

WILLIAM'S AMERICA: ROYAL PERSPECTIVE AND CENTRALIZATION
OF THE ENGLISH ATLANTIC

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Thesis Prepared for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS

December 2018

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Woodlock, Kylie. *William's America: Royal Perspective and Centralization of the English Atlantic*. Master of Arts (History), December 2018, 81 pp., bibliography, 95 titles.

William III, Prince of Orange, ascended the throne of England after the English Glorious Revolution of 1688. The next year, the American colonists rebelled against colonial administrations in the name of their new king. This thesis examines William's perception of these rebellions and the impact his perception had on colonial structures following the Glorious Revolution. Identifying William's modus operandi—his habit of acceding to other's political choices for expediency until decisive action could be taken to assert his true agenda—elucidates his imperial ambitions through the context of his actions. William, an enigmatic and taciturn figure, rarely spoke his mind and therefore his actions must speak for him. By first establishing his pattern of behavior during his early career in the Netherlands and England, this project analyzes William's long-term ambitions to bring the Americas under his direct control following the 1689 rebellions and establish colonial administrations more in line with his vision of a centralized English empire.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In 1685, King James II ascended the throne of England. By 1688, James met increased resistance from both Parliament and the populace for his attempts to centralize the English and American colonial governments under the Crown. James displayed his absolutist tendencies in England by maintaining a standing army in peacetime, openly adhering to Catholicism, refusing to call Parliament into session, violating the Test Acts, and interfering in local governance. In America, James subverted colonial practices, dissolved independent charters to reorganize the colonies into centralized “dominions,” and personally appointed officials, many of whom were from England and not the colonies themselves. These tensions escalated until September 1688, when several Lords seated in Parliament asked William of Orange to invade and take the English crown. William successfully landed in England in early November and was officially crowned King of England in April 1689. By July 1689, American colonists successfully revolted and overthrew James’s colonial establishment. Once the dust of the “Glorious Revolution” had settled, newly crowned King William III had to contend not only with securing his regime in England, Ireland, and Scotland, but also the Atlantic colonies.

With the latter of these problems, William faced several quandaries. First, what was the true nature of the rebellions in the colonies? Although many of the colonists claimed they had rebelled in his name, news traveled slowly across the Atlantic and William questioned whether word of his arrival had actually reached several of the colonies by the time they rebelled. If they truly had heard of William’s landing and

rebelled in support of William's regime, the colonists' rebellions could be justified; if not, they were treasonous. Second, what was the king's role in colonial governance? The colonists in royal colonies, such as New York, Massachusetts, Virginia, and Barbados, petitioned for the reinstatement of their original charters that granted them a large degree of self-governance. However, the centralized governments installed by James II strengthened William's control in the Americas, which he understood to be a second frontier in the Nine Years' War against Louis XIV's France.¹ Proprietary colonies such as Maryland and Carolina added an additional layer of complexity to this quandary, as the king officially had little say in their management. Finally, William grappled with the question of the colonies' place in his new empire: were the colonies and their occupants subordinate or equal to England and Englishmen? William III's perception of the Glorious Revolution in the American colonies influenced both his reaction to the initial rebellions and English policies that reshaped colonial governments in the following years.

The historiography surrounding the Glorious Revolution in both England and America address some aspects of these questions. Most works on the Glorious Revolution focus on the revolution and its effects in England, Scotland, and Ireland.²

¹ The Nine Years' War (1688-1697), primarily waged between England and France, has been given several names: the Nine Years War, the War of the Grand Alliance, the War of the League of Augsburg, and King William's War. The last term was most often used colloquially in the American colonies. For the purposes of this paper, the war will be referred to as the all-encapsulating "Nine Years' War," as the war efforts will be discussed in both England and America primarily through William's perspective.

² John Childs, *The Army, James II, and the Glorious Revolution* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980) and *The British Army of William III, 1689-1702* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987); Tim Harris, *Revolution: The Great Crisis of the British Monarchy, 1685-1720* (London: Penguin Books, Ltd., 2006); J.R. Jones, *The Revolution of 1688 in England* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1972); Steve Pincus, *1688: the First Modern Revolution* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009); Stephen Saunders Webb, *Lord Churchill's Coup: The Anglo-American Empire and the Glorious Revolution Reconsidered* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995).

Fewer studies examine the American rebellions in 1689. Of these, Massachusetts Bay receives a disproportionate amount of attention, primarily due to the well-kept records and historians' interest in its Puritan historical figures. Moreover, most studies of the Glorious Revolution in America tend to focus on the buildup of tension and enmity in the years before the rebellions, dedicating merely a chapter or two to scrutinize the aftermath of the rebellions and the relationships between colonial governments and the new regime in England. Stronger works delve deeper into the negotiations following the rebellions and the struggle to maintain colonial power while simultaneously redefining the colonies' place in the English empire. Nevertheless, these works usually focus on the colonial actors, rather than the necessary cooperation with their counterparts in England.³ Thus, the historiography would benefit from a thorough study examining the immediate aftermath of the 1689 rebellions in America from an imperial perspective.

Social histories regarding William III are few and far between. William of Orange, whom historians and contemporaries alike describe as pensive, aloof, and at times cold, has not inspired many biographies or socio-political studies compared to his royal and non-royal contemporaries. Biographers lament the lack of sources from his childhood, as William preferred not to discuss his upbringing. In addition, many available sources are written in Dutch or French, posing a challenge for Anglophone historians.

³ Jack Greene, *Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Politics of the British Empire and the United States, 1607-1788* (Athens and London: University of Georgia Press, 1986); Jack P. Greene and J.R. Pole, eds, *Colonial British America: Essays in the New History of the Early Modern Era* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1984); Michael G. Hall, *Edward Randolph and the American Colonies, 1676 - 1703* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960); Richard R. Johnson, *Adjustment to Empire: The New England Colonies, 1675-1715* (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1981); David S. Lovejoy, *The Glorious Revolution in America* (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1972); Jack M. Sosin, *English America and the Revolution of 1688: Royal Administration and the Structure of Provincial Government* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1982); Owen Stanwood, *The Empire Reformed: English America in the Age of the Glorious Revolution* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011).

Descriptions of William III are often fleeting, depicting an ambitious conqueror and champion of Protestantism. Many historians speculate whether or not the king exhibited homosexual preferences. A handful of works examine William's colonial policies, but greater emphasis is placed on military campaigns during King William's War and his ongoing conflict with Louis XIV than ground-level governance. The few biographies written in English offer insights to a private man and his approach to politics in England and, by extension, the American colonies.⁴

This thesis examines William III's perception of the American rebellions of 1689 and the impact his perception had on colonial structures following the Glorious Revolution. William offers a unique glimpse into transatlantic relations at the time. The colonies, many of which were established by royal charters, were subject to the King's prerogative. For this reason, colonial dignitaries such as Increase Mather appealed directly to William on behalf of their disbanded charters, and imperial officials removed from office by American rebels addressed accusations of treason and Jacobite sympathies in the king's court. Because the colonies were, at this time, subject to the king's prerogative, one must examine William's understanding of the American rebellions to understand England's response and the post-1689 transatlantic relationship. Examining William's political method in dealing with the colonies elucidates his imperial ambitions through the context of his actions. While William rarely spoke his

⁴ Stephen B. Baxter, *William III* (London: Longmans, 1966); Tony Claydon, *William III and the Godly Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Henriette Elisabeth Heimans, *Het karakter van Willem III, Koning-Stadhouder*, (Amsterdam: H.J. Paris, 1925); Henry Horwitz, *Parliament, policy, and politics in the reign of William III* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1977); Herbert H. Rowen, *The Princes of Orange: the stadholders of the Dutch Republic* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and Wouter Troust, *William III the Stadholder-King: a Political Biography*, translated by J.C. Grayson (Routledge, 2005).

mind, the pattern of his actions speaks for him. His short-term actions largely did not reflect his long-term objectives for the empire (save for the West Indies). His *modus operandi*, to make political choices for expediency until decisive action could be taken to exert his true agenda, illuminates his long-term vision for the English empire.

Chapter 2 discusses William III's background, struggle to reassert himself as stadtholder in the Netherlands, and patterns of political behavior he exhibited in both the Netherlands and England. William's early contemporaries described the young prince as "tight-lipped and sealed," enigmatic, and a first-class soldier and politician. An Orangist scholar observes "William could...wait with at least the appearance of patience for years, then act with stunning rapidity."⁵ William's slow accumulation of power in Holland and his reclamation of his father's office demonstrated his willingness to cooperate with the existing political regime until he could take decisive action to further his own agenda. This pattern was also evident in England, specifically in William's dealings with John Churchill, the future Duke of Marlborough. William cooperated with Churchill, who offered to help him capture the English throne. Once his regime in England had been secured, William demonstrated his inherent distrust of Churchill by refusing to promote him to a higher office. In short, William routinely mollified or cooperated with political adversaries when expedient, but later adjusted policies to better reflect his true intentions. This chapter provides historical evidence to support this assessment and establishes the foundation for the remainder of the project.

The remaining chapters examine the American rebellions and William's actions in the context of Chapter 2's argument regarding his background and *modus operandi*.

⁵ Rowen, *Princes of Orange*, 135.

Chapter 3 analyzes William's perception of the Massachusetts Bay rebellion. Increase Mather, a prominent scholar and Puritan minister, sailed to England in 1687 to beseech James II and his Privy Council to reinstate the 1629 charter. When William and Mary ascended the throne, Mather immediately began petitioning the new monarchs in the same manner. The Boston rebellion of April 1689 complicated Mather's mission, as it cast the loyalties of the colony in a poor light. The old Puritan attempted to resurrect the original charter in full, which would allow Bay colonists full rights as Englishmen plus special religious privileges. Mather's autobiography and biographies suggest that William and Mary initially humored his proposals and petitions while the king concerned himself with quelling upheavals in Ireland and Scotland. With the immediate threats neutralized, William turned his attention to an increasingly desperate Increase Mather. William understood the history of dissent in Massachusetts and no doubt questioned the true nature of the Boston rebellion of 1689. Thus, when the new charter was issued in 1692, little remained of the old Bay charter for which Mather fought. Instead, William placed the government directly under his control while permitting local general assemblies. He also introduced a new voting system, granting a greater degree of suffrage to all Protestants in the colony and stripping the Puritans of their oligarchy. In essence, the new charter forced Massachusetts Bay to recognize the Crown's authority and their place in William's empire.

The rebellion in New York and William's reaction are the topic of Chapter 4. Disgruntled after being roped into the Dominion of New England, New York colonists rebelled against Lieutenant-Governor, Francis Nicholson. In May 1689, an argument broke out between Nicholson's forces and the city militia, which spiraled into armed

conflict, action leading the lieutenant-governor to flee to England. Jacob Leisler, leader of the rebels, did not attempt to explain his actions to William III until August and emissaries sent to negotiate a charter or confirm sanctions for New York's actions botched their attempts to reconcile with the Crown. William had already considered Nicholson's report of the rebellion and decided to appoint a new governor, Colonel Henry Sloughter, as early as September 1689. Sloughter, who had commanded troops on the Isle of Wight, did not arrive in New York until January 1691, however. This delay indicates that William perceived Leisler as less of a threat to his regime than the concurrent conflicts in France and Ireland and therefore prioritized his war efforts. William dispatched Sloughter only when reinforcements arrived to relieve his garrison on the Isle of Wight. Once in New York, the new governor quickly subdued the rebellious government and asserted the king's sovereignty in New York.

Chapter 5 expands the study of William's *modus operandi* to consider William's actions throughout the American colonies in the years following his ascension. In the Chesapeake (Virginia and Maryland), growing anxieties about a violent Catholic and Native American conspiracy fueled rebellions against the sitting governments. Virginian royal officials quickly subdued the tensions and reasserted authority, while the Maryland rebels overturned the proprietary administration like the rebels of New York and Massachusetts. William permitted these rebel administrations to continue while focusing his energies on the Jacobite uprising in Ireland. Once the Irish war turned in his favor, William solidified control over the Chesapeake by appointing strong governors in both colonies, and brought Maryland directly under the Crown's supervision. The Carolina rebellion presented a different challenge. Because it was a proprietary colony, William

had little say in the colony's management, but was frustrated by the proprietors' failure to halt the colony's booming illegal trade, resulting in a severe loss of customs revenues. Near the end of the Nine Years' War, William created the Board of Trade, a new advisory board to replace the less effective Lords of Trade. The Board of Trade granted the king oversight in all of the American colonies, including proprietary colonies like Carolina. The only exception to this pattern was Barbados, which William reorganized and brought under his direct control as he was addressing the Jacobite rebellion in Ireland and the war in Europe. William recognized Barbados's commercial and strategic importance to the English empire and therefore broke from his established *modus operandi*.

William understood the 1689 American rebellions as an opportunity to further centralize the Anglo-American empire. Due to his taciturn nature, discerning William's intentions must be done by examining his actions. His *modus operandi*—previously established by other historians to study his motivations and political intentions in Holland and England—illuminates William's perception of himself as a ruler and his role in colonial governance following the Glorious Revolution. He understood the American rebellions of 1689 to be an expedient means to overturn James II's colonial administrations while he focused on more pressing matters in England and Europe. But William later brought these colonies under his direct control, establishing a centralized administration more in line with his vision of empire.

CHAPTER 2

WILLIAM, “FORT DISSIMULÉ”

Prince William Henry of Orange, later King William III of England, befuddled both contemporaries and historians alike with his quiet, reserved personality, which rendered his true motivations difficult to decipher. Due to his early introduction into the world of politics and aloof personality, the prince developed a pattern of behavior defined by calculative stoicism and taciturnity; William habitually cooperated with existing institutions and the most influential people for political expediency until the time came that he could enact his true agenda swiftly and deftly. This pattern can be recognized in his familial ties, traced through his slow accumulation of power in the Netherlands, and evidenced in his handling of rivals such as Grand Pensionary Johan de Witt and John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough. Understanding William’s *modus operandi* as a pattern developed throughout his childhood and early career elucidates his behavior later as king of England as well as his handling of the rebellions in the American colonies following the Glorious Revolution of 1688.

Prince William III of Orange had truly been “born in misfortune and brought up in misfortune.”⁶ The death of William II in November, 1650 left the political landscape of the United Provinces in a state of uncertainty. Dutch politics divided into partisan factions known as the *Staatsgezind*, often the wealthier classes who favored the independent sovereignty of the States, and the *Oranjegezind*, most often the common people or those with close Orangist ties who advocated the expansion of prerogatives

⁶ Paul Fuchs to the Great Elector, March 19, 1684, *Urkunden und Actenstücke zur Geschichte des Kurfürsten Friedrich Wilhelm von Brandenburg*, 23 vols (Berlin-Leipzig, 1864-1930), xxi, 79, as cited in Wouter Troost, *William III, Stadholder-King: A Political Biography*, trans. J.C. Grayson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 23.

granted to the House of Orange as the “eminent head” of the state.⁷ During William II’s reign as stadholder in 1647-50, Holland regents developed the theory of “True Freedom,” which sought to establish full sovereignty of the seven provincial states within the federation without the powers of a stadholder looming overhead. Holland, as the strongest of the provinces, particularly touted “True Freedom” as the Orangist stadholdership placed a check on its influence. Because no provisions established the inheritance of William II’s titles, a special session of the Great Assembly determined the shape of the national government. The leaders of the “True Freedom” movement directed the council to adopt three important resolutions: first, the stadholdership would remain indefinitely empty; second, the newborn Prince William would not be offered the honorific title as First Noble of Zeeland, as the function of First Noble belonged to the stadholdership; third, the post of the captain-general would be left vacant.⁸ As if to further spite the house of Orange, the council later passed the 1654 Act of Seclusion, purposefully excluding William III from ever holding the office of stadholder. Thus in the span of a few short years the Grand Assembly stripped young Prince William of his hereditary offices and titles, which he would spend a great deal of his young life to reclaim.

His titles and honors stripped, William’s life would also be fraught with familial conflict, coloring his world view. His mother, Royal Princess Mary Stuart, sister to the exiled Charles II and James II of England, and his paternal grandmother, Dowager

⁷ Herbert H. Rowen, *John De Witt: Statesman of the ‘True Freedom,’* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986), 54.

