TOWARD A DESCRIPTIVE EIDETICS OF ATONALITY: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF WEBERN OP. 3, NO. 1

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Thesis Prepared for the Degree of

MASTER OF MUSIC

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS

August 2012

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David Lewin, in his 1986 article “Music Theory, Phenomenology, and Modes of Perception,” offers a promising methodological approach for the analysis of tonal music from a phenomenological perspective. Lewin’s phenomenological method has a propensity to render seemingly contradictory readings in such a way that their respective validities can be preserved by articulating them within differentiated contexts. Expanding upon Lewin’s phenomenological work with analyzing tonal music, I propose that a phenomenological investigation of an atonal song, Webern op. 3, no. 1, from within a variety of differentiated contexts can shed light upon what it means to perceive a piece of music as being “not in a key.”

This thesis will open with an introduction to Lewin’s phenomenological work and the writings of Edmund Husserl and Izchak Miller that Lewin used as a point of departure. The analysis of Webern op. 3, no. 1, that follows will regard the voice and piano parts as differentiated musical contexts in order to investigate the interaction between these contexts as they generally undermine the perception of tonality in the song. Finally, the notion of a “musical context” as an organizing factor of musical perception will be expanded to include the different analytical approaches of Olli Väisälä and Elmar Budde as they interact to reveal contrasting aspects of the song’s multivalent structure.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Dr. David Schwarz, for his guidance throughout my thesis work and his commitment to fostering my success. I would also like to thank my committee members, Dr. Stephen Slottow and Dr. Paul Dworak, for their prompt and helpful suggestions throughout this process. I am grateful to Dr. Brian Kane for sharing his insight into the phenomenology of music and for helping me to clarify my thoughts. Most of all, I would like to thank all of my family and friends whose support made this project possible, especially my wife Megan and my parents Bob and Yvonne, who have always believed in me.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENOLOGY AND MUSIC

1.1 Introduction

David Lewin, in his 1986 article “Music Theory, Phenomenology, and Modes of Perception,” offers a promising methodological approach for the analysis of tonal music from a phenomenological perspective. In questioning the nature of musical perception in phenomenological terms, Lewin effectively examines the way that specific musical perceptions motivate a listener to enact the analytical observations and assertions that comprise the act of musical analysis. Lewin emphasizes the centrality of context in determining the organization of musical perceptions and the relations between different perceptions as they inform one another in various ways throughout the listening process.

Lewin’s 1986 phenomenology article is an outgrowth of an earlier unpublished manuscript from 1974, and the subject of analysis in both of these documents is Schubert’s “Morgengrüss,” op. 25, no. 8, from Die Schöne Müllerin. While Lewin’s writing on a phenomenological approach to music theory by no means constitutes a recent contribution to analytical discourse, these writings continue to articulate their sphere of influence in contemporary publications, such as Jack Boss’s 2009 article

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2 David Lewin, “Morgengrüss” (unpublished typed manuscript, 1974).
“The Musical Idea and the Basic Image in an Atonal Song and Recitation of Arnold Schoenberg” and Brian Kane’s 2011 article “Excavating Lewin’s ‘Phenomenology.’”

Expanding upon Lewin’s phenomenological work with analyzing tonal music, I propose that a phenomenological investigation of an atonal song, Webern op. 3, no. 1, from within a variety of differentiated contexts can shed light upon what it means to perceive a piece of music as being “not in a key.” The introduction to phenomenology and music that follows in this chapter sets the stage for such an analysis by examining Lewin’s work as well as the phenomenology of Husserl and Miller that Lewin used as a point of departure.

For the first step of my analysis, I consider the vocal line within its own context and describe possible tonal implications of specific melodic segments. This first analytical step is to be understood as somewhat hypothetical, in that it divorces the vocal line from the piano accompaniment that would invariably influence a listener’s perception of the song in an actual performance.

In the second step of my analysis, I consider the hypothetical tonal implications found in the vocal line within the larger context of the surrounding musical material of the piano accompaniment. This second step in my analysis is less hypothetical than considering the vocal line in its own context, and it thereby reflects how a listener will “actually” hear the song. Furthermore, I show that most of the hypothetical tonal implications found in the vocal line are complicated beyond perceptibility by the material.

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in the piano accompaniment. In this way, the general lack of tonal implications can be investigated by considering specific hypothetical tonal implications and the ways that those hypothetical implications are undermined in the context of the full musical texture. I also examine instances in which the tonal implications found in the vocal line find some support in the piano accompaniment. Along the way, an analytical description of the song’s pitch organization will unfold, most notably highlighting the inclusion relations between the vocal melodic segments and the piano chord of mm. 7-8.

Finally, the notion of a “musical context” as an organizing factor of musical perception is expanded to include the different analytical approaches of Olli Väisälä and Elmar Budde. By considering the piano chords of mm. 3-4 specifically, I examine the conflicting analytical implications put forth among my analysis and those of Väisälä and Budde. Finally, while the conclusion of this thesis makes the relation between mine and Lewin’s approaches explicit, the reader familiar with Lewin’s phenomenological analysis should find his influence to be ubiquitous throughout this document, especially in the consideration of meaning as largely determined by context.

This analysis of Webern’s op. 3, a set of five songs setting poems from Stefan George’s “Der siebente Ring” and among the first set of atonal songs composed by Webern,\(^5\) provides insight into Webern’s early atonal style. The first song of the cycle, “Dies ist ein Lied für dich allein,” has been selected for this analysis for its compatibility with Lewin’s method. Furthermore, this song alone from the cycle is considered to allow

\(^{5}\) Robert Wason discusses the problems of dating the exact chronology of the individual Op. 3 songs as well as the complication of chronologically relating them to the Op. 4 songs that were also settings of George’s poetry. Robert Wason, “A Pitch-Class Motive in Webern’s George Lieder, op. 3,” in *Webern Studies*, ed. Kathryn Bailey (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 132.
a deep analytical investigation of a small amount of material. While this research project produces a close reading of the song, the analytical journey is of greater value than the destination in exploring the notions of context and relations between perceptions, mentioned above, as they apply to this freely atonal song.

“Dies ist ein Lied für dich allein” has been the subject of numerous analytical discussions over the past few decades, perhaps most visibly in Robert P. Morgan’s “Anthology of Twentieth-Century Music,” published in 1992. Other notable contributions to the literature on this song include multiple articles by Robert Wason published during the 1990’s, Elmar Budde’s 1967 dissertation “Anton Weberns Lieder op. 3 - Untersuchungen zur frühen Atonalität bei Webern,” and Olli Väisälä’s 2002 article “Prolongation of Harmonies Related to the Harmonic Series in Early Post-Tonal Music.”

In their discussions on “Dies ist ein Lied für dich allein,” these writers often present different perspectives about analytical details of the song’s pitch organization, sometimes on the most fundamental levels of structure, and these differences typically go unmentioned in their prose—it is left to the astute reader to identify the divergent analytical readings in these works and to infer the ramifications of these disputes for themselves. However, as I will demonstrate in the following introductory discussion, one

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8 Elmar Budde, “Anton Webers Lieder op. 3 - Untersuchungen zur frühen Atonalität bei Webern” (PhD diss., Universität Freiburg, 1967).
of the most useful aspects of Lewin’s phenomenological method is its propensity to render seemingly contradictory readings in such a way that their respective validities can be preserved by articulating them within differentiated contexts. As my discussion of “Dies ist ein Lied für dich allein” incorporates the material of the above sources, I hope to demonstrate the potential for Lewinian phenomenology to foster an intertextual discourse among these analytical works.

1.2 Lewin’s Musical Phenomenology and Recent Responses

In “Music Theory, Phenomenology, and Modes of Perception,” David Lewin develops a phenomenological method of musical analysis that precisely defines certain musical perceptions within specified contexts and relates those perceptions to one another in a variety of ways. Lewin applies this method by analyzing an excerpt from Schubert’s

Ex. 1.1: Lewin’s reduction of Schubert’s “Morgengruß” mm. 5-17.
“Morgengruß,” a strophic song in C Major selected as the subject for his analysis to demonstrate the complex subtleties of musical perception within a presumably simple context. Example 1.1, above, shows a two-voice reduction of the excerpt that Lewin addresses in his analysis.  

In order to handle such an elusive abstraction as “musical perception” with the specificity required to make his argument, Lewin must introduce a set of perceptual terms and relate them with one another. To this end, he proposes a basic formula to function as a descriptive model for “a musical perception”:

\[ p = (EV, CXT, P-R-\text{LIST}, ST-\text{LIST}) \]

Lewin goes on to define the elements of his “p-model” as follows:

Here the musical perception \( p \) is defined as a formal list containing arguments. The argument \( EV \) specifies a sonic event or family of events being “perceived.” The argument \( CXT \) specifies a musical context in which the perception occurs. The argument \( P-R-\text{LIST} \) is a list of pairs \( (p_i, r_i) \); each pair specifies a perception \( p_i \) and a relation \( r_i \) which \( p \) bears to \( p_i \). The argument \( ST-\text{LIST} \) is a list of statements \( s_1, \ldots, s_K \) made in some stipulated language \( L \).  

Lewin asserts that his analysis sets out “to examine with some precision the variety of formal perceptions that are generated by such a variety of formal [contexts] for the [events] of [a given measure of music].”  

For instance, Lewin examines the variety of harmonic functions that the events of m. 14 imply when those events are considered within a variety of relatively expanded or contracted contexts. As Ex. 1.2 demonstrates below, in one perceptual act he hears m. 14 as a \( i_4 \) chord with an omitted root in the local context of D minor, whereas, in another perceptual act from within the larger context of

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10 This example is a reproduction of Lewin’s original. Lewin, *Phenomenology*, 344.
11 Lewin, 335.
12 Lewin, 347.
13 Lewin, 351-3.
Ex. 1.2: Two perceptual acts regarding m. 14 of Schubert’s “Morgengruß.”

C Major, he hears m. 14 as a modally inflected iv⁶ chord belonging to the second unit of a sequence following a iv⁶-V statement in D minor and, thus, anticipating a V chord in C.¹⁴

¹⁴ My Example 1.2 is largely derived from Brian Kane’s insightful explanation of Lewin’s application of
In terms of Lewin’s p-model, these perceptions (p) both have as their object the same event (EV) of m. 14, and they consider that event from within differing contexts (CXT). These perceptions are related as mutually modifying one another (entries reflecting this state of affairs could be made on the P-R-LIST of each perception), and the analytical statements (belonging to the ST-LIST) that Lewin articulates are reflected in the analytical graphs above (following the word “as” along the arrow). Finally, these statements are made in the language (L) of tonal harmonic theory.

The value of this phenomenological approach is that it considers differing musical perceptions in terms that allow them to co-exist as mutually valid, with the qualification that this is only made possible by considering them as valid within different contexts. Lewin clarifies this as follows:

The intermodifications of [these differing perceptions] in this connection involve something like Rameau’s double emploi brought into our present model. In one perception . . . the acoustic signal of measure 14 signifies an “f chord.” In another perception . . . the same stimulus signifies a “d chord” . . . . To say these things about the two distinct mental objects (or acts) . . . is very different from having to assert that there is one acoustic object, “the chord of measure 14,” which “is” both an f chord and a d chord “at the same time.”

As it turns out, Lewin eventually considers m. 14 as part of a passing contrapuntal motion outlining a modally inflected dominant harmony in C Major, prolonged for the duration of the middle contrasting section of the strophe from mm. 9-15, as demonstrated in Ex. 1.3, below.
Example 1.3: “Morgengruß” m. 14 as a contrapuntal passing motion within a prolonged dominant.

Example 1.3 suggests a “final” interpretation of m. 14 within the largest possible context: the song as a whole. The finality of this interpretation is, of course, facilitated by the hierarchical syntactic structure of the tonal harmonic idiom within which Schubert composed this song. Lewin makes a point, however, to emphasize that “final” or “less final” perceptions are not to be considered “correct” or “incorrect” perceptions, respectively:

... there is nothing... to imply that your impressions [in the final context] are in any sense more “correct” or even more “important” than were your impressions [in the more limited context]. We can say that they are “different,” at this stage in the listening process. And they have a particular structural significance, as being “final” in the sense that further listening will not revise their general framework. But that is another matter.\(^{17}\)

By emphasizing that perceptions derived from more limited contexts are no less valid than those derived from larger ones, Lewin’s method allows the analyst to “bypass certain false dichotomies in analytic discourse, dichotomies that arise when we implicitly but erroneously suppose that we are discussing one phenomenon at one

\(^{17}\) Lewin, *Morgengruß*, 52.
location in phenomenological space-time, when in fact we are discussing many phenomena at many distinct such locations."\(^{18}\) He goes on to say that

the discomforts we feel [as a result of these false dichotomies] are symptoms of a deficiency in traditional analytic discourse . . . By saying, “The harmony of measure 12 is . . .,” we are already falsely constraining our musical perceptions by implicitly stating that there is one phenomenological object called “the harmony of measure 12 . . .”\(^{19}\)

Lewin closes his phenomenology article by critiquing his p-model as unable to account for modes of musical perception other than listening, such as performance or composition.\(^{20}\) This appraisal prompts Brian Kane’s recent criticism that Lewin, in suggesting the application of phenomenology to creative, embodied musical actions, shifts from a Husserlian phenomenological framework to what Kane calls a “post-Husserlian phenomenology” framework reflecting the later work of Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, and that this shift, as it goes unmentioned by Lewin, creates confusion at a fundamental level of the article’s rhetorical structure.\(^{21}\) Departing from Kane’s post-Husserlian argument, I would like to focus on Lewin’s relationship with Husserl and Miller. This relationship is not central to his discussion, but Kane does remark that Lewin’s understanding of Husserl seems to derive entirely from Miller’s exegesis of Husserl’s work on temporal perception.\(^{22}\) For this reason, my introduction to Husserl’s terminology will focus prominently upon Miller’s interpretation of many key topics, especially the idea of “noema.”

\(^{18}\) Lewin, *Phenomenology*, 357.
\(^{19}\) Lewin, 357-8.
\(^{20}\) Lewin, 381.
\(^{21}\) Kane, 27.
\(^{22}\) Kane, 28.
In addition to Kane’s work, Jack Boss’s recent article “The Musical Idea and the Basic Image in an Atonal Song and Recitation of Arnold Schoenberg” also uses Lewin’s approach as a point of departure. Boss describes Lewin’s comments regarding the contextual determination of musical perception as providing “an analytical model within which conflicting understandings of a piece’s coherence can co-exist as separate processes involving different (phenomenological) [sic] objects.”23 The introduction to Boss’s article, specifically, decries what he perceives to be a deficiency in the current state of atonal analysis. In his assessment, set-theoretical analyses tend to lack the sort of multivalent readings of musical material that Lewin’s method makes possible. Boss’s article, however, refers to Lewin’s ideas only as a precursor to a discussion that applies Schoenberg’s notion of “the musical idea” as its primary analytical method. As such, Boss’s article leaves the opportunity open for a more rigorous application of Lewin’s phenomenological approach in the analysis of atonal compositions.

