

LIMITATIONS OF HUNGARIAN NATIONAL POWER
IN WORLD WAR TWO

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CHAPTER I

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

This study covers a period of a quarter of a century of Hungarian history, focusing on questions that affected the country's World War Two participation. It is not an attempt to ascertain yet uncovered facts. At the present such are unattainable. As a leading work on Eastern European post-1941 events states: "The material for a serious record is not yet available."¹ Otherwise most data are already well attested, so that to squeeze them further would be rather useless. In certain respects a purely historically oriented diplomatic and political inquiry not only would be repetitious but equivalent to reviving old fights as to what the data actually mean.

As a result of such pre-postulates, this study invokes the aid of value forming principles in order to reach conclusions. Besides relying on historical data it penetrates beyond the purely empirical. Its guiding principles relate to political theory affecting international relations. Such a method gives more freedom to deal with the period concerning which not all the data are available, that is to say, the years between 1941-45.

¹C. A. Macartney and A. W. Palmer, Independent Eastern Europe, A History (London, 1962), p. 450.

For instance, it is well known that attempts of the Kállay government in 1943-44 to disengage Hungary from the war failed. The record of at least what the Hungarians said and did is reasonably well established in published literature even if documents in Washington and London are not released as of the moment of this writing. Let us suppose for a moment that British-American documents may contain entirely new viewpoints as to the motivation of the Royal Hungarian Government for delaying Hungary's exit from World War Two. Even if that were the case, pre-dispositions deriving from Hungary's geo-political and military situation, her culture affecting attitudes of the population, her system of government, etcetera, in other words, the "givens" would have remained what they always were. The content of negotiations could have altered little the country's known capacity to move either direction. Thus learning about such capacity is equivalent to knowing the essentials predetermining Hungary's fate.

Let us assume, again, that before quitting the war Hungary wanted British-American paratroops on her territory as a prerequisite to separating from Germany, and not receiving them was her reason not to drop out. Not knowing this now for sure, due to the absence of British-American documentation, does not prevent meaningful inquiry into the problems of Hungarian decision making in 1943-44, because knowing the "givens" it can be well established that sending

of paratroops would have been suicidal, militarily speaking, from the British-American point of view, even if political circumstances would have permitted or advised such an action. At that time Hungary stood completely denuded in the military sense, as she had neglected to do at least two things: first, to rearm properly and provide for an Air Force and for some heavy armor and artillery; and secondly, to keep her existing army within the national territory.

It is not suggested here that these two measures would necessarily have solved Hungary's problem and led to British-American-Hungarian cooperation. This would have depended upon so many other factors affecting global policy making, that it would be impossible to go beyond speculations as to what actually might have happened. All that is suggested is that the military pre-disposition was missing for attempting such a venture. However, the existence or absence of such prerequisites falls entirely in the sphere of documented facts. Thus conclusions as to why Hungary could not succeed with her attempts to disengage from the war without incurring the wrath of Germany does not depend on knowing elements of respective British-American decision making.

The primary question to which this study dedicates itself is the problem of "limitations of national power." The term "national power" will be taken in its Morgenthauan context and corrections.²

²Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations; the Struggle for Power and Peace, 3rd ed. (New York, 1960), pp. 101-123.

The elements of national power that make the list according to Morgenthau are as follows: geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, and national character. The present study puts emphasis on almost all these elements of national power as far as Hungary was concerned from the point of view of what essentially affected national defences. An exception is the last one, the discussion of which would have required a thorough examination of Hungarian culture, historic background, trends of urbanization, semi-feudalism, the churches, and so forth. Population trends are not discussed here either as such are questions affecting decision-making only if long range considerations can have a play which was not the case then in Hungary.

By contrast a considerable amount of the study will be dedicated to show how Hungarian political and military leadership failed to recognize the significance of air power in general and its fast changing evolutionary features in particular. According to Morgenthau, one error in evaluating national power is to take for "granted the permanency of a certain factor that has in the past played a decisive role, thus overlooking the dynamic change to which most power factors are subject."³ Coming to details, in Hungary's case one such factor appears to have been an overrated prestige of the

³Ibid., p. 153.

two-wing fighter, in which category Italy was leading. Relying on Italy, Hungary was caught empty-handed in most of the critical years, having no modern fighter defences. Such a mistake of course resulted in a serious de facto limitation of national power.

Another limiting factor affecting Hungarian military preparedness was her lack of attractiveness to the great powers acceptable to her (and Germany was not one of them, even as seen with the eyes of most contemporary Hungarian leaders). The "distribution of benefits within an alliance"⁴ in the Italian-Hungarian partnership was severely handicapped as far as the military viewpoint was concerned due to Trianon-caused geopolitical weakness of Hungary as well as technological weakness in both countries.⁵

These and similar inquiries can produce solid conclusions since they are based on known facts. They make for a set of essential "givens." As soon as aims of the "national decision making unit"⁶ or units can well be established, there is a possibility of making an evaluation of the realism of the national foreign policy, or of the various factors affecting such. Of the three "interpretative schemes" listed in the basic study establishing the epistemology of scientific

⁴Ibid., p. 185.