⁸ Hollanders feared William Frederick, cousin to William III and captain under William II, would rally support to hold both the offices of stadholder and captain-general, posing a threat to Holland’s sovereignty. Troost, *William III*, 21. See also Jonathan Israel, *The Dutch Republic: its rise, greatness, and fall, 1477-1806* (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

Princess Amalia van Solms, fought fiercely for stewardship over the prince. Mary, whose true political interest lay in the restoration of her brother to the English throne, demanded sole guardianship of her son and administration of what few estates remained in his name. Aware of Mary's personal agenda and fearful the Orange's assets would be squandered helping the Stuarts, Amalia van Solms insisted on equal representation in the administration of the estate and education of her grandson.⁹ The conflict between the two women remained intense throughout William's childhood, often fighting for the little prince's household appointments.¹⁰ Eventually the High Council of Holland granted Mary primary guardianship, effectively placing her in charge of the Orangist movement in the Netherlands, much to the dowager's chagrin.¹¹ Mary, for her part, played her role as guardian well, assuaging provincial leaders and protecting her son from further political sabotage; she employed only native Dutchmen in the administration of William's household and avoided political dealings herself. Instead, she focused on the Prince's education.¹²

After the Stuart Restoration in 1660, William's domestic affairs were in a much better state; similarly, Mary's political position advanced so well that the dowager brusquely informed the prince's governor that she no longer cared to discuss William's

⁹ Discussion of Mary's English preferences and a warning against disclosing too much information to Amalia van Solms can be found in a letter to M. de Thou: "Instructions à M. de Thou," May 1657, *Archive ou correspondance inédite de maison d'orange-Nassau*, serie 2, deel 5, 168-70.

¹⁰ "Le même à [M. de Briene] Différends entre les Princesses d'Orange," *Archive*, serie 2 deel 5, 186-88; Troost, *William III*, 27; Stephen B. Baxter, *William III*, (London: Longmans, 1966): 15-18; Rowen, *The Princes of Orange*, 113-4;

¹¹ Baxter, *William III*, 16-18; Rowen, *Princes of Orange*, 102-114; Troost, 27.

¹² Baxter, *William III*, 17; Troost, *William III*, 34-40.

interests and even considered rescinding her guardianship rights.¹³ Emboldened by her brother's reclaimed status and subsequent visit to the Netherlands, Mary cornered Johan de Witt, Grand Pensionary and ardent anti-Orangist, in meetings with Charles II and attempted to pressure de Witt into a parallel restoration of William to both the offices of stadholder and captain-general.¹⁴ William, present at the celebratory festivities in Amsterdam and The Hague though too young to play an active role in the discussions, undoubtedly recognized the gravity of his uncle's presence in these negotiations. This made his mother's death in January 1661 all the more troubling—now William's political future stood at risk. In her final moments, Mary bequeathed sole guardianship of her son and his estates to Charles II. Recognizing the growing tensions leading to the second Anglo-Dutch War, de Witt convinced the Council of Holland to have William considered Child of the State and to be educated under the watchful eyes of the Grand Pensionary.¹⁵

William III's personality undoubtedly took shape in these formative years, hardening him into being aloof and cynical; his experience growing up surrounded by enemies made him cautious and distrustful. He certainly earned his moniker "fort dissimulé" for his skill at hiding his true feelings.¹⁶ Although he had too high a sense of honor to outright deceive, William frequently toed the line by concealing his true feelings

¹³ "Le 15 juillet M. de Thou écrit de la Haye à Mazarin," *Archive* serie 2, deel 5, 198; "Le même au Cardinal Mazarin. Restauration en Angleterre," The Hague, June 10, 1660, *Archive*, serie 2 deel 5, 196-7.

¹⁴ "Le 15 juillet M. de Thou écrit de la Haye à Mazarin," *Archive* serie 2, deel 5, 198; Rowen, *Princes of Orange*, 112; *John de Witt*, 92; Troost, *William III*, 43.

¹⁵ Baxter, *William III*, 40-1; Rowen, *Princes of Orange*, 118.

¹⁶ Baxter, *William III*, 52; Troost, *William III*, 24.

without grossly misrepresenting himself.¹⁷ His greatest propagandist, Bishop Gilbert Burnet, recognized “if he had any commotions within, he had a very extraordinary command over his temper, in restraining or concealing them.”¹⁸ His aloofness, however, often translated as coldness and a lack of tact. The English in particular found his taciturnity off-putting, noting “He has a coldness in his ways that damps a modest man extremely, for he hears things with a dry silence that shows too much distrust of those to whom he speaks. His coldness will look like contempt, and that the English cannot bear.”¹⁹

William’s inherent distrustful nature affected his political dealings in both the day-to-day and grand scheme. Henry Sidney, Earl of Romney recalled the Prince’s cautious yet adroit behavior in navigating politics in The Hague: “In the evening the Prince told me the States would desire a conference with me, and advised me to pretend to not be well, and then only the Pensioner and another would come to me, and then he would speak more openly.”²⁰ William’s sensitive side rarely showed itself, save for his correspondence with longtime friend and confidant William Bentinck, so the general public had to attune to his dry and serious personality.²¹ William’s political agenda

¹⁷ Heimans, *Het karakter*, 155.

¹⁸ Gilbert Burnet, *Bishop Burnet’s History of his Own Time from the Restoration of Charles II to the Conclusion of the Treaty of Peace at Utrecht, in the Reign of Queen Anne*, vol. 3 (London, 1753) 82.

¹⁹ H. C. Foxcroft, ed., *A Supplement to Burnet’s ‘History of my own Time;’ derived from his original memoirs, his autobiography, his letters to Admiral Herbert, and his private meditations, all hitherto unpublished* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902) 192-3; See also Stephen Saunders Webb, *Lord Churchill’s Coup: The Anglo-American Empire and the Glorious Revolution Reconsidered* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), insert, portrait and character.

²⁰ Sidney’s Diary, vol. 2, 131, as cited in Heimans, *Het karakter van Willem III*, 158.

²¹ Unlike his other letters, which were often brief and strictly regarding political or military matters, William’s correspondence with Bentinck was often deeply personal, such as a letter of condolence after the death of Bentinck’s father: “It was with great displeasure that I learned...the unfortunate death of your father; I can assure you, truthfully, that there is no one who so much shares in the affliction that your house has received, but mainly you, for I am so much your friend that all that happens to you, I proceed

remains puzzling due to his reserved nature and cagey interactions with others; his *modus operandi* can therefore best be inferred, by logical induction, from his actions.

The political and familial experiences of his youth helped William develop patience when making political decisions; he rarely acted impulsively and moved in a calculated fashion to take advantage of the perfect opportunity to strike. Bishop Burnet observed that the prince was “the closest man in the world, so that it is not possible so much as to guess at his intentions until he declares them.”²² He inherited this trait from the Stuart side of his family as his temperament closely mirrored that of his mother; Mary sullenly accepted the Act of Seclusion in 1654 but began earnest efforts to restore William to both the stadholdership and captain-generalship years later, when her brother assumed the throne of England which in turn bolstered her own political leverage.²³ William operated in much the same way, cooperating with the policies of the existing regime while calculating the best way to exert his true agenda. William’s contemporaries often complained about his patience in such cases. For example, Burnet noted “His firmness and patience are tested by the greatest obstacles which never repel him, but his slowness and irresolution arrest him in the best way...he concludes nothing in time, which makes his ministers murmur that he must be spoken to a hundred times on the same subject without being able to obtain a decisive answer.”²⁴

as if it happened to me...” Japikse, “Willem III aan Bentinck, Aug. 13, 1668,” *Correspondentie van Willem III en van Hans Willem Bentinck, Eerste Graaf van Portland, Eerste Gedeelte: Het Archief van Welbeck Abbey*, deel 1 (1927), 1.

²² Foxcroft, *Supplement*, 190.

²³ Heimans, *Het karakter van Willem III*, 3; Rowens, 73-4. Edwin and Marion Sharpe Grew, *The Court of William III* (London: Mills & Boon, Ltd., 1910):13-14.

²⁴ *Archive*, serie III, xxix; Foxcroft, *Supplement*, 190; Heimans, *Het karakter van Willem III*, 59.

However, William's absolute resolution in his decisions belies this accusation of indecisiveness. His closest confidantes recognized that William preferred to ponder the weight of his choices without the sway of meddling ministers. William Temple, a long-time friend and advisor, best encapsulated the Prince's self-resolution, "for the deference they believed His Highness might have for my sentiments, I would assure them, he had none for mine...he had sense enough to govern himself."²⁵ Rather than accept the advice of his council at face-value, William chose to delay making decisions until he felt resolute in his choice. This virtue of patience combined with a tight-lipped personality made William a befuddling figure to his contemporaries yet an effective dignitary.

Recognizing William's inherent enigmatic and patient nature clarifies his political behavior both before and after his ascension to the English throne; William patiently worked within existing conventions for political expediency until the opportune moment to act, then quickly and decisively maneuvered to enact his true intentions. The prince exhibited this pattern throughout his efforts to reclaim his titles in the Netherlands. The States of Holland passed the "Eternal Edict" in 1667, which supported William joining the Council of State and opening the possibility of his eventual appointment as captain-general, while simultaneously barring the election of a captain-general who was a stadholder in another province. While on the surface the edict appeared to be a direct attack against the Prince of Orange, it instead created a stepping stone to his

²⁵ Sir William Temple, *The Works of Sir William Temple Bart., in Two Volumes*, vol. 1 (London: Printed for J. Round, J. Tonson, J. Clarke, B. Motte, T. Wotton, S. Birt, and T. Osborne, 1731), 421; Heimans, *Het karakter van Willem III*, 69.

accumulation of power.²⁶ William then laid the groundwork for two ambitious goals: securing the office of captain-general and the title First Noble of Zeeland. The first was easy enough—the Eternal Edict had already made allowances for his assumption of the office and groomed him to accept the position in 1671. The second, however, required patience and cunning to seamlessly take control without interference from Holland. Although the ploy to install William as First Noble did not occur until September 1668, the Secretary and Grand Pensionary of Zeeland had worked tirelessly to appoint the prince since 1664.²⁷ After William’s first acquisitions of power in 1667, he set the wheels in motion to acquire the next political seat. An emissary of the Prince made arrangements with the Zeeland Pensionary in March 1668.²⁸ In September, while officially on a hunting trip in Breda, William travelled to Middleburg to accept the office of First Noble and thank the Pensionaries of Middleburg and Zierickzee for the installation. By surreptitiously arranging his assumption of the office, William assumed the office without interference of Holland which could have potentially derailed his ambitions. A meticulous and calculated plan and patience in executing such a scheme proved to be an effective strategy for William, one he would continue to employ in the years to come.

William’s infamous struggle against Grand Pensionary Johan de Witt exemplifies the Prince’s virtue of patience; from his birth in 1650 until de Witt’s death in 1672, William absorbed each of de Witt’s offenses until he had reclaimed enough power to topple his opponent. As a leader and champion of the “True Freedom” movement, de

²⁶ Rowen, *The Princes of Orange*, 137-8; Baxter, *William III*, 46.

²⁷ J.A. Worp, “Het plan voor de reis van de prins van Oranje naar Zeeland in 1668” *Digitale Bijdragen voor Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde*, 4th series, I (1900), 224-9, 224; Troost, *William III*, 57.

²⁸ D’Estrades, *Mémoires*, vi. 438, as cited in Baxter, *William III*, 49.

Witt targeted the House of Orange and became a driving force in anti-Orangist policies, including William's exclusion from the captain-general and First Noble offices as well as the 1654 Act of Seclusion.²⁹ Princess Mary Stuart bemoaned de Witt's frequent meddling, calling him vindictive.³⁰ When de Witt made William, then sixteen-years old, Child of State and restructured his educational program, in a moment of emotional weakness the prince tearfully begged the Grand Pensionary to allow his beloved tutor to remain in his service, which de Witt denied. For William, this rebuff proved to be a lesson in temporarily accepting what he could not change and the virtue of patience when dealing with an adversary. This would be a pivotal moment in their relationship; while some reports stated William began to look on de Witt as a father and trusted advisor, his conduct indicates that, in fact, the prince merely composed himself, concealing his true feelings until he had the opportunity to act, as the two men continued to pursue opposing goals: William hoped to reclaim power, whereas de Witt aimed to thwart him.³¹ When news spread of William's establishment as First Noble of Zeeland in 1668, de Witt and Hollanders worked furiously to limit William's new control of the province through pamphleteering, claiming that "all republics save the Dutch had fallen under the control of a great family. The Dutch must take care to protect themselves from a similar fate."³² De Witt certainly sowed the seeds of William's

²⁹ Troost, *William III*, 29; Rowen, *John de Witt*, 74-90.

³⁰ "Le même au même. M. de Sommelsdyck ennemi passionné des Arminiens," The Hague, March 11, 1660, *Archive*, serie 2 deel 5, 192.

³¹ D'Estrades, *Mémoires*, iv, 223, as cited in Baxter, *William III*, 41; Troost, *William III*, 52;

³² Willem Pieter Cornelis Knuttel and Koninklijke Bibliotheek (Netherlands), "Den haestigen Zeeuw of Brief aen N.N. Raeckende 't Subject van't avancement van den Heer Prins van Oragien (1668)" No. 9683, *Catalogus van de pamfletten-verzameling berustende in de Koninklijke Bibliotheek* (Algemeen Landsdrukkerij, 1895); Baxter, *William III*, 49-50. See also Troost, *William III*, 57.

discontent, which the Grand Pensionary would later reap in full as the prince had developed a reputation for holding grudges and seeking revenge.³³ William understood that dealing with de Witt required patience and tact; after a companion commented on William's amicable conversation with de Witt in 1668, William curtly responded that he would be friendly "until the time came that he could be otherwise."³⁴

The "Year of Catastrophe" proved to be the perfect opportunity for William to both advance his political position and act against de Witt. In 1672, the English and French simultaneously attacked the Dutch Republic and stirred the growing discontent against Dutch-republican government for its apparent failure against military threats. Johan de Witt survived an attack in the streets of The Hague for his willingness to negotiate peace with France, and the common people began to whisper of the Grand Pensionary's "treason."³⁵ Through June, Orangist mobs successfully pressured magistrates to overturn the Eternal Edict and restore William to the stadholdership by the end of July. Thus, William accomplished his longtime goal of restoring himself to the stadholdership by simply waiting for public favor to swell as de Witt and his "True Freedom" fell out of favor. De Witt, recovering from his attack and fearful of continued civil unrest, wrote to request that William clear his name of slanderous accusations of financial malfeasance, cronyism, and purposefully hindering the army in order to deliver the country to the French. Remembering years of slights and political attacks, William

³³ Heimans, *Het karakter van Willem III*, 172.

³⁴ J.H. Gourville, *Memoires de J.H. de Gourville, Conseiller D'Etat, Concernant Les Affaires Auxquelles Il a Ete Employe Par La Cour Depuis 1642 Jusqu'en 1698*, tome ii, (A Paris, Chez Estienne Ganeau, rue S. Jacques vis-à-vis la Fontaine S. Severin, aux Armes de Dombes, 1724): 395; Heimans, *Het karakter van Willem III*, 156.

³⁵ Baxter, *William III*, 76; Troost, *William III*, 75.

informed de Witt that he and his own family had been slandered for years, and while he knew nothing of any financial malfeasance by the Grand Pensionary he could not judge de Witt's responsibility for the failings of the country's defenses, as he had better things to do.³⁶ To the public, this deft response indicated that de Witt really had been at fault and signaled the beginning of William's campaign against Holland's regents. For William, it was a chance to finally act against the man who had thwarted his ambitions for years. A few weeks later he explicitly requested, for good measure, to strike the honorable mention from de Witt's discharge resolution.³⁷

When the opportunity to exact revenge against de Witt finally came, some questions arose regarding William's complicity in his nemesis's murder in the following weeks. William began an intimidation campaign against Holland's regents, with whom he had previously cooperated, in an attempt to capitalize the current public fervor and solidify his triumph over "True Freedom."³⁸ This enraged the citizenry, as the prince's actions appeared to be further proof of de Witt's fault in the failings of the state. De Witt's brother Cornelius sat in prison, accused of treason and plotting to assassinate the prince.³⁹ As an Orangist mob, bolstered by the town guard, became ravenous for rough justice, the cavalry was ordered to leave its post at the jail to defend the town against

³⁶ Rowen, *John de Witt*, 203; Baxter, *William III*, 81.

³⁷ Troost, *William III*, 85.

³⁸ To do so, he published a letter from Charles II dated July 18, 1672 in which the King declared that he had gone to war against the Republic to humble the *Staatsgezind*. So while the mob's reaction targeted de Witt, William in fact attempted to intimidate all of the regents; Troost, *William III*, 85-6.

