A COMPARISON OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND PRAGMATISM

AS THEY RELATE TO INQUIRY

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The problem of the study was to effect a comparison of psychoanalysis and pragmatism as they relate to inquiry.

The purpose of the study was to demonstrate that certain fundamental insights of psychoanalysis and pragmatism, heretofore seen as mutually exclusive, are, in fact, complementary, and uniquely augment, supplement, and clarify each other. It was believed that a presentation of the rapprochement between the two theories would be a significant contribution towards the maximum release and maturation of man's potential to inquire.

Four constructs which were deemed to be common and critical to each theory were isolated. Passages from the works of Dewey and Freud were selected to show how the two theories made similar or identical use of the constructs.

The Evolutionary—Naturalistic—Scientific Base

Psychoanalysis and pragmatism are both based upon a belief in the veracity of evolutionary theory. Freud used the theory to establish causal sequences and determinism, Dewey to emphasize process and change. The differences were
more a matter of emphasis than basic disagreement and both views are needed for a comprehensive position.

Both assume an agnostic stance based on their acceptance of a naturalistic philosophical frame of reference. All manifestations of supernatural first causes, universals, essences, or existences are repudiated by both theorists.

Both agree that scientific modes of inquiry are the only way for men to know and that science must be broadened to include considerations involving ethical and religious values and morals.

Natural Mind: The Unconscious and the Conscious

Dewey and Freud were in agreement that mind could be defined as a natural series of insights encoded into the tissue as a result of experiences. Such encoding might be conscious or unconscious but once established became habitual and unconscious.

On certain occasions when the habitual reactions were dysfunctional, consciousness might ensue and the experimental insights might be introjected to restructure the mind, the body of encoded insights. But while psychoanalysis and pragmatism defined mind and consciousness similarly, their views of the unconscious were different. Dewey confined the mental to the conscious and problematic while Freud extended the mental into the unconscious and included the effects of the libido. It is held that Freud's is the more instrumental view
and can be incorporated into the pragmatic model without altering the basic pragmatic concepts.

The Experiential Origin of Knowledge and the Possibility of Its Subsequent Hypostatization

Psychoanalysis and pragmatism are in complete agreement that all knowledge is of natural origin and is mediated by human intelligence. Ideas of supernatural origin and eternal fixed universals are treated as hypostatizations of insights occurring naturally in human inquiry.

Inquiry: Reflective Thought and the Secondary Process

Dewey's reflective thought and Freud's secondary process are identical concepts designed to picture conscious mental operations utilized to facilitate more harmonious transactions between the individual and his social and physical environment. Thus the goals of psychoanalysis and pragmatism, the realization by man of his potential for conscious scientific modes of inquiry, are identical.

It is held that psychoanalysis and pragmatism share many similar or identical insights and that the two taken together can be more instrumental in achieving inquiry than either by itself. Pragmatism offers a more comprehensive philosophical model for inquiry, while psychoanalysis can promote the type
of self knowledge needed to prepare the organism for truly objective behavior.
A COMPARISON OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND PRAGMATISM
AS THEY RELATE TO INQUIRY

DISSERTATION

Presented to the Graduate Council of the North Texas State University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

By

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Denton, Texas

May, 1973
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This study grew out of a general interest in the theories of John Dewey and Sigmund Freud. Both theories were highly valued, and as the reading continued and interest grew, the idea occurred that the two were very similar and contained many corresponding insights and concepts. Further study was instituted specifically to identify and isolate the points of communication between the two theories. It became apparent that the two were rarely treated in the same work, and when they were, it was to emphasize their differences rather than to point out their similarities. Nevertheless some references which suggested similarities were found.

Erich Fromm has suggested that Dewey and Freud had similar outlooks concerning the deleterious effects of supernatural dogmas of religion on the humanistic efforts of man to use the powers they possess to advance the good in life (3, p. 20). Abraham Kaplan, in a definitive work on inquiry in the behavioral sciences, used insights from pragmatism and psychoanalysis congruently (4). Morton Levitt suggested that the differences between Freud's and Dewey's views on human nature were more a matter of emphasis
and were not biological or constructional in origin (5, p. 162).

From such references and from continued reading of psychoanalysis and pragmatism the conviction grew that, contrary to prevailing opinion, the two theories had much to share and that a thorough study could establish this fact. But what might be gained by such a study?

In the first place such a comparison and contrast assists in bringing each theory into clearer relief so that a better understanding of each may be gained. It follows that if critical similarities can be isolated and substantiated, each theory might be bolstered by the additional evidence and support of the other. Even the most optimistic pragmatist would be forced to admit that Dewey's instrumentalism has made little headway in achieving the role that Dewey sought for it. In turn, Freud hoped that psychoanalysis would be developed by a group of lay analysts and be available to the general public. He foresaw and deplored its appropriation and exploitation by the doctors and/or the priests (6, p. 126). As is the case with pragmatism, psychoanalysis has not been generally understood and has not made the significant contribution which is within its potential. Seen as complementary and contributing views, the two may succeed where individually they have been largely unsuccessful.
Therefore, the hypothesis underlying this paper is that psychoanalysis and pragmatism are complementary insights and that they uniquely supplement and augment each other to the point that an understanding of their relationship may make each more viable and potentially instrumental in human inquiry.

This is not to say that they are identical. Dewey saw a complete picture, but for good reasons relating to his own background and motivation chose to emphasize certain parts of it. Freud perceived a similar picture but emphasized other aspects of it. The two taken together are a more adequate report of the situation than either in separation.

Stated in yet another way, psychoanalysis is a technique without peer in assisting one to understand the workings of his own psychical processes as a naturally evolved, interacting social organism. Once these analytical insights are gained, Dewey's theory can reach its full potential as a method or a model for continuing inquiry. The individual psyche needs the insights of analysis to prepare it to utilize instrumentalism.

To aid development of this study, four constructs were selected through which to effect the comparison of psychoanalysis and pragmatism. These were thought to be concepts which are common and critical to each theory. The treatment of each construct constitutes one chapter, and the chapters are
II. The Evolutionary-Naturalistic-Scientific Base

III. Natural Mind: The Unconscious and the Conscious

IV. The Experiential Origin of Knowledge and the Possibility of Its Subsequent Hypostatization

V. Inquiry: Reflective Thought and the Secondary Process

The discussion of each construct is divided into four divisions or subsections. These consist of (1) an "Introduction" in which the construct is defined and explained, (2) a section entitled "Dewey," and (3) a section entitled "Freud," in which each theorist's position is documented, and (4) a section entitled "Summary and Conclusions" in which the two views are compared and contrasted. A fifth section entitled "Related Ideas" is included in the first three chapters only.

The four chapters on the constructs are followed by a fifth and concluding chapter entitled "Comparison and Contrast of Psychoanalysis and Pragmatism," in which the closing assessments and conclusions are developed.

At the present stage of understanding, the apposition of pragmatism and psychoanalysis is a difficult and tedious task, and to many it will seem unimportant and ill-advised. A statement of Freud's will clarify the goals of the task and amplify the spirit of the undertaking.

The transformation of scientific ideas is a process of development and progress, not of revolution. A law that was at first held to be
universally valid proves to be a special case of a more comprehensive law, or else its scope is limited by another law not discovered until later; a rough approximation to the truth is replaced by one more carefully adjusted, which in its turn awaits a further approach to perfection (2, p. 97).

Dewey made a similar point in explaining his preference of the term "warranted assertibility" to belief and knowledge.

It is free from the ambiguity of these latter terms, and it involves reference to inquiry as that which warrants assertion. The use of a term that designates a potentiality rather than an actuality involves recognition that all special conclusions of special inquiries are parts of an enterprise that is continually renewed, or is a going concern (1, p. 9).

Both men speak of science in the sense of a "development," "progress," and "enterprise that is continually renewed." The emphasis is on continued, co-operative inquiry that refines and assimilates seemingly diverse insights as it moves towards ever more precise articulation.

Such a future might await the insights of psychoanalysis and pragmatism, and a careful redefining of their tenets might well assist a needed formulation of a more descriptive and functionally unified theory combining elements of both.
CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY


CHAPTER II

THE EVOLUTIONARY-NATURALISTIC-SCIENTIFIC BASE

Introduction

The hypothesis which directs this study is that psychoanalysis and pragmatism are complementary but not necessarily identical theories. In discussion of the Evolutionary-Naturalistic-Scientific Base, the goal is to show that the two theories share a conceptual model or frame of reference which is based on three chief elements. The first is an acceptance of evolutionary theory, the second is the assumption of a naturalistic philosophical attitude, and the third is a utilization of the scientific method.

The rationale for this approach is taken from an idea which appears fairly regularly in treatises devoted to logic, inquiry, and scientific method. This idea suggests a relationship between a conceptual model and its accompanying inquiry. Ray Hyman makes the point succinctly.

In sum, then, the point we want to make is that all psychological inquiry is guided by a conceptual system. This conceptual system—including subject matter, preconceptions, concepts, values, restrictions—serves as a basis for organizing experiments, selecting facts, analyzing data, and interpreting results. Because this conceptual framework limits what the experimenter sees and deals with, it serves both to facilitate and to hinder the development of psychological knowledge (17, p. 7).
Undoubtedly the conceptual system does influence the inquiry and Hyman's point is well made, but he does perhaps oversimplify the situation, and other philosophical positions would see the relationship differently. Hyman's view, as stated, is nominalistic and subjective and emphasizes ascendancy of the conceptual scheme over the facts. The empiricists would emphasize that one starts with the facts and then determines the conceptual scheme. To them, the facts are the primary thing. Dewey and Freud represent a third or middle position. The conceptual system does influence the perception of the data, but in turn, the data bring about a restructuring of the conceptual system. There is a give-and-take situation wherein the facts and the theory are adjusted to "fit" each other (6, p. 171). In the following discussion, the purpose is to show that evolutionary theory, naturalism, and scientific method are essential elements of the respective conceptual systems of psychoanalysis and pragmatism and that the two are similar and complementary as they share this common base.

Dewey

In a very excellent short exposition on pragmatism, Max Fisch suggested that the pragmatists Peirce, Wright, James, Holmes, and Dewey felt the general scientific influence of their time, but that by far the most influential single idea was that of evolution (4, p. 10). Peirce, seen
by many as the originator of American pragmatism, felt that "that theory of Darwin's was, without any undistanced rival, the very greatest poem that man's brain ever struck out since the Great Pyramid" (4, p. 16).

These men never worried about the linking of man to the lower animals. This was accepted as fact. Their interest was in the implications of evolutionary theory for other fields. To them it came to mean, among other things, (1) expelling from nature the last fixity, that of species, (2) including man and his intelligence in nature, and (3) adopting a biological view of intelligence (4, p. 10). Levitt (20, pp. 48-49), Cork (16, pp. 338-341), and Kallen (16, p. 21) all support this general view.

In 1910, Dewey published his book The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy. In this and in all subsequent works, Dewey emphasized the ideas of process and change he took from evolutionary theory and rebutted the older ideas of fixed and eternal "essence" and "existence." This book, and the shift in thought it represented, are one of the most significant milestones in Dewey's career.

The following passages have been selected in an effort to supply an example of the flow of Dewey's inferences from evolutionary theory. The first passage shows that Dewey saw change as opportunity and that human minds could be capable of reshaping existence to their own purposes.
Fixed forms and ends, let us recall, mark fixed limits to change. Hence they make futile all human efforts to produce and regulate change except within narrow and unimportant limits. They paralyze constructive human inventions by a theory which condemns them in advance to failure. Human activity can conform only to ends already set by nature. It was not till ends were banished from nature that purposes became important as factors in human minds capable of reshaping existence. A natural world that does not subsist for the sake of realizing a fixed set of ends is relatively malleable and plastic; it may be used for this end or that . . . . Nature is subdued to human purpose because it is no longer the slave of metaphysical and theological purpose (6, p. 70).

The following reiterated his idea that reason was naturally evolved and in nature, not above or beyond it:

The progress of biology has accustomed our minds to the notion that intelligence is not an outside power residing supremely but statically over the desires and efforts of man but is a method of adjustment of capacities and conditions within specific situations (8, p. 68).

Then nature was process and intelligence was natural and in nature.

In the next passages Dewey attested to the primacy of change over fixed forms and suggested that laws are observations of selected portions of change. Science is possible because naturally evolved intelligence can register change and intervene in its processes.

. . . No, nature is not an unchangeable order, unwinding itself majestically from the real of law under the control of deified forces. It is an indefinite congeries of changes. Laws are not governmental regulations which limit change, but are convenient formulations of selected portions of change followed through a longer or shorter period
of time, and then registered in statistical forms that are amenable to mathematical manipulation (8, p. 72).

The scientific attitude, as an attitude of interest in change instead of interest in isolated and complete fixities, is necessarily alert for problems; every new question is an opportunity for further experimental inquiries—for effecting more directed change. There is nothing which a scientific mind would more regret than reaching a condition in which there were no more problems. That state would be the death of science, not its perfected life (9, p. 101).

Other philosophers welcomed the theory of evolution but used it in a different manner. They saw design or purpose in evolution. It was the mode of operation of the supernatural power. Dewey did not hold with these views, for in Experience and Nature he stated:

With Hegel, becoming is a rational process which defines logic although a new and strange logic, and an absolute, although new and strange, God. With Spencer, evolution is but the transitional process of attaining a fixed and universal equilibrium of harmonious adjustment. With Bergson, change is the creative operation of God, or is God—one is not quite sure which. The change of change is not only cosmic pyrotechnics, but is a process of divine, spiritual, energy. We are here in the presence of prescription not description . . . . Flux is made something to revere, something profoundly akin to what is best within ourselves, will and creative energy. It is not, as it is in experience, a call to effort, a challenge to investigation, a potential doom of disaster and death (5, pp. 50-51).

This is the naturalistic view and contains a sometimes overlooked facet of Dewey's thought. If one is to reject the concept of cosmological design, then this premise must hold
true throughout nature (8, p. 14). Dewey continued in this vein with the idea that nature is neither rational nor irrational. Nature is neutral, but natural intelligence can make use of it.

Abandon completely the notion that nature ought to conform to a certain definition and nature intrinsically is neither rational nor irrational. Apart from the use made of it in knowing, it exists in a dimension irrelevant to either attribution, just as rivers inherently are neither located near cities nor are opposed to such location. Nature is intelligible and understandable. There are operations by means of which it becomes an object of knowledge, and is turned to human purposes, just as rivers provide conditions which may be utilized to promote human activities and to satisfy human need (9, p. 210).

These selected passages give support to the contention that Dewey made use of an evolutionary, naturalistic, scientific base for his theory. They were selected to illustrate the following points. First, Dewey used evolutionary theory to undergird his idea that change and process is the true state of nature. Since "isolated and complete fixities" are inimical to science, these "indefinite congeries of change" make science possible. Mind is of nature, not something above and beyond it. Nature itself operates through chance and not design, is neither rational nor irrational, but provides opportunity for operations by which it "... becomes an object of knowledge and is turned to human purpose" (9, p. 210).
Freud also used evolutionary theory, naturalism, and science to construct his own conceptual system. Since Freud was only three years older than Dewey (1856, 1859) the two men grew up in the same scientific period and were subject to many of the same influences. Brown states that "Freud, like most scientists of his time, was a rationalist and a materialist with a great admiration for Darwin, whence came his evolutionary and biological approach" (3, p. 6). Hall ties Freud to Darwin and suggests how evolutionary theory influenced Freud and other young scientists of his day.

Before Darwin, man was set apart from the rest of the animal kingdom by virtue of his having a soul. The evolutionary doctrine made man a part of nature, an animal among other animals. The acceptance of this radical view meant that the study of man could proceed along naturalistic lines. Man became an object of scientific study, no different, save in complexity, from other forms of life (14, p. 11).

Freud himself tells us how important evolutionary theory and naturalism were to him in the following passage. He also mentions his great affection for Goethe, a fact noted by most of those who study Freud's early career.

The theories of Darwin, which were then of topical interest, strongly attracted me, for they held out hopes of an extraordinary advance in our understanding of the world, and it was hearing Goethe's beautiful essay on Nature read aloud at a popular lecture by Professor Carl Bruhl just before I left school that decided me to become a medical student (12, p. 14).
Freud's earliest work as a student in the laboratory was based on evolutionary theory. His first research concerned the recondite testes of an eel and was based theoretically on the evolutionary development of these sex organs (14, p. 14). A short time later he had moved to the nervous system and had embarked on a project which carried over into his psychoanalytic theories. The following two passages by Ernest Jones show conclusively that the young Freud used evolutionary theory in his conceptual system and hoped to add to it information concerning the evolution of the mental or psychical apparatus:

... He established that some mysterious cells in the spinal chord of a lowly fish were the source of the sensory root fibers and were on their way to emerge into the posterior root ganglia so familiar in higher animals. He also demonstrated the continuity between the bipolar cells of the lower organisms and the unipolar one of the higher. These were solid stones in the edifice of the doctrine of evolution, a remarkable achievement for a young student and they early indicate Freud's genetic outlook (18, p. 219).

At another time Jones refers again to these early efforts by Freud:

The chief one was a contribution to the general theory of evolution ... Whether the nervous system of the higher animals contained elements different in kind from those of the lower animals or whether any apparent differences were only of degree ... His foreshadowing of the fundamental neurone theory, i.e., the discontinuity of neuronic fibrils, and his comparative work on the
origins of cranial nerves and their ganglia as an extension of his studies of spinal ganglia, are of a purely evolutionary nature (19, p. 303).

The following quotation from Freud is important because it affords a broader glimpse of his conceptual scheme and definitely shows the importance he placed on Darwin's theory. Also it leads towards the naturalistic position. In the last seven lines he denied the idea of a cosmological Reason and the concept of a rational plan or design in nature which was reflected in the cognitive abilities of man.

Humanity has in the course of time had to endure from the hands of science two great outrages upon its naive self-love. The first was when it realized our earth was not the center of the universe but only a tiny speck in a world system of a magnitude hardly conceivable; this is associated in our minds with the name of Copernicus although Alexandrian doctrines taught something very similar. The second was when biological research robbed man of his peculiar privilege of having been specially created and relegated him to a descent from the animal world, implying an ineradicable animal nature in him; this transvaluation has been accomplished in our time upon the instigation of Charles Darwin, Wallace, and their predecessors and not without the most violent opposition from their contemporaries. But man's craving for grandiosity is now suffering the third and most bitter blow from present day psychological research which is endeavoring to prove to the ego of each one of us that he is not even the master of his own house but that he must remain content with the veriest scraps of information about what is going on unconsciously in his mind (11, p. 296).

The next passages emphasize Freud's naturalism growing out of his belief in the evolutionary position. Naturalism, as understood here, is a belief in the natural order of occurrence of things and a denial of supernatural plan or
purpose in which Reason is supreme and man occupies a special or favored position. Freud's attacks on philosophy and religion were expressed in this belief. He thought that they were in error in assuming the supernatural position and man's preeminence in it. Jones attests to this naturalism.

We have no reason to suppose that Freud passed through the religious phases so frequent in adolescence; he told me once that he had never believed in a supernatural world. Thus he went through his life from beginning to end as a natural atheist: that is to say, one who saw no reason for believing in the existence of any supernatural Being and who felt no emotional need for such a belief. The world of nature seemed all embracing, and he could find no evidence of anything outside it (19, p. 351).

In The Future of An Illusion, Freud talked about the "religious feeling." He stated that the religious feeling supposedly starts when man senses his own insignificance and impotence, but Freud disagreed with this. To him the religious feeling comes when man creates a God and an ontological system which places man in a central and important role. Freud suggested that "he who humbly acquiesces in the insignificant part man plays in the universe, is on the contrary, irreligious in the truest sense of the word" (13, p. 57).

Freud's naturalism was based on his belief that man was a natural species occurring in the process of evolution and that he occupied no favored place in the cosmos. He felt that philosophical and religious theories that placed man in
Jones again develops this tendency of Freud in another passage.

... There must surely have been a moment when the Deity decided to add the higher mental attributes, notably the soul, to man, and thus fulfill his purpose of fundamentally distinguishing him from all other animals ... .

Freud, however, whose main interest was in genetic development, was able to show that a great many of these higher attributes, including even the religious instinct itself, had passed through a lowlier evolution before attaining to their lofty heights, and that their existence could be accounted for without the necessity of invoking any supernatural intervention; even such an exquisitely human feature as the sense of self, the ego, Freud was able to derive, through the influence on it from the outer world, from the impersonal primordial group of impulses he designated as the Id. By so doing he closed the still remaining gap in the doctrine of human evolution, and thus rendered superfluous the idea that through such intervention man has a peculiar and unique relation to the Divinity. It was for this reason that I bestowed on Freud the title of the Darwin of the Mind (19, p. 304).

Now, should man give up his false pretenses to a special status? Freud believed he should.

True, man will then find himself in a difficult situation. He will have to confess his utter helplessness and his insignificant part in the working of the universe; he will have to confess that he is no longer the centre of creation, no longer the object of the tender care of a benevolent providence . . . . Man cannot remain a child forever; he must venture at last into the hostile world. This may be called "education to reality" (13, p. 85).

If man was to give up his special position and accept his "education to reality," he would be rejecting religious and philosophical doctrines and accepting his role as seen
in naturalism. How then can he seek to help himself and improve his lot? Freud thought that experience and reason afforded the only avenue.

Parallel with the human progress in the mastery of the world has been a development in his Weltanschauung which has more and more diverged from the original belief in omnipotence, and has mounted from the animistic phase through the religious to the scientific one (19, p. 357). In the long run nothing can withstand reason and experience, and the contradiction religion offers to both is only too palpable (19, p. 357).

There can be no doubt that Freud saw science as the only hope for man. Freud is sometimes labeled an irrationalist; even Dewey so characterized him indirectly on occasion. But while Freud did emphasize the irrational aspects of behavior, his purpose in doing so was to assist in understanding them and thereby to assist in implementing the rational and cognitive life. The following passage by Freud demonstrates a similarity to Dewey in that science is seen as a process. It also establishes the fact that Freud saw psychoanalysis as a scientific operation.

The fundamental concepts or most general ideas in any of the disciplines of science are always left indeterminate at first and are only explained to begin with by reference to the realm of phenomena from which they were derived; it is only by means of a progressive analysis of the material of observation that they can be made clear and can find a significant and consistent meaning. I have always felt it as a gross injustice that people always refused to treat psychoanalysis like any other science (12, p. 111).
This is not an argument as to whether or not psychoanalysis is a scientific operation. What is to be established is that Freud revered science, saw science as the only possible way for men to progress, and believed that he was operating in an acceptable scientific manner. Many passages by Freud will support this contention. Two of the best are:

The riddles of the universe only reveal themselves slowly to our inquiry, to many questions science can as yet give no answer; but scientific work is our only way to the knowledge of external reality (13, p. 55).

The voice of the intellect is a soft one, but it does not rest until it has gained a hearing. This is one of the few points in which one may be optimistic about the future of mankind, but in itself it signifies not a little (13, p. 93).

This completes the presentation of data relating to Freud.

