THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INCONGRUENCY, DOGMATISM, AND SOCIAL DESIRABILITY IN COLLEGE STUDENTS

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

An area of increasing interest in psychology and one receiving much research attention is cognitive consistency. Consistency may be understood as a cognitive style and/or a cognitive process. The former refers to the encoding, restructuring, distorting, and learning of new cognitions or experiences so as to maintain consistency with existing cognitive systems. The latter refers to changing existing cognitions, rather than distorting or restructuring new cognitions. Singer states that "where the focus is on the processing of new stimuli and new information, formulations such as adaptation level or contrast and assimilation," (18, p. 50) are more appropriate explanatory theories with regard to consistency as a cognitive style.

The manipulation of variables, as a means of arousing a state wherein attitudes or beliefs are inharmoniously or inconsistently related, has provided support for the hypothesis that individuals have a tendency to seek and maintain a state of cognitive consistency. Festinger (8) hypothesized that the existence of inconsistency or
dissonance would produce psychological discomfort, arouse motivation for consonance, and result in the avoidance of situations or information likely to increase inconsistency or dissonance.

Similar to the cognitive dissonance theory proposed by Festinger (8) is McReynolds's theory of assimilation. McReynolds (12) in presenting a conceptual analysis of assimilation proposes several hypotheses and theoretical assumptions. After assuming that it is an inherent part of man to seek out new experiences he states that percepts are assimilated by either "... (a) integrating them into new perceptual systems, or (b) assimilating them directly into existent perceptual systems" (12, p. 295). McReynolds refers to these percepts as "... data which are being or have been perceived and are still a part of the individual" (12, p. 294). Assimilation connotes a process of harmoniously fitting or relating percepts in a consistent manner. The process of seeking new percepts, integrating them, and seeking more new percepts is continuous, and referred to as perceptualization. Therefore, as an individual encounters new experiences he tends to absorb them into his existing perceptual systems at a rate commensurate with his assimilating process. As a result, the individual tends to maintain a state of balance in the process of perceptualization.
All of the percepts an individual encounters are not assimilated with equal ease. Some percepts are difficult to assimilate, while others completely resist assimilation due to inconsistency with existing perceptual systems. Unassimilated percepts tend to accumulate, persist, and result in a state of cognitive disequilibrium. McReynolds (12) felt that as unassimilated percepts accumulated certain behavioral characteristics tend to occur, such as: inhibiting the search for new percepts, increasing levels of anxiety, and promoting the search for unifying percepts.

McReynolds proposed that the reason percepts are not assimilated is due to the incongruencies between new percepts and existing perceptual systems. Incongruency refers to the "... relationship between percepts or perceptual systems which make them difficult to reconcile or to harmonize, such as contradictions, inconsistencies, and anomalies" (13, p. 57).

McReynolds felt that a limited level of incongruency could be measured by rating an item according to subjective values (good-bad) and feelings (like-dislike). McReynolds (13) therefore defines an incongruent response as inconsistency between values and feelings (good-dislike, or bad-like) in regard to various types of objects, behaviors, or events.
Byrne (3) developed an instrument to measure three types of incongruency in regard to items depicting some degree of hostile behavior. Each item was rated according to feelings (like-dislike), values (good-bad) and consequences (pleasant-unpleasant consequences). All items were rated on one dimension before they were considered on the next dimension. It therefore seems reasonable that a response to an item on one dimension (like-dislike) will not be assimilated with another dimension (good-bad) until the same item has been encountered on both dimensions. Byrne conceptualizes incongruence between feelings and values as "... corresponding roughly to perceived discrepancies between the motivational push of basic impulses and the evaluative constraints of conscience" (3, p. 330). The consequence dimension corresponds roughly to external pressures in regard to rewards and punishments.

It seems plausible that awareness or lack of awareness of incongruent responses should be an important consideration of incongruent measures. Crowne and Marlowe (5) and McReynolds (13) emphasize the cultural and social pressures toward making an individual behaviorally and cognitively consistent, which should provide even greater pressure toward consistency should the individual become aware of his behavioral or cognitive inconsistencies. Therefore, the simultaneous presentation of several
dimensions (good-bad, like-dislike, etc.), used to rate a statement, should result in greater cognizance of a cognitive inconsistent or incongruent response than when the dimensions are not presented simultaneously. Simultaneous refers to the concurrent presentation of several cognitive dimensions without the presence of a time interval or additional statements between the dimensions.

Therefore, a reduction in awareness of incongruent responses should result in reducing the social and cultural pressures toward consistent behavior. It also seems plausible that in reducing awareness of incongruent responses a greater isolated cognitive system should be indicated than when there is an awareness of incongruent responses.

Rokeach's (17) concept of dogmatism, as a relatively closed system of beliefs and disbeliefs, is related to difficulty in assimilating percepts due to the isolation of parts within the cognitive system. Rokeach states:

The greater the dogmatism the greater are the assumed degrees of isolation of interdependence between the belief and disbelief systems and the assumed degree of isolation among the various parts of the belief system (15, p. 197).

Several characteristics of such isolation were presented:

1. The presence of contradictory beliefs existing within the system.
2. The presence of greater differentiation and less similarities between systems which serve the purpose of warding off threat.

3. The presence of perceiving as irrelevant that which may realistically be relevant.

4. The presence of defending existing isolations between the parts of belief and disbelief systems through denial of their apparent contradiction (16, pp. 36-37).

The concept of dogmatism, as delineated by Rokeach, is defined as

... (a) a relatively closed cognitive organization of beliefs and disbeliefs about reality, (b) organized around a central set of beliefs about absolute authority which, in turn, (c) provides a framework for patterns of tolerance and qualified tolerance towards others (15, p. 195).

In an experimental series, Rokeach (15) demonstrates the difficulty high-dogmatic or closed-minded individuals have in approaching new cognitive systems which contradict their usual beliefs. Other investigators (1, 4, 9) have supported Rokeach's findings regarding the difficulty of high-dogmatic subjects in synthesizing incongruent or dissonant information.

Rokeach provides the suggestion that the more closed the belief system the more it represents "the need to ward off threat" (16, p. 197). Therefore, the function of the closed belief system may be understood as a defense in allaying anxiety. Other investigators have obtained support
for the hypotheses of dogmatism as a defense significantly related to anxiety (4, 10, 11, 14, 19). It may be assumed that the closed-minded individual avoids new perceptual data which tend to increase anxiety rather than lowering the existing amount of anxiety and thereby maintains greater consistency between new perceptual data and existing perceptual systems. However, this avoidance of new perceptual data will not reduce the existing amount of incongruencies due to the isolated characteristics of the individual's belief-disbelief systems.

Another important characteristic of the dogmatic individual is his "... increasing admiration or glorification of those perceived in positions of positive authority" (15, p. 201). This characteristic is closely related to degrees of reliance upon and approval from others.

Crowne and Marlowe (5) have intensively investigated various aspects of approval-dependent or social-desirable behavior. They propose (6) that social desirability represents a need for approval. Although social desirability was first conceived as a major artifact contaminating and therefore distorting the obtained results on most personality measurements it has more recently received consideration as a personality construct. High scoring need-for-approval individuals find reinforcement in
culturally approved behavior and may be appropriately characterized by greater conformity, cautiousness, and persuasibility. Crowne and Marlowe (5) more recently state "... that the dynamics of approval dependence may involve the protection of a vulnerable self-esteem" (p. 132).

Therefore, it may be a defense appropriately used in specific situations as a means of maintaining consistency between certain needs and self presentation. It is not consistent, if one is approval dependent, to present himself in an unfavorable manner.

Crowne and Marlowe (5) have incorporated the "need-for-approval" and defensive assumptions, as measured by the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, into the Social Learning Theory proposed by Rotter (17). The Social Learning Theory emphasizes the purpose, striving, and goal-directedness of behavior. An individual's mode of responding is learned as a result of social interaction accompanied by certain learned expectancies and reinforcements. Therefore, the subjective anticipation of attaining certain goals results in behavior that has been reinforced in social interactions. It seems reasonable that individuals who are approval-dependent will adopt certain types of behavior that will maximize the probability of being accepted, and minimize the probability of being rejected.

Therefore, in situations of self evaluation, an individual
will bring behavior characteristics of his particular response style including goal-directed behavior influenced by the need for approval and the need to defend a vulnerable self-esteem. It may be assumed that the greater the need for favorable evaluations from others the greater will be the need to defend against anticipated rejections. This should result in the avoidance of behavior that may increase the risks of social rejection and threat to self-esteem.

Crowne and Marlowe (5) have found support for the relationship between high need-for-approval and defensiveness. They have also found a significant relationship between high social desirability scores and a vulnerable self-esteem.

Thus, a relationship between the concepts of incongruency, dogmatism, and social desirability may be inferred. These concepts appear to be related on the consistency-inconsistency continuum in relation to cognitive assimilation. Also, an individual that is approval dependent will also have a closed belief-disbelief system due to his attitude with respect to authority. The approval dependent individual will exhibit greater cognitive consistency as a result of his need to present himself in a favorable and approved manner. It also appears that anxiety and certain defensive modes of responding influence the scores which
purport to measure incongruency, dogmatism, and social desirability.

Purpose of The Study

The purpose of this study was to determine if there was a relationship between the concepts of incongruency, dogmatism, and social desirability. It was assumed that high scores of social desirability would be related to low incongruity scores while high dogmatism scores would be related to high incongruity scores. The relationship between social desirability scores and dogmatism scores was also investigated. In order to measure these relationships Byrne's Hostility Incongruency Test, Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale, and Marlowe and Crowne's Social Desirability Scale were used.

Hypotheses

The assumed relationships between the above constructs formed the basis for the hypotheses of this study.

(I) Subjects with high social desirability scores will have significantly lower levels of incongruency than will subjects with low measured levels of social desirability.

(II) Subjects with high dogmatism scores will exhibit a significantly higher level of incongruency than subjects with low dogmatism scores.
(III) Subjects with high social desirability scores will have significantly higher levels of dogmatism than subjects with low social desirability scores.