⁵See Chapter IV.

⁶R. C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and B. Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics (New York, 1962), p. 95.

approach in international relations,⁷ there will be occasional references to the "operational scheme," especially in the first and last chapters, where glances are taken at a "legalistic"⁸ and "moralistic" behavioral philosophy, determining Hungary's relations with the three hostile great powers, of their allies, as well as with her own ally, Germany. Similar references will be made to facts useful in a scheme evaluating phenomena from the point of view of "efficiency." On the whole, however, this study is regimented according to the "predictive" norm of assessing political decision-making. This is the connecting mental link between evaluation of measures taken or omitted as far as the country's military posture is concerned, and a critical look as to what the country's foreign policy aims were and should have been.

Of course, in order to make the "predictive" norm of evaluation a realistic one, it is necessary to use standards other than those resulting from the benefits of historical retrospection. It is easy to be wise after the event. Thus the present study is concerned not to accept the results of World War Two and the post war political situation as a foregone conclusion that ought to have been always apparent to the leaders of Hungary when they made their decisions. There is a need here for some objective criteria that are either

⁷Ibid., p. 25.

⁸Morgenthau, op. cit., pp. 227-232.

timeless or at least valid at the time of the decision making.⁹

Can such standards of evaluation be found? The present author believes so. The more obvious of them for Hungarian leaders of the time would have been criteria dictated by the spirit of nationalism in which they believed and to which they were dedicated. Nationalism can be misleading, but also can motivate toward correct aims. It depends mainly on how the "national interests" are interpreted. Foreign Policy Decision Making points out very clearly that usually there are no attempts to define exactly what various authors mean when they use the term.¹⁰ Obviously this is the case with political leaders too. There is a distinction used in the language of diplomacy separating national interest per se and "vital" national interests. Using this distinction the present study assumes that everything that endangers the very existence of an independent national government is against the vital national interest. By contrast, everything that merely increases or diminishes national power potential without constituting an essential plus, or a jeopardy to the independence of the national government, is not.

Such a standard may be challenged in the case of a great power whose vital national interests may include much more

⁹Snyder et. al., op. cit., p. 37.

¹⁰Ibid.

than safeguards for freely operating a national government. However, in the case of a small power endangered by powerful neighbors whose ambition is to impose their will on the government itself, this standard appears to be valid in determining what constitutes policies harmful to vital national interests.

In the case of Hungary the post-World War One policy of Irredentism reflected emotional nationalism and not rational considerations observant of all dangers aimed against the existence of the national government. The first may be regarded as a policy of pursuing non-vital interests as opposed to its reverse. But by injecting the new terms "emotional" and "rational," in conjunction with "vital" and "non-vital" a further qualification has been added. "Emotional" and "vital" are not mutually exclusive--nor are "rational" and "non-vital." They usually refer to the participation of the national society in motivating the government's decision-making. Nor does the Hungarian example prove that "emotional" is necessarily incorrect and "rational" correct. Yugoslavia in 1941 rebelled against a foreign policy which had been conceived in terms of rational considerations and which was oriented toward saving the government and thereby safeguarding vital national interests, according to the above specification. And yet, the emotional and seemingly suicidal twist of events in Belgrade ultimately, and with much suffering, led to the emergence of a relatively mighty, and at any rate, completely independent postwar Yugoslavia.

Thus, can it be said that "rational" policies aiming at the preservation of the national government are always the correct way, and consequently in pursuance of the vital national interest, even in case of small and exposed nations? At a closer look the Yugoslavian example does not really discredit the correctness of such a contention. Indeed Yugoslavia might have emerged equally well by abstaining from the conflict and sitting it out to the last, as did, for instance, Turkey. On the other hand, that she did not remain cautious was the result of her spirit of heroic nationalism, and her mountains capable of sheltering a guerrilla army. With respect to these "givens" the Yugoslav rebellion against the Axis actually was not without a certain "rational" assessing of the ability of the nation to pull back its forces into the mountains and keep the core of a national decision making apparatus out of the hands of Germany and Italy.

This also leads to the recognition that the occupation of the national capital and the seeming suspension of operations of the national government and its substitution with a puppet regime does not necessarily mean the end of the national sovereignty, although the necessity of moving the government into exile, as proven by the example of Poland, often does.

Consequently, what is the standard of what constitutes the vital national interests for a small nation under duress? It is not merely having a national government surviving somewhere

in exile or invisibly in the underground. It is its ability to stay put on at least one section of the national territory so that it still can wield prohibitive military power in behalf of self-preservation. The keeping of a combination of basic elements of nationhood, such as some territory, some population wielding military power, and the government together constitute the ultimate realm in which the vital national interest can assert itself.

