THOMAS HARDY AND ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY

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THOMAS HARDY AND ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to show the influence of Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophy upon two of Thomas Hardy's novels and selected poems from six volumes of his poetry. Both writers saw the first cause of our universe as a blind, unconscious force, and this study will concern itself with how closely Thomas Hardy's philosophy resembles that of Schopenhauer and how Schopenhauer's concepts affected Hardy's writing.

Hardy was a product of the philosophic and scientific rebellion of the nineteenth century. His aesthetic response to this realistic view of nature and the universe was sensitive and intellectual. Hardy spoke contemptuously of "Nature's holy plan" and stressed a view of reality in which the first cause of the universe was unconscious of man's suffering and desires.

The unconscious quality of the first cause is the essence of Schopenhauer's concept of a blind, striving will to live. The second chapter of this study will concern itself with an examination of Schopenhauer's philosophy. This examination is concerned with Schopenhauer's metaphysic and the evolution of his philosophical system from Kant.
This second chapter also discusses Schopenhauer's idealism and his concept of the world as will, the cause of man's pain and suffering.

Thomas Hardy read and studied Schopenhauer's philosophy in the 1880's and was impressed with the German philosopher. For the first time, I believe, we have found trustworthy evidence that Hardy has been influenced by German pessimism. . . . [The] fact that his library contained a first edition of the Haldane-Kemp translation of The World as Will and Idea (completed in 1886), and his reference to the renunciative side of Schopenhauer's philosophy in Tess (1891), inclines me to believe that Hardy adopted the term "Will" for his First Cause because he was impressed, sometime between May, 1886, and 1893, by the arguments contained in Schopenhauer's great work.¹

Hardy also bought and read Schopenhauer's dissertation, The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and a reading of either of these works could account for the influence of the German philosopher's concepts upon Hardy's writing.²

To link Hardy's name with Schopenhauer's philosophy is not a new discovery. In 1911 Helen Garwood wrote a dissertation on the similarities between Hardy and Schopenhauer. The weakness of her study is caused by the fact that she could not prove that Hardy had even read Schopenhauer's philosophy. Her correspondence with Hardy did not provide her with the necessary evidence because Hardy did

¹Harvey Webster, On a Darkling Plain (Chicago, 1947), p. 196.

not definitely admit to her that he had read Schopenhauer's works. It was not until 1957 that Carl Weber found concrete evidence that Hardy read and studied Schopenhauer's philosophy. Thus, this study has a distinct advantage over Miss Garwood's dissertation, *Thomas Hardy: An Illustration of the Philosophy of Schopenhauer*. 3

Another work that deals exclusively with the comparison of Hardy and Schopenhauer is Ernest Brennecke's *Thomas Hardy's Universe*. 4 His work was invaluable to this study, but the great majority of Brennecke's book is concerned with a detailed study of *The Dynasts*. The value of this thesis must rest upon its discussion of Schopenhauerian philosophy, its analysis of Hardy's poetry, excluding *The Dynasts*, and its detailed discussion of Hardy's *Tess of the D'Urbervilles* and *Jude the Obscure*.

*Tess of the D'Urbervilles* and *Jude the Obscure* were the novels chosen in this study to show the philosophical similarities between Hardy and Schopenhauer because both of the novels were published after Hardy had the opportunity to buy the translations of Schopenhauer's works. Chapter four of this study is concerned with a detailed study of *Tess of the D'Urbervilles* and *Jude the Obscure* as expressions of Schopenhauer's philosophy.

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3Helen Garwood, *Thomas Hardy: An Illustration of the Philosophy of Schopenhauer* (Philadelphia, 1911).

In the examination of Hardy's poetry, *The Dynasts* was omitted because Ernest Brennecke has thoroughly discussed the relationship between Schopenhauer's concepts and the philosophy expressed in this epic-drama in his work, *Thomas Hardy's Universe*. Consequently, this thesis is concerned with selected poems from Hardy's *Wessex Poems*, *Time's Laughingstocks*, *Satires of Circumstance*, *Moments of Vision*, *Human Shows Far Phantasies*, and *Winter Words*. 
CHAPTER II

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCHOPENHAUER

Metaphysics is a system of philosophy that attempts to deal with the problems of the structure and the meaning of reality. "It may be defined, provisionally, as the science of the first principles of reality, or the theory of the structure and meaning of reality as a whole, or the theory of the nature of the cosmos."¹ Metaphysics is therefore a system that seeks to explain the questions that have occupied the attention of philosophers throughout the ages because it seeks to define reality and see it as a whole.

The methods of metaphysics are the analysis of human experience and the synthesis of the results of this analysis into the meanings and implications of this experience in its totality. This process can be an intellectual procedure only in so far as it draws its conclusions from actual experience, and here lies the problem.

The philosopher is justified, since he is compelled by the urge of thought, in transcending actual experience in order to render complete and coherent the implications thereof. The problem as to how far, and in what directions, the philosopher is warranted in transcending the actual can only be

Consequently, experience is the basis of metaphysics, but without interpretation, this experience cannot be called philosophy. Without intellect, without analysis of data, and without synthesis, experience has no real meaning for metaphysics; metaphysical inquiry, therefore, becomes the analysis of the most general forms of human experience and the synthesis of these experiences into a coherent system of thought.

Arthur Schopenhauer certainly possessed the questioning mind that impelled him to metaphysics for the solution to the problem of human existence. According to Schopenhauer, man needs a metaphysic simply because he is conscious of his own existence. "... [The] special philosophical disposition consists primarily in this, that a man is capable of wonder beyond the ordinary and everyday degree, and is thus induced to make the universal of the phenomenon his problem. ..."4

Schopenhauer's personal need for a metaphysic seems to have stemmed from basic experiences in human existence, pain, suffering, and death.

... [The] philosophical wonder which springs from this [self-consciousness] is conditioned in the

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2Ibid., pp. 6-7.  
3 Ibid., pp. 7-9.  
individual by higher development of the intellect, yet in general not by this alone; but without doubt it is the knowledge of death, and along with this the consideration of the suffering and misery of life, which gives the strongest impulse to philosophical reflection and metaphysical explanation of the world. If our life were endless and painless, it would perhaps occur to no one to ask why the world exists. 

Thus, Schopenhauer is concerned that the world contains pain and suffering, and this is the problem that his philosophy seeks to explain about our human existence.

In 1813 Schopenhauer published his first major philosophical work, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason; Kant's influence on this work was immediately apparent. Although Schopenhauer criticized unsparingly the Kantian philosophy, he retained all his life a feeling of deep reverence for Kant, and found his own initial speculative impulse in Kant's epistemological idealism and in his metaphysical doctrine of the thing-in-itself.

Schopenhauer claimed that he owed what was best in his philosophy to the ideas of Plato and Kant, and the influence of the latter can readily be seen in his metaphysical system. Since it is impossible to discuss Kant's philosophy in detail at this point, the best course consists in

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5Ibid.
6Patrick Gardiner, Schopenhauer (Hamondsworth, Middlesex, 1963), p. 15.
8Gardiner, Schopenhauer, p. 41.
considering those elements of Kant's philosophy that most deeply influenced the development of Schopenhauer's views.

Kant argues that it is impossible to establish any really positive conclusions concerning what exists beyond all possible experience, and therefore, according to his theory, every claim to knowledge of the nature of non-empirical reality is without foundation, i.e., empty. Schopenhauer shared this theory with Kant and recognized the problem involved in using the empirical method for solving metaphysical problems. According to Schopenhauer, "Kant's greatest merit is the distinction of the phenomenon from the thing in itself, based upon the proof that between things and us still always stands the intellect, so that they cannot be known as they may be in themselves." Thus, Kant and Schopenhauer believed that the traditional, rational method of investigation was not capable of solving transcendent problems.

In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant demonstrated that rationalism and empiricism are both equally right, but that neither school of thought by itself can arrive at a valid solution because they each disregard what is fundamental in the other: rationalism overlooks the fact that objects of knowledge must be given by the senses and empiricism does not recognize that the sense-perceptions remain blind if they are not thought by the understanding.

9 Ibid., p. 42.

10 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, II, 6.
Perceptions without concepts are blind, concepts without perceptions are empty. ...  

Thus, metaphysics, as traditionally conceived in the past, was impossible for Kant. He therefore felt that the laws which control human existence cannot be applied to deduce and explain existence itself; their validity is only relative to experience.\(^1\)

Kant exhibited these laws, and therefore the whole world, as conditioned by the form of knowledge belonging to the subject; from which it followed, that however far one carried investigation and reasoning under the guidance of these laws, yet in the principal matter, i.e., in knowledge of the nature of the world in itself and outside the idea, no step in advance was made, but one only moved like a squirrel in its wheel. ... We may also say that Kant's doctrine affords the insight that we must seek the end and the beginning of the world, not without, but within us.\(^2\)

Thus, according to Schopenhauer's "Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy," previous philosophers who had striven to transcend the limits of experience through rational inquiry had always failed because the principles upon which they relied related only to phenomena and were incapable of leading them beyond the sphere of empirical reality. The key to the mystery was locked within, not without, and Kant's doctrine of the Ding an sich therefore played an essential part in the evolution of Schopenhauer's own philosophical system.

\(^1\)Heinrich Kaestner, "Knowledge as an Object of Itself," \textit{Ratio}, IV (December, 1962), 114.

\(^2\)Schopenhauer, \textit{The World as Will and Idea}, II, 9-10.

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 10.
From Kant's theory of the Ding an sich, Schopenhauer felt that he could penetrate to the essence or core of reality.

I therefore say that the solution of the riddle of the world must proceed from the understanding of the world itself; that thus the task of metaphysics is not to pass beyond the experience in which the world exists, but to understand it thoroughly, because outer and inner experience is ... the principal source of all knowledge; that therefore the solution of the riddle of the world is only possible through the proper connection of outer with inner experience. .....

According to this quotation then, Schopenhauer also saw the purpose of metaphysics to be the interpretation of inner experience. These ideas, largely borrowed from Kant, therefore laid the groundwork for Schopenhauer's first work, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

Like Kant, Schopenhauer saw the world of experience as the phenomenal world, and as such to him, it was a world of our individual consciousness.

But no object is ever presented to us in a state of complete isolation and detachment. That is to say, all our presentations are related to or connected with other presentations in regular ways. And knowledge or science is precisely knowledge of these regular relations. ... And there must be a sufficient reason for this relatedness of connectedness. Thus the general principle which governs our knowledge of objects or phenomena is the principle of sufficient reason. 15

14 Ibid., p. 20.

This principle of sufficient reason can therefore be called a principle of causation. "... It] is this very assumption a priori that all things must have their reason, which authorizes us everywhere to search for the why. ... Nothing is without reason for its being." 16

Schopenhauer maintained that his idea of causality was not founded upon any single axiom or any single truth. "With him [Schopenhauer] it stands as an inclusive term for four modes of connexion by which the thoroughgoing relativity of phenomena to one another is constituted for our intelligence." 17 These four modes of connection govern the four types of human knowledge; to recognize that the principle is subject to human experience is to be conscious of the fact that this principle cannot be put to a transcendent use. Schopenhauer's definition of the principle of sufficient reason is consequently restricted to the interpretation of the phenomenal world, the world as idea.

We cannot therefore treat it as authorizing us to try to answer questions which take us beyond the limits of experiencable reality; we cannot, for instance, say of the world as a whole that it exists or must exist by reason of something apart from itself. ... 18


17 Thomas Whittaker, Reason and Other Essays (Cambridge, 1934), p. 91.

18 Gardiner, Schopenhauer, pp. 73-74.
Then, according to Schopenhauer, so far as knowledge of phenomena is concerned, the validity of the principle of sufficient reason is beyond challenge.

To seek proof for the Principle of Sufficient Reason, is, moreover, an especially flagrant absurdity, which shows a want of reflection. Every proof is a demonstration of the reason for a judgment which has been pronounced, and which receives the predicate true in virtue precisely of that demonstration. This necessity for a reason is exactly what the Principle of Sufficient Reason expresses. Now if we require a proof of it . . . we find ourselves involved in the circle of exacting a proof of our right to exact a proof.19

The first class of objects or presentations consists of intuitive and empirical objects. These objects are the physical objects which are causally related in space and time and which form the subject matter of science.20 This spatial, temporal, and causal relationship is a function of the mind which organizes the matter of phenomena and sensations according to the a priori forms of space and time.

The forms of these representations are those of the inner and outer sense; namely, Time and Space. But these are only perceptible when filled. Their perceptibility is Matter. . . . If Time were the only form of these representations, there could be no coexistence, therefore nothing permanent and no duration. . . . On the other hand, were Space the sole form of this class of representations, there would be no change; for change or alteration is succession of states, and succession is only possible in Time.21

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19Schopenhauer, Two Essays, p. 5.
20Copleston, A History of Philosophy, VII, 265.
21Schopenhauer, Two Essays, p. 34.
The second class of objects consists of abstract concepts. Although Schopenhauer saw that the forms of space, time, and causality played an indispensable part in our experience, he did not feel that the structure of our knowledge in general could be defined by reference to these forms alone. This concept was based on the fact that our knowledge is not limited to knowledge of a purely perceptual or sensory character, but includes abstract knowledge.22

The third class of objects comprises the a priori intuitions of the forms of space and time. "They are forms of our sensibility, which is to say among other things, that we are so constituted that everything we are aware of in our sense-experience must appear to us in spatial and temporal terms."23 In this class of objects are contained arithmetical and geometrical relations. Arithmetic is dependent upon the law governing the relations between the parts of time; geometry depends upon the law governing position in space.

We can say, therefore, that Schopenhauer's third class of objects are mathematical objects, and that the relevant form of the principle of sufficient reason or ground, which governs our knowledge of geometrical and arithmetical relations, is the law, or rather laws, according to which the parts of space and time are respectively related to one another.24

The fourth class of objects is the subject itself as object of knowledge, the conscious subject; knowledge of the

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22 Gardiner, Schopenhauer, pp. 88-90.
23 Ibid., p. 90.
24 Copleston, A History of Philosophy, VII, 266.
subject is attained directly through self-consciousness.  