Summary and Conclusions

Dewey and Freud made major use of the three concepts, evolutionism, naturalism, and science, in building their own individual conceptual systems, and these three elements are essential to pragmatism and psychoanalysis. The contention is that the two theories must have certain similarities because of these common or shared ideas which make up their respective conceptual schemes. Dewey and Freud made practically the same use of naturalism and demonstrated the same attitude and belief in science. However, while both depended heavily on evolutionary theory, they made different use of it
and placed emphasis on different aspects. For these reasons the three, naturalism, science, and evolutionary theory, will be discussed in that order.

The discussion of naturalism can be expedited by first defining the concept.

Naturalism: Naturalism, challenging the cogency of the cosmological, teleological and moral arguments, holds that the universe requires no supernatural cause and government, but is self-existent, self-explanatory, self-operating, and self-directing; that the world-process is not teleological and anthropocentric but purposeless, deterministic [except for possible tychistic events], and only incidently productive of man; that human life, physical, mental, moral and spiritual, is an ordinary natural event attributable in all respects to the ordinary operations of nature; and that men's ethical values, compulsions, activities, and restraints can be justified on natural grounds, without recourse to supernatural sanctions and his highest good pursued and attained under natural conditions, without expectation of a supernatural destiny (21, p. 205).

Dewey and Freud would each have accepted this definition, and this fact is reflected in the passages presented in evidence. They came to this position through evolutionary theory, and they valued it because it made possible the greatest degree of application of science to all the affairs of men. When dogmatic philosophical and theological ideas prevail, inquiry must suffer. Both Dewey and Freud assumed the more open and agnostic view afforded by naturalism.

As concerns the second construct, science, the same situation prevails. There is no basic difference in the
attitude that Dewey and Freud held about science, and they both saw it as the only hope to insure man's future. Each sought to broaden its application in the affairs of mankind. Dewey's supposed optimism and Freud's alleged pessimism concerning inquiry are grossly oversimplified concepts. Both more nearly espoused a position Dewey called meliorism (6, p. 178; 1, p. 177). To Dewey and Freud ideas such as pessimism and optimism were extraneous to the situation. Both saw that evolution and naturalism constituted insights which freed thought from existing restrictions and, regardless of the consequences, made possible the kind of deliberate thought entailed in the concept of science.

In comparing Dewey's and Freud's uses of evolutionary theory most of the similarity is found to be wrapped up in their acceptance of naturalism. The undoubted fact of the evolution of all the cosmological constituents negated the types and kinds of dogmatic fixities and supernatural verities that Dewey and Freud sought to expose. But in spite of their many similar uses and attitudes about evolutionary theory, there is one basic difference between Freud's and Dewey's approaches. Dewey emphasized the ubiquity of change, its resulting novelty, and the opportunity it affords for mediation of change by human intelligence. Freud would not disagree with this. It was his lifetime goal to assist men in improving their lot by the
deliberate application of reason and scientific inquiry. But his experiences caused him to look back, to note "... the ineradicable animal nature in man" (11, p. 296). Freud explained the irrational aspects of behavior by alluding to phylogenetic predispositions and apparent dysfunctions in the human psychical apparatus. In following these clues, he affected what some consider an extreme determinism that overemphasized causal sequences and underestimated chance and novelty. For example, in the face of the general acceptance of mutation and natural selection as the vehicle of evolution, Freud obdurately clung to an outmoded idea very similar to Lamarck's concept of the inheritance of acquired characteristics (19, p. 313; 10). In his psychology of errors and his dream theories, Freud again and again cautioned against "... an illusion of a psychic freedom within you which you do not want to give up. I regret to say that on this point I find myself in sharpest opposition to your views" (11, p. 52). On another page he emphasized that "One who suggests that there are occurrences so small as to fail to come within the causal sequence of things has thrown over the whole scientific outlook on the world" (11, p. 32).

In summary then, Freud and Dewey both lean heavily on evolutionary theory--Dewey to emphasize process and change, Freud to establish causal sequences and determinism. Dewey
points to change as an opportunity for progress. Freud points to inherited irrational tendencies as an impediment to intellectual functions. Their goal, the realization by man of his full potential to reason, is identical, but their emphasis on methods to expedite this common goal differs. Each makes use of evolutionary theory in a unique way to aid in his own individual approach. The position taken here is that each is needed to complement the other to gain a full and complete report at this stage of our understanding.

The importance of evolutionary theory, naturalism, and science to the basic frame of reference or conceptual scheme underlying the theories of psychoanalysis and pragmatism has been tentatively established.

Related Ideas

It would seem that any theory in the behavioral sciences must assume some view as to human nature. Certainly Dewey and Freud did so and pragmatism and psychoanalysis reflect these attitudes. Dewey saw man as extremely adjustable and plastic. He objected to fixed concepts of human nature on the grounds that they denoted permanent or immutable qualities which he rejected because of his inferences from evolutionary theory. The seemingly fixed qualities of human nature were actually the result of experiences, were habits which were amenable to change. Early in his career,
Dewey wrote an article negating the reflex arc theory of the Behaviorists and supporting the cognitive views of learning (7, pp. 1-3).

Freud held that there was a human nature built around the desire of the organism to survive. He centered this nature in the instincts and suggested that they expressed themselves through the libido. While it is true that Freud undoubtedly accepted some facets of the reflex arc concept, this in no way suffices to characterize his ideas. Psychoanalysis had voluntaristic aspects which included the idea of purposiveness and organization on the part of the organism and its concepts of sublimation and displacement gave opportunity for novelty in the identifications through which the psychical energy was channeled. Another way to graphically describe psychoanalysis as it relates to learning theory is to note that the primary process is basically behavioristic but that the secondary process has cognitive overtones. It is not by accident that Hilgard and Bower, in their work on learning theory, placed Freud's psychodynamics between gestaltism and functionalism in the section devoted more to cognitive theories (15).

In summary, Dewey emphasizes the plasticity of man gained through his processes of cognition and Freud spends a considerable amount of time on identifications and cathexes which approach the reflex arc reaction. These emphases can
be misleading stereotypes, however. Freud recognized cognition in his concept of the secondary process and Dewey often speaks of habit which can only be equated with relatively mechanical stimulus-response reactions.

Another similarity between Dewey and Freud which is basic to this first construct is their desire to insinuate the naturalistic-scientific conceptual scheme into matters concerning morals and ethics which had previously been reserved for religions and theistic philosophies. Dewey refers to this state of affairs repeatedly.

... This means that while we have been reasonably successful in obtaining command of nature by means of science, our science is not yet such that this command is systematically and preeminently applied to the relief of the human estate (6, p. 43).

At another time Dewey suggests that "the greatest historic obstacle to science was unwillingness to make the surrender, lest moral, esthetic and religious objects suffer" (5, p. 131). In *The Quest for Certainty*, he suggests that "Experimental empiricism in the field of ideas of good and bad is demanded to meet the conditions of the present situation" (9, p. 258). "This issue involves nothing less than the problem of the directed reconstruction of economic, political and religious institutions" (9, p. 259).

Freud expressed exactly the same ideas in *The Future of an Illusion*. He thought that religious influence was on the decline and that morality and ethics would suffer because
they had been connected with religion. Although he was not optimistic that such could happen, he hoped that science could replace religion as the basis for moral and ethical decisions (13).

A related aspect of this concept is the interest that Freud and Dewey shared in education. In America, educationalists identified with Dewey and supplied the main support for his theories. Freud saw as the goal of psychoanalytic therapy the making of the unconscious conscious. He called this a re-education to reality. He argued that it would be worthwhile to make the experiment of a non-religious education (13, p. 84).

One has the feeling that pragmatism, in the broader sense of the definition, has failed so far in American education because it was not afforded the full support of its evolutionary-scientific-naturalistic base. The supposed separation of church and state has not freed education from censorship from the entrenched religious interests. The evolutionary-naturalistic-scientific base which Dewey and Freud accepted and worked from is still not generally presented, much less utilized, in American education. As an example, empirical evidence such as Berrill's documentation of the recapitulation of its evolutionary history by the human fetus affords exciting new support for evolutionary theory (2). Such information, however, still offends the public and is
not likely to be discussed in a public school. We can be certain that Dewey and Freud would stand for an educational system which would present all the facts as they are known and make them available for every facet of human inquiry.
CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY


CHAPTER III

NATURAL MIND: THE UNCONSCIOUS
AND THE CONSCIOUS

Introduction

There are certain popular misconceptions held about the theories of Dewey and Freud which mask and obscure their basic similarity. Psychoanalysis is most often seen as a therapeutic technique for the treatment of psychical or mental aberrations through dialogue between the analyst and the patient. Emphasis is placed on the etiology of childhood sexual experiences and the subsequent effect on adult personality functioning. While this is an important segment of Freudian theory and perhaps its most viable representation in contemporary society, it is but one relatively minor facet of the total import of Freud's contribution. Similarly, pragmatism is often seen as a method of making decisions by reducing the considerations to the practical aspects of two counter proposals, a decision reduced to "what will work". In each case such popularizations miss the true import of the theories completely and facilitate their misinterpretation.

The important aspect common to psychoanalysis and pragmatism is that they attempt to show how the naturally evolved
mind operates in a social and cultural environment and share a desire to free and enhance man's ability to utilize his natural intelligence in inquiry. Seen in this broader perspective and with this common goal the two theories are quite compatible. In order to establish this fact, the discussion will center around three concepts: natural mind, the unconscious, and the conscious, as they are utilized by Dewey and Freud respectively.

It is true that there seem to be differences in the way the two theorists use the terms but these may be more a question of individual emphasis rather than of mutually exclusive or contradictory premise. The evidence warrants the conclusion that both regarded mind as a natural phenomenon, a concept consistent with their evolutionary-naturalistic tendencies. Also, it can be shown that Dewey, while emphasizing the methods of attaining conscious reflective inquiry, was certainly not in disagreement with Freud that most human behavior is unconscious and habitual (5, pp. 5-7). Similarly, while Freud's writings are redundant with references to unconscious mental habits, his goal was to make the unconscious conscious, to assist in attaining conscious inquiry not unlike that envisioned by Dewey (12, pp. 53-54).
The concept of natural mind was critical to Dewey's theory, and he developed his ideas on this subject very carefully and completely. Levitt suggests that Dewey started from a position which is identified with George Mead. The crux of the idea was that different entities had interactions with each other as they went about their life sustaining activities. Some organismic adjustments in these interactions were instinctual and automatic, psycho-physical, as Dewey was wont to say, but on the plane of mind and in the times of consciousness such adjustments were truly psychical and even intellectual and could be mediated by natural intelligence. In Dewey's model such intelligence was always seen as a natural outgrowth of the evolutionary process.

Mead started from the idea of the organism acting and reacting in an environment; in this view the nervous system, brain included, is an organ for regulating the relations of the organism as a whole with objective conditions of life. Psychological phenomena, including processes of thought and knowledge, must then be described from this point of view. Mead had also developed an original theory of the psychical as the state occurring when previously established relations of organism and environment break down and new relations have not yet been built up (17, p. 58).

Over the years Dewey used three terms to describe these encounters of the organism with its environment. These were self-action, interaction and transaction. In the evolution
of these terms Dewey was prompted by an ever increasing sense of the interrelatedness of the constituents involved in the situation and of the ever closer relationship and dependency between the entities that make up the natural world.

Dewey did not attempt to explain the origin of the nervous system except through its evolutionary development. He believed that mind and soul were hypostatizations of natural processes made possible by the functions of the specialized cells which made up the brain and nervous system. These functions were dependent upon the life of the organism and did not exist before its birth or after its demise (2, pp. 293-296). In practice this led to the denial of any cosmological Consciousness, Reason, Soul, etc., as envisioned by the older philosophical schools. As the organism interacted as Mead had suggested, it had only its naturally evolved abilities to aid it in its adjustments. Thus, mind to Dewey was natural, and the symbol represented meanings which the organism could gain through experience and utilize to mediate subsequent experiences which had similar grounds.

In *Experience and Nature* Dewey made the following statement:

... To see the organism in nature, the nervous system in the organism, the brain in the nervous system, the cortex in the brain, is the answer to the problems that haunt philosophy... Clearly we have not carried the plane
of conscious control, the direction of action by perception of connections, far enough. We cannot separate organic life and mind from physical nature without also separating nature from life and mind (2, p. 296).

Nothing but unfamiliarity stands in the way of thinking of both mind and matter as different characters of natural events, in which matter expresses their sequential order, and mind the order of their meanings in their logical connections and dependencies (2, p. 74).

In The Quest for Certainty similar passages reinforce this point.

There is no separate "mind" gifted in and of itself with a faculty of thought; such a conception of thought ends in postulating the mystery of a power outside of nature and yet able to intervene within it (7, p. 227).

While traditional theories regard mind as an intruder from without into the natural development, or evolution, of organic structures, or else in the interest of natural continuity feel compelled to deny that mental behavior has any differential features, the theory that organic responses have mental quality in the degree that they deal with the uncertain recognizes both continuity and difference (7, p. 231).

From these sources several points can be definitely established. To Dewey, mind was natural and made possible by the evolutionary process. He clearly denied any outside reason or power which intruded on the natural processes. The natural organism did have ways of dealing with the uncertain and problematic other than blind and automatic instinct. Dewey argued that insights gained through interactions (experiences) could be encoded into the neural tissue. Then these isolated insights could be joined in meaningful patterns:
Experience has temporal continuity. There is an experiential continuum of content and subject-matter and of operations. The experiential continuum has definite biological basis. Organic structures, which are the physical conditions of experience, are enduring. Without, as well as with, conscious intent, they hold the different pulses of experience together so that the latter form a history in which every pulse looks to the past and affects the future. The structures, while enduring, are also subject to modification. Continuity is not bare repetition of identities. For every activity leaves a "trace" or record of itself in the organs engaged. Thereby, nervous structures taking part in an activity are modified to some extent so that further experiences are conditioned by changed organic structure. Moreover, every overt activity changes, to some extent, the environing conditions which are the occasions and stimuli of further experiences (4, p. 245).

Through experience, the natural structures are changed and insights are introjected to form the natural mind. Thus a series of insights are encoded and filed away, and in such manner the mind is developed. This affords a beginning to the understanding of Dewey's concept of mind, but because the concepts of consciousness and unconsciousness are so interwoven with a full understanding of mind one must consider these concepts before completing the description.

In Experience and Nature Dewey stated that consciousness is a word of "... unsettled signification" (2, p. 298). He suggested that:

On the one hand, it is employed to point out certain qualities in their immediate apparency, qualities of things of sentiency, such as are, from the psychological standpoint, usually termed feelings. The sum total of these immediate qualities present as literal ends of or closures of
natural processes constitute "consciousness" as an anoetic occurrence. This is consciousness wherever meanings do not exist; that is to say, apart from the existence and employment of signs, or independently of communication (2, p. 298).

In the text Dewey continued immediately with a second description which developed the term consciousness as he preferred to use it.

On the other hand, consciousness is used to denote meanings actually perceived, awareness of objects, being wide awake, alert, attentive to the significance of events, present, past and future (2, p. 298).

Dewey suggested that these were quite different meanings and that the key to the difference was language. "Meanings do not come into being without language and language implies two selves involved in a conjoint or shared undertaking" (2, p. 299). Feelings of immediate qualities which are not mediated by meanings requiring symbolization and language might come under the first definition of consciousness, but Dewey preferred the second definition because he denied immediate knowledge, holding that all knowledge was mediated. The perceiver brings predispositions gained through prior experiences to a present situation. The present experience mediates and is mediated by prior experience.

Dewey used a similar point of demarcation to define the subconscious of human thinking. The subconscious is the realm where feelings rule unmediated by the meanings implicit in language.
Apart from language, from imputed and inferred meaning, we continually engage in an immense multitude of immediate organic selections, rejections, welcomings, expulsions, appropriations, withdrawals, shrinkings, expansions, elations and dejections, attacks, wardings off, of the most minute vibrantly delicate nature. We are not aware of the qualities of many or most of these acts; we do not objectively distinguish and identify them. Yet they exist as feeling qualities and have an enormous directive effect on our behavior . . . . In a thoroughly normal organism, these "feelings" have an efficiency of operation which it is impossible for thought to match (2, p. 299).

It is important that in this area the similarity between Dewey and Freud be established. The following passage is therefore used to continue to develop Dewey's use of the subconscious, a concept not at all unlike Freud's preconscious and unconscious.

Meanings acquired in connection with the use of tools and of language exercise a profound influence upon organic feelings. In the reckoning of this account are included the changes effected by all the consequences of attitude and habit due to all the consequences of tools and language—in short, civilization. Evil communications corrupt (native) good manners of actions and hence pervert feeling and subconsciousness. The deification of the subconscious is legitimate only for those who never revel in it—animals and thoroughly healthy naive children—if there be any such. The subconscious of a civilized adult reflects all the habits he has acquired; that is to say all the organic modifications he has undergone. And in so far as these involve mal-coordinations, fixations and segregations (as they assuredly come to do in a very short time for those living in complex artificial conditions) sensory appreciation is confused, perverted and falsified (2, p. 300).
With this background, a finer definition of mind, consciousness, and unconsciousness can be drawn. Mind is a system or fund of meanings drawn from experience and consisting of insights gained in experience or interactions to which the organism has been a party. Such meanings may have originally been encoded into the neural tissue in a conscious or unconscious setting. This system of meanings is functional for the organism and may operate quite satisfactorily as the organism continues to interact. But on occasion the organism will experience malfunctions or discontinuities in this train of habit. This break in the continuity of life is most important. This is what Dewey termed the forked road situation. The organism, faced with the dilemma, may revert to the old, established, habitual, instinctual, subconscious pattern, or it may use intelligence to reexamine meanings so as to gain new meanings and establish new modes of interaction. If the former course is followed:

. . . There then occur systematized withdrawals from intercourse and interaction, from what common sense calls "reality:" carefully cultivated and artificially protected fantasies of consolation and compensation; rigidly stereotype beliefs not submitted to objective tests; habits of learned ignorance or systematized ignorings of concrete relationships; organized fanaticisms; dogmatic traditions which socially are harshly intolerant and which intellectually are institutionalized paranoid systems; idealizations which instead of being immediate enjoyments of meanings, cut man off from nature and his fellows (2, p. 302).
But it is possible that the latter case may ensue. Faced with a problem, the organism, rather than persisting in improper course, may turn to reflective thought and inquiry. In such a case that portion of mind, of the system of encoded meanings which has bearing on the immediate problem, is subjected to conscious scrutiny.

While on the psycho-physical level, consciousness denotes the totality of actualized immediate qualitative differences of "feelings", it denotes, upon the plane of mind, actualized apprehensions of meanings, that is, ideas. There is thus an obvious difference between mind and consciousness, meaning and an idea. Mind denotes the whole system of meanings as they are embodied in the workings of organic life; consciousness in a being with language denotes awareness or perception of meanings; it is the perception of actual events, whether past, contemporary or future, in their meanings, the having of actual ideas. The greater part of mind is only implicit in any conscious act or state; the field of mind--of operative meanings--is enormously wider than that of consciousness. Mind is contextual and persistent; consciousness is focal and a constant background and foreground; perceptive consciousness is process, a series of heres and nows. Mind is a constant luminosity; consciousness intermittent, a series of flashes of varying intensities. Consciousness is, as it were, the occasional interception of messages continually transmitted, as a mechanical receiving device selects a few of the vibrations with which the air is filled and renders them audible (2, p. 303).

Consciousness, an idea, is that phase of a system of meanings which at a given time is undergoing re-direction, transitive transformation . . . . Consciousness is the meaning of events in course of remaking; its "cause" is only the fact that this is one of the ways in which nature goes on (2, p. 308).
Then mind is a fund of meanings. The organism received these meanings as insights from interactions or experiences and they may have been consciously or unconsciously introjected into the neural tissue. Those times in which meanings are operative in behavior are the times of mind. When we operate by habit, unconsciously or subconsciously, mind can function in terms of meanings previously established leading to outcomes which are expected to ensue. However, there are times when anticipated outcomes do not occur or when outcomes not anticipated occur in addition to those anticipated. Then consciousness may occur; that portion of experience—that portion of the fund of meanings (mind) unconsciously operative, which is in question, which is in doubt, is consciousness. To be conscious for a moment or to experience consciousness is to have the occurrence of doubt, uncertainty, question, so that a portion of mind (as fund of meanings, which is all that it is) is reexamined and inquiry instituted which may result in new connections and satisfactions.

Freud

The passages used to establish Freud's acceptance of evolutionary theory also support the hypothesis that he viewed mind as a natural phenomenon made possible by the effect of experiences on the neural system. His earliest
research as a student was designed to show the relationship between the nervous systems of the lower and higher animals and between the spinal ganglia and the more specialized cranial nerves (15, pp. 219, 303).

Jones suggested that Freud held that "the psychical is a process parallel to the physiological (a dependent concomitant)" and that "there is no evidence of psychical processes occurring apart from physiological ones: that no mind could exist apart from a brain" (13, p. 368). At another time Jones reported that "Freud did not, as some philosophers have done, regard consciousness as an epiphenomenon, or even as an index that a given mental process has been completed" (13, p. 404).

As a student Freud hoped to make progress in understanding the functions of the brain tissues through empirical laboratory methods. When this goal was thwarted by the limitations of the scientific expertise of his time and by the lack of financial remuneration research afforded, he turned to medicine as an alternative. When Breuer referred mental patients to him, Freud saw in the clinical setting an opportunity to get back to his original interests through an examination of the mental processes and functions of these patients. Jones supports these premises in the following passages:
He (Freud) had always been greatly puzzled by the old problem of the relationship between body and mind, and to begin with had with his strongly held Helmholtzian principles cherished the hope of establishing a physiological basis for mental functioning. As we shall see later, during the years 1888-1898 he passed through a severe struggle before he decided to relinquish the idea of correlating somatic and psychical activity (13, p. 258).

Thus Freud came to realize that he was in a depth beyond the abilities of his day, and therefore Jones suggested that in his maturity:

Freud held that not only was the essential nature of both mind and matter quite unknown, but they were so intrinsically different in kind as to make it a logical error to translate a description of processes in the one into the terms of the other (13, p. 369).

Nevertheless, while Freud realized he could never be the one to establish them, he always felt that empirical relationships between the two would finally be established. Evidence for this view was a half-serious prediction that "in time to come it should be possible to cure hysteria by administering a chemical drug without any psychological treatment" (13, p 259).

As did Dewey, Freud identified the conscious and unconscious mental. Dewey suggested that "states of consciousness are the morphology of certain functions" (6, p. 252), while Freud suggested that "the sub-division of the unconscious is part of an attempt to picture the apparatus of the mind as being built up of functional systems whose
interrelations may be expressed in spatial terms, without reference, of course, to the actual anatomy of the brain" (8, p. 60).

Freud came to equate the unconscious with a series or type of mental operation he called the primary process. The primary process was more or less instinctive and automatic and obeyed the pleasure principle. These mental tendencies were in part the result of experiences which the organism had undergone in its evolutionary history. Freud thought some were introjected by our ancient ancestors and passed on to their offspring. This is the use Freud made of Lamarckianism for which he has so often been criticized.

