
This study addresses the problem of determining the attitude of a small nation, Mexico toward the United Nations, as manifested in her actions within the organization. The objectives of Mexican policy in the United Nations and the enthusiasm with which those goals are pursued are the primary indicators of the extent to which Mexican leaders view the U.N. as a viable means of promoting the prestige and ideals of their nation.

The purpose of this investigation is to look at the international organization from the point of view of a small, non-military nation to discover if and how it may be useful to such a nation in carrying out its foreign policy objectives in a bi-polar, nuclear world.

The first step in establishing the Mexican concept of the United Nations is to examine the historical and contemporary factors which shape the Mexican international political personality. These influences may be termed hereditary and environmental factors. The Revolution of 1910 emerges as the major hereditary factor, giving Mexican leaders their strong belief in national sovereignty and the corollary principles of non-intervention, self-determination and juridical equality of states. Mexico's contemporary environment contributes
a concern for human development, disarmament, and the rule of law, as well as an identification with the developing nations of the third world.

Having defined Mexico as a political entity, two areas of international activity are available in which to observe Mexico's expression of this personality. First, Mexican participation in the conferences which produced the Charter of the United Nations and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance demonstrates enthusiasm for and the desire to contribute to the establishment of effective international organizations. Second, the particular causes championed by Mexico in the United Nations since its founding reveal her dedication to the traditional principles and choice of areas in which her influence can be effectively exerted.

The case of Castro's Cuba, before the United Nations and the Organization of American States as an extension of the United Nations, provides a closer look at the way Mexican leaders use principles as the basis of their United Nations policy. The Cuban case shows the inter-relationships of Mexico's traditional ideals, the contemporary world situation, regional associations, and her chosen causes in approaching a specific international problem.

In developing the international political personality of Mexico, the main sources are histories and general articles about Mexican foreign policy, colored with statements by Mexican leaders. The section of the study concerned with charter-making relies on U.N. and United States documents.
as well as the content of resolutions and charters produced by the conventions together with the news reported in the New York Times. Mexico's actions in the United Nations are pieced together from a variety of primary and secondary sources. The official records of the General Assembly, other U.N. publications, U.N. documents, and reports of events in the U.N. monthly periodicals are incorporated with articles and books about Mexican or Latin American activities, especially Jorge Castaneda's *Mexico and the United Nations*. The New York Times, together with the U.N. publications and a few pertinent articles, supply the information for the treatment of the Cuban case.

The study indicates that Mexican leaders, fully aware of their nation's lack of military power, value the United Nations as a means of exerting moral influence and increasing the prestige of Mexico as a nation that champions ideals.
MEXICO IN THE UNITED NATIONS

THESIS

Presented to the Graduate Council of the
North Texas State University in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

By

Stephanie L. Barron, B. A.
Denton, Texas
August, 1971
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. MEXICO'S INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL PERSONALITY</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Scope of the Study</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hereditary Factors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Factors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment-Conditioned Policies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. MEXICO'S ROLE IN CHARTER-MAKING</strong></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chapultepec Conference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The San Francisco Conference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Rio Conference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III. MEXICO'S ACTIONS IN THE UNITED NATIONS</strong></td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On National Sovereignty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Peace</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Intervention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On International Law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV. MEXICO'S POLICY IN THE CUBAN CASE</strong></td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-American Conferences</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>V. MEXICO IN THE UNITED NATIONS</strong></td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

MEXICO'S INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL PERSONALITY

The Scope of the Study

The international personality of a nation is as much the product of heredity and environment as that of a human individual. Each nation has unique traits, traits which identify it with a particular group and traits which it shares with the whole universe of nations. The United Nations, through which member nations come together and interact in both prescribed and extemporaneous ways, provides its members with a vehicle for expressing their individual and composite personalities. This expression takes many forms and explores many facets of international relationship: cultural, economic, social and political. To the extent that the political relationships of nations within the United Nations, those growing out of the exercise of power on the world scene, can be divorced from their other forms of relationships, the political interaction of nations will shape the boundaries of the international setting of this study. The international political personality of one nation, the Republic of Mexico, will be the subject observed within this international setting.

These considerations establish the limits of this investigation: the unique historical experience and contemporary
political realities determining Mexico's international identity and the extent to which this identity is expressed in the United Nations (and the Organization of American States functioning as an agency of the UN) during the time from 1945 to 1970.

Hereditary Factors

Hernán Cortés brought Mexico her first intercontinental experience by imposing Spanish rule and introducing European influence with the conquest of the Aztecs in 1519. The subjection of the native Indian population, blending of bloodlines and introduction of the Roman Catholic Church led to social and economic stratification that two revolutionary periods could only partially alleviate. From 1810 to 1867 the Mexicans fought to free themselves from foreign domination, breaking with Spain in 1821 (though continuing under the threat of Spain's returning), losing territory to the Republic of Texas in 1836 and to the United States in 1848, and thwarting French imperialist ambitions through the defeat of the emperor, Maxmilian, in 1867. From 1910 to 1928, the bloody portion of another revolution, an internal war waged against the abuses of the aristocratic rule of Porfirio Díaz, began the trend of land reform, economic nationalism, education,

and other liberal political and social movements that have brought Mexico to a position of prestige among the developing nations.4

During the unstable period of the Revolution of 1910, Mexico added to the bitterness of lost territory the further violation of her sovereignty by the United States in the direct intervention of the occupation of Vera Cruz and the Army expedition into northern Mexico pursuing Pancho Villa.5 President Woodrow Wilson also intervened indirectly, using his recognition policy to influence the outcome of developments in the rapidly changing Mexican political picture.6

The Revolution of 1910 is a Mexican institution pervading all areas of governmental operation. Decision-makers are mindful of the principles developed and lessons learned in that formative period and apply them in contemporary situations. As early in that struggle as 1918, Venustiano Carranza showed no obligation to President Wilson, who had aided his coming to power, when he presented four basic principles of international relations, stressing national sovereignty and opposing intervention. These propositions, listed below, have guided the foreign policies of subsequent Mexican


presidents:

1. All countries are equal; their laws, institutions, and integrity must be mutually respected.
2. No country must intervene in the internal affairs of another in any way, or under any pretext whatsoever. All must accept the principle of non-intervention, without exception.
3. Nationals and foreigners must be equal before the state in which they find themselves; and no foreigner must make his foreign citizenship a basis for claiming special privileges and protection.
4. Legislation must be equal and uniform as far as possible except in cases affecting the sovereignty of the State.  

One does not have to look far into the history of Carranza's era to discover the basis of the fears which underlie his presentation of beliefs. A strong sense of nationalism together with a fear of the growing power of the United States is evident. A theory of international relations emerges from these statements which extends beyond Mexico to embrace all small, emerging nations. It is a foreign policy that views small nations as the equals of great powers in their possession of the essential right of nationhood, national sovereignty. National sovereignty, made so precious to Mexicans by internal struggle and suffering at the hand of more powerful nations, especially the United States, became the cornerstone of Mexican foreign policy. Other basic principles are corollaries of national sovereignty: the juridical equality

---

8 Ibid., p. 281.
of nations, the concept of self-determination, and the doctrine of non-intervention.\textsuperscript{9}

Mexico's support for the principle of the juridical equality of nations has led to a strong belief in the importance of international law. As early as 1831, Mexico tried to convene an inter-American conference to adopt a code of international law which could serve as a basis for settling disputes among American nations.\textsuperscript{10} Speaking on the same subject at the time the United Nations was being organized, Mexican statesman Luis Padilla Nervo declared that "if the fundamental and the juridical equality of states are not safeguarded, peace will not count and cannot count with the sincere efforts of free nations and free men."\textsuperscript{11}

The concept of self-determination also has special meaning for Mexicans, colored by their revolutionary experience. Eighteen years of guerilla war were required for the Mexican nation to change its form of government. Mexico, therefore, defends the right of every nation to determine what form of government it shall have, and when that form shall be changed.\textsuperscript{12}


\textsuperscript{10}Rafael de la Colina, "Salute from the Ambassadors," América, VII, 4 (April, 1965), 34.


The belief in self-determination has set the tone of Mexican policy on the question of recognizing governments. In 1930, Mexican Foreign Minister Genaro Estrada formulated a doctrine of recognition in reaction against the practices of the United States in the case of Mexico and other Latin American revolutionary governments. His proposal, today called the Estrada Doctrine, is based on the principle that recognition is a right of all de facto governments, regardless of their ideological basis or method of achieving power. A change of government in a Latin American nation, however achieved, is regarded in the same light as a change of presidential administrations in the United States. Mexico opposes the use of recognition as a tool for indirect intervention against unpopular regimes.

Non-intervention, the negative side of self-determination, is a principle so jealously guarded by Mexican policy-makers that it has become almost a national symbol. The Mexican position on intervention has been one of absolute opposition. Luis Quintanilla, diplomat and writer, emphasized Mexico’s role in making the principle of non-intervention an inter-American principle in *A Latin American Speaks* (1943). The

---


Mexican delegation introduced the "Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention" at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace at Buenos Aires in 1936. The Protocol was adopted by the Conference and, significantly, signed by the United States, indicating a willingness to disavow past practices and refrain from future interventions. The first article of the protocol (which Quintanilla considered so important to the development of Pan-Americanism that it alone justified the Buenos Aires meeting) read:

The high contracting parties declare inadmissible the intervention of any one of them, directly or indirectly and for whatsoever reason, in the internal or external affairs of any other of the parties.\(^1\)

Non-intervention is a negative, defensive principle. It is a principle based on fear and distrust. Yet, it is a strong tenet of Mexican foreign policy, representing the most effective basis for coexistence in a hemisphere dominated by a power which has given ample reasons for fear.\(^2\) Former foreign minister Manuel Tello revealed the total dedication of his government to the unqualified application of the principle of non-intervention when he stated, "We believe in non-intervention not as an abstract ideal but as an imperative

\(^{16}\) Quinlanilla, "From the Worst to the Best," p. 68. This article was originally published as a part of \textit{A Latin American Speaks} (New York, 1943), pp. 155-163; included by C. Neale Ronning in the collection, \textit{Intervention in Latin America}.

necessity that is probably the best guarantee of peace." The Mexican Revolution continues to generate political, social, and economic changes which may affect foreign vested interests in the future; these changes may be based on the Mexican historical experiences and developmental factors peculiar to that nation, yet not conforming to the patterns of development accepted by other nations. Mexico still needs liberty from outside interference to accomplish in peace and stability those reforms which were initiated in violence and upheaval. The Revolution requires an unyielding position on non-intervention. Manuel Tello has warned, "Let us not hurl into the wind of the future a boomerang that could eventually come back against our people."

It is the Mexican Revolution of 1910 with its strong nationalistic spirit and bitter memories of foreign intervention that is the primary force of heredity in the development of Mexico's international political personality. The basic ideal of national sovereignty, with the companion principles of juridical equality of states emphasizing the role of international law, self-determination dictating a non-discriminating policy of recognition, and nonintervention revealing the negative and defensive side of Mexico's foreign

---

19 Castañeda, Mexico and the UN, p. 64.
20 Compton, "What about Intervention?" p. 5.
policy, have their theoretical genesis in the revolutionary experience. The specific ways in which Mexico applies these principles is determined by her contemporary political environment.

Environmental Factors

The international environment in which Mexico's abstract policy principles have taken tangible form is characterized by the physical size and economic and military power of Mexico and the surrounding nations, their proximity being a major factor. The environment is further shaped by Mexico's participation in two international organizations, the United Nations and the Organization of American States. Beyond the physical aspects of geography, money and firepower, an atmosphere of ideological conflict affects the climate of the political environment.

On a world-wide comparative scale, Mexico is a middle-sized country with a rapidly growing population, adequate natural resources, a developing economy and a stable, democratic government.21 Within the Latin American community of nations, Mexico's immediate international surroundings and the international group with which Mexico shares many traits of political personality, Mexico is the largest in population

---

and second largest in area of the Spanish-speaking nations. Mexico shares the leadership role in the Latin-American group with Brazil and Argentina, who assert themselves in the South American continental area.

The Constitution of the Republic of Mexico is a part of the political environment. Emphasizing the role of the executive, the Mexican political system places the responsibility for defining foreign policy primarily in the hands of the President. Credit or condemnation for the outcome of activities in the international sphere belongs to the President and his chief advisor, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with a very small part of the power in foreign policy-making given to the legislature. Discussions of Mexican foreign policy are in reality discussions of the personal philosophies of a few dominant men, within the bounds set by tradition, national interest and respect for the remote possibility of a reaction from public opinion.

Mexican leaders who have taken the initiative in international relations have found that their most effective efforts are those which rely on Mexico's international prestige.

---


26 Castaneda, Mexico and the UN, p. 5.
in applying moral persuasion or in representing the interests of the small emerging nations of the "third world." Mexico has succeeded in breaking out of the endless cycle of dictatorship, human misery and revolution to establish a constitutional system of government that provides an orderly solution to the key problem of succession while expanding the opportunities for participation and allowing opposition. 27 This political achievement together with the economic growth and social reforms accomplished in the last forty years make Mexico an example to newer and less developed nations, 28 and provide a platform from which Mexican leaders can launch a bid for an independent position in international affairs. 29

The United States is a strong determinant in Mexican foreign policy. Sharing the northern boundary with one of the two great military powers of the world and faced by a void of military power to the south, Mexico does not need men or equipment for international defense. There is no possibility of countering the power of the northern neighbor, no fear of attack from the south, and no doubt that Mexico's proximity to the United States guarantees defense against extra-continental invasions. 30

27 Needler, "Political Development of Mexico," p. 308.
28 Engel, "Revolution and Mexican Foreign Policy," p. 519.
30 Astiz, Latin American International Politics, p. 81.
Economically dependent on the United States, Mexico must face this hard fact in formulating international policies. Relations with the United States are a basic consideration in decision-making. With about 60 per cent of all imports and exports tied to the American market and 74 per cent of all foreign investments coming from the United States, economic reality cannot be ignored. Mexican international policy is conditioned by geopolitics.