In the case of Hungary, however, where mountains are absent, the place for the government to stay entrenched and surround itself with military power that could not be attacked unpunished would have been by necessity Budapest, the capital city. Athenians had put to sea against the Persians of Xerxes, giving up their city voluntarily, but modern day Hungary's conditions called for making Budapest a bulwark and the ultimate safeguard against the ambitions of Germany and Russia to rule the Carpathian basin. In the pre-atomic age this was perhaps the last occasion to use a European metropolis in a military context affecting the national fate essentially.

Thus this study uses the "predictive" evaluating standard for assessing Carpathian political evolution after World War One on two inter-connected levels. First, from the point of view of how domestic and international "givens" affected Hungarian military preparedness. Secondly, although by implication mainly, how these "givens" affected the government's ability to survive in an independent although restricted

military milieu even if the national territory was already under hostile military occupation. In both instances the vital national interest is regarded to be equal to securing a military milieu that remains free from foreign influence and shelters the government.

Besides these there is a third standard of evaluation. This one, however, is not based on rational nationalism in the sense established earlier. It thinks in terms of envisaging an ideal common military milieu for the Eastern European nations via mutual cooperation, as the theoretical but only truly satisfactory means of securing their national independence. This level of handling the material calls for major reassessments concerning guiding principles of the Trianon status quo and that of the preceding age of Danubian non-cooperation between Slavs and Non-Slavs.

As a yardstick in measuring Danubian policies from this last point of view, this study uses a basic document of political history showing how to overcome regional separatism in behalf of a larger concept of common good, the Federalist Papers.¹¹ It is duly recognized here that emotional nationalism is a force essentially differing from that of emotional regionalism, and for that reason the Federalist Papers, with their argument for ultra-regional unity, could be used mainly as a distant ideal in the present context. Nonetheless they serve

¹¹Federalist Papers, with an introduction by Clinton Rossiter (New York, 1961).

as a good inspiration for recognizing the viability of a missed chance that could have made of rumps of the Dual Monarchy at least a Confederacy (which is the less perfect framework of regional interdependence). Or it could have made such a Confederacy a political goal for the Danubian nations after Trianon.

Such an evaluation goes beyond the scope of dealing with the Hungarian government and society but only in part. Policies of any government result in reactions in other states and in other national societies as soon as they affect them directly. Where there is a possibility of interdependence there exists one of hostile interactions as well.

Thus the study is about the principal external and internal limitations affecting the Hungarian government's capacity (mainly militarily) to deal with a very difficult situation that ultimately led to the loss of de facto national self-determination. In order to show these limitations, first it is necessary to give a short survey of Hungary's record before and during the Second World War. This is done using mainly the "operational" and "efficiency" schemes for evaluation. The standard in Chapter Two is the World War Two record offered by other small or medium nations in somewhat similar circumstances. Then Chapters Three and Four will discuss the policies of other countries affecting Hungary's military preparedness. Chapter Five discusses the resulting situation in a more detailed way. The evaluation scheme in

these chapters is based mainly on the "predictive" formula, and its standard is how these policies affected first the establishment of a major regional defense milieu, then, as this chance was lost, of a Hungarian national defense milieu and ultimately to some degree the capacity to defend if not the country at least the capital. It is contended that all these ought to have been aims of the government in anticipation of moves of Pan-Germanic-and Russian imperialisms.

The reason why military-strategic problems are placed in the focus of this paper as they relate to foreign policy decision-making in Hungary is easy to explain. The limitations of national power, as far as this country was concerned, began at the basic military level. Morgenthau's viewpoint mainly concerns great powers. Thus the term "limitation of national power" does not seem to be conceivable for him as being military in nature, but comes primarily from moral forces and influences that are supra-national and generally human in scope. This study, however, concerns a country whose limitation of power was due to military weakness and which sought in moral, legalistic, and ideological (although not pacifist) motives a substitute for an inability to defend national interests from a position of strength. In other words, Hungary in a sense was on the receiving end of the kind of great power policies against whose total implementation Morgenthau lists limitations of a moral and cultural character as the only effective check.

Of course the moral energy at the disposal of Hungary happened to be a highly controversial weapon as it manifested itself effectively only in the cultural and social ambience of the Axis. In fact, it was a moral armament which lacked appeal as soon as contemporary statesmanship was compelled to abandon the luxury of listening to arguments derived from historic and ethnically based rights unsupported by hard core military reality. Thus Hungarian limitation of power expanded right into the realm of the relative ethos of the time and locale--something that Finland did not have to experience in view of her exceptional position vis-à-vis the United States and other Western democracies giving her a special moral status even while officially belonging to the Axis camp. Needless to say, this moral status was the result, in part at least, of military achievements in the face of the 1939-40 Russian aggression.

If diplomacy accepts the notion that words and gestures are its very body and essence, as suggested by the Snyder-study,¹² (recalling Aristotelian formulas determining political reality,¹³) then it automatically assumes a certain equality

¹²"Motive statements . . . function to co-ordinate social action by persuading some participants to accept an act or acts," Snyder, et al., op. cit., pp. 145-146.