Constitutional predispositions are undoubtedly the aftereffects of the experiences of an earlier ancestry; they also have been at one time acquired; without such acquired characters there would be no heredity (9, p. 370).

But by itself this is an incorrect assessment of Freud's position. He did not underestimate the role of society in influencing these predispositions or tendencies. Rather he combined the two as evidenced in the next passage.

The phylogenetic aspect is to some extent obscured in man by the circumstance that what is fundamentally inherited is nevertheless individually acquired anew, probably because the same conditions that originally induced its acquisition still prevail and exert their influence upon each individual. I would say: where they originally created a new response they now stimulate a predisposition (15, p. 309).
These predispositions, inherited and learned, were largely operative in the unconscious and preconscious. They may have always been unconscious, or they may have once been conscious and then repressed into the unconscious and preconscious. These experiences of the species and/or of the individual were encoded into the neural tissue and thereafter operated in a fashion perfectly comparable to the unconscious or subconscious as envisioned by Dewey.

To summarize, Freud used the term primary process to designate a type of unconscious or preconscious mental functioning which followed the pleasure principle and was basically an expression of life giving or libidinous behavior.

An important point in this discussion is that any theorist who deals with the mind and unconscious and conscious mental operations makes a critical decision. From the evolutionary scheme we know that physical or somatic adjustments which are largely unconscious preceded conscious or mental adjustments both in the sense of the evolutionary development of the many species and in the individual adjustments of a particular organism. There is a continuum of adjustment operations from the simple and purely physical to highly complicated mental acts involving symbolization and logic.

At what point in this continuum does a theorist label an adjustment mental rather than physical? Freud extended the
mental operations into the unconscious. In fact, he suggested that the mental was more often unconscious than conscious.

... But the study of pathogenic repressions and of other phenomena which have still to be mentioned compelled psychoanalysis to take the concept of the "unconscious" seriously. Psychoanalysis regarded everything mental as being in the first instance unconscious; the further quality of "consciousness" might also be present, or again it might be absent. This of course provoked a denial from the philosophers, for whom "conscious" and "mental" were identical and who protested that they could not conceive of such a monstrosity as the "unconscious" mental. There was no help for it, however, and this idiosyncrasy of the philosophers could only be disregarded with a shrug. Experience (gained from pathological material, of which the philosophers were ignorant) of the frequency and power of impulses of which one knew nothing directly and whose existence had to be inferred like some fact in the external world, left no alternative open (8, pp. 57-58).

But there was, in Freud's model, a second type of mental operation which followed the reality principle and was called the secondary process. This secondary process was a conscious operation which involved quite a different mode of mental activity. The passages which follow describe the transition from the primary process which is basically instinctive and unconscious to the more deliberate and conscious secondary process.

It is from the contrast between Reality and Wish Fulfillment that our psychical life grows—It is between the simple reflex on the one hand, when the movement of excitation from the sensory to the motor fibers is immediate and unchecked, and on the other hand the various complex reactions to stimuli
which may or may not be followed by a motor response and in the course of which inhibition always plays a part (13, p. 338).

A series of changes in the psychical apparatus becomes necessary. Both consciousness and the sense organs achieve a heightened significance and have to attend to various qualities beyond that of pleasure alone. The function of attention is developed, so as to be prepared for new impressions. They are noted and gradually a Memory is developed. Repression or flight is to some extent replaced by Judgement. Motor discharge, instead of being inchoate as earlier, is organized in the direction of behavior. This is carried out through a process of Thought, which is in essence a probing action, a seeking in various directions with the least possible expenditure of energy (14, p. 313).

So far the documentation has leaned heavily on the work of Ernest Jones because it is difficult to extract specific statements from Freud's writings on this subject. Perhaps the most complete treatment is in Strachey's translation of An Outline of Psychoanalysis. This work will be quoted extensively to establish a basis from which to compare Freud and Dewey. Freud first discussed the phenomenon of consciousness and in a footnote chided American behaviorism for trying to construct a psychology which disregarded the fundamental fact of its existence.

The starting point for this investigation is provided by a fact without parallel, which defies all explanation or description--the fact of consciousness. Nevertheless, if anyone speaks of consciousness, we know immediately and from our own most personal experience what is meant by it (9, p. 34).
Then he continued in one of the most conclusive and definitive statements of the concerns and beliefs of psychoanalysis. It is especially pertinent to this study.

Many people, both inside and outside the science of psychology, are satisfied with the assumption that consciousness alone is mental, and nothing then remains for psychology but to discriminate in the phenomenology of the mind between perceptions, feelings, intellective processes and volitions.

It is generally agreed, however, that these conscious processes do not form unbroken series which are complete in themselves; so that there is no alternative to assuming that there are physical or somatic processes which accompany the mental ones and which must admittedly be more complete than the mental series, since some of them have conscious processes parallel to them but others have not. It thus seems natural to lay the stress in psychology upon these somatic processes, to see in them the true essence of what is mental and to try to arrive at some other assessment of the conscious processes. The majority of philosophers, however, as well as many other people, dispute this position and declare that the notion of a mental thing being unconscious is in itself contradictory.

But it is precisely this that psychoanalysis is obliged to assert, and this is its second fundamental hypothesis. It explains the supposed somatic accessory processes as being what is essentially mental and disregards for the moment the quality of consciousness. It does not stand alone in this opinion. Many thinkers (such as Theodor Lipps, for instance) have made the same assertion in the same words. And the general dissatisfaction with the usual view of what is mental has resulted in an ever more urgent demand for the inclusion in psychological thought of a concept of the unconscious, though the demand has been of such an indefinite and vague nature that it could have no influence upon science.

Now it may appear as though this dispute between psychoanalysis and philosophy was only concerned with a trifling matter of definition—the question whether the name "mental" should be applied
to one or another series of phenomena. Actually, however this step has been of greatest importance. Whereas the psychology of consciousness never went beyond this broken sequence of events which was obviously dependent upon something else, the other view, which held that what is mental is itself unconscious, enabled psychology to take its place as a natural science like any other. The processes with which it is concerned are in themselves just as unknowable as those dealt with by the other sciences, by chemistry or physics, for example; but it is possible to establish the laws which those processes obey and to follow over long and unbroken stretches their mutual relations and interdependences—in short, to gain what is known as an "undertaking" of the sphere of natural phenomena in question. This cannot be effected without framing fresh hypotheses and creating fresh concepts; but these are not to be despised as evidence of our embarrassment but must on the contrary be valued as enriching science. We can claim for them the same value as approximations as belongs to the corresponding intellectual scaffolding found in the other natural sciences, and we look forward to their being modified, corrected and more precisely determined as more experience is accumulated and sifted. So too it will be entirely in accordance with our expectations if the basic concepts and principles of the new science (instinct, nervous energy, etc.) remain for a considerable time no less indeterminate than those of the older sciences (force, mass, attraction, etc.).

Every science is based upon observations and experiences arrived at through the medium of our psychical apparatus. But since our science has as its subject that apparatus itself, the analogy ends here. We make our observations through the medium of the same perceptual apparatus, precisely by the help of the breaks in the series of (conscious) mental events, since we fill in the omissions by plausible inferences and translate them into conscious material. In this way we construct, as it were, a series of conscious events complementary to the unconscious mental processes. The relative certainty of our mental science rests upon the binding forces of these inferences. Anyone who goes deeply into the subject will find that our technique holds its ground against every criticism.
In the course of our work the distinctions which we denote as mental qualities force themselves on our attention. There is no need to characterize what we call conscious: it is the same as the consciousness of philosophers and of every day opinion. Everything else that is mental is in our view unconscious (10, pp. 34-37).

Thus Freud clearly stated his position on conscious and unconscious mental events so that the passage needs little interpretation. The next task is to effect a comparison of the positions of Dewey and Freud on the three concepts: natural mind, unconsciousness, and consciousness.

Summary and Conclusions

In the first chapter evidence was presented to show that the theories of Dewey and Freud were similar in that each depended upon a naturalistic conceptual scheme, put heavy emphasis upon insights from evolutionary theory, and sought to operate through ways and means consistent with scientific methodology. Then evidence was offered to support the contention that the two theorists had complementary views concerning natural mind and the phenomena of conscious and unconscious mental events.

Both Dewey and Freud saw mind as a natural fund of meanings gained through experiences and in some as yet un-explainable way encoded into the neural tissue. That Freud espoused a form of Lamarkianism cannot be denied. This
tendency can be attributed to his desire to show cause and effect relationships. Freud was engaged in a speculative endeavor and was under constant attack from a hostile society. Little wonder that he tried to operate in such a fashion and perhaps overemphasized determinism. One should not overlook the fact that Dewey's statement "... every activity leaves a trace or record of itself in the organs engaged," is perfectly consistent with his view of evolution by mutation and natural selection. This organic change in the individual is comparable to Freud's view provided one leaves Freud's Lamarkianism as conjectural. The aspects of determinism (Freud) or change and novelty (Dewey) are interesting and provocative and are not mutually exclusive concepts. The fact is that both Dewey and Freud saw mind as a series of insights encoded naturally into a naturally evolved nervous system. Neither saw mind as an epiphenomenon or relied on any supernatural construct to explain its origin, and neither saw it as any "force," "power," "spirit," or "thing" either imposing itself upon or otherwise intruding into the course of natural events.

The passages selected also show clearly that Dewey recognized that the unconscious or subconscious is in control of most of the adjustments made by the organism. These unconscious "feeling qualities" have an enormous directive effect on man's behavior. "These feelings have an efficiency
of operation which it is impossible for thought to match" (2, p. 299).

Dewey also realized that certain thoughts or ideas could be introjected into the natural mind in a subconscious or unconscious way. In this respect Dewey's theory is perfectly comparable to Freud's. In *Freedom and Culture* Dewey states:

Such thoughts (authoritarian rather than reflective) grow up unconsciously. They are picked up—we know not how. From obscure sources and by unnoticed channels they insinuate themselves into the mind and become unconsciously a part of our "mental furniture." Tradition, instruction, imitation—all of which depend on authority in some form or appear to our advantage or fall in with a strong passion—are responsible for them (3, p. 8).

Also it should not be overlooked that Dewey agreed with Freud that men were more influenced by the unconscious desires, dreams and fancies than by their moments of conscious thought. Idealists may have overemphasized Dewey's belief in the primacy of reason. Note in the following passages by Dewey the mention of such Freudian concepts as dreams, reveries, delusions, mental disorders, desires, associations, and fancies. Dewey goes even farther to suggest that only when subjected to a discipline foreign to human nature, actually artificial to natural man, can man cease to be primarily actuated by such unconscious desires.
Thinking, however, is not the only way in which a personal solution of difficulties is sought. As we have seen dreams, reveries, emotional idealizations are roads which are taken to escape the strain of perplexity and conflict. According to modern psychology, many systematized delusions and mental disorders, probably hysteria itself, originate as devices for getting freedom from troublesome conflicting factors. Such considerations throw into relief some of the traits essential to thinking as a way of responding to difficulty. The shortcut "solutions" alluded to do not get rid of the feeling of it. They cover up consciousness of it. Because the conflict remains in fact and is evaded in thought, disorders arise (4, pp. 139-140).

We need to recognize that the ordinary consciousness of the ordinary man left to himself is a creature of desires rather than of intellectual study, inquiry or speculation. Man ceases to be primarily actuated by hopes and fears, loves and hates, only when he is subjected to a discipline which is foreign to human nature, which is, from the standpoint of natural man, artificial . . . .

It is then overlooked that both rationality and irrationality are largely irrelevant and episodical in undisciplined human nature; that men are governed by memory rather than by thought, and that memory is not a remembering of actual facts, but is association, suggestion, dramatic fancy.

If we are willing to take the word dreams with a certain liberality, it is hardly too much to say that man, save in his occasional times of actual work and struggle, lives in a world of dreams that is organized about desires whose success and frustration form its stuff (4, pp. 5-7).

Remember that Dewey liked to use the simile of man facing the forked path situation. The individual operates successfully in habitual and established ways until a discontinuity occurs. At this time he may "cop out" by resorting to the illusionary or delusionary forms of unconscious and faulty thinking or control himself and utilize conscious inquiry and
reflective thought. The preceding quotations support the premise that Dewey, like Freud, realized that natural man was more likely to live in the unconscious.

Nevertheless, Dewey was dedicated to the possibility of conscious and deliberate inquiry and spent his efforts in seeking ways to assist men in attaining reflective skills. Of course, this is a generally accepted truth but what is not so commonly understood and comprehended is that Freud shared the same goal. Freud did not deny consciousness, but he did suggest that the "... conscious moments formed a broken series which were undergirded by unconscious mental happenings." Thus Dewey and Freud agreed that the life of man was basically a series of more or less automatic and authoritative reactions which are basically subconscious or unconscious. Also both agreed that this train could be broken by occasional conscious times of mind when reason and sanity could reshape the habitual responses. Not many would disagree that the attainment of conscious inquiry was the goal of Dewey's work but that Freud had an identical purpose is often overlooked.

Both men wished to make the unconscious conscious and thereby intersperse periods of controlled and deliberate inquiry into the "times of mind." Dewey himself may not have realized that Freud shared his desire in this respect. Levitt suggests that Dewey was protected from and therefore
ill-informed about Freud's aims (17, p. 160). The position taken herein is that Freud's purpose in emphasizing the irrational aspects of human behavior was to implement their understanding and control. Others have taken this view. Brown suggested that the critical difference between the theories of Jung and Freud was that while Jung revered the unconscious as the source of true knowledge, Freud advocated its study in an effort to understand and control its effect upon reason (1, pp. 45-52). Fromm took a similar tack by comparing Jung to James but insisted that Freud and Dewey had the same goals, the attainment of the rational lifestyle (11, pp. 10-20).

The only conclusion to be reached is that there is no basic difference in the theories of pragmatism and psychoanalysis as they utilize the concepts of natural mind and conscious and unconscious mental acts. Also, evidence has been presented to show that Dewey and Freud shared a common purpose, the enhancement of human inquiry by rendering the unconscious conscious, thereby opening man's adjustments to the maximum application of his intellectual powers.

Suppose one inserts the Freudian theory of the unconscious into the philosophy of instrumentalism. It was true that both Dewey and Freud agreed that the unconscious—Dewey would have preferred the nonconscious—must be and can only be perceived through the conscious.
Thinkers could still utilize the orderly and lucid guidelines developed by Dewey. What would be gained, however, are the rich and cogent ideas of psychoanalysis such as free association, dream interpretation, and the defense mechanisms. Freud's forte is the understanding of the unconscious and the recovery of the repressed.

Dewey utilized the philosophic concept whereby mental acts by definition are restricted to the conscious realm. Freud's particular genius was in showing conclusively that the concept of mental or psychical function could be broadened to include unconscious functions.

Related Material

In contemporary psychological, anthropological, and neurological material the evolutionary origin of the human brain is currently being reemphasized. The purpose is to offer rebuttal to the idea of the perfect coordination and design of the human psychical apparatus and point out certain dysfunctions and apparent lack of coordination resulting from chance mutation during the long evolutionary process.

One of the most thorough treatments is contained in a theory outlined recently by Arthur Koestler which seems particularly suited to characterize and explain Dewey's and Freud's position concerning mind and the conscious and unconscious mental processes. Neurological research alludes
repeatedly to the evolutionary development of the central nervous system with such terms as brain "stem," "old" brain, and "new" brain. Koestler postulates that man, rather than being the lord of creation, may actually be better characterized as the dupe of nature, a freak in the evolutionary process. He theorizes that because of some unknown mutations in the distant past, our species is operating with three basically different brains joined together (16). Careful study of the vagaries indubitably present in the evolutionary process will lend credence to this possibility. Two areas, reaching back to our reptilian and mammalian beginnings, make up the older constituents which Koestler designated the "old" animal cortex. This area is usually called the brain stem and includes the thalamus, the hypothalamus, the reticular formation, the rhinencephalon, and the hippocampus.

Ruch presents information which basically makes Koestler's theory sound possible.

Historically, the study of these lower brain centers in man has been neglected, partly because of the greater accessibility of the structures nearer the surface of the brain and partly because it was largely assumed that most of their importance had been lost with the development of the higher centers. For example, it was early found that whereas a cat deprived of its cerebrum would still react to visual stimuli—supposedly through thalamic function—a man so deprived would be totally blind. Such findings led to the unwarranted generalization that the role of the lower centers in human sensation could be more or less disregarded. With the methods of chemical and electrical stimulation which are now available, however, there has
been a great surge of research on the lower centers and a realization that in man, as in the lower animals, they play an extremely important role. Although in some cases the newer, higher centers have taken over functions formerly performed by the older parts, it is more common, as we shall see, to find that the older centers have continued to perform their primitive functions with varying degrees of control by the higher centers (18, pp. 43).

Koestler suggests that the tremendously accelerated series of mutations which produced the "new" human brain may be without parallel in the history of the evolutionary process. He points to the two hemispheres of the cerebrum, the association areas of the cortex and the corpus callosum as the primary locus of the functions he attributes to this construct.

His next step is to compare the functions of the voluntary nervous system associated with the spinal column and the new brain or the cerebrum and the autonomic system which includes the sympathetic and parasympathetic networks. These systems share many potential nervous pathways, but the voluntary system is characterized as functioning through the central system including the "new" brain areas while the autonomic controls may terminate in the "old" brain centers and not be subject to the complete control of the cerebral functions (16, p. 428). The interactions between these systems and their somatic or visceral organs have long been of interest, both to philosophy and to psychology and neurology as well.
Koestler's theory points out the well documented problems implicit in their interaction and the apparent lack of a smoothly functioning hierarchical control. If we possessed only the "old" animal brain, we would be creatures of instinct and do instinctively what is "best" for us and our species. If we possessed only the "new" human brain, we would be able to reason our way out of our impasse as coolly as we have been able to order our technical and material progress. However, the new intellect in the neocortex has crippled the ancient instinctual impulses while the human brain has been impeded by its ancestral vestiges.

Perhaps Freud found the unconscious in the older cortex, "... the physical or somatic processes that accompany the mental one," and during a historical period which extolled the rationality of man as evidenced in his scientific pursuits, demonstrated how man's reason can be distorted and altered by his unconscious neural functions. This takes nothing from Dewey's simultaneous emphasis upon the abilities of the "new" brain to function logically nor from his aspirations towards scientific methods of inquiry. Seen as complementary insights, the two theories together may yield a more instrumental conceptualization than either can afford independently.
CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY


CHAPTER IV

THE EXPERIENTIAL ORIGIN OF "KNOWLEDGE" AND
THE POSSIBILITY OF ITS SUBSEQUENT
HYPOSTATIZATION

Introduction

Dewey and Freud were in agreement in operating on the general premise that all the insights and knowledge to which men had access had been gained through human experience mediated by reflective thought and inquiry. Both denied the existence of immediate knowledge, that is, ideas or objects which had ontological status irregardless of human inquiry. Not only did they agree that "warranted assertions" and "approximations to the truth" could only be gained through experience but that such cosmological entities as the essence and existence posited by Realism and Idealism were, in fact, tentative concepts born in inquiry and converted prematurely--hypostatized--by the inferring of ontological status.

Since philosophical inquiry was Dewey's primary field and his lifetime goal, it would be expected that he would develop this area of his theory more fully than did Freud who was content with an informed and scientifically competent level of understanding. Jones once suggested that
"it would be possible to place Freud as belonging to the category of idealistic philosophy, materialistic or even phenomenalistic, since passages could be quoted from different periods of his life in favor of each view" (12, p. 367). A better description of Freud's position would be that it was agnosticism based on the inability to settle such concerns scientifically. As an example when speaking of religious doctrines, he stated that "of the reality value of them we cannot judge: just as they cannot be proved, neither can they be refuted" (9, p. 55). Freud's position was absolutely congenial to that of Dewey's, although admittedly less well developed. Because it is more extensive, complete, and central to his thought, Dewey's treatment of experiential knowledge and hypostatization will be discussed first.

Dewey

Dewey suggested that both common sense and science had their origins in the simple enjoyments and experiences of the activities of the ancient peoples.

In the making of clothes, rugs, baskets and jars and in the celebrations, dances, wakes and feasts, gradually and by processes that are more or less tortuous and originally unplanned, definite technical processes and instrumentalities are formed and transmitted (3, p. 71).

In this way, knowledge came through trial and error. People experimented with materials and crafts and through
reflective thought and inquiry gained ever deeper understanding and ability. But by the time of the great oriental cultures, the Assyrian, Babylonian, and Egyptian, a division had developed between lower and higher techniques. The lower belonged to those who did the daily practical work: carpentering, dyeing, weaving, making pottery, etc. The higher came to be the possession of a special class, priests and the successors of primitive medicine men. Dewey suggested that herein lay the beginnings of the modern day dualism "... between the empirical and the rational, of theory and practice, and in our own day, of common sense and science" (3, p. 73).

According to Dewey, the Greeks, while fairly free of ecclesiastic and autocratic political control, nevertheless were responsible for the final bifurcation of practice and experience from theory and reason. The working class performed the former while the leisure class pursued the latter.

Dewey felt that Aristotle developed a logic for his time which "... included in a single unified scheme the contents of both the common sense and the science of his day" (3, p. 95). But, Dewey argued, Aristotelian logic fixed the contents and logical forms of both common sense and science in a manner which "... precluded the possibility of the reaction of science back into common sense and the possibility of the ever continuing rise of new scientific
problems and conceptions out of the material of common sense activities and materials" (3, p. 95).

This was accomplished by definition and taxonomic classification of the concepts and entities of the Grecian world. Definition was to grasp the essence which made things what they really were. Species were grouped on the basis of this essence and fixed in their courses, their paths, their regular movements towards a fixed end or completion (3, pp. 86-87).

Seen from this point of view, nature presented the scientific mind with an ordered grade or hierarchy of qualitative things from emptiness up to Being in its full sense. That which truly is cannot change; the existence of change is thus proof of lack of complete Being, of what the Greeks sometimes called, because of emphasis upon lack of substantiality, Non-being (3, p. 84).

Aristotle had frozen Greek thought by basing it on fixed eternal classification of Being. Fixity and permanence were of the higher order; change and modification of the lower.

Because in Aristotle's day and time this position was relevant and modern, Dewey held that Aristotle was deserving of the credit he had received. The problems came "... when efforts were made to maintain that logic, with additions here and revisions there, is adequate or even relevant to the science of today" (3, p. 94). This is the use Dewey made of evolutionary theory and the reason he saw the change implicit in the theory as conducive to the full-flowering of the
scientific age. In setting up the categories the Greeks imputed a fixed, eternal, and immutable essence to certain ontological substance. According to Dewey, they held that "... essence marked out ontological substance" (3, p. 86). Dewey argued that these subjects, called objects in modern terminology (3, p. 84), did not have fixed ontological properties but that their character depended on the inquiry from which they had been apprehended.

The name objects will be reserved for subject-matter so far as it has been produced and ordered in settled form by means of inquiry: proleptically, objects are the objectives of inquiry ... The apparent ambiguity of using "objects" for this purpose (since the word is regularly applied to things that are observed or thought of) is only apparent. For things exist as objects for us only as they have been previously determined as outcomes of inquiries. When used in carrying on new inquiries in new problematic situations, they are known as objects in virtue of prior inquiries which warrant their assertibility (3, p. 119).

