

SHAPING RELATIONS: A MEDIA FRAMING ANALYSIS OF JAPAN-U.S.
AFFAIRS IN THE ERA OF JAPAN (SUR)PASSING

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The relationship between Japan and the U.S. has endured contention since the beginning of the millennium, but the two countries remain allies. This quantitative and qualitative content analysis examines the print coverage of two controversies in Japan-U.S. relations: the sinking of a Japanese fishing trawler and the controversy surrounding the Futenma base. By applying the theoretical framework of media framing, the research examines four U.S. newspapers and one Japanese newspaper while considering the two corresponding geopolitical periods: Japan (sur)passing. By coding each article for predefined framing categories, the research found in the era of (sur)passing, the application of the mea culpa and responsibility frames mirrored the geopolitical dynamic of the time. However, the reconciliation frame, created by the U.S. newspapers' use of elite news sources in the period of Japan passing, went against the scholarly interpretation of the period, and instead focused on a positive bilateral relationship in order to influence public opinion.

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INTRODUCTION

The relationship between Japan and the United States has endured a fair share of controversies—with disputes over trade, politics, and culture—beginning with the 1853 voyage by U.S. Commodore Matthew Perry, who landed in Tokyo Bay and commandeered Japan into accepting an open trade policy. Japan began its endeavor to catch up to the West’s powerful economy. The U.S., first impressed with the growth of Japan’s industry, soon became wary of its Eastern apprentice. As Japan’s economy grew, U.S. policymakers began to turn bitter, and a perception developed that Japan was an exotic yet underdeveloped land—growing its economy with its peculiar practices and surreptitious motives (Morris, 2011).

Japan’s economy and power continued to intensify until its eventual defeat in World War II. The country faced a long road to recovery, and the U.S.—once again a strong ally with Japan following a postwar treaty—developed a series of economic stabilization policies to help Japan rebuild. By 1953, Japan had once again regained its momentum and the country amassed its pre-war economic strength. A decade later, in the 1960s, the two countries continued to maintain a strong alliance and strove for an equal partnership, sharing common economic goals.

However, Japan’s economy continued to rise and began to overtake U.S. industries, such as automotive and high technology (Prestowitz, 1988). Once again, the U.S. became apprehensive of Japan. U.S. policymakers worried that the country had set its sights on becoming a world power. In order to prevent this from happening, some U.S. strategists believed Japan needed to be contained. This perceptiveness—marked by the Presidents Reagan and George Bush Sr. era of 1980 through 1992—sparked a sentiment known as “Japan bashing,” a concept of anti-Japanism that encapsulated the belief of Japan as a problem or threat to the West (Morris, 2011; van Wolferen, 1989). Following Japan’s stock market crash of 1992, however, U.S. opinion of

Japan shifted once again, and moving from Japan bashing to a phase known as “Japan passing.” This phase, from roughly 1992 to 2000, was characterized by the U.S. looking past Japan as its capable partner, focusing instead on China and its rising economy. However, by the 2000s, the relationship was again on an upswing, incited by Japan’s harrowing support of the War on Terror after the 9/11 terrorist attack. This era, known as “Japan surpassing,” saw the two countries as strong global partners with common security goals (Cossa, 2008). Yet after President Barack Obama replaced President George W. Bush in office, attention again drifted away from Japan and focused once more on China’s advancing influence in Asia. China soon surpassed Japan as the world’s second most powerful economy, and in 2008 Japan slipped into the current sociopolitical phase known again as “Japan passing,” sometimes also referred to as “Japan nothing” (Morris, 2011; Schuman, 2010).

Despite the two nations’ contentions, both countries have remained allies since the end of World War II, sharing not only military and political accord, but also artistic and cultural influence. In the first decade of this millennium, however, Japan and U.S. relations have once again been tested by two major conflicts: the sinking of the *Ehime Maru* by the USS *Greeneville* and a rehashing of an old controversy—the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, in Okinawa, Japan.

In February 2001, USS *Greeneville*, a U.S. naval submarine, rammed a vocational fishing vessel called the *Ehime Maru*. The collision occurred when the *Greeneville*, performing a rapid surfacing drill, came up directly beneath the fishing vessel, sinking it within minutes and killing nine civilians. Reports confirmed that the ship’s commander may have acted with negligence during the drill, and was subsequently asked to retire. Following the accident, the Navy located the sunken *Ehime Maru* and Japanese and U.S.-American divers recovered the victims’ bodies in

a \$60 million operation. Despite U.S. efforts, many Japanese citizens were angered that Commander Scott Waddle did not immediately issue a direct apology to the victims' families (Drumheller & Benoit, 2004; "Surviving Students Arrive," 2001).

The Marine Corps Air Station Futenma has been another source of continued agony for many Japanese citizens, also causing a number of disputes between the two countries. The base located in the densely populated city of Ginowan has been responsible for aircraft noise pollution, a helicopter crash into Okinawa International University, and even a case of rape of a 12-year-old Okinawan girl (Harlan, 2011). In 2009, plans to relocate the base were once again brought into the political spotlight, but a weak management style by Japan's prime minister served to only confound the issue, irritating both U.S. politicians and Okinawan residents.

Still, Japan and the U.S. consistently strive for reconciliation, a need that seems to serve as the balance in the two countries' vacillating relationship. This research explores how five U.S. mainstream newspapers and one Japanese newspaper have framed these two contemporary conflicts, while examining the geopolitical dynamics around the Japan-U.S. alliance, shifting from Japan surpassing, to the current state of Japan passing again.

The current research uses the theoretical framework of media framing. Media framing focuses on the exclusion, organization and emphasis of certain facts, making some events more salient than others (e.g., Entman, 1993; Gitlin, 1980; Goffman, 1959, 1974; Iyengar & Reeves, 1997). Frames organize facts and principles and suggest a connection between concepts and events (Nisbet, 2010, Reese, 2010). Frames can be analyzed from the perspective of episodic and thematic coverage.

According to Iyengar (1991), the episodic frame concentrates on individual news events, or episodes, while the thematic frames looks at the big picture and give historical perspective.

Frames can also be broken in specific categories, as demonstrated by researchers Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007) when they explored the use of frames used two elite newspapers in the U.S. and the United Kingdom, and two Arab news websites for coverage of the 2003 Iraq War. By selecting predefined categories, the researchers were able to identify the presence or absence of specific frames.

To identify the existence of frames, an element known as a framing device is helpful. These devices can be linguistic clues or lexical choices (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Nisbet, 2010; Reese, 2010). Sources are also an important element, as the use of elite sources are often chosen during coverage of foreign affairs or security issues. According to Aday, Livingston, and Hebert (2005) “between Vietnam and the recent Iraq War ... news tends to privilege official sources, especially those from the White House” (p. 6).

Studying frames cross-culturally provides an opportunity to examine how events were covered simultaneously by two cultures. By applying a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of 400 articles from one Japanese newspaper and four U.S. newspapers, the current research examines the use of frames in each article and determines in what way frames differ in the geopolitical periods of Japan surpassing and Japan passing, together referred to as (sur)passing. The current research also explicates the differences in each article’s dateline, story source, word count, and genre.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Japan-U.S. Relations

“It has been said that Western images of Japan have swung back and forth between positive and negative since the late 19th century, as if on a pendulum” (Morris, 2011, p. 14). The first swing of the pendulum begins with the Western concept of “Orientalism” of the early 20th century—a prejudice that characterized Japan as a threatening “other” aiming to gain world power with a dominant global economy.

After World War II, the pendulum finally swung in opposite direction. Once Japan started to rebuild after its defeat, the U.S. perception of Japan shifted to a more equal partnership. Japan’s economic output continued to increase until it was positioned as the world’s second largest economy, promoting a notion that Japan could now act as a strong and reliable partner for the U.S.

However, by the early 1980s, the U.S. viewed Japan’s economic strength as more of a threat than an asset, which marked the beginning of Japan bashing phase, a period characterized by U.S. doubt and distrust. After Japan’s economic recession in the 1990s, during a phase known as Japan passing, the U.S. had all but disregarded Japan as a competent ally. By the 2000s, during the War on Terror, the U.S. saw restored confidence in Japan as a trustworthy partner. Now, in the present decade, Japan has once again slipped into a period of Japan passing or Japan nothing, as Japan’s economy became overtaken by China.

1852 to the 1970s

In 1852, U.S. Navy Commodore Matthew C. Perry set sail from Norfolk, Virginia, in hopes to transform Japan’s *sakoku*, or “locked country” foreign relations policy, into an open

trade market. In 1853, he landed in Tokyo Bay with the intent of coercing Japan into abandoning its 250-year isolation under the Tokugawa Shogunate, a regime that had ruled the land since 1603 (Prestowitz, 1988). As Perry drew near Japan's archipelago, he commanded his fleet to steer toward the capital city, which is today's Tokyo. As his squadron pushed through the waters of the bay, he and his crew saw what no other foreign vessels had yet seen—the ravines, hills, and bluffs of the Tokyo coast (Beasley, 2003).

Upon his arrival, a fleet of Japanese ships attempted to halt the Navy's progression, but was unable to interrupt the path of Perry's steam engines—a technology yet unseen in Japan (Beasley, 2003). Perry presented a letter from President Millard Fillmore, which demanded Japan to open its market or face the consequences—a blockade preventing Japan from receiving imports by sea (Prestowitz, 1988). Japan asked for more time, and Perry gave word he would return a year later. When he arrived in the bay in 1854, he brought with him a larger fleet. Japan agreed to the Treaty of Kanagawa, a free trade agreement with the U.S., and the country opened two small ports (Prestowitz, 1988).

Soon afterward, Japan began its effort to catch up to the West's strong economic gains. The U.S., however, did not view this endeavor positively. As Japan's economy grew, so did the U.S.'s negative sentiment. The U.S. view of Japan through the lens of Orientalism framed the country as an unusual land. While the West thought of itself as rational and developed, it viewed the “Orient” as depraved and underdeveloped (Morris, 2011). In the early 1900s, many U.S.-Americans also believed that “yellow peril,” or the threat of Japan overtaking the U.S., was a clear and present danger. This perception lasted well through the next few decades, eventually phasing out around the beginning of the Cold War in the late 1940s (Morris, 2011).

In the early 1900s, Japan's technology industry had met with that of the U.S., and Japan boasted one of the world's most productive growth rates, averaging about 3.5% a year (Denison & Chung, 1976). In 1930, its textile and steel markets had surpassed those of other countries. When World War II began, the U.S. discovered the Zeroes, a Japanese-made fighter plane, were the pinnacle in aero-technology (Prestowitz, 1988). A series of significant events before, during, and after World War II follows:

- 1936: Axis alliance forms between Germany and Japan
- 1937: Japan invades China, Nanjing Massacre
- 1939–1945: World War II
- 1941: Japanese Navy attacks U.S. at Pearl Harbor
- 1941: Allies formally declare war on Japan (and Germany and Italy on the U.S.)
- 1945: U.S. Navy defeats Japan; releases atomic bombs onto Hiroshima and Nagasaki; Japan surrenders
- 1945–1952: Japan occupied by Allied Powers

After Japan's defeat, the country faced a challenging rebuilding process. The country had been left with only half of the land area of its previous empire. From 1945 to 1946, the country's industrial output sank to only one-fifth of what it was from 1939 to 1944 (Denison & Chung, 1976). About 40% of Japan's capital stock was eradicated, and living conditions were poor (Henderson, 1993).

In late 1948, during the U.S. postwar occupation of Japan, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur, set his sights on transforming Japan back into a progressive nation. Through a series of economic stabilization policies, the two countries setup

the groundwork for an economic comeback, and Japan's economy began to rise out of the ashes (Denison & Chung, 1976).

By 1953, Japan recouped the economic strength it had in the prewar period (Denison & Chung, 1976). Its industries prospered once more. By the 1960s, Japan and the U.S. considered their relationship as one of brothers, sharing common national goals (Morris, 2011). Japan was soon to be positioned as a reliable ally, holding the second-largest economy in the world (Henderson, 1993; Johnson, 1982; van Wolferen, 1989).

The 1980s

As Japan watched its economy grow larger, many did not believe this unprecedented growth could be sustainable. Japan's own political scientists were scoffing at the swift economic rise, warning of an inevitable collapse (Johnson, 1982). However, instead of bottoming out, it continued to flourish, and this swell became known as the "Japanese miracle" (Henderson, 1993; Johnson, 1982). Japan soon began overtaking its mentor, the West, in industries such as high technology and finance, and once more, the U.S. opinion of Japan's economic positioning started shifting from accolades into apprehension (Prestowitz, 1988; Schuman, 2010; Stockwin, 2003; van Wolferen, 1989).

This worry was again fueled by the West's inability to truly understand the "exotic" land, culture and people of Japan. To the U.S., Japan was completely different from the U.S., and this "difference" was what catapulted Japan's postwar success. It wasn't just the growing economy that had the Western policymakers feeling anxious—add to that the perception that Japan may try to position itself once again as a dominant world power (Morris, 2011). U.S. policymakers shared a perception that Japan must be contained—and not just for the benefit of the West but for

Japan itself. As this sentiment grew, the U.S. began questioning Japan's commitment to be a fair partner in trade and politics. It was also during this time that Japan was exporting an abundant amount of goods, resulting in monumental trade surpluses: \$44 billion in 1984, \$56 billion in 1985 and \$93 billion in 1986 (van Wolferen, 1989).

This period, characterized by a waning confidence in Japan's trade and political partnership, became known as Japan bashing. Robert Angel is most often credited with coining the term as a public relations catchphrase when he served as the CEO and president of the Japan Economic Institute of America, a research institution funded by Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (van Wolferen, 1989). He is said to have developed the term to disparage those who were critical of Japan, after his initial attempt at coining "anti-Japanism" failed to catch on among journalists (O'Conner, 2009). The phrase described those who viewed Japan as a "problem," whether political, economic, or cultural. Other experts maintain that the exact origin of the term is unknown (Morris, 2011). Journalist Theodore White has also been credited with the term's origination in his 1985 *New York Times* article, "The Danger from Japan," which pointed out the dilemma of the "Japan Problem" or the threat of Japan's growing economy (Morris, 2011; van Wolferen, 1989). Scholar Masao Miyoshi later posited that White did not invent the term, but wholly demonstrated it with the tone of his writing. White's article was the first appearance of the term "Japan bashing" in print, and according to Morris (2011), since that appearance, the *New York Times* has printed the term approximately 150 times between 1985 and 1994, with a notable spike in 1992 of 40 uses.

As Japan continued its economic rise, the U.S. became less impressed with the miracle of the Japanese economy, accusing the country of unfair trade practices. From the U.S.

perspective, the Japanese economy continued to grow, first overtaking the automotive industry, and then, the industrial sector (Morris, 2011).

The U.S. sentiment of Japan was quantified in a 1989 opinion poll, which asked respondents to name the more serious threat, given an option between the Soviet Union and Japan. While 22% of respondents named the Soviet Union, 68% chose Japan (Morris, 2011). Mirroring the negative perception, offensive tropes began appearing in higher volumes—from stereotypical caricatures of short, buck-toothed men with slanted eyes to dehumanizing descriptions of the Japanese work ethic as “living in a robotic kingdom” (Morris, 2011, p. 28).

The 1990s

From 1952 to 1991, Japan's gross national product had grown at an impressive average annual rate of 6.8% (Henderson, 1993). But in 1991, the economic bubble burst, followed by the stock market crash in 1992, and the U.S. opinion of the Japanese took a turn for the worse (Inoue & Patterson, 2007; “Sadness of Japan,” 2002). By the mid-90s, Japan’s banks had started to give way and borrowing could no longer support the economy (“Sadness of Japan,” 2002). Japanese consumers stopped buying and growth became stagnant. The price of commercial real estate in Japan plummeted 87% from the peak (Clark, 2012). From the stock market crash until around 2000, Japan’s annual growth rate of per capita GDP averaged about 0.5%.

