BELIEFS OF INTERNAL VERSUS EXTERNAL CONTROL AND THEIR
RELATIONSHIP TO STAGE OF MORAL JUDGMENT

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This investigation sought to explore the relationship of Julian Rotter's concept of internal versus external control (I-E) to stages of moral judgment. The I-E dimension is defined as the attribution by the individual of responsibility for behavioral outcomes to either oneself or to outside entities. The internal oriented person believes that the events in which he is involved lie within his control. Conversely, the external oriented person believes that the events that happen to him are controlled by other factors. The internal person has been linked through correlational studies with such personality attributes as achievement via conformance, dominance, sociability and orderliness. The external person has been usually associated with lower social class and lower self-regard.

Moral judgment, as represented primarily by the work of Lawrence Kohlberg, involves the perception by the individual of rules and standards. Kohlberg conceived of six stages of moral judgment which progressed from relative hedonism to universal principles of man. Kohlberg's dimension has been used as an index of maturity of thinking.

The validity of the instruments designed by Rotter to measure the I-E dimension has been questioned. Therefore, a new I-E test, the Attribution of Reinforcement Vector...
(ARL) Scale, was constructed to measure the I-E dimension. Results of a pilot study indicated the ARL scale was closely comparable to Rotter's I-E scale.

The ARL, the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale and the Kohlberg MDT were administered to sixty-one North Texas State University students (thirty-five females and twenty-six males). The Pearson product moment correlation formula was applied to resulting scores for all Ss.

One judge scored all of the Kohlberg MDT protocols. His reliability was checked by another judge scoring a random sample of approximately half of the protocols. The correlation between the two judges' ratings was .62, somewhat lower than that obtained by Kohlberg. Social Desirability proved to be significantly related to some of the measures used in the study. As a result, its effect was controlled by the use of partial correlations.

Correlations for the total sample between scores on the ARL and the Kohlberg MDT did not approach significance. Correlations for males and females when computed separately yielded one significant correlation. A significant relationship ($p < .05$) was found between situation III and the ARL.

The single significant correlation is not very strong evidence of a relationship between the I-E dimension and stage of moral judgment. Several interpretations of the lack of significant relationships found in the present study are discussed. First, the two dimensions may be independent of each other. Secondly, scoring problems associated with the
Kohlberg MDT may have lowered the reliability and validity of the measure. A third alternative lies in the revision of the research design. Perhaps, an additional measure of the parents' level of moral judgment and their ARL score would give a better estimate of the complexity of moral judgment. Any of the above considerations suggest the need for further research in this area.
BELIEFS OF INTERNAL VERSUS EXTERNAL CONTROL AND THEIR
RELATIONSHIP TO STAGE OF MORAL JUDGMENT

THESIS

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By

Wylie A. Coulter, B. S.
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BELIEFS OF INTERNAL VERSUS EXTERNAL CONTROL AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO STAGE OF MORAL JUDGMENT

The attribution of responsibility for behavioral outcomes to either oneself or to outside entities defines Rotter's concept of internal versus external control of reinforcement (Rotter, 1966). This construct has been derived from Rotter's social learning theory (Rotter, 1954), in which it is postulated that the probability of a behavior's occurrence is a function of preference for particular reinforcements and the expectancy of obtaining these reinforcements in certain situations. It is primarily the expectation of reinforcement and the anticipation of a contingency between action and outcome that comprise the theoretical basis for the internal-external (I-E) construct. In the theory, the perception of control (i.e., the "feeling" of contingency of outcome upon action) is seen as a generalized expectancy, operating across the spectrum of behavior (Leftcourt, 1966). The degree to which a person accepts or rejects the belief that he has control or power over what happens to him defines his position on the internal-external continuum. Internal control, then, refers to the perception of events, positive and negative, by an individual as contingent upon his actions, external control, conversely, is the perception of events as beyond personal control or not contingent upon his actions.
In general, measurement of the internal-external dimension has been undertaken by subjects responding to a self-report questionnaire. Phares (1957), in his dissertation, developed a 26-item scale in an attempt to measure individual differences in external control. His study used the chance versus skill design common to most I-E research. Individuals competed on tasks labeled as chance or skill, but actually no differences between tasks existed. Phares' hypothesis was that an internal oriented individual would behave differently dependent upon his perception of the locus of control in the task. But the externally oriented individual would behave in a similar manner on both tasks because of his feeling of lack of control regardless of the potential for control in the task. The results of his study supported Phares' contentions. James (1957) followed the rather crude measure by Phares with a revision of the scale to test the almost identical hypothesis that within each sample group, regardless of the chance or skill label, external individuals would behave equally in either situation. His results show a low but significant correlation between his measure of internal orientation and a differential response to the skill and chance tasks.

