

ANGLO-SPANISH RELATIONS DURING WORLD WAR I

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This investigation is concerned with the determination of the exact nature of Anglo-Spanish relations during World War I. It examines the nature of these relations in an attempt to define Spain's commitment to her neutrality policy and the amount of pressure placed upon Spain by Britain in order to force Spain to adopt a policy of at least "benevolent neutrality." Most historical accounts heretofore have accepted the idea that Spain simply refused to abandon her neutrality policy.

Sources for a study of Anglo-Spanish relations are extensive, but not readily available. The major sources are the records of the Spanish Cortes and the documents contained in the Public Office of Great Britain. Documents circulated to the War Cabinet of Great Britain are informative; the British sources tend to be more informative than Spanish sources. The memoirs and personal accounts of the period reveal little, although occasional valuable facts may be gleaned from them. The London Times for the war years contains considerable information. General histories, however, contain little of use and usually report only a few of the major incidents of the period.

Each division of the thesis treats one aspect of Anglo-Spanish relations and the factors influencing it. The thesis

opens with a discussion of the major problems faced by the two countries at the outbreak of the war. Some background is then given concerning the historical development of each country, especially Spain, in relation to the problems that arose during World War I. Spain's adoption of a neutrality policy at the beginning of the war and the reactions to this policy are considered in detail. Related to this discussion are the problems of the violations of neutrality, the problems of the Spanish government in maintaining the policy, Spanish economic problems, and the problems caused by the Moroccan war. Each is discussed in its relationship to the development of Anglo-Spanish relations during the war period.

The study of Anglo-Spanish relations revealed that, in 1917 and 1918, the economic, social, and political affairs of Spain were conducive to Spain's abandoning a policy of strict neutrality. It is demonstrated that a pro-British policy was advantageous for Spain and that it would not, as many observers claim, have been impossible for Spain to enter the war, as she considered doing. The investigation also found that Britain was putting pressure on Spain to cooperate with her extensively. Spain did not become actively involved in the war because the army, due to its own interests, would not have supported the government had it attempted to enter the war on the Allied side.

The conclusion of the thesis is that Spain may have considered entering World War I, especially during the 1917 ministry of the Conde de Romanones and that Great Britain, aided partly by the United States, did everything possible to obtain an abandonment of strict neutrality. The army's attitude was the major factor keeping Spain a neutral; radical discontent arising from the economic situation brought on by the war was a contributing factor, but would not alone have kept Spain out of the arms of the Allies. Anglo-Spanish relations, especially in economic affairs, became increasingly close throughout the war years.

ANGLO-SPANISH RELATIONS DURING WORLD WAR I

THESIS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
LIST OF TABLES	iv
Chapter	
I. SPAIN'S MAJOR PROBLEMS 1914-1918	1
II. THE LEADERS	25
III. THE NATURE OF SPANISH NEUTRALITY	40
IV. SPANISH PUBLIC OPINION	59
V. THE SINKING OF SPANISH SHIPS: VIOLATIONS OF SPANISH NEUTRALITY	73
VI. THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT AND THE WAR	91
VII. THE SPANISH ECONOMIC SITUATION: BRITISH PRESSURE AND SPANISH NEUTRALITY	115
VIII. GIBRALTAR AND MOROCCO: ANGLO-SPANISH PROBLEMS	143
IX. ANGLO-SPANISH RELATIONS DURING WORLD WAR I: THE MAINTENANCE OF NEUTRALITY UNDER PRESSURE.	164
BIBLIOGRAPHY	175

CHAPTER I

SPAIN'S MAJOR PROBLEMS 1914-1918

On June 28, 1914, the heir to the Austrian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, were shot to death while on an official visit to Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia. The repercussions of that assassination were felt as the great powers entered World War I. The nations actually involved in the war, however, were not the only countries in Europe affected by the events at Sarajevo; the nations which chose to remain neutral were also involved, and not the least of these was Spain. In a war which saw the virtual destruction of many great nations, Spain, a country which was rapidly disintegrating, was able to preserve herself as a national entity, and, very possibly, prolong the existence of her government. The Spanish government, upon hearing of the death of the archduke, immediately sent a message of sympathy to the aging Franz Josef, the Austrian Emperor. The President of the Spanish Chamber, the Deputy González Besada, spoke of the assassination to the assembled Deputies.

Señores Diputados, one more time the exaltation of passions and the perversity of spirits has motivated a horrible crime depriving of existence the crown Prince of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and his illustrious wife. It is certain that to this Chamber, as to the entire country, as to all of the cultured and civilized world, a very deep emotion will be produced by this sad event

which in such a manner opposes the ideas of progress, of culture and of civilization which happily characterize the days in which we live"

Thus, a crippled nation which was to survive the war consoled the Emperor of a lamed empire which was to die.

A month later the British ambassador to Spain, Sir Arthur Hardinge, received a telegram warning him of the impending conflict. It stated simply, "Hold yourself in readiness to receive message: Prepare for war with Germany, Instruct Consuls."² Hardinge, therefore, could not have been surprised when the war came and probably he was not surprised, however, at the government's delay in proclaiming neutrality; it was only on August 11, 1914, that the Spanish Prime Minister, Eduardo Dato, stated that Spain had not yet proclaimed her neutrality because she had not received any official notification that a state of war existed.³ Although Spain officially published her neutrality on August 30, 1914, it was not until November 5, 1914, that Prime Minister Dato made his neutrality speech before the Cortes.

The Government of H.M., responding delightedly to the courteous conjunction of the minority of the republican-socialist invitation, has true satisfaction in manifesting before the Congress that it

¹Diario de Sesiones de Cortes, Cámara de Diputados, 1914, No. 63, p. 1703. This and all subsequent translations from the Spanish are mine.

²Sir Arthur Hardinge, A Diplomatist in Europe (London, 1927), p. 5.

³The Times (London), August 12, 1914, p. 5.

perseveres in the attitude of neutrality that, with the ardent applause of the country, it adopted from the moment in which was made known to it the declaration of war among nations with all of whom we maintain the most sincere and loyal relations of friendship. The Spanish Nation, which has not received from any of them the least aggravation, and which is totally surprised at the causes which may have been able to produce the horrors of the war, and to this it has an unquestionable right, being completely satisfied with observing that the neutrality she chooses is accepted and has been recognized as very legitimate and prudent by the same belligerent nations, which have honored our ambassadors and ministers overseas by confiding in them the representation which they had to abandon, of the rights and interests of their subjects.

Attentive to the march of events, and with foresight of future happenings, the Spanish Government does not remain indifferent to anything which relates to the national defense. It has adopted and will continue adopting those methods which its foresight and its patriotism advise it as indispensable, unless Parliament can say one word more over this, believing trustingly that the Chamber and the country are, in all that refers to the national defense, on the side of the Government, because the Government represents the interest of Spain.

We maintain, the, that attitude of neutrality, from which we have never voluntarily separated ourselves, and, if against what constitutes our honored conviction, there arrives, in the course of circumstances, a moment in which we ought to consider if that neutrality is or is not compatible with the interests of the Spanish State, before modifying our attitude in the least, we will resort to Parliament. And if the Cortes will have suspended sessions, we will convoke them to the effect that they deliberate on this essential point for the life of Spain, because we, gentlemen, have a blind faith, an absolute confidence in the patriotism and in the wisdom of the Cortes. We do not wait until the event arrives (in hypothesis all must admit) in which Spain could be the object of any aggression. Ah! If that event arrives, gentlemen, we are Spaniards and we know how to respond to the glorious tradition of noble old Spain, sacrificing our lives, which are worth nothing, for the integrity and independence of our territory.

Meanwhile, and until the hour of peace arrives, desired by all humanity with infinite anguish, until that blessed hour arrives (and God will that the

neutral peoples can abbreviate it interposing our good office), we ought to fulfill austere the narrow duties and duties of Parliament, but the duties of all the Spanish Nation, of respect, of admiration, of commiseration with those peoples who suffer the horrors of war, duties which respond to the traditional nobility of the Spanish people.

And for that reason it interests us much, gentlemen, that we are all tightly united, that we form a true national solidarity, from the King to the 1st citizen, because our union will be the best safeguard of the high and sacred interests of the fatherland.⁴

Dato's neutrality speech is of primary importance because it reflected with precision some of the major problems which Spain was to encounter as a neutral. Spain's major concern during World War I was to fulfill to the best of her ability what she, or her governments, conceived to be the duties of a neutral. The Spanish conception of neutrality meant not just a lack of military participation in the war, but also an active participation in attempting to terminate the conflict. To Spain, a position of neutrality meant also a zealous protection of all Spanish rights. Violations of Spanish neutrality would not be tolerated.

Spaniards, faced with a collapsing government, an army disgraced by weakness and military failure in actions which were minor in comparison with the great battles of the war, a citizenry torn by political and social divisions, an increasing shortage of all necessities, even food, as the war dragged on, and with the burden of an economic system which was struggling to reach the level of development of other Western nations, sought desperately for some source

⁴Diario de Sesiones, 1914, No. 77, p. 2137.

of national pride, of national unity. Even Spain's king, the well-intentioned Alfonso XIII, with his Austrian mother and English wife, seemed to symbolize the disunity and confused, divided loyalties of the country. In an age when the loyalties of great nations were reflected in the adoration of their rulers, such as England's George V or Germany's Wilhelm, Alfonso XIII's throne was reeling under the impact of attacks from anti-monarchical radicals. The national loyalty that developed during the war may have helped to preserve Alfonso's throne for a few years longer than it might otherwise have been able to exist.

In defense of their rights as neutrals, Spaniards found a cause which reflected the glory of the Spanish nation; a defense of Spain's rights became a defense of all neutral rights. It is possible that the Spanish people were aware of the political fact that rights may be a nation's only defense. "Let's not forget, rights are the strongest defense of a small nation," wrote Dag Hammarskjöld a half century later.⁵

Spain was able to preserve her neutral status in spite of numerous internal problems, in spite of at least some pressure to join the war, and in spite of many violations of her neutrality by most of the chief belligerents. Spain

⁵Dag Hammarskjöld, En Minnesbok, quoted in Emery Kelen, Hammarskjöld (New York, 1966), p. 43, n. 2.

stood up to both the Allies and the Central Powers. That she was able to do so was amazing; even more so was her survival as a constitutional monarchy. Affection for the Spanish government in wartime may have been a factor in preventing a military dictatorship in the latter years of the war; the constitutional aspects of the monarchy collapsed with the establishment of Primo de Rivera's dictatorship in 1923. The monarchy itself, more popular in World War I than at any other time, fell in 1931.

Spain was in danger of dictatorship during this period. In 1917, military juntas forced the government to implement many plans favorable to the military. The juntas which eventually attempted to change the course of Spanish political life were nothing new. During the Carlist wars of the 1840's, the army gained political positions of some prominence; it became the strongest force in Spain. Generals needed political support for their military activities and politicians wanted military support to lend strength to their actions.

In Spain, military intervention became a chronic manifestation because the politicians' desire for military backing expanded beyond this primary war-time need and combined with military ambition to produce a race of soldier politicians. It was not merely that the army was the home of liberalism and its defence against Carlism; it was the only solid institution in the liberal state. The political factions, sensing their weakness and isolation after 1837, appealed to the generals.⁶

⁶Raymond Carr, Spain: 1808-1939 (Oxford, 1966), p. 215. This discussion on the military is largely taken from Carr, whose analyses are at times exceptionally shrewd.

The military gradually became permanent party leaders, largely when, unable to procure money from the national government, they began to force supplies from local authorities under their command or near their area of jurisdiction. In this manner, they eventually became local powers and then proceeded to extend their influence into national political institutions.⁷ This situation was as apparent in 1917, when a rash of military discontent erupted, as it had been in the nineteenth century. In both periods, failure of the central government to support the army had its effect in arousing the military. In 1917, some soldiers protested the lack of military equipment. The inglorious war in Morocco had not done much to add to the prestige of Spanish arms and throughout the war years, Spaniards who were dissatisfied with the lack of success and the losses in men and materiel, initiated a persistent movement to get out of the Moroccan war.

The Spanish army was a refuge for the unemployed middle classes from the nineteenth century on; this group was actively involved in political maneuvers to assure the promotion of its members.⁸ The officer corps thus became the monstrous head of a feeble body. According to British sources of the time, it was "said that in 1913 it had more Colonels than the German army."⁹

⁷Ibid., pp. 215-216.

⁸Ibid., p. 217.

⁹Weekly Report on Spain, XI, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/Oll, G.T.-2228, October 4, 1918, CAB 24/28, Public Record Office. This depository will be cited hereafter as P.R.O.

The threat of dictatorship was not the only problem of Spain's neutral government. Revolutionary movements erupted like measles throughout the war years. The rightist military was no more revolutionary than was the leftist socialist group, which fomented an outbreak of disturbances, due at various times to government repression of strikes, scarcities, or opposition to the party in power. Strikes were frequent, due again, at various times, to government repression of workers, governmental failure to pass desired legislation, scarcities, or unemployment. The major site of strikes was Barcelona, which, when not the scene of simple strikes, served as a breeding ground for the recurrent Catalan autonomy movement.

Spain had a tradition of strikes, especially railroad strikes and general strikes. This tradition was not to be broken during the war years.¹⁰ One of the first important strikes had been going on for several months, but it was not until May that the government decided to devote much time to a consideration of the problem. The industrial workers of Béjar were striking against employers whom they considered to be unusually intransigent in meeting their demands. Several factories were stoned and there were tales that some women involved in the stoning had been threatened by the local military officials.¹¹ The Minister of Gobernación [Home Office]

¹⁰The incidents mentioned here are not in any way meant to be a comprehensive study of the Spanish social situation. They are simply samples, both of major and minor events. In most cases, dozens of similar occurrences are to be noted at the same time.

¹¹Diario de Sesiones, Cámara de Diputados, May 18, 1914, No. 29, p. 692.

defended the actions of the guardia civil in the Béjar strike in a speech which indicated the general position held by the military and which also indicated part of the problems associated with nearly all of the strikes of the time.

I do not know if any official or officials have [been involved] in the intervention which they have related to S.S. [Your Excellency]. I know, although I cannot document it, because I know the noble spirit of the officials of our army, that surely no Spanish official has mistreated any woman whatever was the attitude in which she placed herself.¹²

A major riot broke out in Barcelona in November, 1914, when a typhoid epidemic hit the city. A protest demonstration was held by "La Unión gremial," a workers' association, against those whom the demonstrators felt were responsible for the epidemic.¹³ Such strikes increased in 1915 and spread through the war years.¹⁴

A major strike occurred in the Santa Lucía mines in November, 1915. The employers claimed that an anarchist center was being created in the area.¹⁵ Supporters of the strike claimed that the workers were trying to end caciquismo, of local bossism, in the strike.¹⁶ The strike was finally

¹²Ibid., p. 696.

¹³Ibid., November 11, 1914, No. 82. p. 2312. The civil governor denied permission to hold the demonstration in Las Ramblas, limiting it to the plaza of Cataluna.

¹⁴Don Melchor Fernández Almagro, Historia del reinado de Don Alfonso XIII, 2nd ed. (Barcelona, 1934), p. 272.

¹⁵Diario de Sesiones, November 8, 1915, No. 3, p. 27.

¹⁶Ibid., November 18, 1915, No. 12, p. 258.

ended after almost six weeks.¹⁷ At the same time, a student strike broke out protesting the examination system used in the universities.¹⁸ Another workers' strike appeared in Sanlúcar de Barrameda in December, 1915.¹⁹

Summer of 1916 brought a famous railroad strike. The Railway Workers Union announced that it was planning a strike on May 20, 1916.²⁰ The strikers demanded twenty-five centimos added to their daily wage and a minimum wage. They also wanted recognition of the union.²¹ The strike was extensive; government engineers ran the trains. The strike led to serious disturbances and Madrid was in a "state of siege."²² On July 13, the king suspended the Constitutional guarantees until the strike was settled.²³

A general strike erupted in December, 1916, and there were a series of reprisals in Toledo against the strikers. Workers in the arms factory in Toledo were among those with

¹⁷Ibid., November 20, 1915, No. 14, p. 323.

¹⁸Ibid., November 9, 1915, No. 4, p. 46. Such strikes were very frequent; the universities were under the control of the Minister of Public Education and government decrees concerning them were subject to some amount of protest.

¹⁹Ibid., December 1, 1915, No. 23, p. 596.

²⁰The Times (London), May 13, 1916, p. 5.

²¹Duque de Maura and Melchor Fernández Almagro, Por qué cayó Alfonso XIII: Evolución y disolución de los partidos históricos durante su reinado, 2nd ed., (Madrid, 1948), p. 8.

²²The Times (London), July 14, 1916, p. 8.

²³Ibid.

the most serious problems.²⁴ A protest strike was planned over the lack of food in Madrid.²⁵

During 1917, discontent was great. In January, 1917, floods caused considerable suffering among workers in Jérez de la Frontera.²⁶ Agricultural troubles in southern Spain were to cause uprisings all year.²⁷ On March 27, 1917, the Unión General and the Confederation de Trabajadores called for a general strike protesting scarcities. The strike began on August 10, 1917, and Spain was soon declared to be in another "state of siege."²⁸ The Conde de Romanones suspended the Constitutional guarantees.²⁹

The revolt of the juntas of July, 1917, brought in its wake quite a large amount of social unrest. The workers increased their agitation because wartime prosperity did not touch them; in an atmosphere of discontent such as that which surrounded the juntas and the Assembly movement, working class

²⁴Diario de Sesiones, February 12, 1917, No. 13, p. 360.

²⁵The Times (London), December 18, 1916, p. 7.

²⁶Diario de Sesiones, January 31, 1917, No. 3, p. 38.

²⁷Pierre Vilar, Spain: A Brief History, translated by Brian Tate (Oxford, 1967), p. 70.

²⁸Joseph A. Brandt, Toward the New Spain (Chicago, 1933), p. 363.

²⁹Weekly Report on Spain XII, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/012, G.T. 2418, October 26, 1917, CAB 24/30, P.R.O.

protests could easily be expected. Strikes occurred in Valencia and Bilbao, with "revolutionary" attitudes spreading in Madrid.³⁰ The Assembly movement failed, but at the time it was felt to be a symptom of widely held revolutionary views.³¹

By August, 1917, the general strike had also failed; censorship was revived within Spain and British observers were convinced that the Spanish government wanted to keep them from knowing the actual state of affairs.³² Knowledge of Spain's internal weakness might conceivably have hindered Spanish bargaining power in any delicate international negotiations. The general strike was not conducted without some violence and a number of socialist leaders were arrested, a fact which added to working-class bitterness.³³ The strike resulting from the Assembly movement caused some eighty deaths and a nearly complete stoppage of the railroads.³⁴

The country did not gain anything like tranquillity until October 4, 1917, when the Constitutional guarantees were

³⁰Weekly Report on Spain, Department of Intelligence, Information Bureau FSW/008, G.T. 1511, July 25, 1917, CAB 24/21, P.R.O.

³¹Ibid.

³²Weekly Report on Spain X, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/OIC, G.T. 1882, August 28, 1917, CAB 24/24, P.R.O.

³³Vilar, Spain, p. 85.

³⁴Rhea Marsh Smith, Spain: A Modern History (Ann Arbor, 1965), p. 335.

restored.³⁵ The national calm was broken the next month, however, when a number of minor, purportedly German-inspired, strikes occurred.³⁶

Unrest had not lessened perceptibly by January, 1918. There were serious food shortages and malfunctionings in the transportation systems. A lack of coal affected conditions in the railroads and some sabotage in the part of railway workers was noted. A serious drought hurt Spanish agriculture.³⁷

The food shortage led to riots in Barcelona and still another "state of siege" was proclaimed.³⁸ In spring, there was a strike of postal workers, adding to government problems.³⁹ In late April, the lack of food led to government consideration of food rationing.⁴⁰

The strikes began to take on a new tone in late 1918. A series of strikes, inspired by rumors of the success of revolutionaries in Russia, broke out in Andalucía. Revolutionary

³⁵Weekly Report on Spain XII.

³⁶Weekly Report on Spain XIII, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/O13, G.T. -2540, November 7, 1917, CAB 24/31, P.R.O.

³⁷Weekly Report on Spain XVI, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/O16, G.T. -3291, January 9, 1918, CAB 24/38, P.R.O.

³⁸Weekly Report on Spain XVII, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/O17, G.T. -3514, January 31, 1918, CAB 24/41, P.R.O.

³⁹"The Crisis in Spain," Foreign Office, Political Intelligence Department, Spain 001, G.T. 04144, April 3, 1918, CAB 24/47.

⁴⁰"Memorandum on Spain," Foreign Office, Political Intelligence Department Spain 00/2, G.T. -4377, April 25, 1918, CAB 24/49.

propaganda had been extensive in the area since 1910.⁴¹ The agricultural workers were well-organized and had their own newspaper, The Voice of the Peasant.⁴² The strikes were generally successful at first.⁴³ The years from 1918 to 1921 were known as the "Bolshevik triennium."⁴⁴ Farmhouses bore the words Viva Lenin, indicating the prevailing sentiment among the farmworkers.⁴⁵ Troops were sent into the territory in spring of 1919, yet the situation was not relieved until much later.⁴⁶

Spain, after 1917, stood trembling on the abyss of social revolution. The master revolutionary himself, Lenin, felt that Spain was ready for a revolution. He based his opinion on the agricultural discontent, the exploitation of Spanish workers by capital especially foreign capital, the recent political troubles, the declining aristocracy, and the weakness of the middle class.⁴⁷

⁴¹Raymond Carr, Spain: 1808-1939 (Oxford, 1966), p. 513. Carr reports that one enthusiastic Spanish anarchist changed his name from Cordon to Cordoniev.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Vilar, Spain, p. 86.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Carr, Spain, p. 513.

⁴⁷Vilar, Spain, p. 77.

A variant in Spanish discontent which was of some importance was the Catalan autonomy movement. This movement was not a new phenomenon. "From the beginning localism easily defeated nationalism, and localism remained the dominant tradition until modern times."⁴⁸ In Catalonia, localism reached the height of its influence. The Catalans felt themselves to be unique and Catalan autonomy was the symbol of Catalonia's independence from the control of the rest of Spain. The autonomy movement was not always politically powerful, but it was almost always a vocal movement. The Catalan autonomists had an amazing ability to inject the idea of Catalan autonomy into any discussion on any topic. They were able to state in detail exactly how the Moroccan war, the construction of national monuments, the educational system, and the king were all insidious creations of the Spanish government to persecute Catalonia.

The autonomists actually consisted of several groups, whose views were widely varied. The extreme autonomists were Catalan nationalists who favored Catalonia's secession from Spain and her establishment as a separate nation. Some demanded only Catalan autonomy in internal affairs and are more properly termed autonomists than are the separatists or nationalists. Some were mere regionalists who wanted national recognition of Catalonia's unique regional qualities. Each group contained

⁴⁸Smith, Spain, p. 4.

members whose views merged with those of other groups. The autonomists were a constant feature of the Spanish political scene during the war years.

Catalan regionalism got its first real modern impetus in 1892, when a group of regionalists met at a General Assembly of the Delegates of the Catalan Union at Manresa, under the leadership of Enrique Prat de la Riba. They produced a Catalan regional constitution, the Bases of Manresa, calling for internal autonomy, and recognition of Catalan rights. These included the recognition of Catalan as the only official language of the region, the limitation of office-holding to Catalans, and the exemption of all Catalans except volunteers from the army and navy.⁴⁹

In 1902, an attempt to make Castilian the only language used in the Catalan schools, caused trouble in Barcelona.⁵⁰ Constitutional guarantees were suspended in Barcelona in 1905 when separatists, campaigning in the year's elections, criticized the army and brought about an attack by some officers on the separatist journal which had made the criticism.⁵¹ In reaction to a law allowing military courts to handle cases concerning crimes against the army and nation, a group of Catalans opposed to the law formed a new party, the Solidaridad Catalana. The

⁴⁹Smith, Spain, p. 387.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 389.

new party made a highly successful showing in the 1907 elections; unfortunately for the separatists, a number of terrorists increased their activities at the same time, leading to an anti-terrorist law directed against Catalonia.⁵² By April, 1914, however, the Catalans were strong enough to gain approval for the formation of the Catalan Mancomunidad, a union of several Catalan provincial governments.⁵³

The economic effects of the war added to the conflict between Catalonia, which was industrial, and the rest of Spain, especially Castille, which was agricultural.⁵⁴ The Catalans pushed for autonomy throughout the war in order to establish conditions favorable to their industries. They wanted free trade and opposed taxation of war profits.⁵⁵ Catalan agitation received a severe blow in 1917, which greatly affected the strength of the movement. Its guiding spirit, Prat de la Riba, died suddenly, leaving the movement at a loss. "Of few leaders has the sudden removal been a greater loss to their country,"⁵⁶ Unrest did increase; however, in the summer of 1917. A major strike broke out in several Catalan towns in August. A number of people were killed in the ensuing violence and many were arrested. The government, by

⁵²Ibid., pp. 390-391.

⁵³Fernández, Almagro, Historia, pp. 242-243.

⁵⁴Carr, Spain, p. 502.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶E. Allison Peers, Catalonia Infelix (New York, 1938), p. 164.

force, succeeded in breaking the strike.⁵⁷ By October, the movement was well under control.⁵⁸

Regionalist strength declined in early 1918 and no major changes in regionalist strength in the Cortes took place in the February elections.⁵⁹ The Catalans held a meeting of all Catalan regionalists in Barcelona in November, 1918, to arrange for a deputation to present the autonomists' views to the government. Simultaneous disorders in the city supported the meeting.⁶⁰ With the end of the war, the government felt that it could afford to, or needed to, devote attention to the regionalist demands. In December, 1918, the Conde de Romanones appointed a committee to consider giving autonomy to Catalonia.⁶¹

⁵⁷Weekly Report on Spain, FSW/008, Weekly Report on Spain X, and "Memorandum on The Situation in Spain, with special references to the Republican agitation and the Regionalist Question," Foreign Office, Political Intelligence Department Spain/006, G.T. -6490, December 6, 1918, CAB 24/71, P.R.O.

⁵⁸Weekly Report on Spain, XI, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/011, G.T. -2228, October 4, 1917, CAB 24/28, P.R.O.

⁵⁹"Memorandum on The Situation in Spain, with special references to the Republican agitation and the Regionalist Question," Foreign Office, Political Intelligence Department Spain/006, G.T. -6490, December 6, 1918, CAB 24/71, P.R.O.

⁶⁰"Memorandum on The Situation in Spain with special references to the Republican agitation and the Regionalist Question," Foreign Office, Political Intelligence Department Spain/006, G.T. -6490, December 6, 1918, CAB 24/71.

⁶¹Peers, Spain, p. 264.

The social reaction to economic problems did nothing to help the government confront these problems. Scarcity of essential items became a problem; the war added to the physical sufferings of the Spanish populace. Spain was faced with the problems of controlling the amount of her imports and exports to and from the belligerent countries, at a time when she was trying to expand her own industries. Large profits for a few industries were made during the war, but wartime economic problems had some deleterious effect on Spain's economy. More important, economic pressure from the belligerents, especially Britain, hindered the Spanish neutrality policy.

The Moroccan war claimed Spanish attention; it became an increasingly insatiable drain on Spanish resources and manpower, serving also to discredit her army at a time when national defense might become imperative. War was improbable, but not impossible. Spain was not likely to be attacked by Germany, which was militarily in a position to attack only Spanish shipping.⁶² That Spain was likely to attack Germany is closer to the realm of probability. It is a fact that the Spanish government did consider the idea of joining the Allies.⁶³

⁶²Thomas A. Bailey, The Policy of the United States Toward the Neutrals, 1917-1918 (Gloucester, Mass., 1966), p. 273.

⁶³War Cabinet 91, Minute 10, March 8, 1917, 11: 30 A.M. CAB 23/2, P.R.O.

