THE IMPACT OF THE NEGRO VOTE ON
ALABAMA ELECTIONS SINCE
THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT OF 1965

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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the trends in Alabama voting which have occurred since V. O. Key's classic study of the problem in 1949; particular emphasis is placed upon the impact on Alabama politics of the growing Negro vote since the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The major sources of data for this study were the official Alabama election returns, which were made available through the Secretary of State of Alabama.

The thesis is organized into four chapters: the first two chapters are largely historical and explanatory, the third chapter is quantitative, and the last chapter is biographical. The first chapter is an historical study of the attempts—both successful and unsuccessful—to disfranchise the Negro in Alabama; this chapter covers the time period from Reconstruction until 1950. Chapter Two continues tracing the development of Negro suffrage in Alabama, but here the emphasis is placed on the increasing federal involvement in the area of voting; the various civil rights measures are described and their consequences are analyzed, with special attention given to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its resultant impact on the number of Negroes eligible to vote in Alabama. Changing patterns of
voting in Alabama are examined in the third chapter; this section is highly quantitative, employing many of the techniques of analysis used by V. O. Key in his above-mentioned study. Both chi squares and simple percentages are used as statistical tools to analyze Alabama elections. This third chapter is actually the crux of the thesis, tracing trends in Alabama elections and making predictions for the state's political future. Personalities have long played an important role in Alabama politics; the major personality in the state today is George C. Wallace. Therefore, the fourth chapter is devoted to following the career of Wallace and to analyzing his appeal to supporters.

This study finds that there have been important shifts in voting patterns in Alabama since the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. This leads to the conclusion that the inclusion of large numbers of Negro voters into Alabama politics has produced revolutionary political results; the traditional conservatism of the black belt has largely been replaced by a more progressive voting pattern which now places the black belt in a voting alliance with the traditionally progressive northern counties of the state. At the same time, the southern counties, led by Mobile, have become increasingly likely to support reactionary candidates. This paper also suggests that the "friends and neighbors" voting patterns discovered by V. O. Key are disappearing, being replaced by a more issue-oriented politics. The inroads made in Alabama by the Republican party
are noted; from the bare emergence of the two-party system in Alabama, a full-fledged two-party organization is foreseen for the state at some time in the future.

This thesis is written at a time when many of the trends discussed are just beginning; it is therefore suggested that a study of this type be continued for the next several years in order to trace the evolution of these changes. Special attention should be given to the changing role of political parties in Alabama since it appears at this time that a two-party system is at last beginning to emerge in the state.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

It is the intent of this thesis to examine the evolution which has taken place in Alabama politics since V. O. Key's 1949 study, *Southern Politics*.¹ Key's book was written in the context of a social system of almost total racial segregation and disfranchisement of potential black voters. Due primarily to federal intervention, the "Jim Crow" system has been broken down and Negroes now represent a sizable portion of the electorate in Alabama. This study is an attempt to determine what, if any, has been the political impact of recent social changes in Alabama, chiefly the influx of Negro voters into the Alabama electorate since the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.²

The first portion of this work is a traditional, largely chronological examination of the legal and extralegal tactics employed since Reconstruction by Southern whites for the purpose of denying suffrage rights to black citizens. From Reconstruction until 1957, there was virtually no federal intervention into the area of Negro rights; that year

¹V. O. Key, *Southern Politics* (New York, 1949).
²U. S. Statutes at Large, LXXIX, 437 (1965).
marks the beginning of a series of federal civil rights acts, each one stronger and more pervasive than its predecessor. The series of acts culminated in the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the most effective of such legislation to date. Some attention is also given to the civil rights movement per se and its effect on the enactment of federal legislation.

The next section of this work is an analysis of Alabama elections; both aggregate vote figures and regional voting statistics are employed in testing some of the same hypotheses examined by Key. With the use of the statistical tools of simple percentage and chi-square correlations, this paper attempts to chart any shift in voting alignments which might have occurred over the span of the past twenty years. Particular attention is given to the impact of the newly-enfranchised Negroes in Alabama, in an effort to discover whether the blacks are aligned with any of the traditional political forces in Alabama.

Finally, no analysis of Alabama politics could be complete without at least a brief study of George C. Wallace, who, even today, dominates Alabama politics, much as he has since his first gubernatorial victory in 1962. This dynamic man, undeniably a shrewd politician, has influenced Southern politics as much as any figure in recent Southern history. After a look at the life and political career of George
Wallace, an attempt is made to analyze the Wallace supporters.

It is the intent of this thesis to make some attempt at predicting the direction of Alabama politics today. It is hoped that this work will aid in rendering Alabama somewhat less a political enigma.
CHAPTER II

NEGRO DISFRANCHISEMENT: RECONSTRUCTION--1950

Reconstruction

Following the Civil War, the political system in the South was in a state of disruption. Traditional party alliances had been badly severed by the War, and the Northern Republicans were attempting to establish the dominance of the Republican party in the South, based primarily on massive Negro voting. In order to protect the Negro from possible white discrimination, the national government ushered through three new amendments to the Constitution: the Thirteenth Amendment, ratified in 1865, abolished slavery throughout the nation; the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, granted citizenship to the newly-freed Negroes; and the Fifteenth Amendment, added in 1870, protected the franchise in the South.

Even as the Republican-dominated Congress moved technically to protect Negro political rights in the South, it simultaneously made concessions which would soon return the Negro to a subservient position. For example, in return for Southern legislative approval of the Fifteenth Amendment, the national government allowed the Southern states to
establish the notorious Black Codes,\(^1\) which put the Negro at a severe social and economic disadvantage. These Black Codes set up a system of peonage which resembled slavery and, consequently, limited the Negro's political activity.\(^2\)

In 1871, Congress made a futile attempt to meaningfully protect the Negro's political rights by passing the Enforcement Acts, called "Force Bills" by the hostile white South. These acts made a crime any interference with a person's exercise of his right to vote.\(^3\) However, at the same time one branch of the national government was attempting to protect the Negro's political rights, another was thwarting such efforts. The same year Congress passed the Enforcement Acts, the Supreme Court crippled Negro suffrage by the formulation, in the case of \textit{U. S. v. Crosby},\(^4\) of the "state derivation" doctrine. This philosophy contended that the right to vote is not secured by the Constitution, thus rendering unclear the legal bases of the right by separating federal authority from local control. For several years following this case, the Court held that the right to vote was granted by the state; therefore, any state restrictions on the fran-


\(^2\)Ibid.


chise were not subject to national jurisdiction. The "state derivation" doctrine persisted in the Supreme Court until the 1884 case of Ex parte Yarbrough, which admitted a dual source—national as well as state—of the right to vote; this case clarified the fact that Congress has the constitutional power to protect the integrity of its own selection process.

Universal male suffrage in the South—described by one writer as "the Southern experiment in democracy"—was doomed by the compromise of 1877 between Northern and Southern whites, with the Negro as the victim. In return for delivering their electoral votes to put Hayes in the White House, the South would have federal troops evacuated from its area; the questions of Negro rights and Negro suffrage would be left to the discretion of the Southern whites. This compromise returned white rule to the South; the Negro became again what he had been in 1860—"the ward of the dominant race."

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5110 U. S. 651 (1884).


8Ibid., p. 66.
Negro Political Blackout

The blackout of the Negro's political activity in the South did not descend suddenly and dramatically with the consummation of the 1877 compromise; it came much more gradually. Nevertheless, it was true that the controlling interests of the nation had, at least tacitly, condoned the white South. No longer did the North support the Negro; the last stronghold of Negro rights, the Republican party, was rooted out of the South. Negroes, of course, did not surrender suffrage rights immediately: black Congressmen came out of the South until 1896.9 It was, however, a losing battle. Once the failure of the "Force Bills" became apparent and Reconstruction statutes dealing with voting were partially repealed, it became clear that the federal government was no longer interested in the conduct of Southern elections. Subsequently, the Negro vote was manipulated and, finally, obliterated.10 Even the Negro leaders, notably Booker T. Washington, preached submission; in addition, there was considerable opposition to Negro rights in industry, religion and public opinion. The decisive influence, however, was the overwhelming economic pressure. Negroes who desired employment did not get involved in politics, nor did those

9Ibid., p. 69.
who sought promotions;\(^{11}\) thus, from 1880 on, Negroes relinquished political power in order to earn a living.

The white South devised yet other means of thwarting the development of Negro suffrage. They resorted to gangsterism, led by the Ku Klux Klan, a secret organization dedicated to preserving white supremacy in the South. Their purpose was to overthrow the constituted authority and bring back the antebellum South; their method was terror and violence; the legacy was the blight and the scars which remain on the South even today.\(^{12}\) The Klan went a long way towards restoring white supremacy and prolonging black oppression in the post-War South. Their tactics ranged from intimidation to torture and murder. The bizarre night rides, with the Klan members clad in sheets and mounted on horseback, sorely frightened many Negroes. Even more impressive, however, were the Klan's economic sanctions: with their influence, they could make certain that no goods or services would be available to "uppity niggers" or "nigger-loving" whites. Supplementing the Klan was the organization of the Conservative or "white man's" party, chiefly composed of ex-Confederates and other white supremacists whose ends were the same as those of the Klan, but who preferred less violent, supplementing the Conservative or "white man's" party, chiefly composed of ex-Confederates and other white supremacists whose ends were the same as those of the Klan, but who preferred less violent,

\(^{11}\) Moon, \emph{op cit.}, p. 70.

\(^{12}\) David M. Chalmers, \emph{Hooded Americanism} (Garden City, New York, 1965), p. 11.
more acceptable, means to that end. This party is the one which won elections after the Negro voters had been intimidated by the Klan. Therefore, the two actually worked hand-in-hand, the Conservative party running white-supremacy candidates and the Ku Klux Klan making sure no Negroes or liberal whites turned out to vote against them. As is evident, there were no limits to which certain elements in the South would not go in order to eliminate the Negro as a political factor and restore the antebellum situation.

At first, the white South did not challenge the legality of Negro suffrage, preferring to evade the law rather than to repeal it. Only after the new constitutions, written in the 1890's, was there a move to eradicate the Negro electorate through legal measures. Always there had been a steady pressure to nullify the black vote, but before this period the measures were chiefly extralegal, with emphasis on such instruments as terror, violence, and economic pressure. At that time, other devices began to develop. The gerrymander was revived, with election areas redistricted in such a way as to dissipate Negro voting strength. To keep Negroes away from the polling places, elaborate schemes were concocted, such as illegal arrests of Negroes the day before election and the relocation of the polls overnight. If, by

\[ ^{13} \text{Moon, op. cit., p. 65.} \]
\[ ^{14} \text{Ibid., p. 70} \]
chance, a Negro arrived at the right place, there were further complications: he was required to produce a registration certificate, which was issued six months before the election (registration officials kept these on file for the white voter, but required the black to keep his own, in the apparent hope that such papers would be lost); he was hurried into a voting booth and given a scant two minutes to make a complicated ballot. Finally, to quell any hope the Negro might have of effectively participating in Southern politics, the votes were counted by white officials. Still other restrictions appeared, as the whites strained their ingenuity for legal circumventions of the law: Arrest and conviction for such offenses as petty larceny and wife-beating disqualified prospective voters and, needless to say, it was very easy to obtain the convictions of a Negro. Registration was made more complicated, requiring not simply literacy, but above-average intelligence to fill out the forms, and although registrars aided the white voters, there were none available to help Negroes. White witnesses were required to attest to the "good character" of the Negro applicants, and few whites were willing to do so. These

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15 Moon, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-72.


devices, supplemented by economic pressures, intimidation, and violence, succeeded in drastically reducing the number of Negro voters in the South.18

The White Coalition and Populism

In order to re-establish white supremacy in Alabama, class interests were submerged; poor whites joined the conservative white Planters of the black belt, often called the Bourbons, in pushing the Negro back down into the economic and political ditch from which he was striving to emerge. It has been suggested that, by 1873, there was a great cleavage in Alabama between the Republicans and the small farmers in northern Alabama. The small farmers and the blacks, consequently, were the natural power base for the Republican party in Alabama, since both shared similar economic conditions.19 Likewise, the small farmers of northern Alabama resented the pre-War supremacy of the black belt Planters. However, discontent with the hesitancy of the radical Congress and the state legislature to initiate reform, the small farmers moved increasingly toward the Democratic party. The Negro was the major impediment to


19Allen Johnston Going, Bourbon Democracy in Alabama 1874-1890 (University, Alabama, 1951), pp. 1-3.
total white unity within the Democratic party. The small farmers feared that the Negro's sizable electoral strength in the black belt areas would be manipulated by the Planters in such a way as to reassert Planter supremacy in state politics. This impasse was resolved by an agreement among the white factions within the Democratic party to remove the Negro as a voter through disfranchisement. 20 As long as this front was united, the Negro in the South was isolated and rendered politically impotent. However, no sooner did the South achieve its primary objective of repression of Negro suffrage than the white facade began to crack. Populism rose and spread, creating competition for votes and placing the Negro in a balance of power position in Southern politics. In some states, Populism made a real effort to effect a fundamental political coalition between black and white workers, with the Populists seeking true political equality for the Negro. Lacking the vitality and strength to hold off the Bourbons, the tentative coalition soon collapsed. 21

Legal Impediments to Negro Voting

Alarmed by the Populist revolt, Southern politicians renewed their efforts to eliminate the Negro as a voter.