³⁹ Cornelius, previously a judicial magistrate, was accused of hiring an ex-convict to assassinate William. In actuality, the convict sought revenge against Cornelius for his imprisonment and fabricated the story to the Prince's camp to have Cornelius arrested and later stirred the mob against him; Baxter, *William III*, 81; Rowen, *John de Witt*, 207-211.

additional mob reinforcements in a vain attempt to dampen the rabble's zeal.⁴⁰ When de Witt visited the cell, the mob broke into the jail, dragged the pair into the streets, and brutally tortured and killed them, hanging the bodies by the heels from the gallows.⁴¹ While no documentation directly links the prince to these events, William's actions after the murders gave rise to suspicion of his complicity. William quietly paid off the leaders of the mob to avoid further vigilante violence and—according to critical rumors—buy their silence. This proved to be an efficient means in keeping the mob under control, although it did cast the prince's inaction in the face of the murders in a poor light. As if to counteract this negative image, the prince publicly expressed his regret for the de Witts' deaths and honored their memories while offering protection for the remaining family for the next three decades.⁴² The de Witt murders were a blight on William's early career, exhibiting his calculative nature and willingness to allow violence done in his name for the sake of political expediency, keeping his hands clean to avoid backlash associated with poor public relations that could later hinder his ultimate goals.⁴³

William exhibited similar means of concealing his true feelings until the opportune moment on the English throne, particularly in his handling of John Churchill, Earl and

⁴⁰ Anon., *The Manner of the Killing of Pensionary De Witt...*; Baxter, *William III*, 82.

⁴¹ For a truncated account of the rising discontent in the Netherlands, see Troost, *William III*, 8 and Baxter, *William III*, 82-3; *Strange Newes from Holland, being a True Character of the Country and People; with the putting to Death of De Witt and his Brother the Ruward van Putten, by the Burges at the Hague, and How Cruelly they Stript Them, cutting off their Eares, Fingers, and Toes, and Selling them at certain Rates about the Streets, and Hanging them up by the Heels on the Gallows. Also the killing, wounding, and pulling down the Houses of many of the old Magistrates, of Rotterdam and Delf. Sent in a Letter from a Gentleman in Holland, to a Person of Quality in the City of London*, (London: Printed by E. Crowich, 1672); *The Manner of the Killing of Pensionary De Witt, and his Brother Ruwart van Putten in the Hague, the 20th of August, 1672*, Sold by John Overton at the White Horse with Newgate and Dorman Newman in the Poultry, 1673.

⁴² *Correspondentie van Willem III en Bentinck*, II pt. 2. 744-45; Grew and Grew, *The Court of William III*, 18; Rowen, *The Princes of Orange*, 129.

⁴³ Heimans, *Het karakter van Willem III*, 176-177.

later Duke of Marlborough. Churchill rose from relative obscurity to become a high-ranking official in the English court. Having become a favorite of James, Duke of York, later King James II of England, Churchill commanded dragoons in support of the Stuart king and became known as a devoted servant, though his personal ambition gave pause to some.⁴⁴ William in particular disliked Churchill and flatly refused to have him as an English ambassador at The Hague in 1679, preferring someone more experienced and “docile.”⁴⁵ However, he recognized Churchill as an important leader in both the English military and James’s inner circle. So when the prince received a letter of defection from Churchill, who wrote “My honour I take leave to put in your highness’s hands, in which I think it safe. If you think there is any thing else that I ought to do, you have but to command me...” as he planned the English coup d’etat of 1688, William recognized Churchill’s ambition as similar to his own and distrusted him because of it, but used Churchill to undermine James’s army from within.⁴⁶ The scheme worked, as James lost his nerve after hearing of Churchill’s desertion to William’s camp, and in fleeing to France wrote:

My daughter hath deserted me, my army also, and him [Churchill] that I raised from nothing, the same, on whom I heaped all favours; and if such betrays me, what can I expect from those I have done so little for. I know not who to speak to or who to trust.⁴⁷

With the so-called “Glorious Revolution” of 1688 successfully underway, William

⁴⁴ Webb, *Lord Churchill’s Coup*, 4-6.

⁴⁵ Barillon’s letter to Louis XIV, May 1678, P.R.O. 31/3/145 as cited in Baxter, *William III*, 422; Baxter, *William III*, 150.

⁴⁶ William Coxe, *Memoirs of John Duke of Marlborough, with his Original Correspondence: Collected from the Family Records at Blenheim and other Authentic Sources*, vol. 1 (London: Printed for Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, Paternoster-Row, 1820), 37-38.

⁴⁷ James II, Whitehall, Dec. 10, 1688, *HMC* as cited in Webb, *Lord Churchill’s Coup*, 159.

began the hard and careful work of consolidating his power in England and dutifully offered Churchill a position in the army to both reward him for his efforts in the coup and keep a close eye on his misdoings; Churchill had proven to be a useful tool in military campaigns, but the prince had not forgotten about his betrayal of James. William allowed Churchill to remain close by his side with enough power to sate his ambition until he could act on his longstanding distaste for Churchill and newfound distrust of him.

As William's place in the English empire began to settle and his war on the Continent continued, his true feelings about Churchill came to the surface as evidenced by his treatment of the earl. Both William and Mary were miffed by Churchill's blatant participation in Princess Anne's (Mary's sister) shadow court.⁴⁸ William openly snubbed Churchill for both a dukedom and higher command in the military, which infuriated the latter's ambitious nature as he had doggedly asked for such appointments, even at the behest of their Highnesses George and Anne of Denmark.⁴⁹ William also refused to acknowledge his successes throughout the Ireland campaign, informing the earl that he would hold a subordinate post in Flanders under the king's direct supervision. His ego wounded, Churchill clandestinely rekindled a close correspondence with James II, seeking indemnity in the case of a counter-revolution and reconnected Anne with her

⁴⁸ At this time, Anne, Princess of Denmark, had recently given birth to an heir, whereas William and Mary were childless. This caused many to preemptively look to her in regards to the succession. Sarah Churchill, Duchess of Marlborough and John Churchill's wife, identified herself with the Princess and believed the Churchill family's future and position would be measured by Anne. Sarah's meddling displeased Mary so greatly as to cause a rift between the sisters and threatened John's position with William; Burnet, *History of his own Time*, 125; Coxe, *Memoirs*, 58-61; Webb, *Lord Churchill's Coup*, 230.

⁴⁹ Dalrymple ed., Prince George and Princess Anne to King William, Aug. 2, 1691, *Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland; From the Dissolution of the last Parliament of Charles II till the Capture of the French and Spanish Fleets at Vigo*, vol. 3, 272-3; Burnet, *History of his own Time*, 117; Baxter, *William III*, 298; Webb, *Lord Churchill's Coup*, 245.

father.⁵⁰ Churchill also formed a “cabal” of English officers in opposition to William’s Dutch favorites in an attempt to make himself independently superior to all foreign and domestic officers, save for the king himself. William shunned Churchill to the point of the latter lashing out, allowing William the opportunity to dismiss the earl and his wife from court in 1692.⁵¹ William’s close cooperation with Churchill during his first few years of English rule gave the impression of a friendship. His treatment of Churchill reveals that the friendship was instead a political partnership that ended when William secured his regime in England. William never trusted or liked Churchill and merely used him to achieve his political and military goals.

William III’s *modus operandi*, to patiently cooperate with reigning powers until decisive action could be taken to promote his true interests, had formed during his childhood and established during early career in the Netherlands. This allowed him to take grand strides toward his ultimate goal of reclaiming his hereditary titles in quick succession, all while tactfully handling his enemies with little repercussion. His triumph over de Witt, culminating in the Grand Pensionary’s humiliation and gruesome murder, reflected the prince’s calculative and patient means to assert his will. Similarly, William’s manipulation of John Churchill, a man he had openly disliked before his English coup, represented his willingness to cooperate with adversaries for political expediency, then later change his behavior to better reflect his true feelings. William III’s *modus operandi*, on display in his maneuvering both with his allies and opponents in the Netherlands and England, clearly elucidates his dealing with the American colonies following the Glorious

⁵⁰ Coxe, *Memoirs*, 53-56.

⁵¹ Coxe, *Memoirs*, 58-64; Baxter, *William III*, 298-300; John Childs, *The British Army of William III*, 74; Webb, *Lord Churchill’s Coup*, 248-249.

Revolution. William methodically studied the evolving political and social dynamics both in England and the Americas to better understand his role as monarch before inserting himself and his agenda. William characteristically allowed existing colonial governments to operate as he evaluated the best means to exert control, while he dealt with the wars in Ireland and the Continent.

CHAPTER 3

MASSACHUSETTS BAY: "SEDITION AND ANTIMONARCHY"

Recognizing the importance of cementing his sovereignty not just in the English Isles but also the Atlantic colonies, William III issued statements of his administration and orders for colonial governments to continue operating as normal in early January and February 1689.⁵² Matters were complicated in April 1689, when the Massachusetts Bay colonists led a revolt against the Dominion of New England government and its leader Sir Edmund Andros. Bay Colony representatives in England attempted to portray the rebellion as a mirror of William's own campaign against the Stuart regime and New-France. The Prince of Orange's handling of the rebellion in Massachusetts reflects his *modus operandi*: to assuage opponents as a matter of political expediency until he could enact his true agenda. While he dealt with a Jacobite uprising in Ireland, William humored colonial dignitaries' requests for reinstatement of the Massachusetts Bay Colony charter as he gathered information about the colony's history of dissent. Once the war in Ireland and political discourse in England turned solidly in his favor, allowing him to devote more attention to colonial and domestic matters, William took greater strides to restructure the charter to place the Bay Colony more directly under his control and in line with his idea of empire.

Massachusetts Bay colonists' relationship with the English monarchy had always been somewhat contentious. The original 1629 charter left the colony virtually independent, enabling its Puritan inhabitants to form a government where their rigid

⁵² J.W. Fortescue ed., "America and West Indies, January and February 1689" in *Calendar of State Papers Colonial: America and West Indies*, vol. 13, 1689-1692 (London: HMS, 1901).

religious principles closely overlapped the workings of the state. Sir Edward Randolph, colonial administrator and ardent opponent of the colony, reported that Bay Colony settlers truly believed they had established a commonwealth and did not need to swear allegiance to anyone except their own government.⁵³ Many radical colonists adhered to this philosophy, as colonist Judge Daniel Gookin testified “His Majestye [has] nothing to doe here, for we are a free people of o^r selves.”⁵⁴ In truth, most colonists believed that allegiance to the king was compatible with their religious mission as long as the monarch’s sovereignty remained in England; following the Restoration of King Charles II, the Bay Colony General Court said as much in their statement of allegiance, writing first and foremost that the colony “[conceived] the pattent (under God) to be the first and maine foundation of our civil politye here” and defined themselves “by the pattent, a body politicke, in fact and name.”⁵⁵

In response to Randolph’s reports and the open defiance of the Crown’s prerogative, Charles II began to consolidate his control over the English Empire, challenging the Bay Colonists’ alleged freedoms.⁵⁶ Frustrated by Massachusetts’s insubordination, Charles II asked the Lords of Trade to enforce the Navigation Acts

⁵³ Merrill Jenson, ed., *English Historical Documents*, vol. IX, *American Colonial Documents to 1776* (London, 1995): 238

⁵⁴ Deposition of Nicholas Wardner, June 1681, *M.H.S.*, Gay Transcripts, State Papers, II 80,81, as cited in David Lovejoy, *The Glorious Revolution in America* (Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press, 1987): 125.

⁵⁵ Michael G. Hall, Lawrence H. Leder, and Michael G. Kammen, eds., “The General Court Reports on Massachusetts’ Allegiance to the Crown, June 10, 1661,” *The Glorious Revolution in America: Documents on the Colonial Crisis of 1689* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964): 12-13.

⁵⁶ The Bay Colonists continuously defied parliamentary and royal orders by exempting themselves from the Navigation Act taxes until confirmed by the local assemblies; Leonard Woods Labaree, ed., “An Act for Prevent Planting of Tobacco in England and for Regulating the Plantation Trade, 1670,” *Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors, 1660-1776* (New York: Octagon, 1967): 753; Leo F. Stock, ed. *Proceedings and Debates of the English Parliaments Respecting North America, 1452-1727*. Vol. 1. (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1924): 370-374.

throughout the colonies by limiting the power of the local assemblies, forcing them to ratify the new Acts.⁵⁷ Randolph catalogued the colony's transgressions, finding the colonists had significant trade dealings that "farther marke their power and sovereignty...that they lay at pleasure what impositions, fines and taxes they thinke fit upon their estates, persons, and trade, contrary to the lawes of England."⁵⁸ The Lords attempted to force the colonists to revise their charter to include the new laws; instead, the Bay Colony circumvented this order by scripting their own laws to manage trade and refused to surrender their charter when requested.⁵⁹ John Evelyn noted in his diary that the New Englanders' behavior led many in Parliament to believe that "they were a people almost upon the very brink of renouncing any dependence on the Crown."⁶⁰ Enraged, Charles and the Lords of Trade issued writs of *scire facias et Terminus* and *quo warranto*, effectively liquidating the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1684.⁶¹

With the loss of the charter, the people of Massachusetts were subject to imperial bureaucracy and reorganization.⁶² After the death of his brother Charles, James II consolidated Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island, and Connecticut into the Dominion of New England in 1686, centralizing colonial governance, later adding New York and New Jersey as well. The Dominion brought the northern colonies under one governor

⁵⁷ Richard S. Dunn "The Glorious Revolution and America." *The Origins of Empire: English Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998): 448-450.

⁵⁸ Hall *et al.*, "Letter from Edward Randolph to the King, Sept. 20, 1676," *Documents*, 18-19.

⁵⁹ Hall *et al.*, "The House of Deputies Denies Parliament's Authority, February 23, 1682," "Samuel Nowell to John Richards, Mar. 28, 1683," and "Increase Mather's Argument, 1683," *Documents*, 21-24.

⁶⁰ John Evelyn, *The Diary of John Evelyn* vol. ii (London, New York: Macmillan and Co., Ltd.): 326.

⁶¹ Dunn, "The Glorious Revolution and America," *The Origins of Empire*, 450.

⁶² Lawrence H. Leder, "The Glorious Revolution and the Pattern of Imperial Relationships," *New York History* 46.3 (1965): 204.

general, Sir Edmund Andros, whom James hoped would solve the problems of trade enforcement and political dependence by establishing a military-governorship with the Crown's authority.⁶³ Andros dissolved the legislatures of the colonies, levied taxes without the consent of the governed, revoked the charter for Cambridge College, and reorganized local militias. He also destroyed Congregationalist government in Massachusetts by enforcing James's Declaration of Indulgence to support liberty of conscience and religious toleration. Massachusetts Puritans had initially supported this reform until Andros replaced Congregational church members with Anglicans in prominent military positions.⁶⁴ Local printers lost control of their printing presses to Randolph, who became Secretary of the Dominion; John Tully, a recent arrival from England, released the 1685 and 1686 Boston Almanac with astrological readings and bawdy verses.⁶⁵ Drinking, card games, and theatrical sword-playing led Puritan minister Increase Mather to observe, "the Devil has begun a Lecture in Boston on a Lecture-day which was set up for Christ."⁶⁶

These changes proved to be too radical for the Bay Colonists, who sent Mather as emissary to the king's court to petition on behalf of the colony's interests.⁶⁷ Mather arrived in London in May of 1688 and met with King James several times in the

⁶³ Dunn, "The Glorious Revolution and America." *The Origins of Empire*, 452; Ian Steele, "Governor or Generals?: A Note on Martial Law and the Revolution of 1689 in English America." *William and Mary Quarterly*, April 46.2 (1989): 310.

⁶⁴ Increase Mather, *The Autobiography of Increase Mather*, edited by Michael G. Hall (Worcester, MA: American Antiquarian Society, 1962): 320; Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution in America*, 180-181, 194.

⁶⁵ John Tully, *An Almanack* (Boston, 1687, 1688, 1689, 1690), as cited in Michael G. Hall, *The Last American Puritan: The Life of Increase Mather, 1639-1723* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1988), 205; Marion B. Stowell, *Early American Almanacs: The Colonial Weekday Bible* (Burt Franklin, 1976): 58-59.

⁶⁶ Increase Mather, [Diary], Sept. 27, 1687, *MHS*, Increase Mather Papers, reel 1, microfilm.

⁶⁷ Mather, *Autobiography*, 320-322.

following months, during which the king and his private councilors assured the old minister that James would be “kind to his subjects in New England.”⁶⁸ After a long private interview regarding Andros’s administration, the king requested Mather to put the colonists’ grievances into writing, which he took as a promise of relief.⁶⁹ The minister thanked God for “finding acceptance with the King and other great ones,” and prayed for wisdom in managing the New England affair.⁷⁰ His optimism soon soured as James’s attention turned to the threat of an English coup in September and October, indefinitely delaying further progress. William’s landing and successful coup in November would force Mather to regroup and navigate William’s new inner circle in the Whig-dominated Parliament. He published *A Narrative of the Miseries of New England* in an attempt to stay ahead of political discourse regarding the colony.⁷¹

After accepting Parliament’s Bill of Rights and formally accepting the Crown of England in February 1689, William slowly began learning his role in English and English-colonial governance. The Committee for Trade and Plantations suggested from the start that William issue the Massachusetts Bay colony a new charter that increased colonial dependence on the Crown.⁷² William remained cordial but noncommittal in his early discussions with Mather regarding the colony’s grievances; he validated the old minister’s mission while simultaneously learning more of New England’s patchy history

⁶⁸ Mather, *Autobiography*, 326.