That such action was seriously considered is evidenced by Lord Robert Cecil's repeated assurances to the British House of Commons in the summer of 1917 that Britain was not trying to put pressure on Spain to enter the war.⁶⁴ Spain at this time was furious with German sinkings of Spanish ships. Even the normally noncommittal Sir Arthur Hardinge felt that German destruction of Spanish merchant shipping might have led Spain to end her neutrality policy.⁶⁵ In April of 1917, the Conde de Romanones, then Spanish Prime Minister, sent a note stating the effects of German policy on Spanish shipping and demanding an end to the sinkings.⁶⁶ 1917 was the year in which the United States entered the war and it is not beyond speculation that the Spanish government may have had a chance to recoup the glory of the army and to lessen the military's desire to revolt by aligning Spain with what it probably felt would be the winning side in the war. Linked to the problem of recovering from the disastrous Moroccan war with honor for the army and nation was the still

⁶⁴Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 5th ser., Vol 96 (16 July-3 Aug., 1917), speech of July 26, 1917, p. 1443. See also War Cabinet 172, Minute 8, p. 4, June 29, 1917, 11:00 A.M., CAB 23/3; and Weekly Report on Spain X, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/OLO, August 28, 1917, G.T. 1882, CAB 24/24, P.R.O.

⁶⁵Hardinge, Diplomatist, p. 266.

⁶⁶Conde de Romanones, text of note to German ambassador, quoted in Alberto Mousset, La Política exterior de España, with a Foreward by the Conde de Romanones (Madrid, 1918), pp. 241-242.

live issue of Britain's return of Gibraltar to Spain. The hope of gaining Gibraltar as a prize of war may have entered somewhat into the hearts of Spanish officials. Joining the war might also have been a way to turn attention from a series of violent outbreaks, in part the result of radical reaction to news of the 1917 Russian Revolution.

The Spanish government, from 1914 to 1918, was also faced with the problems stemming from its political practices. The government was based on the turno pacífico, the peaceful, manipulated rotation in power of the major political parties. This system had been largely engineered in the late nineteenth century by the powerful Spanish statesman, Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, who favored a two-party system on the British model. Due to the rapid proliferation of parties in Spain, Cánovas' plan failed and Spanish governments were unable to obtain effective support for their programs. Spain saw a constant change of governments during the war years, not one of which was in office long enough to do much. None of these governments had extensive support; they were supported by coalitions of parties, which were more interested in petty power struggles than in the welfare of the state. Certain party groups within the Cortes were actively trying to bring the party structure crashing down on the major parties and the Cortes. It is significant that the longest ministry of any under Alfonso XIII was that of the Conservative

Antonio Maura in 1907, which lasted for the unusually long period of two years.⁶⁷

The Spanish government, in spite of its weakness, would not collapse without a fight to maintain its existence. At the beginning of the war Spain was impartial, but as Germany increasingly flaunted her violations of Spanish neutrality and propagandized extensively in Spain, Spanish sympathies began to turn to the Allies. These sympathies were affected by a cluster of commercial treaties signed with the Allies both before and during the war. As Spain turned from Germany, she became increasingly susceptible to Allied pressures, especially from Great Britain. Britain and Spain had several long-standing differences, among them the Gibraltar issue, which was used extensively by some pro-German elements in Spain to discredit England. The outstanding example of Anglophobia in Spain was undoubtedly the Carlist deputy from Navarre, Vázquez Mella, whose newspaper, the Correo Español, vitriolically attacked Britain and her allies.⁶⁸ On May 31, 1915, he gave an impassioned speech calling for neutrality and Spanish control of Gibraltar; he said that English "leopards," not German "eagles," had taken over Malto, Cyprus, and Alexandria.⁶⁹

⁶⁷Rhea Marsh Smith, Spain: A Modern History (Ann Arbor, 1965), p. 390.

⁶⁸The Times (London), October 30, 1914, p. 71 See also Hardinge, Diplomatist, p. 258.

⁶⁹La Epoca (Madrid), May 31, 1915, quoted in Fernando Diaz-Plaja, El siglo XX: I La historia de España en sus documentos, (Madrid, 1960), p. 258.

Several days earlier, he had pressed his views in the Cortes, in hardly less demagogic terms, saying that it;

is necessary that we dominate in the Straits, it is necessary that Spain raise herself upon the two pillars of Hercules, that for something they are tenants of his shield, so that across the mists of the sea those American States see her face, where the misfortunes, the battles of history and the wars of her sons, have not yet been capable of erasing the traits of majesty and of beauty, but that they will not be able to see well if over the forehead of Spain is projected the shadow of servitude which is thrown by the flag of England hoisted on Gibraltar England does not want our integrity, nor is it convenient to her that Spain be strong; for that reason she contributed to separating Portugal, for that was done by the Matthuer Treaty; (for that reason we find her dismembering our colonial Empire.)

One of her politicians of the eighteenth century said it: "England will never tolerate a strong Government in Spain," because a strong Government would be a powerful Peninsula, and a powerful Peninsula would be a federatively united Peninsula and dominator of the Straits, and being dominator of the Straits, England would be expelled from the Mediterranean, England would be conquered. For that reason England will conspire always to maintain our weakness. He who is the enemy of England on this point, that one will be our international friend, and I do not find another at this moment than the Triple Alliance.⁷⁰

This extreme anti-British sentiment was not the feeling of the majority. Toward the end of the war some attempts at negotiating the Gibraltar question appear to have been made, and England and Spain began negotiations concerning the settlement of trade differences, notably the Cortina agreements concerning the sale of Spanish iron ore to Britain. The volume of trade increased during the war and strengthened Anglo-Spanish economic ties. The Spanish people had not desire to antagonize a valuable supplier of national wealth.

⁷⁰Diario de Sesiones, May 28, 1914, No. 37, p. 952.

The peculiar relationship which developed between the two countries makes desirable the study of Spain's relations with England, rather than with the other Allies. Spain and France had differences; Spain had no real reason to consider joining France as an ally, whereas Spain did develop increasingly close ties with Britain. The United States entered the war too late to affect a consideration of the entire scope of Spanish neutrality in the war period. It is by her relations with Britain as an important Allied power that Spain and her status as a neutral can best be determined. A study of Anglo-Spanish relations during the World War I is, therefore, necessary to determine the true nature of Spanish neutrality.

CHAPTER II

THE LEADERS

To other European nations in 1914, Spain was represented by the figure of her personable young king, Alfonso XIII. Alfonso was a symbol of the active neutrality of his country; his views were unknown even to his immediate family, and both the Allies and the Central Powers claimed to have his sympathy. Spanish foreign relations were not, however, delegated to the monarch alone. Other actors appeared in the drama of Spain's foreign relations, among them the royal family and the leading members of the Spanish political establishment. Also of primary importance was the diplomatic community.

The head of the royal family was, of course, the king, Alfonso XIII, outwardly comprehensible and inwardly mysterious. To many of his contemporaries, and even to some of his biographers, he appeared as an earnest, not unusually brilliant but serious, young monarch with democratic sympathies. He was immensely popular in the Western democracies, where his exemplary family life and propensity for the game of polo were extolled as virtues which would bring the decadent Spanish Catholic monarchy up to the level of the progressive

Protestant ruling family of Britain.¹ The influence of the Queen, who was British and a granddaughter of Queen Victoria was seen as an integral part of the monarchy's popularity and her conversion to Catholicism was deplored in England, as a concession to Spain's archaic ways. Alfonso was generally viewed as a fun-loving young man who was doing his best to introduce a few progressive reforms into a society dominated by staid, office-seeking politicians.

A more accurate assessment of Alfonso's character is probably that of his friend and acquaintance Winston Churchill, a shrewd judge of character.

. . . I shall not shrink from pronouncing now that Alfonso XIII was a cool, determined politician who used continuously and in full the whole influence of his kingly office to control the policies and fortunes of his country. He deemed himself superior, not alone in rank, but in capacity and experience, to the ministers he employed. He felt himself to be the one strong, unmoving pivot around which the life of Spain revolved. His sole object was the strength and fame of his realm Alfonso could not conceive the dawn of a day when he could cease to be in his own person identified with Spain. He took at every stage all the necessary and possible steps that were within his ken to secure and preserve his control of the destiny of his country, and used his powers and discharges this trust with much worldly wisdom and with dauntless courage. It is therefore as a statesman and as a ruler, and not as a constitutional monarch

¹See Evelyn Graham, The Life Story of King Alfonso XIII, (New York, 1931). This book was written by the man who wrote the authorized biography of the Queen of Spain. It emphasizes the domestic bliss of the king and states that the monarchy was increasingly popular. The date of publication makes this statement somewhat ironic. Most contemporary biographies of Alfonso are saccharine.

acting usually upon the advice of ministers, that he would wish to be judged, and that history will judge him. He need not shrink² from the trial. He has, as he said, a good conscience.

Other observers, less charitable than Churchill, saw the Spanish monarch as the "most feudal king of Europe, ruling by the most feudal constitution."³ Spanish opinion was even more varied than that of foreign observers. A Spaniard's view of Alfonso and the monarchy was colored by his politics. Republicans saw Alfonso as the devil disguised in kingly form, as a pro-Austrian fiend who made his British wife suffer for her ancestry. Alfonso was for them a brutal despot trampling on Spanish rights. Conservative Carlists saw Alfonso as a usurper and gave their allegiance to the Pretender, Don Jaime.⁴

The Carlists, a persistent irritation to the monarchy, were the political heirs of the supporters of Don Carlos, brother of Ferdinand VII. Ferdinand, in 1831, named his daughter Isabella as his heir. His brother claimed that, as only males could inherit the throne, he was the rightful king. After Ferdinand's death, a series of bloody wars, the Carlist wars, were fought to determine whether or not

²Winston S. Churchill, Great Contemporaries (New York, 1937), pp. 185-186.

³Joseph A. Brandt, Toward the New Spain (Chicago, 1933), p. 361.

⁴Edgar Holt, The Carlist Wars in Spain (London, 1967), p. 274. Holt gives a detailed study of the Carlist dispute.

the principles of the Salic Law would be upheld in Spain. Isabella eventually consolidated her hold on Spain, but sporadic uprisings of Carlists appeared throughout the nineteenth century. Don Jaime was, in 1914, the current claimant to the throne. The Liberal Party was generally loyal to Alfonso. The Conservative Party supported the monarchy, also.

The Bourbon royal family which Alfonso headed was equally divided. The Queen was Princess Victoria Eugenia Ena of Battenberg. Opinions on the beneficial effects of her influence were varied. It has been stated that Alfonso's marriage showed that England was Spain's "natural friend and ally."⁵ Another observer feels that "Spain, during that time, was a part of the British Empire."⁶ One of Spain's leading Marxists of the period, Joaquin Maurin, maintained that Alfonso XIII was deeply influenced by his British connections; he was an English agent and Spain's Moroccan policy was a result of British imperialism. Alfonso XIII was the "Gibraltar in Madrid,"⁷ Whatever the extent of the Queen's influence, it was definitely in favor of the British.

⁵E. Allison Peers, editor, Spain: A Companion to Spanish Studies (London, 1929), p. 251.

⁶Edward Conze, Spain To-Day: Revolution and Counter-Revolution (New York, 1936), p. 1.

⁷Joaquin Maurin, La Revolución Española, pp. 89-90, quoted in Conze, Spain To-Day, p. 2.

Her natural inclinations may have been strengthened by the death of her brother, Prince Maurice of Battenberg, who was killed fighting with British troops.⁸

The Queen Mother, María Cristina, was Austrian and her sympathies lay with the Central Powers, for which the Archduke Frederick, her brother, some nephews, and some cousins, fought. Her half-sister was the Queen of Bavaria.⁹ The Queen Mother's influence was extensive and cannot be underrated. She guided Alfonso XIII through one of the longest regencies in history and remained as an advisor to her son in political matters to the end of her life.¹⁰ Her importance was recognized by the British Ambassador to Spain, Sir Arthur Hardinge. Hardinge was impressed by the former regent, who was always courteous and tactful when she was with him. He attributed her influence to her control of the king when Alfonso was a child; Hardinge pointed out that María Cristina reared the boy in the Basque provinces, which were essentially conservative, anti-liberal strongholds. The Queen Mother hoped to get Basque supporters

⁸Graham, Life Story, p. 257.

⁹Sir Charles Petrie, King Alfonso XIII and His Age (London, 1963), p. 121.

¹⁰The regency is thoroughly discussed in Melchor Fernández Almagro, Historia política de la España contemporánea: Regencia de Doña María Cristina de Austria durante la menor edad de su hijo Don Alfonso XIII, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1959).

of the Carlist cause to transfer their allegiance to Alfonso and, by rearing the king in Basque country, she made him more conservative than he might otherwise have been.¹¹

The true attitude of Alfonso XIII was never known. He remained truly neutral, at least in actions, during the war. It is not at all clear that Alfonso knew his own mind. Winston Churchill records the following conversation.

Presently the king said, abruptly:

'Mr. Churchill, do you believe in the European War?'
I replied, "Sir, sometimes I do; sometimes I don't."
'That is exactly how I feel,' he said.¹²

The former Allies usually claim Alfonso's support. The London Times stated, in 1914, that Alfonso sympathized with the Allies and would follow a cautious wartime policy.¹³ Hardinge felt that Alfonso was pro-British, but was carefully impartial in action.¹⁴ On one occasion, the king did express what may have been pro-French sentiments. He had made inquiries concerning the sympathies of his servants and had been informed that they were all pro-German. Alfonso then made his famous, often misquoted or improperly translated statement " . . . it

¹¹Sir Arthur Hardinge, A Diplomatic in Europe (London, 1927), pp. 21, 260.

¹²Churchill, Contemporaries, pp. 179-180.

¹³The Times (London), October 30, 1914, p. 7.

¹⁴Hardinge, Diplomatist, p. 262.

is seen that in Spain only I and the canaille are Francophiles."¹⁵

Some defense of possible German, or at least Austrian, sympathies on the part of Alfonso can be made. The Queen Mother's influence was great. Also influential was the army, a staunchly conservative, pro-German body. Alfonso was educated largely by soldiers and military adjutants were known to be close to him.¹⁶ By the time he was fourteen, Alfonso was already thoroughly indoctrinated in the belief that a strong army and navy were necessary for Spain's welfare, as he stated in his diary entry for January 1, 1901.

It is necessary to have an army and marine, cost what it costs and to whom it costs, because without those two hands, to say it thus, which sustain Spain, she would fall like a ball which England, Germany, France and the United States of North America would dispute.¹⁷

¹⁵Manuel Digos Aparicio, España bajo la dinastia de los Borbones (Madrid, 1932), p. 417. The statement was reported in The Times (London), September 8, 1915, p. 5 and has been given various translations. Gerald Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the Social and Political Background of the Civil War (Cambridge, 1950), p. 58, translates the Spanish "francofilos" as "on the side of the Allies."

¹⁶J. L. Castillo-Puche, editor, Diario intimo de Alfonso XIII (Madrid, 1961). This work is Alfonso's childhood diary in which he discusses his education. The army's influence is also stressed in Raymond Carr, Spain: 1808-1939 (Oxford, 1966), p. 475.

¹⁷Castillo-Puche, Diario, p. 65.

Alfonso shared the army's interest in Morocco and was likely to uphold military desires. He was known to admire German military efficiency and was an advocate of military and naval reforms.¹⁸

The pro-Allied, rabid Republican Blasco Ibanez was convinced that Alfonso XIII was a German sympathizer, but Blasco Ibanez found little to praise in Alfonso, anyway.¹⁹ Whatever his real views, Alfonso tried to be neutral and even went to the extent of forbidding all discussion of the war at the family dinner table, probably to protect not only familial affection, but also the royal digestive tract. Alfonso followed the battles of the war with intense interest, keeping large maps in the palace, and frequently consulting the French military attache and Sir Arthur Hardinge as to the war's progress. Alfonso's efforts on behalf of war victims were well-known and popular among the Allies. If his sympathies were not neutral, his actions were, at least until 1917.²⁰

By 1917, the agitation of Republicans, Socialists, and discontented workers was intense. The monarchy, fairly

¹⁸See Carr, Spain, p. 520, Graham, p. 257, and Theo Aronson, Royal Vendetta: The Crown of Spain 1829-1965 (Indianapolis, New York, Kansas City, 1966), p. 191.

¹⁹Ciges Aparicio, España, p. 417. For Ibanez general attitude, see Vincent Blasco Ibanez, Por España y contra el rey (Paris, 1925).

²⁰Graham, Life Story p. 257 and Hardinge, Diplomatist, p. 262.

popular at the war's outbreak, was increasingly threatened. Alfonso was influenced by the pro-German military; the radical leaders were largely pro-Allied in attitude. Spain was on the verge of revolution in 1917. If the king supported the agitators, a military coup d'etat became feasible. If he supported the army, a popular revolution also became possible. In July of 1917, the British government was concerned with assuring Alfonso that the Entente did no favor a popular revolution and that it wished him well. The British government needed to prove that it did not "finance or support" revolutionaries.²¹ Since Britain was trying to get Spain into the war as an ally in 1918, she needed to convince the Spanish king that his throne would be supported by the Allies. Naturally, the Spanish government would not give up its protective overcoat of neutrality in exchange for an ill-fitting cape of Republican revolution, in which it would freeze to death. The British government also found it wise to assure the House of Commons that the pro-German party in Spain was not part of the group surrounding the king.²² In February, 1917, the king, often accused of attempting to be an absolute

²¹Weekly Report on Spain, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/008, G.T. 01511, July 25, 1917, CAB 24/21, P.R.O.

²²Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates, (House of Commons), 26 July 1917, 5th ser., Vol 96 (16 July-3 August 1917), p. 1444.

monarch, became the object of open challenges to his position within the Spanish Cortes itself. The Spanish government, technically, took responsibility for all actions of the king. The king could not be blamed for anything. His position was questioned in the following discussion in the following discussion in the Chamber of Deputies.

Sr. Domingo: . . . If it is not a crime, we protest against these words by the King of Spain.

The President [of the Cortes]: The King of Spain has said nothing; his responsible government has said it.

Sr. Domingo: The King has said it in words which are related in an article.

The President: They must be related in a newspaper article, which does not have authority for that.

The Marquis of Valderrey: What Sr. Domingo . . .

The President: Order, Sr. Pidal; it is enough for the Presidency to maintain in Parliament the respect owing to institutions.

The Marquis of Valderrey: I did not try for more than to clarify the affair.

.....
Ruiz Jaminéz: . . . His Majesty the King has not pronounced such words. If he had pronounced them, the Government would be here to respond to them absolutely.²³

In 1917, Alfonso, basically neutral, was faced with an increasingly untenable political situation. The monarchy needed support; Spanish entrance into World War I as a British ally would divert attention from the instability of the constitutional monarchy. It would also divert Spanish anger at Germany's flagrant violation of Spain's freedom of the seas from the weakness of the Spanish government to the actual culprit, Germany.

²³Diario de Sesiones de Cortes, Camara de Diputados, February 15, 1917, No. 16, p. 448.

Alfonso was not the only major factor in Spanish foreign policy. Other figures were important, also. The prime minister at the outbreak of World War I was Eduardo Dato, a somewhat pro-Allied, "progressive Conservative."²⁴ The outstanding Conservative of the time, however, was Antonio Maura, a Mallorcan who had studied law in Madrid. In 1881, Maura was elected Deputy from Palma, which he represented for the rest of his life. Maura was a reformist, interested in local government reform; he formally resigned in 1898 from the Liberal Party, probably because of Liberal failure to accept his ideas for reform. He was not accepted by the more extreme Conservatives; even Dato was more conservative than Maura. In 1907, Maura had formed a ministry which was the longest of any under Alfonso XIII, since it lasted for two years.²⁵ Maura felt that Britain was Spain's true enemy.²⁶

Among the Liberals, Alvaro Figueroa y Torres, the Conde de Romanones, was the dominant figure. He supported neutrality, although he was strongly sympathetic to the Allies. In 1917, his government began seriously to consider entrance into the war on the side of the Allies. To Romanones, Spanish neutrality

²⁴Petrie, Alfonso, p. 122.

²⁵Rhea Marsha Smith, Spain: A Modern History (Ann Arbor, 1965), pp. 387-390. See also Don Melchor Fernández Almagro, Historia del reinado de Don Alfonso XIII, 2nd ed. (Barcelona, 1934), pp. 235-236, and Gabriel Maura Gamazo, Recuerdos de mi vida (Madrid, 1935?).

²⁶Carr, Spain, p. 500.

was "a 'Neutrality which killed.'"²⁷ Romanones' policies were anathema to the Germans and Austrians, who tried to "Make it impossible for him to exercise power."²⁸ Romanones claimed after the war that he never wanted Spain to enter the conflict, but that she should maintain support for the Allies. If Spain's rights were ever violated, then she should enter the war. He stated that:

I never understood that Spain ought to be a belligerent. For entering in the colossal contest, no justified motive existed, but indeed in order to remain, not in a neutral [italicized in the original Spanish] neutrality, but in a neutrality frankly inclined to the western nations. If in the course of the war, Spain received insults, in whatever form they might be, then would arrive the moment to be a belligerent at the side of the allies. Thus and only thus could Spain cease to be neutral.²⁹

Weaker than Dato, Maura, and Romanones, but also important, was the neutralist Don Manuel García Prieto, Marqués de Alhucemas, who, unable to make his own views dominate even in his own governments, appeared to favor the Germans at times, although he was a neutralist who occasionally also appeared pro-Allied.³⁰

²⁷Brandt, Toward the New Spain, p. 363.

²⁸Alberto Mousset, La política exterior de España, with a Foreward by the Conde de Romanones (Madrid, 1918), p. 241.

²⁹Conde de Romanones, Las responsabilidades políticas del antiguo régimen de 1875 a 1923, 2nd ed. (Madrid, n.d.), p. 77.

³⁰Weekly Report on Spain XIII, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/OI3, G.T.-2540, November 7, 1917, CAB 24/31 P.R.O. See also Fernández Almagro, Historia del reinado, p. 290, and Mousset, La política exterior, p. 246.

Dato, Maura, Romanones, and García Prieto all rotated in the office of prime minister during the war. They represented the two major parties, Conservative and Liberal, in a weak two-party system based on the British parliamentary practice, but lacking the stability of the English system, largely because other parties kept appearing on the Spanish scene. The Conservatives and Liberals, who rotated in office, being called upon to form ministries by the king, after ostensibly free elections, resembled in ideas and structure their British counterparts.

Certain other politicians, not necessarily the most important, but the most ubiquitous, deserve mention. The Republican leader Alejandro Lerroux, son of an army veterinary surgeon, was the "greatest mob politician of the nineteenth century."³¹ Lerroux, of some influence in Catalonia, had a large amount of support in the restless city of Barcelona. The leading Socialist of the period was Don Pablo Iglesias, an anti-clerical politician who periodically faced proceedings for having written inflammatory articles.³² The Marqués de Lema, who served occasionally as Spanish Foreign Minister, also obtained notice during the war. Educated in England, he

³¹Carr, p. 288. See also Smith, Spain, p. 384, for Lerroux's background.

³²See Diario de Sesiones, June 1, 1914, No. 40, Appendices 29 and 31, for two such cases. Lerroux's publishing problems appear frequently in the Cortes records.

favored British interest so much that the Germans called him "Lord Lema."³³ The interests of the extreme Conservatives and the military were upheld by Don Juan de la Cierva; two of the major regionalists were the Deputies Rodés and Cambó. The Carlist Vázquez Mella was the noisiest of the pro-German politicians. His anti-British ravings, with their premonitions of doom should England win the war, added color to the already polychrome Spanish political scene. He held that the fall of Austria meant the creation of an Italian empire in the Mediterranean. He feared that if the Allies won the war, Spain, neutral or not, would be treated as a conquered nation. Vázquez Mella's oration in Madrid, in May, 1915, was a long harangue on this theme, which lasted for over two hours.³⁴

Several members of the diplomatic community played an important role in Anglo-Spanish relations. The British ambassador in Spain was Sir Arthur Hardinge, who had seen diplomatic service in Russia and whose post in Spain was to be his final political service to his country. Hardinge was deeply impressed by his Spanish experience, admiring the royal family greatly. His Spanish counterpart in England was King Alfonso's former English tutor, Alfonso Merry del Val.

³³Hardinge, p. 253.

³⁴La Epoca, May 31, 1915, quoted in Fernando Diaz-Plaja, editor, El siglo XX: Volume of ca 3 volumes projected, La historia de España en sus documentos (Madrid, 1960) I, 321-322. See also

The German ambassador to Spain was the brusque Prince Ratibor, who increasingly irritated the Spaniards and Hardinge, who, in his memoirs, expressed his disgust at Rabitor's deportment and undiplomatic behavior when Ratibor dared to turn his back on Hardinge at a public meeting.³⁵

Anglo-Spanish diplomatic relations from 1914 to 1918 were largely conducted, or affected by these people, who all served some major interest or who possessed some strong opinion concerning the belligerent nations. The Conservatives, especially the Conservative Party and the army, were pro-German. The Liberal Party and the radicals tended to be pro-Allied. The king and his ministers were forced into a compromise position of neutrality and had to maintain some balance between the two major groups in order to conduct his foreign policy.

³⁵Hardinge, p. 253.

CHAPTER III

THE NATURE OF SPANISH NEUTRALITY

Spain officially declared her neutrality on July 30, 1914, although the royal declaration of neutrality was not proclaimed until one month later, when it appeared in the Gaceta on August 30, 1914.¹ The Prime Minister, Eduardo Dato, did not make his neutrality speech before the Cortes until November 30, 1914.² On August 11, 1914, Dato defended the delay in issuing the proclamation by claiming that Spain had not been officially notified of the war's existence.³

Spain's declaration of neutrality was brief and clear.

War having unfortunately been declared between Austria - Hungary and Serbia, it is the duty of His Majesty's government to prescribe to Spanish subjects the strictest neutrality in conformity with the laws in force and the principles of public international law.

¹"Proclamation of Neutrality in the World War, July 30, 1914," Francis Deák and Philip C. Jessup, editors and annotators, A Collection of Neutrality Laws, Regulations and Treaties of Various Countries (Washington, 1939), II, 936-937. For publication, see Don Melchor Fernández Almagro, Historia del reinado de Don Alfonso XIII, 2nd ed. (Barcelona, 1934), pp. 252-253.

²Diario de Sesiones de Cortes, Cámara de Diputados, November 5, 1914, No. 77, p. 2137.

³The Times (London), August 12, 1914, p. 5.

In consequence, Spaniards residing in Spain and abroad who carry out any hostile act regarded as contrary to the strictest neutrality will lose all right to the protection of his majesty's Government and will undergo the consequences of any measures which the belligerents may establish, and that without prejudice to the penalties which they will incur according to the Spanish laws.

Agents, national or foreign, who, in Spanish territory, are employed or aiding in recruiting soldiers for any of the belligerent armies or navies, will in addition be subjected to the application of Article 150 of the Penal Code.⁴

On August 7, 1914, Spain proclaimed her neutrality in the conflict between Germany and Russia, France, and Britain.⁵ All Spanish neutrality proclamations were identical except in the naming of belligerents.⁶ Spain issued twenty-seven neutrality proclamations during the course of the war.⁷

It has been said that Dato's failure to consult the Cortes in declaring neutrality was one sign of the decline of parliamentary government in Spain.⁸ This may be true, but parliamentary government was still alive enough to assert its right to exist. On October 30, 1914, the London Times stated that Dato planned to defend the government's neutrality policy before the Cortes.⁹ Dato, did, indeed make his speech and was

⁴"Proclamation of Neutrality," Deák and Jessup, Collection, II, 936-937.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid., pp. 936-937.

⁸Raymond Carr, Spain: 1808-1939 (Oxford, 1966), p. 500.

⁹The Times (London), October 30, 1914, p. 7.

given the support of the majority of the Cortes, with some minor dissension by such radicals as Alejandro Lerroux.¹⁰

The Conde de Romanones, although he personally favored entrance into the war, stated in the name of the Liberal Party that the government, by proclaiming neutrality, had determined the true feeling of Spain.¹¹ Numerous other politicians hastened to add their names to the Cortes records as favoring the government's policy. Expressions of support for the government's policy were strong enough for Dato to feel that they could be taken as a "vote of confidence to the Government in all that refers to the representation of Spain before the European conflict."¹²

Spain remained generally firm in her policy of neutrality until 1917, when she began seriously to consider entering the war. Until 1917, when German sinkings of Spanish ships severely threatened her economic life, she had little choice but to remain neutral. Militarily, Spain had no need to enter the war since she was unable to participate actively.¹³ The army, made up of soldiers turned politicians, was interested only in maintaining its privileged political position. The

¹⁰Diario de Sesiones, November 5, 1914, No. 77, p. 2138.