This brief introduction has aimed to supply a familiarity with Lewin’s main thesis in his work on phenomenology and music theory, specifically regarding the multiplicity of perceptual meanings with which his phenomenological method is able to render musical material when considered within a variety of differing contexts. Putting aside Kane’s discomfort with Lewin’s unwieldy use of post-Husserlian phenomenology, I wish to focus specifically on the relationship between the terms and concepts of Husserl and Miller and their interpretation and application by Lewin. The discussion that follows will thereby serve to flesh out the introduction to Lewin’s notion of phenomenology and to

23 Boss, 224.
prepare the reader to recognize my analytical method’s inclinations toward and
departures from Lewin’s appropriation of Husserl’s perceptual theory.

1.3 The Phenomenological Terminology of Husserl and Miller

The term *phenomenology* may be somewhat misleading insofar as it, at first glance, seems to suggest that it proposes nothing more than a study of phenomena. Already, the problem of beginning to apprehend Husserlian terminology becomes apparent: *phenomenon*, when set forth as a term with which one sets out to *begin* an account of Husserl’s project, falls short of establishing a point of departure in that its application in phenomenological discourse is typically already weighed down by the conceptual baggage of other terms that the reader is assumed to have already grasped. It is perhaps more helpful, then, to begin one’s introduction to Husserl’s terminology by considering phenomenology as a study of consciousness, or, more specifically, the directed consciousness of perception. Miller gives a helpful account of the type of consciousness that phenomenology aims to consider:

The object of phenomenology is to describe the structure of our experiences in virtue of which they have the intentional properties that they do. This task is alternatively characterized by Husserl as the task of describing how consciousness “constitutes” its different objects. Husserl says about the objects of our acts that they are constituted by, or through, those acts. The task of phenomenology, then, is to describe the various features of consciousness and their roles in the constitution, or the individuation, of objects by, or before, consciousness. Again, Husserl assumes that these features are accessible to us through reflection, and that they are (in principle) exhaustively describable through reflection.²⁴

This account characterizes phenomenology as a descriptive discipline that reflects upon the capacity of consciousness to constitute the objects of perception. Regarding its use in the above quotation, “constitution” can be clarified as “the processes in virtue of which objects make their appearance,”\(^\text{25}\) that is, through the acts of perception that consciousness performs.

Miller’s use of the word “intentional” warrants further explanation, as this is one of phenomenology’s most fundamental notions and one that is easy to confuse, considering its specialized application of the commonly used word “intention.” Intentionality, as a phenomenological term, has little to do with the idea of intention as it is commonly understood: it does not suggest the notion of intent in the sense of “meaning to do something or other.” Rather, intentionality “refers to the property peculiar to our conscious experiences, namely, their being always directed at putative objects.”\(^\text{26}\)

Intentionality, then, simply denotes the directedness of perception. By describing perceptual acts as “intentional lived experiences of internal consciousness,”\(^\text{27}\) Husserl suggests that the perceiving subject directs its internal consciousness toward an external object, and, in that sense, “the theory of intentionality is phenomenology’s response to the problem of how mind transcends itself to grasp an objective reality.”\(^\text{28}\) For this reason, Husserl uses the term “Transcendental Ego” to describe the component of the perceiving


\(^{26}\) Miller, 7, emphasis mine.


subject that directs its consciousness toward a perceptual object. See Figure 1.1, below, for an illustration of how a Transcendental Ego directs its intentionality toward an object in an act of perception.

![Diagram of Transcendental Egoichi intentionality toward an object](image)

Fig. 1.1: The direction of intentionality toward an object of perception.

Phenomenologists treat intentionality with a fair amount of nuance. For instance a Transcendental Ego’s intentionality toward an object may be empty or filled. By filled intention, we simply mean that the object of one’s intentionality is perceptually given in the act of perception. If I look at the front side of a desk, for instance, I can see the desk as given from a certain perspective; from that perspective, the front side of the desk is perceptually given and my intentionality toward the front side of the desk is filled. However, as I direct my perception toward the desk, I do not suppose that it has no back side simply because that side is not perceptually given from my current perspective. Rather, based on what I know about desks and from my current perspective, I direct my intentionality toward the desk as an object possessing some aspects that are not perceptually given, and, in that sense, my intentionality toward the back side of the desk is an empty intentionality. As we will see in the discussion of temporality below, the

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29 Miller, 190-1.
30 This example is inspired by a similar one found in Miller, 177.
31 Robert Sokolowski provides a helpful discussion on this topic by inviting the reader to imagine perceiving a cube; my discussion of perceiving a desk is heavily influenced by Sokolowski’s example. Robert Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 17-21.
notion of filled vs. empty intentionality has implications for one’s directedness towards
temporal objects that unfold over time, such as musical objects of perception.

One aspect of intentionality regarding temporal objects, however, will be helpful
to clarify at present—namely, that perception can be directed toward objects that,
themselves, can be regarded as a composite of constituent elements. As Miller explains,
“I perceptually ‘individuate’ (at least some of the) constituent parts of the ‘composite’
object in addition to my ‘individuating’ the ‘composite’ object as a whole.”32 One could
consider the perception of a melody, as Miller does, in these terms, in the sense that a
melody is a process: “the (purported) ‘composite’ object of a perceptual act need not be
an enduring object. It may also be a process whose constituent events are not
simultaneous with one another.”33 Using these terms, a melody is a composite object
whose constituent events are the individual tones of which it is comprised, and I can
individuate, or direct my perception toward, either the composite object as a whole or the
individual elements belonging to it.

This notion of individuation is useful in that it makes intentionality, which sounds
at first like an idealized abstraction, more clearly understood as a relatable aspect of
conscious experience. By this, I mean that our discussion of intentionality has so far
suggested that we perceive objects more or less in a vacuum—that we have a single
object before our Transcendental Ego and that we simply direct our intentionality toward
that object without having to worry ourselves about any other objects in our perceptual
field that may compete for our attention or problematize the clarity with which our single

32 Miller, 77-8.
33 Miller, 79.
object of perception is rendered before us. Miller dispels this notion—likely the source of qualms that the critical reader may have with such an idealized notion of intentionality—as he explains that “the most fundamental form of perceptual manipulation is our very ‘singling out’ of individuals in what is hypothetically considered to be a genetically prior and not yet (mentally) ‘organized’ perceptual field, a field conceived of as containing ‘prominences’ which attract the Ego’s interest.”34 The music analyst should certainly be familiar with this notion, as the process of individuating prominences in the musical texture that impinges upon one’s perceptual field is the most basic form of segmentation that facilitates any proposals of relatedness between musical ideas that the analyst decides to put forward.

While the aspects of intentionality detailed above clarify some nuances that the concept entails, the possibility of erroneous perceptual experiences complicates the notion of intentionality considerably. Despite Husserl’s claim that “the intentional object of sensory presentation is an ordinary physical object,”35 there are certainly instances when we think we perceive an object that is actually not there or is, as it turns out, really some other object than we believed ourselves to have perceived. As Miller clarifies, “all acts are intentional (i.e., all acts have directedness), but an act’s being intentional does not mean that it must have an object.”36 This leads Miller to refer to the objects of perception as “purported objects” throughout the duration of his book.

34 Miller, 47.
35 Miller, 14.
36 Miller, 15.
The problem, then, is this: what is my intentional act of perception directed toward if the object that I believe myself to perceive is, in reality, non-existent? This problem leads us to the introduction of a new term, as Miller explains that “since an act has directedness regardless of whether or not it has an object, something other than the object must be that which accounts for the act’s directedness. This ‘something,’ according to Husserl, is the act’s noema.”37 To put this another way, not every act has an object, but every act does have a noema; or, “for an act to be directed is, simply, for it to have a noema.”38

An act’s noema is an “abstract [entity]”39 that “meaningfully directs [the Ego] to an object.”40 The noema is comprised of several components that work together to attribute meaning to the purported object of an intentional act as that object impinges upon a Transcendental Ego from a given perspective. Some of the components of the noema are demonstrated below in Figure 1.2.41

As the below figure illustrates, “the noema has two major components: a noematic Sinn, and a noematic correlate of the mode of givenness (Gegebenheitsweise) of the

37 Miller, 16.
38 Miller, 31.
39 Miller, 25.
40 Drummond, 127.
41 This diagram is based specifically on Miller’s account of Husserl’s “noema.” Miller explains that the “thetic character” of the act is the main feature of the Gegebenheitsweise, and, for an explanation of the remaining constituents of the Gegebenheitsweise, he directs the reader to Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 273-9. (In short, the “mode of attention” refers to the priority with which we individuate an object in relation to its surroundings as the primary object in our perceptual field, the “evidential modality” refers to the degree of perceptual evidence with which our perception is given, and the “doxic modality” refers to the degree to which we believe our perception to correctly correspond to an objective reality.) In this sense, Miller regards the noematic Sinn as a closed system consisting only of the determinable-X and its attribute meanings, whereas the Gegebenheitsweise is more open to various descriptive aspects of an act’s mode of givenness. Miller, 21.
The noematic \textit{Sinn} specifies the meaning that the Ego attributes to the purported object, whereas the \textit{Gegebenheitsweise} specifies the manner in which the act in question is carried out. For instance, if I remember hearing a bird singing as I awoke this morning, the noematic \textit{Sinn} of my act would be “a bird singing,” and the \textit{Gegebenheitsweise} could be summed up as “remember.” This intentional act, as an act directed toward a past event not presently given in perception, would be intending its object emptily. Furthermore, if what I remember hearing this morning was not a bird at all but, for instance, a recording of a flute playing a trill, then the purported object of my act would, in fact, not exist. This would not change the fact that the noema of my act does exist, and that, in that sense, what I remember hearing is, in fact, a bird singing.

As Figure 1.2 suggests, the noematic \textit{Sinn} can be more finely parsed into the “attribute-meaning” and the “determinable-X.” Miller offers this explanation of attribute-
meaning: “According to Husserl, an object is always experienced by us through the perceptual act ‘as’ having some properties or other. What we experience the (purported) object ‘as,’ i.e., what properties we attribute to the (purported) object through the act, depends on the *attributive content* of the noematic *Sinn* of the act.”

As for the determinable-X, Miller describes it as “a feature present in the noematic *Sinn* of a perceptual act, a feature which determines the (purported) object of the act ‘*in abstraction*’ from its properties.” While it is difficult to imagine an element belonging to an object that is somehow abstracted from the actual properties of that object, Miller clarifies the nature of the determinable-X by describing Husserl’s concept of the term as “a ‘purely referring’ element of meaning, something like the meaning of an indexical, probably (at least part of) the meaning of the word ‘this.’” In the example of noema given above, the noematic *Sinn* could be more accurately phrased as “I remember *this* sound (determinable-X) *as* a bird singing (attribute-meaning).”

Of course, the attribute meaning “a bird singing” is only part of the noematic *Sinn* of my act on account of my past experiences with birds and the knowledge that I have accrued regarding birds’ ability to “sing” and some of the “songs” of specific birds that I have heard in the past. Miller refers to this learned knowledge that guides one’s attribution of meaning in a perceptual act as the “conceptual framework.” He explains that what we attribute to the (purported) objects of our perceptual acts through those acts (what we perceive those objects “as”) is determined, in part, by our

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43 Miller, 58.  
44 Miller, 60.  
45 Miller, 43.
conceptual framework. But at the same time our conceptual framework must, in turn, continually adjust itself to our perceptual experience. There is, in other words, a continual interplay between our conceptual framework, on the one hand, and our perceptual experience, on the other.  

In fact, Miller would place Lewin’s Language (L) of the p-model within the conceptual framework in that the language that we use to describe musical objects determines, to a large degree, the meanings with which we constitute them. Moreover, Husserl would place Miller’s conceptual framework within the noema’s Gegebenheitsweise since the conceptual framework with which one engages in a perceptual act is an aspect of that act’s mode of givenness. In other words, “I remember this sound (determinable-X) as a bird singing (attribute-meaning) based on my previous experiences of hearing birds singing (a statement made in Lewin’s ‘Language (L),’ situated within Miller’s ‘conceptual framework,’ situated within Husserl’s ‘Gegebenheitsweise’).”

The Gegebenheitsweise can also be more finely parsed, but it will suffice for our present purposes to simply clarify that “the main . . . constituent of the ‘mode of givenness’ is the thetic character of the act. The thetic character of an act is that feature of the act which makes it, for instance, a perceiving rather than a remembering one. The thetic character, in other words, is the act-species-determining feature of the act.”

As this description of the thetic character sums up our discussion of the main components of the noema, Figure 1.3, below, can be understood as a re-reading of Figure 1.1 that clarifies the manner in which the noema accounts for the directedness of an

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46 Miller, 52.
47 Miller, 21.
intentional act toward its purported object. Here, the noema is denoted by a triangle—the bottom corners of the triangle correspond to the two elements of the noematic Sinn (the determinable-X and the attribute-meaning), and the top corner of the triangle corresponds to the main constituent of the Gegebenheitsweise (the thetic character).

![Fig. 1.3: Directedness toward an object on account of a noema.](image)

Armed with this schematic of an intentional act as directedness from a Transcendental Ego, through a noema, toward a purported object, we can see that this structure was already at work in Example 1.2, and these Husserlian terms can be mapped onto that example as demonstrated in Example 1.4, below.

In this example, the Transcendental Ego is reflected by the self-proclaimed “I” at the top end of each arrow of intentionality. The thetic character of each act is “hear,” and the determinable-X and attribute-meanings of each act are denoted by the words “this” and “as,” respectively. Finally, the object of perception of each act, not to be confused

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48 This figure, like Figure 1.1 above, is inspired by a similar example found in Miller, 177. Miller uses a triangle to represent the noema through which intentionality is directed toward a purported object. My innovation here is to label each point of the triangle with one of Miller’s three main constituents of the noema.

49 The main difference between my example and Brian Kane’s (Kane, 30) is that I, after Miller, place the determinable-X within the noema and thereby differentiate it from the purported object of perception. Kane labels my “Object” as the “determinable-X,” and he does so after Lewin (Lewin, 336). The distinction between the determinable-X, as an element of the noema apart from the purported object, and the object, as a purportedly existing element external to the perceiving subject, is essential to Miller’s argument that the noema of an act accounts for the possibility a perceptual object’s non-existence in a case of erroneous perception.
Ex. 1.4: Husserlian terms mapped onto Example 1.2.

with the determinable-X, is denoted by the circled dyad in the musical score that, in turn, denotes the acoustic signal of that dyad as it would be heard in performance.

This chapter’s introduction to Husserlian terminology will now conclude with a consideration of temporality and the perception of processes as they unfold over time. Our discussion of filled vs. empty intentionality in a process alluded to the notion of temporality, as did the notion of a temporal process as a composite object of an intentional act. While intentionality does have application to the realm of temporality,
Husserl's notion of *horizon* is the natural point of departure for an investigation into the structures of consciousness that facilitate temporal awareness.