⁶⁹ Mather, *Autobiography*, 329-331; Hall, *Last American Puritan*, 214.

⁷⁰ Increase Mather, [Diary], Aug. 1, 1688, *MHS*, Increase Mather Papers, reel 1, microfilm.

⁷¹ Mather, “Narratives of the Miseries of New England, by Reason of Arbitrary Government Erected there Under Sir Edmund Andros,” *Andros Tracts, being a Collection of Pamphlets and Official Papers* vol. 2, W.H. Whitmore, ed., (Boston: the Prince Society, 1874): 3-8.

⁷² Fortescue ed., Order of the King in the Council (Feb. 26, 1689), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial*, vol. 13, #37. Sosin, *English Atlantic*, 128.

of imperial governance.⁷³ The Privy Council issued a circular ordering the colonies to proclaim William and Mary as joint monarchs with the exception of New England “which [was] deferred until the business of taking away the Charters can be reported on to the King.”⁷⁴ At the same time, William, still trying to understand his part in managing the Americas, ordered all colonial officers, including those in New England, to continue serving in their offices.⁷⁵ On February 22, the Lords of Trade reviewed a petition for the restoration of the Massachusetts charter submitted by Mather and Sir William Phips and agreed to recommend a new governor to replace Andros and take charge of the colony until further action could be taken. James II’s March landing in Ireland to recover his kingdoms shifted William’s priorities from consolidating the English overseas empire to protecting his claim at home, halting any significant administrative progress for the Bay Colony.⁷⁶ However, when William accepted Mather into his chamber on March 14, 1689, he responded to the Puritan’s requests saying he would “shew [Bay colonists] all the kindness which is in my power to do.”⁷⁷

The extent of the king’s kindness would be challenged with news of the Boston rebellion in April 1689 that overthrew the Dominion of New England government. During the first week of April, a copy of William’s declaration to the colonies arrived in Boston and the messenger was arrested and held overnight for holding “Seditious and

⁷³ Mather, *Autobiography*, 331.

⁷⁴ Fortescue ed., Order of the King in Council (Feb. 19, 1689), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial*, vol. 13, #21.

⁷⁵ Fortescue ed. Proclamation of the King and Queen (Feb. 19, 1689, Whitehall), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial*, vol. 13, #22.

⁷⁶ Fortescue ed., Journal of Lords of Trade and Plantations (Feb. 22, 1689), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial*, vol. 13, #28; Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution in America*, 335.

⁷⁷ Mather, *Autobiography*, 331.

Treasonable” papers, only to be released the following morning.⁷⁸ Word spread amongst the colonists, who perceived Andros’s failure to immediately acknowledge the news as an attempt to suppress intelligence; in the minds of the Bay colonists, Andros would try to hold Massachusetts Bay for King James II as part of a greater Catholic conspiracy.⁷⁹ In mid-April, restless militiamen mutinied and began walking from Pemaquid garrison, where they had been stationed by Andros’s orders, to Boston.

As the militia arrived in Boston on April 18, angry citizens took to arms, formed ranks with the troops, and seized Captain John George of His Majesty’s frigate *Rose* to prevent gunship reprisal. Andros agreed to parley and discuss matters in the Town House, where the colonists demanded that he surrender and promptly imprisoned him. He and other members of his committee, such as Randolph, were initially held in a private home, but the people insisted they be moved in chains to the fort, where they would be held for the duration of their imprisonment. The entire affair lasted two days, and as Byfield later wrote to Increase Mather, “Through the Goodness of God, there hath been no Blood shed.”⁸⁰ A committee of Boston gentlemen drafted a declaration

⁷⁸ Ian K. Steele, *The English Atlantic, 1675-1740: An Exploration of Communication and Community* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986): 104-106.

⁷⁹ Catholic or “popish” plots were common both in England and in the Americas, particularly Massachusetts Bay. Bay colonists’ concerns were not without merit, as they constantly suffered French and Indian attacks from the north. Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution in America*, 239-240; Sosin, *English America*, 88-91; Stanwood, *Empire Reformed*, 99-101. For more information about Catholic anxieties in the seventeenth century, see Tim Harris, *London Crowds in the Reign of Charles II: Propaganda and Politics from the Restoration until the Exclusion Crisis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); J.P. Kenyon, *The Popish Plot* (California: Phoenix Press, 2001); and John Miller, *Poperly and Politics in England: 1660-1688* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973).

⁸⁰ Charles M. Andrews ed., Nathaniel Byfield’s “An Account of the Late Revolution in New-England. Together with the Declaration of the Gentlemen, Merchants, and Inhabitants of Boston, and the Country Adjacent. April 18, 1689,” *Narratives of the Insurrections, 1675-1690* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1915) 170-175; Hall et al., “Samuel Prince’s Account, April 22, 1689,” *Documents*, 40-42; Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution in America*, 239-241; Sosin, *English America*, 92-93; Stanwood, *Empire Reformed*, 102-103.

justifying the revolt, describing their struggle against a “popish plot” like that in England and the general grievances of Dominion governance. Thus, in compliance with the “patterns” established in England, the people seized “the Persons of those few ill Men which have been...the grand Authors of our Miseries” to overcome “popery” and the Dominion of New England government.⁸¹ A provisional council of safety, led by old governor Simon Bradstreet, sent off this declaration and a brief account of the council’s assumption of power until further orders were received, maintaining that the people of Boston had only followed the prince’s example to overthrow tyranny.⁸²

News of the rebellion in Massachusetts Bay did not reach England until June 1689. Frustrated by delays in Parliament to approve his campaign against James’s insurrection in Ireland, William now had to grapple with another rebellion across the Atlantic. Although he understood that news traveled slowly across the sea, William had issued orders for the continuance of Andros’s government, making the colonists’ actions technically treasonable; William did not know Increase Mather managed to delay these orders being sent to Andros, which the minister reflected “if there had bin nothing else...was worth my voyage to England.”⁸³ Mather, sensing the king and Privy Council’s distaste for the rebellion, feverishly began publishing accounts of the rebellion in London pamphlets and met with the king to boldly explain the rebellion as the colony’s attempt “to secure that Territory for King William” and the “Protestant Interest” against

⁸¹ Andrews ed., “An Account,” *Narratives*, 181-182; Hall *et al.*, “The Boston Declaration of Grievances,” *Documents*, 42-46.

⁸² Sosin, *English America*, 93.

⁸³ Fortescue ed., Order of the King in Council (Feb. 19, 1689, Whitehall), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial*, vol. 13, 21; Mather, *Autobiography*, 332.

New France to the north, rather than a revolt against Andros.⁸⁴ At first, William accepted Mather's interpretation of events, issued a letter to the colony acknowledging their deeds done in his name, and permitted the council of safety to continue to act as government. In doing so, William expeditiously swept the matter under the rug to continue focusing on more important concerns in England, Ireland, and the Continent.⁸⁵ The issue had not been settled however, as William made it clear that the council had certain permissions only until "such Time as an orderly settlement could be obtained so as should be for his Service" and ordered the council to send Andros and other detained Dominion officials to England.⁸⁶

The end of the campaigning season in Ireland allowed William to return to Whitehall and slowly begin restructuring the colonial governments as new intelligence from Boston trickled into his court. By mid-October, the king had received no word confirming Andros's release and instead learned of the Bay Colonists' continued insubordination; the provisional council of safety had fallen back into the same patterns of disobedience, and based their actions on their perceived "chartered liberties" rather than the king for whom they supposedly rebelled. Randolph frequently wrote to the Privy Council and the Bishop of London describing the seditious chaos in Boston following the

⁸⁴ Fortescue ed., Brief Account of the Declaration of Boston (Aug. 7, 1689, Hampton Court), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial*, vol. 13, #324; Mather, *Autobiography*, 332; Increase Mather, *A Brief Relation of the State of New England, from the Beginning of that Plantation to this Present Year, 1689*, licensed July 30, 1689 (London: Printed for Richard Baldwine, near the *Black Bull*, in the *Old Baily*, 1689); Hall, *The Last American Puritan*, 225.

⁸⁵ Sosin, *English Atlantic*, 132.

⁸⁶ Fortescue ed., Order of the King in Council (July 25, 1689), King to the Revolutionary Government of Massachusetts (July 30, 1689, Whitehall), Copy of a letter from Boston (July 30, 1689), Commission of the Magistrates (Aug. 12, 1689, Whitehall), and the King to the Governor of Massachusetts Bay (Aug. 15, 1689, Whitehall), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial*, vol. 13, #291, 309, 310, 332, and 340; Mather, *Autobiography*, 339; Hall, *The Last American Puritan*, 225-226.

rebellion, stating “[the colonists] accounted themselves the King’s nominal, not real, subjects. I hope that...the King has sent sufficient force to quiet these disorders and reduce the country to a firm dependence on the Crown.”⁸⁷ He continued, “their charter continues as valid as ever...that by their charter they had an absolute power...and were authorized to resist any who withstood it.”⁸⁸ Randolph further reported that leaders of the rebellion actively promoted anti-monarchical principles and would blatantly oppose the king’s commands unless the orders were “in favor of their late proceedings.”⁸⁹ William could not ignore such accusations and officially canceled the Massachusetts Bay charter on October 30, 1689.⁹⁰

Between the campaigning seasons of 1689 and 1690, William demonstrated his true intent to consolidate Massachusetts Bay under his prerogative and his overall distaste of the colonists’ rebellious proceedings. By January 1690, William shifted his agenda toward strengthening his hold on England and the Americas; fatigued by the Whig party’s contempt for monarchical authority, he began favoring the Tories, who held more traditional beliefs regarding royal prerogative. The king prorogued and dissolved Parliament in early February, and then placed the Tory President of the Committee of Trade and Plantations, Sir Thomas Osborne, the Marquis of Carmarthen, in several high positions.⁹¹ This shift signaled the king’s newfound confidence in managing the

⁸⁷ Fortescue ed., Edward Randolph to the Lords of Trade and Plantations (July 23, 1689, Common Gaol, Boston), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial*, vol. 13, #286.

⁸⁸ Fortescue ed., Edward Randolph to the Bishop of London (Oct. 25, 1689), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial*, vol. 13, #510.

⁸⁹ Fortescue ed., Edward Randolph to the Bishop of London (Oct. 26, 1689), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial*, vol. 13, #512.

⁹⁰ Fortescue ed., Exemplification of the judgement given against the charter of New England (Oct. 30, 1689), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial*, vol. 13, #525.

⁹¹ Hall, *The Last American Puritan*, 229.

state and a desire for more direct control of the colonies. This is further evidenced by the fact that Carmarthen had favored a strong military governor for New England and sat on the committee when the charter was first withdrawn under Charles II. In the spring of 1690, the Tories dominated the elections and secured a strong majority, which effectively killed the Corporations Bill, a Whig initiative that would have secured and restored all charters lost during Charles II's and James II's reigns.⁹² William now had sole authority in the settlement of New England's charter, and Mather recognized that the Massachusetts agents must "implore the King's Royal Favor" for all future agreements.⁹³ The king, still more concerned with his efforts in Ireland, managed to shift political discourse to better reflect his overall agenda and established his prerogative in the colony so that he could maintain primary control once he won his war in Ireland.

William became more involved in managing the American colonies following the Battle of the Boyne (July 1690), which decisively turned the Irish war in his favor. After asserting his dominion over the revolutionary government in New York, another major thorn in his side, William focused on restructuring the Bay Colony's charter. He ordered several reports from the Lords of Trade regarding the status of the colony and its subsidiaries, New Hampshire, Plymouth, and Maine after receiving the colonists' petition for their new charter.⁹⁴ When the king returned to his Council in late April, he inquired whether he could appoint a governor of the colony "without any Breach of

⁹² Andrews ed., "Increase Mather's Brief Account of the Agents, 1691," *Narratives*, 278; Hall, *The Last American Puritan*, 229; Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution in America*, 341.

⁹³ Andrews ed., "Increase Mather's Brief Account of the Agents, 1691," *Narratives*, 279.

⁹⁴ Fortescue ed. Order of the King in Council (Jan. 1, 1691, Whitehall), Order of the Queen in Council (Mar. 30, 1691, Whitehall), Order of the King in Council (Apr. 9, 1691, Whitehall), and [Apr., Misc.] (Apr. 1691, I.—XXXVI, A History of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, with the proceedings against the Charter), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial*, vol. 13, #1276, 1377, 1391, and 1443.

Law...” He stated that “he was desirous to promote the Welfare of New-England...and that he believed it would be for the Good and Advantage of his Subjects in that Colony, to be under a Governour appointed by himself.”⁹⁵ To assuage Mather, who was present at this council meeting, William assured him that “this notwithstanding,” he sought to restore the colony’s old privileges. This proved to be another example of William’s expeditious politics, as the King’s Order of the Council declared that not only would the king appoint his own governor, but that the new charter “should be settled on the same Foundation with Barbadoes,” which would exceptionally extend William’s influence via a powerful royal governor.⁹⁶ This reflects William’s *modus operandi*: to vocally express interest in a small change to mollify his adversaries, while his later actions revealed his true intent. William continued to assure Mather that he would only request small changes to the Massachusetts charter while allowing the colonists’ ancient privileges to take precedent, when in reality he planned to restructure the colony in a way that would grant him greater and more direct control.

The charter drafting process further illustrated William’s willingness to placate his adversaries in the interim while devising long-term plans to assert his agenda. After the king ordered the charter be drafted following the Barbados model, Increase Mather and the Massachusetts agents frantically worked to remind the council of William’s earlier promises and complained that the draft infringed on the colony’s rights. The minister wrote to colonial leaders with hope, saying certain members of the Privy Council

⁹⁵ Fortescue ed., Minute of the Lords of Trade and Plantations (Apr. 27, 1691), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial*, vol. 13, #1432; Mather, “Brief Account,” *Narratives*, 282.

⁹⁶ Fortescue ed., Order of King in Council (Apr. 30, 1691, Whitehall), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial 1689-92*, vol. 13, #1440; Mather, *Autobiography*, 335-336; Andrews ed., Mather “Brief Account,” *Narratives*, 282; Hall, *Last American Puritan*, 241-242.

assured him that “we might prevail with his Majesty to signifie his Disallowance of those Minutes which were so grievous to us...”⁹⁷ He further pressed the queen, who remained as cordial and noncommittal as her husband as she promise to speak to the king on behalf of New England. By this point however, New England’s persuasiveness had completely dwindled as bad news from the colony arrived: William Phips’s expedition against New-France [Canada] proved disastrous, forcing Phips’s troops to fall back, which prompted scathing pamphlets suggesting “whether we are now evidently reduced unto that extreme dilemma that either *New-England* or New-France must unavoidably perish?” and that “by a defensive warr nothing but bare defense can be hoped for.”⁹⁸ The colony’s position further weakened, New Englanders’ suggestions for the organization of the new charter were largely dismissed throughout the drafting process.⁹⁹

William left the execution of his colonial agenda in the hands of Mary and his privy council in order to finish his business in Ireland. Once set in motion, the drafting process rapidly unfolded. The Lords of Trade issued their recommendations for the charter to the Attorney-General on May 12, who received the draft and the Privy Council’s committee report on May 14.¹⁰⁰ By June 8, the Attorney-General drafted the charter and presented it to the Lords of Trade and Privy Council for amendments. In late

⁹⁷ Andrews ed., Mather, “Brief Account,” *Narratives*, 284.

⁹⁸ Further Quaeries, *Andros Tracts*, I, 200; Baxter, James Phiney, ed. Proposals of John Nelson, Jan. 4, 1690, *Documentary History of the state of Maine*, V, The Maine Historical Society (Portland: Thurston Print, 1897): 96-98; Johnson, *Adjustment to Empire*, 194-95.

⁹⁹ Fortescue ed., Extract of a letter from New England (May 27, 1691), and Proposals offered by the New England Agents for perfecting the Charter of New England ([June] 1691), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1689-92*, vol. 13, #1534 and 1574.

¹⁰⁰ Fortescue ed., Journal of the Lords of Trade and Plantations (May 12, 1691) and Order of the Privy Council (May 14, 1691), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1689-92*, vol. 13, #1482 and 1501.

