Russian National Security Policy and the Enlargement of NATO

Senior Honors Colloquium
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Introduction

On 28 Sept 1995, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) published its internal study on its potential enlargement to include new member nations from Central and Eastern Europe. This study has served to clarify how NATO will enlarge, the principles to guide this process and the implications of membership (Fact Sheet NIDS 29.9.95). Amongst its conclusions, NATO has determined that new members will be guaranteed full protection under the collective security component of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, including the supreme guarantee of the Alliance’s strategic nuclear force, and that no country outside the alliance, including Russia, will be given the right or ability to veto new membership. Further, the Alliance will not be subordinated to any other European security institution (NATO Study 3-5).

The next day, Komsomol’skaya Pravda reported that the General Staff of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has composed a new draft military doctrine to meet the perceived threat from NATO’s expansion. According to the newspaper, the draft document warns that Russia will re-deploy tactical nuclear weapons in western Russia, Belarus, Kaliningrad, and on warships and submarines of the Russian Baltic Fleet. Further, any attempt by NATO to grant membership to the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia will provoke an immediate invasion of the Baltics by Russian troops. Any attempt on the part of NATO to resist this will be considered by Russia as a prelude to a global nuclear catastrophe (Kom Pravda Advab no. 1010 2).
As the belligerent nature of these statements indicates, our hopes for a strategic partnership between the United States and Russia in the post-Cold War world have greatly diminished. International and economic cooperation are being shunted aside as each side is increasingly relying on a military vocabulary in dealing with one another. Once again, security issues are becoming the pre-dominant lens with which we view relations between Russia and the West. Instead of a new world order of multilateral cooperation, a cold peace seems to be settling across central and eastern Europe. There are a multiplicity of reasons for this increased perception of military threats by each side: the reemergence of communist elites, ultranationalism, difficulties over policies in Bosnia and the Middle East, NATO’s determination to expand eastward, a confused U.S. foreign policy, and Russia’s reliance on its military in pursuing its own foreign policy. Although the number of conferences, think tank discussions, and high-level negotiations has proliferated in the last five years, each side is pursuing national security policies that virtually ignore the interests of the other side. This yet furthers the widening gap in perceptions between Russia and the West.

In exploring the faultlines and dynamics of these increasing military tensions, this paper will concentrate on two issues: the enlargement of NATO and Russia’s activist foreign policy in the near abroad (a geographic area loosely defined as those former states of the Soviet Union and encompassing Russia’s sphere of influence). This is not an arbitrary choice. I will attempt to demonstrate the interlocking relationship between these two trends and how they are mutually proliferating a potential conflict. The greater the threat Russia perceives from the West, the more it will attempt
to consolidate its power in the near abroad using diplomatic pressure or outright military force to secure its interests. Likewise, the more assertive Russia’s foreign policy becomes, the greater the pressure and necessity is to enlarge NATO into central and eastern Europe.

The first half of this paper will explore the future of NATO in the post-Cold War era. It will focus on NATO’s attempts to adapt its mandate to a changing global environment and the new threats that it may face. Further consideration will be given to NATO’s role in the broader architecture of European security, a larger process that includes the European Union, the Western European Union, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Finally, the process of NATO’s enlargement into east-central Europe will be examined in some detail.

The second half is devoted to the changes that are happening in Russia’s national security policy. Russian political and military doctrine are observed to take on increasingly aggressive characteristics, as Russia re-asserts its strategic agenda. Last, I will examine the shape and content of Russia’s efforts to prevent NATO’s expansion and how its policies are pointing toward the beginning of a new Cold War.
I. The Future of NATO in Europe

Few would dispute the contention that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the most powerful military organization in the world. It represents the common resolution and commitment of the world’s richest and most powerful nations to collective security. Having achieved its primary objective of keeping the Soviet Union out of western Europe until that state’s internal dissolution, it is now searching for a new mandate and direction for the post-Cold War era and the 21st century. Critics have argued that now that the Soviet menace no longer exists, NATO’s very existence is no longer needed. They point out the emergence of other organizations that could potentially serve the interests of both Europe and North America in the very different international climate of the 1990’s. However, there seems to be a growing consensus amongst politicians and students of European affairs that NATO can still play a constructive role in promoting peace and stability in Europe.

What form should this new role for NATO take? Should it remain primarily a military alliance or would it serve a more appropriate role as a political organization with commitments and responsibilities in the economic, political, and social realm? Further, what new mandates or threat assessments should fuel NATO’s new functions in the broader architecture of European political development and security? Would these new directions for NATO be helped or hindered by the enlargement of its membership into Central and Eastern Europe? Last, what role should the United States play in this dramatic evolution of both NATO and the broader scope of European integration? The first half of this paper will attempt to shed some light on these queries.
A. The United States

Since its entry into World War II, the United States has played a leading role in the security of Europe. It maintained this role for half a century, up through the last days of the Cold War. In contrast to isolation during the preceding century, America's involvement in Europe came to be regarded as a natural state. American military forces turned the tide against Nazi Germany. President Roosevelt helped draw the lines of postwar Europe at Yalta. Secretary of State Marshall created the conditions for the reconstruction of Europe.

Washington became the mainstay of NATO, which kept the members of the alliance secure and West Berlin free. After President Kennedy, the United States took the lead in gradually building up an arms-control regime with the Soviet Union which aimed at keeping the peace in Europe at a lower level of military confrontation. The Bush administration played a key role in the unification of Germany in 1990. Throughout this entire period the United States has been committed to a transatlantic relationship in which the US undertook to lead the effort to keep the alliance secure. In contrast, the end of the Cold War has brought warnings of overextension and decline in American power. The break-up of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the Soviet communist threat removed the energizing element that triggered American leadership for the duration of the Cold War years. Greater emphasis on the American domestic agenda has produced public attitudes that no longer accept the premise that the United States should continue to exert a major effort to provide security in Europe when the familiar threat to Europe's security has seemingly
vanished. Now, congressional opinion questions American commitments abroad, and their costs. Some academic voices call for a policy that would detach America from Europe, cease what they regard as an unnecessary drain on U.S. resources, and withdraw from overseas commitments. In short, the proposition that America plays a natural role in the security of Europe is under challenge. The future of the American involvement with Europe will be neither a whole-hearted commitment to assume the lead on all major issues -- and the major costs such a commitment would entail -- nor an abandonment of previous American responsibilities.

The United States position will be something in between. However, the debate on just what this position should be has just begun. The outcome remains to be shaped. President Clinton has sketched his administration's view of the U.S. role with respect to Europe in three addresses during 1994 in Brussels, Paris, and Berlin (Layne and Schwarz 523). He sees America and Europe as part of a larger economic relationship, including Japan and other countries, that together can provide jobs and prosperity through trade under free market conditions. He has given assurance of a continuing American role in Europe and pledged a continued U.S. military force presence at the level of 100,000 troops. The Clinton administration has welcomed the intention of the countries of the European Union to create a European security identity and, ultimately, a European defense identity. It has proposed the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), based on the notion that European defense efforts can be separable but not separate from those of the United States. It has talked about Europe as one entity, building on President Bush's concept of one Europe
whole and free. It has pursued a relationship with Russia that seeks to maximize common objectives.