20 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
21 Moon, op. cit., p. 73.
The new constitutions adopted by eight Southern states between 1890 and 1910 embodied some drastic measures. One of the more unique of these was the "grandfather clause," first adopted in Oklahoma in 1910. 22 This device provided that an extremely difficult literacy test must be taken by any prospective voter who was not a descendant of persons eligible to vote prior to January 1, 1866. Since no Negro could vote before 1866 in the South, the literacy test effectively eliminated Negro voting in most instances. This "grandfather clause" was finally declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1915, in the case of Guinn v. U. S. 23

A variety of devices involving literacy and understanding was developed. One of these was the reading and writing test, which required applicants to read and/or write passages of the United States or state constitution in order to be allowed to register for voting. Invariably, Negroes were given more difficult passages, were graded more stringently, and were discriminated against in the administration of the test; for example, the registrar might read a passage so rapidly that it was impossible for the applicant to take down what was being read. Another type of literacy test was the use of the application form itself as a test.


23 238 U. S. 347 (1915).
The form was supposedly for the sole purpose of obtaining the substantive information requested, and, for whites, it was used in this way. ²⁴ For blacks, however, it was an obstacle which could not be overcome; no Negro could complete an application to the satisfaction of the voter registrars. Yet a third kind of literacy device was the interpretation test, which required applicants to be able to understand and explain any section of the United States or state constitution. In this last test, Negroes were unfailingly assigned more difficult passages than were whites, and their explanations were never satisfactory to the registrars.²⁵

In addition to literacy tests, there were other impediments to Negro voting and registration. Among these were the identification device and the poll tax. The former required Negroes to be vouched for by one or more registered voters (two were required in Alabama);²⁶ since few Negroes were registered, this usually meant whites had to vouch for them. This device was further complicated in Alabama by the provision that a person could vouch for only two applicants a year. The poll tax, besides being a financial burden, was made even more a hardship by provisions that it be

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 463-464.
²⁶ Ibid., pp. 460-461.
cumulative and that it be paid several months in advance of the election. Payment of the poll tax by Negroes was, in some places, virtually impossible. They were told that no one except the sheriff was authorized to collect the tax; the sheriff, of course, could never be found.  

The White Primary

Even all of these impediments could not completely remove the Negro from politics, but the leaks left by the new state constitutions were plugged by the one-party system with its white primary; for many years, this was the most effective legal method of denying Negroes the right to vote. The white primary made the Democratic party an exclusive white man's association, simply excluding Negroes from voting in the Democratic primary elections. Since victory in the Democratic primary in the South was tantamount to election, Negroes were effectively barred from the process of electing public officials. Because theoretically political parties were private associations, Negroes could be excluded from their operations on the basis that a private club may restrict its membership. Also, at that time, Congress exercised no control over primaries. In 1921, the Supreme Court seemingly approved the legality of the white primary

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27 Ibid., p. 464.

28Moon, op. cit., p. 75.
in the case of Newberry v. U. S.,\textsuperscript{29} when the Court held that the primary was not an election in the sense of constitutional provisions. However, after a long and torturous process of litigation, the Court, in the case of Smith v. Allwright,\textsuperscript{30} outlawed the white primary, ruling, in effect, that primaries are part of the electoral process and thus must conform to constitutional provisions.

Alabama reacted to the Smith decision by adding the Boswell Amendment to the state constitution in 1946.\textsuperscript{31} This amendment established as qualifications for voting: the ability to read, write, understand, and explain any article of the United States Constitution to the satisfaction of the registrar; proof of employment for the past twelve months; "good character;" and an understanding of the duties and obligations of citizenship.\textsuperscript{32} Obviously, this left a great deal of leeway for the local registrars, who, typically, registered whites and rejected blacks through one of the many avenues provided by the Boswell Amendment. In a per curiam decision, Schnell v. Davis,\textsuperscript{33} the Supreme Court

\textsuperscript{29}256 U. S. 232 (1921).

\textsuperscript{30}321 U. S. 649 (1944).


\textsuperscript{32}Ibid., p. 129.

\textsuperscript{33}336 U. S. 933 (1949).
upheld a district court opinion that the amendment was an unconstitutional discriminatory device intended to prevent Negroes from voting.

Undaunted, Alabama, in 1951, passed the Voter Qualification Amendment, also called the "Little Boswell" Amendment; this restricted registration to those who could read and write any article of the United States Constitution, were of good character, and understood the duties and obligations of citizenship. Local registrars determined whether or not the applicants met the qualifications, and Negroes seldom did. This amendment remained in effect in Alabama until the Voting Rights Act passed by Congress in 1965. The white primary and its successors, then, left the Negroes largely disfranchised. Even those who voted knew they were not an effective political voice.

Despite the fact that the Negro was practically eliminated as a positive factor in Southern elections, for several years following Reconstruction he was important in the Republican party. For years, the Negro formed the base of the Republican party in the South, although it was never all-Negro. One of the major blows to Negro political participation in the South was the abandonment of the Negro by

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34 Brittain, op. cit., p. 129.
35 Ibid.
36 U.S. Statutes at Large, LXXIX, 437 (1965).
the Republican party. Immediately after Reconstruction, the Negro in the South fell heir to leadership positions in the state Republican organizations, and the black voter represented the grass-roots base of Southern Republicanism. But, in the 1890's, as the U. S. was expanding its authority into the Pacific under Republican leadership, white Republicans in the South were taking control of the local party machinery to the exclusion of Negroes. The Republican party in the South became a cadre party controlled by white businessmen contesting no state or local elections, hoping only to hold the party together, for the purpose of distributing patronage when their party controlled the White House.\textsuperscript{37} In order to make the party more respectable to Southern standards, the Negro was largely dissuaded from active participation in the Southern Republican parties, through such devices as the "White Republican Clubs."\textsuperscript{38} Nevertheless, black loyalties to the party of Lincoln remained until the 1930's when the economic policies of Franklin Roosevelt captured their support.

By the 1950's, then, the American Negroes were in despair. No civil rights legislation had been passed since the Federal Civil Rights Law of 1875,\textsuperscript{39} invalidated by the Supreme

\textsuperscript{38}Ibid., p. 286.
\textsuperscript{39}\textit{U. S. Statutes at Large}, XVIII, Part III, 335 (1875).
Court in 1883. Narrow court interpretations had restricted the validity of the War amendments; Jim Crow laws and segregation had become standard in all the Southern states. Although the Southern Negro had increased in economic prosperity, he was essentially denied the ballot. The situation could not remain static forever; the winds of change were already beginning to stir.

\(^{40}\textit{Civil Rights Cases}, 109 \text{ U. S. 3}, (1883).\)
CHAPTER III

THE MOVEMENT FOR BLACK SUFFRAGE

The 1948 Election

The election of 1948 differed from an "ordinary" presidential election in at least two ways. One distinguishing feature was the candidacy of Henry A. Wallace, a former Vice President of the United States under Franklin D. Roosevelt, who ran on the Progressive ticket. Wallace demanded an end to racial discrimination, defied "Jim Crow" laws, and concentrated his campaign on the civil rights issue. Although Wallace had much Negro support, there were many who declared that a vote for Wallace would be a futile protest, since his third party could not possibly be elected to implement his proposals. Nevertheless, Wallace was the Negro's major choice until President Truman gave his civil rights program to Congress in February of 1948. This action gained the loyalty of many Negroes, although it simultaneously caused the Southern Democrats to bolt the party. Truman's change in attitude resulted in a political shift in the Negro community;

1Moon, op. cit., p. 204.

2Walton, op. cit., p. 58.
large numbers of Negro voters realized that they could accomplish more by working and voting for the Democratic party, because it had a much greater possibility of carrying out its promises. Therefore, despite Wallace's concentrated appeal for Negro votes, blacks supported Truman as strongly as they had backed Franklin Roosevelt.  

The second unique aspect of the 1948 election was, of course, the desertion of the national Democratic party by the Southern Democrats, dubbed "Dixiecrats." Incensed by the inclusion of a civil rights plank in the national party platform, the Dixiecrats held their own convention; at their States Rights Conference in Birmingham, they selected Governor J. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina to run for the presidency. Despite their high hopes and their insistence that they were not a third party but the true Democratic party, Thurmond's showing in the election was less than overwhelming. He carried only four Southern states (Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina) and it is probable that the only reason he carried those is that he ran in those states as the official candidate of the Democratic party.

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3 Moon, op. cit., p. 205.
4 Walton, op. cit., p. 77.
5 Frank J. Sorauf, Party Politics in America (Boston, 1968) p. 45.
The Beginnings of Progress

Not until the early 1950's did the civil rights movement truly begin in earnest. Only then did the cause begin to mobilize masses of people, black and white, to seriously dedicate themselves to freeing the Negro from the bondage of being a "second-class citizen" in America. The accomplishments between the years of 1948 and 1954 seem inadequate by today's standards. Nevertheless, the gains of this period were important because they represented some improvement in the condition of blacks, but more vitally, because they contributed to building a Negro power base.

By 1954, Negroes, especially in the North, had developed some political power. They had also developed a certain amount of self-respect, skills, status, income, and leadership in a variety of fields. Their freedom of movement had expanded, both in terms of occupational and geographical mobility, and in terms of public facilities and accommodations which were available to them. Nonetheless, this fell far short of fulfilling Negro aspirations. The lessening of discrimination was good as far as it went, but it was not enough. America needed to grant even more in order to provide the promised equality under the law.

The 1954 Supreme Court decision of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka\(^6\) overturned the separate-but-equal doc-

\(^6\)347 U. S. 483 (1954).
trine which had provided a legal basis for desegregation in the South since *Plessy v. Ferguson* in 1896. Furthermore, it gave rise to a surge of activity in the civil rights movement—the Montgomery bus boycott, sit-ins, increasing demands by blacks for equal rights in every facet of American life. 8

To say that all this unrest and ferment culminated in the Civil Rights Act of 1957 is to indicate a somewhat anticlimatic finale. In truth, the 1957 act was quite a modest and greatly watered-down version of what American Negroes truly sought. Briefly, the act forbade any person to interfere with the right of another to vote in federal elections, expressly including primaries. In addition, the Attorney General was empowered to seek injunctions to prevent such interference. 9 Finally, the act created a Commission on Civil Rights, which began to gather vitally needed information on voting practices. This Commission became an influence for stronger federal action in the field of voting rights. 10 The chief importance of the act, besides the fact

7 163 U. S. 537 (1896).