As Japan’s economy sank, so did U.S. ties with Japan. This phase is known as Japan passing, in which many Japanese felt as if the U.S. no longer needed Japan as a global partner and instead would rely on China as its Asian ally. Former President Bill Clinton cemented the concern in 1998 on a circuit to Asia, a presidential tradition since the 1970s. Clinton visited China for 10 days but altogether skipped a trip to Tokyo (O’Conner, 2009; Yokota, 2009). This

came on the heels of Clinton's 1997 State of the Union address in which he mentioned China six times but failed to mention Japan at all (Morris, 2011). These events created a sense of uneasiness and insecurity among many Japanese. It effectively produced the ideology that because of Japan's burst economic bubble and the rise of China's economy, Japan was no longer valuable to the United States (Cossa, 2008; Funabashi, 2004; Morris, 2011; Yokota, 2009). Japan's economy, once inciting U.S. resentment for its prowess, was once again to blame, this time for its weakness.

The 2000s

On September 11, 2001, the Islamist extremist group al-Qaeda hijacked U.S. planes and flew them into the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. Japan's harrowing support of the U.S. War on Terror following these attacks produced a phase known as Japan surpassing, coined by Ralph Cossa, president of the Hawaii-based Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies (Cossa, 2008; Funabashi, 2004; & Hanson, 2004). Little more than a week after the attack, on September 19, 2001, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro announced Japan's basic policy against terrorism in the Antiterrorism Law:

- Japan will actively engage itself in the combat against terrorism, which it regards as Japan's own security issue.
- Japan strongly supports the United States, its ally, and will act in concert with the United States and other countries around the world.
- Japan will take concrete and effective measures, which will clearly demonstrate its firm determination. These measures will be implemented in a swift and comprehensive manner (Statement by the Prime Minister, 2001).

According to Cossa (2004), as reported by the Associated Press, this was the period in which Japan began to “assert itself on a national stage and accept its role as an independent power, outgrowing decades old worries about any action that might encourage a return of unfettered Japanese militarism” (Kageyama, 2004).

In this phase, the U.S saw Japan exceed its commitments as a U.S. ally, deploying Japanese troops to Iraq and renewing its Indian Ocean refueling measures for allied forces in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan (Funabashi, 2004). A statement during the March 2004 conference on Japan-U.S. relations, cosponsored by the Japan Institute of International Affairs, the Embassy of Japan in Washington, D.C., and the Pacific Forum CSIS, sums up the period: “In this new era of ‘Japan surpassing,’ the challenge is to meet rising expectations and to manage the evolving relationship in a manner that gains support from the publics in both countries and from Japan’s neighbors and the international community in general” (Skanderup, 2004).

Japan and the U.S. were once working together as allies, but to some observers, the alliance was far from equal. When Japan’s Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama assumed office in September of 2009, tensions flared once more. Capitol Hill became anxious that Hatoyama’s administration would disturb the alliance, one that policymakers had worked so hard to develop over the previous three decades. This was an example of the more assertive Japan that had once characterized the Japan-surpassing period (Hanson, 2004). Now, it was viewed as a thorn in the alliance. Hatoyama, the first-elected member of the Democratic Party of Japan, acted in a more independent manner than did his predecessors, whose Liberal Democratic Party had governed the country since 1955 (Hatoyama, 2009; Yokota, 2009). Hatoyama disturbed Washington politicians when his party announced it would cease the program that allowed Japanese watercrafts to refuel U.S. ships in the Indian Ocean—part of the agreement to aid the War on

Terror (Fackler, 2010; Yokota, 2009). Hatoyama also announced, as part of a campaign promise, a planned renegotiation of the U.S. Marine airfield based in Okinawa called the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. However, after Hatoyama led a long and tiresome period of continued indecisiveness on the base's new location, he reneged on his promise, causing indignation on Capitol Hill and Okinawa. These two announcements, along with an op-ed piece written by Hatoyama in the *New York Times*, sent anxiety throughout Washington about the decades-old alliance (Yokota, 2009). Hatoyama penned his thoughts on a growing attitude among many Japanese—the belief that Japan should be treated as a peer. He no longer wished the world to view Tokyo as “Washington's lapdog” and would strive to create an “equal partnership” with the U.S. (Cooper & Fackler, 2009; Yakota, 2009). But with the blunder of Futenma, Hatoyama resigned just 10 months into his position.

Following former president George W. Bush's leadership, and in the eve of Obama's presidency, Japan worked to stimulate its economy and find ways to deal with the reality of China's advancing influence in Asia. During this time, Japan felt as if the U.S. was indifferent to its challenges and took the nation's cooperation for granted (Han, 2008). As China surpassed Japan as the world's second largest economy in 2010, and with controversies such as Toyota's massive recall and Japan's hunting tradition of dolphin killing in the 2009 documentary *The Cove*, Japan's reputation became tarnished and the country faded back into the phase of Japan passing, which has also been called Japan nothing. In this phase, Japan has once again turned its attention to China to act as a strong partner in the East (Funabashi, 2004; Hanson, 2004; Morris, 2011; Schuman, 2010).

Two Controversies in the New Millennium

On February 9, 2001, the submarine USS *Greeneville* rammed into and sank a Japanese fishing trawler, the *Ehime Maru*, when it rapidly surfaced underneath the civilian craft.

The 741-ton *Ehime Maru*, a vocational fishing vessel for the Uwajima Fisheries High School, sank within moments off the coast of Hawaii after it was struck by the 6,330-ton USS *Greeneville*, a fast-attack nuclear submarine ("Surviving Students Arrive," 2001; Washington, 2001). Aboard the *Ehime Maru* were 20 crewmen, 13 students, and two instructors. The accident killed a total of nine people: four 17-year-old students, three crewmembers, and both instructors.

The USS *Greeneville* carried a total of 123 people: 106 crew members, 16 civilians, and the ship's commander. The civilians were part of a public relations operation under the Distinguished Visitor Embarkation Program—chosen by former Admiral Richard Macke—and largely consisted of wealthy businessmen and their wives (Washington, 2001). The National Transportation Safety Board provided a "Marine Accident Brief" (2001) based on testimony and evidence presented at the Navy's Court of Inquiry. A summary of the report's findings begins with the civilians boarding the USS *Greeneville*. The day's voyage included several planned activities, including observing the submarine's maneuvers, which were a demonstration of the ship's capabilities. During preparation of an emergency surfacing operation, the civilians were invited to the control room. At this time, sonar had tracked three surface vessels, one vessel being the *Ehime Maru*. The report notes that a few of the civilians blocked tools and equipment in the control room, including a chart that was used to note the submarine's position relative to other vessels. The submarine proceeded to surface in order to perform a periscope check, which found no close contacts. The commanding officer then called an emergency deep dive maneuver,

which uses highly pressurized air to rapidly bring the vessel to the surface of the ocean in the shortest time. Upon surfacing, the *Greeneville* struck the *Ehime Maru*.

Following the initial rescue attempt occurring directly after the collision, the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard remained on the scene for 22 days. On February 16, the Navy located the sunken *Ehime Maru* by sonar. Underwater searches did not find any of the nine missing passengers, and the search was suspended until March 2. On October 12, 2001, the Navy transported the *Ehime Maru* to a shallow-water recovery site. Japanese and U.S.-American divers recovered all but one of the victims' bodies. The *Ehime Maru* was then taken back to sea and released to sink. The recovery operation cost \$60 million, with an added \$2.67 million in compensation to the Ehime Prefecture for a number of causes, including lost equipment, crew salaries, and memorial services, according to the accident report.

On February 9, 2001, the Navy ordered an official inquiry into the collision. The Court of Inquiry issued disciplinary measures against six *Greeneville* crewmembers. Commander Scott Waddle was found guilty for two violations of military law, and resigned with full rank and pension. He and later wrote a memoir of the event and its aftermath, titled *The Right Thing*.

After the collision, many Japanese citizens were angered that Commander Scott Waddle did not immediately issue a direct apology, as is customary in Japanese culture (Drumheller & Benoit, 2004; "Surviving Students Arrive," 2001). However, from the U.S. perspective, the Japanese outcry over a more sufficient apology may have sounded unreasonable as President George W. Bush, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, and other government officials issued their many condolences.

Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, which houses approximately 3,200 U.S. Marines, symbolizes for Japan a litany of controversy. The base, built in 1945, is located in the densely

populated city of Ginowan, Okinawa. Since its creation, the base has also been responsible for aircraft noise pollution, a helicopter crash, and even a case of violence (“Futenma Marine Corps,” n.d.). In August 2004, a helicopter crashed into Okinawa International University, damaging it extensively. No Japanese were injured, but the building was destroyed. About 10 years prior, in September 1995, one Navy seaman and two Marines were accused of the kidnapping and rape of a 12-year-old Okinawan girl (“Tanaka pushes for,” 2012). The seaman later admitted to the rape, while the Marines plead guilty to assault and abduction (“Fired Admiral,” 1995). Shortly after the crime, U.S. Navy Admiral Richard Macke was fired for making an insensitive comment toward the victim, saying, “I have said several times: for the price they paid to rent the car [used in the crime], they could have had a girl [prostitute]” (“Fired Admiral,” 1995). Macke later apologized.

Vice President Al Gore, visiting Japan, acknowledged that the crime was damaging to Japan-U.S. relations, and announced the development of a task force to help work through the issue. However, this may have been viewed as afterthought to many Japanese, as Gore’s visit was as a substitute for Clinton’s attendance, having skipped his visit to Tokyo (“Fired Admiral,” 1995).

The rape reignited controversy over the Futenma base, and between 60,000–85,000 Japanese took to the streets, forming a human chain to rally for the base’s removal (Lee, 1995). The protesters aimed for a reversal of Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, an agreement between Japan and the U.S. enacted in 1960 that allowed the U.S. troops to be stationed in Futenma. This was the first of five “human chain” protests for the purpose of removing the base from the Okinawa prefecture (“Human Chain,” 2010).

In 2006, the Japan and the U.S. came to an agreement to move thousands of the U.S.

soldiers, as well as the Marine base out of Okinawa to Guam. However, Prime Minister Hatoyama, elected into office in September of 2009, declared he wanted to move the base completely off of the prefecture, as part of his campaign promise. Neither Hatoyama nor his successor Prime Minister Naoto Kan were able to negotiate an agreement with the U.S., and the base's move was tabled indefinitely. In April 2012, Washington agreed to transfer approximately 9,000 Marines off of Okinawa, but the specific issue of Futenma remained a stalemate, as Okinawans are still in heated opposition of the base, and the U.S. insists Japan find a suitable location in the prefecture (Burns, 2012).

Despite the accident, both countries have been moving toward common ground in their enduring attempts to maintain a stable alliance. In 2005, Hawaii and the Ehime Prefecture held a youth baseball series, which was an act preformed, in part, to “open the door of friendship” between Japan and the U.S. (Ohira, 2005). The series was so successful that Honolulu and Uwajima, the Japanese city from which the *Ehime Maru* and its fishery hailed, established a sister-city relationship (Ardolino, 2008). Despite all the controversy surrounding the location of the Futenma base, U.S. Marines in Okinawa were deployed to aid in the disaster relief after the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (Fellman, 2001). In total, the U.S. military responded with more than 189 tons of food, 2 million gallons of water, nearly 12,000 gallons of fuel, and 100 tons of relief supplies (Daniel, 2011). After the Marines' assistance, protesters against the relocation plan have seemed to fade away (Fletcher, 2011).

Media Framing Theory and Research

“Media framing can be likened to the magician's sleight of hand—attention is directed to one point so that people do not notice the manipulation that is going on at another point”

(Tankard, 2001, p. 97). The framing perspective was first introduced by sociologist Erving Goffman (1974), who posited that, “people rely on expectations to make sense of their everyday social experience” (as cited in Reese, 2001, p. 7).

While Goffman did not subscribe to the belief that framing was blatant manipulation as Tankard (2001) did, his idea that a social reality can be created using a particular lens—or frame—was adapted to media analysis shortly thereafter, as scholars attempted to understand how media presented particular issues and how meaning was derived from said issues. Reese (2001) acknowledged a media frame’s ability to influence an audience’s understanding of their reality: “Frames work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world” (p. 11). Media frames are the abstract tools of interpretation that use persistent, organized symbolic devices within media content to develop social meaning (Pan & Kosicki, 2001; Reese, 2001).

The media framing theory is a dimension of agenda setting, which refers to a direct media effect that emerges when the audience processes media content and assigns importance to the events or issues in the same order that the media devoted space and time to them (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). In other words, the higher up on the page, the longer the article, and the longer the airtime given to a story, the more salient the issue becomes to the public. While framing, like agenda setting, is a form of media influence, framing differs in that its focus is not on the quantity of news coverage assigned a specific topic, but the manner of its presentation (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Framing focuses on the exclusion, organization and emphasis of certain facts, making those events more salient than others (e.g., Entman, 1993; Gitlin, 1980; Goffman, 1959, 1974; Iyengar & Reeves, 1997). By selecting certain aspects of an issue over others, media make those issues more salient to readers, thereby assigning a particular meaning to an event or issue (Iyengar & Reeves, 1997). Put another way, frames are a set of “organizing

principles” (Reese, 2010, p. 21) that “suggest a connection between two concepts, issues, or things, such that after exposure to the framed message, audiences accept or are at least aware of the connection” (Nisbet, 2010, p. 47).

Gitlin (1980) viewed media frames as a mechanism for journalists to process large amounts of material quickly, and package it for their audience in a digestible manner. Essentially, frames exist because journalists decide which facts are more important than others, and then assign certain words and phrases to present those facts (Atwood, 1987; Entman, 1991). As Gitlin (1980) wrote, frames are “persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual” (Gitlin, 1980, p. 7). Hertog and McLeod (1995) emphasized framing’s ability to create perceived salience within a news story: “the frame used to interpret an event determines what available information is relevant (and thereby what is irrelevant)” (p. 4).

Episodic and Thematic Frames

According to Iyengar (1991), media frames may appear in two, or a combination of two, patterns. The first frame is the episodic frame, which concentrates on individual news events, or episodes, while the second, thematic, looks at the big picture. Iyengar (1991) explains:

The episodic news frame takes the form of a case study or event-oriented report and depicts public issues in terms of concrete instances (for example, the plight of a homeless person or a teenage drug user, the bombing of an airliner, or an attempted murder). The thematic frame, by contrast, places public issues in some more general or abstract context and takes the form of a “takeout,” or “backgrounder,” report directed at general outcomes or conditions. ... The essential difference between episodic and thematic framing is that

episodic framing depicts concrete events that illustrate issues, while thematic framing presents collective or general evidence. (p. 14)

Iyengar (1991) argues, however, that many news reports are not exclusively episodic or thematic. A news report can harbor elements of both frames, but either the episodic or thematic frame will be dominant.

According to Hertog and McLeod (2001), frames are cultural structures that have central ideas with varying levels of connectivity. The strength of a frame is in its meaning, and not a concrete definition, but the myth and symbolism that is attached to the frame. Hertog and McLeod (2001) explicate three ways in which frames are powerful within cultural realms. First, frames have a large amount of symbolic strength. This is because members of society have strong emotional ties to certain myths, and those myths or metaphors are deeply embedded and woven into a society's cultural fabric. Second, frames grant excessive meaning because the frame is strongly connected to other powerful ideas and connotations. The "War on Terror" elicits a number of beliefs and experiences—and triggers other concepts in the readers' minds, like the dichotomy of heroes and villains. Last, frames require widespread recognition. For communication to be effective, the sender and the receiver must share an understanding of the meaning of a message.

Frame Categories

A frame itself can provide shared meaning for society as a whole, which includes sharing assumptions and social realities. Put another way, frames engender specific ways of thinking about public issues and present issues for discourse (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). According to Pan and Kosicki (1993), four main news dimensions develop these perceptions: (1) syntactic

structures, or stable patterns of arranging words or phrases into sentences; (2) script structures, or established, stable sequences of activities; (3) thematic structures, or issue orientation with causal themes; and (4) rhetorical structures, or stylistic choices made by journalists.