The Greeks had mistakenly imputed an ontological quality to natural objects or subjects which had no ontological essence. Dewey saw that while objects were "real," that is, were existential and could be used over and over again in the inquiries of individuals and of the race, to impute to them ontological essence was to hypostatize ideas which were concepts or tools arising from inquiry (3, pp. 522-523).

In a theoretical sense, Dewey was using inferences from the concept of change implicit in evolutionary theory to refute the Grecian idea that true being was based on objects
or subjects which had an eternal and fixed essence. Inquiry grounded in a conceptual scheme utilizing evolutionary theory could demonstrate the error of the conversion of existential objects grounded in inquiry into ontological objects with an essence independent of inquiry.

The importance of this idea cannot be overestimated, for it is the point of departure for Dewey's criticism of the other philosophies and their individual and particular forms of logic. To postulate that objects and subjects have given essence and ontological status was, to Dewey, inimical to inquiry and placed definite limits upon the efforts of science.

Categories based upon the infinite and the finite, the timeless and the temporary, the changeless and the changing, lie at the base of the difficulties of science and inquiry. Dewey hoped to regain the correspondence between common sense and science so that inquiry could penetrate to all areas of human endeavor.

The demand for reform of logic is the demand for a unified theory of inquiry through which the authentic pattern of experimental and operational inquiry of science shall become available for regulation of the habitual methods by which inquiries in the field of common sense are carried on; by which conclusions are reached and beliefs are formed and tested (3, p. 98).

The separation and opposition of scientific subject matter to that of common sense, when it is taken to be final, generates those controversial problems of epistemology and metaphysics that still dog the course of philosophy. When scientific subject matter is seen to bear genetic and functional relation to the subject matter of common sense, these
problems disappear. Scientific subject matter is intermediate, not final and complete in itself (3, p. 66).

In summary, Dewey held that knowledge (warranted assertion) was gained through experiences which were mediated by reflective thought and inquiry. Such inquiry could produce objects or subjects which could serve as instruments or tools for subsequent inquiry. Blocking such use, however, were theories of logic developed in Grecian times which hypostatized these instrumental objects by mistakenly imbuing them with a permanent essence and converting them to ontological status. Dewey agreed that such objects of inquiry were existential and hoped to recombine common sense and science by making such objects available to both.

There are several other ideas concerning experience and hypostatization which are germane to Dewey's theory.

James Feibleman, an exponent of Realism, correctly characterized Dewey's dependence on experience but erred when he assumed the same degree of certainty in Dewey's approach as he as a Realist might bring to his own. If one keeps in mind Dewey's agnosticism and the relativity implied in his theory, however, Feibleman's characterization was basically correct.

Experience, then, in the grand sense becomes inquiry . . . . This requires that there shall be no logic operative in the world apart from the intentions and actions of human beings . . . .
Furthermore, it means that there can be no guide to inquiry in the sense of a valid principle lying outside of inquiry (7, p. 87).

The central notion or premise in terms of which Dewey's whole philosophy is constructed is that of experience. For him the world has meaning just in proportion to its connections with an experiencing subject. The subject himself, the process of experiencing and that which is experienced, all hang equally for their reality upon the act of experience. Nothing then, is constant. The ideas of fixed forms, or order, and of being, are hypostatizations of elements lifted from experience. All changes take place in terms of experience and there is nothing outside it or apart from it (7, p. 85).

To Dewey, a realist such as Peibleman has hypostatized experiential ideas which might have been instrumental at one time but have lost most of their cogency through being hypostatized. Dewey suggests that:

The ulterior issue is the possibility that actual experience in its concrete content and movement may furnish those ideals, meanings and values whose lack and uncertainty in experience as actually lived by most persons has supplied the motive force for recourse to some reality beyond experience: a lack and uncertainty that account for the continued hold of traditional philosophical and religious notions which are not consonant with the main tenor of modern life (5, p. 107).

He was suggesting that in their daily experiences men may not find the ideals, meanings, and values they need to order their lives but that such are there. More reflection and inquiry may produce ideas that are more instrumental and make it unnecessary for men to depend on fixed ideas which originated through hypostatization. These are no longer functional and are actually detrimental to inquiry because they inhibit fresh insights.
In the Reconstruction in Philosophy Dewey systematically rebutted the various traditional hypostatizations and argued for a philosophy based on experience.

The true "stuff" of experience is recognized to be adaptive courses of action, habits, action functions, connections of doing and undergoing; sensori-motor coordinations . . . . Experience carries principles within itself. These principles are none the worse because they are vital and practical rather than epistemological . . . . This organization intrinsic to life renders unnecessary a super-natural and super-empirical synthesis. It affords the basis and material for a positive evolution of intelligence as an organizing factor within experience (4, p. 91).

Another passage in the same work documents several facets of Dewey's thought in this area.

In every case, active reformers were "empiricists" in the philosophic sense. They made it their business to show that some current belief or institution that claimed the sanction of innate ideas or necessary conceptions, or an origin in an authoritative revelation of reason, had in fact proceeded from a lowly origin in experience, and had been confirmed by accident, by class interest or by biased authority (4, p. 82).

This passage completely supports the idea that the many institutions which rely upon revelation or authority were to Dewey derived from or premised upon hypostatizations of insights gained in experience. Dewey also made clear that custom, social mores, attitudes, and preconditions enter into the shape and form that a hypostatization might take. This goes back to the idea that the facts should be adjusted to
fit the conceptual scheme. Once a scheme based on hypostatizations gains ascendancy, subsequent facts can be, and are, adjusted to the scheme.

Not safely can an "ism" be made out of experience. For any interpretation of experience must perforce simplify; simplifications tend in a particular direction; and the direction may be set by custom which one assumes to be natural simply because it is traditionally congenial (4, p. 4).

At another time while discussing Bacon, Dewey mentioned his idea that "truths" were hypostatizations.

Such "truths" are in fact only the systematized mistakes and prejudices of our ancestors. Many of them originated in accident; many in class interest and bias, perpetuated by authority for this very reason—a consideration which later actuated Locke's attack upon the doctrine of innate ideas. The other portion of accepted beliefs come from instinctive tendencies of the human mind that give it a dangerous bias until counteracted by a conscious and critical logic.

The mind of man spontaneously assumes greater simplicity, uniformity and unity among phenomena than actually exist. It follows superficial analogies and jumps to conclusions; it overlooks the variety of details and the existence of exceptions. Thus it weaves a web of purely internal origin which it imposes upon nature. What had been termed science in the past consisted of this humanly constructed and imposed web. Men looked at the work of their own minds and thought they were seeing realities in nature (4, p. 35).

Many authorities on Dewey overemphasize his treatment of logic and inquiry to the point of completely overlooking the great amount of time and effort he spends with the illogical and irrational aspects of men's behavior. In the next passage, Dewey's belief that men's imagination causes
them to distort aspects of their experience is again docu-
mented.

The things most emphasized in imagination as it reshapes experience are things which are absent in reality. In the degree in which life is placid and easy, imagination is sluggish and bovine. In the degree in which life is uneasy and troubled, fancy is stirred to frame pictures of a contrary state of things. By reading the characteristic features of any man's castles in the air you can make a shrewd guess as to his underlying desires which are frustrated*...

These considerations apply beyond mere personal psychology. They are decisive for one of the most marked traits of classic philosophy; its conception of an ultimate supreme Reality which is essentially ideal in nature...

The gods, whatever their origin and original traits, became idealized projections of the selected and matured achievements which the Greeks admired among their mortal selves (4, pp. 104-105).

These passages support the premise that Dewey did not underestimate man's imagination as it influenced the perception and the memory of his experiences. In addition, they introduce the idea that such personal hypostatizations can be readily assimilated by cultures and civilizations. Art, law, drama, poetry, religion, science, all consist of experiential insights hypostatized into social dogma.

Both unconsciously and by definite social requirement individual memories are assimilated to group memory or tradition, and individual fancies are accommodated to the body of beliefs characteristic of a community. Poetry becomes fixated and systematized. The story becomes a

*This sentence of Dewey's succinctly characterizes exactly what Freud sought to do in his psychoanalytic therapy.
social norm. The original drama which re-enacts an emotionally important experience is institutionalized into a cult. Suggestions previously free are hardened into doctrines . . . .

. . . Judea, Greece, Rome and I presume all other countries having a long history, present records of a continual working over of earlier local rites and doctrines in the interests of a wider social unity and a more extensive political power. I will ask you to assume with me that in this way the larger cosmogonies and cosmologies of the race as well as the larger ethical traditions have arisen (4, pp. 8-9).

Dewey felt that men were exposed to conditions in the world which caused them to be uncertain and to experience uncomfortable amounts of anxiety. He thought that they had two alternative methods with which to deal with this uncertainty and anxiety.

. . . One of them began with an attempt to propitiate the powers which environ him and determine his destiny. It expressed itself in supplication, sacrifice, ceremonial rite and magical cult (5, p. 3).

Uncertainty is primarily a practical matter. It signifies uncertainty of the issue of present experiences; these are fraught with future peril as well as inherently objectionable. Action to get rid of the objectionable has no warrant of success and is in itself perilous . . . . The natural tendency of man is to do something at once; there is impatience with suspense, and lust for immediate action. When action lacks means for control of external conditions, it takes the form of acts which are the prototypes of rite and cult (5, p. 223).

Of course, the second alternative was to control the anxiety resulting from uncertainty and to refrain from what Dewey called the habitual, natural, and instinctive tendencies to leap to conclusions and accept as fact ideas that
were only tentative and which might even be illusionary. When men could attain this control, they were able to take the first step towards reflective thought and inquiry.

Freud

Freud's beliefs in this area are identical to Dewey's in that he believed that all knowledge was the result of experiences which humans had undergone. Also he saw, as did Dewey, that men tended to draw erroneous conclusions from their experiences because of the same tendencies that Dewey had described, the "habitual, natural, and instinctive" tendencies to shape the experiences to fit pre-ordained patterns determined by individual, social and philosophical self-interests. While Dewey's treatment of this phenomenon tended to be more specific and factual and spread throughout his works, Freud used an allegorical and metaphorical approach and concentrated his efforts chiefly in two works, Totem and Taboo (10) and The Future of an Illusion (9). In the former Freud suggested that both totemism and taboo had their roots in the oedipus complex, which lies at the basis of all neurosis and was also the origin of religion, ethics, society, and art. Between pages 162-207 of this book, Freud develops his primal horde theory, the title of which was borrowed from Darwin and which is based on sociological theory of Freud's era and his own clinical observations. It is a metaphorical work of a highly speculative nature.
J. A. C. Brown has done a beautiful job of compressing this theory in his book *Freud and the Post-Freudians*, and his material will be quoted here:

Freud believed that, at a remote period in the history of man, human beings lived in a state of "heedless sexual and primitive egoistic motives," and throughout this time, of course, they had neither the ability nor the need to create myths since repression was unnecessary. In *Totem and Taboo*, making use of such anthropological material as was available in the first decade of this century (*The Golden Bough*, and other works of Sir George Fraser; the totem theory of Robertson Smith; and some of the views of Darwin), he proceeded to examine the origin of social institutions, of totemism and exogamy, and the prohibition of incest in the light of the following theory: he assumes that the earliest type of human society must have been the "primal horde" described by Charles Darwin, over which a powerful male, the father of the horde, was absolute ruler. The father subjected the younger males to his absolute power and kept all the women for his own use. Thus subdued the sons were forced to live in complete abstinence and obedience until one day they revolted and banding together killed the father and ate his body. As is well known, many primitive peoples live in groups which are represented by a "totem," a sacred animal or plant which it is forbidden to eat or kill: yet, on ceremonial occasions, a feast is held during which the ordinarily forbidden is killed and the meat eaten ritually. This ritual, according to Freud, is a symbolic representation and commemoration of the original parricide. Behind the hatred for the old man of the primal horde lay an ambivalent feeling of affection, and the sons soon after their criminal act felt the need of atonement and reparation. This need led to their forbidding the killing of the totem animal which represents the father, its deification as the leader of the tribe, and the institution of a ceremonial feast at which the original crime was re-enacted in ritual form. But since the women of the tribe had been the original cause of the murder a danger existed that competition between the sons...
might lead to a repetition of the crime. They therefore forbade marriage with the liberated women and created a taboo against killing within the tribe. Henceforth it was compulsory to marry outside the group (exogamy, prohibition of incest) and new laws forbade the killing of one's blood-brother. In this way the competition for women between brothers no longer existed as a serious threat to the social organization of the tribe, the large patriarchal family group. Freud's theory therefore assumes that society has arisen out of the need to curb man's unruly sexual and aggressive drives and that its function is primarily suppressive. In a single hypothesis, he explains the origin of society, of religion and law, of totemism, of the incest taboo and exogamy and of ritual and myth. Law curbs the sexual and aggressive drives, religion, myth, and ritual commemorate the crime and assuage guilt, and society is the overall mechanism of control. In the course of time the myths relating to the ritual (the ceremonial representation of the original act) led to the drama of Sophocles and Aeschylus which still makes use of the material supplied by myths, and at a further remove the modern theatre. Surely no theory has ever explained, or attempted to explain, so much (1, pp. 115-117).

This theory of Freud's supports several contentions. It is evident that the people who made up the primal horde were experiencing or interacting, both with their environment and their fellow men. It is also evident that Freud believed they gained insights from these experiences. If not, why the development of controls and sanctions to regulate the socially unrewarding type of behavior? Then, as did Dewey, Freud showed that he believed these basically instrumental ideas derived from experiences were hypostatized to give them added support and authority. Because the old man was of limited value in enforcing sanctions, he was
hypostatized into the cult animal and eventually into God himself. Although the motive, the strengthening of socially approved taboos, may have been good, the method was erroneous and stultifying and inimical to continuing inquiry.

In The Future of An Illusion Freud gave a complete picture of the way that men could use tentative insights gleaned from their experiences. As was the case in the primal horde theory, one can see thinking man using experiential insights to order and regulate subsequent experiences in such a way as to better his lot. An example of this was to mentally attach moral values to the memory of the old man so as to give some sustaining and supporting moral codes to the group. But along with the practical aspects came the hypostatizations of an illusionary or delusionary nature. When the lesson of the chaos engendered by the death of the old man was learned, the horde profited. Perhaps even his subsequent hypostatization into the supernatural gave more initial control, but in the long run Freud felt it weakened man's inquiry and reason by making him subject to supernatural concepts which were the products of his own uncontrolled desires. In fearful and calamitous times men were driven by anxiety to project their own psychological processes into the real world. For example, men were at the mercy of fierce and uncontrollable natural phenomena so they tended to humanize nature as demonstrated by the fact that
many of men's first gods were natural processes and objects such as water, fire, thunder, mountains, and storms.

With the first step, which is the humanization of nature, much is already won. Nothing can be made of impersonal forces and fates; they remain eternally remote. But if the elements have passions that rage like those in our own souls, if death itself is not something spontaneous, but the violent act of an evil Will, if everywhere in nature we have about us beings who resemble those of our own environment, then indeed we can breathe freely, we can feel at home in the face of the supernatural, and we can deal psychically with our frantic anxiety (9, p. 28).

So men created idols and developed propitiating rites to secure their favor. To render these rites inviolate and give them added authority, they were invested with the supernatural. Unquestioning faith replaced questioning reason. Freud thought that it was entirely possible that all cosmologies had evolved and developed in this manner.

I believe in fact that a great part of the mythological view of the world, which reaches far into the most modern religions, is nothing other than psychological processes projected into the outer world. The obscure apprehending of the psychical factors and relationships of the unconscious is mirrored—it is hard to put it otherwise; one has to use here the analogy with paranoia—in the construction of a super-sensible reality, which science has to retranslate into the psychology of the unconscious. One could venture in this manner to resolve the myths of Paradise, the Fall of Man, of God, of Good and Evil, of Immortality and so on, thus transforming Metaphysics into Metapsychology (13, pp. 352-353).
Another passage helps to establish both Freud's belief in a natural origin of knowledge and his view that such natural knowledge was hyposstatized.

As it is a delicate task to decide what God has himself ordained and what derives rather from the authority of an all-powerful parliament or a supreme judicial decision, it would be an indubitable advantage to leave God out of the question altogether and to admit honestly the purely human origin of all cultural laws and institutions (9, p. 72).

This was a bold and plain spoken statement of Freud's position, but to correctly present his views two other quotations are needed. Freud was agnostic and not atheistic. An important difference exists between the two positions and even Jones erred somewhat in his use of the terms in describing Freud. Freud took great pains to describe the difference in an illusion and a delusion and in so doing clarified his own beliefs.

An illusion is not the same as an error; it is indeed not necessarily an error. It is characteristic of the illusion that it is derived from men's wishes. In the delusion we emphasize as essential the conflict with reality; the illusion need not be necessarily false, that is to say, unrealizable or incompatible with reality (9, p. 53).

Freud equated religion and God with illusion, not with delusion. He felt that they were hyposstatizations incorrectly inferred from human experience, but he reserved any final statement about the possibility of their realization.
Of the reality value of them we cannot judge; just as they cannot be proved, neither can they be refuted. We still know too little to approach them critically. The riddles of the universe only reveal themselves slowly to our inquiry; to many questions science can as yet give no answer; but scientific work is our only way to the knowledge of external reality (9, p. 55).

Freud made many statements which directly support the conclusion that he saw knowledge (approximations to truth) as successive derivations from natural experience and inquiry. Several have already been mentioned but others can be offered. For example, Freud always maintained that his theory was based on experience.

If only one could get the better people to realize that all our theories are based on experience (there is no reason as far as I am concerned why they should not try to interpret it differently) and not just fabricated out of thin air or thought up over the writing desk (14, p. 27).

At another time, while lecturing to a group of students he admonished them:

On the other hand, you are not for a moment to suppose that the psychoanalytic point of view which I shall lay before you is a speculative system of ideas. On the contrary, it is the result of experience, being founded either on direct observations or on conclusions drawn from observations (8, p. 256).

Freud did speculate and much of his work was speculative, but he was always careful to ground his speculations in the experience or inquiry that sustained and supported them. Again what wants to be established was Freud's theoretical
dependence on natural experience, not his own success or lack of success in utilizing this method. In passing, it may be noted that his more speculative ideas, such as the primal horde theory, while generating vigorous opposition, have not been without reputable support. Mead, Roheim, Kluckholm, Coon, and Howell have all offered support for Freud's anthropological efforts (13, pp. 332-333; 15; 1; 11). Comfort supported Freud's theory while discussing the manifestations of the Oedipus complex in the great apes (2).

Summary and Conclusions

Dewey and Freud shared the belief that man could know only through his own experiences. Because they denied the existence of a cosmological reason outside nature, it follows that insights (objects) warrantedly assertible were available to the naturally evolved biological organism in and through natural experience and inquiry. Both theorists agreed that such insights or objects warrantedly assertible in the context of inquiry could be removed from their environing conditions and converted into objects of ontological substance or essence. This was the "error of conversion," or in more common parlance, hypostatization. When objects are given permanent ontological essence they are above inquiry and, in fact, come to shape and control inquiry from their autonomous position. Dewey and Freud sought to refute
these erroneous ideas thereby freeing natural experience from their restrictive inhibitions and opening all areas of human concern to human inquiry.

Related Ideas

Two supporting ideas will be briefly presented here. The first is a selection from Plato which typifies the kind of manipulative use of hypostatization that individuals and societies may utilize. Both Dewey and Freud studied the Grecian civilization and were familiar with and made much use of the writings of Plato. Dewey and Freud agreed that western philosophy, and therefore western morals and ethics, had developed from Grecian thinking. Plato can be particularly singled out as one who created God (hypostatization) to help direct and control the energies of the citizens of his state. Will Durant has done an excellent presentation of Plato's thought as expressed in his Republic:

Now since men are by nature acquisitive, jealous, combative, and erotic, how shall we persuade them to behave themselves? By the policeman's omnipresent club? It is a brutal method, costly and irritating. There is a better way, and that is by lending to the moral requirements of the community the sanction of supernatural authority. We must have a religion.

Plato believes that a nation cannot be strong unless it believes in God. A mere cosmic force, or first cause, or elan vital that was not a person, could hardly inspire hope, or devotion, or sacrifice; it could not offer comfort to the hearts of the distressed,
nor courage to embattled souls. But a living God can do all this, and can stir or frighten the self-seeking individualist into some moderation of his greed, some control of his passion. All the more so if to belief in God is added belief in personal immortality; the hope of another life gives us courage to meet our own death, and to bear with the death of our loved ones: We are twice armed if we fight with faith. Granted that none of the beliefs can be demonstrated; that God may be after all only the personified ideal of our love and our hope, and that the soul is like the music of the lyre, and dies with the instrument that gave it form: Yet surely (so runs the argument, Pascal-like of the Phaedro) it will do us no harm to believe, and it may do us and our children immeasurable good (6, pp. 26-27).

Of course, Freud and Dewey did not agree that "it will do us no harm to believe" and such well-meaning hypostatization is just as lethal to inquiry as the more spontaneous and natural forms produced by lack of certainty, anxiety, impulsiveness, and irrationality.

The second idea is a definitive presentation of the relationship between Realism-Idealism and psychoanalysis-pragmatism. James Feibleman, in his book The Revival of Realism has done a particularly fine job in presenting simply the basic postulates of Realism and Idealism and criticizing psychoanalysis and pragmatism from the view of Realism.

According to Feibleman there are being and existence beyond mere physical things. Realism holds that these universals have their being independently both of concrete and
actual things and of thoughts. They are as real as concrete things (7, p. 3). These two things, being and existence, are real, are necessary and are the foundations on which Realism as a philosophy rests.

Idealism, contrary to Realism, holds that being is the sole reality and is the universal behind the physical particulars. Being is made superior to existence in Idealism while Realism recognizes that both exist as universals (7, pp. 8, 9).

Feibleman then states that psychoanalysis and pragmatism are neither realistic nor idealistic but are, in fact, nominalistic (7, pp. 81, 308). Nominalism is defined by Feibleman in two ways: First, it may consist of making either ontological order (being or existence) superior to the other. Secondly, nominalism consists of holding only material or physical things as real and denying the existence of universals beyond mere physical things (7, pp. 3, 9, 91). Idealism then becomes subjective idealism and is nominalistic because it recognizes only one ontological order, being, as superior and as a universal (7, p. 9). Those who deny both the existence of being and existence as universals are also nominalists, but they are materialists because they believe only in the existence of actual physical things. According to Feibleman, both psychoanalysis and pragmatism fall into the latter category and are nominalistic because
they are materialistic; they recognize no being or existence beyond the actual physical things.

