Risk effectiveness evaluation of surveillance testing Page: 4 of 8
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In this paper, we will present and demonstrate a quantitative methodology for
evaluating the negative impact of surveillance testing for a more comprehensive risk-
based methodology in defining surveillance requirements for nuclear power plants.
With a brief review of the method for evaluating the risk contribution detected
by the test and a description of the various negative effects of surveillance testing (see
Table 1), the paper presents the methodology for evaluating the negative test risk
impacts associated with the negative effects. The methodology presentation will focus on
two important kinds of negative test risk impacts, that is, the risk impacts of test-caused
transients and equipment wear-out.
Identifier Risk Contribution Root Cause of the Risk
R, Risk from test-caused trips Equipment failure, human error,
R. Risk from test-caused equipment wear Inherent characteristics of the test,
procedure inadequacy, human error
Re Risk from test misconfigurations or Human error, procedure inadequacy
component restoration error
Rd Risk associated with test downtime in Unavailability of the component
carrying out the test during the test. Affected by the test
Table 1: Test-Caused Risk Contributions and their Root Causes.
The operating history of nuclear power plants indicates that the conduct of a
surveillance test while the plant is at power may cause a transient that causes or requires
a reactor trip. The test-caused transient, once it occurs, generally deteriorates the process
condition of the plant. The risk impact of the test-caused transient or the resultant trip
depends on the functions of the safety systems and sometimes on the operator actions
following the occurrence of the transient. Since the various responses of the safety system
and operators are typically taken into account in probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs),
the risk contribution from test-caused transients can be evaluated within the context of
a PRA model.
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Martorell, S.; Kim, I. S. (Universidad Politecnica de Valencia (Spain). Dept. de Ingenieria Quimica y Nuclear); Samanta, P. K. (Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States)) & Vesely, W. E. (Science Applications International Corp., Columbus, OH (United States)). Risk effectiveness evaluation of surveillance testing, article, July 20, 1992; Upton, New York. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1444884/m1/4/: accessed April 24, 2019), University of North Texas Libraries, Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.