Factors Influencing Judicial Decision Making

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I. Introduction

Every trial varies in some aspect or another. However, it is the sentencing phase in which the majority of the variation takes place. Since there is such a wide array of sentencing options as a result of judicial discretion, it is interesting to note what factors influence the level of sentencing imposed by individual judges. These factors can include social, political, and cultural influences as well as the mitigating and aggravating factors of the particular case. This study focuses on the decision making process of state trial judges and examines whether gender plays a significant role in determining what sentence will be imposed. It is expected that gender does indeed play a significant role in the sentencing variation of state trial judges since that is field in the judiciary with the largest number of women. Moreover, state trial courts have a high volume of cases, and they are the ones that usually hear cases dealing with sexual assault. Throughout this study, I focus on the factors surrounding the socialization of the judges as well as on the circumstances of the case that may be significant in influencing the level of punishment that each judge imposes on the defendants.

II. Factors of Judicial Decision-Making:

A. Previous Experience

Most judges begin their careers as attorneys and generally have a narrow scope of experience in the wide array of legal disciplines. Even the most seasoned attorney will not face all of the legal issues that a judge has to deal with on a daily basis. Lawyers tend to deal with criminal defense, wills and contracts, and family disputes. Judges, on the other hand, must deal with civil liberties, the Fourteenth Amendment, and other constitutional issues with which they have not dealt prior to becoming judges. Unlike
other countries, such as France, where all their justices must endure a rigorous 28-month formal training, the United States has no formal system for training its judges. Instead, judges are appointed or elected and thrown directly into the new world of the judiciary. During their first few months, they go through a period known as “freshman socialization” where they learn their new responsibilities. After the initial introduction to the judicial field, “occupational socialization” sets in. This socialization includes years of on the job training and includes many factors. For example, new judges must learn how to manage large dockets, effectively run a courtroom, and how to deal with a variety of administrative duties they did not have to deal with as attorneys (Carp and Stidham 1983, 260).

B. Election

State trial court judges are selected one of five ways. They are either elected in a partisan election, elected in a nonpartisan election, selected by merit, appointed by the governor, or appointed by the legislature. In Texas, they are selected in a partisan election (Carp and Stidham 1983, 241). White males still largely dominate the judiciary, and approximately 75% of the justices sit in the state in which they were born (Carp and Stidham 1983, 229). However, the courts are starting to diversify. The largest numbers of women in the judiciary are found at the state trial level. In 1982, roughly 550 women were sitting as judges, making up about 7% of the judiciary (Carp and Stidham 1983, 245). After a 1991 Supreme Court ruling, which said that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 fully applied to the election of state judges, the door opened for strong minority districts to have a greater voice in electing judges (Carp and Stidham 1983, 246). When Clinton took office in 1992, women comprised only 11% of the federal judiciary. However, by
1996, women held 17% of the federal benches, and by 1997, only 7 states did not have any female judges (Martin and Pyle 2000).

C. Social Influences

As the judicial body diversifies, there is increasing debate about what factors influence judicial decision making. It is a well-known idea that judges should be a completely passive, non-biased third party when hearing a case. However, due to the differing socialization processes, even those judges who believe that they are acting in a fair manner may let their personal values, cultural ideals, and socialization influence their decision making. After looking at the research surrounding judicial decision making, Lawrence Baum, found that on the whole, state trial judges present two images. First, that each judge’s behavior reflects many goals such as bettering society or rehabilitating offenders. Second, each judge has a different set of priorities when it comes to these goals (Baum 1997, 25).

Judges often have contrasting perspectives as to what their roles should be. Studies using questionnaires and interviews found that the differences usually focused on how much weight judges paid to the state of the law versus their own conception of justice (Baum 1997, 84). One explanation for this distinction rests on whether or not the judge has to run for re-election. Since all Texas State trial judges are elected on a partisan basis, public opinion plays a greater role in their decision making than it does for those judges appointed for life. All judges, whether elected for life or for a specified term, are affected, to some degree, by public opinion. They all live and participate in their communities. They read newspapers and magazines, and consciously or not, they are influenced by public opinion. Furthermore, state judges are left at the mercy of the
Supreme Court. When the Supreme Court hands down a ruling, and doesn’t specify how it is to be carried out (i.e., busing or district malapportionment) it is left to the lower courts to interpret how it should be implemented. However, both state and federal judges know that without some degree of public support, their decisions cannot be carried out.

