overtures found little reception in the periphery. While urban populations supported Montanelli's initiatives, the conservative countryside remained skeptical of his radical projects. Any proposal that subordinated Tuscan interests to other states remained unacceptable.<sup>100</sup> Further, while it was possible to unite Tuscans on the issue of eliminating Austrian influence in the peninsula, ideas of ousting the long-established house of Habsburg-Lorraine did not resonate. As had been the case throughout the French Wars and the early years of the Restoration, the dynasty remained the symbol of stability for conservative peasants. With all activity focused in Livorno and Florence, Leopold represented the interests of the periphery against the center. Dramatic shifts were needed before the countryside would reject his traditional authority as sovereign. In his memoirs, Capponi confirms that the idea of a national government of a partially unified Italy did not resonate with Tuscans at the time, "because it seemed that Tuscany would like to remain itself in all capacities [and that] the regime of the grand duke could trust itself to the voluntary support of [its subjects]."<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> Woolf, *A History of Italy*, 396-7.

<sup>99</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 191.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, 162.

<sup>101</sup> Capponi, "Settanta giorni," *Scritti editi e inediti*, 2:142.

Now removed from politics, Capponi criticized Montanelli's imprudent calls for such radical developments on the basis of foreign affairs. He believed that the radicals failed to factor Austria into their ambitious nationalist program. Reestablished as master of northern Italy, Vienna "would not permit such doctrines [as a national assembly] to thrive under its own nose."<sup>102</sup> Although an armistice paused hostilities, Austria's armies remained within range of the Tuscan border. As Tuscany possessed no means to oppose an Austrian invasion, the state was in a precarious position. The treasury was nearly empty, and the Tuscan national guard was not large enough to offer significant resistance.

The liberal governments of 1848 had remained cognizant of the balance between pursuing their political goals and avoiding antagonizing the major powers. However, their years of experience in foreign and domestic affairs had little influence on the policies of Montanelli's ministry. By late 1848, radicals had ousted moderate liberals from the national government in Florence as well as municipal governments across Tuscany. Led by radicals, the government's focus was no longer stabilization or international diplomacy, but rather the overthrow of the status quo in pursuit of a new Italy. Their sights were set on unification. However, to Capponi and other liberals, this vision appeared ignorant and shortsighted. None believed that Montanelli's goals would be attained, and they feared the effects that his attempts would have on Tuscany's wellbeing. In the meantime, Guerrazzi strove to contain the situation from his position within Montanelli's government. As minister of the interior, he shifted his focus toward diffusing the tension in Livorno and other urban areas until a less-radical faction could secure a majority and challenge Montanelli's authority in the legislature.

At the beginning of 1848, Leopold "pronounced before the world his separation from

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<sup>102</sup> Capponi, "Settanta giorni," *Scritti editi e inediti*, 2:141-2.


Austria” by supporting the plight of Italian patriots in their fight for autonomy.<sup>103</sup> His rejection of Vienna’s influence liberated him from any obligation to promote Habsburg interests in the peninsula and secured his dynasty’s hold on the Tuscan state. Initially, he believed that this separation granted him a free hand to rule his *patria* as he deemed appropriate. However, by granting Tuscany constitutional rule, Leopold surrendered the initiative and authority he previously maintained as absolute ruler. Both he and his state were now subject to the decisions of elected and appointed officials, whether conservative or radical. As Austrian forces crept ever closer to Tuscan frontiers, an ideological battle raged within Tuscany. As liberals and radicals vied for control of the legislative assembly, two distinct conceptions of nationalism rose to further separate left from right.

Following Leopold’s confirmation of the Statuto fondamentale, Tuscany entered what appeared to be a new age of enlightened, constitutional governance. In contrast to the nationalist revolutions raging across the continent in February and March 1848, Tuscany again maintained a semblance of order and stability. In Piedmont, King Carlo Alberto assumed the role of military liberator and advocate of Italian interests in the war against Austria. Meanwhile, advances in Tuscany represented a different facet of the struggle for Italian independence: political autonomy. The constitutional developments and factional battles between moderate-liberals and radicals throughout 1848 demonstrated the tension present in all Italian states. Further, Leopold’s position illustrated the difficulties that lay ahead for anachronistic monarchs in the age of representative government. For a time, he remained a variable in the affairs of his state. By early 1849, it was clear that he no longer factored into the equation.<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 140.

<sup>104</sup> The difficulties Tuscan politicians faced in reconciling democracy and monarchy reflected the problems that plagued Italy following unification as well.



**Figure 3.1: The Grand Duchy of Tuscany**

## CHAPTER 4

### FROM ENLIGHTENMENT TO AUTOCRACY, THE END OF LEOPOLDINE LIBERALISM

In 1848, Leopold II largely disappeared from Tuscan politics. Following the promulgation of the Statuto fondamentale in February, his role shifted from that of true sovereign to figurehead. While he performed a number of ceremonial functions, the practical affairs of the constitutional government now functioned largely independent of his input. During Cosimo Ridolfi and Gino Capponi's moderate-liberal ministries, the liberal yet traditional aristocrats preserved the appearance of Leopold's influence by consulting him on matters of state. After the radicals secured a hold on the legislature in late 1848, this display of deference ceased. As executive, he retained the authority to approve ministers' proposals for forming and operating governments. However, after securing their hold on the government, the radicals did not invite Leopold into the governance of Tuscany beyond requiring his signature on new laws. Soon, they introduced policies that directly attacked Leopold's position of honor as the father of his people. For a time, he retained his belief that he, as benevolent patriarch, remained the guide and guard of Tuscan affairs. However, this illusion quickly dissipated. Soon after the installation of Giuseppe Montanelli's radical ministry in October 1848, Leopold found himself on a collision course with the constitutional government.

In November 1848, an unexpected shift accelerated the pace of revolution in Tuscany. By approving a radical ministry under Montanelli's presidency, both Leopold and the outgoing liberal ministry believed that welcoming the radicals into government would quell republican agitation. They were mistaken. Both Leopold and the liberal establishment underestimated Montanelli's power to sway the "inexperienced masses."<sup>1</sup> After Montanelli formed his cabinet,

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<sup>1</sup> Capponi, "Settanta giorni," *Scritti editi e inediti*, 2:142.

he demanded the dissolution of the legislature and called for new elections to select candidates that represented the “will of the people.” As the government made arrangements for another election subject to existing suffrage restrictions, urban agitation spiked. Radical pamphlets attacked moderate-liberal candidates and encouraged popular upheaval. This “electoral terror” secured a majority of votes in favor of the Montanelli-Guerrazzi government.<sup>2</sup> Buoyed by its success in the second election, the radical party concluded 1848 confident that its nationalist, democratic aims were supported by the majority of Tuscans.

Affirmed by the results of the November 1848 election, President Giuseppe Montanelli increased his efforts toward the creation of a national constituent assembly. Montanelli received no affirmation for his plans from the grand duke. Initially, Leopold mistakenly understood the Costituente as a solely Tuscan enterprise and posed no objections to a local constituent assembly to assist in the governance of the Tuscan state. However, as Montanelli announced his intention for the Costituente to expand to encompass all of the Italian states, Leopold recognized the danger the proposal posed to his position. Montanelli’s nationalism was not of the Tuscan variety that liberal ministers like Ridolfi and Capponi supported. Rather, it was a broader vision of a united Italy in which he would have no place. On 27 December, Montanelli informed Leopold that “if the Costituente was not accepted, he would resign and turn all the hatred generated by his ousting against [the grand duke himself].”<sup>3</sup> Paired with Pius IX’s flight from Rome in November 1848 and Montanelli’s continued pursuit of the national constituent assembly at the beginning of 1849, this threat provided the wake-up call Leopold needed to recognize his true position. He was not sovereign of his state; he had not been for quite some time.

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<sup>2</sup> Former President Cosimo Ridolfi’s home was one of the targets of public destruction. Foreign embassies in Florence were also antagonized leading up to the election. Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 191.

<sup>3</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 373.

This encounter permanently altered Leopold's relationship and interactions with the ministers of state. In October 1848, Grand Duke Leopold had remained confident that his "paternal merits" had secured him the support of his people, and that he "believe[d] that the people would vote for a constitutional monarchy and for [him]." <sup>4</sup> By late December, the "harmony and fidelity" that demonstrated "the trust that... [his] beloved subjects placed in him" described in the constitution of February 1848 had all but disappeared. <sup>5</sup> The constant riots in Livorno and Montanelli's personal attack on his status as grand duke shifted Leopold's mindset. Previously, the grand duke had retained the belief that constitutional government preserved the right of the prince to rule, and that it was *his* will and benevolence that permitted the people to participate in government. However, it appears that only at the conclusion of the Year of Revolutions did Leopold recognize that the system created by the Statuto fondamentale removed much of his authority. The deference of the liberal ministers that preceded Montanelli had preserved the appearance of his influence. Montanelli's outright rejection of Leopold's involvement and emphasis on the constitutional government's independence revealed the extent of the differences between liberal-moderate and radical ideology. The urban masses now placed their faith in the legislature rather than their prince.

Further, Leopold recognized the role that nationalism played in Tuscan affairs. Previously, he understood that the people of Livorno desired reform and change, but he did not grasp the full implications of their vision of nationalism. As the liberals promoted unification along federalist lines, their – largely unsuccessful – efforts posed little to no threat to Leopold. Further, during this time Leopold remained confident that he retained the confidence and

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<sup>4</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 189. Guerrazzi also notes this conversation in his memoirs.

<sup>5</sup> *Statuto fondamentale del Granducato di Toscana*, 15 February 1848, preamble.

admiration of his people. The radical model of unification along republican lines instead required his removal as grand duke of Tuscany. In a new united Italy without an independent Tuscan state, an autonomous and independent Tuscan grand duke had no place. The radicals threatened his status in ways that the liberals never had.

While previous “anti-government” propaganda attacked the ministers of the grandducal system, rarely had Leopold been the specific object of hatred.<sup>6</sup> Montanelli’s threat to turn the rage of the masses against Leopold *personally* was an affront to the grand duke’s paternal self-identity. Further, popular support for the constituent assembly represented a threat to Leopold’s legitimacy as grand duke, and that of all Italian sovereigns. While Leopold attempted to remain supportive of his people throughout the dramatic changes of 1847 and 1848, the insults he now sustained as Tuscany transitioned to a republic changed his outlook. In the autumn, he approved of Montanelli as a reasonable alternative to the volatility of F. D. Guerrazzi’s populism. By December, he understood the implications of this decision. “The Costituente is governmental suicide,” he wrote. “It grants the right to elect the sovereign...and steal from legitimate princes their right of sovereignty granted by God.”<sup>7</sup> He decided that he must oppose it at all cost.

Meanwhile, Montanelli vigorously pursued the creation of the Costituente. As noted, he met increasing objections from his cabinet members as they continued to encourage moderation in his policies. Nevertheless, he looked to the other Italian states to support his vision of unification. In January 1849, he entered negotiations with Piedmont to secure its participation in a pan-Italian national convention, but Turin soundly rejected his proposals. Following the failed negotiations at the 1848 Congress of Brussels, Piedmont remained focused on resuming the war

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<sup>6</sup> Most often, even during the reign of Ferdinand III, “the rage of the populace was not against the sovereign, but against the ministers” Baretta, *Le società segrete in Toscana*, 54.