Cold war issues arising from the ideological and physical power contest for hegemony between the United States and the Soviet Union, with their respective allies, have required Mexican representatives to make unequivocal stands in order to preserve the principles inherited from the Revolution. In these conflicts Mexico expresses the hopes of all peoples for peace, realizing the absolute necessity that the great powers find non-military means of settling their differences. Interventions by the United States, the Soviet Union and Communist China, together with interventions by other Latin American governments, all related to the ideological conflict in the Western Hemisphere, have compromised the principle of non-intervention, which in 1936 seemed permanently established.

\[\text{References:}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{31} Astiz, Latin American International Politics, p. 82.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{32} United Nations Review, VI, 5 (November, 1959), p. 16.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{33} Neale Ronning, Law and Politics in Inter-American Diplomacy (New York, 1963), p. 64.}\]
A final determinant of Mexican international policy is the opportunity within the structured functions of the United Nations and the Organization of American States, as it operates within the meaning of the charter of the world organization, to exert a measure of influence on world events. Outside the Western Hemisphere, Mexico has no specific national interest to defend. The United Nations offers a medium in which to work for humanitarian goals that express Mexico's ideals. Having taken an active interest in the composition of the Charters, Mexico works within the world and regional organizations to realize the general purposes of preserving peace and promoting human welfare in addition to protecting national interests. Luis Padilla Nervo phrased the Mexican concept of the role of the United Nations when he became President of the UN General Assembly in 1951. He said that he based his hopes for world peace on "the new diplomacy engendered in the United Nations as an informed public which if displeased can bring pressure to bear on governments and politicians."  

---

34 Castañeda, Mexico and the UN, p. 3.  
Environment-Conditioned Policies

How do these environmental factors shape the expression of Mexico's traditional principles? Mexico's relative world position, the cold war, and the functions of international organizations have provided Mexico with a large number of real situations in which to define principles in terms of explicit policies.

National sovereignty, earlier established as the cornerstone of Mexican foreign policy, enters into Mexican thinking on the question of membership in the international organizations. Mexico supports universal membership and opposes any move to expel members. Expulsion would violate the juridical equality of states, one aspect of the national sovereignty principle, because members of the Security Council could not be expelled. The question of admitting new members is related to Mexico's recognition policy. To refuse a nation admission would be a comment on the legitimacy of its government. For Mexico, participation in international organizations is not a privilege, but an obligation.

Self-determination enters Mexico's relations with the developing nations. Colonialism has become a target of Mexican policy, which insists on the earliest possible freedom to

---

39 Dozer, "Recognition in Inter-American Relations," p. 327.
40 Castañeda, Mexico and the UN, p. 81.
non-self-governing territories. Racial discrimination, especially as practiced in the Union of South Africa, has been attacked by Mexicans championing self-determination. This principle is also reflected in Mexico's enthusiasm for declarations of the rights of man and other projects aimed at protecting human rights. Historical experience gives Mexico a special knowledge of and sensitivity to the economic and social aspirations of peoples recently ending their colonial relationships with European powers. For Mexico self-determination is second only to the preservation of peace as a purpose of the United Nations. Former president Adolfo Lopez Mateos demonstrated Mexico's concern for problems of human rights when he made the following statement at the opening session of the General Assembly in 1959:

We have managed to discover the profound causes that in part provoke or foster warlike action. To a large extent these reasons are misery, injustice and fear. Misery is often the impotence of people to benefit from their natural resources. Injustice is often the domination or oppression of one group by another. Fear is often engendered in the threats of one group versus another, or of the powerful versus the weak and of the powerful among themselves.

The current world situation challenges national sovereignty in the Western Hemisphere with three different kinds of intervention: first, the familiar intervention by one American nation in the internal affairs of another American

---

41 Faust and Stansifer, "Mexican Foreign Policy," p. 105.
42 Castañeda, Mexico and the UN, p. 67.
nation; second, the intervention of extra-continental powers such as the Soviet Union and Communist China through clandestine political movements; and third, the collective intervention of international organizations in the name of peace. The world-wide ideological conflict between Marxism and democracy as interpreted by the capitalist countries is at the root of most of the interventions which call Mexico to take a stand on the issue of non-intervention.

As in the case of Cuba, which will be discussed at length in the final chapter of this study, there may be elements of all three types of intervention present. A guerrilla invasion of one Latin American nation sponsored by the Communist government of another is believed to be the work of the Soviet Union by the United States, which pushes measures through the OAS authorizing collective intervention by the organization to prevent the intervention or punish the intervening nation.\textsuperscript{44}

Mexico objects to these procedures at every turn. With the exception of a case in which the government of a nation is seriously threatened by an attack from outside its borders, Mexico does not support collective OAS action. If hemispheric peace is not threatened, there is no basis for a meeting of the OAS. Mexico opposes armed intervention by the Soviets in the Western Hemisphere,\textsuperscript{45} but considers internal Communist movements a domestic problem related to the nature of the state.

\textsuperscript{44}Koslow, "Mexico in the OAS," p. 49.
\textsuperscript{45}Hispanic-American Report, XIII, 7 (September, 1960), 437.
and therefore falling within the reserved domain of the state.\textsuperscript{146} Mexico jealously guards this reserved domain against trespass by international organizations.\textsuperscript{147}

International organizations are not exempt from the absolute rule of non-intervention.\textsuperscript{148} In fact, it is more important that these official groups of nations, especially since they are led by one or more of the great powers, be prevented from intervening in the domestic affairs of states. In the case of the Organization of American States, which Mexico now feels is simply a tool of American foreign policy, collective intervention cannot be allowed to cover United States interventions with a multilateral facade.\textsuperscript{149} "We are firmly persuaded," stated Foreign Minister Manuel Tello at the OAS meeting in Santiago de Chile, 1959, "that the OAS . . . was not established to create, maintain or overthrow governments . . . or to take the place of states in the choice and application of internal measures."\textsuperscript{50}

Another aspect of the interventionism controversy is the question of recognizing governments that come to power by other than constitutional means. Mexico's application of the Estrada Doctrine, giving unqualified recognition to all de facto governments no longer receives the support it once knew

\textsuperscript{146}Faust and Stansifer, "Mexican Foreign Policy," p. 101.

\textsuperscript{147}Padilla Nervo, "The Presence of Mexico," p. 92.

\textsuperscript{148}Castañeda, Mexico and the UN, p. 181.

\textsuperscript{149}Koslow, "Mexico in the OAS," p. 16.

\textsuperscript{50}Compton, "What about Intervention?" p. 5.
from Mexican public opinion. Mexican sympathy for social reform movements in other nations and antipathy for dictatorship bring demands from some segments of the population, especially the intellectual groups, to withhold recognition from dictatorial regimes. Mexican official policy continues to uphold the Estrada Doctrine,\(^1\) declaring that recognition in no way denotes approval of a government, but simply acknowledges the reality that a government exists in fact. Recognizing a dictatorship may be less dangerous than the risk of compromising the principle of non-intervention.\(^2\)

In cases of violent changes, Mexican policy-makers believe the responsibility of the international organization and of its members individually is clearly set out in the charters: to make every effort to avoid internationalizing the revolution. Rather than joining other nations to interfere in the progress of the rebellion, the nations should secure their own borders so that they are not, even unknowingly, guilty of supporting either side of the conflict.\(^3\) Mexico fears that if the principle of non-intervention is not strictly enforced, any conflict in the world may become an arena for a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. For Luis Padilla Nervo, long-time leader of Mexican policy in the United Nations, "each intervention

---

\(^1\)Astiz, Latin American International Politics, p. 85.  
\(^2\)Castañeda, Mexico and the UN, p. 186.  
\(^3\)Padilla Nervo, "The Presence of Mexico," p. 95.
contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter propagates the seeds of world conflict." 54

Insisting on strict observance of the non-intervention principle leads Mexico to another tenet, adherence to the letter of the international law. Interest in international law is reflected in Mexico's support for the International Court of Justice, 55 and consistent practice of voting (or abstaining) on international resolutions after giving due consideration to the "legal" questions involved. 56 Mexico's national interest plays a part in determining a legal basis for voting. Mexico is able to "abstain on legal grounds" in order to avoid supporting measures sponsored by the United States which contradict Mexico's interpretation of the Charter thereby enabling Mexico to defend basic principles without openly opposing the United States or endangering the essential international relationship. 57

Strong states base their actions on political considerations, regarding international law only to the extent that it serves their national interests. 58 International law serves the small nations when the great powers can be persuaded to observe the rules. The General Assembly has the

56 Hispanic-American Report, XIV, 10 (October, 1969), 941.
58 Compton, "What about Intervention?" p. 3.
potential of serving the small nations as a means of legis-
lating and enforcing through moral pressure.\textsuperscript{59} As Antonio
Castro Leal, a Mexican legislator, points out in his book,
¿Adónde Va México?, no one will benefit more than the small
nations if international laws are codified and observed.\textsuperscript{60}

A more specific aspect of the international law question
involves the relationships between the world organization and
the regional organization. United States efforts to keep
hemispheric affairs out of the United Nations are opposed by
Mexico's insistence on the supremacy and all-embracing capa-
city of the world organization.\textsuperscript{61} Luis Padilla Nervo made
the Mexican position clear to the First Committee of the
General Assembly in 1961 when he stated "the competence of
the United Nations to deal with a situation involving two
members cannot be challenged on the ground that both parties
are also members of a regional organization."\textsuperscript{62}

International polarization coupled with the development
of nuclear military power brings a number of additional prin-
ciples to Mexico's policy line. These ideas, based on the
desire for peace, rise from the drive for self-preservation,
which Mexico shares with all nations, rather than from a

\textsuperscript{59}Jorge Castañeda, "The Underdeveloped Nations and the
Development of International Law," \textit{International Organization},

\textsuperscript{60}Antonio Castro Leal, ¿Adónde Va México? (Mexico City,
1968), p. 66.

\textsuperscript{61}Koslow, "Mexico in the UN," p. 17.

\textsuperscript{62}International Organization, XV, 3 (Summer, 1961), 430.
particular historical influence. Among the more important goals of Mexico in the realm of peace-keeping are collective security, primarily through peaceful settlement of disputes, and disarmament, especially the denuclearization of the Latin American nations. Mexico looks to the collective security provisions of the Organization of American States for protection from armed attack.

Mexican foreign policy is the product of the thinking of a small number of men in official positions who have inherited the principle of national sovereignty and its corollaries from a violent and significant revolution. They have expressed this heritage in response to the exigencies of the contemporary political situation in the light of national interest. They have found in international organization opportunities to pursue policies that go beyond national interest to those crises which affect all peoples.

Heredity and environment, acting on the men who have made Mexican policy, have shaped the international political personality of the nation which in the following pages will express that personality within the political bounds of the United Nations.

---

63 Castaneda, Mexico and the UN, p. 79.
64 Manger, "Mexico and the UN," p. 59.
CHAPTER II

MEXICO'S ROLE IN CHARTER-MAKING

Mexican interest in international organizations was never greater than in the year 1945, when the Charter of the United Nations was widely analyzed, discussed and eventually approved. In that year Mexico was host to a meeting of representatives of the United States and the Latin-American nations (except Argentina\(^1\)) which produced resolutions that were later embodied in the United Nations Charter and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. During the Mexico City meeting and later at San Francisco, Mexico made numerous written proposals and spoke out on issues considered vital to the Western Hemisphere or to the small non-military nations.

Observing Mexican activity at three conferences, the Inter-American Conference on the Problems of War and Peace (Chapultepec Conference), the United Nations Conference on International Organization (San Francisco Conference), and to a lesser extent, the Conference for the Maintenance of Peace and Continental Security (Rio Conference), provides a clear picture, not only of Mexican principles of international policy, but of the initial experiences which were to condition

\(^1\)Argentina had not broken relations with the Axis Powers.
Mexico's future responses within the world and regional organizations.

The Chapultepec Conference

In August, 1944, diplomatic experts from the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union met in Washington, D.C. to an old home called Dumbarton Oaks, to discuss plans for a new international organization to grow out of the United Nations alliance against the Axis Powers. Having completed the conversations with the Soviets in late September, the British and American representatives began a second series of talks with the Chinese experts. Both meetings involved foreign policy experts rather than officials in order to avoid giving the impression that the governments were committed to the proposals, thereby limiting the freedom of discussion.

On October 9, 1944, the "Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization" were published, despite the fact that several important details, including the voting formula for the Security Council, had not been worked out. Hoping to avoid some of the problems that had hampered the formation of an effective League of Nations due to lack of preparation prior to the Versailles conference,

---

6Ibid., p. 411. 7Ibid., p. 416. 8Arne, Primer, p. 118.
the four powers made their proposals, called the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, available for all other nations to consider prior to the meeting of all the United Nations.  

Disappointed by United States failure to consult them prior to the conference, the Latin American ambassadors met with officials of the United States Department of State on Columbus Day, 1944, at a Blair House reception for a briefing on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The meetings were intended to be strictly informative, to advise the ambassadors concerning the United States understanding of the meaning of the proposals. The Latin Americans were not satisfied, desiring an opportunity to make recommendations for changes in the proposals.

Argentina's failure to break relations with the Axis Powers, with resulting non-recognition and exclusion from the Blair House meetings, led to an Argentine request for an inter-American meeting to discuss the position of Argentina in the hemispheric community. Eager to have an opportunity to meet with the United States in a consultative situation, the Latin Americans urged the Pan-American Union to call a

---

10 Ibid., p. 552.
11 Ibid., p. 551.
meeting of the foreign ministers. A compromise, which excluded Argentina but agreed to discuss the Argentine question made it possible for the United States to accept the proposal.\textsuperscript{11} The Mexico City Conference, scheduled for February 15, 1945, was described as "the New World's dress rehearsal for the drama that will open at San Francisco at the end of April."\textsuperscript{15} The meeting sought hemispheric solidarity between one great power and a number of diverse and less powerful nations even as the later meeting would seek solidarity between the five great powers and the rest of the nations. Mexico City was an appropriate meeting place in terms of location and because of Mexico's historical interest in inter-American affairs.\textsuperscript{16}

Ezequiel Padilla, the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent invitations to the United States and the Latin American nations on January 10, 1945.\textsuperscript{17} In his note, he stated the bases for discussion as the Mexicans envisioned them:

... first, complementary measures for intensifying cooperation in the war effort until complete victory; second, examination of problems relative to the international organization for the maintenance of peace and security: A) world organization B) development of the present inter-American system and its coordination with the world organization; third, consideration of the

\textsuperscript{11}"The Ambassador in Mexico to the Assistant Secretary of State," \textit{The American Republics}, p. 86.