Thus, the principle of sufficient reason has four forms: phenomena, or the objects of sense perception; reason, or the objects of rational apprehension; mathematical, or space and time; and self-consciousness. According to Copleston, Schopenhauer's general position is based on Kant's philosophy.

The world is phenomenal, object for a subject. It is to be noted, however, that the principle of sufficient reason applies only within the phenomenal sphere of objects for a subject. It does not apply to the noumenon, metaphenomenal reality, whatever this may be. For it governs relations between phenomena.

The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason is an important work because in it Schopenhauer conceived the foundation for his complete philosophical system; it may thus be regarded as containing the seeds of thought that later blossomed in his principal work, The World as Will and Idea.

In 1818 Schopenhauer composed his most important philosophical work, Die Welt Als Wille und Vorstellung, and he was convinced that he was giving the world the secret of the universe. The work was published early in 1819 and was not an immediate success. Most of the critics were indifferent, and the book did not sell to the general public. The philosophical work consisted of one volume comprising

25Schopenhauer, Two Essays, p. 165.
four sections when it was first published, and later in 1844 an enlarged second edition of the work was published. A third edition was published in 1859 that contained three volumes in which Schopenhauer added supplementary chapters arranged in four divisions to correspond with the four books of the original work. With this third publication of his main work, Schopenhauer finally gained the fame and recognition that he had so long desired.  

The English translation of the German title is somewhat confusing; consequently, the title, *The World as Will and Idea*, needs some clarification. The term "world" is misleading because the term is too narrow in meaning. A more suitable term would be "universe" because Schopenhauer felt that his system was a solution not only to the mystery of the world, but also a solution to the mystery of the whole universe. The term "will" is also confusing because this word usually denotes some kind of purposeful activity on the part of some individual. To use this meaning of will in this manner would be a distortion of Schopenhauer's philosophy.

For he [Schopenhauer] uses "Will" in a much wider sense, so as to include not only deliberate actions... but also (in addition to these) habits and instincts, impulses and tendencies of any and every kind, alike in human life and in animal existence... Schopenhauer passes beyond these to include the unceasing movements, the incessant ebb and flow,
of the unconscious physical universe or entire realm of Nature, both animate and inanimate.\textsuperscript{28}

The German word "Vorstellung" is translated into the English title of Schopenhauer's work as idea. Vorstellung may also be translated into English as representation or presentation, and either of these terms may be preferable in trying to clarify Schopenhauer's definition of the word "idea."

In the first sentence of \textit{The World as Will and Idea}, Schopenhauer makes the following statement:

"The world is my idea:"—this is a truth which holds good for everything that lives and knows, though man alone can bring it into reflective and abstract consciousness. . . . No truth therefore is more certain than this, that all that exists for knowledge, and therefore this whole world, is only object in relation to subject, perception of a perceiver, in a word, idea.\textsuperscript{29}

With this statement Schopenhauer is actually saying that matter has no essence independent of mental perception. This statement also introduces Schopenhauer's concept of subject and object. To Schopenhauer the subject is the perceiver and the object is the perceived: "That which knows all things and is known by none is the subject. Thus it is the supporter of the world . . . for all that exists, exists only for the subject."\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{28}Helen Zimmern, \textit{Schopenhauer} (London, 1932), p. 141.


\textsuperscript{30}Ibid., p. 5.
Schopenhauer, the world is divided into two halves: subjects and objects. The objects are perceived in a relation to space and time, and the subject is present in every percipient being. "It is only so, in Schopenhauer's view, that the compatibility of empirical reality and transcendental ideal-ity can be established."\(^1\) Heinrich Kaestner also sees the connection between Schopenhauer's principle of sufficient reason and his definition of idea:

In all Schopenhauer's discussions the original intention is apparent: namely to prove that the world, as it lies before us, is nothing more than a presentation of the percipient; for—as Schopenhauer tries to prove—the intellect construes the outside world on the basis of an a priori function, namely the law of causality and of predisposed mental forms of space and time.\(^2\)

Thus, Schopenhauer believed that the a priori forms of time, space, and causality can be known by any and all animals, even the least developed, because they are all capable of perceiving objects. But, according to Schopenhauer, the degrees of acuteness and the degrees of knowledge possessed by these percipient beings vary enormously. "... [The] existence of this whole world remains ever dependent upon the first eye that opened, even if it were that of an insect. For such an eye is a necessary condition of the possibility of knowledge, and the whole world exists only in and for knowledge. ..."\(^3\)

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\(^1\)Knox, *The Aesthetic Theories*, p. 125.

\(^2\)Kaestner, "Knowledge as an Object of Itself," p. 133.

\(^3\)Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea*, I, 38.
Schopenhauer believed that one class of ideas belonged to man's consciousness alone; he called this faculty reflection. Reflection is the ability to think in an abstract manner; however, he maintains that reflection still obtains its content from knowledge of perception and is closely related to it. Although reflection and abstract thought separate man from animals, this power of self-consciousness also causes man pain and suffering because only man can live in the future and the past, and only man is conscious of the fact that he will eventually die. Consequently, man can reason, but he cannot use reason or reflection to extend his knowledge; it only enables him to know in the abstract what first becomes known in sense-perception.34

Therefore, Schopenhauer believed that science and other philosophical systems had not explained the "inner nature" of the universe because reason and abstraction cannot go beyond perceived knowledge.

Every explanation which does not ultimately lead to a relation of which no "why" can further be demanded, stops at an accepted qualitas occulta. . . . Every explanation in natural science must ultimately end with . . . complete obscurity. . . . It must leave the inner nature of a stone just as much unexplained as that of a human being. . . . 35

If this is so, there must be two things in the world that cannot be explained by the principle of sufficient reason: the principle of sufficient reason itself in its four forms,

34 Ibid., pp. 36-42. 35 Ibid., p. 106.
and the original source of all phenomena, Kant's Ding an sich. The principle of sufficient reason explains the connections of phenomena, but does not attempt to explain the phenomena themselves. Because of this restriction, Schopenhauer sees a special task for philosophy. "It [philosophy] must therefore consist of a statement in the abstract, of the nature of the whole world, of the whole, and of all the parts." For Schopenhauer, this nature of the whole world, this universal characteristic in all phenomena is the will.

The second book in Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung defines the objectification of the will; to Schopenhauer this will was the essence, the thing-in-itself. Montague argues that Schopenhauer's concept of the will is a type of panpsychism. "... [Panpsychism] has recently been employed as the appellation for the theory that every physical object is, in its inner nature, psychical. ... For Schopenhauer, the panpsychic character of each thing in Nature is will. ..."

This inner core of things cannot be known from without; it must be known from within. This ability to know the will is accomplished through Schopenhauer's division of subject and object.

36Ibid., p. 108.
... [The] meaning for which we seek of that world which is present to us only as our idea, or the transition from the world as mere idea of the knowing subject to whatever it may be besides this, would never be found if the investigator himself were nothing more than the pure knowing subject (a winged cherub without a body). But he is himself rooted in that world; he finds himself in it as an individual, that is to say, his knowledge, which is the necessary supporter of the whole world as idea, is yet always given through the medium of a body....

It follows therefore that if man's body is "rooted" in the world and if the inner core of reality is will, man's body and all his actions are nothing but the manifestation of that will. Hence, this will is only known to the "investigator" through the double knowledge that he has of his own body: the investigator is "rooted" in the world, and he is at the same time a self-conscious, knowing individual; he is a self-conscious subject and a phenomenal object at the same time. If this is so, man is then a phenomenal individual; however, in arguing that he is essentially will and that his body is the objective manifestation of that will, Schopenhauer believed that he had steered a path between the impossible view of a person as being a knowing mind with a body attached, and the equally unacceptable idea that a person can be described only as a physical body. He saw his concept of the will as providing a solution which accounted for the circumstance that man must identify himself with his body as a phenomenon.

38 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, I, 128-129.
in the phenomenal world and which preserved the Idealist
insight that his knowledge of himself as object is pre-
scribed by sensibility and self-consciousness.39

Thus, for Schopenhauer the will is the essence of every-
thing that exists, and the ideas that we see are all the
objectivity of that same will; therefore, the will is only
knowable when it enters the form of phenomena.

The lowest grades of the objectification of will
are to be found in those most universal forces of
nature which partly appear in all matter without
exception, as gravity and impenetrability. . . . Only
their particular manifestations are subordinated to
the principle of sufficient reason. . . . The force
itself lies quite outside the chain of causes and
effects . . . as such, it is groundless, i.e., it
lies outside the chain of causes and outside the
province of the principle of sufficient reason. . . .40

In the higher grades of the objectivity of the will, in-
dividuality becomes more dominant. Plants and animals have
less individuality than man, and the farther down one goes
in degree, the more completely is every trace of the indi-
vidual character lost in the common character of the species.
Finally, in the inorganic kingdom of nature, all individuality
disappears. "Thus every universal, original force of nature
is nothing but a low grade of the objectification of will,
and we call every such grade an eternal Idea in Plato's
sense."41

39 Cardiner, Schopenhauer, pp. 144-152.
41 Ibid., pp. 174-175.
At this point, Schopenhauer introduces the concept of the Platonic Idea. The will objectifies itself at levels of development; these levels are the Platonic Ideas. These Ideas are fixed, eternal patterns, the unchangeable forms of all phenomena, the eternal qualities of all things. Through these Platonic Ideas the will tries to objectify itself in higher degrees:

No victory without conflict: since the higher Idea or objectification of will can only appear through the conquest of the lower . . . Thus everywhere in nature we see strife, conflict, and alternation of victory, and in it we shall come to recognize more distinctly that variance with itself is essential to the will. Every grade of the objectification of will fights for the matter, the space, and the time of the others. Thus the will to live everywhere preys upon itself, and in different forms is its own nourishment, till finally the human race, because it subdues all the others, regards nature as a manufactory for its use.\(^{42}\)

Schopenhauer sees this will to live as a blind, unconscious, striving force in the whole of nature. At the base of this striving is the fact that the will must live on itself for there is nothing else in existence except will, and, according to Schopenhauer, it is a blind, hungry will.

"The theme and moral of the *World as Will and Idea* is that we are part of a world which is the product of a blind and aimless Will, and the scene of the struggle of innumerable species of things for mere survival."\(^{43}\) So, freedom from

\(^{42}\)Ibid., pp. 190-191.

all aim is the nature of the will; it can be characterized by an endless striving so that every attained end is the beginning of a new course. "Eternal becoming, endless flux, characterizes the revelation of the inner nature of the will."\textsuperscript{44}

The third book of The World as Will and Idea is concerned with art as a release from the will; this occurs only through aesthetic contemplation:

\[\text{... } \text{[If] he [man] thus ceases to consider the where, the when, the why, and the whither of things, and looks simply and solely at the what; if, further, he does not allow abstract thought ... to take possession of his consciousness, but, instead of all this, gives the whole power of his mind to perception, sinks himself entirely in this and lets his whole consciousness be filled with the quiet contemplation of the natural object ... then that which is so known is no longer the particular thing as such; but it is the Idea, the eternal form, the immediate objectivity of the will at this grade; and, therefore, he who is sunk in this perception is no longer individual, for in such perception the individual has lost himself; but he is pure, willless, painless, timeless subject of knowledge. ... In such contemplation the particular thing becomes at once the Idea of its species, and the perceiving individual becomes pure subject of knowledge.}\textsuperscript{45}

Thus, the subject and the object become one through this contemplation; the pure subject of knowledge draws nature or art into himself. Therefore, Schopenhauer believed that through art, which reproduces the eternal Ideas of nature, one can escape from the will. \"... [For] Schopenhauer the merit of art resides in its propensity to still the will.\"\textsuperscript{44,45}

\textsuperscript{44}\textit{Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea}, I, 214.
\textsuperscript{45}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 231-232.
Through art the human being . . . becomes divorced from his own individual existence. Schopenhauer is thus saying that aesthetic vision releases us from the bondage of life. This vision comes to us more readily through art because the true artist has the ability to abstract the Idea from the actual object by omitting all the other disturbing elements of contemplation. Consequently, the artist then achieves the same end as nature does; only the true artist can draw out the pure essence or Idea and leave out all the excess perceptions. "If the whole world as idea is only the visibility of will, the work of art is to render this visibility more distinct."

Schopenhauer places the arts in a series of gradations. Architecture is placed among the lower grades of art because it deals with the lower grades of the objectivity of the will: gravity, rigidity, and cohesion. Next in degree comes historical painting and sculpture; these art forms are higher in importance to Schopenhauer because they deal with the Idea in which the will reaches the highest grade of objectification, human beauty. Poetry is next in importance because it comprehends the Idea, the inner nature of man. At this point, it is no surprise to find that Schopenhauer felt that "tragedy is to be regarded . . . as

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the summit of poetical art. . . . [The] end of this highest
achievement is the representation of the terrible side of
life.\footnote{\cite{Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, I, 336.}} Again, one can see Schopenhauer's concern for
pain and suffering.

Schopenhauer believed that music was the epitome of
art. To Schopenhauer music was as direct an objectification
and copy of the will as the world itself, and to him it was
not like the other arts.

He [Schopenhauer] maintains that music is exceptional
in that it does not mirror the Ideas, but plunging
deeper expresses the unfathomable Will itself in
action. Since all the arts present to the mind some
copy of what is in the world, music too must be a
copy, but it is the copy of the Will and not of the
Idea.\footnote{\cite{Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, I, 336.}}

It would seem then that nature and art would provide a
permanent escape from the will, but such is not the case
according to Schopenhauer:

Now the nature of man consists in this, that his
will strives, is satisfied and strives anew, and so
on for ever. Indeed, his happiness and well-being
consist simply in the quick transition from wish to
satisfaction, and from satisfaction to a new wish.
For the absence of satisfaction is suffering, the
empty longing for a new wish, languor, ennui.\footnote{\cite{Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, I, 336.}}

Since to will is to suffer, the solution can be only to cease
to will. If man escapes pain, boredom is just around the
corner. "Why and for what purpose does all this torment and

\footnote{\cite{Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, I, 336.}}
agony exist? It is this: that the will to live . . . must satisfy its craving by feeding upon itself. 61

Art, then, is not a total escape; it delivers man from the will only for moments. Aesthetic contemplation, either of natural objects or works of art, only offers a temporary escape from the slavery of the will. Thus Schopenhauer believed that lasting release from the will can only come about through the renunciation of the will to live.