D. Feminist Jurisprudence

Due to the rise of women joining the judiciary, there is speculation that they will bring with them a new style of jurisprudence. There are several theories that examine the way that women will interpret the law.

1. Tokenism Theory

The tokenism theory suggests two reasons why females in the judiciary, as well as in other careers dominated by men, conform to the male way of doing things. First, the women chosen will be those who do follow a male model. Second, since there are so few women in the judiciary field, they serve merely as tokens, and they realize there is no hope of sustaining a different course of action that is against the male norms (Martin and Pyle 2000). However, with the rise of women in the judiciary, this theory does not hold the same influence as it once did. Of the entering classes at law schools in 1997, approximately 22,500 were male and 17,500 were female (Digest 1999). This statistic indicates that there has been a shift in attitude and that women are becoming more involved in the legal system.

2. ‘Different Voice’ Theory

With an increasing number of women in the judicial field, one could surmise that there is less pressure to conform and more freedom to interpret the law as they see fit. This second theory of feminist jurisprudence is known as the “Different Voice.” Females
are raised differently than males, both socially and culturally. From birth, females are instilled with a different set of expectations than males receive and therefore, they do not interpret the world in exactly the same way as men do (Wood 1996, 14). This gender difference carries over to the judiciary and the difference in culture and socialization becomes particularly important because there is no formal training to be a judge. The socialization of any judge, male or female, includes two distinct phases. First is the process in which individuals acquire values, attitudes, and behavior patterns (influenced by family, friends, education, co-workers, religion, political affiliation, and communication). Second is the process in which a person is formally trained to perform the tasks of a particular profession (Carp and Stidham 1983, 259). In a field that is dominated by men, women must first learn the rules and then determine to what extent they will follow those rules (Wood 1996, 215). Psychologist Carol Gilligan, speaks about the ‘different voice’ that women will bring to the judicial field. This new voice should result in a different perspective on the law as well as new interpretation and jurisprudence. This new jurisprudence should become increasingly apparent as more women enter the judiciary (Martin and Pyle 2000).

3. Recent Studies on Women in the Judiciary

These theories have been tested several times. There have not been many significant gender differences found in criminal, women’s policy, obscenity, or search and seizure cases. However, in areas where an individual’s personal liberty is in danger, there has been some gender differences in voting behavior. A study by Allen and Wall (1987) found that on state supreme courts, women are the most likely to be pro-feminine on ‘women’s issues’. They are also more likely to engage in non-conformist voting
behavior (Songer, Davis, and Haire 1994, 427). Martin and Pyle (2000) found that women, both Republican and Democrat, were more likely to vote liberally on divorce cases. However, a 1985 study by Walker and Barrow found that, in areas of personal liberties and minority policy cases, it was the men on the court that were more likely (one and a half times) than women to take a liberal position. One explanation for this voting behavior is that female judges will vote liberal to the extent that any discrimination that has occurred has resulted in exclusion from full participation in the community. In cases where individual rights conflicted with those of the community, women would take a more conservative stance (Songer, Davis, and Haire 1994, 436).

E. Political Influence

Political affiliation, whether or not a judge identifies with, supports, or is supported by a political party, has been found to have a higher impact on judicial decision making than religion, sex, race, pre-judicial career, or level/prestige of legal education (Carp and Stidham 1983, 284). Between 1933 and 1987 Republican judges decided to acquit criminal defendants 30% of the time, Democrats 43% of the time. In other words, Democrats were 1.81 times more likely to decide in favor of acquittal (Carp and Stidham 1983, 178). However, there is less evidence for the role that partisanship plays at the state level than at the federal level. There are several reasons for this. First, less research has been done at the state level. Second, state judges do not publish their opinions as often as federal judges do. Finally, several states are dominated by a single party or have areas where political ties are not as strong (Carp and Stidham 1983, 290).