<sup>7</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 373.



with Austria.<sup>8</sup> Turin had little interest in Montanelli's radical, republican schemes. Even without the war, it remained unlikely that Piedmont would have supported Montanelli's constituent assembly at this stage. Under the leadership of the neo-guelphist prime minister, Vincenzo Gioberti, any Piedmontese effort toward unification would not mirror Mazzini's plans for a republic. Only federalist proposals held a chance at swaying the government at Turin, and such efforts were not pressing enough to demand their attention.<sup>9</sup> Following Piedmont's rejection to support his program, Montanelli shifted his attention toward forming an alliance with Mazzini's government in Rome.<sup>10</sup>

While Cosimo Ridolfi and Gino Capponi focused their efforts to secure Tuscan autonomy and stability through traditional diplomacy and political activity, Montanelli placed his success solely on the creation of the *Costituente*. This policy dominated both his foreign and domestic agendas. Further, these policies rested on his ability to harness the agitation of the masses. As his efforts continued, the tension between him and the grand duke increased.

A helpless Leopold mourned the "decline" of his state. "Tuscany, long ill, had come to a critical moment," he laments, "though it continued to display signs of life."<sup>11</sup> As Montanelli antagonized Vienna with his support for Mazzinian policies, Leopold II silently rejected calls for a republic, praying that Tuscans would recognize that "a republic was not in their best interest"

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<sup>8</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 196-7; Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 372-3. Motivated by a desire to recover Lombardia from Austrian occupation, King Carlo Alberto of Piedmont had resumed conflict with Austria in the spring of 1849. As with the campaign of 1848, that of 1849 was similarly unsuccessful. Following his defeat at the Battle of Novara on 23 March, Carlo Alberto abdicated in favor of his son. He died in exile in Oporto, Portugal in July 1849. Duggan, *The Force of Destiny*, 175.

<sup>9</sup> Offended by Piedmont's refusal of support, Montanelli responded to Gioberti on 5 January that Piedmont's "refusal of the *Costituente* could lead to the fall of the [radical] Tuscan government." Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 196.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 200.

<sup>11</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 363-4.

and to both “avoid and reject” such ideas.<sup>12</sup> Seemingly “abandoned” by his liberal ministers, Leopold remained at Florence to fulfill his only remaining duty: signing decrees into law.<sup>13</sup>

At the conclusion of the Year of Revolutions, Leopold resolved to reclaim his authority as “executive.” Tensions were high in Tuscany as the country anticipated the opening of the newly elected legislative assembly. As an assertion of his authority as executive, Leopold informed now-Internal Minister Guerrazzi that he “would open the Chamber only when order was guaranteed, when all deputies had arrived, topics of discussion met [his] approval, and his honor [as sovereign] restored.”<sup>14</sup> Guerrazzi consented and succeeded in “containing the extreme disorder.”<sup>15</sup> The demagogue agitator, no longer the most radical of his peers, acted as an agent of stability. Leopold sent his family to Siena to remove them from any disturbances and Guerrazzi increased the number of national guardsmen in Florence to contain protests. The opening of the new legislative session on 10 January 1849 occurred with little fanfare. The capital was silent, but the tension remained.

With the convening of the legislature, Montanelli initiated the work toward the realization of his Costituente. Throughout January 1849, demonstrations, petitions, and policy proposals highlighted the radical party’s desire for a constituent assembly. Efforts increased after the Roman government proceeded with elections for representatives to a constituent assembly on 21 January.<sup>16</sup> In response, crowds gathered outside the Palazzo Vecchio in support of democratic developments in Rome.<sup>17</sup> Deliberations on the matter of the constituent assembly continued in

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<sup>12</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 365.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 364.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 374.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 375.

<sup>16</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 197.

<sup>17</sup> Leopoldo II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 377. The Palazzo Vecchio serves as the center of government in Florence. It

the council, and popular demonstrations intensified in the piazzas.

As the situation escalated, Leopold sought advice on the appropriate response to the creation of the *Costituente*. In addition to the noted political implications of the constituent assembly, the grand duke felt the weight of the moral and ethical consequences of his support or opposition to Montanelli's program. His dilemma involved whether he, as a Catholic sovereign and symbol of legitimacy, could approve of the constituent assembly. In his own deliberations, Leopold decided that he could neither accept nor reject the assembly. "The guilt" Leopold felt in "granting his approval of the *Costituente* was immense before [his] soul."<sup>18</sup> He wrote to the bishops of Florence, Pisa, and Sienna, and to Pope Pius IX, seeking advice and prayers. Pius IX responded with a definitive rejection of the radical policy. With the knowledge that the pope formally disapproved of the constituent assembly, this question weighed even heavier on Leopold's conscience.<sup>19</sup>

Socialist Enrico Montazio claims that one of the reasons Leopold did not understand the negative implications of the *Costituente* on his authority was because he anticipated a positive outcome in any elections. He hoped that the trust and admiration of his subjects might place him at the head of a united Italian state and "seemed tickled by the favorable consequences that the vote of a constituent assembly could have for him." However, after considering the revolts that ousted Pius IX in Rome and the pope's harsh reaction against republican developments, "he trembled at the possibility of excommunication due to the *Costituente*."<sup>20</sup> Although he had

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is located on the Piazza Signoria, adjacent to the famous Uffizi Galleries and the Arno River.

<sup>18</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 377.

<sup>19</sup> Leopold's memoirs provide consistent evidence of his deep and genuine religiosity. This fact grants both gravity and credibility to his concern over the state of his soul and the spiritual and moral dilemma he faced in this situation. Similarities can be drawn to the late King Louis XVI, who felt similar pressure to reject political developments in France because of his religious loyalty and the pope's opposition.

<sup>20</sup> Montazio, *L'ultimo granduca*, 74.

previously asserted that the Pope's opinions did not influence the affairs of state, the severity of the new situation shifted his priorities.

While presiding over the meetings of the legislature, Leopold grew increasingly uneasy about the radical program. Demonstrations and riots continued as the assembly debated the *Costituente*. Leopold sickened at the “insults to religion, the pope, the clergy,” and mourned that now “everything was subject to popular pressure,” and that the affairs of the state “rested in the hands of [his] enemies.”<sup>21</sup> The senate scheduled a vote for approving the election of delegates to a national assembly, or *Costituente italiana*, for 30 January. Leopold uneasily acknowledged that “there was little chance that [the senate would] vote against it.”<sup>22</sup> Still unsure of how to proceed given his moral qualms, Leopold decided to leave the city to both delay his participation in the discussions of the provision and consider the best course of action. He joined his family in Siena on the morning of 30 January.<sup>23</sup>

The first week of February 1849 marked a series of dramatic and rapid developments in the history of revolutionary Tuscany. As expected, both the senate and legislative assembly approved the election of delegates for a constituent assembly. To formalize the decision, the legislature needed the grand duke to approve the law. Montanelli and a small cohort of deputies traveled to Siena to obtain Leopold's signature. Upon his arrival on 6 March, Montanelli received the news that the grand duke, now ill, would not be able to grant him an audience.<sup>24</sup> In the meantime, Leopold prepared a statement to reject the *Costituente*. In a letter to Montanelli, he

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<sup>21</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 378.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 379.

<sup>23</sup> Enrico Montazio asserts that Leopold left for Siena “having given to the honest men of the government the reason that his presence in Siena might be useful to extinguish the reactionary flames being stoked by the nobility and the clergy.” Montazio, *L'ultimo granduca*, 74.

<sup>24</sup> Montazio comments that Montanelli was too kind to force Leopold to approve the statute, deferring to the staff when informed that the duke was feeling unwell. Montazio, *L'ultimo granduca*, 76.

explained his reasons for opposing it as well as the necessity of his departure.<sup>25</sup> Leopold informed his family that they were to make secret preparations to leave Siena, under the appearance that they were returning to Florence. Seemingly recovered from his brief illness, Leopold met briefly with Montanelli on the morning of 7 February. Afterward, Leopold and his family departed Siena “as though for a short outing.”<sup>26</sup> As the duke had been ill the previous day, Montanelli thought little of the family’s trip to “take in the country air.”<sup>27</sup> Leopold used this opportunity to hasten toward the Tuscan border. The grandducal family traveled through the night and reached the port of Santo Stefano near Grosseto on the morning of 8 February. There, they boarded a British freighter, the *Porcupine*, and entered the protection of the Royal Navy.<sup>28</sup> Rather than approve the “illegal” constituent assembly, Leopold chose to flee.

Although absent, Leopold had no intention of abdicating. On the contrary, he sought to use his absence to reassert his authority as grand duke. His letter to the Consiglio asserted that he “was led to depart not through fear, but from a scruple of conscience, confirmed by a letter from the Pope, in answer to one of his own.”<sup>29</sup> By remaining on Tuscan territory, Leopold retained the full rights and privileges as the executive of state. As such, the provisional government in Florence remained an illegal institution.<sup>30</sup> On 13 February, Leopold dispatched a letter to Vienna apologizing for “the momentary interruption of political dialogue and kinship

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<sup>25</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 380.

<sup>26</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 201.

<sup>27</sup> Montazio, *L'ultimo granduca*, 76. Hamilton also confirms in his report that Montanelli “was not aware of His Royal Highness’s departure from Sienna [sic].” Hamilton to Palmerston, 9 February 1849, *Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Italy*, no. 126, 4:118-9.

<sup>28</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 380-2.

<sup>29</sup> Hamilton to Palmerston, 9 February 1849, *Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Italy*, no. 126, 4:119.

<sup>30</sup> The British delegation in Tuscany informed Montanelli on 9 February of their inability “to exercise their diplomatic functions towards the Provisional Government” as they had “the honour [sic] to be exclusively accredited to His Royal Highness the Grand Duke.” The Diplomatic Body to M. Montanelli, 9 February 1849, *Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Italy*, Inclosure 2 in no. 127, 4:120.

between Austria and Tuscany.”<sup>31</sup> The next day, he received a letter from Guerrazzi encouraging abdication.<sup>32</sup> It was exactly one year since Leopold’s proclamation of the Statuto fondamentale. Already, the institutions it established were soundly dismantled and replaced. The maelstrom of revolution had overcome even the most liberal of the Italian states. In his letter to Leopold, Guerrazzi asserted that “if the grand duke does not return [to Florence], there will be civil war.”<sup>33</sup>

Tuscans from all segments of the political spectrum resented Leopold’s betrayal and supported Montanelli’s republican government. However, many moderate-liberals tacitly considered alternatives to his reactionary rejection of the constituent assembly. Montazio relates that many moderates encouraged Leopold to travel to Turin and ally himself with King Carlo Alberto.<sup>34</sup> A similar solution to the problem of Tuscan instability emerged in Piedmont, as Carlo Alberto also wrote Leopold to offer protection and friendship in restoring him to power in his state.<sup>35</sup> In doing so, both the Piedmontese and moderate Tuscans hoped Austrian involvement could be avoided and that efforts to pursue unification on a federalist model could resume. However, conservatives sought to persuade Leopold otherwise. Some members of the nobility, whom Montazio refers to as Austrian sympathizers, recommended that Leopold join Pius IX in Gaeta.<sup>36</sup> Similarly, the pope, King Ferdinand II of Naples, and the duke’s family encouraged Leopold to reject these appeals.<sup>37</sup> Ultimately, the more conservative option dominated. Leopold

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<sup>31</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 207.