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{New York Times}, February 21, 1945, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{16}Manger, "Mexico and the UN," p. 21.

\textsuperscript{17}"The Mexican Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of State," \textit{The American Republics}, p. 3.
economic or social problems of America. . . fourth, would be considered the resolution, regarding the request of the Argentine Government.\(^{18}\)

Subsequent exchanges between the Mexican and the United States departments of state established a more detailed agenda for the meeting, adhering to the basic topics set out by Padilla. Throughout the preparatory period, the Mexicans worked very closely with American representatives in Mexico City, demonstrating their awareness that the role of the United States would make or break the conference.\(^{19}\) In the original invitation, Padilla stated that the presence of the United States Secretary of State himself in a conference with foreign ministers of the "countries of America would be an advance guarantee of the success of the work of the conference."\(^{20}\) United States Ambassador Messersmith requested more freedom in speaking with the Mexicans on February 7, relating the substance of his talks with Padilla to Assistant Secretary of State Nelson Rockefeller. "Padilla feels," he wrote, "that the Mexicans want to keep their thinking so far as possible in line with our own . . . as they know that ours is the most responsible position and that nothing can really be done without us."\(^{21}\)

---

18"Mexican Minister to the Secretary of State," The American Republics, pp. 3-4.

19"The Ambassador in Mexico to the Assistant Secretary of State," The American Republics, p. 90.

20"Mexican Minister to the Secretary of State," The American Republics, p. 3.

21"The Ambassador to the Assistant Secretary of State," The American Republics, p. 69.
Although Padilla was later criticized for being so cooperative with the United States, the Mexican attitude showed a realistic analysis of the situation which helped make the conference significant in the light of later events at San Francisco. Mexico was the only Latin American nation making detailed preparations for the conference which addressed proposals to all major points. Other Latin American nations had opinions and proposals, but they were more sporadically or incompletely prepared. The extent of Mexican preparedness together with the urgency of conferences with United States representatives in the weeks before the conference indicate the intensity of Mexican determination that the meeting would be successful.

In a conversation with Merwin L. Bohan and William Sanders, two American experts sent to work with the Mexicans in preparing for the conference, Alfonso Garcia Robles, assistant to Padilla, revealed the Mexican positions which were later published and distributed to the delegates as a handbook, presenting twenty-eight proposals for change in the Dumbarton Oaks plan. The more important points were as follows:

23 "The Ambassador in Mexico to the Assistant Secretary of State," The American Republics, p. 85.
24 Ibid.
25 "Political Memorandum Number Four by Mr. William Sanders," The American Republics, p. 90.
1. Support for a strong international organization based on the principle of juridical equality of states, therefore more power for the Assembly.

2. Support for a strong inter-American regional system able to solve its own problems; strengthening the inter-American system.

3. Protection of the international rights of men.

4. Incorporation of international law into national law, especially the principle of non-intervention.

5. Making membership universal and obligatory.

6. Change the name to Permanent Union of Nations.

7. Proposals for more specific changes such as frequency of Security Council meetings, number of votes constituting a majority, and prohibition of a big power's voting on its own case.

Ezequiel Padilla's statements during the conference further indicate the eagerness and internationalism of the Mexican attitude. At one point he stated, "We can no longer live in isolation whether as peoples or as nations. We have learned to cooperate in times of war; ... we must maintain solidarity in time of peace." Another Padilla speech explained the philosophy of the weaker nations:

The small nations do not pretend to equal participation in a world of unequal responsibility. What they do desire is that in the hour in which injustice may strike at the doors of small nations, their voice may be heard; that they may appeal to the universal conscience and that their complaints and protests against injustice shall not be shrouded in silence and blind solidarity of the great powers.

---

27 "Political Memorandum Number Four," The American Republics, pp. 90-95.


30 Manger, "Mexico and the UN," p. 22.
In his welcoming address to the conference, Mexican President Manuel Ávila Camacho emphasized the right of the Americas to help shape the international security system and expressed hope that the principles of the international organization and those which the Latin American nations had fought to defend would not conflict. Ávila Camacho's hopes were realized in the outcome of the conference. The resolutions adopted after nearly three weeks of committee meetings and general discussions focused primarily on the desire that a stronger role in international decision-making be assigned to the General Assembly, the preference for regional approaches to hemispheric problems, and the defense of human rights. These proposals were presented to the world in the three most significant resolutions of the conference: Resolution XXX, "On Establishment of a General International Organization," Resolution VIII, "Reciprocal Assistance and American Solidarity" (Act of Chapultepec), and Resolution XI, "Declaration of Mexico."

Resolution XXX expressed general agreement with the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, adding a list of points in which the Latin American nations were especially interested. These

---


points included: (1) universality as an ideal; (2) amplification and more specific enumeration of the principles and purposes of the organization; (3) greater power for the Assembly as the fully representative organ, harmonizing the power of the Security Council with it; (4) extended jurisdiction and competence for the International Court of Justice; (5) solution of inter-American controversies by inter-American methods and procedures; and (6) adequate representation for Latin America on the Security Council. 35

Two of Mexico's more specific proposals to implement these general points were aimed at the question of competence of the General Assembly and the Security Council. The first was the recommendation that the constitution of the international organization include the pledge of all signatory nations to incorporate international law into their national laws. 36 The second suggested eliminating the domestic jurisdiction limitation on the action of the international organization, so that no nation could use its reserved rights to exclude the organization when a domestic matter created international friction. 37 This second point seems to contradict Mexico's belief in non-intervention. Placed in the context of some of Mexico's other suggestions—elimination of the veto power, broader powers for the General Assembly, human

37Castañeda, Mexico and the UN, p. 44
rights protection, and pledging all nations to obey interna-
tional law--the suggestion instead indicates the degree of
internationalism felt by Mexico at this point. Developments
at San Francisco, where most of the Mexican suggestions
curbing the power of the Security Council failed, forced
Mexico to return to a narrower, more negative point of view.

In an effort to base the Security Council on a more re-
alistic concept of international affairs in the long run,
Mexico proposed that the Security Council should be composed
of twelve rather than eleven members, six of whom would be
semi-permanent, serving for eight years (the five Big Powers
plus a representative of Latin America), and six non-permanent
members elected by the General Assembly. The basis for se-
lecting semi-permanent members would be the degree of respon-
sibility for maintenance of peace in the international
community so that those nations that were more powerful were
more responsible.

This proposal demonstrates the Mexican determination to
see greater representation for Latin America and to subject
the Security Council to a degree of regulation by the General
Assembly. It also reveals Mexico's sensitivity to the les-
sons of history and the long-term implications of the imme-
diate discussions, expressed by the Mexican representative in

38 Castaneda, Mexico and the UN, p. 45.
39 Ibid., p. 50. 40 Manger, "Mexico and the UN," p. 22.
these words: "There is no state whose relative international importance fails to suffer change with the passage of time."\textsuperscript{1}

The Latin American nations were very enthusiastic about Pan-Americanism at the time of the Chapultepec Conference.\textsuperscript{2} Much of their confidence in the inter-American system was based on recent assurances from the United States during the period of Franklin Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy. The United States came to the conference espousing an internationalist interpretation of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals,\textsuperscript{3} but was impressed by the determination of the other American states to preserve the rights of the inter-American system to solve its own problems.

"Regionalism Resurgent," emblazoned on the banner raised at the Inter-American Conference on War and Peace,\textsuperscript{4} voiced the preoccupation of the Latin Americans with preserving independence of action for their regional system. The Dumbarton Oaks proposals did not ignore the existence of regional organizations. In fact, the proposals encouraged the continuation and future creation of regional agencies to attend to

\textsuperscript{1}Manger, "Mexico and the UN," p. 22.
\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., p. 21
regional problems. The point of disagreement was on the statement of the Security Council responsibility to oversee regional action as provided in Chapter VIII, Section C of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals:

1. Nothing in the charter should preclude the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action. . . . The Security Council should encourage settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements.

2. . . . (the Security Council) should where appropriate, utilize such arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority, but no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council. (Emphasis supplied.)

Objections to Security Council regulation of regional collective security measures were based on three fears. First, the Latin Americans were afraid that the veto power given the great powers on the Security Council would doom the Council to inaction so that inter-American efforts to prevent armed attack on a hemisphere nation would be frustrated. Second, the preponderance of European powers on the Council raised the specter of European intervention. Third, the United States veto would make it impossible to apply any hemispheric sanctions to the great power.

---

45 Castaneda, Mexico and the UN, p. 151.
47 Manger, "Mexico and the UN," p. 22.
49 Castaneda, Mexico and the UN, p. 151.
The Act of Chapultepec, approved by the conference on March 6, 1945, expressed the belief that the "new situation in the world makes more imperative than ever the union and solidarity of the American peoples, for the defense of their rights and the maintenance of international peace." It contained a lengthy statement of the beliefs of the inter-American system based on national sovereignty and the juridical equality of states. In Part II, the resolution listed sanctions to be used against nations committing acts of aggression against American states, whether the aggressor was an American state or an extra-continental state. The Act served as the basis for American collective security until the victory of the Allies, and as the model for the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed at Rio de Janeiro in 1947.

By assuming a position of leadership in proposing and writing Resolution XXX and Resolution VIII, Mexico exerted a great deal of influence in the shaping of the two international organizations in which she now participates. The resolution on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals led to a compromise on the question of regional authority versus the Security Council; the resolution on the Inter-American System

---

50Goodrich and Carroll, Documents, 1944-45, p. 720.
51Ibid., pp. 717-720.
52Manger, "Mexico and the UN," p. 21.
53Ibid., p. 22.
was eventually embodied in the documents which constitute the Organization of American States.54

One other product of the Chapultepec Conference, the Declaration of Mexico, was largely the result of Mexican effort. Unlike the other resolutions discussed here, it was not a basis for specific action by international organizations, but a statement of seventeen principles such as sovereignty of states, juridical equality of states, support for democracy, and the rights of man.55 The Mexicans wanted the charter of the world organization to "reflect a spiritual note as well as the realities of power."56 The passage of this act, as the American ambassador observed, was important to the Mexican delegation as a matter of prestige.57 It reflects the Mexican dedication to principles discussed above in Chapter I. This statement of ideals did have some bearing on the final wording of the Preamble of the United Nations Charter.58

57"The American Delegation to the Acting Secretary of State," The American Republics, p. 140.
The San Francisco Conference

Concluding the Chapultepec Conference on March 8, 1945, the American nations entrusted the United States with the primary responsibility of introducing their resolutions to the governments of the United Nations. Realizing that it was up to a great power and co-sponsor of the conference to accomplish any major changes in the four-power plan, Mexican Foreign Minister Ezequiel Padilla envisioned a different role for the small nations participating in the conference:

Small nations do not threaten peace. A moral force, invisible but formidable, is on the side of small nations. They live in the protective shadow of their own sacrifices and their contribution to the cause of right. This war began with the treacherous Axis aggression against peoples guilty only of innocence and weakness. The kind of peace the world wants is more than a mere question of force; (it is) justice for all men and for all peoples.

The Mexican foreign office submitted a set of proposals independent of the Chapultepec resolutions, reiterating the positions discussed in the foregoing section of this chapter. Emphasizing Mexico's enthusiasm for the prospect of a new and truly effective international organization, President Avila Camacho announced that Mexico's policy at the San Francisco conference would be that of supporting the general aims of all Latin-American republics, namely "an honorable

60 Ibid., April 3, 1945, p. 16.
and dignified life in a free world of free peoples conscious of their destiny." Fundamental to the new world organization would be one concession to the major powers: giving them the burden of responsibility for world peace. 62

In an effort to restrict the power of the Security Council and increase the influence of Latin America in the United Nations, Mexico made a number of suggestions to the Commission on the Security Council at the San Francisco Conference. At one of the early meetings of Commission III, dealing with the Security Council, the Mexican representative, Francisco Castillo Najera, clearly established his position in the Conference on International Organization:

The states of America represented at the San Francisco Conference are animated by the most fervent desire and the firmest intention of cooperating with all the states of the world for the establishment, the maintenance, the prestige and the efficacy of the United Nations, but with equal determination, they are resolved to conserve and perfect in accordance with changing circumstances and with the progress of civilization the inter-American system of unity and solidarity as a contribution to the concord and harmony of the world and, to the reign of human fraternity which we all desire. 63

Following these guidelines, several Mexican amendments attempted to clarify or change the nature of the Security Council. At one point Mexico unsuccessfully offered an amendment to insert a statement in Section A of Chapter IV that would make it clear that the permanent members were


chosen on the basis of their greater responsibility for maintaining world peace.\textsuperscript{64} The Mexican delegates also wished to see the Security Council designated by Assembly action, so that the make-up of the Council might be reconsidered at a later time in the light of future international conditions.\textsuperscript{65} The designation of permanent members as "semi-permanent," with eight-year terms was also proposed and defeated.\textsuperscript{66} In opposition to the veto power given the permanent members, Mexico stated that the great power unanimity requirement was against all concepts of justice, comparing it to allowing a murderer to vote on his own guilt.\textsuperscript{67}

In an effort to enlarge the power of the General Assembly and reduce that of the Security Council, Mexico proposed that the General Assembly be allowed to intervene on questions of peaceful settlement when the Security Council failed to take action.\textsuperscript{68} Describing the world order being established at San Francisco as one in "which the mice could be stamped out but the lions would not be restrained," the Mexican delegate to the eighteenth meeting of Committee I (Structure and Procedure) of Commission III said that he could accept the Yalta voting formula, that is, the permanent members' veto

\textsuperscript{65}Document 120, \textit{UNCIO Documents}, XI, p. 252.
\textsuperscript{67}Document 459, \textit{UNCIO Documents}, XI, p. 333.
\textsuperscript{68}Document 555, \textit{UNCIO Documents}, XI, p. 376.
power, only if the Charter were to be reviewed in a reasonable time. A
Australian attempt to eliminate the veto by declaring all Security Council actions procedural measures (which did not require great power unanimity) had Mexican support, but did not pass.