CHAPTER II

RELATED STUDIES

On the basis of the previously stated theoretical assumptions, a relationship between social desirability, incongruency, and dogmatism may be expected. Investigation has found these constructs to be related to anxiety and defensiveness. It was proposed that these constructs may be related on the consistency-inconsistency continuum. A sample of findings, implying the relationship between social desirability, dogmatism, and incongruency, will be presented in this chapter.

Social Desirability

Salman, (11, pp. 115-132) using 150 male volunteers hypothesized that high need-for-approval subjects as measured by the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (M-C SDS), would experience greater attitude change after delivering a persuasive message contrary to their own private beliefs. The hypothesis was supported at a significant level (p < .05). The results were interpreted as arousing a greater degree of inconsistency in high need-for-approval scorers which was more difficult to tolerate than for low need-for-approval subjects. It was concluded that high scorers tend to maintain greater consistency as a result of their need for approval in situations of commitment.
Conn and Crowne (9) investigated high scorers on the M-C SDS and their reactions to a hostility arousing situation. They selected seventy-four male subjects, each serving with another person whom they did not know as an accomplice. Following the hostility-arousing situation, as a result of the behavior of the accomplice, the subjects were instructed to rate the accomplice. The experimental group, or high need-for-approval subjects characterized the accomplice more favorably than low need-for-approval subjects. The M-C SDS was administered to obtain two groups of high and low scorers. The accomplice filled out a scale describing the subjects' behavior toward him. The experimenter and another observer, unknown to the subject, also observed and rated the subjects' reactions. The results significantly indicated that high need-for-approval scorers react in a more favorably rated manner than low need-for-approval scorers in a manner suggesting repression or reaction formation.

Strickland and Crowne (11, pp. 150-159) used one hundred forty psychotherapy patients to investigate the need for approval and the necessity of discussing personal conflicts and feelings not necessarily socially approved. It was hypothesized that as a means of defending against the threat of self-revelation, high need-for-approval subjects would terminate therapy sooner than low need-for-approval subjects. Scores on the M-C SDS were dichotomized to compare the extremes. The results significantly supported the hypothesis.
Feder (14) administered the Repression-Sensitization Scale, Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, Couch and Keniston's Acquiescence Response Set Scale, and the Cornell Index #2 to one hundred sixty-one hospitalized male patients. The purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship between adjustment status, social desirability, acquiescence response set and two extreme modes of defensive behavior. Eighty-three subjects were classified as "adjusted" and were hospitalized in medical and surgical wards. Seventy-eight subjects were classified as "maladjusted" and were psychiatric patients. The "adjusted" medical and surgical patients were significantly identified as repressors (p. <.01) while the "maladjusted" or psychiatric patients were identified as sensitizers. Among the findings of this study, a significant correlation of -.45 (p. <.01) was found between the M-C SDS and the Repression-Sensitization Scale. The results indicated that, on measures of self-report, repressors or "adjusted" subjects indicate a significantly greater need for approval than sensitizers or "maladjusted" subjects. Feder concluded that the repression-sensitization dimension is measuring something not included in the other measures.

Katkin (20) investigated the relationship between the M-C SDS and the obtained indices, for male and female subjects, on the MMPI. The Edwards Social Desirability Scale was also used in this study. A sample of sixty-six females
and fifty-three males were administered the above scales. The scales on the MMPI included not only the Edwards scale, but nine clinical scales, the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale, and the Welsh Anxiety Scale. The results indicated significant correlations between all the scales except the L scale and Edwards Social Desirability Scale, while all but the Hy scale correlated negatively with the M-C SDS. On the nine scales correlating with the M-C SDS the females were significantly higher than the males. This study left tentative the hypothesis that correlations between the MMPI and the "need-for-approval" construct, as measured by the M-C SDS indicates a relationship between psychopathology and social desirability. This relationship indicated that high scorers on the M-C SDS present themselves as more "adjusted" on self-report measures than low M-C SDS scorers. The significant sex differences may indicate that responding in a more socially desirable manner is more strongly reinforced in females than males.

Breger (3) reports the results of three studies supporting the hypothesis that the M-C SDS is measuring a repressive, less aware ego-defense. In the first study, M-C SDS scorers were dichotomized into high and low scoring groups. Ten TAT cards were administered to the seventy-nine female subjects comprising this study. Conformity to group pressures resulted in no significant difference between high
and low scorers, however, significantly more covert-hostility responses were given to the ten TAT cards by high M-C SDS as compared to low M-C SDS scorers who gave more overt-hostility responses.

In the second study, thirty males and twenty-seven females were manipulated so as to affect their attitude toward conformity. The subjects were divided into two groups according to their high and low scores on the M-C SDS. The results supported the conformity situation of the first study. High and low scorers show no significant difference regarding conformity to group pressures. This left the "need-for-approval" construct of the M-C SDS unsupported.

The final study was an attempt to investigate the "insightfulness" of sixty-one subjects and high and low scorers on the M-C SDS. The degree of "insight" was determined by the subjects' responses on the F-scale, a TAT hostility expression score, and an interview. The obtained results indicated a significant inverse relationship between scores on the M-C SDS and "insightfulness" as measured in this study. Breger concludes that the above studies support the M-C SDS as a measure of defensiveness since high scorers express greater covert hostility and less "insight" as compared to low scorers.

Jacobson and Fort (18) obtained a sample of one hundred twelve undergraduate males from the State University of New
York at Buffalo. The Ford Social Desirability Scale (FSD), and the Edwards Social Desirability Scale were administered to the sample. Previous investigations have found correlations of .70 and .80 between the FDS and the M-C SDS.

Twenty-four bipolar scales, based on the semantic differential method, were used as a means of assigning meaning to slide projected, black and white, stimuli. Two groups were obtained in which one group observed the black pictures while the other group observed the white pictures. Each group was divided into high and low social-desirability groups. The purpose of the study was testing the alternative prediction of "need-for-approval" construct of the Lie type of social desirability scale, namely, defensiveness. The results indicated that the potency connotation given to the stimuli did not differ for high and low FDS groups. However, low FDS scorers perceived the black stimuli in a more negative evaluation as compared to high FDS scorers. The results provided support for the Lie type of scale, such as the M-C SDS and FDS, as a measure of defensiveness rather than approval dependent.

Efran and Boylin (12) selected fifty-three male undergraduate students to participate in small groups of five to seven in an attempt to investigate the hypothesis that high M-C SDS scorers, due to their anticipation of social rejection and avoidance of situations threatening their self-esteem, would be more reluctant to volunteer for a group
observation task. The hypothesis was supported by a significant point-biserial correlation ($p < .01$). The results were interpreted as supporting the behavior of high M-C SDS scorers as avoiding situations of potential disapproval rather than as a need to obtain approval.

Efran and Broughton (13) subjected thirty-three male college students to five minutes of required one-way verbal communication toward two partners. However, prior to this, each subject was allowed opportunity to engage in a friendly two-way communication with one of the two partners. It was hypothesized that the subject would engage in more eye contact with the partner with which he engaged in the two-way friendly conversation than with the other partner. It was also hypothesized that the subject would avoid eye contact with both partners if he has low expectations of social approval and will engage in more visual contact with the individual providing the greatest visual cues of approval. The M-C SDS was used to measure the extent of the subjects' defensive behavior and low expectancy of social approval. The results supported the hypothesis that visual behavior is influenced by expectations of approval directed toward those providing greater visual cues of approval. A positive relationship was found between M-C SDS scorers and the amount of time the subjects looked at their partners. This study gave support to the defensiveness and low expectancy of approval interpretation of high M-C SDS scorers.
Buckhout (4) investigated the need-for-approval construct as a variable related to dyadic verbal behavior. Thirty-two male undergraduates were paired to form sixteen dyads. One member of each dyad served as a "communicator" while the other served as "receiver." The M-C SDS scores were used to obtain high and low scoring groups of communicators and high and low scoring groups of receivers. The "communicators" were instructed to persuade the "receivers" in a given manner and toward a given attitude. Following an interview a post experimental questionnaire was administered to each subject covering the issue of the experiment. The results showed that high M-C SDS scorers of the "receivers" showed greater attitude change. High M-C SDS scorers of the "communicators" showed greater conformity to the instructions given them prior to the experiment than low M-C SDS scorers.

Palmer and Altrocchi (27) conducted two experiments investigating the determinants of unconscious attribution of hostile intent. In the first experiment ninety-nine fraternity pledges of Duke University were administered the M-C SDS as a measure of repression of hostility. The subjects viewed a film concerned with the deliberation of a court jury, Twelve Angry Men. The film included segments of intense hostile verbal behavior. Following the movie each subject rated six characters in the movie on a ten-point scale from conscious to unconscious hostile intent.
In a second study sixty-five male students of Duke University were given the M-C SDS. Two groups were established with one group receiving information that the defendant in the movie was a college student, poor, and had no previous police record. The second group was informed that the defendant was a delinquent with a previous police record. The subjects rated the characters on the same ten-point scale as in the first experiment. In addition, the subjects were given the Repression-Sensitization and the Expressor Scale.

The results of the first experiment indicated that low M-C SDS scorers tend to attribute greater unconscious hostile intent into the characters behavior, whereas, in the second experiment the reverse was obtained. The results of the second experiment indicated that low Repression-Sensitization scorers, or repressors, which scored high on the M-C SDS, attributed hostile intent as unconscious where overt hostile behavior was exhibited by the characters. Differences in the findings between scores on the M-C SDS and attribution of unconscious hostile intent was explained as providing greater means of identification with the defendant due to college status.