F. Community Influences
Another factor influencing judicial decision-making is the location of the court over which the judge presides, be it in an urban or a rural environment. Recent studies by social scientists have shown that values and attitudes in urban areas tend to be more liberal than those in rural areas are. Most judges, especially in state courts, are serving in the same area in which they were raised, and they bring to the bench the values with which they were raised. Other influences include the fact that big cities most often have rich, liberal, lobbying groups and judges have an easier time voting their conscience in such a location. If they make an unpopular decision, it is more likely to blow over faster and not be held against them. On the other hand, judges in small towns are subjected to more intense public scrutiny (Carp and Stidham 1983, 297). Unpopular decisions are not soon forgotten.

III. Sentencing

A. Case Circumstances

At the federal level and in most states, sentencing is one of the responsibilities held by the judge. Differences in sentencing between judges is one of the main reasons for studying judicial decision making. There are several factors that help in determining in the degree of punishment that a judge will impose on an offender. Most of the time in criminal cases, a parole officer gives judges a recommendation after examining the facts, and looking at the aggravating and mitigating circumstances surrounding a case (Carp and Stidham 1983, 183). Probation is the lightest sentence that can be given. This sentence usually implemented in minor, non-violent cases or in instances where the offender is not likely to re-offend. When an actual jail or prison sentence is imposed, a judge must at least sentence the offender to the minimum jail time required by law for the
particular offense. In addition, extra jail time can be added to the sentence to account for repeat offenders, and aggravating circumstances.

B. Sentencing Guidelines

Due to the wide range of sentences imposed by different judges for similar offenses, Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, and the Sentence Reform Act of 1987. These acts set down a sentencing table with minimum guidelines for sentencing. The tables allow deviation only for mitigating and aggravating circumstances (Carp and Stidham 1983, 184). While there is some evidence that suggests that judges do not always follow the general sentencing guidelines, the likelihood of reversal upon appeal is greater if the guidelines are not followed. Given the reputation associated with having rulings overturned, most judges do not stray considerably from the guidelines (Baum 1997, 87).

C. The Effects of the Plea Bargain

Many judges have begun urging parties to settle out of court. According to a 1997 study of the Northern Texas region by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, out of 1,080 total cases, 989 were plead out and only 91 were tried (Fiscal 1997). The necessities of the plea bargain come about because of the large workload, and in order to reduce the time and difficulty of reaching a decision. Cases that are clear cut are often settled out of court. Most cases that do go to trial do so because they are close cases that are more difficult to decide (Baum 1997, 68).
IV. Study

A. Hypothesis

Since the objective of this study is to determine the effects of gender and other social factors on judicial decision making, it is focused on sexual assault cases in the Texas State court system. These cases were examined at the trial court level and date from 1993 to March 2001. The cases were selected from the state trial courts because they have the greatest number of judges, and therefore, the greatest number of female judges. It is hypothesized that female judges would place harsher sentences on offenders than male judges for two reasons. First, because sexual assault cases usually cast women as the victims, and second, because the rights of the victims are not in conflict with the interests of the community, it is expected those women will empathize with the victims. Furthermore, it is expected that Republican judges and those who sit in an urban area will impose harsher sentences on the offenders. As for the factors surrounding the case, it is expected that aggravating factors, the number of counts the defendant is charged with, and the age of the victim will all have an influence on the judge's decision. It is expected that as aggravating circumstances and the number of counts increase, so will the severity of the sentence. It is also expected that offenders will be given a tougher sentence for assaulting children than for assaulting adults.