In Husserl’s theory of the perception of time, the formal structure that accounts for the temporality of experience has three inseparable elements: primal impression, retention, and protention.⁵⁰ “Primal impressions have for content what is signified by the word *now*, insofar as it is taken in the strictest sense; every new now is the content of a new primal impression.”⁵¹ Each new primal impression finds itself situated between the retentions that account for our awareness of the immediate past, on the one hand, and the protentions that account for our anticipation of the immediate future, on the other.

While the temporal horizon may sound at first like a mundane description of an intuitively experienced feature of consciousness, the profundity of this notion can be clarified by a brief discussion of the problem that Husserl aimed to address, particularly with his concept of retention. The passage that follows outlines this problem—the problem of perceiving a succession of sounds:

If we observe, for example, a particular instance of succession and assume that the sensations disappear with the stimuli producing them, we should have a succession of sensations *without a notion of temporal flow* . . . If, in the case of a succession of sounds, the earlier ones were to be preserved as they were while ever new ones were also to sound, we should have a number of sounds simultaneously in our imagination [Vorstellung], *but not succession*. The situation would be no different in the case in which all these sounds sounded at once . . . . We arrive at the idea of succession only if the earlier sensation does not persist unaltered in consciousness but in the manner described is specifically modified, that is, is continuously modified from moment to moment.⁵²

⁵⁰ Drummond, 128.
⁵¹ Husserl, 92.
⁵² Husserl, 32.
Here, Husserl considers two theoretical frameworks to explain the awareness of temporal succession before rejecting both frameworks in favor of his own theory. In the first rejected framework, we would no longer perceive sensations once they ceased to impinge upon our senses. While this account seems intuitive, further reflection reveals that this scenario would preclude our awareness of succession entirely. In fact, it would radically limit the ability of consciousness to have awareness of any kind since we would have no recollection of the immediate past and, therefore, no recollection of any more distant past, since the latter is founded upon the former. We would have no conceptual framework built up in our memories with which to attribute meaning to objects of perception or even to individuate such objects in our perceptual field. In short, we would experience nothing more, at any given moment, than a chaotic, disorganized perceptual field with no means of making sense of anything and no awareness that we had ever experienced any previous chaotic perceptual fields in the past.

On the other hand, maybe we do still perceive sensations once they have ceased to impinge upon our senses. This theory suggests the possibility of memory, which perhaps makes it preferable to the theory that we just considered. However, reflection reveals problems here as well. If sensations persisted unaltered, we would have no way to distinguish between the past and the present: both would appear as presently occurring. A melody, for instance, would, by the time of its last sounding tone, be indistinguishable from a sustained chord that built up each successive tone into a final verticality. This theory is problematic as well, since it precludes the possibility of perceiving a melody.

53 Miller, 111.
Husserl’s solution is to suggest that our perceptions do persist after they have past, but only in a modified way: this process of modification is what Husserl means by retention. “As the [primal impression passes] over into retention it is replaced by a new [primal impression]. The experiencing individual continues to be affected by the original appearance, but now only retentively, and the force of the affection diminishes as the appearance sinks further into the past.”\textsuperscript{54} Husserl refers to this diminishing affection of retentions as the “flowing-off” of retentions “in the flux of primordial impressions.”\textsuperscript{55} Furthermore, as primal impressions are continuously flowing off in the temporal flux, Miller reflects this continuity by referring to the field of flowing retentions as the manifold of retentions.\textsuperscript{56}

In Figure 1.4, below, I demonstrate the flowing-off of retentions in the perception of a succession of tones, namely, the first three pitches of the vocal line from Webern op. 3, no. 1: D-Db-Eb.\textsuperscript{57} Here, the upper edge of the large triangle represents the succession of time moving from left to right. The points $T_1$, $T_2$, and $T_3$ are the points in time at which the vocalist articulates each new pitch of the melody. The diagonal lines, extending down and to the right from points $T_1$ and $T_2$, represent the modification of the primal impressions at these points into retentions. Notice that primal impressions of pitches are denoted as notes with stems, whereas these stems are removed to show the modification of these pitches as they flow off into retentional awareness. The vertical lines in this figure, extending down from $T_2$ and $T_3$, represent the cross-section of the

\textsuperscript{54} Drummond, 128.
\textsuperscript{55} Husserl, 120.
\textsuperscript{56} Miller, 148.
\textsuperscript{57} This figure is a modified version of similar diagrams found in Husserl, 49 and Miller, 122.
Fig. 1.4: Temporal flux in the perception of the first three vocal pitches in Webern op. 3, no. 1.

manifold of retentions at these given points. These cross-sections are shown horizontally at the bottom of the figure as primal impressions (notes with stems) with adjoined retentions (without stems) at each point in time. This bottom section of the figure resonates with Husserl’s illustration of each primal impression as “the nucleus of a
comet’s tail of retentions referring to the earlier now-points of the motion.” The reader may find it helpful to focus on the arrows in the above figure, imagining this diagram as a dynamic, flowing illustration of the continual flux of temporal experience.

Husserl treats protention with less rigor than he does retention, likely due to the indeterminate nature of the former. The protentions of the immediate future are “in general not determined with regard to their matter and are first determined through the actual additional perception.” In this sense, perception is always directed at the future with an empty intentionality, but these intentionalities “trace out in advance at least the style of what is to come.”

To close our discussion of temporality, it is necessary to differentiate the immediate temporal horizon from the more generally understood notions of past and future. This distinction is quite relevant to our discussion as it differentiates retention, the immediate awareness of the just-past, and recollection, the making present before consciousness of a lived experience that has already occurred. Husserl explains that “a great phenomenological difference exists between representifying memory [recollection] and primary remembrance [retention] which extends the now-consciousness.” Husserl makes it clear that the recollection of a temporal experience is carried out in the mode of temporality in which it was first given; in other words, recollective experiences

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58 Husserl, 52.
59 Husserl, 140.
61 Husserl, 68.
themselves are built up in a “continuum of presentifications” with a temporal horizon of retention and protention just as in the originary experience of that which is recollected.62

The most marked difference between retention and recollection is the freedom in which the latter is carried out:

The originary appearing and passing away of the modes of [flowing-off] in appearance is something fixed, something of which we are conscious through “affection,” something we can only observe (if, in general, we achieve the spontaneity of such viewing). On the other hand, presentification [or, recollection] is something free; it is a free running-through [Durchlaufen]. We can carry out the presentification “more quickly” or “more slowly,” clearly and explicitly or in a confused manner, quick as lightning at a stroke or in articulated steps, and so on.63

While the notion of retention will be of considerable relevance in the analysis that follows this introduction, I should stress the fundamental importance of recollection as the phenomenological process that makes all music analysis possible. A piece of music to be analyzed, as a temporal object of perception, “can become a repeated experiential act. If this [temporal object] has been given once, then it can be given as often as you like, examined again and in different acts, which then form a succession, can be identified.”64

This discussion of phenomenological terminology can be summed up by describing the acts of musical perception and analysis as follows: In perceiving a piece of music as a temporal object, I direct the intentionality of my perception toward prominences in my perceptual field as the music unfolds as a process over time. I individuate these prominences and attribute meanings to them through the noemata that account for my intentionality, and these meanings are a product of my conceptual

62 Husserl, 59.
63 Husserl, 71. The term “affection,” in quotes above, is not clarified in the context of this quotation. I take it to reflect the state of affairs that we are affected by the flowing of the temporal flux and that we have no control over it, as opposed to recollection, which we can exercise control over.
64 Husserl, 143.
framework. All the while, the manifold of retentions flowing off from each new primal impression accounts for my awareness of succession, and the manifold of protentions anticipates the style of what is to come. After this first listening act, I am free to live out acts of recollection as often and as rigorously as I please, continually going back to the score and to recordings or mental audiations of the music. Through these recollective experiences, my constitution of the musical object is made increasingly more complete, and my intentionality toward the musical meaning of the object gradually moves from emptiness into fullness.
CHAPTER 2
EIDETIC VARIATION AND ANALYSIS OF VOCAL MATERIAL IN
WEBERN OP. 3, NO. 1

2.1 Eidetic Variation

Before the analytical portion of this thesis commences, it will be helpful to introduce one more phenomenological concept: *eidetic variation*. Husserl proposes eidetic variation as the primary methodology that he uses to reflect upon conscious experience in a phenomenological sense. The first step of this method is to perform the *transcendental reduction*, which takes out of play the question of whether or not the objects that we perceive objectively exist. The idea is that studying the objects of perception cannot give us knowledge about the experiences that make our perceptions of those objects possible, so we disregard the question of their existence in order to focus, instead, on our intentional experiences and the noemata that account for their directedness.\(^65\)

Once we “perform” the transcendental reduction, we are directed at our “pure” consciousness, and we are in a proper position to “collect the data” relevant for the study of intentionality. The task of phenomenology, however, is not fulfilled by a set of autobiographical descriptions of particular acts transcendentally reflected upon. The aim of phenomenology is to provide general or *universal* knowledge about the intentional structure of those acts. Such knowledge, according to Husserl, is facilitated through *the eidetic* [variation] performed by us on our transcendentally reduced consciousness.\(^66\)

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\(^{65}\) Miller, 176.

\(^{66}\) Miller, 186.
Miller mentions that, as a methodology that tries to describe the structure of intentional acts, phenomenology aims to formulate general descriptions and, for that reason, must go beyond reflecting upon particular, individual experiences. As a consideration of multiple conscious experiences, then, eidetic variation is an “act or experience which is directed toward what a number of distinct entities have in common. That which a number of distinct entities have in common (when they do have something in common) Husserl calls, ‘essence’ (Wesen) or ‘eidos.’” Husserl uses the term “descriptive eidetic laws” to refer to the assertions that phenomenologists make about the fundamental structures of experience, and these assertions are based upon invariants of experience discovered through eidetic variation.

Strictly speaking, the entire body of terminology discussed in the previous chapter is based upon descriptive eidetic laws that Husserl formulated by reflecting upon conscious experience through eidetic variation. For instance, the descriptive eidetic law “all mental acts have intentionality” is derived from Husserl’s reflective assessment that every mental act, whether real or imagined as a possible reality, has directedness toward a purported object.

Phenomenologists often employ the strategy of imagining possible realities in eidetic variation. “For example, one can phantasize perceiving things in order to come to eidetic insights concerning any thing-perception whatever and to determine the pure concept ‘thing-perception,’ in eidetically lawful statements.” I employed such an

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67 Miller, 186.
69 Sowa, 257.
“imaginative variation” in the introduction with my fictional example of remembering waking up to the perceived sound of a bird singing.70

A musical example of a descriptive eidetic law is “any conceivable timbre has some temporal extension.”71 I could freely imagine all kinds of timbres produced by all kinds of instruments as coloring all kinds of pitches, and these imaginative variations would all confirm the above eidetic law since it is true of each variation that the timbre in question must last for some duration of time in order for me to perceive it. However, I cannot conceive of any timbre that does not have temporal extension. Therefore, this “eidetic law is confirmed, and we can accept it in good epistemic conscience as an eidetic law that is valid until further notice.”72

I mention eidetic variation here because I would like the analysis of Webern op. 3, no. 1, that follows to involve, to a large extent, the consideration of an eidetics to describe the conscious experience of hearing musical material as “not in a key,” specifically in the pre-serial music of the Second Viennese School. I restrict the scope of this eidetics to such a specific repertoire because there are so many examples of post-tonal music written over the last century or so, and this multiplicity of composers and works, let alone the aesthetic motivations for abandoning a tonal center in each case, would be too broad a focus to make general eidetic claims of any use.

What does it mean in a phenomenological sense, then, to perceive musical material as “not in a key”? Schoenberg briefly describes the notion in his discussion on

70 Sowa, 259, gives a helpful discussion on the imaginative element of the eidetic variation.
71 This example is after Sowa’s “any conceivable phenomenal color has some sort of phenomenal extension.” Sowa, 258.
72 Sowa, 259.
“the emancipation of the dissonance,” saying, “a style based on [the premise of ‘the emancipation of the dissonance’] treats dissonances like consonances and renounces a tonal center.” This description of renouncing a tonal center, or suppressing tonal implications, in the musical material likely resonates with one’s experience of listening to this repertoire, but it is of little help in describing the act of perceiving such a general renunciation. Furthermore, it is not merely of phenomenological value to investigate the notion of perceived suppression-of-tonal-implications. It is also of music-analytical value since the pitch organization of such music would interact with the phenomenological structures that facilitate the perceived suppression of tonal implications.

Perhaps articulating the discussion in phenomenological terms would help to clarify the matter at hand. As composers of art music in the Austro-Germanic tradition in the early twentieth century, Schoenberg, Berg, and Webern were likely aware that their audiences strongly retained the tonal tradition in their conceptual frameworks—this is, of course, why Schoenberg’s renunciation of a tonal center was such a remarkable development. What I propose, in other words, is that audiences of this specific early-twentieth-century music were accustomed to attributing meaning to the musical objects of their intentionality based on a conceptual framework that was dominated by the notion of a tonal center and the hierarchies of tonal logic.

For this reason, if Webern set out to write a composition that renounced a tonal center and, in so doing, chose to use no flats or sharps in the entire piece, an audience

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73 Arnold Schoenberg, “Composition with Twelve Tones” (delivered as a lecture at the University of California at Los Angeles, March 26, 1941), in Style and Idea, ed. Dika Newlin (New York: Philosophical Library Publishers, 1950), 105.
member would rightly contest that the renunciation of a tonal center was not complete. Even if the hypothetical piece in question employed non-triadic combinations of the material or a non-traditional harmonic syntax, the critical audience member would contest that Webern was merely applying the elements of a C Major tonality in novel ways without, in the process, truly renouncing the tonal center that related those elements to one another. In other words, to motivate a listener to attribute the meaning “renounced tonal center” to some perceived musical material, it would be necessary for the composer to engage the listener’s conceptual framework, to anticipate which gestures would suggest the relatedness of pitch material to a tonal center, and to outwit that conceptual framework at every turn.74

Thomas Clifton addresses the crux of this issue in a discussion of the phenomenological similarities between music and ritual:

A few connections between music and ritual can now be drawn. Both involve directed action rather than mere movement. An action, or activity, is goal directed, if “goal” is taken to be the constituted meaning. Even if the goal is “non-directedness,” still this is the meaning toward which an activity may be tending. Words like “directed” or “activity” imply that there is someone who directs or acts, and therefore, the goal comprises the meaning for that someone . . . . The upshot of all this is that the actual movements in a ritual (people walking or gesturing) are not what constitute the meaning of the action. Rather, the meaning of the action suggests which kind of movement shall be appropriate to the meaning.75

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74 This notion is reminiscent of Charles Seeger’s theoretical concept of “dissonation” as described by Joseph Straus in Joseph N. Straus, The Music of Ruth Crawford Seeger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 17-20. However, while Seeger’s dissonation is a documented theoretical concept that is exhibited in the music of composers with close ties to the theorist, my ideas about Webern’s music are not based upon documented compositional strategy or theoretical material that Webern would have been familiar with. In this sense, my work on Webern’s suppression of tonal implications is more speculative than Straus’s work on Crawford’s use of dissonation.