Above all, it has restated the importance it attaches to NATO and propagated the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program that seeks to promote closer working relationships with the military forces and defense officials of non-NATO countries. These factors notwithstanding, Europeans and others are still left with questions about America's future role on the continent. Events in Somalia have lessened Washington's earlier emphasis on assertive multi-lateralism, a doctrine advanced by U.S. United Nations Ambassador Madeleine Albright. American reluctance to shed the blood of its ground troops has caused grave concern amongst our European allies about the credibility and resolve of American commitments. The current public debate over the use of American ground troops in the Bosnian peace settlement has done little to alleviate Allied doubts. Indeed, earlier official American suggestions that Bosnia was a European problem -- rather than an out-of-area alliance problem to be tackled in first instance by Europeans -- raised questions whether Washington might be abandoning the proposition that alliance security is indivisible. A drawn-out conflict involving U.S. peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia could further erode alliance cohesion if open conflict were to erupt.

This is not an isolated instance. The long list of conditions for American participation in peacekeeping -- catalogued in Presidential Decision Document 25 -- has, if anything, increased those doubts. The case of Haiti, which revealed strong public and congressional opposition to the threatened U.S. use of force, does little to
add assurance. The debate about a new national security strategy for the United States -- and the issue of the U.S. role on Europe -- in the post-Cold War era will find an American public that is profoundly ambivalent about the role the United States should play. The debate will have elements of four different approaches (Levin MR-365-A). One is realism, based on a perceived need to maintain stable security balances in regions important to the United States, including Europe. Another is collective security, seeking security through cooperative arrangements and extending these as conditions permit. A third is democratic internationalism, based on the spread of liberal values. The last is strategic independence, a United States seeking to protect its interests mainly by itself. Whatever the outcome of the debate, it is likely to bear marks of each of these four approaches. As to Europe, the likely outcome is some combination of the first and the second. NATO provided balance of power during the Cold War. The new tasks of collective security and crisis management still need to be put to the test. In his address to a Berlin audience on 9 September 1994, Vice-President Gore spoke of a world facing a profound transition, asserting that the United States and its allies need to rethink the very meaning of European security (Gore Speech Press Release). The evocation of this objective came upon the heels of persistent official American encouragement for Germany to play a greater role in shaping the future of Europe. It can be anticipated that with the strategic change in the situation in Europe, the United States will seek a reallocation of responsibilities. Congress is likely to insist on new terms for burden-sharing with America's NATO allies. At the same time, the United States is likely to link continued support to the
enlargement of European institutions -- NATO, the European Union (EU), and the Western European Union (WEU) -- to encompass other countries that wish to join, thereby expanding security eastward. Finally, Washington is likely to recognize that the creation of greater trust, understanding, and cooperation with the countries that do not now belong to West European institutions will be to a large extent a function not so much of governments but of the private sector.

**B. Current Threats Facing the Alliance**

A redefined U.S. role in Europe will have to respond to an entirely new situation. Previous NATO perceptions of security were mostly if not exclusively preoccupied with the danger of a military threat from across national borders. The main threat from across national borders. The main threat during the Cold War --except for the case of a strategic nuclear exchange -- was a thrust of conventional Soviet armies across the northern plain of Germany. In the course of just a few years, this threat has now given way to a different threat, perhaps less ominous but in different ways as dangerous, and certainly more complex. Threat is now perceived in broader terms. Today's threat is instability in Central and Eastern Europe and war in the Balkans. It involves ethnic and religious conflict and nationalism. It is lack of economic progress. It includes structural unemployment. It has to do with environmental degradation. It includes drugs and disease. It embraces terrorism. Many of these threats, moreover, are of a nature such that they cannot be met by military force. The task for Western Europe is no longer mainly to be able to deter possible Soviet aggression. The principal task, instead, is to deal with the feeling of insecurity in Central and
Eastern Europe and to cement that region's relationship to the rest of Europe (Brzezinski in NYT 17). The objective is better security for the countries of east-central Europe with the West and among themselves. Prudence, though, would require that Western countries also maintain the capacity to dissuade any possible Russian expansionism, and deal with it should it occur. Such a stance requires the maintenance of credible military forces. It requires NATO to be ready, if necessary, to balance Russian power and to provide a counter-balance to possible future Russian expansionism. From Russia, threats can be seen in various ways. One is that NATO continues to have potentially aggressive designs. This attitude feeds on long habits of thought. It remains present particularly among the military. Another is a fear of exclusion and rejection. Coming on the heels of a strategic withdrawal the dimensions of which must be clear to even the most casual Russian observer, such a perception sits uneasily, at best, with notions of Russian self-esteem. A third is the possibility that Russia might not be able to obtain assistance from the major developed countries, even though such assistance would be available to countries in Eastern Europe. Those countries in Central and Eastern Europe mostly worry about a recurring threat from the east, either because of instability on the western Russian periphery or because of nascent Russian designs for influence. They also worry that instability, resulting from faltering economic and political reform could make them easy targets for Russian expansionism. Their urgent objective is to secure the maximum dose of economic and political security from the West. They seek to achieve this objective by joining Western organizations, in particular NATO and the EU. Finally, the countries in
Western Europe are facing wholesale domestic political and economic change at an unprecedented pace. Mass education, instant communications, rapidly changing political structures, structural unemployment seemingly impervious to correction, and what is now a questioning of Western values (Havel NY Review of Books 3) are, if not a threat to the national states that are going through this experience, at least significant obstacles to the search for clear and politically acceptable ways in which to approach the issue of European security.

C. NATO's New Mandates

The new situation in Europe requires NATO as presently constituted to deal with two challenges. The first is to keep its members together around a new purpose. The second is to help stabilize eastern Europe. The likelihood that NATO will be able to meet these challenges is subject to question on both counts.