A content analysis of the 2003 Iraq War by Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007) explored frames used in two elite U.S. and UK newspapers and two Arab news websites. By selecting predefined categories, the researchers were able to identify the presence or absence of specific frames. These categories were the following: war frames, violence of war, human interest, prognostic frame, diagnostic frame, anti-war protesters frame, oil resources frame, media self-referential frame, looting frame, responsibility frame, and rebuilding of Iraq frame. The study found that the Arab news websites framed the war as military conflict, with an emphasis on war's resulting violence. However, the U.S. and UK elite newspapers more frequently framed the war by emphasizing its long-term benefits, such as the emergence of a democratic government.

According to Reese (2001), the way in which issues are framed within stories has a direct effect on the way a culture is thereby perceived by the audience. As previously discussed, these shared realities have the aptitude to affect a reader's social reality, which includes organizing public opinion and affecting a reader's perception of their own society, as well as other nations. Reese (2001) states that frames do not simply organize information, but invite the reader to adopt a grander understanding of the culture beyond the immediate information presented to them in the story.

Framing Devices

An important part of analyzing frames is the qualitative identification of framing devices,

or linguistic clues, such as metaphors, allusions to history, lexical choices, catchphrases or graphics that signal the existence of a frame (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Nesbit, 2010; & Reese, 2010). According to Reese (2010), the qualitative approach “tends to give greater emphasis to the cultural and political content of news frames and how they draw upon a shared store of social meanings” (p. 2). For example, the “metaphor” of war was used in the concept of the War on Terror, as well as the war on drugs and the war on poverty. Each “metaphor” created a “frontline” because these wars, unlike a traditional war between two armies, with a boundary between them being the literal frontline, do not naturally contain one. A war metaphor can link the concept to other actual conflicts in the mind of the reader, such as Pearl Harbor or World War II (Reese, 2010).

Analyzing “frame sponsors” is a useful way of determining why the frame was presented in the way that it was. The sponsors could be political parties, interest groups, NGOs, and so on. According to Lawrence (2010):

Many issues and events that citizens encounter in the news have been framed by political actors, particularly government officials, but sometimes also other political actors such as interest group leaders, academic experts and grassroots movement spokespersons. Quite often these frames have political purposes—they are intended to influence public perceptions and guide public discourse. (p. 265)

By looking at the frame sponsor, it is possible to analyze who is responsible for an audience’s current attitude about an issue. However, this is what Reese (2010) considers the “how” of framing research, or the “process-centric” side of framing, which examines how an agenda-setter may choose what frames to use, or the effects of said frames. He suggests starting with the “what” perspective, which is “more frame-centric; it is concerned with frame-building and

involves the dissection of the content of the frame, specifically the network of concepts and the unique narrative and myths that make it work” (p. 3). Once the “what” has been established, further research may be done on the “how.”

Sources

Researchers agree that sources influence news frames, particularly the use of the elite sources, such as policymakers and high-ranking military officials (e.g., Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007, Dimitrova & Stromback, 2005; Entman, 1989; Groshek, 2008; Lee & Maslog, 2005). These sources are most commonly used in content relating to security or foreign policy (Groshek, 2008; Ruigrok & van Atteveldt, 2007). According to Schneider (2011), “journalists’ ability to choose who speaks (or does not speak) in news coverage enables them to frame news without appearing to do so” (p. 73).

Ryan (2004), examining the War on Terror in 10 elite U.S. papers, found that editorials between September 11th and the bombing of Afghanistan frequently relied on government sources—often U.S. government officials. The narratives implied the bombing was the only feasible response after 9/11, and moral consequences for the attack were rarely mentioned. Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern’s (2007) study of the 2003 Iraq War grouped sources into six categories: (1) government representative, (2) military personnel, (3) individual, (4) journalist, (5) terrorist group member, and (6) “other.” Not surprisingly, research revealed that the most frequently used sources in the study across all countries were government and military officials.

According to Aday, Livingston, and Hebert (2005), “between Vietnam and the recent Iraq War, the main finding of scholars looking at war and foreign policy coverage is that the news tends to privilege official sources, especially those from the White House” (p. 6). A study

by Maslog, Lee, and Kim (2005) observed the use of sources and frames in a cross-cultural analysis of coverage of the Iraq War. They found that reports focused on the here and now with a lack of background information, and focused on the political leaders and military officials behind the battle, instead of the soldiers or the civilians. After looking at U.S. newspaper coverage of foreign policy about Indochina, Welch (1972) found that the ample use of official sources was responsible for “developing and sustaining mass and elite public acceptance of the administration’s view” (p. 231).

Relying on these elite sources can determine the way a story is structured, effecting elements of an article such as its tone and focus, which can lead to the construction and adoption of specific frames (Groshek, 2008).

Framing Foreign News

War frame research often provides an opportunity to examine coverage of two cultures from different perspectives. An example of this appeared after September 11, 2001, during the War on Terror. According to Reese (2010), the press adopted these terms and continued to frame the U.S. attempt to defend its freedom as the “War on Terror.” This frame has ultimately led to the “Us vs. Them” mentality, adopted by audiences and journalists alike (Powell, 2011, p. 90). When covering international news stories, researchers have found that journalists may frame two countries—or citizens from the respective countries—in a this sort of dichotomy of good versus bad, or hero versus villain (Powell, 2011). This is meaningful because Dimitrova and Lee (2009) identify that the link between framing and the audience could be even stronger in international news events. The audience has no direct experience with those events and, therefore, has to rely on media accounts to learn what happens in remote places (Dimitrova & Lee, 2009, p. 538).

Powell (2011) examined media coverage of 11 acts of terrorism that occurred in the U.S. between October 2001 and January 2010. The researcher analyzed the frames through the theoretical perspective of Orientalism, which is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between “The Orient” and “The Occident” (Powell, 2011; Said, 1978, p. 2). When stories were framed to establish the U.S.’s War on Terror, the perspective allowed the Occident, or the West, to be viewed as a superior to the Orient, or East. This clash between East and West, directly resulting from the media messages, can produce long-reaching stereotypes about groups and religions (Maslog, 1971, Powell, 2011).

Powell (2011) found that during the labeling of terror suspects, three common labels emerged: Muslim, al Qaeda, and terrorist. Powell posits that these themes connect terrorism and Islam, while contributing to Orientalism. In all 11 events analyzed, the articles attempted to label the suspect as Muslim. Specifically, it either directly labeled the person as a Muslim or speculated his association with the religion. If there was a direct connection made between the terrorist and being Muslim, it was repeated throughout the coverage. For example, the researcher notes that Nidal Malik Hasan, who opened fire at Fort Hood in Killeen, Texas, in November 2009, was labeled as Muslim 578 times in the course of the two-week study. Once a suspect was labeled Muslim, the articles then attempted to establish a connection to al-Qaeda. Powell also noted that the label “terrorism” was used in all 11 events, regardless of the degree of proof that it was actually labeled as terrorism by official investigators.

A 2009 study by Dimitrova and Lee examined the frames surrounding the execution of Saddam Hussein, by using the classic example of Entman's (1991) media framing of two separate air attacks. In the first case, the U.S. shot down an Iranian airplane, and it was framed as a “technical problem.” In the second case, the Soviets shot down a Korean plane, and it was

framed as “moral outrage.” As mentioned before, this difference in framing the event is salient because Dimitrova and Lee (2009) posited that the link between framing and the audience could be even stronger in international news events because the audience has no direct experience with those events.

Besley and McComas (2005) use “justice framing,” examining two concepts: distributive justice and procedural justice. According to the researchers, distributive justice focuses on the outcome, whether or not the punishment matches the crime. On the other, procedural justice concerns the fairness of decision-making or deliberative procedures used in the trial.

The distributive justice and procedural justice frames were applied as it related to Saddam’s execution. Distributive justice would emphasize that he deserved to be hanged and that execution was fair punishment. Procedural justice as it related to the execution would place emphasis on the evaluation of the trial and procedures, and whether or not he received fair treatment leading up to his hanging.

The researchers examined how elite U.S. newspapers framed Saddam’s execution by looking at each article’s tone and most frequently used justice frame. They found that most articles were anti-execution and that the procedural justice frame was the dominant justice frame. These findings suggested that media coverage focused *how* the execution was performed, instead of whether or not the execution was justified. The researchers posited that when an audience believes an outcome has been attained using a fair procedure, those individuals show stronger support for the authorities or government that carried out the procedure. According to Dimitrova and Lee (2009), “This example demonstrates that media coverage of justice cases such as the case of Saddam’s execution may have a significant impact on U.S. public attitudes toward the event as well as the authorities” (pp. 539–540).

Cross-Cultural Framing

In April 2007, the student body of Virginia Polytechnic Institute suffered a serious trauma from the tragic campus shooting by a young man of South Korean descent. This event, which resulted in the highest number of casualties in the history of U.S. school violence, sent waves of fear throughout national and international audiences. South Koreans were frustrated by the fact that the gunman was one of their own (Kwon & Moon, 2009, p. 270). In response to the shootings, South Koreans acted in a collectivistic manner, issuing statements from the government about their collective shock resulting from the shooting (Kwon & Moon, 2009).

Kwon and Moon (2009) compared U.S. and Korean newspaper articles and blog posts, after the shooting incident to see if collectivism is displayed differently between both nations and the media outlets. Embedded values are important in framing analysis, as they build common frames that connect a journalists' story to the public's interpretation (Kwon & Moon, 2009, p. 271). This is particularly true when journalists are reporting on international news for a national audience. The phenomenon is known as news domestication, or making international news suitable to a domestic audience (Kwon, & Moon, 2009).

Kwon and Moon (2009) evaluated the collectivism frame to reveal the degree of collectivistic storytelling. The collectivist frame was represented by the distinction of collective identity, or a sense of “oneness” as a culture, such as having a bond with nationality. This opposes personal identity, or individual characteristics such as gender or occupation. The researchers found that Korean news articles used the collectivist frame more often than did the U.S. media outlets.

Instead of relying on their own cultural norms, however, some nations have adopted a Westernized tradition of reporting. Despite restrictions by its government, China has begun

adopting Western news values and practices (Pan, & Chan, 2003).

The study was based on the framing research developed by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) and de Vreese (2001), which explored economic consequences, responsibility, human interest, and conflict. The economic consequences frame is employed when a story discussed the results of economic events. The responsibility frame is used if discussions of responsibility, such as blame or credit, for actions or events were used. The human-interest frame uses individual lives to personalize the story. In the conflict frame, emphasis is on clashes between entities (Semetko, & Valkeburg, 2000; Vreese, Peter, & Semetko, 2001). The study found that Chinese newspapers were less likely to present a responsibility frame than U.S. newspapers. The U.S. newspaper articles that presented the responsibility frame blamed China for the spread of SARS.

A study conducted by Atwood (1987) examined the mental images created in the minds of U.S. readers of Japan news, and in turn Japanese readers of the U.S. papers, through a series of non-subject-specific articles mentioning the two countries. Research found that elite U.S. newspaper, the *New York Times*, was more likely to mention Japan tangentially than offer U.S. readers substantial learning opportunities about the country. For example, only 18 of 61 stories mentioning Japan in the *New York Times* gave meaningful information concerning Japan.

Likewise, the *Asahi Shimbun*, while including the U.S. in many of its daily stories, only mentioned the country in surface-level detail. In all, both newspapers mentioned the other country for matters such as weather reports, sports scores, and currency reports, overemphasizing the economic and political relations and seemingly ignoring the cultural side of the two allies. In the stories that were substantive, the press focused on problems rather than equal grounds.

Atwood (1987) sums up what one might interpret from these stories:

The U.S. press placed the blame for the then \$20 billion U.S. trade deficit on the Japanese who through unfair pricing, falsified trade documents, government financing of private research, and an artificially low value on the Japanese yen had an unfair, perhaps even illegal, trade advantage. On the other side of the Pacific the Japanese press suggested that the U.S. was trying to dump agricultural products, close its own markets, force Japan to increase its defense budget, and unfairly blame Japan for foolish U.S. budget deficits that increase the cost of U.S. products in the world market. (p. 86)

Stromback, Shehata and Dimitrova (2008) examined how Swedish and U.S. elite newspapers framed the Muslim prophet Mohammad cartoon issue. On September 20, 2005, the *Jyllands-Posten*, Danish daily, ran 12 cartoons of Mohammad. The researchers examined six months of coverage and analyzed three frames: freedom of speech, clash of civilizations and intolerance. The first frame, freedom of speech, is based on the *Jyllands-Posten* editor's decision to publish the cartoon to challenge self-censorship often practiced by the Danish as a means of not offending the Muslim community. The second, clash of civilizations, was centered on the two cultures' widely different belief systems, or as the researchers write, "an ongoing struggle based upon diverging value systems that stem from inherently different and incongruent cultures" (p. 123). Finally, intolerance refers to the underlying level of anti-Islamic sentiments in Denmark. The conflict frame was added to the aforementioned frames, and was the most common, appearing in almost three-fourths of all articles.

The current body of research applies Iyengar's (1991) episodic/thematic frames and Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern's (2007) interpretation of Pan and Kosicki (1993), to analyze print-media coverage of two contemporary Japan-U.S. conflicts in a cross-cultural comparative quantitative analysis, combined with qualitative textual analysis of framing devices, as suggested

by Gamson and Modigliani (1989), Nisbet (2010) and Reese (2010) to identify words, catchphrases or attributes of the frame system or systems employed in the article.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

As McQuail (1994) stated, media outlets are entrenched in the socio-political environment that surrounds them. This study will examine the coverage of two contemporary controversies in Japan-U.S. relations through the lens of four elite U.S. newspapers and one elite Japanese newspaper while considering the two dynamics in play: Japan surpassing from 2000–2008, and Japan passing from 2008 to current day.

By focusing on Iyenger's (1991) episodic/thematic frames and Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern's (2007) application of Pan and Kosicki (1993), the research will explore these research questions and hypotheses:

RQ1: How does story placement differ between Japanese and U.S. newspapers, as well as between the Japan-surpassing and Japan-passing periods?

RQ2: How do datelines differ between Japanese and U.S. newspapers, as well as between the Japan-surpassing and Japan-passing periods?

RQ3: How does the story genre differ between Japanese and U.S. newspapers, as well as between the Japan-surpassing and Japan-passing periods?

Japan's newspaper will use editorials and special contributors to discuss the contentious relationship between the two countries, where the U.S. will not, because during this time, the U.S. was dissatisfied with the bilateral relationship (Hanson, 2004; Funabashi, 2004; Morris, 2011; & Schuman, 2010). Therefore,

H1: Japan's newspaper will have more opinion pieces than U.S. newspapers.

RQ4: How does word count differ between Japanese and U.S. newspapers, as well as between the Japan-surpassing and Japan-passing periods?

RQ5: How do news sources differ between Japanese and U.S. newspapers, as well as between the Japan-surpassing and Japan-passing periods?

Foreign policy coverage favors official sources (Lawrence, 2010; Ryan, 2004; & Schneider, 2011). The Futenma controversy defined a time when issues of foreign policy and security were being tested by both nations. Therefore,

H2: During the Futenma controversy (the period of Japan passing), the U.S. articles will rely more heavily on elite news sources—the government/military source, than during the period of Japan surpassing,

RQ6: How does the use of episodic and thematic frames differ between Japanese and US newspapers, as well as between the Japan-surpassing and Japan-passing periods?

The Futenma base controversy is an ongoing political and cultural struggle for the Japanese. Episodic frames are used most frequently to package short-term events, whereas articles about ongoing events, which typically have long historical background, are better suited for the thematic frame (Iyengar, 1991). Therefore,

H3: Both countries' newspapers will employ the thematic frame in coverage more often in the period of Japan surpassing than in Japan passing.