Another abortive attempt by Mexico concerned the number of nations represented on the Security Council. At the same time, Mexico had two proposals before the Committee on Structure and Procedure: one calling for twelve and the other for fourteen members on the Security Council. Although none of the suggestions offered by Mexico were adopted by Commission III, the persistence with which the Mexican delegation offered and defended proposals based on their conception of mission at San Francisco showed a determination to play a part on the international scene.

The proposal to lessen Security Council control over the actions of regional organizations fared much better. The success of this movement at San Francisco, resulting in the addition of Article 51 to the United Nations Charter, is considered one of the great contributions of Latin America to world peace. Latin America accomplished this goal indirectly, by persuading the United States to sign the Act

of Chapultepec and acknowledge responsibility to sponsor a pro-regional adjustment in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.\textsuperscript{73} The influence of the United States as a world power,\textsuperscript{74} together with European desires to preserve their cooperative military alliances,\textsuperscript{75} successfully pushed an amendment through the conference which satisfied the Latin Americans and calmed their greatest fears.

Article 51 of the United Nations Charter does not remove Security Council authority in security measures involving regional organizations. It does relieve the fear of Security Council stalemate by allowing regional organizations to take forceful action in case of armed attack. Once the response is initiated, it is the responsibility of the organization to advise the Security Council and accept direction from the Security Council as to the future course of action.\textsuperscript{76}

A number of other less significant proposals sponsored or supported by Mexico are further indicators of the attitude and inclination of the Mexican delegation. As it became clear that the Security Council would retain its permanent member veto, Mexican enthusiasm for removing the domestic jurisdiction protection clause faded. Originally suggesting that the provision be removed altogether, Mexico finally was

\textsuperscript{74}New York Times, May 13, 1945, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{75}Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, Charter of the U.N., p. 343.
\textsuperscript{76}Article 51, Chapter VII, Charter of the United Nations.
willing to agree to its being placed in the statement of principles instead of the chapter on peaceful settlement of disputes where it had originally appeared.\textsuperscript{77}

On the question of membership, Mexico changed from a position of complete universality\textsuperscript{78} to accepting the limitation to peace-loving countries to the extent that it excluded the allies of the Axis powers,\textsuperscript{79} especially the Franco regime in Spain.\textsuperscript{80} At the same time, Mexico urged the inclusion of Argentina on that nation’s assurance of intentions to uphold the Chapultepec resolutions.\textsuperscript{81} On the question of including White Russia and the Ukraine, Mexican delegates were ”glad to vote for the admission”\textsuperscript{82} of these Russian states.

Mexico contributed to the expression of human rights in the Charter provisions for the Trusteeship Council.\textsuperscript{83} In another area, mindful of his nation’s enthusiasm for international law, the delegate taking part in discussions on the International Court of Justice defended compulsory court

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{77}Castaneda, Mexico and the U.N., p. 52.
\item \textsuperscript{78}New York Times, February 11, 1945, p. 20.
\item \textsuperscript{79}Castaneda, Mexico and the U.N., p. 82.
\item \textsuperscript{80}New York Times, May 30, 1945, p. 15.
\item \textsuperscript{81}“Minutes of the Fourth Four-Power Preliminary Meeting on Questions of Organization and Admission,” General: the United Nations, p. 486.
\item \textsuperscript{82}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{83}Russell, History of the Charter, p. 832.
\end{itemize}
jurisdiction against the strong opposition of the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the super-powers were in the minority on the committee, their announcements that they would not be able to ratify the statute if it included compulsory jurisdiction forced a decision in their favor. The Mexican delegate pointed out the paradox of the great powers expecting the small powers to trust them not to misuse the veto power, and in turn refusing to trust judicial disputes to a Court which had been impartial in past settlements.\footnote{Russell, History of the Charter, p. 886.}

Commenting on the outcome of the San Francisco Conference, Padilla emphasized the gains for the regional organization as the greatest accomplishment of the Mexican and other Latin American delegations. Had it not been for the Chapultepec resolutions, the United States would have been the only American power in the international organization and would have "solved, without the participation of the other American republics, the fate of this continent."\footnote{New York Times, May 28, 1945, p. 13.}

Explaining the role of the great powers in the organization, he stated, "security has become the exclusive responsibility of the great powers. They have the power and must assume full responsibility."\footnote{Ibid., September 4, 1945, p. 5.}
The Rio Conference

Having gained a degree of autonomy for the regional organization in the area of collective security, it remained for the Latin American nations to embody the provisions of the Act of Chapultepec in a more permanent agreement. The opportunity to establish an inter-American agency for collective security came in August, 1947 at the Conference for the Maintenance of Peace and Continental Security in Rio de Janeiro.  

The basic structure of the Rio Treaty had already been decided at Chapultepec two years before. Most of the differences arising to challenge Mexico to take a position have been the result of later interpretations and attempts to broaden the Rio Treaty, which fall within the concerns of succeeding chapters of this study.

Four articles of the treaty express the more important principles embodied in it. Article 3 states the agreement that "an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States." Basing the legitimacy of action on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the article further authorizes immediate action by American states on an individual basis.

---


88 Castaneda, Mexico and the U.N., p. 159
and a meeting of the Organ of Consultation (the Conference of Foreign Ministers) to determine collective actions to be taken. 89

Article 6 covers aggression other than armed attack:

If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of peace and security of the Continent. 90

Article 8 lists the sanctions available to the Organ of Consultation in case of either type of aggression, including the recall of diplomatic personnel, breaking diplomatic relations or consular relations, and interrupting economic relations, transportation or communication. The final sanction available to the Organ of Consultation is the use of armed force. 91 As a complement to Article 8, Article 20 requires that all nations comply with the decisions of the Organ of Consultation in applying measures against aggressor nations with the exception that no nation can be required to use armed force without its consent. 92

90 Ibid., Article 6.
91 Ibid., Article 8.
92 Ibid., Article 20.
The Rio Treaty, applying the guarantees of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter to the inter-American system, is the basis on which that system acts as an extension of the United Nations. It is not the sole basis of that system, which also has a charter and a number of other treaties, primarily economic in nature, under which it operates. The details of the hemispheric aspects of the Organization of American States are outside the concern of this study, which includes the O.A.S. only to the extent that it is used as a substitute for the United Nations on a political question.

Mexico's assuming a leadership role at Mexico City, followed by participation in the Conferences that wrote the Charter of the United Nations and the Rio Treaty indicated a strong interest in international affairs and the desire to contribute to the development of meaningful organizations. The positions taken by Mexican representatives demonstrated their dedication to uphold basic principles including national sovereignty, especially that of the small non-military nations, the juridical equality of states, and the rule of international law. Somewhat disillusioned by the nationalism of the great powers, Mexico lost some of the enthusiasm for international organizations, but continued to work within both the regional and the world associations. Scanning the

93 Charter of the Organization of American States, signed at Bogota, Colombia, May 2, 1948.

record of Mexican participation and accomplishments within the United Nations through the first twenty-five years will reveal the further development of the Mexican international political personality.
CHAPTER III

MEXICO'S ACTIONS IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Before the United Nations began its official existence in January, 1946, Mexico took an active part in the preparatory arrangements. One of the major items before the United Nations Preparatory Commission in the winter of 1945 was deciding on the location for the headquarters of the United Nations. Emphasizing his delegation's preference for an American rather than a European site, Luis Padilla Nervo, Mexican Ambassador Plenipotentiary, stated that "the essential thing was to find the most suitable atmosphere, moral, social and political, to assure the best success of the deliberations of the United Nations." In his speech before the preparatory committee on general questions, Padilla Nervo set forth the view of the United Nations which is expressed in Mexican action at later stages of U.N. history, that the organization is

more important as a moral, rather than as a physical entity. Most of the important organs of the United Nations have as their main function and powers to discuss, consider, initiate studies, draft conventions and make recommendations. ²


Padilla Nervo's remark characterizes the realism\(^3\) of Mexico's policies in the United Nations. Throughout the cold war period which coincides with the existence of the U.N., Mexico has used the organization as a medium for discussing and making recommendations on problems creating world tensions,\(^4\) fully aware that the final responsibility for solution rests in the hands of the great powers. Mexico has supported and even initiated measures exercising the "moral" power of the small nations to persuade the great powers\(^5\) to use their force to further peaceful goals. In the discussion that follows, Mexican action on such questions as universal membership, colonialism, collective security, disarmament, intervention and the role of international law reflect the interest of this small nation in utilizing the international organization to preserve traditional principles and promote peace and human development. In those instances when the Organization of American States has substituted for the United Nations as a medium of collective security, Mexico has followed a similar pattern of action.

---

\(^3\)Manger, "Mexico and the U.N.," p. 60.


On National Sovereignty

As discussed in Chapter I, the national sovereignty principle pervades all of Mexico’s international policies. It is especially prominent in the Mexican approach to the questions arising from the admission of new members and the liberation of colonial populations.

With two major exceptions, Franco Spain and Communist China, Mexico’s policy on U.N. membership has supported universality. During the first decade of the United Nations, an impasse between the United States and the Soviet Union, each vetoing the admission of the other nation’s allies, kept eighteen nations out of the U.N. Throughout the series of discussions surrounding repeated attempts by these nations to gain admission, Mexico consistently defended universality. Only the criteria provided in the Charter, that the nations must be peace-loving, should be applied. In applying this standard, Mexico further held that the burden of proof should not be placed on the applicant—a nation must be proved not to be peace-loving.

Eventually, an agreement was negotiated among the great powers and the impasse was broken. Long years of frustration convinced even United States Secretary of State John F. Dulles that political criteria should be abandoned in determining

\[6\] Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, *Charter of the U.N.*, p. 86.
eligibility for membership in the U.N., a position Mexico
had held since the San Francisco conference.

In the case of Spain, Mexico opposed granting membership
because the Franco regime had been established with the help
of the Axis powers, and was therefore an enemy of the United
Nations. In addition, Mexico had recognized the Spanish
Republican Government-in-exile, first in Mexico City and
later in Paris. Even when the other Latin American nations
decided to support Spain's request for admission in 1955,
Mexico continued to refuse to endorse "a government that
flouts the Declaration of Human Rights."

Mexico supported United States efforts to keep Com-
munist China out of the United Nations before and during the
Korean Conflict. Since then Mexico has taken a compromise
position of voting for resolutions postponing consideration
of the problem, or simply abstaining. A direct vote
against Red China would be a violation of Mexican principles

---

8 Castañeda, Mexico and the U.N., p. 94.
11 Ibid., VIII, 12 (January, 1956), 576.
12 Ibid., 10 (November, 1955), 457.
14 For example, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Session, 580th Plenary Meeting, January 16, 1956, p. 84.
although Mexico has sometimes voted no, so delegates seek refuge in legal options. During the Korean Conflict, there was evidence that Communist China was not a peace-loving nation. Mexico's subsequent position is probably best attributed to hesitancy to oppose the United States on extracontinental questions.

Although Mexico is not a new nation, she identifies, through historical experiences with the emerging and colonial states. Mexican interest in the progress of non-self-governing nations is evidenced by past membership on the Trusteeship Council and sponsorship of a number of resolutions dealing with colonial problems, especially in South West Africa. Mexico's enthusiasm for the Declaration of Human Rights enters this picture, for often colonial peoples suffer the denial of not only political rights, but social and economic rights as well.

Opposing colonialism as particularly out of time and place on the American continents, Mexico has also taken great interest in the progress of colonial peoples in Africa.

---

15 Faust and Stansifer, "Mexican Foreign Policy," p. 102.
16 Astiz, Latin American International Politics, p. 83.
17 Castañeda, Mexico and the U.N., p. 216.
18 For a discussion of the political meaning and force of this document see Maurice Cranston, What Are Human Rights? (New York, 1962).
As early as 1949, Mexico was elected to serve on a special committee to receive information on non-self-governing territories set up by the General Assembly under two resolutions adopted December 2, 1949. In the Eighth Session of the General Assembly, Mexico sponsored an amendment to a resolution clarifying the competence of the General Assembly in guiding the implementation of obligations arising under the Charter provisions for the Trusteeship Council. The Mexican amendment added the statement that the primary method of attaining self-government is through independence, as opposed to the other options of associations such as the British Commonwealth or remaining a free but integral part of another country.

Mexican opposition to colonialism does not go to the extreme of advocating independence without preparation for self-government. At the 1066th meeting of the Fourth Committee (on Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories), Luis Padilla Nervo pointed out that a major responsibility of the General Assembly was to establish procedures for dependent territories to follow in achieving independence.

---

21 Resolutions 332 (IV) and 333 (IV).
23 Castañeda, Mexico and the U.N., p. 206.
A Mexican resolution suggested establishing an ad hoc committee to examine cases of non-self-governing territories and recommend joint international administration of those not ready for self-government. In addition, the resolution urged nations disputing title to sovereignty over a particular territory to submit their differences to the International Court of Justice.\textsuperscript{26} The measures prescribed in this resolution typify the Mexican approach to international problems through an established procedure with reference to a judicial agency.