Katkin (19) investigated the previous findings of Marlowe and Crowne (11) investigating the relationship between the M-C SDS and the subscales of the MMPI. Katkin's
investigation involved a considerably larger sample than that used by Marlowe and Crowne. Using two hundred students at Duke University, the experimenter administered the M-C SDS and a modified form of the MMPI which contained the three validity scales, the nine clinical scales, as well as items from the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale, and the Welsh Anxiety Scale. The results indicated significant negative correlations between the M-C SDS and the K, Pd, Pt, Sc, Ma, A-scale, and the MAS subscales, (p. < .001). The Hs subscale was also negatively significant at < .01 probability level, and the D subscale at < .05 probability level. Katkin interprets his results as due to the greater sample size, however, he does recognize that his sample consisted mostly of male subjects while Marlowe and Crowne's sample consisted of predominantly female subjects. The differences between the two studies are in the magnitudes of the correlations and population size.

Schill (32) used a sample of forty-two males and forty-two females to investigate the effects of approval motivation and reinforcement on incidental memory. Each subject completed the M-C SDS and judged the age of 80 photographed persons. Three groups were established: one group reinforced positively, one group negatively reinforced, and another group receiving no reinforcement of their judgments. The groups were again asked to estimate the ages of the
photographed persons. The results indicated that high need-
for-approval subjects demonstrated significantly greater
memory than did the low need-for-approval subjects. It was
also found that high scorers on the M-C SDS as compared with
low scorers performed better under the positive reinforcement
condition and produced less incidental memory under the
negative reinforcement situation.

Buckhout (5) administered the M-C SDS to three hundred
female undergraduates. Fifty-four females were selected for
the study due to their protelevision attitude. Among forty-
four cards, containing statements about television programing,
twenty-eight antitelevision statements were included. During
an interview each subject was given a forced-choice scale
requiring them to publically commit themselves to incon-
sistent attitudes. Reinforcement was manipulated within the
three established groups regarding their choice of pro- or
antitelevision statements. The results significantly
supported the hypothesis that high need-for-approval subjects
as measured by the M-C SDS would show greater attitude change
and conformity behavior when verbally reinforced than low
need-for-approval subjects.

Thaw and Efran (34) administered the M-C SDS and a
sociometric measure of social defensiveness to forty-three
male undergraduate students. After a three week interval
each subject engaged in a dart throwing game standing as
close as they desired from the target. However, the score received was determined by multiplying the points received on the target by the distance from the target. Goal-setting rigidity was determined by the variance of distance selected on each of fifteen trials. It was hypothesized that high scorers on the M-C SDS would be rated as more defensive on a sociometric measure of defensiveness, and would be more rigid in their goal-setting behavior than low scorers on the M-C SDS. Significant correlations were found between scores on the M-C SDS and measures of defensiveness. High scorers on the M-C SDS tend to stand significantly closer to the target and had less variability of rigidity scores. This study provided support for the finding that high M-C SDS scorers are described as more socially defensive by their peers, are more rigid in goal-setting behavior, and try to maximize opportunities for successful behavior as compared to low M-C SDS scorers.

Crowne and Liverant (10) investigated a proposition from Rotter's Social Learning Theory that conformity and defensiveness are related to low expectations of social success. One hundred ten students enrolled in an introductory psychology course were appointed to three different conditions. The conformity situation was an Asch perceptual discrimination task between the larger of two groups of dots. A confederate worked with each subject in an attempt to force
conformity. One group was allowed to bet upon the accuracy of his statements, in regard to the task, while another group scaled the certainty of their decision on a ten-point scale. A control group was used in which the purpose of the study was described to them as dealing with perceptual discrimination and speed. The M-C SDS, the Liverant and Scodel's I-E scale, and a problem situation calling for self-evaluation as measured by Rotter's Level of Aspiration Board were administered. The results indicated that conformers have lower expectations of success, lack greater confidence, and exhibit greater avoidant behavior as compared to nonconformers. It was also found that personal commitment increases the defensive behavior.

Liberty (22) investigated the similarities between perceptual defense and dissimulation, and consistent response styles. One hundred fifty male college students were administered the MMPI, Agreement Response Scale, the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, and a Forced Choice Social Desirability Scale. Evidence of social desirability and acquiescence were given greatest weight as indicators of perceptual defense and dissimulation respectively.

Fisher and Kramer (16) investigated the relationship between the M-C SDS and the Cattell Anxiety Scale. A sample of two hundred California psychiatric technician trainees were administered the two scales. Correlations between the
M-C SDS and the various measures from the Cattell Anxiety Scale were significant beyond the .01 probability level. The conclusion was that the M-C SDS may be adequately conceptualized as a defensive measure. Highly defensive subjects tend to have less variance on the Cattell Anxiety Scale than low defensive subjects as measured by the M-C SDS. It was also suggested that the Cattell Anxiety Scale was heavily loaded on social desirability factors.

Pervin (28) investigated social desirability and self-ideal self ratings with a sample of fifty male and fifty female undergraduates. It was hypothesized that subjects with high scores on the M-C SDS would rate themselves more positively and indicate fewer self-ideal self discrepancies on the semantic differential. It was also hypothesized that the above hypothesis would hold most for adjective scales loading on the evaluative factor, for scales rated as important, and for scales on which the subjects are uncertain of their ratings. The results significantly supported the first hypothesis on scales high on the evaluative dimension but not on scales of high potency and activity dimensions. High M-C SDS scorers were mostly related to low self-ideal, self discrepancies for high certainty and high importance ratings.

Newberry (26) administered the M-C SDS to twenty-nine male and thirty-one female introductory psychology students. Need for approval and expectancy of approval versus disapproval were manipulated under high and low consequent
conditions to determine their relationship to defensiveness. M-C SDS scores were trichotomized into high, medium, and low groups. Expectancy was manipulated by providing the subjects with either a positive or negative verbal reinforcement during an interview period. The experimenter served as a threatening authority figure to thirty subjects and as a student to the remaining thirty subjects as a means of manipulating high and low consequent conditions. It was hypothesized that defensiveness would be directly related to "need-for-approval" as measured by the M-C SDS which in turn would be directly related to the approval-disapproval and consequence conditions. The results indicated that subjects became more defensive only under the high consequence condition and "need-for-approval" was related to defensiveness only under expectancy of approval condition.

Dogmatism

Rokeach (31 p. 348) administered the Dogmatism Scale and thirty items from the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory to determine the relationship between dogmatism and anxiety. A sample of 1,025 subjects was used to investigate the hypothesis that the greater the cognitive closedness of the individual the greater would be the anxiety level. Positive correlations were found significantly relating high levels of anxiety to high levels of dogmatism.
Pilisuk (29) hypothesized that threats to the self tend to be met by cognitive constriction. The Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale, the Self-Ideal Index of Self-Acceptance, the Tolerance for Ambiguity Scale, and the Intellectual Non-Conformity Test were used to measure levels of anxiety, self-acceptance, and open-mindedness of one hundred four male fraternity students. A significant negative correlation indicated that high levels of anxiety were accompanied by low levels of self-acceptance, and a significant positive correlation indicated that high levels of self-acceptance were accompanied by greater tolerance for ambiguity. The tendency to reject threat and authoritarian defense scores was positively related to anxiety scores, while the opposite held for high self-acceptance scores.

Byrne, Blaylock, and Goldberg (7) administered the Repression-Sensitization, and an instrument combining the Dogmatism Scale and Opinionation Scale to five hundred seventy-six undergraduate students of psychology. The significant positive correlations between the two measures indicated that highly-dogmatic individuals tend to use such defensive modes as intellectualization and sensitization as opposed to repression and denial as compared to low-dogmatic individuals.

Adams and Vidulich (1) dichotomized thirty-six volunteers on the basis of their high and low scores on the Dogmatism
Scale to investigate the belief congruence in a paired associate learning task as related to closed- and open-mindedness. A memory drum, set at a two-second exposure interval, was used to present each subject with two paired-associate lists of words to memorize. Fifteen word pairs were presented on each list. One list contained belief-congruent word pairs while the other contained belief-incongruent word pairs. The results supported the hypotheses that both groups would learn the belief-congruent associations more easily, and that highly-dogmatic subjects would experience greater difficulty in learning the belief-incongruent associations relative to the belief-congruent associations. It was concluded that highly-dogmatic subjects are poorer learners as compared to low-dogmatic subjects regardless of the material.

Becher and Dileo (2) trichotomized the scores of two hundred sixteen introductory psychology students at Louisiana State University on Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale. It was hypothesized that low, medium, and high scorers would differ in the tendency to present a positive social and personal image. The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, and Worchel's Self Activity Inventory were used to measure the tendency to present a positive social image and a positive personal image respectively. Males and females compared in each group indicated that males presented a more positive personal image than females while females presented a more
positive social image than males. The results also indicated that low or open-minded subjects tend to present a more positive personal image as compared to a positive social image.

Fillenbaum (15) selected a sample of forty-seven female introductory psychology and sociology students at the University of North Carolina to study the relationship between dogmatism and dissonance reduction. The experimental group was subjected to an embarrassing initiation before being admitted to the various groups set up by the experimenter. The control group was allowed admittance into the group without being subjected to any embarrassment. The embarrassing initiation was defined as dissonance arousing when combined with the dull and unrewarding activities of the group. It was assumed that the initiation and dull activities would cause the individuals to value the group more, and therefore, have a greater tendency to reduce dissonance. Each subject was administered the Dogmatism Scale. The results indicated, by product-moment correlations, a significant relationship between high levels of dogmatism and greater tendency to reduce dissonance. The embarrassing initiation did not have significant effects since the control group showed similar significant results.

In an intensive study of 4,506 California college freshmen, Plant, Teleford, and Thomas (30) investigated
various personality differences between high- and low-dogmatic subjects. Each subject was given a psychological battery and the Dogmatism Scale. All male subjects were dichotomized into two groups on the basis of their high or low dogmatism score. The same procedure was followed with the female subjects. High- and low-dogmatic subjects were compared with various aspects of personality, values and interests, and scholastic-aptitude as measured by the psychological battery. The results indicated that low-dogmatic males and females scored significantly more positive and well adjusted than high-dogmatic males and females. The low-dogmatic subjects were characterized as more extraverted and enterprising, mature, calm, responsible, and more likely to succeed academically than high-dogmatic subjects. The high-dogmatic subjects were characterized as immature, impulsive, defensive, and experiencing greater cognitive constriction.