B. Research Design

The study included 45 judges, 7 of which were female. All of the female judges were either appointed by or elected as a Republican. There are 6 Democrats in the study, all male. Of the defendants included, 4 are women, 5 are undetermined, and 254 are males. There are 263 cases in the data set. Two sets of tables were tabulated, each with a
different dependent variable. The first set of tables (Tables 1-3) looked at all the cases in which a life sentence (sentence equaling 100 years) was given and used life (coded as 0=no, 1=yes) as the dependent variable. These tables ran a logistical analysis, which initially included all 263 cases. Table 4 was a tabulation making a direct comparison between party affiliation and a life sentence. The second set of tables (Tables 5 and 6) looked at the cases and used sentence (measured in jail time received up to 99 years) as the dependent variable. Sixty-seven cases were deleted from these tables because all of the cases in which a life sentence was given were excluded. Since the variable ranges from 0-99 years, a regression analysis was run. The two variables were used to compensate for the fact that life was placed at 100 years, so that the data was not skewed. Both tables included some variation of independent variables.

C. Independent Variables

1. The gender of the trial judge

This is measured as either a 0 for males, or a 1 for females. It is expected that this variable would have a positive correlation to the dependent variables in both tables. This variable was included in all 263 cases.

2. The party affiliation of the judge

This is measured as either a 0 if they were appointed by or elected as a Republican or as a 1 if they were appointed by or elected as a Democrat. It is expected that this variable will have a negative correlation to the dependent variable in each table because Republicans are expected to hand down harsher sentences than Democrats. This variable was included in all 263 cases.

3. Whether or not the victim of the sexual assault was a child or an adult
This is measured as a 0 for victims over the age of 18, or as a 1 for victims under the age of 18. It is expected that this variable will have a negative correlation to the dependent variable. This variable included 145 cases.

4. Whether or not the sexual assault was aggravated

This is measured as a 0 for non-aggravated and a 1 for aggravated. This is expected to have a strong, positive correlation to the dependent variable because the harsher the assault, the harsher the punishment should be. This variable was included in 157 cases.

5. Whether or not the offender committed another crime at the same time as the sexual assault. This variable was measured in two categories. It was measured first by whether or not a robbery had been committed (coded 0 for no and 1 for yes). Second it was measured by whether or not a kidnapping had been committed (coded 0 for no and 1 for yes). Also, included in this area is the independent variable labeled counts. This variable will measure the number of counts that a person is charged with. Since this measures basically the same as the kidnapping and robbery variable, all will be considered, but ultimately only one will be included in most tables. These variables were included in 256 cases.

6. Whether or not the judge held a seat in Dallas County or in a neighboring county.

This was measured as a 0 for all counties other than Dallas, and a 1 for Dallas County. It is expected that this will have a positive correlation to the dependent variable because Dallas is the most urban county of those included in the study and urban judges should be more apt to give offenders higher sentences. This variable was included in all 263 cases.

D. Results:
Following are each of the tables run with the data set collected for this research. The data was collected from a search of all sexual assault cases under the search string of Dallas, 5th Court of Appeals, on the courtstuff.com website. Several tables with varying dependent and independent variables were run to insure that the data was being analyzed in a thorough manner. There were 263 initial cases entered into the statistical program, however, since some information was unobtainable, most tables consist of only 100-200 cases. When an appellate decision was not yet rendered, the specific facts of the cases could not be included, and only the trial court name and gender, and punishment were recorded.

[Table One see pg. 21]

Table One consists of a logistical analysis with a life sentence as the dependent variable. The independent variables included aggravating factors, whether or not the victim was a child, the number of counts the person was charged with, whether or not a kidnapping or robbery took place concurrently, the gender of the trial judge, and whether or not the judge sat in Dallas. This table included 145 observations. According to the pseudo R2, the variables explained about 23% of the reasoning behind the life sentence. As expected, the aggravating factor was very significant to the .01 level in determining if the offender would receive a life sentence or not. The only other variable that reached the level of significance is the Dallas variable. It was significant to the .05 level in the expected direction. The variable, which dealt with the number of counts that the offender was charged with, actually went in the opposite direction than was expected. This means that the more crimes that a defendant was charged with, the less chance he/she has of
being given a life sentence. One explanation for this odd occurrence could be the fact that in the collection and coding of the data, instances in which there were more than one charge were coded as separate cases with the count being 1, instead of one case with a count greater than 1. The variable dealing with whether or not the victim is a child or an adult went in the opposite direction as well. This indicates that judges are more likely to impose a life sentence if the victim is an adult instead of a child. The robbery and kidnapping charges did go in the expected direction, however they did not reach the level of significance. Finally, the gender variable did not go in the expected direction. Women ended up being less likely than men to impose a life sentence.

