

DETERRENCE: AMERICAN NAVAL POLICY IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC,  
REALISTIC OR SUBJECT TO CHANGE

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## ABSTRACT

Since 1990, the U.S. has become the sole super power in the world. One aspect of U.S. foreign policy during this time period has been greater responsibility in international relations. In regard to the Western Pacific, American naval policy has used deterrence to influence regional powers and promote stability. Over the years however, this policy has begun to face new challenges from a gradual decline in American prestige and power in the region due to other global interests in the Middle East. Simultaneously regional powers such as China and Russia are increasing their naval presence in the region making it more difficult for the U.S. to influence foreign relations through deterrence. My research will focus on the future of deterrence and conclude whether or not it is still a viable form of American naval policy.

## RESEARCH TOPIC

The purpose of my research is to understand the conceptual basis, implication, and practicality of American naval deterrent policy in the Western Pacific. Over the two decades since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States Navy has been able to use its force projection to influence East Asian politics according to American interests and its allies. Due to advances in naval presence from other nations in the region, however, the U.S. Navy must either continue to use deterrent policy or adopt another strategy to protect its interests. I will answer key questions such as: Is deterrence still a sustainable form of foreign naval policy? What other policies could be implemented to take its place? This research paper will identify how deterrence policy has worked for the U.S. Navy in the past and in what environment it is most effective. I will then explain the challenges facing the U.S. Navy today and consider if deterrent policy can continue to function effectively or if a new policy should be adopted.

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## CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

In 1945 with the defeat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, the United States had surpassed any other nation, ally or axis, in naval strength and superiority. The necessity for such an outcome was not surprising for the United States was forced to fight on two fronts: one in the Atlantic and Western Europe and the other in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. These global commitments to fight in theatres that were a world apart created enormous strategic and logistical hurdles that the U.S. overcame. Fighting the Nazis and Japanese simultaneously required the creation of large naval forces. Any such campaign made it compulsory for the navy to serve as a transport mechanism and a powerful fighting force depending on the circumstances. The war necessitated the construction of an Atlantic and Pacific fleet on a scale that had previously never existed. Command structures were created for both fleets and established that operations in the two theatres should remain separate based on the immensity of the campaigns and areas of control. Before and during the war, naval construction programs were instituted on a level that could only be compared to by the construction programs of WWI. Navy vessels of the period had become more technologically advanced and could be made with quicker speed and proficiency than before, leading to better ships and more of them. At the end of WWII the U.S. navy had reached a level of superiority never before known and was able to use this new found legitimacy against any such rivals and rogue states that went against American interests.

After WWII the Soviet Union became the primary adversary to the United States for its support of communist regimes around the world. This conflicted with U.S. support for capitalist regimes and was a crucial reason for the creation of the Cold War which lasted from 1945 to 1989. The development of a nuclear weapon by the Soviets in 1949 effectively gave them a

counter tool with which to threaten the Americans should they attempt a political move threatening the Soviet Union or its allies. This nuclear standoff between the world's two superpowers became the groundwork for foreign policy development until 1989. The United States foreign policy toward the Soviet Union at this time was a policy of nuclear deterrence. The threat of mutually-assured destruction (MAD) gave both nations ample reason to be careful about how they handled the other. Nuclear deterrence was effective in stopping the use of nuclear weapons between the two superpowers for fear of retaliation. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1989, the U.S. became the sole superpower remaining in the world and used its powers to help its allies and deter any potential enemies. Since American foreign policy up to this time had been a balance of power with the Soviet Union and the use of nuclear deterrence, they were appropriately subjugated to fit the new rapidly changing political world.

The primary factor needed to establish deterrence policy is a superior force with which to threaten an opponent to not make a certain action out of fear of retaliation. With the U.S. maintaining its naval dominance during the Cold War and with no competing superpower to serve as a nuclear deterrent, American naval policy aptly adopted the use of deterrence around the world to limit the influence of regional rivals that might threaten U.S. or allied interests. In the Western Pacific the U.S. navy has used deterrence policy to limit the actions of regional rivals, such as China, and to protect its allies in the region. The U.S. 7<sup>th</sup> Fleet stationed in Japan and Guam were used to promote peace and stability as well as to assert American dominance over international affairs in the region.