9 U. S. Statutes at Large, LXXI, 634 (1957).

that it was the first civil rights legislation since 1875, was its reassertion of the principle of federal protection of the right to vote. The results of the act were disappointing, mainly because it provided for no effective enforcement mechanism; it was evaded when registrars simply resigned in the face of federal legal action. This kind of evasion was second nature to those Southern politicians who had been eluding federal court decisions and federal law for decades. By 1959, the new Civil Rights Commission could only report that "no one has yet been registered through the civil remedies of the 1957 act."

The Civil Rights Act of 1960

The Civil Rights Act of 1960 was, in many respects, an attempt to correct the flaws of the 1957 act. This second civil rights act designated as a criminal offense any obstruction of the exercise of voting rights. Its major provisions were: the voting records of all federal elections must be preserved for twenty-two months, and they must be made available for inspection by the Justice Department; district court judges were authorized to appoint voting referees to facilitate registration of qualified persons in any area.

11Brainerd Dyer, "One Hundred Years of Negro Suffrage," Pacific Historical Review, XXXVII (February, 1968), 17.

12Watters and Cleghorn, op. cit., p. 212.

where there was found to be a pattern of discrimination; and the Attorney General was enabled to take action, not simply against individual registrars, but against the states themselves, thus allowing litigation to proceed even where the registrars had all resigned without successors.  

The modus operandi of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice was to forgo criminal prosecutions, instead instituting civil actions resulting in broad injunctions under which large numbers of Negroes would be placed on the voter rolls. The decision against criminal prosecutions was largely due to the knowledge that, even in a federal court, it would be difficult to persuade Southern juries to convict. More useful would be the civil cases yielding broad injunctions to immediately end discrimination against thousands of Negroes. This was an optimistic strategy, but it did not achieve widespread breakthroughs in the South. State resistance continued, new obstacles to Negro suffrage were devised, and there was no marked increase in the registration of Negro voters. For example, in Dallas County (Selma), Alabama, Negro registration rose from one hundred fifty to only four hundred, although there were then fifteen thousand Negroes of voting age in that county.

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14 Steinberg, op. cit., p. 6.
15 Watters and Cleghorn, op. cit., p. 212.
One reason for the failure of the act was that the desegregation ruling of the Supreme Court in 1954 had caused the attitudes of Southern whites to solidify and lines of resistance to Negro registration and voting to increase. Therefore, despite a few local gains—notably in Macon, Bullock, Montgomery, and Jefferson Counties, in Alabama—the 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights Acts today are generally recognized as limited means for removing racial discrimination from the franchise.

The Civil Rights Commission itself recognized the inadequacy of the acts, concluding in 1963: "After five years of federal litigation since the 1957 act, it is fair to conclude that case-by-case proceedings, helpful as they have been in isolated localities, have not provided a prompt or adequate remedy for widespread discriminatory denials of the right to vote." A year later, Burke Marshall, director of the commission, wrote: "The federal government has demonstrated a seeming inability to make a significant advance, in seven years time, since the 1957 law, in making the right to vote real for Negroes in Mississippi, large parts of Alabama, and Louisiana, and in scattered counties in other states."

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17 Dyer, op. cit., p. 18.
18 Steinberg, op. cit., p. 6.
20 Burke Marshall, quoted in Watters and Cleghorn, op. cit., p. 213.
Measures to Encourage Negro Registration

The Twenty-Fourth Amendment

Obviously, then, there was a need for new and stronger civil rights legislation. When such was not immediately forthcoming, however, other measures were employed in the attempt to enfranchise black citizens. In 1962, after a quarter of a century of attempts to outlaw the poll tax, Congress approved and sent to the states for ratification the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, banning payment of a poll tax or any other tax as a qualification for voting in any presidential or congressional election. The amendment was promptly ratified, and this restrictive device was eliminated, except for state and local elections, in the five Southern states which were continuing to use it.  

The Voter Education Project

Perhaps an even more important occurrence that year was the establishment by the Southern Regional Council of the Voter Education project to finance voter registration campaigns across the South. The chief purpose of the Voter Education project was research to determine the causes and

21 U. S. Statutes at Large, LXXXVIII, 1117-1118 (1962).
remedies of the abnormally low voter registration in the South; its method was to encourage people to try to register. Whites were not excluded from the project, but the main emphasis was on Negro registration and organized drives to increase it.\textsuperscript{22} There had been many Negro registration drives since the outlawing of the white primary in 1944, but this one, unlike the others, as Table I indicates, was quite successful. This was possibly due to the requirement of the Voter Education Project for the submission of reports by the local organizations to the central coordinator, which may have induced increased efficiency; it is also possible that this was simply a better time for such a program to be in operation. This project made the vital contribution of establishing momentum for Negro registration even before there was an effective federal voting law. Its most important finding was its daily demonstration of the intense need for federal legislation if Negro enfranchisement was ever to be fully achieved in the South.\textsuperscript{23}

The Civil Rights Act of 1964

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was aimed at eliminating discrimination in public accommodations; one section, how-

\textsuperscript{22}Watters and Cleghorn, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 46.

\textsuperscript{23}Voter Education Project, Southern Regional Council, \textit{The Effects of Federal Examiners and Organized Registration Campaigns on Negro Voter Registration} (Atlanta, 1966).
TABLE I

NEGRO REGISTRATION IN ALABAMA

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ever, did deal with the area of voting rights, although it applied to federal elections only. This section provides

. . . that the same standards must be used in registering all voters; minor errors in application cannot be used to disqualify registrants; a sixth-grade education is proof of literacy for voting purposes unless election officials can prove otherwise in court; literacy tests must be given in writing, with copies available to applicants; and a three-judge federal court must be impaneled to hear any case in which the Attorney General of the United States charges voting discrimination with right of direct appeal to the U. S. Supreme Court. 24

These provisions somewhat expedited voter registration, as well as outlawing several tactics used to disqualify Negro voters. However, neither the legal cases of the federal government nor the dedicated work of registration drives could prevail against Southern white resistance until the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

The Voting Rights Act of 1965

The Selma March

Nineteen hundred and sixty-five was an explosive year for the civil rights movement in America. On March 6, seventy white Alabama citizens marched for the right of Selma Negroes to vote; this was the first all-white demonstration of the civil rights movement. 25 Three days later, 525 Negroes

25 Watters and Cleghorn, op. cit., p. 252.
attempted to march from Selma to Montgomery to protest discrimination in Negro voter registration. Governor George C. Wallace made clear his position: he would not permit the march to take place unless he was ordered to do so by the federal courts; nevertheless, the marchers continued, in defiance of his orders. They had barely reached Edmund Pettus Bridge at the edge of downtown Selma when they were confronted by fifty state troopers and by Sheriff Jim Clark and his volunteer posse. When they refused to turn back, the marchers were attacked with clubs, horses, whips, and tear gas and routed back to their church in defenseless terror. This kind of thing had happened many times before across the South. But this one instance was seen by the entire nation on television, and the people responded to the need which they saw. Many flew to Selma that very night in an attempt to somehow remedy this outrage.

The Case of Williams v. Wallace

Out of this episode came the case of Williams v. Wallace, restraining Alabama officials from interfering with the march and insisting that the protection of the marchers be guaranteed. It was in March, 1965, that Federal Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr. ordered the state of Alabama, Governor George C.

27 Ibid., p. 62.
Wallace, and Sheriff Jim Clark, Jr. of Selma to allow the civil rights march from Selma to Montgomery. Governor Wallace countered with the statement that the state of Alabama could not be responsible for the safety of the marchers on the journey. Angered by the decision of the state of Alabama to neglect its responsibilities of protection to those who would march in protest of a system of segregation sanctioned by the state government itself, President Lyndon B. Johnson called some forty thousand troops to duty to protect the marchers. Although it is somewhat surprising that Governor Wallace would clear the way for the use of federal troops in Alabama, there is no doubt that his defiance of the federal government made him somewhat a hero in the eyes of the South. That President Johnson was highly disturbed by Wallace's decision was made clear in his statement that:

"It is not a welcome duty for the federal government to ever assume a state government's own responsibility for assuring the protection of citizens in the exercise of their constitutional rights. It has been rare in our history for the Governor and legislature of a sovereign state to decline to exercise their responsibility and to request that duty be assumed by the federal government."

29Ibid.


In spite of opposition by Governor Wallace and the state of Alabama, the march went on; the fifty-eight mile trek ended March 26, with twenty-five thousand people there by the last day.\textsuperscript{32} This demonstration is generally credited with playing a major role in the passage of the Voting Rights Act later that year.

\textbf{Provisions of the Act}

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was aimed chiefly at the administrative aspects of voter discrimination. It set forth a coverage formula (called the "triggering formula") to ascertain to which states or political subdivisions of states the remedial sections of the act would apply. This formula, currently in effect, requires two findings: one by the Attorney General that on November 1, 1964, the state or political subdivision maintained a voter "test or device"; and the second by the director of the census that less than 50 per cent of its voting-age residents were registered on November 1, 1964 or voted in the 1964 presidential election.\textsuperscript{33} When these two findings are made, all such tests or devices are automatically suspended, as are any new voting regulations that may subsequently be adopted, until either the Attorney General or the district court for the District of Columbia has certified that they do

\textsuperscript{32}Ibid., p. 70.

\textsuperscript{33}U. S. Statutes at Large, LXXIX, 437 (1965).
not abridge the franchise on racial grounds. In addition, the act provides for the appointment of federal examiners authorized to register qualified voters in areas where tests and applications had been used to discriminate, and for the appointment of federal poll watchers to ensure an honest count of the ballots. Another unique feature of the law is that it provides a penalty for intimidation or threatening of voters and allows the Attorney General to institute action for injunctions or restraining orders against the violation of any part of the act.\textsuperscript{34}

\textbf{Effects of the Act}

In terms of results, figures suggest that federal presence in any one area encouraged Negro registration generally over the entire state. In all four of the states with examiners (Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and South Carolina), local registrars alone added more Negroes to the books than they did in Georgia, suggesting that there was both an encouragement to Negroes to try to register and a stimulus to local registrars to do their jobs in order to avoid having the federal examiners sent in.\textsuperscript{35} The impact of the examiners within a county, of course, was tremendous, involving the greater ease with which Negroes could register and the better

\textsuperscript{34}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{35}\textit{Watters and Cleghorn, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 261.}
availability of officials to register them. One example of the effect of federal examiners is Jefferson County, Alabama. In this county, 25,944 Negroes were registered before the passage of the Voting Rights Act in August of 1965. From August until the end of January, local registrars registered 17,917 Negroes, and on January 20, 1966, federal examiners were sent in to Jefferson County; by February 21—a month later—they had added 14,047 Negroes to the voter rolls. In one month, federal examiners included as many Negroes on the registration lists as local registrars had added in seven months.  

It is quite obvious that local registrars had dragged their feet. Nor was this the only problem—all over the black belt there were complaints about discrimination due to registration. In some places, there was violence; in others, black sharecroppers were quietly evicted after they registered to vote. In other areas, blacks were still given a difficult time when they tried to register; in some counties, the registration went smoothly, but the local officials listed the Negro applicants as members of crank parties, which prevented them from voting in the next Democratic primary and necessitated complicated party-changing applications.  

