slippery slope to active euthanasia" and opponents demonstrated loudly outside of his office and
distributed flyers comparing him to Adolf Hitler (Glick, 1992a).
Keene's strategy became consensus-building while seeking and winning the support of
those with influence most likely to be sympathetic to his cause- like the California Medical
Association (Glick, 1992a). He continued to court his opponents and recruited a Catholic priest
to approach the bishop, and they ultimately won the bishop's agreement although he would not
publicly endorse the proposal for fear of a backlash. Keene sought to mobilize public opinion
through the mass media and took full advantage of the Quinlan decision to publicize his bill and
cultivate support (Glick, 1992a).
When California Catholic Conference suspected that the bill would pass, the group
became willing to drop their opposition and become neutral in exchange for amendments they
believed would protect patients who would not have otherwise been protected if the bill passed
as written (Glick, 1992a). They also believed that working with Keene would grant them future
access to a Senator who was proving to be a powerful player in the legislature (Glick, 1992a).
Keene brokered this compromise, which included many new amendments like a declaration
against active euthanasia, extensive witnessing provisions, giving living wills an expiration date
of five years, making the law inapplicable to pregnant women, insisting upon two physicians to
validate a terminal diagnosis, plus a 14-day waiting period after diagnosis before a patient can
execute their living will. The bill passed easily (Glick, 1992a).
In contrast, Walter Sackett introduced his proposal to the Florida Senate in 1967 (Glick,
1992a). Sackett was a new legislator like Keene, but had lacked Keene's savvy for creating a
hospitable legislative environment as well as winning over outside opponents (Glick, 1992a).
Glick explains Sackett's strategy for passing bills as nothing more than "filing them and hoping

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