Staying Together

The original task of NATO was to deter and respond to the Soviet political and military threat. The likelihood of such a threat on the part of Russia has, however, greatly diminished. The strategic situation in east-central Europe has changed. Russian troops are no longer stationed in Germany but have withdrawn east of the Ukraine-Russian border. Soviet military power has lost its edge. Poland and Ukraine are now independent states. At best, NATO faces a reduced residual task of guarding against a possible revival of a threat from Russia, and of continuing to safeguard member states on NATO's flanks -- Norway and Turkey -- as they continue to face substantial Russian military power. NATO's ability to meet military threats has been much
reduced. The alliance continues to maintain the integrated command structure, the advantages of interoperability, and its established chain of command, with proven responsiveness to political guidance from the NATO Council of Ministers. However, NATO force strength has declined sharply, thus lowering military capacity. Moreover, stringent budget requirements are likely to further erode force levels, modernization, and training. NATO preparedness has also suffered, with smaller force levels not yet equipped, nor mobile, to meet Alliance unity to deal with new challenges. Rather than plan in detail to meet a Soviet threat along the east-west divide of the Cold War, NATO military planners face uncertainty. It is not enough for them, as it once was, to have prepared for conflict on the central front. Today, they face the need to respond to situations covering a large part of Europe and a broad range of possible conflicts (Strategic Concept S-1 (91) 86). Moreover, these conflicts are most likely to arise not at NATO’s borders, but out of area, in countries outside and perhaps not even contiguous to the territory of the members of NATO. In the face of uncertainty, NATO members are likely to differ in matters of threat perception, the nature of national (or Alliance) interests that are affected, the willingness to take action, and the capacity of doing so. Not least, it will be more difficult to generate the domestic political support that is essential to effective NATO action when the nature of the threat no longer is Soviet communism but merely ill-defined instability. Under these circumstances, Alliance unity will be difficult to maintain. Fissures in the Alliance on the issue of a response to a threat to a NATO member appeared already in 1991. As the U.S. and its allies were gearing up for Desert Storm, Turkey, feeling threatened by Iraq,
requested NATO assistance in the form of the air element of the ACE Mobile Force. This led to a debate in the Bundestag. It was the position of some members of the German parliament that if Turkey had through its own actions triggered the Iraqi threat, Germany would not be under an obligation to respond. This episode was a vivid alert to the uncertainties of how the Three Musketeers principle of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty -- one for all and all for one -- will be applied in practice (van Hueven 18). With the changes in Europe, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty must now be understood in the light of new circumstances. Years of NATO practice assumed that the allies were each mutually committed to each other's defense. A long string of NATO communiques ringingly asserted Alliance unity of purpose. The integrated military command was a guarantee of concerted military readiness and action, if required. Despite major difficulties -- including the adoption of the strategy of flexible response during the Kennedy administration and the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in the late seventies -- the Alliance held together.

Today, the threat has changed and alliance unity may not be what it was before. The German response to the Turkish request for help in 1991 is instructive. Another such call today is even more likely to cause diplomatic activity rather than quick military help. Alliance unity may not operate today the way it did in the past. Furthermore, the United States now supports a European security identity and a European defense effort. At the January 1994 NATO summit meeting in Brussels, President Clinton abandoned the previous American reservations about European efforts to establish their own approach to security. In doing so, Washington bowed belatedly to
the inevitable. Ever since the Gulf War, Western European countries have been
determined to gain greater control over their security policy, especially as they
perceived a lessening of the American role on the continent.

The new U.S. position, however, now encourages and supports efforts of the
European members of the Alliance to proceed with the strengthening of their own
security identity -- as the European pillar of NATO -- within the Western European
Union, the establishment of their own military capacity -- mostly around the so-called
Eurocorps -- and their own defense policies. The theory is that this will enable Euro-
pean countries to undertake military action in cases when the U.S. does not want to
participate but agrees to European use of NATO military assets. This approach is
based on the notion that this will provide a separable but not separate European
defense capacity. But as the words indicate, this approach weakens the long-standing
principle that Alliance security is indivisible. It will inevitably have a decoupling effect.
The problem is aggravated by the concept of combined joint task forces (CJTFs). This
concept received impetus at the January 1994 NATO summit, though implementation
still has to get off the ground. The idea is to shape different force packages with which
to be able to meet different contingencies. An inevitable side effect, though, is to leave
the impression that NATO security is no longer indivisible. Thus, we seem to have
arrived at a situation where the linkage of the U.S. to European defense -- long the
bedrock of European NATO security -- is subject to erosion. What this means is that in
the face of some threats, Alliance countries will not be able to assume that the NATO
countries will all face the threat together.
Instead, they will be faced with the need to build coalitions of the willing and able, depending on the circumstances. Doing so will gain desirable flexibility to meet new contingencies. This approach will, however, sacrifice the unity that used to provide NATO with its strength and that gave credibility to deterrence.

**Central and Eastern Europe**

In dealing with the question whether NATO can stabilize east-central Europe, the case of the former Yugoslavia is instructive. NATO communiques have described it as a serious threat in international peace and security. These words, however, hide sharp disagreements. The continuing war from 1991 to 1995 clearly constituted such a threat. Throughout this period, however, a wide range of views existed among NATO members about the seriousness of the threat. These disagreements related to the extent of the threat -- local, regional, continental, or international. They involved its nature -- humanitarian, territorial, ethnic, religious, or nationalistic. They have to do with its consequences -- refugees, spillover, apparent sanctioning of unwanted precedents, regional war, and major power conflict by proxy. At the time, there were a number of disagreements underlying sharply differing prescriptions among NATO allies -- as within the United States -- for dealing with the situation: use air power (Zimmerman p.C1); impose a cold war on Serbia (Gompers p. 30); lift the arms embargo on Bosnia; or get ready to deal with Serbia since, after the fighting subsides, that country would be the regional hegemonic power. These disagreements were accentuated by differing degrees of willingness and/or ability of NATO countries to become involved by diplomacy or with military forces, despite strong popular
sentiment that outside powers should act to stem the conflict and prevent violations of human rights. For four years, NATO had been handicapped by working under a UN mandate. This mandate -- containing an internally contradictory mix of a traditional neutral role of keeping the warring parties apart but a partisan role of repelling aggression and of punishing war crimes -- had the effect of rendering the NATO military effort of limited consequence.

In the last year of the UN's peace-keeping mandate, these restrictions were relaxed -- allowing the United States and NATO to pursue a much more vigorous campaign of enforcement. A combination of intensive air strikes, an augmented ground presence, a combined Bosnian-Croat offensive, international outrage at Serb atrocities, and the accumulative effect of sanctions on Serbia proper finally led to an earnest round of negotiations conducted in Dayton, Ohio in November. President Milosevic of Serbia, having secured the reluctant assent of the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate on their behalf, seemingly reversed his own pursuit of a Geater Serbia by signing a peace accord with the presidents of Croatia and Bosnia. The Dayton Accords created a new federation in Bosnia, giving the Bosnians and Croats a majority of the territory (this largely reflected battlefield possessions by November after the Bosnian-Croat offensive). It further obliged the combatants to a military withdrawal and de-escalation to be monitored by a NATO peace-keeping force of over 400,000 troops.

Once considered a dismal failure in out-of-area operations, Bosnia has given NATO a second chance to prove its adaptability to the new strategic situation in
Europe. Interestingly, this development largely confirmed the necessity of a strong U.S. presence in NATO initiative and leadership. While the NATO troops are in danger of being targeted by renegade bands of combatants, the Dayton Accords call for robust response measures and rules of engagement to respond to acts of violence. Nevertheless, the United States and its allies should expect battlefield losses. The success or failure of NATO’s new mission in Bosnia and, indeed, the entire peace process in the former Yugoslavia remains to be seen. Consequently, NATO effectiveness out of area cannot be properly gauged. A number of considerations emerge from this difficult process, however. One, U.S. leadership is an essential component for any future NATO out-of-area operation or initiative. Two, NATO’s effectiveness is dependent on the political and operational restrictions placed on its objectives. Therefore, NATO’s decision-makers should carefully consider its future commitments and objectives. Three, no amount of force or success on the battlefield can properly replace political settlements to long-standing disputes in the long-term.