<sup>32</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 382.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 382-3.

<sup>34</sup> Montazio, *L'ultimo granduca*, 76.

<sup>35</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 205.

<sup>36</sup> Montazio, *L'ultimo granduca*, 76-7.

<sup>37</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 205.

departed Tuscan territory for Gaeta on 20 February.

At this stage, it is important to note that Leopold did not intend to request Austrian intervention in Tuscan affairs. His letter to Vienna dated 13 February did not request military assistance. As such, his discernment of whether to go to Gaeta, Turin, or Florence following his flight was not based on a predetermined anticipation of Austrian intervention. Leopold was well aware of popular opinion against Austria. Further, as discussed in chapter 2, Leopold maintained no interest in opening Tuscan affairs to Austrian control. He too desired Tuscan autonomy and a secure hold on his own state. As such, by contacting Vienna he sought to normalize relations with Austria to *prevent* intervention rather than to plead for military assistance.<sup>38</sup> Willingly inviting Habsburg intervention was contrary to his and his dynasty's ruling philosophy, as this would reverse the progress he made during the reforms of the mid-1840s.

Leopold rejected Piedmontese offers of military support for similar reasons. He replied to Carlo Alberto's "fraternal offer of assistance" by asserting that "[Piedmontese] intervention in Tuscany would bring the consequence of war with Austria; I cannot conceal the risk you run by offering such assistance."<sup>39</sup> In addition to the foreign implications of Piedmontese involvement in Tuscany, Leopold also cited domestic concerns. He believed Piedmontese military intervention would only accelerate civil war; "[Tuscany] does not count on Piedmontese help. It does not shed blood in civil war."<sup>40</sup>

Leopold's flight was a catalyst for a dramatic political transformation. As he departed

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<sup>38</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 207. As Pesendorfer confirms, "there was no request for help, nor military [intervention]," in Leopold's letter.

<sup>39</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 385.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 385. Leopold was similarly disgusted by the idea of using military force against his subjects, as he makes clear throughout his memoirs. This was one reason why riots in Livorno reached such heights in 1848, as Leopold refused to dispatch armed guards against the rioters.

Tuscan territory, Giuseppe Mazzini arrived at Livorno. After the grand duke fled and formally renounced the constituent assembly, many “felt free to decide their own destiny.”<sup>41</sup> With Mazzini’s encouragement, Montanelli, Guerrazzi, and radical democrat Giuseppe Mazzoni established a provisional government with themselves as the ruling triumvirate.<sup>42</sup> The new provisional government declared the creation of the Tuscan Republic on 19 February 1849. As its first task, the new government sought to eliminate their opposition. While the triumvirate succeeded in quieting their opponents, their actions remained limited. Sir George Hamilton noted in a report to British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Palmerston that the provisional government is “obliged however to submit to a most despotic master”: the nationalist clubs. With the structures of the constitutional government dismantled in favor of a new, radical executive, the sway of republican nationalist political factions increased. Florence disintegrated into chaos. In his dispatch, Hamilton declared: “It is impossible to exaggerate the terror, the poverty and desolation reigning in this fair city.”<sup>43</sup>

Their measures did little to restore order to the state; “this time was a period of true anarchy,” recalled one contemporary.<sup>44</sup> Outside of Livorno, few Tuscans approved of the radicalism of the provisional government. The countryside, which had remained largely conservative due to the influence of the moderate, landowning nobility, soon erupted in revolt.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 202.

<sup>42</sup> The Constituent Assembly in Rome declared the creation of a Roman Republic on 9 February 1849. Hearder, *Italy in the Age of the Risorgimento*, 204.

<sup>43</sup> Hamilton to Palmerston, 27 February 1849, *Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Italy*, no. 198, 4:174-5.

<sup>44</sup> Matilde Gioli, *Il rivolgimento Toscano e l'azione popolare (1847-1860), dai ricordi familiari del marchese Ferdinando Bartolommei* (Firenze: Presso G. Barbera, 1905), 35. Ferdinando Bartolommei (1821-1869) was a Florentine nobleman and ally of the radical parties in Tuscany.

<sup>45</sup> Woolf, *A History of Italy*, 400-1. Although the political right remained largely silent in the drama of revolution, the rural regions of Tuscany remained a conservative stronghold. Hamilton reports on a peasant assault on Florence in his dispatch of 23 February. Hamilton to Palmerston, 23 February 1849, *Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Italy*, no. 183, 4:168.



To complicate matters further, Austrian troops continued to remain near the Tuscan border, agitating both the provisional assembly and the wider public. Unrest only increased. On 4 March, the provisional government issued a “Declaration to Europe” to defend its actions with the hope of deterring foreign involvement.<sup>46</sup> This and other measures were unsuccessful. The continued riots and general dissatisfaction expressed throughout Tuscany did not bode well for the provisional government.<sup>47</sup>

Guerrazzi and a coalition of liberal politicians seized this opportunity to reverse the tide. On 27 March, they dissolved the new legislature, arrested Montanelli, and abolished the republic.<sup>48</sup> Guerrazzi took the reins as dictator of Tuscany as a “placeholder” for Leopold in anticipation of his imminent return. His experience as minister of the interior had converted him from a populist agitator to an advocate for order and stability. He summoned the Guardia civica to Florence to act as a peacekeeping force. However, his measures were not enough to remedy such widespread upheaval. On 11 April, loyalists and a large contingent of peasants marched on Florence.<sup>49</sup> After clashing with radical forces outside of the city, the conservative-moderate coalition overtook the city and demanded Guerrazzi’s expulsion. He was deposed and arrested only two weeks after taking power.

On 12 April 1849, a moderate-liberal committee restored order in the name of the grand duke, and “assumed the direction of Tuscan affairs” with “promises to liberate Tuscany from the

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<sup>46</sup> Hamilton to Palmerston, 12 March 1849, *Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Italy*, no. 216, 4:204-7.

<sup>47</sup> In an election on 14 March for delegates to the nonexistent Costituente, Hamilton reported that “at Florence not one-twentieth part of the electors have cast their votes.” In Lucca, “not a single countryman was found to vote.” Hamilton to Palmerston, 14 March 1849, *Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Italy*, no. 230, 4:215.

<sup>48</sup> Woolf, *A History of Italy*, 401; Emiliana P. Noether, “Tuscany” in *Encyclopedia of Revolutions of 1848*, <https://www.ohio.edu/chastain/rz/tuscany.htm>.

<sup>49</sup> Montazio, *L'ultimo granduca*, 78.

suffering of a [foreign] invasion.”<sup>50</sup> Its members, including Gino Capponi and Bettino Ricasoli, sent a petition to Leopold inviting him to return and resume his reign. However, by April, the Austrian army had soundly defeated the Piedmontese in the north. The turbulence in Tuscany provided ample grounds for the Austrians to continue south to restore order in the grand duchy.<sup>51</sup> The moderate-liberal council appealed to both France and Britain to negotiate with Austria on Tuscany’s behalf. As the restored constitutional government favored the return of the grand duke and had expelled the radicals from government, its leaders hoped that Austria would respect Tuscan autonomy.<sup>52</sup> The only assurance that the ambassadors secured was that, for the moment, the army had not received orders to proceed beyond the duchy of Modena.<sup>53</sup>

The restored liberal government in Florence remained hopeful that by expelling the radicals and inviting Leopold to return they could avoid Austrian intervention. Unfortunately, the events of March and April had convinced Leopold that returning to Tuscany without military support was unwise.<sup>54</sup> A delegation of liberal politicians traveled to Gaeta to formally petition his return, but Leopold remained convinced that the gesture was “completely arbitrary.” Although it “gave him great distress,” Leopold decided it was “better to receive them, but to simply refrain from granting approval of their plans.” Instead, Leopold agreed to send a

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<sup>50</sup> Giacomo Lumbroso, “L’intervento austriaco in Toscana e l’opera della Commissione Governativa,” *Rassegna storica del Risorgimento: organo della Società nazionale per la storia del Risorgimento italiano* 18, no. 2-3 (April-September 1931), 329.

<sup>51</sup> Following Leopold’s departure for Gaeta, Vienna asserted its right to intervene in the affairs of Tuscany by citing provisions from the “Final Act of the Congress of Vienna.” For the full dispatch, see Schwarzenberg to Colloredo, 25 February 1849, *Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Italy*, no. 177, 4:161-4.

<sup>52</sup> Lumbroso, “L’intervento Austriaco,” 331-2.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 332. Hamilton served as the British advocate for the Tuscan delegation. Hamilton had previously intervened on Tuscany’s behalf in similar fashion in August 1848. Hamilton to Palmerston,” 11 August 1848, *Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Italy*, no. 197, 3:194-5. Hamilton was also the diplomat who met Leopold and his family in Porto Santo Stefano in February 1849.

<sup>54</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 219.

plenipotentiary back to Florence to act on his behalf while he “sought the advice and illumination of...the other sovereigns” gathered at Gaeta.<sup>55</sup> The consensus of the reactionary coalition was for him to request Austrian military assistance. Contrary to his previous preference for eliminating Austrian interference in Tuscan affairs, he dispatched a secret representative to Milan to petition Marshal Radetzky for Austrian intervention. The marshal agreed, and the Austrian army made preparations to invade Tuscany, with a focus on subduing Livorno.<sup>56</sup> On 27 April, Radetzky informed Leopold that the army was prepared to enter Tuscany, and advised him to postpone his arrival “at least until order, calm, and security” were established.<sup>57</sup>

An Austrian army under General Costantino D’Aspre invaded Tuscany on 6 May 1849. Given the attempts by British and French diplomats to avoid this event, confusion dominated the discussions of early May. The foreign diplomatic corps at Florence met with Leopold’s representative, Count Luigi Serristori, on 6 May to seek clarification of Leopold’s involvement in the escalating situation. However, Serristori had little information to offer. He revealed his surprise by the invasion and remained unaware of the grand duke’s involvement. Specifically, the ambassadors demanded to know if Leopold had requested or approved the Austrian intervention. Serristori replied that his knowledge of Leopold’s opinion on the matter was not *au courant*. He would have to forward their question to the grand duke himself.<sup>58</sup> As moderate-liberal politicians in Florence struggled to understand their situation, the revolutionary Livornese battled the Austrian army for control of the city.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 388.

<sup>56</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 219.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 221.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 223.