Since 1990, the U.S. navy has successfully used deterrence policy in the Western Pacific to affirm American dominance in the region for itself and its allies. In the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, President Clinton ordered two carrier battle groups into the strait to avert hostilities

between China and Taiwan and to force China to back down in light of unwavering American support for Taiwan. This move was credited with thwarting the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership on Mainland China from continued action against the Taiwanese. This success for naval deterrence policy highlights the effectiveness of deterrence as the U.S. continued its naval presence in the Western Pacific throughout the 1990s. After the World Trade Center terrorist attacks in New York City in 2001, U.S. foreign policy and international affairs focused on the Middle-East and central Asia. The War on Terror undertaken by the Bush Administration sent American military resources to the Persian Gulf to aid the Invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. This shift in foreign policy focus didn't make deterrence policy in the Western Pacific ineffective but it did limit its potential effectiveness for the future. As regional powers such as China and Russia began building new naval capabilities, the U.S. remained concerned with events unfolding in the Middle East. The Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) focused on creating asymmetrical military capabilities to subvert American naval dominance. They have created new submarines and anti-ship guided-missile weapons systems that give them the ability to attack unexpectedly or destroy ships from the mainland. The Russians have also begun building new classes of ships and sending them to the Pacific to build up their forces as well. All of these updates have sufficiently stumped American deterrence power because no longer can the U.S. freely take action against its rivals.

American naval deterrence policy in the western Pacific must undergo reform to address the new challenges presented by the Chinese and Russian navies. One reform would be to establish a deterrence stance of General deterrence rather than immediate deterrence. Since the dangers of sending American naval forces into a situation might result in more loss than gain, it would be more beneficial to achieve a naval deterrence in which simply the knowledge of a

dominant U.S. naval presence in the region is enough to deter an adversary from action. Another would be to reform the U.S. 7<sup>th</sup> Fleet to fit the new challenges of Chinese submarines and anti-ship guided missile systems by upgrading and investing in Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) technologies and making the technologically advanced *Aegis* weapons systems more prolific in American vessels.

American naval deterrence in the Western Pacific will continue to exist as the dominant policy for the U.S. 7<sup>th</sup> fleet but with many changes that will help it to be more successful in the future. With the reforms stated above I believe deterrence policy will continue to be effective for the next decade but for it to last generationally, other changes must be instituted. One change would be that the U.S. would continue to be the dominate power in the Western Pacific but would establish alliances creating more cooperation and participation from other powers in the region such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Japan, Singapore, and others. In this way, the alliance systems can make China and Russia political outcasts for not participating while the U.S. maintains enough naval superiority to still bring force to bear if necessary. Deterrence policy will be reformed in the future but will not be replaced as the dominant American naval policy in the Western Pacific.

### Methodology

The main method of collecting data will be by acquiring secondary information from scholarly journal articles found online and in the library. Online databases are extremely helpful because I can find peer reviewed articles that provide good detail on American naval policy. I will also use reference lists of the above stated sources to expand my research further. I will collect journal articles, military research papers, and primary source material, such as speeches, to gather evidence for a better understanding of United States' objectives in the western Pacific

and how those affect naval policy. All of the sources will have to be from 1990 to 2010 due to the limited time frame of the topic under investigation and will have to focus on American foreign policy in the Western Pacific.

### Literature Review

In order to define deterrent policy and understand its function I first have to review all of the information provided on the subject. This includes scholarly journal articles, military research papers, and primary source information that address the subject of American foreign policy in East Asia. I will use this data to form my own explanation on the future of deterrent policy as a part of American naval doctrine. Below are the sources I have chosen to review because they are important to understanding deterrence, the environment in which it is used, and the changing conditions that could quite possibly jeopardize its continuance.

*What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980*, by Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, gives an overview of deterrence policy and classifies the strategy into the definitions of general and immediate deterrence. This interpretation is important to establishing American deterrence policy and can be an accurate template to describe American capabilities. The authors identify general deterrence as a use of force in which no threatening action is taken. Instead it is the presence of a potential threat of action that is sufficient enough to provide for deterrence. Immediate deterrence is identified as the use of direct threatening action to coax an adversary into not taking action of his own. The recognition of these two types of deterrent policy and realizing the disadvantages/advantages of their use is crucial to understanding how deterrent policy should evolve over the next decades.