Rotter (1966) revised the Phares-James test and presented considerable evidence to support the reliability and validity of his revision. In contrast to a Likert-type test format
used in the early scales, Rotter's test was developed to utilize a forced-choice method. This procedure has been subsequently utilized by most of the other researchers developing tests of the I-E construct. The Rotter I-E scale is a 23-item test with six filler items to make the purpose of the test more ambiguous. Rotter reports a variety of reliability studies using college freshmen and penal inmates. He also stated that the wording of his scale was changed to make the test appropriate for non-college adults and senior high school students.

Research based on Rotter's concept sought to establish other types of behavioral predictions. Bailer (1961) investigated the conceptualization of success and failure in mentally retarded and normal children. Using a scale of his own designed for children, Bailer (1961) sought to determine whether or not mentally retarded children differed qualitatively from normals in the development of the ability to conceptualize (via the I-E dimension) success and failure. His results showed that the ability to perceive an internal locus of control was related to increasing age, and that mental age rather than chronological age was more relevant to the development of such a conceptualization. Zytokoskee, Strickland, and Watson (1971) failed to find a significant relationship between the I-E dimension and the delay of gratification in black and white adolescents. Dembroski,
Lasater, Evans, Rozelle, and Allen (1970) failed to find any relationship between scores on Rotter's I-E test and a measure of children's honesty. MacDonald (1970) in an unusual study of birth control practices by college students found that internals were more likely to practice some method of birth control. Crandall, Katkovsky, and Crandall (1965) using their own I-E scale, found that the internal scoring child tends to have a higher achievement test score than an external scoring child.

Correlational studies have been used to establish the relationship of the I-E dimension to various psychological tests and concepts. Baier and Rotter (1963) found a significant and positive relationship between the I-E dimension and social class, internality being predictive of higher social class. Epstein and Komorita (1971) found significant ethnic differences in which Negro children reported lower I-E scores than did previously tested white children. Rotter (1966) has also presented evidence to support this relationship using Negro and white college students. Wall (1970) compared Rotter's I-E test and Shostrum's Personal Orientation Inventory and found a positive, significant relationship between high internal scores and the sub-scales Self-regard, Self-actualizing Value, and Nature of Man as Constructive. Hersch and Scheibe (1967) presented a comprehensive validity report correlating the Rotter I-E test and the
California Psychological Inventory (CPI) and the Adjective Check List (ACL). Significant relationships were found between internal scores and high CPI scores on Dominance, Tolerance, Good Impression, Sociability, Intellectual Efficiency, Achievement via Conformance, and Well-Being. High internal scores were also related to high ACL scores on Defensiveness, Achievement, Dominance, Endurance, and Order with low internal scores related to high ACL scores on Succorance and Abasement.

Despite considerable success in correlational studies, Rotter's test has been severely criticized. Dembroski et al. (1970), reflecting on the nonsignificance of their results, criticized the somewhat dated terminology of Rotter's items and the limitations of the forced-choice format. Thomas (1970) also found fault with the terminology of Rotter's test and presented evidence to show that the items were biased so that a politically conservative view was related to an internal orientation. Also, the test proved to be a better predictor of social concern for college students than their parents. Although Rotter (1966) contends that the test measures a universal dimension, Thomas and others have raised serious doubts as to its validity.

The purpose of the present study was to investigate the relationship between a measure of the I-E dimension and the stages in moral judgment outlined by Kohlberg (1963). The first formal theory of the structure and development of
moral judgment was presented by Piaget (1932) in his early studies of children's perception of rules. Piaget thought that children progressed through three stages of moral judgment. First is the stage of submission to adult authority, where justice is virtually unknown. This stage is present in most children up to eight years of age. Piaget's second stage is labeled progressive equalitarianism, occurring in ages eight through eleven years. Then at approximately eleven or twelve years of age, equalitarian justice is tempered by considerations of equity and human rights. Piaget conceived of moral judgment as dependent upon both social and cognitive development.