June, the Committee met and compared the old charter to the current draft in parallel columns for further adjustment. William Blathwayt incorporated his recommendations for the charter into the draft read on July 2, granting the governor broad privileges and powers of appointment “with the advice and consent of the council.”¹⁰¹ Mather, not realizing the advantages these terms granted the colonists, tried to contest this language and suggested the General Court of Massachusetts make such appointments without the governor’s approval. At the advice of his council, William rejected these objections, recognizing that such a suggestion would relinquish the administration of justice to the colonists and invite a “co-partnership” rather than dependence on the Crown.¹⁰² The queen ordered the attorney-general to send the charter to the king on July 30 for his final approval, and on October 7, 1691, the new Charter of Massachusetts received the great seal of England.¹⁰³

With the new charter in place, William finally secured his prerogative in the colony while wiping out the political basis for the old colonial structure through several important changes. First and foremost, the king retained the right to appoint the governor, who could adjourn, prorogue, and dissolve the assembly and exercise martial and admiralty authority. Through the governor, the king would also select judges, sheriffs, and justices of the peace, while the assembly elected all other officers. The

¹⁰¹ Francis Newton Thorpe, ed., Massachusetts Charter of 1691, *The Federal and State Constitutions Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1909); Hall *et al*, *The Massachusetts Charter of 1691, Documents*, 76-79.

¹⁰² Fortescue ed., Agents’ Objections (July 29, 1691), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1689-92*, vol. 13, #1670; Nottingham to the King, July 31, 1691, H.M.C 71, as cited in Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution in America*, 346-7.

¹⁰³ Fortescue, ed., Order of the Queen in Council (July 30, 1691, Whitehall) and Charter of Massachusetts (Oct. 7, 1691), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1689-92*, vol. 13, #1675 and 1807; Hall, *The Last American Puritan*, 251.

king retained the right to veto all laws, elections, and acts of government; laws passed in Massachusetts had to be sent to England for approval. William also dismantled the Congregationalists' hold on power in the colony by opening provincial voting rights to all freeholders, rather than church members. William furthermore ensured that all people in the colony "Except Papists" enjoyed a liberty of Conscience to worship, a large shift for the colony's strict religious code.¹⁰⁴

A broad statement midway through the charter granted Massachusetts colonists "all Libertyes and Immunities of Free and naturall Subjects within any of the Dominions...within this Our *Realme* of England."¹⁰⁵ This paralleled a similar sentiment in the 1629 charter that the Bay colonists previously abused by denying basic rights to non-Congregational church members. However, the statement was still a necessary addition, as Mather's defense of the colony rested on the restoration of these rights on the grounds that the colonists were Englishmen equal to those in England. Increase Mather and the colonists were just happy to have the matter sorted; Mather recognized that further pressing of colonial preferences could result in even fewer liberties, and in the context of Phips's failed expedition, the colonists were willing to accept political dependence in exchange for military relief from the French and Indians.¹⁰⁶

King William III managed to completely restructure the Massachusetts Bay Colony to foster a deeper dependence on the Crown by following his *modus operandi*, working with the existing colonial government as a temporary measure only to later

¹⁰⁴ This did not, however, dismantle the state-sponsored religion. Congregationalism would continue to be the established religion in Massachusetts until 1824.

¹⁰⁵ Hall *et al.*, *The Massachusetts Charter of 1691, Documents*, 78.

¹⁰⁶ Hall *et al.*, *The Massachusetts Charter of 1691, Documents*, 77; Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution in America*, 348-9; Stanwood, *Empire Reformed*, 173; Sosin, *English America*, 138.

forcefully assert his true agenda. The king assuaged Increase Mather's and the other colonial agent's concerns for a short period at the beginning of his reign, patiently listened to their proposals for the reinstatement of the old charter, and implicitly accepted their explanation of the Glorious Revolution in the Bay Colony while he focused on the more pressing matters of securing his claim to the throne and quelling the Irish uprising to the north. Once the war in Ireland turned in his favor and English political discourse became more loyalist, William moved to strengthen his hold over the colony throughout the charter negotiation process.

The completed charter of 1691 created a Bay Colony drastically different than that under the old charter both in daily practice and its dependence on the Crown. The king now had direct control in appointing the governor and through him all judicial appointments and colonial rule of law was entirely at the mercy of his prerogative and subject to his veto. William also reshaped Massachusetts society by forcefully opening the door for freeholders and religious dissenters to actively participate in their communities, forcing the Congregationalist establishment to recognize his imperial authority by weakening their oligarchical control. In short William handled the Massachusetts Bay crisis by relying on a similar pattern of behavior evident throughout his reign: allowing existing governments and agents to continue to operate until he found the best means to exert his will and realize his vision for an English empire.

CHAPTER 4

NEW YORK: “DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES”

William faced a problem similar to that in Massachusetts when cementing his regime in New York. Despite his orders for existing colonial governments to continue through his transition of power in England, the people of New York reacted violently against Dominion of New England officials in May 1689. Unlike Massachusetts, New York did not have emissaries in England to immediately interpret news of the rebellion in their favor. This put the colony at a significant disadvantage when they attempted to reconcile their actions with the king’s commands. William handled this rebellion by remaining true to his *modus operandi*: allowing his adversaries in the colony to remain in power for political expediency, then acting quickly at the opportune moment to assert his authority. Although William knew that he had to subdue and replace Jacob Leisler, a rebel who had assumed the governorship in New York, his conflicts in Ireland and the Continent took precedence. He delayed sending his appointed governor until the Irish war turned in his favor, at which time he could spare both the ship and the officer chosen for the position. Once in New York, William’s officials quickly brought Leisler and his followers to heel, executed many of the leading dissenters, and asserted the king’s sovereignty in the colony.

The tumultuous establishment of New York colony in 1664 bred insecurities and frustrations that William faced following the rebellion of 1689. After receiving the colony from his brother, Charles II, James, Duke of York faced several problems that made governing the colony difficult from the outset.¹⁰⁷ Land and border disputes made tax

¹⁰⁷ New York Commissioners of Statutory Revision, *The Colonial Laws of New York from the Year 1664 to the Revolution: including the charters, to the Duke of York, the commissions and instructions to colonial*

collection impossible; parts of Connecticut officially belonged to New York, though the colonists adamantly refused to acknowledge this and instead partnered with Massachusetts, with which they shared Puritanical sensibilities.¹⁰⁸ Additionally, Connecticut Puritans and Long Islanders ignored the trade monopoly granted to New York City in favor of Boston markets, cutting New York out of every major trading opportunity.¹⁰⁹ Because of these property and commercial disputes, the colony often failed to support itself financially.

In addition to these internal concerns, New York maintained a long boundary with Catholic New France and the Iroquois Nations, omnipresent threats despite the government's attempts to maintain "a durable peace."¹¹⁰ New Yorkers feared a Roman-Catholic conspiracy in which Frenchmen and their Native allies would sweep through the northern colonies and kill all loyal Protestants, and the officials in the government suggested the beginnings of such a plot. Several high-ranking officials and militia officers, including former governor Thomas Dongan, were avowed Roman-Catholics. Lieutenant-governor Francis Nicholson's closeness to James, a known Catholic, and Edmund Andros, a supposed Catholic-sympathizer, fueled considerable suspicion about

governors, the Duke's laws, the laws of Dongan and Leisler Assemblies, the charters of Albany and New York and the acts of colonial legislatures from 1691 to 1775 inclusive, I (5 vols., Albany: J.B. Lyon, 1894): 1-5.

¹⁰⁸ E.B. O'Callaghan, ed., "Answers of Gov. Andros to Enquires about New York, 1678," *Documentary History of the State of New York* [hereafter *Doc. Hist. NY*], I (4 vols., Albany, 1849-51): 89-90; Hall *et al.*, "Governor Dongan's Expansionism, Feb. 22, 1687" and "Edward Randolph Criticizes New York's Expansionism, Nov. 23, 1687," *Documents*, 91-93.

¹⁰⁹ E.B. O'Callaghan, ed., "Gov. Dongan's Report to the Committee of Trade on the Province of New York, dated 22d February, 1687," *Doc. Hist. NY*, I (Albany, 1849-51): 151.

¹¹⁰ E.B. O'Callaghan, ed., "Memoir Concerning the Present State of Canada, 1685," *Doc. Hist. NY*, (Albany, 1849-1851): 196-202; *Ibid.*, "Gov. Dongan's Report," *Doc. Hist. NY* (Albany, 1849-51): 155-159; Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution in America*, 98-106.

him, leading colonists to dub him a “pretended protestant.”¹¹¹ Growing trouble with New France enhanced New Yorker’s fears; several key forts, including Albany, had fallen into moldy disrepair, leaving the colonists and commerce in these areas vulnerable.¹¹²

To combat these issues, James introduced “the Duke’s Laws” to address the needs of the proprietary colony at the expense of the colonists’ perceived right to assemble.¹¹³ The laws covered every aspect of colonial life: governmental structure, church management, debt collection, fees of justices of the peace, and even the reward for dead wolves.¹¹⁴ The colonists protested the arbitrary laws, grumbling for the right to assemble, deputize, and tax themselves. As the government continued to ignore their requests to assemble and elect representatives, many towns refused to pay customs, protesting higher rates than those in neighboring New England.¹¹⁵ In June 1681, the New York Court of Assizes petitioned James to constitute the right to assemble, describing the “miserable burden” placed on the colonists unable to govern and tax themselves.¹¹⁶

The Duke of York then ordered Governor Thomas Dongan to issue writs for an election of representatives in response to the continued loss of revenues. When this assembly convened in 1683, it approved new taxes and called for a new colonial charter

¹¹¹ O’Callaghan, *Doc. Hist. N. Y.*, II, 10; Hall *et al.*, *Documents*, 109-110.

¹¹² O’Callaghan, *Doc. Hist. N. Y.*, I, 147-15.

¹¹³ This was certainly a conscious choice by James, who hated local assemblies and believed “they would be of dangerous consequence, nothing being more knowne...which prove destructive to...the peace of the government wherein they are allowed.” Hall *et al.*, “The Duke of York on the ‘Dangerous Consequence’ of Assemblies, January 28, 1676,” *Documents*, 94.

¹¹⁴ New York Commissioners of Statutory Revisions, *The colonial laws of New York from the year 1664 to the Revolution*, vol. I, 6-71.

¹¹⁵ See Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution in America* for a full description of the growing tensions.

¹¹⁶ John Romeyn Brodhead, *History of the State of New York*, II (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1853-71): 658.

(the New York Charter of Liberties and Privileges).¹¹⁷ The Charter of Liberties addressed the colonists' grievances against James's arbitrary governance by expressly proclaiming their individual and community liberties: a general assembly elected by freeholders would be held at least every three years, taxes and customs could not be levied without the assembly's consent, and every freeholder had the right to property. The Charter also outlined a clear executive and legislative structure in which power would be held largely by New York colonists.¹¹⁸ For granting the right to assemble the duke would receive sufficient revenues, which the colonists hoped would entice James to sign this liberal charter. The document secured Governor Dongan's approval and was sent to England for the duke's signature. James reportedly signed the Charter of Liberties in October 1684, but it was never sealed and returned to the colony.¹¹⁹

Allowing an assembly to convene proved to be a pretense; the Duke of York, now King James II, moved quickly to assert his idea of a centralized, absolutist imperial government following the death of Charles II and his own succession to the throne. He reappraised the Charter of Liberties in a series of "Observations," believing the charter allowed New Yorkers to govern themselves, a privilege he claimed was not granted to any other colony.¹²⁰ A year later he specifically declared the Charter or Liberties void and officially made New York a royal colony but ordered local administrators to continue

¹¹⁷ E.B. O'Callaghan, "Instructions to the Governor to call an Assembly in New York, January 1683" and "Writ Issued for Elected Representatives," *Origin of Legislative Assemblies*, 14-17; New York Commissioners, *The colonial laws of New York*, 111-16; Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution in America*, 114-15; Sosin, *English America*, 53.

¹¹⁸ New York Commissioners, *The colonial laws of New York*, 111-16; For a detailed analysis of the complete Charter, see Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution in America*, 115-17.

¹¹⁹ Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution in America*, 121.

¹²⁰ Brodhead ed., "Observations," *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York; produced by Holland, England, and France*, III (Albany: Weed, Parsons, and Company, 1853): 357-60.

collecting the taxes approved by the 1683 assembly.¹²¹ In a final move to cement his centralized imperial policy, James added New York to the Dominion of New England under the governorship of Sir Edmund Andros and Lieutenant-Governor Francis Nicholson in 1688.

As with Massachusetts, the 1689 rebellion in New York complicated William's relationship with the colony. The king sent word to New York to maintain the existing colonial government and to issue a proclamation of allegiance.¹²² Lieutenant-Governor Nicholson did not receive any official news from England or Andros as letters were detained in Boston following the rebellion there. In early May, the Massachusetts Declaration of April 18, 1689 reached New York describing the colony's triumph over the "great Scarlet Whore" of Catholicism, saving them from the "brinks of Popery and slavery," all in the name of the new king of England, William of Orange, Protestant hero.¹²³ New Yorkers' previous concerns of a Catholic threat ignited into panic as rumors circled of a conspiracy to take New York for France following William's ascension; the lieutenant-governor's silence regarding the news made him complicit in the minds of the colonists, who believed Nicholson conspired with papists and Jacobites to conceal the news.¹²⁴

Nicholson attempted to quell the rumor of the coup in England while he tried to confirm William's ascension. This turned out to have been a tactical mistake. At first

¹²¹ Brodhead ed., "Instructions to Governor Dongan," *Documents Relative to Col. N.Y.*, 369-375.

¹²² Fortescue ed., *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1689-92*, February 19, 1689, Whitehall.

¹²³ Cotton Mather, *The Declaration of the Gentlemen, Merchants, and Inhabitants of Boston, and the Countrey Adjacent*, April 18, 1689 (Boston: Printed by Samuel Green, London Coffee-House, 1689); Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution in America*, 253-4.

¹²⁴ Andrews ed., "Loyalty Vindicated, 1689," *Narratives*, 380.

Nicholson treaded cautiously, noting that the New York Council did not want to act hastily for fear of spurring the colonists into open rebellion like in Massachusetts.¹²⁵

Nicholson wrote to the Board of Trade that “some ill-affected and restless spiritts amongst us, used all imaginable means to stirr up the Inhabitants of this City to sedition and Rebellion.”¹²⁶ Nicholson’s subordinates declined to follow orders to march to Boston and demand the release of Andros and his cabinet, fearing other New York colonists would interpret this as criticism of the Boston rebellion, label them papists, and harm their homes and families.¹²⁷

On May 30, an exaggerated report claimed that Nicholson, frustrated with the ongoing uncertainty and military insubordination, had exclaimed in anger that he would shoot an officer, turn the fort’s guns on the city, and set fire to the town.¹²⁸ News of Nicholson’s outburst spread through town like wildfire and on May 31 anxious militiamen quickly organized to retaliate against the “pretended protestant.” According to Stephen van Cortlandt, “drums beat and the Towne full of noise...they marched to the fort...in [half] hour’s time the fort was full of men armed and intraged, no word could be heard but they were sold, betrayed, and murdered, it was time to look for themselves.”¹²⁹ The militia commanders, including Jacob Leisler who would become the movement’s leader, placed themselves at the head of the rabble. They demanded the keys to the fort from

¹²⁵ Hall *et al.*, “Councilors Beg to be Excused, May 22, 1689” *Documents*, 107.

¹²⁶ Brodhead ed., “Lieutenant-Governor Nicholson and the Council of New-York to the Board of Trade, May 15, 1689,” *Docs. Relative to Col. N.Y.*, III, 574-575.

¹²⁷ “Documents Relating to the Administration of Jacob Leisler,” *New York Historical Society Collection*. I: 265-66 as cited in Stanwood, *Empire Reformed*, 104.

¹²⁸ Brodhead ed., “Stephen Van Cortlandt to Governor Andros, N. York, July 9, 1689,” *Docs. Relative to Col. N.Y.*, III, 593-4; Brodhead, *History of N.Y.*, II, 563.

¹²⁹ Brodhead ed., “Stephen van Cortlandt to Governor Andros, N. York, July 9, 1689,” *Docs. Relative to Col. N.Y.*, III, 594.