A Mediterranean Initiative

Beside the issues of whether NATO can remained unified in purpose and whether it can act effectively out of area, there is a further issue. This concerns a potential threat from the North African littoral. Here, too, a NATO role is by no means assured. The threat is vividly perceived in the European countries bordering the Mediterranean -- Spain, France, and Italy in particular. Yet this threat is hard to define. The upsurge of fundamentalism constitutes a significant element, as does the prospect of increased
pressures for immigration. Added to these concerns is a sense of military vulnerability. Italians recall the Libyan shell that landed on the island of Lampedusa. Furthermore, it is difficult to sketch clear countermeasures, except in domestic political terms. Following the killing of French officials in Algeria, Paris has significantly increased police surveillance of its Arab population. While any military threat emanating from the North African littoral could engage NATO, the NATO countries bordering on the Mediterranean are giving mixed signals whether they want NATO involved. They have been more energetic in trying to consult among themselves. This may be due to a mix of factors. One is that the attention of the other NATO countries and of the new Partners for Peace is cast exclusively in east-west terms. Another is that the NATO countries on the southern littoral may feel that by engaging the whole alliance, they might lose control of the way the issue is handled. This combination of factors is likely for now to keep the issue from occupying a major place on the NATO agenda. As long as the threat is perceived not so much in military as in political and economic terms, this situation is not likely to change.

However, should the military element gain in significance, NATO would be faced with two very different tasks -- one to the east, the other to the south. To manage both will not be easy. It will be even harder when, at some time in the future, NATO takes in new members.
D. The Broader Architecture of European Security

An assessment of NATO's new tasks requires a brief look at the roles of other key organizations and institutions. They form an integral part of the entire European setting and help shape its future. This survey demonstrates the diversity of European outlooks and the complexity of the issue of European unity. In doing so, one may gain a more comprehensive understanding of the broad architecture of European security. It is not one in which NATO is expected to fulfill all the necessary security requirements of the entire geographic area. Rather, NATO is envisioned to be but one option of a variable matrix of security alternatives -- each capable of performing certain functions as circumstances require. It is uncertain whether or not this confusing jungle of acronyms and commitments will ever be able to truly guarantee pan-European security for a broad spectrum of interests. Nevertheless, NATO's future is but one factor in a larger security arena. In particular, we shall look at the European Union, the Western European Union, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe as key determinants in this area.

The European Union

Perhaps the most dramatic element in the variable matrix of European integration is the European Union (EU). It has the potential to be a bold experiment in supra-national sovereignty and common interest in the economic, political, and military spheres. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty is the cornerstone of the Union's future evolution. The EU is pursuing prosperity through an elaborate and far-reaching program of trade liberalization. The Maastricht Treaty has also set it on the road toward
a common European security and defense identity (EDSI), and European defense. Efforts to give meaning to ESDI have yielded but scant concrete results. The EU is now facing its own enlargement process -- having added Austria, Finland, and Sweden to its membership on 1 Jan 1995. Further enlargement -- in particular by accession of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and perhaps Slovenia -- is but a matter of time. With respects to them, major hurdles remain. Arrangements will need to be made to mesh the economies of these new prospective east European members into the existing common market of the EU. These economic challenges notwithstanding, the drive toward political enlargement of the EU has strong momentum, even though there is much uncertainty of the nature of the EU that will result. These issues are scheduled to get a hearing at the forthcoming intergovernmental conference (IGC) on the future of the EU in 1996 (already being called Maastricht 2).

**The Western European Union (WEU)**

The EU’s defense capacity is in the hands of the WEU. The future of that organization, which now has an untested planning staff, no forces of its own and is about to get new and untested membership, with a yet-to-be-named Secretary-General, will be reviewed by the EU states in 1996. the WEU is meant to be open to all members of the EU. Thus, as the EU enlarges, so will the potential number of WEU members. This will pose the tricky issue of which membership shall come first, WEU or NATO. For now, the commitments of the WEU Treaty for common defense are matched in practice by weak organizational arrangements and by only a limited ability to field a modest array of national forces under WEU direction. There are several
proposals on the table to allot a certain proportion of members' NATO troop contributions to WEU exercises. The effect of such an arrangement may have a detrimental effect on NATO's cohesion and joint command.

The Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

The other organization that plays a significant though ill-understood role in European security is the OSCE. Once called the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), its institutional status has been upgraded to that of an organization, largely at the behest of Russia. This organization embraces Europe in a collective security system that has expanded to 57 countries, reaching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. It includes Russia, other former Soviet republics, and the United States. The signal contribution of OSCE since its establishment in Helsinki in 1975 has been the promulgation of principles of state conduct. Its current objective is to help provide a new and broader definition of the goals of a European security policy (Kornblum 20). At the 1990 Paris Summit, CSCE states committed themselves to democracy, free markets, and the rule of law as the foundation for their common security. OSCE now has a secretariat, a conflict prevention center, and office for human rights, and a High Commissioner for minorities. The scope of OSCE is broad, its mandate inclusive. It couples the widest possible participation with the support of common principles and standards of behaviour. In establishing the new definition of security, OSCE seeks to integrate all elements of modern society into a unified approach (Kornblum 23). While pursuing the objective of state conduct in conformity
with the baseline standards set at Helsinki, OSCE seeks voluntary compliance. It has no military forces.

Moscow touts it as the premier European security organization. Other members view it with varying degrees of confidence in its ability to contribute to European security. In the United States, OSCE is known little and understood less, though a cadre of foreign policy experts in the Clinton administration and the Congress have actively participated in OSCE’s work.

E. The Enlargement of NATO

The future roles of Russia and the United States in Europe intersect on the issue of NATO enlargement. American policy will seek to bring strategic stability to eastern European countries as they cope with necessary change toward economic and political reform. At the same time, American policy will seek to do this in a way that implies no adversarial relation with Russia, no intentions of encirclement, and no denigration of Russia’s status. The West tends to view Russian objections as an issue that can be simply corrected through education of NATO’s objectives and purposes. Nevertheless, Russia will seek to avoid marginalization with respect to issues of European security, and will continue to voice its opposition to NATO enlargement. East-central European countries -- Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia, in particular -- will press for NATO (and EU) membership. Others will not be far behind. Western European countries are, to the extent they have considered this issue at all, ambivalent about NATO enlargement.
Partnership for Peace

The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program launched at the January 1994 NATO summit was the optimum compromise that was acceptable under the circumstances. It responded imaginatively to the need to accommodate strong east European desires for association with NATO as the best way to obtain a sense of security. It was flexible enough to allow Russia to sign on 31 May 1995, though Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev has been subject to domestic criticism for committing Moscow. The PfP program has the virtue of flexibility. New partners can set the pace and extent of cooperation. This puts the initiative where it properly belongs. It has already provided the framework for joint exercises with Polish and Russian troops, Baltic troops with U.S. troops, and Czech with German troops, thereby taking the first step toward better cooperation among military forces.