For Schopenhauer the denial of the will to live becomes the goal for everyone who desires to permanently escape from the will, but this renunciation is not at all an easy task. This process of the renunciation of the will begins when a man becomes conscious of the fact that the will manifests itself in all phenomena:

If that veil of Maya . . . is lifted from the eyes of a man to such an extent that he no longer makes the egotistical distinction between his person and that of others, but takes as much interest in the sufferings of other individuals as in his own . . . then it clearly follows that such a man, who recognises in all beings his own inmost and true self, must also regard the infinite suffering of all suffering beings as his own, and take on himself the pain of the whole world. 52

The knowledge of the whole, the knowledge of the world as a universal will permits man to escape. "Man now attains to


52 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, I, 489.
the state of voluntary renunciation, resignation, true indifference, and perfect will-lessness."

The second step in gaining the state of the ascetic is voluntary and complete chastity; thus, abstinence from sex is also a denial of the will to live. After chastity, asceticism then shows itself further in voluntary and intentional poverty; this poverty is meant to include hunger. For Schopenhauer asceticism might be defined as the "

intentional breaking of the will by the refusal of what is agreeable and the selection of what is disagreeable, the voluntarily chosen life of penance and self-chastisement for the continual mortification of the will." Suffering, then, becomes the solution to the problem of the will to live. "All suffering, since it is a mortification and a call to resignation, has potentially a sanctifying power."

Given these premises, it would seem to follow that Schopenhauer would view suicide as a denial of the will to live, but he argues that suicide expresses a surrender to the will rather than a denial of it:

The suicide wills life, and is only dissatisfied with the conditions under which it has presented itself to him. . . . Just because the suicide cannot give up willing, he gives up living. The will asserts itself here even in putting an end to its own manifestation, because it can no longer assert itself otherwise. . . . Suffering approaches and reveals itself as the possibility of the denial of will; but the will rejects it,

53Ibid., p. 490.
54Ibid., p. 506.
55Ibid., p. 511.
in that it destroys the body... in order that it may remain unbroken.\textsuperscript{56}

The man who commits suicide does so to escape certain worldly evils, and if he could escape from them without killing himself, he would do so. Paradoxically, suicide becomes the expression of a concealed will to live.

Suicide may also be regarded as an experiment—a question which man puts to Nature, trying to force her to an answer. The question is this: What change will death produce in a man's existence and in his insight into the nature of things? It is a clumsy experiment to make; for it involves the destruction of the very consciousness which puts the question and awaits the answer.\textsuperscript{57}

Therefore, the solution to the problem of life is not suicide, but the negation of the joys of life, the desires of the body, and the corresponding acceptance of poverty, chastity, and sainthood. This negation becomes a sort of a voluntary, self-appointed death in life; this is the path to true salvation.

Schopenhauer's pessimistic view of life seems to be based upon two major concepts. First, the pleasures that life yields are essentially transient; as soon as a desire is fulfilled, another desire soon takes its place to torment us:

Human life must be some kind of mistake. The truth of this will be sufficiently obvious if we only remember that man is a compound of needs and necessities hard to satisfy; and that even when they are satisfied,
all he obtains is a state of painlessness, where nothing remains to him but abandonment to boredom. Therefore, happiness is a negative quality, the absence of pain.

The second main concept in Schopenhauer's pessimism is based upon his concept that any individual can live only at the expense of other individuals. The will is a blind, hungry will, feeding upon itself; this causes the well-being of an individual to be dependent upon the suffering of others. "Unless suffering is the direct and immediate object of life, our existence must entirely fail of its aim." Because of these two views, Schopenhauer saw the world as sort of a "penal colony" or penitentiary; the only escape from this imprisonment is through aesthetic contemplation or through the rejection of the will to live.

Certainly, Schopenhauer's system of metaphysical pessimism will always be remembered as perhaps one of the most striking statements of pessimistic thought in the history of philosophy. It is an extreme statement of the problem of suffering and pain, but one cannot say that his system does not contain an element of truth in it; the proof is in the world around us. If Schopenhauer's picture of the human condition is gloomy, it is nevertheless painted with great artistry and skill. Certainly The World as Will and Idea

contains inconsistencies, but it cannot be disregarded as a work of literature and its influence upon later philosophers cannot be denied.
CHAPTER III

HARDY AND SCHOPENHAUER

That Thomas Hardy was not merely a teller of stories cannot be denied by anyone who has carefully read his novels and poems. Certainly, Hardy was an artist; that also cannot be denied, but it is obvious that the aim of the bulk of Hardy's work is to convey philosophical ideas. In this context, it is possible to call Hardy a philosopher although his mind had formed many of the philosophical ideas expressed in his work before he had acquired formal philosophical learning:

In some of his [Hardy's] earliest poems, written at a time when he could barely have known the names of the great thinkers of the past, he was constrained to grapple with metaphysical problems that have been burning in the heart of thinking mankind since the dawn of history.¹

Literature must reflect the interests and ideas of the times, and Hardy's works reflect his attempts to solve some of the questions about the universe that bothered the Victorian thinker. It is simply because Hardy was interested in the "whence," the "how," and the "what" of our existence that he may be called a metaphysician.

Those same trifling adverbs, "whence" and "how"; that little "what," which formed the riddle of the universe

for Thales, still compose the riddle for Schopenhauer; the relation of man to the gods, the form the "how" took in Aeschylus, is still the theme of Hardy. . . . Schopenhauer and Hardy delineate the same country, the one by a relief map, the other by a model of villages and fields, animals and people. . . .

Thus, there seems to be a close intellectual affinity between Arthur Schopenhauer and Thomas Hardy because they were both concerned with describing and understanding the same problems of human existence, a groping after the unknown.

. . . [One] who is familiar with the main points of the Schopenhauerian philosophy, and reads Hardy feels that here is a curious sympathy of outlook of life. Here are two men who view life through the same glasses, dark glasses if you will, lenses that distort if you will, but lenses that are similar, surely.3

According to Brennecke, it is probable that the broad outlines of Hardy's metaphysic were developed before Hardy read Schopenhauer, but it cannot be denied that Hardy's later works, especially Tess of the d'Urbervilles, Jude the Obscure, and most of his poetry, give artistic expression to Schopenhauer's concept of the will to live, the Ding an sich.4 To understand this philosophical relationship between the two men, it is necessary first to describe the development of Hardy's own metaphysic and

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2Helen Garwood, Thomas Hardy: An Illustration of the Philosophy of Schopenhauer (Philadelphia, 1911), pp. 8-9.
3Ibid., p. 10.
4Brennecke, Thomas Hardy's Universe, p. 15.
then to discuss the nature and extent of the philosophical
parallelism between the two writers.

It is safe to say that every man is a product of his
environment, and Thomas Hardy was certainly not the exception.
By the time Hardy was twenty years old, the intellectual
atmosphere in England was undergoing a violent revolution.
Darwin's *Origin of Species* appeared in 1859, and in 1860
there appeared a volume entitled *Essays and Reviews*. It is
an understatement to assert that these two books had a pro-
found effect upon the young Thomas Hardy. The ideas that
were contained in these two works seemed to stress that the
individual human being was of very small significance in the
total scheme of the universe, and most critics agree that
this concept had a great effect upon Hardy's development of
a metaphysic.\(^5\)

For it is not only true that *Essays and Reviews* and
the *Origin of Species* were the most notorious and
influential books of the early sixties; it is also
true that Hardy stated definitely that these books
were of particular importance to him in his young
manhood. When we examine these books carefully, it
becomes evident that they could have destroyed his
faith and forced him into the first formulation of
his "pessimistic" philosophy. . . .\(^6\)

According to Webster, Hardy was extremely affected by these
ideas concerning man's insignificance in the total scheme
of things because he was sensitive to the pain and suffering
of others, both men and animals. As a child, Hardy had been

\(^6\)Rayner Webster, *On a Rocking Chair* (Chicago, 1917).
sensitive to the cruelty of nature, and "reading in Darwin of the struggle going on in all nature ... made him even more sensitive than before to the pain involved in the continuation of life." 7

During the 1860's, Hardy also read John Stuart Mill, Huxley, Spencer, and Lyell.

Conceivably, Hardy also read one of the earliest English reviews of the work of Arthur Schopenhauer. But is is [sic] highly improbable that works his biographer fails to mention had an influence comparable to that of Darwin's hypothesis and that of the Essays and Reviews. 8

This is still a possibility that cannot be overlooked in this study.

When Hardy was twenty years old, he was an orthodox believer and an optimist; by the time he was twenty-six, he had abandoned his orthodox convictions. Hardy's loss of religious convictions had begun in the early 1860's, and by 1866 Hardy had begun to form his own metaphysic. After reading Darwin, Hardy saw that "chance" seemed to be the deciding factor in survival and that "human ethics are not recognized by the law of Nature." 9 Hardy felt that the survivors of nature's struggle were not always the fittest and believed that the law which determined survival operated without regard for human ethics. "We can see Hardy, then, in the late sixties, as a young man with a sense of personal

7Ibid., pp. 43-44.  
8Ibid., pp. 46-47.  
9Ibid., p. 65.
loss. ... He had lost a faith and a church." From Hardy's reading during this period, one can thus see the development of his concept of a monistic universe, governed by blind chance; this is the essence of Hardy's fatalism.

According to Laird, "a fatalist ... is a man who believes that all action everywhere is controlled by the nature of things or by a power superior to things." If this definition is valid, the fatalist would immediately see that there is little that he can do about the power of fate. "It [fatalism] is the doctrine that little, and, in the extreme case nothing, that a man may dream he does of his own volition ... makes the slightest difference to anything that happens either to himself or to any other person or thing."  

Determinism is a different process, trying to explain the same question. "... [Determinism] is the doctrine that every event, including every human action, is the inevitable result of preceding events. ..." Thus, all that happens is caused by what happened before and is in turn a cause for what will happen in the future.

It [determinism] acknowledges, just as does fatalism, that man's struggle against the Will behind things,

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10Granville Hicks, Figures of Transition (New York, 1939), p. 119.
12Ibid., p. 188. 13Ibid.
is of no avail, but it does decree that the laws of cause and effect must not suspend operation. ... [Determinism] seeks to explain conditions which fatalism is content to describe.¹⁴

With these definitions in mind, one can see that Hardy was both a fatalist and a determinist. "The fact ... that his mind fluctuated between fatalism and determinism, and at times accepted both, cannot be held as a nullification of his consistency."¹⁵ Hardy's consistency lies in the fact that he saw the process of existence as a struggle against a force that cares nothing for the needs and desires of individual existence.

This conception is characteristic of all Hardy's work. ... We never feel the characters to be isolated in a purely human world; the conditions of their being, and their being itself, are always engaged ... with an immense background of measureless fatal process, a moving, supporting darkness more or less apparent; it may be only hinted at, but it is always to be felt.¹⁶

Thus, by 1870 Hardy had developed a metaphysic that stressed the lack of orderliness in the universe and the conflict between the individual consciousness and this lack of order.

The ideas and emotions which Hardy cautiously termed his "tentative metaphysic" took shape so gradually that no point in his career can be indicated where the fatalism of his youth gave way to the final

¹⁵Ibid., p. 32.
¹⁶Lascelles Abercrombie, Thomas Hardy (New York, 1964), p. 27.
determinism of his old age. First a fatalist and then a determinist—such are the backgrounds of most articles discussing the earlier and the later Thomas Hardy.17

Schopenhauer's concepts concerning free will and fatalism closely parallel Hardy's fatalistic and deterministic philosophy. According to Schopenhauer, since the will itself never changes and since man is a manifestation of this will, a person can never do anything else or be anything else other than what the will allows him to do or to be. "Accordingly, the whole course of a man's life, in all its incidents great and small, is as necessarily predestined as the course of a clock."18 Therefore, the will predetermines everything, and it is a blind, hungry will. Schopenhauer believed that an understanding of this concept was necessary for a clear understanding of life.

Instead of trying to explain away the fundamental truth of Fatalism by superficial twaddle and foolish evasion, a man should attempt to get a clear knowledge and comprehension of it; for it is demonstrably true, and it helps us in a very important way to an understanding of the mysterious riddle of our life. Predestination and Fatalism do not differ in the main. They differ only in this, that with Predestination the given character and external determination of human action proceed from a rational Being, and with Fatalism from an irrational one. But in either case the result is the same: that happens which must happen.19

17Gilbert Neiman, "Was Hardy Anthropomorphic?" Twentieth Century Literature, II (July, 1956), 86.


19Ibid., p. 393.
It is not difficult to see that both Hardy and Schopenhauer believed that this determination of human action proceeded from an irrational force. It is also not difficult to see how this philosophy would appeal to Thomas Hardy. For Schopenhauer, this force was called "the will to live"; for Hardy, this force was called "fate" in his early years, and in his later life it was called the "Immanent Will." It is the opinion of this study that Hardy read Schopenhauer's philosophy and adopted the German philosopher's terminology and general framework to describe this irrational force that Schopenhauer defined in The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and The World as Will and Idea.

Thomas Hardy was certainly familiar with the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer; this cannot be denied. When Helen Garwood was writing her dissertation at the University of Pennsylvania, she wrote to Hardy and asked about the influence of Schopenhauer's philosophy upon his own metaphysics and his writing:

In a letter which he [Hardy] very courteously sent me [Garwood] in answer to an inquiry, Mr. Hardy speaks of his philosophy being a development from Schopenhauer through later philosophers.... On the one hand, he has not deliberately and consciously set out to give artistic expression to the Schopenhauerian philosophy; on the other he constantly suggests it. Influence is too strong and definite a word for the result attained, sympathy comes nearer to it. There is a noteworthy and observable sympathy between the philosophy of Thomas Hardy and that of Schopenhauer.20

20Garwood, Thomas Hardy: An Illustration, pp. 10-11.
Hardy did not admit to Miss Garwood that he had studied Schopenhauer's philosophy, but now it is known that Hardy read Schopenhauer and studied him carefully; this is a fact that has been discovered since Garwood wrote her dissertation in 1911.