[Table Two, see pg.22]

Table Two is very similar to Table One except that the kidnapping and robbery variables were excluded. This was done in order to insure that those variables are not dependent on the aggravating or counts factors, thus skewing those results. The pseudo R2 for this table is fairly consistent with Table One at about 22%. The aggravating variable does not seem to have altered at all. However, the Dallas variables have become slightly more significant and the gender variable has become less significant. The child variable continues to have a negative correlation. Since there is not a significant change between the two tables, we can assume that the robbery and kidnapping variable were running independent of the aggravating variable.

Left out of the above models was the party affiliation variable. This was done in order to fairly measure both the effects of gender and party affiliation. Since all of the women in the model are affiliated with the Republican party and all of the Democrats are men, the two variables must be measured separately. Table 3 excluded trial judge gender
and replaced it with party affiliation. However, when the table was run, party affiliation was dropped because it measured the life variable almost perfectly, see Table 4. When party affiliation was dropped, the number of cases dropped to 128. The independent variable dealing with the aggravating factor remained significant, however the Dallas variable is no longer significant. The child variable is still headed in the opposite direction than was hypothesized. The pseudo R2 in Table 3 has dropped to roughly 18%.

[Table 3, see pg. 23]

[Table 4, see pg. 24]

The next set of tables use sentence (measured in years) as the dependent variable. This was done to compensate for the life variable being measured as 100 years. It was important to measure the effect of the independent variables on the range of sentences. Some judges are not comfortable giving a life sentence to a defendant for a first offense, or they may have thought that the circumstances of the crime did not warrant a life sentence. It is, however, still necessary to measure which factors are important in determining the length of the sentence. Table 5 includes aggravating factors, child, counts, and Dallas.

[Table 5, see pg. 25]

Table 5 includes only 105 cases. This is due to the exclusion of the cases in which a life sentence was given. There were also several cases where exact sentences could not be determined. With an adjusted R2 of about 19%, this model does not explain the same amount of the influences on sentencing decisions as the life variable does. The variable measuring aggravating factors is still significant in the expected direction to the .01 level. However, the variable dealing with whether or not the victim was a child is not
significant, but it now has a positive correlation. This means that the sentence is higher when the victim is a child. The variable measuring whether the judge sits in Dallas County is no longer significant, and is headed in the opposite direction from Table 3. Interestingly, while party affiliation, in previous models, was almost an exact indicator of whether or not a judge would give life as a punishment, in this model it did not even rise to the level of significance. However, it does appear from the table that Republicans are still somewhat more likely to hand down a tougher sentence. The variable measuring the counts the defendant is charged with is still not significant, but it is now headed in the expected direction.

[Table 6, see pg. 26]

Table 6 measures the influence of gender on the level of sentence that a judge will give to the defendant. With an adjusted R2 of about 21%, it explains slightly more than does Table 5 which looked at party affiliation. This table contains 109 cases. As with Table 5, only the aggravating variable is significant. Child continues to be insignificant in the direction that was expected. The Dallas variable is insignificant but the correlation is negative instead of positive. The variable measuring counts is insignificant, but it does have a positive correlation as was expected. Finally, in regards to the gender variable, it continues to be insignificant. It does, however, have a positive correlation as was hypothesized, and it is headed towards becoming significant.