75 Clifton, 90.
By quoting Clifton here, I mean to suggest that Schoenberg’s general renunciation of a
tonal center amounts to such a goal of “non-directedness” as Clifton mentions—non-
directedness toward any tonal center. Even though this goal suggests non-directedness, it
is nonetheless toward such a goal that music is directed when it renounces a tonal center.
Clifton would argue, then, that the musical gestures employed in a piece of music that
renounces a tonal center are not, themselves, what constitute the meaning of such a
renunciation. Rather, the meaning of the musical action, that is, the suppression of tonal
implications, suggests what kind of musical gestures shall be appropriate to that
meaning.

Whether we take on the role of a phenomenologist seeking to generally describe
an experience or a music analyst seeking to describe the structures of a certain musical
style, the problem here is the same: we must account for the structures of perception that
motivate a listener with a “tonal conceptual framework” to attribute the meaning
“suppression of tonal implications” to a perceived musical object. Toward this end, we
can propose descriptive eidetic laws regarding such perceptual structures and, in so
doing, reveal the manner in which given musical gestures are appropriate to the meaning
of the suppression of tonal implications.

This is not to suggest that a listener with a “tonal conceptual framework” would
continue to expect a tonal piece of music once they had begun to perceive the suppression
of tonal implications in a piece or, for that matter, that such a listener would be capable of
systematically analyzing, “in the moment,” each possible tonal interpretation of the
musical material and the manner in which the composer continually outwits such an interpretation.

To clarify my point, then, I propose that there are two different types of “listeners.” First, there is the present listener addressed by the instrumentalists in a musical performance. The performers address this listener by playing music that is already written, and this listener constitutes the meaning of the musical perceptual object “in the moment” of performance, i.e., in the temporal flux, in the continual flowing-off of primal impressions as they are modified into retentions. Second, there is the absent listener addressed by the composer in the creative act of composition. The composer addresses this listener by engaging the latter’s conceptual framework, by writing music so as to prompt this listener to attribute a specific meaning to the musical perceptual object. This act of musical creation is carried out by the composer not “in the moment” of primal impressions and retentions, but in multiple acts of creative recollection—the composer freely returns to each moment of the piece and continually reworks the material so as to guide this listener’s constitution of the piece.76

By addressing the absent listener through the act of composition, the composer enables the present listener to, “in the moment” of performance, constitute the musical

76 I would like to distinguish my “listener types” from a similar notion found in Theodor W. Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: The Seabury Press, 1976), 1-20. Adorno describes the following eight listener types: expert listener, good listener, culture consumer, emotional listener, resentment listener, jazz expert/ fan, entertainment listener, and musically indifferent/ unmusical/ anti-musical. Adorno’s types are theoretical sociological categories and would all fall under my category “present listener.” My “absent listener” is one theoretically removed from the actual listening experience. I employ the “present/ absent listener” binary to clarify that my analysis will, in exploring multiple tonal interpretations and the degree to which those interpretations are supported or not by the surrounding context, consider the pitch material of Webern op. 3, no. 1, more closely than a “real” listener could hope to in listening to a single performance of the song. The “absent” listener is proposed to account for the composer’s relation with a listener’s perceptual-interpretive capacity and the phenomenologist’s relation with a perceiving subject’s conceptual framework as it is investigated in eidetic variation.
object with the attribute-meanings that were set forth in the creative act—at least to the extent that the present listener’s perception interacts with the musical meaning that the composer intended. Or, for our present purposes, I propose that by addressing the “tonal conceptual framework” of the absent listener, Webern enables the present listener to constitute the song “Dies ist ein Lied für dich allein” with the attribute meaning of “suppressed tonal implications.” In the discussion of the song that follows, then, I will propose a descriptive eidetic law to investigate the structures of perception through which Webern addresses his absent listener and, in doing so, analyze Webern’s compositional means toward a specific perceptual end.77

2.2 Analysis of Vocal Material in Webern op. 3, no. 1

Webern op. 3, no. 1, “Dies ist ein Lied für dich allein,” is a song for piano and female vocalist and was first published in 1919, roughly a decade after Webern wrote it in 1908-09.78 Based on a poem by Stefan George, the song follows the three-part formal structure of the poem with a clear correspondence to the rhyme scheme and syntactic form, as shown in Figure 2.1, below.79 The reproduction of the score in Example 2.1, below on page 37, shows the three-part A B A' form of the song as well the segmentation of the vocal line that this analysis will initially address.

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77 I should clarify that, in my discussion of Webern’s compositionally addressing the absent listener’s “tonal conceptual framework,” I do not intend to suggest that my analytical methods that follow correspond to any documented compositional strategies that Webern actually employed in writing this song. Such a suggestion would be a commission of the intentional fallacy. Rather, I mean to suggest that, to the extent that a listener perceives material in this song as suppressing tonal implications, as I do perceive, certain compositional gestures embodied in the pitch structure of the song must be prompting such a perception. The purpose of the following analysis will be to examine such compositional gestures by closely examining the pitch organization of the song.


79 This figure is taken from Wason, 114.
As I outlined in the previous chapter, this analysis will begin by considering the vocal line in isolation. The precedent for considering the perception of the vocal line in its own context, apart from the piano accompaniment, is found in Lewin’s unpublished “Morgengruss” manuscript, in which he describes that song as a “multi-dimensional structure”\textsuperscript{80} and refers to the vocal line in its own context as a “cross-section”\textsuperscript{81} of that structure. Lewin extracts the vocal line from the piano accompaniment in order to locate strong points of arrival in the voice-in-its-own-context, which he then compares with arrival points in the context of the voice and accompaniment together.\textsuperscript{82} By specifying instances where the arrivals within these two different contexts do not temporally align, Lewin exposes aspects of ambiguity in the pitch structure of the song that he uses as a point of departure to explore the role that strophic repetition plays in resolving such ambiguities.\textsuperscript{83}

As will become apparent in the analysis that follows, my application of this vocal-extraction technique differs from Lewin’s approach in many regards since aspects of form

\textsuperscript{80} Lewin, \textit{Morgengruss}, 74.
\textsuperscript{81} Lewin, 85.
\textsuperscript{82} Lewin, 90.
\textsuperscript{83} Lewin actually uses these ambiguities to propose a multi-strophe Uurlinie (although he does not use this term) moving (F)\textsuperscript{-}E\textsuperscript{-}D\textsuperscript{-}C over the course of the song’s four strophes. Lewin, 136-9.
Ex. 2.1: Webern op. 3, no. 1.
and pitch organization in the Schubert and Webern songs are so dissimilar. Furthermore, while Lewin investigates points of arrival that differ between the two contexts outlined above, I will examine hypothetical tonal implications in the vocal context and then consider the amount of support provided in the context of the piano accompaniment for such implications. In other words, my consideration of the vocal line in isolation will serve as a point of departure for my examination of a musical style characterized by the suppression of tonal implications. As much as my analytical goals differ from Lewin’s, however, my extraction of the vocal line as a context within itself will serve the same general methodological purpose as it did for Lewin: to “[reveal] aspects of the large [context] which one had not noticed before.”

Ex. 2.2: Vocal setting of “Dies ist ein Lied” along with continually accumulating segmentation.

Example 2.2, above, shows the melodic segment that sets the text “Dies ist ein Lied,” along with what I will henceforth refer to as a continually accumulating segmentation of the same melodic segment. The reader should recall the diagram in Figure 1.4 that demonstrated the flowing off of retentions in the temporal flux as

84 Lewin, 74.
pertaining to the first three pitches of this four note melodic set. The continually accumulating segmentation in Example 2.2b corresponds to the bottom part of Figure 1.4 that illustrated the adjoining of retentional manifolds onto primal impressions over the course a melodic perception—the so-called “comet’s tail.”

The meaning of my term “continually accumulating segmentation” should be fairly self-evident: as each new pitch is added to the temporal span of the melodic perception, the segmentation of the set expands. To describe this technique phenomenologically, the meanings of the pitches retained in the manifold of retentions and of the new “primal-impression pitch” mutually influence one another. In Millerian terms, the technique treats melodic segments as composite objects whose constituent elements appear one after another so that the final segmentation of the set as a whole is shown to be the product of a dynamic process throughout which the meanings that we attribute to the segment are continually in flux.

The critical reader may feel some discomfort with my use of PC set theory in the temporal-phenomenological context of my “continually accumulating segmentation,” and rightly so: set theory tends to “flatten out” temporal elements of musical perception by disregarding the order of individual pitches in their melodic presentation, focusing instead upon “atemporal” intervallic relationships. However, by noting the intervallic

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85 The set-theoretical notation employed in all of the continually accumulating segmentations in this chapter uses square brackets to denote normal order and round parentheses to denote prime form.

86 This technique corresponds, more or less, to Alan Forte’s term “imbrication,” “the systematic (sequential) extraction of subcomponents of some configuration,” which Forte refers to as a “pre-analytical technique.” Allen Forte, *The Structure of Atonal Music* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 83-4. I mean to use continually accumulating segmentation as a pre-analytical technique as well, but it should be clear to the reader that this technique is intimately tied up with Husserl’s concept of temporal awareness, and, for this reason, I will apply it thoroughly in my discussion of the melodic material in this chapter.
content of the segment as it is presented in sequential adumbrations, my application of set theory in continually accumulating segmentation tries to incorporate temporal awareness by considering a melodic segment “in terms of a sedimentation of meaning, and [by saying] that as the [melodic segment] moves, the accumulation of meaning fills out the incompleteness of the moment.”

Furthermore, my technique of continually accumulating segmentation is amply supported by Husserl, who writes that “with a melody, for example, we can arrest a moment, as it were, and discover therein shadings of memory of the past notes. It is obvious that the same holds true for every individual note.”

Let us now consider the melodic segment at hand: D-Db-Eb-Gb. Taken in isolation, the first tone D (“Dies”) offers little set-theoretical information of value—it is merely a single pitch, and if one were to apply a “tonal conceptual framework” in attributing analytical meaning to this single pitch, one would be hard pressed to make any assumptions of key center at this point aside from the vague assumption that D might be the tonal center of the melodic material to follow.

Db (“ist”) expands the temporal span of the segment and, combined with the retentionally modified D natural, creates a semitone. Our set-theoretical information regarding this set has moved forward from a single pitch to a dyad of interval class 1. Regarding our D-tonal-center assumption, above, Db could easily be heard as C#, suggesting scale degrees 1-7 in either D Major or minor. Let us imagine that Db was

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87 Clifton, 85.
88 Husserl, 151.
written as C# and that our first two melodic pitches were supported by piano accompaniment in a i-V progression in D minor, as in Example 2.3, below.\textsuperscript{89}

Ex. 2.3: A proposed tonal harmonization of “Dies ist” in imaginative variation.

Our reflection upon the perception of the second pitch of this melodic segment as it is adjoined by the retentionally modified first pitch reveals an important point about the isolated perception of a melodic dyad: any dyad can, in imaginative eidetic variation, imply a tonal center since there is no dyad that does not map onto the basic interval content of a diatonic collection. This reflection is our first step in beginning to formulate a descriptive eidetics of the perception of tonal-center-renunciation.

Let us now consider the addition of the third pitch in this segment. As Eb (“ein”) becomes the new primal impression, it is adjoined by the retentionally modified Db and D natural to give us our first pitch-class set on the Forte list: [1,2,3] (012). This moment

\textsuperscript{89} While the accompaniment in Example 2.3 suggests a harmonic framework for the tonal interpretation of the vocal line’s first two pitches, the reader should try to hear this interpretation as if the accompaniment is not actually sounding. Toward this end, the reader may wish to play the accompaniment at the piano and sing along with the vocal line, then sing only the vocal line while remembering the context of the piano accompaniment. The same approach may be helpful in examining each of the imaginative variations that follows in Examples 2.4 and 2.5.
may come as a shock to a listener who had imagined a D tonal center as implied by the first two pitches. The problem is this: the three pitches Eb-Db-D natural cannot all co-exist in the same diatonic collection without demoting the status of at least one of these tones as a chromatically functioning embellishment of some type. To put the matter in set-theoretical terms, the perception of this trichord as belonging to a diatonic collection is problematic because its prime form, (012), is not an abstract subset of the prime form of the diatonic collection, (013568T). The addition of Eb in the continually accumulating segmentation marks the instant at which such a diatonic mapping is precluded, as is denoted in Example 2.2b with a bold font for the set label.

Despite the impossibility of mapping (012) onto (013568T), it is possible, in imaginative variation, to render the notes Eb-Db-D natural within a key, given the liberty of enharmonic re-spelling. For instance, if we reinterpret Db as C# and consider C# as a chromatic embellishment within a key, then, in the chronological order of presentation, D-C#-Eb suggests a chromatic embellishment common in tonal practice on the fifth degree of a minor scale. In other words, this segment could be heard as scale degrees 5-#4-b6 in the key of G minor and could be harmonized as a V chord, as in Example 2.4, below.

The addition of the final pitch in this melodic segment, Gb (“Lied”), gives us PC-set [1,2,3,6] (0125). Again, this set cannot be mapped onto a key without disregarding some its pitches as chromatic embellishments. This is obvious in set-theoretical terms: since (012) is a subset of (0125), and since (012) cannot map onto (013568T), it follows that (0125) also cannot map onto (013568T). Of course, if one were still attributing
Ex. 2.4: A proposed tonal harmonization of “Dies ist ein” in imaginative variation.

meaning to this pitch content based on a “tonal conceptual framework,” one could respell Gb as F#, the leading tone in G minor, thereby hearing the entire four note segment as a melodic, chromatically inflected elaboration of a dominant harmony in the key of G minor, as the imaginative variation in Example 2.5 demonstrates below.

Ex. 2.5: A proposed tonal harmonization of “Dies ist ein Lied” in imaginative variation.
What has this reflection upon the opening melodic set of the vocal line revealed about the perceptual structures at work in its constitution by a listener? If one were to use Lewin’s terms, an analytical statement made in the language (L) of pitch-class set theory would assert that the constituent elements of this melodic set, [1,2,3,6] (0125), cannot be heard as belonging to the same key because they cannot all map onto a single diatonic collection. On the other hand, an analytical statement made in the language (L) of tonal harmonic theory would assert that a listener should have no problem perceiving the melodic segment as a chromatic elaboration of a V chord in G minor, as our imaginative variations have demonstrated.