In his keynote address, Captain Bischeri stressed the importance of cooperation between the U.S. and western Pacific nations in preserving maritime security and stability. The WPNS is

a multilateral organization created during the cold war and is currently used as a forum for discussion and debate over common issues related to the new regional security environment in East Asia. The roles of the WPNS are to build relationships, continue international dialogue, and to further confidence-building measures between nations such as naval exercises and information sharing. Captain Bischeri's urge for a cooperative effort to protect maritime freedoms was formed by his belief that freedom of the seas is the responsibility of all nations. He stressed that the free flow of goods, services, and ideas benefit all nations in the East Asian theatre (Bischeri 2010). This argument was established by naval historian Alfred Thayer Mahan in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and was adopted by Captain Bischeri in support of the WPNS. The U.S. is playing a decreasing role in the western Pacific and wants to encourage western Pacific allies to take on larger responsibility in security without becoming confrontational. Bischeri's dialogue is important because it can be interpreted that the U.S. no longer wants to play a major role in Asian affairs partly because it can't afford to.

Thomas J. Christensen is currently the William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War and Director of the China and the World Program at Princeton University. His research is focused primarily on Chinese foreign relations and East Asian affairs. From 2006-2008, he served as the deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs with responsibility for relations with China. In his article concerning China's rise, Christensen concluded from state department documents, memos, reports and secondary information from other scholars that China is constructing submarines with an asymmetrical advantage over U.S. naval forces. A weaker China might be compelled to attack the U.S. because the Chinese feel they are backed into a corner and that a military action is necessary (Christensen 2001). This

threatens U.S. naval hegemony in the western Pacific and may force the U.S. to change its policy of deterrence.

Christopher Twomey is an associate professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. He has worked closely with the Departments of State and Defense on diplomatic relations across East Asia. In his article, he defines deterrence as the art of making contingent threats to convince the adversary not to do something (Twomey 2007). He looks to the policy implementation of the Bush Administration and points to the pitfalls that he thinks will lead to the deterioration of future relations with China. This threatens the use of deterrence because future relations with the Chinese might require a more forceful doctrine.

Michael Glosny is currently an instructor for the Department of National Security Affairs and also serves as an adjunct senior research fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University in Washington D.C. His research interests include Chinese foreign and security policy, grand strategies of great powers, and U.S. alliances in East Asia. In his article detailing the submarine blockade of Taiwan by the PRC (Peoples Republic of China), Glosny uses hypothetical scenarios based on information gathered from state department research to articulate strategic outcomes and success rates. He created a ratio system to match the effectiveness of the blockade with its overall cost to the Chinese submarine fleet. The result was that any attempt by the Chinese to put Taiwan under a naval blockade would be a very negative decision and ultimately fail (Glosny 2004). He confirms that Taiwanese trade shipping would not be fully stopped and therefore the blockade would not be desirable to the Chinese. Deterrence then is described as a policy in which the U.S. doesn't want to have open hostilities but if the situation deteriorated to one such as a naval blockade of Taiwan, it would ultimately have to

commit itself to conflict with China to reestablish freedom of the seas. His use of statistics and empirical data are helpful by creating evidence for deterrent policy.

David Shambaugh is currently a professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the China Policy Program at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. His research interests include Chinese foreign relations and China's military and security. Before joining the faculty at George Washington, he taught at the University of London where he was also the editor of the *The China Quarterly*- a very prestigious scholarly journal of contemporary Chinese studies. In his article, Dr. Shambaugh analyzed the Chinese military modernization after the end of the cold war and concluded that the new Chinese military doctrine is more aggressive and responsive to foreign threats outside the nation's borders due to a growth of nationalism stemming from economic prosperity in the later 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries. He highlighted many developments within the PLA through researching primary and secondary information from Chinese sources and could possibly lead to challenges against U.S. deterrence policy. Chinese power projection and procurement has led many American analysts to argue that deterrence cannot exist once there is a naval force of equal strength to counter the U.S. presence in the region.