In toto, though, the Voting


Rights Act of 1965 was the first effective federal legislation in the field of voting rights. The Supreme Court upheld the act as constitutional in the 1966 case of *South Carolina v. Katzenbach*; Chief Justice Warren hailed it as a law to "banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting, which has infected the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly one hundred years."39

In view of the success white supremacists had in nullifying earlier legislation, one might wonder if the Chief Justice was not overly optimistic, but results indicate that perhaps his optimism was justified. In 1967, President Johnson reported:

> Since the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the number of Negroes registered in the five states where voter discrimination was most severe has increased by 64 per cent—from 715,099 to 1,174,569. The vast majority of the new voters . . . were registered by local officials, in voluntary compliance with the Act.40

**Extension of the 1965 Act**

One concession granted to the Southern Congressmen in the 1965 Voting Rights Act, and a thorn in the side of civil rights leaders, was the provision, in the act itself, that

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38 383 U. S. 301 (1966).
39 Ibid.
the enforcement mechanism (the sections providing for the
dispatch of federal registrars to discriminatory regions)
would last only for five years. Because of its expiration
in 1970, civil rights advocates faced a legislative crisis,
as they strongly desired to have the act extended. Southern
opposition centered around the fact that the enforcement pro-
visions of the act were regional in scope; they applied only
to six Southern states (Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, Louis-
iana, Virginia, and South Carolina) and parts of a seventh
(North Carolina). Southern Congressmen took up verbal arms
to have the act expanded in scope to apply uniformly to all
fifty states, convinced that, should this maneuver succeed,
the bill would be soundly defeated. Their initial observa-
tions were correct: members of Congress from outside the
South showed little enthusiasm, even open hostility, toward
the idea of expanding the enforcement provisions of the act
to all fifty states. For a while, the Congressional contro-
versy raged. Those who supported a simple extension of the
1965 act concentrated their arguments on the results of the
act thus far. Representative William M. McCulloch, one of
the civil rights advocates, declared:

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 does work... We have made progress since 1965, but more time is
needed... figures show the strides we have made
and the strides we will have to make. When I voted
for the Voting Rights Act of 1965, I hoped that
five years would be ample time. But resistance to
progress has been more subtle and more effective
than I thought possible. A whole arsenal of racist
weapons has been perfected. Boundary lines have been gerrymandered, elections have switched to an at-large basis, counties have been consolidated, full-slate voting has been instituted, elective offices have been abolished where blacks had a chance of winning, the terms of white officials have been extended. . . and both physical and economic intimidation have been employed. . . . Because of such obstacles, we need more time.

. . . The bill which I introduced today would allow the act to continue for five more years as presently in effect. . . . It preserves the only voting rights law that really works.

Leading the attack on the extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was Attorney General John N. Mitchell, who supported the administration-backed substitute bill which would extend the provisions of the 1965 act to all fifty states. Many Capitol Hill observers, noting the opposition to the bill by substantial numbers of Republicans, concluded that its purpose was largely political, aimed at increasing Republican popularity in the South. Speaking before the House, Representative John Conyers of Michigan quoted Mitchell as follows:

The proposal for a simple five-year extension of the 1965 Voting Rights Act leaves the under-educated ghetto Negro as today's forgotten man in voting rights legislature. . . . It is not enough to continue to protect Negro voters in seven states. . . . It is unrealistic today to ignore the ghettos

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of Harlem, Watts, Roxbury, Seattle, Hartford, and Portland, Oregon—all of which are located in states which have literacy tests.\footnote{New York Times, July 2, 1969, quoted by Hon. John Conyers in Congressional Record, 91st Congress, 1st Session, July 2, 1969, p. 18298.}

Countering the Nixon Administration proposal were the civil rights advocates; again McCulloch was the spokesman, stating:

I regret the necessity of opposing the Administration proposal as a substitute for the Voting Rights Act of 1965. As a Republican, I would like nothing better than to . . . support a program sponsored by the present Administration. But in good conscience, I cannot support the one outlined . . . for two reasons: The Administration bill is actually a weaker bill. It also jeopardizes the chances of passage of voting rights legislation.\footnote{Ibid.}

Southern Congressmen centered their attack of the 1965 Act, and their support of the Administration proposal, on the unfairness of "picking on" the Southern states. One of the most vocal Southerners was Representative John R. Ranick of Louisiana, who said:

We of the seven Southern states who have had our state constitutions suspended at will by the U. S. Attorney General, under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, were amazed to overhear the screams of anguish and prejudice against the present Administration's initial proposal to extend the Voting Rights Act uniformly into all fifty states. . . . A dual standard of equality is acceptable so long as it applies only to the citizens of the Southern states.\footnote{Congressional Record, 91st Congress, 1st Session, July 2, 1969, p. 18371.}
Some non-Southerners agreed with Ranick, among them Representative William A. Steiger of Wisconsin, who read the following from an editorial:

Outlawing literacy tests or similar voter qualification devices in some states and districts and not in others is in itself discriminatory. This is what the Voting Rights Act of 1965 did and this is what supporters want it to continue to do by simply extending the law as is for five more years. . . . In fairness, . . . one cannot support what amounts to regional legislation. If the federal government is going to suspend the literacy test qualification, it should do so on a nationwide basis. Because it didn't see fit to do so in 1965 is no reason by the legislative discrimination should now be extended for another five years.  

In the end, after the battle ceased and the voting was at last accomplished, civil rights proponents emerged the winners: the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was simply extended for another five years. Effective legislation exists, then, for the political mobilization of the black population of the South. What the results will be yet remains to be seen.

In the next chapter, this paper will analyze voting patterns in Alabama in an attempt to discover any trends which might be developing in the politics of that state. Since V. O. Key has written the most famous work on Southern politics, his observations will be tested in the light of contemporary political developments.

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47 Key, op. cit.
CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF ALABAMA ELECTIONS

The Friends-and-Neighbors Phenomenon

Observations of V. O. Key

The classic work on Southern politics by V. O. Key notes a phenomenon of Southern politics which in 1949 was especially significant in Alabama—the "friends and neighbors" vote. This means that candidates for state office tend to poll overwhelming majorities in their home counties and to draw heavy support in adjacent counties. Key connected this localism with low voter-interest in issues and with the absence of a two-party situation. He presented several examples of this phenomenon; two of these were Chauncey Sparks' showing in the 1938 gubernatorial race and the Folsom-Boozer contest in the first gubernatorial primary of 1946. In the 1938 gubernatorial primary, Chauncey Sparks, a native of Barbour County, was one of the contenders. The friends and neighbors in his home county returned 84.7 per cent of the vote for Sparks, which is especially noteworthy when contrasted with his 23.7 per cent of the statewide total.²

¹Key, op. cit., p. 37.
²Ibid., p. 41.
In 1946, "Big Jim" Folsom and Judge Elbert Boozer were two of the five gubernatorial candidates in the first primary. Folsom's strength clustered around two counties: Coffee and Cullman. He was born and spent his young manhood in Coffee County; there he polled over 65 per cent of the vote plus 40 per cent of the vote in adjacent counties. Folsom spent his later life in Cullman County; in 1946, he received 72 per cent of the Cullman County vote, with 40 to 50 per cent of the vote in surrounding counties. This is quite significant when one notes that in the state as a whole, Folsom drew only 28.5 per cent of the vote.

One of Folsom's opponents, Judge Elbert Boozer, was probate judge of Calhoun County. Although he received only 15.9 per cent of the total statewide vote, Boozer attracted more than 50 per cent of the vote in his own county and a couple of adjacent ones.

Key contends that, while not every candidate for statewide office profits from a heavy friends-and-neighbors vote, nearly always such a following constitutes a nucleus around which an aspirant for a statewide office attempts to build a faction. He concludes that a candidate in Alabama gains

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3Ibid., p. 40.
4Ibid., p. 39.
5Ibid., p. 40.
support not primarily for his principles or for his ability, but for the location of his home. 6

It is the contention of this paper that Key's friends-and-neighbors phenomenon is no longer at work in Alabama gubernatorial primaries. No longer can candidates count on huge majorities in their home counties and strong support in adjacent counties. This friends-and-neighbors support is becoming the exception rather than the rule in Alabama voting patterns. The friends-and-neighbors phenomenon apparently continued until the mid-1960's in Alabama. A look at the elections involving George C. Wallace from 1958 to 1970 indicates the decline of friends-and-neighbors voting. Wallace, like Sparks, is from Barbour County. In 1958, he was defeated by John Patterson in the Democratic gubernatorial primary. Despite his statewide defeat, Wallace carried Barbour County with 87.8 per cent of the vote. Following the friends-and-neighbors patterns, he also fared well in the adjacent counties, with exception of Russell County. Totals show that he polled 68.8 per cent of the vote in Bullock County, 60.7 per cent in Pike, and only 38.5 per cent in Russell County. 7 The low vote for Wallace in Russell County was due in part to the sympathy for his

6 Ibid.

7 Secretary of State of Alabama, Official Alabama Election Returns, 1958.
opponent, whose father, serving as Attorney General, was assassinated in Phenix City, located in Russell County.

An examination of Table II reflects the decline of friends-and-neighbors voting, especially after 1962. This decline may be attributed to the increase in the number of Negroes eligible to vote in these selected counties. As is indicated by Table III, the number of registered Negroes increased from a microscopic amount prior to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to several thousand by 1968. The consistent decline of the Wallace vote in these counties paralleled the steady increase in the number of registered Negro voters. It may therefore be suggested that it is the Negro vote in these counties which has terminated the friends-and-neighbors phenomenon observed by Key in 1949.

**Effect of the Black Vote**

The Wallace elections present only a one-dimensional view of the decline of friends-and-neighbors voting. It is not surprising that a candidate such as Wallace, who campaigned as a staunch segregationist, would suffer from increased Negro voting in counties like Barbour, where Negroes compose nearly half the electorate. But friends-and-neighbors voting also appears to be declining in regions where only a small proportion of the population is black. The Brewer vote in the 1970 gubernatorial primaries presents
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barbour</td>
<td>87.8</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>58.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bullock</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pike</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>55.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russell</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>60.3</td>
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</table>

**TABLE III**

NUMBER OF REGISTERED NEGROES

BY SELECTED COUNTY AND YEAR

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barbour</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>767</td>
<td>3,666</td>
<td>3,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bullock</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>976</td>
<td>1,088</td>
<td>3,197</td>
<td>3,203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pike</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>3,180</td>
<td>3,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russell</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>3,932</td>
<td>4,292</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

a look at friends-and-neighbors voting from this second dimension. Albert Brewer served as Lurleen Wallace's lieutenant governor until her death in 1968, at which time he became governor. In 1970, he decided to run for election as governor in his own right, facing in the primary George Wallace and several minor candidates. Brewer is from Decatur (Morgan County), which is in northern Alabama, where the proportion of Negro population is very small and there is a progressive tradition dating back to the Civil War. Key observed the friends-and-neighbors phenomenon in northern Alabama in the first gubernatorial primary of 1946. "Big Jim" Folsom's home is in Cullman County, Alabama. As is shown by Table IV, Folsom overwhelmingly carried Cullman and the surrounding counties, using them as a nucleus for his statewide campaign. 8 Table IV indicates that this friends-and-neighbors policy followed in 1946 was not in operation in the 1970 gubernatorial primary. It was only in his home county of Morgan that Brewer ran ahead of his statewide total in the first primary. In the adjacent counties, he ran several percentage points behind his statewide total and, in fact, saw George Wallace carry a plurality in each of three adjacent counties. 9

8Key, op. cit., p. 39.