Since the degree of partnership is set by each of the partners themselves with NATO, Russian attempts to use its partnership as a way to control the whole PfP process — should they occur — will not directly affect NATO partnership arrangements with other countries. PfP does have drawbacks, however. It puts emphasis on relations with each of the new partners separately. In due course, this pattern of interaction will need to be supplemented by increases bilateral and regional cooperation among the new partners themselves. Another drawback is cost. At present, this element is open-ended. As PfP activities grow, however, they will need to be funded. Candidate partners are likely to look for NATO financial assistance. This issue needs to be addressed. The most significant limitation of PfP, however, is that it does not address
directly the issue of NATO enlargement. PfP opens the door to consultations under Article IV of the NATO treaty (PfP founding document). The new partners, however, want security guarantees, under Article V. Since the program was launched, pressure has built up on NATO members to face the issue of security guarantees. It is too early to determine whether or not the Dayton Accords will be capable of stabilizing the situation in Bosnia and hostilities may re-erupt. Ukraine's difficulties with Russia over the Black Sea Fleet and the Crimean Peninsula have yet to be resolved to anyone's satisfaction and a crisis may yet develop. East European and Balkan tensions have grown; the tense relations between Macedonia and Greece are but one example. European integration is not working smoothly. Under these circumstances, PfP, while it is helpful, is widely seen in eastern Europe as insufficient. Critics of PfP argue that what is necessary now is a clear statement of American and western European priorities. PfP saw NATO through a challenging year. Now, however, the Alliance is under growing pressure to move on.

Enlargement

On 28 Sept 1995, NATO completed and published its internal study on enlargement. This document detailed the mechanisms by which NATO will enlarge, the principles to guide this process, and the implications of membership (NATO Press Release 29.9.95). Broadly speaking, discussion of these issues has focused on four questions: why, how, who, and when. Elaboration of these questions will clarify the assumptions and goals NATO takes on as it begins the process of enlarging its membership into east-central Europe.
Why NATO will enlarge

Fundamentally, NATO hopes that enlargement will further the process of enhancing security and extending stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. It will extend to new members the benefits of common defense and integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. In doing so, it is a threat to none. NATO will remain a purely defensive alliance whose chief objective is to preserve peace in Europe and to provide security to its members. Additionally, NATO enlargement is aimed at:

1. The support and encouragement of democratic reforms in eastern Europe, including the civilian and democratic control of the military.

2. Fostering patterns and habits of cooperation, consultation, and consensus building.

3. Increasing transparency in defense planning and budgets, thus increasing inter-state confidence.

4. Reinforcing the tendency towards European integration and cooperation.

5. Strengthening the Alliance's ability to contribute to European and international security to support both the UN and OSCE in their endeavors (Study on NATO Enlargement 1-2).

Principles of Enlargement (How?)

As per Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, Eastern European states will be admitted on a case by case basis, with unanimous approval by each nation and its legislature being required. Consequently, the U.S. Congress, like every other European parliament, will vote and have the ability to veto the admission of a prospective state. The only exception to this will be that newly admitted states cannot "shut the door" on other applicants. No non-NATO state, such as Russia, will have a veto of this
process. Parallel with this enlargement, NATO will conduct bilateral and multi-lateral negotiations with Russia within PfP and OSCE with the intent of solidifying a strategic NATO/Russian partnership. If possible, the result of these negotiations should be a comprehensive treaty clarifying this relationship (Study 2-4, 9).

Further, states with ethnic or territorial disputes must settle these disputes in accordance with OSCE principles before admission to NATO. The resolution of potential conflicts with its neighbors will certainly be a factor in any state gaining admission. Democratization and economic reform will also be criteria, though not singular reasons for exclusion (Study 2-3). NATO’s experience with Spain, Greece, and Turkey demonstrates its flexibility regarding its members’ political systems.

Last, prospective members must be able to contribute militarily to the collective security of the Alliance. This demands some standard of capability, the acceptance of NATO doctrine, and inter-operability. Although most of the applicants cannot hope to achieve full compliance with NATO’s inter-operability standards, C3I compatibility (command, control, communications, and intelligence) will be a minimum requirement (Study 17).

The most important dynamic of NATO enlargement is its security guarantee. In accord with the Washington Treaty, the Article 5 guarantees will be extended to its members. This includes full collective security protection using both conventional and nuclear weapons for all its members as necessary. There is no requirement that specifies that new member-nations must actually house NATO nuclear weapons on their soil, although Poland and the Czech Republic have indicated their willingness to
do so. This prompted President Yeltsin to threaten in mid-October that Russia would feel compelled to task its nuclear weapons at those countries in eastern Europe who accept nuclear weapons from NATO (Prism 13 Oct 1995).

Who will join?

This question has not been fully answered. Although neither NATO nor its members' governments have issued any official policy statements on the matter, we may speculate on some probable candidates to NATO membership. In all likelihood, the Visegrad four, namely Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia will be among the first to enter NATO. They are the farthest along the road to European integration of the former Warsaw Pact countries in political, cultural, and economic terms. Next, Slovenia could possibly be admitted -- it has made some startling progress in economic and social reform since its secession from Yugoslavia in late 1991. Afterward, Romania or Bulgaria and perhaps even Albania could be considered for admission. The fate of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia is, at this time, yet unknown. Although all three are thoroughly western in orientation, their geo-strategic proximity to Russia heightens the risk of accepting them. I suspect that they may end up being forced into a state of neutrality, rather like Finland at the start of the Cold War. In south-central Europe, it is unlikely that any of the former Yugoslav republics, excepting Slovenia, will be candidates for NATO membership in the near to mid-term. Further east, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia have all been ruled out from the NATO enlargement process.
When?

In mid-October, NATO announced that serious discussions of who and when will not begin until after the end of 1996. This decision is based on four primary considerations: the ‘96 U.S. presidential election, the December 1995 Russian Parliamentary elections, the ‘96 Russian presidential election, and the 1996 IGC on the European Union. Any of these factors could have a dramatic effect on both NATO’s resolve to enlarge and the geo-strategic climate in which it might do it. There have been some indications that the Visegrad four and possibly Slovenia could be admitted into NATO as early as the turn of the century.

NATO enlargement will not take place in a vacuum. The effects of this process will be felt across Europe. Despite NATO’s assurances that its expansion can benefit Russia by increasing European stability, Moscow continues to interpret NATO enlargement as a threat to its security. The second half of this paper will explore Russia’s move to consolidate its interests in the near abroad and the methods by which it seeks to prevent the expansion of NATO.
II. Russian National Security Policy

The past three years have seen some significant developments in the conduct of Russian foreign policy. The emergence of nationalist sentiment, imperial nostalgia, and real and perceived threats to its national interests have evoked a reformulation of Russia’s national security policy and its views of the West. It is tempting to view this shift as merely the result of a knee-jerk reaction on the part of Moscow to increasingly popular ultra-right groups such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Rather, there seems to be a growing consensus among elites from both liberal and conservative sides of Russia’s political spectrum that Russia has a special interest and responsibility in those states that formerly comprised the Soviet Union and further, that these interests are directly threatened by the expansion of NATO into Central and Eastern Europe.

This activity derives from Russia’s conception of what its national interests are. They are not ideological in scope as in the case of the former Soviet Union, nor are they inherently expansionistic as in the imperialism of czarist Russia. Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the Duma Foreign Affairs Committee and former ambassador to the United States, defines those interests as the following: the strengthening of democracy and its conversion into an effective system of administration for the entire country; regional stability and the prevention of periphery ethnic conflicts from spilling into Russia’s borders; the protection of the 25 million Russians living abroad; CIS integration and its economic viability; inhibiting nuclear proliferation by potentially hostile states amongst its neighbors; keeping potential adversaries from gaining
influence in the region, and to ensure Russia’s continued role as the leading power throughout the former USSR (Sestanovich 107-111).