Strict and Fox (33) administered the Dogmatism Scale, the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale, and a geographical mobility questionnaire to ninety introductory psychology students at the University of Arizona. The hypotheses were confirmed that the subjects experiencing greater geographical mobility would be more dogmatic and anxious than subjects experiencing less geographical mobility. It was
also found that highly mobile subjects changed residence earlier in life than subjects of low mobility.

Klech and Wheaton (21) hypothesized that high-dogmatic scorers would prefer information consistent with their own opinions than would low-dogmatic scorers. They also hypothesized that high-dogmatic scorers would evaluate opinion-inconsistent information less favorably and would recall less opinion-inconsistent information. Seventy-two high school students were administered the Dogmatism Scale and a questionnaire on five issues. The subjects evaluated several articles, given them to read, some agreeing and some disagreeing with their own opinions. After a two-week interval the subjects were tested to determine the type and quantity of material remembered. The results supported the hypothesis that high-dogmatic scorers would show significantly less recall of opinion-inconsistent information with a tendency to evaluate consistent information in a more positive manner as compared to opinion-inconsistent information. However, high-dogmatic scorers did not show a greater preference for opinion-consistent information with the tendency to evaluate opinion-inconsistent information less favorably than low-dogmatic scorers.

Wohl and Hyman (35) investigated the relationship between anxiety, and cognitive constriction to defensive test taking behavior. Sixty-four college students were
administered the **Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale**, **IPAT Anxiety Scale**, **Emotional Constriction Scale**, Wohl's **Constriction Scale** and the **K** scale of the **Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory**. Significant positive correlations were found between the two anxiety scales and Wohl's **Constriction Scale** but not with the **Emotional Constriction Scale**. However, when the defensive scale (K) was held constant, insignificant correlations were found between all scales. It was concluded that test taking defensiveness was a factor in the significant relationship between anxiety and cognitive constriction, and that the **IPAT** and **Manifest Anxiety** scales were measuring different aspects of anxiety.

Zagona, and Zurcher (39) investigated the thirty highest and thirty lowest scorers on the **Dogmatism Scale** from five hundred seventeen elementary psychology students in a variety of classroom situations. The results significantly supported the hypotheses that high-dogmatic subjects would be more leader-oriented, prefer a more structured classroom situation, show signs of insecurity and indecision when challenged by authority figures, and spend less time in reaching group harmony than low-dogmatic subjects.

**Incongruency**

Byrne, Barry, and Nelson (6) administered the **Repression-Sensitization Scale** along with Worchel's **Self**
Activity Inventory to seventy-seven undergraduate students at the University of Texas. The purpose of the study was to investigate the relationship between self-ideal discrepancy and certain defensive modes of behavior. The results supported the hypothesis that subjects using repressive defense mechanisms would be less inclined to indicate negative self descriptions than subjects using sensitizing defensive mechanisms.

In another sample of one hundred fourteen introductory psychology students, the investigators administered the Repression-Sensitization Scale and the Hostility Incongruency Test. A significant relationship was found between total incongruency scores and sensitization. The results of these studies indicate that sensitizers as compared to repressors exhibit greater discrepancy between self and ideal concepts and report greater incongruence among feelings, values, and environmental consequences.

Lomont (23) investigated the Repression-Sensitization Scale and the IPAT Self-Analysis Form. Observation was made of the subjects' behavior while being presented sixty-six stimulus words. The purpose of the study was to investigate the relationship between defensive modes of behavior and anxiety. A significant correlation was found between the IPAT Self-Analysis Form and the sensitization dimension of the Repression-Sensitization Scale. The
behavior observed in response to the word list was used as another measure of anxiety. A significant negative correlation was found between behavioral reactions and the sensitization dimension. The results indicated that repressors are more threatened by the actual encounter of stimuli than sensitizers even though they appear more adjusted on most self-report instruments.

McReynolds (24) investigated the relationship between various measures of anxiety and the quantity of incongruent responses. Three studies were conducted to test the hypothesis that anxiety was a positive function of the level of perceptual incongruency. Each subject was given fifty-six cards, each containing a statement, to be placed into any of the sixteen slots in a box. The sixteen slots allowed the subject to indicate any combination of two dimensions: like, dislike, both, indifferent, and good, bad, both, neither. A response of like-bad or dislike-good combination received a maximum incongruency score, while a like-good or dislike-bad combination received a minimum incongruency score. The incongruency scores ranged from a possible zero to five for each card.

In the first study, twenty male psychiatric patients were used as subjects. The interviewer rated each subject on an eight-point anxiety scale and each subject rated himself as to the degree of his present anxiety, the degree
of "generally today" anxiety, and a comparison between the degree of present feelings of anxiety and past feelings of anxiety. Correlations were in the predicted direction with the "generally today" and comparison ratings significantly related to incongruity level.

In the second study, seventy undergraduate college students were given the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale, an Evaluations Form, and self-ratings as in the first study. The sample had to be reduced to only twenty-eight subjects due to difficulties in comprehending the directions. However, the results indicated all coefficients significant at the .01 probability level.

Forty-six psychiatric male patients were used as subjects in the third study. Each patient was administered the same material as in the second study. The results failed to support the major hypothesis, but significant differences were found between the subjects in study two and the psychiatric patients. McReynolds concludes that, viewed in their totality, the findings support the hypothesis that anxiety is a positive function of the level of perceptual incongruence.

McReynolds and Bryan (25) investigated the assumed relationship between quantity of unassimilated percepts and inhibition of novelty seeking. Thirty-six neuropsychiatric patients at the Palo Alto V.A. Hospital were used in this
study. The level of unassimilated percepts was manipulated by exposing each of one hundred geometrical cards, each containing a design to the subject on two separate occasions. It was assumed that by not allowing the subject to complete the task would result in unassimilated percepts. Therefore, on the second exposure of the one hundred cards the examiner did not allow the subject to complete the learning task of the designs. Novelty seeking was measured by involving the subject in a categorizing game. Triangular pieces of paper containing familiar written names of objects and jigsaw pieces containing unusual novel objects were given the subject to categorize as to whether they were animal, mineral, or vegetable. Two groups were studied who differed significantly in their level of unassimilated material. The hypothesis was confirmed that the greater the level of unassimilated material the less jigsaw pieces the subject chose as a measure of novelty seeking behavior.

Haywood (17) investigated the above hypothesis, with the same procedure, to see if the same results could be obtained with a nonhospitalized population. Sixty subjects enrolled in an introductory psychology course at the University of Illinois were selected. The anxiety hypothesis of unassimilated material was also investigated. A palmer-sweat apparatus was used to measure the anxiety level. The results found a significant relationship between
the level of unassimilated percepts and anxiety level as measured by the palmer-sweat apparatus. However, the results did not support the novelty-seeking-inhibition hypothesis previously supported by McReynolds and Bryan (25). It was concluded that unassimilation of percepts inhibited novelty seeking behavior only in more deviant populations. The college population, evidently feels less threat by new and novel stimuli than less adjusted populations.

Byrne, Terrill, and McReynolds (8) selected thirty-three male neuropsychiatric patients and administered an incongruency scale, a humor appreciation test and a humor interpretation test to each subject. An incongruency level was obtained by the subject responding to sixty statements dealing with hostility, sex, and neutral or buffer items. Each subject checked the list of items according to their preference as to whether the items were "liked" or "disliked" and whether the same items were "good" or "bad". The subjects responded to sixty-four cartoons by sorting them into four piles on a four-point continuum from "most funny" to "least funny". The subjects then sorted the cartoons into "hostility", "sexual", "making fun of", and "nonsense" categories. The results indicated no relationship between the measured level of incongruency and human area preference; however, subjects significantly avoided percepts
in areas of marked incongruence. Incongruence in the area of hostility was inversely related to the perceptual accuracy of hostile cartoons. Also, incongruence in the area of sex was inversely related to identifying sexual cartoons.

In summary, social desirability as measured by Marlowe and Crowne's scale has been characterized by a need for approval (3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 12, 27, 32) as related to attitude change, conformity, expectancies, willingness for group participation, and incidental memory. As a measure of defensiveness, high scorers have been differentiated from low scorers in a variety of self-evaluative situations (3, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 20, 22, 26). Anxiety, sex differences, and low self-ideal ratings have been found to differ from high and low M-C SDS scorers. It has also been found that psychopathology and rigidity in goal-setting behavior are related to the high scores on the M-C SDS.

Dogmatism has been found to be related to defensive behavior (2, 7, 35), anxiety (31, 33), self-acceptance (29) and intollerance for inconsistencies (1, 15, 21, 39). Dogmatic individuals have also been found to differ from non-dogmatic individuals on a variety of measurable personality variables (30).

Incongruency has been characterized by a relationship to anxiety (17, 23, 24) and certain defensive modes of
responding (6). It has also been found to be related to novelty seeking activities (17, 25) and inversely related to accuracy of perception and identification (8).
CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY


CHAPTER III

METHOD

Subjects

Ninety-eight subjects were selected from three introductory psychology classes at North Texas State University. The subjects were not selected according to a prescribed sampling plan but rather according to their availability for research at the time data were collected. The sample included ten freshmen, forty-three sophomores, twenty-five juniors, and twenty seniors. There were fifty-three males and forty-five females with chronological ages ranging from eighteen to thirty-two. There was no specific field of study common to all subjects. Each subject completed a battery of three self-rating measures as described below.

Description of Measures

The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale

Crowne and Marlowe (5) consider the research on response bias characteristic of two major forms of weakness. First, the endorsement of socially desirable content indicates nothing of an individual's personality characteristics. The second weakness is the neglect of the goals
and expectations of the individual regarding the testing situation.

Crowne and Marlowe (5) consider the Edwards Social Desirability Scale (E-SDS) responsible for much if not most of the enthusiasm concerning social desirability response investigation. However, the abnormal or pathological characteristics of the items in the E-SDS are considered, by Marlowe and Crowne, as questionable content for a social desirability scale. That is, a socially desirable response to a "pathological" item may not reflect a response-set but rather a response based on a true "fact".