TABLE IV
FRIENDS AND NEIGHBORS VOTING IN SELECTED COUNTIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Folsom MAY PRIMARY 1946</th>
<th>Brewer MAY PRIMARY 1970</th>
<th>Brewer JUNE PRIMARY 1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cullman .68</td>
<td>Morgan .52</td>
<td>Morgan .54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall .53</td>
<td>Madison .42</td>
<td>Madison .42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blount .49</td>
<td>Franklin .37</td>
<td>Franklin .37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etowah .47</td>
<td>Limestone .38</td>
<td>Limestone .38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walker .41</td>
<td>Jackson .31</td>
<td>Jackson .31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lawrence .31</td>
<td>Lawrence .31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LEGEND
- 30% - 39%
- 40% - 49%
- 50% - 59%
- 60% and above

In the 1970 runoff primary, Brewer fared only slightly better, running ahead of his statewide total in both Morgan and Madison counties. At the same time, however, Wallace carried majorities in Franklin, Limestone, Jackson, Marshall, and Lawrence Counties; all of these are in close proximity to Brewer's home and, according to Key's criteria, they should have been subject to friends-and-neighbors voting. Obviously they were not.

The 1970 gubernatorial primary was also contested by Charles Woods, a multimillionaire businessman from Dothan, Alabama. As a result of an airplane crash during World War II, Woods is severely disfigured, a factor which somewhat affects his vote-attracting ability. He polled a little over 15 per cent of the total statewide vote in the primary, running third in the election behind Brewer and Wallace. If friends-and-neighbors voting remains valid, Woods should have run ahead of his statewide total in Houston County (Dothan) and the adjacent counties. However, this did not occur; Figure I shows that Woods ran considerably behind his statewide total in his friends-and-neighbors territory. In fact, in his home county of Houston, he received only 8 per cent of the popular vote. Of the counties adjacent to his home, he fared best in Dale County but even there he was able to capture only 9 per cent of

\[\text{Ibid.}\]
FIGURE I
FRIENDS AND NEIGHBORS VOTE FOR WOODS, MAY 1970

the vote. Clearly, in the case of Charles Woods, friends and neighbors were voting for the opposition.

Key observed that the friends-and-neighbors phenomenon was the result of the transient factions and the lack of stable and well-organized statewide campaign organizations, which are typical of Alabama politics. It may be that political factions are presently stabilizing somewhat in Alabama. The Negroes in the black belt of the state are courted by the all-black National Democratic Party of Alabama (N. D. P. A.). The N. D. P. A. represents a continuous political organization in Alabama. Perhaps as a reaction to the N. D. P. A., white candidates have been forced to tighten their statewide campaign organizations.

**Voting Patterns in Minor Statewide Elections**

This paper does not intend to suggest that friends-and-neighbors voting has completely subsided in Alabama. In elections of narrow popular appeal, friends-and-neighbors voting seems to be well and vigorous; this does not, however, diminish the importance of the decline of friends-and-neighbors voting in major statewide elections because, if Alabama is to ever develop a two-party system on the state level, friends-and-neighbors voting must be replaced by a more issue-oriented vote.

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11 Ibid.

12 Key, op. cit., p. 37.
An example of the continuation of friends-and-neighbors voting can be found in the 1968 Public Service Commission race, in which former Dallas County sheriff Jim Clark ran for president of the Commission. The Public Service Commission race lacks both the intense competition and the widespread public interest enjoyed by the gubernatorial races. In this race, Clark polled only 18 per cent of the total statewide vote, a defeat severe enough to consign him to political retirement. Nevertheless, Clark did run ahead of his statewide total in his home county and in all the adjacent counties except Montgomery, as is shown in Figure II. In fact, he did surprisingly well in Dallas County, where he gained 48 per cent of the vote. Obviously, friends-and-neighbors voting is indicated in the case of Jim Clark in 1968.

A second example of the friends-and-neighbors effect is the case of William Baxley's 1970 race for Attorney General against the incumbent MacDonald Gallion. At the time of the election, Baxley was twenty-seven years old and was serving as County Attorney in Houston County (Dothan), Alabama. He had no statewide campaign experience and, apparently, a very sketchy statewide campaign organization;

\[13\] Secretary of State of Alabama, Official Alabama Election Returns, 1968.

\[14\] Ibid.
FIGURE II
FRIENDS AND NEIGHBORS VOTE FOR CLARKE, MAY 1968

nevertheless, he was victorious. The election results shown in Figure III clearly illustrate Baxley's support by his friends and neighbors. In his home county and in each of the adjacent counties, Baxley ran well ahead of his statewide total of 52 per cent of the vote.

From these observations on friends-and-neighbors voting, it is evident that this phenomenon is diminishing in gubernatorial races, but that it apparently continues to exist in races which attract less public interest, such as Attorney General and the Public Service Commission. The figures shown in this paper prompt this writer to speculate that friends-and-neighbors voting is likely to decline in most races for state office in the near future. From the data used in this paper can be drawn evidence that the black belt counties are undergoing a political transformation, due to the influx of thousands of Negroes into the voting population. Also, the persistent campaign activities of the N. D. P. A. have mobilized Negro voters to those elections which the N. D. P. A. chooses to contest. As the pre-

15 Probably the victory for Baxley can be attributed to Charles Woods, Dothan gubernatorial candidate, who continually, in statewide televised speeches, branded Gallion as a liquor agent who took contributions from out-of-state liquor companies in return for aiding these companies in gaining the right to sell their products in Alabama's state-run liquor stores.

FIGURE III
FRIENDS AND NEIGHBORS VOTE FOR BAXLEY, MAY 1970

sent voting system, with its many new Negro voters, matures, it seems likely that candidates for any statewide office will have to form better statewide campaign organizations, particularly if the N. D. P. A. chooses to run candidates for office on a party slate. While the decline of friends-and-neighbors voting may not lead immediately to the formation of a two-party system in Alabama, it should trend toward a more solidified factional system that may divide along geographic and/or socioeconomic lines within the state.

Methodology

As a means of empirically examining election data on a sectional basis, the chi square statistic will be employed in this paper. Chi square is a nonparametric measure which allows the researcher to test the degree of relationship between groups of variables. The use of this device in the paper will allow the measurement of voting statistics for the three regions of the state—the northern counties, the black belt, and the southern counties. It has been observed that, traditionally, Alabama voting patterns differ greatly between and among these three areas.\(^\text{17}\)

Using Alabama election results, this paper will test the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference in voting patterns between the three regions of Alabama.

\(^{17}\text{Key, op. cit., p. 42.}\)
If the computation produces a chi square large enough to be statistically significant, then a significant difference in voting patterns between the regions will be indicated.\textsuperscript{18}

It should be noted that, in dealing with election results, this paper makes use of aggregate vote totals, not of sample data; therefore, the paper is not concerned with the problem of invalid sample data. By using chi square, the paper can compute regional differences more precisely than by using simple percentages, although the latter are included in the paper. Since chi-square is a commonly used statistic in research on voting behavior, if similar work is ever conducted in other states, this would make a good comparison device.

Sectionalism

\textit{Folsom Versus Ellis}

Key further noted that sectionalism emerged from friends-and-neighbors voting. He observed that, from time to time in Alabama, there was visible a sectional cleavage within the Democratic party—the same cleavage which would probably be followed by party lines if there were two parties in the state. In this sectional division, northern and southeastern

Alabama aligned against the black belt region and the metropolitan areas of Birmingham and Mobile. As an example of this sectionalism, Key cited the 1946 gubernatorial runoff primary between "Big Jim" Folsom and Handy Ellis. Folsom represented the more progressive faction, running on a platform which promised more adequate care for the aged, better salaries for schoolteachers, a road-building program, and a pledge to be tough with the conservative economic interests in Alabama. In the face of this platform, the conservative forces rallied around Ellis. In the election, voting fell into regional divisions: Ellis found his greatest popular strength in the black belt, while Folsom's popularity tended to be more concentrated in the northern and southern counties, where the Negro population was relatively small.

Empirical examination of the 1946 race indicates that there was a strong division in candidate choice between voters in the black belt and those in the northern and southern regions. The chi squares for the 1946 election results are shown in Figure IV, A through D. In Figure IV A, election results for Folsom and Ellis in this election are compared by region (northern counties, black counties, and southern counties). The chi square for this comparison, shown in Figure IV A, is 29.47.

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19 Key, op. cit., p. 42.
20 Ibid., p. 43.
FIGURE IV

JUNE 1946 DEMOCRATIC GUBERNATORIAL PRIMARY

A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Black Belt</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ellis</td>
<td>0.69</td>
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<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Folsom</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.62</td>
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B

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<td>Folsom</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.66</td>
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<td>0.38</td>
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<td>0.62</td>
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D

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<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Folsom</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
indicating an extremely high statistical difference in voting between regions. Going further, the comparison in Figure IV B of the black belt and the northern counties alone derives a chi square of 24.35; when the black belt is compared to southern counties alone, in Figure IV C, a chi square of 19.32 is computed. In both of these tests, the chi square is extraordinarily high, suggesting a marked division of voter preference between sections. But, when the northern and southern counties were compared without regard to the black belt counties, in Figure IV D, a chi square of only .34 resulted; this shows a closeness of candidate preference between voters in these two sections.

When only percentages for the candidates within each region are compared, the same relationship can be seen. In the black belt counties, Ellis received a mean total of 69 per cent of the votes cast, while Folsom received only 31 per cent of the votes in that region. Almost the opposite was true in the other two sections: in the northern counties, Folsom averaged 66 per cent of the vote and in the southern counties, he received an average of 62 per cent of the vote, with the remainder in each section going to Ellis.  

More recent election results indicate a significant shift in the sectional divisions within the state. When sectional  

21Secretary of State of Alabama, Official Alabama Election Returns, 1946.
divisions occur in Alabama gubernatorial primaries, the black belt is no longer isolated as the most conservative section of the state. At present, the black belt finds itself in voting alliance with the northern counties, while the southern counties are taking the role of the most conservative in terms of voting.

1970 Gubernatorial Primary: Brewer

The 1970 elections for which the chi squares are computed in Figure V, A through C, give a good illustration of this shifting alliance. In the first gubernatorial primary, the vote for Brewer showed this split in voter preference. Comparing the three sections statistically, Figure V A reveals that the Brewer vote presents a chi square correlation coefficient of 6.25, which indicates a significant cleavage between the sections. Breaking this examination into smaller units, the chi square for a comparison of black belt and southern counties, shown in Figure V B, is 5.74, which again indicates a highly significant division in candidate preference. Chi square for the black belt and the northern counties, documented in Figure V C, is only .08, showing a similarity in voting patterns between these two sections.

Another way to consider this same phenomenon is to compare percentages received by the candidates in each region.

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22 Key noted that sectional divisions did not occur in each election but emerged "from time to time." (Key, op. cit., p. 42.)
FIGURE V
MAY 1970 DEMOCRATIC GUBERNATORIAL PRIMARY

A
Black Belt North
\[\begin{array}{cc}
\text{Brewer} & \text{Others} \\
.46 & .54 \\
.48 & .52 \\
\end{array}\]

B
Black Belt South
\[\begin{array}{cc}
\text{Brewer} & \text{Others} \\
.32 & .68 \\
.48 & .52 \\
\end{array}\]

C
"ez
\[\begin{array}{cc}
\text{Brewer} & \text{Others} \\
.46 & .54 \\
.48 & .52 \\
\end{array}\]
In comparing the mean sectional figures for Brewer in the first gubernatorial primary, the sectional cleavage becomes evident. Brewer polled 48 per cent of the vote in the black belt and 46 per cent in the northern counties. At the same time, he gained only 32 per cent of the vote in the southern counties,\textsuperscript{23} showing a marked division in voting behavior between the sections.