¹³The symbolic significance bearing on the political of a clever tyrant's benevolent behavior, for instance is, to paraphrase Aristotle, his identification with something that he is not. See Aristotle, The Politics, translated by T. A. Sinclair (Baltimore, 1966), pp. 230-231.

of military posture among the nations. Thus a harmonious convergence of a state's intentions with its expression of them is to be expected only when treachery can lead to reprisals by the other party.¹⁴ But no such repercussions might result from a great power's misleading gestures which tend to lure an isolated small power into feelings of security. As a consequence, Central and East-Central European small powers could hardly rely on pacts or promises as a counterweight to great power military superiority when they were dealing with their giant continental neighbors in the years of World War Two or after.

To bring into focus the military reality as a primary determinant of national policies in Hungary consequently is the same as to scale considerations about national power down to their bare essentials. In Central and East Europe international relations between great and small powers are not determined by moral forces or the spoken words of the diplomats and public media, especially as far as the great powers are concerned. The opposite is true: German promises concerning Czechoslovakia and Europe about no further claims to be raised,¹⁵ and the Russian declaration concerning withdrawal

¹⁴See footnote No. 15. On the other hand, however, there is the possibility of bluffing, as an opposite ruse, among roughly equally strong powers, on which see Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York, 1958), p. 241.

¹⁵Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D, Volume II, No. 487 (Washington, 1949), pp. 786-798. This particular treachery shows the difference that such acts may do to small and great power relationship, respectively. It helped

of troops from Hungary in 1956 in order to make preparations for a counterattack easier, are just two of a long series of treacheries when diplomatic action and gestures were used to cover the exactly opposite intentions of the aggressor-to-be.¹⁶ An invitation for a friendly talk with the opposite small power decision maker, leading to his arrest and to military paralysis in his camp, is one of the typical methods of the aggressor; if the invitation is refused, there is an excuse for the invasion, if it is accepted there is a good chance of its success without stirring up organized resistance.¹⁷

to abolish Czechoslovakian border defenses and thus independence in six months, yet it led to British-French repercussion in the form of guarantees given to Poland and World War Two, thus to Hitler's end as well.

¹⁶Prof. F. A. Váli, turning against the deception theory, says that "it may, of course be argued, that this promise (of Russia's withdrawal from Hungary---author's remark), like many later statements relative to troop movements, were mere deception; but we believe that at this juncture the Soviet military moves were just a part of the operational preparation to meet the potential dangers of the Suez conflict." Ferenc A. Váli, Rift and Revolt in Hungary (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), p. 360. Leaving the question open, this author suggests another theory, namely that of Russian actions of double meaning, paralyzing the opposite party by allowing it to guess. While on one level there is bluff, and that is with respect to the opposite great power, or power block, on the other one there is a real threat with respect to the small power, militarily unprotected by the opposite great power. Applications of "double meaning tactics" are endless in kind. It was used even against Marshall Zhukov when he was sent to Albania on the pretext of the Lebanese crisis, while the Eisenhower administration was kept guessing whether or not it already went too far in its stabilizing efforts in the Middle East. Real power available to the victim, however, no matter how relatively small, increases the possibility of bluff and decreases the reality of threat from the part of the menacing great power.

¹⁷As seen in the case of Regent Horthy and military leaders' invitation to Klesheim by Hitler just prior to the invasion of

As a by-line, one should note here that in the age of instant nuclear exchange diplomatic word and gesture may be the only way of knowing the other party's intention if military intelligence is faulty or non-existent. But it also may turn out to be an excellent ruse introduced in order to lull the opposite power and thus obtain a psychological momentum favorable for launching a surprise attack (which behavior was displayed in the pre-nuclear age by the Kurusu mission to the United States). If, however, such tactics may very well backfire in the case of great power confrontations, this is not the case with aggression launched against a small power by a powerful neighbor. The new barbarian age of which Morgenthau speaks¹⁸ contains bad news for all who cannot shield the national decision-making apparatus behind barriers of a creditable defence capability. A small power always may be crushed by a superior enemy. Still, having a relative resistance potential may very well spell the difference between survival and loss of national self-determination, especially if power combines with skillful diplomacy. Diplomacy absolutely cannot operate without the availability of the military--while the military

Hungary in 1944, and General Paul Maléter's invitation by the Russian command to Thököl hours before the second attack on the Hungarian revolution began in 1956. In both cases the commander or commanders in charge became unable to discharge their duties in the moment of military crisis.

¹⁸"The ethics of international politics reverts to the politics and morality of tribalism, of the Crusades and the religious wars." Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 259.

may prove to be insufficient, although not necessarily so, without the support of diplomacy.

Chapter Five thus deals with the foreign policies of Hungary logically only after the military antecedents have been clarified. The last chapter of this study will be dedicated to final conclusions concerning the balance of Hungarian decision making.