A consideration of this vocal material in its own context supports both of these interpretations depending on the conceptual framework that the listener brings to the listening experience, and, thus, the following eidetic description can be proposed: a melodic segment is perceived as avoiding tonal implications if its pitch material cannot be mapped onto a diatonic collection and if it is not plausible to interpret one or more of its constituent elements as a traditional chromatic elaboration of some type or other. This proposed eidetic law is clearly problematic: using imaginative variation as our only guide, we could likely construe any melodic pitch as a chromatic embellishment of some tonality or other, and it is therefore necessary at this point to consider the piano accompaniment of our opening melodic segment, as in Example 2.6, below.

The question of whether or not the opening vocal segment can be construed as suggesting a tonal center, in this case G minor, is left up to the piano accompaniment to decide. In light of the piano accompaniment, the G minor interpretation that was perfectly
Ex. 2.6: Lack of support for G minor interpretation of “Dies ist ein Lied.”

reasonable in imaginative variation is rendered hopelessly problematic, as neither the
treble-clef verticalities nor the low E bass tone offer any support for the interpretation
“V chord in G minor.” Even if the interpretation added a 7th to the proposed V harmony
in G minor, the only chord tone amongst D-F#-A-C that is to be found in the piano
accompaniment of the opening vocal segment is the highest note, D, of the first piano
verticality. Even the most earnest proponent of a tonal interpretation could not explain
away every remaining note of the piano accompaniment as chromatic elaborations of a
diatonic collection generated by a tonal center.

In light of this investigation, the analyst will be inclined to choose the language
(L) of pitch-class set theory to describe the opening vocal segment, and the analysis will
emphasize that this melodic segment avoids tonal implications on account of its inability
to map onto a diatonic collection. Our proposed descriptive eidetic law can then be
revised as follows: a melodic segment is perceived as avoiding tonal implications if its
pitch material cannot be mapped onto a diatonic collection and if it is not plausible to
interpret one or more of its constituent elements as a traditional chromatic elaboration of some type or other in light of the surrounding musical context. The italicized addition here amounts to a rejection of imaginative variation as a fully sufficient means of evaluating the plausibility of a tonal interpretation of a given melodic segment.

I am not suggesting that the “present” listener will have time or insight enough to consider each of the above imaginative variations and tonal interpretations in the act of listening to a performance of this song. Instead, I am suggesting that a phenomenological investigation of the “absent” listener’s imaginative variations and proposed tonal interpretations will elucidate the composer’s avoidance of tonal implications as constituted by his audience and the music analyst’s understanding of which specific musical gestures the composer chooses to employ toward that end.90

The critical reader will likely feel discomfort with my use of the word “plausible” in the proposed eidetic law. What is plausible to one person may seem utterly implausible to another, and this observation exposes a weakness in the proposed eidetic descriptive law. However, this weakness does not render the proposed descriptive law phenomenologically useless, it simply opens up a space for discourse in its application. Surely every analyst must consider the notion of the piano accompaniment supporting an interpretation of a V chord in G minor either plausible or implausible, and to the extent

90 I should clarify again that I do not mean to suggest that Webern’s compositional methods correspond to my analytical methods or that there is any documentary evidence to support such a position. There will likely be unknown factors of Webern’s compositional strategy for the duration of scholarship devoted to his works. I only mean to suggest that Webern’s compositional choices did result in the organization of the song as published, and, insofar as a listener hears the song as avoiding tonal implications, it must have been Webern’s compositional choices that prompted the pitch organization that prompted such a perception in the listener.
that two sincere analysts disagree, a helpful discourse will ensue to the extent that both parties are interested in productive analytical discussion.

I have considered the piano accompaniment of the opening vocal melodic segment in order to clarify the role of the surrounding musical context as either supporting or not supporting a tonal hearing of a melodic segment, and, in so doing, I have proposed a descriptive eidetic law with which to investigate the perceptual structures that prompt a listener to hear musical material as avoiding tonal implications. Now that this has been accomplished, further analysis of the piano accompaniment will be deferred to the next chapter. For now, I will continue to investigate the continually accumulating segmentations of the remaining vocal melodic segments, paying special attention to pitches whose addition to the segment preclude the mapping of the set onto a diatonic collection.

Example 2.7, below, shows the second vocal segment along with its continually accumulating segmentation. The first pitch alone cannot preclude a tonal interpretation nor can the addition of the second since any dyad can be mapped onto a number of diatonic collections. The addition of the third note, E ("al-") does complicate a tonal interpretation since [4,5,8] (014) cannot map onto a diatonic collection, as is reflected in the bold font of this set label. An obvious solution to this problem, if one wanted to insist upon a tonal interpretation, would be to consider E as a raised leading tone in the key of F minor, as one could easily construct an imaginative variation to support such an interpretation.

Vocal segments have largely been determined according to the placement of rests in the vocal line. The segmentation of “für dich allein” is an exception; it was segmented as such on account of a marked change in the piano accompaniment. Other exceptions include the vocal segmentation of “Durch Morgengärten klingt es” and “Nur dir allein,” and these exceptions are justified as their musical examples enter into the discussion.
Ex. 2.7: Vocal setting of “für dich allein” along with continually accumulating segmentation.

interpretation. In fact, the Bb that completes the melodic tetrachord supports such an interpretation. This notion will be investigated in the following chapter. For now, our descriptive eidetic law suggests that, unless the F minor interpretation is supported by the piano accompaniment, this melodic segment will be perceived as avoiding tonal implications.

By employing this descriptive eidetic law, I am not suggesting that the “present” listener will, in an actual listening experience, persistently seek out a perceived tonal center in the imaginative variations that I am putting forward here. It is likely that this present listener will adjust his or her expectations to the context of the song as it is performed and, upon recognizing the avoidance of tonal implications, modify his or her conceptual framework accordingly. However, in addressing the “absent” listener, I will apply my descriptive eidetic law systematically to each vocal melodic segment, observing possible tonal interpretations. The purpose of considering tonal implications, after the point that the listener will have already adjusted his or her conceptual framework to
accept the general renunciation of a tonal center, is to propose an explanation for which specific musical gestures prompted this change in the listener. As we will see, this systematic analytical approach will also account for moments of tonal reminiscence that blur the tonal/atonal binary—moments when a “tonal conceptual framework” finds a shaky foothold.

Example 2.8, above, shows the third vocal segment along with its continually accumulating segmentation. Again, we see that the third pitch introduced, E (“di-”), produces PC-set [1,4,5] (014) and precludes the mapping of the melodic segment onto a diatonic collection without admitting of chromatic embellishment. A pattern is beginning to emerge considering the points in the continually accumulating segmentation at which the set is rendered intervallically incompatible with the diatonic collection. In that neither a single pitch nor a dyad can, in principle, be excluded from a diatonic interpretation, the third pitch-class introduced in a temporally unfolding melodic perception is the earliest possible point at which a set can preclude such a tonal interpretation, and Webern has, thus far, taken every opportunity to complicate a tonal hearing as early as possible in each
vocal segment. As far as a tonal interpretation is concerned, Db respelled as C# (as in the fourth note of the segment, on “-schem”) suggests D minor, as Robert Wason also observes, and the plausibility of this hearing will have to be decided by a reflection upon the amount of tonal support in the piano accompaniment.

a) Ex. 2.9: Vocal setting of “von frommen Tränen” along with continually accumulating segmentation.

The fourth melodic segment, shown above in Example 2.9, is a transposition up a whole step of the third segment (“von kindischem Wähnen”), with the exception that “von frommen Tränen...” does not repeat a pitch class with its fourth note, as the third segment did to accommodate its syllabic material. Considering this transposition up a whole step, the fourth melodic segment also complicates a tonal interpretation with its third note, creating [3,6,7] (014), and a possible tonal interpretation would suggest E minor with a raised leading tone (Eb, “von,” respelled as D#).

Example 2.10, below, shows the fifth vocal segment with its continually accumulating segmentation. This segmentation has bracketed off the last two notes of “Durch Morgengärten klingt es” for reasons that will be discussed shortly. For now, the

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92 Wason, 116.
Ex. 2.10: Vocal setting of “Durch Morgengärten” along with continually accumulating segmentation.

The reader should note that the first four pitches of this segment comprise a retrograde of the pitch material from the opening segment “Dies ist ein Lied” (D-Db-Eb-Gb becomes Gb-Eb-Db-D natural, with Eb and Db transposed up an octave). We recall that “Dies ist ein Lied” could not map onto a diatonic collection because of the PC-set [1,2,3] (012) (D-Db-Eb) but that this vocal segment in its own context could imply a chromatically inflected V harmony in G minor. This implication also holds for “Durch Morgengärten,” with Gb respelled as F# (the leading tone to G) and Db respelled as C# (the secondary leading tone to D, the dominant scale degree of G). In fact, the addition of the last pitch in this melodic segment, the G natural that extends past the retrograde of the opening vocal segment, lends a great deal of support to the G minor interpretation of this segment, with D-G as the last two pitches suggesting 5-1 in G minor, or, the resolution of the elaborated dominant harmony to a tonic chord.

Again, we will have to investigate whether the piano accompaniment supports such an interpretation in the following chapter. For now, we should note that, while the
setting of “Dies ist ein Lied” complicated a tonal interpretation with its third pitch, this moment does not occur with the setting of “Durch Morgengärten” until the fourth note, on account of the retrograded pitch material from the opening vocal segment.

a) Ex. 2.11: Vocal setting of “-ten klingt es” along with continually accumulating segmentation.

It is helpful to segment “-ten klingt es,” shown above in Example 2.11, as an elided segment, overlapping with “Durch Morgengärten” on the pitch G (“-ten”) because the vocal segment that follows, “ein leicht beschwingtes,” is an ordered pitch transposition $T_{+1}$ of “Durch Morgengärten.” “klingt es,” then, is retrospectively revealed as an extension of the material selected for transposition, and a meaningful connection is revealed as the analyst adjoins these pitches with the elided G natural: this gives us $[7,8,E] (014)$, a set class that has featured prominently in the melodic material of the vocal line thus far as a trichord that cannot map onto the diatonic collection (013568T). The possible tonal interpretation here involves respelling G natural as Fx, the chromatically raised leading tone of G# minor.

As mentioned above, “ein leichtbeschwingtes” is an ordered transposition of “Durch Morgengärten,” up a half-step. Accordingly, the first four notes of this segment
Ex. 2.12: Vocal setting of “eine leichtbeschwingtes” along with continually accumulating segmentation.

comprise a transposition up a half-step of the “Dies ist ein Lied” retrograde, and all of our analytical points about “Durch Morgengärten” still hold under this transposition. As shown above in Example 2.12, a tonal interpretation is complicated with the fourth pitch, creating [2,3,4,7] (0125), and a possible tonal interpretation would feature Ab as the proposed tonal center with the second pitch, E, as a respelled Fb, the sixth scale degree of Ab minor.

Ex. 2.13: Vocal setting of “Nur dir allein” along with continually accumulating segmentation.
Transposition continues to feature prominently as a variation technique, as “Nur dir allein,” shown above in Example 2.13, is a transposition of “von frommen Tränen” down three half-steps. Our analytical observations about the setting of “von frommen Tränen” hold under transposition, so that the third pitch complicates a tonal hearing with \([0,3,4] (014)\), and a possible tonal interpretation of C# minor with C natural (“al-”) as a respelled B#, the chromatically raised leading tone.

a)

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{möcht es ein Lied} \\
\end{array}
\]

b)

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{möcht es ein Lied} \\
\end{array}
\]

Ex. 2.14: Vocal setting of “möcht es ein Lied” along with continually accumulating segmentation.

The return to earlier vocal material suggested by “Nur dir allein” is confirmed by the setting of “möcht es ein Lied,” a restatement of the opening melodic segment with an inserted G natural on the attack of “Lied,” as shown above in Example 2.14. The reader will notice that the pentachord created by the addition of G natural to the opening vocal segment is identical to the setting of “Durch Morgengärten”: \([1,2,3,6,7] (01256)\). Here, as in “Dies ist ein Lied,” the third pitch of the segment complicates a tonal interpretation with \([1,2,3] (012)\), and, as in “Durch Morgengärten,” the insertion of G natural lends support to the possible tonal interpretation of G minor. As we will see, this “inserted-G”
technique features prominently in the relationship between the voice and the piano accompaniment.

The final vocal segment, shown below in Example 2.15, brings closure to the restatement of opening melodic material with an exact restatement of the pitch material from “für dich allein.” Again, the third pitch complicates a tonal interpretation with \([4,5,8] (014)\), and a possible tonal interpretation would feature an F minor tonal center with E natural as a chromatically raised leading tone.

a)  

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Ex. 2.15: Vocal setting of “das rühre sein” along with continually accumulating segmentation.}
\end{align*}
\]

b)  

With the conclusion of our vocal-melodic analysis, it will be helpful at this point to review what we have accomplished thus far. As we set out to describe the perceptual structures that would motivate a listener with a “tonal conceptual framework” to attribute the meaning “avoidance of tonal implications” to a perceived musical object, we discovered that Webern consistently applied the strategy of complicating a tonal interpretation of melodic material by prominently featuring trichords that do not map onto the diatonic collection (013568T). Furthermore, with the exception of two melodic
segments ("Durch Morgengärten" and "ein leicht beschwingtes"), every melodic segment of the vocal line complicated a tonal interpretation as immediately as possible (i.e., with the third new pitch-class of the segment), and the two exceptions to this pattern, above, resulted from a retrograde technique applied to the melodic material that set up the pattern itself. Finally, the melodic analysis in this chapter also identified the variation techniques applied—namely, transposition and retrograde—and identified the return to melodic material from the A section at the commencement of the A' return—beginning with “Nur dir allein.”

The following chapter will now turn to a more thorough treatment of our proposed descriptive eidetic law: a melodic segment is perceived as avoiding tonal implications if its pitch material cannot be mapped onto a diatonic collection and if it is not plausible to interpret one or more of its constituent elements as a traditional chromatic elaboration of some type or other in light of the surrounding musical context. Toward this end, the following chapter will examine the relationship between the vocal part and the piano accompaniment in order to investigate the manner in which the accompaniment either supports or undermines the tonal interpretations of the vocal material that we proposed in imaginative variation.
CHAPTER 3

ANALYSIS OF THE VOICE-PIANO TEXTURE AND COMPARISON OF

COMPETING ANALYTICAL STRATEGIES

3.1 Analysis of the Voice-Piano Texture

The following analysis of the piano accompaniment will continue the investigation of the vocal-melodic material by placing the latter within the context of the former. The reader should recall that the procedure of taking the vocal line as its own context was a hypothetical gesture intended to function as a point of departure for my analysis. Considering the vocal line in the context of the surrounding piano accompaniment, then, is a less hypothetical procedure that will more accurately reflect a listener’s perception of the song as it is performed.