Hardy did not read German with ease; therefore, any influence that Schopenhauer's philosophy had upon Hardy's thinking must be traced to the English translations that were available to him. Schopenhauer had become known to the English public in 1875 through a book written by Helen Zimmern about Schopenhauer's life and his philosophy, and it is possible that Hardy read this book; it cannot be proved.

There had been some talk of Schopenhauer in England during the 'seventies. But the first English version of *Die Welt Als Wille und Vorstellung* was that by Haldane and Kemp, which was published in three volumes in 1883. Hardy bought this book, and it is still in his library. 21

Although Hardy bought this book, one could not prove that he actually read the work unless one had access to Hardy's personal library. One can only assume that Hardy would not have bought Schopenhauer's work unless he intended to read it because Hardy was not an individual who wasted his money.

Although Hardy was a very wealthy man . . . he was parsimonious to the pitch of niggardliness, an

21Rutland, *Thomas Hardy*, p. 93.
ingrained phobia due perhaps to centuries of ancestral peasant upbringing in poverty ridden households. A Christmas gift to the maids... was only 2s. 6d. each, and he was so sparing of coal that there was scarcely ever a good fire at Max Gate... E. E. T. saw him once remove from the fire she had just stoked up all the unburnt coal "lump by lump, arranging the pieces in a neat semi-circle around the hearth front." It is difficult to imagine a man that was so careful with his finances spending money on a book that he did not intend to read, and The World as Will and Idea is certainly not at all a boring book to peruse. If Hardy read the first page of the book, it is probable that he read every page of it. Of course, this cannot be accepted as conclusive proof that Hardy even read any of Schopenhauer's philosophy at all, but in 1957 Carl Weber found some concrete evidence that Schopenhauer's work did greatly interest Hardy.

The first English translation of Schopenhauer's philosophy appeared in 1881. Garrett Droppers and C. A. Dachsel translated some of Schopenhauer's essays, and their book, entitled Select Essays by Arthur Schopenhauer, was published by The Sentinel Company of Milwaukee, Wisconsin in 1881. This company apparently holds the distinction of being the first to print Schopenhauer's philosophy in English. It is also possible that Hardy read these essays, but again it cannot be proved. The only concrete evidence that Hardy read

22Miss E. E. T., The Domestic Life of Thomas Hardy (Beaminster, Dorset, 1963), p. 7.
Schopenhauer was discovered only after Hardy's personal library was sold after his death at an auction in London.23

In 1889 another English translation of Schopenhauer was published:

Mrs. Karl Hillebrand's translation of The Four-fold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason into English finally appeared in London in 1889. It was published by George Bell and Sons. This book was Schopenhauer's third appearance in English, his second London publication, the first English publication of his doctoral dissertation. The book contained nearly four hundred pages. Bound in dull blue cloth, it sold in London for five shillings.24

Hardy bought this book for five shillings in 1889 or 1890, and it is fortunate for this study that the book still survives. Hardy's use of the term "Immanent Will" had made many Hardy scholars think that Schopenhauer was its source, but as Hardy's reply to Helen Garwood's letter shows, he was inclined to be somewhat evasive on that point. The existence of Schopenhauer's books in Hardy's library is strong evidence that Hardy was familiar with at least one of the German philosopher's works.25

After Hardy bought The Fourfold Root, sometime in 1889 or 1890, he signed his name on the title page and made various marks in it. It was Hardy's usual practice to draw a vertical line in the margin of a book when he read something


24Ibid., p. 218.

that greatly interested him; Hardy's copy of this particular work by Schopenhauer had marks on many of the pages, and on some of the pages there are double pairs of vertical marks to emphasize certain important passages.

When the book reached the Colby College Library, all the leaves had been cut open, from the first to the last. Hardy underlined the two words "Sufficient Reason" in the title, and wrote in pencil his own explanation of their meaning: "i.e., Sufficient Reason for the existence of things." . . . [We] can tell that Hardy read all of this book by Schopenhauer and that certain passages held special interest for him. . . . In short, Hardy not only read Schopenhauer but studied him, diligently and long.  

According to Weber, Hardy was most interested in Schopenhauer's concept of the will. In Hardy's copy of The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, the paragraphs discussing the will as the thing in itself on pages 236 and 237 were heavily marked with pairs of vertical marks. This is ample proof that Schopenhauer's concept of the will as being the essence of all phenomena greatly interested Hardy.  

It is possible that Hardy had developed a tentative metaphysic before he read Schopenhauer, but the similarity of the terminology of the two men cannot be denied. "Hardy borrowed the term 'Immanent Will' from Schopenhauer, it is true, but these traits which he

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27 Ibid., 223.
ascribes to it, he observed on the stream of humanity in London long before he was acquainted with German philosophy."

Pierre d'Exideuil agrees with the conclusion that Schopenhauer had a profound effect upon Hardy's thinking:

Hardy, the philosophical poet, found anew in Schopenhauer, the poetic philosopher, his own substance and drew nourishment from it. He found anew his thought at a more highly developed stage, but with the addition of that powerful charm issuing from the artistic temperament of Schopenhauer. Both were prophets of the Immanent Will.

Lionel Stevenson also argues that since Hardy was not familiar with Schopenhauer until about 1884, the German philosopher merely provided a framework and nomenclature for the ideas that Hardy had begun to develop in his youth through his reading of Mill and Darwin. "There can be no doubt that Hardy was strongly influenced by Schopenhauer in constructing his conception of the Immanent Will, and that he pictures for us in a startling poetic way the very essence of Schopenhauer's thinking."

Thomas Hardy's personal writings also offer some interesting clues to the development of his metaphysic. Ideas


30 Lionel Stevenson, Darwin Among the Poets (Chicago, 1932), p. 240.

31 Elliot, Fatalism in the Works of Thomas Hardy, p. 27.
that seem to parallel the pessimistic philosophy of Schopenhauer appear in Hardy's writings as early as 1877. It is possible that Hardy had read about the pessimism of Schopenhauer before 1878, but again it cannot be proved:

The first evidence of its [pessimism's] increasing importance is found in an article on "Schopenhauer and Darwinism" in the Journal of Anthropology for January, 1871. In August of the same year an article on "Optimism and Pessimism" appeared in the Contemporary Review. Before 1878, four other essays dealing with either Schopenhauer, Von Hartmann, or the general subject of pessimism were published in journals with fairly wide circulation.32

By 1877 one can see in Hardy's personal writings the initial development of the concept of the unity of the will. On May 30, 1877, Hardy wrote that "I sometimes look upon all things in inanimate Nature as pensive mutes."33 This statement is certainly similar to Schopenhauer's view of the will existing in animate and inanimate phenomena alike.

In January of 1881, Hardy made a comment concerning style and writing:

This reproduction [of the natural object] is achieved by seeing into the heart of a thing (as rain, wind, for instance), and is realism, in fact, though through being pursued by means of the imagination it is confounded with invention, which is pursued by the same means.34

This statement seems to echo Schopenhauer's concept of

32 Webster, On a Darkling Plain, pp. 89-90.
34 Ibid., p. 147.
aesthetic escape from the will by viewing the Platonic Ideas in nature, the essence of all phenomena.

By 1885 one can see the maturation of Hardy's so-called "pessimistic" metaphysic. On May 28 of this year he made the following statement:

This hum of the wheel—the roar of London! What is it composed of? Hurry, speech, laughter, moans, cries of little children... Some wear jewels and feathers, some wear rags. All are caged birds; the only difference is the size of the cage.35

This view of human existence is certainly similar to Schopenhauer's concept of the world as a gigantic "penal colony." Are these similarities in thought merely coincidence? It is the opinion of this study that the effect of Schopenhauer's philosophy had begun to influence Hardy as early as 1883, and possibly even before this date. In "The Pedestrian," a poem written about an incident that occurred in 1883, Hardy mentions Schopenhauer's name:

"A student was I—of Schopenhauer,
Kant, Hegel,—and the fountained bower
Of the Muses, too, knew my regard:
But ah—I fear me
The grave gapes near me!... Would I could this gross sheath discard,
And rise an ethereal shape, unmarred!"36

This poem would seem to indicate that Hardy was familiar with the three German metaphysicians as early as 1883.

On July 11, 1887, Hardy stated that "it is the on-going—i.e. the 'becoming'—of the world that produces its sadness.

35Ibid., p. 171.
If the world stood still at a felicitous moment there would be no sadness in it."37 This idea can also be compared with Schopenhauer's concept of the ever striving, never satisfied will to live. This blind striving of the will is also mentioned by Hardy in 1901. "My own interest lies largely in non-rationalistic subjects, since non-rationality seems, so far as one can perceive, to be the principle of the Universe."38

In a letter sent to and printed in The Academy and Literature in 1902, Hardy made the following statement concerning the aimlessness of the will's striving for manifestation in phenomena:

Far be it from my wish to distrust any comforting fantasy, if it can barely be tenable. But alas, no profound reflection can be needed to detect the sophistry in M. Maeterlinck's argument, and to see that the original difficulty recognized by thinkers like Schopenhauer, Hartmann, Haeckle, etc., and by most persons called pessimists, remains unsurmounted. Pain has been, and pain is: no new sort of morals in Nature can remove pain from the past and make it pleasure for those who are its infallible estimators, the bearers thereof. And no injustice, however slight, can be atoned for by her future generosity, however ample, so long as we consider Nature to be, or stand for, unlimited power. The exoneration of an omnipotent Mother by her retrospective justice becomes an absurdity when we ask, what made the foregone injustice necessary to her Omnipotence?39

In the Apology, written as the preface to Late Lyrics and Earlier in 1922, Hardy admitted that he had great respect

38Ibid., p. 309.  
39Ibid., p. 315.
for the German philosopher of pessimism. "I repeat that I
forlornly hope so, notwithstanding the supercilious regard
of hope by Schopenhauer, von Hartmann, and other philosophers
down to Einstein who have my respect." 40

Thus, one sees that Hardy read, studied, and respected
the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. One also sees that
as Hardy matured, and probably because of Schopenhauer's
influence, he altered his initial fatalistic metaphysic to
include the concept of the will as the ultimate force in
the universe. "... [Both Schopenhauer and Hardy] are
determinists, both look upon Will as the motive-power
behind the universe, both describe this Will as blind,
and both are pessimists." 41 Yet both men resented being
called pessimists; can there be any doubt about it? Is it
pessimistic to claim to see the truth about reality?
Schopenhauer did not think so:

I shall be told ... that my philosophy is comfort-
less because I speak the truth; and people prefer to
be assured that everything the Lord has made is good.
Go to the priests, then, and leave philosophers in
peace! At any rate, do not ask us to accommodate
our doctrines to the lessons you have been taught.
That is what those rascals of sham philosophers will
do for you. Ask them for any doctrine you please,
and you will get it. Your University professors are
bound to preach optimism; and it is an easy and
agreeable task to upset their theories. 42

40Thomas Hardy, Thomas Hardy's Personal Writings, edited
by Harold Orel (Lawrence, Kansas, 1966), p. 56.
41Herbert Grimsditch, Character and Environment in the
42Schopenhauer, "On the Sufferings of the World," The
Thomas Hardy also resented being called a pessimist.

In a conversation with William Archer, Hardy made the following statement:

For instance, people call me a pessimist; and if it is pessimism to think, with Sophocles, that "not to have been born is best," then I do not reject the designation. I never could understand why the word "pessimism" should be such a red rag to many worthy people; and I believe, indeed, that a good deal of the robustious, swaggering optimism of recent literature is at bottom cowardly and insincere. . . . But my pessimism; if pessimism it be, does not involve the assumption that the world is going to the dogs. . . . On the contrary, my practical philosophy is distinctly meliorist. . . . When we have got rid of a thousand remediable ills, it will be time enough to determine whether the ill that is irremediable outweighs the good. 

Thus, Hardy did not consider himself to be a pessimist, but considered himself to be a "meliorist."

The hope for change and improvement of man's position in the universe is the basic difference between the philosophies of Schopenhauer and Hardy. Schopenhauer offers man escape from the will through aesthetic contemplation and through denial of the will to live. Hardy offers man a different solution to the same problem.

That the Unconscious Will of the Universe is growing aware of Itself I believe I may claim as my own idea solely—at which I arrived by reflecting that what has already taken place in a fraction of the whole (i.e. so much of the world as has become conscious) is likely to take place in the mass; and there being no Will outside the mass—that is, the Universe—the whole Will becomes conscious thereby; and ultimately, it is to be hoped, sympathetic.

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43William Archer, Real Conversations (London, 1904), pp. 46-47.

44Florence Hardy, The Life of Thomas Hardy, p. 335.
Thus, one can observe that Hardy founded his evolutionary meliorism upon the concept that since the universe is constantly in the process of change, the will, which is identical with the universe, also will change. Ultimately, he hoped that the will itself would become conscious, a concept that Schopenhauer could not have accepted. "It was this optimistic conception which Hardy regarded as his most valuable and original contribution to thought."45

If Hardy really had hope that the will would eventually become conscious, it would be erroneous to say that pessimism is the main philosophical parallel between Hardy and Schopenhauer. If pessimism were all that the two men had in common, why not compare Hardy with other pessimists or look for parallels of thought in ancient philosophies? There were certainly many pessimists before Schopenhauer, and to confine this study to one aspect, i.e., pessimism, would be a mistake. The pessimistic tone in literature is nothing new; the concept of a blind brute force called the will was a new concept in 1833, and this is the common denominator between Hardy and Schopenhauer. The will is the foundation, the essence of the universe, for both men, and for both men, it is a blind, aimless will. Thus, according to Brenneck, "the place of both writers in the world of thought, as well

as in the significance of their message, is determined by the fact that both are prophets of the Immanent Will. 

Both Hardy and Schopenhauer stress the fact that man has certain instincts that can never be totally satisfied. The general desire is for a state of happiness, yet this desire is always in excess of its gratification. One would certainly expect to find a reason for this dilemma, but it is just this lack of purpose or reason that bothered Schopenhauer and Hardy. The lack of justice, the lack of purpose, and the lack of gratification for man's needs and desires account for the so called "pessimistic" tone in the philosophy of Schopenhauer and the novels and poetry of Thomas Hardy.47

Therefore, one sees in the work of Hardy and Schopenhauer the concept of a monistic universe, a concept based upon the metaphysical oneness of the will. All phenomena, animate and inanimate, and all events, however separated in space and time, are to be viewed as essential parts of one unified system. However, this system feeds upon itself; thus, this system results in conflict, and conflict, in turn, results in suffering and pain. The system has no regard for human happiness, welfare, or even existence, and because of man's self consciousness, he can see this meaningless suffering.