Feibleman claims that realism is a valid metaphysical position. Dewey and Freud would ask, "What is the basis of this idea?" It cannot be proved by natural inquiry. It may be proved on the basis of antecedent realities (hypostatizations) but it is then suspect in its very origins. Intuition and revelation are interesting phenomena to pragmatism and psychoanalysis but are not accepted as objective proof of any substance beyond conscious experience.
CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY


CHAPTER V

INQUIRY: REFLECTIVE THOUGHT AND
THE SECONDARY PROCESS

Introduction

In the three previous chapters, psychoanalysis and
pragmatism have been compared by utilizing several con-
structs that are common and basic to both as the basis for
the discussion. Psychoanalysis and pragmatism are similar
and complementary in the degree that they are based on an
evolutionary, naturalistic, scientific frame of reference.
They share a naturalistic epistemology which maintains that
all knowledge is based on and gained through human experience.
Consistent with their evolutionary-naturalistic tendencies,
both Freud and Dewey saw mind as a natural system of meanings
or potential reactions to select and mediate appropriate
stimuli and carry out the accompanying interaction. The un-
conscious was a symbol to designate the psycho-physical
reactions which were more or less habitual and instinctual.
The conscious denoted a higher mental sphere where automatic
and habitual reactions could be mediated by intelligence and
inquiry. Freud's secondary process and Dewey's consciousness
are constructs used to denote periods when reason and inquiry
may reshape the instinctual or psychosomatic habits.
Because of these similarities, it is hypothesized that pragmatism and psychoanalysis have similar views of the nature and conditions which should characterize and nurture human inquiry. The aim is to present a brief description of the theory of inquiry as envisioned by Dewey and Freud respectively, and to compare and contrast the two views.

Dewey

Dewey's ideas of inquiry began with his concepts of impulse and interaction. He felt that in order for the living organisms to maintain some sort of equilibrium necessary to life, they must interact with the other organisms in their environment. In a theoretical sense these interactions were carried even into the sphere of inanimate objects, to the chemical and physical changes of the atoms and molecules. Bernstein suggested that Dewey used three concepts: self-action, interaction and transaction. Self-action, the first concept of action, designates the type of action where an entity is thought to act solely under its own powers independently of other entities (1, p. 81). Later Dewey coined the term interaction to denote the type of action that takes place among entities that are themselves permanent or relatively fixed. In this instance, action is thought of not as emanating from an entity, but
rather as taking place among entities (1, p. 82). The concepts of self-action and the restricted sense of interaction presuppose that there are elements that have independent existence, that there are individuals which have an innate principle of motion or there are real atoms which interact with each other (1, p. 83). Dewey added the term transaction to go even beyond this definition. From a transactional perspective, an element is a functional unit that gains its specific character from the role that it plays in the transaction (1, p. 83). But more important, the concept of transaction brought Dewey closer to gestalt and field theory as the idea of independent entities reacting as described in interaction was rejected in favor of a systems approach wherein the functional interdependence of the full system was emphasized. All objects were seen as interrelated in one inclusive transactional system.

These transactions occur at all levels. They range from the physical-chemical, such as the ingestion of food and air and the expulsion of waste products, to the highly social or political, such as meetings to exchange scientific ideas or political caucuses at a national or international level. Such transactions may be prompted by need or uncertainty within the organism and the goal or drive is to fill the need. Conversely, transactions may lead to need
by depleting the energy available to the organism. Transactions may be undertaken only when the organism is relatively certain and sure of the outcome. At other times transactions may result from uncertainty and be aimed at producing certainty. The system of meanings called mind controlled and directed these transactions. When all went well they were more or less subconscious or unconscious. When uncertainty prevailed, consciousness could result and meanings be changed and altered so as to become more functional in the present and future transactions. Such transactions are the pulses of experience and, as has been noted, cause "alterations" in the neural tissue and result in "adaptive courses of action, habits, action functions, connections of doing and undergoing; sensori-motor coordinations."

Many writers of his time used instinct as the initiating cause which precipitates such transactions. Dewey preferred the term impulse and in Human Nature and Conduct compared instinct and impulse thusly:

The use of the words instinct and impulse as practical equivalents is intentional, even though it may grieve critical readers. The word instinct taken alone is still too laden with the older notion that an instinct is almost definitely organized and adapted—which for the most part is just what it is not in human beings. The word impulse suggests something primitive, yet loose, undirected, initial. Man can progress as beasts cannot, precisely because he has so many instincts
that they cut across one another, so that most serviceable actions must be learned. In learning habits it is possible for man to learn the habit of learning (6, p. 104).

Dewey preferred impulse to instinct because he wanted to emphasize the possibility of the organism's changing its characteristic or habitual response. This enhanced the possibility of change and novelty occurring in the transactions within the environing field. A transaction effects some change in both parties to the transaction. These parties Dewey called the knower and the known. As transactions take place they become patterned, and habit ensues. Dewey was well aware that most transactions were of the habitual, unconscious and automatic variety. Nevertheless, as the impulse drives the element to take part in the transaction, it also affords the unique possibility for insight to enter Dewey's paradigm because each time the element is brought to the verge of consummating the transaction by the impulse there is the possibility of a new and different type of transaction. The possibilities for novelty and change herein are endless. Each transaction effects change in the parties to the transaction so that the participants themselves are always different.

The organism acts in accordance with its own structure, simple or complex upon its surroundings. As a consequence the changes produced in the environment react upon the organism and its activities. The living creature undergoes, suffers, the consequence of its own behavior (8, p. 86).
Each transaction then affords that forked path situation wherein natural intelligence and insight are afforded an opportunity to intervene and break up encrusted habits and established patterns and produce new and more insightful ones. Boyd H. Bode called this a "flexible habit" concept rather than a "fixed habit" one (1, p. 22).

Throughout his writings Dewey opposed the concepts of SR theory and interjected the possibilities of insight and intelligence as the movers in transactions rather than the blind, fixed and instinctual action-reaction type of performance. Further, Dewey interposed the idea of purposive goal seeking behavior which could cause an element to defer and deny momentary considerations to seek long range goals. Impulse was not bound blindly to an habituated response but could sustain itself to carry out intellectual, cognitive pursuits.

This relatively simple beginning affords the hub around which Dewey's theory is constructed. Naturalism and evolutionary theory ground his belief that A and B, parties to a transaction, bring no innate or essential qualities to a transaction. This is why it was so important to refute the idea of fixed ontological essence which had its origins in the hypostatization of natural objects occurring in the course of transactions mediated by inquiry. The parties do bring qualities which are the result of previous transactions,
but these are open to experience and inquiry and can be altered and changed. Truth (warranted assertibility) is thus grounded in inquiry and is natural and not ontological. If consciousness attends the transaction, intelligence may mediate it and reflective thought and inquiry can enter the paradigm.

Reflective thinking, in distinction from other operations to which we apply the name of thought, involves (1) a state of doubt, hesitation, perplexity, mental difficulty in which thinking originates, and (2) an act of searching, hunting, inquiring to find material that will resolve the doubt, settle and dispose of the perplexity (5, p. 12).

One can think reflectively only when one is willing to endure suspense and to undergo the trouble of searching. To many persons both suspense of judgement and intellectual search are disagreeable; they want to get them ended as soon as possible. They cultivate an overpositive and dogmatic habit of mind, or feel perhaps that a condition of doubt will be regarded as evidence of mental inferiority. It is at this point where examination and test enter into investigation that the difference between reflective thought and bad thinking comes in. To be genuinely thoughtful, we must be willing to sustain and protract that state of doubt which is the stimulus to thorough inquiry, so as not to accept an idea or make positive assertion of a belief until justifying reasons have been found (5, p. 16).

The mere occurrence of ideas or suggestions constitutes thinking, but not reflective thinking, not observation and thought directed to an acceptable conclusion—that is, to a conclusion which it is reasonable to believe because of the grounds on which it rests and the evidence which supports it (5, p. 47).

This function whereby one thing signifies or indicates another, thus leading us to consider how far the one may be regarded as warrant for belief
in the other, is, then, the central factor in all reflective or distinctively intellectual thinking (5, p. 10).

It (reflection) commences when we begin to inquire into the reliability, the worth, of any particular indication; when we try to test its value and see what guarantee there is that the existing data really point to the idea that is suggested in such a way as to justify acceptance of the latter (5, p. 11).

In every case of reflective activity, a person finds himself confronted with a given, present situation from which he has to arrive at, or conclude to, something else that is not present. This process of arriving at an idea of what is absent on the basis of what is at hand is inference (5, p. 95).

What is important is that every inference be a tested inference; or (since often this is not possible) that we discriminate between beliefs that rest upon tested evidence and those that do not, and be accordingly on our guard as to the kind and degree of assent or belief that is justified (5, p. 97).

Reflection involves not simply a sequence of ideas, but a consequence—a consecutive ordering in such a way that each determines the next as its proper outcome while each outcome in turn leans back on, or refers to, its predecessors (5, p. 3).

Within these selected passages taken from How We Think, Dewey fairly defines reflective thinking. The elements involved include a suspension of judgment, the toleration of suspense and anxiety, the acceptance of probability and the relinquishment of certainty, the ordering of occurring ideas and the inference from the given to the unknown. But still one other important concept must be included which is that reflective thought is never finished. The product of one cycle becomes the object to be examined in the next. The emphasis is always on process and not on product.
This brings the circle of thought again to Dewey's desire to call his philosophy instrumentalism. The premise is that man must think through the medium of ideas and that ideas are therefore instrumental in inquiry. In fact, the value of an idea is relational to its value in promoting and maintaining the processes of reflective thought and inquiry. Some would call Dewey's theory experimentalism but this is not quite as descriptive or as intellectually perceptive of Dewey's intent and purpose.

Inquiry may be slightly more formal than reflective thought in that reflective thought represents a deliberate mulling over of pertinent elements while inquiry leads to a definite, though tentative, course of action.

Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinant in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole (7, p. 104).

Now suppose that reflective thought and inquiry leads to a consummatory transaction. Then immediately the process begins again except that there is now a new and different situation engendered by the change brought about during the experience of the transaction, the mediation of habit by intelligence. But the inquiry must not be conducted or judged through any external frame of reference. The conditions or operations of the interactions afford the only criteria by which to judge.
This is exactly the situation to which Feibleman (10) and Crosser (3) have pointed. If there is to be no point of reference except that engendered within the inquiry, how can the inquiry be tested? This undoubtedly is a crucial point for one who would attempt to understand and utilize Dewey's system. What one must reject are all the previous systems which were built on hypostatizations. One must proceed by inferences gained through the experiences founded in the transactions. The following passages make this clear. The first passage shows that Dewey rejects older and well established systems which guide inquiry.

In the face of the matter, it does not seem fitting that logical theory should be determined by philosophical realism or idealism, rationalism or empiricism, dualism or monism, atomistic or organic metaphysics. Yet even when writers on logic do not express their philosophic prepossessions analysis discloses a connection. In some cases conceptions borrowed from one or another philosophic system are openly laid down as foundations of logic and even of mathematics (7, p. 2).

In the next passage Dewey tells why it is necessary that inquiry not be conducted within the boundaries of some preconceived system.

For the different varieties of realism, idealism and dualism have their diverse conceptions of what "knowledge" really is. In consequence, logical theory is rendered subservient to metaphysical and epistemological preconceptions, so that interpretation of logical forms varies with underlying metaphysical assumptions (7, p. 8).
Dewey is sometimes criticized on the basis of the idea that society becomes his frame of reference or conceptual system. It is assumed that Dewey emphasized the acceptance of the will or belief of the democratic majority. This is, of course, an oversimplification. Dewey understood that freedom was essential to effect meaningful change and that this included freedom for the individual from his society. In *Experience and Nature* Dewey makes this clear.

The truth of which the social compact was a symbol is that social institutions as they exist can be bettered only through the deliberate interventions of those who free their minds from the standards of the order which obtains (4, p. 218).

Again he mentions that science can be perverted by class interest.

It is an incident of human history, and a rather appalling incident, that applied science has been so largely made an equivalent of use for private and economic class purposes and privileges. When inquiry is narrowed by such motivation or interest, the consequence is in so far disastrous both to science and to human life (4, p. 164).

In *Reconstruction in Philosophy* there is a passage that is perhaps the best to document and explain Dewey's position on the respective roles of the individual and his society in inquiry.

*Society is composed of individuals: this obvious and basic fact no philosophy, whatever its pretensions to novelty, can question or alter. Hence these three alternatives: Society must exist for the sake of individuals; or individuals must have their ends and ways of living set for them by society; or else society and individuals*
are correlative, organic, to one another, society requiring the service and subordination of individuals and at the same time existing to serve them. Beyond these three views, none seems to be logically conceivable (8, p. 187).

At this point, it would seem Dewey is ready to commit himself to one of these three, but what follows is typically Deweyian. He maintains that each and all are applicable at certain times and under certain conditions.

We plunge into the heart of the matter, by asserting that these various theories suffer from a common defect. They are all committed to logic of general notions under which specific situations are to be brought . . . . They are general answers supposed to have a universal meaning that covers and dominates all particulars . . . . They tell us about the state when we want to know about some state. But the implication is that what is said about the state applies to any state that we happen to wish to know about (8, pp. 187-189).

However, Dewey is simply returning to the idea of truth as a warranted assertion in terms of a given transaction, a specific set of operations. Each of the definitions may be true within a given transaction but none are "Truth" in terms of a cosmological verity which can be applied to all transactions. The point is, in answer to his critics who demand an unwarranted degree of certainty, that Dewey is cognizant that the possible transactions between the individual and his society are many in number and varied in kind.

Dewey has rejected all the "isms" as determiners of logical theory. He also has disclaimed the right of social
orders or classes to be considered as purveyors of ontological truths. The following passage would apply to any agency which purported to have evidence not grounded in natural experience.

The essence of their position is that reflective inquiry is valid as it terminates in apprehension of that which already exists. When thinking introduces any modification into antecedent reality it falls into error; in fact, productive origination on the part of mind defines error (9, p. 109).

At this point a statement of Dewey's will introduce the concept of the autonomy of inquiry.

From these preliminary remarks I turn to statement of the position regarding logical subject-matter that is developed in this work. The theory, in summary form, is that all logical forms (with their characteristic properties) arise within the operation of inquiry and are concerned with control of inquiry so that it may yield warranted assertions (7, p. 3).

Dewey then maintains that all the logical theory needed for inquiry grows out of "transactions mediated by intelligence" (inquiry), and he rejects the concept of immediate knowledge. Immediate knowledge would, in this sense, be all knowledge not grounded in inquiry.

The considerations adduced in discussion of the pattern of inquiry and of the structure of judgement, entail the conclusion that all knowledge as grounded assertion involves mediation. Mediation, in this context, means that an inferential function is involved in all warranted assertion. The position here defended runs counter to the belief that there is such a thing as immediate knowledge, and that such knowledge is an indispensable precondition of all mediated knowledge (7, p. 139).
Immediate knowledge, that is, knowledge above, beyond, or apart from inquiry, is stamped as hypostatization. All knowledge and all rules concerning knowledge are born in inquiry and as such have been mediated. In denying immediate knowledge, Dewey denies Reason and Rationality in nature.

Abandon completely the notion that nature ought to conform to a certain definition, and nature intrinsically is neither rational nor irrational. Apart from the use made of it in knowing it exists in a dimension irrelevant to either attribution, just as rivers inherently are neither located near cities nor are opposed to such location (9, p. 210).

But while nature is neither rational or irrational it is consistent enough in its functions and modes to lend itself to inquiry.

Nature is intelligible and understandable. There are operations by means of which it becomes an object of knowledge, and is turned to human purposes, just as rivers provide conditions which may be utilized to promote human activities and to satisfy human need (9, p. 210).

Basically then the concept of the autonomy of inquiry means that all knowledge results from inquiry and is, thus mediated knowledge. The existence of immediate knowledge is denied. It follows that inquiry is responsible only to itself, that is, to the logical rules that grow out of inquiry and expedite its functions. Inquiry is a transaction mediated by intelligence.

Another concept which is paramount in Dewey's model of reflective thought and inquiry is his use of the idea of
experience. It would be difficult, in fact impossible, for
man to profit from insights gained through interactions and
transactions unless there was some connection to lend order
and reason to the otherwise isolated and fragmented occur-
rences. Dewey argued that experience tied these interactions
together and made it possible for insights gained in past
experiences to be applied to subsequent similar situations.

The true "stuff" of experience is recognized
to be adaptive courses of action, habits, active
functions, connections of doing and undergoing,
sensori-motor coordinations.
Experience carries principles of connection
and organization within itself. These principles
are none the worse because they are vital and
practical rather than epistemological (8, p. 91).

Again Dewey took care to explain that intelligence and
experience were natural and required no other grounds for
their potentially effective operations.

This organization intrinsic to life renders
unnecessary a super-natural and super-empirical
synthesis. It affords the basis and material for
a positive evolution of intelligence as an organi-
zizing factor within experience (8, p. 91).

An important idea in Dewey's theory, and one applicable
to learning theory, to education, and to this discussion of
inquiry, was that the organism was not passive but had some
role to play in reading and selecting the stimulus situation
to which it would react. The organism then learned by under-
going the results of this chosen course of action.

Experience becomes an affair primarily of
doing. The organism does not stand about, Micawber-
like, waiting for something to turn up. It does
not wait passive and inert for something to impress
Itself upon it from without. The organism acts in accordance with its own structure, simple or complex, upon its surroundings. As a consequence the changes produced in the environment react upon the organism and its activities. The living creature undergoes, suffers, the consequences of its own behavior (8, p. 56).

Dewey did not disagree that experiences could "come clothed with meanings that originate in custom and tradition" (4, p. 26) or that the mind of man has "instinctive tendencies" that gave it a "dangerous bias" (8, p. 35). To counter these, he argued for the possibility of empirical co-operative experience.

The scientific investigator convinces others not by the plausibility of his definitions and the cogency of his dialectic, but by placing before them the specified course of experiences of searchings, doings and findings in consequence of which certain things have been found. His appeal is for others to traverse a similar course, so as to see how what they find corresponds with his report (4, pp. 35-36).

In this same vein, Dewey, although he argued for a degree of relativity based on operations, saw that such relativity could be diminished by the application of sound empirical practices within the co-operative democratic society. Bernstein suggested that:

The idea of community, developing through the "community of inquirers" that is fundamental for Peirce and the "Great Community" that Royce envisioned as the true meaning of the Christian ideal of the kingdom of heaven, is given a distinctively practical turn in Dewey's concept of the democratic community (1, p. 134).
One other idea particularly distinguishes Dewey's ideas about scientific inquiry. He was quick to see that science had been adopted readily in matters concerning production and technology but had met bitter resistance when applied to matters involving morality and ethics. One of his most persistent themes was the need to utilize inquiry and the scientific method in such considerations.

Put in the language of Bacon, this means that while we have been reasonably successful in obtaining command of nature by means of science, our science is not yet such that this command is systematically and preeminently applied to the relief of the human estate. Such applications occur and in great number, but they are incidental, sporadic and external. And this limitation defines the specific problem of philosophical reconstruction at the present time. For it emphasizes the larger social deficiencies that require intelligent diagnosis, and projection of aims and methods (8, p. 43).

Dewey was well aware of and decried the fact that science had been perverted by class interest.

It is an incident of human history, and a rather appalling incident, that applied science has been so largely made an equivalent of use for private and economic class purposes and privileges. When inquiry is narrowed by such motivation or interest, the consequence is in so far disastrous both to science and to human life (4, pp. 164-165).

Here again, the point is that conceptual scheme influences the apprehension and use of new concepts and ideas. The potential contribution which Dewey and Freud saw as a possibility of the wide acceptance of modes of scientific thought
could be thwarted by its perversion by existing philosophical concepts.

In summary, reflective thought and inquiry is made possible because of the natural intelligence of the evolved mind. Impulse prompts interactions which produce experiences which are cumulative and serve as guidelines for subsequent interactions. Individuals learn by undergoing the consequences of selected modes of behavior. Relatively private insights gain empirical status when they prove instrumental to others who retrace the operations. The role of the individual and his society in inquiry is extremely complex but can be fulfilling and complementary rather than inhibiting or self-defeating. Inquiry should be autonomous and should answer not to extraneous models of thought but only to conditions arising within and as a part of its own operations. One of Dewey's persistent themes was his belief and hope that the scientific frame of reference could be vital and instrumental in the area of moral and ethical attitudes and values. Much of his effort was spent in what he called developing a genetic approach to refute traditional philosophy so as to free and enhance the possibilities of scientific inquiry (8, p. 24).

Freud

When one turns to the study of the psychoanalytic inquiry a new focus emerges. While Dewey worked much in the
philosophical-logical manner, Freud was essentially a clinician. He worked with patients and postulated inferences based on their disclosures. He came to the sessions with the naturalistic, evolutionary, scientific, and agnostic tendencies which have already been established. One should not overlook Freud's acquaintance with literature, and although he was not interested in systematic philosophy his conceptual model is highly important to his method and is, of course, philosophic. Since it would not commonly be thought that Freud's was a philosophical and social inquiry, this needs to be established first.

Freud's opinion of philosophy is most candidly expressed in a letter to Eltingon written in 1928. In this instance, Freud is speaking of the type of philosophies Dewey sought to refute.

Probably you cannot imagine how alien all these philosophical convolutions seem to me. The only feeling of satisfaction they give me is that I take no part in this pitiable waste of intellectual powers. Philosophers no doubt believe that in such studies they are contributing to the development of human thought, but every time there is a psychological or even a psychopathological problem behind them (18, p. 140).

Yet Jones holds that Freud did revere philosophy and felt, in fact, that in his work in psychoanalysis he was returning to this field.

In later years Freud more than once spoke of his interest having returned via the circuitous path of medicine and psychopathology to his earliest love, philosophy. By that I believe he meant to use
the word in its earliest sense of general knowledge and wisdom rather than in its more restricted modern academic and technical sense, one which does not seem ever to have interested him much. This last point is borne out by a remark in his Autobiography: "Even when I have moved away from observation, I have carefully avoided any contact with philosophy proper. This avoidance has been greatly facilitated by constitutional incapacity." In a postscript to that book, written when he was seventy-nine years old, he phrased the same thought thus: "My interest, after making a life-long detour through the natural sciences, medicine and psychotherapy, returned to the cultural problems which had fascinated me long before when I was a youth scarcely old enough to think" (18, p. 335).

In a letter to Fliess in 1896 Freud echoed this remark:

Far beyond these considerations (on psychopathology) lurks my ideal and problem child, metapsychology.

I see that you are reaching, by the circuitous path of medicine, your first ideal, that of understanding human beings as a physiologist, just as I cherish the hope of arriving, by the same route, at my original goal of philosophy. For that was my earliest aim when I did not know what I was in the world for (17, p. 294).

Undoubtedly Freud was returning to philosophy, but the manner and form of this return is the critical issue. Freud attacked philosophy indirectly as it manifested itself in religious and social outlets although he decried any contact with philosophy proper. A theory which would seek to uproot the prevailing philosophies by showing that their origins were in illusionary mental phenomena must be recognized as philosophical in its basic nature.

Another problem of major proportion is the continued tendency to overlook the social nature of Freud's theory.
Herbert Marcuse has grasped this point and expressed it well. In his book _The Freudian Left_ Robinson quotes Marcuse as follows:

In particular Marcuse objected to the revisionist's claim to have "added" a sociological dimension to Freud's psychology; he objected both because of their apparent ignorance of the profoundly sociological character of Freud's thought, and because of their unsystematic notion that a social dimension could be tacked on an individual psychology. In Freud's theory, he insisted, the sociological dimension was included and developed in the basic categories, whereas in revisionist Freudianism it appeared under the guise of "sociological aspects"—as incomprehensible, external factors (20, p. 197).