CHAPTER II

PANORAMA OF THE PROBLEM

In terms of wielding national power and exercising the faculty of decision-making Hungarian leadership showed a record of inconsistency and paralysis in World War Two. The point in the above statement is emphatically disassociated from any notion of success or failure as regards the outcome of decisions already made. The focus is on the operative faculty in itself. Two questions define the problem in this connection. First, is the quality of the decision such as to enable the country to meet its vitally important goals, and secondly, once conceived and determined, is the decision carried out?

In Hungary, in World War Two, there was no determination of what to do about the country in a consistent way. Once a decision had been reached, it was immediately allowed to melt away in its impact by a policy of second thought permitted to slow down the wheels set in motion by the first. One can even speak of a dialecticism of overcautiousness. Had an energetic line of action been based on a falsely identified vital national interest, the result would have been a foreign policy typical of Fascist countries. It would have been a policy of aggressive dynamism leading to disaster. A Fascist policy is

a policy of totalitarian war against materially superior enemies trying to make up for the differences in power status by aggression, pre-emptive attacks and immoral shock tactics (although Italy was an exception in this regard). Therein lies their great danger. Such policies by necessity lead to total disaster if they don't result in immediate victory as they are bound to release the furies of resistance ultimately increasing the material superiority of the hostile front by an added dimension of reactive hate. As things stood with Hungary, she was Fascist on occasion, and mainly by rhetoric. Certainly she did not mobilize her national energy in behalf of Germany and Italy, or for that matter, for any cause.

Here we reach the crux of the problem. Hungary should have mobilized her national energy in behalf of national self-determination, as did almost all of the small European nations. What such a policy would have involved in terms of foreign policy aims and domestic measures in strengthening the moral unity and military strength of the nation is explained in the course of this study. The historical survey conceived in rough outlines of Hungarian actions and inactions in this chapter shows neither a coherent line of foreign policies that could be identified with a pursuit of the vital national interest, nor would it indicate that decisions that had been reached were brought to bear in shaping Hungarian military and political reality in a consistent way.

Since the picture emerging from the record is so confusing as to whether there was a conception in the government of what the vital national interests were at all, this student thought it best to see if the record gives any clues about such a conception within Hungarian society. The records indicate more acumen in government than in society in this respect. In fact, it indicates that the government did not base its foreign policy, whatever that may have been, on the support of the people. Consequently, when this support was badly needed, the government discovered in the people a limiting factor in carrying out policies consistent with the vital national interest.

Let the facts speak now. Let them outline how subsequent governments used their power in determining foreign policy and what the Hungarian public did to re-emphasize or annul their government's aims.

Premier Julius Gömbös as early as 1932 began developing a new military based on Hungaro-German elements lured into the officer corps.¹ He also cooperated with Mussolini and anti-National Socialist Austrian leaders in building a tripartite alliance to prevent the Anschluss.² For a while he was deemed to be the most pro-German and Fascist Hungarian

¹About additional details of this turn of events see Stephen D. Kertesz, Diplomacy in a Whirlpool (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1953), pp. 27-28.

²C. A. Macartney, October Fifteenth (Edinburgh, 1957), Vol. 1, pp. 137, 139.

politician, who actually had something to do with the formulation of the Axis.³ Some of his heirs followed his anti-German rather than pro-German line and tried to block Germany's intrusion into the Central and Eastern European theater. Thus after the collapse of pre-Munich Czechoslovakia Foreign Minister Kánya attempted to build a Warsaw-Budapest-Rome counter-Axis, with the possible participation of Belgrade. The German government had to issue a note amounting to an ultimatum to prevent the materialization of preliminaries of such policy.⁴ But while this was afoot the public was pumped full of pro-German editorials in influential parts of the Hungarian press without airing Kánya's aims, and the military to back such a policy was non-existent.

During the Munich crisis, a few weeks before these events, Regent Horthy, Premier Béla Imrédy, and Foreign Minister Koloman Kánya went for a state visit to Germany where they were received most lavishly. Horthy's consort christened the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen as the result of a refined gesture by Hitler, accommodating the mostalgias of the last Commander-in-Chief of the Austro-Hungarian Navy.⁵ There seemed to be no obstacles to a renewal of World War One Kameradschaft when the news arrived that a Hungarian plenipotentiary had signed an

³Ibid., pp. 136, 138.

⁴See Appendix VII.

⁵Miklós Horthy, Emlékirataim (Buenos Aires, 1953), pp. 185-189.

agreement with representatives of the three Little Entente nations. It stated that Hungary would abstain from using force in behalf of her revisionist policies while these finally consented to a reversal of the military clauses of the Trianon Peace Treaty.⁶ An indignant German leadership questioned Imrédy and Kánya about the meaning of all this. They realized that most of the propaganda impact on the Western powers of the Horthy visit, planned in order to help blackmail Chamberlain and Daladier into concessions concerning Czechoslovakia with a show of determination by united revanchist powers, had dissipated as suddenly as the champagne on the Prinz Eugen.