<sup>59</sup> Excellent resources for understanding the Austrian intervention include: Sergio Camerani, “Leopoldo II e l’intervento Austriaco in Toscana (1849),” *Archivio Storico Italiano* 107, no. 1 (1949): 54-88; Giacomo Lumbroso, “L’intervento austriaco in Toscana e l’opera della Commissione Governativa,” *Rassegna storica del Risorgimento*:

Leopold's sudden willingness to use foreign troops to regain control of his state is puzzling, especially given his previously staunch opposition to using force against his subjects.<sup>60</sup> However, his consistent requests that Florence be spared and only Livorno occupied grant insight into his intentions. Leopold, like many of the liberal ministers of Tuscany, blamed the radicalization of Tuscany on the radical activity at Livorno. Thus, he assumed that by subjecting the port city to military rule, he could return to his country and resume his reign. He interceded for the people of Tuscany by appealing to "the noble efforts by which not only the inhabitants of Florence, but almost all Tuscans – with the exception of the city of Livorno – have managed to shake off the yoke of the faction which does such damage to Italy."<sup>61</sup> He genuinely believed that "the vast majority of [his beloved subjects]" desired his return. As such, he repeatedly appealed to the Austrians to treat only the Livornese harshly and to trust in the "sincere and spontaneous cooperation of his beloved subjects."<sup>62</sup> However, with a firm foothold in Tuscan territory, the Austrian army did not plan to cease their operations after pacifying Livorno. Invited into Tuscan affairs, Vienna had no intention of stopping until its commanders on ground considered their mission complete.

Radicals in Florence quickly understood Tuscany's situation, as well as Leopold's role in it. D'Aspre notes that "Republicans laugh[ed] at the moderates who believed that the Austrians would not come," to Florence after pacifying Livorno. He continues, "They cr[ie]d that soon,"

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*organo della Società nazionale per la storia del Risorgimento italiano* 18, no. 2-3 (April-September 1931): 329-348.

<sup>60</sup> As noted, Leopold's initial letters to Vienna make no requests for armed intervention. It is only after he had remained at Gaeta for a number of months that he chooses this course of action.

<sup>61</sup> Leopold II to D'Aspre, 8 May 1849, *Le relazioni diplomatiche fra l'Austria e il Granducato di Toscana*, no. 32 allegato, 1:83.

<sup>62</sup> Leopold II to D'Aspre, 8 May 1849, *Le relazioni diplomatiche fra l'Austria e il Granducato*, no. 32 allegato 1:83; Leopold II to D'Aspre, 16 May 1849, no. 39 allegato, 1:100-2.

after the truth became known, “no one would want to hear from Grand Duke Leopold again.”<sup>63</sup> However, many moderates and liberals remained convinced that the grand duke was not party to the Austrian invasion. In a dispatch from 17 May, D’Aspre notes that “the wife of the future minister of foreign affairs told all of Florence...that her husband wrote to confirm that the Grand Duke would never permit an Austrian occupation of the capital.”<sup>64</sup> As the Austrians prepared to shift their operations toward Florence, D’Aspre expressed his “fear that by going [to Florence] to overcome the opposition, [he would] be obliged to use arms, supposedly against the Grand Duke,” as Leopold denied having any involvement in the affair.<sup>65</sup> As he advanced toward Florence, D’Aspre was granted permission “to issue a proclamation to the residents of Tuscany announcing that the intervention was ordered in response to the express and repeated request of the Grand Duke to His Majesty the Emperor.”<sup>66</sup> Thus, D’Aspre and his troops entered Florence in the name of the grand duke on 25 May 1849.<sup>67</sup>

Leopold provides surprisingly little illumination on his perspective of the events of April and May 1849 in his memoirs. While this absence in his narrative is puzzling, it is not inexplicable. By observing Austrian correspondence from this period, it is clear that although Leopold requested military intervention, he did not want that fact to be publicly known. He insisted that the occupying force make no pronouncement of his having done so.<sup>68</sup> This offers

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<sup>63</sup> Astini to Hügel, 8 May 1849, *Le relazioni diplomatiche fra l’Austria e il Granducato*, no. 25 allegato, 1:70.

<sup>64</sup> D’Aspre to Schwarzenberg, 17 May 1849, *Le relazioni diplomatiche fra l’Austria e il Granducato*, no. 35, 1:87-8.

<sup>65</sup> He added: “I have another fear, an attack of gout is almost certain. It is probable that tomorrow I will not be in a state to serve and that the Archduke Albert will have to take command of the troops.” *Ibid.*, no. 35, 1:87-8.

<sup>66</sup> Radetzky to D’Aspre, 19 May 1849, *Le relazioni diplomatiche fra l’Austria e il Granducato*, no. 37 allegato C, 1:93-4.

<sup>67</sup> D’Aspre to Schwarzenberg, 25 May 1849, *Le relazioni diplomatiche fra l’Austria e il Granducato*, no. 46, 1:116-7.

<sup>68</sup> *Le relazioni diplomatiche fra l’Austria e il Granducato di Toscana*, nos. 10-14, 1:38-44.

further clarification as to Serristori's apparent ignorance of Leopold's appeal to Radetzky. Leopold hoped that the Austrian invasion would be interpreted solely as a consequence of Piedmont's defeat in the War for Liberation and of the chaos that had reigned in Tuscany between February and May. Further, as Livorno remained the epicenter of radical activity, he may have reasonably assumed that if only the port city were repressed, the loyal subjects in the rest of Tuscany would support his return.

His desire to conceal his involvement in the matter was not realistic. As the Austrian troops continued their campaign to occupy Tuscany, their situation was complicated by the grand duke's unwillingness to confess his involvement.<sup>69</sup> General D'Aspre was plagued by "the obstacles which [Leopold's] timidity posed" to Austrian operations. Further, he noted that Leopold's plenipotentiary Serristori's indecisiveness and ignorance of Leopold's intentions following the Austrian occupation of Livorno "sufficiently proved to me the gaps which the grand duke must have left in his instructions to Count Serristori." He expressed further frustration that neither the "guiding principle" nor the intention of the Austrian invasion was public knowledge.<sup>70</sup> That Leopold concealed his involvement even from his direct representatives in Florence further demonstrates his understanding that his support for the occupation would jeopardize his authority.

The revelation that Leopold had summoned the Austrian invasion, more than the occupation itself, shook Tuscan loyalists in 1849. While many felt abandoned after Leopold's flight in February 1849, liberals and conservatives recognized the sudden departure as necessary

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<sup>69</sup> *Le relazioni diplomatiche fra l'Austria e il Granducato di Toscana*, nos. 14 and 25, 1:43-4 and 66.

<sup>70</sup> D'Aspre to Schwarzenberg, 16 May 1849, *ibid.*, no. 33, 1:84-5. This "goal" was to pacify Tuscany in preparation for the return of the grand duke and his family.

in relation to Montanelli's constituent assembly.<sup>71</sup> Capponi notes that "the small number and poor reputation of our soldiers made a foreign invasion almost inevitable."<sup>72</sup> Moderate-liberals encouraged Leopold to collaborate with Piedmont to expel the republicans. In rural regions of Tuscany, conservative peasants and nobles rose in revolt against the republican regime in support of the grand duke's return. Many agreed with his opposition to the Costituente and, prior to 1849, remained uncertain that unification with other states would benefit Tuscany.

However, in April, Leopold jeopardized his position. In many respects, an Austrian invasion was not only anticipated but expected in the spring of 1849. Given Tuscany's participation in the War for Liberation, liberal ministers understood that Austria's success against Piedmont and their advance toward Tuscany was a consequence of both the war and the chaos of 1849. Following Guerrazzi's ouster in April 1849, liberal ministers quickly worked to petition the Austrian army to leave Tuscany and allow Florence to manage its own affairs. The reconstituted council of ministers relied on both British and French assistance to prevent foreign occupation. However, it was understood that these efforts might come to naught. In this regard, the new ministry understood that such an invasion would have been reflective of the broader situation in Europe.<sup>73</sup> Tuscany had participated in the War for Italian Liberation and thus was subject to the consequences of the coalition's defeat.

However, the knowledge that Leopold *supported* the Austrian invasion and specifically

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<sup>71</sup> As Baldasseroni notes, "Leopold's departure from Siena for the Port of Santo Stefano and his subsequent departure for Gaeta are two distinct events that must be considered as separate for the many differences between the two." Baldasseroni, *Leopoldo II*, 352.

<sup>72</sup> Capponi, "Ricordi, 1849," *Scritti editi e inediti*, 2:55.

<sup>73</sup> Sergio Camerani similarly argues that "the Austrian intervention in Tuscany was the result of the development of the situation in Europe more than of Leopold II's request." It is probable D'Aspre's invasion would have occurred with or without Leopold's approval. Camerani, "Leopoldo II e l'intervento Austriaco in Toscana (1849)," *Archivio storico Italiano* 107, no. 1 (1949): 88.

*requested* assistance changed the situation. By turning to the Austrians for support, Leopold betrayed the one universal goal of Tuscans: elimination of Austrian influence. Leopold had publicly and willingly endangered his position as grand duke, even renouncing his title as a Habsburg archduke, in support of the autonomy and independence of Tuscany.<sup>74</sup> His actions were consistent with the priorities of both Peter Leopold and Ferdinand III. As noted, although Tuscany maintained a close relationship with Austria due to the familial ties, Tuscany had a long and proud tradition of independence from Austrian influence. Leopold's open rejection of bowing to Vienna's wishes throughout the 1840s had solidified his position among his predecessors on this issue. By willingly inviting Austrian troops to Tuscan territory, Leopold spurned his subjects, his ancestors, and the very idea of Tuscany. As such, this grave decision marks the end of his enlightened rule.

After Leopold betrayed Italian liberation and violated Tuscan autonomy by inviting the Austrian occupation, many of his greatest supporters were more open to considering Piedmontese leadership. Many liberals, including Capponi, who supported the idea of a united Italy, had prioritized the good of Tuscany over independence out of loyalty to the grand duke and to the autonomy of the grand duchy. However, Leopold's actions demonstrated that his primary concern was no longer the good of the state and of his subjects, as it had been early in his reign.<sup>75</sup> His abdication of the paternalistic care for his people that he demonstrated in his willing collaboration with Austria sparked widespread disillusionment. A particularly stinging remark from the time of his initial flight from Siena exemplifies the betrayal that loyalists felt: "He is not

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<sup>74</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 152. He renounced his titles, "prince imperial of Austria," "royal prince of Hungary and Bohemia," and "archduke of Austria," as anti-Austrian agitation increased in late March 1848.

<sup>75</sup> Capponi notes that while "Tuscany's fate was being decided at Gaeta," Leopold chose to take the advice of the reactionaries and chose "to govern his people once they had been silenced." Capponi, "Ricordi, 1849," *Scritti editi e inediti*, 2:55-6.



sovereign, he is not father, he is only a wet nurse who gives milk to everyone.”<sup>76</sup>

The chaos of popular demonstrations and democratic reforms in the first weeks of 1849 culminated in Leopold’s flight from Tuscan territory and his open rejection of republican policy. Both offended and repulsed by republican initiatives, Leopold and his family fled Tuscany and joined other reactionary “Italian” sovereigns at the fortress of Gaeta in March 1849. The politics surrounding Leopold’s departure, his controversial return to Florence under the protection of the Austrian military, and the reassertion of Habsburg authority are crucial for understanding the Tuscan experience of the Risorgimento.