In examining the conflictual relationship that is slowly developing between Russia and NATO, it will be necessary to look at two developments in Russian foreign policy. The first is Russia’s interventionist policies in the near abroad. Second, attention must be paid to the variety of responses and threats that have come out of Russian foreign policy-making circles in regard to the expansion of NATO. These two issues have not been chosen haphazardly. How Russia conducts itself in the near abroad and its immediate environs helps determine the nature of its foreign policy in the larger world scene. Further, no other single issue in European security promises to be more divisive than NATO’s future in eastern Europe.

**A. Russian Interventionism in the Near Abroad**

Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia has consistently argued that it has a special responsibility and interest in those states that formerly comprised the Soviet Union, namely the near abroad. It has correctly perceived that local instabilities on its borders have an immediate effect on its own security. As no other world body or organization is likely to take an active role in stabilizing this region, Russia feels compelled to, both out of its own national interests and its historical attachments to the area. Therefore, since 1992 Russia has actively pursued interventionist policies in the near abroad in the form of peace-keeping, re-integration through the auspices of the CIS, and through unilateral actions designed to secure its interests. The net result of these activities is the slow development of a traditional sphere of influence.
It remains to be seen whether this will translate into genuinely imperialistic policies.

Since the end of the Cold War, the wellspring of this renewed foreign policy activism in the near abroad comes from the institutionalization of two policy doctrines: the political and the military. Both may be seen as key instruments, reinforcing one another, that have been shaped by a desire on the part of both conservatives and liberals to retain a Russian sphere of influence in the Eurasian region: the conservatives motivated by a traditional Russian nationalism and the liberals by disillusionment with the West (Crow 15).

**The Yeltsin Doctrine**

Although the use of military force has been Moscow’s chief method of pursuing and securing its interests in the near abroad, the military does not function in a decision-making vacuum -- its legitimacy rests on the foundations provided by the political dimension of Russia’s national security policy. It defines and controls the extent to which the Ministry of Defense (MoD) may implement its doctrine and operate in the near abroad. This political or foreign policy facet of Russia’s larger national security strategy is loosely known as the “Yeltsin Doctrine.”

The Yeltsin Doctrine represents the synthesis and conceptualization of a number statements made by Yeltsin and Kozyrev between 1993 and 1995. The clearest statement of Russian foreign policy came during the Yeltsin-Clinton summit in late September 1994. Yeltsin stated that international security is best ensured by a condominium of Russia and the U.S. to maintain a global diarchy. Each state would be on equal footing and would consult and take action together. But as superpowers,
Yeltsin continued, each would maintain a sphere of influence in which it had a special and pre-eminent role. Specifically, “the sphere of Russia’s economic, political, and humanitarian interests extends to the entire post-soviet space . . . noone except Russia would take any steps to prevent ethnocratic trends in the CIS countries. Of all the great powers only Russia, with its vital national interests in the ex-soviet regions --even if it defends those interests in often clumsy and contradictory ways -- remains a real presence throughout the entire post-soviet space” (Socor 189). Although the Yeltsin Doctrine unequivocally recognizes the sovereign borders of the CIS states, it also contends that the long historical and blood ties between the former Soviet republics demands a continued Russian presence. As will be seen later, Russia’s “special responsibility” for the near abroad will sometimes translate into military action, sometimes paternalistic and sometimes interventionist.

The 1993 Military Doctrine

Having introduced the presidential authority through which military might may used to protect Russian national interests outside its borders, we can now examine the strategic specifications and modalities with which the armed forces are to be used. This necessitates an investigation of doctrine. On 2 November 1993, the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (RF) was give the force of law. The significance of this document was stated in its preface:

it represents a system of views officially accepted by the state on the on the prevention of wars and armed conflicts, on the development of the Armed Forces, on the country’s preparations to defend itself, on the organization of actions to ward off threats to the military security of the state, and on the use of the Armed Forces and other troops of the RF to
or abroad. These fall on roughly three dimensions: peacekeeping, and unilateral intervention.

A form of Russian military use in the former Soviet states is on the use of force to effect a political settlement, it is clear that translated as peace-making (Orr 5). The Russian intrusive involvement than the principles that Russia's military doctrine states that armed forces the conflicting sides; ensure the delivery of human resources from the conflict zone; isolate any sanctioned settlement" (Dick 32). In reality, however, and components of operatsii po maintain peace. In addition to conflict of specially trained forces to locate them; ground and combined air operations; air assaults; and other counter-least 16,000 Russian troops and the 4th MRD have even. A large contingent of air-
comprise the near abroad. These fall on roughly three dimensions: peacekeeping, collective security, and unilateral intervention.

**Peace-keeping**

The most common form of Russian military use in the former Soviet states is the peace-keeping mission. While the term "peace-keeping" conjures certain restrictions and conditions on the use of force to effect a political settlement, it is clear that the very term Russians employ has a qualitatively different meaning to it -- mirotvorchestvo, perhaps better translated as peace-making (Orr 5). The Russian concept is a much more active and intrusive involvement than the principles that govern American and U.N. efforts. Russia's military doctrine states that armed forces should: "be prepared to disengage the conflicting sides; ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid and the evacuation of civilians from the conflict zone; isolate any sanctioned area; and create conditions for a political settlement" (Dick 32). In reality, however, there are a number of expanded functions and components of operatsii po podderzhaniyu mira (OPM) -- operations to maintain peace. In addition to conflict prevention these have included: the preparation of specially trained forces to locate and disarm bands and if necessary, neutralize them; ground and combined air-ground sweeps; search and surgical strike operations; air assaults; and other counter-insurgency operations (Orr 4). Currently, there are at least 16,000 Russian troops engaged in peace-keeping operations. The 27th MRD and the 4th MRD have even been designated specifically as peace-keeping divisions. A large contingent of airborne forces are employed in the same role (Orr 1).
Currently, there are seven deployments of Russian peace-keeping forces and are here briefly summarized:

1. **South Osetia** (since July 1992). Deployed to secure a cease-fire and disengagement between the Georgian government and Osetians seeking union with fellow-nationals in N. Osetia.

2. **Moldova** (since July 1992). The 14th Army under General Lebed was deployed to maintain a cease-fire between the Moldovan government and separatists of the “Transdniestrian Republic” who seek union with Russia. This has since led to a significant intervention by 14th Army largely to the benefit of the separatists.

3. **North Osetia and Ingush Republic** (since Nov. 1992). Noteworthy as being on RF soil, troops were deployed to separate the warring factions over possession of the Prigordnyy Raion.

4. **Yugoslavia** (since Dec 1995). Part of the multi-national force ostensibly under the operational command of NATO. This peace-keeping force will enforce the peace settlement reached in the Dayton Accords. Russia’s participation is largely seen as a way to maintain its influence in the region as a counter-balance to NATO’s. Russia formerly participated in the UN force from 1992 to November 1995.