¹¹Ibid., p. 2139.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Carr, Spain, p. 499.

Moroccan war, at an impasse during the early part of the war, became increasingly difficult for the Spanish army to control. Spanish officers tended to be pro-German; as the war continued, their sympathies became more and more alien to the sympathies of most of their countrymen. At the outbreak of World War I, Spain was wise to stay out of the war. The army was not able to fight effectively. A Spanish offensive was impossible and, due to her geographical position, Spain was the only neutral nation which was unlikely to face a German land attack.¹⁴ Germany could only attack Spanish ships, which she did with growing zeal as the war progressed.¹⁵

On the other hand, Spain had no particularly strong reason for joining the Allies, who had little to offer her, whereas Germany could offer Spain possession of Gibraltar and Tangier.¹⁶ As the war progressed, Spain's ties to the Allies grew. German offers of Gibraltar began to lose their appeal when the offers were accompanied by the sinking of Spanish ships. Spain was not obliged to enter the war by any existing international agreement and chose a policy of neutrality in order to wait for a solution of the conflict.¹⁷

¹⁴Thomas A. Bailey, The Policy of the United States Toward the Neutrals, 1917-1918 (Gloucester, Mass., 1966), p. 273.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶E. Allison Peers, editor, Spain: A Companion to Spanish Studies (London, 1929), p. 257.

¹⁷Alberto Mousset, La política exterior de España, With a Foreward by the Conde de Romanones (Madrid, 1918), p. 224.

Dato reaffirmed the government's neutrality policy in 1915, when it was questioned by his political opponents.¹⁸ That Dato's government strictly maintained its policies is evidenced by a statement made on November 30, 1915, by Lord Robert Cecil, the British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that Spain's behavior as a neutral was irreproachable.¹⁹ Upon becoming Prime Minister in late 1915, the Conde de Romanones reluctantly reaffirmed the neutrality policy of the Dato government.²⁰

During the first half of the war, the Allies did not make strenuous efforts to obtain Spain's entrance into the war, but some pressure was put upon her to get her to cooperate in economic actions beneficial to the Allied war effort. Britain, in 1915, prohibited the export of coal to Spain, and the Spanish government made determined efforts to obtain coal without interference.²¹ Spain produced one-third less coal than she consumed and was facing a grave coal shortage.²² The problem was aggravated by the fact that certain mines and some arms factories controlled the existing stocks in coal.²³

¹⁸The Times (London), November 26, 1915, p. 7.

¹⁹Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 5th ser., Vol 76 (22 November-17 December 1915), p. 601.

²⁰The Times (London), December 11, 1915, p. 7.

²¹Diario de Sesiones, November 27, 1915, No. 20, p. 505.

²²Ibid., p. 500.

²³Ibid., p. 498.

By 1917, Spain was frantically trying to obtain coal; Britain wanted Spanish iron ore. The pressure applied to Spain was intensive, indicating a strong determination to force Spain to behave as the Allies wished. Britain's problem was a simple one. Until the German submarine blockade was declared, Spanish ships took iron ore to Britain in return for coal. Spain, in danger of losing her ships, began to take coal to the United States and refused to use her own ships in the iron ore trade with Britain. She insisted that British ships carry coal and iron between the two countries. Spain also demanded that Britain give twenty per cent of the cargo space on these ships to Spanish oranges, since the export trade in oranges was in severe trouble. Spain threatened to put an embargo on her own mineral supplies to force Britain to act as she wanted. Britain, in retaliation, used Allied ships to transport Spanish ore, but sent coal to France and Italy. Spain then refused to let the British ships load ore unless they brought a cargo of coal. Finally, Spain found it possible to buy coal from the United States.²⁴

²⁴Letter, Mr. Balfour for the British Special Mission to the Secretary of State, May 5, 1917, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1917, Supplement 2: The World War Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1932, II, 1199-1202. Balfour gives an excellent summary of the British position. For an unbiased study of events, see Bailey, Policy, p. 277. Bailey uses United States government documents extensively.

"This is noteworthy as being perhaps the earliest threat to use the American exports club for the purpose of forcing a neutral into co-operation with one of the Allies."²⁵ Britain was quite frank in suggesting that the United States apply pressure on the neutrals in regard to shipping.

It will be seen that pressure of the strongest kind is suggested in the case of Sweden and Spain, very definite pressure in the case of Norway, and pressure of a highly flexible and judicious character in the case of Denmark and Holland.²⁶

The United States was quite willing to apply such pressure; she had no desperate need for Spanish ores. "In the last analysis," wrote the Chief of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, "I think we can do without the supplies that we get from Spain much better than Spain can afford to do without our products."²⁷ Spain's prohibition of the export of metals infuriated the British, who suggested the following actions to the United States.

In these circumstances the British Government would very greatly appreciate it if the United States Government would intimate to the Spanish Government, in any manner that seem proper to them, that they are entirely in accord with the views of the British Government with

²⁵Bailey, Policy, p. 278.

²⁶Memorandum, The British Embassy to the Department of State, May 7, 1917, Foreign Relations, 1917, World War, II, 828-829. An interesting account of this episode in relation to another neutral is to be found in Olav Riste, The Neutral Ally: Norway's Relations with Belligerent Powers in the First World War (Oslo, 1965), p. 191.

²⁷Letter, Chief of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce to Frank L. Polk (June 18, 1917), quoted in Bailey, Policy, p. 276, n. 8.

whom, they understand, an arrangement has been made by which British coal can be supplied to Spain on certain conditions. It might be pointed out that in view of this and of the extreme importance to the Allies of economizing tonnage, the United States do not see their way to allowing the export of coal to Spain, not that ample provision has been made for the necessary supplies to be obtained from the United Kingdom which entails a much shorter sea voyage. It might, perhaps, also be hinted that other essential supplies from the United States would be dependent on a satisfactory attitude of the Spanish Government in regard to²⁸ the shipment of iron ore and pyrites to Great Britain.

The United States acceded completely to Britain's request in May, 1917, when the following instructions were sent to the American Embassy in Spain to apply pressure:

Department advised by British commission now here that the Spanish Government may be inclined to refuse to Great Britain iron ore which is greatly needed for the manufacture of munitions, since Spain believes she no longer needs to obtain coal from Great Britain because she can obtain it from the United States. You may, . . . say to the Foreign Minister that the recent reports of Spanish attempts to purchase coal in the United States make it important to bring to his notice the fact that American coal is being increasingly needed owing to the exigencies of war, . . . , and that it may be necessary, therefore, for this Government to restrict or prohibit the exportation of coal of neutrals
 . . . if Spain is willing to continue to export iron ore to Great Britain as heretofore, so as to relieve . . . the large exportations of iron and iron products, including tubing, from the United States to Great Britain and her allies it may be possible to facilitate the²⁹ exportation of limited amounts of coal to Spain.

²⁸Balfour to the Secretary of State, May 5, 1917, Foreign Relations, 1917, World War, II, 1201-1202.

²⁹Telegram, The Secretary of State (Lansing) to the Ambassador in Spain (Willard), May 22, 1917, 6:00 P.M., Telegram No. 481, Ibid., pp. 1202-1203.

Spain, under such pressure, became frantic. The pressure may not have helped the British, however, as it placed a strain on Anglo-Spanish relations. Sir Arthur Hardinge sent a memorandum to the American Ambassador in Spain on this matter in late 1917. "The British Government understands that unless supplies reach Spain shortly, the position of the present Government, which is friendly, may be seriously affected, owing to the urgent need of coal."³⁰ This statement to may have indicated that Spain's policy toward Britain may have been subject to reconsideration if economic conditions did not improve. Moreover, revolution caused by economic discontent was always a possibility.

By 1917, Spain was under constant Allied pressure. The Allies hoped that economic needs would force Spain to cooperate with them, chiefly in economic matters. "Few people know with what anxiety our authorities watched Spain when the war drew out, but it is not even now advisable to tell all the facts."³¹ Spain nevertheless maintained its neutrality in spite of such provocation as German attacks on the Spanish merchant marine. These sinkings deeply affected the populace, which was on the verge of revolt. It is generally accepted in secondary sources that Spain's internal troubles kept her out of the war.

³⁰Telegram, The Ambassador in Spain (Willard) to the Secretary of State, October 8, 1917, 12:00 Noon, Telegram No. 819, Ibid., p. 1209.

³¹Joseph McCabe, Spain in Revolt: 1814-1931 (London, 1931), p. 220.

They added to her troubles, but they, alone, did not keep her out. The failure to solve them weakened the government's position, but entrance in the war might have helped the government to handle the problem of internal stability.

According to the secondary sources, when Germany increased her submarine warfare in 1917, the

. . . United States responded with the rupture of diplomatic relations, on the way to the declaration of war (April 6), and some American republics of our race were inclined to an analogous policy. But Spain did not want to go so far, always made timid by her internal struggle, and Romanones succeeded sufficiently with his note in reply (February 6), in which courteous words insinuated reprisals in case of Germany's not agreeing to the good reasons of our right, our loyalty and our injuries.³²

Internal problems as a factor in keeping Spain out of the war have been exaggerated; Spain stayed out of the war because her army was unwilling and unable to fight. Many other factors could be reasons for Spain's entrance. Such entry has often been hinted at and certain events lend strength to the hints. In his noncommittal memoirs, Sir Arthur Hardinge states that German destruction of Spanish merchant shipping might have led Spain to end her neutrality policy.³³ Indirect evidence suggests that from 1916 on, David Lloyd George, British Prime Minister, felt that Spain might enter the war. He hoped

³²Fernández Almagro, Historia, p. 285.

³³Sir Arthur Hardinge, A Diplomatist in Europe (London, 1927), p. 266.

to get Spain to enter and then to send Spanish troops overland to the Western Front.³⁴ One British officer, Sir Charles Petrie, who was one of those involved, states that a number of British officers were trained for liaison work with the Spanish army. They were trained for three months and then returned to their units.³⁵ Petrie accepts the usual viewpoint of secondary sources that Spain never considered entering the war, but the events he cites point to definite plans made by the British for such entrance.

The sinking of Spanish merchant ships led the Conde de Romanones, then Prime Minister, to state that since February 1, 1917, the Spanish merchant marine had been immobilized. He further remarked that negotiations were taking place with several governments, but that he could not tell the Cortes what these negotiations were. To do so would interrupt the negotiations.³⁶ What negotiations were so secret that the Prime Minister dared not tell the Cortes what they were? The Cortes records show that the United States government had asked Spain to associate with her in various efforts to arrange a peace. Later the United States asked Spain to break diplomatic relations with Germany, a policy which was not specific even though it would stop short of a declaration

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Diario de Sesiones, February 17, 1917, No. 18, p. 505.

of war. A discussion took place in which Deputy Rodés stated that Romanones' classification of the American notes to Spain on the matter as an invitation to war was imprudent and indiscreet. Romanones then admitted that the United States had not asked Spain to enter the war; she had merely requested that Spain, a neutral nation, break diplomatic relations with Germany.³⁷

In March, 1917, the British War Cabinet decided that the Foreign Office, the First Sea Lord, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the Minister of Munitions, and the Shipping Controller, should all prepare memoranda concerning the value of Spain's entering the war.³⁸ This action took place as a response to the reception by the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of information from Paris that Spain was "making overtures" concerning joining the Allies.³⁹

On April 27, 1917, a note sent by Romanones to the German ambassador was published. The note was a final effort to appeal to German respect for Spain's neutral rights. Coming when it did, the note can easily be interpreted as a none too heavily veiled threat.

'Time elapsing, it was said, had demonstrated, unfortunately, that the Imperial Government has not found in the sentiments of friendship which unite both

³⁷Ibid., pp. 506-511.

³⁸War Cabinet 91, Minute 10, March 8, 1917, 11:30 A.M.
CAB 23/2, P.R.O.

³⁹Ibid.

countries means to satisfy the just reparations of Spain, nor has believed that the firm, correct and loyal attitude of neutrality in which she placed herself since the beginning of the war, could be a motive of consideration before the legitimate exigencies of a violated international right.

All the reiterated actions of the Government of His Majesty, to the end of obtaining the security of the maritime traffic and a guarantee for the life of its crew members have crashed before the unbreakable decision of the imperial Government to employ in the war such proceedings of unaccustomed violence that, upon trying to make impossible the economic life of its adversaries, it puts in great danger that of friendly powers and neutrals.

The Government of H.M., in spite of the negative results of its previous Notes, wants still to trust that that [the Government] of Germany will know how to appreciate serenely the feeling and scope of this Note, and from here on its acts will be inspired in respect for the life of our ships which realize an indispensable commerce for the economic existence of Spain.⁴⁰

With the government crisis of June, 1917, the Romanones government, the one most likely to institute a break with Germany, went into eclipse. In April, 1917, Romanones had resigned; by June, the neutralist Dato was in office. Dato was cautious because he was opposed by many German sympathizers who wished to oust him from power at a time when his government was extremely weak.⁴¹ The British government felt at this time that it would be impolitic to interfere in Spanish internal affairs.⁴² Obviously, with an anti-war government

⁴⁰Note, Conde de Romanones to the German Ambassador, quoted in Mousset, La política, pp. 241-242.

⁴¹Weekly Report on Spain XIII, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/013, G.T. -2540, November 7, 1917, CAB 24/31, P.R.O.

⁴²War Cabinet 172, Minute 8, June 29, 1917, 11:00 A.M., CAB 23/3, P.R.O.

in office in Spain, Britain would not want to call attention to her behavior with the previous government of Romanones. On July 2, 1917, Balfour refused to give the House of Commons information on the Spanish situation. He stated that Britain would not interfere on behalf of any side in Spain.⁴³ Shortly thereafter, Lord Robert Cecil asked for approval to make a statement before the House of Commons that Britain was not trying to get Spain to give up her neutrality.⁴⁴ Cecil did indeed make his speech, on July 26, stating that England was not putting pressure on Spain to join the Allies and that she valued Spanish friendship.⁴⁵ Cecil's speech arose from questions concerning German propaganda that Britain was trying to get Spain into the war.⁴⁶ By December, 1917, it had become obvious that Spanish sympathies were not with her pro-German army' Spain would face a revolution by the pro-Allied Radicals and Republicans if she did not support a pro-Allied policy indicating Spanish support for entrance into the war.⁴⁷

⁴³Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 5th ser., Vol. 95 (25 June-13 July, 1917), p. 732.

⁴⁴War Cabinet 195, Minute 10, July 25, 1917, 12:00 Noon, CAB 23/3, P.R.O.

⁴⁵Parliamentary Debates, Vol 96 (16 July-3 August, 1917), p. 1443.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Weekly Report on Spain XV, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/105, G.T-2973, December 13, 1917, CAB 24/35, P.R.O.

In 1918, the Spanish government was having a difficult time maintaining the neutrality policy. On July 7, 1918, a law was passed giving the government the power to protect Spanish neutrality. The law made it an offense to give reports concerning Spanish neutrality to a foreign power or to give out information harmful to another foreign power. No notices were to be published which were harmful to Spanish neutrality. Defamation of a foreign head of state was illegal. The Council of Ministers was permitted to establish censorship and confiscation of illegal material was allowed.⁴⁸ This bill had much opposition. The press was convinced that the German Ambassador, Prince Ratibor, was responsible for it.⁴⁹

In 1917, at the time of the Romanones government, when Spain's desire to enter the war was strongest, German propaganda was reaching one of its highest levels. Possibly, this propaganda campaign was a frantic reaction to rumors of Spain's ending her neutral status. In August, 1917, Sir Arthur Hardinge was complaining that the Germans were instigating riots in Bilbao and that Germany had much to gain from a revolution

⁴⁸"Law Vesting in the Government the Power Necessary to Safeguard the Neutrality of Spain, July 7, 1918," Deak and Jessup, II, pp. 929-930.

⁴⁹"Memo on the New Spanish Law About Espionage and the Press," Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, Spain/004, G.T. -5200, July 18, 1918, CAB 24/60, P.R.O.

in Spain.⁵⁰ The German press campaign was heightening in intensity.

It became so persistent that even the fanatic germanófilo Carlist leader Vázquez Mella admitted to being irritated.⁵¹ Aliadofilo newspapers felt that over half of the Spanish press had been bought by Germany.⁵² The Germans were, in addition to their propaganda, trying to get Dato out of office after he instituted his policy of interning German ships; this indicates that even the Dato government was being pushed to declare war and that the Germans were becoming panicky.⁵³

By 1918, Spain was less likely to enter the war than she had been in 1917, but she was still considering the idea of entrance. As late as August 20, 1918, she was hoping to gain some advantage from entering, but, apparently, the Allies no longer felt that her entrance was necessary.⁵⁴

⁵⁰Weekly Report on Spain X, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/O10, G.T. -1882, August 28, 1917, CAB 24/24, P.R.O.

⁵¹Weekly Report on Spain XIII, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/O13, G.T. -2540, November 7, 1917, CAB 24/31, P.R.O.

⁵²Weekly Report on Spain XV, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/O15, G.T. -2973, December 13, 1917, CAB 24/35, P.R.O. The terms mean "germanophile" and "pro-Allied" respectively.

⁵³Weekly Report on Spain XIII, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/O13, G.T. -2540, November 7, 1917, CAB 24/31, P.R.O.

⁵⁴Memorandum on The Situation in Spain with special reference to the Republican agitation and the Regionalist Question, Spain/006, Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, G.T. -6490, December 6, 1918, CAB 24/71, P.R.O.

It probably cannot be proven that Spain intended to enter World War I. Most works on Spanish history for the period state flatly that Spain never intended to enter the war. She did remain a neutral and it is difficult to ascertain her commitment of that neutrality. That there are indications that Spain intended to enter the war has been shown here. Spain seems to have considered entrance; certainly, she had ample provocation. The spread of rumors concerning such entrance is a sign of her possible entrance. On the surface, however, Spain appeared to be a model neutral.

Spain's wartime actions as a neutral attest to that position. The widest publicity was given to Alfonso XIII, whose acts of charity were subject to numerous saccharine encomiums from the Allied press. Alfonso personally intervened with the Germans to prevent the deaths of at least eight women and twenty men.⁵⁵ It has also been widely stated that if the Spanish minister in Brussels, the Marqués de Villalobar, had been given time to contact Alfonso, the king would have saved Edith Cavell, the nurse who became an Allied heroine.⁵⁶ Alfonso also gained great admiration for establishing an agency for finding and aiding the missing, wounded, and

⁵⁵Sir Charles Petrie, The Spanish Royal House (London, 1958), p. 223.

⁵⁶Ibid. The story is confirmed in Hardinge, Diplomatist, p. 262. An interesting recent article which treats, in part, the Spanish efforts to save Edith Cavell is Angela Stuart, "A Scrap of Paper," Mankind, I (April, 1969), 10-13, 32-39.

prisoners of war of all the belligerents.⁵⁷ In 1917, Alfonso was instrumental in arranging the appointment of Spanish officers to British and French hospital ships to deter the sinking of these ships.⁵⁸ The Queen of Spain did her part by founding a group to provide milk for the children of mothers who could not nurse their own infants.⁵⁹

Diplomatically, Spain was involved in the affairs of the belligerents from the beginning of the war; she hoped to aid in ending the conflict. In 1916, Spain handled all Allied interests in Germany and Austria, except for those of England, which were handled by the American ambassador.⁶⁰ She occasionally protested German wartime treatment of belligerent civilians, such as when Spanish censorship allowed public objection in the newspapers to the deportation of French civilians at Lille in 1916.⁶¹

Spanish attempts to serve as a mediator were amazingly slow in coming. In 1916, Spain rejected an offer by the United States and Sweden to aid in mediation as "premature."⁶² In

⁵⁷Hardinge, Diplomatist, p. 263.

⁵⁸Weekly Report on Spain IX, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/009, G.T. -1812, August 21, 1917, CAB 24/24, P.R.O. and The New York Times Current History: The European War, 41 vols. (New York, 1918), XIV, 421.

⁵⁹The Times (London), February 5, 1916, p. 5.

⁶⁰Ibid., April 28, 1916, p. 5.

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²Mousset, La política, p. 237.

September, 1917, Spain did relay a message to England from Germany; Germany wished to confer with England concerning a possible peace settlement. Spain did not want to intervene. The British decision was delayed until October 8, 1917, when it was decided to accept the message and to tell the other Allies of it. Germany failed to answer the British decision.⁶³ In August, 1918, the Kaiser proposed the Queen of Holland and the King of Spain as possible mediators, but the plan was rejected at a conference held at Spa.⁶⁴

Spain was a model neutral as long as she chose to act the role of a neutral. She was led, partly in an effort to control internal problems, to become increasingly pro-Allied in policy. Her neutrality changed from a position of firm impartiality to one of preference for the Allies.

⁶³War Cabinet, Telegram Sir A. Hardinge to Lord Hardinge, September 18, 1917, 9:30 P.M., G.T. -2143, CAB 24/27, P.R.O. A full account, with British documents on the affair, is given in David Lloyd George, The War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, (6 vols. Boston, 1937), pp. 300-311. The story is confirmed by Blanche E.C. Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour, First Earl of Balfour, (2 vols, New York, 1937), II, p. 180 and Paul Guinn, British Strategy and Politics, 1914 to 1918 (Oxford, 1965), pp. 238-239.

⁶⁴Lloyd George, Memoirs, VI, 219.

CHAPTER IV

SPANISH PUBLIC OPINION

Spain, according to most observers, was united in supporting the policy of neutrality. In a sense, she was. Spain was so divided in her attitude toward the war that she was unable to state positively which side she favored; to do so would cause violent internal conflict. Most Spaniards probably favored the Allies, but an influential segment of the population, including that group which would have to fight a war, the army, was pro-German. But due to German violation of Spain's neutral rights, public sympathy for the Central Powers declined as the war progressed. The army, however, largely in admiration of German military efficiency, strongly supported Austria and Germany throughout the war.

Spanish public opinion was divided into two groups, the aliadófilos or Allied supporters, and the germanófilos, or friends of the Central Powers. "The aliadófilo prefers intervention; but he knows that the rupture [of diplomatic relations] is internal war, and conforms to a benevolent neutrality."¹

The parties of the Left usually tended to be Allied supporters. The leading Allied sympathizer of the Liberals

¹Manuel Ciges Aparicio, España bajo la dinastía de los Borbones (Madrid, 1932), p. 416.

was the Conde de Romanones. Two moderates, Dato and Lema, were basically pro-British, but they tended to be more moderate than Romanones. The extreme left, including the Republican Socialists and the Catalan separatists, tended to be strongly pro-French.² The old conflict of Castile and Catalonia, reflecting the aims of the Catalan separatists, was reflected in attitudes toward the Allies. Castile was anti-French, remembering the Napoleonic invasion of Spain and its aftermath. Catalonia, which desired liberation from the control of Castile, was pro-French. The Catalan dialect was in some respects similar to the French dialect spoken near Catalonia; the French and the Spanish Catalans felt a certain linguistic kinship, and many Spanish Catalans were fighting with the French in World War I.³

The more conservative members of Spanish society, the nobility, the clergy, and the military, tended to be pro-German. The nobility, or at least those nobles who were extreme monarchists, feared the creation of a republic in Spain if the Allies won the war. They were confirmed in this fear by the Church, which hated French anti-clerical ideas. Inspired by the speeches of Kaiser Wilhelm, the Catholic Church of Spain was convinced that it would gain in influence if Germany won the war. Old dislikes of British

²Sir Arthur Hardinge, A Diplomatist in Europe (London, 1927), p. 258.

³Ibid., p. 257.

Protestantism also affected the attitude of the Spanish clergy.⁴ The Carlists also tended to be conservative, although the pretender, Don Jaime, claimed to be pro-Allied since he felt that French conservatives deserved his gratitude for their support for the original Carlist pretender.⁵

The reasons the germanófilos advanced for their attitudes were many. Among the ones most frequently proclaimed were that France was the citadel of atheist free-thinking, anarchist ideas, and corrupt socialism, that France was maneuvering against Spanish interests in Morocco, that a German victory might lead to Spanish acquisition of Gibraltar, and that Britain, staunchly Protestant, felt herself superior to the Latin countries. The Gibraltar issue was a particularly irritating one to Spaniards, who resented British control of the rock. It became a tempting lure for Britain to dangle before Spain in 1917 and 1918, when she hoped to catch the Spanish fish and dump it into the frying pan of World War I. Spanish orators, notably Vázquez Mella, spent much of the war agitating for the return of the rock. In

⁴Ibid., p. 254. See also The Times (London), November 23, 1915, p. 4 and February 19, 1916, p. 7 and Joseph McCabe, Spain in Revolt: 1814-1931 (London, 1931), p. 220.

⁵Hardinge, Diplomatist, p. 256.

1917, Spanish reaction to the results of the Spanish-American War affected relations with the United States.⁶

Some mention should perhaps be made of the role of the press in shaping Spanish public opinion. A vigorous propaganda battle was waged between the aliadófilos and germano-filos, with the germano-filos beginning the battle. Increasingly, pro-Allied propaganda gained dominance until, by 1918, German press influence greatly lessened.

This influence was at first considerable. The Germans were able, in 1916, to have the secretary of the Barcelona Daily Press Association, whose pro-Allied opinions were expressed in the Diluvio, indicted seven times for his writings.⁷ Other Germanophile papers included the Correo de Andalucía, ABC, and Vázquez Mella's Carlist organ, the Correo Español.⁸ The major pro-Allied newspaper was La Epoca; other papers became increasingly pro-Allied in sympathy as the war

⁶The Times (London), October 30, 1914, p. 7, September 8, 1915, p. 5, and November 23, 1915, p. 4. Accounts of Spanish opinion are to be found in most secondary sources. Also of interest are excerpts from contemporary Spanish newspapers; some of these may be found in Fernando Diaz-Plaja, editor, El siglo XX 1 volume of projected ca. 3 vols., La historia de España en sus documentos (Madrid, 1960), I.

⁷The Times (London), May 20, 1916, p. 5.

⁸Ibid., September 24, 1914, p. 3, and October 30, 1914, p. 7. Note also the various newspaper excerpts which are scattered throughout in Diaz-Plaja, El siglo XX.

progressed. The Conde de Romanones published pro-British articles in the Diario Universal.⁹ These were the major Spanish newspapers of the period; their influence was wide among the literate members of Spanish society. It must be remembered, however, that the Spanish reading public was limited in size and that the press was subjected to a strict censorship. It is doubtful if German propaganda reached more than the upper classes. The increasingly pro-Allied attitude of the lower classes indicates a lack of exposure to sustained German propaganda.

The Germans did propagandize in Spain; much of Germany's propaganda, however, dealt with issues which bore little direct relation to the war. German propaganda centered around the Spanish desire to regain Gibraltar from Britain. Such propaganda, inflamed by the speeches of orators such as Vazquez Mella, may have some effect on Anglo-Spanish negotiations concerning an exchange of Gibraltar for Ceuta in 1917 and 1918.

If the British press is to be believed in such matters, the Germans were feeding lies to the Spanish public, which eagerly digested German fabrications; Spanish papers published numerous articles inspired by the Germans, chiefly the

⁹Alberto Mousset, La política exterior de España, With a Foreward by the Conde de Romanones (Madrid, 1918), p. 230, n.l. See also Diaz-Plaja, p. 321.

diabolical German Embassy at Madrid, the sinister Consulate at Barcelona, and the wicked Wolff and Favre agencies.¹⁰

For all of her fulminations against German propagan-
dizing, Britain was more than willing to publicize the worthiness of her own cause. As the war continued, British propaganda efforts were directed against German violations of neutral rights, especially those of Belgium. Britain also objected to Germany's recalling of advertisements in newspapers friendly to the British cause, and she complained of Germany's daring to publish German journals in Spanish.¹¹

By July 1917, German press propaganda had switched its main point of emphasis and had become interested in blaming the British for riots in Spain. German agents claimed that Britain was trying to start a revolution.¹² Such propa-
ganda was obviously aimed at discrediting the British position in the eyes of the monarchists. The pro-German press also felt that the Allies were trying to get Spain involved in the war and began an active campaign on the matters.¹³

¹⁰The Times (London), October 30, 1914, p. 7.

¹¹Hardinge, Diplomatist, p. 204, and The Times (London), September 8, 1915, p. 5.

¹²Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 9 July 1917, 5th ser., Vol. 95 (25 June-13 July 1917, p. 1587.