RQ7: How does the use of frame categories differ between Japanese and US newspapers, as well as between the Japan-surpassing and Japan-passing periods?

Japan blames the U.S. for the sinking of the *Ehime Maru*. This may be because of Japan's perception of itself as a more "assertive" country in this period, not apprehensive to place blame on the U.S. (Cossa, 2004; Hanson, 2004; & Funabashi, 2004). Therefore,

H4: The dominant frame category in the Japanese newspaper during the Japan-surpassing period will be the responsibility frame.

METHOD

This study applied a quantitative and qualitative content analysis to answer the research questions and hypotheses. Using the geopolitical and economic background of Japan passing and Japan surpassing, sometimes referred to in this research as the period of (sur)passing, this research examined how Japanese and U.S. major newspapers framed two conflicts: the sinking of Japanese fishing trawler *Ehime Maru* and the controversy surrounding the Futenma base.

Sampling

The sample of articles was chosen based on these two criteria: (1) The newspaper must be an elite news source, and (2) its content must be accessible from an online database. The unit of analysis was the individual newspaper article. The study analyzed four U.S. newspapers (i.e. the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, *USA Today*, the *Wall Street Journal*), and one Japanese newspaper, the *Daily Yomiuri*. A LexisNexis Academic database located articles for each newspaper except the *Wall Street Journal*, for which a ProQuest search was used. A Boolean search located each keyword. The search for the first controversy contained the terms: “*Ehime Maru*” or (*Greenville* and submarine). The second contained the terms: Futenma or (Okinawa and base). The original search terms were the phrases “*Ehime Maru*” or “Futenma,” but had to be expanded because the *Wall Street Journal* referred to the *Ehime Maru* not by name but as the “Japanese trawler” in some instances. The search employed a specific date range for each controversy. The first controversy, the sinking of the *Ehime Maru*, covered the range of February 1, 2001 (the month of the incident) through February 28, 2003 (one month after the Navy’s legal settlements with Japanese families were finalized). For the Futenma controversy, the period of coverage in this study was between September 1, 2009 (election of former Prime

Minister Hatoyama) and September 11, 2011 (marking the resignation of Hatoyama's successor, Naoto Kan).

The articles were sequestered in four separate categories: Japan's newspaper coverage of the sinking of the *Ehime Maru* ($n = 133$), Japan's newspaper coverage of the Futenma base controversy ($n = 538$), U.S. newspaper coverage of the sinking of the *Ehime Maru* ($n = 288$), and U.S. newspaper coverage of the Futenma base controversy ($n = 269$).

In each respective group, the article's source, title, date and word count were saved into an Excel spreadsheet in sequential order, from oldest to newest. A set of restrictions were then applied to each article in the four categories, as suggested by Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007): (1) articles must be 160 words or more, (2) articles must not be a correction, news brief, summary, letter to the editor, or a duplicate; (3) articles must not contain the search terms in a peripheral mention. Dimitrova (2007) suggested excluding articles that did not mention the search term in the lead paragraph; however, this suggestion was excluded because the current model of news story does not singularly rely on the inverted pyramid, and has instead, in some instances, adopted a narrative format. An example is the human-interest piece, which may explicate the background of a particular individual before delving into the account of the particular key word. Dimitrova (2007) also excluded editorials, but the current research includes them as Japanese newspapers commonly use this genre.

In order to select 100 articles from each category, a random number generator in Excel—generating a random starting number and interval—was used in the application of systematic random sampling to each category. According to Churchill and Iacobucci (2005), the systematic random sample is more representative than a system random sample. This guarantees representation from all years in all newspapers, because the articles had been arranged in

chronological order from oldest to newest. This resulted in a total of 400 articles, 100 each from the four respective categories. Each article was then combined into one Excel spreadsheet and renumbered 1 to 400, maintaining date sequence while grouped by newspaper in the following order: the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, *USA Today*, the *Wall Street Journal* and the *Daily Yomiuri*.

Procedure

A pilot study revealed that the sheer volume of articles relating to the controversies in Japanese elite newspaper *Yomiuri Shimbun*, compared to the *New York Times*, was significant.

The *New York Times* mentioned the “*Ehime Maru*” in 82 articles and “Futenma” in 37 articles. However, the *Yomiuri Shimbun* mentioned the former in 890 articles and the latter in 2,973 articles. After eliminating inappropriate articles during analysis, this research analyzed 43 *Yomiuri Shimbun* and 75 the *New York Times* articles about the sinking of *Ehime Maru* and 34 *Yomiuri Shimbun* and 29 the *New York Times* articles about the Futenma base controversy. This difference would indicate the conflicts were more significant to Japan than to the U.S.

The pilot study adopted the framing analysis used by Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007), but needed modification before conducting the current research. Several articles in U.S. newspapers made reference to past conflicts, outside of the context of the contemporary conflicts, such as making reference to Pearl Harbor when discussing the sinking of the *Ehime Maru*. It was determined that this was a significant finding, so the current research added a frame to contain these references.

Coding for the current body of research began by identifying the newspaper, date of publication, word count, page of section, headline, dateline, and story genre. The page of section

was specific to whether or not the article appeared on the front page of any given section. The dateline refers to the location of where the story occurred. The story genre was coded as one of seven categories: wire/straight news, staff straight news, staff editorial, special contributor, op-ed, unknown, and other. Articles falling into the wire/straight news category originated from the AP, Reuters, or any other news organization that creates and supplies news for other news organizations. A member of the newspaper's staff wrote articles in the staff straight news genre and could be identified with a byline or the term "staff writer." For example, Martin Fackler, the *New York Times*' Tokyo Bureau Chief, wrote a majority of the Futenma articles. Straight news refers to an article's fact-based content. Articles written by a member of the newspaper's senior staff identified the staff editorial. Editorial refers to an article's opinion-based content. Articles identified the special contributor genre specifically contained the phrase near the byline. Often these writers were a political expert or cultural critic. For example, Robert D. Eldridge wrote an article for *The Daily Yomiuri*. He is a fellow at the Research Institute for Peace and Security in Tokyo, and the author of *The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem: Okinawa in Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations, 1945–1952*. The op-ed genre contained articles written by someone unaffiliated with the newspaper. "Unknown" articles did not carry a byline, and articles in the "other" category did not fit into any of the aforementioned genres. For instance, *USA Today* ran articles in a section called "Debates," a mix of fact and opinion.

Articles were then coded for sources. According to Dimitova and Connolly-Ahern (2007), "one of the devices that influences news framing of events is the choice of sources" (p. 156). A tally was made each time a writer attributed a unique source in the article. Attribution could be a direct quote, or given indirectly, such as "according to" or "sources say." The sources were coded as follows: U.S. governmental/military source, U.S. nongovernmental expert source,

U.S. private citizen source, and U.S. other; Japanese governmental/military source, Japanese nongovernmental expert source, Japanese private citizen source, Japanese other, foreign governmental/military source, foreign nongovernmental expert source, foreign private citizen source, and foreign other.

Governmental/military sources were sources working for the government or a branch of the armed services in their respective country. For example, an article in the *Washington Post* that contained quotes from President Bush received one tally mark for U.S. governmental/military source. If the same article contained quotes from Prime Minister Hatoyama, a tally was marked on Japanese governmental/military sources.

Nongovernmental expert sources were sources who were not employed by the government in their respective countries but were interviewed to offer insight and perspective, such as political scientists and economists. The *New York Times* would call upon university professors for their opinion, such as Kuniko Inoguchi, a professor of international politics at Sophia University in Tokyo.

Private citizen sources were sources such as witnesses and victims. In *Ehime Maru* articles, family members of the victims in the Ehime prefecture were interviewed for their reaction to the accident. Each source received a tally for Japanese private citizen source. Sources who did not fall into the aforementioned categories were marked “other.”

In analyzing frame types, each article was first coded based on its dominant frame: episodic, thematic, or mixed. According to Iyengar (1991), the episodic frame “takes the form of a case study or event-oriented report and depicts public issues in terms of concrete instances,” and the thematic frame “places public issues in some more general or abstract context and ... presents collective or general evidence” (p. 14). For the purposes of this

research, the episodic frame was defined as a frame that focused on specific events or particular cases, with little or no context about underlying issues. For example, U.S. articles reported on the Navy's Court of Inquiry after the sinking of the *Ehime Maru* with little reference about the damage done to the victims' families or Japan-U.S. ties and the historical background of U.S.-Japanese naval relations. During coverage of the Futenma controversy, some U.S. articles discussed the flip-flopping of Hatoyama on the issue without discussion of the reason for the prime minister's indecision, such as his divided loyalty to both Okinawans and to Washington.

The thematic frame was present when there was a focus on the big picture or general context of political issues and events, such as in-depth expert analysis or historical background. For example, some stories discussed the history of the Futenma controversy, particularly a decision to readdress a 2006 pact to move the base to a less populated area of Okinawa. In *Ehime Maru* articles, an in-depth discussion of the Japanese cultural expectation for an in-person apology followed the report that many victims' families were unsatisfied by Commander Waddle's response to the accident. Similarly, some U.S. articles contained an explanation of the necessity for the U.S. Navy to recover the victim's bodies, clarifying the belief system of Buddhist citizens, who put a great deal of importance on physical remains.

The research then analyzed a system of frame categories by modifying Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern's (2007) categories, and article were coded for the following seven message-frame categories:

- Mea culpa frame
- Responsibility frame
- Reconciliation frame
- Human interest frame

- Diagnostic frame
- Prognostic frame
- Media self-referential frame

Articles contained the mea culpa frame when the country in which an article was published takes blame, offers apologies or admits fault. For example, articles in *The Daily Yomiuri* blamed Hatoyama for the delay in moving the Futenma base, or articles in the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times* discussed Commander Waddle's sorrow for the collision between the USS *Greeneville* and the *Ehime Maru*, which caused the death of nine Japanese civilians. This frame was also present if one country published an article about the other country's anger. For example, the *New York Times* published an article, with Japanese-citizen sources, about Japan's outrage at Waddle's insincere apology. Even though Japan blamed the U.S., it was considered the mea culpa frame because of the nationality of the newspaper that published the article.

The responsibility frame was present in articles when the country in which the story was published blames the other country. *The Daily Yomiuri* published articles that blamed the U.S. for failing to punish Waddle with a court martial and instead allowing him to quit with full rank. *USA Today* published articles blaming Hatoyama's ineffectiveness for a delay in the Futenma-base renegotiations.

The reconciliation frame focused on friendship, a positive future and collaboration between the two countries. For instance, terms such as "mending fences" or "reliable ally" appeared in the articles containing this frame. Despite the current controversies, a goal of maintaining a secure bilateral relationship or "common strategic objectives" was apparent.

In the human-interest frame, articles focused on the individual, such as the victims of the *Ehime Maru* and their families, or the protesters of the Futenma base. The *New York Times* featured an article that told the story of two close cousins who were separated after the sinking of the *Ehime Maru*—one survived the accident and the other did not. The newspaper also ran a profile of Naoto Kan, successor of Hatoyama, in the wake of the Futenma base controversy.

The diagnostic frame contained perceptions that led to the conflict, with a discussion of what caused the conflict in the first place. An article in the *Washington Post* included the litany of issues that caused Japan's anger over the U.S. military presence, including a discussion of the sinking of the *Ehime Maru*, the 1995 rape of the 12-year-old Okinawan, a 2001 incident in which a U.S. Marine was charged with lifting up a Japanese teenager's skirt to take a picture, and a bad-mannered email sent by a Marine Lt. Gen. to his subordinates.

Articles that contained reports of the long-term effects of the conflict, or a broader discussion of the consequences of the conflict, were classified as the prognostic frame. For instance, the *New York Times* article reported the ways in which Hatoyama and his administration may further strain ties between Tokyo and Washington.

The media self-referential frame put an emphasis on media's role in the conflict. Hatoyama was quoted in *The Daily Yomiuri* stating that his words had overemphasized by the Japanese press, which caused a misunderstanding between his administration and the general public.

Last, the past conflict frame referred to past military conflicts or culture clashes outside of the two contemporary conflicts investigated in the present research. For instance, U.S. newspapers referred to the location of the collision between the *Ehime Maru* and the USS *Greeneville* as "Pearl Harbor," when Japanese press identified it as "Honolulu."

The research also employed a qualitative textual analysis, or the framing devices used in each frame, by recording statements that classify the article into a specific message-frame category. Researchers (e.g., Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Nisbet, 2010; Reese, 2010) have identified a framing device as linguistic clues, such as metaphors, allusions to history, lexical choices, catchphrases, or graphics that signal the existence of a frame. For instance, to capture the anger felt by Japanese families over the loss of life caused by the *Ehime Maru* sinking, the *New York Times* applied the responsibility frame, with language such as “Japanese patience has evidently begun to wear thin” and “mounting Japanese irritation over the accident.” In the Futenma articles, *The Daily Yomiuri* applied the mea culpa frame when articles characterized Hatoyama’s indecisiveness as “clumsy” and a “mishmash of last ditch ideas.” Both U.S. and Japan’s newspapers used words such as “ally” and “cornerstone” to apply the reconciliation frame.

For statistical analysis, chi-square test and t-test were used to detect statistically significant differences. The chi-square test is said to be invalid if any cell has an expected frequency of less than 5. In addition, the cutoff number is a somewhat arbitrary approximation, and some statisticians believe a more liberal rule is necessary. For example, Sullivan (2011) says that the chi-square test for independence is valid “provided that (1) all expected frequencies are greater than or equal to 1 and (2) no more than 20% of the expected frequencies are less than 5” (p. 574). When a cell’s expected count was less than 5, a note was added to that table.

Intercoder Reliability

Wimmer and Dominick (2011) recommend that independent coders reanalyze between 10% and 25% of the data to calculate intercoder reliability (p. 172). In addition, Lacy and Riffe

(1996) argue that a reliability estimate based on a simple random sample may contain sampling error. Therefore, in order to reanalyze 15% of the total sample and reduce the amount of sampling error, systematic (random) sampling with the sampling interval of 6.6667 was applied to obtain 15 articles from each county-period combination (e.g., Japan–Japan surpassing) of 100 newspaper articles. A total of 60 newspaper articles were systematically sampled for calculating intercoder reliability.

An independent coder was recruited and given a coding-instruction sheet and a one-hour training session that included coding two new articles not chosen for the final sample of 400 newspaper articles.

Two intercoder-reliability measures were used in this research. First, the percent agreement, or Holsti’s formula, calculated the intercoder reliability for open-ended questions (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011, p. 172). The formula is the following:

$$\text{Reliability} = \frac{2M}{N_1 + N_2}$$

where M stands for the number of coding decisions that two coders agree on, and N_1 and N_2 respectively represent the total number of coding decisions by the first and second coders.

Second, for the two framing systems, in addition to the present agreement, Scott’s π (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 155; Wimmer & Dominick, 2011, p. 173) was used. Any combination of multiple responses was treated as an independent category. The formula is the following:

$$\pi = \frac{\text{PA}_O - \text{PA}_E}{1 - \text{PA}_E}$$

where PA_O (proportion of observed agreement) = (total number of agreement)/ N ; and PA_E (proportion of expected agreement) = $\sum p_i^2$ with p_i^2 being each joint marginal proportion.

As a guideline, Wimmer and Dominick (2011) state that most published content analyses typically report .90 or above when using the percent agreement, and .75 or above when using Scott's π (p. 175).

The following variables had 100% agreement scores: newspaper, date, length, section, front page of section, headline, dateline, and story genre. Because many articles used for intercoder reliability had only one source for a given category where it appeared, the news-source variable was transformed into a dichotomous variable to represent the presence or absence of a given type of news sources. For this variable, the percent agreement is .88, and Scott's π is .86.

For the general frame system of analyzing episodic and thematic frames, the percent agreement is .78, but Scott's π is .53. Finally, for the specific frame system, the percent agreement is .97, and Scott's π is .96.