Lawrence Kohlberg (1964) continued Piaget's research and differentiated six stages of moral judgment. Rather than hypothesizing that development of moral judgment occurs as a result of social influence and cognitive factors as did Piaget, Kohlberg conceived of the development of moral judgment as determined by cognitive factors only. Kohlberg's types of moral judgment were formulated so that each could be considered a separate moral philosophy. Each philosophy is based upon the individual's view of his world. Kohlberg conceived of this development of moral judgment in terms of progression from judgment based on immediate external physical contingencies to judgments in terms of internal purposes, norms, or values.
In Kohlberg's theory (1968), the progression of an individual from one stage to the next involved a better cognitive organization. Essentially what Kohlberg presents is a theory of the structure of moral judgments based on cognitive factors only. Development of moral judgments by an individual conforms to this structure and is not significantly affected by cultural or social conditions. Rather it is the rate at which the individual progresses from stage to stage that is affected by the cultural milieu.

Kohlberg (1969) describes the basic typology as consisting of three levels and two stages within each level (see Table 1).

**TABLE 1**

Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Typology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Stage 1</th>
<th>Stage 2</th>
<th>Stage 3</th>
<th>Stage 4</th>
<th>Stage 5</th>
<th>Stage 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level II. Morality of Conventional Role-Conformity.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level III. Morality of Self-Accepted Moral Principles.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At stage 1, the child responds to superior adult power. The external physical consequences of his actions determine the content of the child's judgment. Stage 2 best describes the child who perceives the rightness of action by the degree to which it satisfies his own needs; however, the concept of fairness is present. As Kohlberg (1968) states, "Elements of fairness, of reciprocity and equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical, pragmatic way (p. 26)." Stage 3 orientations chiefly reflect the "good boy-good girl" child. Good behavior is usually described as that which gains the approval of others while bad behavior is defined by the disapproval of others. A stage 4 individual responds to what could be considered a legalistic definition of morality. Children of this type respond to fixed rules. The concern is for maintenance of the present order of things. The individual earns respect by lawful performance of his perceived duties. Individuals reflecting a stage 5 orientation respond to standards which are upheld by the majority. Kohlberg terms this the "social contract" stage or the "official morality" of the American government (1968; p. 26).

Type 6 morality describes the abstractly derived system of ethical principles which appeals to the universality of human experience. The system is not a concrete set of rules but instead a collection of principles of human rights. Kohlberg (1970) feels most people progress to stage 4 or 5 in a lifetime. These stages of moral judgment assist in
the perpetuation of social organization by assuring orderly interpersonal intercourse. According to Kohlberg's theory, a certain level of stability in human affairs is maintained in part by the socialization of moral principles (1970). For Kohlberg, the stages do not account for all the variance in moral judgments. Rather, the stages represent a general factor which does account for a substantial part of the total factor (Maccoby, 1968, p. 237).

This theory and the method Kohlberg developed to assess it (1970) have been used as an index of maturity of individual thinking. Haan, Smith, and Block (1968) used Kohlberg's measure with college students in a study of political commitments and social action. Similarly, Mosher and Sprinthall (1970) have suggested the use of Kohlberg's method of assessment to determine success of human development programs in secondary schools. Though Kohlberg's dimension would appear, intuitively at least, parallel with Rotter's I-E continuum, no research as yet has dealt with this question.

However, Kohlberg's theory has received criticism from some social learning theorists, most notably Bandura (1969), regarding the fixed nature of his stages and the emphasis upon cognitive factors. An alternative explanation advanced by Bandura concerned the influence of models and social reinforcement in changing moral judgments. Bandura maintains that the structure of the beliefs, indeed Kohlberg's
whole developmental scheme, has little relevance to an explanation of how moral judgment develops. Bandura and McDonald (1963) presented some evidence to support their hypothesis that moral judgments were learned through imitation and social reinforcement and were independent of any fixed structure. However, in replicating Bandura and McDonald's results, other authors disagreed with Bandura and McDonald's interpretations (Cowan, Langer, Heavenrich, & Nathanson, 1969). The argument between whether moral development is a fixed stage entity persists. More important for the present discussion is the question of relationships between moral maturity as defined by Kohlberg and other basic dimensions of personality which appear to be developing at the same time. Social learning theory would tend to favor a view that the two dimensions in this study, moral judgment and development of perception of locus of reinforcement (I-E), are significantly related. Both dimensions reflect the individual's view of and expectations concerning his environment. Both dimensions have common factors, cognitive and interpersonal, in their development. Kohlberg, however, would not adhere to such a hypothesis because, for him, the development of moral judgments is primarily cognitive, and thus somewhat independent of interpersonal and personality factors.