As a result of the above considerations Marlowe and Crowne devised the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (M-C SDS). The M-C SDS consists of thirty-three statements considered culturally approved "...yet untrue of virtually all people, and with minimal pathological or abnormal implications" (5, p. 22). The theoretical assumptions of the scale have been modified since its original construction. Marlowe and Crowne first assumed the M-C SDS to measure "approval-dependence" and found some empirical support for their construct. However, after extensive investigation Marlowe and Crowne proposed that the M-C SDS was measuring "...a less frankly aware defensive kind of self-deception" (5, p. 190).
Crowne and Marlowe (6) selected fifty items and submitted them to ten judges. The judges rated each item on a social desirability continuum according to whether the item was responded to as true or false. Thirty-six items received a unanimous agreement from all judges, and eleven items received 90 per cent agreement from all judges. This resulted in a preliminary form of forty-seven items adequately meeting the criteria of being relatively untrue of most people and with minimal pathological implications.

As an attempt to demonstrate the success in meeting the item criteria, Marlowe and Crowne administered the M-C SDS along with the E-SDS to ten judges. Each judge rated each item along a continuum of a five-point scale from extremely adjusted to extremely maladjusted. The results indicated a 3.9 mean rating for the E-SDS and a mean rating of 2.8 for the M-C SDS. The results were significantly different at the .0001 probability level. The mean of the M-C SDS indicated that the items of the scale were relatively absent of pathological characteristics.

The M-C SDS was further subjected to an item analysis to determine those items which could discriminate better between high and low total scores. Thirty-three items were retained in the final form of the scale, as presented in Appendix I. Eighteen items were keyed true while the remaining fifteen are keyed false. The true and false
items are randomly dispersed throughout the scale thereby making an acquiescence response set highly improbable.

Each item receives one point when the subject's response matches the true or false keys. The lowest possible raw score is zero while the highest possible raw score is thirty-three. The raw scores are then converted, by a table of norms (5, p. 210), into standard scores. The standard scores contain a mean of fifty and a standard deviation of ten.

The normative data were obtained from a number of college samples, and various other samples. This provided a normative sample of 1,418 subjects. The males (N=666) obtained a mean of 15.06 with a standard deviation of 5.58 and the females (N=752) obtained a mean of 16.82 with a 5.50 standard deviation.

Reliability of the M-C SDS was obtained through a test-retest and an internal consistency method. The Kuder-Richardson, formula 20, indicated a .88 internal consistency coefficient. A test-retest reliability, with a four week interval, resulted in a .88 coefficient of correlation.

Additional comparison with the E-SDS scale provided additional evidence for the M-C SDS as a better measure of social desirability as defined in terms of "... the need of subjects to respond in culturally sanctioned ways,"
Thirty-nine students from an abnormal psychology class were administered the E-SDS, the M-C SDS, and the MMPI. The M-C SDS correlated lower on all seventeen MMPI subscales than the E-SDS. The lower correlations were interpreted as supporting the M-C SDS as a better measure of social desirability.

Goldfried (8) investigated the cross-validation of the M-C SDS, as well as the possibility of the importance of sex differences on the scale. Two hundred eighteen undergraduate students (one hundred eight males and one hundred ten females) were administered the M-C SDS under three different types of instructions. One group received the standard instructions, another group was instructed to respond to each item according to whether it was more socially desirable than undesirable, while the third group was instructed to respond according to a person with a strong need for social approval. An item analysis indicated that seventeen of the items for the males and fifteen items for the females discriminated significantly at the .05 level between the sexes. A t-test significantly (<.001 level) differentiated between the three groups on the total score obtained with all thirty-three items. A lack of consistency between the social approval group and the social-desirability group was interpreted as leaving some doubt "... that they reflect the same phenomenon," (8, p. 145).
The results that the items do not hold up well on cross-validation is attributed to Marlowe and Crowne's use of an insufficient number of judges in the original development of the scale.

Fisher (7) obtained similar results as Goldfried (8) with a sample of six hundred fifty Peace Corps volunteers. Goldfried's (8) cross-validation items (CV) were compared with the standard M-C SDS form with regard to male and female subjects. The correlation between the CV items and the standard M-C SDS items indicated a .93 for males and .92 for females. The obtained mean for the CV form was significantly higher than those obtained by Goldfried (8). Contrary to Marlowe and Crowne's findings, males had a higher score than females but the females were similar in both studies. The results of Goldfried's (8) and Fisher's (7) investigations may indicate the scales' sensitivity to subcultural differences.

Christie and Lindauer (4), upon an extensive review of the literature on social desirability and tendency to agree, find adequate support for the psychological meaning of social desirability. They state:

In summing up, it is clear that the Crowne & Marlowe SDS is getting a meaningful behavioral dimension. The relative lack of reported correlation between behavioral indices and the Edwards SDS may be due to the fact that Edwards originally thought of it as a measure of the attempt to "look good" on other personality scales and has not
encouraged its use as a measure of a personality variable (4, p. 207).

They go on to point out that the E-SDS sorts people less efficiently than the M-C SDS.

Marlowe and Crowne (5) have found that high scorers on the M-C SDS are characterized by greater conforming behavior, cautiousness, and persuasibility. However, their behavior, although appearing "well adjusted", is characterized by an avoidance of situations stimulating anticipated threats to a vulnerable self-esteem. Therefore, the behavior of high scorers appears to be more normatively anchored than low scorers as an attempt at defending a vulnerable self-esteem.

Heilbrun (9) states:

Marlowe and Crowne and their associates have provided rather convincing evidence that high and low SD test performers do show differential sensitivity to social approval in a wide array of experimental tasks (9, p. 381).

The Rokeach Dogmatism Scale

An extensive refinement of the Dogmatism Scale by Rokeach has resulted in a forty-item scale embracing general authoritarianism and general intolerance irrespective of the specific ideological content. Each item in the scale deals with some particular aspect of the open-closed mind theory. Rokeach delineates those aspects of the theory which correspond to the test items as:
1. Emphasis on differences between the belief and disbelief systems.

2, 3. Simultaneous presence of contradictions within the belief system.

4. Relative amount of knowledge possessed.

5-8. Beliefs with respect to the isolation, and helplessness of man.


15-17. Self-aggrandizement, as a defensive mode.


27-33. Intolerance of those with different beliefs.

34, 35. Making a party-line change.

36. Selective avoidance of incongruencies with one's beliefs or disbeliefs.

37. Attitude regarding the past, present, and future.

38-40. Knowing the future (10, p. 73-80).

Each subject responded to each statement on the Dogmatism Scale, as presented in Appendix II, by indicating degrees of agreement or disagreement. This was accomplished by indicating a +1, +2, or +3 to represent "little", "on the whole", and "very much" agreement, respectively. Various degrees of disagreement were similarly indicated by a -1, -2, or -3 response. As an attempt to eliminate
the positive and negative signs from each response a constant of four was added to each item thereby converting the responses to a seven-point scale. This conversion provided the possibility of obtaining an extreme score of forty as indicating extreme open-mindedness or a score of two hundred eighty as indicating extreme closed-mindedness. It was also possible to obtain a theoretical neutral position between the open- and closed-mind extremes with one hundred forty points.

In developing the Dogmatism Scale, Rokeach began with sixty-six items, but through five subsequent editions selected the forty items, as presented in Appendix II, as the final scale. Each new revision was accompanied by modifications in the theoretical assumptions relative to the open-closed belief continuum.

In terms of reliability, Rokeach obtained an odd-even coefficient of .70 from a sample of two hundred two introductory psychology students at Michigan State University. An odd-even reliability coefficient of .91 was obtained from a sample of one hundred thirty-seven English college students. Rokeach states, "These reliabilities are considered to be quite satisfactory, especially when we remember that the Dogmatism Scale contains quite a strange collection of items that cover a lot of territory and appear on the surface to be unrelated to each other" (10, p. 90).
Zagona and Zurcher (11) administered the Dogmatism Scale on two separate occasions, to five hundred seventeen elementary psychology students. A fifteen week test-retest interval between the two administrations of the test resulted in a .697 reliability coefficient. Also, test-retest reliability coefficients ranging from .186 to .506 were found for high, medium, and low-dogmatic subjects. They also observed the thirty highest and thirty lowest scorers throughout an entire semester. The high-dogmatic subjects were characterized as uncreative, constricted, leader oriented, preferred structured to unstructured topics, and wavered in conviction when challenged by an authority figure. The low-dogmatic subjects were characterized as being more secure, creative, and less concerned about structured topics.

In summary, the Dogmatism Scale appears to be a reliable measure in differentiating low from high-dogmatic subjects. It also appears to be quite capable of differentiating or sorting individuals on various personality variables.

The Hostility Incongruency Test

The Hostility Incongruency Test is a modified version of an incongruency measure developed by Byrne, Terrell, and McReynolds (3). They developed a sixty item scale which
contained twenty hostile items, twenty-six items, and
twenty buffer items. Various degrees of hostile behavior
were depicted by the twenty hostile statements, and various
degrees of sexual behavior were depicted by the twenty sex
statements. Each subject considered each statement on the
sixty dittoed list according to whether he "Mainly Liked",
"Mainly Disliked", "Both Liked and Disliked", or "Neither
Liked or Disliked" the activities depicted. Following the
completion of this task the subjects were then instructed
to consider each statement according to whether the ac-
tivities were "Mainly Bad", "Mainly Good", "Both Good and
Bad", or "Neither Good nor Bad". For each item, incon-
gruent responses (Mainly Like-Mainly Bad) were scored four
points, while congruent responses (Mainly Like-Mainly Good)
received no points. This procedure provided each subject
with two incongruency scores: sexual and hostile.

In investigating the relationship between incongruency
and responses to humor, Byrne, Terrell, and McReynolds (3)
administered their incongruency scale and sixty-four
cartoons to thirty-three male neuropsychiatric patients.
Each subject was instructed to rate the cartoons according
to four degrees of "Most Funny" to "Least Funny". Sixteen
cartoons were the maximum allowed for any of the four
categories. Each of the cartoons had been previously rated,
by five judges, into hostile, sex, ridicule, and nonsense
areas. Each subject indicated a humor preference area in rating the cartoons on the "funny" continuum.