As discussed in the previous chapter, Leopold failed to recognize the implications of increasing radicalism and nationalism in the constitutional reforms of 1848. Following the proclamation of the Statuto, his distance from the affairs of state blinded him to the reality of his situation. This was due in part to the ruling mentality that he inherited from his father and grandfather. Leopold’s perception of the role and purpose of Tuscan government was founded primarily on his study of Peter Leopold’s memoirs and his experience of his father’s rule. Both perpetuated a system that Stuart Woolf describes as the “Tuscan tradition of paternalistic reformism and Catholic liberalism.”<sup>77</sup> Paired with the Congress of Vienna’s emphasis on legitimacy and the restoration of the *Ancien régime*, Leopold developed his own, reform-centered paternalistic mentality that informed his rule. In his estimation, a constitution did not alter his role.<sup>78</sup>

Leopold’s patriarchal attitude clashed with the notions of popular sovereignty that radical

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<sup>76</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 382.

<sup>77</sup> Woolf, *A History of Italy*, 320.

<sup>78</sup> Pesendorfer comments on this by noting that “evidently, the introduction of the Tuscan constitution had not damaged Leopold’s faith in his divine right of rule.” *Leopoldo II*, 200.

republicans espoused. His emphasis on the role of the sovereign to guide the people of Tuscany as a father does his children, visible both throughout his memoirs and in all of his decrees, was perceived as an insult to reformers striving to emphasize the voice of the masses. However, it aligned with classical liberal philosophies that advocated for the necessity of widespread education as a step toward including the masses in the affairs of state. These complimentary mentalities were further reflected in the preamble of the Statuto. In theory, constitutional rule involves the delegation of a monarch's absolute authority to the representatives of the people. Based on the outdated French *Charte du 1830*, the language of the Statuto echoed Leopold's idea that he retained his role as father and shepherd of his people. The constitution, it stated, was a "proof of the trust that [the grandducal regime] placed in the *maturity* and good judgement of [the Tuscan] people."<sup>79</sup> Any rights and privileges of Tuscan subjects remained a gift of the sovereign in Leopold's worldview. Further, the constitution itself was likened to a benevolent gift to a mature and wiser child; one who had come of age and was prepared to participate as an adult at the table of government. Thus, while the Statuto conformed to the appearance of modern political ideologies, both the constitution and sovereign failed to adapt to the full implications of this new form of government. For Leopold, this failure in understanding placed him on a collision course with the radical elements of Tuscan politics. Ultimately, his solution to the difficult situation that developed in 1849 lost him both the respect of his subjects and, ultimately, in 1859, his throne.

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<sup>79</sup> *Statuto fondamentale*, preamble. Emphasis mine.

## EPILOGUE: DECLINE AND FALL OF THE LORENESE

Leopold's inglorious sojourn at Gaeta during the summer of 1849 marked the beginning of the end for the Tuscan House of Habsburg-Lorraine. After General Costantino D'Aspre's invasion of Florence on 25 May 1849, Tuscany became little more than a puppet of the Viennese government. D'Aspre encouraged Leopold to delay his return from Gaeta until the army could stabilize the situation. Baron von Hügel also advised the grand duke against returning to Florence until the Austrian army subdued the radicals: Leopold consented.<sup>1</sup> Leopold's self-imposed exile allowed the Austrian emperor's lieutenants to treat Tuscany as a conquered state.

With the grand duke's extended absence, Austrian diplomats and military officers forcefully returned Tuscany to the fold of Habsburg conservatism. Hügel recommended renewed restrictions on the press and an indefinite delay of any further elections. Both of his suggestions were implemented. D'Aspre installed Vienna-approved politicians in ministerial positions and dictated the policies of the "restored" grandducal regime.<sup>2</sup> As such, not only did the Austrians install a military occupation, Vienna directly controlled Tuscan affairs. As the Austrians deemed him trustworthy enough to retain a role in government, Giovanni Baldasseroni was selected to chair the council of ministers. The new chief minister "pleased the Austrians" by banning the *tricolore* as a symbol of the revolution.<sup>3</sup> While the council of ministers managed the Tuscan state, General D'Aspre had the final word. One of his first measures was the dissolution and disarmament of the national guard. Although freedom of the press remained, authors of

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<sup>1</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 234.

<sup>2</sup> The crucial posts of minister of the interior and minister of foreign affairs were granted to "fervently pro-Austrian" politicians. William A. Jenks, *Francis Joseph and the Italians, 1849-1859* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1978), 85.

<sup>3</sup> Jenks, *Francis Joseph and the Italians*, 85.

“unseemly” articles or pamphlets could be arrested and prosecuted for sedition.<sup>4</sup> Although the Statuto had not been formally abolished, it was not restored.<sup>5</sup> Consequently, the Tuscan government became a mere satellite of Vienna.

The proud and independent-minded people of Tuscany took poorly to foreign occupation. Both political elites and commoners refused to cooperate with their Austrian overlords. On 28 May, General D’Aspre noted that “in Tuscany, where there was so much well-being before these revolutions, we are further away from starting over than in other states.” He continues, “nothing more can be done since the revolutionary party has not lost hope...in a few days we will see what the new ministry will do. If it does not begin well, I do not see a remedy for this government.”<sup>6</sup> Baldasseroni notes that during this time, “the grand duke remained silent to avoid prolonging this unfortunate polemic, while the ministers refused entirely to cooperate with the desires of the General [D’Aspre].”<sup>7</sup>

By June, D’Aspre believed that stringent measures were necessary to restore order in Tuscany. However, the underground press continued to encourage dissent. Unrest built, and in June radicals attacked an Austrian officer on the streets of Florence.<sup>8</sup> This prompted D’Aspre to recommend declaring martial law, noting that while “the president and minister of justice are against such a measure, the other cabinet members are in favor of it. Interior minister [Leonida] Landucci told me yesterday that although he cannot publicly support this measure, he is convinced of its necessity.”<sup>9</sup> He notes that it “would be almost impossible” to enforce martial

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<sup>4</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, Ibid., 232.

<sup>5</sup> Baldasseroni, *Leopoldo II*, 381.

<sup>6</sup> D’Aspre to Schwarzenberg, 28 May 1849, *Le relazioni diplomatiche fra l’Austria e il Granducato*, 1:123.

<sup>7</sup> Baldasseroni, *Leopoldo II*, 383.

<sup>8</sup> D’Aspre to Schwarzenberg, 26 June 1849, *Le relazioni diplomatiche fra l’Austria e il Granducato*, 1:152.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid. Count Landucci served on the constitutional “*commissione dei quinqueviri*” in 1848 and as minister of

law if Leopold returned, but that implementing restrictions before his arrival “would prevent him from returning” a while longer.<sup>10</sup> Hence, the government declared martial law in Florence.<sup>11</sup>

Official diplomatic relations between Vienna and Florence resumed at the beginning of July. Ottaviano Lenzoni returned to Vienna as the Tuscan ambassador, and preparations for Leopold’s return from Gaeta began.<sup>12</sup> The grand duke returned to Tuscany on 24 July 1849 to find the state profoundly changed. He disembarked at the port of Viareggio after a five-month absence.<sup>13</sup> En route to Florence, the grand duke visited Lucca and Pisa. During this visit on 27 July, he met with his cousin, Archduke Albert, Duke of Teschen and the Austrian commander of the troops occupying Lucca. Significant controversy emerged during this official visit. Albert, on behalf of Emperor Franz Josef and the army, insisted that Leopold appear in Austrian military dress during his return to Florence. However, Leopold objected, asserting that it was customary for a sovereign to appear dressed in the uniform of his country.<sup>14</sup> This was deemed unacceptable, as it was the uniform “which [Leopold’s] subjects wore during their combat against the empire.”<sup>15</sup> Ultimately, with the help of Leopold’s wife, Grandduchess Maria Antonia, Leopold negotiated a compromise to the archduke’s demand. Leopold entered Florence in the regalia of the Tuscan Order of Saint Stephan, but received the Austrian officers in his new Austrian cavalry

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finance during the Capponi ministry. He reentered politics as minister of the interior in Baldasseroni’s ministry and remained in office until Leopold’s abdication in 1859.

<sup>10</sup> D’Aspre to Schwarzenberg, 26 June 1849, *Le relazioni diplomatiche fra l’Austria e il Granducato*, 1:152.

<sup>11</sup> Geoffrey Wawro, “Austria versus the Risorgimento: A New Look at Austria’s Italian Strategy in the 1860s,” *European History Quarterly* 26, no. 1 (1996), 10. Livorno was placed under martial law immediately following its capitulation to the Austrian army in 1849.

<sup>12</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 251.

<sup>13</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 389.

<sup>14</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 239.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 238.

uniform. Further, he issued a public declaration clearly stating his loyalty to Austria.<sup>16</sup>

Reluctantly, Leopold understood that it was crucial that Austro-Tuscan relations return to their pre-war status to stabilize his position. These symbolic gestures publicly announced the grand duke's cooperation with Tuscany's occupiers.

In his memoirs, Leopold provides no account of this drama. He simply notes that on 25 July, "he came to Lucca" and "on 27 [July] there were many faces along the Lungarno in Pisa; his citizens again greeted him as they had before [his departure]."<sup>17</sup> Leopold's version of his return to Florence highlights the applause he received on arrival and his "sincere joy" upon his return to the Palazzo Pitti.<sup>18</sup>

In the midst of his joy, he soon discovered Tuscany's dire situation.<sup>19</sup> The main concern was finances: the state's accounts were empty, and Tuscany remained subject to the costs of the Austrian occupation. The city of Livorno "presented" 400,000 lire to D'Aspre after its defeat in May 1849.<sup>20</sup> Similar payments were made to Vienna throughout the Austrian occupation.<sup>21</sup> Just two days after his return to Florence, Leopold expressed his dissatisfaction to Vienna over General D'Aspre's conduct. As a result, D'Aspre received orders to transfer from Florence to Piacenza, a smaller city that suggests the general was rebuked. Despite this victory, the task of

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<sup>16</sup> Jenks, *Francis Joseph and the Italians*, 86-7.

<sup>17</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 389. The Lungarno is the street that follows the path of the Arno river in downtown Pisa.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 390. Pesendorfer notes the sincerity of Leopold's joy at returning to his home and his city. Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 239. The Palazzo Pitti is the Renaissance-era palace owned by the Grand Dukes of Tuscany.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 390.

<sup>20</sup> See D'Aspre to Schwarzenberg, 28 May 1849, *Le relazioni diplomatiche fra l'Austria e il Granducato*, 1:123; Schwarzenberg to Radetzky, 5 June 1849, *ibid.*, 1:131; Ministerrat, Schonbrunn, 3 June 1849, *Die Protokolle des österreichischen Ministerrates 1848-1867: II Abteilung, Das Ministerium Schwarzenberg* ed. Thomas Kletecka (Vienna: öbv a hpt, 2002) no. 86, 1:358

<sup>21</sup> Jenks, *Francis Joseph and the Italians*, 93.