**Runoff Primary: Brewer Versus Wallace**

The sectional differences which align the northern and black belt counties against the southern counties were also prevalent in the runoff primary held in June of 1970, between Wallace and Brewer. The chi squares for this election are computed in Figure VI, A through C. Figure VI A shows that the chi square is 19.17 when the three sections are statistically compared. In contrasting individual sections, a clear division emerges between the southern counties and the rest of the state: Figure VI B indicates a chi square of 18.82 when the black belt is compared to the south, but the comparison of the black belt to the north in Figure VI C reveals a chi square of only 2.64, illustrating the new sectional split. The percentage figures for this race are also extremely informative.

In the black belt counties, where Negro population is consid-

\textsuperscript{23}Secretary of State of Alabama, Official Alabama Election Returns, 1970.
erable, Wallace polled only 45 per cent of the vote, which suggests a racial basis for black belt voting. The coefficient of correlation between the percentage of voters which are black and the percentage of vote for Wallace in the black belt counties is .94; this indicates that, in the black belt counties, as Negroes come to constitute an increasing proportion of the total vote, the vote for Wallace proportionately decreases.

The Shift in Black Belt Voting

The shift in voting in the black belt is an extremely important political phenomenon, since it represents a severe change in voting patterns of a major section of Alabama. This shift might have been predicted from Key's observations in Southern Politics. He noted that, while the presence of large numbers of Negroes in the black belt might tend to make the whites of that area more conservative than whites in regions containing fewer Negroes, there were also some important socioeconomic factors which influenced black belt conservatism. Negroes constitute, for the most part, the lowest socioeconomic levels in the black belt. Since, at the time that Key was writing, Negroes did not vote in any

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24 Ibid.
25 Pearson Product Moment Correlation.
26 Key, op. cit.
appreciable numbers in Alabama, the voters in the black belt tended to be, as a group, from the higher socioeconomic levels. At the time of Key's study, there was no large lower-SES group voting in the black belt counties. It seems to follow naturally that, once Negroes began to vote in large numbers, they would select candidates who were more progressive on issues of race and economics than would the white voters of the black belt. Since Negroes constitute half or nearly half of the potential vote in each of the black belt counties, their influx into the electorate was bound to have extraordinary consequences on traditional voting patterns.

Exceptions to Sectionalism

This paper does not intend to suggest that sectional divisions occur in each race for statewide office in Alabama. It is, rather, the contention of this work that when sectionalism does occur—Key suggested that this happened in times of crisis—the sectional divisions are different from those in operation when Southern Politics was written. An example of an election in which sectionalism did not occur is the 1968 senatorial primary, won by Jim Allen. When the

27 Ibid., p. 44.
28 Ibid., p. 46.
29 Key, op. cit.
three sections of the state are compared by chi square in Figure VII, the correlation coefficient is 2.60, which shows no significant difference in voting between the sections. The percentage of vote which Allen received reflects this lack of sectional significance. He gained 49 per cent of the vote in the black belt counties, 58 per cent of the northern county vote, and 47 per cent of the vote in the south.  

FIGURE VII
1968 DEMOCRATIC SENTORIAL PRIMARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Black Belt</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allen</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Urban Vote

It is also interesting to note that, when this sectional division occurs, the urban areas seem to vote in accord with their section. For example, in the first gubernatorial primary of 1970, Brewer received 54 per cent of the vote in Jefferson County and only 37 per cent of the vote in Mobile County. This corresponds to the sectional vote which Brewer gained in that election: he attracted 48 per cent of the black belt vote, 46 per cent of the northern county vote, and only 32 per cent of the vote in the southern counties. This trend continued into the runoff primary, where Brewer collected 61 per cent of the Jefferson County vote, an amazing 20 per cent better than his showing in Mobile County. This examination suggests that the voting between the two metropolitan areas in Alabama is not distinct from the section of the state in which the city is located; there is, then, no urban vote per se in Alabama.

31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
Presidential Elections and Republicanism

The 1948 Election

Nineteen hundred and forty-eight marked the beginning of an era of Alabamian rebellion against the national Democratic party. It was in that year that the Alabama state Democratic party chose to pledge its slate of electors to J. Strom Thurmond instead of to the national party nominee, Harry S. Truman. This dissatisfaction with the national party's choice was also reflected by the state Democratic party in subsequent elections: in 1960, when half of the Democratic slate of electors ran unpledged; in 1964, when the entire slate of Democratic electors ran unpledged; and in 1968, when George Wallace ran as a Democrat on the Alabama ballot. The reason for these unpledged electors was the hope that the presidential election would be close enough that these electors would hold the balance of power, thus giving them a lever for bargaining with presidential aspirants, especially in the area of civil rights.

The voters in Alabama have apparently enthusiastically supported this strategy. In the 1948 presidential election, Thurmond received nearly 80 per cent of the Alabama statewide total vote.\(^3\) As might have been expected from reading

\(^3\)Secretary of State of Alabama, Official Alabama Election Returns, 1948.
Southern Politics,\textsuperscript{35} the vote fell somewhat along sectional lines, with the northern counties voting less for Thurmond than did the southern or black belt counties. Despite this sectional difference, Thurmond overwhelmed his opponents throughout the state, polling 95 per cent of the vote in the black belt counties, 75 per cent in the north, and 88 per cent of the southern vote.\textsuperscript{36} There was no significant difference in the vote for Thurmond in Jefferson and Mobile counties, where he received 79 per cent and 78 per cent of the vote, respectively.\textsuperscript{37}

The Eisenhower Elections

The two Eisenhower elections saw the growth of Republican presidential strength in parts of Alabama. Eisenhower ran well in the two metropolitan areas, gaining 46 per cent of the Jefferson County vote and 49 per cent of the Mobile County vote in 1952, and a majority vote in both of these regions in 1956.\textsuperscript{38} This is not surprising since, as Cosman suggests, the urban areas are the traditional sources of Republican strength in the South.\textsuperscript{39} But 1952 also saw an

\textsuperscript{35} Key, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{36} Secretary of State of Alabama, Official Alabama Election Returns, 1948.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 1952, and 1956.

\textsuperscript{39} Bernard Cosman, \textit{Five States for Goldwater} (University, Alabama, 1966), p. 52.
increase in the votes for a Republican presidential candidate in the black belt counties, where Eisenhower gained almost 42 per cent of the popular vote.40 This enthusiasm for Eisenhower had apparently dampened somewhat by 1956, as he received that year only 32 per cent of the votes cast in the black belt counties.41 In both cases, however, Alabama continued to support the Democratic party; Stevenson carried Alabama in both elections.

Electoral Strategy in the 1960 Election

The 1960 election in Alabama was unique in its use of unpledged electors for half of the Democratic slate, with the rest pledged to the national Democratic party nominee, John F. Kennedy. As mentioned previously, this was a ploy to give bargaining power to the South in the event of a close election, in which unpledged electors from Alabama and some other Southern states would hold the balance of power in the Electoral College. The Democratic slate of electors polled almost the same amount of votes as did the Democratic slate in 1956, receiving 57 per cent of the total state vote.42 The Republican party held relatively the same position as

40 Secretary of State of Alabama, Official Alabama Election Returns, 1952.
41 Ibid., 1956.
42 Ibid., 1960.
it had in 1956. The Pearson Product Moment Correlation coefficient between the 1956 and the 1960 Republican vote in Alabama is .88, which indicates not only that Nixon polled almost the same percentage of vote as did Eisenhower, but also that the vote came from the same area.

1964: Shift in Republican Strength

Nineteen hundred and sixty-four marks the beginning of a different type of Republican vote in Alabama. The last of any significant Negro affiliation with the Republican party in Alabama passed into history with this election. Negroes may have found little reason to be enthusiastic about the 1964 election, since the only choice on the ballot was to vote for Goldwater or for a slate of unpledged electors. Nevertheless, Negroes seemed determined to vote against Goldwater, even if it meant casting votes for electors whose loyalties had not yet been made public. In Birmingham, there are two electoral districts in which, in 1964, 99 per cent of the registered voters were Negro. In these two wards, Goldwater received only thirty-nine votes out of 3,819 ballots cast. Mobile's ward ten, which is also 99 per cent black, produced 2,032 votes for the slate of independent electors and only 17 votes for Goldwater.

43 Cosman, op. cit., p. 69.
44 Ibid., pp. 52, 55.
45 Ibid., p. 79.
The statewide pattern of voting also changed during the 1964 election. The correlation coefficient between the 1960 and the 1964 Republican vote was only .06, which indicates a vast deviation in voting patterns between the two elections. Goldwater gained tremendously over Nixon in all sections of the state, but his biggest gain was in the black belt, where he polled nearly 80 per cent of the total popular vote; this election took place before many Negroes voted in the black belt. He ran well in the southern counties, receiving nearly 78 per cent of the vote and it was only in the northern counties that he ran behind his statewide total of 69 per cent of the vote. In the northern counties, Goldwater received only 59 per cent of the vote, which, while a majority, is some ten percentage points behind his statewide average. This sectional division of the vote shows up clearly when a chi square correlation is computed for the election. The

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46 Ibid., p. 69.


48 Ibid.
chi square for 1964 election, as documented in Figure VIII, is 13.36, indicating the significance of the sectional division.

FIGURE VIII
1964 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Black Belt</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>South</th>
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<tr>
<td>Goldwater</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpledged</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Goldwater's success in the election can be attributed to the fact that "in 1964, the Republican presidential party, for the first time in history, played the role of the traditional party of the South..." 49 Goldwater, who had voted against the Civil Rights Act of 1964, campaigned on a states' 

49 Cosman, op. cit., p. 55.
White voters in the Deep South, "responded much as their grandparents would have. They voted for what they perceived to be the 'candidate of the Southern white man'."  

Of more lasting effect was the election of three Republican Congressmen from Alabama in 1966. Geographically, the districts of these Congressmen range from Birmingham south to the coast and are centered in the urban areas of Birmingham, Montgomery and Mobile. Jack Edwards was elected from the First District, located in southeastern Alabama, with its major portion in Mobile County. William L. Dickinson was elected from south-central Alabama, the Second District, which encompasses the Montgomery area. John H. Buchanan was elected from the Sixth District, which is wholly within the city limits of Birmingham.  

1968: Third Parties and Confusion

The inroads which the Republican party has made in Alabama can be seen in the 1968 election. All three of the Republican Congressmen were successful in being re-elected, despite the fact that George Wallace was running for president.

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51 Cosman, op. cit., p. 62.
52 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, XX (1964), p. 1042.
dent as a Democrat in Alabama that year and the Democratic aspirants for Congress were listed in the same party column as was Wallace. It is particularly significant to note that in the First District, though Wallace polled 68.8 per cent of the gubernatorial vote, Edwards was able to gain 57.1 per cent of the votes cast for Congressman. In the Second District, despite Wallace's 70.8 per cent of the vote, Dickinson attracted 55.4 per cent of the congressional vote and was re-elected. It was only in the Sixth District that Wallace failed to poll a majority. In that district, he received 48 per cent of the vote, with 23.5 per cent going to Nixon and 28.6 per cent cast for Humphrey. Buchanan ran ahead of each of the presidential candidates, gaining 59.3 per cent of the votes cast. The 1968 election suggests that these three Congressmen are well-entrenched in their present positions and that Alabamians will apparently vote Republican if they like the candidate, even if there is a popular personality heading the national ticket as a Democrat. The voters of Alabama seem to be willing to split their tickets and elect persons of different political parties in the same election. Each of these Republican Congressmen was returned in the 1970 election; each received more than 60 per cent of the total votes cast for Congressman in his district. The 1970 election

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again points up both the popularity of these individual
Congressmen and the willingness of Alabama voters to elect
Republicans.