¹³Memorandum on The Situation in Spain with special reference to the Republican agitation and the Regionalist Question, Spain/006, Foreign Office, Department of Political Intelligence, G.T.
6100 December 6 1918 CAB 21/71 P P O

German violations of Spain's maritime rights had increased so much that by 1918 the Spanish press began to publish numerous anti-German newspaper articles. German submarines sank five Spanish ships in the first half of July, 1918.¹⁴ On July 9, 1918, a censorship law was passed in reaction to the increasing number of articles published which did not reflect Spain's neutral position.¹⁵ These articles came from widely different regions, reflecting universal anger at the sinkings. The major offender was El Parlamentario of Madrid, which published over thirty articles of an anti-neutral nature. The titles of some of the offending articles give a good indication of their content. Some of them were "German Espionage," El Parlamentario, (January 4, 1918), "Fear? Infamy? Cynicism?," El Parlamentario, (January 17, 1918), "They are the Work of German Spies," El Parlamentario, (January 25, 1918), "The Torpedoing of the 'Argota,'" El Parlamentario, (January 26, 1918), "The Crimes of Teuton Espionage," El Mosquito, (Madrid, February 14, 1918), "Some Sensational Information," El Noroeste, (Oviedo, March 6, 1918), "Notes of the War. Rhine Money," El Correo de Asturias, (Oviedo, March 25, 1918), and "A Letter from Ratibor," El

¹⁴Don Melchor Fernández Almagro, Historia del reinado de Don Alfonso XIII, 2nd ed. (Barcelona, 1934), p. 334.

¹⁵Diario de Sesiones de Cortes, Cámara de Diputados, July 9, 1918, No. 72, p. 2327.

Pueblo, (Valencia, March 9, 1918).¹⁶ From January to July of 1918, numerous articles of this type were published. They were published by such well-known newspapers as La Epoca (Madrid), La Protesta (Madrid), El Sol (Madrid), El Mundo (Madrid), El Diluvio (Barcelona), La Razón (Madrid), El Campo de Gibraltar (Cádiz), El Socialista (Madrid), España (Madrid), El Heraldo de Madrid, Ejército y Armada (Madrid), El Pueblo Navarro (Pamplona), El Pueblo Vasco (San Sebastián), and La Voz de Guipúzcoa (San Sebastián).¹⁷ Not all of the articles cited as violating Spain's policy of neutrality were directed against Germany and Austria; an occasional attack on the Allies is to be found. By late 1918, however, the Spanish press was aware of the trend of events. War Trade Board representative George McFadden wrote on September 5, 1918, that "'The Spaniards are first pro-Spanish, and secondly, pro-winner, and with the improvement in the military situation, pro-Ally sentiment in the country is increasing.'"¹⁸

The newspapers were not the only forces shaping Spanish public opinion. The intellectuals, notably the writers, affected

¹⁶Ibid., July 5, 1918, No. 70, pp. 2248-2250.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Letter from George McFadden, War Trade Board representative, September 5, 1918, quoted in Thomas A. Bailey, The Policy of the United States Toward the Neutrals, 1917-1918 (Gloucester, Mass., 1966), p. 274, n.5.

Spanish thinking on the war. Most of the intellectual community was uninfluenced by German propaganda. The intellectuals overwhelmingly favored the Allies. Most notoriously pro-Allied was the violently Republican popular novelist Vicente Blasco Ibañez, who openly admitted propagandizing for the Allies.¹⁹

In July, 1915, a number of other intellectuals published a manifesto in the British press. The manifesto was signed by members of all Spanish political parties. The document stated that the signers supported the Allies "inasmuch as they represent the ideals of liberty and justice, and therefore their cause coincides with the highest political interests of the nation."²⁰ Among the signatories were such noted figures as Americo Castro, Manuel B. Cossío, Gregorio Marañón, Ramón Menéndez Pidal, José Ortega y Gasset, Miguel de Unamuno, Manuel Falla, Luis Araquistain, Manuel Azaña, "Azorin," (Gonzalez Hontoria), Antonio Machado, Manuel Machado, Ramiro de Maeztu, Benito Pérez Galdós, Ramón Pérez de Ayala, and Ramón del Valle-Inclán.²¹ Many of these men were still staunchly pro-Allied in 1916, and had the support of the leaders of the Republican party, which was

²⁰"Spain and the War," The New York Times Current History: The European War, (New York, 1917), IV, 1190.

²¹Ibid., pp. 1190-1191.

extremely pro-French.²² The partly pro-British Ortega y Gasset hoped to gain support for the idea of a parliamentary democratic government like that of England.²³

Anti-neutral writings by leading intellectuals became plentiful. By November, 1915, the Deputies in the Cámara de Diputados had written enough articles criticizing the neutrality policy to warrant an attempt to establish special commissions to bring charges against those Deputies whose writings were of an especially harmful nature.²⁴

Alfonso XIII sanctioned a law granting amnesty for political crimes which is supportive evidence for Spain's desire to enter the war in 1917 and 1918, in January, 1917. Amnesty was granted for crimes of printing, drawing or using any mechanical form of publicity or of the spoken word in meetings or public manifestations of any type. Certain crimes listed in the Penal Code, crimes of rebellion in which armed force was used, workers' strikes, except when common crimes were committed, the crime of breaking exile, and some electoral crimes, were also given amnesty. Amnesty was granted to soldiers who married without the necessary legal prescriptions and to the officials performing the marriage.

²²The Times (London), February 19, 1916, p. 7.

²³Raymond Carr, Spain: 1808-1939 (Oxford, 1966), p. 537.

²⁴Diario de Sesiones, November 19, 1915, No. 13, p. 327. Among the articles cited as offensive to the German Emperor was a caricature by Deputy Rodrigo Soriano in España Nueva, entitled "Rare Animals."

Those given amnesty were to be immediately freed and those who were outside Spain when the decree was made could return to their country.²⁵ The act appears to have been passed in order to obtain support for the government.

Miguel de Unamuno, who was having troubles with the government in 1914, was openly attacking that government's policy in 1917. In 1914, Unamuno was removed from his post as rector of the University of Salamanca; the removal caused some debate in the Cámara de Diputados.²⁶ On May 27, 1917, in the Plaza de Toros in Madrid, he made a speech attacking the "pusillanimity" of the neutralists "at any cost."²⁷ In May, 1917, the government of García Prieto was in office, the violently pro-Allied government of Romanones having just fallen. The fall of the Romanones government was brought about by opponents of his biased foreign policy; García Prieto was a somewhat pro-German neutralist. Public sympathy was pro-Allied; García Prieto could hardly go against the general sentiment of Spain. He needed the support of Allied sympathizers. His ministry soon fell due to the opposition of the extremely pro-German military juntas. With a weak government, he did not dare reveal the extent to which Spain intended to commit herself in the war because the army would have overthrown him immediately. Unamuno was, therefore, permitted to

²⁵Ibid., January 29, 1917, No. 1, Appendix 1.

²⁶Ibid., November 3, 1914, No. 75, pp. 2075-2077.

²⁷Mousset, La política exterior, p. 273.

express his views in order to pacify the pro-war elements and to gauge the extent of popular feeling for the policies of Romanones. In March, 1918, García Prieto resigned as a result of the political maneuvering of the army's henchman in the Cabinet, Juan de La Cierva. When a new government was finally formed under the Conservative Dato, it, too, ran afoul of the military juntas which Dato was unable to please. In April, 1918, it was known that Unamuno felt that Dato was a "dictator under dictation," due to the influence of La Cierva.²⁸ Unamuno, consciously or unconsciously, was voicing the views of those who were attempting to bring about Spain's entry into World War I. The changed attitude of the government is of some importance in discussing the nature of Spanish thought on neutrality.

The Republican leader Lerroux, a known Allied sympathizer, was continuing his campaign for entrance into the war in February, 1917, when Romanones was still Prime Minister. Lerroux made one of his typical speeches before the Cámara; the speech was debated, but it is an example of the type of speech permitted by the Spanish government in 1917.

No one can be unaware that in the exact moment of exploding [of] the international conflict I made concrete and final declarations expounding my opinion. If you would like to give me tone I would add that I had foreseen

²⁸"The Crisis in Spain," Department of Political Intelligence, Foreign Office, Spain 001, G.T. 04144, April 3, 1918, CAB 24/47, P.R.O.

the war, and thus it is clearly written in the daily "El Radical," organ of my politics, which was still published then.

I have never hidden it; I did not make of it [his] views' inopportune nor provoking parades: but in order to sustain it I have run risks which give to my opinions guarantees of sincerity, and they permit me to relate beforehand with the respect of those who do not share them, how that, . . . , I live and my friends live with me in the most absolute solitude. I am an enemy of Spanish neutrality; I am a partisan of intervention.²⁹

The neutralist position was excellently summarized by the Deputy Alvarez y González, whose views were typical of most neutralists, and may have been those of many.

I differ, on the point of participating in the war, from the respectable opinion sustained by my dear friend Sr. Lerroux; I have never been an interventionist, I have not been a partisan of taking Spain to war. I believe that one goes to war when he sees his territory invaded, or when he feels his honor offended, or when he dreams of territorial accretions, and Spain, fortunately has neither received the first insult, nor has these imperialist ambitions. I have never been a partisan of war.

I am a partisan of neutrality, but of neutrality which is not divorced from respect; because neutrality without respect, is not neutrality: it is a disgrace for the country. Sustaining this, I have always said that neutrality is not an entelechy, nor a vague word, nor a phosphorescent concept: that neutrality is a juridical state which a country adopts as a consequence of its liberty and of its sovereign independence, and that neutrality implies duties. The duties of Spain, the duties as a neutral nation, we have complied with, I believe, to the satisfaction of all the belligerents. I am not suspicious; I was in Paris in the epoch of greatest effervescence against Spain; I spoke with the most eminent politicians, I include the illustrious President of that Republic, and they were satisfied with the neutrality, and they had praises, which made me

²⁹Diario de Sesiones, February 17, 1917, No. 18, p. 513.

proud as a Spaniard, for the King of Spain, whom they considered in that moment as the firmest guarantee that the cordial relations of friendship which exist between that Republic and our country can never be altered. I believe that at present the duties of neutrality are complied with, and in a scrupulous manner, by the Government, and thus I see reflected in the English Press, and in the French Press, and I have even read news items of German newspapers which extol the conduct of the Spanish Government for having taken into practice in a respectable and worthy manner those duties which neutrality implies If we permit the right of neutral nations to be trampled by a superior force, we will not be a nation, we will be degraded people, material of conquest. No; what I ask the Government is that it affirm our rights as a neutral nation, that it make them seem before all the belligerents. But if trampling our rights as a neutral nation, makes difficult that which is the life of the country, if it destroys the property of the country, makes attempts against the lives of our compatriots, for the honor of Spain, make sure that on defending the respect of the country, you defend the life, the independence, the prestige, the authority of Spain as a Nation.³⁰

This speech symbolized the Spanish desire to preserve Spain's glory by preserving her neutrality. It is in opposition to those who counseled dragging Spain into the war. Spain lacked a united opinion even on the issue of neutrality, an issue central to her existence. One of Spain's leading thinkers of the period, the writer Pérez de Ayala, accurately interpreted this lack of political consensus and saw in it the reason for the revolutionary events of 1917.

Why have we not felt obliged to participate in the World War? For lack of universal political conscience. The events of the summer of 1917 provide the most conclusive proof of this absence of political conscience.³¹

³⁰Ibid., p. 518.

³¹Ramón Pérez de Ayala, Escritos políticos, Presentación de Paulino Garagorri, (Madrid, 1967), p. 26.

CHAPTER V.

THE SINKING OF SPANISH SHIPS: VIOLATIONS OF SPANISH NEUTRALITY

By 1917, Spanish ships became prime targets for German submarines. This situation was to lead directly to Spanish interest in joining World War I. The destruction of Spanish ships was so great that entrance into the war became an economic necessity. "Either the Spanish boats sail or asphyxia happens, which for our country is entirely economic ruin and social splitting."¹

During the early period of the war, Spain was not especially concerned about the threat of German submarines. On November 8, 1915, the Minister of State, the Marqués de Lema, claimed that Spain was not affected by the sinking of foreign ships in the Mediterranean.² Two foreign vessels, one English and one Japanese, had been sunk far enough from Spain and her African possessions not to have an immediate effect on Spain.³ The Marqué's speech was opposed by some alarmists who claimed that the war was coming too close to Spain and that the sinkings were too close to Spanish territory for her to feel safe.

¹Conde de Romanones, Notas de una vida (1912-1931), Vol. III of Notas de una vida, 3 vols. (Madrid, 1947), p. 119.

²Diario de Sesiones de Cortes, Cámara de Diputados, November 8, 1915, No. 3, p. 22.

³Ibid.

The attitude of the alarmists became stronger by October, 1915, when the Conde de Romanones pushed a more strongly pro-Allied policy.⁴ Spain still was not greatly alarmed at the threat of German submarines. She was, in fact, actively supplying the submarines. The first German submarines to be sighted in the Atlantic off Spain were seen on July 1, 1915.⁵ English authorities claimed that they obtained gas and provisions off Huelva. German submarines passed the Strait of Gibraltar on November 2, 1915, and were supplied off Cape Tres Forcas.⁶ The Spanish authorities made efforts to control contraband trade with the submarines, especially after a large amount of gas was found in the Guadalquivir and detained by the Civil Governor of Seville.⁷ The Germans had sunk large deposits of bidons in Spanish waters, especially off the Odiel estuary. They were discovered when one bidon became loose and drifted in to the shore.⁸

The state of euphoric acceptance of the presence of the submarines received its first jolt with the sinking of the "Vigo" on April 13, 1916, with only ten minutes notice.⁹ The "Santanderino" was sunk shortly after with no warning. The

⁴Alberto Mousset, La política exterior de España, With a Foreward by the Conde de Romanones, (Madrid, 1918, p. 232.

⁵The Times (London), November 26, 1915, p. 7.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid. April 15, 1916. p. 8.

reaction in Spain to these sinkings included a protest by twelve shipping companies which asked the government to stop sailings if the ships were not protected. It was noted that Spain already lacked ships. The Prime Minister and his Cabinet protested.¹⁰ Two Spanish citizens, Sr. Granados and his wife, died when the "Sussex" was torpedoed.¹¹

On June 2, 1916, one of the most publicized incidents involving a submarine took place when the "U-35" appeared in the port of Cartagena.

This gesture of bravura, necessary perhaps to the credit of Germany after the battle of Jutland (March 31), bothered the allies, who blamed the U-35 for some torpedoings in the Mediterranean, and Spain, for allowing it to rest in that base.¹²

The submarine ostensibly came to deliver a letter from the Kaiser to Alfonso XIII expressing gratitude for Spanish treatment of Germans interned in the Cameroons. The submarine left after one day, but its very appearance violated international law and the Spanish press protested loudly.¹³

In August, 1916, all of the neutral countries protested the use of submarines.¹⁴ The next month, the Allies informed

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Don Melchor Fernández Almagro, Historia del reinado de Don Alfonso XIII, 2nd ed. (Barcelona, 1934), p. 281.

¹³Ibid. See also Mousset, La política, p. 233, and The Times (London), June 29, 1916, p. 7, and September 1, 1916, p. 5.

¹⁴Fernández Almagro, Historia, p. 282.

the Spanish government that submarines had no right to stay in a neutral port for twenty-four hours; Spain delayed reaching a decision.¹⁵ Finally, on August 31, Germany told the Spanish government that no submarines would anchor off the coast or in the ports of Spain.¹⁶ The government soon, however, was faced with the internal protest of the German actions. Groups of seamen informed Romanones that unless their ships were protected, they would suspend the export-import traffic.¹⁷

The protest did not succeed in obtaining effective protection of Spanish ships, however, since on September 15, 1916, the "Luis Vives" was torpedoed; it was the third Spanish ship lost in a two-day period and was carrying an innocuous cargo of melons and onions.¹⁸

By September 27, 1916, the sinkings had begun to cause consternation in the Cortes. Sr. Nougues claimed in the Chamber of Deputies that the government should seize German ships for any Spanish ships sunk. Sr. Domine, in the Senate, a representative of shipping interests, stated that shipping would be suspended if ships were not protected.¹⁹ Spain had lost 30,000 tons of merchant shipping due to German submarines

¹⁵Mousset, La política, p. 233.

¹⁶The Times (London), September 1, 1916, p. 5.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid., September 18, 1916, p. 8. See also Fernández Almagro, Historia, p. 283.

¹⁹Ibid., September 29, 1916, p. 5.

and this loss "estranged Spain gradually from Germany."²⁰
 Spain was quite angry by December 30, 1916, and refused to
 enter peace moves suggested by President Wilson.²¹

Spain felt that her actions as a neutral and her generous
 treatment of German war refugees residing in Spain was such
 that the German sinkings were rude breaches of hospitality.
 On February 9, 1917, ABC, a leading newspaper, stated that the

. . . subjects of Germany, who in the contingencies
 of war have been obliged to come to Spain and to remain
 there, have only found in us evidence of consideration
 and of respect. The least that our conduct merits is to
 be reciprocated; and it is not since the moment in which
 our ships have been sunk near our coasts.²²

In April, the "San Fulgencio," which carried a cargo of
 fruit, was torpedoed.²³ On April 27, in response to the
 sinkings of the "Triana" and the "Patricio," a national junta
 of the reformist party demanded the breaking of diplomatic
 relations with Germany.²⁴

Perhaps the most publicized submarine incident of the
 war involving Spain was not a sinking: it was the internment
 of the "U.C. 52." On June 11, 1917, the German submarine
 "U.C. 52" entered Spanish territorial waters and Spanish

²⁰E. Allison, Peers, ed., Spain: A Companion to Spanish Studies (London, 1929), p. 258.

²¹The New York Times Current History: The European War, (New York, 1917), X, 791-792.

²²ABC (Madrid), April 9, 1917, quoted in Mousset, p. 239.

²³Fernández Almagro, Historia, p. 287.

²⁴Ibid., p. 289.

warships escorted it to Cadiz. The submarine had damaged its starting motors and was unable to navigate.²⁵ The British Vice-Consul in Cadiz suggested that Sir Arthur Hardinge try to get the submarine interned.²⁶ Spain, however, applied the rules of the Thirteenth Hague Convention of 1907 which governed belligerent warships in neutral ports, and allowed the "U.C. 52" to leave.²⁷ As a result of the affair, a royal decree was issued regulating the entry of belligerent submarines in Spanish ports. Submarines of any class were not to be allowed in Spanish territorial waters. Any submarines found in these waters would be interned until the end of the war. Neutral submarines in Spanish waters should sail on the surface and have their flags flying.²⁸

²⁵Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), speech of 9 August 1917, 5th ser., Vol. 97 (6 August-21 August 1917), pp. 579-580.

²⁶Telegram, The Consul at Seville (Gracey) to the Secretary of State, June 12, 1917, 3:00 P.M., Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917, Supp. 2, II, 1289.

²⁷Parliamentary Debates, Vol 97, p. 580. Telegram, The Ambassador in Spain (Willard) to the Secretary of State, June 22, 1917, 11:00 P.M., Telegram 631, Foreign Relations, 1917, World War, II, 1289-1290, and Telegram, The Ambassador in Spain (Willard) to the Secretary of State, June 29, 1917, 10:00 P.M., Telegram 648, p. 1292, Ibid.

²⁸Royal decree, quoted in Mousset, La política, p. 247. See also Fernández Almagro, Historia, p. 300, n. 1 and Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 97, p. 580.

The first test of the new decree came on June 29, 1917, when the "U.B. 23" entered harbor for repairs. The ship was duly interned in accord with the decree.²⁹ In September, 1917, the damaged "U-293" put in at Cádiz and was interned. Its wireless was removed and the munitions on the ship were unloaded. The commander of the ship gave his word that he and his company would not try to escape, but on October 6, 1917, the "U-293" bolted Cádiz harbor and escaped.³⁰ Violation of its parole by "U-293" affected Spanish public opinion and German failure to return the submarine threatened to align Spain more firmly with the Allies.³¹ On October 24, 1917, it was announced in the House of Commons that Britain "expressed concern" to Spain over the incident and hoped that Spain would prevent a repetition of the escape by other submarines.³² In Britain speculation was rife that the Germans may have bought off the Spanish Cabinet members in affairs concerning the "U-293" as nothing more was heard of the escaped submarine.³³

²⁹Telegram, The Ambassador in Spain (Willard) to the Secretary of State, July 31, 1917, 2:00 P.M., Telegram 714, Foreign Relations 1917, World War, II, 1293, Parliamentary Debates, Vol 97, p. 580, and Fernández Almagro, Historia, 300, n. 1.

³⁰Thomas A. Bailey, The Policy of the United States Toward the Neutrals, 1917-1918 (Gloucester, Mass., 1966), p. 283.

³¹J.C.B., Weekly Report on Spain XIII, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/O12, G.T. -2418, October 26, 1917, CAB 24/30, P.R.O.

³²Parliamentary Debates, Vol 98, p. 805.

³³Weekly Report on Spain XIV, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/O15, G.T. -2973, December 13, 1917, CAB 24/35, P.R.O.

From November, 1917, to January, 1918, Germany began to add to her submarine "blockade" of Spain. She increased the dangers of navigation between Spain and America by extending her blockade zone west of England until it included the Azores. She abolished the "channel" left free for Spanish navigation to Greece. Spanish ships were unable to go near the western African coast and communications with the Canary Islands and Spanish Equatorial Africa were disrupted. Much of Spain's trade with her colonies was interrupted.³⁵

Another Spanish ship was torpedoed in December, 1917, with some lives lost.³⁶ Spain began, in 1918, seriously to consider interning the crews of German refugee vessels felt to be helping the submarines.³⁷ On February 19, 1918, the German Ambassador to Madrid told the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs that Germany would sink any ships trading "directly or indirectly" with the Allies.³⁸ Infuriated by the whole question of sinkings, Spain on February 21, 1918, published three notes which had been sent to Germany about the sinkings. The first, a result of the sinking of the "Duca di Genova," demanded respect for Spanish territorial waters. The second, concerning the sinking of the "Giralda,"

³⁵Mousset, La política, pp. 251-252.

³⁶Weekly Report on Spain XV, Department of Information Intelligence Bureau FSW/O15, G.T. -2973, December 13, 1917, CAB 24/35, P.R.O.

³⁷Weekly Report on Spain XVI, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/O16, G.T. 3291, January 9, 1918, CAB 24/38, P.R.O.

³⁸War Cabinet 350, Minute 8, Feb. 20, 1918, 11:30 A.M., CAB 23/5 P.R.O.

required German recognition of Spain's right to regulate coastwise traffic. The sinking of the "Ceferino" led to a request for an explanation; she also wanted to know the veracity of reports that the "Negur" had been sunk.³⁹

In 1918, Spain began to move closer to the Allies. Spain and the United States, on March 8, 1918, ratified an agreement which allowed General Pershing to obtain army supplies from Spain.⁴⁰ Britain and Spain entered negotiations concerning the number of German officers controlling native troops on the island of Fernando Po; these officers were felt by the Allies to be in a position to communicate with German submarines. Spain promised to bring the officers to Spain. She also promised not to let a newly interned German refugee submarine escape.⁴¹ The crew of another German submarine was interned at Santander and some concern was felt in Britain that the men might be transmitting wireless signals. The British Vice-Consul carefully watched the situation, but was unable to determine the facts.⁴² By August, Britain was

³⁹The New York Times Current History, (New York, 1918), XV, 29.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 9.

⁴¹Memorandum on Spain," Foreign Office, Political Intelligence Department Spain OO/2, G.T. -4377, April 25, 1918, CAB 24/49.

⁴²Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 109, p. 1138.

trying to get the submarine commander interned in the interior of Spain, rather than in Santander.⁴³

Germany suddenly broke out with a rash of attacks on Spanish ships. She sank the "Mar Baltico" and she sank four more ships within a short time. On July 11, 1918, the "Roberto," sailing from Piraeus to Barcelona, sank taking with her Don Andrés López Muñoz, the minister plenipotentiary of Spain in Athens. The "Ramón de Larrinaga," traveling from New York to Santander, was sunk on July 13, killing eight crewmen. The ship was openly flying the Spanish flag.⁴⁴

Spain, reacting furiously, announced, in August, her intention to substitute German ships in Spanish ports for all Spanish ships sunk after publication of the announcement, to compensate for losses in her merchant marine, which amounted to twenty per cent of the total amount of its tonnage.⁴⁵ She also decided, on August 21, 1918, to confiscate all German steamships in Spanish ports.⁴⁶

⁴³Ibid., p. 906.

⁴⁴This account is largely taken from Fernández Almagro, Historia, p. 334.

⁴⁵Ibid. See also "Memorandum on The Situation in Spain, with special reference to the Republican agitation and the Regionalist Question," Foreign Office, Political Intelligence Department Spain /006, December 6, 1918, G.T. -6490, CAB 24/71, P.R.O.

⁴⁶The New York Times Current History, (New York, 1919), XVII, 115.

British-Spanish relations received a minor blow when the Allies told the Dutch, Swedish, Norwegian, Danish, and Spanish governments in September, 1918, that neutral ships sailing with an enemy safe-conduct could be detained; Britain, possibly because of her attempts to get Spain into the war, was not particularly in favor of this.⁴⁷ In addition, Germany attempted to compensate Spain for her losses by the delivery of several ships. The Allies felt that the transfer was invalid because Germany had rights of ultimate recovery; the Spaniards felt that the compensation was less than Dato and Romanones wanted.⁴⁸ England began at this time to try to make Spain take action on the shipping situation, preferably by breaking diplomatic relations, but the Spanish government, fearing internal troubles, delayed acting.⁴⁹ When the armistice arrived on November 11, Spain was still negotiating with Germany on the ship sinkings.⁵⁰

Estimates of Spanish shipping losses during the war vary, although most tend to estimate the loss at about 100,000 tons of the merchant marine. One source states that Spain lost

⁴⁷Edgar Turlington, The World War Period, Vol. III of Neutrality: Its History, Economic and Law, 4 Vols. (New York, 1936), p. 98.

⁴⁸Memorandum on The Situation in Spain, with special references to the Republican agitation and the Regionalist Question, Foreign Office, Political Intelligence Department Spain/006, G.T. -6490, CAB 24/71, P.R.O.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Fernández Almagro, Historia, p. 335.

1,000,000 tons,⁵¹ and another that Spain lost sixty-five ships, amounting to a total of 139,402 tons.⁵² The Conde de Romanones, in his memoirs, lists thirty-one boats as having been sunk by German mines or submarines.⁵³ Another estimate places the loss at sixty-seven ships sunk by submarines in the war zones, amounting to 145,412 tons valued at \$28,074,288 and eight ships, amounting to 17,130 tons, worth \$4,092,964, destroyed by mines. Total cargo losses amounted to about \$9,000,000.⁵⁴ One Spanish ship was condemned by the French Prize Court for carrying contraband; but most condemnations of Spanish ships were made by British and German courts.⁵⁵ The British held three Spanish ships totalling 5,787 tons, but did not condemn them.⁵⁶ The Germans condemned thirty Spanish ships, totalling 60,356 tons of \$17,948,975 value.⁵⁷ The most recent estimates put the loss at about 170,000 gross tons of shipping due to German sinkings or about one-fifth of the merchant marine. The total loss due to submarines was 152,387 tons lost and 16,104 tons lost by mines.⁵⁸

⁵¹Peers, Spain, p. 268.

⁵²Fernández Almagro, Historia, p. 335.

⁵³Romanones, Notas, p. 117.

⁵⁴Turlington, Neutrality, Vol. III, p. 63, 65.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 25, n. 53.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 26.

⁵⁷Ibid., pp. 25-26, n. 55.

⁵⁸Bailey, Policy, p. 273. See also note 2, Ibid.

Spain had reason to be upset by her losses, as her merchant marine was the smallest of those of the neutral nations.⁵⁹ The sinkings, as shown, had risen to such alarming proportions that Spain, in 1917 and 1918, was given ample reason for entering the war. In addition to her submarine losses, Spain's neutral rights were violated extensively. As a nation noted for its pride in its national heritage and glory, Spain was not about to accept such open insults easily.

German espionage was extensive throughout the war; German spies were particularly interested in the use of Spain as a base from which to observe French ships and to obtain news from France.⁶⁰ The chief centers for espionage were Galicia, Bilbao, Málaga, Algeciras, and Barcelona.⁶¹ Sub rosa German activities also involved the use of the Spanish zone in Morocco as a base for attacks on the French zone.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 273.