Product moment correlations provided significant results indicating that subjects with high levels of hostile incongruence were least accurate in perceiving hostile cartoons as hostile than those with lower levels of hostile incongruence. It was also found that subjects with marked sex incongruent scores were less accurate in identifying sexual cartoons than those with less sexual incongruities.

The _Hostility Incongruency Test_, as presented in Appendix III, consists of fifty items, randomly distributed under three different types of instructions. Each item of the test depicts emotionally toned behavior of varying degrees of hostility. The subjects first consider their feelings with regard to each item as to whether it would be fun or unpleasant, enjoyable or not enjoyable by indicating whether they would "Mostly Like" or "Mostly Dislike" carrying out each activity. Second, each subject was instructed to consider value judgments of moral or immoral, right or wrong evaluations of each item by indicating whether it was "Mostly Good" or "Mostly Bad". Finally, each subject considered the subsequent pleasure or distress, reward or punishment resulting from carrying out such activities by indicating whether it would result in "Mostly Pleasant" or "Mostly Unpleasant Consequences". Thus, incongruence
could be obtained between feelings and values, values and consequences, and feelings and consequences.

Each incongruent response received one point, while congruent responses were not given scoring consideration. This provided three total incongruity scores for each of the three types of incongruence. It was also possible to obtain a total Hostility Incongruency Test score by combining all three types of incongruities.

In terms of reliability, Byrne, Barry, and Nelson (2) found split-half coefficients for the three basic scores of incongruency. They obtained coefficients of .92 for feelings (Like-Dislike), .84 for values (Good-Bad), and .85 for consequences (Pleasant-Unpleasant).

The Hostility Incongruency Test and the Repression-Sensitization Scale were administered to one hundred fourteen students. The results indicated that the total incongruent scores of each incongruent area was positively related to scores on the Repression-Sensitization Scale. It was concluded that "sensitizers", on measures of self-description, tend to admit that they enjoy behavior which they consider morally wrong, and which are likely to have unpleasant consequences for them. The possibility was raised that "...psychodiagnostic instruments which rely on self-ratings may tend to identify maladjustment,"
conflict, or dissonance only in individuals who respond to stress with sensitizing mechanisms" (3, pp. 332-333).

In summary, the Hostility Incongruency Test appears to have adequate reliability. High incongruent scorers appear to be differentiated from low incongruent scorers in regard to certain defensive modes of responding significantly related to anxiety, and accuracy of perceiving and identifying stimuli relative to areas of incongruence.

Procedure

The three scales, as described above, were administered to three elementary psychology classes at North Texas State University in the Fall semester of 1969. The three scales were combined into a single booklet for administrative convenience. Within each booklet, the various tests were randomly arranged as a precautionary measure against possible order effects. These arrangements were selected at random from a total of six possible sequence arrangements.

The administrator was introduced to the respective classes by each class instructor. The examiner explained that the purpose of the battery was to collect data for a research project. It was also explained that the scales were not timed, and the instructions were printed on each test. Upon completion of all three scales the subjects were allowed to leave the room. It was also explained to
each class that the results would in no way affect their grades. All three tests were completed by all subjects.

Each test was scored by the examiner and re-checked as a precaution against possible scoring errors. The scores of each subject were punched on individual IBM cards and mechanically checked as a precautionary measure against possible errors. The data were presented to the North Texas State University computer center for statistical computation.

The data were dichotomized into high and low scores with respect to the hypothesis investigated. Since the hypotheses dealt with only two groups, a $t$-test was considered sufficient to investigate the relationships. In an attempt to determine the magnitude of the relationships between the three scales simple correlations were computed. The critical value necessary to support each hypothesis was set at the five per cent probability level.
CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY


CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

The three principle hypotheses with which the present investigation was concerned will be repeated for purposes of clarity. Each hypothesis will be followed by a presentation of the relevant results. Although the major statistical procedure employed to test the tenability of the three hypotheses was a t-test, supplementary correlations were computed. The t-test results and relevance to each hypothesis are presented first.

The first step involved in the statistical treatment was to divide the social desirability score distribution of all subjects (N=98) into high and low segments. This was accomplished by obtaining the median of the distribution and using the scores on each side of this point to represent the two groups to be investigated. The high-social-desirability group (H-SDS) included all scores (N=49) of eighty and above. Similarly, the low-social-desirability group (L-SDS) included all scores (N=49) of seventy-nine and below. Thus, this truncation procedure yielded two groups: a high-social-desirability group and a low-social-desirability group.
A direct test of Hypothesis I was made by subjecting the total incongruency means of the H-SDS and L-SDS to a t-test analysis. The sub-scales of the HIT will also be presented.

Hypothesis I: Subjects with high social desirability scores will have significantly lower levels of incongruency than will subjects with low social desirability scores. The incongruency means, standard deviations, and t values, relative to Hypothesis I, are presented in Table I. It can be observed that the incongruency means of the H-SDS group are lower than the incongruency means of the L-SDS group.

TABLE I

MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND t-VALUES OF THE INCONGRUENCY SCORES FOR THE SOCIAL DESIRABILITY GROUPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scales</th>
<th>L-SDS (N=49)</th>
<th>H-SDS (N=49)</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feelings Values</td>
<td>11.90</td>
<td>5.74</td>
<td>7.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values Consequences</td>
<td>7.20</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>6.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feelings Consequences</td>
<td>12.35</td>
<td>5.51</td>
<td>8.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Incongruency</td>
<td>31.96</td>
<td>11.71</td>
<td>22.92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*P < .01.
As indicated in Table I, the groups were significantly different on all scales except the Values versus Consequences subscale of the HIT. However, the obtained $t$ value of 3.23 (Total Incongruency) was significant beyond the five per cent probability level as the critical value. Therefore, since Hypothesis I was concerned with only the Total Incongruency values of the H-SDS and L-SDS groups, the hypothesis was accepted.

Pearson product moment correlations were computed between the social desirability scores and incongruency scores as may be seen in Table II. The coefficients were significantly different from zero beyond the one per cent probability level.

**TABLE II**

**CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SCORES ON THE MARLOWE-CROWNE SOCIAL DESIRABILITY SCALE AND SCORES ON THE HOSTILITY INCONGRUENCY TEST**

(N=98)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>$r$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Desirability and Feelings Values</td>
<td>-.521*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Desirability and Values Consequences</td>
<td>-.396*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Desirability and Feelings Consequences</td>
<td>-.527*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Desirability and Total Incongruency.</td>
<td>-.564*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*P < .01.
Hypothesis II was concerned with the relationship between dogmatism and incongruency. Hypothesis II stated: Subjects with high dogmatism scores would obtain significantly higher levels of incongruency than subjects with low dogmatism scores. A \( t \)-test and Pearson's product moment coefficient of correlation were computed to test this hypothesis.

The first step in investigating Hypothesis II was to divide the dogmatism score distribution of all subjects (\( N=98 \)) into a high-dogmatic group (HD) and a low-dogmatic group (LD). The median (149.5) of the distribution was used to obtain the two groups to be investigated. The high-dogmatic group (\( N=49 \)) included all scores of one hundred fifty and above. Similarly, the low-dogmatic group (\( N=49 \)) included all scores of one hundred forty-nine and below. Thus, two groups were obtained: a high-dogmatic group and a low-dogmatic group.

Presented in Table III are the incongruency means, standard deviations, and \( t \) values of the HD and LD groups. As can be seen by inspection of the data, the high-dogmatic group obtained the highest means on all the incongruency scales. The \( t \) values on Total Incongruency and the incongruency subscales were statistically significant using the five per cent probability level as the critical value.
Thus, on the basis of the significant \( t \) value (2.80), Hypothesis II was accepted.

### TABLE III

**MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND \( t \)-VALUES OF THE INCONGRUENCY SCORES FOR THE HIGH AND LOW DOGMATISM GROUPS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scales</th>
<th>High Dogmatism (N=49)</th>
<th>Low Dogmatism (N=49)</th>
<th>( t )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( M )</td>
<td>( SD )</td>
<td>( M )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feelings Values</td>
<td>11.90</td>
<td>5.74</td>
<td>7.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values Consequences</td>
<td>7.20</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>6.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feelings Consequences</td>
<td>12.35</td>
<td>5.51</td>
<td>8.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Incongruency</td>
<td>31.96</td>
<td>11.71</td>
<td>22.92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*\( P < .01 \).*  
**\( P < .02 \).**

Pearson product moment coefficients of correlation were computed between the Hostility Incongruency Test scores and scores on the Dogmatism Scale. A summary of the results is presented in Table IV. The obtained coefficients between dogmatism scores and incongruency scores were statistically different from zero beyond the one per cent level.
TABLE IV

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SCORES ON THE DOGMATISM SCALE AND SCORES ON THE HOSTILITY INCONGRUENCY TEST (N=98)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>r</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dogmatism and Feelings Values</td>
<td>.395*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dogmatism and Values Consequences</td>
<td>.387*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dogmatism and Feelings Consequences</td>
<td>.391*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dogmatism and Total Incongruency</td>
<td>.456*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*P < .01.

Hypothesis III stated that subjects with high social desirability scores would have significantly higher levels of dogmatism than subjects with low social desirability scores. A *t*-test analysis was made between the dogmatism means of the H-SDS and L-SDS groups.

Presented in Table V are the dogmatism means, standard deviations, and *t*-test values of the H-SDS and L-SDS groups. An observation of Table V indicates a relatively small difference between the high and low social desirability groups on the Dogmatism Scale. The obtained difference was not statistically significant at the five per cent probability level as the critical value. Thus, Hypothesis III was not accepted.
TABLE V
MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND t-VALUES OF THE DOGMATISM SCORES FOR THE SOCIAL DESIRABILITY GROUPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>L-SDS (N=49)</th>
<th>H-SDS (N=49)</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dogmatism</td>
<td>149.00</td>
<td>27.37</td>
<td>143.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The relationship between scores on the Dogmatism Scale and scores on the M-C SDS were also investigated by the Pearson product moment coefficient of correlation. The coefficient of correlation ($r = -.174$) was not statistically significant at the five per cent probability level.