The small countries throughout the world, free of the political considerations that blind the great powers to the problems of developing nations, are in a unique position to work for a solution to the colonial problem in the U.N. Creativity and new thinking are demanded by situations outside the national experience of the great powers.\textsuperscript{27} The problem is complicated by floundering new nations which invite interference from both sides of the cold war, threatening international peace and security as well as the sovereignty of the new states.\textsuperscript{28} Commenting on the work of the Trusteeship Council, Sherman Hayden made the following evaluation of the Mexican contribution:

\textit{... some of the shrewdest comment and ablest examination have come from representatives of the smaller states, some of whom have been themselves but recently...}  

\textsuperscript{26}Ibid., p. 97.  
\textsuperscript{27}Castaneda, \textit{Mexico and the U.N.}, p. 203.  
\textsuperscript{28}Manger, "Mexico and the U.N.," p. 59.
in a colonial or quasi-colonial status and are still confronted with a problem of backward groups within their own borders, notably Padilla Nervo and Noriega of Mexico. 29

The small nations have the additional advantage in the Trusteeship Council of equal voting, where no nation, however powerful, has a veto. 30

Mexico has been concerned with the progress of such African colonies as the French Cameroons, Nigeria, 31 Rwanda-urundi, 32 Togoland, 33 Southern Rhodesia, 34 and the Portuguese territories of Mozambique and Angola. 35 In these cases Mexico was willing to see the Trusteeship Council help the colonial powers maintain a degree of dignity in leaving their possessions, but at the same time insisted on their compliance with the requirement to supply information. The colonial question that has interested Mexico most is the problem of the South African mandate, South West Africa.

30 Ibid., p. 230.
32 Ibid., IX, 7 (July, 1962), 41.
34 International Organization, XVIII, 1 (Winter, 1963), 174.
South West Africa was a mandate of the Union of South Africa under the League of Nations system. When South Africa failed to live up to the obligations of the mandate, the General Assembly first tried to alleviate the situation by a series of resolutions in 1946-1949, recommending that the territory be placed under the International Trusteeship System. An advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice held that the mandate was still in effect, and though it could be changed only by South Africa, the obligations under the League mandate continued under the United Nations.

On the basis of this court decision, Mexico, Brazil and Uruguay submitted a draft resolution in November, 1950, requesting that South Africa supply information and transmit petitions from the inhabitants of South West Africa. The resolution provided for a Commission for South West Africa to help the General Assembly examine evidence submitted by South Africa and report to the Assembly, evaluating the fulfillment of mandate obligations by the Mandatory Power.

After attempting for over a decade to persuade South Africa to administer the mandate according to requirements

36 The resolutions were: 65(I), December 14, 1946; 141(II), November 1, 1947; 227 (III), November 26, 1948; and 338(IV), December 6, 1949. See General Assembly Resolution, A/C.4/L.116.


38 Ibid.
of the League of Nations system, the General Assembly saw the futurity of peaceful negotiation and set up a Special Committee to implement stronger political measures against the Union of South Africa.\textsuperscript{39} Jorge Castañeda of Mexico, looking at the situation in the light of international law, described the mandate system as a bilateral contract between the international organization and the mandatory power. As in any such contract, the failure of one party to fulfill the obligations entitled the injured party to declare the contract terminated. Castañeda reasoned that the United Nations could use this principle to end South African authority over the territory.\textsuperscript{40} Having revoked the mandate, the United Nations could assume the administration of the territory until it was ready for independence.\textsuperscript{41} The Mexican delegation felt that the legal approach was preferable to the usual political approach of passing "high sounding" resolutions.\textsuperscript{42}

Later attempts by Mexico to help the General Assembly find a solution to this problem have maintained the idea that there are legal grounds for terminating the mandate. In 1966, Mexico held that it was the duty of the United

\textsuperscript{39}International Organization, XVII, 1 (Winter, 1963), 179.


\textsuperscript{42}International Organization, XVII, 1 (Winter, 1963), 180.
Nations to protect the unalienable right of the people of South West Africa to independence. The next year the Mexican delegate argued that the United Nations should not avoid the responsibility for the development of self-government in the territory, but should postpone declaring the territory independent until the people were prepared. The political realities of the situation—the lack of leaders with sufficient national authority, apathetic population, and inertia from years of servitude—were problems the United Nations must solve.

Throughout the long years of discussion and recommendation on the South West Africa question, and in spite of the failure of South Africa to cooperate, Mexico has refused to accept the use of coercive measures. Instead, Mexico has urged negotiation with South Africa, following proper legal procedures.

The government of the Union of South Africa has also been the target of efforts by Mexico and other small nations to enforce the provisions of the Declaration of Human Rights. Early efforts to force South Africa to recognize human rights resulted from complaints by India and Pakistan about the

---

44 Ibid., IV, 4 (April, 1967), 15.
treatment of persons of Indian origin in South Africa.\textsuperscript{47} Mexico contributed to the writing of a resolution proposed in November, 1950, recommending a conference among the governments of India, Pakistan and South Africa aimed at reaching an agreement on the implementation of the guarantees of the Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights within the offending nation.\textsuperscript{48} In 1955\textsuperscript{49} and again in 1958, Mexico sponsored resolutions requesting that the disputing parties negotiate a settlement.\textsuperscript{50} Calling for moderation and patience in dealing with South Africa,\textsuperscript{51} Mexico proposed a resolution in 1959 inviting member states to use their good offices to encourage negotiation.\textsuperscript{52}

The apartheid racial policies of South Africa, denying the human rights of non-white groups in addition to those of Indian origin, have been a source of concern for Mexico both as a violation of the Declaration and as a threat to international peace.\textsuperscript{53} Mexico has cooperated in General Assembly

\textsuperscript{47}Castañeda, Mexico and the U.N., p. 67.


\textsuperscript{49}International Organization, XI, 2 (Spring, 1955), 300.

\textsuperscript{50}Ibid., XII, 1 (Winter, 1958), 79.

\textsuperscript{51}Ibid., XIII, 1 (Winter, 1959), 83.

\textsuperscript{52}Ibid., p. 87.

embargoes on military sales to the Republic of South Africa, and has supported resolutions on the question of racial discrimination. Only when expulsion of South Africa has been suggested has Mexico refused to support the efforts of African groups fighting apartheid. Strident, general resolutions offer a poor solution; Mexico suggests a detailed consideration of the problem of racial discrimination.

On Peace

Collective security was the primary objective of the great powers in urging the establishment of a strong international organization. Although Mexico does not have any military power, collective security is still a matter of concern as a member of the U.N. Mexican Jorge Castañeda defines collective security as the maintenance of international peace by collective action. Several assumptions form the basis of the concept of collective security. A set of standards must be established to regulate relationships among members of the group. The standards are upheld by the common


belief that conforming to them is mutually beneficial for all parties. In addition, the members must accept at the outset a system of consequences which will result if any member violates the standards, a possibility that is anticipated at any moment. Castañeda draws a parallel with the internal order of a nation, pointing out that the state has one more element which is lacking on the international scene: an authority able to enforce the standards and to see that offenders suffer the consequences of violating them.59

Keeping these theoretical aspects of the collective security system in mind, the failure of the United Nations to operate effectively as a peace-keeping organization is easily explained. International law is not considered superior to national interest, the world is composed of two opposing groups of power, instead of one group seeking mutual benefit,60 and the international organization must depend on military contributions from its members in order to carry out peace-keeping missions.

The theoretical solution to the problem is to establish a federation of states, thereby creating an international authority above the individual states. Such a solution is not possible in a world where all nations, large and small, place so much stock in the principle of national sovereignty.61

Assuming a realistic point of view, Mexico urges the United

59Castañeda, Mexico and the U.N., p. 96.
60Ibid., p. 99.
61Ibid., p. 97.
Nations to pursue peace through the one aspect of collective security which remains open, peaceful settlement of disputes.\(^6^2\) A great power cannot be deterred from war-making by threats of United Nations military action.\(^6^3\) It is possible, however, that negotiation, conciliation and mediation,\(^6^4\) three techniques that can be developed by an effective international organization, will persuade the great power to accept a settlement short of a military solution.

Although Mexico continues to place the responsibility for maintaining world peace in the hands of the great powers, her representatives realize that the small nations can play a major role in the area of peaceful settlements. In statements on the Vietnam conflict, for example, Mexican representatives consistently allude to their willingness to lend "moral support to any formula by which the parties concerned would start negotiations." Non-participating states can assist, they suggest, by "keeping channels of communication open so that hostilities can be ended or escalation avoided."\(^6^5\) Similar statements have been made concerning the Middle East crisis.\(^6^6\)

---

\(^6^2\) Castañeda, Mexico and the U.N., p. 79.
\(^6^3\) Ibid., p. 80.
\(^6^4\) Ibid., p. 79.
\(^6^6\) Ibid., IV, 10 (November, 1967), 103.
On occasions when the United Nations has used military forces or observers to maintain the peace, Mexico has given support in the voting, but has contributed little in terms of men and materiel. Mexico supported the Uniting for Peace resolution and was a member of the Collective Measures Committee. Co-operative or complementary action of the General Assembly and the Security Council within the competence of the Charter is, in the Mexican view, the only way of insuring effective peace-keeping in the future. Mexico recognizes that peace-keeping is the collective responsibility of all members of the Organization, but returns to an emphasis on great power responsibility when the question of finances is brought up. The Mexican delegate's statement on peace-keeping at the Twenty-second Session of the General Assembly is exemplary:

The United Nations must recognize that permanent members of the Security Council have special responsibilities and that developing countries cannot divert any substantial sums from their own economic growth. It should not be forgotten that economic backwardness lies at the root of many situations capable of endangering international peace and security.

Mexico attributes United Nations financial problems growing out of peace-keeping activities to the failure of the organization to develop better sources of revenue than depending on contributions.\textsuperscript{72}

In the early days of the Korean crisis, Undersecretary of Foreign Relations Manuel Tello stated the Mexican attitude in a note to Secretary General Lie, acknowledging Mexico's intention to fulfill obligations to the United Nations.\textsuperscript{73} Shortly thereafter, the Mexicans made it clear that they had no intention of committing themselves to defending the United States.\textsuperscript{74} With the majority of the Mexican people opposed to military involvement,\textsuperscript{75} the Mexican contribution was limited to three million pesos worth of beans, chickpeas and other food supplies.\textsuperscript{76} When asked to contribute to the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, the Mexican delegate requested that a distinction be made between relief and rehabilitation, as Mexico was willing to provide relief but reserved rehabilitation funds for national needs.\textsuperscript{77}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{72}United Nations Review, X, 6 (June, 1963), 7.
\item \textsuperscript{73}Hispanic-American Report, III, 8 (August, 1952), 8.
\item \textsuperscript{74}Hispanic-American Report, IV, 4 (April, 1951), 17.
\item \textsuperscript{75}Ibid., III, 8 (August, 1952), 8.
\item \textsuperscript{76}United Nations Department of Public Information, Yearbook of the United Nations (New York, 1950), 227.
\item \textsuperscript{77}International Organization, V, 1 (February, 1951), 127.
\end{itemize}
Francisco Cuovas Cancino expressed the Mexican attitude toward the United Nations efforts to maintain peace in the Congo when he objected to criticism of the Secretary-General for a course "so brilliantly begun." At another time, the Mexican delegate commented on the satisfactory action taken by the Security Council to end hostilities between India and Pakistan, and agreed to send ten military observers. The Mexican role in peace-keeping operations has been primarily one of moral rather than financial or military support. The degree of this moral support is revealed in a Mexican statement in 1967 that although Mexico believed in the principles of non-intervention and self-determination, the obligation of the United Nations to take enforcement actions in certain circumstances was recognized.

Holding the position that "security will be achieved when the nuclear powers cease manufacturing atomic weapons and . . . reduce their stockpiles," Mexican representatives have persistently worked to better the chances of peace through disarmament. Mexico has, on one hand, endeavored to find common ground for agreement among the nuclear powers for reducing their arsenals while simultaneously, on the other hand, encouraging denuclearization projects in Latin America.

81Ibid., II, 10 (November, 1965), 77.
When President Truman announced Russia's accession to nuclear power in 1949, Mexican ambassador Padilla Nervo noted that the need for international control of atomic energy was thereby increased. As a member of the Atomic Energy Commission, he presented a plan for centralizing all atomic energy in an international zone from which nations could draw fuel for peaceful purposes. Most of his suggestions, and those of other Mexican representatives, are more realistic if less desirable than this early idea. Another Mexican proposal was a joint resolution calling for all nations to accept international control of atomic energy and regulation of all armaments and armed forces under a system of control, inspection and eventual reduction.

Mexico has worked on several occasions to bring the great powers together to work out their differences so that some measure of disarmament may be achieved. At the same time that he was working within the General Assembly

---

82 Hispanic-American Report, II, 10 (October, 1949), 7.


86 International Organization, XII, 1 (Winter, 1959), 68.
Disarmament Commission, newly reconstituted to allow all members of the United Nations to participate in its deliberations, Padilla Nervo was also encouraging the efforts of the nuclear powers to work out an agreement at the Geneva Disarmament Conference. Antonio Carrillo Flores, Mexican Minister for Foreign Affairs, spoke to the Assembly several years later about his disappointment in the failure of the Geneva talks to resolve differences on non-proliferation and underground testing, hoping that the General Assembly might play a part in bringing about an agreement on a method of inspection or a temporary cessation of underground testing.

With disarmament efforts stalled by great power incalculance, Mexico sought a partial solution to the proliferation problem in a denuclearization treaty for Latin America. The move toward denuclearization came in 1963 when the Presidents of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico presented a draft declaration to the other Latin American nations. The declaration was also presented to the disarmament conference in Geneva, where Mexico was urging the denuclearization of Latin America.