Nicholson who, after meeting with the council, obliged and fled to England days later to report this insurrection to the king and to ask for forgiveness for abandoning his post.¹³⁰

The rebels cited the lieutenant-governor's supposed threat and failure to proclaim the king and queen as just cause to overthrow the colonial establishment. Nicholson's departure left militia commanders such as Leisler to name themselves the de facto government rather than one established by the king.¹³¹

William now had to contend with another treasonous colonial government; he was, however, in the middle of campaign season in Ireland, which was progressing slowly and poorly, limiting his ability to handle the colonial uprising. In August, displaced Lieutenant-Governor Nicholson arrived in London with reports from several prominent merchants explaining the course of the rebellion and the "unsatiable Ambition" of Jacob Leisler, who illegally assumed control of the fort and refused to deliver the king's revenues.¹³² Leisler, unlike Nicholson or even the Massachusetts rebels, failed to immediately proclaim William and Mary as the rightful monarchs, nor did he attempt to explain his rebellion to the king until June, word of which did not reach England until November.¹³³ Nicholson's ardent apology and tearful narrative moved William, who

¹³⁰ *New York Historical Society Collections*, I, 270 as cited in Elmer Roy Stahl, "Governor Francis Nicholson, 1655-1728" (MA Thesis: University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, 1911), 14; Brodhead ed., "Stephen van Cortlandt to Governor Andros, N. York, July 9, 1689," *Docs. Relative to Col. N.Y.*, III, 595; Stephen Saunders Webb, "The Strange Career of Francis Nicholson," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 23.4 (Oct. 1966): 524

¹³¹ Hall *et al.*, "Inhabitants of New York City Rise, May 31, 1689," "Nicholson Leaves the Colony, June 6, 1689," *Documents*, 108-9, 111; Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution*, 255-6; Sosin, *English America*, 106-7; Stanwood, *Empire Reformed*, 105.

¹³² Fortescue ed., "Protest of Joseph Nicholls, Town Clerk, in a collection of documents sent by Captain Nicholson" (June 10, 1689), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1689-92*, vol. 13, #188; Andrews ed., "A Modest and Impartial Narrative, Re-printed at London 1690" *Narratives*, 320-35; Hall *et al.*, "Colonel Bayard's Version of the Uprising, June 4, 1689," *Documents*, 110-111.

¹³³ Although Leisler did eventually declare New York for William and Mary several weeks after the rebellion, Leisler's delay frustrated William, who deemed it an affront to his sovereignty. Fortescue ed.,

accepted his interpretation of events and later offered Nicholson the esteemed position as lieutenant-governor of Virginia as a reward for his loyalty.¹³⁴ William ordered the Lords of Trade to recommend a replacement governor for New York. By September 1689 they promoted Colonel Henry Sloughter, a competent officer and royal favorite after William's coup, to the position.¹³⁵

Although William promptly decided against Leisler and found a suitable replacement, his slow execution of these orders was consistent with his *modus operandi*: he allowed Leisler's government to continue to operate for another year due to his greater concern with the Irish war. Newly appointed governor Colonel Sloughter commanded troops on the Isle of Wight, an important military base protecting the English Channel against France. William believed an effective naval blockade could cut off Ireland from France, bringing the Jacobite resistance in Ireland to its knees. As it stood, the defenses at the Isle of Wight were in deplorable condition with far too few men permanently garrisoned there.¹³⁶ In these circumstances, the king could not immediately spare Sloughter or a vessel to the colonies. Leisler would have to be dealt with at a later date.

In the interim, William permitted Leisler to operate his ad hoc government for political expediency and humored his poor attempts to curry favor, all while building a

"Address of the Militia of New York to the King and Queen" [June 1689], *Calendar of State Papers Colonial*, 1689-92, vol. 13, #221.

¹³⁴ Fortescue ed., Earl of Shewsbury to the Lords of Trade and Plantations (Sept. 25, 1689, Whitehall), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial*, 1689-92, vol. 13, #456; Webb, "Strange Career", *WMQ* 23.4, 526.

¹³⁵ Fortescue ed., Memorandum of the Lords of Trade and Plantations (Aug. 31, 1689) and Orders received to prepare a commission for Colonel Henry Sloughter as Governor of New York (Sept. 25, 1689), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial*, 1689-92, vol. 13, #395 and 451; Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution*, 336.

¹³⁶ Childs, *British Army of William III*, 173, 211.

case against him. The king learned that Leisler attempted to establish his own government rather than wait for royal orders; he wrote to the Connecticut council asking to join in their charter.¹³⁷ Leisler arbitrarily created his own council of safety and presumptuously signed all of his correspondence to England as “Jacob Leisler, Lieut. Gov.,” a title not confirmed by the king.¹³⁸ Further correspondence from local officials cemented William’s plans to remove Leisler from power. Nicholson’s colleagues frequently wrote to London describing Leisler’s continued provocation of violence against dissenters throughout New York, whom he alleged were all secret papists, in an attempt to centralize the colony under his administration.¹³⁹ Unlike Massachusetts colonists, who fell back on their pre-existing structures of governance in absence of instructions from London, Leisler took it upon himself to form a new government in contempt of the king’s proclamation for the continuance of officers in their posts.¹⁴⁰ Leisler’s men co-opted a customs house, violently removed the official from the premises, and withheld the king’s revenues, if they bothered to collect it. Stephen van

¹³⁷ O’Callaghan ed., “Leisler to Major Gold, June 2, 1689,” *Doc. Hist. of N. Y.*, II, 14-15; Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution*, 255-6.

¹³⁸ Fortescue ed., “Lieutenant Gov. Leisler to the King, January 7, 1690” (Jan. 7, 1690, Fort William New York), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1689-92*, vol. 13, # 689.

¹³⁹ Leisler spread conspiracy theories and dubbed any opponents “papists,” jailing all those who stood against his authority; Sosin, *English America*, 196-7; Fortescue ed., Nicholas Bayard to Francis Nicholson (Aug. 5, 1689, New York) and George Mackenzie to Francis Nicholson (Aug. 15, 1689, New York), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1689-92*, vol. 13, #320 and 350; Brodhead ed, “A Modest and Impartial Narrative of Several Grievances and Great Oppressions that the Peaceable and most Considerable Inhabitants of their Majesties Province of New York in America lye under, by the Extravagant and Arbitrary Proceedings of Jacob Leysler and his Accomplices,” *Doc. Relative to Col. Hist. N. Y.*, III, 665-684.

¹⁴⁰ Fortescue ed., “Nicholas Bayard to Francis Nicholson” (July 23, 1689), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1689-92*, vol. 13, #288.

Cortlandt reported that “All is in confusion” as Leisler’s men upended remnants of the Dominion of New England.¹⁴¹

Leisler also failed to report his actions or explain his governance until the king had already decided against him; he underestimated Nicholson’s success in earning the king’s favor, believing William would hang the governor once he received Leisler’s letters explaining the events. This likely explains why he neglected to immediately send emissaries to England, who did not arrive until November. The Privy Council listlessly attended the testimonies of Leisler’s agents, Joost Stoll and Matthew Clarkson, who were more interested in conflating their roles in the conflict and obtaining official appointments for themselves than representing the Leislerian administration.¹⁴² Stoll in particular made a poor impression at court, pompously brandishing a list of articles the colonists expected to be included in the new colonial charter. Needless to say, the New York representatives did not sway the king’s opinion of the rebels’ coup or Leisler’s administration.¹⁴³

Despite Leisler’s growing list of gaffs, William prioritized his wars in Ireland and France and kept Governor Sloughter from leaving for New York. Although proceedings to officially commission Sloughter progressed at a glacial pace due to the wars, the new governor clearly represented William’s ambitions for a strong imperial agenda in the

¹⁴¹ Fortescue ed., “Frederyck Flypse and Stephen van Cortlandt to William Blathwayt” (Aug. 5, 1689, New York), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1689-92* vol. 13, #319.

¹⁴² Jerome R. Reich, *Leisler’s Rebellion: A Study of Democracy in New York, 1664-1720* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953): 85-86.

¹⁴³ Brodhead ed., “Representation of Ensign Joost Stol, Agent for the Committee of Safety of New York,” *Docs. Relative to Col. N.Y.*, III, 629-33; Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution*, 275.

Americas.¹⁴⁴ In a proposal to the Lords of Trade, Slougher lamented that New York “lyeth under loose management being destitute both of a Governour and Government seized by the Rabble” and made suggestions to both fortify the colony against French and Indian attacks by centralizing the government.¹⁴⁵ On November 14 1689, William drafted Slougher’s commission, which granted the governor authority to suspend members of his council, prorogue and dissolve general assemblies, appoint justices and courts, and judge any offender in criminal matters, incredible authority for any colonial governor.¹⁴⁶ William waited to send Slougher until he felt more confident in his Irish campaign, but his choice already reflected his desire to centralize New York as part of a greater Anglo-American empire.

Slougher planned to embark for New York as early as June 17, but he was detained by orders to immediately sail for the Isle of Wight, where he remained through September due to the naval defeat at Beachy Head.¹⁴⁷ The English Navy lost a total of seventeen ships, leaving England at risk of invasion and jeopardizing the campaign in Ireland.¹⁴⁸ The earl of Marlborough called the militia and raised private funds to recruit

¹⁴⁴ Compared to the dispatching of other colonial governors, Slougher had an incredibly long period between his official commission and his swearing into office—seventeen months. See Fortescue ed., Orders received to prepare a commission for Governor Colonel Henry Slougher of New York (Sept. 25, 1689, Whitehall), Order of the King in Council (Nov. 14, 1689, Whitehall), Instructions to Governor Henry Slougher of New York (Jan. 31, 1690, Whitehall), Order of the King in Council (Apr. 10, 1690, Whitehall), Petition of Governor Henry Slougher to the Lords of Trade and Plantations (Apr. 24, 1690), Governor to the Lords of Trade and Plantations (Aug. 15, 1690, Isle of Wight), and Minutes of the Council of New York (Mar. 19, 1691), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1689-92*, vol. 13, #560, 750, 823, 841, 1020, and 1366.

¹⁴⁵ Brodhead ed., “Proposals submitted by Colonel Slougher, to the Lords of Trade,” *Docs. Relative to Col. N.Y.*, III, 622.

¹⁴⁶ Brodhead ed., “Draft of a Commission for Henry Slougher, Esquire, to be Governor of New York, and Order in Council thereupon,” *Docs. Relative to Col. N.Y.*, III, 623-629.

¹⁴⁷ Fortescue ed., Governor Slougher to the Lords of Trade (Aug. 15, 1690), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1689-92*, vol. 13, #1020.

¹⁴⁸ Webb, *Churchill’s Coup*, 231-32.

new regiments and rebuild garrisons to defend the vulnerable coast.¹⁴⁹ Once reinforcements arrived at the Isle of Wight and William felt confident in his victory at the Battle of the Boyne (July 1690), Sloughter could finally prepare his vessel to sail for New York.¹⁵⁰ He received official dispensation on October 22 and immediately left for New York with orders to report on the condition of the government and assert the king's prerogative.¹⁵¹

Sloughter arrived in New York on March 19, 1691, and was met with a chaotic siege. Major Ingoldesby, Governor Sloughter's troop commander, arrived in New York in January 1691 and ordered Leisler to surrender the fort, which the latter flatly refused, stating he would not do so for anyone less than the governor himself and declared Ingoldesby to be a Jacobite invader.¹⁵² After several days of failed negotiations, a large cannon backfired, killing several of Ingoldesby's soldiers. Frightened, Leisler's militia sporadically fired on soldiers and civilians alike, killing and wounding colonists and damaging property. Leisler finally relinquished the fort and was jailed after two days of parleying and three refusals to surrender, guaranteeing a hefty treason charge.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁹ Webb, *Churchill's Coup*, 232.

¹⁵⁰ Childs, *British Army of William III*, 174; Fortescue ed., Governor Sloughter to William Blathwayt (Sept. 25, 1690, Newport, Isle of Wight) and Governor Sloughter to William Blathwayt (Sept. 27, 1690, Isle of Wight), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1689-92*, vol. 13, #1068 and 1078.

¹⁵¹ Fortescue ed., William Blathwayt to Governor Sloughter (Oct. 22, 1690) and Receipt for a packet with the Seal of New York (Oct. 25, 1690), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1689-92*, vol. 13, #1130 and 1144.

¹⁵² O'Callaghan ed., "The Lt. Gov. and Council's Reasons for Resisting Major Ingoldesby," and "Declaration of Leisler and his Party Against Major Ingoldesby and his Council, 16 March, 1691," *Doc. Hist. of N. Y.*, 328-330, 340-5; Sosin, *English America*, 200.

¹⁵³ Leisler rejected Sloughter's orders several times. First, he stated he could not be sure whether he was the real governor or a ruse to draw him out. He sent Stoll, the bumbling emissary, to make sure it was indeed Sloughter, as he had seen him in England. After confirming it was indeed the governor, Leisler sent two more men to discuss the terms of handing over the fort. Sloughter barked that the king negotiated terms with his enemies, not his subjects, and arrested the envoys. Fortescue ed., "Jacob

Slougher tried to reprieve Leisler until William could sign the warrant himself, but later felt compelled to execute him for “traitorously levying war against our Sovereign Lord & Lady the King and Queen of our realme.”¹⁵⁴

The governor quickly corrected Leisler’s mess and established an administration that better reflected William’s vision of a centralized empire. Slougher reported that the colonists welcomed royal authority, as they craved stability after Leisler’s arbitrary governance.¹⁵⁵ The new colonial government very closely resembled that of the administration prior to the colony’s annexation to the Dominion: Slougher’s council consisted of strong supporters of the king’s prerogative in the colonies including Joseph Dudley, Nicholas Bayard, van Cortlandt, and Frederick Philips, all of whom proved their loyalty to the Crown after the 1689 rebellion. Recognizing the colonists’ complaints against previous administrations, Slougher called for an assembly to meet to pass legislation for “Quieting and Setling” the turmoil throughout the colony. This assembly further reflected the governor’s commission to centralize the colony under William; it elected James Graham, a proponent of centralized government and one of Andros’s close advisors, as its speaker, and declared all power and authority exercised in the

Leisler to [Governour Slougher]” (Mar. 20, 1691, Fort William), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1689-92*, vol. 13, # 1367; Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution*, 339-40; Reich, *Leisler’s Rebellion*, 114.

¹⁵⁴ Fortescue ed., Governor Slougher to Earl of Nottingham (May 6, 1691, Fort William Henry), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1689-92*, vol. 13, # 1458; O’Callaghan ed., “Warrant for Jacob Leisler’s Commitment to Prison,” *Docs. Hist. of N.Y.*, 362-3; Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution*, 338-9.

¹⁵⁵ Fortescue ed., Governor Slougher to Earl of Nottingham (Mar. 26, 1691 and May 6, 1691, Fort William Henry), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1689-92*, vol. 13, #1373, 1458.

colony existed only at the king's pleasure and was derived directly from the monarchy.¹⁵⁶

Sloughter took a final measure to ensure the colony would remain under William's direction while recognizing the colonists' claims to certain privileges. On May 13, 1691 under the direction of the governor, the assembly voted to pass "A declaration of Rights and Privileges" for the colonists of New York. This document closely mirrored the Charter of Liberties in that it granted the right to assembly, property, and liberty of conscience with the exception of papists. However, the declaration differed from the original in an important way: New York would remain a royal colony under the king's and queen's immediate administration. Ultimate legislative and executive power resided in a royally appointed governor who also retained the power of veto over all legislative acts of the assembly.¹⁵⁷ The colonists humbly asked William to approve of these terms, as the declaration could not take immediate effect without his consent.¹⁵⁸ With the 1691 declaration, William's governor assured that the king was at the center of colonial government in New York following the coup of 1689, true to his royal commission.

William III navigated Leisler's rebellion and catastrophic administration by following his *modus operandi*: he allowed Leisler to control New York while he focused on the wars in Ireland and the Continent and studied the political lay of the land in New York, only to act swiftly later to promote his imperial interests. William first learned of the

¹⁵⁶ Brodhead ed., "An Act for the Quieting and Settling the Disorders that have lately happened within this Province and for Establishing and Securing their Majestyes present Government against the like Disorders for the Future," *Col. Laws of N. Y.*, 223-224.

¹⁵⁷ Brodhead ed., "An Act declaring what are the Rights and Privileges of their Majesties Subjects inhabiting within their province of New York," *Col. Laws. of N. Y.*, 244.

¹⁵⁸ Brodhead ed., "Act declaring...the Rights and Privileges..." *Col. Laws of N. Y.*, 244.

New York rebellion from the displaced lieutenant-governor, Francis Nicholson, who sailed to England and reported on Jacob Leisler's violent overthrow. Although William knew he must replace Leisler, he could not afford to immediately send his chosen governor, Colonel Sloughter, due to Sloughter's important position on the Isle of Wight, a key base of operation against the Jacobite rebellion in Ireland. He therefore allowed Leisler to further condemn himself through multiple gaffs until he could dispatch the new governor. In the interim, William indicated his desire to bring the colony more directly under the king's purview through the governorship; Sloughter's commission granted enormous power to the gubernatorial office, second only to the king himself, over legislation, the courts, and the colonists' right to assemble. Once the Irish war turned in his favor and reinforcements were sent to relieve Sloughter, William dispatched the governor, who quickly took control of New York, executed Leisler for treason, and asserted William's direct sovereignty in the Anglo-American empire.