It is expected that because Rotter's I-E concept has been found to increase with a number of factors related
to cognitive maturity, most significantly, mental age (Bailer, 1961), some significant degree of relationship to Kohlberg's stages of moral judgment should be found.

Method

Subjects. Sixty-one North Texas State University students who were enrolled in undergraduate psychology classes served as subjects. All Es were given course credit for participation in the study. Thirty-five females and twenty-six males participated.

Instruments. The "Attribution of Reinforcement Locus" scale (ARL) (See Appendix) was constructed by generating items from Rotter's I-E test (Rotter, 1966), the Intellectual Achievement Responsibility questionnaire (Crandall, Katkovsky, & Crandall, 1964), and the Locus of Control scale (Bailer, 1961). Special effort was made to word items in simple, direct language. Subjects responded to the 80-item test by choosing each answer along a five-point continuum from "very true" to "very untrue."

A pilot study was conducted to determine selected reliability and validity characteristics of the test. The total sample of thirty-seven subjects included seventeen females and twenty males. The coefficient alpha for the ARL was .71, indicating a fairly good degree of internal consistency. The ARL scale's correlation with the Rotter I-E was .63 (p < .001), providing an indication of construct validity. With the correction for attenuation due to
unreliability, the correlation between Rotter's scale and the ARL was .91 for the pilot sample. The scale correlated -.31 with the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964). This correlation, though not significant, is of sufficient magnitude that the effects of social desirability were controlled for in the present study.

A shortened version of Kohlberg's Moral Dilemmas test (MDT) (Haan, Smith & Block, 1963) was also employed in this study. Kohlberg (1970) developed a manual for content analysis which was used in the scoring of this study's sample. This version of Kohlberg's test involves the presentation of three moral dilemmas (III, IV, VIII) which the S is asked to read. The S then responds to a set of standard questions regarding the moral implications involved in each situation. Each S's answers are then compared by the judge with example answers and stage rules for the specific situation in the manual and a stage score is assigned to that answer. All answer scores for each situation are then totaled, averaged, and rounded off to the closest stage category. To obtain a global score for each S, the scores for the three situations are added, then averaged. The resulting measure is a two digit score rounded off to the nearest tenth. In this manner a total of four scores are obtained for each S.

The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964) was included to analyze the effects of
socially desirable response sets on the ARL and the Kohlberg MDT.

Procedure. The Ss were administered the ARL, the Kohlberg MDT, and the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability scale at two testing sessions within a three-day period. All Ss completed the forms in a group testing situation.

The Pearson product moment correlation formula was applied to the resulting scores of all Ss. The effects of the Social Desirability scores were partialled out from scores on the ARL and the Kohlberg MDT situations and global scores.

Results and Discussion

The means and standard deviations for the males, females and total group on the ARL are presented in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>193.61</td>
<td>16.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>195.15</td>
<td>14.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>192.45</td>
<td>18.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One judge scored all of the Kohlberg MDT protocols.

To check the reliability of the judge's ratings, a random
sample of thirty of the protocols, approximately one half, was scored by another judge using the same Kohlberg manual and system. A correlation of agreement of .62 between the two judges was obtained. This relatively low correlation may simply reflect scoring problems due to the inexperience of the raters in the present study or may reflect the relative homogeneity of the sample (See Table 3).

TABLE 3

Means and Standard Deviations of Global Kohlberg MDT Scores for Total Group, Male and Female Ss

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Social desirability as measured by the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability scale was found to be a significant factor in several of the correlations involving the Kohlberg MDT (See Table 4). Partial correlations between ARL scores and the Kohlberg MDT scores were computed, controlling the effects of social desirability. Social desirability scores, however, were not significantly related to the ARL measure (See also Table 4).
Correlations Between Social Desirability and the Kohlberg MDT and the ARL for Total Group, Male and Female Ss
N=61-26 Males, 35 Females

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Desirability</th>
<th>Situation III</th>
<th>Situation IV</th>
<th>Situation VIII</th>
<th>Global Rate</th>
<th>ARL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>-.21</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>-.31</td>
<td>-.34*</td>
<td>-.50**</td>
<td>-.54**</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05.
**p < .01.