J. A. C. Brown in a little book entitled _Freud and the Post-Freudians_ has written the best chapter on assessments and applications of psychoanalysis. Brown approached Freudian theory in a proper manner, neither as an awed disciple or as a prejudiced antagonist. He suggested that

The psychoanalytic approach is a helpful one in understanding the dynamics of social movements and planning social schemes and policies, provided the actual planning is not left to those whose proper concern is treating the abnormal rather than advising the normal. Repression and the irrational lie at the very foundations of society and the wise policy may sometimes be to play along with them, lightening the burden they may cause here, supporting their edicts there, because no psychologist or psychoanalyst, much less psychiatrist, can give a better reason for not stealing, not killing, not committing incest (all anti-social acts in any society) than the ingrained belief that in the beginning it was said, 'Thou shalt not' (2, p. 212).
These last two passages definitely support the idea that Freud's inquiry was, contrary to some opinion, both socially oriented and of extreme import to society. Freud was not antisocial, nor did he underestimate the social component as a factor in the development of human mental functions. He was in disagreement with those who took the extreme social position because he did insist that certain inborn and hereditary factors were involved in the development. Brown also summarizes this relationship nicely:

Freud was a materialist who used psychological terminology—his mythology as he called it—to describe processes that in his view would one day be described in physico-chemical terms so far as their bodily component was concerned. Yet since these interacted with an environment the most significant part of which was other human beings he saw the system as a whole as basically an interpersonal one, because personality with its physiological roots arises in the course of living and relating oneself to others (2, p. 11).

The following passages offer additional support to the contention that Freud placed major emphasis on social and cultural determinants and that his views of culture and society were relatively orthodox.

It (civilization) includes on the one hand all the knowledge and power that men have acquired in order to master the forces of nature and win resources from her to the satisfaction of human needs; and on the other hand it includes all the necessary arrangements whereby men's relations to each other and in particular the distribution of the attainable riches, may be regulated (13, p. 9).

At bottom Society's goal is economic; since it has not means enough to support life for its members without work on their part, it must see to it that
the number of these members is restricted and their energies directed away from sexual activities on to their work—the eternal primordial struggle for existence, therefore, persisting to this very day (11, p. 321).

So one gets the impression that culture is something which was imposed on a resisting majority by a minority that understood how to possess itself of the means of power and coercion. Of course it stands to reason that these difficulties are not inherent in the nature of culture itself, but are conditioned by the imperfections of the cultural forms that have so far been developed (13, p. 10).

Freud follows this with a very Deweyian type statement which should especially be noted.

Mankind has made solid advances in the conquest of nature and may expect to make even greater ones; no certain claim can be established for a corresponding advance in the regulation of human affairs (13, p. 10).

One could not deny the fact that Freud was critical of certain values of western society. This was the main thrust of his inquiry. The foregoing passages should establish his basic view of the nature of culture and the following his support of cultural forms:

But how ungrateful, how short-sighted after all to strive for the abolition of culture! What would then remain would be the state of nature, and that is far harder to endure. It is true that nature does not ask us to restrain our instincts, she lets us do as we like; but she has her peculiarly effective mode of restricting us: she destroys us, coldly, cruelly, callously, as it seems to us, and possibly just through what has caused our satisfaction. It was because of these very dangers with which nature threatens us that we united together and created culture, which
among other things, is supposed to make our communal existence possible. Indeed, it is the principal task of culture, its real raison d'être to defend us against nature (13, p. 26).

Freud saw man as the creator of society, not society as something apart from man. It is true, as many have observed, he felt that society had overdone repression, that mental illness resulted from the conflict between human drives and the prohibitions and sanctions of the culture. Freud had tremendous control, and did not leap to conclusions about solutions. As Brown states, Freud's theory asks the proper questions although it does not include "the answers" (2, p. 191).

Jones includes a quotation of Freud's which serves as conclusive proof of this interaction between man and his environment as determinant in the formation of personality and also makes clear Freud's ideas of the origins of culture.

The phylogenetic aspect is to some extent obscured in man by the circumstance that what is fundamentally inherited is nevertheless individually acquired anew, probably because the same conditions that originally induced its acquisition still prevail and exert their influence upon each individual. I would say: Where they originally created a new response they now stimulate a predisposition (18, p. 309).

A phrase by Lawrence K. Frank, writing on Dewey, can show how Freud's statement can be compared to a modern view of man and his social order. Granted that some may object to the phylogenetic aspects of Freud's statement, certain similarities do exist.
To understand man and his social order we may today utilize the psychocultural approach which operates with a conception of culture (spelled with a small c) and of personality. The conception derives from the findings and interpretations of anthropology, sociology, social psychology and the arts to illuminate our understanding of culture, and from psychiatry, especially psychoanalysis and clinical psychology, to provide insights into personality development and expression (16, p. 88).

This is the method by which Freud worked and this is the underlying rationale of his theory. Thus far several points have been suggested which concern Freud's inquiry. One is that it carries philosophical import since it seeks to refute several traditional philosophical beliefs. Secondly, it is social in nature and, in this respect, not at all far removed from current theory. In the third place, evidence shows that Freud's was an interaction theory. Examination clearly indicates that the social element of personality development was well recognized and of major importance.

In therapy sessions, Freud utilized free association to try to recover lost childhood experiences which had shaped and now directed the beliefs and operations of the adult. As the child, with his hereditary predispositions, was socialized through contact with his society, the experiences were encoded into the neural tissue. There is a parallel between Dewey's genetic approach to the development of philosophy and its subsequent reconstruction. Each traces the experiences so as
to understand and subsequently reconstruct a system of beliefs developed through experience. Freud worked with individuals and made philosophical inferences while Dewey worked with philosophical systems but their purpose was very similar.

The id, the ego and the super-ego were constructs of Freud's to assist in understanding and describing the development of a personality. Freud felt that, due to its evolutionary history, the organism had certain predispositions. In this area, he posited the id, its libido, and the psychosomatic and unconscious processes. A second area consisted of a series of values encoded in the neural tissue as a result of reward and punishment in interactions with the environment. This was the super-ego. Between these two, he placed the ego which represented the rational and reasonable abilities of the human mental apparatus.

When Freud's theory is examined to see what particular import it carries for contemporary inquiry, several chief ideas emerge and these will be discussed.

Freud saw the id as a construct representing the ancient primordial life force. In one sense it would be fitting to see the id as the element which separates the animate from the inanimate. It is that quality which defines life and which furnishes energy to carry on the battle for survival. Since the id predates consciousness in the evolutionary
scheme, it never attains consciousness, but it must furnish the energy for all mental processes. This energy is channeled through the instincts and its expression is libido. Many have tried to equate libido with the sex drive, but Freud did not hold this view. The libido contains the sexual urge but is much more. It is best described as all the processes which seek to preserve and advance the organism.

Hall said that

... The form of energy which is used by the life instincts is called libido, but no special name was ever given by Freud to the form of energy employed by the death instincts. In his earlier writings, Freud used the term "libido" to denote sexual energy; but when he revised his theory of motivation, libido was defined as the energy of all the life instincts (15, p. 59).

Levitt makes a similar point.

Moreover, what psychoanalysis called sexuality was by no means identical with the impulsion towards a union of the two sexes or towards producing a pleasurable sensation in the genitals; it had far more resemblance to the all-inclusive and all-preserving Eros of Plato's Symposium (19, p. 62).

Brown felt that "life force" was too metaphysical to apply to a concept which is a purely biological one but he too suggests that libido is a much larger term than just the sexual instinct and calls it drive energy (2, p. 22).

While the energy which powers the psychic functions comes from the id which has somatic connections, libido manifests itself in the ego as the ego is the agency through which the organism contacts objects in the environment. To
paraphrase Dewey’s term, all transactions proceed on libido—
inal energy. The possible cathexes, anti-cathexes and
identifications that can be made through the libido in-
vested in the ego are legion and make up the many psychical
processes available to psychoanalysis. These are always
narcissistic or in some way devoted to forwarding the
organism. Even the super-ego must depend on this type of
energy which can be utilized only for the life instincts.
True the super-ego may turn this energy against the ego,
but underneath still lies the old aggressive idian desire
to fight for survival. Translated into human social trans-
actions, it means that men will always pursue their own
ends and even when they seem to be altruistic they are so
chiefly for the pleasure of the rewards of their own super-
ego. The self-righteous feeling that accompanies the
benevolent action is the true goal of the process.

The super-ego is the construct which through its ego-
ideal and conscience absorbs the values of the culture and
makes of the child a responsible social being. But in Freud’s
model it too must serve the aims of the organism in order to
receive energy upon which to operate and this it does. By
rewarding or punishing the actions of the individual child,
the society (parents) mold the super-ego and socialize the
child, but the id and its libido remain dominate because the
society retains so many opportunities for either the direct
or sublimated expression of the libido. One can be aggressive in the service of the super-ego. It is all right to express oneself if the cultural weltanschauung approves, and it does since it patterns the super-ego originally.

All of these things can be accomplished and without presenting any harm to the "normal" person because repression and inhibition can mask the processes to the conscious ego and keep one from realizing what he is doing. "Health" to some extent depends upon the organism's ability to sublimate, that is to find approved social outlets for the displaced libido. It might be sports, politics, profession, avocation, religion, or even the field of philosophy. When conflicts stop the person's activities or block the expression of the libido or allow it to express itself in ways sanctioned by the society, some type of psychoses or neuroses results.

In its strictest sense, the oedipus complex involved the libidinous desire by the child for the opposite sexed parent. Here again libido entails the sexual expression so repugnant to Freud's early critics, but it involves much more including the sense of identification with the parent and the parents' values as a source of all the narcissistic needs. To Freud the resolution of the oedipus complex, the relinquishing of this incestuous fixation on the parent, was a necessary condition to gaining full physical maturity. It
was a question of giving up the symbols which supported
the childish development in order to stand free and alone
in psychic adulthood. Freud meant this literally, that
the child must give up the parent, but also he meant it
symbolically and applied it in a much more general fashion.
Erich Fromm makes this point very well.

Freud states that the Oedipus complex is the
core of every neurosis. His assumption is that
the child is bound to the parent of the opposite
sex and that mental illness results if the child
does not overcome this infantile fixation. For
Freud the assumption that incestuous impulses
must be a deeply rooted human passion seemed in-
escapable. He gained this impression from the
study of clinical material, but the ubiquity of
incest tabus was to him additional proof of his
thesis. As is often the case, however, the full
significance of Freud's discovery can be recog-
nized only if we translate it from the sphere of
sex into that of inter-personal relations. The
essence of incest is not the sexual craving for
members of the same family. This craving, in so
far as it is to be found, is only one expression
of the much more profound and fundamental mental
desire to remain a child attached to those pro-
tecting figures of whom the mother is the earliest
and most influential. The foetus lives with and
from the mother, and the act of birth is only one
step in the direction of freedom and independence.
The infant after birth is still in many ways part
and parcel of the mother, and its birth as an in-
dependent person is a process which takes many
years—which, in fact, takes a whole life. To cut
through the navel string, not in the physical but
in the psychological sense, is the great challenge
to human development and also its most difficult
task (14, p. 79).

Fromm then goes on to outline the role of anxiety in
this relationship. One avoids insecurity by clinging to the
familiar, but in so doing he fails to become a full human being, to develop his full power of reason and of love.

The attachment to parents is only one, though the most fundamental, form of incest; in the process of social evolution other attachments in part replace it. The tribe, the nation, the race, the state, the social class, political parties and many other forms of institutions and organizations become home and family. Here are the roots of nationalism and racism, which are in turn symptoms of man's inability to experience himself and others as free human beings. It may be said that the development of mankind is the development from incest to freedom (14, p. 81).

To the uninformed reader or to those who feel antipathy to psychoanalysis this suggestion of Fromm's may seem far removed from Freud's statements, but actually Fromm has understood Freud's purpose perhaps better than any other writer. Fromm's major diversion from Freud's position lies in his extreme humanism, his belief in human perfectability, which becomes almost a religion in itself. Freud himself remained agnostic to the end.

What one perceives then is an organism striving to survive and a psychic apparatus primarily devoted to that purpose. Seen from this view the cathexes and identifications of the ego are extremely functional but are only incidentally available to the purposes of inquiry. For what one does is to develop a cultural weltanschauung which best suits the immediate needs of the individual concerned. If inquiry coincides with these narcissistic and libidinal needs it can be
facilitated quite readily but if it is foreign, perhaps even antagonistic to the egoistic aims, it falls prey to the defense mechanisms and is easily shunted into some other activity.

This is why Freud saw the socially successful man as one who could sublimate. It also explains why science is so welcome in technology and regarded with suspicion in ethical and moral concerns.

Inquiry is then tied to the developing ego. Only when the basic needs are met could excess psychical energy be devoted to mental activities of this nature. Freud was not optimistic about this prospect so he tended to emphasize the kind of reactions he attributed to the primary process.

The primary process was used to denote the unconscious processes of the id. It is hallucinatory, represents wish fulfillments and has little contact with reality. This is the realm of reflex and conditioned response. Dewey speaks of this type of mental phenomenon also: "Direct immediate discharge or expression of an impulsive tendency is fatal to thinking. Only when the impulse is to some extent checked and turned back upon itself does reflection occur" (5, p. 87). At another point he mentions a phenomenon much like Freud's defense mechanism: "Until the habit of thinking is well formed, facing the situation to discover the facts requires
an effort. For the mind tends to dislike what is unpleasant, and so to shear off from an adequate note of that which is especially annoying" (5, p. 103).

So Dewey outlines the same kind of reaction Freud includes in his primary process, but each also has a construct to denote deferred, reasoned, realistic, and objective type thinking. To Dewey it is reflective thought, and to Freud it is realistic thinking and involves the secondary process.

To discuss the secondary process is difficult for several reasons. One is that Freud spent more time on other concepts and often sheared away from a full exposition. One must gather bits and pieces from here and there. Another problem is that the so-called ego psychologists worked with this area extensively. Where Freud again refused to form any final decision, they spoke in terms of an autonomic ego and gave it control over the unconscious and preconscious processes. Freud never did this. He did, however, define the primary and secondary processes.

But behind all of these uncertainties there lies one new fact, the discovery of which we owe to psychoanalytic research. We have learned that processes in the unconscious or in the id obey different laws from those in the preconscious ego. We name these laws in their totality the primary process, in contrast to the secondary process which regulates events in the preconscious or ego. Thus the study of mental qualities has after all proved not unfruitful in the end (12, p. 45).

Later in the same book, Freud briefly describes his hypothetical psychical apparatus and in so doing mentions a function
which is conscious and involved in experience with the 
external world.

We have adopted the hypothesis of a psychi-
cal apparatus, extended in space, appropriately 
constructed, developed by the exigencies of life, 
which gives rise to the phenomena of conscious-
ness only at one particular point and under cer-
tain conditions (12, p. 105).

A few pages further on Freud describes the ego as his 
construct for this function. After a review of the id and 
the primary process he refers to the other function of the 
mind.

The other agency of the mind, which we 
appear to know the best and in which we recog-
nize ourselves most easily—what is known as 
the ego—was developed out of the cortical 
layers of the id, which, being adapted for the 
reception and exclusion of stimuli, is in di-
rect contact with the external world (12, p. 
109).

Now follows an extremely important statement about the 
functions of the ego:

Its psychological function consists in 
raising the processes in the id to a higher 
dynamic level (perhaps by transforming freely 
mobile into bound energy, such as corresponds 
to the preconscious condition); its construc-
tive function consists in interposing, between 
the demand made by an instinct and the action 
that satisfies it, an intellective activity 
which, after considering the present state of 
things and weighing up earlier experiences, 
endeavors by means of experimental actions 
to calculate the consequences of the proposed 
line of conduct. In this way the ego comes to 
ade a decision whether the attempt to obtain satisfac-
tion is to be carried out or postponed or 
whether it may not be necessary for the demand 
of the instinct to be altogether suppressed as 
being dangerous (12, p. 110).
Here is Freud’s process which can best be compared to comparable ideas in Dewey’s theory. The ego is born in interaction (transaction) and is, at least for a short time, conscious. It controls the demand of the instinct (impulse) while it casts about in the external world for possible alternative solutions (reflective thought). Freud even goes so far as to suggest possible assessment of previous interactions and the formulation of tentative and alternative acts based upon such rememberances.

Hall defines the reality principle and the secondary process and has a good descriptive paragraph on the ego.

Instead of the pleasure principle the ego is governed by the reality principle. Reality means that which exists. The aim of the reality principle is to postpone the discharge of energy until the actual object that will satisfy the need has been discovered or produced . . . . The postponement of action means that the ego has to be able to tolerate tension until the tension can be discharged by an appropriate form of behavior (15, p. 28).

The reality principle is served by a process which Freud called the secondary process because it is developed after and overlays the primary process of the id. In order to understand what is meant by the secondary process it is necessary to see just where the primary process gets the individual in the satisfaction of his needs. It gets him only to the point where he has a picture of the object that will satisfy the need. The next step is to find or produce the object, that is, to bring it into existence. This step is accomplished by means of the secondary process. The secondary process consists of discovering or producing reality by means of a plan of action that has been developed through thought and reason (cognition). The secondary process is nothing more or less than what is ordinarily called problem solving or thinking (15, p. 29).
In the well-adjusted person the ego is the executive of the personality, controlling and governing the id and the super-ego and maintaining commerce with the external world in the interest of the total personality and its far-flung needs. When the ego is performing its executive functions wisely, harmony and adjustment prevail. Should the ego abdicate or surrender too much of its power to the id, to the super-ego, or to the external world, disharmony and maladjustments will ensue (15, p. 28).

Freud's inquiry can possibly best be seen as a three faceted structure. In the simplest sense, it involves a study of the interactions between the hypothetical constructs, the id, the super-ego and the ego. In the second sense, it involves the entities which the constructs represent, the individual, his society, and his efforts and abilities to coordinate the desires and goals of each. In the third or philosophical sense, it involves the clinical observations which result in inferences on the nature of man, his social and philosophical achievements and speculative ideas about their restructuring so as to provide optimum conditions for human life and inquiry.

Summary and Conclusions

Before turning explicitly to a comparison of inquiry as conceived by Dewey and Freud, it may be helpful to note again the similarities between psychoanalysis and pragmatism. Both depend on the veracity of evolutionary theory and are naturalistically inclined. Also they share the idea that traditional philosophies may be based on hypostatizations
of natural experience which have been prematurely converted to fact and truth. Each held that knowledge could only be gained through the experience of natural interactions and transactions.

The impetus to cause these transactions was similar in each theory. Dewey used the term impulse although he admitted the similarity of the term to instinct which was used by Freud (6, p. 104). Both wanted to begin by emphasizing the tendency of the animal (man) to do something to allay an excitation produced by some need of the tissue. To Freud, these instincts originated in the id, the primeval life force or being which seeks its own survival. Dewey expressed a similar thought in these words: "A brute animal, as far as we know, is pushed on from behind; it is moved in accordance with its present physiological state by some external stimulus" (5, p. 17). At another time Freud writes, "The libido follows the paths of narcissistic needs and attaches itself to the objects that ensure their satisfaction" (13, p. 41).

Levitt holds that Dewey's use of impulse and Freud's use of instinct are actually very similar:

One begins to wonder whether Dewey's "impulse" would not suffice for Freud's "triebe," or vice-versa. It would seem that the differences between the two concepts are more apparent than real, and this writer prefers to speculate on whether Dewey fully apprehended what Freud meant when he spoke on instinct. For both men suggested that the term they had in mind was to be limited; in Freud's words to those "which are not to be resolved further," and in Dewey's to the "loose, undirected, initial" (19, p. 155).
What Dewey sought to counter was the concept of tight SR bonds as posited in Thorndikes Connectionism and Pavlovian conditioning but the Freudian theory never used instinct or drive in this manner. True, interactions based on cathexes must be made, but sublimation was not only possible but to be desired. Freud saw that identifications could become habit and then be perpetuated unconsciously, a point with which Dewey would certainly agree.

So impulse or instinct triggered interactions to insure the life and well-being of the organism. Dewey and Freud definitely agreed that one of the primary goals of such interactions was the maintenance of the life of the individual and the species. Also they agreed that such interactions could be more or less automatic, habitual, unconscious, non-conscious, or subconscious, and could occur at a psychosomatic or physical level. Freud would extend the mental to the psychophysical adjustments; Dewey was more reluctant to do so. Dewey called such activity thinking but not reflective thinking while Freud labeled the phenomenon the primary process.

On occasion, these more or less automatic reactions were interrupted and delayed while the organism sought for more satisfying and fulfilling modes of transactions. For Dewey, this was the fork pathed situation where consciousness
intervened and reflective thought ensued. For Freud, it was associated with the conscious ego, operated by reality testing, and was called the secondary process. Both theories agreed that (1) this was a conscious operation, (2) it was unpleasant to the natural organism which preferred certainty and immediacy, (3) it could lead to new cathexes and identifications, i.e., to new modes of transactions, and (4) it marked the beginning of thought, inquiry, and science.

Both men spent a great effort working back through the experiences of mankind to lay to rest spurious ideas which, when accepted as Truths, were detrimental to thought and inquiry. Dewey did this in a philosophical sense by studying and reporting on various philosophical positions and theories. He used a genetic approach, that is, he tried to recapitulate the origins in experience of such ideas and show where the errors resulting in hypostatization had been made. Freud did the same thing in therapy. He sought to recapitulate the formation of the psyche of the individual so as to free him of the unproductive beliefs and modes of interactions established as a child and introjected into the mental operations.


5. __________, How We Think, Boston, D. C. Heath and Company, 1933.


CHAPTER VI

COMPARISON AND CONTRAST OF PSYCHOANALYSIS
AND PRAGMATISM

Statement of the Problem

The problem of this study was to effect a comparison of psychoanalysis and pragmatism as they relate to inquiry.

Purpose of the Study

Any democratic educational system should see the promotion of inquiry as one of its major goals and tasks. In our era, one who seeks to know through philosophic and scientific inquiry must find the insights of both psychoanalysis and pragmatism pertinent and essential. This study sought to demonstrate that certain insights of the two, heretofore seen as mutually exclusive, are, in fact, complementary and uniquely augment, supplement, and clarify each other. It was believed that an exposition of this relationship would be a significant contribution towards the maximum release and maturation of man's potential to inquire.