Kánya reassured his hosts that the Bled agreement was of no importance. Germans and Hungarians finally agreed that editorial policies of the Hungarian media would ultimately determine which way Hungary was actually going--and such remained pro-Axis indeed.⁷ Something similar happened again during the Polish campaign in 1939, when official Hungary (and this time the government media too) engaged in neutralist stratagems. Foreign Minister Count Csaki threatened to blow up bridges and tunnels on roads and railroad lines leading to southeast Poland when Germany and Slovakia asked for the privilege of using these installations.⁸ However, such

⁶Macartney, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 239, 243-244. Macartney says that the Hungarians gave the Bled agreement an interpretation which would have allowed them to attack Czechoslovakia.

⁷Documents on German Foreign Policy, op. cit., Vol. II, Doc. 383, p. 616.

⁸The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943, edited by Hugh Gibson (New York, 1946), pp. 140, 145.

measures were never told to the Hungarian public, or to the world in the remaining years of the Horthy era.

Moves of the government opposing German policies generated signals which were perceived and interpreted best in neighboring Germany. Except for governmental circles they were not understood in far-away Great Britain and the trans-Atlantic world, and especially not among politically blinded segments of the middle and lower classes of the Hungarian scene itself. Yet Hungary was no dictatorship, and cooperation at least of the learned classes was essential for success of any foreign policy.

A good example of the latter is the Teleki case. The protest suicide of Premier Count Paul Teleki against Hungary's being dragged into the Yugoslavian campaign in 1941 by her military, was clearly understood by the British government⁹ as a symbolic gesture but was not very well understood by the general public in Budapest. For one thing, Teleki being a practising Catholic, influential clerical circles instigated rumors that he was killed by German agents. Some of the clergy wished to avoid what they deemed a necessary collapse of his Catholic image, had it been admitted by the Church, as it was by the state, that he committed an act forbidden by religion. Thereby, however, clerical stolidity managed to wash away whatever moral reflections Teleki's sacrifices might

⁹Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance (New York, 1959), pp. 140-141, but see Macartney, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 8 for difference of tune used between Eden and Churchill with regard to policy toward Hungary.

have caused in Hungary. Believing neither version and caught amidst a web of seeming mystery, the public preferred not to draw any conclusion, especially not one that had inspired an obligation to resist pro-German domestic forces and foreign policy orientations. Regent Horthy, however, used this tragedy as an excuse for postponing the Hungarian attack against Yugoslavia and to limit Hungarian action to pacification of Yugoslavian regions inhabited by ethnic Magyars.¹⁰

After June 25, 1941--on the entry of Hungary into World War Two--generally it was safe to say that the government attempted to continue a foreign policy similar to Finland's, and thus tried to avoid unnecessary annoyance of the Western Democracies by concentrating her war on Russia only. Hungary declared war on two of the three great powers, the Soviet Union and the United States of America. None of these acts took place with the formal consent of Parliament and the Head of State, as the one-time American Minister to the Hungarian Government states: "Although Hungary declared war on us, it was illegal. . . . Apparently Bárdossy (the Hungarian Premier) realized that he could not get the consent either of Parliament or the Regent to a formal declaration of war."¹¹ A few months earlier the same premier, Ladislao Bárdossy, after being informed

¹⁰Miklós Szinai and Laszlo Szűcs, The Confidential Papers of Admiral Horthy (Budapest, 1965), pp. 176-179, and Macartney, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 4-5.

¹¹John Fournoy Montgomery, Hungary, the Unwilling Satellite (New York, 1947), pp. 152-153.

that Hungarian cities were bombed by Russian aircraft on June 24 and 25, 1941 (a very unlikely supposition in view of the Soviet Union's attitude toward the then yet uncommitted satellite, whose entering the war could have complicated the already great difficulties of the Russians),¹² convoked a Ministerial Council, and created a fait accompli committing Hungary to the war, while he "did not even inform the Regent, that day, of what had been done."¹³ Under Law XIII of 1920 paragraph 5, declaration of war was a prerogative of the Regent, but could only be exercised by him after Parliament had previously given its consent. Yet both the Lower and Upper Houses were convened to deal with the situation only after the Hungarian Air Force had begun to launch attacks against Russian targets.¹⁴

Thus the difference between the Hungarian attitude with respect to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on one hand and the United States of America (as well as Great Britain) on the other was not rooted in Hungarian Constitutional Law. Both declarations made by Hungary (Great Britain spared her

¹²History still has no verdict as to the actual identity of warplanes bombing Kassa (Kosičce). That Bárdossy believed they were actually Hungarian or German is not likely the case according to Macartney, see footnote 13. But there was another possibility involved, namely, that they were neither Russians, nor Hungarians or Germans, but Rumanians, Slovaks or Russian-based craft piloted by Czechs acting under orders of the exile-government in London.