Clarifying the intent of the declaration, Alfonso Garcia Robles of Mexico said the term denuclearize

88Ibid., VI, 10 (April, 1960), 17.
90Hispanic-American Report, XVI, 5 (May, 1963), 512.
meant to prohibit nuclear weapons and nuclear launching devices, but not nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.\textsuperscript{91} Inspections under the proposed treaty would be carried out with respect for the principle of non-intervention. Mexico hoped that the denuclearization would cover all the countries in Latin America, but welcomed an agreement among some of the states or even the unilateral statement of a single nation.\textsuperscript{92}

Mexico urged the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 1911 (XVIII) giving moral support to a regional meeting on denuclearization\textsuperscript{93} which was held in Mexico in 1964.\textsuperscript{94} Finally, in February, 1967, the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America was adopted by the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America at Tlatelolco, Mexico.\textsuperscript{95} Explaining the treaty to the Political and Security Committee of the General Assembly, the Mexican representative pointed out that the treaty stated an agreement to use nuclear facilities only for peaceful purposes, set up a permanent supervisory organ for inspection and control, and precisely defined nuclear weapons. This explanation accompanied a draft resolution requesting that the General Assembly officially welcome the Treaty and urge

\textsuperscript{92}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{93}Ibid., p. 45.
\textsuperscript{95}Ibid., IV, 10 (November, 1967), 104.
the nuclear powers to sign additional protocols of the treaty acknowledging their intention to respect the limitations on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.\textsuperscript{96}

In the general debate of the Assembly in October, 1968, Mexican representative Garcia Robles appeared optimistic on the subject of disarmament. He welcomed the Non-proliferation Treaty signed by the nuclear powers as the most positive and encouraging event of the year.\textsuperscript{97} In addition, he pointed to the good will shown by nations in Latin America who had renounced the right ever to possess nuclear weapons in the Treaty of Tlatelolco. He noted with satisfaction that many nations had already ratified the treaty, and that the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands had signed the additional protocols, indicating their willingness to respect the limitations of the treaty. The Soviet Union had also advised Mexico that they would observe the denuclearized zone.\textsuperscript{98}

Having participated in the talks developing the Non-Proliferation Treaty\textsuperscript{99} while leading the denuclearization movement, Mexico could claim credit for two major gains for peace.

\textsuperscript{96}United Nations Monthly Chronicle, IV, 10 (November, 1967), 18.

\textsuperscript{97}Ibid., V, 10 (November, 1968), 72.

\textsuperscript{98}Ibid., p. 73.

\textsuperscript{99}Ibid., II, 1 (January, 1965), 97.
Another aspect of the disarmament question receiving attention from Mexico was the effort to create a demilitarization zone in Africa following the Latin American model. Mexico also urged prohibiting nuclear weapons in outer space. Another Mexican suggestion, tied to an interest in the developing nations, asked the nuclear powers to consider devoting funds saved through reduction of armaments to improving the quality of human life throughout the world.

On Intervention

The principle of non-intervention is part of the Mexican position on all of the questions discussed above, yet it is so central to policy considerations that it demands separate attention. Antonio Carrillo Flores, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, emphasized the importance of this principle to Mexico before the General Assembly in 1968 when he said:

Mexico seeks peace, but ... peace ... must be based on respect for the rights of all peoples, especially the right to self-determination, which underlies all others. Self-determination, in turn, requires the fulfillment by all States--great and small--of the principle of non-intervention. Understanding among the great powers is a necessary element, but in itself insufficient to avoid war.

---

102 International Organization, XII, 1 (Winter, 1958), 63.
The protection of self-determination, which Carrillo Flores ties to the non-intervention principle in his statement, has ironically been the cause of United Nations actions which have brought charges of interventionism against the Organization. The Charter specifically reserves to the states matters which are "essentially within the jurisdiction of the states," and forbids the United Nations to intervene or require members to submit these matters to settlement by the international organization. This domestic jurisdiction clause has been used by nations like South Africa to oppose U.N. efforts to enforce recognition of the Declaration of Human Rights or the obligations of mandate treaties. Mexico has had to establish a policy position that defends human rights without compromising the principle of non-intervention.

The Mexican tendency has been to suggest that the International Court decide what matters are within the reserved domain of the state. Although this course would provide a convenient solution to the policy problem, it is hardly feasible, due to the political nature of United Nations interventions. The one exception to the domestic jurisdiction clause is the right of the United Nations to act in cases where there is a threat to the peace, breach of the

---

104 Article 2, Paragraph 7, Charter of the United Nations.

105 Castañeda, Mexico and the U.N., p. 59.

106 Ibid., p. 71.
peace or act of aggression. In any situation deemed to be a threat to international security, the principle of domestic jurisdiction is eliminated by the initial determination in the Security Council that the threat exists. In all other matters, the wording of the Charter precludes a judicial determination: the word "essentially" is not specific enough to provide a basis for a legal decision. Mexican legal expert Jorge Castaneda holds that the word was deliberately used to introduce political rather than judicial elements.

Mexico's evaluation of the domestic jurisdiction clause balances two considerations. As long as the United Nations is not incapacitated in matters where Mexico supports intervention (for instance, human rights) and is restrained in matters where Mexico resists intervention, she will not be caught in a policy crisis. Political solutions, such as Assembly resolutions and, especially, Security Council resolutions, which reflect great power unanimity, produce results often through their psychological effect. At the same time, world peace is protected from the danger that an attempt by the General Assembly to initiate action against a major power could destroy the organization itself.

107 Paragraph 7, Article 2 and Chapter VIII, Charter of the United Nations.
108 Castañeda, Mexico and the U.N., p. 71.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid., p. 68.
111 Ibid., p. 70.
112 Ibid., p. 69.
Bearing in mind these theoretical considerations, Mexico has followed a somewhat irregular voting pattern usually opposing intervention by the organization but sometimes supporting intervention when a situation is deemed a threat to peace. When charges of violations of human rights were first brought against Hungary in 1949, Mexico voted against resolutions that the General Assembly investigate the situation, insisting that the matter was within the domestic jurisdiction of the state.\textsuperscript{113} Nine years later, when Hungary was again a topic of discussion, Mexico voted in favor of a resolution to place the human rights question on the agenda of the Assembly.\textsuperscript{114} Mexico favored sending peace observers to the Balkans, when Greek independence seemed threatened,\textsuperscript{115} but opposed the intervention of the U.N. in the Tunisian elections (1953).\textsuperscript{116} As previously discussed, Mexico has consistently supported measures against South Africa, with the reservation that no force be used. Even in the case of economic and social assistance from the United Nations, a crucial U.N. activity enthusiastically supported by Mexico, representatives

\textsuperscript{113}International Organization, V, 1 (February, 1951), 117.


\textsuperscript{115}International Organization, VI, 1 (February, 1952), 62.

\textsuperscript{116}Ibid., VIII, 1 (February, 1954), 52.
have demanded assurance that the aid will not be accompanied by interference in the domestic affairs of the recipient nations.\textsuperscript{117}

The domestic jurisdiction clause is concerned with the danger of collective interventions by the organization, a new variation on the unilateral intervention that Mexico has traditionally opposed. The connection is indicated in the Mexican rejection of an Uruguayan suggestion for joint intervention in the Western Hemisphere against any nation guilty of denying its people their rights or not fulfilling international obligations. Foreign Secretary Francisco Castillo Nájera reminded the government of Uruguay that non-intervention was a "cherished victory of inter-American cooperation and must not be altered in any form."\textsuperscript{118}

Mexico has also been concerned with unilateral intervention, which was not expressly forbidden in the original United Nations Charter.\textsuperscript{119} In 1966, Mexico and seventeen other Latin American nations submitted a draft resolution to the General Assembly asking for affirmation of the obligation of every state or group of states to refrain from any act of intervention and condemning all forms of intervention.\textsuperscript{120}

\textsuperscript{120}International Organization, XX, 2 (Spring, 1966), 318.
The text of the resolution followed the provisions against
intervention in the Charter of the Organization of American
States: "No state has the right to intervene directly or in-
directly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or ex-
ternal affairs of another state."

A similar dilemma confronts Mexico in the Organization
of American States as a result of the United States efforts
to use the collective security powers of that organization
to combat the spread of Communism in the Western Hemis-
phere. Some Latin American members have urged the same
type of action against dictators. Mexico has held fast
to the position that the Rio Treaty cannot be invoked unless
there is a real threat to the security of the hemisphere,
and that ideological questions are internal matters to be
determined by individual states. At the Caracas confer-
ence, where the United States was urging a declaration
against Communism, Foreign Minister Manuel Tello defined the
Mexican position:

> We reject the idea that has been expressed on var-
> ious occasions that the mission of guarding the mainten-
> ance of our institutions has ceased to be a matter
> within the exclusive national jurisdiction of our

---

121 United Nations Monthly Chronicle, III, 1 (January,
1966), 29.

122 Engel, "The Revolution and Mexican Foreign Policy,
p. 525.

123 C. Neale Ronning, Law and Politics in Inter-American
Diplomacy (New York, 1963), p. 82.

124 Castañeda, Mexico and the U.N., p. 186.

respective governments, and has become an international concern subject to collective action. If we accented this doctrine, we would be encroaching on the authority reserved to the states and consequently we would be violating both the Charter of Bogotá and that of San Francisco which prohibit our intervening individually or collectively in matters involving the internal jurisdiction of states, and we would be converting our organization into a supra-national tribunal commissioned to pass judgment on our institutions and to regulate the democratic zeal of our governments.126

When Venezuela, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and Honduras submitted a resolution calling for an inter-American declaration against coup d'état, Mexico opposed the move as "frankly interventionist,"127 in spite of Mexican devotion to democratic principles and self-determination of peoples. Mexican policy-makers generally believe more can be accomplished by cooperation and pacific coexistence with nations of different ideologies128 than by condemnation or exclusion.

After championing the cause of regionalism at the San Francisco conference, Mexico was convinced by later events that the world organization afforded a better means of approaching hemispheric security problems than the O.A.S. due to domination of the latter by the United States.129 In recent O.A.S. decisions (especially those related to Cuba,

which will be treated in the next chapter as a case study.) Mexico has taken a negative position, usually abstaining or voting against measures because they are violations of the charters of the regional or international organizations.\textsuperscript{130} Mexico's primary objectives have been to promote the legal point of view and to insist that members of a regional organization are not excluded from protection available in the United Nations\textsuperscript{131} simply because a precedent has been established for using the regional machinery first.\textsuperscript{132}

The non-intervention principle was first championed as a protection against European and United States intervention. As political and social upheavals have rocked the Latin American nations, conditions encouraging interventions by one American nation into the affairs of another have developed. When governments of opposing ideologies exist in neighboring nations, or when groups of refugees from an overthrown regime regroup in a neighboring state, the situation is ripe for intervention.

The Caribbean area, including the Central American republics, Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and the South American nations of Venezuela and Colombia, have been

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{130}] Koslow, \textit{Mexico and the O.A.S.}," p. 16.
\item[\textsuperscript{131}] P. V. Garcia Amador, "The Dominican Situation," \textit{Américas}, XVII, 7 (July, 1965), 1.
\item[\textsuperscript{132}] Castañeda, \textit{Mexico and the U.N.}, p. 126.
\end{itemize}
the scene of a large number of unilateral interventions generated by these conditions of instability. In the summer of 1959, for instance, the Rio Treaty was invoked three times within two months by the governments of Panama, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic, charging that their territories had been violated. The Mexican approach to these incidents has usually been to oppose joint action by the organization and to encourage each member to exercise greater caution to ensure that their territory is not used as a base for operations by insurgents.

In the fairly recent case of United States intervention in the Dominican Republic (1965), Mexico took an uncompro- mising position on the principle of non-intervention, objecting to the infringement on the sovereignty of the island republic. Mexico opposed O.A.S. resolutions calling for an Inter-American force made up of men and materiel contributed by member nations to keep order in the Dominican Republic. The measure, passed by the minimum fourteen votes required, resulted in a force that reflected Mexico's vision of U.S. domination: 250 Hondurans, 164 Nicaraguans, 25 Costa

133See Ronning, Law and Politics in Inter-American Diplomacy, pp. 82-85 for a more detailed discussion of interventions by one American nation in the affairs of another.


Ricans, 1250 Brazilians, and 186 troops from Paraguay joined 22,000 United States Marines to constitute the O.A.S. peacekeeping force.\textsuperscript{137}

On International Law

Throughout the preceding pages, Mexican action in the United Nations has been attributed to a respect for international law or a desire to assume a legalistic position. A combination of several factors explains this attitude. One consideration is the fact that those nations which lack physical power take refuge in the law as their only protection against the military powers.\textsuperscript{138} Another element is the culturally characteristic love for detailed and specific documentation.\textsuperscript{139} A third factor is the relative safety that a legalistic position offers Mexico when confronted with a choice between compromising principles and opposing the United States.\textsuperscript{140} As President Adolfo Lopez Mateos told the General Assembly in 1959, "Mexico prefers the force of law to the resources of power."\textsuperscript{141}

\textsuperscript{137}Koslow, "Mexico and the O.A.S.,” p. 52.

\textsuperscript{138}Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, "The Patterns of International Politics and International Law," American Political Science Review, LIII, 3 (September, 1959), 710.

\textsuperscript{139}Alberto Lleras, "The 4th Meeting," Américas, III, 5 (May, 1951), 5.

\textsuperscript{140}Koslow, "Mexico and the O.A.S.,” p. 53.

\textsuperscript{141}Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourteenth
The area of international law which most concerns Mexico is the controversial area of national security.\textsuperscript{142} This concern has led to participation in two major United Nations projects on international law, the Committee to Define Aggression and the Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among Nations.

Attempts to establish a definition of aggression have a complicated history continuing to the present. In 1950, the problem was referred to the International Law Commission, which submitted a report to the Assembly in 1951. The Sixth (Legal) Committee of the Assembly examined the report and suggested that the Secretary-General and member states submit observations on the problem of defining aggression to the Seventh Session of the Assembly in 1952. The Seventh Session in turn set up a Special Committee to meet at the headquarters of the United Nations and prepare draft definitions to present to the Ninth Session. The Special Committee of fifteen members, one of which was Mexico, met in August, 1953\textsuperscript{143} and has, with some changes in personnel, met annually ever since.\textsuperscript{144}

\textsuperscript{142}Charles G. Fenwick, "International Law, Old and New," \textit{Américas}, XV, 9 (September, 1963), 27.


During the debates of the original Special Committee, Mexico urged the inclusion of elements other than armed force in the concept of aggression. The definition suggested in a working paper submitted by the Mexican delegation declared that:

In an international conflict aggression shall be regarded as the direct or indirect use of force by the authorities of one State against the territorial integrity or political independence of another State for any purpose other than legitimate individual or collective defense or compliance with a decision or recommendation of a competent organ of the United Nations.

Because the use of force was justified by self-defense, Mexico was also concerned with determining that only when a threat was accompanied by force could a nation have recourse to self-defense.