Procedures for Completing the Study

Four basic constructs deemed to be essential and common to both psychoanalysis and pragmatism were selected. These were to provide a framework for organization on which the
views of Freud and Dewey could be analyzed and compared. The proposed constructs were

I. The Naturalistic-Evolutionary Rationale.

II. The Experiential Origin of Knowledge and Its Subsequent Hypostatization.

III. Conscious and Unconscious Dimensions of Personality.

IV. Inquiry, Empiricism and Rationalism.

At the time of the proposal, it was agreed that these constructs were chosen somewhat arbitrarily on the basis of the preliminary study and that, should it prove necessary, some alterations or additions to constructs could be made in the course of the investigation. With some minor adjustments, the constructs did prove to be satisfactory for the purpose at hand. In their final form they were

I. The Evolutionary-Naturalistic-Scientific Base.

II. Natural Mind: The Unconscious and the Conscious.

III. The Experiential Origin of Knowledge and the Possibility of Its Subsequent Hypostatization.

IV. Inquiry: Reflective Thought and the Secondary Process.

Thus the following changes were made: Science was added to the first construct. The order of the second and third constructs was reversed. The concept of natural mind was added to the conscious and unconscious because it was deemed essential and necessary to the development of the construct.
Empiricism and rationalism were dropped and reflective thought and the secondary process substituted for two reasons. (1) The concept of the blending of empiricism and rationalism was adequately treated while dealing with other ideas, and (2) it became apparent that a comparison of Dewey's reflective thought and Freud's secondary process would be of more value to the study.

Methods to Complete the Study

A representative selection of the works of both Dewey and Freud was surveyed in order to (1) gain an adequate grasp of the content and spirit of their respective theories, (2) ascertain whether or not the selected constructs were indeed common and essential to each, and (3) select appropriate documentation to ground and support the conclusions reached concerning the positions of Dewey and Freud relating to the selected constructs. Works by authorities on the two men and their respective theories were perused to direct, order, and guide this reading. Finally, the selected passages were presented in an effort to realize the purpose of the study.

Findings

In this section, the similarities and dissimilarities of the two theories pertaining to each construct is discussed and conclusions drawn. The greatest difficulty in this study has been to isolate individual concepts from what
there are two basically holistic theories. Never had the perceptualist's mandate that the "whole is more than the sum of the parts" been better appreciated. One can argue that some conclusions are not unquestionably grounded in the insights afforded by the treatment of the individual construct. This observation is undeniably true. Nevertheless, the conclusion in question is "warrantedly assertible" in terms of the complete inquiry and one can only be invited, as Dewey suggested, "to retrace the operations of the inquiry for himself to justify the conclusions thereof." Over and over again Dewey mentioned that in the history of philosophy he was able to find few notable successes in the matter of conclusions attained. He maintained that philosophy was vision and that its chief function was to free men's minds from bias and prejudice and to enlarge their perceptions of the world about them (7, p. 21). To Dewey, it was enough that philosophy loosen the hold upon us exerted by predispositions that owe their strength to conformities which became so habitual as not to be questioned, and which in all probability would still be unquestioned were it not for the debt we owe philosophy. Dewey maintained that philosophy could proffer nothing but hypotheses, and that these hypotheses are of value only as they render men's minds more sensitive to life about them (7, p. 22).
Evolutionary Theory

Comparison and contrast.---The theories of psycho-
analysis and pragmatism are both firmly grounded in evo-
lutionary theory. Dewey's book *The Influence of Darwin* on Philosophy marked the turning point in his career. At this juncture, he turned from objective Idealism and Hegelianism and emphasized the concepts of change instead of fixed qualities, process instead of product, chance instead of plan, human purpose instead of divine fiat, natural intelligence instead of immortal Reason, and experience instead of revelation. The natural cosmos was in process and nothing was fixed and immutable. Change made science possible since man could intervene in the process. Laws were simply "convenient formulations of selected portions of change followed through a longer or shorter period of time" (8, p. 72). Dewey felt that change made science possible, and that fixity and lack of problems would mark the death of science (9, p. 101).

Freud entered the medical profession under the influence of the naturalist Goethe and the evolutionary theories of Darwin. He felt that, due to evolutionary theory, man was no longer set apart from the rest of the animal kingdom by virtue of his having a soul but was a part of nature, an animal among other animals. From this position man could be studied scientifically just as any other natural object.
Freud's early laboratory work was based on evolutionary theory and sought to show how the nervous system and the brain of the higher animals could have evolved naturally from the simpler constituents of the lower forms (24, p. 303). Where Dewey emphasized chance and novelty, Freud was engrossed with causal sequences which were evident in the evolutionary patterns. Dewey accepted the idea of mutation and natural selection although the concept was of no major importance to this theory. Freud did not disagree with this concept, but he also argued for the inheritance of qualities which had been previously influenced by the experiences of both the individual and the race (24, p. 309). Freud's concept of the libido as the evolutionary, biological, and yet socially influenced source of somatic and psychical energy has been one of his most controversial ideas, but it need not be so if one reads Freud carefully. Freud was using libido to represent the broad general type of activities which the organism utilized to try to insure its survival. It included but was not confined to overt sexuality. Since all the functions of the organism, including even the most cognitive inquiry, must operate with energy which is basically libidinal, this construct is vital to Freud's demonstration of the undermining of inquiry by personal desires or motives. Although Dewey used such concepts as impulse, desire and drive, he had no conceptual
counterpart for Freud's libido. In fact, Dewey, in one of his few direct references to psychoanalysis, indicated that, in his opinion, Freud may have hyposstatized libido and related concepts. In psychoanalytic theory, Alfred Adler represented the supremacy of the libido in his "drive for superiority" (20). Freud did not disagree with Adler's position as far as it went but he felt it was insufficient as a complete theory. The pecking order of animals (19, p. 162) and the social classes of men exemplify this aspect of the expression of the libido. The various forms of government, fascism, communism, and democracy, represent different methods of dealing with the economic manifestations of the ubiquitous libido.

Conclusions. Dewey and Freud both based their ideas on concepts from evolutionary theory. This dependance on evolutionary theory is of major importance and neither pragmatism nor psychoanalysis could operate without it. Nevertheless each emphasized a different aspect of the theory. Dewey stressed chance and novelty and the opportunity for natural intelligence to intervene. Freud sought to show that man, as a species, was a product (albeit unfinished) of his long evolutionary development and could best be understood within this frame of reference. The difference is a matter of emphasis and not one of basic incompatibility. To assure the most advantageous position for inquiry, one needs
the views of both. For this reason, as regards evolutionary theory, psychoanalysis and pragmatism are deemed to be complementary, and in terms of contemporary inquiry, it is held that they do uniquely complement and augment each other so that the two theories together offer a more instrumental conceptualization than either in isolation.

An interesting paradox is presented in the treatment of evolutionary theory by Dewey and Freud. While Dewey was in every respect more comprehensive and thorough in both a philosophic and scientific sense, Freud's genius may have touched upon the greatest impediment to human inquiry in his conceptualization of the libido and its effects upon the psychosomatic and mental processes. Certainly every comprehensive philosophy postulates a similar or related concept, but Freud's conceptualization seems particularly instrumental for studies relating to inquiry.

The implications for education in this area are only too apparent. American education is still overtly operating in a fashion dictated by the ontological theories of Idealism and Realism which Dewey and Freud saw negated in evolutionary theory. Where such theories of being are not taught overtly, they are insinuated covertly by other community agencies while the schools abstain on the basis of the traditional separation of church and state. Certainly evolutionary theory is now better grounded in inquiry than either Idealism or
Realism, but because the latter are embedded in the cultural mores they are difficult to surplant. Thus our system continues to produce people who are dogmatic in these vital areas and this conceptual scheme limits the alternatives available for inquiries designed to reconstruct the philosophic, scientific, and social climate.

**Naturalism**

Comparison and contrast.—As is true of any major philosophical position, naturalism has many subtle themes and semi-divergent schools so that it would be perilous to classify Dewey and Freud as naturalistic in any classic philosophical sense. The basis for this assertion is the obdurate agnosticism that Dewey and Freud maintained towards any assertion about ultimate nature and being. Thus the correct characterization of Dewey and Freud would be that they operated within or according to the basic tenets of naturalism without necessarily accepting the ontological veracity of the conceptual scheme.

Naturalism was an inference from evolutionary theory. To Dewey and Freud, it meant that man was a natural animal produced through the vagaries of the evolutionary process and that he occupied no special or prescribed place in the affairs of the cosmos. They denied any preordained cosmological plan or system and questioned the assumptions by other philosophies of ontological universals, essences, or
existences. Dewey argued, and Freud would have agreed, that only in such a naturalistic cosmological system could man be free and science be possible.

There is a relationship between pragmatism, psychoanalysis, and existentialism that is illuminating in this context. The existentialists argue that other philosophies make the "leap of faith", that is, that faced with the impossibility of knowing in the cosmological sense, people accept ideas which cannot be reasonably or scientifically demonstrated. Albert Camus suggested that faced with this situation the existentialist does not leap but seeks to remain at the "crest of the wave," in other words, as far as natural reason can go without "leaping" beyond assertions which can be grounded in inquiry. The existentialists speak of the dread and anxiety implicit in living with such a philosophy. Walter Kaufman lists Freud among the existentialists (26, p. 41; 27, pp. 320-337) largely because he believed Freud represented a lifestyle of promoting inquiry without leaping to conclusions concerning its import and application. Kaufman spends a great deal of time developing his views of Freud's character traits which enabled him to maintain this stance. He mentions Freud's courage and humor, tenacity and tolerance, his stoicism in response to suffering, fame, and death (27, p. 325). He implied that Freud experienced the "dread and anxiety" of the existentialists because
he refused to "leap." In the context of this study, Freud did all he could to promote inquiry but remained agnostic about its ultimate possibilities.

Bayles suggested that there was a similar rapprochement between pragmatism and existentialism (1, pp. 62-63). Pragmatic axiology emphasizes that the individual himself, although immersed in his culture, must determine how much he will conform and the degree and manner in which he will effect whatever breakaway he may achieve. Also, while Dewey believed that there was the possibility of existential intelligence in the natural operations of the evolved organs of the higher species, he never argued for any concept of the innate or predetermined efficacy of human inquiry. He simply maintained that reflective thought and inquiry were possible, that they were crippled by the traditional philosophic positions and their parochial forms of logic, and that, regardless of the consequences, the reconstruction and utilization of a new logic or theory of inquiry was necessary. In his last years, Dewey felt it was necessary for him to admit that all his theories might be fallacious (28) and again reasserted the basic naturalistic grounds on which they were predicated.

A homely example may assist in understanding this facet of the life style of Dewey and Freud. Suppose that the two were stranded in the middle of the great desert or shipwrecked
in the vastness of the South Pacific. After a brief period of reflection, the inquiry—the walking or the swimming—would begin. There need be no recourse to supernatural beings, no optimism, no pessimism; what is indicated is simply, that for better or for worse, the affairs of Freud and Dewey are in the hands of the natural abilities of Freud and Dewey.

It can be demonstrated that Dewey and Freud shared an antagonism towards religions as traditionally conceived. This antagonism was rooted in their conceptions of naturalism.

Freud was always agnostic even as a child. In a letter he once stated:

I cannot find any transition from the fact that our ideas of perfection have psychical reality to a belief in their objective existence. I will add that I have no dread at all of the Almighty. If ever we were to meet I should have more reproaches to make to him than he could to me. I should ask him why he had not given me a better intellectual equipment, and he could not complain that I had not made the best use of my supposed freedom (23, p. 417).

Levitt argued for a similar attitude on the part of Dewey. Dewey had been worrying about "whether he still meant it when he prayed." One evening Dewey felt that this anxiety resolved itself and he stated it like this:

What the hell are you worrying about, anyway? Everything that's here is here, and you can just lie back on it. I've never had any doubts since then, nor any beliefs. To me faith means not worrying (29, p. 10).
On another occasion Dewey suggested that

The Gods, whatever their origins and original traits, became idealized projections of the selected and matured achievements which the Greeks admired among their mortal selves (7, p. 105).

These statements denote, as has been the contention herein, more of an agnostic bent than a tendency to atheism. This is in keeping with the basic tenor of the naturalistic position. In this context, the subject of "faith" appears. Many authorities have attributed faith in reason (17, p. 2) and faith in democracy (3, p. 176; 21, p. 36) and so forth, to Freud and/or Dewey, respectively. The conclusion gained in this study is that faith, in the common sense of the word, had no relevancy to the attitudes of Dewey and Freud. One does not have to have faith to swim in the vastness of the Pacific or walk from the certain death of the desert. The existential situation as portrayed by naturalism "is" and one must simply deal with it. Scientific inquiry is the preferred method, but there is no guarantee or faith that it will suffice. Faith has for too long been associated with a need on the part of the subject for a certainty that is inimical to continued and persistent inquiry.

Conclusions.—Freud and Dewey made similar use of the concept of naturalism as a frame of reference or conceptual scheme for their respective theories. Naturalism was not taken as a final ontological position but as a tentative,
workable, practical, set of attitudes and beliefs within which inquiry could best be facilitated. Both Dewey (4, p. 218) and Freud (11, p. 15) believed that in order to inquire scientifically one had to "free his mind from the standard that obtains" or "gain a certain independence of judgment from the compact majority." Since naturalism maintained that man, his origins, his philosophies, his values, and all his pursuits could best be examined on natural grounds without recourse to cosmological, teleological, or moral arguments, it freed Dewey and Freud from all such limiting philosophic concepts and allowed inquiry to proceed in a scientific way. On this basis, Dewey and Freud have been termed agnostic and the quality of agnosticism has been considered a prerequisite for truly scientific inquiry. This beginning also underlies Dewey's concept of the "autonomy of inquiry." Logic as inquiry was seen as a circular process which need not depend upon anything extraneous to inquiry. To Dewey this meant the exclusion of any "... first principles, a priori intuitions and metaphysical and epistemological assumptions and presuppositions" (6, pp. 20-21). Freud's inquiry beautifully exemplifies this concept of autonomy and can only be properly judged in terms of its own assumptions and operations.

In order to inquire effectively, one must remain skeptical and agnostic about his own inquiry. At the same time he
must have the psychical energy to continue the endeavor. Freud insisted that all energy originated in the id, obeyed the primary process and the pleasure principle, and was libidinal in nature. These ideas are firmly grounded in Freud's use of evolutionary theory and naturalism. Dewey did not disagree except as he put a different emphasis on the concepts. Freud's idea that inquiry could be subverted and misguided by libidinous tendencies offers a most important insight to promote inquiry.

Science

Summary and conclusions.—Dewey and Freud also shared similar attitudes about science and the application of scientific modes of thought. The scientific attitude has been defined as a willingness to accept the facts as they are and not as one would have them be. To some extent this idea represents a major thrust of Freud's and Dewey's efforts. They saw evolutionary theory as the culminating concomitant attitude most conducive to the application of these insights. Each sought to bring this evolutionary-naturalistic-scientific conceptual scheme to bear on the study of man and his inquiry within his physical and social environment.

Dewey and Freud shared a free and natural definition of what composed scientific thought and methodology. Dewey suggested that man "... has an innate disposition to draw
inferences and an inherent desire to experiment and test" (5, p. 83). Dewey did not disagree with the great emphasis Idealism put upon the importance and power of ideas. He did insist that ideas were instrumental only when seen not as statements of what is or has been but as acts to be performed (9, p. 138). Again and again Dewey and Freud insisted that the natural values of scientific inquiry could be lost if an unwarranted need for certainty prevailed.

Actually one cannot find in Dewey's or Freud's work a single example of the carefully controlled and statistically supported research currently endorsed in the professional literature of the behavioral sciences. In *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* Dewey did set up a number of research designs. However, the major goal of Freud and Dewey was to show the origins of many accepted universals in hypostatization and free inquiry from these concepts. Science to them, therefore, represented a conceptual scheme or frame of reference to guide thought which could operate completely free of existing restrictions and thereby penetrate to all the affairs of mankind. Dewey and Freud both saw the possibilities that scientific inquiry held out for man, but both also were aware of the obstacles facing its utilization. Dewey knew there was risk in thought and that merely freeing inquiry from inhibiting standards would not guarantee inquiry.
He knows little who supposes that freedom of thought is ensured by relaxation of conventions, censorships and intolerant dogmas. The relaxation supplies opportunity. But while it is a necessary, it is not a sufficient condition. Freedom of thought denotes freedom of thinking; specific doubting, inquiring, suspense, creating and cultivating tentative hypotheses, trials or experimentings that are unguaranteed and that involve risks or waste, loss and error. Let us admit the case of the conservative; if we once start thinking no one can guarantee where we shall come out, except that many objects, ends and institutions are surely doomed (17, p. 222).

This quotation supplies a general "feel" of a scientific attitude as seen by Dewey. There is no certainty, no rightness, no unassailable truthfulness implicit nor implied in this position. Both Freud and Dewey were extremely cognizant of the fact that men desired a greater certainty than was available in science and that in order to utilize science and inquiry men must control the impatience and need for certainty endemic to their species.

To Dewey science was based on the possibility of "a cooperative tendency towards concensus" (4, p. 35). Thus democracy was the best form of government to realize the possibility of this type of scientific inquiry. But democracy and intelligence and science were

... impossible when appetites and desires are conceived to be the dominant factor in the constitutions of most men's characters, and when appetite and desire are conceived to be manifestations of the disorderly and unruly principle of nature (8, p. 59).
In this passage Dewey was referring to at least two groups. One is the religionists who held that men were innately sinful and that redemption was "of faith and not of works." If such was accepted scientific inquiry is negated and man is helpless to help himself except by the acceptance of an immutable supernatural order. In the second place, Dewey may have been including Freud and his theories of psychoanalysis, but this is conjectural. However, this passage may be the pivotal one in any comparison of Dewey and Freud. Freud did hold that appetites and desires are the dominant factors in the constitution of most men's characters but not that they were conceived as manifestations of the disorderly and unruly principle of nature. Nature includes appetites and desires just as it does natural intelligence. To Dewey and Freud science depends upon the control of the former to promote the latter.

Intelligence (scientific inquiry) can be subverted when appetite and desire enter into the operations of the inquiry. One tends to believe that which in some way contributes to the satisfaction of his appetites and desires. When one's position depends upon his having a certain opinion, you may be sure that that is the opinion he holds. Consider how professional and business concerns tend to select young men for inclusion into their organization who hold compatible views and then involve them in an intensive training program.
to further refine these views before entrusting the initiate with a responsible position. Professional researchers gain stature in relation to the reception of their findings, and their own personal fortunes as well as the fundings of future operations are involved.

Freud's model of the development of the personality was uniquely developed to show the many direct and sublimated ways that desire and appetite intruded upon man's natural ability to inquire.

Dewey saw the many possible relationships between the individual and his society. Briefly reviewed, they are (1) the individual is subservient to the society, (2) the society is subservient to the individual, and (3) the individual and the society are in a cooperative relationship with each other. Dewey and Freud saw science and scientific inquiry as a social process carried out in the same relationship as outlined above but as Dewey stated, none of the three is the correct position. All are applicable at various times, and this insight constitutes the fourth and truly inclusive view. This is the spirit necessary as a ground for scientific inquiry.

The symbol "science" represents an idea which to Dewey and Freud has no ontological status but is existentially "real" as it is perceived in human inquiry. As an object of inquiry it can readily be hypostatized by those susceptible
to appetite and desire and lacking the control to institute
and maintain psychical protection against such usurpation
of the capacity to reason by the ubiquitous libido. All
the scientific expertise available to man is insufficient
unless the proper philosophical conceptual scheme is also
present. Science has undoubtedly erred where its appli-
cation has not been accompanied by an ethical and moral
conceptual scheme growing, not out of pre-scientific onto-
logical systemology, but from the ongoing scientific inquiry
itself. The current ecological problems represent the most
conclusive example of scientific technology divorced arbi-
trarily from its concomitant philosophical conceptual scheme
which should have been realized in the course of the oper-
ations of the inquiry. But before one condemns science, he
should remember that few men have as yet seen the necessity
for its inclusion in all the affairs of men and that men
continue to think with a bifurcated mode. Consider Freud's
observation that

It is a popular habit in scientific matters
to seize upon one side of the truth and set it
up as the whole truth, and then in favor of that
element of truth to dispute all the rest which
is equally true (10, p. 355).

Freud's belief that desires and appetites influence
intellectual activities is illustrated in the following
passage: "When he dislikes anything he can defend himself
against it most ingeniously, but when anything suits his
book he can be credulous enough" (12, p. 303). But perhaps
the most conclusive evidence to document Freud's belief
that desire perverts reason is the following passage from
Jones

Marie Bonaparte once gave him Poincare's
La Valeur de la Science to read, and made the
comment: "Those who thirst before everything
for certitude do not really love truth." To
which Freud replied: "That is so true. I
have said that too somewhere, in another way.
Mediocre spirits demand of science a kind of
certainty which it cannot give, a sort of
religious satisfaction. Only the real, rare,
true scientific minds, can endure doubt, which
is attached to all knowledge" (23, p. 419).

Freud spoke again of the need for certainty which
intrudes harmfully into scientific inquiry. "They (the
uneducated) are ready to accept the results of scientific
thought without having effected in themselves the process
of change which scientific thought induces in men" (15,
p. 69). A few pages later Freud characterized very ably
a "believer" who was a quite remarkable predecessor of
Erich Hoffer's "true believer," in that he identified with
his objects of belief on an affective basis rather than
through reason (15, p. 79).

Dewey was in basic agreement with Freud's idea that
inquiry could be influenced by desire and appetite.

The mind of man spontaneously assumes greater
simplicity, uniformity and unity among phenomena
than actually exists. It follows superficial analogies and jumps to conclusions; it overlooks the va-
riety of details and the existence of exceptions.
Thus it weaves a web of purely internal origin which
it imposes upon nature. What had been termed science in the past consisted of this humanly constructed and imposed web. Man looked at the work of their own minds and thought they were seeing realities in nature. They were worshipping, under the name of science, the idols of their own making (7, pp. 35-36).

Desire and appetite are not mentioned in the passage. Dewey described exactly the same psychical operations pictured by Freud but declined to attribute a cause. Freud postulated a complex model to deal with the situation Dewey describes. The basic positions are very similar. The questions are (1) does Freud overestimate desire and appetite or does Dewey shy away from it because it devalues his hopes for inquiry and (2) which has the better scheme in terms of aiding and abetting inquiry and controlling and negating illusions, delusions, and other psychic phenomena based on desire and appetite.

Conclusions.—Psychoanalysis and pragmatism have many similar attitudes concerning science and the necessary conditions for its utilization. They agree that scientific inquiry is the preferred, in fact the only, mode by which to know. They are similar in preferring "warranted assertibility" and "successive approximation" to such terms as truth or knowledge. Each seeks to refute commonly accepted hypostatizations which were formulated in prescientific times and are inimical to the type and kind of inquiry which they seek to promulgate. Both saw that science must be accepted
in all phases of human concern and that failure to do so could only result in grievous error. Both attacked religion as it inhibited scientific thoughts. All morals and ethics were seen as derived from natural experience and were subject to empirical test and reformulation. Both saw that reason and reflective thought and subsequently inquiry could be perverted by other "dangerous tendencies of the mind" which "caused it to shear away from unpleasant consequences." The difference in the two theories lies in their treatment of desire and appetite as a potential disrupter of inquiry. Freud saw them as major deterrents and formulated an elaborate model of hypothetical constructs to utilize in studying and controlling these libidinal desires. Dewey saw no need for this conceptualization and suggested that one could easily hypostatize the constructs and thereby lose sight of the important issues. The difference is one of emphasis and does not represent any basic disagreement or irreconcilable incompatibility between pragmatism and psychoanalysis. Indeed, at the present time, the difference signifies the special point for further thought and consideration, and since neither position is irrevocably established, the two in conjunction offer the more instrumental approach.
Comparison and contrast.—These concepts cannot be discussed except in the context of their interrelations so they cannot be isolated for treatment. Neither Freud nor Dewey would have agreed with Locke's idea that the mind of the newborn child was a "blank page" upon which experience could write with a completely free hand. However Dewey put much less emphasis on inherited predispositions than did Freud. Theoretically the interactions or experiences that modified the organs so as to form the system of meanings that became mind could start even before the birth of the organism, possibly at conception or, for Freud, even earlier in the prior experiences of the species. It would be generally accurate to state that Freud and Dewey were in agreement that mind was a system of meanings encoded in the tissues through experiences of the organism. These meanings could be encoded in a conscious or in an unconscious or automatic way. The organism might register the interaction and the insight gained consciously, or it might occur without the conscious notice of the organism. Insights gained in consciousness could later revert to the unconscious or subconscious.