CHAPTER 5

THE KING'S AMERICAN PLANTATIONS: BEYOND THE DELAWARE

In the years following his ascension to the English throne, William reinforced his sovereignty and centralized the American colonies by handling political crises in ways that reflected his *modus operandi*. He contended with the rebellions in the Chesapeake, particularly Maryland, in a similar fashion to those in New York and Massachusetts, by allowing the rebel government to operate until the wars in Ireland and France turned in his favor. William then concentrated his efforts to bring the proprietary colonies, such as Carolina, further under his immediate control with the creation of the Board of Trade in 1696, near the end of the war with France. The only exception to this pattern can be found in William's management of the West Indies, which the king recognized as strategically and commercially crucial to his regime. He thus quickly turned out the previous administration and installed his own governor early in 1690, while also managing his wars in Ireland and the Continent. These efforts over the course of a decade reflected an ambitious long-term plan on William's part, in which he exercised supreme sovereignty throughout a centralized English Atlantic empire.

The Chesapeake colonies, Virginia and Maryland, both struggled with the arbitrary terms of colonial governance prior to William's coup. Virginia, a royal colony, staggered under the weight of heavy taxation and several seasons of poor tobacco harvests. After the Stuart Restoration in 1660, Charles II granted proprietors rights to land already settled by Virginians. This divided control of the royal colony so much that the people were unsure "whether they should make a country for the King or other

Proprietors.”¹⁵⁹ In 1675 the colonists attempted to address these concerns and redefine the power of the monarch in the colony through a new charter, but the document never progressed as far as the Great Seal. At the same time, Bacon’s Rebellion briefly threatened to subvert the colony’s structure with the ousting of Governor William Berkeley but royal forces soon bolstered the governor’s defenses and continued eliminating pockets of resistance in the following years.¹⁶⁰ The House of Burgesses’ attempts to petition arbitrary governance and the extent of the king’s prerogative resulted in severe retaliation against individual house members, some being dismissed and others losing their license to practice law.¹⁶¹ Virginia colonists had little recourse in addressing the Stuarts’ absolutist policies and resentment continued to build through 1689.

Maryland colonists faced similar struggles in the years prior to William’s ascension. In the early 1680s Marylanders lived in relative poverty due to a surplus of tobacco crop plummeting prices in London and hefty customs levied by both the Crown and Lord Charles Calvert, Baron of Baltimore, the colony’s proprietor.¹⁶² Baltimore, an avowed Catholic, openly practiced favoritism and nepotism by appointing his family

¹⁵⁹ W. Noel Sainsbury ed., “Thomas Ludwell, Secretary to (Secretary Lord Arlington), June 26, 1671, Virginia,” *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and the West Indies, 1669-1674*, vol. VII (London, 1889).

¹⁶⁰ Andrews ed., *Narratives*, 9-139; Bernard Bailyn, “Politics and Social Structure in Virginia,” in James Morton Smith ed., *Seventeenth-Century America: Essays in Colonial History* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1959), 90-115; Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution in America*, 47-50; Wilcomb E. Washburn, *The Governor and the Rebel: A History of Bacon’s Rebellion in Virginia* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1957).

¹⁶¹ J.W. Fortescue ed., “Journal of the Lords of Trade and Plantations, Dec. 9, 1684,” *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and the West Indies, 1681-1685*, vol. 11 (London, 1898); Leonard W. Labaree ed., *Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors, 1670-1776*, vol. I, (New York: Octagon Books Inc., 1967), 117-18; Percy Scott Flippin, *The Royal Government in Virginia, 1624-1775* (New York: Columbia University, 1919), 106-11.

¹⁶² Fortescue ed., July 25, 1691, *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and the West Indies, 1681-1685*; Hall et al., *Documents*, 154-5; Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution in America*, 70;

members and Catholics to high-ranking positions in colonial government. This angered Protestant colonists, who thought that they lost plum opportunities and were underrepresented in a colony where they outnumbered Catholics twenty to one.¹⁶³ Even more troubling was the lack of time limit on the proprietor's veto, which meant Baltimore could cancel legislation years after it passed the Upper and Lower Houses of Assembly.¹⁶⁴ Maryland was periodically wracked with rebellion (1659, 1676, and 1681) because of these economic, political, and religious imbalances and, as Virginia Governor Thomas Culpeper reported, in "very great danger of falling to pieces" without intervention from the king; Lord Baltimore's style of proprietary governance failed to address the colony's dire concerns.¹⁶⁵ James II took advantage of the growing dissatisfaction and began *quo warranto* proceedings against the charter of Maryland to foster greater dependence on the Crown in 1687.¹⁶⁶

News about the specifics of William's coup did not reach the Chesapeake until March 1689, but the colonists received a notice from James II warning of a foreign invasion in January. Already on edge, the colonists panicked when rumors from local Native tribesmen claimed that some of Baltimore's men had hired Native Americans to

¹⁶³ Hall *et al.*, *Documents*, 143-45; 150, 152; Michael G. Kammen, "The Causes of the Maryland Revolution of 1689," *Maryland Historical Magazine* vol. 55 (1960): 293-96; F.E. Sparks, A.B., "Causes of the Maryland Revolution of 1689," *Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science* ser. 14, (November-December, 1896): 75. Antoinette Sutto, *Loyal Protestants and Dangerous Papists: Maryland and the Politics of Religion in the English Atlantic, 1630-1690* (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2015).

¹⁶⁴ Hall *et al.*, "A Petition of the Lower House to Lord Baltimore, Sept. 17, 1681," *Documents*, 149; Kammen, "Causes of the Maryland Revolution," *Maryland Historical Magazine*, 297-98.

¹⁶⁵ Fortescue, "Lord Culpeper to the Lords of Trade and Plantations: the Present State of Virginia," Dec. 12, 1681, *Calendar of State Papers Colonial 1681-1684*; Hall *et al.*, *Documents*, 143-45.

¹⁶⁶ Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution in America*, 258.

slaughter all Protestants to turn the region over to the Pope.¹⁶⁷ Royal government officials in Virginia suppressed a majority of dissent by quashing the most scandalous rumors and carefully assuaging the colonists; the Virginia Councilors also quickly issued a proclamation confirming the ascension of William and Mary once news reached the colony in late April.¹⁶⁸ The Maryland lower houses, still convinced of a conspiracy, begged the council to rescue them from both the proprietor and the Indians. A Protestant Association led by John Coode, “An Association in arms for the defense of the Protestant Religion, and for Asserting the Right of King William and Queen Mary to the Province of Maryland and all the English Dominions,” formed to protect citizens from the looming Catholic threat.¹⁶⁹

The 1689 Chesapeake rebellions challenged royal authority in the region following William’s ascension. Lord Baltimore was in England during William’s coup and immediately welcomed the new monarch in hopes of securing the rights to his old charter. He proclaimed William and Mary in England and sent orders for officers in his colony to follow suit but, unbeknownst to Baltimore, the messenger died en route,

¹⁶⁷ Hall et al., “A Letter from Lord Baltimore’s Deputies to the Government of Virginia, Mar. 26, 1698,” *Documents*, 164-5.

¹⁶⁸ Reverend John Waugh, a fiery Protestant minister, spread many of the rumors and stoked the flames of the most uproarious Virginia rebellion in Stafford County long after the Virginia Council proclaimed King William. He was soon brought to justice and the Virginia rebellions quickly died down. See Farifax Harrison, “Parson Waugh’s Tumult: A Chapter from Landmarks of Old Prince William,” *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* vol. 30 (Jan. 1922): 31-37. Fortescue, Minutes of the Council of Maryland (Apr. 2, 1689), Minutes of the Council of Virginia (Apr. 26, 1689), Nicholas Spencer to William Blathwayt (Apr. 27, 1689, James’ City, VA), and Nicholas Spencer to the Lords of Trade and Plantations (Apr. 29, 1689, James’ City, VA), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1689-1692*; Guttridge, *Colonial Policy of William in America and the West Indies*, 36-7; Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution in America*, 263; Sosin, *English America*, 119-21; Stanwood, *Empire Reformed*, 106, 109.

¹⁶⁹ Fortescue ed., Minutes of the Council of Maryland (Mar. 24, 1689), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1689-1692*; Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution in America*, 260-61; J. Thomas Scharf, *History of Maryland, from the Earliest Period to the Present Day* vol. 1 (Baltimore: Published by John B. Piet, 1879): 307-309; Sparks, “The Maryland Revolution of 1689,” *Johns Hopkins University Studies*, 101-02.

severely delaying the message.¹⁷⁰ In the meantime, Maryland proprietary councilors had no direction and were left to their own devices in the face of growing panic about a Catholic and Native American alliance. As word spread from Virginia, Coode's Protestant Alliance accused proprietary officials of concealing William and Mary's order and refusing to proclaim the new monarchs.¹⁷¹ By July, Coode raised a squadron of men along the Potomac and on July 27 handily took Maryland's capital after the lieutenant governor's men refused to fight. Coode then immediately addressed William in a statement explaining the insurgents' actions and proclaiming Maryland the king's Protestant domain, finally wrenched from Catholicism.¹⁷²

William's response and eventual assertion of control following the Chesapeake rebellions of 1689 reflected his familiar *modus operandi*—he delayed restructuring the region until the wars with Ireland and France turned in his favor and then acted quickly to bring the colony to heel. Virginia remained a decidedly royal colony and its councilors settled the political disturbances in the colony by the time word of insurgency reached England; there was little question of the king's sovereignty in Virginia and therefore little needed to be done to secure the king's control. William sent Francis Nicholson of New York, who had proven himself loyal to the new king by reporting Leisler's rebellion, to act as Virginia's interim governor until 1692 (when the war in Ireland drew to a close),

¹⁷⁰ Baltimore had no idea of the messenger's death and had no explanation for the colony's failure to proclaim William in August 1689; Fortescue ed., William Blathway to Lord Baltimore (Aug. 30 and 31, 1689), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1689-1692*.

¹⁷¹ Fortescue ed., Journal of the Lords of Trade and Plantations (Feb. 20, 1689) and Extract of a letter from Nicholas Spencer, of Virginia (Jun. 10, 1689), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1689-1692*.

¹⁷² Andrews ed., "Declaration of Protestant Subjects in Maryland," *Narratives*, 305-14; Fortescue ed., "Address of the Protestant Inhabitants of Maryland to the King and Queen (Aug. 3, 1689)," *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1689-1692*; Guttridge, *Colonial Policy of William*, 32-33; Hall et al., "The Declaration of the Protestant Association," *Documents*, 171-75; Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution in America*, 265-67; Sosin, *English America*, 124-5.

when William could choose a strong governor to bolster royal authority in the colony.¹⁷³ Reorganizing Maryland, however, was more complicated, as the Maryland charter remained in *quo warranto* and would demand careful evaluation in order to bring the colony more directly under the king's prerogative rather than that of the proprietor. Coode and his ilk posed no immediate threat as his rebellion ousted a Catholic government for the "preservation of Protestantism," which William to some extent approved despite his orders for the continuance of existing governments.¹⁷⁴

Following William's successes in Ireland in the summer of 1690, the king and Privy Council reevaluated Maryland's standing and pointedly sought to bring the colony directly under the Crown's supervision. After a meeting with both Coode and Baltimore, the Privy Council determined the proprietor was "incapacitated by Law to govern" and that the king should send a royal governor, Colonel Lionel Copely, to direct affairs in Maryland.¹⁷⁵ After Copely arrived in Maryland in 1692, the king ordered the new governor to restructure the colony, transforming it from a proprietary oligarchy to a royal colony; the king's governor would sit at the head of a representative assembly, but derive his power authority from the king, who had ultimate legislative veto power.¹⁷⁶ The 1692 assembly upended laws established by the proprietary government and drafted

¹⁷³ William eventually sent Sir Edmund Andros, previous governor of the Dominion of New England, to Virginia in 1692 because Andros firmly believed in the king's sovereignty and central authority in the Americas. Webb, "Strange Career," 527-32.

¹⁷⁴ Tony Claydon's *William III and the godly Revolution* details William's propaganda campaign to portray his war against France as that of an epic battle between Protestantism and Catholicism in an effort to win support and continued funding in England. William confirmed Coode as interim governor in 1690; Tony Claydon, *William III and the godly Revolution*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

¹⁷⁵ Fortescue ed., Lord Chief Justice Holt to the Marquess of Carmarthen (Jun. 3, 1690), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1689-1692* vol. 13 (London: HMS, 1898).

¹⁷⁶ Lord Baltimore still retained some proprietary privileges, but governance of the colony rested with the Crown.

new laws in the name of the king. With this level of royal control institutionalized, William vetoed several bills of religious establishment that would have limited the Crown's prerogative by extending the rights of Englishmen to colonists.¹⁷⁷

The 1689 Chesapeake rebellions gave William the opportunity to exert his prerogative after he gained the upper hand in the Irish war in the summer of 1690. He moved quickly at that point to strengthen his hold in Virginia (by appointing a strong royal governor) and dissolve the Catholic-proprietary oligarchy in Maryland, bringing the entire region firmly under the Crown's control.

Farther south, in Carolina, William's centralization efforts were complicated following the Glorious Revolution. The colonists' 1689 insurrection was a result of growing resentment against proprietary governance, rather than a reaction to William's English coup, and therefore did not warrant royal interference. Since the colony's conception, the board of proprietors led by Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury, failed to control the colony as illegal trade ran rampant and immigration stagnated. In an attempt to promote their interests, the board introduced "The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina," which implemented a complex system of provisions for colonial oversight in 1662.¹⁷⁸ The colonists resented and resisted the proprietors' efforts to reform the Constitutions in 1682, attacking it as a constitution that changed at the whim of the proprietors and was thus "contrary to the nature of a fundamentall sacred and

¹⁷⁷ David William Jordan, "The Royal Period of Colonial Maryland, 1689-1715," (Princeton University, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 1966); Michael David de Michele, "The Glorious Revolution in Maryland: A Study of the Provincial Revolution of 1689," (Pennsylvania State University, ProQuest Dissertation Publishing, 1967): 146-179; Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution in America*, 364-70; Sosin, *English America*, 171-84.

¹⁷⁸ The original copy of the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina was written by John Locke, who worked as secretary for Shaftesbury in 1669. Hugh Talmage Lefler and Albert Ray Newsome, *The History of a Southern State: North Carolina* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1954): 34-37.

unalterable law.”¹⁷⁹ Colonists divided into proprietary and anti-proprietary factions, thus splintering the proprietors’ influence even further. The dissenting colonists challenged the authority of the proprietors’ administration by rejecting Governor James Colleton’s attempts to reconcile the two factions; in response, Colleton refused to call another assembly into session and earned the ire of every politician in the colony.¹⁸⁰

As word spread of the 1689 rebellions in the north, proprietor Seth Sothell arrived in Carolina and offered dissenters the opportunity to seize control from Colleton by petitioning for him to assume the governorship.¹⁸¹ Once the London proprietors heard of Sothell’s unsavory actions and extralegal measures, they disallowed all acts passed under his administration and replaced him with Philip Ludwell. In an effort to placate local dissenters and imperial authorities, the board also acknowledged the rights of the lower house of assembly to sit separately and initiate legislation.¹⁸² Although the proprietors managed to settle this matter in the Carolinas without interference from the Crown, they failed to address the rise in illegal trade. Scottish and Irish mariners took advantage of the Crown’s preoccupation with the Nine Years’ War to circumvent navigation codes and undercut “fair traders” in the Chesapeake and Delaware.¹⁸³

¹⁷⁹ J.W. Fortescue ed., “Declaration of Twelve Members of the Commons (Nov. 20, 1685),” *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and the West Indies, 1685-1688* vol. 12 (London: HMS, 1899).

¹⁸⁰ Edward McCrady, *The History of South Carolina under the Proprietary Government* (New York and London: Macmillan Co., 1897): 226-30; M. Eugene Sirmans, *Colonial South Carolina: A Political History, 1663-1763* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996): 37-49; Sosin, *English America*, 156-60; Robert Weir, *Colonial South Carolina: A History*, (Millwood, NY: KTO Press, 1983): 66-67.

¹⁸¹ Sothell claimed that, as proprietor, he outranked Colleton and therefore could bend the Fundamental Constitutions to assume the governorship via petition. Sirmans, *Colonial S.C.*, 37-49; Sosin, *English America*, 156-60; Weir, *Colonial S.C.: A History*, 66-67.

¹⁸² Fortescue ed., Lords Proprietor to Governor Seth Sothell (Dec. 2, 1689), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1689-1692*, vol. 13, #611; J.W. Fortescue ed., “Lords Proprietors of Carolina to Governor Philip Ludwell (Apr. 12, 1693),” *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and the West Indies* vol. 14 (London: HMS, 1903); Sosin, *English America*, 162-63; Weir, *Colonial S.C.: A History*, 68.