Since the gender variable points toward the direction expected, a direct comparison between all the cases that involved a child was included. Of the 20 cases where the victim was a child and the judge was a woman, the lowest sentence was 0 years and the highest was 99 years. The average sentence for that data set was 30 years with a
median of 20. In contrast, there were 30 cases in which the victim was a child and the judge was a male. Once again, the sentences ranged from 0-99 years. However, the average number of years went up slightly to 34.4 years with a median of 30 years. This implies that while there is not much of a difference in sentencing practices, male judges do impose slightly tougher sentences when the victim is a child. Of particular interest, though, is the outcome when the victim is an adult. Of the 15 cases in which the judge was a female, the sentences ranged from 5-99 years, with an average of 31.8 years and a median of 22 years. Not only is this higher than the sentencing pattern for females when the victim is a child, it is also higher than the sentencing pattern when the victim is an adult and the judge is a male. There were 44 such cases with sentences ranging from 0-80 years with an average of 14.05 years and a median of 10 years. As is evident, when the victim is a child, the sentencing patterns between males and females are fairly even. When the victim is an adult, though, the sentencing patterns indicate that women are more likely to sentence the defendant to twice as long of a sentence than their male colleagues.

V. Discussion

There was not much difference in the pseudo R2 of Table 2 and Table 6, both of which used the trial court judges gender as a variable, but differed on the dependent variable. There also was not a significant difference between the pseudo R2 of Table 3 and Table 5, which included the variable for party affiliation. Even thought the party affiliation was almost an exact indicator in Table 3, the tables using the gender variable tended to explain 2-5% more than the tables using party affiliation.
A. Variable Aggravate

As expected, the aggravating factor was significant to the .01 level in every table it was included in. This means that if the offense was aggravated than it received a higher sentence than if it was not. This was overwhelmingly the biggest indicator of the level of sentence that would be received.

B. Variable Dallas

This variable was significant only in Table 1 and Table 2, which were logistical measures of life including the gender variable. Though not significant, the Dallas variable was a fair indicator in Table 3 where the party affiliation variable was included. In Tables 5 and 6, which used the sentence as the dependent variable, the level of explanation is moving farther away from the level of significance. In these tables, the Dallas variable also has a negative correlation to the dependent variable. This means that judges in Dallas County are more likely to give a life sentence than their colleagues in less urban counties. However, the judges in the other counties are more likely to hand down longer sentences, up to 99 years, than are those judges in Dallas county. This somewhat supports the hypothesis that urban judges are more likely to hand down a tougher sentence than their colleagues in less urban counties.

C. Variable Counts

This variable never reached the level of significance. In Tables 1-3, it had a negative correlation to the probability that a judge would impose life. While it did have a positive correlation in Tables 5 and 6, it was insignificant. Since most of the cases in which the defendant was charged with more than one offense were broken up and treated
as separate cases, this variable is not a good indicator of what influences judicial
decision making.

D. Variable child

This variable never reached the level of significance in the direction expected.
While the data indicates that defendants who are convicted of sexually abusing children
are less likely to receive a life sentence, it does show that on average they will receive a
higher sentence, up to 99 years, than those who are convicted of sexually abusing an
adult.

E. Variable gender

This variable also does not reach the level of significance in any of the tables.
Tables 1 and 2 show a negative correlation between female judges and the likelihood of
imposing a life sentence. However, looking at Table 6, which uses sentence as the
dependant variable, the correlation is positive. Looking at the breakdown of cases in
which the child variable was included, the data supports the hypothesis that women will
impose higher sentences than men. This is only the case, though, if the victim is an adult.
Since, the difference between the male and female judges in these cases were so different,
it does lend support to the hypothesis that female judges will support the rights of persons
who are somehow discriminated against and excluded from society. Victims of sexual
assault fall into this category because their bodies have been violated and their personal
liberties were intruded upon. Previous studies have suggested that female judges tend to
be more likely to defend the rights of persons who have had their personal liberties
violated as long as there is no conflict with the rights of the community. This is precisely
the case when dealing with sexual assault victims.
F. Variable party affiliation

This variable reached the level of significance only in Table 3, which used the dependant variable of life. It had to be excluded as a variable in that table because it was a near perfect indicator of whether or not a life sentence would be imposed. Looking at Table 4, of the 60 cases in which a life sentence was imposed, only 1 was by a Democrat. However, the division along party lines is not as apparent when looking at Table 5. When the dependant variable has been changed from life to sentence, party affiliation is no longer significant. It still has a negative correlation, which means that Republicans are still slightly more likely to impose a higher sentence than Democrats. One explanation could be that, instead of giving a sentence of 80 years, a Republican would be more inclined to impose a life sentence.