This contextualization will extend the application of the descriptive eidetic law proposed in the previous chapter: a melodic segment is perceived as avoiding tonal implications if its pitch material cannot be mapped onto a diatonic collection and if it is not plausible to interpret one or more of its constituent elements as a traditional chromatic elaboration of some type or other in light of the surrounding musical context. Furthermore, the analysis of the piano accompaniment will fill out our analytical discussion of the song by describing prominent organizational features of the accompaniment’s pitch structure. Following this analysis, the second section of the chapter will compare the analytical methods applied in the present discussion with
differing methods employed in published analyses of Webern op. 3, no. 1, by Olli Väisälä and Elmar Budde.\(^{93}\)

Ex. 3.1: Tonal implication of “Dies ist ein Lied” considered with accompaniment.

The analysis of the piano accompaniment will commence with an examination of Example 3.1, above, which contextualizes the opening vocal segment “Dies ist ein Lied.” The reader will recall that this vocal segment’s interpretation in relation to a proposed tonal center was complicated with the third pitch, Eb (“ein”), which created \([1,2,3,6] (012)\) and precluded the possibility of mapping onto a diatonic collection since \(012\) is not a subset of \((013568T)\). Imaginative variation suggested a possible tonal interpretation in G minor, suggesting a chromatically elaborated V chord in that key with Db respelled as

\(^{93}\) While a closer look at his work unfortunately falls outside the scope of this thesis, the reader will find Robert Wason’s *Pitch-Class Motive* article as well as his collaboration with Elizabeth West Marvin to offer fascinating and insightful analytical work on Webern op. 3. In researching and analyzing this song, I was pleased to find many of my own analytical observations in his writing, and his work on the opus as a whole features D minor as a suggested tonality. The relationship of his idea with my analysis will become clearer as my argument proceeds, but I would like to note here that I arrived at my D minor interpretation independently and from a different perspective from Wason.
C# and Gb respelled as F#. However, an examination of the piano accompaniment to this vocal segment rendered such a tonal interpretation implausible, since the proposed chord, D-F#-A-(C), only found support from the piano accompaniment in the high D natural of the first piano verticality.

Further examination of this excerpt reveals a proliferation of half-step relationships in the piano accompaniment, with the first chord juxtaposing B-Bb and Eb-D, and the upper-voice motion of the treble-clef verticalities imitating the vocal line’s D-Db. Furthermore, the piano’s low E is a semitone against the opening chord’s Eb, and, when taken into the context of the D-Db motion of the piano’s upper voice, this creates a semitone cluster Db-D natural-Eb-E natural [1,2,3,4] (0123). Interestingly, with these semitone relationships, the piano accompaniment is applying the same means of avoiding tonal implications as was applied in the vocal line with the addition of the third pitch (Eb) to effect [1,2,3] (012).

Webern loosens the suppression of tonal implications with the second treble-clef verticality in the accompaniment. This chord, [T,E,1,3] (0135), does map onto the diatonic collection (013568T). Admitting of enharmonic respelling (Eb = D#, Bb = A#, Db = C#), a listener with a “tonal conceptual framework” could interpret this chord in the key of B Major, with B-D# suggesting tonic harmony and A#-C# suggesting an elided dominant harmony.\textsuperscript{94} While such a listener would likely experience this chord as a welcome evocation of the diatonic-intervallic domain, they would be hard pressed to

\textsuperscript{94} One could also describe this harmony as a B\textsuperscript{9} chord with an omitted 5th. My attribution of tonal functions to 9th chords will become more clear in my analysis of the piano chords leading into m. 4. In that instance, an “elided dominant” tonic harmony actually follows a decorated pre-dominant sonority.
explain away the surrounding context as consisting purely of chromatic elaborations of B
Major, especially since this chord is manifest chronologically in the music not in its own
context, but in the context of the more tonally puzzling semitonal malaise of the song’s
preceding material.

Continuing now with the accompaniment of the second vocal segment, we recall
that the third note of the vocal melody, E (“al-”), created [4,5,8] (014) and thereby
complicated a tonal interpretation since (014) does not map onto the diatonic collection
(013568T). Imaginative variation suggested a possible tonal interpretation in F minor
with E interpreted as a chromatically raised leading tone. The piano accompaniment,
however, does not support such an interpretation. Example 3.2, below, demonstrates that
the accompaniment of this segment is comprised of two strata: the upper stratum consists
of an imitation of the preceding vocal segment (“Dies ist ein Lied”) along with the first
two pitches of the present vocal segment (“für dich”)—an imitative technique that recalls

Ex. 3.2: Tonal implication of “für dich allein” considered with
accompaniment.
the D-Db imitation in the upper voice of the opening piano verticalities—while the lower stratum continues to expound upon the semitonal juxtapositions introduced in the opening segment. Note the repeated voice exchange technique used to elaborate the B natural-Bb juxtaposition, while Eb-E natural is represented by a simple melodic ascent. Furthermore, note the insertion of G natural in the upper stratum’s imitative line. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the exact same G-natural-insertion is found in the vocal setting of “Durch Morgengärten” and “möcht es ein Lied,” the latter of these instances picking up on the exact insertion foreshadowed by the piano accompaniment to “für dich allein.”

Given the piano accompaniment’s continued fixation with semitone juxtaposition (the inserted G natural-Gb in the piano making its contribution) and lack of support for the F minor tonality vocal interpretation suggested in imaginative variation, I find such an interpretation implausible and continue to hear the song up to this point as effectively suppressing tonal implications.

The question regarding the accompaniment of the third vocal segment, shown below in Example 3.3, is whether or not its material supports the possible D minor tonal interpretation suggested in imaginative variation that considered Db as enharmonically equivalent to C#, the chromatically raised leading tone to D. An examination of the single verticality that comprises the accompaniment here reveals a continued fixation with semitone relationships, juxtaposing D-C# and F-E. These semitones, in fact, can be found in the melodic material setting “von kindischem Wähnen,” and the only pitch in this

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95 Wason discusses similar voice-exchange techniques in op. 3, nos. 3 and 5. Wason, 125, 128.
Ex. 3.3: Tonal implication of “von kindischem Wähnen” considered with accompaniment, featuring “semitone” interpretation.

vocal segment not found in the piano accompaniment here is G, exhibiting further application of the inserted-G idea discussed above. Furthermore, the highest pitch of the chord, E, continues the piano’s imitation of the vocal line from the upper stratum supporting “für dich allein.”

Continuing this discussion of the close relationship in pitch-content between this vocal segment and its accompaniment, we can see that the most rhythmically prominent feature of the melodic segment, the triplet “kin-di-schem,” offers a slightly different interpretation of the accompanying piano verticality. The pitch content of “kin-di-schem,” [1,4,5] (014), can influence our interpretation of the piano chord by revealing that it is comprised of two inversionally related overlapping (014) sets, as in Example 3.4, below. While the semitone-relation interpretation of this chord related D-C# and F-E, the overlapping-(014) interpretation relates D-F-C# and F-C#-E, and both interpretations feature the vocal G (“Wäh-”) as an inserted element.
Ex. 3.4: Tonal implication of “von kindischem Wähnen” considered with accompaniment, featuring “(014)” interpretation.

Turning now to the question of whether or not this accompaniment supports a D minor interpretation of the vocal segment, we can observe that, given the chord’s exact duplication of the vocal segment’s pitch-class content, this chord could, in fact, support a D minor interpretation with D-F suggesting tonic harmony and C#-E suggesting an elided dominant harmony, as in our proposed B Major interpretation of the second treble-clef piano verticality accompanying “Dies ist ein Lied.” The problem with this interpretation is that, while a case could be made for its plausibility, its chronological context places it following musical material whose tonal interpretation was made highly problematic by a proliferation of semitone relationships—semitone relationships that, one could argue, are continued in the accompaniment of “von kindischem Wähnen.” For these reasons, I cannot hear this portion of the song as supporting a D minor tonal center without some reservation, but I can hear Webern once again loosening his suppression of tonal
implications in this material, more so than I did with our proposed “elided B Major” sonority accompanying “Dies ist ein Lied.”

Ex. 3.5: Piano harmonies over the bar line into m. 4.

The piano chords from the end of m. 3 and over the bar line into m. 4 are elided with the last note (D) of “von kindischem Wähnen” and the first note (Eb) of “von frommen Tränen.” Acknowledging these elisions with the vocal line, I would like to consider these chords within their own context. Example 3.5, above, gives set labels to both chords: [2,4,6,8,T,E] (013579) and [1,2,4,5,9] (01348). Neither chord maps onto the diatonic collection (013568T), and, in fact, both chords have multiple trichord subsets that preclude such a diatonic mapping. For instance, the first chord contains [T,E,2] (014) and [2,6,T] (048), whereas the second contains [1,2,5] (014), [1,4,5] (014), and [1,5,9] (048), none of which map onto (013568T). This analysis demonstrates the complications involved in hearing a tonal interpretation of these chords.

On the other hand, as these chords directly follow the accompaniment of “von kindischem Wähnen” that, as we noted above, could tentatively suggest a D minor tonality, it is worth investigating the possibility that this suggested tonality could continue
to covertly assert its influence. For instance, the second of these chords is a literal superset of the chord accompanying “von kindischem Wählen,” which we already proposed elides a suggested tonic harmony (D-F) with a suggested dominant harmony (C#-E) in D minor. In fact, the only added pitch in the superset on the downbeat of m. 4 is A, which would serve to fill out the suggested tonic harmony in D minor (D-F-A) and tip the scales in its favor against the elided tones of the dominant chord (C#-E). This interpretation labels the harmony “i (add 9 add #7),” as in Example 3.6, below.

Ex. 3.6: D minor interpretation of piano harmonies into m. 4.

This analysis reveals the downbeat of m. 4 to be the greatest loosening of the tonal-center-renunciation in the song thus far, constituting the pinnacle of a suggested D minor tonality that has been articulated with increasing assertiveness since the setting of “von kindischem Wählen,” despite its persisting hesitancy. In fact, the chord that precedes m. 4 can be also heard as supporting D minor tonality, but in an extremely tentative way. Example 3.6 labels this chord as “o3,” suggesting an “inversion” of an augmented sixth harmony in D minor (this position is, of course, more like “root position,” but it is inverted in respect to its normative arrangement, which would place scale degree 6 in the bass, supporting #4 above). While the motion from o3 to i (add 9 add
#7) skips over the expected dominant harmony that would normatively resolve \( o^3 \) and precede i, this is not an unprecedented harmonic idea. In fact, Schoenberg refers to such a procedure in his Harmonielehre as an “abbreviation” or an “overskipping” [überspringend].

Furthermore, the voice leading between these two chords follows traditional tonal norms: G\# (\#4) resolves up by half-step (plus an octave) to A (5), Bb (b6) resolves down by half-step to A (5)—these motions resolve the “\( o^3 \)” to an octave—and B natural (natural 6), though it clashes with Bb, moves up by whole-step to C\# (#7), as is typical in a melodic ascent toward the tonic degree in a minor key. The F\# in this chord is perhaps the most problematic pitch for this interpretation, as it suggests D Major tonality as opposed to D minor, and it thereby serves to obscure the implied tonal relationship between these two chords.

Finally, the highest pitch of this first harmony completes the piano’s imitation of the voice’s “Dies ist ein Lied für dich allein.” This canonic interplay began as a clear melodic imitation with an inserted G, articulated its penultimate pitch E (imitating “al-”) as the highest note of the chord accompanying “für dich allein,” and now finds its completion on Bb (imitating “-lein”) as the highest pitch in the piano on the upbeat to m. 4.

The A section of the song concludes as shown in Example 3.7, below, with the setting of “von frommen Tränen.” We recall from the previous chapter that a tonal

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97 Marvin, 99.
interpretation of this vocal segment was complicated by the addition of its third pitch, F# ("-men"), creating [3,6,7] (014). A tonal interpretation was proposed in imaginative variation that respelled Eb as D# as a chromatically raised leading tone to E minor, but an examination of the piano accompaniment to this segment reveals such a tonal interpretation to be implausible.

For instance, the vertical chord articulated directly before the voice’s F# ("-men") is an alteration of our “o3” chord, above, replacing pitch-class B natural with C natural and raising Bb up an octave. As labeled in Example 3.7, this alteration gives us [0,2,4,6,8,T] (02468T), or, the “whole-tone-even” collection. This harmony does not imply E minor—its two augmented-triad subsets [0,4,8] and [2,6,T] prevent it from mapping onto the diatonic collection (013568T)—nor does the more rhythmically varied piano material that follows. Here, the low Eb is, perhaps, derived from the first pitch of
the vocal segment, Eb (“von”), and the triplet F-E-C#, harmonized in sixths, is clearly derived from the triplet vocal setting of “kin-di-schem” in m. 3. The transposition down an octave of the triplet grouping’s first two dyads suggests an incomplete “kin-di . . .”

In summary, this accompaniment material does not support an E minor interpretation of the vocal segment, thereby cutting down our aspiring D minor tonality and re-asserting the avoidance of tonal implications to close off the A section.

Ex. 3.8: Tonal implication of “Durch Morgengärten klingt es” considered with accompaniment.

The song’s B section opens with the vocal setting of “Durch Morgengärten klingt es,” and, while this vocal line was broken up into two elided segments in the previous chapter, Example 3.8, above, shows these elided segments in the same example to reflect

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98 Dai Griffiths suggests the piano’s trailing off repetition of the vocal material in her article that considers the song as a free associating psychoanalytical therapy session between a patient (the vocalist) and her therapist (the piano). Dai Griffiths, “‘So Who are You?’ Webern’s op. 3, no. 1,” in Analytical Strategies and Musical Interpretation: Essays on Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Music, ed. Craig Avery and Mark Everist (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 311.
the piano’s continuity across this elided boundary. In fact, the 32nd notes in the accompaniment continue on into the accompaniment of “ein leichtbeschwingtes” that follows. These 32nd notes have been cut off here because the voice enters on “ein” on the very next 32nd note, and the piano completes an idea at the end of this segment and begins a new one along with the entrance of the voice that commences the next segment, as we will see.

While the elided trichord at the end of this vocal segment, “-ten klingt es,” forms its own melodic idea, \([7,8,E]\) (014), the opening pentachord “Dürch Morgengärten” suggests a possible tonality of G minor, as this segment comprises a pitch-class retrograde of “Dies ist ein Lied” with an added G natural. We recall that this melodic idea suggested a possible chromatically elaborated V in G minor, with a suggested resolution to tonic on the added melodic G (“-ten”). While the piano accompaniment opens with imitation of the vocal line harmonized in thirds, sometimes written as diminished fourths (B-Eb), the continued presence of B natural in these harmonizing thirds contradicts our proposed G minor interpretation. Furthermore, the low C on the downbeat of m. 6 could support the notion of dominant harmony in G minor, but only as the bass note of a third inversion chord that never resolves. Thus, the B section of the song opens with the continued suppression of tonal implications.