⁶⁰Romanones, p. 114.

⁶¹Ibid. One of the more famous spies of the war was the Baron de Koenig, whose true name may have been Colman. He replaced one Bravo Portillo as a police agent for the Captain-General of Barcelona; Bravo Portillo was convicted of espionage. After the war, de Koenig became involved in worker agitation to force suspension of the Constitutional guarantees and ruin the civil government. The Captain-General would then be the major force in Barcelona. Koenig achieved his hold over the Barcelona factory owners by blackmailing them. Gerald Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the Social and Political Background of the Civil War (Cambridge, 1950), p. 69.

These maneuvers had two ends: to excite to rebellion the Moorish caudillos who were enemies of France, providing them arms and money, and to succeed in getting the cabilas to proclaim Muley Haffid Sultan, resident at that season in our Motherland, which would have been equivalent to a general insurrection of Morocco not only against France, but against Spain equally.⁶²

The Germans began the war by violating Spanish neutrality in a manner that aroused Spanish ire. During the night of August 20-21, 1914, German troops in Liège, after spending some time in the taverns, began shooting at the house containing the shop of the Oliver brothers, members of a Mallorcan family. In the ensuing confusion, the house was burned. The Oliver family and some dependents, among them some children, were taken prisoner. The women and children were separated; the men were taken to the University plaza and shot with machine-guns. Don Antonio Oliver's wife and children were set free the next day. They went to the Spanish consul, who, to console them, claimed that the brothers had been interned in Germany. The government also believed the consul and failed to obtain reparations.⁶³ Several versions of the story circulated. One claimed that a colony of Russian students in the Oliver house fired on the Germans, causing the incident; the other claimed that some Russians had left Liège and, after the situation in the city had reached some stability, the Oliver brothers returned and opened their shops. The Germans then invaded the homes of the city's inhabitants.⁶⁴

⁶²Romanones, p. 114.

⁶³Diario de Sesiones, November 10, 1914, No. 81, p. 2285

⁶⁴Ibid., November 12, 1914, No. 83, p. 2354.

Spain first heard of the incident from a telegram sent by the Spanish ambassador in London. The Spanish government then sent a telegram to its ambassador in Berlin. The telegram informed the Germans that Spain had heard the German soldiers had shot five Spaniards and held five "incommunicado." Information and help for the Spaniards were requested.⁶⁵ After receiving definite news, Spain determined to get reclamation."⁶⁶ The Germans denied any shootings, but admitted to having mistaken five Spaniards for Russians. They had been sent to Germany, but Germany would return them. Germany promised to give satisfaction for any shootings. The Spanish government asked the Minister Plenipotentiary in Brussels to investigate the whole affair.⁶⁷ The incidents led to a debate in the Cortes over the nature of Spanish neutrality, with claims being made that Germany did not respect Spanish rights.⁶⁸

Other German atrocities in Belgium did not escape the notice of the Spaniards. Supposedly, fifty German soldiers sacked the house of Don Miguel Rolland; they gave special attention to the wine cellar. The house of Don Narciso

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 2358.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 2359.

⁶⁷Ibid., pp. 2359-2360

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 2366.

Torres, which flew the Spanish flag, was hit by two bombs. A certain Padre Torres, aged seventy-five, died of emotion and, while dying, blamed the Germans for his condition. The house of a Sr. Antonio was burned, causing the death of one M. Torres and the wounding of his eleven-year-old daughter. The firm of Montaner and Co. suffered a 5,000,000 franc loss when it was bombarded. The Cortes also recorded the abuse of two Spaniards in the Saint'Guiense district.⁶⁹ On November 28, 1914, Sr. Belaunde brought to the attention of the Chamber the fact that three Asturian workers who had gone to France had been German prisoners since the war's outbreak.⁷⁰

German authorities destroyed the site of a statue in Brussels of the Spanish radical Francisco Ferrer, who was executed before the war. A group of radicals informed the civil Governor of Barcelona that it intended to hold a protest meeting. A Carlist group then informed him that it would meet to protest the protest. The exasperated Civil Governor obtained government approval not to authorize either meeting.⁷¹ The Governor's action was protested by

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 2360. All of these cases are recorded here.

⁷⁰Ibid., November 28, 1914, No. 97, p. 2901.

⁷¹Ibid., January 30, 1915, No. 129, p. 4019.

the liberal groups in the Cortes, leading to considerable futile debate.⁷² A similar meeting in San Sebastián, held in favor of peace in general, was also prohibited.⁷³

Still more German-inspired agitation was brewing. On January 29, 1915, the German consul organized a demonstration in favor of Germany; the demonstration would be held on the Kaiser's birthday. The Deputy Soriano declared that if the Carlists demonstrated in favor of Germany, the Liberals would also demonstrate.⁷⁴ With the support of various radical groups, the government prohibited both meetings.⁷⁵ Many radicals felt that the German Consul was responsible for an outbreak of student disturbances at this time.⁷⁶

Many Germans fleeing from Allied colonies took refuge in Spain, but they aroused resentment in the country. Their presence was considered offensive to Spanish workers, who protested.⁷⁷ Anti-German feeling had not diminished by 1916, when the Germans were blamed for attempting to spread "Kultur" in Spain.⁷⁸

⁷²Ibid., pp. 4019-4021.

⁷³Ibid., p. 4022.

⁷⁴The Times (London), February 1, 1915, p. 7.

⁷⁵Ibid., February 3, 1915, p. 7 and February 4, 1915, p. 7.

⁷⁶Ibid., February 17, 1915, p. 7.

⁷⁷Ibid., February 6, 1915, p. 7.

⁷⁸Ibid., February 26, 1915, p. 5.

Little is heard of German activities in Spain in 1917. This may in part be due to Germany's need to concentrate her efforts upon justification of her submarine policy. That some intrigue was carried on throughout the period is evidenced by the fact that by 1918 the Germans were entrenched firmly enough in the Spanish munitions factories to be organizing strikes.⁷⁹ Early in 1918, Germany was still intriguing in the Spanish zone of Morocco in a desperate attempt to start a "holy war" to free Morocco from France. This intrigue had lasted throughout the war.⁸⁰

German violations of Spanish neutrality, especially the sinkings of Spanish ships, were so flagrant that some action was needed. Spain could not afford to have her honor insulted and her merchant marine destroyed. By 1917, Spain was in a position which required her consideration of entrance into the war. The sinking of Spanish ships almost drew Spain into the war. She was able to stay out only by the most strenuous effort.

⁷⁹Brenan, Spanish Labyrinth, p. 68.

⁸⁰"Memorandum on Spain," Foreign Office, Political Intelligence Department, Spain 00/2, April 25, 1918, G.T. -4377, CAB 24/49, P.R.O.

CHAPTER VI

THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT AND THE WAR

The government of Spain during World War I was a constitutional monarchy struggling to survive. The Republicans wished to abolish the monarchy; the monarchists, especially the extreme Carlists, longed to abolish the parliament. The king was faced with the confrontation of his personal desire to be a strong ruler and his oath, taken upon his accession to the throne, of loyalty to the constitution. This conflict was to weaken Alfonso's government and was of some influence in its eventual decline. The young monarch's problem appeared almost immediately after he attained his majority in 1902.

Upon meeting his ministers for the first time after taking his oath of allegiance, Alfonso stated that he reserved to himself the right to confer titles. The ministers were offended and one, the duke of Veragua, mentioned that ministers must sign royal mandates in order to make them effective. Alfonso was faced with an immediate lack of communication with his ministers.¹

Alfonso succeeded to his throne after one of the longest regencies in history. He was a posthumous child and his mother

¹Rhea Marsh Smith, Spain: A Modern History (Ann Arbor, 1965), p. 386.

ruled until he was of age. During the regency of María Cristina, the ministers were influential; Alfonso had to counteract this influence upon his accession.

Alfonso's government was established under the constitution of 1876, which was formulated after the Bourbon restoration. It established a bicameral legislature, which, with the king, had the power of making laws. Deputies in the lower house, the Cámara de Diputados, were popularly elected.²

The monarchy consisted of two sovereignties, the king and the Cortes. The sovereignty of the monarch was theoretically above political debate. The system itself, established by Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, was unable to resolve the conflict which eventually developed between king and Cortes. The Cortes itself, as established by the constitution of 1876, with the king, possessed legislative power. The constitution which created this situation lasted until 1923, when Primo de Rivera came to power. Ministers were responsible to the Cortes, although they were appointed by the king. Cánovas hoped in establishing his constitution to ensure parliamentary control of the governmental apparatus.³

What he ensured was conflict between king and Cortes; during the war years the king was in partial ascendancy, with the Cortes in temporary eclipse due to its internal divisions.

²Ibid., p. 369.

³Raymond Carr, Spain: 1808-1939 (Oxford, 1966), p. 349.

The turno pacífico, the rotation of the major parties in office, was eventually to collapse. From 1914 to 1918, the parliamentary system was so weak that military rule threatened to establish itself permanently. The rotation of the parties in power prevented the adoption of more than a neutral attitude concerning the war. When a change in foreign policy appeared imminent in 1917, the military arranged the fall of the government involved and, unable to force the country to adopt its own sympathies toward the belligerents, confirmed it in its unenthusiastic neutrality.

At the beginning of World War I, the Conservative Eduardo Dato was in office and his policy of neutrality was generally accepted. The first signs of trouble were appearing, however. On December 11, 1914, the Minister of Public Instruction and Fine Arts, Sr. Bergamin, resigned, accusing the Conde de Romanones of trying to get Spain involved in the war.⁴ A new minister was appointed and Alfonso XIII expressed his confidence in Dato.⁵ No sooner was this crisis ended than Dato was faced with a regional conflict which added to parliamentary division. In January, 1915, the government suppressed a meeting, the Assembly of Diputaciones, which was to be held in Valladolid, partly on the grounds that the Assembly was an

⁴The Times (London), December 12, 1914, p. 7.

⁵Ibid.

attempt of Castille to control the other areas of Spain.⁶ The trouble began when a provincial deputy of Valladolid gave a conference in the Ateneo of Valladolid concerning the possible development of neutral zones in Spain and the inclusion of wheat and cereal growing areas in these zones. The government prohibited any further meetings of the "deputies."⁷ They protested, claiming that Castille's liberties were violated because they could not meet.⁸ The Castilian deputy in the Cortes, Sr. Silió, bitterly attacked the Catalanian deputies and blamed them for the affair.⁹ Castille had the support of other provinces hostile to Catalonia.¹⁰ The entire dispute appears to have been one of Spain's recurrent outbreaks of provincial rivalry between the industrial interests of Catalonia and the agricultural interests of Castille. The government, in turn, maintained that the Assembly was an illegal body giving itself the powers of a legal body, those of a government agency.¹¹ The government could legally stop "any infraction of the Constitution."¹² Provincial deputies

⁶Diario de Sesiones de Cortes, Cámara de Diputados, January 18, 1915, No. 119, p. 3740.

⁷Ibid., p. 3741.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 3743.

¹¹Ibid., p. 3748.

¹²Ibid.

could not send individual or collective petitions to the king, the Cortes, or any other authorities.¹³ Silió then pointed out that similar meetings elsewhere were not suppressed and lengthy debate ensued in the Cortes.¹⁴ Dato prepared the basis for future conflict when he attacked the militarist minister La Cierva for using government authority in the closing of the Assembly.

For that reason S.S. [His Excellency], Sr. Cierva, is a partisan of authoritarian Governments, and I am a partisan of that liberal policy which, within the dogma of the conservative party we are realizing, His Excellency considers dangerous, suicidal, fatal, and therefore he advises us that we are not equal to circumstances, therefore he fears that we, with those condescensions which he supposes unnecessary and wide, are abandoning the most important resorts of the home affairs of the State and even the national defense.¹⁵

A vote of confidence in the Assembly issue supported the government.¹⁶ In June, Alfonso signed a decree ordering Dato and his ministry to remain in power.¹⁷ The Liberal-Conservative ministry fell in October, 1915, over political matters unrelated to international concerns, but Dato remained in power.¹⁸ Dato's control of the government was not to last

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid., January 19, 1915, No. 120, p. 3761.

¹⁵Ibid., January 20, 1915, No. 121, p. 3805.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 3814.

¹⁷The Times (London), June 25, 1915, p. 7.

¹⁸Ibid., October 25, 1915, p. 7. See also Don Melchor Fernández Almagro, Historia del reinado de Don Alfonso XIII, 2nd ed. (Barcelona, 1934), p. 278 and Alberto Mousset, La política exterior de

long, however. On December 9, 1915, his government fell and a new Liberal Cabinet under the Conde de Romanones was formed.¹⁹ Dato's resignation was the result of Romanones' opposition to some proposed military reforms; Dato felt that he needed the support of all groups for his reform bill. The clash of interests was concerned chiefly with the numbers and composition of the General Staff, which was finally created on December 27, 1915.²⁰ The new General Staff was a reform of the Committee of National Defense, which had been headed by the infamous General Weyler.²¹

In April, 1916, elections were held and the two parties leading in votes were the two major opposing parties, the Liberals and Conservatives.²² In May, Romanones changed his Cabinet to ensure that all of the ministers were his supporters.²³ The new cabinet was unable to solve the problems which came before it and in June, 1916, it resigned over a loan failure.²⁴

More headaches came to Romanones when the highly influential Antonio Maura began speaking out on neutrality in September, 1916. Maura felt Spain should stay neutral, but that eventually she would need to join the Allies. Although some

¹⁹The Times (London), December 10, 1915, p. 7 and Fernández Almagro, Historia, p. 274.

²⁰The Times (London), December 28, 1915, p. 6.

²¹Ibid. January 26, 1916, p. 7.

²²Ibid. April 5, 1916, p. 7.

²³Ibid., May 2, 1916, p. 8. ²⁴Ibid., June 23, 1916, p. 7.

of his own supporters objected to joining England and France in the war, Maura's opinions were widely publicized.²⁵

Government opponents also attacked Romanones because the merchant fleet had already lost 80,000 tons of shipping. Pro-German propaganda claimed that Romanones was profiting from the war and the contraband trade must be stopped.²⁶

The problems of the Liberal government in 1916 were minor, however, when compared to the problems of governing in 1917. Spain had four governments in just one year. Briefly, the Romanones government was weakened by military juntas constituted in 1916, and, in April, 1917, the Marqués de Alhucemas succeeded Romanones. In June, 1917, the Junta de Defensa issued a manifesto declaring its aims and calling for governmental reforms. The military action in June brought about the resignation of Alhucemas and Eduardo Dato again became Prime Minister. Dato recognized the juntas, but was still unable to control the government. He lost power in October, 1917. After a period of instability, Alhucemas succeeded in forming a ministry in November, 1917.²⁷

Various interpretations have been given for the crisis of 1917. The crisis has been blamed on the high cost of living

²⁵Ibid., September 13, 1916, p. 10, September 14, 1916, p. 5, and September 15, 1916, p. 5.

²⁶Smith, Spain, p. 396.

²⁷E. Allison Peers, editor, Spain: A Companion to Spanish Studies (London, 1929), p. 259.

and the growing importance of the industrial workers.²⁸ It has been blamed on the boom in war profits which changed the economic structure. The big landowners lost their political power; they did not represent the Spanish population, anyway. Businessmen, workers, and the middle classes combined to revolt against the existing system.²⁹ Another interpretation holds that Catalan extremists, the army, the Republicans, and the workers' groups tried forcible reforms through the Assembly Movement. The governmental system pitted these groups against each other. Democratic change of the system became impossible. This was the reason not only for the 1917 crisis, but also, in part, for the fall of the monarchy in 1931. World War I and its results ruined the monarchy, which received its death blow from the failure of the Moroccan war.³⁰ According to this interpretation, Romanones resigned in April 1917, because of the submarine issue.³¹

The position of the Spanish army in 1917 was that of an extremely powerful political elite which had the advantage of its command of the force to support its desires. Spain established conscription in 1912; the main feature of the Spanish

²⁸Pierre Vilar, Spain: A Brief History, translated by Brian Tate (Oxford, 1967), p. 62.

²⁹Edward Conze, Spain To-Day: Revolution and Counter-Revolution (New York, 1936?), pp. 82-83.

³⁰Carr, Spain, p. 497.

³¹Carr, p. 500.

system of compulsory military service was that purchased exemptions were prohibited.³² In 1912, the army consisted of 12,000 officers and 100,000 men.³³ By 1923 there was a doubling of the number of officers and men.³⁴ The army's strength grew until, in 1917, it was able to threaten the entire political establishment of Spain. As World War I dragged on, the civilian population of Spain was confronted with economic hardship and governmental inability to maintain order under demoralizing conditions. As the civilians became more hostile to the monarchy, Alfonso XIII became increasingly conservative and turned to his military advisers for support. That he would do so was natural, since he had been largely educated by the military.³⁵ He started to rely on the military to keep him in power.³⁶ The government began to push for military and naval construction. In February, 1915, it approved the strengthening of the navy by the construction within six years of four cruisers, six destroyers,

³²Smith, p. 394.

³³Gerald Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the Social and Political Background of the Civil War (Cambridge, 1950), p. 60.

³⁴Ibid. There were 25,000 officers and 200,000 men.

³⁵J. L. Castillo-Puche, editor, Diario intimo de Alfonso XIII (Madrid, 1961), p. 475.

³⁶Rafael Altamira, A History of Spain From the Beginnings to the Present Day, 2nd ed., translated by Muna Lee (Toronto, Princeton, N. J., London and New York, 1958), p. 603.

twenty-three submarines, three gunboats, and eighteen coastal defense vessels.³⁷ The press was requested by the government to refrain from commenting on military and naval preparations. The establishment of censorship was brandished by the government as a weapon to be used if journalistic discussion of such topics did occur.³⁸

By November, 1916, the civilian politicians were afraid to try controlling the army's powers; they especially avoided changing its budget.³⁹ The army began to organize itself into juntas de defensa.⁴⁰ The Madrid junta was formed in January, 1917.⁴¹ The center of the juntas was, however, in radical Barcelona.⁴²

The juntas were somewhat anachronistic creations of the officer class. "They resembled more the condottieri of Renaissance Italy than the officer corps of a modern European army."⁴³ They were to radically change Spain's history during

³⁷The Times (London), February 23, 1915, p. 7.

³⁸Ibid., June 10, 1915, p. 7.

³⁹Carr, p. 559.

⁴⁰Fernández Almagro, Historia, p. 290.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 291

⁴²Manuel Ciges Aparicio, España bajo la dinastía de los Borbones (Madrid, 1932), p. 418.

⁴³Dante A. Puzzo, Spain and the Great Powers: 1936-1941 (New York and London, 1962), p. 13.

the war period; such change, in view of the traditional role of the army in Spanish history since the Carlist wars, should have been expected.

"Since the middle decades of the nineteenth century the army in Spain has constituted an imperium in imperio and has acted as the ultimate arbiter of the political destinies of the nation."⁴⁴

The juntas de defensa began the 1917 crisis. These juntas were the result of protest among officers under the rank of colonel against the generals and politicians. They objected to low wages and political promotions. Essentially, they were an attempt to imitate the élite officers' groups of the artillery. Romanones tried to force the use of proficiency tests on the officers, establishing seniority as the basis for promotion, thereby alienating the artillery. He got the Captain-General of Barcelona to dissolve the juntas. An officers' strike was started and, upon the eventual arrest of the officers, the Manifesto of June, 1917 was issued.⁴⁵ The army was convinced that the government needed reforms, which it outlined in the manifesto.⁴⁶

The interpretation given to events at the time was that Romanones felt that entering the war was essential and resigned.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Ciges Aparicio, España, p. 419.

⁴⁶Carr, Spain, pp. 500-501. The general interpretation given above is Carr's and is developed extensively in his work. See

The Allies had put pressure on him and he was angry with Germany's submarine policy. The Liberal Party failed to support his stand, so he resigned, leaving the position to the Liberal neutralist García Prieto, Marqués de Alhucemas. The loss of position then left the situation open for further crisis.⁴⁷

Actually, the reasons for the resignation were somewhat more complex. The German blockade led to the fall of the Liberal government and a price rise which was succeeded by a number of serious labor troubles.⁴⁸ The major cause of the resignation of the Cabinet appears, however, to have been German violation of Spanish rights on the seas.⁴⁹ Romanones himself resigned" declaring that acquiescence in Germany's ruthless submarine campaign was endangering the very life of the Spanish Nation and that Spain should forthwith join the Entente Allies."⁵⁰

The new government of García Prieto was weak because the army, still protesting loudly, gave no support to the Liberals.

We agreed at the beginning of these lines, that the only power of the State which rules in Spain (apparently) is the executive Power, and the executive Power rules because it avails itself of the armed forces to enforce its

⁴⁷Manuel de J. Galván, "Spain and the World War," The New York Times Current History: The European War, (New York, 1917), XIII, 60.

⁴⁸Harold Livermore, A History of Spain (London, 1958), p. 415.

⁴⁹Joseph A. Brandt, Toward the New Spain (Chicago, 1933), p. 363.

⁵⁰The New York Times Current History, Vol. XIII, 22-23.

decisions. But I direct your attention to the fact that the infantry branch of the Spanish army determined to constitute itself in juntas of defense, with the purpose of avoiding certain arbitrarinesses of the executive Power and of governing now on its own account and own design. This was worth as much as it autonomizes itself and untying itself, for certain effects, from the obedience to the executive Power. The Juntas presented a regulation, and it is said that the liberal Government of señor García Prieto refused to approve it, defending the prerogatives of the civil Power. What has passed behind the scenes no one knows. The characteristic of 'public' life in Spain is that it always develops in 'secret.' It is said that the Juntas, or it would be better to say, the Junta Central, which resides in Barcelona, maintained in entirety its claims. It is said that the infantry meant as much as they asked. Meanwhile, living Spain has remained with its soul in suspense, and imagine how official Spain would get along. Because an executive Power without armed force, what is it? The oligarchs say now that normality has been reestablished. But the rest of the Spaniards think that the castle of cards has begun to lose its center of gravity and that it totters from its base -- because it does not have foundations -- even to the weathervane.⁵¹

The army persisted in demanding the freedom of all arrested officers and official recognition of the juntas. The Junta superior circulated instructions to the regional juntas concerning various methods of effectuating the army's threats.⁵² A Reglamento was established for the juntas, but the ministry disagreed over its final approval.⁵³

On June 9, 1917, García Prieto's government fell and on June 11, 1917, Eduardo Dato became Prime Minister.⁵⁴ The Dato

⁵¹Ramón Pérez de Ayala, Escritos políticos, Presentación de Paulino Garagorri (Madrid, 1967), pp. 48-49.

⁵²Fernández Almagro, Historia, p. 294.

⁵³Ibid., p. 298 and Ciges Aparicio, España, p. 419.

⁵⁴Ciges Aparicio, España, p. 419 and The New York Times Current History, XII, p. 23.

ministry approved the reglamento, which by its mere existence, recognized the juntas. The Junta of Defense of the Infantry issued a public manifesto agitating against it.⁵⁵ Dato suspended the Constitutional guarantees. The Cortes had not yet been dissolved and the leftists demanded that it meet. The "Assembly" met on July 19, 1917 in Barcelona to get the Cortes convoked as a constituent assembly. The group consisted largely of regionalists, especially Catalan separatists, reformists, radicals, and socialists.⁵⁶ Roughly eighty people met.⁵⁷ Most of the regular parties boycotted the meeting.⁵⁸ The Assembly was dissolved and the result of the dissolution was a general strike which broke out on August 13, 1917.⁵⁹ When the strike broke out, affairs in Spain had reached such a state that the security of the government was not assured. Lord Robert Cecil, on June 18, 1917, in the British House of Commons, refused to give out any information concerning the situation in Spain; he claimed that he had only the information which he obtained from newspapers.⁶⁰ The British government apparently

⁵⁵Smith, Spain, p. 398.

⁵⁶Vilar, Spain, p. 85.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Carr, Spain, p. 503.

⁵⁹Ciges, Aparicio, España, p. 419.

⁶⁰Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 5th ser., Vol 94. (5 June 1917-22 June 1917), p. 1431.

did not want to attract attention to its behavior in regard to Spain. Spain appeared to be on the verge of a military coup d'état which threatened to throw Spanish support to the Central Powers. Possibly, Britain, as the speech indicates, simply was unsure of the Spanish situation.

A number of civil juntas of defense were organized by public employees; these were used by various political leaders, such as Cambó, the Catalan separatist, and Lerroux, the Republican, for their own ends.⁶¹ They added to the confusion which arose from the strike. The strike collapsed after three days. Seventy people were killed, hundreds were wounded, and over 2,000 prisoners were taken.⁶² The juntas lost strength, the leaders were incarcerated, and the army officers retained their power.

The strike demonstrated the growing weakness of the constitutional monarchy, especially the weakness of the fabricated two-party system of government. The turno político could function only with a limited number of parties; Spain had a myriad of conflicting political groups. By July, 1917, the system was noticeably declining. The Conservative party, Dato's party, had an extreme conservative wing called the Maurista faction, which supported Antonio Maura and opposed Dato. The Liberals divided their allegiance between Romanones

⁶¹Smith, Spain, p. 398.

⁶²Brenan, Labyrinth, p. 65.

and García Prieto. The Republicans were gaining strength and in doing so weakened the king. It was obvious that some reform in the governmental system was necessary.⁶³

By October, 1917, the Dato government was somewhat steadier than it had been during the summer, due to its concessions to the army.⁶⁴ Economic negotiations with Britain, begun during the Romanones ministry, were resumed.⁶⁵ In late October, constitutional rights were restored and it appeared to contemporary observers that the Spanish situation was becoming quieter.⁶⁶ The appearances were deceptive, however. Dato quarreled with the German ambassador over the internment of German submarines and German violations of international law in Belgium.⁶⁷ The juntas remained influential. In October, 1917, Alfonso XIII admitted to the Italian ambassador that his government virtually had to follow the policy of the military.⁶⁸

In late October, 1917, Dato fell from office, partly because of his attempts to negotiate an Anglo-Spanish trade agreement at Germany's behest.⁶⁹ The new ministry was headed by

⁶³Weekly Report on Spain, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/008, G.T. -1511, July 25, 1917, CAB 24/21, P.R.O.

⁶⁴Weekly Report on Spain, XI, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/013, G.T. -2228, October 4, 1917, CAB 24/28, P.R.O.

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Weekly Report on Spain XIII, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/013, G.T. -2540, November 7, 1917, CAB 24/31, P.R.O.

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸Ibid.

García Prieto, whose ministry was made untenable by the militarist Juan de La Cierva, a man who "was grateful to the Military Juntas of Defense."⁷⁰ La Cierva was the only important politician in the new Cabinet. His appointment was demanded by the military, since he was their avowed supporter. His views fell between those of the Dato conservatives and the extreme Maurist reactionaries.⁷¹ The first civilian to serve as Minister of War, La Cierva was despised by radicals and Republicans, whose hatred of him was founded on his career as Minister of the Interior; he was blamed for the execution of the radical hero Francisco Ferrer.⁷² The attitude of the leftist intellectuals toward La Cierva was characterized by a statement of the writer and political commentator, Ramón Pérez de Ayala, made in May, 1918. ". . . Are not Sánchez Guerra [Minister of War under Dato.] and Cierva, for example, worse than a pair of tight boots?"⁷³

The Alhucemas ministry, with such an uncontrollable being in its midst, was not expected to last long.⁷⁴ A

⁷⁰Bleye and Molina, Manual, III, 855.

⁷¹Weekly Report on Spain XIII, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/O13, G.T. -2228, October 4, 1917, CAB 24/28, P.R.O.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Pérez de Ayala, Escritos, p. 21.

⁷⁴Ibid.

former Conservative minister, Sánchez de Toca, and Antonio Maura, were both unable to form ministries, before García Prieto established his Cabinet in November.⁷⁵ In January, 1918, after much party squabbling, the Cortes was dissolved, to wait for the February elections. British observers noted that regionalists and Republicans were likely to gain some seats and it was hoped that Spain would remain at least "mildly pro-Ally."⁷⁶ Britain watched Spain anxiously at this time, fearing that a military dictatorship in Spain would put Spanish troops on the French border to divert French troops.⁷⁷

La Cierva soon found cause to divide the new ministry. This was relatively easy to do, given the increasingly Republican, pro-Allied nature of the Spanish electorate " . . . because if Romanones fell for tinting neutrality with aliadofilia, it was less advantageous for García Prieto to give it a Germanophile tone."⁷⁸ La Cierva forced the issuance of a number of military reforms by royal decree

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶Weekly Report on Spain XVI, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/O16, G.T. -3291, January 9, 1918, CAB 24/38, P.R.O.