¹³Macartney, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 28.

¹⁴See Ibid., pp. 17-32, as to the whole affair of the declaration of war on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

from a problem by declaring war first) were illegal. To this one may add that the Hungarians might simply have played it unconstitutionally in order to have a disclaimer if things did not work out. The press meanwhile was adamant in stating Hungarian loyalty to the Axis.

The factual difference between Hungarian policies toward the West and the East is revealed by the aftermath. No Hungarian military unit was permitted to participate in any way in war actions involving unprovoked confrontation with British-American or even Yugoslavian (guerrilla) forces until the day the country was occupied by Germany and Hitler pushed for a truly puppet government to take over.

Up to March 19, 1944 (the day Germany occupied Hungary), strict orders were issued by the highest command that firing at Anglo-American aircraft was to be restricted to planes engaged in offensive action against us.¹⁵

This order was faithfully adhered to and no Hungarian weapon fired in anger on Western craft or vice versa until that day.

During the Kállay era in the field of diplomacy Hungary avoided all further irritations of the West, thereby vexing German nerves considerably. Thus in spite of heavy pressures from Berlin, Hungary abstained from declaring war on Brazil and Chile,¹⁶ and would not recognize the Salo Republic de

¹⁵Nicholas Kállay, Hungarian Premier (New York, 1954), p. 340.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 64.

jure, only de facto, while maintaining relations with the Royal Italian Government as well.¹⁷

All this, however, took place behind the facades. The same results transpired with respect to certain speeches by Kállay. These by his own admission, were strongly anti-Semitic, and had been given regularly after the refusal of some German ultimatum, such as delivery of 300,000 Jewish workers to Germany, or introduction of the Star of David for Hungarian Jews.¹⁸ They misled no one in Berlin. Also, they were not conducive to the recognition in Hungary that government and country stood under direct German pressure. One must add in this connection that publicly no anti-German stance was ever taken by anyone with a portfolio in Hungary after Hitler became Reichskanzler. It is necessary to point this out, because it explains quite plausibly how it was possible to develop a situation where certain political gestures were deemed as clearly lip service in quarters intended to be fooled, while failing to educate and enlighten those masses on whose behalf this policy had been undertaken and on whose proper information a great deal depended with regard to its success.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 214-217. It is interesting that Ivon Kirkpatrick would state massively: "On German instructions the Axis satelites, Rumania, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Hungary recognized (the Salo Republic), and Japan followed." Ivon Kirkpatrick, Mussolini, A Study in Power (New York, 1968), p. 569. The Salo Republic was the name of Mussolini's shadow state after Italy's surrender to the Allies. It was the German occupied Italy.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 358.

Contrary to a long record of gestures toward the West, which includes the complicated history of secret negotiations between Budapest and Washington as well as London,¹⁹ in the east Hungary was not reluctant to engage militarily while abstaining from diplomatic negotiations with Moscow even below the surface until late 1944. It was obvious however, that whatever were Hungary's intentions with respect to the Western Powers, sending twelve Hungarian divisions to Russia in 1942 meant giving far more aid to Germany than was needed for symbolic contributions expressing moral unity. More tragic was that the evacuation of half of the army barracks and the almost complete commitment of the available arsenal in modern weaponry in behalf of a campaign born out of fear of both Germany and Russia brought no peace and security for Hungary, not even with respect to Germany. On the contrary, it made the German invasion of Hungary in 1944--in the moment when German armed might had already reached a stage of critical shortages--extremely easy, and robbed the nation of the possibility and potential benefits of mounting resistance. Had Hungary been able to deter a German invasion, the Russian army could have been resisted in mountain defences with the desperate energies of a nation not yet bled white during futile campaigns in the Russian plains. Hungary could have become a second Finland, master of her fate, opposing German aspirations to control its government and territory but fighting Russia

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 355-406.

from a good defence position, with high morale, and with a relatively strong army were it necessary.

Thus the precise results of the decision to send the Second Army to Russia in 1942 only began to emerge in March, 1944. The German surprise attack crushed the government and yet Hungary did not drop from the war on Germany's side or turn against her by means of active or passive resistance. On the contrary. Obeying the Regent (blackmailed into co-operation by German threats), the country, its military, society, its political and economic apparatus continued to function smoothly to serve a war-machine whose masters were about to make Hungary a dummy thrown in the way of Germany's enemies. A victim of Germany, yet officially now totally committed to her, Hungary lost her freedom of choice which she hoped to have re-affirmed in connection with receiving British-American troops on her territory.²⁰

The Kállay government fell after the German invasion on March 19, 1944. At this time the Regent did not go into exile, obviously to save a potential to reverse the fate of the country at a later date.²¹ Thus a government headed by Döme Sztójay was installed, under which Hungary engaged in