“governing [Tuscany] had become difficult.”<sup>22</sup> Throughout the fall of 1849, Leopold and Baldasseroni sought to secure foreign loans to buoy the government’s finances.<sup>23</sup> Leopold deemed this measure “necessary to bring peace and have time to reorder the [Tuscan] State.” Although Tuscany had little to back the loans with, the government acquired favorable loans “founded on Tuscany’s good credit.”<sup>24</sup>

Leopold’s attitude toward the Austrian delegation at Florence did not reflect his new client status. In fact, the embassy remained baffled by Leopold’s continued denial of the state of Tuscan affairs and his apparent ignorance of his and his state’s reduced status. Baron Karl Schnitzer von Meerau, recently reinstated as Austrian chargé d’affaires at Florence, comments that “the grand duke has learned absolutely nothing from his disgrace, and all of his sad experiences.”<sup>25</sup> Even in July, well after the successful invasion and subjugation of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, Leopold remained convinced that he could uphold “his version” of the Austrian intervention. However, both the citizens of Tuscany and their Austrian occupiers understood the reality of the current state of affairs. Tuscany was a conquered state, now subject to the will of the Austrian army and the emperor at Vienna.<sup>26</sup> In this atmosphere, Leopold eventually recognized the importance of catering to the Hofburg.

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<sup>22</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 390.

<sup>23</sup> Leopold notes that Tuscany was the only Austrian-affiliated Italian state that had not yet received a loan from Austria by the end of 1849. Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 391. Records from the Council of Ministers indicate that this was due to a general distrust of the Tuscan ruler and dissatisfaction with Tuscany’s financial situation. In the “Protokoll” from a meeting on 21 August 1849, the Minister of Finance, Philipp Freiherr v. Krauß, noted that “from a financial point of view, he found no grounds for consenting to admit” a loan of 40 million lire to the Tuscan government. He cited both “political reasons” in addition to “the burden the loans would have on Austria.” The Minister of Justice, Anton Ritter von Schmerling, noted similar concern, and the Minister of Culture, Leo Graf von Thun und Hohenstein, noted that the council could “hardly grant such approval without the Reichstag.” Tuscan requests for funding were rejected at this meeting. Ministerrat, Wien, 21 August 1849, *Die Protokolle des österreichischen Ministerrates*, no. 151,1:612-3.

<sup>24</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 391.

<sup>25</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 239.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 250-1.

In an attempt to dull the sting of occupation, Leopold issued pardons for many who had opposed the Austrian invasion in May. Consequently, he issued two proclamations of general amnesty. The first pardoned those who committed “crimes against the grand duke himself,” and the second acquitted those who enacted “offenses against the political and social order of Tuscany.”<sup>27</sup> In November, he declared a third general pardon for political activists, but excluded members of the provisional government of February 1849.<sup>28</sup> While Leopold’s subjects accepted the benefits of these benevolent gestures, his actions could not repair the damage caused by his collaboration with Austria.

Previously, the average Tuscan subject had remained content with the peaceful reign of the Lorraines. After the counterrevolutionary overthrow of the republican provisional government in April, Capponi notes that “Tuscans intended to forget all thoughts of liberty and independence” in favor of restoring the tradition and stability of the grandducal regime.<sup>29</sup> Yet, “for the honor of [the Tuscan] people it was important [that Leopold not] assert that he desired or would willingly accept [Austrian] assistance, and the servitude that would follow.”<sup>30</sup> Thus, Leopold insulted Tuscan honor by requesting Austrian occupation and choosing to “govern [his] people after they had been silenced” by a foreign military.<sup>31</sup> His decision demonstrated a desire for subjects, not citizens. Faced with foreign occupation, many loyal Tuscans became attracted to radical ideas of Italian unification. Thus, discourse on the restoration of liberty in a united Italy ensued.

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<sup>27</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 239.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, F. D. Guerrazzi was among those excluded from the pardon.

<sup>29</sup> Capponi, “Ricordi, 1849,” *Scritti editi e inediti*, 2:53.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 2:55. Capponi did not consider it “shameful to negotiate with Austria.” However, he believed that Leopold’s actions were “foolish” and that his dealings with Austria were “an unequal negotiation.” Capponi, *ibid.*, 2:55.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 2:56.



Contrary to other accounts, Minister Baldasseroni's consistently claims that privately, many Tuscans welcomed the stability offered by the Austrian occupation.<sup>32</sup> Further, he notes that he encouraged Tuscans to overlook the criticism and examine the benefits offered by the Austrians.<sup>33</sup> In particular, his account emphasized the success of the government in providing the security necessary for industry and commerce to recover from the setbacks of war and revolution.<sup>34</sup> He asserts that his ministry "chose to make the best of the advantages of each form of government," both constitutional and absolutist, "while seeking to manage its defects."<sup>35</sup> He emphasizes the bravery of officials who opposed patriotic attempts to oust the Austrians, and notes the "good sentiments of a great majority of the population who generally and sincerely celebrated the return of their prince."<sup>36</sup>

However, while these positive sentiments did exist among segments of the Tuscan population, Baldasseroni's perspective favors that of the most conservative facets of Florentine society. While his observations were accurate in describing the experience of some conservatives with whom Baldasseroni himself interacted, evidence illustrates that this "grateful" acceptance of the Austrian occupation was not as widespread as he claims. Police records from the period of the so-called "second restoration" indicate that members of the artisan and working class increasingly gravitated toward ideas of republicanism.<sup>37</sup> Motivated by their experience of the

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<sup>32</sup> He claims that "it would be easy to cite the names of citizens and distinguished merchants...who acknowledged the truth that although inconvenient, the occupation has brought security that has benefited our families." Baldasseroni, *Leopoldo II*, 389.

<sup>33</sup> Despite the conciliatory tone of his account of the Austrian occupation, Baldasseroni admirably and firmly defended Tuscan interests during his tenure as president of the council of ministers. See Jenks, *Francis Joseph and the Italians*, 90-6.

<sup>34</sup> Baldasseroni, *Leopoldo II*, 389.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 390-1.

<sup>36</sup> Leopold similarly notes that in 1850, "Good men recovered their spirits, and material prosperity was restored." Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 392.

<sup>37</sup> Benjamin Kehoe, "*Viva l'Italia, Viva la Repubblica: Popular Political Engagement and Participation in Tuscany*

Revolution of 1848, the lower classes reacted strongly against the continued presence of the Austrian army and the dissolution of the Guardia civica.<sup>38</sup> Further, D'Aspre's proclamation that disclosed Leopold's role in the intervention demonstrated Leopold's lack of trust in his people. Rather than trusting his loyal subjects to help restore his rule, he turned to foreigners. The absence of public outcry against the Austrian was not a sign of gracious acceptance of their assistance, as Baldasseroni claims. Rather, it was a silent protest against Leopold's breach of trust.<sup>39</sup> In his return, Leopold ruled a silenced rather than a content people.

Further, Austrian diplomats similarly noted the change in attitude of the Tuscan people toward their prince. In 1850, Hügel replaced Schnitzer von Meerau as the Austrian ambassador in Florence. Hügel notes that Tuscans "of almost all social classes" had become extremely critical of both Leopold and the Tuscan state.<sup>40</sup> Tuscany and its sovereign were subject to the will of a foreign power, and Leopold had willingly invited the occupier. His observations of Leopold's behavior during this time also indicate that the grand duke was similarly displeased with Tuscany's situation. Hügel reported that during this time, Leopold's attitude toward Austria was "that of a sulky and jealous person [who] asked for our help, but only because he was forced by the circumstances."<sup>41</sup> The ambassador regarded Leopold as a foolish leader, ungrateful for the assistance he had received.<sup>42</sup>

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during the Italian Risorgimento, c. 1830-1861," PhD diss., University of Oxford (2019), 125-6.

<sup>38</sup> Kehoe, "*Viva l'Italia*," 126-7.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 128-9. Kehoe's dissertation seeks to illustrate the role of popular involvement during the Risorgimento in Tuscany, as well as the development of "popular politics." As he notes, very few resources on Lorenese Tuscany examine the common man's experience during the Risorgimento.

<sup>40</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopold II*, 239

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 236.

<sup>42</sup> In Hügel's opinion, the ministers in Florence were similarly ungrateful and provided no support as the Austrians worked to reestablish order. *Ibid.*

As the Austrian occupation continued, Leopold's position stagnated. Although he focused his efforts on promoting commerce, industry, and infrastructure, his subservience to Vienna required that he revoke many of the most crucial reforms of 1847 and 1848.<sup>43</sup> In doing so, he alienated many of his liberal allies. On 21 September 1850, he dissolved the legislature and proclaimed that "until a new meeting of the legislative assembly could be arranged, all power would rest in the person of the grand duke."<sup>44</sup> The following day, a second decree formally abolished freedom of the press.<sup>45</sup> Although martial law had largely restored the censorship practices of the early nineteenth century, this formal revocation of previous reforms illustrated the reactionary mindset of the "restored" puppet regime. The most grievous insult to Tuscan liberalism came in 1852 with Leopold's repudiation of the Statuto fondamentale. As Leopold's actions continued to follow Vienna's example, Emperor Franz Josef's abolition of the 1848 Austrian constitution on 31 December 1851 indicated the proper course of action. As Leopold notes, "it was clear that the time had come to abolish the Tuscan Statuto."<sup>46</sup> With Austria's support, he signed the decree finalizing his decision on 6 May 1852.<sup>47</sup>

Other contemporary events further illustrated the grandducal regime's reactionary and Austrian-dependent actions. Held in custody since April 1849, F. D. Guerrazzi officially stood trial in September 1852 for his involvement in the Revolution of 1849.<sup>48</sup> While awaiting his

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<sup>43</sup> During the last decade of Leopold's reign, Tuscany completed the installation of a modern railway. By 1850, Tuscany had more kilometers of track than the much larger Kingdom of Sardinia. See Andrea Giuntini, *Leopoldo e il treno: le ferrovie nel Granducato di Toscana, 1824-1864* (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1991).

<sup>44</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 258.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 397.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 398; Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 285. While the primary motivation for Leopold's abolition of the Statuto was clearly the developments in Vienna, Louis Napoleon's coup d'état of 2 December 1851 also encouraged his decision, as the rise of Emperor Napoleon III "dispelled the specter of revolution" in Europe. Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 397.

<sup>48</sup> A comprehensive account of his trial, as well as commentary on the testimony of witnesses including Bettino

hearing, he authored an *Apologia* describing his role in the events of 1849 in great detail. His narrative illuminates the questionable actions of the grand duke and his Austrian-approved ministry. His account increased public support for his cause and contributed to widespread indifference toward the grandducal regime.<sup>49</sup> Trial proceedings began on 24 September 1852. Guerrazzi was charged with hostility toward the person of the grand duke, machinations against the structures of the constitutional government, and opposition to the restoration of the grandducal regime.<sup>50</sup> Trained as a lawyer, the accused presented a well-ordered defense. Guerrazzi emphasized his “irrefutable” refusal to align with the radical republicans, citing his violent and public rupture with Mazzini as evidence of his rejection of republican plots to unite with Rome. As Pesendorfer notes, Guerrazzi “had recognized the limits of his situation, and knew that the vast majority of Tuscans wanted to maintain traditional” Tuscan independence.<sup>51</sup> As such, Guerrazzi argued that he had instead worked to reestablish stability amid the chaos of 1849 in the grand duke’s absence. He insisted that he had not actively “contrived” against the government.