46 Brennecke, Thomas Hardy's Universe, p. 16.
47 Garwood, Thomas Hardy: An Illustration, p. 23.
A detailed study of almost any one of Hardy's later novels will illustrate his conviction that the world we live in is an unreasonable and inharmonious one. This study will attempt an examination of two representative novels, *Tess of the D'Urbervilles* and *Jude the Obscure*, to show how Schopenhauer's concept of the will affected Hardy's writing.
CHAPTER IV

TESS OF THE D'URBERVILLES AND JUDE THE OBSCURE:
AN EXPRESSION OF SCHOPENHAUER'S PHILOSOPHY

Tess of the D'Urbervilles was published in 1891; the
serial form of the novel was printed first in the Graphic
from July 4 to December 10 of that year. Purdy states that
the idea for the novel may have originated in Hardy's mind
as early as 1888, and by 1889, it is apparent that the
novel was well under way. These dates are important to
this study because they illustrate the fact that Hardy was
conceivably familiar with Schopenhauer's philosophy by the
time Tess of the D'Urbervilles was begun. The World as
Will and Idea had been printed in London in 1883, and it
is more than probable that Hardy had read his personal
copy of the work before he began work on the novel in 1888.

On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
was published in England in 1889, and Weber states that
Hardy had bought this work by 1890. A reading of either
of these two works by Schopenhauer would account for Hardy's
expression of Schopenhauer's concepts in Tess of the
D'Urbervilles.

1Richard Purdy, Thomas Hardy: A Bibliographical Study
The most obvious proof that Hardy was conscious of Schopenhauer's philosophy by the time he had begun *Tess of the D'Urbervilles* occurs in the fourth phase of the novel, when Hardy describes the intellectual characteristics of Angel Clare: "His creed of determinism was such that it almost amounted to a vice, and quite amounted, on its negative side, to a renunciative philosophy which had cousinship with that of Schopenhauer and Leopardi."\(^2\) The fact that Hardy mentions Schopenhauer's name is an indication that he was at least aware of the existence of the German philosopher, and the use of the word "renunciative" indicates that Hardy was familiar with Schopenhauer's concept of the rejection of the will to live. This renunciation of the will is certainly the foundation of Schopenhauer's philosophy and is the only solution given in his philosophy whereby man can escape from the will. This escape is only possible because Schopenhauer believed that perception was the creative principle underlying all visible phenomena; i.e., the world is idea. Schopenhauer's concept of metaphysical idealism can readily be found in *Tess of the D'Urbervilles*.

In the first phase of *Tess of the D'Urbervilles*, Hardy describes Joan Durbeyfield's search for her "shiftless husband" at Rolliver's inn:

To discover him at Rolliver's, to sit there for an hour or two... made her happy... Troubles and other realities took on themselves a metaphysical impalpability, sinking to mere mental phenomena for serene contemplation, and no longer stood as pressing concretions which chafed body and soul.3

Hardy's concept of idealism is further expressed in the second phase of the novel, when he states that "... the world is only a psychological phenomenon..."4 Again in the third phase of the novel, Hardy stresses this idealism and the connection between the knowing subject and the object. "Tess was the merest stray phenomenon to Angel Clare as yet -- a rosy warming apparition which had only just acquired the attribute of persistence in his consciousness."5

The relationship of the knowing subject to the object perceived is a concept that Schopenhauer explains in great detail in On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and in The World as Will and Idea:

That which knows all things and is known by none is the subject. Thus it is the supporter of the world, that condition of all phenomena, of all objects which is always pre-supposed throughout experience; for all that exists, exists only for the subject. ... But his body is object, and therefore from this point of view we call it idea.6

Thus, Schopenhauer states that the object is known by the subject, and it therefore lies within the principle of sufficient reason; yet the subject is the "knower" and never the "known" because the knowing subject is not an object of

3 Ibid., p. 18.  4 Ibid., p. 72.  5 Ibid., p. 109.

perception. These are the two inseparable halves of Schopenhauer's idealism; Hardy expresses the same concept of idealism in *Tess of the D'Urbervilles*.

In the second phase of *Tess of the D'Urbervilles*, one finds a statement that clearly expresses Schopenhauer's concept of the division between the "knower" and the "known."

She [Tess] was not an existence, an experience, a passion, a structure of sensations, to anybody but herself. To all humankind besides Tess was only a passing thought. Even to friends she was no more than a frequently passing thought. If she made herself miserable the livelong night and day it was only this much to them—"Ah, she makes herself unhappy."

This quotation expresses the concept that Tess was only an idea to other perceivers; as a subject, the "knower," she was known by no one.

Hardy's most obvious statement concerning metaphysical idealism occurs when he describes the developing affection between Angel and Tess at Talbothay's dairy.

Many besides Angel have learnt that the magnitude of lives is not as to their external displacements, but as to their subjective experiences. The impressionable peasant leads a larger, fuller, more dramatic life than the pachydermatous king. Looking at it thus he [Angel] found that life was to be seen of the same magnitude here as elsewhere.

Schopenhauer expresses the same concept of the metaphysical unity of phenomena in the third book of *The World as Will and Idea*, when he discusses the nature of idealism.

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8Ibid., p. 130.
and the escape from the will through perception of the beauty in nature. "Thus all difference of individuality so entirely disappears, that it is all the same whether the perceiving eye belongs to a mighty king or to a wretched beggar; for neither joy nor complaining can pass that boundary with us." It is interesting to notice that both Hardy and Schopenhauer use the analogy of the relationship between a king and a peasant to illustrate the effect of the idealistic viewpoint. "It is then all one whether we see the sun set from the prison or from the palace."  

Hardy's concept of the importance of the perceiver in the idealistic framework is expressed when he describes Tess at Talbothay's dairy. "Upon her sensations the whole world depended to Tess; through her existence all her fellow-creatures existed, to her. The universe itself only came into being for Tess on the particular day in the particular year in which she was born."  

Schopenhauer's concept of the importance of the perceiver in his system of idealism is similar in both content and wording:

Suns and planets without an eye that sees them, and an understanding that knows them, may indeed be spoken of in words, but for the idea, these words are absolutely meaningless. ... And yet, the

9Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, I, 256.
10Ibid., p. 255.
11Hardy, Tess of the D'Urbervilles, p. 130.
Thus, for Hardy and Schopenhauer the world is no more than a psychological phenomenon; the world is idea.

The world as will represents the other half of Schopenhauer's philosophy. For Schopenhauer, the will gives the universe its metaphysical oneness. "For the will denotes that which is the inner nature of everything in the world, and the one kernel of every phenomenon." This will objectifies itself in every phenomenon and forms a bond of unity between everything.

Although Schopenhauer knows nothing about the term monism, which was of later invention, and very rarely uses the expression immanent, yet his whole philosophy is permeated by the conception of a monistic universe, based upon the Immanence of the Will. Thus, according to Brennecke, Schopenhauer's world view is monistic and is based upon the will.

Thomas Hardy also saw the oneness of the universe and the immanence of the will.

That Hardy's world-view is Idealistic Monism is evidenced by the frequency with which the epithet "Immanent" is applied to the Will. The conception of oneness and immanence in the Schopenhauer-Hardy cosmology are inseparably bound together: each is a necessary corollary and consequence of the

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other, and both are of equal importance in the work of each of the two writers.\textsuperscript{15}

Hardy's concept of the unity of the universe appears throughout \textit{Tess of the D'Urbervilles}. In the first phase of the novel, Hardy describes the countryside as Tess walks back to Trantridge with her companions.

They followed the road with a sensation that they were soaring along in a supporting medium, possessed of original and profound thoughts, themselves and surrounding nature forming an organism of which all the parts harmoniously and joyously interpenetrated each other. They were as sublime as the moon and stars above them, and the moon and stars were as ardent as they.\textsuperscript{16}

Hardy uses the concept of the oneness of the will again in the second phase of the novel after Tess has left Trantridge. Again Hardy expresses the unity between man and all phenomena:

> On these lonely hills and dales her quiescent glide was of a piece with the element she moved in. Her flexuous and stealthy figure became an integral part of the scene. At times her whimsical fancy would intensify natural processes around her till they seemed a part of her own story. Rather they became a part of it; for the world is only a psychological phenomenon, and what they seemed they were.\textsuperscript{17}

This quotation explicitly expresses Hardy's \textit{idea} about the subject-object relationship and Hardy's concept of the unity of the will are obviously stressed.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 66.

\textsuperscript{16} Hardy, \textit{Tess of the D'Urbervilles}, p. 55.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., p. 72.
Hardy's concept of the unity in nature is again present in the third phase of *Tess of the D'Urbervilles*. He now attempts to show the connection or the oneness of phenomena through the use of personification.

It was a typical summer evening in June, the atmosphere being in such delicate equilibrium and so transmissive that inanimate objects seemed endowed with two or three senses, if not five. There was no distinction between the near and the far, and an auditor felt close to everything within the horizon. 18

According to Schopenhauer, after one can see that the world is will, he should no longer consider himself to be an individual phenomenon, existing in a vacuum. The individual then loses his egocentricity and has compassion for all living beings. Since the world is will, one shares a common element with all phenomena:

If that veil of Maya, the *principium individuationis*, is lifted from the eyes of a man to such an extent that he no longer makes the egotistical distinction between his person and that of others, but takes as much interest in the sufferings of other individuals as in his own, and therefore is not only benevolent in the highest degree, but even ready to sacrifice his own individuality whenever such a sacrifice will save a number of other persons, then it clearly follows that such a man, who recognises in all beings his own inmost and true self, must also regard the infinite sufferings of all suffering beings as his own, and take on himself the pain of the whole world. 19

Through the character of Angel Clare, Hardy seems to express a philosophy that closely resembles Schopenhauer's

18 Ibid., p. 103.
concept of the suffering in the world. Angel Clare, in part, sees the unity of all phenomena, and he seems to be aware of and sensitive to the suffering of his fellow beings.

This consciousness upon which he had intruded was the single opportunity of existence ever vouchsafed to Tess by an unsympathetic First Cause—her all; her every and only chance. How then should he look upon her as of less consequence than himself; as a pretty trifle to caress and grow weary of; and not deal in the greatest seriousness with the affection which he knew that he had awakened in her—so fervid and so impressionable as she was under her reserve; in order that it might not agonize and wreck her?20

Certainly it seems that Hardy shared the beliefs with Schopenhauer—that if one can see the metaphysical oneness of the will, one can have pity and compassion for other beings. According to Osgerby, Hardy saw his age's main defect as being a lack of pity. The cruelty of life is certainly a theme expressed in most of Hardy's works.21

In *Tess of the D'Urbervilles* Hardy also employs descriptive metaphors and similes to express the phenomenological connection between the perceiver and the object of perception. Anderson classifies these devices as metaphors of enlargement and metaphors of diminution.

We have ... simple metaphors that enlarge and those that minimize, expressing ... the close relationship between past and present, between the


species and the individual, between human life and all life, and between human life and landscape. An excellent example of a metaphor of enlargement occurs when Angel and Tess walk together at the dairy.

"She was no longer the milkmaid, but a visionary essence of woman—a whole sex condensed into one typical form." Here Hardy expresses the relationship between the species and the individual. Later in the novel, Hardy reduces Tess and creates a symbolic diminution when he compares her to a fly. "Not quite sure of her direction Tess stood still upon the hemmed expanse of verdant flatness, like a fly on a billiard table..." Thus, one can see Hardy expanding and diminishing a character to emphasize the unity of the will. Although Hardy was obviously impressed with the unity he saw in nature, he was apparently equally impressed with the blindness and strife of the will feeding upon itself.

Because Hardy, like Schopenhauer, saw the causality of the universe governed by a blind will, Hardy saw and wrote about the cruelty and suffering in the world. If his novels have an ironic tone, it is only because he saw the will as an unconscious force.


23 Hardy, Tess of the D'Urbervilles, p. 111.

24 Ibid., p. 89.
In the early phase of its history, irony was the voluntary purpose of man's conduct or the willful performance of the gods; in Hardy, irony is unwilled. It [injustice] appears to be but a circumstance of the relationship between the individual and the universe, the effect of an unconscious and blundering Prime Cause.\(^{25}\)

This unconscious aspect of the "Prime Cause" is described early in *Tess of the D'Urbervilles* when Hardy describes the Durbeyfield children.

All these young souls were passengers in the Durbeyfield ship—entirely dependent on the judgment of the two Durbeyfield adults for their pleasures, their necessities, their health, even their existence. . . . Some people would like to know whence the poet whose philosophy is in these days deemed as profound and trustworthy as his song is breezy and pure, gets his authority for speaking of "Nature's holy plan."\(^{26}\)

In the second phase of the novel, Tess is seduced by Alec in *The Chase*, and Hardy makes the following statement about the aimlessness of the will.

But, might some say, where was Tess's guardian angel? where [sic] was the providence of her simple faith? Perhaps . . . he was talking, or he was pursuing, or he was in a journey, or he was sleeping. . . .\(^{27}\)

Here one can see that Hardy clearly viewed the will as an unconscious force. On the other hand, at times Hardy's view of the will seems to be ambivalent. In *Tess of the D'Urbervilles* and *Jude the Obscure*, Hardy's world seems excessively cruel, even antagonistic to individual need;


\(^{27}\)Ibid., p. 62.
it appears to be a world in which chance becomes a malevolent rather than an indifferent force. This view is plainly expressed in the last paragraph of *Tess of the D'Urbervilles*. "Justice' was done, and the president of the Immortals, in Aeschylean phrase, had ended his sport with Tess."²⁸ This quotation seems to imply a will with a purpose, indeed a malicious purpose.

Yet, with all the cruelty, the pain, and the suffering that one finds in *Tess of the D'Urbervilles*, Hardy's view of life is not totally destitute of hope; there is a momentary escape from the will. Almost every character in the novel attempts to escape from the suffering of the will to live. Jack Durbeyfield and his wife, Joan, try to escape by drinking at Rolliver's. Even Angel Clare uses music and the dairy as a sort of pastoral escape. But it is Tess who escapes momentarily through the contemplation of natural beauty. She can see the sublime in nature and can for the moment escape from the will.