RESULTS

A total of 400 articles were coded for this study, with 100 articles about the Futenma base controversy from a Japanese newspaper, 100 articles about the Futenma base controversy from U.S. newspapers, 100 articles about the sinking of the *Ehime Maru* in a Japanese newspaper, and 100 articles about the sinking of the *Ehime Maru* in U.S. newspapers. Of the 400 articles selected, 73 (18.3%) from the *New York Times*, 72 (18.0%) from the *Washington Post*, 22 (5.5%) from *USA Today*, 33 (8.3%) from the *Wall Street Journal*, and 200 (50%) from the *Daily Yomiuri*.

Turning to year distribution, 189 (47.3%) of articles were from 2001, 10 (2.5%) from 2002, 1 (.3%) from 2003, 43 (10.8%) from 2009, 125 (31.3%) from 2010, and 32 (8%) were from 2011.

Univariate Analysis

The length of the total sample of articles had a range of 2,724 with a mean of 695.62 words. When examining the placement of coverage, 84 (21%) appeared on the section's front page. Of the 400 articles coded, 208 (52%) contained a dateline. The top five datelines that appeared in more than 10 newspaper articles were Tokyo (38.1%, $n = 67$), Honolulu (30.1%, $n = 53$), Washington, D.C. (12.5%, $n = 22$), Uwajima (10.2%, $n = 18$), and Pearl Harbor (9.1%, $n = 16$). The sixth dateline was Okinawan places, which appeared in only six newspaper articles altogether. The remaining datelines were other Japanese, U.S., and foreign cities, as well as UN, each of which appeared in four or less newspaper articles.

Research then examined the story genre of each article. Wire/news services produced 10 (2.5%) articles. This may be a low number because LexisNexis did not carry a significant

amount of wire stories for each newspaper. Staff straight news stories accounted for 83.25% ($n = 333$), and 32 (8%) were staff editorials. Special contributors accounted for 2.75% ($n = 11$) of articles and op-eds occurred in 3 articles.

Each article was also coded for the occurrence of sources. U.S. government/military sources appeared in 196 (49%) of the 400 articles. They were attributed as a source one time in 111 (27.75%) articles, twice in 71 (17.75%), three times in 12 (3%) articles, and both four and five times in one article apiece. A U.S. nongovernmental expert was attributed one or more times as a source in 40 (10%) articles. They appeared as a source one time in 34 (8.5%) articles, twice in 5 (1.25%) articles and three times in one article. U.S. private citizens appeared in 11 (2.75%) articles. They were attributed one time in nine (2.25%) articles and twice in two (.5%) articles. Sources coded as U.S. other appeared in five (1.25%) of articles, where they were attributed once in two articles and twice in three articles.

Japanese government/military sources appeared in 172 (43%) of the 400 articles. They were attributed as source one time in 128 (32%) of articles, two times in 38 (9.5%) in articles, and three times in six (1.5%) articles. Japanese nongovernmental experts appeared as a source one or more times in 47 (11.75%) articles. They were attributed once in 39 (9.75%) articles, twice in six (1.5%) articles, and three times in two (.5%) articles. Japanese private citizen sources appeared in 44 (11%). They were attributed once in 24 (6%) articles, twice in 9 (2.25%) articles, three times in eight (2%) of articles, four times in two articles and five times in one article.

Foreign sources appeared much less frequently. Foreign government/military were attributed one or more times in two articles (.5%), foreign nongovernmental experts were

attributed one or more times in four (1%) articles, and foreign other appeared with one or more times in 3 (.75%) articles.

The two categories of sources that appeared most frequently in the 400 articles were Japanese governmental/military (43%) and U.S. governmental/military (49%), which suggests both U.S. and Japan's elite newspapers rely on elite sources for their stories.

Turning to frames, the episodic frame was present in 321 (80.25%) of 400 articles. The thematic frame was present in 81 (20.25%). The mea culpa message-frame was present in 138 (34.5%) articles, the reconciliation frame in 123 (30.75%) articles, the responsibility frame in 112 (28%) articles, the human interest frame in 32 (8%) articles, the prognostic frame in 30 (7.5%) articles, the diagnostic frame in 28 (7%) articles, the past conflict frame in 23 (5.75%) articles, and the media self-referential frame in 9 (2.25%) articles.

Bivariate Analyses

The following bivariate analyses compared Japanese and U.S. newspapers, as well as the two significant time periods, Japan surpassing (2001–2003) and Japan passing (2009–2011).

Story Placement

RQ1 asks how the placement of articles differed between newspapers, as well as between periods of Japan surpassing and passing. The left half of Table 1 shows Japan's newspaper put 28% ($n = 56$) of articles on the front page of a section, compared with 14% ($n = 28$) of U.S. newspapers. In short, the Japanese newspaper gave significantly more prominence to articles than U.S. newspapers, $X^2(1, N = 400) = 11.814, p < .001$. In the right half of the table, during the Japan surpassing phase, 23.5% ($n = 47$) articles appeared on the front page of a section,

compared with 18.5% ($n = 37$) during the Japan-passing phase. The difference was not statistically significant, $X^2(1, N = 400) = 1.507, p = .220$.

Table 1

Proportion of Front Page of Section by Newspaper and Period

Front Page Status	Japanese Newspaper ($n = 200$)	U.S. Newspapers ($n = 200$)	Japan Surpassing ($n = 200$)	Japan Passing ($n = 200$)
Present	28.0% (56)	14.0% (28)	23.5% (47)	18.5% (37)
Absent	72.0% (144)	86.0% (172)	76.5% (153)	81.5% (163)

Table 2 compares the placement of articles between both countries and between the periods of (sur)passing. In the left half of the table, both Japanese articles and U.S. articles were given close to equal placement during Japan surpassing, marked by strong bilateral relations. However, as seen in the right half of the table, Japanese articles were given the first page of a section 32% ($n = 32$) of the time, compared with U.S. newspapers, which placed them on the front page of a section only 5% ($n = 5$) of the time. This difference was statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 400) = 24.175, p < .001$.

Table 2

Cross-Comparison of Front Page of Section by Newspaper and Period

Front Page Status	Surpassing (2001–2003)		Passing (2009–2011)	
	Japanese Newspaper ($n = 100$)	U.S. Newspapers ($n = 100$)	Japanese Newspaper ($n = 100$)	U.S. Newspapers ($n = 100$)
Present	24.0% (24)	23.0% (23)	32.0% (32)	5.0% (5)
Absent	76.0% (76)	77.0% (77)	68.0% (68)	95.0% (95)

This suggests that during the period of Japan passing, when the U.S. was moving away from Japan as a strong partner and closer to China (Morris, 2011; Schuman, 2010), articles did not receive prominence. This may have also occurred because the Futenma controversy occurred to surpassing period, and while it may have received more prominence when the conflict first began getting heavy coverage, it wasn't deemed worthy of prominent placement during this phase.

Dateline

RQ2 asks how the use of datelines differed between newspapers, as well as between periods of Japan surpassing and passing. In total, 52% ($n = 208$) of articles carried a dateline. About two-thirds of them were published in U.S. newspapers. Table 3 compares Japanese and U.S. newspapers, with the left half showing that only 34.5% ($n = 36$) of Japanese newspaper articles carried a dateline, whereas 69.5% ($n = 139$) of U.S. newspaper articles did. The difference was statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 400) = 49.079, p < .001$. Likewise, the right half of Table 3 compares the Japan (sur)passing periods. Although 56.5% ($n = 113$) of articles carried a dateline during the Japan surpassing period, 47.5% ($n = 95$) had a dateline during the Japan passing period. The difference, however, was not statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 400) = 3.245, p = .072$. Evidently, the Japanese newspaper, *The Daily Yomiuri*, would often report without a dateline.

Table 3

Proportion of Dateline by Newspaper and Period

Dateline Status	Japanese Newspaper ($n = 200$)	U.S. Newspapers ($n = 200$)	Japan Surpassing ($n = 200$)	Japan Passing ($n = 200$)
Present	34.5% (69)	69.5% (139)	56.5% (113)	47.5% (95)
Absent	65.5% (131)	30.5% (61)	43.5% (87)	52.5% (105)

The left half of Table 4 compares the newspapers of interest during the Japan-surpassing period. In this period, Japanese articles carried a dateline in 49.0% ($n = 49$), whereas 64.0% ($n = 64$) of U.S. articles did. The difference was statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 200) = 4.577, p = .032$. The right half of Table 4 compares the newspapers within the period of Japan passing. In this period, Japanese articles carried a dateline in 20.0% ($n = 20$), whereas 75.0% ($n = 75$) of U.S. articles did. When the two countries' newspapers were compared during this period, the difference was also statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 200) = 60.652, p < .001$.

Comparing Japanese articles between periods, 49.0% ($n = 49$) during the Japan-surpassing period carried a dateline, only 20.0% ($n = 20$) did so during the Japan passing period. The difference was statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 200) = 18.608, p < .001$. When comparing U.S. articles between periods, 64.0% ($n = 64$) carried a dateline, but more articles (75.0%, $n = 75$) during the Japan-passing period did so. The difference, however, was not statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 200) = 2.854, p = .091$. Based on those results, it can be concluded that only a small portion of the Japanese newspaper articles carried a dateline during the Japan-passing period.

Table 4

Cross-Comparison of Datelines by Newspaper and Period

Dateline Status	Surpassing (2001–2003)		Passing (2009–2011)	
	Japanese Newspaper ($n = 100$)	U.S. Newspapers ($n = 100$)	Japanese Newspaper ($n = 100$)	U.S. Newspapers ($n = 100$)
Present	49.0% (49)	64.0% (64)	20.0% (20)	75.0% (75)
Absent	51.0% (51)	36.0% (36)	80.0% (80)	25.0% (25)

Table 5 presents the distribution of the five most frequent datelines. Although Okinawan places are relevant to the present research, their low frequency ($n = 6$) would contribute to making the chi-square test invalid. Therefore, these datelines, and others that appeared in four or less articles, were excluded from the analysis.

Although 51.2% ($n = 63$) of the U.S. newspaper articles had Tokyo as a dateline, only 7.5% ($n = 4$) of the Japanese newspaper articles had it. Yet, 18.9% ($n = 10$), 49.1% ($n = 26$), and 24.5% ($n = 13$) of the Japanese newspaper articles had Washington, D.C., Honolulu, and Uwajima as a dateline, respectively, all of which exhibited a higher percentage than their U.S. counterparts. The most interesting finding was that all examples of the dateline Pearl Harbor appeared in U.S. newspapers (13.0%, $n = 16$). The difference was statistically significant, $\chi^2(4, N = 176) = 52.114, p < .001$.

The right half of Table 5 shows the distribution of datelines based on the periods of Japan surpassing and Japan passing.

Table 5

Distribution of Specific Datelines in Newspaper and Period

Dateline Distribution	Japanese Newspaper ($n = 100$)		U.S. Newspapers ($n = 100$)		Japan Surpassing ($n = 100$)		Japan Passing ($n = 100$)	
Tokyo	7.5%	(4)	51.2%	(63)	5.0%	(5)	82.7%	(62)
Washington, D.C.	18.9%	(10)	9.8%	(12)	11.9%	(12)	13.3%	(10)
Honolulu	49.1%	(26)	22.0%	(27)	49.5%	(50)	4.0%	(3)
Pearl Harbor	0.0%	(0)	13.0%	(16)	15.8%	(16)	0.0%	(0)
Uwajima	24.5%	(13)	4.1%	(5)	17.8%	(18)	0.0%	(0)

Note: For the left half of the table, the Japanese paper's Pearl Harbor cell has an expected count of 4.82.

As expected, Honolulu, Pearl Harbor, and Uwajima were used as the dateline of a story predominantly in the Japan surpassing period in relation to the sinking of the *Ehime Maru*. However, Tokyo appeared in 82.7% ($n = 62$) of newspaper articles in the Japan passing period, compared with only 5.0% ($n = 5$) in the Japan surpassing period. The difference was statistically significant, $\chi^2(4, N = 176) = 123.201, p < .001$. Comparing the right and left portions of Table 5 shows that it was predominantly U.S. newspapers and during the Japan passing period that used Tokyo as a dateline. Further analyses based on the country's newspaper(s) or one period were omitted because of more than a couple cells that had an expected count less than 5.

Story Genre

RQ3 asks how story genres differ between Japanese and U.S. newspapers, as well as between the Japan-surpassing and Japan-passing periods. In analysis of genre, those coded as other or unknown were not counted. The left half of Table 6 compares the two news genres side by side, and shows that for Japanese newspapers, 15.5% ($n = 30$) of stories were staff editorials or written by special contributors, whereas for U.S. newspapers, 6.8% ($n = 13$) of stories were staff editorials or written by special contributors. The difference was statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 386) = 7.367, p = .007$. This finding suggests that while U.S. newspapers relied on a straight news format during the sinking of the *Ehime Maru* and the Futenma controversy, Japanese newspapers valued the opinion of writers to explain the dynamics of the Japan-U.S. relationship during these two controversies. Therefore, H1 was accepted.

Turning to analysis of the period in the right half of Table 6, during Japan passing, U.S. newspapers used the opinion genre—made up of staff editorials and special contributors—in 4% ($n = 4$) of the articles, but Japanese newspapers used them in 17.5% ($n = 17$) of articles. This

finding was statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 194) = 9.024, p = .003$. This suggests that Japanese newspapers used opinion pieces to discuss the ongoing Futenma struggle at a time when Japan felt ignored by the U.S. (Morris, 2011; Schuman, 2010).

Table 6

Proportion of Store Genre by Newspaper and Period

Genre	Japanese Newspaper (<i>n</i> = 194)		U.S. Newspapers (<i>n</i> = 192)		Japan Surpassing (<i>n</i> = 192)		Japan Passing (<i>n</i> = 194)	
Straight news	84.5%	(164)	93.2%	(179)	88.5%	(170)	89.2%	(173)
Opinion-based	15.5%	(30)	6.8%	(13)	11.5%	(22)	10.8%	(21)

Word Count

RQ4 asks about how the word count differs between Japanese and U.S. newspapers, as well as between the Japan-surpassing and Japan-passing periods. Table 7 compares an article's length to the country and time period. Looking first at each country, the mean length for Japanese newspapers was 626.66 words, and the mean length for U.S. newspapers was 764.59 words. This difference was statistically significant, $t(398) = 3.888, p < .001$. This finding shows U.S. newspapers devoted more space to the two conflicts than the Japanese newspaper. Turning to analysis of time period, the mean length of an article was 669.57 in the Japan surpassing period, and 721.68 words during the Japan passing period. Although the two countries' newspapers devoted more space to the Futenma issue, than the sinking of the *Ehime Maru*, the difference was not statistically significant, $t(385.156) = -1.446, p = .149$.

Table 7

Proportion of Article Length by Newspaper and Period

	Japanese Newspaper (<i>n</i> = 100)	U.S. Newspapers (<i>n</i> = 100)	Japan Surpassing (<i>n</i> = 100)	Japan Passing (<i>n</i> = 100)
Length	626.66	764.59	669.57	721.68

News Sources

RQ5 asked how news sources differed between Japanese and U.S. newspapers, as well as between the Japan-surpassing and Japan-passing periods. Table 8 compares U.S. governmental/military sources in both countries' newspapers in the periods of Japan surpassing and Japan passing. Examining the left half of the table, during the Japan surpassing period, U.S. news articles used this elite news source in 79% (*n* = 79) of articles, compared with 40% (*n* = 40) in Japanese articles. This difference is statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 200) = 31.559, p < .001$. This may be because of U.S. newspapers' tendency to rely on elite sources for matters of foreign policy sources (Lawrence, 2010; Ryan, 2004; & Schneider, 2011).