Correlations for the total sample between scores on the measure of internal versus external locus of control (ARL) and the level of moral judgment (Kohlberg MDT) did not approach significance (See Table 5 and Table 6). Analysis of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARL Scores</th>
<th>Situation III</th>
<th>Situation IV</th>
<th>Situation VIII</th>
<th>Global Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>-.28</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>-.43*</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05.
the sample by male and female groups yielded slightly different results. Correlations for males between the ARL and the four MDT scores also failed to reach significance (See also Table 5 and Table 6). However, analysis of the correlations for females on the two variables revealed a significant correlation between ARL scores and the level of moral judgment as measured by situation III of the Kohlberg MDT ($p < .05$). Correlations for all other variables for females failed to approach significance (See also Table 5 and Table 6).

**TABLE 6**

Partial Correlations Between ARL Scores and Kohlberg MDT Scores for Total Group, Male and Female Ss

$N=61$—26 Males, 35 Females

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARL Scores</th>
<th>Situation III</th>
<th>Situation IV</th>
<th>Situation VIII</th>
<th>Global Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>-.40*</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*$p<.05$.

The resulting single significant correlation is not strong evidence of a relationship between the I-E measure and the MDT. The correlation between situation III and the I-E measure for males comes closest to significance among
the remaining correlations. This suggests that perhaps situation III evokes a more accurate measurement of moral judgment for the sample. Perhaps situation III elicits more consistent moral judgments among subjects due to the nature of its particular dilemma. In situation III, the subject is presented with a dilemma concerning whether or not a man should steal a drug as the only means to save his wife's life. In contrast to this dilemma, situations IV, and VII require the S to make decisions for other characters involved in the initial situation (III). A possible hypothesis for differences found in the present study could be that situation III evokes more identification with the character for the S than do the succeeding situations. Further investigation of the differences among the Kohlberg MDT situations needs to be made.

There are several ways to interpret the overall insignificance of the results. First, Kohlberg may be correct in theorizing that moral judgments develop solely as a function of cognitive factors. Within Kohlberg's theory, reference to personality or interpersonal factors (in this case, perception of reinforcement locus) is not necessary in explaining the level of maturity of an individual's moral judgments. Thus, as Kohlberg has stated (1963), it is the structure of moral judgment that is important for the modification of those judgments. Other factors, such as the peer group (Piaget, 1932) or the
primary model (Bandura, 1969), are relatively unimportant in accounting for changes in moral judgments. If Kohlberg is correct, social learning theory, a second explanation, would be wrong in assuming that the parents or significant others provide for the child essential examples of cognitive judgments and thereby influences what he believes.

Although the data reported here give no evidence that Kohlberg's contentions concerning moral judgments and the influence of social factors on these judgments are wrong, several alternative explanations need to be explored. First, the relative homogeneity of the present sample (see Table 3) does not give an adequate representation of the spectrum of moral judgments. With a larger and more heterogeneous sample, the data might reveal significant relationships not found in the present analysis.

Second, the scoring of the Kohlberg MDT protocols was accomplished by two relatively inexperienced judges. Also, the low correlation of agreement would give additional support to the suspicion that with experienced judges, a more reliable and perhaps more valid measure might be obtained.

A third observation regards the level of the present research design. Given a hypothesis based on social learning theory, it may be that neglecting an additional measure of the parents' level of moral judgment and their
locus of control (I-E) underestimates the complexity of
development of moral judgment. Indeed, knowing what
intentions the child's parents might have may be a
significant factor in the level the child attains.

The above-mentioned considerations would seem to point
to the need for an improved experimental design which would
more adequately embrace both the complexity of moral
judgments and of social influences.
Appendix

Attribution of Reinforcement Locus Scale

1. If my MOTHER says, "You are a good kid," it is because she is in a good mood.

2. How many friends I have depends on how hard I try.

3. If I get caught doing something wrong, it is because I wasn't smart enough.

4. If my FATHER says I am acting silly, it is because of something I have done.

5. Getting people to understand me is impossible no matter how hard I try.

6. If I become successful and respected, it will be because I just got the right break at the right time.

7. If my MOTHER scolds me for not cleaning up my room, it's because I sometimes forget to listen to her.

8. When I show a friend how to play a game and he has trouble with it, it is because he doesn't usually understand things well.