Hypotheses I and II were accepted on the basis of the t-test results and at moderate magnitudes as indicated by the coefficients of correlations. That is, a significant negative relationship exist between social desirability and incongruency, and significant positive relationship exists between incongruency and dogmatism. However, no significant relationship was found between social desirability and dogmatism, as anticipated by Hypothesis III.
CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY


CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

The present investigation proposed that the constructs underlying dogmatism and social desirability could provide understanding of some characteristics relative to the cognitive congruent-incongruent continuum. Cognitive congruency, characterized by a relative ease in assimilating percepts, may be a function of the degree to which an individual needs to protect a vulnerable self-esteem by seeking approval from others. Also, cognitive congruency, characterized by a relative difficulty in assimilating percepts, may be a function of the degree to which the dogmatic individual's cognitive system is characterized by isolation between its parts.

The hypothesized association between these concepts was investigated. A negative relationship between social desirability and incongruency was expected. As stated in Hypothesis I and reflected by mean differences, a moderate negative coefficient of correlation ($r = -0.564$) between total incongruency and social desirability was found which reached a statistically significant level ($p < .01$). This supported the theory of Crowne and Marlowe (3) regarding the
social desirability scale (M-C SDS) and McReynold's (7) and Byrne's hypothesis underlying measures of incongruency (HIT). That is, approval dependence, characterized by the need to protect a vulnerable self-esteem, is related to the ease in assimilating percepts.

Approval-dependent individuals, in situations of self-evaluation, such as a testing situation, present themselves in a favorable manner consistent with their approval dependence. It is not consistent for one who is dependent upon the approval of others to indicate inconsistencies between one's feelings, values and consequences. For if one is to be well thought of, he had better be consistent and not say things he does not mean. Therefore, approval-dependent individuals tend to adopt certain styles of behavior that maximize acceptance and minimize rejection by others. One such prevailing style of behavior appears to have less difficulty in assimilating percepts which results in greater cognitive consistency. Therefore, approval-dependent individuals may be defending a vulnerable self-esteem against inconsistencies that could possibly bring disapproval from others.

Another aspect of the present study was concerned with the relationship between dogmatism and incongruence. A moderate positive coefficient of correlation (r = .456) was found between total incongruency and scores on the
Dogmatism Scale. This finding indicated a relationship between the assumptions underlying cognitive incongruency as measured by the HIT and closed-mindedness as measured by the Dogmatism Scale.

A positive relationship between scores on the HIT and Dogmatism Scale was anticipated as a result of cognitive isolation between the parts of the belief-disbelief system, characteristic of the closed-minded individual. Dogmatism, as defined by Rokeach (10) is characterized by the presence of contradictory beliefs existing within the isolated cognitive system. This may explain the relative difficulty closed-minded individuals have in assimilating percepts.

Rokeach also suggests that cognitive isolation may be a defensive measure used to allay anxiety. Thus, the function of the closed cognitive system may be to reduce awareness of the contradictory beliefs existing within the cognitive system. This does not however, reduce the level of incongruency within the cognitive system. It seems plausible that the dogmatic individual maintains congruence between new perceptual data and existing perceptual systems through avoidance of new perceptual data which tend to increase anxiety rather than reducing the level of existing incongruency.

From the above results the congruent-incongruent continuum appears to be associated with the degree to which
an individual is approval-dependent or closed-minded. Also, approval-dependent individuals appear to have less difficulty assimilating percepts than dogmatic individuals.

However, another possible explanation for the relationship of incongruency to social desirability and dogmatism may be due to the effects of anxiety. McReynolds (7) felt that anxiety was a positive function of the level of perceptual incongruency and found (8) a positive relationship between the level of incongruency and the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale. Similarly, Rokeach (10) found a significant positive relationship between measures of anxiety and scores on the Dogmatism Scale and suggested that anxiety and dogmatism merge as a single factor. Strict and Fox (11) also found a positive relationship between dogmatism scores and scores on the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale. However, the M-C SDS has been found by several investigators to be negatively related to self-report measures heavily loaded on anxiety. Fisher and Kramer (5) found the Cattell Anxiety Scale and the M-C SDS negatively related beyond the one per cent probability level. Similarly, Katkin (6) found a significant negative relationship between the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale, the Welsh Anxiety Scale, and the M-C SDS. Therefore, since the HIT and Dogmatism Scale appear to be highly loaded on anxiety; this common factor may explain the positive relationship found in the present
study. That is, those individuals who score high on the HIT and Dogmatism Scale, as compared to those who score low, may have greater anxiety. Also, the negative relationship between anxiety and social desirability may be the result of the negative relationship between the M-C SDS and HIT. Therefore, individuals who score high on the M-C SDS and low on the HIT may have less anxiety as compared to those with low M-C SDS scores and high HIT scores.

Another possible explanation for the relationship of incongruency to social desirability and dogmatism may be the result of certain types of defensive behavior. Thus, certain defensive modes of responding should influence the subject's readiness to perceive and/or to indicate relevant material on self-report measures. Byrne, Blaylock, and Goldberg (2) found dogmatic subjects indicating sensitizing modes of defensive behavior as measured by the Repression-Sensitization Scale. Byrne, Barry, and Nelson (1) found similar results between the HIT and the Repression-Sensitization Scale. These investigators have interpreted sensitizing modes of defensive responding as the tendency to overemphasize and admit to failings. Sensitizers attempt to reduce levels of anxiety through approach or control of the stimulus by intellectualization, obsessive-compulsive behavior, and ruminative worrying. However, approval-dependent individuals appear to be reluctant to admit their
failings. Feder (4), and Palmer and Altrochi (9) found high scoring M-C SDS subjects indicating repressive defenses as measured by the Repression-Sensitization Scale. These investigators conclude that approval-dependent subjects tend to deny that anything is wrong with them and attempt to reduce levels of anxiety through avoidance of the stimulus and its consequences. Therefore, subjects who score high on the HIT and Dogmatism Scale tend to use similar defensive modes of responding, namely sensitization. This common factor may be an important variable influencing the positive relationship found in the present study since individuals with high levels of incongruency and high levels of dogmatism tend to admit their failings and respond more openly on self-report measures as compared to individuals with low incongruency and dogmatism scores. The negative relationship between the HIT and M-C SDS may also be the result of different defensive modes of responding. That is individuals with high levels of incongruency tend to be more open and admit their failings as compared to individuals with low levels of incongruency. On the other hand, approval-dependent individuals tend to deny that anything is wrong with them and respond less openly on self-report measures than individuals less approval-dependent. Therefore, it seems possible that the incongruent and approval-dependent individuals would approach the testing situation with
different defensive modes of responding that may explain the negative relationship found in the present study.

With regard to social desirability and dogmatism it was expected that the scores would be positively related as stated in Hypothesis III. These results, as reflected by mean differences, were not confirmed. The low negative coefficient of correlation ($r = -.174$) was not statistically significant.

The predicted relationship between scores on the M-C SDS and the Dogmatism Scale may be due to faulty theorizing. Thus, the high scoring M-C SDS individual is no more likely to have a closed belief system than an open belief system. Nor are all approval-dependent individuals, as proposed by the present study, prone to share the admiration or glorification of those in positions of positive authority characteristic of the dogmatic individual. It, therefore, appears that the M-C SDS and Dogmatism Scale are measuring characteristics of the cognitive congruent-incongruent continuum not common to either scale.

In summary, individuals who score on the congruent end of the congruent-incongruent continuum may be characterized as high need-for-approval individuals who tend to experience less difficulty in assimilating percepts. However, the effects of anxiety and defensive modes of behavior may provide another explanation for the negative
relationship between the HIT and M-C SDS scores. Thus, approval-dependent individuals may be denying incongruities as a means of defending against anxiety aroused by anticipations of "looking bad" on self-report measures.

Individuals who score on the incongruent end of the congruent-incongruent continuum may be characterized by high dogmatic individuals who tend to have difficulty assimilating percepts. However, the influence of anxiety and similar defensive modes of responding may account for the positive relationship between dogmatism and incongruency.

Thus, the congruent-incongruent continuum appears to be associated with the degree of approval-dependence and degree of closed-mindedness characteristics of the individual. Also, approval-dependent and dogmatic individuals differ with respect to the ease or difficulty in assimilating percepts. However, the results of the present study may be contaminated by the possible influence of anxiety and certain defensive modes of responding.

The relationship between scores on the M-C SDS and Dogmatism Scale was also investigated. However, the results were not significant and the hypothesized relationship was attributed to faulty theorizing.
CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY


CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The present investigation was concerned with the relationship between the assumptions underlying the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale, McReynold's assumptions of incongruency and Byrne's Hostility Incongruency Test, and the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale. It was proposed that the M-C SDS and the Dogmatism Scale would be related to the congruent-incongruent continuum as measured by the HIT. The M-C SDS and the Dogmatism Scale were expected to be related on the basis of similar attitudes regarding authority. It was also proposed that anxiety and defensive modes of behavior would influence responses on the three scales.

Thus, according to Hypothesis I, approval-dependent individuals (high M-C SDS scorers) were expected to have a lower level of incongruence than individuals less dependent upon approval from others (low M-C SDS scorers). The M-C SDS scores were used to predict high and low magnitudes of incongruence as measured by the HIT. Conversely, according to Hypothesis II, closed-minded individuals (high dogmatism scorers) were expected to have greater levels of cognitive incongruities, as reflected by the HIT, than open-minded
individuals (low dogmatism scorers). Thus, the two poles of the consistency-inconsistency or congruent-incongruent continuum could be analyzed.