Guerrazzi’s ability to rally the masses, demonstrated throughout his career, posed a threat to the Austrian-supported regime. Further, the positive reception of his *Apologia* illustrated his continued influence on public opinion. Guerrazzi’s *Apologia* demonstrated that commoners could offer interpretations of recent history and contradict the approved state dialogue.<sup>52</sup>

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Ricasoli and British Ambassador George Hamilton, can be found in *Discorsi di F. D. Guerrazzi davanti la corte regia di Firenze ed esame dei componenti la commissione governativa*, ed. Tomasso Corsi and Tito Menichetti (Firenze: tipi di Felice le Monnier, 1853).

<sup>49</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 258.

<sup>50</sup> *Discorsi di F. D. Guerrazzi*, vi-vii. The comprehensive list of charges against Guerrazzi, of which there are seven, are explained in this account of the trial.

<sup>51</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 275.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 274.

Convinced of the dangers posed by such treasonous writings, Ambassador Hügel and the Austrian delegation decided that Guerrazzi should serve as an example of what would happen to any who contradicted the grandducal regime. Guerrazzi was convicted for his crimes against the grand duke and the constitutional government – recently dismembered by Leopold’s renunciation of the Statuto – and sentenced to fifteen years in prison.<sup>53</sup> The harsh treatment he received illustrated the extent to which the Austrians dominated Tuscan affairs. Following the trial, the government implemented more stringent censorship measures to monitor and control public discourse, further emphasizing Leopold’s status as a mere Austrian puppet.

Between 1852 and 1859, Leopold vigorously resumed his philanthropic work in an attempt to mend his damaged reputation.<sup>54</sup> Sadly, he could do little to rectify his situation. The first twenty-five years of Leopold’s reign had been characterized by his enlightened acceptance of liberal reforms and his willingness to collaborate with liberals, radicals, constitutionalists, and republicans. Conversely, the last decade of his rule was defined by his political impotence, reactionary tendencies, and aversion to public discourse. Disillusionment with Leopold’s divestment in Tuscan autonomy spread to members of all social strata during the Austrian occupation. Although Leopold issued pardons and initiated public works projects, he had lost the faith and respect of his people.<sup>55</sup>

These years of stagnation emerged as a “time of preparation” for Tuscany’s unification with Piedmont and the creation of the Kingdom of Italy in 1861. Dissatisfaction with the

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<sup>53</sup> After three years, his sentence was commuted to exile on the island of Corsica. He escaped from the island in 1857.

<sup>54</sup> Leopold specifically notes his renewed efforts in the remediation of the Maremma and the enlargement of the port of Livorno in his memoirs. Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 399.

<sup>55</sup> Jenks notes that “the Florentines paid Leopold little respect” even after the departure of the Austrian garrison in 1855. Jenks, *Francis Joseph and the Italians*, 95.

Austrian occupation fermented as Mazzini and his followers encouraged action against the regime. In February 1852, the secret police foiled a Mazzinian plot in Florence.<sup>56</sup> Following this event, nationalist agitation continued to rise. Nationalist activity in the Austrian Empire spiked again in 1853, as revolts in Lombardy and Hungary threatened imperial authority.<sup>57</sup> In the midst of this domestic unrest, Europe became entangled in yet another war, this time on the Crimean peninsula.<sup>58</sup> The Austrian garrison remained in Tuscany to contain and control the satellite state. Regardless, even after its departure in the spring of 1855, Leopold continued to bow to Vienna's wishes.<sup>59</sup>

As pressure between Vienna and Turin rose in the late 1850s, Leopold faced a dilemma similar to that of 1847 and 1848. Would he support his fellow Italian sovereigns in their pursuit of an independent Italy, or would he remain faithful to the head of his dynasty in Vienna? Ultimately, he chose the latter. As Turin "offended Austria with licentious publications," conflict between Piedmont and Austria escalated again in 1857.<sup>60</sup> Tension continued to build as King Vittorio Emanuele of Piedmont-Sardinia cultivated closer ties with Napoleon III; a formal alliance was signed in January 1859. In the months that followed, "both states did everything they could to provoke Austria into declaring war."<sup>61</sup> As Piedmont and the patriotic National Society encouraged nationalist fervor throughout the peninsula, riots erupted in Florence and

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<sup>56</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 268.

<sup>57</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 410. Leopold specifically references the success of Mazzini and Hungarian radical Lajos Kossuth during this period of renewed conflict. The two revolutionaries announced an alliance between elements of Italian and Hungarian nationalists on 22 February 1853.

<sup>58</sup> Neither Tuscany nor Austria participated in the Crimean War, as they were otherwise occupied with internal turmoil and revolt.

<sup>59</sup> Hearder, *Italy in the Age of the Risorgimento*, 88-90.

<sup>60</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 471; Frederick C. Schneid, *The Second War of Italian Unification, 1859-61*, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2012), 27.

<sup>61</sup> Lucy Riall, *Risorgimento: The History of Italy from Napoleon to Nation State*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 30.

Livorno in March 1859.<sup>62</sup> Austria officially declared war on Piedmont on 26 April 1859, and the Second War for Italian Unification commenced. While the war of 1848 and 1849 declared itself a struggle for liberation, the war of 1859 was explicitly and strategically framed as a struggle for Italian unification under the Piedmontese banner.<sup>63</sup>

Nationalist fervor erupted in Florence and across Tuscany as the war against Austria commenced in the north. The long-repressed dissatisfaction with Austria paired with the absolutism of the grandducal regime manifested in insurrection that included members of all social strata.<sup>64</sup> On the morning of 27 April 1859, the situation escalated further as revolutionaries surrounded the Belvedere Fortress, adjacent to the Palazzo Pitti, and demanded a statement from Leopold on Tuscany's stance on the war.<sup>65</sup> He could not support the nationalist movement and risk war with Austria, and neither could he reject the patriotic cause. Now, even the Tuscan military supported the Piedmontese cause, and many of the troops wore the tricolor cockade.<sup>66</sup> Both former minister Cosimo Ridolfi and the elderly and experienced Don Neri Corsini recommended abdication. After taking time to consider his position, Leopold decided "to renounce everything except honor, and to abdicate and depart with his honor intact."<sup>67</sup> Faced with the choice between supporting Austria or joining Piedmont, Leopold departed Tuscany for a second time on 27 April 1859.

Following this bloodless coup d'état and Leopold's subsequent "flight" from Florence on

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<sup>62</sup> In 1857, Piedmontese Prime Minister Camillo Benso di Cavour supported the creation of the *Società Nazionale Italiana*, or National Society. This organization was created to support the movement for national unification, and posed a direct threat to Austrian interests in the peninsula.

<sup>63</sup> On the Second War for Italian Liberation, see Schneid, *The Second War of Italian Unification*.

<sup>64</sup> Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 346.

<sup>65</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 525-6; Pesendorfer, *Leopoldo II*, 346-7.

<sup>66</sup> Leopold II, *Il governo di famiglia*, 526.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*

27 April, the Tuscan government issued the following proclamation.

*Toscani!* Rather than adhere to the will of the people, Leopold II has abandoned Tuscany a second time with all of his family. In these awkward times, it is of extreme necessity that we not leave this place without government, and at the same time of equal necessity not to judge in some way the future, a Giunta will be formed that will govern for the shortest possible term. In the meantime, the opinions of the army and of the country will be satisfied: we will offer King Vittorio Emanuele the rule of Tuscany during the war.<sup>68</sup>

By 1859, it was commonly held that Leopold was a Habsburg Archduke *placed* at the head of the state. He was no longer a true Italian sovereign, but a foreigner, a puppet, and a reactionary.

After the conclusion of the war in July 1859, Leopold returned to Tuscany, but only briefly.<sup>69</sup> On 21 July 1859, Leopold abdicated in favor of his eldest son, Ferdinand. However, Ferdinand IV never reigned over the Grand Duchy of Tuscany. On 20 August, the provisional government's legislative assembly voted unanimously for the permanent deposition of the Lorenese.<sup>70</sup> On 22 March 1860, Tuscany was formally annexed to the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia.

The provisional government's proclamation of 27 April 1859 marked a stark shift in the discourse of Tuscan reformers and the public in general. During the initial Lorenese restoration of 1814 and throughout the early years of Leopold's reign, the security and stability of the autonomous House of Lorraine had served as a comfort for the independent and proud people of Tuscany. Although life in post-war Tuscany remained difficult, the average citizen prospered in the return of Tuscany's traditionally calm, quiet, and peaceful state of affairs. The restoration of 1849 presented a stark difference primarily because the grand duke, the advocate and father of the Tuscan people, had used foreign forces against his people to pacify his state and restore his own authority. The silence that resulted from this show of force differed greatly from the

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<sup>68</sup> Società nazionale per la storia del Risorgimento italiano, *XXVII Aprile MDCCCLIX* (Firenze: Stab. G. Civelli, 1909), Proclamation on the Flight of Grand Duke Leopold II, 27 April 1859, i.

<sup>69</sup> The Second War for Italian Unification concluded on 11 July 1859 with the signing of the Treaty of Villafranca.

<sup>70</sup> Woolf, *A History of Italy*, 453.



peacefulness of the 1820s and 1830s.

Ultimately, in 1849 Leopold betrayed both Tuscan autonomy and the mutual respect between ruler and ruled. In his last decade of rule, the appeal of a broader Italian community that would secure their independence and expel foreign influence held greater appeal. Although moderates like Gino Capponi hoped that Tuscany would retain some autonomy after its annexation by Piedmont, the enthusiasm of pro-unification elements prevailed.<sup>71</sup> With the declaration of the Kingdom of Italy on 17 March 1861, Tuscany became part of a united Italian state. Following Leopold and his family's departure from Florence, over a century of Lorenese rule came to an abrupt and inglorious end.

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<sup>71</sup> Woolf, *A History of Italy*, 453.

## CONCLUSION

In 1814, the people of Tuscany willingly welcomed back Grand Duke Ferdinand III as their legitimate ruler. Although the years following the French Wars were among the most difficult of his reign due to famine and the damages wrought by war on Tuscan agriculture and infrastructure, his restoration marked the return of normalcy and stability. While revolutions racked Europe in 1821, Tuscany emerged unscathed. Although popular unrest and nationalist resistance successfully fomented revolt further south in the Italian peninsula, the people of Tuscany remained uninterested in upending the existing political order. Their sovereign secured Tuscany's autonomy and wellbeing. As such, movements that dominated affairs elsewhere found few adherents in Tuscan territory.

Following Ferdinand's death in 1824, Leopold II began his reign buoyed by the stability and security of his father's rule. His enlightened embrace of reform and his genuine concern for the wellbeing of his Tuscan "children" characterized the early years of his reign. His paternal *mentalité* helped cultivate the close and loving relationship he maintained with his subjects. Viewed as the successor of his grandfather's liberal legacy, Leopold successfully navigated European politics when another wave of revolutions upended the Congress of Vienna's political order in 1830. Yet again, Tuscany emerged from a year of revolution and uprising unscathed.