She knew how to hit to a hair's breadth that moment of evening when the light and the darkness are so evenly balanced that the constraint of day and the suspense of night neutralize each other, leaving absolute mental liberty. It is then that the plight of being alive becomes attenuated to its least possible dimensions.²⁹

In the third phase of the novel, Tess again mentions escape from the will through aesthetic contemplation; it

²⁸Ibid., p. 330.  
²⁹Ibid., p. 72.
is a perfect example of Schopenhauer's concept of the sublime in nature.

"A very easy way to feel 'em go," continued Tess is to lie on the grass at night and look straight up at some big bright star; and, by fixing your mind upon it, you will soon find that you are hundreds and hundreds o' miles away from your body, which you don't seem to want at all."30

Thus, one can observe that Tess was sympathetic with nature and had the ability to escape from the will by entering into the innermost being of an object; she perceived nature in the Schopenhauerian sense; i.e., she "became" it. "It [sympathy] includes 'charity' ... and is an attraction to what is painful and pathetic in man's longing for survival, and of course a oneness with all nature."31

This oneness with all nature, this charity, and this sympathy are also shared by another one of Hardy's famous characters, Jude Fawley.

There are traces of Schopenhauerian idealism to be found in Jude the Obscure, but the examples are fewer and less obvious than the passages found in Tess of the D'Urberville. After Jude Fawley seduces Arabella, he begins to discover the baseness of her character. "For his own soothing he kept up a factitious belief in her. His idea of her was the thing of most consequence, not Arabella herself. . . ."32

30 Ibid., p. 102.


The real tragedy of Jude Fawley is caused by his sensitive nature. Because of Jude's abnormally sensitive personality, his defeats and sufferings are magnified. Hardy's concept of suffering is exemplified in Jude and is also shared by Schopenhauer:

Thus, in proportion as knowledge attains to distinctness, as consciousness ascends, pain also increases, and therefore reaches its highest degree in man. And then, again, the more distinctly a man knows, the more intelligent he is, the more pain he has; the man who is gifted with genius suffers most of all.\(^{33}\)

Thus, Jude suffers more than the other characters in the novel because of his intelligence and sensitivity.

Jude's intelligence also permits him to perceive the oneness of the will, even when he is a small boy. When he is hired to frighten the rooks from Mr. Troutham's farm, Jude is a complete failure because he has sympathy for other living beings.

Why should he frighten them away? They took upon more and more the aspect of gentle friends and pensioners—the only friends he could claim as being in the least degree interested in him, for his aunt had often told him that she was not.\(^{34}\)

Jude sees that the birds are part of the universal will to live and that they suffer too. The individual that has sympathy for other creatures sees that

\[\ldots\text{the difference between him who inflicts the suffering and him who must bear it is only the phenomenon, and does not concern the thing-in-itself,}\]

\(^{33}\text{Schopenhauer, } \text{The World as Will and Idea, I, 400.}\)

\(^{34}\text{Hardy, Jude the Obscure, p. 19.}\)
for this is the will living in both. ... The in-
flicter of suffering and the sufferer are one.$35

Young Jude Fawley is the perfect representation of
Schopenhauer's concept of sympathy for other beings.

Though Farmer Troutham had just hurt him, he
was a boy who could not himself bear to hurt anything.
He had never brought home a nest of young birds with-
out lying awake in misery half the night after. ... He
could scarcely bear to see trees cut down or lopped,
from a fancy that it hurt them. ... He carefully
picked his way on tiptoe among the earthworms, without
killing a single one.$36

Later in the novel, Jude is again portrayed by Hardy
as a character aware of the unity of the will. After Jude
has killed the pig in Part I of Jude the Obscure, he realizes
that "the inflicter of suffering and the sufferer are one."

The white snow, stained with the blood of his fellow-
mortal, wore an illogical look to him as a lover of
justice, not to say a Christian; but he could not see
how the matter was to be mended. No doubt he was, as
his wife had called him, a tender-hearted fool.$37

Schopenhauer's concept of the will to live is also
expressed in Jude the Obscure. According to Schopenhauer's
essay, "On the Sufferings of the World," the material basis
of happiness is "bodily pleasure" or "bodily pain." He
restricts this basis to health, food, protection from wet
and cold, and the satisfaction of the sexual instinct. Thus,
self maintenance is the first instinct of the will to live,

$35$Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, I, 449.
$36$Hardy, Jude the Obscure, p. 21.
$37$Ibid., p. 70.
and after man has made provision for that, he only strives toward propagation of the species.38

Arabella Donn is a character that perfectly represents Schopenhauer's concept of the will to live. Her will to live compels her to make Jude her husband. Her representation as an example of the will to live is also expressed when Jude asks her why she carries the cochin's egg near her bosom, and she answers, "I suppose it is natural for a woman to want to bring live things into the world."39 Thus, Arabella is representative of both Schopenhauer's concept of self maintenance and his concept of the sexual instinct as an expression of the will to live.

The business of life is to reproduce life; existence is for the sake of existence. Nature, seeking only to prolong the species, has given this function preeminently to woman. Hence woman's instinctive assertion of charm against which the intelligence of man revolts but to which his instincts succumb. . . . Love, the sexual attraction, forms the chief motive in Hardy's tragedies because . . . it embodies the conflict of reason and intuition. The earlier novels, in which these ideas were already implicit, were written before Schopenhauer was known in England, but the resemblances between the later books, notably Jude, and the teachings of the German philosopher are so close as almost to rule out of consideration the possibility of their being due simply to coincidence.40


39 Hardy, Jude the Obscure, p. 59.

Schopenhauer also believed that since the will to live is blind and striving, it can only exist through constant destruction because every grade of the objectification of the will fights for the matter, space, and the time of the others. Indeed, for Schopenhauer, nature existed only through conflict and suffering.

... [Each] animal can only maintain its existence by the constant destruction of some other. Thus the will to live everywhere preys upon itself, and in different forms is its own nourishment, till finally the human race, because it subdues all the others, regards nature as a manufactory for its use.41

Jude the Obscure is definitely concerned with suffering in the world, and Hardy clearly gives expression to Schopenhauer's concept of the cause of this suffering in the novel. Obviously, Arabella and Sue Bridehead are the instruments of the will to live in the novel, and their desires cause great suffering for Jude. However, the tragedy of the novel is caused by Jude's consciousness of suffering. After Jude has been berated by his aunt for losing his job at Troutham's farm, he understands, but finds it difficult to accept, the idea of the will feeding upon itself. "Nature's logic was too horrid for him to care for. That mercy towards one set of creatures was cruelty towards another sickened his sense of harmony."42

41Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, I, 192.
42Hardy, Jude the Obscure, p. 22.
The most emphatic statement concerning Schopenhauer's concept of the striving will occurs in Part V of *Jude the Obscure*. This statement occurs when Jude and Sue are forced to sell their furniture as they leave Aldbrickham. After Sue's pet pigeons had been sold to a poulterer, she stopped by his shop, released the birds, and then exclaimed to Jude, "'It was so foolish of me! Oh Why should Nature's law be mutual butchery!'" Obviously, Sue was also aware of the strife and conflict in the will to live.

The blindness and unconsciousness of the will are most vividly expressed in Part IV of *Jude the Obscure*. Sue finally realized "... that the first cause worked automatically like a somnambulist, and not reflectively like a sage... Jude called this first cause "senseless circumstance," but Schopenhauer's term "will" would also be appropriate.

The theme of the renunciation of the will to live is dominant in *Jude the Obscure*. For Schopenhauer, there was escape from the will through art, nature, and asceticism. Jude is aware that renunciation is necessary for happiness, and it is interesting to note that Hardy uses the term "renunciation" repeatedly in the novel.

Jude left in the afternoon, hopelessly unhappy. But he had seen her [Sue] and sat with her. Such intercourse as that would have to content him for the

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43Ibid., p. 304.  
44Ibid., p. 336.
remainder of his life. The lesson of renunciation it was necessary and proper that he, as a parish priest, should learn. Of course, the will to live is stronger than Jude's intentions, and he can find no escape. Unlike Tess, Jude does not find escape from the will through the contemplation of nature, and he does not have the strength of character for asceticism; consequently, there is no escape for Jude Fawley except through death.

The desire to renounce the will to live is most forcefully expressed in the character of Jude's child, Little Time. Of course, Schopenhauer did not believe that suicide was the true denial of the will to live.

We have already seen that as life is always assured to the will to live, and as sorrow is inseparable from life, suicide, the wilful destruction of the single phenomenal existence, is a vain and foolish act; for the thing-in-itself remains unaffected by it, even as the rainbow endures however fast the drops which support it for the moment may change.

However, for Little Time, suicide was the only escape; thus, he becomes Hardy's symbol of the wish not to live. Jude tried to explain this concept to Sue.

"It was in his nature to do it. The doctor says there are such boys springing up amongst us--boys of a sort unknown in the last generation--the outcome of new views of life. They seem to see all its terrors before they are old enough to have staying power to resist them. He says it is the beginning of the coming universal wish not to live."


47*Hardy, Jude the Obscure*, p. 331.
Hardy's Jude the Obscure is an expression of Schopenhauer's ideas. The blind, unconscious will to live causes undeserved suffering because it feeds upon itself. Jude and Sue realize that renunciation is the answer to the will, but neither has the strength to break the will. Sue realizes that renunciation is the key to happiness, but her self-chastisement only brings misery and pain, not happiness. After Sue's children have been killed by Little Time, her guilt leads to a neurotic desire for suffering, and she tells Jude that self-renunciation is necessary.

"I have thought that we have been selfish, careless, even impious, in our courses, you and I. Our life has been a vain attempt at self-delight. But self-abnegation is the higher road... Self-renunciation—that's everything! I cannot humiliate myself too much. I should like to prick myself all over with pins and bleed out the badness that's in me!"

Of course, Sue's renunciation does not produce the happiness that Schopenhauer predicts; it is merely pain for the sake of pain. She wants to punish herself because of her neurotic attitude toward sex, and she becomes a masochist instead of a saint.

Her own happiness, as she half realizes at last, depends on reenactment of this pattern: to live with a man in an ostensibly sexless and fraternal intimacy, arouse his sexual desire, lead him on, reject him, and then do penance for the suffering she thus has caused.

Thus, Sue causes suffering so that she can suffer herself. She wants to subject herself to punishment and horror;

\[48\] Ibid., p. 339.
\[49\] Albert J. Guerard, Thomas Hardy (Cambridge, 1949), p. 111.
Guerard believes that this "moral masochism" was caused by her sexual maladjustment. In any case, the renunciation that Sue seeks does not serve as an escape from the will in the novel because her suffering only causes more suffering. Only Little Time escapes, and his renunciation of the will to live is actually, according to Schopenhauer, an expression of the will to live.

Although Tess of the D'Urbervilles and Jude the Obscure contain many ideas that are identical with Schopenhauer's philosophy, Hardy's poetry is the source where one finds the most numerous parallels between the two philosophers; consequently, this study would not be complete without an investigation of Hardy's poems.

\[50\text{Ibid., p. 112.}\]
CHAPTER V

THOMAS HARDY'S POETRY: AN EXPRESSION OF
PHILOSOPHICAL DEVELOPMENT

After the publication of Jude the Obscure in 1895, Thomas Hardy abandoned writing novels and devoted his full attention to poetry, his first love. Therefore, the bulk of his poetry was written after 1895; however, he did write some poetry when he was a young man. Hardy's early poems were written in the 1860's, and they express the rather pessimistic outlook that Hardy developed in his youth.

The earliest dated poems, belonging to the period 1865-1870, afford a . . . clue to the inner workings of his mind. The two main reasons of Hardy's dissatisfaction with the order of things are the cruelty of Nature, who constantly creates life without caring for it, and his inability to believe in a merciful Ruler of the Universe. These favorite themes (unknowingness, pain, and injustice) are elaborately dealt with in the poems of his early youth.

Consequently, one who studies Hardy's poems finds that his early conception of the first cause of the universe takes the form of blind, unconscious chance.

Since it is improbable that Hardy could have had any thorough knowledge of Schopenhauer's system of philosophy

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1R. E. Zachrisson, Thomas Hardy's Twilight-View of Life (New York, 1966), pp. 4-5.
before 1886, one must assume that Hardy's conception of a blind, unconscious first cause must have been influenced by other philosophers. Hardy read Darwin, Huxley, Spencer, and Mill in the early 1860's, and it is more than probable that these men helped Hardy formulate his conception of an unconscious force ruling the universe. "Hardy's reading of the Essayists, who undermined his faith, and of Darwin, who destroyed his faith, accounts for his coming to believe in the universal scope of "crass Casualty" as no other explanation can."2

Hardy rejected his religious faith in a personal god, and this can be seen as early as 1866 in a poem entitled "Hap."

... How arrives it joy lies slain,
And why unblooms the best hope even sown?
--Crass Casualty obstructs the sun and rain,
And dicing Time for gladness casts a moan...
These purblind Doomsters had as readily strown
Blisses about my pilgrimage as pain.3

The personifications in this stanza stress the aimlessness of the first cause, an automaton that works without intelligence, logic, plan, or purpose. "At a Bridal" was also written in 1866 and expresses the same theme. The narrator in this poem wonders why he and his lover must never be wed, and he comes to the conclusion that the "Great Dame," the first cause, has no regard for human happiness.

2Harvey Webster, On a Darkling Plain (Chicago, 1947), p. 44.
And, grieved that lives so matched should miscompose,
Each mourn the double waste; and question dare
To the Great Dame whence incarnation flows,
Why those high-purposed children never were:
What will she answer? That she does not care
If the race all such sovereign types unknows.