5. **Tajikistan** (since August 1993). Deployed to protect key sites during the Tajik Civil War, prevent cross-border infiltration from Afghanistan, and produce a political settlement.

6. **Abkhazia** (since 1994). Deployed to maintain a disengagement line along the Inguri River between the Georgian government and Abkhazian separatists. (Russia accused of complicity in the Abkhazian insurgency).

7. **Nagorno-Karabakh** (since 1994). Deployed to create a disengagement zone between the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh and the Azeris (Orr 9-11).

An interesting development has been the recent attempts by Russia to gain OSCE or UN peacekeeping status for its troops in Tajikistan, Georgia, and Moldova.

The reasons for this are many: first, it would lend international legitimacy to its military presence in the near abroad; second, it would facilitate political (and possibly
financial) support for conducting these operations; and third, it would enable them
to share responsibility with the world community for their frequent failures to prevent
bloodshed (Sray 1). Most of the West has been distrustful of Moscow's motives in this
endeavor, noting that several of these operations do not even qualify as peacekeeping.
Some observers have asserted that these operations are instead local wars “con-
ducted in blatant protection of Russia's perceived interests.” These OPM's are instead
focused on the requirement to prevent a security vacuum in the area (Sray 2).

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

Since the strategic loss resulting from the break-up of the USSR, Russia has
attempted to regain its sphere of influence through collective security arrangements
in the CIS. Early movements by the post-Soviet states toward a confederal CIS were
based on the example set by the European Community. Since early 1994 (and the
December 1993 elections), Russia has consistently asserted its “special responsibility”
for the former Soviet Union. This responsibility necessitates, according to Yeltsin and
Kozyrev, that Russia take a leading, almost hegemonic role -- it must be “first among
equals” (Smith 9). Defending Russia's pre-eminent status in the CIS, Kozyrev has
asserted on several occasions that only Russia has the capability or the willingness
to assume responsibility for the post-Soviet geopolitical space. In absence of its
military presence, forces hostile to Russia (such as Turkey, China, NATO, or Islamic
fundamentalists) would fill the strategic vacuum, directly threatening both Russia and
the other CIS states (Smith 6).
Two considerations are worth noting here. First, the CIS’s collective security structure is heavily dominated by Russian military might. Its top leaders have consistently been Russian generals and the bulk of its forces have been from the Russian armed forces. Further, the CIS has proven useful in keeping Russian troops abroad and in maintaining Russian bases on foreign soil. Second, the CIS collective security arrangement is part of a larger Russian strategy to prevent the eastward expansion of NATO. Such an expansion has been repeatedly decried as a threat to Russia’s national interests and a step towards re-igniting a two-camp cold war in Europe. It is this issue that threatens to be the most divisive concern between Russia and the West. Its efforts to effectively veto NATO expansion from without have largely proven to be in vain, resulting in its leaving the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in December 1994 (OMRI Dec 1994). Only in May of 1995 did Russia rejoin.

**Unilateral Intervention**

Western fears of a neo-imperialist Russian war machine are largely based on the anxiety created by Russian unilateral intervention in the near abroad. Indeed, how Russia behaves toward its neighbors -- whether it is willing to interfere in the internal affairs of the other post-Soviet states or respect their sovereign independence and territorial integrity -- is a crucial litmus test for determining whether or not Russia’s foreign policy activism is a sign of traditional great power assertiveness or of a genuine engagement with imperialism. So far, the signs have not been overly encouraging. In fact, Russia has repeatedly used military might in the region to defend or advance its interests. Further, Russian policy-makers from Yeltsin to Kozyrev to
Grachev have all asserted the fundamental necessity of doing so. For example, in an interview with Izvestiya in October 1993, Kozyrev stated that:

In the future, our foreign policy will continue to defend Russia’s vital interests, even in these cases where it is contrary to the interests of the West and to the interests of our partners within the CIS and the former Soviet Republics (Dick 53).

It would be a grave error by observers to dismiss these kinds of statements as simple rhetoric or as pandering to conservative voters in the RF, this viewpoint has been repeated at virtually every level of authority since early 1994 and is institutionalized into doctrine. Subsequent military and political activity on the part of Russia in its near abroad has largely conformed to these principles.

The potential for unilateral intervention will primarily be in response to a variety of actual and potential dangers roughly grouped into two categories: regional instability and protection for Russian minorities in the newly independent states. Any of these threats could provoke Russia to militarily intervene in the near abroad or, potentially, in countries such as Afghanistan, Turkey, or Iran. Although the military doctrine pays lip service to respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states, it seems clear that the needs of self-defense and national interest supersede such considerations. This tendency undermines Russia’s commitment to solve disputes through peaceful means and suggests that war prevention may serve as a future justification for military action (Dick 52).

Russia certainly has a legitimate concern over the instabilities and conflicts in areas bordering the RF. Aggressive nationalism, religious intolerance, ethnic conflicts,
territorial disputes, and low-intensity border wars have all threatened to corrode the balance of power in the post-Soviet states. In response, Russia has sought to use both political and military intervention to create conditions favourable to Russian security and hegemony. For example, Moscow has militarily intervened on behalf of both Transdniestra separatists in Moldova and Abkhazians in Georgia, presumably in order to provoke instability within each state and force them back into Moscow’s orbit. Russia has armed both sides of the conflict between Nagorno-Karabakh. Indeed, it is also suspected of a role in the forceful removal of the democratically elected Abulfaz Elchibey and replacing him with the former KGB chief Geidar Aliev (Teague 10). The OPM mission in Tajikistan has shifted to a decidedly interventionist role and acts as a combatant. Although these military actions have done virtually nothing to re-establish peace in the region, they have helped solidify Russia’s hegemony in the Transcaucuses and in Central Asia.

A second source of military intervention will be on behalf of the 25 million Russians that found themselves living in foreign states after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Anti-imperial sentiment in the Baltics and in Central Asia have created a number of problems for the Russian diaspora living in these states. Harsh citizenship and language laws in several states have marginalized Russian populations and raised the ire of Russian politicians. Indeed, the “suppression of the rights, freedoms, and lawful interests” of these Russians have proven to be a powerful motivation for conservatives who have pushed for direct Russian hegemony. Further, military doctrine addresses this issue as a potential danger to Russia’s interests, implying
the possibility of a military response. Most recently, on 19 Apr 1995, Kozyrev went on record as saying that Russia reserves the right to intervene militarily to protect the rights of ethnic Russians living in the near abroad (Mihalka #77). If this policy is carried through, at minimum it could result in any number of military interventions that could prove detrimental to regional cooperation and prosperity. On a more ominous note, it could prove to be the catalyst for the reassertion of direct Russian control over currently independent states -- a realization of a neo-imperialist Russia.