VI. Conclusion

This particular data set had several limitations which, if compensated for in the future, could lead to more significant results. The major shortcoming was the lack of diversity in gender and in party affiliation. Of the 263 cases considered, only 13 were decided by a Democrat. Perhaps in a more politically diverse area than the counties in North Texas we could receive a more accurate picture of the true influence of political affiliation on judicial decision making. Similarly, while there is some evidence supporting the idea that men and women will derive different conclusions when looking at the same facts in a case, there needs to be a larger pool than 7 female judges out of 45. This is a problem that has been faced by persons wanting to measure the effects of gender on judicial decision making for the past 30 years. However, the judicial body is becoming more diversified and, hopefully, in the next decade there will be enough women in the judiciary
that accurate measures of the influences on their judicial decision making can be measured. One other interesting factor, which should be looked at more in depth, is the child factor. While in this data set it never reached significance, there was a definite difference in the sentencing habits of judges when the victim is a child as opposed to an adult. In future research, this variable has the possibility of explaining alternate influences on judicial decision making.
Table One

Logit estimates

| life          | Coef.    | Std. Err. | z      | P>|z| |
|---------------|----------|-----------|--------|------|
| aggravat      | 3.105497 | .8246638  | 3.766**|      |
| child         | -1.250417| .5074587  | -2.464 |      |
| counts        | -1.214353| .6523314  | -1.862 |      |
| robbery       | 1.226529 | 1.028283  | 1.193  |      |
| kidnap        | .0087131 | .8578152  | 0.010  |      |
| gender_t      | -1.852302| .5088513  | -0.364 |      |
| dallas        | 1.634785 | .8123742  | 2.012* |      |

* p<.05
** p<.01
Table Two

Logit estimates

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<th>Std. Err.</th>
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* p<.05
** p<.01
Table Three

Note: partyaff~=0 predicts failure perfectly
partyaff dropped and 6 obs not used

Logit estimates

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<th>Std. Err.</th>
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Number of obs = 128
LR chi2(4) = 24.87
Prob > chi2 = 0.0001
Log likelihood = -57.26264
Pseudo R2 = 0.1784

* p<.05
** p<.01
Table Four

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<td>Total</td>
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Table Five

.drop if life==1
(67 observations deleted)

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<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>14344.6046</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2868.92093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>47591.0525</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>480.717702</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>61935.6571</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>595.535165</td>
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Number of obs = 105
F( 5, 99) = 5.97
Prob > F = 0.0001
R-squared = 0.2316
Adj R-squared = 0.1928
Root MSE = 21.925

<table>
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<tr>
<th>sentence</th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>aggravat</td>
<td>20.21669</td>
<td>4.751942</td>
<td>4.254**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>child</td>
<td>6.668018</td>
<td>4.732589</td>
<td>1.409</td>
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<td>counts</td>
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<td>4.31546</td>
<td>1.157</td>
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<tr>
<td>partyaff</td>
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<td>10.00119</td>
<td>-0.472</td>
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<tr>
<td>dallas</td>
<td>-2.816605</td>
<td>5.582482</td>
<td>-0.505</td>
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* p<.05
** p<.01
Table Six

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>15650.1294</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3130.02589</td>
<td>F( 5, 103) = 6.83</td>
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<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>47205.8797</td>
<td>103</td>
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<td>Prob &gt; F = 0.0000</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>108</td>
<td>582.000085</td>
<td>R-squared = 0.2490</td>
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Number of obs = 109
F( 5, 103) = 6.83
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.2490
Adj R-squared = 0.2125
Root MSE = 21.408

<table>
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<td>-0.508</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05
** p<.01
References