It is important to understand that Hardy does not imply a malevolent God in these early poems, but merely an unconscious force; a malevolent God would suggest a consciousness or a purpose. "Examples are numerous enough to discredit the assertion that Hardy has postulated a malignant and fiendish God. . . . At most he has thought that at the back of things existed an indifferent and unconscious force." 5

Another poem of 1866, "Her Dilemma," also stresses the blindness of the order of nature; this theme seems to be dominant in Hardy's first volume of verse, Wessex Poems. "Ditty" was written in 1870 and again shows that in the late 1860's and early 1870's Hardy was deeply concerned with the lack of order in our universe. "And Devotion droops her glance/To recall/What bondservants of Chance/We are all." 6

In a poem of 1867, "Heiress and Architect," nature again is unconscious of man's needs and happiness. An heiress asks an architect about a design for her house, and he responds to her requests with a "cold, clear voice, and cold clear view." She desires a house that will enable

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4 Ibid., p. 9.
6 Hardy, Wessex Poems, p. 22.
her to enjoy nature, and the architect only replies that winters freeze and destroy the plants and animals; nature cares nothing for man's wishes. Next, she desires to live a life of joy; the architect then replies:

"O maid misled!"
He sternly said,
Whose facile foresight pierced her dire;
"Where shall abide the soul when, sick of glee,
It shrinks, and hides, and prays no eye may see?
Those house them best who house for secrecy,
For you will tire."

When the heiress desires a "little Chamber" where she may live with her lover, the architect tells her that love is not permanent. And finally when the heiress wants a place for seclusion and peace, the architect tells her that life is short. "'To wit: Give space (since life ends unawares)
/To hale a coffined corpse adown the stairs;/For you will die.'" In short, life is full of pain, and nature cares nothing for man's desire for happiness. In these early poems, Hardy gives no hint that man may someday find happiness in his existence.

"To a Motherless Child" is not dated, but it was also published in Wessex Poems in 1898. In this poem the narrator objects to nature's cruel and "mechanic artistry."

The Dame has no regard, alas, my maiden,
For love and loss like mine——
No sympathy with mind-sight memory-laden
Only with fickle eyne.

\[7\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 104.}\] \[8\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 105.}\]
To her mechanic artistry
    My dreams are all unknown,
And why I wish that thou couldst be
    But One's alone!9

"Nature's Questioning" is also impossible to date, but it was written before 1898, when Wessex Poems was published. This poem presents four possibilities concerning the first cause of our universe.

"Has some Vast Imbecility,
    Mighty to build and blend,
But impotent to tend,
    Framed us in jest, and left us now to hazardry?

"Or come we of an Automaton
    Unconscious of our pains? . . .
Or are we live remains
    Of Godhead dying downwards, brain and eye now gone?

"Or is it that some high Plan betides,
    As yet not understood,
Of Evil stormed by Good,
    We the forlorn Hope over which Achievement strides?!10

Thus, before 1898, for Hardy the first cause is either a "Vast Imbecility," an "Automaton," a dying consciousness, or a force that is struggling for good, but misunderstood by man. At this point in his philosophical development, Hardy had no answers to these four questions. However, later in his life he hoped that the will, the Schopenhauerian term that he adopted for the first cause, would become conscious.

In 1883 Hardy wrote the central idea for "The Mother Mourns" in his personal diary. The poem appears in Hardy's volume, Poems of the Past and the Present, which was published

9Ibid., p. 88. 
10Ibid., pp. 89-90.
in 1901.\textsuperscript{11} Since the poem is not dated, it is impossible to know when the poem was written, but apparently Hardy conceived the idea for the poem in 1883. Most of the poems in \textit{Poems of the Past and the Present} were written in the 1890's. Since most Hardy scholars believe that Hardy had read Schopenhauer by 1886, it is possible that "The Mother Mourns" could have been influenced by Schopenhauer's philosophy. The poem is concerned with a prime cause that made no provision for man's questions about its blind workings. Thus, man is an accident in a world that is ruled by the blind workings of the will to live.

\begin{quote}
Weary plaint that Mankind, in these late days,
    Had grieved her by holding
Her ancient high fame of perfection
    In doubt and disdain. . . .

\textit{--"I had not proposed me a Creature}
    (She sought) so excelling
All else of my kingdom in compass
    And brightness of brain.}

"My purpose went not to develop
    Such insight in Earthland;
Such potent appraisements affront me,
    And sadden my reign!"\textsuperscript{12}
\end{quote}

In 1883 Hardy also conceived the idea for another poem, "The Pedestrian." Again, the poem is not dated, and it appeared in \textit{Moments of Vision}, which was published in 1917. Purdy states that most of the poems in this volume were products of the years 1913-1916, but five of the poems in

\begin{footnotes}

\textsuperscript{12}Hardy, \textit{Wessex Poems}, pp. 161-162.
\end{footnotes}
this volume were written in the 1880's; therefore, it is possible that some of the undated poems were from this earlier date. In any case, "The Pedestrian," conceived from an incident that occurred in 1883, mentions Schopenhauer's name and indicates that Hardy was aware of Schopenhauer's existence by the early 1880's.

Schopenhauer, previously the property of the esoteric, became almost well known. His World as Will and Idea was translated into English between 1883 and 1886. "By 1879," Goodale comments, "every person alive to the developments of the day must have heard of him; and by 1883 an educated man could not think of pessimism without thinking also of Schopenhauer." Articles and books on pessimism and the value of life enjoyed an unprecedented vogue.

The difficulty in proving exactly when Hardy's poetry began to express the influence of Schopenhauer's philosophy is increased by the fact that many of Hardy's poems are not dated. In Hardy's Wessex Poems "The Lacking Sense" strongly indicates that Hardy was intellectually approaching a direct expression of Schopenhauer's concepts, but the poem is not dated. Other poems in this volume also express Schopenhauerian concepts, but they, too, are not dated. "Doom and She," "The Subalterns," "God-Forgotten," "The Bedridden Peasant," "By the Earth's Corpse," "To an Unborn Pauper Child," "The Last Chrysanthemum," and "To the Unknown God" are poems that deal with the blindness

13 Purdy, Thomas Hardy, p. 207.
14 Webster, On a Darkling Plain, p. 138.
and unconsciousness of the first cause and could have been influenced by Schopenhauer's concepts. This cannot be proved because the poems are not dated.

By 1903 Hardy had absorbed some Schopenhauerian terms and used these terms to define his first cause. From 1903 to 1908, Hardy published The Dynasts. Purdy states that this epic-drama had been taking shape in Hardy's mind for thirty years because of his interest in Napoleon and the Napoleonic wars.15

One can hardly expect from a poet—even a cosmic poet—the observation that "Will is the Thing-in-itself," expressed in so many words; but if this definite philosophic concept is to be found anywhere expressed in the language and imagery of poetry, it is found in this wonderful section of the "Fore-Scene" to The Dynasts (1903), in which "the anatomy of the Will" is for the first time visualized.16

Thus by 1903, Hardy had recognized that the will to live was the essence of the universe, and he freely used this Schopenhauerian concept in The Dynasts.

The earliest dated poem that definitely reveals Hardy's debt to Schopenhauer was written in 1893. "He Wonders About Himself" was first printed in Moments of Vision in 1917. The narrator of the poem states that there is no reason for one to become angry or to hope for happiness because the universe is controlled by the will. Man is no more than a puppet that is controlled by the will to live.

15Purdy, Thomas Hardy, p. 121.

No use hoping, or fooling vex't,
Tugged by a force above or under
Like some fantocine, much I wonder
What I shall find me doing next?

... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Part is mine of the general Will,
Cannot my share in the sum of sources
Bend a digit the poise of forces,
And a fair desire fulfil? 17

The poem also indicates in the last stanza that Hardy had accepted Schopenhauer's concept of the unity of the will when the narrator states that he is part of the "general" will to live.

In 1905 Hardy wrote "The Unborn"; it was published in Time's Laughingstocks in 1909. This poem deals with Hardy's concept of the world as a place of pain and suffering. The narrator of the poem looks into the Cave of the Unborn and thinks of the suffering these beings will face when they are brought into a world that is controlled by a blind will, feeding upon itself. This concept of life is certainly similar to Schopenhauer's view of the world as a "penal colony."

My heart was anguished for their sake,
I could not frame a word;
And they descried my sunken face,
And seemed to read therein and trace
The news that pity would not break,
Nor truth leave unaverted.

And as I silently retired
I turned and watched them still,
And they came helter-skelter out,
Driven forward like a rabble rout.

Into the world they had so desired
By the all-immanent Will.\(^{13}\)

Here one can see the will urging its renewal through birth
and Hardy's view of the suffering and pain caused by the
will to live. Indeed there is also a hint of the rejection
of the will to live in this poem because the narrator
implies that it would be better for the unborn not to be
born at all.

In *Time's Laughingstocks* (1909), "God's Education,"
"A Dream Question," and "New Year's Eve" are concerned with
Hardy's concept of the will to live, but in these poems he
refrains from using the term "will" to designate the first
cause. In fact, it is of particular significance that
Hardy frequently employs the neuter terms "It" or "That"
to designate the will. The use of these neutral words
indicates Hardy's attempt to present the will as something
indefinable. The will is the Ding an sich and is therefore
beyond the sphere in which phenomenon is limited by another;
in short, the will is everything. The will is therefore
unlimited in the fullest sense of the term.

As far as he \(^{[}Hardy\)]\) is concerned, The First Cause,
however it be named, is neither moral nor immoral,
without consciousness of good or evil, capable of
neither love nor hate, operating mechanically, blindly,
non-rationally.\(^{19}\)

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\(^{19}\) Charles Glicksberg, "Hardy's Scientific Pessimism," *The Western Humanities Review*, VI (Summer, 1952), 274.
In 1911, Hardy's *Satires of Circumstance* was published. This volume contains three poems that definitely show the effect of Schopenhauer's philosophy upon Hardy's writing. The narrator in "The Obliterate Tomb" returns to the tomb of his enemies and prepares to refurbish the decaying, crumbling, unintended grave.

"And the day has dawned and come
For forgiveness, when the past may hold it dumb
On the once reverberate words of hatred uttered
Half in delirium. . . .

"With folded lips and hands
They lie and wait what next the Will commands,
And doubtless think, if think they can: 'Let discord
Sink with Life's sands!'"20

Again, one can see that Hardy saw the will as the controlling factor in the universe.

"The Torn Letter" was written in 1910 and was also published in *Satires of Circumstance*. This poem also reveals the will as the blind, striving force in man's existence. In "The Torn Letter" the narrator destroys a letter from an unknown admirer; after his temper has cooled, he attempts to reconstruct the fragments of the letter he has destroyed. The narrator finds all of the letter except the name and the location of his unknown correspondent and later regrets that blind chance should cause him pain and suffering. "I learnt I had missed, by rash unheed, My track; that, so the Will

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decided, "In life, death, we should be divided, /And at the sense I ached indeed." 

"The Convergence of the Twain" was written for the aid of the Titanic Disaster Fund in April of 1912 after the sinking of the great ship. It appeared on April 24, 1912, and was later included in Satires of Circumstance in 1914. Stanza VI of this poem clearly indicates that Hardy had read Schopenhauer's philosophy, had "borrowed" his terminology, and had incorporated Schopenhauerian ideas in his poetry.

VI

Well: while was fashioning
This creature of cleaving wing,
The Immanent Will that stirs and urges everything

VII

Prepared a sinister mate
For her--so gaily great--
A Shape of Ice, for the time far and dissociate.

In this poem, Hardy speaks of the immanent will as a controlling force that "stirs and urges everything" in our universe.

"A Plaint to Man" also appeared in Satires of Circumstance and was written in 1909 and 1910. This poem seems to imply that man has created a god in man's human image from observing the will. Thus, man has created God from

21 Ibid., p. 24.
22 Ibid., p. 11.
the phenomenon of the will to live as man evolved and gained a certain degree of intelligence and perception.

When you slowly emerged from the den of Time,
And gained percipience as you grew,
And fleshed you fair out of shapless slime,

Wherefore, O Man, did there come to you
The unhappy need of creating me--
A form like your own--for praying to?23

Thus, man created a god and gave him anthropomorphic qualities from his observation of nature, the workings of the immanent will; therefore, man saw his God as being a rational being, but the will is blind and this is the problem that concerned Hardy. "God's Funeral," written during the years 1908-1910, also deals with the same theme. This poem states that the belief in a personal God is no longer possible; in other words, if man believes in the immanence of the will, God can no longer be a conscious, sympathetic first cause. "Till, in Time's stayless stealthy swing,/Uncompromising rude reality/Mangled the Monarch of our fashioning,/Who quavered, sank; and now has ceased to be."24 Thus, "rude reality" forces one to see that the will is the first cause in our universe, not God.

In the "King's Soliloquy" Hardy employs the neutral term "That" to represent the will to live. On the night of his funeral, the king looks back into the past and states that if he could live again, he would prefer to be

23Ibid., p. 43.  
24Ibid., p. 46.
an average man, not a king. The king finally realizes that both kings and ordinary men are controlled by the will.

Since, as with them, what kingship would
It cannot do,
Nor to first thoughts however good
Hold itself true.

Something binds hard the royal hand,
As all that be,
And it is That has shaped, has planned
My acts and me.25

In 1917 Hardy's Moments of Vision was published. This volume of poetry contains two poems that show a close relation between the philosophy of Schopenhauer and Hardy. Hardy uses the term "Immanent Doer" to describe the will in "The Blow." The narrator of this poem realizes that the will to live is totally unconscious of man's needs and desires.

That no man schemed it is my hope--
Yea, that it fell by will and scope
Of That Which some enthrone,
And for whose meaning myriads grope.

Time's finger should have stretched to show
No aimful author's was the blow
That swept us prone,
But the Immanent Doer's That doth not know.26

Hardy's "Fragment" also uses Schopenhauer's terminology.

"'O we are waiting for one called God,' said they,/'(Though by some the Will, or Force, or Laws;/And, vaguely, by some, the Ultimate Cause;)/Waiting for him to see us before we are clay.'"27

27Ibid., p. 150.
Throughout Hardy's poetry one finds examples of human suffering caused by the unconsciousness and the strife of the will. "As a poet, Hardy not unnaturally works over the same themes that we find in his prose. His work is concerned mainly with suffering, and in particular with the human sense of impotence in the face of a ruthless destiny."28

In Hardy's "A Meeting with Despair," the narrator finds life a place where "many glooms abide." The narrator looks to God in heaven for solace and receives this answer from "the Thing," another term Hardy used for the will.