**B. The Expansion of NATO**

Since 1992, Russia has consistently opposed the expansion of NATO into Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, there is remarkable consensus between the once pro-western Foreign Ministry under Kozyrev, the conservative Ministry of Defense (MoD) under General Pavel Grachev, and President Yeltsin who stands somewhere in between on precisely this issue. Russia has consistently maintained that the expansion of a NATO alliance fundamentally unaltered from its Cold War posture to include nations such as the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary would only consolidate a military bloc detrimental to the immediate interests of Russia. They have, however, differed in method. Whereas Kozyrev has repeatedly tried to augment the OSCE into a pan-European security architecture beneficial to all of Europe, Grachev has traditionally relied on scarcely veiled threats to deter NATO expansion. Yeltsin, seemingly torn between the two extremes, has alternatively endorsed each depending on the prestige of one or the other in any given month.
However, it seems that Andrei Kozyrev's fortunes (and his largely pragmatic conduct of foreign policy) are on a permanent decline. On 20 Oct 1995 and again two weeks later, Yeltsin threatened to sack Kozyrev as foreign minister out of dissatisfaction with the conduct of Russia's foreign relations (Parrish No. 10). Specifically, Yeltsin and more conservative members of his administration have been highly critical of Kozyrev's neglect of Russian interests in the former Yugoslavia, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and NATO enlargement. Although he has yet to be relieved, his responsibilities have been virtually ceded to the MoD and Grachev, who conducted negotiations with the U.S. on Russia's participation in implementing the Dayton Accords in late November. It is probable that Yeltsin will keep Kozyrev in office for the short-term if only to placate the West and will continue to shift policy-making responsibilities elsewhere, most notably the secretive National Security Council and the MoD.

This hard-line shift in policy formulation has had an immediate effect on Russia's position regarding NATO's imminent expansion. Its complaints largely unheeded, its interests seemingly ignored, Russia may be formulating an overtly aggressive security posture with the intention of deterring NATO enlargement. On 29 Sept 1995, one day after the release of NATO's internal study on enlargement, *Komsomolskaya Pravda* reported that the General Staff and the MoD have composed a new draft military doctrine to meet the perceived threat of NATO's encroachment on Russia's borders. A traditionally reliable source, *Kommersant* seems to confirm similar claims made by *Segodnya* in August. Both are known to have good contacts with
Russia’s military and political leadership and the columnists’ materials have often reflected the opinion of the top military leaders. Although Yeltsin and Grachev have neither confirmed nor denied the existence of this new military doctrine, it is well known that there are many high ranking officials in Yeltsin’s administration and in the Duma who are more than sympathetic to its provisions.

Noting that Russia’s conventional force capabilities are greatly diminished (as the debacle in Chechnya so eloquently proves), the new draft doctrine rescinds the Soviet Union’s “no first use” policy on Russia’s nuclear weapons. Despite the West’s curious indifference to this dramatic change in policy, Russia’s stated reliance on its nuclear arsenal for first-strike purposes is cause for serious concern. *Kom Pravda* notes that if NATO expands into the Baltics, Russia will establish forward deployments of tactical nuclear weapons in western Russia, Belarus, Kaliningrad, and the Baltic Fleet in response (*Kom Pravda* 29.9.95 2). Further, Russia would mount an invasion of the three Baltic nations, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, warning the West that any attempt on the part of NATO to resist this deployment would be considered by Russia as a prelude to a global nuclear catastrophe. In addition, recent amendments to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) will be exploited to reinforce forward deployment capabilities in the St. Petersburg District and in the North Caucasus District. President Yeltsin has also stated that NATO expansion will precipitate the formation of a CIS military alliance, once again dividing Europe into two camps (*Kom Pravda* 29.9. 95 2). Russia would also look for allies in the Middle and Far East to combat NATO’s military consolidation.
A special research paper, the 101 Document of the Defense Research Institute, examines a potential Russian military incursion into the Baltic states in detail. It envisions the deployment of Spetnatz special forces into all three nations to take measures against the Baltic Mafia, defend Russian minorities living in these countries, seize their leaders, and annex the territory, splitting it up between Russia and Belarus (Prism 1.12.95 5-6). The 101 Document states that a military invasion would be justified and that the West would limit its reaction to short-term partial economic sanctions.

In the above mentioned article, Kom Pravda reports that this new military doctrine has been approved by General Grachev and his staff. This doctrine eliminates the ambiguities and neutral assertions of the 1993 military doctrine and specifically states the Russia considers its primary enemy to be the United States (AP 22 Oct 1995). It envisions the deployment and use of tactical nuclear weapons to rectify strategic imbalances of power unfavourable to Russian national interests. It suggests an overt conventional invasion of countries that are independent and sovereign. It calls for the formation of a military alliance stretching from Belarus to Iran to oppose NATO and the US both in the near and far abroad. These are threats specifically designed to counter NATO’s expansionist tendencies and should not be ignored. Lacking official confirmation of this new military doctrine, NATO refuses to allow Russia any veto in its enlargement process.

Conclusions

With the best of intentions, NATO has resolved to expand both its mandate and
its membership to create a new pan-European security order based on collective
defense and mutual interest. NATO insists that it is a collective security system that
acknowledges no one as its enemy and that its enlargement will only stabilize the
European strategic space. Unfortunately, its arguments have yet to convince decision-
making elites in Russia. Across the spectrum, Russian politicians and officials perceive
NATO’s expansion into a geographic area of direct strategic interest to Russia to be its
primary threat. Despite this dissonance, NATO insists that Russia will not veto its
enlargement and, indeed, has no reason to. Not wanting to be the first to re-divide
Europe, NATO countries are making the most benign interpretations of Russian
international re-assertiveness. They are observing Russia’s peace-keeping practices
and its furious internal political debates in its future but are staying largely mute for
fear of seeming antagonistic. Therefore, NATO is moving forward of its own inertia
despite the serious concerns and threats being communicated by Russia.

In the interest of promoting European peace, the West has been reluctant to
publicly discuss the dramatic changes occurring in Russian foreign policy. It seems
loath to perceive Russia in hostile terms and is generally willing to accept the
plaintive assertions that Russian saber rattling has no other purpose than to placate
conservative and nationalistic political groups. If recent reports are true, Russian
military doctrine and its threat assessments have no such crutches. There seems to
be a growing consensus in Russian political circles and in its policies in the near
abroad that Russia perceives its primary threat to be from the West, most specifically
NATO and the United States. In a vast array of political, economic, and military policies
that include peace-keeping, monetary policy, troop deployments, collective security measures, and unilateral military actions, Russia is patiently consolidating its hold over the near abroad so that it may defend itself.

In consequence, a dangerous dynamic is evolving in east-west relations. The more NATO talks of enlargement, the more Russia feels compelled to assert its strategic agenda. The more aggressive Russia’s words and actions become towards its neighbors, the greater the necessity that NATO should accept countries like the Czech Republic, Poland, and even the Baltics to protect their independence. At the outset of this paper and during my participation in the ATA Conference on NATO, I supported the enlargement process. Now, after having reached decidedly ominous conclusions regarding the future of Russian foreign policy, I am forced to reconsider those prior convictions. Perhaps it is this very aggressiveness in Russian national security policy that necessitates the inclusion of Central and Eastern Europe into NATO’s collective security umbrella. On the other hand, we may be creating the very conditions for a new Cold War by ignoring Russia’s legitimate concerns about the most powerful military alliance in the world approaching its borders. In any event, the West, and the United States in particular, must exercise the utmost caution and deliberation in considering its next move. At stake is the very security order it hopes to create.
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