⁷⁷Weekly Report on Spain XVII, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/O17, G.T. -3514, January 31, 1918, CAB 24/41, P.R.O.

⁷⁸Fernández Almagro, Historia, p. 289.

in March, 1918, including pay increases.⁷⁹ The two Catalan members of the Cabinet promptly resigned.⁸⁰ Eventually, the entire Cabinet, except La Cierva, resigned, and García Prieto was unable to form a new ministry. Antonio Maura tried to create one and failed because he was unable to obtain the support of Romanones and some other important Liberals.⁸¹ The new crisis made Alfonso XIII seriously consider leaving Spain at this time.⁸² No one wanted to work with La Cierva. Maura wanted the juntas dissolved; Romanones would not have anything to do with La Cierva.⁸³ A National government was finally formed under Maura; he was then faced with the problem of obtaining and keeping Cabinet ministers, who resigned with great regularity. An additional problem arose when the votes were counted in the February elections. The representatives in the Chamber of Deputies consisted of six major groups, the Liberals, the Conservatives, the regionalists, the Republicans, the independent republicans, and the Reformists. These were further subdivided. The Liberals consisted of four major groups, the garciaprietistas, the romanonistas, the

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 325, n. 1 and Weekly Report on Spain XIX, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/019, G.T. -3866, March 7, 1918, CAB 24/44, P.R.O.

⁸⁰Ibid.

⁸¹Fernández Almagro, Historia, p. 326.

⁸²Smith, Spain, p. 398.

⁸³Weekly Report on Spain XX, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/020, G.T. -4002, March 21, 1918, P.R.O.

albistas, and the independents, who were further subdivided into the gassetistas and the alcalázamoristas. Each division was named for its political leader. The Conservatives were also made up of four groups, the datistas, the mauristas, the ciervistas, and the independents. "Regionalists" included the catalanistas, the national republicans, the Catalan nationalists, the Basque nationalists, the Asturian regionalists, and the Andalusian regionalists. The Cortes contained 174 Liberals of all shades, 150 Conservatives, and thirty-five regionalists. There were, in addition, fifteen Republicans, one independent republican, and nine Reformists. The Cortes was further tinted by most other colors in the political spectrum, since it also contained nine jaimistas (supporters of the Carlist pretender to the throne), eight independents, six socialists, four "strike committee members," two Catholics, and one agrarian.⁸⁴ Obviously, with this type of composition, the Cortes was unable to legislate with any effectiveness. In April of 1918, the army was still Spain's biggest domestic problem. At that time, there were 67,000 soldiers in Spain

⁸⁴Ciges Aparicio, España, p. 420. The author gives this breakdown of the composition of the Cortes; the Cortes records themselves do not give a complete picture of the events of the period, as major crises are simply considered or postponed. The Cortes, consisting of numerous petty politicians at the time, is amazingly provincial in its consideration of affairs.

itself, not counting those in Morocco.⁸⁵ It received forty-two per cent of the national budget, as compared to the French army, which then received only twenty per cent of France's national budget.⁸⁶ On October 2, 1918, the Liberal leader Santiago Alba resigned from the Cabinet, causing the rest of the Cabinet to resign also. The other Cabinet members resumed office the next day, without Alba. It was believed at the time that Alba may have wanted to form his own political party.⁸⁷ This action, combined with his inability to really solve the problem of growing military power, contributed to Dato's fall from power in October, 1918.

Since January, 1918, the army had become increasingly unpopular and was soon to be in serious trouble. The people and the Leftist parties were irritated by large military expenses when the army was showing little success in exchange for its support.⁸⁸ While the country tended to become more pro-Allied and the government toyed with the idea of entering the war, the army began to raise objections to its actual use.

⁸⁵"The Crisis in Spain," Foreign Office, Political Intelligence Department, Spain 001, G.T. -4144, April 3, 1918, CAB 24/47, P.R.O.

⁸⁶Ibid.

⁸⁷"Memorandum on The Situation in Spain, with special reference to the Republican agitation and the Regionalist Question," Foreign Office, Political Intelligence Department, Spain/006, G.T. -6490, December 6, 1918, CAB 24/71, P.R.O.

⁸⁸Weekly Report on Spain XVIII, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/018, G.T. -3696, February 20, 1918, CAB 24/42, P.R.O.

Ostensibly, the army had been created for purposes of defense and warfare, yet when the suggestion of its possible use for these purposes was put forth, objections appeared. The officers, who were pro-German, were sure that the main body of the army was pro-Allied.⁸⁹ This created a gap between officers and men. In spite of the huge budget for military expenses in 1918, the army claimed that it lacked equipment for war.⁹⁰ Possibly this claim was justified; certainly the army was unfit to fight. It was unable to win the war in Morocco and was unpopular for this reason. Officers who held high political posts were unwilling to see these posts jeopardized by ignominious defeat in a war which could be avoided. In its attempt to preserve its prestige by remaining out of World War I, the army lost what dignity it already possessed.

On October 14, 1918, the announcement came that the German government would deliver seven German ships of 21,000 tons to the Spanish government.⁹¹ It is not beyond conjecture that this German move was an attempt to hold back the wave of

⁸⁹Weekly Report on Spain XVII, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/OI7, G.T. -3514, January 31, 1918, CAB 24/41, P.R.O.

⁹⁰Weekly Report on Spain XVIII, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/OI8, G.T. -3696, February 20, 1918m P.R.O.

⁹¹"Memorandum on the Situation in Spain, with special reference to the Republican agitation and the Regionalist Question," Foreign Office, Political Intelligence Department, Spain/006, G.T. -6490, December 6, 1918, CAB 24/71, P.R.O.

pro-Allied propaganda which was sweeping Spain and which threatened to put a Liberal pro-Allied government in power.

The German move failed in its intent, however, when in November, 1918, a Liberal Cabinet under Romanones took office. The fall of the Maura government, which held office briefly after Dato's fall, indicated that German action concerning the ships came too late to check the nation's political movement to the left.⁹² The Maura Cabinet fell largely because of increased losses of Spanish shipping to German submarines and due to the government's sudden urge to defend Spain.⁹³ The new Prime Minister, Romanones, was unable to form an effective ministry.

Fortunately for Spain, World War I ended in November, 1918. Any desire to join the Allies would have been crushed by the sudden revolutionary turn of events in late 1918.

The country openly objected to the obvious weakness of its political system. The Catalan nationalists, relatively quiet for some time, seized on this period of debility to renew their demands, which were equivalent to the destruction of the Spanish nation-state. The Catalanists retired from the Cortes, and Barcelona, the center of regionalist activity, broke out in a wave of disturbances. The Catalan problem

⁹²Ibid.

⁹³Ibid.

and the explosive social conditions of the country combined to create total chaos. By 1919, Romanones could govern only by suspending sessions of the Cortes. Strikes erupted and Barcelona entered a "state of war."⁹⁴ A total strike was declared and constitutional guarantees were suspended. 1919 was to see an almost farcical rotation of parties in power, all of them unable to settle the situation.

The constitutional monarchy fell apart at the end of World War I. The fall of Germany stimulated the spread of Republicanism and socialism; Spain no longer felt a need for union in the face of an external threat.⁹⁵ The army and the Catalans refused to accept a government of badly divided Liberals, so Spain had a series of Conservative governments after the war. The Conservatives, however, were equally divided and the split between datistas and mauristas kept either group from working effectively.⁹⁶ This fundamental political division was finally to destroy the government which survived, barely, World War I.

⁹⁴Ciges Aparicio, España, p. 423.

⁹⁵"Memorandum on The Situation in Spain," with special reference to the Republican agitation and the Regionalist Question," Foreign Office, Political Intelligence Department, Spain/006, G.T. -6490, December 6, 1918, CAB 24/71, P.R.O.

⁹⁶Carr, Spain, p. 508. Carr is convinced that the constitutional monarchy collapsed with Maura's fall in 1918.

CHAPTER VII

THE SPANISH ECONOMIC SITUATION: BRITISH PRESSURE AND SPANISH NEUTRALITY

The factor which perhaps most influenced Spain's decision concerning entrance into World War I was her economic relationship with Britain and, to a lesser extent, with the other Allies. From the outset of the war, British economic interests in Spain necessarily predisposed the Spanish in favor of the Allies. British economic actions had repercussions in Spain, which both profited and suffered from the war. Spanish behavior was greatly affected by economic conditions. From 1914 to 1917, Anglo-Spanish economic ties grew steadily stronger, although occasional fraying of the bonds was noticeable. By 1917, these ties were so strong that they exerted severe pressure upon Spain to end her policy of neutrality.

Foreign economic interests in Spain had been extensive since the mid-nineteenth century. The most important interests of foreign investment in Spain were mining and railroad development. The almost extensive copper deposit in Europe, worked by the famous Río Tinto mine, was located in Spain; the Spaniards, however, lacked the means to exploit it.¹

¹Raymond Carr, Spain: 1808-1939 (Oxford, 1966), p. 265.

In 1873, these Río Tinto mines were sold to a British firm for 93,000,000 pesetas.² Foreign capital invested in Spanish mines was far greater in amount than was Spanish capital invested in them. The chief investors were the Belgians, the French, and the English.³ The foreign companies with investments in Spain were primarily interested in the export of raw materials and were anxious to obtain cheap labor.⁴ Such interests were to cause some conflict with the Spanish government during the war years. Spain's railway system, also dominated by foreign investors, grew extensively prior to the war. This growth was due to foreign development, especially to French activity. By 1914, French companies controlled eighty-five per cent of the Spanish railroad system.⁵ With one of her major export industries, the mining industry, and her major transportation source under the control of foreign companies located mainly in Allied countries, Spain from 1914 on found it necessary to attempt to conciliate these nations who could easily ruin her economic system if she failed to cooperate with them. Other interests also bound Spain closely to the Allies.

Spain profited greatly during World War I. An indicator of this profit was the rise in gold reserves held by the Bank

²Pierre Vilar, Spain: A Brief History, translated by Brian Tate (Oxford, 1967), p. 71.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Carr, Spain, p. 265, n. 3.

of Spain. In 1914, the Bank of Spain had 567 million pesetas in gold reserves; in 1918, this amount rose to 2,223 million pesetas.⁶ This amounted to a rise of from twenty-three millions sterling to eighty-nine millions.⁷ In August, 1917, the reserves amounted to 1,774 million pesetas in gold and 738 million pesetas in silver.⁸ By the end of the war, most of Spain's industrial and national debt was redeemed.⁹

Much of Spain's wartime profits came from the sale of goods to belligerents; neutrality proved to be an economic boon.¹⁰ Catalan mills supplied the French army.¹¹ A lack of Welsh coal increased growth in the Asturian coal mines.¹² Whole districts in Spain were industrialized during the war in order to supply the Allies.¹³ Industrial expansion was greatest in Catalonia, Andalusia, and the Basque territories.¹⁴

⁶Sir Charles Petrie, King Alfonso XIII and His Age (London, 1963), p. 133.

⁷Gerald Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the Social and Political Background of the Civil War (Cambridge, 1950), p. 57.

⁸Ramón Pérez de Ayala, Escritos políticos, Presentación de Paulino Garagorri (Madrid, 1967), p. 53, n. 1.

⁹Brenan, Labyrinth, p. 57.

¹⁰Edward Conze, Spain To-Day: Revolution and Counter-Revolution (New York, 1936-37?), p. 15 and Alan Lloyd, The Spanish Centuries (Gardne City, New York, 1968), p. 332.

¹¹Carr, Spain p. 497.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Sir Charles Petrie, The Spanish Royal House (London, 1958), p. 222.

¹⁴Rhea Marsh Smith, Spain: A Modern History (Ann Arbor, 1965), p. 415.

The rapid growth of profits during the war hid basic economic evils, however, and created some new problems. Spain supplied the Allies with raw materials, with primary products resulting from foreign investment.¹⁵ Since the industrialists tried chiefly to obtain quick profits, they seldom reinvested their money.¹⁶ The boom led to a rise in prices, which, in turn, added to domestic troubles.¹⁷ The price rise upset labor-management relations, as the workers began to agitate for a comparable rise in wages.¹⁸ Spanish food exports did increase during the war years; Spain built flour mills and exported wine and olive oil.¹⁹ Sugar production also increased.²⁰ Textiles brought high prices.²¹

The government was unable to control the economic problems arising from the war. The rise in prices forced many products off the domestic market.²² Profiteering, although the government tried to control it, did take place. The private importation of wheat and flour was prohibited and special committees, ineffective because of their contradictory policies, were created to handle Spain's economic problems²³

¹⁵Carr, Spain, p. 498.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 497.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 499.

¹⁹Smith, Spain, p. 421.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Carr, Spain, p. 498.

²²Smith, Spain, p. 396.

²³Ibid.

War profits were great until the German submarine campaign of 1917.²⁴ The German submarine blockade interrupted merchant marine commerce at the beginning of 1917.²⁵ This meant that the disturbance of the Spanish economy increased throughout the year, probably adding to Spanish infuriation at German activities and showing Spain to the Allies as a prospective belligerent. The interruption of trade meant that exports declined. One of the notable examples of the effects of the blockade occurred in the Levante area, where the harvest could not be exported. Crops rotted and the people, deprived of their usual income, starved.²⁶ "Spain was much more rich and the Spaniards were dying of hunger."²⁷

Spain sold chiefly to the Allies and it is highly possible that the loss of profits due to the blockade increased anti-German feeling.

The economic situation led to widespread dissatisfaction. Organized labor protested the price rise at a time when the Spanish parliamentary system simply could not handle the economic, as well as all of the other problems, arising from the war.²⁸

²⁴Joseph McCabe, Spain in Revolt: 1814-1931 (London, 1931), p. 220.

²⁵Pérez de Ayala, Escritos, p. 55.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Carr, Spain, p. 499.

The number of popular outbreaks demonstrating hostility to the government increased. Added to the "natural" economic problems arising from the war were those arising from belligerent pressure. The German blockade caused the greatest trouble in Spain, but other pressure was applied, with the Allies in the end applying definite pressure to obtain entrance into the war. Sir Arthur Hardinge, the British ambassador, stated that commercial pressure on the neutrals was used by all the belligerents, but that German pressure was the worst.²⁹ Hardinge did admit that the Allies applied commercial pressure on Spanish firms dealing with the Germans and that Allied sea power made such pressure more effective than German pressure.³⁰ Hardinge's comments are masterpieces of understatement; he never mentions the extensive British pressure applied to Spain in 1917.

No highly unusual matter of economic concern was considered by the Cortes during the first half of 1914; considerable discussion of the proposed 1915 budget took place and proposed taxes on salt and the adjustment of some existing taxes occupied much of the time of the Deputies.³¹

²⁹Sir Arthur Hardinge, A Diplomatist in Europe (London, 1927), p. 264.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Diario de Sesiones de Cortes, Cámara de Diputados, May 6, 1914, No. 21, pp. 485-486, May 9, 1914, No. 24, pp. 566-574, May 18, 1914, No. 29, p. 692, June 2, 1914, No. 41, p. 1038 and June 12, 1914, No. 49, Appendix 3. Other numbers of the Diario for the period also contain such information.

The first signs of economic difficulty in Spain appeared in connection with the proposed ratification of a commercial treaty with Italy. The treaty, which arranged for mutual trading concessions, was signed in Madrid on March 30, 1914.³² Opponents of the treaty contended that the treaty was essentially one of friendship and that as a commercial treaty it failed to benefit Spain. Spain received concessions in three articles of the treaty, whereas Italy got concessions in seven articles. Italy needed the treaty more than Spain did because Italo-Spanish trade was declining. Objectors to the treaty pointed out that in 1905 Italy had exported over 20,000,000 pesetas to Spain but that, with the opening of a tariff war between the two countries in 1912, the amount had fallen to 12,000,000 pesetas. The tariff war was particularly painful to the Italian economy and Italy pushed for a renewal of trade.³³ Supporters of the treaty claimed that the treaty would benefit Spain's ailing cork industry; opponents felt that Italy was responsible for the sufferings of the cork trade. The treaty's proponents wanted Spain to benefit from Italy's large transit commerce.³⁴

This is the first real indication in the Cortes records of economic trouble to come; the Spanish cork industry suffered during the war. The Spanish cork industry began in the

³²Ibid., June 19, 1914, No. 55, Appendix 4.

³³Ibid., June 25, 1914, No. 60, pp. 1628-1634.

³⁴Ibid., p. 1634.

eighteenth century as a small Catalan industry which happened to have a monopoly on the necessary raw material.³⁵ After 1815, it was increasingly prosperous. The industry was run by a strong guild which opposed technical improvements and modernization; in the 1850's, riots took place after an attempt to introduce advanced machinery.³⁶ Prior to World War I, the Anglo-Spanish cork trade was flourishing. Germany had begun exporting cork in sheets, ruining the trade in manufactured cork. The bottle cork industry was already failing. By June, 1914, the once-flourishing cork industry was in trouble. In his defense of the Italian trade agreement, one Deputy probably found the main reason for the cork industry's decline.

S. S. [Your Excellency] has with reason a preoccupation which is very legitimate in S.S. It is . . . , certain that the cork industry [corchataponer] is encountering a great crisis. I myself have had occasion to verify it And the raw cork industry in Spain is a truly important production, large, extraordinary; it could be said (S.S. has said it) that it is a production; it is a product par excellence for exportation

. . . Besides, S.S. forgets that today the bottling industry for mineral waters, wines, etc., is substituting with some advantage the cork stopper with that of rubber, with metallic capsules and with other materials which substitute for cork.³⁷

The problems of the cork industry were not solved in 1914, in spite of the fulminations of the opponents of the treaty

³⁵Carr, Spain, p. 31.

³⁶Ibid. and The Times (London), February 5, 1916, p. 5.

³⁷Diario de Sesiones, June 25, 1914, No. 60, p. 1635.

The treaty, or convenio, of navigation and commerce was ratified in October, 1914³⁸ The Spanish cork-cutters were not defeated, however, by the expected success in the Cortes of the treaty, for, in August, 1914, a group of these enterprising gentlemen informed the London Times correspondent that the Seville cork factories could produce a million bottle corks daily to replace the German production of cork. They also appealed to British sympathies by announcing that over 800 workers and their families depended on British orders of cork.³⁹

The war's outbreak did cause some economic dislocation, which was later quieted. There was an immediate rush on the banks.⁴⁰ Currency values fell, but, according to the British ambassador, the spread of the knowledge that England would "intervene" to help the situation aided in controlling the panic.⁴¹ Hardinge, in his usual uninformative manner, fails to elaborate on the matter, which, since his statement is not confirmed elsewhere, indicates that Britain's intent to stabilize Spain's economy was largely Hardinge's own desire. The Times correspondent stated in September, 1914, that given the current condition of the English bank rate, the Spanish

³⁸Ibid., October, 30, 1914, No. 73, p. 2056. See also Appendix.

³⁹The Times (London), August 23, 1914, p. 5.

⁴⁰Hardinge, Diplomatist, p. 253.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 255.

government itself would be unable to do much to ease the industrial crisis.⁴² The Bank of Spain, on September 3, refused to cash foreign drafts.⁴³ Much of the early crisis was caused by trade dislocation and the arrival of war refugees in Spain.⁴⁴ Spain's economic situation was still unstable by late 1914. In November, protection of the Spanish silk industry was proposed.⁴⁵

Spanish trade began to recover in November and December, 1914, and then steadily improved. A concession was granted to a steamship line running between Bilbao and England.⁴⁶ During the war, Biscayan trade with Britain through Bilbao was apparently quite good.⁴⁷ British imports of Spanish mineral products sometimes went through the port of Bilbao.⁴⁸ Biscay had good reason to be as Anglophile as she was.⁴⁹ In December, 1914, the Cortes also began considering the establishment of Barcelona as a neutral zone or "depósito franco" in order to take advantage of the European shipping situation.⁵⁰

⁴²The Times (London), August 23, 1914, p. 5.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Ibid., August 23, 1914, p. 5

⁴⁵Diario de Sesiones, November 4, 1914, No. 76, Appendix 4.

⁴⁶Ibid., November 21, 1914, No. 91, p. 2637.

⁴⁷Hardinge, Diplomatist, p. 257.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 256.

⁵⁰Diario de Sesiones, December 9, 1914, N. 104. p. 3155.

Spain's economic situation, due to wartime demands for Spanish products, improved noticeably in 1915. The growth of Spanish wealth was such that Finance Minister Alba tried to tax war profits.⁵¹ Much of Spain's commerce was with the Allied countries, especially Britain and France.⁵² Over forty-six per cent of Spain's imports in 1914 came from Britain and France; over half of her exports went to Britain, France, and British dependents.⁵³ Most of the trade was carried in British freighters.⁵⁴ As early as February, 1915, German-financed steamship companies began to apply pressure to Spain by refusing to let their ships sail; they did succeed in dislocating trade between Barcelona and Seville.⁵⁵

In April, 1915, Britain gave Spain a list of exports which she wished prohibited. Spain was largely amenable to British desires and did much to control the contraband trade originating in Barcelona.⁵⁶ The effect of Spain's trade began to

⁵¹E. Allison Peers, editor, Spain: A Companion to Spanish Studies (London, 1929), p. 271.

⁵²A. C. Bell, A History of the Blockade of Germany and of the Countries Associated with Her in the Great War, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey: 1914-1918 (London, 1961), p. 378.

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 278.

⁵⁵The Times (London), February 4, 1915, p. 7.

⁵⁶Bell, Blockade, p. 379.

demonstrate itself in the Spanish rate of exchange. By February 27, 1915, the peseta had a premium over all foreign exchange.⁵⁷ Spain also began to change her export policies extensively. She permitted the export of cattle and a few other agricultural products.⁵⁸ In December, she authorized the free export of arms and rice.⁵⁹ Britain, in response to Spain's generally friendly attitude in commercial matters, and to increase her influence, lifted all her restrictions on coal exports to Spain in June, 1915.⁶⁰

The happy state of Anglo-Spanish trade was not to exist without a few clouds over it. In August, 1915, a royal decree suspended all Spanish exports of wolfram.⁶¹ November, 1915, saw the beginnings of Spanish protest against British policy. The Valencian representative in the Cortes requested the Spanish government to pressure Britain to extend the franchise granted to the "Mala Real Holandesa" to carry Spanish fruit

⁵⁷Duque de Maura and Melchor Fernández Almagro, Por qué cayó Alfonso XIII: Evolución y disolución de los partidos históricos durante su reinado, 2nd ed. (Madrid, 1948), p. 280. According to this source, it was quoted at two per cent over parity for the British pound sterling and the French franc, six and a half per cent over the Swiss franc, and fifteen per cent over the German mark.

⁵⁸Don Melchor Fernández Almagro, Historia del reinado de Don Alfonso XIII, 2nd ed. (Barcelona, 1934), p. 274.

⁵⁹The Times (London), December 17, 1915, p. 9.

⁶⁰Ibid., June 26, 1915, p. 8.

⁶¹Diario de Sesiones, November 19, 1915, No. 13, p. 289.

exports.⁶² Another Deputy announced on behalf of the fruit growers of the Levante, that the year's first shipment of oranges to Britain had been unloaded, receiving good prices. The fruit industry, suffering from trade dislocation, could be saved if other companies were allowed to carry fruit. Spanish boats could at least carry fruit to Holland.⁶³ Orange exports remained a point of contention between Britain and Spain.

Certain of the less attractive economic outgrowths of the war began to be reflected in Spain. Some scarcities appeared. A lack of phosphorous was noted, but it apparently was not great enough to affect Spain's match industry.⁶⁴ Copper sulphate and sulphur were in short supply; the Minister of Hacienda, Sr. Bugallal, announced that he would do his best to obtain both of these.⁶⁵ The sulphur problem was a serious one. Spain attempted to negotiate with Britain in order to obtain copper sulphate throughout 1914 and 1915.⁶⁶ In November, 1915, the Spanish ambassador in London, Merry del Val, informed his government that the British government was willing to continue negotiations.⁶⁷ Negotiations with Italy for the same purpose were also taking place.⁶⁸

⁶²Ibid., November 11, 1915, No. 6, p. 94.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Ibid., November 15, 1915, No. 9, p. 182.

⁶⁵Ibid., November 27, 1915, No. 20, p. 563.

⁶⁶Ibid., November 29, 1915, No. 21, p. 527. ⁶⁷Ibid. p. 528.

⁶⁸Ibid.

Spanish vineyards were subject to several diseases, notably mildew. Treatment for the disease required the use of sulphur or copper sulphate. Sulphur was obtained from Italy and England was the chief supplier of copper sulphate.⁶⁹ The war led to unrealistically high prices for sulphur in Italy, making it impossible for Spanish workers to buy it.⁷⁰ The price of copper sulphate usually wavered between sixty to sixty-five pesetas per kilo; the war brought the price up to 120 to 150 pesetas per kilo.⁷¹ The 1915 crop had already lost the produce of roughly six hundred million litres and the loss of all vineyards was considered possible.⁷² The situation was aggravated by the fact that Spain, although she produced a considerable amount of sulphuric acid, was exporting the acid to Marseilles to be used in the production of asphyxiating gases.⁷³

The negotiations which Spain was trying to conduct with Britain concerned Spanish importation of copper sulphate. Britain produced copper sulphate from copper which she brought from Spain. She then sold the copper sulphate to Spain at prices which doubled or quadrupled its value. Spain felt that she should be able to obtain more of the copper sulphate than she actually

⁶⁹Ibid., November 27, 1915, No. 20, p. 503.

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Ibid., November 29, 1915, No. 21, p. 527.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Ibid., p. 528.

was able to buy. Imports from Britain came in irregular consignments and British export firms insisted that they be paid the value of the consignment before the ships sailed. Agreement between the firms led to the imposition by the British government of restrictions on the amount of copper sulphate exported. One consignment to a firm in Barcelona left Liverpool and became waterlogged in a storm. The Barcelona company wanted the British government to replace the shipment, which it considered inferior, and afford facilities for the ship to continue. British companies refused even to quote prices for shipments, even to Catalan cooperative societies and agricultural syndicates.⁷⁴ The negotiations were still continuing in December when the representative of the agricultural district of Redondela, Sr. de Federico, asked the Minister of State to do something to get England to continue authorizing the export of copper sulphate, since the mildew plague had reached extensive proportions in Galicia.⁷⁵

Conflict also appeared in Spain over the exportation of wolfram. Most of the materials produced in Spain were primary products which could be easily exported. The mines which contained wolfram producing ores, especially in Galicia and Extremadura, employed numerous workers at a time when unemployment in other economic sectors was high.⁷⁶ The exportation of wolfram had been suspended in August, 1915.⁷⁷ Wolfram had no industrial

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 527 and November 27, 1915, No. 20, p. 503.

⁷⁵Ibid., December 4, 1915, No. 26, p. 710.

⁷⁶Ibid., November 19, 1915, No. 13, p. 288. ⁷⁷Ibid., p. 289.

use in Spain, where production was extensive and enough was available for both Spain's need and to satisfy much of the foreign demand.⁷⁸ The price abroad was high and could provide a good source of income. Supporters of wolfram exportation were thus appalled when the possibility of a royal decree closing the mines was bruited about in the Cortes. Frantic pleas defending the mineworkers, who would be unemployed, were made asking not only the continued operation of the mines, but also the exportation of wolfram.⁷⁹

The controversy over wolfram was apparently unresolved; possibly wolfram was included when Spain lifted all bans on exports and imports in February, 1916.⁸⁰ Other matters of primary importance soon overshadowed this problem.

Signs of a lack of coal began to appear; Spain imported three and a half million tons of coal annually.⁸¹ Spanish mineworkers were being taken from mines for military service and production was falling. Campaigns to recruit more workers were being conducted, chiefly in foreign countries with, apparently, no great success.⁸² Lack of coal and mineworkers was to become a considerable problem in the next year.

⁷⁸Ibid.

⁷⁹Ibid., pp. 288-289.

⁸⁰The Times (London), February 5, 1916, p. 5. There appears not to be any record of the outcome of the wolfram controversy.