In 1956, Mexico joined Paraguay, Peru and the Dominican Republic in proposing a draft resolution which declared that "in no event may aggression be justified by any considerations of a political, economic or social nature." The resolution included a more specific definition of aggression than earlier proposed. Declaration of war in violation of the U.N. Charter, invasion by armed forces, armed attack against territory, population, or land, sea or air forces of a State, blockading the coast or ports of a State, or incursions by

---

146 Ibid., Annex, p. 6.
147 Ibid., p. 21.
armed bands were listed as acts of aggression. A working paper submitted to the 1956 Special Committee by Mexico went one step further by specifically defining grounds which would not justify aggression such as the internal condition of the State or specific legislative acts or regulations of a State.

In the most recent report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, published in 1970, the project is still far from completion. Mexico continues to participate on the committee which has not yet reached a conclusion on the original problem of whether or not to include aggression other than armed force. Several new considerations have been added, such as bombardment and weapons of mass destruction, as well as "aggressive intent," and the principle of priority (which state used force first).

The same pattern of development characterizes the efforts of the General Assembly to codify international law

---


through the activities of the Special Committee on the Principles of International Law. A letter from the Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations, written in June, 1961, expressed a desire to see the General Assembly undertake a

general survey of the present state of international law, with a view to strengthening and adapting to present circumstances the encouragement which . . . the General Assembly must give to the progressive development of international law and its codification.154

The letter further suggested that the General Assembly choose a number of topics for consideration in the Assembly rather than in the International Law Commission, so that the discussion would reflect the opinions of representatives of governments rather than legal experts. Possible topics offered for study were: succession of governments, outer space, sources of international law, and non-intervention.155

The international law existing at the time of the San Francisco conference was for the most part the product of 19th century European international experience.156 Much of the law governing sovereignty and security was unacceptable


155Ibid., p. 11.

to the new nations which joined the United Nations in the decades that followed because they had not participated in making it and felt it was designed to favor the interests of the colonial powers. The Mexican letter called for the General Assembly to exercise its responsibility to develop and codify international laws pertinent to contemporary problems and offer all member nations the opportunity to take part in the process.

In a period when the number of nation-states has doubled and the power discrepancy among them has become greater (that is, when there are more nations but fewer of them have significant power), even a basic postulate of international law such as sovereign equality of states becomes anachronistic. In answer to the problems posed by the conflict between self-determination for the small nations and strategic interests of the great powers, and as a response to requests for codification of international law, the General Assembly set up the Special Committee, to begin work in 1964.

---


161 Ibid.

Mexico was host to the first soties of meetings in Mexico City\textsuperscript{163} where the committee was instructed to draw up a report on its conclusions concerning the first four of seven principles of international law chosen by the General Assembly. The seven principles to be studied were:

(a) . . . States shall refrain from the threat or use of force . . . ;
(b) . . . States shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means . . . ;
(c) The duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State . . . ;
(d) The principle of sovereign equality of States;
(e) The duty of States to co-operate with one another;
(f) The principle that States shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter.\textsuperscript{164}

Praising the work of the 1964 Special Committee, a Mexican delegate to the United Nations noted that for the first time since San Francisco the fundamental principles of the Charter had been studies by a geographically representative group of member states. He was especially impressed with the work of the Committee in regard to the principle of non-intervention.\textsuperscript{165} The report of this Committee was finally considered by the Assembly at the Twentieth Session. As a result, the Special Committee was reconstituted, and

held sessions in subsequent years at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City (1966 and 1968) and at the U.N. Office in Geneva (1967). 166

After four years of meetings, the committee had not yet covered all seven principles and was instructed to continue meeting in 1969. Mexico was a member of a drafting committee set up within the Special Committee to write reports based on the discussions which took place and submit them for approval by the whole committee. 167 Finally, in 1970, the Committee presented a draft declarations on principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among states to the General Assembly 168 as part of the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations. 169

The resolution includes an interpretation and application for each of the original seven principles based on the discussion of the committee and closes with an appeal to all states "to be guided by these principles in their international conduct and to develop their mutual relations on the basis of their strict observance." 170 In his comments on the meaning of different sections of the declaration, the Mexican representative

167 Ibid., p. 11.
170 Ibid., pp. 62-70.
took special notice of the provisions which prevented intervention as that aspect of the problem had been of particular importance to his efforts on the Special Committee.\textsuperscript{171}

A general overview of Mexican activities within the international organization tends to relate certain principles to particular events, giving the impression that decision-makers apply one principle or another in a series of isolated cases. To correct this impression, a comprehensive study of one particular problem showing how many principles are challenged at once, can be instructive. Having described the subject, Mexico, as a political entity and observed this international actor within the United Nations, the study will now focus on Mexico's reaction to a single international problem, Castro's Cuba.

CHAPTER IV

MEXICO'S POLICY IN THE CUBAN CASE

Background

The international events precipitated by the Cuban revolution overthrowing the dictatorial Batista regime and establishing Fidel Castro as the ruler of the island republic have been the subject of three major inter-American conferences and numerous United Nations discussions and resolutions. Especially in the period between 1960 and 1964, when the most concentrated efforts were made to settle the differences between the United States and Cuba which threatened the peace and later the security of the hemisphere, Mexico had ample opportunity to demonstrate her determination to defend traditional principles while urging peaceful settlement. Predictably, Mexican policy in the case of the United States versus Cuba (or Cuba versus the United States, depending on the particular stage of the conflict) was characterized by a legalistic stand on the Charters and treaties of the U.N. and the O.A.S. and the proved facts as they related to the provisions of international law, especially the principle of non-intervention. A brief look at the historical developments which set the stage for international is essential to appreciate the Mexican point of view.
When the Communist-influenced government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala first raised the threat of Soviet intervention in the Western Hemisphere, the United States sought justification for its efforts to remove the threat by urging that the Tenth Inter-American Conference, meeting in Caracas, Venezuela (March, 1954), adopt a strong resolution declaring the intervention of international Communism in the government of an American state a threat to the security of the hemisphere. The Latin American states were hesitant to enable the United States to use the threat of Communism as an excuse for meddling in their domestic affairs, but did agree to a statement against Communism known as the Caracas Resolution:

The domination or control of the political institutions of any American State by the international Communist movement, extending to this hemisphere the political system of an extra-continental power, would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States, endangering the peace of America, and would call for a Meeting of Consultation to consider the adoption of appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties.

By calling for a Meeting of Consultation, the resolution invoked the Rio Treaty and its regional provisions for sanctions against nations disrupting the peace, so that an

1Dreier, The Organization of American States, p. 52.


anti-Communist action becomes an act of self-defense. Mexico abstained from voting on the resolution for several reasons: first, the treaty constituted an illegal expansion of the meaning of the Rio Treaty, which was designed to respond to armed attack; second, it violated provisions of the O.A.S. Charter forbidding intervention, and third, it threatened future interventions in the affairs of nations whose economic policies aroused capitalist opposition.

When a rebellion assisted by the United States, Nicaragua and Honduras threatened the Arbenz government, Guatemala appealed to the Security Council of the United Nations. The United States was able to command enough support there to keep the question off the Council agenda, arguing that it was a regional problem better handled by the O.A.S. The victory of the Castillo Armas revolution removed Arbenz and with him the complaint. The short-lived dispute was sufficient, however, to establish a precedent of O.A.S. priority in regional problems.

Another Caribbean crisis, involving a dictator, Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, also contributed to the precedents.
that were applied in the later Cuban case. Venezuela charged the Trujillo regime with an attempt on the life of her president;\(^\text{10}\) the charge was considered at the Sixth Meeting of Consultation of American Foreign Ministers held at San José, Costa Rica in August, 1960. The Final Act of the conference, which provided for member states to break diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic in addition to suspending trade in war materiel and interrupting economic relations,\(^\text{11}\) was sent to the Security Council of the United Nations as required by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. The United States succeeded in persuading the Council to take note of the sanctions applied rather than officially approve them, thus establishing the precedent that regional action does not have to have Council authorization.\(^\text{12}\)

The alleged act of aggression had taken place, but it was a single act in the past, and there was no evidence to indicate that any future violence should be expected.\(^\text{13}\) Yet the O.A.S. took the strongest action in the history of the Organization up to 1960.\(^\text{14}\) The United States had succeeded in establishing an O.A.S. pattern for severe action against

\(^{10}\) Dreier, *The Organization of American States*, p. 98.


\(^{13}\) Dreier, *The Organization of American States*, p. 98.

\(^{14}\) Connell-Smith, "The Inter-American System," p. 64.
an American government, which could carry over into the discussions of the Cuban problem \(^15\) which dominated the Seventh Meeting, held immediately after adjourning the Sixth.

These events produced three precedents applied in the Cuban case: outlawing international Communism in the Western Hemisphere, giving the regional organization priority over the international organization in hearing disputes, and taking action against another American republic to the extent that its internal affairs are affected.

In 1960, the United States and the Castro government began to exchange complaints, then accusations, and eventually denunciations. Cuba took her case to the Security Council of the United Nations, \(^16\) while the United States sent a memorandum to the Inter-American Peace Committee accusing Cuba of "provocative actions increasing Caribbean tensions." \(^17\) In the international organization, Cuba was the plaintiff, pointing to economic aggression (in sugar and oil trade) and intrigues with exiles, among other U.S. atrocities. \(^18\) In the O.A.S., on the other hand, the complaint lodged by the Eisenhower administration made Cuba the defendant.

\(^15\)Connell-Smith, "The Inter-American System," p. 75.
\(^17\)Ibid., June 28, 1960, p. 1.
\(^18\)Ibid., July 19, 1960, p. 1.
The Inter-American Conferences

While the Cubans were waiting for Security Council action, Peru requested that a meeting of Consultation be called by the O.A.S. Council to discuss the dispute between the United States and Cuba. The Seventh Meeting was set for August, 1960 (to follow the Sixth, in San José, Costa Rica). At the same time, Ecuador and Argentina were working within the Security Council to have the Cuban complaint referred to the O.A.S. for a report. Cuban Foreign Minister, Raúl Roa was allowed to make his formal statement to the Security Council, and then the case was sent to the regional organization.

The Mexican position throughout this sequence of events was one of sympathy for the Cubans. Emilio Sanchez Piedras, Chairman of the Permanent Commission of Congress declared that Mexico supported Cuba and wished to assist the Cuban people in their fight for "social justice and economic liberty." Demands from Washington that this statement be explained brought demonstrations by Mexican students against United States intervention and a statement by Foreign

20Ibid.
22Hispanic-American Report, XIII, 7 (September, 1960), 437.
Minister Tello that, while Mexico was sympathetic with the Cubans, the government hoped for a solution in the Inter-American system.24

Before the San José meeting was definitely scheduled, the Cuban case had already become a battleground for the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Eisenhower warned that the United States would "not permit a regime dominated by international Communism in the Western Hemisphere."25 Khrushchev threatened to use missiles if the United States attempted a military intervention in Cuba.26 In the Security Council the delegates of each nation warned the other, "Don't touch Cuba." Cuba was a "pawn in the Cold War."27

Mexico maintained a "hands-off" policy toward the Cuban revolution, opposing interference by the United States28 and urging a settlement through the peaceful means available to the O.A.S. When Cuba's President Osvaldo Dorticos visited Mexico in July, 1960, Lopez Mateos assured him of Mexico's support for the aspirations of the Cuban people and persuaded him to take a more conciliatory attitude toward the United States.29 Later, Mexico approached the U.S. government, urging a softer line on the Cuban question at the San

26Ibid.
29Ibid., XIII, 6 (August, 1960), 366.
José meeting. Mexican efforts paid off in the final wording of the Declaration of San José, which did not allude to Cuba specifically.

The Cuban delegation walked out of the meeting just before the declaration was unanimously approved. Rejecting the "attempt of the Sino-Soviet powers to make use of the political, economic or social situation of any American state to manage the security of the hemisphere," the declaration condemned intervention by an extra-continental power. Although the original case referred to the O.A.S. by the Security Council was against the United States, no charges of aggression were made by the conference. Having previously announced their intention to ignore any action taken by the San José meeting, the Cuban leaders charged betrayal against the O.A.S. and prepared to meet an invasion by an armed force they believed to be organizing in the O.A.S.

The Mexican delegates felt it was necessary to attach a statement to the declaration explaining their affirmative vote:

The delegation of Mexico is convinced that this is a resolution of a general character for all member.

34 Ibid., August 29, 1960, p. 3.
states of the Organization and that in no way is it a condemnation or threat against Cuba, whose aspirations for economic improvement and social justice have the fullest support of the Government and people of Mexico.  

One constructive provision of the declaration welcomed by Mexico was the section establishing a Committee of Good Offices that could be used in the U.S.-Cuba dispute.

Convinced that in the O.A.S., where Cuba was always the defendant, there was no protection from the United States, the Cuban leaders returned to the Security Council and the General Assembly with more complaints and requests for action. The Latin American and African states made an effort at mediation in a resolution presented to the General Assembly asking Latin American members to help settle the dispute by peaceful means.

The Security Council had briefly heard and ended its consideration of the Cuban complaint, and the First Committee of the General Assembly had just begun its discussions on the subject when the Cuban charges were substantiated by an abortive attack on the island. After the United States had broken diplomatic relations with Cuba in January, 1961 the

38 Ibid., April 13, 1961, p. 8.
39 Etzioni, Majority of One, p. 155.
Cubans had begun predicting an invasion such as the landing at the Bay of Pigs by a group of Cuban exiles April 17, 1961. President Kennedy of the United States, in May, 1961, and the president of Guatemala in January, 1962, eventually admitted their complicity in the attack.

At the April 18 meeting of the General Assembly, projects were initiated to bring a peaceful end to the dispute, which threatened regional and world peace. Mexico had originally co-sponsored a Latin American joint resolution calling for O.A.S. members to lend their assistance in reaching a solution, but withdrew support after the Bay of Pigs invasion for fear that it would give the impression that Mexico condoned United States actions. Instead, the Mexican delegate offered a resolution specifically condemning the United States intervention and requesting peaceful settlement without reference to the O.A.S. Mexico was moving to a position of preferring United Nations action to hemispheric action.