According to Hypothesis III, the closed-minded individual was expected to be approval-dependent as a result of the probable acceptance and glorification of persons in positions of authority. Therefore, the M-C SDS scorers were used to predict open and closed cognitive systems as measured by the Dogmatism Scale.

The three scales were administered to a sample of ninety-eight introductory psychology students from North Texas State University. However, no prescribed sampling plan was used to obtain a representative sample of the general college population.

The data were collected and submitted to the North Texas State University computer center for analysis. A t-test was computed to test the significance of the difference between the means of each group.

Hypotheses I and II were accepted beyond the one per cent probability level. The five per cent probability level was selected as the critical value for acceptance of each hypothesis. Differences obtained for Hypothesis III did not appear at a significant level. Therefore, Hypothesis III was rejected.
It was concluded that individuals who have a greater need for approval and experience less difficulty assimilating percepts tend to have lower levels of incongruency than individuals with lesser need for approval. Thus, the individual with lower levels of incongruency may be defending against anxiety aroused by anticipations of "looking bad" on self-report measures.

Individuals scoring on the incongruent end of the congruent-incongruent continuum tend to be highly dogmatic individuals who tend to have difficulty assimilating percepts. Thus the tendency to assimilate percepts appears to be a function of the degree to which an individual is approval-dependent and/or the degree to which an individual is dogmatic.

The anticipation of approval-dependent individuals and highly dogmatic individuals to share a similar attitude and similar modes of responding to persons of authority was not supported. This hypothesized relationship was attributed to faulty theorizing.

Since assimilation, anxiety, and certain defensive modes of responding appear to be related to the scales used in the present study, caution must be exercised in generalizing from the obtained relationships due to certain weaknesses of the present investigation. Further research is needed to determine the degree to which each variable might
be related on the consistency-inconsistency continuum in a more representative sample. Therefore, the results of the present investigation cannot be adequately attributed to the assumed theoretical relationships because the influence of anxiety and/or certain defensive modes of responding in the testing situation make it necessary to interpret the results with caution. However, the results leave tenable future investigation into the relationship between social desirability, dogmatism, and the congruent-incongruent continuum.
APPENDIX I

PERSONAL REACTION INVENTORY

Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and traits. Read each item and decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to you personally.

TRUE FALSE

1. ___ ___ Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all the candidates.

2. ___ ___ I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble.

3. ___ ___ It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged.

4. ___ ___ I have never intensely disliked anyone.

5. ___ ___ On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life.

6. ___ ___ I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way.

7. ___ ___ I am always careful about my manner of dress.

8. ___ ___ My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out in a restaurant.

9. ___ ___ If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I was not seen I would probably do it.

10. ___ ___ On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too little of my ability.

11. ___ ___ I like to gossip at times.

12. ___ ___ There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even though I knew they were right.

13. ___ ___ No matter who I'm talking to I'm always a good listener.
True  False

14. ___ I can remember "playing sick" to get out of something.

15. ___ There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone.

16. ___ I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.

17. ___ I always try to practice what I preach.

18. ___ I don't find it particularly difficult to get along with loud mouthed, obnoxious people.

19. ___ I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.

20. ___ When I don't know something I don't at all mind admitting it.

21. ___ I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.

22. ___ At times I have really insisted on having things my own way.

23. ___ There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things.

24. ___ I would never think of letting someone else be punished for my wrongdoings.

25. ___ I never resent being asked to return a favor.

26. ___ I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own.

27. ___ I never make a long trip without checking the safety of my car.

28. ___ There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others.

29. ___ I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off.

30. ___ I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me.
<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>I have never felt that I was punished without cause.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>I sometimes think when people have misfortune they only got what they deserved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX II

ATTITUDE SCALE

The following is a study of what the general public thinks and feels about a number of important social and personal questions. The best answer to each statement below is your personal opinion. We have tried to cover many different and opposing points of view; you may find yourself agreeing strongly with some of the statements, disagreeing just as strongly with others, and perhaps uncertain about others; whether you agree or disagree with any statement, you can be sure that many people feel the same as you do.

Mark each statement in the left margin according to how much you agree or disagree with it. Please mark every one.

Write +1, +2, +3, or -1, -2, -3, depending on how much you feel in each case.

+1: I AGREE A LITTLE -1: I DISAGREE A LITTLE
+2: I AGREE ON THE WHOLE -2: I DISAGREE ON THE WHOLE
+3: I AGREE VERY MUCH -3: I DISAGREE VERY MUCH

1. The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common.

2. The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form of democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent.

3. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups.

4. It is only natural that a person would have a much better acquaintance with ideas he believes in than with ideas he opposes.

5. Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.

6. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonesome place.

7. Most people just don't give a "damn" for others.
8. I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve my personal problems.

9. It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of the future.

10. There is so much to be done and so little time to do it in.

11. Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I just can't stop.

12. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several times to make sure I am being understood.

13. In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed in what I am going to say that I forget to listen to what the others are saying.

14. It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live coward.

15. While I don't like to admit this even to myself, my secret ambition is to become a great man, like Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare.

16. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something important.

17. If given the chance, I would do something of great benefit to the world.

18. In the history of mankind there have probably been just a handful of really great thinkers.

19. There are a number of people I have come to hate because of the things they stand for.

20. A man who does not believe in some great cause has not really lived.

21. It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful.

22. Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world there is probably only one which is correct.

23. A person who gets enthusiastic about too many causes is likely to be a pretty "wishy-washy" sort of person.
24. To compromise with out political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.

25. When it comes to differences of opinion in religion we must be careful not to compromise with those who believe differently from the way we do.

26. In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish if he considers primarily his own happiness.

27. The worst crime a person could commit is to attack publicly the people who believe in the same thing he does.

28. In times like these it is often necessary to be more on guard against ideas put out by people or groups in one's own camp than by those in the opposing camp.

29. A group which tolerates too much differences of opinion among its own members cannot exist for long.

30. There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth.

31. My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's wrong.

32. A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness is beneath contempt.

33. Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the paper they are printed on.

34. In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what's going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted.

35. It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's going on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects.

36. In the long run the best way to live is to pick friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own.

37. The present is all too often full of unhappiness. It is only the future that counts.
38. If a man is to accomplish his mission in life it is sometimes necessary to gamble "all or nothing at all."

39. Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed important social and moral problems don't really understand what's going on.

40. Most people just don't know what's good for them.
APPENDIX III

Name: ___________________________ Age: ______ Date: ___________________________
Major: ___________________________ Class: Fr. _____ Soph. _____ Jr. _____ Sr. _____
Sex: M _____ F _____

INSTRUCTIONS

On the accompanying pages are 50 phrases referring to behaviors and feelings. If what is written there involves an activity which you tend to enjoy, put an X in the blank under the heading Mostly Like. If you tend not to enjoy it, put the X in the blank under Mostly Dislike. You may feel indifferent about some of the items but try to make a decision in terms of mostly like or mostly dislike. Even if you have not been in the sort of situation described, indicate whether you believe you would like it or dislike it.

Do this for all the items.

Please answer in terms of your own actual feelings of liking and disliking and not in terms of how you think others might answer or as you think you "should" feel, or in terms of what the consequences might be, or whether you would actually do it or not. Instead, consider each item as to whether it would be fun or unpleasant, enjoyable or not enjoyable, something you would do if it were not for other considerations or something you probably would not do regardless of other considerations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mostly Like</th>
<th>Mostly Dislike</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. _______</td>
<td>Hating those who are evil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. _______</td>
<td>Beating up someone who has treated me cruelly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. _______</td>
<td>Hunting for game with a gun.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. _______</td>
<td>Having a friendly argument with someone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. _______</td>
<td>Griping to my friends about school, job, and other problems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. _______</td>
<td>Getting rid of my anger on inanimate objects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. _______</td>
<td>Thinking angry thoughts about someone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. _______</td>
<td>Giving punishment to someone who deserves it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. _______</td>
<td>Disobeying those who give me ridiculous orders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. _______</td>
<td>Feeling envious when a friend is more successful than I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. _______</td>
<td>Losing my patience when someone is too stupid to understand what I am talking about.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. _______</td>
<td>Refusing to do what a boss tells me.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. _______</td>
<td>Acting in a spiteful way toward those I dislike.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. _______</td>
<td>Reading murder mysteries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. _______</td>
<td>Making a sarcastic remark to someone who is rude.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. _______</td>
<td>Thinking about a person being tortured.</td>
</tr>
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INSTRUCTIONS

On the accompanying pages are 50 phrases referring to behaviors and feelings. If what is written there involves an activity which you believe to be the right thing to do put an X in the blank under the heading Mostly Good. If, in your opinion, it is the wrong thing to do, put the X in the blank under Mostly Bad. You may not think of some of the items as anything especially good or bad, but try to make a decision in terms of mostly good or mostly bad. Even if you have not been in the sort of situation described, indicate whether you believe it would be good or bad.

Do this for all the items.

Please answer in terms of your own actual feelings of good and bad and not in terms of how you think others might answer, or in terms of what the consequences might be, or whether you might actually do it or not. Instead, consider each item as to whether it would be moral or immoral, right or wrong, proper or improper.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Mostly</th>
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<tbody>
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On the accompanying pages are 50 phrases referring to behaviors and feelings. If what is written there involves an activity which would, in your opinion, lead primarily to pleasant consequences for yourself, put an X in the blank under the heading Pleasant Consequences. If, in your opinion, it would lead primarily to unpleasant consequences, put an X in the blank under Unpleasant Consequences. Even if you have not been in the sort of situation described, indicate whether you believe it would lead to pleasant or unpleasant consequences.

Do this for all the items.

Please answer in terms of your own actual feelings about whether you find the consequences pleasant or unpleasant and not in terms of how you think others might answer, or what you might like to do, or as you think you "should" behave, or whether you would actually do it or not. Instead, consider each item as to whether it would lead to subsequent pleasure or distress, whether other people would react positively or negatively to it, or whether you are likely to receive some sort of reward versus some sort of punishment for it.
BEHAVIOR AND FEELING LIST

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quences quences

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books


Articles