Timothy N. Ketter studied at the Naval War College in Newport, RI. His research interests included Anti-submarine warfare (ASW), U.S. naval strategy, and asymmetrical warfare. He concluded from his research of American ASW doctrine post 1945 to the present was that the current U.S. naval strategy was geared more toward symmetrical threats from enemy surface vessels and aircraft carriers. Ketter argues the U.S. Pacific fleet needs to undergo a shift in fleet composition to better prepare itself for the threat of Chinese diesel powered submarines. Ketter concluded that because the Chinese do not have the capability to defeat the U.S. navy in

symmetrical engagements, they will create asymmetrical weapons to achieve an advantage. He argues the navy needs to re-examine its current ASW doctrine and force structure and invest now in a future force to counter the submarines (Ketter 2004, 1).

Frederik Van Lokeren has been an analytical writer for the *Geopolitical and Conflict Report* think tank. Their mission statement is to promote stability by providing a comprehensive analysis of conflicts and other events leading to conflict. In his analysis on the naval balance in the Pacific, Lokeren used information provided by the combined state departments of Russia, China, and the U.S. to conclude that the resurgence of Russian influence and the growing power of Chinese naval presence are forcing the U.S. to rethink its deterrence policy and consider the adoption of another doctrine to face these new threats. This shift coupled with a down turning economy and global interests around the world has dramatically limited the size of U.S. naval forces in the Pacific (Van Lokeren 2011).

U.S. deterrent policy has been effective and unchallenged mainly due to the U.S. naval dominance in the region. New challenges, however, threaten to lessen the effectiveness of the policy and undermine U.S. ability to protect its national interests. I have concluded that deterrence is a realistic policy for current East Asian diplomacy but in the future it might not be advantageous. Further study will be to find what policies could possibly replace U.S. deterrence.

## CHAPTER 2

### THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING OF DETERRENCE

To grasp how American naval policy utilizes deterrence in the Western Pacific it is important to understand how the theoretical concept of deterrence is applied to international politics. According to Patrick Morgan's conceptual analysis on deterrence, it is defined as "the threat to use force in response as a way of preventing the first use of force by someone else"

(Huth and Russett 1984). This threat to use force could mean military and political acts such as a threat to blockade, threat to occupy territory, threat to declare war and displays of force such as mobilization and military alert (Huth and Russett 1984). In international politics this means that one major power is coercing another to act or not act depending on the desired result of that major power. Major Powers with global commitments and resources, such as the United States, have the ability to prevent an aggressor from using the first use of force by threatening massive retaliation if they do not comply. Deterrence may seek to prevent an attack on oneself or an attack on some other third party such as a client state or a friendly neutral (Huth and Russett 1984). This is important to note because the U.S. has numerous allies in the western pacific that have been under the protection of American interests since the end of WWII.

Before I go any further it is important to mention that determining the success of deterrence is a difficult science. Since the goal is trying to deter an aggressor from attack then how do we know for sure it was the threat of retaliation and not a change of priorities or a change of leadership that influenced their decision? For the gathering of empirical data, however, it is a reasonable presumption that the threat was the primary reason for success (Huth and Russett 1984). There are three classifications for which deterrence can be categorized: General, Immediate and Extended. General deterrence concerns a relationship where both sides are neither anywhere near mounting an attack against one another. This category is primarily used for political jostling and expanding political power at the expense of another state. Immediate deterrence is where at least one side is seriously considering an attack. This creates a more direct application of deterrence policy because it has the potential to fail by which I mean the deterrence threat did not discourage the aggressor from attacking the deterrent state or their allies. Extended deterrence specifically refers to the major powers use of influence to deter

attacks on another third party by the aggressor. During the cold war, extended deterrence was widely used to protect American allies and interests around the world from the Soviet Union. Since 1990 it has still been a main focus of deterrence policy in the western pacific simply because the U.S. has many allies in the region such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Successful deterrence is much more than just a matter of having a favorable military balance, but a matter of the nature and extent of ties between the defendant state and the state it wishes to protect (Huth and Russett 1984). In the western pacific, the success of deterrence policy can be seen in how U.S. foreign policy goals are met but also by measuring the relationship between U.S. and its allies in the region.