In the United Nations debate on the resolutions related to the Cuban case, Mexico made the following points:

---


first, she noted the 'sympathy and admiration with which the Mexican people viewed the struggle of the Cuban people to fulfill national aspirations'; second, she emphasized that 'the competence of the United Nations to deal with the situation involving member states could not be challenged on the ground that both parties were also members of a regional organization'; third, she proclaimed that people had the right to resort to arms to repel armed foreign intervention, to depose a tyrant, or to carry out a social revolution; but fourth, no foreign power had the right to instigate or bring about the fall of a government not to its liking.

In response to a single international incident, Mexico called forth a number of policy principles. The Mexican resolution passed in committee but failed in the plenary meeting of the Assembly. The Assembly finally adopted a resolution which called on all members to lend their assistance to efforts to establish peace and to abstain from any action which might aggravate the situation.

Although it was now more restrained, the United States government continued to work for actions against the Castro regime. Shortly after the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy had made a statement which revealed that the U.S. had not rejected the possibility of unilateral action. His assurances that the "United States would not abandon Cuba to Communism, and . . . did not rule out the possibility of armed interventions in case of imports of Russian arms or executions of United States citizens" increased Castro's

---

46 Glick, "Cuba and the 15th General Assembly," p. 246.  
48 Etzioni, Majority of One, pp. 157-158.
paranoia. He further undermined the O.A.S. by saying that "if the nations of this hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against outside Communist penetration, I want it clearly understood that this government will not hesitate to meet its primary obligations, which are to the security of our own nation."^49

Numerous efforts were made to condemn Cuba for alliances with the Soviet Union until finally Colombia succeeded in having an inter-American conference summoned on the subject. The Eighth Meeting of Consultation was convoked to meet the challenge to hemispheric security which "might arise" from extra-continental intervention.^50 The conference was summoned to deal with a problem before it developed, to consider what action to take if peace were threatened.

Mexico's opposition to the Eighth Meeting began in the Council debates to determine whether or not a meeting of foreign ministers was justified. Vicente Sanchez Gavito, the Mexican delegate, announced his intention to vote against the meeting because it was not legal under the Rio Treaty. Meetings of Consultation were to be called only to meet the danger of a specific incident, not to consider threats that might arise in a hypothetical situation.^51 When the meeting was approved by a majority of states and set for January,

^50 Etzioni, Majority of One, p. 181.
1962, at Punta del Este, Uruguay, Mexico stood in the unfortunate position of attending and participating in a convocation believed to be illegal. To Foreign Minister Tello, the meeting was a deliberate attempt to amend the Rio Treaty by broadening its applicability.

During the meeting, those nations opposed to calling it continued their opposition to resolutions discussed there on the same legal grounds, that there was no basis for the meeting. Foreign Minister Tello asked the questions, "Where is the threat? Is anyone being attacked?"

Realizing that the deadlock between anti-Castro and pro-Castro groups was not opening, the United States guided the discussion of the conference into areas of agreement. Even Mexico made the concession of approving a resolution that declared Marxism-Leninism incompatible with the goals of the inter-American system.

Faced with the dilemma of reconciling support for democracy with opposition to intervention even in the name of democracy, the Mexicans were quick to point out that democracy, however precious, is a belief, while non-intervention is a rule of law.

---

54Koslow, "Mexico and the C.A.S.,” p. 49.
55Ibid.
56Rondero, "Mexico at Punta del Este," p. 129.
Having outlawed Communism at Caracas, opposed extra-continental intervention at San José and declared Marxism incompatible with the Inter-American system at Punta del Este, the American states moved, by a bare two-thirds majority to the most extreme position yet, expulsion of a Communist government (the Castro regime, not the nation itself, was expelled). Mexico established a position on legal principles and would not give ground. Not only was the meeting illegally convened, but the move to expel a member was a blatant violation of the Charter. Cuba had not committed an act to warrant any type of sanction (in fact, Cuba was the nation which had been attacked); the sanction of expulsion was not even provided for in the Charter. The sovereignty of an American state was being compromised by an act which attempted to amend the Charter illegally.

The final vote on the move to expel Cuba was fourteen in favor, one, Cuba, opposed, and six abstaining (Mexico, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Ecuador). The delegates also approved suspending trade in arms with Cuba, with Mexico again abstaining. For Mexico neither the use of the term "incompatibility" to avoid the intervention issue

57 Rondero, "Mexico at Punta del Este," p. 129.
58 Etzioni, Majority of One, p. 183.
59 Meek, "Eighth Meeting of Consultation," p. 7.
nor the distinction between the country of Cuba and the "present government of Cuba,"62 could rationalize the absence of legal grounds for action.

No longer a member of the O.A.S., the Cuban government had even more reason to refer the intervention question to the United Nations.63 In the Assembly, though much sympathy was expressed for the Cuban cause, none of the resolutions proposed were passed.64 In the Security Council, Cuba requested a judicial opinion on the legality of the O.A.S. action, but was rejected. The final result was to emphasize the idea that the United Nations could not block regional enforcement action, an idea emerging from the 1960 Dominican Republic crisis.65 Mexico continued to defend Cuba as demonstrated by her abstaining on a vote to exclude Cuba from the Latin America Free Trade Area.66

The only time that hemispheric unity was achieved and Mexico approved sanctions against Cuba67 was in the crisis resulting from the discovery that Russian missile sites had been erected in Cuba in October, 1962. Having decided to impose a limited blockade on Cuba, giving Russia a chance to

63Ibid., p. 77.
64Etzioni, Majority of One, pp. 184-185. 65Ibid., p. 189.
66Hispanic American Report, XV, 9 (September, 1962), 792.
withdraw the missiles rather than risk attack, President Kennedy and his advisers sought a legal basis for their action. Their solution was to call the limited blockade a quarantine and submit it to the O.A.S. for approval. Secretary of State Dean Rusk's hurried trip to Mexico on October 20, 1962 may have encouraged Mexican co-operation. On October 22, the day that knowledge of the weapons was made public, Latin American ambassadors in Washington were briefed. At a meeting of the Organ of Consultation (an O.A.S. Charter provision for emergency conferences), October 23, the Latin Americans gave unanimous support to a resolution specifically addressed to the Cuban situation. It called for the immediate withdrawal of missiles and other weapons, recommended that members take all measures including armed force deemed necessary to prevent further shipment of arms, and informed the Security Council of its decision.

Privately, the Mexican President had informed the president of Cuba that "Mexico could not view with indifference a Latin American country establishing facilities for utilizing the most destructive weapon of all times." Having gained the assurance of the Cuban ambassador that the missiles

---

68 Etzioni, Majority of One, p. 192.
69 Hispanic-American Report, XV, 10 (October, 1962), 886.
70 Etzioni, Majority of One, p. 193.
71 Hispanic-American Report, XV, 10 (October, 1962), 886.
would be removed, Mexico was willing to vote for withdrawal, but abstained on the section calling for possible armed action. 72

Mexico made it clear that this affirmative vote on missile withdrawal did not indicate a change of position on United States Cuban policy. 73 Diplomatic relations with Cuba continued, 74 as did economic relations and channels of transportation and communication.

The next challenge to the Mexican stand on Cuba came in the autumn of 1963, when Venezuela charged Cuba with attempted sabotage and subversion of the Venezuelan government. 75 An Inter-American Meeting of Consultation, the Ninth, was called to meet in Washington, D.C. in July, 1964. The Mexican delegation, after examining the facts, concluded that there was no threat to the peace in Venezuela, and therefore no basis for adopting measures against Cuba. Mexico was again in the minority, voting against a resolution that verified that the acts of aggression had taken place, condemned Cuba and requested that all members break diplomatic relations and suspend economic activity with Cuba. 76

72 Hispanic-American Report, XV, 10 (October, 1962), 886.
73 Etzioni, Majority of One, p. 194.
75 Connell-Smith, "The Inter-American System," p. 78.
The Mexican government maintained that the resolution was illegal under the Rio Treaty. Refusing to recognize the decision of the majority as binding, Mexico continued diplomatic relations with Cuba even after all other American nations conformed to the required measures. The refusal was conditioned by an offer to submit to a decision of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the resolution. The United States, not wishing to allow the international judiciary any opportunity to comment on regional action, has not pushed Mexico to comply with the decisions of the Ninth Meeting.

Conclusion

In the five-year period when most of the debating and resolving on Cuba took place, Mexico met challenges to every basic principle of her foreign policy and grappled in some way with all the conditions which have been described in previous chapters. The principle most often endangered was that of non-intervention, threatened both by the unilateral actions of the United States and the collective measures of the O.A.S. The self-determination of the Cuban people, emerging from an economic relationship with the United States that paralleled colonialism, and the universal membership principle, based on national sovereignty, were both championed by Mexico.

---

Mexico often had recourse to international law, as her policies repeatedly relied on a strict interpretation of the world and regional charters. The meaning of aggression was often discussed, as well as the nature and justification of self-defense. The relationship between the United Nations and the O.A.S. underwent several changes while Mexico moved to a position of championing the world organization and developed a progressively more negative attitude toward the regional group.

The cold war, both as a physical confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union and as the ideological conflict of capitalist democracy and international Communism, pervaded the situation. Nuclear arms, which Mexico later worked to eliminate from the Latin American area, were the cause of a crisis in which Mexico opposed extra-continental intervention and supported collective security measures. Numerous formulas for peaceful settlement of disputes were proposed and some approved.

Within this narrow focus, and on the broader scale of the history of Mexico's movements within the United Nations, certain themes are repeated often, emphasizing their lasting importance and providing a basis for drawing general conclusions about Mexico's international personality as expressed in the United Nations.
CHAPTER V

MEXICO IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Mexico's position in the United Nations is unique. Recognized as an independent state in 1821, Mexico is not a new nation. Yet, the Revolution of 1910 brought a rebirth, resulting in an outlook most compatible with that of the young ex-colonial nations. By institutionalizing the Revolution, Mexican leaders have perpetuated the spirit of change so that Mexicans continue to see their aspirations for social and economic improvement reflected in the efforts of less developed nations. Mexico has achieved a sufficient level of economic development and political stability to command the respect of the powerful world states, yet continues to identify closely enough with the third world to gain acceptance as a representative of their views and desires.

Lack of military power has given Mexico considerable leverage in international circles. Power can be a limiting factor in times of peace. Mexico's strong nationalistic spirit and concern for the betterment of mankind are more freely expressed because her leaders are not limited by the political considerations that great power demands.

Thus Mexico, a nation old enough to have developed a tradition of principles, yet young enough to feel the spirit of national development, has enough stability to command
attention to her proposals, and enough weakness to be free to act in the international organization.

The strong nationalist spirit champions national sovereignty, contesting the forces that threaten the political lives of small nations. Mexico demands juridical equality for all nations, realizing that such equality is not possible unless the law before which all nations are equal is recognized by all. Therefore Mexico promotes international law and encourages further codification and clarification of its provisions. Non-self-governing peoples and national groups fighting for social change concern Mexico, who defends their right to self-determination.

Bordering the United States, Mexico knows the helplessness of living under a nuclear cloud, yet has responded to the challenge of working for peace and disarmament. Her willingness to deny herself the right to nuclear armaments, however empty the promise may seem, is still an example of good will set before the world.

Although much of the Mexican effort in international affairs is positive, the strongest tenet of Mexican policy is the negative principle of non-intervention. Social and economic ideals have been neglected rather than compromise this principle. History has taught a bitter lesson, and though unilateral interference by one nation in another is infrequent, a new offender, the international organization, perpetuates the threat. Once, interventions were motivated by
financial interests; today they are veiled as collective self-defense measures to promote peace and democracy. Whatever its form, intervention arouses Mexican opposition.

Mexican leaders are not blind idealists. Their policies reveal a very realistic analysis of the contemporary situation. In 1945, for instance, Mexico worked for a strong regional organization, wishing to avoid European involvement in hemispheric affairs. Subsequent events demonstrated that the United States was going to turn the O.A.S. into a tool of foreign policy. In the United Nations, the veto power of the Soviet Union and the voting power of the third world blocs in the Assembly served as a counterweight to U.S. power. Mexico changed to a position favoring the consideration of hemisphere problems in the world forum, enabling her leaders to espouse the principles of their foreign policy more effectively. Mexico did not change ideals, but methods.

Basing her actions on beliefs and law frees Mexico to follow an independent course in the U.N. Mexican leaders do not have to adjust their alliances to the changing world order; their alliances are to principles and to the Charter.

Mexico is a stable, yet developing, moralist, defending principles taught by history in an environment dominated by two centers of fearful power. Within the United Nations, Mexico expresses this political personality through adherence to principles and efforts for peace and human development.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Documents

Organization of American States


United Nations

Documents: United Nations General Assembly


Official Records of the General Assembly:


Twelfth Session, 678th to 731st Plenary Meetings, September 17 to December 14, 1957, pp. 1-634.

Thirteenth Session, 747th to 794th Plenary Meetings, September 16 to December 13, 1958, and February 20 to March 13, 1959, pp. 1-650.

Fourteenth Session, Special Political Committee, 132nd Meeting, October 19, 1959, p. 28.

Fourteenth Session, 795th to 857th Plenary Meetings, September 15, 1959 to December 12, 1959, pp. 1-753.


Official Records of the Security Council:


Reports:


Charter:


Public Information:


United States


Books


### Articles


"Latin America and the Palestine Partition Resolution," Journal of Inter-American Studies, I, 2 (April, 1959), 211-222.


Needler, Martin C., "Political Development and Socioeconomic Development: The Case of Latin America," American Political Science Review, LXII, 3 (September, 1968), 889-897.


"Ninth Meeting of Consultation," Américas, XVI, 9 (September, 1964), 1-10.


"Salute from the Ambassadors," Américas, XVII, 4 (April, 1965), 34.


Periodicals


International Organization, V, 1 (February, 1951) through XX, 3 (Spring, 1966).


Newspapers