Imitation is clearly the main feature of the piano accompaniment in this segment, as Example 3.8 illustrates, above. The top voice of the right hand begins with exact imitation, in some cases articulated simultaneous with the vocal line, stating Gb-Eb-C# (re-spelled Db)-D. This imitation is then interrupted by the upper voice E natural on the
upbeat of beat two. This interrupting E natural then resolves down to Eb, a familiar member of the vocal line that was already imitated on the downbeat of the measure, perhaps jogging the listener’s retentional memory and suggesting a return to the imitative line from that point, possibly proceeding with another C#. The listener is fooled again, however, when the piano line skips over C# and moves straight on to D natural, continuing the imitation then with a leap up to G natural (D-G imitating “-gär-ten”).

The left hand imitates the vocal line with a far greater rhythmic intensity than the right hand. Following the non-imitative low C, the imitation commences in 16th notes with a full statement of the retrograded “Dies ist ein Lied” (Gb-Eb-C#-D) with which the vocal line had just articulated “Dürch Morgengär-.” This is immediately repeated as an incomplete fragment (Eb-C#-D) followed, surprisingly, by E natural, recalling the inserted E in the right hand piano imitation mentioned above. This procedure is, of course, reminiscent of the “inserted-G” that has featured somewhat prominently in our discussion so far. Another Eb-C#-D fragment opens the next measure, this time in 32nd notes, followed by a statement of the voice’s G-G#-B (“-ten klingt es”), lending further support for our elided segmentation of the trichord as an independent musical idea.

Imaginative variation had proposed a possible Ab minor tonality for “ein leichtbeschwingtes,” but, as our analysis of the accompaniment will show, there is not enough harmonic support for a V-i interpretation of this vocal segment. For that matter, there is little harmonic material in this portion of the accompaniment at all. As Example 3.9 shows below, this segment consists largely of disintegrating imitative ideas—disintegrating in terms of both pitch and rhythm.
Ex. 3.9: Tonal implication of “ein leichtbeschwingtes” considered with accompaniment.

The left hand continues the 32nd notes from our previous segment, starting with another attempt at the voice’s opening B section material: Gb-Eb-Db-D. Beginning with F# (re-spelled Gb), this imitative statement is then immediately complicated by the return of inserted-E. The left hand is “corrected” by the Eb that follows, but is then complicated by the following D instead of the C# that was expected after Eb. The left hand takes a momentary rest, as if to recompose itself, and successfully completes its imitation with Eb, a now-reassuring C# and, after another hesitation, D. The left hand sets out on another imitation beginning on a high Eb but, as if bewildered by what had just occurred, simply gives up.

The right hand moves in sixths (spelled at first as an augmented fifth). While both dyad pairs in the right hand end on B over D, the first pair uses the top line G#-B to imitate “klingt es” from the previous segment, whereas the second pair uses the bottom
line E-D to imitate “leicht-be-” from the present segment. While every note of the piano accompaniment here can be imitatively accounted for, the effect of this passage is one of extreme rhythmic and, to an extent, motivic disorientation, supporting our claim that an Ab minor interpretation of the vocal material is completely implausible.

The song’s B section concludes with a punctuating low-range piano chord, shown below in Example 3.10. While this chord does not accompany any vocal material, it does continue to avoid tonal implications on account that its intervallic material, [1,2,5,7] (0146), cannot map onto the diatonic collection (013568T). Furthermore, the low range of this harmony contributes to its harsh sound, with the overtones of the low piano pitches mutually contributing to a dissonant and tonally disorienting sonority.

Ex. 3.10: Pitch content of piano mm. 7-8 sonority as related to voice’s “für dich allein.”

The attentive reader will notice that this prime form (0146), the so-called “all-interval-tetrachord,” has also manifested itself in the vocal setting of “für dich allein” in

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99 Forte, 1, refers to prime form (0146) as the “all-interval tetrachord” and asserts that this combination of pitches “has a very special place in atonal music.” The specific configuration of (0146) that Forte refers to is the last sonority of Schoenberg’s op. 15, no. 1, from his “George Lieder” — this sonority is comprised of E#-A-D#-G# with normal form [3,5,8,9].
m. 2—and will manifest itself in “das rühre sein” in m. 10—as \([4,5,8,T]\). Accordingly, the piano sonority at hand is a \(T_9\) transposition of these vocal statements mentioned above. (0146) is also a subset of many of vocal segments discussed in the previous chapter. For instance, (0146) is a subset of (01346), the prime form of “von kindischem Wählen,” “von frommen Tränen,” and “Nur dir allein.” (0146) is also a subset of (01256), the prime form of “Durch Morgengärten” and “ein leichtbeschwingtes.” Our only trichord vocal segment, \([7,8,E]\) (014) setting “-ten klingt es” in m. 6, is a subset of (0146). The only vocal segment, then, that bears no subset or superset relation with the piano chord of mm. 7-8 is the very first vocal statement “Dies ist ein Lied,” \([1,2,3,6]\) (0125), and this marks an exception that, as we will see, Webern addresses by altering the return of this melodic line as it sets “möcht es ein Lied” in the song’s A’ return.

The pitch material of the piano chord in Ex. 3.10 can also be derived from the verticality accompanying the voice’s “von kindischem Wählen” in m. 3. Both chords contain the subset D-F-C#, the difference being that the m. 3 chord also contains E, whereas the chord in mm. 7-8 replaces that pitch class with G. One could, therefore, consider this transformation a more subtle instance of the “inserted-G” that has asserted itself at various points over the course of the piece.

The A’ section of the song returns to the material of the A section in a peculiar way, as Example 3.11 illustrates below. By this, I mean to point out that, instead of beginning the return with the restatement of the vocal line’s opening material from “Dies ist ein Lied,” the voice enters with “Nur dir allein,” an ordered pitch transposition \(T_{-3}\) of “von kindischem Wählen” and “von frommen Tränen” from the second half of the
Ex. 3.11: Tonal implication of “ein leichtbeschwingtes” considered with accompaniment.

A section. The piano, meanwhile, begins with the opening “Dies ist ein Lied” melody following the vocal entrance and, as we will see in analyzing the next segment, this reverses the canonic relationship between voice and piano once the voice does get around to the opening melodic material.

While the upper line of the piano in this segment anticipates the vocal return of the opening melodic material, the lower stratum of the accompaniment elides several elements of the piano material from the A section. For instance, the held Bb in the right hand recalls the supporting third below D, the first note of the upper line’s imitative melody, that articulated the piano’s imitative line in m. 2. In m. 8, however, there is no intense series of voice exchanges between Bb and B natural as in the A section—in fact, B natural is conspicuously absent from this segment. Bb is simply held over the bar line creating, along with the held E and G# of the left hand, an ambiguous boundary line in
the piano part, denoted above with the vertical dotted line. The left hand’s D#-E in this measure recalls the enharmonically equivalent Eb-E natural in the left hand of m. 2, although, in m. 8, the motion up to E natural corresponds rhythmically with C# of the right hand’s imitative line, whereas it corresponded rhythmically with the Eb of the right hand’s imitative line in m. 2. The low G# can be heard as a recollection of the bass notes of the piano harmonies from mm. 3-4, discussed above.

The question regarding a possible tonal center is whether or not the pitch material of the vocal line “Nur dir allein” [0,1,3,4,6] (01346), which cannot map onto the diatonic collection (013568T) without admitting of some traditional chromatic elaboration, can be plausibly heard as supported by a C# minor tonality in the piano accompaniment as was proposed in our imaginative variation. This proposed tonal interpretation would comprise a V7-i motion in C# minor. I cannot hear such a tonal interpretation as plausibly supported by the piano accompaniment, especially since the held Bb in the right hand of the piano negates what our imaginative variation regarded as an enharmonically respelled chromatically raised leading tone (B# = C natural) in the key of C# minor. Given this appraisal of the situation, I hear the opening of the A’ return as effectively avoiding tonal implications.

As mentioned above, the voice returns to the opening melodic material of the song with its setting of “möcht es ein Lied,” now following the piano’s canonic lead, as shown below in Example 3.12. The piano accompaniment of this segment begins with the rhythmically accented inserted-G, recalling the procedure’s first appearance in m. 2, and this time the voice finally submits to this insertion technique on beat three of the measure.
Ex. 3.12: Tonal implication of “möcht es ein Lied” considered with accompaniment.

with the articulation of “Lied,” resolving down to the expected Gb on the third triplet eighth note of the beat.

The lower stratum of the piano accompaniment continues to recall various elements from the A section. For instance, B natural, absent from our previous segment, makes its appearance on beat two in the bass, and this B natural is the first articulated pitch of a rhythmically expanded statement of the so-called “o3” chord from the upbeat to m. 4. Webern cleverly involves the last two pitches of the right hand’s canonic line, E-Bb, in the rhythmic expansion of this harmony.

While the inserted G in the vocal line on “Lied” perhaps lends support to our proposed G minor tonal center from imaginative variation, the piano accompaniment renders such a tonal interpretation implausible, especially on account of the salient bass note G#, which is even articulated simultaneous with the inserted G of the vocal line. The
accompaniment here is more reminiscent of the semitone-juxtaposition technique from the opening statement of “Dies ist ein Lied” than it is of a proposed G minor tonality, and the avoidance of tonal implications is thereby continued in this segment.

Inserted-G in the vocal line is not enough support to justify a G minor interpretation of this segment, but it does effect an inclusion relation with the guttural (0146) piano sonority from mm. 7-8. The addition of G natural in this vocal segment expands the basic template of “Dies ist ein Lied,” [1,2,3,6] (0125), to become the altered “möcht es ein Lied,” [1,2,3,6,7] (01256). (01256) is the familiar prime form of “Durch Morgengärten” and “ein liechtbeschwingtes,” and, with the expanded prime form (01256), the altered “möcht es ein Lied” can now regard the (0146) piano sonority as a subset. This development is quite remarkable, considering that the conspicuous “inserted-G” technique, varied as “inserted-E” in the B section, was, all along, prefiguring the alteration of the opening vocal segment “Dies ist ein Lied,” the only segment of the entire vocal line with no subset/superset relation to the (0146) piano sonority of mm. 7-8, to become “möcht es ein Lied” with prime form (01256), thereby uniting the totality of vocal material as related to most contextually assertive piano sonority in the song.

Example 3.13, below, presents the final segment of this analysis. The imitative procedure at work throughout the A’ section continues here, with the piano restating its imitation of the final vocal segment “das rühre sein.” Inserted-E, from the B section, makes its return, as the expected piano top line F-Ab-E-Bb is expanded as F-E!-Ab-F!-E-Bb, thereby also introducing inserted-F. The first piano verticality of this segment is
Ex. 3.13: Tonal implication of “möcht es ein Lied” considered with accompaniment.

familiar as a subset of our “o3” chord from the upbeat to m. 4, leaving out pitch classes F# and B natural.

The question of tonal center is whether this accompaniment supports the F minor tonal interpretation that we proposed in imaginative variation, and, even though the piano material is comprised of the same pitch material as the vocal line of this segment, with the exception of the piano’s added D in the left hand, I do not hear an F minor interpretation as plausible. I do not hear it as plausible because the vocal line’s suggestion of F minor tonality was predicated on an imagined i chord (harmonizing F-Ab) followed by V7 (harmonizing the chromatically raised leading tone E natural and the chordal seventh Bb), and the piano accompaniment, while comprised of similar pitch material, is not organized in such a way as to support a i-V7 harmonization of the vocal line.
Furthermore, the piano accompaniment supports some tonal interpretations here that contradict an F minor tonal center. For instance, we mentioned above that the first piano verticality is a subset of the \(\omega^{3}\) chord without the F# and B natural that were present at the upbeat to m. 4. This alteration makes a tonal interpretation of the sonority even more suggestive than it was in regards to the harmony’s original appearance since the remaining pitch-classes G#-D-Bb-F now correspond exactly with the pitch content of a Ger. augmented sixth harmony in the key of D minor. Webern even spells the chord as Ger. augmented sixth in this key, and the right hand’s melodic line F-E-Ab-F-E-Bb, taken in this context, comprises 3-2-#4-3-2-b6 in D minor, suggesting an augmented sixth harmony that carelessly drifts off before ever resolving to the dominant.

On the other hand, this D minor interpretation is complicated by the bass tone G#, which departs from the normative practice of voicing augmented-sixth harmony with b6 (in this case, Bb) in the bass. Along this line of thought, it may be easier to hear the harmony as a dominant seventh chord in third inversion, Bb-D-F-G#(Ab), suggesting the tonal center Eb (Major or minor). In the immediate context of this segment, I find it easier to hear this chord as a \(V_{4}\) because of its arrangement with G# in the bass, but the larger context of the song will, of course, recall the harmony on the upbeat to m. 4 functioning within the D minor tonality that its chord of resolution suggested, eliding D-F-A (i) with C#-E (V) on the downbeat of m. 4.

This final segment, then, suggests an unsupported F minor tonality with the vocal line, an Eb tonality with the piano’s sonority taken in the limited context of the segment as a \(V_{4}\) chord, and a D minor tonality with the piano’s sonority taken in the larger context.
of the song as a Ger³ chord. To further complicate this amalgam of contradictory readings, the isolated piano melody that concludes the song after the voice and piano harmony have dropped out puts forth its own suggested tonal relation. The last three notes of this melody, F-E-Bb, outline a perfect fifth, as does the setting of “das rühre sein,” above (F-Ab-E-Bb). The insertion of F as the third to last pitch of the song, however, highlights this pitch class in the retentional memory of the listener, effecting a persistent F natural sound (F-E-Ab-F-E-Bb), thereby strengthening the perceptibility of the outlined perfect fifth. This outlined interval alone is, perhaps, not enough to suggest a Bb tonality without further contextual support. However, the exposure of this outlined interval after all other voices have dropped out renders the perfect fifth with a distinct salience, and the effect of this gesture is that it contextually establishes Bb as a stable consonance—this, of course, in contradiction with the D minor interpretation, which would interpret the final Bb as an unstable scale degree b6, deprived of its resolution to the dominant scale degree.

The preceding analysis of Webern op. 3, no. 1, has given an extremely close reading of the musical foreground with a focus on the elements of pitch structure that would motivate a listener with a lingering “tonal conceptual framework” to perceive the suppression of tonal implications. The first step in this process was carried out in Chapter 2, as we considered each melodic segment of the vocal line in its own context. Our examination revealed that none of the vocal segments considered could map onto the prime form of the diatonic collection (013568T) and suggested that any possible
interpretation of these segments as supporting a tonal center would have to bracket off one or more pitch classes as operating outside the diatonic content of a proposed tonal center as a traditional chromatic embellishment of some kind.

This suggestion led to the realization that each vocal segment could, in fact, accommodate this procedure, in most cases by considering one of the pitches in a segment as a chromatically raised leading tone in a minor key. In this way, I proposed possible tonal centers for each vocal segment in imaginative variation, and, along with these, I proposed a descriptive eidetic law: a melodic segment is perceived as avoiding tonal implications if its pitch material cannot be mapped onto a diatonic collection and if it is not plausible to interpret one or more of its constituent elements as a traditional chromatic elaboration of some type or other in light of the surrounding musical context.