Now comparing U.S. newspaper articles between the two periods, Table 8 shows that 43% (*n* = 43) of U.S. articles used the government/military source during the Japan passing period, compared with 79% (*n* = 79) in the surpassing period. This difference was statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 200) = 27.238, p < .001$. This finding suggests that U.S. newspapers relying more heavily on elite news sources during the controversy surrounding the sinking of the *Ehime Maru*. Therefore, H1 was rejected. Perhaps in earlier coverage of the Futenma controversy, U.S. newspapers relied more heavily on the elite government/military source. During this stage of the controversy, however, these sources were not used as frequently to comment on foreign policy.

Instead, articles about the sinking of the *Ehime Maru* used a high number of elite sources to describe the incident and offer apologies.

Table 8

Cross-Comparison of U.S. Government/Military Source by Newspaper and Period

Source Frequency	Surpassing (2001–2003)		Passing (2009–2011)	
	Japanese Newspaper (<i>n</i> = 100)	U.S. Newspapers (<i>n</i> = 100)	Japanese Newspaper (<i>n</i> = 100)	U.S. Newspapers (<i>n</i> = 100)
No reference	60.0%	21.0%	66.0%	57.0%
One or more	40.0%	79.0%	34.0%	43.0%

Table 9 examines the use of U.S. nongovernmental expert sources. In the left half of the table, during Japan surpassing, the Japanese newspaper used U.S. nongovernmental sources in 10% (*n* = 10) articles, and U.S. newspapers used them in 14% (*n* = 14) articles. The difference was not statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 200) = .758, p = .384$. When examining the Japanese newspaper's use of the source between periods, the difference is significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 200) = 5.674, p < .001$. During the Japan surpassing period, Japanese articles employed this type of source in 10% (*n* = 10), whereas 2% (*n* = 2) of articles used it during Japan passing. This suggests that during the sinking of the *Ehime Maru*, Japan newspapers relied more heavily on nongovernmental sources than during the Futenma controversy, perhaps because the sinking was a new event, not ongoing as was the Futenma controversy, so seeking varied expert perspectives was more important during this period. For instance, the newspaper called on a professor of political affairs to describe how sinking might damage the Japan-U.S. relationship.

Turning to the right half of Table 9, U.S. the use of a U.S. nongovernmental expert source in the Japanese newspaper during Japan passing was only 2% (*n* = 2), whereas 14% (*n* = 14) of U.S. newspaper articles used this source category. This period for Japan characterized a

time in which the country did not feel the U.S. favored it (Cossa, 2008; Morris, 2011; & Schuman, 2010).). Perhaps some Japanese writers did not think it appropriate using U.S. sources. The difference was statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 200) = 9.783, p = .002$.

Table 9

Cross-Comparison of U.S. Nongovernmental Expert Source by Newspaper and Period

Source Frequency	Surpassing (2001–2003)		Passing (2009–2011)	
	Japanese Newspaper (<i>n</i> = 100)	U.S. Newspapers (<i>n</i> = 100)	Japanese Newspaper (<i>n</i> = 100)	U.S. Newspapers (<i>n</i> = 100)
No reference	90.0%	86.0%	98.0%	86.0%
One or more	10.0%	14.0%	2.0%	14.0%

In an analysis between U.S. private citizen sources, and each country’s newspapers, 9% (*n* = 9) of U.S. newspapers referenced this source, while only 1% (*n* = 1) of the Japanese newspaper did. This finding was statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 200) = .6737, p = .009$. In the U.S. other category, only 1% (*n* = 1) of U.S. and 1% (*n* = 1) of Japanese articles referenced this source.

Table 10 displays the comparison of Japanese government/military sources between each country’s newspaper during Japan (sur)passing. In the first half of the table, 32% (*n* = 32) of Japanese articles referenced this source, while 8% (*n* = 8) of U.S. newspapers did. The difference was statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 200) = 18.00, p < .001$. However, moving to the right half of the table, during the passing period, the Japanese newspaper used its country’s governmental/military source in 70% (*n* = 70) of articles, compared with 62% (*n* = 62) used in U.S. articles. This difference was not statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 200) = 1.426, p = .232$. However, both countries’ percentages were much higher than in the surpassing era, which suggests that during the Futenma controversy, both countries more heavily relied on Japan’s elite

news sources. During this time of surpassing, Japan and the U.S. were seeking a new location for the Futenma base, and much attention was given to Hatoyama’s administration—which was seen by both Japan and the U.S. as the reason for failing to reach a decision.

Table 10

Cross-Comparison of Japanese Government/Military Source by Newspaper and Period

Source Frequency	Surpassing (2001–2003)		Passing (2009–2011)	
	Japanese Newspaper (<i>n</i> = 100)	U.S. Newspapers (<i>n</i> = 100)	Japanese Newspaper (<i>n</i> = 100)	U.S. Newspapers (<i>n</i> = 100)
No reference	68.0%	92.0%	30.0%	38.0%
One or more	32.0%	8.0%	70.0%	62.0%

When comparing the use of the source in U.S. newspapers between periods, the dissimilarity seems counterintuitive. During the surpassing phase, when Japan-U.S. ties were strong, the U.S. did not rely on Japanese sources during the sinking of the *Ehime Maru* (8%, *n* = 8). Perhaps this is more representative of a U.S. desire to keep the Japanese government uninvolved from the controversy, and instead, handle the accident quickly and sufficiently, with no desire to “disturb” Japanese policymakers. During the passing phase, when the U.S. put the responsibility of finding a new location for the Futenma base on the Japanese, U.S. newspapers used Japan government/military sources in 62% of articles (*n* = 62). These articles often quoted Hatoyama and Naoto Kan. The difference was statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 200) = 64.088, p < .001$.

Table 11 compares Japanese private citizen sources between each country’s newspapers during Japan (sur)passing. The Japanese newspaper used private citizen sources in 19% (*n* = 19) during the surpassing period, which coincides to the sinking of the *Ehime Maru*. During this period, reporters interviewed victims and family members extensively, compared with the Japan

passing stage, which saw this source in 5% ($n = 5$) of articles. The difference was statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 200) = 9.280, p = .002$.

Perhaps in the earlier stages of the *Futenma* controversy, reporters interviewed protesters in the human-chain rallies against the base; however, at this point in the controversy, more reporters relied on elite governmental sources.

Table 11

Cross-Comparison of Japanese Private Citizen Source by Newspaper and Period

Source Frequency	Surpassing (2001–2003)		Passing (2009–2011)	
	Japanese Newspaper ($n = 100$)	U.S. Newspapers ($n = 100$)	Japanese Newspaper ($n = 100$)	U.S. Newspapers ($n = 100$)
No reference	81.0%	87.0%	95.0%	93.0%
One or more	19.0%	13.0%	5.0%	7.0%

It was found that only one article in the U.S. newspapers and one articles in the Japanese newspaper used the Japanese “other” source category. No U.S. articles used the foreign government/military source category, and only one article in the Japanese newspaper did. No articles in the Japanese newspaper or U.S. newspapers used a “foreign nongovernmental expert” source or a “foreign private citizen source.” One article in the U.S. newspapers used a “foreign other source,” but the Japanese newspaper did not.

Episodic and Thematic Frames

RQ6 inquires how the use of episodic and thematic frames differs between Japanese and U.S. newspapers, as well as between the Japan-surpassing and Japan-passing periods. Table 12 compares the episodic frame between the Japanese and U.S. newspapers, as well as between the

Japan (sur)passing periods. During both the Japan passing and Japan surpassing phases, both newspapers employed this frame most frequently.

The Japanese newspaper employed the episodic frame in 81% ($n = 81$) of articles during the Japan passing period, compared with the U.S. newspaper use, which was 68% ($n = 68$). This finding was statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 200) = 4.448, p = .035$. The finding suggests that during the passing phase, Japanese articles concentrated on the issue of Futenma, without delving extensively into the history of the controversy. The U.S. newspapers used the frame in 82% ($n = 82$) of articles during the Japan surpassing phase, compared with the the Japan passing phase, in which 68% ($n = 68$) used this frame. This finding is statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 200) = 5.227, p = .022$, which suggests U.S. newspapers reported on the *Ehime Maru* accident without offering historical information on the relationship between the U.S. Navy and Japan. This period also marks a time when the U.S. and the Japan were at their strongest alliance (Cossa, 2004). Perhaps reporters did not want to compare the incident to other damaging controversies.

Table 12

Cross-Comparison of Episodic Frame by Newspaper and Period

Frame Status	Surpassing (2001–2003)		Passing (2009–2011)	
	Japanese Newspaper ($n = 100$)	U.S. Newspapers ($n = 100$)	Japanese Newspaper ($n = 100$)	U.S. Newspapers ($n = 100$)
Present	90.0%	82.0%	81.0%	68.0%
Absent	10.0%	18.0%	19.0%	32.0%

Table 13 compares the thematic frame with both countries' newspapers, as well as between and periods of Japan (sur)passing. U.S. newspapers employed the thematic frame most frequently in the Japan passing period, using it in 31% ($n = 31$) of articles. This may be because

the Futenma controversy occurred during this period, and U.S. articles discussed the both the ongoing controversy, and the underlying issues causing the disagreement, including political and cultural factors. This finding was statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 200) = 5.373, p = .020$.

Japanese newspapers also employed the thematic frame in a higher percentage in this time frame, using it in 20% ($n = 20$) of articles, compared with the 13% ($n = 13$) during Japan passing. The difference in the percentage of usage in both papers between Japan surpassing and Japan passing was statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 200) = .074, p = .020$. Therefore, H3 was accepted. Both countries' papers did use the thematic frame more often in coverage of the Futenma controversy than the sinking of the *Ehime Maru*.

Table 13

Cross-Comparison of Thematic Frame by Newspaper and Period

Frame Status	Surpassing (2001–2003)		Passing (2009–2011)	
	Japanese Newspaper ($n = 100$)	U.S. Newspapers ($n = 100$)	Japanese Newspaper ($n = 100$)	U.S. Newspapers ($n = 100$)
Present	13.0%	17.0%	20.0%	31.0%
Absent	87.0%	83.0%	80.0%	69.0%

Frame Categories

RQ7 asks how frame categories differ between Japanese and U.S. newspapers and during the periods of Japan surpassing and Japan passing. The first frame category under analysis is the mea culpa frame. Table 14 compares this frame between the Japanese newspapers and U.S. newspapers in the period of Japan (sur)passing. As seen in the first half of the table, during the period of Japan surpassing, Japan's newspaper used the mea culpa frame in 15% ($n = 15$) of its articles, compared to U.S. papers, which used it in 70% ($n = 70$). This finding was statistically

significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 200) = 61.893, p < .001$. This result suggests that during this time of Japan surpassing, when the Japan-U.S. alliance was very strong, the U.S. did not wish to damage this relationship (Cossa, 2004). Articles were quick to report the USS *Greeneville*'s mistakes and Washington's apologies after the U.S. Navy caused the sinking of the *Ehime Maru*. Furthermore, Japan had committed itself to supporting the War on Terror, and the U.S. did not want to shake the two countries' alliance, and took full blame for sinking the *Ehime Maru*, and the subsequent nine drowning deaths of its passengers and crew.

Turning to the right half of the table to examine articles during Japan passing, almost half of the Japanese articles, 49% ($n = 49$) exhibit the mea culpa frame, compared with only 4% ($n = 4$) of U.S. articles. This finding is statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 200) = 51.983, p < .001$, suggesting that during this phase, Japan was blaming its own government for the mistakes of the Futenma base. The frame was also dominant because this period was characterized by Japan's feelings that it was losing value in the eyes of the United States, so it blamed its own government, rather than the government of the U.S.

Table 14

Cross-Comparison of Mea Culpa Frame in Newspaper and Period

Frame Status	Surpassing (2001–2003)		Passing (2009–2011)	
	Japanese Newspaper ($n = 100$)	U.S. Newspapers ($n = 100$)	Japanese Newspaper ($n = 100$)	U.S. Newspapers ($n = 100$)
Present	15.0%	70.0%	49.0%	4.0%
Absent	85.0%	30.0%	51.0%	96.0%

Table 15 compares the responsibility frame between both newspapers, as well as between the Japan (sur)passing periods. Taking a look at the left half of the table, the Japanese newspaper during the surpassing period had 52% ($n = 52$) employ this frame, whereas 17% ($n = 17$) of U.S.

articles did. This finding was statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 200) = 61.893, p < .001$. This is because the Japanese were putting the responsibility of the submarine wreck on the U.S., demanding apologies and a salvage operation to recover the bodies of the nine persons aboard the ship. The shipwreck also occurred at a time when Japan was asserting itself as a country, no longer wishing to be in the shadow of Washington and its policies. Therefore, H4 was accepted.

Turning to the right half of the table, the U.S. newspapers' use of the responsibility frame flip-floped during the Japan passing period. The U.S. newspapers used the frame in 36% ($n = 36$) of articles, whereas Japan newspapers use it in just 7% ($n = 7$). This difference is statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 200) = 24.915, p < .001$. This is because the U.S. put the responsibility of finding a new location of the Futenma base on Japan and its government. This phase was also characterized by the U.S.'s waning confidence in Japan, and the perception that Japan was no longer important to the U.S.

Table 15

Cross-Comparison of the Responsibility Frame In Newspaper and Period

Frame Status	Surpassing (2001–2003)		Passing (2009–2011)	
	Japanese Newspaper ($n = 100$)	U.S. Newspapers ($n = 100$)	Japanese Newspaper ($n = 100$)	U.S. Newspapers ($n = 100$)
Present	52.0%	17.0%	7.0%	36.0%
Absent	48.0%	83.0%	93.0%	64.0%

Comparing the two countries' newspapers between the periods, the U.S. newspapers employed the frame in 17% ($n = 17$) of articles in the surpassing period, compared with 36% ($n = 36$) during the passing period. This difference was statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 200) = 9.267, p < .001$. The reason for the difference may be inherently linked to the attitude the U.S. held toward Japan during the passing era. Therefore, use of the responsibility frame, that is, the

U.S. faulting the Japanese government for its perceived inability to choose a location for the Futenma base, was higher in this period. When comparing the Japanese newspaper’s use of the responsibility frame between periods, 52% ($n = 52$) of articles used the frame in the surpassing period, compared with just 7% ($n = 7$) in the passing period. This finding suggests that during the surpassing phase, when Japan was most assertive, Japanese articles were more likely to blame the U.S., compared with the passing period, when the Japanese felt slighted by Washington.

Table 16 compares the use of the reconciliation frame between both countries’ newspapers, as well as the periods of Japan (sur)passing. As seen in the left half of the table, during the Japan surpassing period, the Japanese newspaper used the frame in 21% ($n = 21$) of articles, while the U.S. newspaper used it in 14% ($n = 14$). The difference was statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 200) = 1.697, p = .193$. These low numbers reflect the mutual understanding that both countries felt their relationship was secure, so there was no need to discuss strengthening ties.

Table 16

Cross-Comparison of the Reconciliation Frame in Newspaper and Period

Frame Status	Surpassing (2001–2003)		Passing (2009–2011)	
	Japanese Newspaper ($n = 100$)	U.S. Newspapers ($n = 100$)	Japanese Newspaper ($n = 100$)	U.S. Newspapers ($n = 100$)
Present	21.0%	14.0%	44.0%	44.0%
Absent	79.0%	86.0%	56.0%	56.0%

The Japan passing period produced an unexpected result. Both the Japanese and U.S. newspapers used the reconciliation frame in 44% ($n = 44$) of the articles. This suggests that during the period of fraying relations, both countries’ discussed the need to maintain strong ties and work together to build a strong relationship.

When comparing the U.S. newspaper to both time periods, 14% ($n = 14$) of articles used the reconciliation frame during Japan surpassing and 44% ($n = 44$) in the Japan passing phase. This was a statistically significant finding, $\chi^2(1, N = 200) = 21.855, p < .001$. The Japanese newspaper also used the frame in 44% ($n = 44$) of articles during the passing phase, compared with only 21% ($n = 21$) in the surpassing phase.