General deterrence is the least dangerous form of deterrence policy from the perspective that actual military conflict will break out. Neither party is seriously considering an attack. Morgan identifies general deterrence as relating to “opponents who maintain armed forces to regulate their relationship even though neither is anywhere near mounting an attack” (Huth and Russett 1984). An aggressor may use an intimidating political action called “rattling the saber” to imply that their intentions are to attack but will never materialize. The main utility of General deterrence is given to the defender over the aggressor because of the perpetuation of the political atmosphere and status quo. Since there is no real threat to the defender being attacked then maintaining an equal parity or a higher advantage in military strength with the aggressor will allow the defender to continue normal procedure but with a heightened scrutiny if in fact the aggressor does intend to attack.

In regard to immediate deterrence in which the aggressor is considering an attack, the defender becomes more aware of the potential for conflict but still holds to the viewpoint that achieving a threatening presentation of retaliation will still deter the aggressor. Much attention is

given to the balance of military capabilities between attacker and defender but other psychological factors such as motivation, resolve, and commitment are equal to military capabilities if not more important. Huth and Russett identify deterrence as a game of strategic interaction in which a “rational” opponent assesses the potential costs and benefits of its actions (Huth and Russett 1984). By this view, a deterrent threat is effective to the extent it can produce cost-benefit calculations on the part of the potential attacker in which the expected utility of an attack would be less than the expected utility of foregoing the attack (Huth and Russett 1984). If the aggressor realizes that the costs of attacking are more than the potential benefits then they will not attack and therefore deterrence is reinforced.

Extended deterrence is different from both general and immediate deterrence because it concerns the threat and protection of a 3<sup>rd</sup> party rather than the defender himself. It is defined by Paul Huth as a confrontation in which policymakers of one state (“defender”) threaten the use of force against another state (“attacker”) in an attempt to prevent that state from using military force against an ally (Huth 1988). It is with this version of deterrence that it becomes a more complex problem than simply measuring military balances. More importance is placed in demonstrating concern, motivation, and commitment in the protection of the 3<sup>rd</sup> party. Since the costs of failing to meet an attack on a third party are rarely as great as the costs of failing to defend one’s home territory it is to commitment and resolve of the defender that the aggressor now looks to measure the cost-benefits of such as attack (Huth and Russett 1984). Resolve and commitment are affected by the relationship between the defender and the 3<sup>rd</sup> party in danger. Resolve may be communicated by establishing a formal military alliance between the two and once established, it may serve to strengthen a defender’s resolve by raising the stakes it has to lose by failing to honor its alliance commitment (Huth and Russett 1984). As for commitment, it

may be strengthened by a variety of economic, political, and military ties between defender and the 3<sup>rd</sup> party such as trade and economic investment (Huth and Russett 1984). In summation the defender is increasingly willing to take risks to defend the 3<sup>rd</sup> party if there are more tangible and intangible interests at stake.

### CHAPTER 3

#### HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK OF AMERICAN NAVAL POLICY IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC 1990-2011

To understand American naval policy in the Western Pacific from 1990-2011 it is important to go as far back as WWII to address how different relationships have formed and how American interests have developed in the region. Since the end of WWII, the U.S. has worked diligently in creating allies in the western Pacific, most notably Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. With the beginning of the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, American foreign focus shifted to a policy of containment. Every ally that the U.S. had now became an important asset that would be devastating to lose. The U.S. rebuilt Japan's wrecked economy and established naval bases on the Japanese home islands and as well as Guam to support American interests in the region. South Korea was defended with a predominantly led U.S. force of UN nations from invasion by communist North Korea in the early 1950s. Taiwan became the last bastion for Chinese nationalist forces once they escaped the communist mainland and was put under the protection of American influence. In the perspective of the western Pacific the enemies were now all communist regimes such as the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. American foreign relations made it a necessity to develop relationships with the few allies in the western Pacific and make it clear that the U.S. was going to stand behind their commitment to protect these regimes.