¹⁸³ Hall, *Edward Randolph*, 156-57.

William remained on the sidelines, as he had little recourse in the proprietors' management of Carolina, and his war with France demanded more immediate attention.

In line with his *modus operandi*, William shifted focus to consolidating his authority in the Americas and addressing issues of trade throughout the English empire near the end of the Nine Years' War (1696). The war hurt commercial interests and William believed that proprietary governments could not cope with these challenges. At the behest of the king, and on the recommendation of Edward Randolph, colonial Secretary of Customs, William Blathwayt, secretary of the Committee for Trade and Plantations, and James Chadwick of the Customs Board proposed Parliamentary bills to prevent fraud and regulate abuses in American trade.¹⁸⁴ To successfully address the issue in its entirety, however, William had to assert control over proprietary colonies such as the Carolinas, in which the Crown previously had little direct influence. William's cabinet briefly considered a motion to have all independently chartered colonies restructured and turned into royal colonies, but the Commissioners of Customs quickly pointed out that overstepping the legal rights of the proprietors would be too radical.¹⁸⁵ The Privy Council and Commissioners of Customs settled for the creation of a new administrative bureau, the Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations, commonly known as the Board of Trade, in 1696.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁴ Fortescue ed., Presentment of the Commissioners of Customs (Jan. 13, 1696, Whitehall), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1693-1696* vol. 14, #2237; Sosin, *English America*, 232.

¹⁸⁵ Charles M. Andrews, *The Colonial Period of American History: England's Commercial and Colonial Policy* vol. IV (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938): 149-61; Hall, *Randolph*, 160-61; Sosin, *English America*, 232.

¹⁸⁶ The Board of Trade was a separate and new institution, not to be confused with the Lords of Trade. The Lords of Trade operated strictly as a part of the Privy Council and were therefore limited by the king's prerogative and their other duties as Privy Councilors. The Board of Trade members, on the other hand, were not exclusively Privy Councilors and therefore had time to focus specifically on colonial matters. For

The Board of Trade operated under the Privy Council and offered William new oversight in the Americas. Board members were granted extensive administrative privileges and supervisory powers: to correspond with and recommend colonial governors, deputy governors, and members of local councils; to review laws passed by colonial assemblies; hear colonial complaints and offer recommendations; and to investigate under oath the state of affairs in the colony regarding all matters relating to commerce. In Carolina, the right of colonial appointments still lay with the proprietors, but was now subject to approval by the Board and bound by the same obligations to enforce the Navigation Acts. The Board boldly demanded that colonial policy be consistently upheld under the king's immediate governance and suggested that the king appoint a "captain-general" to govern all of the colonies in times of military emergency. They later suggested that William assume the proprietary colonies to the Crown, as the proprietors governed irregularly and without regard for the Board or for William's Navigation Acts.¹⁸⁷ Strictly speaking, the Board of Trade existed only as an advisory board, but the Privy Council generally confirmed its recommendations.¹⁸⁸ Through the authority of the Board of Trade, William forced local administrators in Carolina and London proprietors to answer to the Crown's authority and brought the proprietary colony more in line with his vision of a centralized English empire.¹⁸⁹

a full discussion of the Board of Trade and some of the political thought surrounding its creation, see Andrews, *Colonial Period of American History*, 281-290.

¹⁸⁷ Andrews, *Colonial Period of American History*, 380; Jack Greene, *Peripheries and Center*, 16-17; Cecil Headlam ed., "Council of Trade and Plantations to the King (Mar. 26, 1701)," *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and the West Indies, 1701* vol. 19 (London: HMS, 1910): #286.

¹⁸⁸ Andrews, *Colonial Period of American History*, 178-317; Converse D. Clowse, *Economic Beginnings in Colonial South Carolina, 1670-1730* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1971): 114-15; Wesley Frank Craven, *Colonies in Transition, 1660-1713*, (Harper & Row, 1967): 254-55.

¹⁸⁹ Sirmans, *Colonial S.C.*, 73.

In the mainland colonies, William followed this *modus operandi*. However, in the West Indies, it is clear that he took a different approach. Barbados was the only true exception to William's handling of the American colonies according to his *modus operandi* for two simple reasons. First, the colony was far too important to England as a source of income. The tobacco and sugar plantations dominated English commercial interests, and Barbados's inhabitants were the most affluent in the Caribbean.¹⁹⁰ Second, the island offered a strategic vantage point against the French colonies of St. Christophers and Martinique. The existence of a French threat in the Caribbean made Barbados an active and strategically important participant the Nine Years' War.¹⁹¹ As such, it required William's immediate attention and demanded a governor whom William could trust implicitly.

In the years preceding the Glorious Revolution, Barbados's governor, Edwyn Stede, attempted to balance his loyalty to King James II, an open Catholic, and the necessity of assuaging local fears of a Catholic invasion. English-Barbadians were skeptical of two Catholic figures who arrived on the island in 1688: Sir Thomas Montgomery, the king's attorney general, and a Jesuit priest, who the planters believed was a spy.¹⁹² The growing presence of French- and Irish-Catholics in the Caribbean further exacerbated the colonists' anxiety. Stede wrote to the king alleging that the

¹⁹⁰ The West Indies was the "jewel" of the Anglo-American empire and by far its most profitable venture in the Americas. See Richard Dunn, *Sugar and Slaves: Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624-1713* (Chapel Hill: Institute of Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg, Virginia, by the University of North Carolina, 1972); William Thomas Morgan, "The British West Indies during King William's War (1689-97)," *Journal of Modern History* 2.3 (Sept. 1930): 378-409.

¹⁹¹ Stanwood, *Empire Reformed*, 149-52.

¹⁹² Fortescue ed., Lieutenant Governor Stede to the Earl of Sunderland (Sept. 1, 1688, Barbados), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1685-1688*, vol. 12, #1881.

people of Barbados had no qualm with Catholicism, but that Montgomery fervently “threaten[d] them with the Law & his Ma[jes]ties Displeasure” unless they converted, unnerving colonists, who feared Montgomery had turned coat for the French.¹⁹³ As if to compensate for what could be construed as criticism of the king, Stede prepared an extravagant display of loyalty celebrating the birth of James’s new son in 1688—the governor organized a grand procession of the island’s important people and a feast for more than two thousand in addition to the standard firing of the fort’s cannons.¹⁹⁴ The people of Barbados, it seemed, were King James’s most loyal subjects.

As tenuous reports of William’s coup reached Barbados early in 1689, Stede’s reaction proved to the king that the lieutenant-governor could not be trusted. In a dramatic shift from his apologetic tone in discussing Catholicism with James II, Stede declared that all of King William’s problems in Barbados stemmed from “wicked, horrid and abominable contrivances of the Popish Recusants,” jailed Montgomery for being “reconciled to the Church of Rome,” and ordered that Catholics could no longer hold public office.¹⁹⁵ Stede then reported his efforts to William, painting himself a hero of Protestantism and welcoming the king’s oversight.¹⁹⁶ This maneuver appeased the nervous people of Barbados, who turned their attention to external threats from the

¹⁹³ Edwyn Stede, Stede to Blathwayt, Aug. 16, 1688 and Oct. 23, 1688, *The Blathwayt Papers*, vol. 31 folder 4, as cited in Stanwood, *Empire Reformed*, 89-90.

¹⁹⁴ Fortescue ed., Lieutenant Governor Stede to the Lords of Trade and Plantations (Aug. 30, 1688), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1685-1688*, vol. 12, #1876

¹⁹⁵ In truth, Stede gambled his position and likely his life by making such bold statements; at this time, no report from England confirmed William’s ascension, only that an invasion force arrived in November. Stede and his council technically rebelled against James’ administration in an act of self-preservation. See Stanwood, *Empire Reformed*, 91-92. Fortescue ed., Minutes of the Council of Barbados (Feb. 24, 1689) and Orders of the Lieutenant-Governor of Barbados in Council (Feb. 25, 1689), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1689-1691* vol. 13, #34 and 35.

¹⁹⁶ Fortescue ed., Minutes of the Council of Barbados (Mar. 7, 1689) and Council of Barbados to the Prince of Orange (Mar. 11, 1689), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1689-1692*, vol. 13, #43 and 47.

French islands rather than their own government. Stede's quick thinking allowed his administration to weather the Glorious Revolution in the Americas, unlike his counterparts on the mainland, but it frustrated William, who wanted a steadfast, strong-willed governor to protect his interests in Barbados.¹⁹⁷

By the time Stede's reports reached England, William had already declared war on France and subsequently called for a defense squadron to be sent to the West Indies. With the war against France in the Caribbean well under way, William wanted assurance that his orders would be implicitly followed. William was skeptical of Stede's declarations of loyalty, which was all the more crucial to him at that critical juncture in the war in the Caribbean. At the suggestion of the Lords of Trade, the king considered new governors for all the Caribbean colonies, including Barbados. Stede's newfound devotion to a Protestant Barbados came too late; William and the Privy Council were well aware of Stede's shifting loyalties and determined that in a crisis, the king needed a more trustworthy and steady governor in such an important colony.¹⁹⁸ William removed Stede quickly as he stabilized his regime in England. On July 5, 1689—less than three months after his coronation—William replaced Stede with Colonel James Kendall, a proven soldier, who arrived the following year with fresh instructions for the governance and defense of the colony.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁷Every other colonial uprising in 1689 resulted in the overthrow of government officials—see Massachusetts, New York, and Maryland. Stanwood, *Empire Reformed*, 92.

¹⁹⁸ Fortescue ed., Circular to the Governors of the Colonies (Apr. 15, 1689, Whitehall), Memorandum of Lords of Trade and Plantations (Apr. 29, 1689), and (May 2, 1689, Hampton Court), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1689-1692*, vol. 13, #69, 94 and 102.

¹⁹⁹ Kendall was delayed for a while in Plymouth due to bad weather and a sickly crew. Fortescue ed., Earl of Shrewsbury to Lords of Trade and Plantations (July 5, 1689), Order of the King in Council (Sept. 19, 1689), Instructions to Gov. James Kendall as Governor of Barbados (Sept. 19, 1689), Lists and seniority of members of Council of Barbados as fixed by Col. Kendall's Instructions (Sept. 19, 1689), Governor Kendall to William Blathwayt (Mar. 1, 1690, Portsmouth), and Governor Kendall to [the Earl of

William's quick replacement of Stede reflected Barbados' importance in the growing conflict with France. From 1689-90, while the wars in Ireland and France pulled his attention away from handling the other American rebellions, William issued more direct instructions and military aid to Barbados and neighboring islands than to any other colony.²⁰⁰ The first conflicts of the Nine Year's War began in the Caribbean with the defection of Irish Catholic settlers as French forces overwhelmed the English half of St. Christophers.²⁰¹ In response, William commissioned Kendall to suspend any disobedient naval officers, granted him the power to appoint new deputy-governors as needed, and ordered ships and munitions be sent to the Caribbean.²⁰²

In this early period of his reign, Barbados and the West Indies received more of William's attention due to the island's critical role in his war in Europe. In this region, unlike the mainland colonies, William felt he did not have the luxury to bide his time and study local political arrangements. He instead acted quickly, though with the same overall purpose of enhancing royal authority. The Chesapeake and Carolina were not as critical to William's commercial and military efforts and therefore did not warrant immediate action. As the wars drew to a close, William took action to centralize his imperial authority on the mainland as well.

Shrewsbury] (Apr. 4, 1690), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1689-1692*, vol. 13, #229, 440, 441, 442, 778, and 812.

²⁰⁰ See Fortescue ed., *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1689-1692*, vol. 13.

²⁰¹ Fortescue ed., The Governor and Inhabitants of St. Christophers to Lords of Trade and Plantations (July 11, 1689, Charles Fort, St. Christophers), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1689-1692* vol. 13, #253; Stanwood, *Empire Reformed*, 146-52.

²⁰² Fortescue ed., Commission of Colonel James Kendall to be Governor of Barbados (July 17, 1689), List of Stores of war desired by the Leeward Islands (Aug. 15, 1689), and Orders of the King in Council (Aug. 15, 1689), *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1689-1692* vol. 13, #264, 341.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

William cemented his sovereignty and centralized his Anglo-American empire by adhering to a clear *modus operandi* that reflected his personality. His taciturnity and aloofness, familial traits inherited from his mother and paternal grandmother, made him into a stoic politician who patiently cooperated with existing administrations for expediency until the opportune moment permitted him to implement his agenda. William followed this pattern as he regained his father's titles and offices and dealt with political rivals such as de Witt and Churchill. Similarly, he fell back on his *modus operandi* as he grappled with the American colonial rebellions in 1689. William allowed the current colonial administrations to continue managing affairs while he dealt with concurrent wars in Ireland and Europe. Once he believed he had the upper hand in the wars, William redirected his focus to bring the American colonies more in line with his preexisting idea of empire.

The king negotiated with emissaries from Massachusetts Bay while he quelled the Irish Jacobite rebellion. He permitted rebellious governments in New York and the Chesapeake to operate unchecked until the summer of 1690, when the war against Ireland turned in his favor. Although the Carolina rebellion against the proprietors presented an opportunity to bring the colony under a royal charter in 1690, William did not intervene until the end of the Nine Years' War with the creation of the Board of Trade in 1696. The Board of Trade gave the king new levels of administrative oversight over both royal and proprietary colonies, bringing Carolina closer in line with his idea of a centralized English empire.

The only colony in which William acted to replace the current administration immediately, breaking his pattern of behavior, was Barbados; the colony's monetary and military value was integral to his overall war efforts and therefore demanded prompt replacement of the sitting governor in 1689 (who arrived in Barbados early in 1690), as conflicts of the Nine Years' War began in the Caribbean. William's American imperial policy, though drawn out due to his adherence to his *modus operandi*, effectively created a more centralized Anglo-American empire with more executive oversight by the turn of the century.

William laid the groundwork for further centralization following his death. His efforts in this regard reconcile two competing historiographical narratives regarding colonial centralization following the Glorious Revolution. One school of thought identifies a march toward greater imperial authority asserted in the colonies from the Restoration (1660) through the mid-eighteenth century, defined by an increase in colonial dependence.²⁰³ This view portrays William, Anne, and the early Hanoverians as sharing the imperial mindset of Charles II and James II. A second group of historians argues that the Glorious Revolution halted the centralization efforts of Charles II and James II, and instead led to a distinct withdrawal of central authority from colonial administration, causing power to rest more firmly in the local assemblies.²⁰⁴

²⁰³G.H. Guttridge *Colonial Policy of William in America and the West Indies*; Henry Haffenden, "The Crown and Colonial Charters, 1675-1688, Part 1," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 15.3 (July 1958): 297-311; Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution in America*; Richard R. Johnson, *Adjustment to Empire: The New England Colonies, 1675-1715*.

²⁰⁴ See Jack Greene, "The Glorious Revolution in the British Empire 1688-1783," *The Revolution of 1688-1689: Changing Perspectives*, ed. Lois Schwoerer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); James Henretta, *Salutary Neglect: Colonial Administration under the Duke of Newcastle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).

The reality lies somewhere in the middle. William certainly did not halt his predecessors' centralization. He actively pursued greater colonial oversight throughout his administration in adherence to his *modus operandi*. William set precedents that enabled later monarchs to assume greater control within the remaining proprietary colonies, particularly through the creation of the Board of Trade. The Board of Trade facilitated the surrender of New Jersey to Queen Anne in 1702, and South and North Carolina were assumed by the Crown in 1719 and 1729, respectively. William's administration also centralized control by enhancing colonial defenses on the mainland and the Caribbean during the Nine Years' War. Local bureaucrats gladly surrendered certain liberties during the charter negotiations in exchange for protection from French and Indian attacks, in effect handing William greater control of the empire.

On the other hand, however, one could argue that William's administration weakened aspects of the Crown's imperial authority in the long term by enshrining colonists' right to assemble. Since American settlers' primary grievance against James II's regime was the dissolution of assemblies, William permitted and even expanded the right to assemble. Colonial assemblies were bound by governor's authority of course, but they were effective in hemming in the governors, allowing the colonial assemblies greater leeway than William ever envisioned. English monarchs relied on their colonial governors to adhere to their imperial policies, and in the absence of active intervention from the Crown, governors often had no recourse against colonial legislatures, which could easily outmaneuver the governor to the benefit of colonial constituents. This was the defining feature of the so-called age of "salutary neglect," when colonists essentially

governed themselves, as the Crown and Parliament never attempted to manage the colonies “in ways that were at serious variance with colonial opinion.”²⁰⁵

²⁰⁵ Greene, “Glorious Revolution,” 266; Henretta, *Salutary Neglect*, (2005).

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