The Japanese newspaper used the human interest frame more frequently during Japan surpassing period (15%, $n = 15$) of articles than during the Japan passing phase. This finding was statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 200) = 10.865, p = .001$. The result stems from the Japanese newspaper's use of stories from victims and families of the *Ehime Maru* collision to recount the events during and after the incident. However, U.S. newspapers used it infrequently, 10% ($n = 10$) during the Japan surpassing phase and 5% ($n = 5$) in the Japan passing phase. When articles did use the frame, it was often to discuss the *Ehime Maru* accident. The *New York Times* titled "Close Cousins Divided" tells the story of two cousins aboard the ship. The headline is a clever metaphor, also referring to the impact the accident may have on Japan-U.S. relations. This finding, however, was not statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 200) = 1.802, p = .179$.

Table 17 compares the use of the diagnostic frame between the two countries' newspapers, as well as the two periods. In the left half of Table 17, both countries' newspapers did not rely on this frame in the articles. This is because the *Ehime Maru* occurred in this period, and no diagnosis was needed to explain the event. If the papers had employed this frame during this period, it would only be assumptions of what malfunctions, whether human or otherwise, caused the sinking. Instead, both newspapers, more popularly with Japanese articles, simply asked the question: What caused the accident?

Table 17

Cross-Comparison of the Diagnostic Frame in Newspaper and Period

Frame Status	Surpassing (2001–2003)		Passing (2009–2011)	
	Japanese Newspaper (<i>n</i> = 100)	U.S. Newspapers (<i>n</i> = 100)	Japanese Newspaper (<i>n</i> = 100)	U.S. Newspapers (<i>n</i> = 100)
Absent	96.0%	98.0%	97.0%	81.0%
Present	4.0%	2.0%	3.0%	19.0%

Turning to the right half of the table, in the period of Japan passing, U.S. newspapers used the diagnostic frame more frequently (19%, *n* = 19) than the Japanese paper (3%, *n* = 3). This finding was statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 200) = 13.075, p < .001$. This was in the midst of the Futenma conflict, and during this period, U.S. newspapers discussed the ways in which the Japanese government was hindering a consensus on a location for the base.

Use of the prognostic frame was infrequent in the period of Japan passing, appearing in 10% (*n* = 10) of Japanese articles and 9% (*n* = 9) of U.S. articles. Its presence was less infrequent during the Japan-surpassing phase, appearing in 8% (*n* = 8) of Japanese articles and 3% (*n* = 3) of U.S. articles. Such low numbers mean that neither countries' newspapers were discussing the long-term results of these conflicts, and instead focusing on the details of each specific case.

The media self-referential frame appeared in 7% (*n* = 7) of U.S. newspaper articles and in only 1% (*n* = 1) of the Japanese newspaper during the Japan-surpassing period. This was a statistically significant finding, $\chi^2(1, N = 200) = 4.688, p = .030$. In the Japan-passing period, no U.S. articles used this frame, and again, only 1% (*n* = 1) of the Japanese newspaper did. When comparing the U.S. use of the frame between the two periods, it is seen that the U.S. media did not refer to themselves during the passing period, surrounding the Futenma controversy—but did

in 7% ($n = 7$) of the articles during the surpassing phase, surrounding the sinking of the *Ehime Maru*. The finding was statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 200) = 7.254, p = .007$.

Table 18 illustrates the final frame category, the past conflict frame, which appeared in 17% ($n = 17$) of U.S. newspaper articles in the surpassing phase, and only 2% ($n = 2$) during the passing phase. This finding was statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 200) = 13.085, p < .001$. When comparing the use of the frame during the conflict about the *Ehime Maru*, it can be seen that, as previously mentioned, the U.S. uses it in 17% ($n = 17$) of articles, whereas Japan only uses it in 1% ($n = 1$). This is statistically significant, $t, \chi^2(1, N = 200) = 15.629, p < .001$.

Table 18

Cross-Comparison of the Past Conflict Frame in Newspaper and Period

Frame Status	Surpassing (2001–2003)		Passing (2009–2011)	
	Japanese Newspaper ($n = 100$)	U.S. Newspapers ($n = 100$)	Japanese Newspaper ($n = 100$)	U.S. Newspapers ($n = 100$)
Present	1.0%	17.0%	3.0%	2.0%
Absent	99.0%	83.0%	97.0%	98.0%

As previously discussed, this is because U.S. newspapers commonly referred to the location of the *Ehime Maru* accident as “Pearl Harbor,” whereas Japan used “Honolulu.” Use of this frame is significant because as Hertog and McLeod suggested (2001), frames grant excessive meaning when they are strongly connected to other powerful ideas and connotations. In their example, the War on Terror elicits a number of beliefs and experiences, which can trigger other concepts in the readers’ minds, such as the dichotomy of heroes and villains. To use “Pearl Harbor” creates a distinct correlation to the Japan-U.S. conflict during World War II.

Textual Analysis

As found in the quantitative analysis, the mea culpa frame dominated U.S. articles in the period of Japan surpassing, appearing in 70% of articles. This time period was characterized by the maritime accident in which the USS *Greeneville* sank the Japanese fishing trawler, the *Ehime Maru*. A formal court of inquiry followed the accident, which is the military-sponsored procedure that investigates reports or charges against officers. Waddle was charged with negligence, but was allowed to retire with full rank and pension. Many Japanese were upset that his punishment didn't fit the crime—the death of nine passengers aboard the fishing trawler—and felt the only suitable penalty was a court martial. During news coverage of the incident, the socio-political period of Japan surpassing was characterized by Japan's desire to step out of the shadow of Washington and be viewed as an equal partner in the alliance, instead of a subordinate nation (Cossa, 2004; Funabashi, 2004, van Wolferen, 1989). Moreover, the U.S. had a high opinion of Japan during this period, as Japan had agreed to politically and financially back the War on Terror after the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. This accident could threaten to shake the strong bilateral bond the two countries had during this period, and U.S. newspapers demonstrated this attitude through the use of the mea culpa frame.

Across all U.S. newspapers, coverage of the incident moved in a similar pattern. First, coverage focused on the incident itself, the victims, and the U.S. Navy's initial efforts to locate the missing bodies. In the first weeks surrounding the accident, it wasn't yet realized how important recovering the bodies of the victims was to the belief system of the Japanese. By February 14, focus had shifted to the crew of the submarine—the distinguished civilian visitors. By March, the court of inquiry began, and all attention shifted to covering the trial, as well as errors made by the submarine crew, such as “rushed procedure,” “failure to delegate,” “cut

corners” and descriptions of an over-crowded control room. Coverage simultaneously focused on Waddle’s sorrow and remorse. U.S. newspaper articles used the word “apology” 46 times, with the *New York Times* using it eight times in one article alone. On a two occasions, two newspapers specifically labeled Capitan Waddle’s atonement as a “teary apology.”

Still, no admission of direct responsibility for the accident left the families of the victims angry. By April, newspapers reported that Commander Waddle was charged with negligence and asked to resign from the U.S. Navy with full rank. Fitting into the *mea culpa* frame, that is, U.S. papers reporting on the anger of the Japanese, articles used phrases such as “tempers flared,” “outrage,” “resentment,” and even “hatred.” The term “outrage” was used to describe the Japanese temperament over the issue 15 times.

Following a few months’ gap in coverage, in June 2001, focus moved to the recovery operation. Some articles editorialized the U.S. Navy’s search efforts, describing it as “incessant,” “the most difficult and expensive recovery operation ever undertaken,” “extraordinary efforts,” and a “display of the best possible effort.”

According to the quantitative analysis, U.S. newspapers during the Japan surpassing period used the past conflict frame most often in this time period. An editorial by Shin’ya Fujiwara, a Japanese writer, pointed out the discrepancy between the mentions of the wreck’s location. Japanese press, he wrote, put the sinking “off Hawaii,” while U.S. press maintain it occurred “off Pearl Harbor” (Mueller, 2001; Shin’ya, 2001). The U.S. articles examined in this research contained approximately 65 mentions of Pearl Harbor, whether in the article’s dateline or in the body copy. For instance, in the first article of coverage by the *New York Times*, the lead noted, “A Navy submarine collided with a Japanese vessel near Pearl Harbor this afternoon, and sank it, leaving nine people unaccounted for ...” (Marquis, 2009).

U.S. coverage of the *Ehime Maru* sinking during the period of Japan surpassing also employed the human-interest frame in coverage. One article told the story of two cousins aboard the trawler, “inseparable friends since childhood, playing the same sports, living as neighbors, sharing buddies and pursuing the same careers” (French, 2001a). One cousin survived, and the other did not. He was described as a hard worker, “washing his father’s car at night.” The 17-year-old’s father, who worked at a local fishery, would come home late at night, according to the article. It continued, “But no matter how late he came home, Katsuya would wash his car. What a boy” (French, 2001a). The headline, “Adventure Gone Awry Divides Close Cousins,” was not just about Katsuya and his cousin; it is also a tongue-in-cheek reference to the relationship between the two countries. An article in the *Washington Post* described the life-and-death struggle one student endured while on board the trawler, and discussed his family’s generational commitment to the fishing industry.

In applying the prognostic frame, U.S. articles suggested the incident would further strain ties between the two countries, giving the perception that “the United States is a less than reliable guarantor of Japan’s security interests” (French, 2001b). A particular editorial in the *New York Times* said the “submarine episode could force the administration to make some quick decisions on how to handle an apparently growing uneasiness over the presence of American troops in Japan, most of them on Okinawa” (“Reaching Out,” 2001). The diagnostic frame most often prescribed the anti-base sentiment in Okinawa, and the past crime, such as the 1995 rape, as a reason for the overarching negative reaction by Japanese to the *Ehime Maru* accident.

An article titled “We’ve Apologized Enough to Japan,” which ran in the *Washington Post* in late February, used the past conflict frame. In it, columnist Richard Cohen wrote, “This constant call for one apology after another may well reflect a cultural difference between Japan

and the United States, but it also smacks of epic hypocrisy. It took the Japanese forever to acknowledge that approximately 200,000 Asian women were forced to become the sex slaves of the Japanese military during World War II” (Cohen 2001), referring to the brutal rape of “comfort women” during the Nanking Massacre. This blatant comparison between the Nanking Massacre and the *Ehime Maru* emits a similar tone described by Morris (2001) used during the Japan bashing era in the 1980s.

Japanese coverage of events was similar to the timeline of U.S. coverage; however, there were a few noticeable differences in the Japanese paper. For instance, additional detail about surviving students’ conditions was present, both during and after the incident. An article described students “vomiting” after the ship capsized, and others explained the PTSD a few of the survivors were experiencing. Some human-interest pieces told stories about the surviving students’ homecoming, describing how parents were unable to show happiness because some bodies were not yet accounted for. An emotive human-interest article described a wife’s pain at the loss of her husband during the accident.

After the newspaper ended its coverage about the initial details of the shipwreck, it soon turned to anger at both the U.S. government and its own Prime Minister, Yoshiro Mori, who continued to play golf after getting news of the tragedy. Applying the mea culpa frame, articles were critical of this behavior, one wrote, “Mori’s actions raise questions about his personal attitude toward the collision and the government’s ability to respond to a crisis. For a few weeks after the accident, coverage simultaneously shifted between blaming Mori and blaming the U.S. Navy, calling out an explanation of why the submarine surfaced rapidly beneath the trawler. As found in the quantitative analysis, the responsibility frame was dominant in the period of Japan surpassing in the Japanese newspaper, appearing in 52% of articles. This frame appeared in

phrases, such as, “[the accident] runs against common sense, “strong anger,” “careless and inappropriate actions,” “unforgivable actions” and “distrust of U.S.”

In early coverage of the accident, an article used the diagnostic frame to parallel Japan’s feelings of distrust with the 1995 rape and President Clinton’s cancelled summit meeting trip. Interestingly, a U.S.-American special contributor wrote the article. Still other articles would extol the importance of the bilateral relationship, employing the reconciliation frame with phrases such as, “the *Ehime Maru* accident should not damage the confidence between Japan and the United States, which has been cultivated over a long period of time.” With exception to the article written by the U.S.-American, editorials followed this formula, asking why the accident happened but stating the importance of the alliance.

As coverage continued through February and early March, focus remained on the “how” and “why” of the accident, and Japan’s disappointment in its government, discussing Mori’s bad behavior—both long- and short-term—and a money-for-favors scandal involving the Liberal Democratic Party. Most references to Mori in the entirety of coverage had a negative association, from his inability to define effective measures to cope with declining stock prices and “lack of vision” to his “inappropriate” actions, such as a free golf course membership. Each of these articles fell into the *mea culpa* frame.

While the court of inquiry progressed in the U.S., Japan offered similar coverage as the U.S. had, comparatively noting both the testimony and apologies offered by the submarine’s crew.

In late March, an article reported that Waddle accepted full responsibility for the accident, an act the victims’ families had waited for. By April, coverage surrounded the salvage operations and compensatory settlement, the latter not widely discussed in the U.S. articles

examined. In mid-April, speculation, followed by confirmation, about the low likelihood of Waddle's court-martial sent anger throughout the Uwajima community. Since the very few weeks of coverage, the interval of coverage surrounding the court-martial most greatly contributed to the responsibility frame that dominated this period. After Commander Waddle's forced retirement, kin of the *Ehime Maru* believed some members of the Navy had influenced the court of inquiry's decision, and articles reported their anger and disappointment. One article stated that the Navy's choice of punishment was an example of "U.S. leniency." Another quoted an uncle of a victim, saying, "How could this happen ... after everything, our feelings have been ignored" ("Families furious," 2001).

Coverage picked up again in the May, when the U.S. Navy announced its plans to complete the salvage operation by the end of the summer. Contrary to U.S. coverage, Japan's newspapers continued to report that victims' families were hashing out the compensation claims with U.S. authorities. It also continued to cover the health of the victims suffering from PTSD. From July to November, articles focused on the U.S. Navy's salvage operation, which when compared to the U.S., was disproportionate coverage. Focus then shifted back to compensation talks. On December 15, Waddle arrived in Tokyo to offer his in-person apology.

As found in the quantitative analysis, the reconciliation frame dominated U.S. articles during the period of Japan passing, appearing in 44% of articles. It may be the strongest of all frames by the sheer amount of literary devices used to signal it. Despite what this period represents, a time when the U.S. was moving away from its bond with Japan to favor a rising China, the term "alliance" (in relation to the Japan-U.S. alliance) was frequently used, having appeared 106 times in U.S. articles. The use of the word signaled the existence of the reconciliation frame, regardless of the tone surrounding it. For example, articles stated that the

alliance was fraying, while others said that it was strengthening. Either way, the word indicated a discussion of the valuable bilateral relationship. Furthermore, articles used phrases such as “mending fences,” “mending ties,” “cornerstone,” “most important Asian ally,” “equal partnership,” “pillar of postwar order,” “common ground,” “solid ties,” and “longtime ally.”

Perhaps this is because the elite newspapers were mirroring the message of President Obama, who had recently, according to the *New York Times*, “dispelled perceptions in Japan that a better relationship with China would somehow undermine its alliance with the United States.” Since the sentence works so perfectly to counter the socio-political definition of Japan passing, it may mean that, as Lawrence (2010) stated, the elite U.S. newspapers are simply adopting and disseminating the view of the policymakers, instead of turning to nongovernmental experts who could offer an unbiased viewpoint.