However, new difficulties arose in the 1840s. As the nineteenth century progressed and ideas of liberalism and nationalism gained popularity, Leopold found himself in an untenable position. Would he alienate Vienna by supporting the liberal reformism desired by his subjects, or would he hold fast to his dynastic ties to the House of Habsburg? Consistent with his traditional Tuscan interest in autonomy, Leopold chose to willingly separate himself from Austria in favor of securing his state's independence. As he approved increasingly liberal

reforms through 1846 and 1847, Leopold joined his fellow Italian sovereigns by promoting the “liberation” of Italy from foreign influence.

As revolution erupted in the spring of the “Year of Revolutions,” Leopold finalized his break with Vienna. On 17 February 1848, the work of Tuscan liberals culminated in the promulgation of the *Statuto fondamentale*, and constitutionalism was born in Tuscany. However, new struggles emerged with this form of government. As Tuscan politics opened to wider influences in its new representative legislature, radicals and nationalists gained a foothold in Leopold’s grandducal government.

While the First War for Italian Liberation raged on the plains of Lombardia and Venezia, an internal struggle for control of the government ensued in Tuscany. The first ministerial councils of the regime, led by liberals Cosimo Ridolfi and Gino Capponi, lasted only a few months before being overcome by radical opposition. Livorno, ever the center of radical and nationalist agitation, asserted a disproportionate influence on Tuscan affairs through the larger-than-life figures of Francesco Domenico Guerrazzi and Giuseppe Montanelli. As radicals successfully rode the wave of popular enthusiasm to further their republican and nationalist agenda, liberals remained content to trust in the stability of Lorenese reformism.

By November 1848, Montanelli had established himself as the new president of the Tuscan council of ministers. The tension between the grand duke and the radical president only increased as Montanelli’s agenda accelerated. An avid nationalist, Montanelli unceasingly advocated for the creation of a *Costituente italiana*, or national constituent assembly. While Leopold had willingly approved the Tuscan constitution and had promoted reforms that sought to improve life in Tuscany, a constituent assembly exceeded his willingness to bow to radical demands. Although certainly among the most enlightened of the Italian monarchs, Leopold

maintained his belief in his divine right and absolute influence over his state. A constituent assembly that openly sought to forge a path toward a unified Italian republic threatened his position, as well as those of all Italian sovereigns. As internal disputes escalated, Leopold found himself powerless to steer the ship of state. In February 1849, only one year after the proclamation of the Statuto, Leopold fled Florence to protest the excessive radicalism of his chief minister.

After news of Leopold's flight reached Florence, chaos reigned. The radical deputies of the legislative assembly railed against Leopold's rejection of the Costituente. President Montanelli declared the abolition of Tuscany's constitutional regime and proclaimed a new provisional government. Opposition was swiftly silenced.

The success of the radicals in February pushed loyalists and conservatives to their breaking point. Previously ignored and outside of the reforms of 1847 and 1848, Tuscans on the periphery objected to the provisional government's rash rejection of the grand duke. Counterrevolution erupted in the countryside as liberals in Florence sought a solution to this chaos. First, Guerrazzi ousted Montanelli and declared a dictatorship as a temporary solution to calm Tuscan affairs. However, in April, loyalists marched on Florence and liberal politicians announced the reestablishment of the constitutional monarchy, thus deposing Guerrazzi. A delegation of politicians traveled to visit the grand duke at Gaeta to request his return to Tuscany.

However, unbeknownst to the delegation, Leopold had pursued another means to regain control of his sovereignty. In perhaps the most grievous mistake of his reign, Leopold spurned decades of tradition and years of his own policies and requested the assistance of the Austrian army to regain control of Tuscany. The Austrians first subdued rebellious Livorno before turning

to Florence. Many loyalists and liberals had believed that the invasion was solely the result of Tuscany's participation in the War for Liberation and the subsequent chaos that dominated Tuscan affairs. However, as General D'Aspre's forces advanced toward the capital, he issued a proclamation that verified Leopold's complicity in the Austrian invasion. It appeared that their "Tuscan" grand duke was more loyal to Vienna than to his own people, and as such was simply a Habsburg archduke, not a true Italian sovereign.

The period that followed Leopold's restoration was one of general dissatisfaction and political stagnation. Despite demonstrated economic and commercial recovery, morale in Tuscany remained low. After he officially abolished the Statuto fondamentale in 1852, the disillusionment of liberals was complete. Although the Austrian occupation ended in 1855, little could be done to remedy Leopold's situation. Between 1855 and 1857, nationalist agitation increased. The underground press promoted unification and the secret police just barely managed to foil Mazzinian plots. By 1858, a new war between Austria and Piedmont loomed on the horizon. This time, Leopold chose the path opposite the one he took in 1848.

Austria officially declared war on Piedmont on 26 April 1859, and it took little time for the people of Tuscany to demand that Leopold support the Italian cause. After the Second War for Italian Unification commenced, a mob gathered outside the Palazzo Pitti to demand an answer from the grand duke on whether he would support or oppose the war. Instead of facing his people, Leopold chose to flee on the morning of 27 April. With this second flight, radicals claimed that he made his true loyalties clear. Although his absence from Tuscany was short, his return proved even shorter. To appease his opponents in the provisional government, Leopold abdicated in favor of his son Ferdinand on 21 July 1859. The legislative assembly responded on 20 August with a unanimous vote in favor of deposing the House of Habsburg-Lorraine.

What had gone wrong for the last grand duke of Tuscany? Further, what does the history of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany reveal about the Risorgimento? In the early nineteenth century, Tuscans rested secure in their Tuscan identity and confident in their prince's dedication to the wellbeing of the state. They welcomed the Lorraines after the Congress of Vienna as their rightful rulers restored to their hereditary state. However, between 1814 and 1859, Tuscany's political climate underwent substantial changes. Despite his dynasty's secure reputation as the legitimate rulers of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, Leopold's "betrayal" in 1849 voided his claims to the throne in the eyes of his people. His infidelity to Tuscan independence provided Italian nationalists with legitimate grounds to argue for the deposition of the traditional regime in favor of the uncertainty of a new Italian political order. With his abdication in 1859, the remnants of his tumultuous reign disappeared in the midst of the politics of unification.

Leopold II's reign exemplifies the struggle between the Restoration regimes and the onset of nationalism in Italy. Far from a reactionary or mere pawn of Vienna during his early rule, Leopold embraced change and welcomed the advances of the nineteenth century. He cultivated the arts, sciences, and commerce and sought to bring his country into modernity. However, even this most liberal of Italian princes failed to adapt fully to the demands of the Age of Revolutions. Despite his enlightened *mentalité*, Leopold is classed with the ousted rulers of Modena, Parma, and Naples in modern accounts of the Risorgimento. His example demonstrates the immense difficulties that adapting to a new political philosophy posed to monarchs. Although he genuinely sought to do the best for his country, he failed when he allowed the opinions of his reactionary peers to dictate his policies.

While Leopold certainly supported the idea of a liberated Italy, it is clear from his writings that his top priority was always Tuscany, not an abstract "Italy." Further, outside of

radical circles, the idea of Italian nationalism remained less a focus on Italian unity than a desire to expel foreign influences. In Tuscany, this remained the case until the late 1850s. Graffiti from the late 1840s demanded not a unified Italy, but “the independence of Italy and the expulsion of the barbarians.”<sup>1</sup> Leopold’s devotion was to *his* state, his people, and his heritage, not to a radical idea of Italy as a united nation. While the weight and pure force of these competing allegiances ultimately crushed Leopold’s vision for a successful, modern, and stable Tuscany, examining the unfolding of this process is useful for any who live in states where citizens’ loyalties are divided between party, tradition, family, and state. Turning once again to Leopold’s image of the state as a ship in a storm, we can see that his goal was to ensure safe passage for *his* state and *his* dynasty. Although demonstrating support for Tuscany’s neighbors assisted Leopold in steering Tuscany toward a safe harbor, his policies in 1848 were not born of an altruistic desire to stabilize the entire Italian peninsula. Neither were the policies of Pius IX, Carlo Alberto, or Ferdinand II. Leopold’s priority remained Tuscan and Lorenese stability, not the attainment of abstract “Italian” interests.

The shift toward popular acceptance of Italian nationalism during Leopold’s reign similarly demonstrates the dramatic change in the disposition of the Italian masses regarding the idea of a united Italy during the Risorgimento. For many years, as has been demonstrated by several contemporary accounts, Tuscans simply maintained no interest in pursuing the radical dream of a united Italy. Even through the chaos of 1849, the idea of upending the status quo in pursuit of radical Mazzinian unification held no appeal for most Tuscans. Counterrevolution instead pushed away these radicals as a show of support for constitutional monarchy and the stability of the traditional rulers of an autonomous Tuscany. However, after Leopold’s betrayal

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<sup>1</sup> “Coup d’œil rétrospectif sur la situation de l’Italie pendant l’année 1846,” Metternich, *Mémoires*, no. 1568, 7:300.

of his country, the grounds on which loyalists' allegiances lay were shaken. The dilemma now rested on whether to support a regime that invited foreign rule or to seek potential growth under a new government. This small seed of doubt, watered and fed by the imprudent and rash actions of a paranoid ruler, enabled the growth of nationalism among a wider segment of the Tuscan population. At a minimum, it suffocated any lingering loyalist desire to oppose such changes, as had been done in 1849. If this were the case in the most liberal state in the Italian peninsula, it is unsurprising that nationalism held such an appeal throughout the more reactionary and repressive states in Italy.

Even after Italy achieved political unity in 1860, minister Massimo d'Azeglio famously commented, "We have made Italy. Now we must make Italians." Cultural unity and national identity remained tasks to accomplish after the fact.<sup>2</sup> This struggle rests largely in the reality that political unification did not stem from an overwhelming surge of nationalist fervor in 1859. While it was certainly a more active force than it had been in 1848, the shift from "liberation" to "unification" was crucial, and its impact is exemplified in the outcome of the events in Tuscany.

This study only scratches the surface of the rich history of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany during the Risorgimento. However, it beckons further examination of the affairs of Tuscany and its last grand duke. Tuscany, like the other small states of Italy, grants great insight into the influence of nineteenth-century ideologies and liberal politics on the Risorgimento. Further, it emphasizes the value to be found in examining the "failures" that shaped the Risorgimento for understanding the difficulties of Italian unification. By highlighting the political catastrophes that enabled the success of the Risorgimento, it is possible to more completely understand the extent

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<sup>2</sup> Arguably, some elements of Italian national identity remain subordinate to local identity even in the twenty-first century. Italians introduce themselves as Roman, Sienese, or Venetian well before claiming a broader Italian identity.



of the victory achieved by Italian patriots. Both broad surveys of the Italian peninsula and Piedmont-centric accounts omit these crucial developments by oversimplifying the affairs of states such as Tuscany. In stressing *only* Piedmont's successes, the lessons from the failures of leaders like Leopold are lost. Much can be gained from examining these overlooked historical figures, and much remains to be learned from both Leopold's successes and failures.

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