Once these traces or records of experiences are encoded in the brain tissue mind as a system of meanings has begun its formation. Gradually, in this manner, the system of
meanings, the mind, is developed in the brain and neural tissue. Freud and Dewey were again in complete agreement that, since mind was developed in this fashion in childhood, men were naturally subject to "dreams, reveries, emotional idealizations" that "he is a creature of desire rather than intellectual study," that "memory is not a remembering of facts, but is association, suggestion, dramatic fancy," and that "man ceases to be primarily actuated by hopes and fears, loves and hates, only when he is subjected to a discipline which is foreign to human nature" (6, pp. 5-7). The knowledgeable reader would not be surprised if these statements were attributed to Freud, but actually they come from Dewey and represent ideas not commonly associated with his theory.

The organism continues to have interactions. These experiences are connected, have continuity and sequence and, in times of consciousness, furnish the organismic basis for the grounding of natural reason and intelligence. For while the interactions may be continued on the subconscious or unconscious plane indefinitely in an automatic or habitual (psycho-physical) way, both theorists agreed that at various times consciousness did appear and the meanings which made up the mind could be altered and/or rearranged by insights gained with natural intelligence. To Dewey, consciousness was that portion of the system of meanings undergoing
scrutiny and change (4, p. 303). Freud did not have so concise a definition of consciousness (12, p. 34), but his use of the concept was similar to Dewey's and did not represent any serious theoretical departure. Both theorists emphasized that intelligence, reason, thought, and inquiry are instrumental during the periods of consciousness when the system of meanings that constitute mind is undergoing question, doubt, and possible reformulation. The emphasis is upon making the unconscious conscious.

It is important to note that both Dewey and Freud saw mind as a series of insights encoded naturally into a naturally evolved nervous system. Neither saw mind as an epiphenomenon or relied on any supernatural construct to explain its origin, and neither saw it as any "force," "power," "spirit," or "thing," either imposing itself upon or otherwise intruding into the course of natural events.

The single important difference in this area deals with the respective definitions of what constitutes mental activity and where the line should be drawn to separate physical or somatic adjustments, psycho-physical adjustments, and the higher order of purely mental adjustments. Actually both theorists would agree that this range of organismic reactions is probably a smoothly blended continuum from the most automatic physical to the most problematic mental, but for theoretical purposes Dewey
held that the "organic responses have mental quality in the degree that they deal with the uncertain" (9, p. 231). As do most philosophers, Dewey then tied mental with consciousness. Since consciousness was seen as "that portion of mind under question" and mental reserved for "organic responses which deal with the problematic," they seem to be concurrent and necessary constructs. Freud extended the mental to the unconscious and felt that this concept was of major importance and perhaps the salient contribution of psychoanalysis (13, pp. 34-37; 16, p. 283). The elaborate hypothetical constructs that Freud postulated to get at the unconscious mental were instrumental in the task of increasing man's potential to inquire.

Conclusions.---Psychoanalysis and pragmatism used very similar definitions for their constructs of mind and the conscious and the unconscious. To the extent that they did so, they supported and verified each other. They agreed that mind had natural origins in the experience of organisms, the existence of which could be adequately explained within the scope of naturalistic evolutionary theory. Intelligence and inquiry were linked to conscious operations, and while each theorist agreed that most human behavior was largely psychophysical, automatic, and subconscious, the possibility for conscious inquiry was suggested and supported.

The only important difference was that Dewey confined the mental to the conscious and problematic. This is the
traditional philosophical view. Freud maintained that consciousness represented only broken segments of series of mental events that were constantly taking place in the unconscious realm. On the basis of this assumption, Freud was able to develop hypothetical constructs to aid in the understanding of the total scope of mental operations in both the unconscious and conscious spheres.

If Freud's ideas are taken in the pragmatic sense as instruments to assist inquiry, they must be seen as valuable tools. Because psychology has tried so hard to gain an empirical scientific standing, Freud's conceptualizations have been devalued by many schools. Dewey's views in this area are more conservative and less controversial but cannot yield the subtle insights that psychoanalysis can afford. An unwarranted desire for certainty, however, can result in the loss of many of Freud's most creative ideas which are absolutely representative of the type of "existential objects grounded in inquiry" which Dewey supported (6, p. 119).

It may well be that many behavioral scientists, in their desire for certainty grounded in empirical statistical research, have cut themselves off from the richly creative insights of psychoanalysis and pragmatism. Science can also be hypostatized and it should not be at all surprising to see the application of psychoanalysis and pragmatism corrupted by the same old human needs for certainty.
Erich Fromm suggested that Freud’s concept of the oedipus complex, the desire of the child for the opposite sexed parent, could best be understood in a social context. To attain psychological maturity, Freud thought the child must give up the incestuous desire for and dependence upon the beloved and authoritarian parent. In this same sense, the mature adult, the scientific inquirer, must give up the many authoritarian identifications upon which he builds his conceptual scheme and ascertains his own stature and feelings of well-being.

The attachment to parents is only one, though the most fundamental form of incest; in the process of social evolution other attachments in part replace it. The tribe, the nation, the race, the state, the social class, political parties, and many other forms of institutions and organizations become home and family. Here are the roots of nationalism and racism, which in turn are symptoms of man’s inability to experience himself and others as free human beings (16, p. 81).

Only if one has outgrown incestuous ties can one judge one’s own group critically; only then can one judge at all (16, p. 85).

Today it is not Baal and Astarte but the deification of the state and of power in authoritarian countries and the deification of the machine and of success in our own culture which threaten the most precious spiritual possessions of man (16, pp. 118-119).

The reader should, at this juncture, be confused; why the jump from theories of the conscious and unconscious to that of the oedipus complex and the identifications with race, state, class, etc.? The important connection is that such identifications are made unconsciously, or, if made consciously, are repressed into the unconscious. Thus, men are attempting
to inquire with conceptual schemes that are largely uncon-
scious and that have been indubitably influenced by their
own unconscious desires and needs as represented in Freud's
construct of the libido. Freud's preoccupation with the
unconscious was based on his desire to understand these
mental operations and control them so as to make conscious
inquiry possible. Fromm again has understood this facet of
Freud's thought.

In our discussion of Freud I have indicated
that to recognize the truth is a basic aim of the
psychoanalytic process. Psychoanalysis has given
the concept of truth a new dimension. In pre-
analytic thinking a person could be considered to
speak the truth if he believed in what he was saying.
Psychoanalysis has shown that subjective conviction
is by no means a sufficient criterion of sincerity.
A person can believe that he acts out of a sense of
justice and yet be motivated by cruelty. He can be-
lieve that he is motivated by love and yet be driven
by a craving for masochistic dependence. A person
can believe that duty is his guide though his main
motivation is vanity. In fact most rationalizations
are held to be true by the person who uses them. He
not only wants others to believe his rationalizations
but believes them himself, and the more he wants to
protect himself from recognizing his true motivation
the more ardently he must believe in them. Further-
more, in the psychoanalytic process a person learns
to recognize which of his ideas have an emotional
matrix and which are only conventional cliches with-
out root in his character structure and therefore
without substance and weight. The psychoanalytic
process is in itself a search for truth. The object
of this search is the truth about phenomena not out-
side of man but in man himself (16, pp. 76-77).

This inner search into the unconscious is Freud's forte.

Dewey's theory is the more comprehensive and complete philo-
sophical statement, but because it is predicated upon
conscious, deliberate, rational inquiry, it somehow fails to deal adequately with the unconscious. Freud's inquiry followed Dewey's model beautifully in that it was a conscious, deliberate, rational plan to get at and understand the emotional, affective, irrational, narcissistic, and primordial tendencies that interfere with the higher mental processes. Without psychoanalysis, pragmatism fails because the inquirer cannot come to grips with his unconscious. Without pragmatism, psychoanalysis is an incomplete philosophy because of Freud's admitted incapacity to deal with philosophic concepts he felt were illusionary or delusionary. Together the two make a more complete system with psychoanalysis preparing the organism for inquiry and pragmatism furnishing the plan to realize it. It is in this sense that the two theories are adjudged to be complementary.

The Experiential Origin of Knowledge and the Possibility of Its Subsequent Hypostatization

Comparison and contrast.—Dewey and Freud were in general agreement that men had come to know all the ideas that have ever been perceived through their own experiences and that there was no other source of knowledge. In effect, this meant the denial of the existence of all a priori knowledge, immediate knowledge or essence or existence which was above or beyond the experience of men. Because of this belief, both Dewey and Freud have been accused of excessive anthropocentrism.
By this term, critics imply that pragmatism and psychoanalysis are excessively humanistic and err in viewing the word in terms only of human experience (30, p. 13).

On occasion, Freud spoke of a "reality", or a "something" which was "out there" but which man could never truly grasp because of the problems of perception.

Reality will always remain "unknowable."
What scientific work elicits from our primary sense perceptions will consist in an insight into connections and interdependences which are present in the external world, which can somehow or other be reliably reproduced or reflected in the internal world of our thoughts, and the knowledge of which enables us to "understand" something in the external world, to foresee it and possibly to alter it (13, pp. 105-106).

Now if Freud held to the position that "there was something out there," he could possibly be classified as an Idealist, a realist, or a materialist (nominalist). Further, if he held that "it" was there but could never be properly perceived by the faculties of men, one might have grounds for considering him a phenomenologist. This was the position taken by the majority of American philosophers at their convention of 1959 when psychoanalysis was the topic of discussion (22).

Actually this confusion resulted from the loose usage of these philosophical terms by Freud and the ever ready willingness of his readers to misinterpret him. As a comparison Dewey used the term "reality" in a similar way on occasion but was quick to qualify the term to the realm of "common
sense" (4, p. 302). The best way to describe Dewey's and Freud's beliefs in this area remains that taken herein. They operated within a conceptual scheme based upon naturalistic agnosticism and refrained from making observations about phenomena which were not amenable to experience.

Dewey's theory was much more sophisticated and philosophically complete in this area than was Freud's. Dewey rejected the Aristotelian idea of fixed essence on the grounds of inferences gained from the concept of change implicit in evolutionary theory. Aristotle posited objects with fixed ontological characteristics completely independent of man. Dewey maintained that these objects and their supposed ontological characteristics were only existential and not ontological and that their characteristics, rather than being eternal, were defined within the operations of the inquiry which revealed them. When such existential and instrumental objects of inquiry were converted into ontological objects with fixed characteristics hypostatization was the result.

Conclusions.--Freud and Dewey both took the position that all knowledge was gained through human experience and was therefore relative or operational in nature. The insights appearing in inquiry were existential and could afford instrumental ideas for subsequent inquiry. As long as men visualized the objects of inquiry as tools or instruments
with no essence or existence except those qualities grounded in inquiry, scientific activities could proceed. But when these objects were hypostatized, converted to ontological status independent of inquiry, they became those ontological fixities which limited the application of science and terminated the productivity of inquiry.

Dewey and Freud both believed that many of the concepts most valued by men and seen as the highest order of cosmological truth were, in fact, hypostatized ideas born in human experience. Freud tended to emphasize the hypostatization of illusionary or delusionary concepts. In his view, men tended to produce illusionary constructs to protect themselves from the dangers and terrors of the natural world. Such ideas as "God the Father" and the "Mother Church" were exemplary of childhood dependence on the all-powerful mother and father for safety, love and protection (the oedipus complex).

Dewey did not disagree with such concepts but, as has been previously suggested, tended to emphasize the conversion of existential objects of inquiry into ontological objects. In this paper, the term "to free inquiry" has been used. What is inferred is that inquiry has been bound by these hypostatized ideas and that Dewey and Freud both sought to negate them by exposing the operations of their origination and thereby free inquiry from their hold.
As regards these two constructs, pragmatism and psychoanalysis are for all practical purposes identical. Dewey's was again the more considered and philosophically sound treatment, but Freud's ideas were highly provocative and are still germane and tremendously influential.

**Inquiry: Reflective Thought and the Secondary Process**

Comparison and contrast.—If one can free himself from preconceptions and approach psychoanalysis and pragmatism with an open mind, he cannot fail to see that (1) both sought to promote inquiry, (2) their conceptions of the naturalistic etiology of inquiry were practically identical, and (3) each sought to free inquiry from a constricting socio-political-philosophical conceptual scheme formulated in a prescientific time.

Each saw the organism as an evolving process and studied it within an evolutionary-naturalistic-scientific approach. Interactions and transactions were necessary to life and were initiated by the concepts of impulse and instinct. Both theorists saw that such transactions were predominantly instinctual, automatic, and unconscious, but each also posited times of consciousness when natural intelligence could enter the paradigm. At such times the automatic and instinctual reactions could be controlled and altered in face of the external objective conditions encountered by the organism.
Dewey felt that the psycho-physical adjustments could become mental when they dealt with the problematic. When trans-actions which were previously instrumental produced states of doubt, hesitation and perplexity consciousness might intervene. This led to suspense of judgement and purposive search which could lead to new insights and course of action. These courses of action were predicated upon inferences gained in experience (conscious transactions) and were warrantedly assertible to the extent that they "... convert an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole" (6, p. 104).

Freud suggested that there were "different laws in the id and in the preconscious ego" (13, p. 45) and that, under certain conditions, the psychical apparatus could "... give rise to the phenomena of consciousness" (13, p. 105). His construct of the ego embodied the conscious activities and pictured the ego "... in direct contact with the external world" (13, p. 109). The ego obeys the reality principle and subjects the experiences of the organism to intellective activities, considering, weighing, experimenting, and calculating, in order to "... come to a decision as to whether the attempt to obtain satisfaction is to be carried out or postponed or whether it may be
necessary for the demand of the instinct to be altogether suppressed as being dangerous" (13, p. 110). Interactions can be altered. The direct expression of the libido can be denied, displaced, or sublimated. In Freud's model, intellective inquiry was equated with ego strength which depended upon psychical energy which could be obtained from the somatic libidinal source if the ego could reconcile the demands of the id and the super-ego. While Freud remained agnostic about the possibility of the autonomy of the ego some later revisionists "leaped" to the conclusion that such was possible.

Freud's and Dewey's personal inquiries developed in psychoanalysis and pragmatism are just as similar as the models of inquiry contained in each. Dewey recapitulated the experiences of the species to show how and why errors (hypostatizations) had occurred and where philosophic revision was needed. Freud recapitulated the individual's experience--encapsulated as it was within the experiences of the species--for the same purpose. He wanted to show how the child made identifications and cathexes with the same errors (hypostatizations) which produced mental illness, stymied intellectual activities, and negated the possibility for inquiry in the "well-adjusted" adult. Fromm has shown that being "well-adjusted" in a social sense involves giving up the search for truth by accepting the cultural weltanschauung (16, p. 83).
Becker has seen that deviance is defined by the majority which then cuts itself off from the creative insights the study of the deviant might afford (2). These two ideas are implicit in psychoanalytic theory. Freud hinted that inquiry resulting in the truly cognitive life would produce an individual socially "deviant," would require tremendous ego strength, would afford key insights into the psychological preconditions for inquiry and would spotlight the many fallacies prevalent in the cultural frame of reference. Again Fromm has developed this idea of Freud's most completely in his book The Sane Society, wherein he suggested that the society, rather than its unadjusted individuals, may be in error since it suffers from the "pathology of normalcy" (18, p. 15). Jourard developed Freud's idea that the super-ego could produce mental and physical apathy by exerting a fanatical over control of the libido (25).

Dewey had made a thorough and complete statement on all the possible interactions between the individual and his society and was perfectly aware of these conditions outlined above. But because he believed in and wanted to emphasize the possibility of inquiry validated by repetitive, democratic community inquiry, he did not portray the role of the "deviant inquirer" quite so forcibly as did Freud. Here again the two theories complement each other.
Conclusions: This paper is centered around a comparison of psychoanalysis and pragmatism as they relate to inquiry. The constructs used for the discussion are important only as (1) they are essential and necessary to the inquiries which produced psychoanalysis and pragmatism, (2) they are essential to the model for inquiry which psychoanalysis and pragmatism teach and promote, and (3) they are instrumental in effecting the comparison which shows that psychoanalysis and pragmatism are complementary theories.

The conclusions which are now listed are cumulative and represent insights gained from the project as a whole. Because the research centers around inquiry, it is logical that the final summation should come under this construct. These conclusions are in the form of concise statements. More detailed discussion is contained in the treatment of the individual constructs.

1. Psychoanalysis and pragmatism are both grounded in evolutionary theory. They are in general agreement in their use of this theory. To the extent that this is true, psychoanalysis and pragmatism are identical. Where they do differ, neither theory can be proven correct to the detriment of the other. In fact, these areas of disagreement pinpoint insights which are particularly instrumental to the inquirer and mark the areas where psychoanalysis and pragmatism are adjudged to be complementary on the grounds that the two
together represent a more comprehensive and instrumental view that either can afford in isolation.

2. Psychoanalysis and pragmatism both operate with conceptual schemes heavily dependent upon naturalism.

3. Psychoanalysis and pragmatism both attempted to utilize scientific inquiry, extolled the values of such inquiry, and argued for the extension of scientific methods of inquiry to all the affairs of mankind. Particularly, Freud and Dewey insisted that deliberate empirical studies in matters of morals and ethics were imperative.

4. Psychoanalysis and pragmatism were in general agreement in their definition of mind and its conscious and subconscious or unconscious modes of operations. They did differ in their views of what constituted mental operations. Dewey restricted mental to the "conscious problematic" while Freud extended the mental into the unconscious. Our conclusion is that Freud's model could add a new dimension of strength to an area of Dewey's thought which was sound but not particularly creative or instrumental to an understanding of the unconscious libidinous influences which may corrupt inquiry. Here again psychoanalysis and pragmatism are complementary since the two together offer a more precise conceptualization than either can afford independently.

5. Psychoanalysis and pragmatism were in complete agreement that man can "know" only through his experiences and
that all philosophical concepts of an "a priori", "universal" or "immediate" nature are simply hypostatizations of ideas which emerged as hypotheses in inquiry. Both Freud and Dewey agreed that the values of such ideas depended upon their instrumentality in subsequent inquiry and that their hypostatization negated their instrumentality.

6. To Dewey and Freud inquiry was a free process which could be subverted or even terminated by an unwarranted need for certainty. Documentation established that Dewey agreed with Freud that man was primarily a creature of desires and appetites and that the control necessary for inquiry was foreign and artificial to natural man. Freud and Dewey sought to advance scientific inquiry as the only method to utilize in dealing with human concerns but neither made any claims for its innate efficacy. Such terms as optimism and pessimism are not relevant to describe the attitudes of Freud and Dewey towards man's proclivity to utilize scientific inquiry. There was a note of responsible existentialism and agnosticism in their approach.

7. Psychoanalysis and pragmatism are identical in that the inquirer must gain independence from his society in order to serve it most creatively. Freud's conception of the dependent ego struggling to satisfy the libidinous id in the face of the prohibitions of the super-ego can lend a most creative insight to Dewey's more philosophically knowledgeable
instrumentalism. In this study, not one single apostle of either pragmatism or psychoanalysis has been found who can add to either theory without making some "leap" to an assumption based on need and inimical to subsequent inquiry.

8. The understanding of the tenets of psychoanalysis and pragmatism may not benefit an individual, in fact, may be detrimental to him, in a particular socioeconomic context. In times of mind, periods of stress and problem, one may persist in the pursuit of tentative answers in inquiry or retreat to the creeds and dogmas. His previous experiences and his understanding of them will determine his course. In many instances reflection is superior to doing something to avoid the stressful situation.

9. Psychoanalysis and pragmatism are in many respects identical theories. Where they are not identical, they are complementary in that the non-identical concept is specifically the one most important to understanding. The two together offer insights which are not generally understood. It would be a tragedy to lose such insights because they appeared before mankind was prepared to understand them.

Implications

Each child must develop mind through experiences which take place in a given sociocultural setting under the influence of a particular conceptual scheme or frame of reference.
His mentors and his peers indoctrinate him in both an overt and covert manner.

True inquiry begins only when the developing individual begins to question insights previously introjected. His ability to persist in inquiry depends on ego strength developed through previous successful experiences. In the face of anxiety and question, he may persist in inquiry or retreat to the dogmatic creeds for succor. In its initial stages creativity is always deviant.

Freud saw that all psychical energy must be induced from the unconscious libido. One cannot rigidly control the libido (the id). It will simply impinge upon the mental efforts unconsciously through displacement and sublimation. It must be indulged, cajoled, humored, and channeled. Eventually it may be faced more directly. With the aid of psychoanalytic insights the libidinous energy can be utilized by the rational ego. Inquiry can even become satisfying in a sense comparable to libidinous satisfaction.

As an actor in a prearranged or supernaturally controlled drama, man has no true freedom. But if he persists in inquiry he may free himself from all such systems or conceptual schemes. Such freedom is shocking and will produce gradations of disorientation, physical stress, and long term psychological effects. When functioning comfortably within a well established sociocultural environment one's decision load is
reduced; one may even be understimulated. Faced with too many adaptive decisions in too short a time, one is overstimulated and shock will ensue. Sometimes those who would extoll freedom do so from an Idealistic point of view. Those who genuinely experience freedom in an existential or pragmatic sense know it is a double-edged sword.

Often one is isolated from the mainstream of his culture by his budding insights. There is a creative distance established, and one has difficulty moving back into the old beloved and familiar patterns. One cannot go home again, but it is at this stage that the greatest services to society may be forthcoming.

Thoroughgoing inquiry may temporarily produce rebellion and withdrawal, but with the development of a new conceptual scheme, a kind of wry affection for the old displaced ideas will become manifest. Many displaced ideas may become more instrumental once they are divested of their hypostatized qualities and seen in their original experiential context.

Only those who have hypostatized science despair of its application in the behavioral context. If science is seen as logical inferences drawn from controlled operations, even the most speculative hypothesis can be as sound as its underlying conceptual scheme. The existentialist is correct when he points to the anxiety and despair engendered by the lack of controlled scientific evidence, but he realizes his
finest hour when he points to one's individual responsibility to persist in the face of the paradoxical and the absurd.

History is shaped by choices and actions. It is not predetermined by some random pattern or unknown force. It will be determined by us.
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