9. If people think I'm bright or clever, it is because they just happen to like me.

10. When I make plans to do something, I am certain that I can make them work.

11. If my MOTHER says I am Dumb, it is because she is just mad at me.

12. If I get into trouble, I know things will work out because my luck is going to help me.

13. If a boy or girl tells me I'm a friendly person, it is because I really try hard to be that way.

14. If my FATHER tells me I'm doing well in my chores, it's because he is in one of his best moods.

15. In my case, getting what I want depends on luck.

16. If my FATHER says to me, "Try to be better," it is because he says this to get me to try harder.

17. Becoming a success in what I do depends on hard work.
18. If my MOTHER says I am bright or clever, it is because my mother is just feeling good.

19. If I want to go somewhere badly and my MOTHER won't let me, it's because she wants to show me who's boss.

20. In the long run of things, what happens to me depends on what I do with myself.

21. If my FATHER does something for me, it is because I have been a good kid for him.

22. If I become famous someday, it will be because I got lucky at the right time.

23. If I do well on a test in school, it is because my MOTHER kept after me to study.

24. I sometimes wonder if my life will ever be all that my MOTHER wants it to be.

25. If I don't get home on time, it is because my MOTHER forgets to remind me.

26. If I have lots of friends, it is because I'm a person people seem to like.

27. Suppose I remember something my FATHER taught me. It would be because HE taught it to me well.

28. If I become famous one day, it will be because my FATHER really pushed me there.

29. I feel that life would be a lot better if only someone would give me a break.

30. If my FATHER says I'm Dumb, it is because he is in a bad mood.

31. What happens to me in life will depend upon how I handle myself.

32. If I don't get home on time, it is because my FATHER didn't remind me.

33. If my MOTHER says I'm acting silly, it is because she happens to be in a bad mood.

34. If my FATHER says I'm stupid, it is because I haven't been behaving myself lately.
35. To get rid of dishonest government officials, I would try to get people to vote against them.

36. If my MOTHER does something really nice for me, it is because I've been a good kid for her.

37. I feel that what happens to me is out of my own control.

38. If my FATHER scolds me for not cleaning up my room, it is because he is just picking on me.

39. If my MOTHER says to me "Try to be better," it is because I haven't been behaving myself.

40. I know that I can have a good life for myself if only good fortune will stay with me.

41. If I want to go somewhere badly and my FATHER won't let me, it is because he wants to show me who is boss.

42. If my MOTHER says I'm doing well in my chores, it is because she is in her best mood.

43. To become a good leader, I must take advantage of every opportunity that I find.

44. If I bring home good grades, it is because my FATHER really kept after me to study.

45. There is a direct connection between how hard I study and the grades I get.

46. In my case, getting what I want has little or nothing to do with luck.

47. Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me.

48. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work.

49. It is hard for me to know whether or not a person really likes me.

50. Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive at the grades they give.

51. The unhappy things that happen to people are because of the mistakes they make themselves.

52. One SHOULD always be willing to admit his (her) mistakes.
53. The laws of this country are something the politicians control.

54. A person's worth in this world passes unnoticed no matter how hard he tries.

55. Policemen catch people breaking the law because a person's luck usually runs out.

56. Anyone who gets in trouble these days just doesn't want to live a right kind of life.

57. A fellow gets into trouble because he just can't keep from running around with the wrong crowd.

58. The reason kids get into trouble these days is because they usually live in the wrong neighborhood.

59. People just don't realize that their lives are controlled mainly by accidental happenings.

60. The reason we have laws is because people need rules to keep them from acting bad.

61. Too many kids are getting into trouble these days because the world has turned them to crime.

62. If a person wants to be happy in life, he should work HARD at being that way.

63. A person who doesn't have many friends is a person people seem to dislike.

64. This country is controlled by average citizens who use their privilege to vote.

65. A person who is grumpy and unfriendly is that way because most people don't act nice to him.

66. People who are lonely are that way because they don't try to be friendly.

67. The world would be a better place to live if people could get together and work at it.

68. People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make.

69. There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try to prevent them.

70. No matter how hard some people try, others just don't like them.
71. The idea that teachers are unfair to students is nonsense.

72. By taking an active part in political and social affairs the people can control world events.

73. People who can't get others to like them don't understand how to get along with others.

74. In the long run the bad things that happen to people are balanced by the good things.

75. It is difficult for people to have much control over the things politicians do in government.

76. This world is run by the few people in power, and there is not much the little guy can do about it.

77. Most students don't realize the extent to which their grades are influenced by accidental happenings.

78. One of the major reasons we have wars is because people don't take enough interest in politics.

79. In the long run people get the respect they deserve in the world.

80. A person's future is largely a matter of what fate has in store for him.
References