"'Tis a dead spot, where even the light lies spent
To darkness!" croaked the Thing.
"Not if you look aloft!" said I, intent
On my new reasoning.

"Yea—but await awhile!" he cried. "Ho-ho--
Look now aloft and see!"

I looked. There, too, saw night: Heaven's radiant show
Had gone that heartened me.29

"... [Universal] nature takes no notice of man's will, and in the conflict between universal nature and human nature, the Immanent Will always wins."30

According to Schopenhauer, our existence on this planet is painful because the will can only survive through a constant striving; each objectification of the will survives

29Hardy, Wessex Poems, pp. 73-74.
only be feeding upon other phenomena. This concept is also stressed in Hardy's poetry. "In a Wood" was begun in 1887 and finished in 1896, after Hardy was familiar with Schopenhauer's philosophical system.

Heart-halt and spirit-lame,
City-opprest,
Unto this wood I came
As to a nest;
Dreaming that sylvan peace
Offered the harrowed ease--
Nature a soft release
From men's unrest.

But, having entered in,
Great growths and small
Show them to men akin--
Combatants all!
Sycamore shoulders oak,
Bines the slim sapling yoke,
Ivy-spun halters choke
Elms stout and tall.31

In "The Reminder," even the joys of Christmas do not allow the poet to forget that the will to live feeds upon itself.

While I watch the Christmas blaze
Paint the room with ruddy rays,
Something makes my vision glide
To the frosty scene outside.

There, to reach a rotting berry,
Toils a thrush,--constrained to very
Dregs of food by sharp distress,
Taking such with thankfulness.

Why, 0 starving bird, when I
One day's joy would justify,
And put misery out of view,
Do you make me notice you?32

31Hardy, Wessex Poems, p. 85.
32Hardy, Time's Laughingstocks, p. 131.
If a person understands what Schopenhauer means by a striving will, he can see that strife in all of nature.

Hardy's "Bags of Meat" also is concerned with the continued strife of the will. The poem suggests that the cruelty in existence is caused by the unity of the will. When the auctioneer drives the cattle into the pen to be sold, the cattle look at their "unnatural kin" who will soon feed upon their flesh.

Each beast, when driven in,
Looks round at the ring of bidders there
With a much-amazed reproachful stare,
   As at unnatural kin,
For bringing him to a sinister scene
So strange, unhomelike, hungry, mean;
His fate the while suspended between
   A butcher, to kill out of hand,
   And a farmer to keep on the land;
One can fancy a tear runs down his face
When the butcher wins, and he's driven
   from the place.33

In 1912 Hardy wrote a poem entitled "The Bird-Catcher's Boy." The theme of this poem is also concerned with the cruelty of a striving will that feeds upon itself. When Freddy, the bird catcher's son, asks his father why he must catch and cage wild birds, his father gives him this answer. "'Don't be a dolt, my boy! Birds must be caught; /My lot is such employ, /Yours to be taught.'"34 It is interesting to note the similarity between Freddy in this


34 Ibid., p. 267.
poem and Jude Fawley in Jude the Obscure. Both boys are young, and both cannot understand why nature's law should be "mutual butchery."

Another poem in Hardy's Winter Words expresses Hardy's sympathy for living things because of the unity of the will. "Throwing a Tree" was written in 1927 and expresses Hardy's compassion for all things. Job and Ike, the two men who cut down the tree, become executioners in this poem.

The two executioners stalk along over the knolls,
Bearing two axes with heavy heads shining and wide,
And a long limp two-handled saw toothed for cutting great boles,
And so they approach the proud tree that bears the death-mark on its side.35

For Schopenhauer, there was escape from the strife of the will through art, nature, and rejection of the will to live. In Hardy's poetry there is no evidence that he saw any of these methods as a means of escaping the pain of living; however, Hardy did have a solution, and he did have hope. Schopenhauer never had hope that the will would become conscious. Hardy did have hope that the will would eventually become conscious and sympathetic, and he expressed this concept in his poetry. Hardy believed that the concept of the will changing its form was his real contribution to philosophy and first expressed this idea in The Dynasts.

A second, and entirely independent line of thought which seems to indicate something akin to faith, is that of the possibility of the harmony of the universe being re-established through a growth of consciousness in the Immanent Will. This—quite anti-Schopenhauerian—idea is not expressed as a conviction, but is only tentatively advanced as the forelorn hope of the irrational Pities. The possibility of the wakening of a kindly consciousness in the Will through the reaction upon it of its conscious earthling-figments, and the ensuing rule of painlessness, is rather touched upon in various places.36

Thus, Schopenhauer believed that a man must change himself in order to be happy; Hardy hoped that the will itself would change to make man happy. Hardy had hope; Schopenhauer did not.

The poems concerned with the growing awareness of the will to live represent the third phase of Hardy's intellectual development. "During his later years, Thomas Hardy objected to being called a pessimist. He called himself an evolutionary meliorist."37 This meliorism is readily found in many of Hardy's later poems. "Waiting Both," written in 1924, seems to indicate the possibility of a change in the scheme of the universe.

A star looks down at me,
And says: "Here I and you
Stand, each in our degree:
What do you mean to do,—
Mean to do?"

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36 Brennecke, Thomas Hardy's Universe, p. 144.

I say: "For all I know, 
Wait, and let Time go by, 
Till my change come."—"Just so," 
The star says: "So mean I:-- 
So mean I."

There seems to be a certain amount of hope and optimism implied in this short verse; possibly man and the will can change for the better.

In "There Seemed a Strangeness," Hardy implies that a "Great Adjustment" in the blind will may someday take place. 
"'And they shall see what is, ere long,/And Right shall dis-establish Wrong:/The Great Adjustment is taking place.'"39

In 1921 Hardy wrote "Xenophanes, the Monist of Colophon," and this poem strongly suggests that the "Great Dumb" will eventually become conscious. "'Yea, on, near the end,/Its doings may mend;/Aye, when you're forgotten,/And old cults are rotten,/And bulky codes shotten,/Xenophanes.'"40

"An Unkindly May" appeared in Winter Words and was written in 1927. This poem contains a certain amount of hope for man's suffering. In this poem, the shepherd notices the harshness of nature and says, "'Nature, you're not commendable to-day!/I think. 'Better to-morrow!' she seems to say.'"41

"The Wind Blew Words" appeared in Moments of Vision in 1917 and is concerned with the unity of the will. This poem

38 Hardy, Human Shows Far Phantasies, p. 1.
39 Ibid., p. 56.
40 Ibid., p. 63.
41 Hardy, Winter Words, p. 15.
seems to imply that man's inhumanity to other beings may someday change. Thus, as the will becomes conscious and compassionate, man will also develop universal compassion. This will occur when man understands that all phenomena are part of the universal will; i.e., all men are part of the same will to live, and the sufferer and the inflicter of suffering are one and the same.

The wind blew words along the skies,
And these it blew to me
Through the wide dusk: "Lift up your eyes,
Behold this troubled tree,
Complaining as it sways and plies;
It is a limb of thee.

"Yea, too, the creatures sheltering round--
Dumb figures, wild and tame,
Yea, too, thy fellows who abound--
Either of speech the same
Or far and strange--black, dwarfed, and browmed,
They are stuff of thy own frame!"42

After a careful study of Hardy's poetry, one can see that Hardy's philosophical development reveals itself in three phases. Hardy's early poems in the 1860's expressed his pessimism after he had read Darwin, Huxley, Spencer, and J. S. Mill. These early poems viewed the first cause as a blind, unconscious force. Hardy's poems of the 1880's and 1890's reveal the second phase of his philosophical maturity. During this period, he read Schopenhauer's On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and The World as Will and Idea. These two works gave Hardy a new terminology for the first cause of the universe. Hardy began to use the

term "will" in his poetry to designate the unconscious force, and he began to express Schopenhauer's concepts of the strife and the unity of the will in nature. The third phase of Hardy's philosophical development began after he published The Dynasts. In the third phase of development, Hardy hoped that the unconscious will would become a conscious and compassionate force. He also hoped that man's intelligence would eventually evolve through the same process. Hardy's "Apology" in his Late Lyrics and Earlier summarizes the final philosophical position expressed in his verse.

It is true, nevertheless, that some grave, positive, stark, delineations are interspersed among those of the passive, lighter, and traditional sort presumably nearer to stereotype tastes. For--while I am quite aware that a thinker is not expected, and, indeed, is scarcely allowed, now more than heretofore, to state all that crosses his mind concerning existence in this universe, in his attempts to explain or excuse the presence of evil and the incongruity of penalizing the irresponsible--it must be obvious to open intelligences that, without denying the beauty and faithful service of venerable cults, such disallowance of "obstinate questionings" and "blank misgivings" tends to a paralysed intellectual stalemate. Heine observed nearly a hundred years ago that the soul has her eternal rights; that she will not be darkened by statutes, nor lullabied by the music of a bell. And what is to-day, in allusions to the present author's pages, alleged to be "pessimism" is, in truth, only such "questionings" in the exploration of reality, and is the first step towards the soul's betterment, and the body's also.

If I may be forgiven for quoting my own old words, let me repeat what I printed in this relation more than twenty years ago, and wrote much earlier, in a poem entitled "In Tenebris":

If way to the Better there be, it exacts a full look at the worst:
that is to say, by the exploration of reality, and its frank recognition stage by stage along the survey, with an eye to the best consummation possible: briefly, evolutionary meliorism.43

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Thomas Hardy's philosophical outlook was affected by the concepts found in Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Idea* and *The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*. In the early 1860's Hardy read Darwin's *Origin of Species* and a volume entitled *Essays and Reviews*. These two works had a profound effect upon the young Thomas Hardy's philosophy and laid the foundation for his metaphysics. Later in his life, Hardy read Schopenhauer's philosophical works and expressed Schopenhauerian concepts and terms in his later novels and poems.

Schopenhauer's metaphysics stemmed from his need to explain the basic experiences in man's existence: pain, suffering, and death. Kant was a major influence upon Schopenhauer, and Kant's doctrine of the Ding an sich played an essential part in the evolution of Schopenhauer's concept of the world as both will and idea.

Schopenhauer's first major work was his dissertation, *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*. In this work, Schopenhauer conceived the foundation for the complete philosophical system developed in *The World as Will and Idea*, published in 1819.
The World as Will and Idea is based upon Schopenhauer's idealism; the world is idea; i. e., matter has no essence independent of mental consciousness. With this concept as a foundation, Schopenhauer believed that his philosophical system could penetrate to the "inner nature" of the universe. This "inner nature" or essence of the whole universe is the will to live; thus, the will becomes the Ding an sich and can only be known through Schopenhauer's division of subject and object. Man is both a perceiver and an object of perception at the same time.

The will objectifies itself in different grades and can only be known when it enters the form of phenomena. These levels or grades of objectification are called Platonic Ideas by Schopenhauer. Through this process of objectification, the will maintains its striving quality. Every grade of the objectified will fights for the matter, the space, and the time of the other grades; therefore, the will becomes a blind, unconscious, striving force in the whole of nature. Consequently, freedom of aim and a constant striving are the two main qualities of the will to live.

Schopenhauer saw the aesthetic contemplation of art and nature as an escape from the pain of living. He believed that if the subject and the object could become one through contemplation, the strife of the will could be stilled. But art is not a total escape; it only offers man
an escape for a few minutes or a few hours. The denial of the will to live was Schopenhauer's concept of total escape. Only the state of voluntary renunciation and resignation offers total release from the will. Thus, the aimless quality of the will and its blind, hungry striving are the two central concepts in Schopenhauer's metaphysic, and his only solution to the problem of living in a world ruled by the will is to reject the will to live.

Hardy probably developed the broad outlines of his metaphysical system before he read Schopenhauer's philosophy. In his youth, Hardy was concerned with man's insignificance in the total scheme of the universe, and even as a young boy, he was sensitive to the pain in the environment around him. As a young man in the 1860's, he saw fate, a blind and unconscious force, as the controlling factor in the universe.

In 1883, the first English translation of Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Idea was published. Hardy bought this first edition and probably read it. In 1889 or 1890, Hardy bought Schopenhauer's The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and read it; it can be proved that Hardy read and studied all of this work. He became interested in Schopenhauer's concept of the will to live and borrowed the term "Immanent Will" from Schopenhauer's system. Hardy's personal writings express the influence of Schopenhauer's concepts upon his own ideas; The Life of Thomas Hardy contains
many comments that are similar to Schopenhauerian concepts. Thus, both Schopenhauer and Hardy were "prophets of the Immanent Will."

Tess of the D'Urbervilles was published in 1891. In this novel, Hardy expresses a metaphysical idealism that closely resembles Schopenhauer's concept of the division of the perceiver and the object of perception. Hardy also indicates in this novel that he was familiar with the other half of Schopenhauer's system, the world as will. Hardy expresses the unity of the will through many of his comparisons of human beings with other animals and inanimate objects. Hardy also describes the "Prime Cause" in Schopenhauerian concepts. In Tess of the D'Urbervilles, the first cause is described as a striving, hungry, unconscious force. To escape from this force, Tess resorts to aesthetic contemplation of nature to still the will to live.

Jude the Obscure, published in 1896, is also concerned with the suffering caused by the unconscious will. Jude Fawley represents a sensitive character that can see the unity of the will and is, therefore, sympathetic with the suffering of all living beings. Arabella Donn represents Hardy's concept of the will to live insuring its continual survival through self-preservation and the sexual instinct. This novel is also concerned with the theme of renunciation, Schopenhauer's solution to the pain of living.
Hardy's poems represent three stages of philosophical development. In the early poems, Hardy saw the prime force of the universe as blind fate. After he read Schopenhauer's philosophy in the 1880's, Hardy began to use Schopenhauer's term "will" to designate this force. In the third phase of his philosophical development, Hardy hoped that the will would eventually develop a consciousness and become aware of the injustice and the suffering of human existence. Hardy claimed that this evolutionary meliorism was his most significant contribution to philosophical thought, and it did give him a small degree of hope for the suffering and pain that he saw in life.

Thus, Hardy and Schopenhauer were in agreement on the nature and the qualities of the will; however, they both had different solutions to the problem of obtaining happiness in a world full of pain and suffering.
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