⁸¹Diario de Sesiones, November 29, 1915, No. 21, p. 522.

⁸²Ibid., p. 523.

The year 1915 was not to pass without some success in Anglo-Spanish economic negotiations, however. Catalonia was one of Spain's large textile manufacturing areas. This major industry was being seriously damaged by a lack of German needles. In December, 1915, the matter was considered in the Cortes because, as the textile-workers' representative explained, some 40,000 workers would have to be let off if new needles did not arrive within twenty days. The Spanish government requested to use all possible means of convincing Britain to allow the free transit of the needles through Holland.⁸³ Happily for Spain, negotiation was completed to Spain's complete satisfaction.⁸⁴

By 1916, problems were increasing. The cork industry was again floundering. Britain blockaded the German ports, prohibiting the export of sheet cork, but no renewal of the Spanish cork trade occurred and Spain, apparently because of her position as a neutral, was reluctant to pressure Britain for attention to the crisis.⁸⁵ Bitterness also grew in Spain over British prohibition of the importation of Spanish almonds.⁸⁶ Spain, in an effort to improve her foreign relations in the

⁸³Ibid., December 3, 1915, No. 25, p. 662.

⁸⁴Ibid., December 6, 1915, No. 27, p. 729.

⁸⁵The Times (London), February 5, 1916, p. 5.

⁸⁶Ibid.

economic sphere, had lifted all bans on Spanish exports and imports in February, 1915, but reserved the right to restrict both in the future.⁸⁷ Some of the motivation for this act may have come from reports that Britain planned to restrict all importation of Spanish oranges. The Spanish orange growers and traders hoped to convince the government of the necessity of applying pressure on Britain by placing a heavy export tax on ores.⁸⁸ By March 8, 1916, the Spanish Cabinet authorized the Minister of Finance to repeal the laws allowing the export of necessities; this action resulted from an increase in worker disturbance due to unemployment.⁸⁹ Cereals in the coastal provinces were seized to be sold by the government as needed; compensation was given for the confiscated cereals.⁹⁰ The government was already preparing for possible food riots.

The coal scarcity was becoming more acute. The fishermen of Santander desperately needed coal in order to go to sea at all. Lack of coal put many industries on short time and some were closed.⁹¹ Copper sulphate was also lacking.⁹² As the scarcities began to affect prices and to increase unemployment,

⁸⁷Ibid.

⁸⁸Ibid., February 28, 1916, p. 7.

⁸⁹Ibid., March 10, 1916, p. 7.

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹Ibid.

⁹²Ibid.

discontent rose and strikes or strike threats erupted in almost every part of the country.⁹³ By May, jute was also in short supply, due to British restrictions on exports from Calcutta. Spain needed only 40,000 tons of jute, but had permits allowing purchase of only 10,000 tons for the first half of the year. Several tons of the supply were lost when Germany torpedoed the "Angus," which was carrying the jute to Spain. Another contract was lost due to lack of tonnage. Spain faced the ruin of a number of mills if jute could not be obtained.⁹⁴ Britain as if to impress Spain with the possible extent of her ability to influence the Spanish economy, gained control of the South of Spain Railway which served British and Belgian mines.⁹⁵

In June, 1916, Germany demanded that Spain stop contraband trade over the Pyrenees.⁹⁶ Spain had enough troubles simply trying to carry on her legitimate trading concerns; she was not able to completely satisfy German demands, which was shown when Germany took definite steps in 1917 to interrupt Spanish commerce. Economic pressures on Spain were to increase until, in 1917, she was literally almost forced to join the

⁹³Ibid.

⁹⁴Ibid., May 2, 1916, p. 7.

⁹⁵Ibid., April 21, 1916, p. 3.

⁹⁶Smith, Spain, p. 396.

Allies. The Spanish economy could easily be hurt if certain supplies of raw materials were cut.⁹⁷ The economic profit of the war was beginning to lose its luster as the cost of living rose.⁹⁸ Many Spaniards starved since food was exported; the people could not buy it.⁹⁹ In February, 1917, German actions led to the "paralysis of merchant shipping."¹⁰⁰

On February 1, 1917, the Conde de Romanones announced that the ambassadors of Germany and Austria had notified him that their governments would interrupt Spain's maritime traffic with England, France, Italy, and the western Mediterranean countries by any possible means.¹⁰¹ "The life of Spain cannot be interrupted and the life of Spain will not be interrupted."¹⁰² With its economy in its ailing state, Spain did not dare to allow Germany, whose threat may have been an indication of the extent to which her own economy was beginning to suffer, to interrupt her commerce.

Several Spanish industries were in bad shape. The rice industry was slowly collapsing. The export of rice was

⁹⁷Thomas A. Bailey, The Policy of the United States Toward the Neutrals, 1917-1918 (Gloucester, Mass., 1966), p. 272.

⁹⁸Vilar, Spain, p. 85.

⁹⁹Manuel de J. Galván, "Spain and the World War," The New York Times Current History: The European War, (New York, 1917), XIII, 59.

¹⁰⁰Alberto Mousset, La política exterior de España, With a Foreward by the Conde de Romanones (Madrid, 1918), p. 238.

¹⁰¹Diario de Sesiones, February 1, 1917, No. 4, p. 61.

¹⁰²Ibid.

prohibited, hurting business activities which were related to rice production. Many rice producers also raised oranges and were suffering from the bad effects of the decline of both industries. Pleas were made to allow a certain number of tons of rice to be exported in order to save the rice growers.¹⁰³ In addition, sulphate of ammonia was needed in rice production and sulphate of ammonia was purchased from England; prices had risen during the war.¹⁰⁴ Higher prices had to be paid to get sulphate of ammonia in order to grow rice which then could not be exported. Industry in Galicia was in an exceptionally bad condition. Numerous Galician workers were emigrating to South America, especially to Argentina, because of conditions in Spain. Galicia was an important fishing area; canneries normally employed over 30,000 workers. The fish was normally sold in France; only about ten per cent of it was sold in Spain. Sales had fallen and the entire economic system of Galicia was in danger.¹⁰⁵ Sulphur was still needed to fight mildew in Spain's vineyards.¹⁰⁶ The government had been negotiating with Italy to obtain sulphur since December, 1916, but was unable to settle the amount to be purchased and had to arrange transportation once the sulphur was acquired.¹⁰⁷ The Spaniards blamed the lack of sulphur on the German blockade.

¹⁰³Ibid., February 5, 1917, No. 7, p. 152. ¹⁰⁴Ibid., p. 153.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., February 6, 1917, No. 8, p. 191.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., February 15, 1917, No. 16, p. 444.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., February 16, 1917, No. 17, p. 476.

Because of the great abnormality which has been produced in the traffic by the declaration of the blockade [of] which the Central Powers have notified all of the neutral States, a very difficult situation has been created in all Spain, and at the present time there are vine-growing regions and others which live almost exclusively from the exportation of the grape, which find themselves with the very great problem of the lack of sulphur and of sulphate for the sulphuring and sulphating of the vines.¹⁰⁸

The vineyards also suffered from a lack of available transport for their produce.¹⁰⁹ Spain was still in great need of jute and also needed hemp.¹¹⁰ Price rises in raw materials raised costs for sugar production.¹¹¹

Possibly the most famous economic problem faced by Spain in 1917 was the crisis in orange production which precipitated a series of important negotiations with Britain. Orange production, especially in the Levante, had become severely disorganized. Much of the 1915-1916 harvest was lost through lack of organization among the producers. The British were not buying what oranges were exported and transportation costs were high.¹¹² The orange growers wanted the government to get a discount on freight costs for exporting oranges. Huge numbers of oranges were expected to spoil if they were not shipped promptly. It was suggested that the government buy

¹⁰⁸Ibid., p. 477.

¹⁰⁹Ibid.

¹¹⁰Ibid., p. 478.

¹¹¹Ibid., February 24, 1917, No. 21, p. 624.

¹¹²Ibid., February 5, 1917, p. 151.

some of these for supply to the army or hospitals. Spanish ships did not sail to blockade ports, but the growers felt that occasional British boats did. They wanted Spain to convince the British that when these boats did sail, they should take Spanish oranges and that the cargo space should not be monopolized by the four major growers' associations.¹¹³ The associations were the only groups which could afford to obtain space on the ships. Spain had threatened to cut off ore supplies to Britain whenever British failure to buy oranges threatened the Spanish orange industry. This behavior led to a major crisis in 1917, with Britain putting pressure on the United States to put pressure on Spain.¹¹⁴

The controversy was finally resolved by the conclusion of the Cortina agreements. Basically, the terms were that Britain license 150,000 tons of coal per month for export to Spain. If Allied interest permitted, an increase of up to 30,000 tons was allowed. Spain was to let Britain or British firms charter 400,000 tons of Spanish shipping. If the total amount of shipping was not time-chartered, Britain was not required to license as much coal to Spain. Spain was not to prevent, or put a duty on, the exportation of iron ore. Spain was to allow Britain to acquire, on voyage or time-charter, for Anglo-Spanish trade, Spanish ships, but 100,000 tons were

¹¹³Ibid., p. 154.

¹¹⁴See Chapter III.

to be reserved for Spanish use. Britain got an option to buy Spanish ships laid up in British ports since February 7, 1917. Spain could buy two British steamships for the coastal trade, but transfer to a third owner had to be approved by Britain. Britain would import certain amounts of oranges, wine, potatoes, and forage from Spain. British licenses to export sulphate of ammonia were not to be given immediately, but Britain would "remember" Spain's "future Needs." Britain would also allow the export of 300 tons of tin plates and 120 tons of ferro-manganese to Spain. The latter was to be increased if Spain could prove that her steel exports to Britain, France, and Italy were above average.¹¹⁵

The negotiations dragged on until December, 1917, when the agreement was finally signed.¹¹⁶ The agreement, it should be noted, was developed with considerable pressure; it served to stimulate mutual dependence of Britain and Spain.

¹¹⁵Letter, Balfour, for the British Special Mission to the Secretary of State, May 5, 1917, United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1917, Supplement 2: The World War (Washington D.C.), 1932, II, 1199-1202.

¹¹⁶For the negotiations see War Cabinet 263, Minute 11, G.T. -2418, November 2, 1917, 11:30 A.M., CAB 24/30, P.R.O., Weekly Report on Spain XII, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/O12, G.T.-2418, October 26, 1917, CAB 24/30, P.R.O. Weekly Report on Spain XIV, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/O14, G.T. -2807, November 29, 1917, CAB 24/34, P.R.O., and Weekly Report on Spain XV, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/O15, G.T. -2973, December 13, 1917, CAB 24/35, P.R.O. Most secondary sources discuss them widely. The lack of sulphate of ammonia was not eased until February, 1919, when Spain opened negotiations with the United States; Diario de Sesiones, February 12, 1919, No. 122, p. 4034.

Britain also began to consider possibilities for rail-road development in Spain. The War Office requested reports on the feasibility of constructing and developing a rail route from Spain to northern France.¹¹⁷ Britain decided that France did not have enough rolling stock to make such a railway practicable.¹¹⁸

Spain was furious with Germany, blaming her for the shortages and economic problems. By February, 1917, Germany had "absolutely" interrupted Spain's maritime trade, damaging the importation of raw materials.¹¹⁹ The government of Spain at this time, after permitting the export of munitions throughout the war period, suddenly established a government monopoly on the manufacture and sale of powders and explosive mixtures. A special tax was to be placed on these items.¹²⁰ One possible explanation of the government's action is that Spain was building up a supply of explosives to be used should she enter war.

Spanish shortages lasted throughout 1917. Late in the year a rumor spread among the Allies that Spain was negotiating

¹¹⁷War Cabinet 58, Minute 3, February 8, 1917, 5:30 P.M., CAB 23/1, P.R.O.

¹¹⁸War Cabinet 59, Minute 10, February 9, 1917, 11:30 A.M., CAB 23/1, P.R.O.

¹¹⁹Diario de Sesiones, February 17, 1917, No. 18, p. 503 and February 24, 1917, No. 21, p. 626.

¹²⁰Ibid., February 29, 1917, No. 1, Appendix 10.

to buy large amounts of Argentine wheat.¹²¹ The shortage of coal was still acute in early 1918; even the rich Río Tinto Company claimed that it was unable to pay high coal prices.¹²² An arrangement was finally worked out whereby the British would provide enough coal to fill the requirements of the Río Tinto mines for one month. The coal would be carried at market rates in Spanish ships chartered by the Inter-Allied Chartering Committee. The difference in rates would be paid by the British government. No British ships would be used in the trade and the governments of France and the United States would pay Britain their share of the costs.¹²³ Spain withdrew her export duties on potatoes, but Britain feared that she still might enact duties on some foods in order to prove that she was not being "starved" to provide food for the Allies.¹²⁴ Food prices were still high in August, 1918.¹²⁵ An epidemic

¹²¹ Frank M. Surface, The Grain Trade During the World War, Being a History of the Food Administration Grain Corporation and the United States Grain Corporation (New York, 1928), p. 295.

¹²² War Cabinet 350, Minute 8, February 20, 1918, 11:30 A.M., CAB 23/5, P.R.O.

¹²³ War Cabinet 351, Minute 11, February 21, 1918, 4:00 P.M., CAB 23/5, P.R.O.

¹²⁴ "Memorandum on Spain," Foreign Office, Political Intelligence Department Sp/003, G.T. -5015, June 27, 1918, CAB 24/57, P.R.O.

¹²⁵ Weekly Report on Spain X, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/010, G.T. 1882, August 28, 1917, CAB 24/24, P.R.O.

made the situation worse by June.¹²⁶ Protests were made against those who profited from the war and against the weak governments which had failed to put an end to high prices and scarcities.¹²⁷

The war had very nearly destroyed the Spanish economy by mid-1918; only the large wartime export trade and certain "political" agreements with the Allies, kept it from collapsing completely. In 1917, Spain had an excess of exports over imports amounting to about 500,000,000 pesetas.¹²⁸ By 1920, when war profits ceased, the reverse was true by nearly the same amount.¹²⁹ The number of boats increased from 864 in 1914 to 1,192 in 1920.¹³⁰ In spite of the loss of about 100,000 tons of shipping, the gross tonnage of the Spanish merchant marine increased from 877,000 tons in 1914 to 1,000,000 tons in 1920.¹³¹ From 1919 to 1923, the European market for Spanish goods grew smaller. Freight rates after the war fell and the growth of wartime shipbuilding ruined the shipping companies. Mineral products and steel were no longer required,

¹²⁶"Memorandum on the Situation in Spain," Foreign Office, Political Intelligence Department Sp/003, G.T. 05015, June 27, 1918, CAB 24/57, P.R.O.

¹²⁷Ibid.

¹²⁸Peers, Spain, p. 273.

¹²⁹Ibid., pp. 266-267. Peers contains a complete set of figures showing the growth in production of various Spanish industries from roughly 1908 to 1919, the dates varying with each product.

¹³⁰Ibid.

¹³¹Ibid., p. 268.

causing a decline in Spanish mining activities and steel production. Agricultural products were also losing demand. Unemployment increased, and a series of strikes broke out in the immediate postwar period.¹³²

In spite of the economic difficulties, Spain's need to preserve her neutrality, her desire to profit while the war lasted, and her need for preparedness in the event of her entrance into the war, led her to maintain some semblance of internal unity. When the needs arising from the war ended, the social stability of Spain also ended.

¹³²This account is largely the interpretation given in Carr, Spain, p. 509.

CHAPTER VIII

GIBRALTAR AND MOROCCO: ANGLO-SPANISH PROBLEMS

The Spanish army was unwilling to fight in World War I, although the entrance of Spain into the war became a distinct possibility. The reasons behind this lack of martial ardor were more complex than simple pro-German sentiments on the part of the officers or an inefficient military organization. The major reason for the failure of the Spanish military, which usually searches feverishly for military glory, was the fact that the army was deeply involved in adventures in Morocco. These activities were to lead eventually to the decline of the monarchy; the Spanish army was to plummet to its lowest depths in the postwar period because of its Moroccan involvement. The army was unable to win a war against the "backward" Moroccan tribesmen; obviously, it was unwilling to face the powerful forces of the Central Powers. The army officers included a number of office-seeking politicians, whose campaigns emphasized their prestige as soldiers and the glory of the Spanish army. Such men stood to lose both prestige and position if Spain suffered an ignominious defeat in Europe; they had already lost face as a result of their inability to control the raiding tribesmen of Morocco. In addition, men transferred to a European front would be unable to fight in

the colonial war, which had prior claims to the attention of Spain's leaders. Spain, as a neutral with an army, however inefficient, which might enter the war, probably had more influence than she would have had as an ineffective ally with a weak, uncommitted fighting force. The Spanish army could be used as bait to obtain concessions from the Allies, the chief concession being the much-coveted Rock of Gibraltar. The Moroccan question throughout the war years was intimately tied to the volatile issue of British possession of the rock. As Britain began to desire Spanish military aid, she increasingly tempted the Spanish palate with the enticing morsel known as Gibraltar. Germany also used the Gibraltar issue for propaganda purposes, suggesting the return of Gibraltar to Spanish control in exchange for Spanish support of the Central Powers.

Spanish interests in Morocco date to the fifteenth century.¹ Spain gradually extended her control of various outposts in Morocco. In the nineteenth century, a number of attacks by Moroccan native chiefs on these Spanish strongholds led Spain to try to prevent the annoying attacks forever by punishing the tribesmen herself. She assured Great Britain that she would not interfere with navigation near Gibraltar.²

¹Melchor Fernández Almagro, Historia política de la España contemporánea: Regencia de Doña María Cristina de Austria durante la menor edad de su hijo Don Alfonso XIII, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1959), p. 212.

²Rhea Marsh Smith, Spain: A Modern History (Ann Arbor, 1965), p. 335.

Spanish troops landed at Ceuta in 1859 and succeeded in capturing Tetuán in 1860. After Spain attacked Tangier, the Moroccans opened peace negotiations.³

In 1880, the Madrid conference was held; there the major European powers agreed to maintain Moroccan territorial integrity.⁴ Representatives of fifteen European countries met and signed the Madrid Convention which lasted until the 1906 Algeiras Conference.⁵ By the Madrid Convention, all of the signatories could trade freely with Morocco and foreign property rights in Morocco were recognized.⁶

The problem of the Rif tribesmen was still unsolved. Spain continued to fight off the Rifs around Melilla and Ceuta. The Moroccan government was too weak to control the raiders. Spain was forced to withdraw. Reinforcements were then sent to Morocco. Negotiations were conducted with the sultan, who promised to punish the tribesmen. A settlement was finally reached whereby the rebels were to surrender to the sultan for punishment and a fort was to be built at Melilla. In 1894, Spain signed a treaty with Morocco, establishing a neutral zone between Melilla and Morocco.⁷

³Ibid., p. 336.

⁴Smith, Spain, p. 391.

⁵Fernández Almagro, Historia política, I, 368-370.

⁶Ibid., p. 369. See also Smith, p. 391.

⁷Smith, Spain, pp. 376-377.

Britain, in 1904, agreed not to oppose French interests in Morocco in return for French recognition of British interests in Egypt. Spain and France also proceeded to sign a secret treaty partitioning Morocco. France soon wished to have her Moroccan protectorate recognized. In 1905, Wilhelm II of Germany landed at Tangiers and announced that Germany would protect an independent Morocco, or, actually, a Morocco under German influence.⁸

The Moroccan question was mushrooming into a highly uncomfortable problem for the major European powers. In 1906, the Algeciras Conference was called to solve the question. The conference agreed that Spanish and French interests in Morocco should receive special recognition. France and Spain were to police Morocco; German interests were to be recognized by the protection of German investments in Morocco.⁹

France began slowly to expand her Moroccan territory by claiming that she was policing the area.¹⁰ German firms, by 1909, were also expanding the economic interests of the Kaiser's empire. Rif tribesmen still attacked railroad lines used by German and Spanish firms.¹¹ Continued Moroccan attacks forced Spain to send more troops. It was not until mid-1909

⁸Ibid., p. 391.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Carr, Spain, p. 517.

that Spain was able to get the Rifs to surrender.¹² Franco-Spanish rivalry in the area was also growing. Both countries started occupying various important defensive positions; France took Fez and Spain took Ifni. Spain later forced the Moroccans to withdraw from the Melilla area and Spanish troops were eventually able to contain the Moroccans.¹³

In July, 1911, while Spain was engaged in subduing the Rifs, the famous Agadir crisis took place. The Germans sent the gunboat "Panther" to Agadir to express German sympathy for the anti-French native resistance in Morocco. The Germans were especially eager to get the French out of Fez.¹⁴ The primary goal was to get France to yield Congo territory to Germany and to show the failure of the Algeciras settlement.¹⁵

The presence of the "Panther" at Agadir caused considerable consternation in European diplomatic circles. Both Britain and France protested. The Agadir crisis almost precipitated a war, but the Germans did not then want a major conflict.

¹²Ibid., pp. 391-3912.

¹³Ibid., pp. 393-394.

¹⁴Memorandum of Alfred von Kiderlen-Wächter, May 3, 1911, Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871-1914, Sammlung der Akten des Deutschen Auswärtigen Amtes, XLIX, 40 vols. (Berlin, 1922-1927), 101-108, quoted in Sidney Bradshaw Fay, The Origins of the World War, 2 vols., 2nd ed., rev. (New York, 1966), I. 281-282.

¹⁵Fay, Origins, I., 285.

Germany did inform England that she had no intention of gaining territory on the Moroccan coast. Germany admitted that the French could establish a protectorate over Morocco; in return France ceded some miles of the French Congo. Germany gave France some Cameroon territory.¹⁶

The Agadir crisis served to increase Anglo-German enmity and to bind France and Britain more closely. It strengthened French control of her Moroccan territory.¹⁷ It also demonstrated to Spain the interest held by the major powers in dominating the Mediterranean, an interest traditionally felt by most Spaniards to be dangerous to the best interests of Spain.¹⁸

Spain was faced with growing French influence in the Moroccan area, as the French protectorate there was recognized even by Germany in the 1911 Franco-German Convention.¹⁹ In November, 1912, Spain and France agreed upon a convention which divided Morocco into three zones of influence. A small international zone was created; Spain received some coastal territory and her major fortresses. France got the largest zone.²⁰

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 289-290.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 291-293.

¹⁸Gabriel Maura Gamazo, Historia crítica del reinado de Don Alfonso XIII durante su menoridad bajo la regencia de su madre Doña María Cristina de Austria, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1919-1925), Vol I, p. 177.

¹⁹"Memorandum on Spain," Foreign Office, Political Intelligence Department, Spain 00/2, G.T.-4377, April 25, 1918, CAB 24/49.

²⁰Ibid. See also Smith, pp. 394-395, and Don Melchor Fernández Almagro, Historia del reinado de Don Alfonso XIII, 2nd ed. (Barcelona, 1934), p. 214. The treaty and its terms were discussed in the Diario de Sesiones de Cortes, Cámara de Diputados, May 13, 1914, No. 27, p. 657.

By 1913, Spain still was not able to master the Rifs. Numerous Socialist and Republican leaders wanted to get out of Morocco and escape a war which was costing Spain a million pesetas a day to fight.²¹ Spanish control of Morocco appeared to be possible at the outbreak of World War I, however, and the Spanish government was naturally somewhat reluctant to abandon the Moroccan venture. During the war, Germany sought to cause a native revolt against the French protectorate. The decline of French influence meant that Spain, if she acted carefully, could achieve a corresponding increase in influence and territory in Morocco. Spanish wartime policy concentrated on conciliation of the native tribes in Jibala; this policy was not changed until 1921.²²

When the war broke out in August, 1914, the Conservative government hoped that if Germany won the war, France would lose her advantages in Morocco. The government was also influenced by a hope arising from the Moroccan-associated parallel problem of Gibraltar. Spain hoped that, in addition to French losses in Morocco, England would be required to relinquish Gibraltar.²³

Possession of Gibraltar was a festering sore in Anglo-Spanish relations. Britain gained control of Gibraltar in the War of the Spanish Succession; her ownership was confirmed in

²¹Smith, Spain, p. 395.

²²Carr, Spain, pp. 519-520.

²³Sir Arthur Hardinge, A Diplomatist in Europe (London, 1927), p. 256.

the Peace of Utrecht. The rock had never been returned to Spain, which felt that it was rightfully hers. There were thus two major issues which, unless skillfully handled, could cause a serious deterioration of Spain's relations with her Allies. These issues were the Moroccan question and Gibraltar.

As early as May, 1914, the Socialist Iglesias was requesting information concerning the number of casualties in the occupation of Tetuán and stating that the ordinary soldiers in Morocco were suffering greatly.²⁴ He objected to favoritism in the execution of the laws concerning compulsory military service.²⁵ Attitudes toward the Moroccan question had solidified to such an extent that no meaningful consideration could be given to it.²⁶

Many opponents of the Moroccan involvement felt that the campaign in Morocco was a waste of lives and money, and they made such unequivocal statements as "In a word: Africa yes: but at the cost of Spain, no."²⁷ They were not pleased with the stationing of 20,000 men in Tetuán and with the fact that 10,000 men were needed to ensure the safety of convoys to Tetuán.²⁸ Radical leaders were prescient enough to see that the Moroccan problem was a threat to the monarchy and that the government would be wise to reconsider its policy.

²⁴Diario de Sesiones de Cortes, May 5, 1914, No. 29, pp. 477-478.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Fernández Almagro, Historia del reinado, pp. 247-248.

²⁷Diario de Sesiones, May 13, 1914, No. 27, p. 655.

²⁸Ibid., p. 658.

And Sr. Cambó says on conclusion that 'to that [the matter] of Morocco a rapid end must be put, very swiftly. With a royalty without a defender and with a factor such as that of Morocco the future of Spain can be very black.

It is said that the King has an immense popularity; it is said that the republican and revolutionary parties are ruined; and you will remember that the crushing of the republican parties is always a presage of large revolutionary commotions, and [those of] you who have read History will also remember that the moments of great popularity of Princes²⁹ often were very close to changes of régime'

Supporters and opponents of the war disagreed on its cost in both men and money. The exact cost even then was unknown, but anti-war protesters maintained that it cost Spain between 225 and 250 million pesetas a year.³⁰ They believed that the government's claim that only 70,000 to 72,000 men were in Africa was inaccurate, and that in fact there were 85,000 to 90,000 men there.³¹ Obtaining soldiers for the war was difficult, especially since the war was no more popular with the men who had to fight it than it was with the Republican minority in the Cortes. Large numbers of soldiers deserted the army in order to avoid African service.³²

The same radical anti-war politicians usually also were among the first to demand the return of Gibraltar. Often blatantly anti-imperialist in their views on Morocco, they were frequently the first to point out the necessity of Spain's holding the Rock.

²⁹Ibid., May 14, 1914, No. 28, p. 682.

³⁰Ibid., p. 677.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid.

The radical Cambó favored the acquisition of Gibraltar.

There is a problem connected with the problem of the Mediterranean, which complicates and aggravates it, and of which we are a decisive factor; the problem of the liberty of the way most frequented by the boats of the world, and the problem of Gibraltar in the book by René Pinon is also posed in an admirable manner. The quotation is short:

'Thus the question of the Strait is tangled with that of Morocco. No Power which has a fleet and interests in the sea, as much the United States and Japan, as France, Germany and Italy, can admit that Great Britain, seated on her rock of Gibraltar, occupies the Moroccan coast of the Strait, not even a single point of this coast, possessing thus the small molar [maxilar inferior] of this formidable mouth, of which Gibraltar is the principal tooth. In the same way it is certain that presently Great Britain will not permit a great maritime Power to take positions facing Gibraltar, and Tangier, where the English garrison withdraws each day its provisions, to belong to a rival Nation, because this would be to abdicate the empire which they [the English] pretend to exercise over the seas.'

England was blamed by several Deputies for Spanish ambitions in Morocco.

And what would have happened, what would happen now . . . if we were to abandon that politics of territorial occupation which we are following in Morocco? Nothing would happen . . . The status quo manner; because England being mistress of the strait would have completed her purpose. And besides . . . how must the status quo in the Mediterranean be for us the sign of our territorial independence, when by the imposition of England we cannot fortify the heights which are near Gibraltar? We depend on the will of England, we have gone to Morocco by the will of England . . . , and this is the gravest and saddest thing that can be said of the future of a Nation, that [on] the day which is convenient to England that we leave Morocco, within a few hours we will be outside Morocco.³⁴

³³ Ibid., May 20, 1914, No. 31, p. 766.