With the qualification “in light of the surrounding musical context,” the analysis of the song expanded to include the entire voice-piano texture in the present chapter. I evaluated the plausibility of each melodic segment’s proposed tonal center that I had put forward in imaginative variation by considering each proposal within the context of the piano accompaniment. This investigation revealed that the pitch organization of this song undermines any hypothetically proposed tonalities based on vocal material, with the exception of the tentatively articulated D minor tonality in mm. 3-4. This articulation began with the vocal setting of “von kindischem Wähnen,” with Db/C# interpreted as a chromatically raised leading tone in D minor. The piano chord accompanying this vocal setting lent support to the tonal interpretation and was considered as a i chord in D (D-F) elided with a V chord in the same key (C#-E). The harmony on the upbeat to m. 4 was
interpreted as a \(o3\) chord in D minor followed by an ellipsis to a, now fully fleshed out, tonic harmony (D-F-A), again with the elided pitches of dominant harmony (C#-E).

This foray into a descriptive eidetics of the suppression of tonal implications led to other analytical insights concerning the song’s pitch structure along the way. For instance, we noted the prominent use of variation techniques between vocal segments, typically employing transposition or retrograde procedures, as well as ubiquitous imitative relationships between the voice and piano. Semitone-juxtaposition was a salient aspect of the A section, fragmentary repetition of imitative motives was prominently featured in the B section, and the A’ section recalled the opening vocal material in a varied order and elided piano material from various portions of the A section. (014) was found to be a common trichord, often manifest as the first three notes of a vocal segment. Finally, “inserted-G,” and the derived “inserted-E,” prefigured an alteration of the voice’s opening “Dies ist ein Lied” with the addition of pitch-lass G to comprise “möcht es ein Lied” with prime form (01256), thereby effecting a superset relation with the (0146) piano chord of mm. 7-8 that bore inclusion relations with all but the first vocal segment of the song.

The analytical portion of this thesis will now conclude with a comparison of other analytical strategies put forth by Olli Väisälä and Elmar Budde in their published work on this song. This comparison will examine these analysts’ observations as well as the conceptual frameworks that inform them.
3.2 Comparison of Competing Analytical Strategies

The analyses of Webern op. 3, no. 1, put forth by Olli Väisälä and Elmar Budde apply a divergent set of theoretical frameworks to describe the pitch structure of the song. Väisälä employs a post-tonal neo-Schenkerian method, whereas Budde focuses on text setting and derives harmonic material from chords stacked in fourths. While it falls outside the scope of this thesis to present each of these analytical methods in detail, I would like to present their differing interpretations of the harmonies on the upbeat to and downbeat of m. 4, presented in Example 3.14, below.

Ex. 3.14: Piano harmonies over the bar line into m. 4.

While my analysis regards this progression as a “i\(^3\)” chord followed by a “i (add 9 add #7)” chord in D minor, thereby placing emphasis on the second chord as a resolution, Väisälä emphasizes the first harmony, and his entire analysis is, in fact, based on considering the first harmony shown above as the referential sonority for the entire song.\(^{100}\) This assertion is placed within a discussion of three songs from the same time period, the other two written by Berg and Debussy. His analysis of each song focuses on the neo-Schenkerian elaboration of a referential sonority based on the overtone series. In

\(^{100}\) Väisälä, 256-7.
fact, as Example 3.15 illustrates below, Väisälä’s referential sonority is based on the overtone series above the first low bass note in the piano accompaniment: E natural.

![Diagram of overtone series](image)

**Ex. 3.15:** Väisälä’s referential sonority as derived from E natural overtone series.

Väisälä supports this reading by suggesting the prolongation of the piano’s m. 1 bass E as the implied bass of the chord on the last eighth note of m. 3. Väisälä then proposes a consonance-dissonance system based on this referential sonority, regarding the intervals above the implied bass (E) in the sonority as consonant on a deep structural level and the remaining intervals as dissonant, giving him the consonant intervals (in number of semitones) (0), 7, 4, 10, 2, and 6.\(^{101}\) Within this consonance-dissonance system, he suggests the following deep structure, shown in Example 3.16, below, with the low bass E from m. 1 moving to an inverted position of the referential sonority over the A’ section’s G# bass note, with a large-scale melodic descent from the voice’s opening D to its final pitch Bb.\(^{102}\)

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\(^{101}\) Väisälä, 256.  
\(^{102}\) Väisälä, 263.
Ex. 3.16: Väisälä’s fundamental structure of the song.

A passing motion in the structure’s top line moves through C (the voice’s “Nur” from the beginning of the A’ section) with consonant support from the bass note D of the low piano chord from mm. 7-8, considered an arpeggiating bass tone of the referential sonority (this is consonant support since the interval of 10 semitones is a consonance in the consonance-dissonance system derived from the referential sonority). Finally, Väisälä conceives of an elaboration corresponding to a subdominant function over the bass tone C (the low bass note at the opening of the B section) with a dissonant (3 semitones above the bass) “incomplete neighbor” Eb (“Mor-” from the opening of the B section), followed by an additional dissonant incomplete neighbor C# (11 semitones above the bass, with this C# derived from the top note of the piano chord in mm. 7-8). This double-incomplete-neighbor melodic structure corresponds to the opening melodic trichord of the vocal line (D-Db-Eb is expanded, respelled, and reordered as D-Eb-C#).

Given the structural feature that the support for the incomplete neighbors favors the “dissonant” intervals of 3 and 11 semitones above the bass, Väisälä considers the foreground sonority on the downbeat of m. 4 as “another example of the ‘incomplete-
neighbor sonority’ (bass D + upper voices C# and F [comprising 11 and 3 semitones above D, respectively]).’ In fact, this sonority seems to hold no further significance for Väisälä’s analysis, except that its pitch content, namely C# and F, anticipates the overtone series of the Eb bass note that follows on the third beat of m. 4.

Obviously, Väisälä’s interpretation of the piano harmonies moving from m. 3 into m. 4 differs markedly from mine. Väisälä subordinates the second chord to the first, with an extreme differential in structural significance from the referential sonority of the song to a mere “example” of an incomplete-neighbor sonority. My analysis, on the other hand, subordinates the first chord to the second in the “v9”-“i (add 9 add #7)” abbreviated progression. Furthermore, my methodology’s focus on the perception of avoided tonal implications places a great deal of significance on the i (add 9 add #7) chord as the most emphasized tonal implication in the entire song.

This distinction in our analyses aside, I can hear Väisälä’s analytical point regarding the organizational influence of the overtone series, especially in the opening vocal line of the piece “Dies ist ein Lied für dich allein.” Väisälä gives a convincing account of the vocal material as outlining the “chord tones” of the referential sonority, as outlined in Example 3.17, below.

This vocal elaboration is, in my estimation, the most perceptually accessible aspect of Väisälä’s argument, and, polemics for or against post-tonal Schenkerian methods aside, I can hear Example 3.17 as a plausible noematic Sinn with which one can attribute meaning to the opening vocal line. The mode of givenness in this perceptual act,

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103 Väisälä, 265.
104 This example is a re-working of similar graphs found in Väisälä, 265.
Ex. 3.17: Vocal elaboration of the referential sonority in the opening melodic material.

then, would incorporate the Language (L) of neo-Schenkerian theory as part of the listener’s conceptual framework.

Budde’s analysis of the piano chords in question puts forth a different interpretation. He derives the chord on the upbeat into m. 4 as an altered form of a chord constructed in perfect fourths, an interpretation that he bases on Schoenberg’s discussion of such chords in his Harmonielehre. Budde’s argument is that, whereas Schoenberg regarded chords built in fourth as an alteration of the tertian system, Webern takes harmony built in fourths as the norm and proceeds to alter it further.\textsuperscript{105} The derivation of the harmony on the upbeat to m. 4 from a chord built in perfect fourths is shown in Example 3.18, below.\textsuperscript{106}

\textsuperscript{105} Budde, 51.
\textsuperscript{106} Examples 3.18-3.20 are reproductions from Budde, 51.
Budde takes this notion further to demonstrate contextual support for this derivation by stacking two more perfect fourths on top of the chord from Example 3.18 as shown below in Example 3.19. The added pitches stacked in fourths on top, G and D, are found in the immediate context of Budde’s altered fourths chord, with “-nen” from “Wähnen” articulated simultaneously with the piano harmony.

The lower range of the piano also lends support for Budde’s reading. Example 3.20, below, shows a fourth added below the piano sonority, adding D# and respelling it as Eb. An octave below that Eb is the low piano bass note from m. 4, and I find the analytical connection very easily perceivable.
Ex. 3.20: Support for fourths interpretation in piano’s bass line.

Budde’s account of the chord on the upbeat to m. 4, then, attributes meaning to the sonority in the language (L) of quartal harmony in a way that Budde returns to in his discussion of the third op. 3 song as well as Webern’s op. 4, nos. 1 and 2.\textsuperscript{107} This “quartal” conceptual framework differs from Väisälä’s “neo-Schenkerian” conceptual framework, and, while the conceptual framework of my analysis is more akin to Budde than Väisälä’s in that I do not apply Schenkerian methods in my approach, I would like to distinguish my “perceptual” conceptual framework from both of these. Strictly speaking, my conceptual framework contains elements of tonal theory and pitch-class set theory, but it places an emphasis on the application of these theories in the practice of perception, and thereby articulates itself as more “perceptually” than “theoretically” concerned.

The final chapter, then, will aim to address the problem of contradictory conceptual frameworks and the conflicting musical perceptions that they put forward throughout the perceptual acts by which the listener constitutes the song.

\textsuperscript{107} Budde, 107-8.
CHAPTER 4

REFLECTIONS

This discussion of Webern’s op. 3, no. 1, has engaged the song from within a multiplicity of theoretical contexts. The method of eidetic variation applied to the vocal melody led us to consider possible tonal implications and to engage those possibilities in a discourse with the piano accompaniment. This not only generated useful information regarding the eidetics for the perceived suppression of tonal implications, it also brought to light more general aspects of pitch structure at work in the song. For instance, we saw the application of melodic variation techniques such as transposition, octave transfer, and retrograde. The persistently inserted G was shown to prefigure a variation on the opening segment “Dies ist ein Lied” as that pitch class was inserted into the altered “möcht es ein Lied,” thereby effecting an inclusion relation with the piano’s guttural sonority from mm. 7-8 and, in so doing, uniting the material of the vocal line within a network of intervalllic relationships.

Perhaps the most revelatory assertion produced by our eidetic variation was the D minor tonal implication, most assertively put forward by the piano chords leading into m. 4. The specific outline of our method first caught a glimpse of this tonal resonance by systematically combing through the vocal line for possible implications, and the support of the D minor implication in the voice part that immediately followed in the piano clarified the manner in which our “tonal conceptual framework” motivated our noematic Sinn to attribute the meaning “implied tonal center” to this passage of music. However,
this is merely one of many eidetic strategies that one could apply here. For instance, one could begin to look for tonal implications starting with the piano accompaniment and then check those against the voice part. This does seem less practical as an eidetic strategy, though, in that it investigates the more complex aspect first before checking it against the less complex. Of course, one may wish investigate the perceived avoidance of tonal implications in pieces of music other than songs for vocalist and piano accompaniment, and ideal eidetic strategies would manifest themselves in a process of experimentation determined by the particulars of the musical texture in question.

Whatever the case with a given piece, it seems quite likely that the Language (L) that occupies the conceptual framework of the Gegebenheitsweise will consistently function as the primary analytical determinant of the investigation. Our discussion of Väisälä’s neo-Schenkerian Language (L) and Budde’s quartal-harmonic Language (L) demonstrates this point in relation to the chords leading into m. 4. These readings seem to offer utterly contradictory derivations of this harmonic pair, and, concerning the theoretical structure of the work, they are hopelessly incompatible. The interesting thing about this contradiction for my purposes, however, is that each of these contradictory readings is rendered quite perceptually accessible at different points.

For instance, we discussed the vocal melody’s elaboration of Väisälä’s referential sonority in the setting of “Dies ist ein Lied für dich allein,” which actually precedes the first articulation of the referential sonority in m. 3. By the time this harmony is voiced, the vocal perfect fourth setting “Wähnen” is already asserting the perceptual triumph of Budde’s quartal analysis at the expense of Väisälä’s prolongational narrative. I do not
mean to say that Budde’s account is more theoretically sound than Väisälä’s; in fact, such
a question has little to do with our perception of these analytical models’ influence over
the attribute-meanings of the noematic Sinn through which we constitute the music as an
object unfolding through time. As Lewin would put it, having found that Väisälä’s
reading manifests itself perceptually before being overtaken perceptually by Budde’s
reading, “I cannot flush all the ‘evidence in its favor’ down the drain: everything I heard
then I still hear now.” Furthermore, if I then hear a “tonal conceptual framework”
rising to the perceptual surface with the \(\text{o}3\) resolving to i (add 9, add #7), I could not very
well pretend that I had never heard the readings put forth by Väisälä and Budde with
which I had just constituted the meaning of the musical object.

The situation, then, is like Lewin’s “conflicting” perceptions of Morgengrusß
m. 14 that were each entirely valid in their own contexts. Thanks to the hierarchically
subordinating organizational structures of tonal harmony, Lewin was able to consider this
issue in the most final context, the context of the full song. But what would be a correlate
to such a gesture as it would relate to the multiplicity of analytical Language (L)s with
which an analyst can hear contradictory readings of Webern op. 3, no. 1? Surely, one
could not presently assert that the “most final analytical language for post-tonal music”
has been generally agreed upon at this point. In fact, there are very well possibly future
analytical strategies whose Language (L)s will inform future conceptual frameworks and
reveal cross-sections of this song’s multi-dimensional structure that presently elude our
analytical sensitivity.

\[108\] Lewin, Morgengrusß, 69.
All this is to say that, to the extent that one hears a theoretical framework as putting forth a perceptually convincing analytical reading of some musical material, one is obligated to acknowledge the influence that such a theoretical framework is exerting over the meaning through which they constitute the musical object. In the absence of tonal organizational principles, Lewin’s avoidance of “false dichotomies” is especially apt. That is, lived perceptual experiences should not be subordinated to the sanctity of theoretical constructs that insist upon the law of non-contradiction.

What I am most emphatically not saying is that “any analytical strategy will do.” The challenge in navigating these admittedly troubled waters is to continually evaluate which analytical assertions you hear as reasonable and which ones you do not. Disagreements between sincere music analysts will then serve to produce helpful analytical discourse on a piece, and less sincere disagreements between analysts will likely lead to dead ends.

As sincere music analysts of Webern op. 3, no. 1, then, it is our continuing task to stand up for the meanings with which we constitute the objects of our musical perceptions as the song continues to resonate with new meanings, to “wing its way through morning gardens,” “to be a song that stirs the heart.”

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109 From Wason’s translation of George’s poem.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