The use of extended deterrence became an important aspect for U.S. naval policy during the mid to late 20<sup>th</sup> century in the western pacific. It can be argued that the nations under the protection of the U.S. did not possess the military independence necessary to resist communist aggression had it occurred. The presence of U.S. naval forces in the region played an important part in deterring would be aggressors and the use of legislation and other diplomatic negotiations helped to convey American resolve not to leave their allies vulnerable. In an example of this resolve in regard to Taiwan, congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) on 10 April 1979. The act made it legal for the U.S. to support Taiwan and to “help maintain peace, security, and stability in the western pacific, and to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan” (Bartee 2000). The TRA clarified that the U.S. did not want the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to pursue reunification with Taiwan through military means and if this could not happen peacefully, then the U.S. had the option to use force to help Taiwan resist a forceful reunification (Bartee 2000). Other such commitments were made between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea through military alliances and increased economic relations to ensure the safety and continued protection of those states against potential communist aggression. The use of extended deterrence along with the policy of containment was the main focus of U.S. naval policy during this time before the fall of the Soviet Union.

After the Soviet Union dissolved in the early 1990s, the objective of U.S. naval policy was to maintain extended deterrence but it was unsure as to what would happen with the policy of containment. It would still be applied to fit the communist regimes of the PRC and North Korea even though the threat posed to U.S. national security was dramatically less. One of the first challenges to the U.S. naval policy of deterrence in the post-soviet era was the Taiwanese

Strait Crisis in 1995-96 in which the PRC authorized military exercises in the Strait of Taiwan with the purpose to intimidate the Taiwan people, specifically in reference to their upcoming elections (Bartee 2000). During the summer of 1995 the PRC announced a series of military exercises involving missile tests that fired nuclear capable missiles into a designated target area eighty-five miles north of Taiwan (Bartee 2000). In response to these threats President Clinton sent two U.S. carrier battle groups into the Taiwan Strait. This move allowed the U.S. to make good on their obligation and commitment to Taiwan established by diplomatic negotiations of the past and maintain extended deterrence. The PRC interpreted the presence of the carriers as the U.S. taking a stand with Taiwan against them and so these actions reaffirmed the utility of extended deterrence and set the level of consideration for future actions the Chinese might take (Bartee 2000).

Since the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis there have been numerous other crises that have tested the use of U.S. naval deterrence in the Western Pacific but the new focus of aggressor nations is no longer to challenge deterrence but to find advantages around it. Deterrence has proven its utility as a part of American naval policy. It is effective against aggressor nations that do not possess a parity of military capabilities. The U.S. is the last remaining super power and so for any other nations to circumvent deterrence it will be by finding asymmetrical solutions to these problems rather than trying to create more competition.

#### CHAPTER 4

#### CONCLUSION

Before I conclude the topic I must first clarify that this research is far from finished and that the solutions are based off of limited information provided by scholars of academia and the military. Results are subjectively based off my understanding of these concepts of deterrence and

so must be considered with the full scope of all other research available. As stated in the introduction, the purpose of this project is to learn more about the development and future of U.S. naval deterrence policy in the western pacific during the post-soviet era. It has been noted that deterrence as a part of the arsenal for American foreign policy has been developing since the end of WWII and still has an important role to play in the future. The heightened use of extended deterrence as opposed to general and immediate deterrence has become apparent mainly because of the importance of protecting U.S. allies in the region from aggressors such as China and North Korea. Deterrence has proven effective because it allows the U.S. navy to use its current military resources to the fullest while preparing for what the future of deterrent policy might become. Deterrence allows the U.S. navy to threaten a use of force resulting in powerful political statements without jeopardizing naval assets. Changes in the make-up of enemy navies will most likely force the U.S. navy to alter the role of naval vessels to create sufficient counter measures but the idea of deterrence will not be obsolete. As long as the U.S. maintains its commitment to protecting its allies in the western pacific, deterrence policy will always have a place in American naval policy. For the next decade there is no foreseen shift away from deterrence policy but instead the composition of the U.S. navy will be altered to create a better performance of deterrence and control. After the short-term outlook, deterrence looks to have a continued utility because of the new anticipated rise of China that could spark another cold war similar to that between the Soviet Union and the U.S. during the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Deterrence as a naval policy of the 7<sup>th</sup> fleet is realistic so long as the U.S. navy is willing to shift naval resources into creating appropriate counter measures to combat asymmetrical capabilities of aggressor nations in the region.

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