³⁴ Ibid., May 25, 1914, No. 34, p. 863. See also the speech of Sr. Senante, May 27, 1914, No. 36., p. 923.

In June, 1915, the Cortes had at least decided to accept for the moment that fact of Spain's presence in Morocco and began to concentrate on questions of local government in its zone, especially to the necessity of reforming the judicial system.³⁵

Because of its cost, the Moroccan war was becoming increasingly unpopular and, by October, 1914, had little popular support.³⁶ The government, however, was still determined to bring the blessings of Spanish civilization to the unfortunante Moor and approved an agreement with the "Compania general de Marruecos" to build a railroad from Tangier to Fez.³⁷

Gibraltar became briefly a problem in late 1914, but the issue was not that of ownership of the rock. The Spanish towns near Gibraltar, especially San Roque, were in grave economic straits since the agricultural produce of the area was declining, the younger men were emigrating, and new infant industries were not able to grow. The ports were threatened with closure to prevent smuggling of contraband goods.³⁸ The mere threat was enough to solve some, although not all the problem.

³⁵Ibid., May 25, 1914, No. 34, p. 863. See also the speech of Sr. Senante, May 27, 1914, No. 36, p. 923.

³⁶Ibid., June 1, 1914, No. 46, Appendix 1, June 3, 1914, No. 42, pp. 1080-1081, June 12, 1914, No. 49, p. 1274, which treated the matter of land concessions, June 17, 1914, No. 53, p. 143, June 24, 1914, No. 60, Appendix 1, Most of these are concerned with the creation of a court in Ceuta.

³⁷The Times (London), October 30, 1914), p. 7.

³⁸Diario de Sesiones, October 30, 1914, No. 73, Appendix 20.

Fighting broke out in Morocco in January, 1915, again failing to bring glory to the army. Several battles occurred in the Ceuta zone. On February 25, 1915, a Spanish ship en route from Tangier to Ceuta was shot at from the Moroccan coast.³⁹ In April, leading Conservatives Dato and Maura made speeches supporting the Spanish presence in Morocco and affirming the mutual interests of Britain, France, and Spain in all issues concerned with the Mediterranean area. These speeches were similar to those of the Liberal Romanones in expressing solidarity with the Triple Entente's policy concerning the area.⁴⁰ The three countries reached some agreement on the Morocco question when they negotiated the International Statute of Tangier, giving international status to Tangier.⁴¹

Spanish hopes were raised by some successes in Morocco, when Spain gained control of the Valley of Tikerman.⁴² Spain's anti-British orator Vázquez de Mella, like other Spaniards hoping to regain the nation's lost glory, on May 31 called for Spanish control of Gibraltar.⁴³ Further military

³⁹Fernández Almagro, Historia del reinado, p. 266.

⁴⁰The Times (London), April 20, 1915, p. 9, and April 23, 1915, p. 7.

⁴¹Ibid., April 24, 1915, p. 7.

⁴²Fernández Almagro, Historia del reinado, p. 267.

⁴³Speech of Vázquez de Mella, El siglo XX: 1st vol. of ca. 3 projected, La historia de España en sus documentos, edited by Fernando Díaz-Plaja (Madrid, 1960), I., 323.

success were obtained in June with the occupation of Reyen, Hassi-Berkan, and Is-Usaga.⁴⁴ The successes came too late, however, to prevent a change of commanding generals in Morocco.⁴⁵

1916 was a relatively quiet year; the Moroccan situation appears not to have excited much interest among the politicians who were allegedly concerned with winning the war. Spaniards felt that the French in Morocco were attempting to lessen Spanish influence.⁴⁶ The ex-sultan of Morocco, Muley Haffid, was interned in the Spanish zone, since he had been causing considerable trouble there.⁴⁷ During 1916, the British began hatching plans for the possible exchange of Gibraltar for Ceuta and turned their attention from Morocco.⁴⁸

It was in 1917 that events in Morocco and the situation of Gibraltar became important pawns in the Anglo-Spanish

⁴⁴Fernández Almagro, Historia del reinado, p. 266.

⁴⁵Diario de Sesiones, November 8, 1915, No. 3, p. 19. A touchy incident took place in late 1915, when Muley Haffid, the ex-sultan of Morocco, was denied entrance to the cathedral of Toledo because he was wearing a red fez, a sign of respect in Moslem countries. The cathedral was state property, since it had been made a national monument in 1909. The incident provoked rather extensive debate in the Cortes. See the Diario, November 20, 1915, No. 14, p. 321, December 1, 1915, No. 23, p. 604, December 6, 1915, No. 27, p. 731.

⁴⁶The Times (London), January 1, 1916, p. 4. Letter of Juan Claravoz.

⁴⁷Ibid., September 16, 1916, p. 7.

⁴⁸Sir Charles Petrie, King Alfonso XIII and His Age (London, 1963), p. 131. The exchange will be discussed in detail in relation to the beginning of serious consideration of the proposal in 1918.

diplomatic chess game. The rumor spread in early 1917 that Alfonso XIII was opposed to the creation of a civil government in Melilla; he was supposed to favor continued military rule.⁴⁹ The Moroccans were increasingly dissatisfied with Spanish rule. The Conde de Romanones defended Spain's position by stating that he had inherited the Moroccan problem from his Conservative predecessor and that he at least had been able to reduce the number of contingents in Morocco by about 20,000 men. He also claimed to have reduced expenses for the war.⁵⁰

One of the more interesting items in Anglo-Spanish relations during 1917, an item which suggests that Britain was "bribing" Spain to at least be a non-neutral neutral, was the proposed trade of Gibraltar for Ceuta, a proposal which apparently was never publicized, but which has leaked out in a number of tantalizing tidbits of information. On March 24, 1917, the military governor of the Campo de Gibraltar, Miguel Primo de Rivera, made a speech in the Academia Hispano-Americana de Ciencias y Artes de Cádiz advocating an exchange of Gibraltar for Ceuta. He also suggested that Spain leave Morocco. Primo de Rivera was suddenly replaced.⁵¹ In the next month, on April 6, 1917,

⁴⁹Diario de Sesiones, February 15, 1917, No. 16, p. 448.

⁵⁰Ibid., February 17, 1917, No. 18, p. 504.

⁵¹Fernández Almagro, Historia del reinado, p. 288, n. 1. This story is confirmed in Joseph A. Brandt, Toward the New Spain (Chicago, 1933), p. 366.

the British War Cabinet received a report from the Subcommittee on Territorial changes which referred to an exchange of Gibraltar and Ceuta. The proposal was sent to an inter-departmental committee for a report.⁵² According to one source, the Prime Minister Lloyd George drew up a memorandum on such an exchange; although this may be a 1917 memorandum it is more probable that the memorandum was one of the 1918 proposals.⁵³ The memorandum was not known to either Austen Chamberlain or Lord Hankey and it may not have been known to the Spanish.⁵⁴ The Germans at this time must have feared some such negotiations because in 1917 they suddenly began also to hold Gibraltar before the covetous eyes of Spain. In a 1917 interview for the Roma Tribuna, the Conde de Romanones stated that Germany had offered Spain Morocco, Portugal, and Gibraltar in exchange for her cooperation.⁵⁵ Sir Arthur Hardinge, with his usual lack of informativeness, states in his memoirs that the Germans tried to obtain Spanish support by offering Gibraltar to Spain, but that, as Britain pointed out then, Germany would simply transfer Gibraltar to Spain in exchange for another post in the Straits.⁵⁶ The pro-German

⁵²War Cabinet 115, Minute 10, April 6, 1917, CAB 23/2, P.R.O.

⁵³Petrie, Alfonso, p. 131. Petrie only mentions the existence of such a memorandum; he does not, unfortunately, date it. Lloyd George does not mention the exchange in his memoirs.

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 131-132.

⁵⁵The New York Times Current History: The European War (New York, 1917), Vol. XIII, p. 430.

⁵⁶Hardinge, Diplomatist, p. 263.

officers' juntas in December, 1917, circulated the story that the British planned to occupy Spanish territory near Gibraltar.⁵⁷ Plans for an exchange, although they cannot be definitely dated, did take place and by 1918, such an exchange was very seriously considered.

The Gibraltar question was being considered at a time when Morocco again began to be something of a serious irritant for Spain, when she might want to let go of troublesome territory. German agents were active in Morocco and in late 1917 Spain was forced into deporting some of these.⁵⁸ The soldiers were affected by the ending of all awards for military achievement in the African war; their morale declined.⁵⁹ Also, the Rifs in French territory were making pro-German attacks.⁶⁰ There was some possibility that these might affect the situation in the Spanish zone.

The Gibraltar-Ceuta exchange continued to be major topic of diplomatic consideration in 1918. The idea had the support of Alfonso XIII who felt that Spain should rightfully have sovereignty over the rock. The king had his own plan. He wanted to give Britain a ninety-nine year lease on Gibraltar.

⁵⁷Weekly Report on Spain XV, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/O15, G.T. -2973, December 13, 1917, CAB 24/35, P.R.O.

⁵⁸Weekly Report on Spain XII, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/O12, G.T. -2418, October 26, 1917, CAB 24/30, P.R.O.

⁵⁹Brandt, New Spain, p. 364.

⁶⁰Ibid.

Britain would pay a nominal fee of one pound sterling per year by the terms of the lease. Alfonso himself would go to Gibraltar to collect the "rent." The flags of both Britain and Spain would fly over Gibraltar. The Spanish king would keep a British officer on his staff and a Spanish officer would be assigned to the governor of Gibraltar's staff.⁶¹

Pro-German agitation for the return of Gibraltar was still evidence in January, 1918.⁶² The negotiations for an exchange of Gibraltar, an exchange which would gain Spanish friends for Britain and which would ruin the utility of one tool for German propagandists, proceeded through the year. On October 31, 1918, the British Admiralty reported to the War Office concerning the serviceability of Gibraltar as a naval base. The conclusions of the Admiralty were that if a suitable harbor could be found, the location of a coaling station was unimportant; it could be located in either Europe or Africa. The Ceuta harbor was not and could not be as good as that at Gibraltar, however, because of the high winds near Ceuta. A harbor on the African coast would also be an expensive proposition to establish. Ceuta would be harder to hold as a defensive point than Gibraltar, since

⁶¹Petrie, p. 131

⁶²Weekly Report on Spain XVI, Department of Information, Intelligence Bureau FSW/016, G.T. -3291, January 0, 1918, CAB 24/38, P.R.O.

it was only twelve miles from Spain and could also be attacked from Morocco. Gibraltar could be made indefensible by gunfire, but Ceuta was still harder to defend. The Admiralty, in short, reported unfavorably on the exchange.⁶³ The war was over when the Air Ministry, in contrast, reported on its support of the trade. It stated, on December 5, that Gibraltar was extremely vulnerable to air attack and was too small to contain an aerodrome. No large air force could be kept on Gibraltar. Ceuta was excellent for aerial purposes. It had space for an aerodrome and was a good site for aerial maneuvers. It could also be defended from air raids.⁶⁴ With such conflicting opinions before it, the Army Council requested the views of the Secretary of State.⁶⁵ The Secretary of State,

⁶³ "Memorandum on The Situation in Spain, with special reference to the Republican agitation and the Regionalist Question," Foreign Office, Political Intelligence Department Spain/006, G.T. -6490, December 6, 1918, and War Cabinet Gibraltar-Ceuta Committee Correspondence between War Office, Admiralty, Air Ministry, and Foreign Office; and Memorandum by General Staff, War Office. War office to Secretary, Overseas Defense Committee, (Admiralty to War Office, October 31, 1918, M. 023691), G.T. -6615, December 24, 1918, CAB 24/73.

⁶⁴ Air Ministry to War Office-Proposed Exchange of Gibraltar for Ceuta, December 5, 1918, Gibraltar-Ceuta Correspondence, CAB 24/73.

⁶⁵ War Office to Foreign Office, Under Secretary of State December 16, 1918, Ibid.

Balfour, felt that such a negotiation would be difficult to arrange. He would raise the proposed exchange at the peace conference only if his naval and military advisors were agreed on it.⁶⁶ The General Staff then confused matters by supporting an exchange because modern weapons really made Gibraltar indefensible. It was also easily attacked by land and was subject to air attacks.⁶⁷

The General Staff felt that with Morocco still a Spanish problem, Ceuta would be in no danger from Spain. If the Moroccan situation changed, especially if railroad communications improved, it could be threatened by France or Spain. British control of the Mediterranean protected it at the time.⁶⁸ The final arguments presented were that Gibraltar was easier to defend than Ceuta as long as Spain remained a neutral. Gibraltar would be indefensible against a land attack if Spain ever became hostile to Britain. As long as England had control of the seas, Ceuta was more defensible, and Ceuta was always safer from air attack.⁶⁹ The exchange, especially after such conclusions, was never made. Possibly, the Spaniards were never aware of British consideration of an exchange.⁷⁰ After the fall of Romanones,

⁶⁶Foreign Office to War Office, December 21, 1918, Ibid.

⁶⁷Memorandum by General Staff, War Office, Ibid.

⁶⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰Petrie, p. 132, This appears doubtful in view of Britain's curious behavior in other matters in 1917 and 1918.

such an exchange certainly became less feasible, yet, in view of Britain's 1917 desire to force Spain into some form of alliance, the exchange became more than just a wild idea of Lloyd George's. It became a good inducement to gain Spain's friendship by restoring some of her lost prestige. In connection with the Gibraltar question, it should be noted that the Allies hoped, in December, 1918, to talk Spain into relinquishing all claim to Tangier and into keeping her protectorate in Morocco; the Allies would then be assured of pro-Allied policy in Morocco and the peace conference would then possibly give Gibraltar to Spain.⁷¹ Balfour avoided discussing the Moroccan issue with the Spanish ambassador, hoping to get Spain to break with Germany.⁷² In April of 1918, before the matter was closed, a number of leftists were pushing forward the idea of exchanging the Spanish zone in Morocco for Gibraltar.⁷³

This suggests that Spain would have seriously entertained British economic pressure on Spain, and it is possible that Britain sweetened her bitter pressures with hints about

⁷¹"Memorandum on The Situation in Spain, with special reference to the Republican agitation and the Regionalist Question," Foreign Office, Political Intelligence Department Spain/006, G.T. -6490, December 6, 1918.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³"Memorandum on Spain," Foreign Office, Political Intelligence Department Spain 00/2, G.T. 4377, April 25, 1918, CAB 24/49.

the return of Gibraltar if Spain behaved. An exchange would have been popular in Spain. The Moroccan war was unpopular, and Morocco was a steady drain on Spanish resources. Gibraltar was greatly desired by most Spaniards and was a rock upon which to build Spanish prestige. The various rumors circulating in Spain at the time suggests that something was being seriously considered concerning Gibraltar, but the actual proposal, if any, was never publicized.⁷⁴

Whatever the extent of the negotiations, their appearance, however minor, in 1917 and 1918, coincides with the other events of those years, hints that some attempt may have been made to bribe Spain into entering the war and that Spain may herself have tried to coerce Britain into giving up Gibraltar in exchange for Spanish cooperation. The proposed exchange indicates some desire on Britain's part for a closer relationship with Spain, however nebulous the relationship might be. Although Britain may have wanted Spain to enter the war, she probably was, in the proposed Gibraltar exchange, trying to gain diplomatic support. Her actions may well have been a propaganda effort. The Gibraltar proposal, whatever the motives behind it, did signify an attempt by Britain to strengthen Anglo-Spanish ties.

⁷⁴Alberto Mousset, La política exterior de España with a Foreword by the Conde de Romanones (Madrid, 1918), p. 274, is one source for the idea that the Spanish desire to reconquer Gibraltar and Tangier was part of the program of the politicians. The public was not interested in the issue, being more concerned with its own affairs. Mousset claims that the issue was not a part of serious diplomatic discussions because it was not discussed

CHAPTER IX

ANGLO-SPANISH RELATIONS DURING WORLD WAR I: THE MAINTENANCE OF NEUTRALITY UNDER PRESSURE

A study of Anglo-Spanish relations during World War I reveals two items of importance concerning the war and Spain's status as a neutral. The first item is that Spain, in all probability, considered entering World War I on the side of the Western powers, most probably in late 1917. The second major revelation of such a study is that considerable pressure was placed upon Spain by Great Britain to ensure Spanish "benevolent neutrality." Many factors made Spanish cooperation with Britain not only feasible, but desirable. That Spain did not become an ally in the war was due chiefly to the intransigence of an army afraid to lose its honor and to an inability to turn the country from the making of war profits to organizing and unifying for war. An inability to control the social conditions resulting from the economic dislocation of the war and the profit-making zeal of the Spanish industrialists were the main reasons for Spain's failure to become more involved in World War I diplomacy.

The Spanish government at the beginning of 1917, and again in 1918, was the pro-Allied government of the Conde de Romanones. In 1917, when Romanones fell from power, he was succeeded by the Marqués de Alhucemas, who, while not so

blatantly in favor of the Allies, did not feel any strong antipathy for them. Alhucemas was essentially a neutral. When he, in turn, lost power, his successor was the conservative neutralist, Eduardo Dato. Of these three governments, one, probably the Romanones government, which bequeathed its problems to the Alhucemas government, was involved in diplomatic negotiations which indicate that it considered entering the war. In early 1918, Alhucemas was again in office, and after a number of vicissitudes, the Conde de Romanones again became Prime Minister in November, 1918. There is a strong possibility that the Liberal governments of Romanones and Alhucemas were interested in obtaining close Spanish ties with the Allies. The Conservatives, who alternated with them in power, would not have been likely to draw popular wrath against themselves in 1917 by admitting that they were opposed to such a policy in 1917; the people were almost angry enough with Germany to want a war. For the Conservatives to have admitted sympathy for the Central Powers would have been political suicide. They chose instead to stand upon the glory of Spain as a neutral and to maintain that neutrality.

There is a large amount of evidence to support the contention that Spain considered entering World War I. First, there is the diplomatic evidence. British diplomatic maneuvers in 1917 and 1918 indicate that Britain was trying to coax, coerce, and bully Spain into the war. Britain seriously

considered an exchange of Gibraltar for Ceuta in 1917 and 1918. This seems to be a bribe to gain Spanish friendship, although Britain may have been applying pressure to obtain Spanish concessions to British diplomatic moves. News of the pressure put upon Spain had leaked at some time in mid-1917. On the Spanish side of the affair, Primo de Rivera was suddenly removed from his post for suggesting such an exchange. If Spain were considering the exchange, premature disclosure of it could prove embarrassing.

Another form of pressure upon Spain in 1917 was Britain's attempt to force Spain into extensive cooperation with the Allies through the withholding of coal supplies. This economic pressure to get Spain to deliver ore to Britain was a thinly veiled attempt to convince Spain that thwarting British desires could bring economic ruin. Britain compounded the act by getting the United States to join her in the application of such pressure. This action was taken prior to the fall of the Alhucemas government, while the Gibraltar-Ceuta negotiations took place sporadically through 1917 and 1918, and reached final consideration in December, 1918, when Romanones had returned to power. Also in 1917, the United States attempted to pressure Spain into breaking diplomatic relations with Germany. These actions all show that diplomatic pressure was definitely used to convince Spain not to thwart Allied ambitions. Spain responded as Britain had hoped to the economic pressure and appears to have seriously thought of accepting the Gibraltar exchange, which would have been a popular move on the part of the government.

Spain had a major motive and a number of minor motives for cooperation with the Allies. She had a very real grievance against Germany. By 1917, German submarines, as the Spaniards themselves admitted, had "paralyzed" the merchant marine. This paralysis had adverse effects upon the Spanish economy. It also, incidentally, was extremely damaging to Spain's pride as a neutral. Spain at this period was extremely sensitive to all affronts to her national honor. The sinking of the merchant marine of a neutral country was more than an offense; it was a violation of international law. Spain thus had a legal basis for entering the war if she so desired when her neutral rights were violated. Certainly, she had every reason to throw diplomatic support to the Allies.

The sinking of the merchant marine led to economic want. The merchant marine supplied Spain with food and other necessities. Unemployment was high in 1917 and the scarcity of food led to food riots, especially in Madrid. Spain was undergoing hardship and was justified in viewing the defeat of the Central Powers as desirable.

The Spanish government had a minor motive for supporting the Allies and it was a motive which signified a great deal to the stability of that government. Spain was in a state of near revolutionary conflict. Strikes were increasing, separatist movements were rife, and unemployment was high. These internal conflicts were tearing Spain apart. Support for the Allies might have led to post-war gains and support

of successful gains, such as Gibraltar, would have brought at least temporary unity in the face of a national problem and would have been a way to divert the people's attention from their sufferings and the economic crisis.

Significantly, some of the malcontents were appeased in 1917. The Catalan regionalists were relatively quiet; Prat de la Riba had just died. In 1918, a committee was formed to consider their demands. It is possible that the formation of the committee was a reward for their restraint in 1917, which was generally a revolutionary year and which ought to have seen more regional unrest than it did. Catalonia made war profits; it did not want to alter this situation. Concessions were also made to the pro-Allied intellectuals who advocated an end to Spanish neutrality. Miguel de Unamuno was suddenly permitted to make pro-war speeches criticizing the government's neutrality policy. Apparently, criticism of neutrality was not undesirable. Unamuno was supporting an action seriously considered by his government and was a tool of that government in influencing and testing public opinion on the diplomatic situation. Spanish censorship, in favored cases, appears to have been greatly relaxed.

Other factors show that Spain at least wanted to be ready for all possible contingencies. In February, 1917, after allowing an extensive trade in munitions, Spain suddenly established a government monopoly on explosives. She did not consider entering the war until the time for such entry was

highly advantageous, since the last thing Spain could afford was a defeat. The United States entered the war in 1917, and the American entrance made a German victory less likely. Germany in 1917 was beginning to feel the effects of the blockade and Spain, under pressure from the United States and aware of the course of events, probably could guess the likely outcome of the war; she would benefit from post-war settlements. An Allied victory would bolster the prestige of Alfonso XIII's faltering monarchy. The war, by its stimulation of numerous issues, kept the monarchy safe for a few years. Alfonso symbolized the Spanish nation by his strict observance of neutrality. He was the personification of neutral Spain. With the anti-monarchical Republicans becoming a political force of some strength, Alfonso badly needed popular support. He felt that neutrality was necessary and would probably not have led his country into war even for Gibraltar, but he would have savored the chance of getting Gibraltar in a post-war decision and have been aware of the effect which the acquisition of the Rock would have upon the status of the monarchy. He is known to have favored Spanish control of Gibraltar. Supporting the Allies would also have given the government the prestige and support which it needed to make post-war reforms and establish the ailing government on a stable foundation.

The association of Great Britain and Spain was becoming increasingly close. Trade agreements, occasionally forced by Britain, bound the two countries closely. Britain was

respectful of Spain's neutral rights and her violations of such rights tended to be few and minor. Although she did propagandize during the war, in contrast with Germany, she avoided offending Spanish sensibilities and never strongly angered Spain through such activities. She also tried to ease old enmities by hinting at the exchange of Gibraltar for Ceuta.

Spain, obviously, had every reason to abandon strict neutrality and did so. The question naturally arises of why she did not become more active in her support of the Allies. One factor kept Spain inactive -- the army. The Spanish army, in 1917, was not a fighting force. It was appalled by the thought that it might be used for defending the country. The Spanish army was a bureaucratic institution and did not consider itself as a fighting force. It was a political body which provided employment for a number of politically-minded men whose chief concern was gaining and keeping a position which was obtained through political patronage.

The Liberal government, which may have wanted to enter the war on the Allied side, was overthrown by the military. The Conservative La Cierva, the army's man in the Cabinet, engineered the fall of the García Prieto government. La Cierva and the army were very pro-German. The conservative pro-German army had absolutely no desire to support a liberal, pro-Allied government. It admired the German army and would consider fighting with Germany, but not in any way with the Allies.

The king, reared by an Austrian mother and tutored by soldiers, tended to rely on army officers for advice.

The army was not only unwilling to fight. It was unfit to fight. Naturally, it did not favor publicizing this lack of military fitness. The army had an abundant supply of incompetent officers and was undersupplied with equipment. The common soldier was demoralized by poor pay, poor conditions of service, bad officers, and high military mortality. The army had proven in the Moroccan war that it was unable to defeat the Rif tribesmen. It would not have been much support for any government, but its opposition could have been harmful.

The army juntas eagerly aided the fall of the Liberals. If the Liberal governments succeeded in cooperating with the Allies in any way, the army would be ruined. It would lose prestige and, through the loss of prestige, would lose its influence in the government -- and its officers' posts. Its reputation was already weak because of its failure in the increasingly unpopular Moroccan war. The people objected to the wastage of Spanish manpower in Morocco, and Spanish soldiers simply did not want to fight. In addition, the army had the support of conservative Catholics, some of whom were Carlists, but most of whom were good monarchists. The elements which supported the army were also those which were

the firmest supporters of the monarchy.¹ On the other hand, the Allied supporters were usually liberal and frequently were radicals who hated the monarchy. Often they were pro-French and to the conservative Catholic monarchists they symbolized French anti-clericalism. England was, to these people, still a heretical Protestant nation. They would not be likely to support the Allies, since the monarchy rested on pro-German conservatism.

The juntas of 1917 were a warning to the monarchy. The possibility of a military coup d'etat if Spain became too involved with the Allies was great. The army would not fight for the Allies and the people would not support it if it attempted to align itself with Germany. It had to support neutrality in order to protect its position. The army was also aware that as a neutral Spain was safe. She could not be directly attacked by land or sea as a neutral; only her shipping could be lost. If she threw support to the Central Powers, she would face the wrath of Britain on the seas and a hostile France across the Pyrenees. Both could strangle her by their positions.

Spain did not become actively pro-Allied because the government, unable to solve the chaos of economic troubles

¹Pro-German agitators, such as Vázquez de Mella, were occasionally Carlists. These anti-monarchical agitators used the Gibraltar issue as propaganda for placing the Carlist claimant on the throne. One of their chief arguments would have been destroyed by the success of the Gibraltar exchange or by Spain's joining the Allies.

and conservative-radical division, could not control the army. Failure to control the army was eventually to lead to the military government of Primo de Rivera and the fall of the constitutional monarchy. The military juntas of 1917 presaged Primo's dictatorship, the fall of the Republic, and ultimately, the military dictatorship of Generalissimo Francisco Franco. The internal divisions of Spain, the social problems which could not be solved, led to faith in military officers, whose glory was untarnished by the European war. The government could not control the problems and thus, could not control the army.

If the government had strangled the juntas at birth, it might have been able to unite the nation behind its foreign policy and might have laid a basis for post-war social reform. By not crushing the officers, the government destroyed the vitality of the army itself, which, when the officers gained dominance, could no longer be used to defend the government.

Unable to control the army, Spain remained neutral in World War I. The social problems arising from the war and the paralysis of an outmoded political system were contributing factors to Spain's staying neutral. A neutrality policy could be supported, however grudgingly, by most elements of divided Spain. Neutrality was, for Spain, a compromise, and a feeble compromise at that. Spain was a neutral in World War I, but she was not, as is often stated, predisposed to neutrality. It is not true, as is frequently claimed,

that she never considered entering the war. On the contrary, the Spanish government of Romanones appears to have given serious consideration to a declaration of war, and had numerous grievances against Germany. Only the intransigence of the army, which was not inevitably uncontrollable, was a tremendous barricade to entrance.

Spain had no fixed policy of "pro-British" neutrality. Only the government of Romanones can be considered as having been staunchly sympathetic to Britain. The Marqués de Alhucemas may have been inclined to favor the British, but this is by no means certain. Dato and Maura would not have attempted to guide Spain into any course except that of strict neutrality.

Britain had every reason to desire a policy of "benevolent neutrality" on Spain's part. If she could not obtain active alliance in the war, she could at least acquire trading concessions beneficial to her war effort. She could also ensure Spanish cooperation in post-war diplomatic maneuvers by demonstrating to Spain that Hispanic interests were intimately linked to those of Britain. Spain's future welfare, economically and, to a lesser degree, politically, depended on a close mutual understanding with England.

The war did result in closer Anglo-Spanish ties, especially in the area of economic affairs, and these ties strengthened British influence in Spain. The development of mutual interests during the war laid a firm base for possible post-war diplomacy and friendship between the two countries.

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