In 1969, the Republicans elected their first member to
the state House of Representatives since Reconstruction.
On April 1, 1969, Bert Nettles was elected to the House as
the representative from Mobile County. Nettles received
55.1 per cent of the votes cast in a four-way race, which
was also contested by a political unknown, a Negro, and a
white supremacist. In the 1970 race for the House of Repre-
sentatives, Nettles was returned to Montgomery as the sole
Republican in Alabama's state legislature.

The 1968 election saw George C. Wallace sweep Alabama,
collecting over 67 per cent of the total popular vote. Even
though he won the election overwhelmingly, Wallace
failed to prevent the re-election of the three Republican
Congressmen; he also failed to receive great majorities in
the black belt, where Strom Thurmond had collected nearly
every vote cast in 1948. Thus, the influence of the black
vote is shown in the black belt in the 1968 election. Wal-
lace gained 52 per cent of the vote in the black belt

55Mobile County Probate Court, Official Election Returns, 1969.

56Secretary of State of Alabama, Official Alabama
Election Returns, 1968.
counties, but this is considerably less than Thurmond's 95 per cent majority in 1948. In fact, Wallace ran better in the traditionally progressive northern Alabama, where he obtained 64 per cent of the vote, than he did in the black belt. The Wallace returns from the two major metropolitan areas did not mesh in 1968; he received 52 per cent of the vote in Jefferson County, which was considerably below his statewide total, but he gained 67 per cent of the vote—the same as his statewide total—in Mobile County. This division in urban vote can perhaps be explained by sectional differences. As formerly revealed by this paper's examination of gubernatorial races in Alabama, the southern section of the state, including Mobile County, has evolved into a voting pattern more conservative than that of the rest of the state.

The 1968 presidential election saw the establishment of a "third party" which may prove important, in the near future, to Alabama's political destiny. Since George Wallace was running under the symbols of the state Democratic party, two "third parties" were formed to allow Hubert Humphrey's electors to have a place on the ballot: the Alabama Independent

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57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
Democratic Party, a white and black coalition party which vanished immediately after the 1968 election; and the National Democratic Party of Alabama, an all-black party headed by John Cashin, which has remained a very viable force in Alabama politics since the 1968 election. The N. D. P. A. has been successful in electing several black officials at the county level in the black belt region, where its power is centered. More importantly, the N. D. P. A. claims to be the representative of the national Democratic party in Alabama, and, while it has not yet been so recognized by the national party officials, it is likely that the N. D. P. A. leadership will inherit the reins of the state Democratic party if the present trend in Alabama of growing Republican strength and continued Wallace presidential attempts persists.

The Future of Alabama Politics

The future of Alabama politics is unquestionably tied to the Negro vote that has emerged in recent years and the growing Republican strength which has occurred in the 1960's. Key noted that Southern one-party politics was reinforced by limitations on suffrage. The restrictions on voting have been removed by federal legislation, allowing the influx of

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Negroes into the electorate in large numbers for the first time since Reconstruction. As was previously shown, the increased Negro vote has transformed the sectional divisions in Alabama voting. It is likely, at this juncture in history, that Alabama will develop a viable two-party system. The Alabama Republican party has as the basis of its strength the three congressional seats now held by members of that party. Continued dissatisfaction of whites toward the national Democratic party is likely to preclude any major increase in the vote-getting power of a national party nominee for president. Since the state Democratic party is largely in the hands of George Wallace and his followers, it seems probable that the national Democratic party will come to recognize some new coalition, made up of the N. D. P. A. and white loyalists, as its representative within the state. In fact, this is already taking place, since the state party has been forced to re-district for the 1972 election of state committee members in such a way that Negroes will gain considerable representation on the state executive committee. This re-districting was undertaken by the state party to meet the requirements of the "one-man, one vote" rule and to strengthen the party's position in regard to the national party.63

Compounding the problem of the Democratic party in Alabama is the age of the state's senior United States senator, John Sparkman. Sparkman's age will no doubt force his retirement within the next few years and, since George Wallace has expressed absolutely no interest in a Senate seat, the Democrats have no strong candidate to present to the voters. The Republican party has several likely candidates, including their three Congressmen and the head of the Postal Service, Winton ("Red") Blount. It would not be surprising if the Republican party should capture this seat when Sparkman retires.

When the two-party division comes about in Alabama, it is likely to follow traditional sectional lines. The Republican party will find its strength in the affluent white urban areas, the conservative white forces in the black belt, and the voters in the southern counties who have recently shown an inclination to vote conservative. The new Democratic party will find its strength in the traditionally progressive northern counties, among black voters, especially concentrated in the black belt, and from white moderates and blacks in the southern counties. It is probable that when this two-party system initially develops, the Republican party will enjoy majority support. However, as the race issue diminishes in importance and economic factors begin to influence voting to a greater extent, the progressive-conservative cleavage which
Key saw developing in the late 1940's will occur and produce majorities for a new progressive Democratic party. The emergence of this new progressive majority is likely to be a long-range phenomenon. Nevertheless, the seeds for the coalition are clearly present in Alabama today.
CHAPTER V

GEORGE WALLACE: PORTRAIT OF A DEMAGOGUE

The flamboyant personification of Alabama politics is George Corley Wallace, Jr., the short, stocky, racist who rallies the people of Alabama with his cries of "Stand up for Alabama." In order to gain a complete picture of Alabama politics, it is necessary to understand this one central figure. Therefore, the final major portion of this work is devoted to a brief study of George Wallace, demagogue.

Life and Political Career

The South has been viewed by some as an area ruled by the passion and romance of violence, characterized by a congenital love of quick and physical showdowns. Due to this familiarity with violence, it is natural that the South has produced so many demagogues, who were, above all, personalities, with politics that were a mixture of "hilarity and outrage." Moreover, the one-party system so long prevalent in the South is an environment in which personality politics thrives.

George Corley Wallace, Jr., of Barbour County, Alabama, is a product of this environment. Creature of a Huck Finn boyhood, he has had politics in his blood since his youth. His plunge into political life occurred at the age of fifteen, when he was elected to the position of page in the state senate. From then on, everything he did or has become was geared to its political implication: he worked his way through to the law degree at the University of Alabama; today, he neither drinks nor gambles, for political rather than moral reasons; he served in the Army Air Corps in World War II, but turned down an opportunity to become an officer, feeling that an ex-enlisted man could attract more votes.4

At the end of the war, with the added responsibilities of a wife, Lurleen Burns, and a daughter, Wallace became Assistant Attorney General of Alabama. From there, he embarked upon a hitchhiking campaign for the state legislature; he polled more votes in that election than did anyone else in the county, including the incumbent governor. It was at this time that Wallace caught the interest of Billy Watson, a Barbour County political impresario, who became something of a patron saint to the young politician.5

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In these early days, Wallace was "a dizzily gifted young man with an air of inevitability about him, winning and eager and dauntless, with instincts that were refreshingly simple and generous." During his first term in the legislature, he presented much welfare legislation, and was ranked as that body's leading liberal. When he first arrived in Montgomery, it was as a part of the Jim Folsom phenomenon: the transition from established politics to Jacksonian politics, reviving the old Populist tradition. Folsom was Wallace's original political forefather; out of his ashes rose Wallace. Folsom himself was frustrated by the legislature in most of his hopes for raising the economic status of low-income whites and blacks; he was against segregation, which was probably one reason for his downfall (although alcohol was definitely a major contender). When Folsom became embarrassing to him, Wallace quickly shed the relationship between them.

Wallace became Barbour County circuit judge in 1952. In this position, his most memorable act was withholding voter registration records from the Civil Rights Commission in 1958. He circumvented a contempt of court citation by turning the records over to the grand juries of the county.

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6 Frady, op. cit., p. 58.

who in turn yielded them to the Commission. This incident became one of Wallace's favorite instances of his "defiance" of the federal government.  

What was it that actually corrupted Wallace? According to Frady, it was "Insatiable, impatient ambition . . . which led straight to the race issue." In 1958, Wallace made his first attempt to capture the governorship. He fully expected to win this election for which he had been so long in preparation, but a quirk of fate altered not only the election, but also Wallace's stand from that time on. Wallace campaigned as a moderate, supported by the NAACP and the Jewish community. Against him in the runoff was John Patterson, running as a strict segregationist with Ku Klux Klan endorsement. Patterson defeated Wallace, probably because he had a considerable sympathy vote; in 1952, his father, just elected Attorney General of Alabama and ready to "clean up" corrupt Phenix City, was assassinated there. Wallace, however, saw only the surface facts and concluded that Patterson's victory had hinged on his segregationist stand. As Wallace himself put it, "John Patterson out-nigguhed me. And boys, I ain't going to be out-nigguhed again." From that time on, Wallace was an avid segregationist

8 Ibid.


--not through any personal prejudice, but because it was, in his eyes, the way to get votes. And, as a friend once remarked of Wallace, "He don't have no hobbies. He don't do no honest work. He don't drink. He ain't got but one serious appetite, and that's votes." This is the appetite that makes Wallace run.

The next four years Wallace spent recovering from the unexpected 1958 defeat and preparing to run again in 1962. That year he ran on a temperance platform, assuming the intemperate Folsom would be his major competitor. The night before elections, however, Folsom staged a drunk fiasco on television, so the runoff was between Wallace and De Graffenreid. Wallace had no trouble emerging victorious, receiving 340,730 votes to DeGraffenreid's total of 269,122.

Aside from the racial aberration, Wallace was essentially a Populist governor. In a sense, he expanded Folsom's administration: he built junior colleges and trade schools with a lavish hand; he undertook medical clinics, a free textbook program, and extensive road-building. In fact, he might have been ranked as one of Alabama's most beneficial governors were it not for his racism. But the racism was not only pre-

\[11\] Novak, op. cit., p. 35.
\[12\] Frady, op. cit., p. 47.
sent, it was dominant, as he meant it to be. Before his inauguration in 1963, he told a gathering of state senators, "I'm going to make race the basis of politics in this state, and I'm going to make it the basis of politics in this country." The closing lines of his inaugural address removed any doubt as to his intentions: "In the name of the greatest people that have ever trod this earth, I draw the line in the dust and toss the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny and I say, Segregation now! Segregation tomorrow! Segregation forever!"