Coverage during the passing period was uniform throughout each U.S. newspaper and began with the election of a new party in Japan, the Democratic Party, led by Yukio Hatoyama. It quickly moves to the dashed hope and disappointment felt by many Okinawans after Hatoyama quickly backtracked on his pre-election promise to move the Futenma base off of the island of Okinawa. Policymakers in Washington urged Hatoyama to stick to a 2006 pact to move the base to a less populated part of Okinawa, but Hatoyama also backtracked on this plan, according to coverage, and announced his plans to renegotiate a new location. This coverage characterized the responsibility frame, as the United States placed blame onto Japan’s government for its inability to come to an agreement and find a location for the base. Coverage continued in this manner, citing Hatoyama’s lack of clarity for the stagnation of Futenma relocation plans. The *Wall Street Journal* quoted a Deutsche Bank senior analyst as stating, “This is becoming a typically Japanese situation. Japanese politicians change policies easily to

maintain coalitions and personal relationships.” As coverage of the debate continued, descriptors in the *New York Times* moved from “Washington is challenged” to “Washington is properly annoyed.

As Hatoyama continued to drag his feet, the prognostic frame emerged. A lead paragraph in the *Wall Street Journal* stated that Hatoyama’s sudden resignation was a “dramatic downfall that could fray ties with the U.S. and frustrate other allies seeking greater cooperation and leadership from Tokyo (Hayashi & Schlesinger, 2010).

At this time, articles had begun to focus on the resignation of Hatoyama and his successor, Naoto Kan. Sentiment of a University of Tokyo professor seemed to counter the previous statement by the *New York Times*, saying “Insecurity about China’s presence has served as a wake-up call on the importance of the alliance” (Wong, 2010). By acknowledging Japan’s insecurity, the newspaper had begun to move away its dependence on elite sources at the start of coverage. Articles shifted focus once last time as Yoshihiko Noda, the third prime minister in the period of coverage, assumed office.

As found in the quantitative analysis, the mea culpa frame dominated U.S. articles during period of Japan passing, appearing in 49% of articles. Coverage followed the same timeline as U.S. papers, with the difference being the high number of articles critical to their own government, the DPJ lead by Hatoyama. Articles called his management of the Futenma issue “unproductive,” “obtuse,” “indecisive,” “disgraceful,” “a misconception of power,” “worst-ever,” “ham-handed handling,” “a hopeless hodgepodge,” “a mismatch of last-ditch ideas,” and “clumsy handling.”

Similar to U.S. articles, the use of the word “alliance” was very frequent in coverage of the Futenma controversy, with 128 uses, which signaled the appearance of the reconciliation

frame. Like in U.S. newspaper articles, the word appeared in reference to both deepening the alliance and ensuring ties remained strong.

Articles did not shy away from mentioning the “prods” the Japanese government was receiving from U.S. officials, noting that “such a strong U.S. position makes the Japan-U.S. relationship more tense (“Govt must not delay,” 2009). However, after these mentions, articles were quick to apply even stronger pressure on their own government. During Hatoyama’s term, articles mentioned the “fear” and “loss of trust” the nation felt as he continued to “mishandle” the base relocation. These articles also emphasized the feelings of fear stemmed from the possible collapse of the Japan-U.S. alliance.

Coverage began in September 2009, and by January 2011, the focus shifted slightly from citizens’ worry that Hatoyama would damage the bilateral relationship, to talks of strengthening the alliance in spite of him. One lead paragraph quoted a U.S. official who said, “The United States will soon start talks with Japan aimed at deepening the bilateral alliance without waiting for the dispute over the relocation of the U.S. airfield on Okinawa to be resolved ...” (Ogawa, 2010). Upon the election of the new prime minister, Naoto Kan, articles focused on the two tasks he had cut out for him: reviving the economy and restoring the relationship with the U.S. An article nearing the period of coverage focused on a quote from Vice President Joe Biden, who stated, “Our partnership is strong, and our alliance will continue to serve as the cornerstone of peace and security in East Asia.”

CONCLUSION

This current body of research analyzed the use of frames in the socio-political periods of Japan passing and Japan surpassing. The quantitative analysis revealed several interesting findings. The first finding the reporter's dependence on elite news sources to tell the story of both the *Ehime Maru* sinking and the Futenma base controversy. Forty-nine percent of the 400 articles used a U.S. elite source. In U.S. coverage of Futenma base controversy alone, 43% (n = 43) of articles used the elite news source. As revealed in the qualitative analysis, these elite sources were attributed with quotes that countered the scholarly interpretation of the Japan-passing period, and articles would follow this general understanding.

In other words, the period of Japan-surpassing is characterized by U.S. dissatisfaction with Japan and its preference for China and its stronger economy. However, elite news sources, such as President Obama, were attributed with dispelling the perception that the U.S. had a better relationship with China. U.S. articles, especially the *New York Times*, would adopt this mentality, and avoid discussion of a deteriorating relationship. In fact, quite the opposite was propagated, as U.S. coverage during this period relied on the reconciliation frame to affirm its strong ties with Japan.

According to Schneider (2011), journalists choose whose voice is heard in a news story, and by doing so, focus on the emphasis of certain facts, making those facts more salient than others (Entman, 1993). Despite the common scholarly understanding that the period of Japan-surpassing was characterized by a weaker bilateral relationship, U.S. newspapers used the reconciliation frame to portray the contrary. As Lawrence (2010) stated, many issues and events that citizens encounter in the news have been framed by political actors, particularly government officials, in an attempt to influence public opinion. Perhaps this was an effort to shift public

opinion to favorably endorse both the U.S. troops in Okinawa and the Japan-U.S. relationship as a whole. An article in the *Washington Post* quoted a New York University professor on this issue, saying, “The U.S. mass media have been on Japan’s side [during the Futenma controversy], as has public opinion under the media’s influence.”

Perhaps the media was on Japan’s side because policymakers, who influence media, wished to keep public opinion of Japan favorable as the U.S. continues to station troops in Okinawa. The press may have also wanted to shift public opinion of the U.S. relationship with Japan in a positive light so U.S.-Americans may be more willing to accept future negotiations with Japan. By presenting a frame that conveys the U.S. is working to build ties, the nation’s next efforts to collaborate with Japan will receive a higher approval rating.

U.S. newspapers achieved the notion of being on “Japan’s side” by relying on elite news sources. Those particular sources are the most accessible, and on a reporter’s tight deadline, using a government-issued press statement is faster than tracking down a nongovernmental expert source, who might provide an economic or socio-political perspective. As Entman (1993) stated, journalists use frames to quickly make sense of the world around them. By picking up quotes from elite news sources, reporters can swiftly get the governmental perspective.

The analyses of message frames revealed several interesting findings. In the period of coverage during the Japan surpassing era, from 2001 to 2003, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan was at its strongest point. Japan wanted to move out of the shadow of Washington, and assert itself as an independent nation. In 2001, the USS *Greeneville* rammed and sunk the Japanese fishing boat, the *Ehime Maru*. The U.S. newspaper used the mea culpa frame most frequently in time period, surrounding the time of the accident. This suggested that because relations were strong, the U.S. took full responsibility for the damage. Moreover, Japan did not

hesitate to point the finger at the U.S. Navy, especially after a growing dissatisfaction with the presence of U.S. troops in Japan, namely Okinawa.

Compare this with the Futenma conflict in the Japan passing period from 2009 to 2011, and the blame shifts. Here, the U.S. puts the blame on Japan, blaming its indecisive prime minister, among other governmental roadblocks, as the cause for the controversy. Likewise, in the Japanese newspaper, Japan blamed itself for the controversy, also citing a weak government. Just as in U.S. newspapers, Japan does not allow the United States to shoulder the blame.

When examining the use of particular framing devices, the term “outrage” was used across U.S. newspapers to describe the Japanese temperament over the sinking of the *Ehime Maru* in the Japan-surpassing period. As Hertog & McLeod (2001) stated, frames are powerful within cultural realms because of their large amount symbolic strength. The “picture inside our heads” (Lippman, 1922) that materialized based on this connotation of anger is powerful and intimidating.

The articles framed an association between Pearl Harbor and the current controversy, as U.S. articles described the location of the sinking as “off Pearl Harbor” or “near Pearl Harbor.” While many of the articles that mentioned Pearl Harbor did so only in the dateline, it is interesting to note that only U.S. articles chose to do so, while Japanese articles described the location as “off Hawaii.” The use of the phrase “Pearl Harbor” is significant because it refers to Japan’s aerial attack against the U.S. during World War II. Hertog & McLeod (2001) stated that frames grant excessive meaning because the frame can be strongly connected to other powerful ideas and connotations. Combining these two images—Japanese outrage and Pearl Harbor—has the ability to conjure strong associations in the minds of readers.

In both periods of study and in both countries, the application of the mea culpa and responsibility frames mirrored the geopolitical dynamic of the time. However, the frame created by the U.S. newspapers' use of elite news sources in the period of Japan passing went against the scholarly interpretation of the time. Instead of reflecting U.S. disinterest—a characteristic of the passing period, elite sources influenced articles to apply the reconciliation frame, using phrases about rebuilding alliances and maintaining a strong and positive bilateral relationship now and for the future. This may be a significant finding in terms of directing journalists away from following a government agenda, and instead report on the issues at hand. For instance, U.S. newspaper articles did not explore the existing geopolitical dynamic during the phase of Japan passing, and instead applied the episodic frame by focusing only on the conflict at hand. Readers were not provided a thorough background of the shifting Japan-U.S. relationship, so moving forward, they may not be as apt to accept another “assertive” Japan, if the country were to ever move back into this position. Instead, readers would only have the frame that suggested the U.S. was working hard to mend fences, while the Japanese would be perceived as focusing only on becoming, once again, a strong economic contender.

APPENDIX A
CODING SHEET

News Article Number: _____

Newspaper: _____

1. *The New York Times*
2. *The Washington Post*
3. *USA Today*
4. *The Wall Street Journal*
5. *The Daily Yomiuri*

Date: _____(yyyy/mm/dd) **Length:** _____ words

Section: _____ **Front page of section:** 1. Yes 2. No

Headline: _____

Dateline: _____

Story Genre: _____

1. Wire/News service
2. Staff: Straight news
3. Staff: Editorial
4. Special Contributor
5. Op-ed
6. Unknown
7. Other

Number of Times Sources Appear:

1. Domestic: U.S.

Government/military sources: _____

Nongovernmental expert sources: _____

Private citizen sources: _____

Other: _____

2. Foreign: Japan

Government/military sources: _____

Nongovernmental expert sources: _____

Private citizen sources: _____

Other: _____

3. Foreign: Other countries

Government/military sources: _____

Nongovernmental expert sources: _____

Private citizen sources: _____

Other: _____

FRAME SYSTEM 1 (Check predominant frame; mixed frame possible)

Episodic frames (focus on specific events or particular cases; little or no context about underlying issues)

Thematic frames (focus on the big picture or general context of political issues and events; statistics; expert in-depth analysis, historical background)

FRAME SYSTEM 2 (Circle number if present; multiple frames possible)

1. Mea culpa (blaming self, i.e. Japan blaming government; apologies)
2. Responsibility frame (blaming other; unreasonable partner)
3. Reconciliation frame (focusing on friendship; positive future; collaboration)
4. Human interest frame (focusing on individuals, i.e. victims, protesters, families)
5. Diagnostic frame (perceptions that lead to the conflict; broader discussion of what caused conflict, i.e. Japan's dependency on U.S.)
6. Prognostic frame (discussing long-term effects of the conflict; broader discussion of the consequences of the conflict)
7. Media self-referential frame (emphasis on media/press role in the conflict)

8. Past conflicts (reference to military conflicts or culture clashes outside of current conflict, i.e. Pearl Harbor)

Framing devices of Frame System 2 (include number):

APPENDIX B

CODING INSTRUCTIONS FOR CROSS-CULTURAL MEDIA FRAMING ANALYSIS

Introduction

This study will assess the media frames used in coverage of the Futenma base controversy and the sinking of the *Ehime Maru* in four U.S. newspapers and one Japanese newspaper. The following six definitions describe the genre of stories selected for analysis. The source of the story will also be coded.

News Genre

1. Wire/News service

Articles falling into this category will originate from the AP, Reuters, or another news organization that creates and supplies news for other news organizations

2. Staff: Straight news

A member of the newspaper's staff will write these articles; the title "staff writer" will appear near the byline

3. Staff: Editorial

A member of the newspaper's senior staff or someone affiliated with the newspaper editorial board writes this opinion-based article

4. Special Contributor

Only stories marked with "special contributor" in the byline appear in this category.

Often these writers will be a political expert or cultural critic.

5. Op-ed

Op-eds are opinion pieces written by someone unaffiliated with the newspaper

6. Unknown

The article does not carry a byline

7. Other

All articles that cannot be categorized in the above six categories must be placed here

Story Source(s)

This section tallies each time a writer attributes a source in the article. Attribution can be a direct quote, or given indirectly, such as “according to” or “sources say.”

Domestic: U.S. (living in the United States)

1. Government/military sources: A source who is working for the U.S. government or a branch of the armed services, such as Navy officials or White House representatives
2. Nongovernmental expert sources: A source who is not employed by the U.S. government, but is interviewed to offer insight and perspective, such as political scientists, economists
3. Private citizen sources: A source who is interviewed for their private position or reaction toward an event, such as witnesses and victims
4. Other: If a source cannot be placed within the above three categories, it must be marked here

Foreign: Japan (living in Japan)

5. Government/military sources: A source who is working for the Japanese government or a branch of the armed services, such as members of the National Diet
6. Nongovernmental expert sources: A source who is not employed by the Japanese government, but is interviewed to offer insight and perspective, such as political scientists, economists
7. Private citizen sources: A source who is interviewed for their private position or reaction toward an event, such as witnesses and victims

8. Other: If a source cannot be placed within the above three categories, it must be marked here

Foreign: Other countries (living in a country other than Japan or the U.S.)

9. Government/military sources: A source who is working for the a foreign government or a branch of the armed services, such as a representative of The People’s Republic of China
10. Nongovernmental expert sources: A source who is not employed by the Japanese government, but is interviewed to offer insight and perspective, such as political scientists, economists
11. Private citizen sources: A source who is interviewed for their private position or reaction toward an event, such as witnesses and victims
12. Other: If a source cannot be placed within the above three categories, it must be marked here

Frame Analysis

Framing is a system of exclusion, organization and emphasis of certain facts, making those events more salient than others. After reading the article, frames will be identified from Frame System 1 and Frame System 2.

For Frame System 1, identify the predominant frame used in each story. It is possible to have a mixed frame; however, a frame is considered dominant if it is used in 30% of the article.

Episodic frames

This frame focuses on specific events or particular cases with little or no context about underlying issues

Thematic frames

This frames focuses on the big picture or general context of political issues and events; statistics. It may use expert in-depth analysis, or develop a historical background

For Frame System 2, identify the frame in use. Multiple frames are possible.

1. Mea culpa: The country in which the story is published takes blame, offers apologies, admits fault. For example, the Japanese blames its own government for Futenma; the Unites States Navy takes onus for ship wreck
2. Responsibility frame: The country in which the story is published blames the other country. For example, Japanese citizens angered at U.S. Navy; United States blames Japanese government for stalling
3. Reconciliation frame: Focus on friendship, a positive future and collaboration. For instance, “mending fences” or “reliable ally.”
4. Human interest frame: Focus on individual actors, such as victims, protesters, or families. Profile stories also fit this frame.
5. Diagnostic frame: Focus on the perceptions that lead to the current conflict; broader discussion of what caused current conflict, i.e. Japan’s dependency on U.S. This frame should only exist when the conflict discussed is either the Futenma base or the sinking of the *Ehime Maru*. Discussion of other past conflict, such as Pearl Harbor, does not belong here.
6. Prognostic frame: Discussion long-term effects of the current conflict; broader discussion of the consequences of the current conflict. For example, the sinking of the *Ehime Maru* might shake the long-standing alliance between Japan and the U.S.

7. Media self-referential frame: An emphasis on media/press role in the current conflict
8. Past conflict: An emphasis on previous conflicts in the history of Japan-U.S. relations, such as military conflicts or culture clashes. For example, mentions of Pearl Harbor, World War II or “yellow peril.”

Framing Devices

Framing devices are linguistic clues, such as catchphrases or repeated words, which signal the existence of a frame. Indicate the presence of the framing devices used in each article.

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