His finest—or at least his most flamboyant—hour came in 1963, when two Negro students enrolled at the University of Alabama. Redeeming a campaign promise, Wallace stood in the door of the school's administration building to prevent the entrance of the black students. He refused to step aside even when confronted by Assistant Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach, who, accompanied by federal marshals, requested that Wallace remove himself from the doorway and thus symbolically consent to the entrance of the black students. However, when faced by the National Guard, which had been placed under federal command by executive order of President John F. Kennedy, he removed himself quietly from the doorway. This

15 Daniel, op. cit., p. 10.
16 De Forrest, op. cit., p. 25.
action was politically wise for Wallace: he presented himself as a knight crusading for states' rights and white supremacy in the face of federal attempts to alter the "Southern way of life." By going to the campus himself as a representative of the people of Alabama, he prevented the presence of mobs of irate citizens on the campus himself. At the same time, however, it was wise of him to concede to the federal government when he did, thus avoiding a chaotic scene such as occurred at the University of Mississippi in 1962 when James Meredith attempted to enroll. 17

To Alabamians, the important thing is not that, in confrontations with the federal government, Wallace consistently fails. The important thing is that he continues to fight. His reputation is built almost exclusively on defeat. Defeat is triumph. His stand in the school door, his use of troopers to block the desegregation of public schools, his use of the state militia to prevent federal marshals from serving court orders to desegregate all failed. Wallace built his reputation on sheer defiance. 18

After this episode, Wallace entered a new political dimension—a sense of national involvement, as he found himself an overnight "sensation." He received campus invitations

17 Russell Barrett, Integration at Ole Miss (Chicago, 1965).
18 Wicker, op. cit., p. 48.
from all over the United States and accepted as many as he could. In 1964, Grover Hall suggested he enter some of the primaries, whereupon Wallace entered in Wisconsin, Indiana, and Maryland. The task seemed hopeless, as Wallace had little money, haphazard plans, and total rejection by each state's establishment. Contrary to expectations, he wrought havoc in the primaries, polling 35 per cent of the Democratic vote in Wisconsin, almost 30 per cent of it in Indiana, and a staggering 43 per cent in Maryland.\textsuperscript{19} He withdrew shortly after Goldwater was nominated by the Republican Party. Although he claimed his withdrawal was because his purpose of conservatizing the major parties had been accomplished, there are those who believe that certain of his major fund-contributors persuaded him to drop out.\textsuperscript{20}

In Alabama, prior to 1971, a governor could not succeed himself. Therefore, in 1965, Wallace submitted to the state legislature a constitutional amendment which would allow a governor to succeed himself. It passed the House, but was finally killed in the Senate, despite Wallace's threats. He was subdued until it occurred to him that he could run his wife, Lurleen. On the verge of surgery for cancer, Lurleen Wallace was told that she was a candidate for governor of Alabama in


\textsuperscript{20}Sherrill, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 269.
the 1966 election. George Wallace, naturally, dominated the campaign, taking Lurleen along as sort of a figurehead. She smiled and spoke briefly to the crowds while her husband waited impatiently; then he took over handling the crowd in his own inimitable way—firing them up, cooling them down, making them laugh or cry—in short, capturing their emotions and their votes. A favorite device of his was picked up from Orval Faubus of Arkansas and is still used by Wallace: he first rouses the crowd against reporters, then protects the reporters from the irate crowd. Later, he claims such events as evidence of his protection of the press.\textsuperscript{21} Even those who do not adhere to his policies begrudgingly admire his skill and finesse in crowd control.

Lurleen Wallace won the governorship in 1966 by a landslide vote, with George as her number-one adviser. When Mrs. Wallace died in May of 1968, Albert Brewer took over as governor. By then, George Wallace had a new interest: the 1968 presidential election. When Wallace ran for President in 1968 on the American Independent Party ticket, his platform included opposition to federal interference in schools, stress on law and order, opposition to open-housing laws, a hawkish stand on Vietnam, including stress on the "treason" of those who collect blood for the Vietcong, and opposition to the federal

regulations which accompany federal aid. Although Nixon and Humphrey generally chose to ignore Wallace's candidacy, it is significant that both attempted to appeal to Wallace's followers by the adoption of a law-and-order plank in their platforms. While Wallace claimed to be in serious contention for the presidency, it is more realistic to surmise that he hoped to control the balance of power in electoral votes. Should this occur, he could bargain with the major parties until one agreed to modify his platform to embrace some of Wallace's tenets in exchange for the votes Wallace controlled. What would Wallace demand? He wanted state control of desegregation, the repeal of civil rights laws, and the appointment of Southern conservatives to key Washington positions. No presidential candidate would capitulate. Then, if bargaining was impossible, the Electoral College would be stalemated, and the election would be thrown into the House of Representatives. Whatever the result, there would be a certain gratification simply in having caused such chaos. As it happened, Wallace carried five states, all in the South (Alabama, Georgia, "Dealing With Wallace," The New Republic, CLXII (June 27, 1970), 8.
Mississippi, Louisiana, and Arkansas) for a total of forty-five electoral votes. This was not as well as he had hoped to do, but he captured 13.4 per cent of the national vote, which is the best a third-party candidate has done since Robert La Follette's showing in 1924.25

In 1970, Wallace decided to again seek the office of governor, not only because politics is in his blood, but also because he would need a power base from which to launch a 1972 campaign for President. He ran against the incumbent Albert P. Brewer, who could succeed himself since he had actually never been elected governor; he had merely succeeded Lurleen Wallace due to his position as Lieutenant Governor. This election was a test of Wallace's strength, because Brewer was in control of party patronage from the governor's mansion and because there was a growing Negro vote, as indicated by voter registration figures. Wallace ran second in the first primary, but Brewer's failure to obtain a majority necessitated a runoff primary, which Wallace won.

Wallace Supporters

In the light of Wallace's performance in the 1968 presidential election, some exaggeration would be necessary to write off the Wallace vote as harmless or negligible. The important thing to find out, then, is who votes for George Wallace and

for what reasons. Just what is the secret of his appeal? Too often, Wallace supporters have been pictured as redneck bigots intent on keeping the black "in his place." But, the 1968 presidential campaign made evident the fact that the Barbour County boy had tapped something more than the latent racism of white America. While his campaign drew some support from professional men and upper-income families, the overwhelming majority of his supporters came from the ranks of working class and lower-income whites who have developed a genuine sense of alienation from the national government. In their eyes, a liberal national government which once fought big business to help the "little man" is no longer interested in them. Instead, the once-friendly national government now frustrates the working class whites' financial ambitions with inflationary spending and higher taxes that largely nullify an expanded paycheck. The "Wallace man" tends to think he is being unfairly forced by the "pseudo-intellectuals" to pay the real price of the Negro social revolution. Therefore, many cab drivers, policemen, small businessmen, barbers, skilled laborers, blue-collar workers, and lower-echelon white-collar workers view Wallace's call for law and order, an end to

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26 Robert Martin, "Who Supported George Wallace and Why," The Vanguard, (November 25, 1968), Sec. 1, p. 3.

federal give-away programs, overturning of Supreme Court decisions, return of the military to the generals, and jail-
ing of "anarchists" not as the bigoted cry of a segregation-
ist, but as the words of a champion of "Americanism."

Few of Wallace's supporters, then, consider themselves bigots; they are more against his "intellectual morons" than against blacks. What stirs the typical Wallace follower is his sense of remoteness from the government. He feels ex-
cluded from the two-party system because, on the whole, he has been. He will stay where he is economically, and no one cares. His insecurities are heightened through fear of losing status; the only status he has is being above Negroes and wel-
fare recipients. Underlying this form of racism is the fear of failure. Wallace makes these people feel important, that they are as good as anyone and better than the "intellectual morons who can't park their bicycles straight."29

One distinguished group of researchers found that, in essence, Wallace led in 1968 a Populist movement, which turned reactionary as status interests replaced class interests.30

28 "Worrying About Wallace," Nation, CCVII (September 2, 1968), 165.


Another writer examined Wallace's national constituency in terms of party identification and socioeconomic status within the context of regionalized political systems, finding four dimensions to Wallace's strength: (1) weakness of identification with either party, (2) strains of social stratification, which are tending to pit the bulk of the white elite against the socioeconomic elite, (3) Southern nativism, and (4) preference for a militarily aggressive foreign policy. He also noted that people in their twenties are more likely to support Wallace nationally than are those in their sixties; this phenomenon was explained by the contention that people in their twenties do not enjoy party identification to the same degree as do people in their sixties, and they are thus more likely to vote for a third-party candidate. Regardless of reasons, the fact that young voters are more likely than older ones to cast their ballots for Wallace could have considerable effect on the nationwide longevity of Wallace-type movements.31

Burnham sees the Wallace third-party movement as a catalyst for a critical realignment of the American electorate. He views the Wallace phenomenon along the same lines as do Converse, Miller, Rusk and Wolfe—that is, as a status quo reaction of the white middle class against the liberalism

31 Irving Crespi, "Structural Sources of the George C. Wallace Constituency," Southwest Social Science Quarterly, LII (June, 1971), 127-128.
of upper middle class whites and lower class blacks. Burnham states that the Wallace movement

... should be identified for what it is: a cryptofascist or neofascist movement dedicated to the preservation of the petit bourgeois "little man" against the personalized conspirators—symbols for many of the large social forces at work—who are threatening both his material interests and his "way of life."\(^3\)

It is probable that Wallace will again run for the presidency in 1972. His candidacy would provide a platform for the reaction of the conservative forces to the liberal policies of the past several decades. It is very possible that the Wallace candidacy, coupled with the "Southern strategy" of the Republican party, may be the catalyst for the realignment which Burnham foresaw. In fact, the switch of Strom Thurmond to the Republican party, the growing Republican strength in the peripheral South, and the move of John Lindsay into the Democratic party\(^3\) may all be early signs of a coming realignment.


CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

Changing Political Patterns and Predictions for the Future

This paper has attempted to conduct an in-depth study of statewide politics in Alabama. Many of the conclusions drawn by V. O. Key in the late 1940's were tested to determine whether political change of any great magnitude has occurred in Alabama. This paper has surmised that important changes have taken place since Key wrote, and that Alabama is in the midst of a major voter realignment as a result of the impact of the newly-registered Negro voters, as well as the eighteen-to twenty-year old voters.

The friends-and-neighbors voting pattern, of which Key wrote so extensively, is breaking down. The figures in this paper reveal that, at least in major statewide races, the candidate can no longer depend upon large percentages of the vote from his home and adjacent counties. The candidate's statewide organization must be more comprehensive, since it is now robbed of its traditional core of strength, the friends-and-neighbors vote. The vanishing of this phenomenon can be attributed to the increase in Negro voting within the state. The homogeneity of the voters--white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant
fundamentalists—has been broken by the influx of Negro voters into the electorate. The black voters are less inclined to cast ballots for their white "neighbor" than they are to vote for a candidate more supportive of their own position on socioeconomic issues, even if this candidate is from some other part of the state. Apparently, there is a white blacklash to the Negro voting: the white candidate who courts the Negro vote will probably see his white neighbor's vote go to his opponent. The friends-and-neighbors policy which Key observed is being replaced by a voter cleavage based on race and, to a lesser extent, on socio-economics.

The most extraordinary, as well as the most politically important, change in Alabama politics discovered by this paper is the realignment which has taken place between the various regions of Alabama. As Key noted, regional divisions of voting in Alabama date back at least to the Civil War. Traditionally, it has been the black belt and the conservative business interests of Birmingham and Mobile which have aligned themselves against the more progressive northern region of Alabama. Again, due to the Negro voter, the traditional regional voter alignment is rapidly shifting in Alabama. The black belt, with its large proportion of Negro voters, is finding itself allied with the northern region of the state against the more conservative vote of the southern counties, which join with a scattering of peripheral counties surround-
ing the black belt where there are few Negroes but a black belt voting tradition. This paper also noted that the plurality which a candidate receives from these regions is less than when Key wrote, indicating that, in Alabama statewide elections, there is a racial and economic cleavage which transcends regional lines within the state.

Based upon these changes, it would appear that the short-range winner in this voting transformation will be the Alabama Republican party. The Republican party in the state has enjoyed increased strength since Goldwater's candidacy in 1964. As the Democratic primary becomes more and more conditioned by the Negro voter, the Republican party, which uses no primary and would probably have few Negroes voting in the primary if it held one, will be able to present to the Southern white voters candidates who will be more attractive than the candidates of the Democratic party. In the long run, as the race issue dies out in Alabama, a new and progressive Democratic party, composed of both blacks and whites, is likely to emerge as the majority party in Alabama.

An important and reasonably unpredictable factor in Alabama politics is George C. Wallace, the single most popular man in the state. Barring some unforeseen political tragedy, there is no doubt that Wallace will continue to be the major force in Alabama politics. His presence in the future statewide races will slow down the progressive/conserv-
vative voter cleavage which is emerging on economic issues and will relegate elections to the issue of race. But, while George Wallace may slow down this transformation in Alabama voting, it is unlikely that he will be able to pass his mantle on to a successor once he leaves the scene. The seeds of change that are planted in Alabama are destined to bring forth the new political alliance described in this paper.
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