²⁰"We started from the assumption, that, although the Anglo-American powers were far away from Central Europe, yet their policy reached to us. Thus it was to be assumed that Anglo-American troops would reach this area before the Russian soldiers and that Anglo-American policy (the Atlantic Charter) would decide the future of Central and Eastern Europe."
(Ibid., p. 397)

²¹Horthy, op. cit., pp. 253-254.

more war participation while it grew less able to defend herself from dictates of German political interests.²² A subsequent government under General Imre Lakatos was called into office when Germany had to ease her pressure on Hungary due to the Allied landing in France and the Rumanian turn about.²³ Thus Lakatos soon set out to prepare Hungary's exit from the war and surrender.²⁴ When it was done on October 15, 1944, the Regent omitted to turn Hungarian armed might, or what was left of it, into a defensive force against German troops in Hungary so as to secure his authority and save at least the capital from becoming a Danubian Stalingrad.²⁵ Since his orders were not followed by the army anyway,²⁶ and since the Budapest society did not break into a revolt against the German military presence, as it did in 1956 against its Russian equivalent, the Regent was toppled, and a fourth government installed for the year, this one being outspokenly National Socialist. It dictated resistance to the last drop of national energy.²⁷ Before the end of that year a counter-government came into being, set up in Debrecen under Russian "protection."²⁸ All this time Hungarian society was accepting these changes without attempting to interfere and set a course of action of its own against the obvious inability of the government to

²²Ibid., p. 258.

²³Ibid., p. 263.

²⁴Ibid., p. 265.

²⁵Ibid., p. 276.

²⁶Macartney, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 428-429.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 444-452.

²⁸Ibid., p. 464.

protect the national interests. Neither open rebellion nor underground resistance of any consequence materialized.

This short survey thus poses difficulties as to how to classify Hungary among the other smaller nations of Europe. The record of the years 1941-44 would indicate that her inept policies placed her between Finland and Rumania in what can be determined as an Axis alliance directed against Russia, aiding the German war effort less than Rumania, yet falling deeper into the trap than Finland by not being careful enough to abstain from even a purely pro forma declaration of war, against the United States of America. While hers was still a moderate commitment, her society gave more signs of being genuinely infatuated with Germanophile ideologies than did those of Rumania and Finland.²⁹ Also the fact that she inherited anti-Entente notions from World War One, while Finland and Greater Rumania were succession states born out of that war as pillars of the 1919-20 status quo, increased the confusion concerning her identity on both sides of the fences. For German circles this committed her to the battle row of revanchist powers as long as official policies did not counteract such anticipation. But no such corrections occurred in the minds of important parts of the domestic society because half way she was and remained a revanchist power indeed.

²⁹This does not apply to the Nazi activists, however. Hungary had no trouble with groups as the Iron Guard, rampaging in Rumania from 1938-40 until 1944, that is to say until the presence of the Wehrmacht did not come to boost their courage.

Similarly, by the Western public it was taken for granted that she would go along with Germany all the way. No widespread appreciation resulted from the fact--contrary to the case with Finland--that Hungary stalled as long as possible, actually until 1942.

The question here is how to characterize the country in terms of political allegiance in World War Two. Was it pro-German, anti-West, anti-Russian; or pro-German, pro-West, anti-Russian; or rather pro-West, anti-German, and anti-Russian? Was it committed on the Axis side, or manouvering between the major war parties? Was it a victim, or a culprit, and if so, victim of circumstances stemming from abroad, or culprit due to reasons inherent in Hungarian society? The impossibility of giving flat and unqualified answers projects the image of a country locked in indecision, unable to develop a distinguishable profile, and yet fatally committed.

National Socialist historians, had they survived, would likely have condemned Hungary. Communists did, and so have most of those who embark on ships carrying the gold and silver of liberal political thinking for navigational balance. And one cannot with good conscience say that from their specific point of view these observers were wrong. Taking a good look at the Hungarian military and the Gombös and Szálasi eras one might dig at will into endless shafts filled with explosive air of passions. Here is a case for progressives. Taking a good look at motives and deeds of the Kallay government playing

for time to outwit Germany and Russia both, or at his predecessors' under the directives of Koloman Kánya, Paul Teleki and even Steven Csáki, one will find a case history of anti-Russian policy, with an occasional sabotage of Germany. Here is a case for totalitarian historians, for each of the kind. One who is indebted to moral values finds cynical Machiavellianism in the suspicious unconstitutionality by which the Bardossy government endeavored to declare war against the Soviet Union and the United States, satisfying Germany de facto while getting the basis for a postwar argument in case things did not work out, rooted in the de jure logic of a nation led by too many lawyers. One who is fond of political pragmatism, will sincerely object to the tragedy caused by moral scruples in the Regent to turn against the Kameraden as he tried to lead the country out of the war on October 15, 1944. A Hitlerite immoralist, of course, would equally object to the suicide of Count Teleki protesting Hungarian participation in the invasion of Yugoslavia, arranged behind his back by the Hungarian and German army staffs.

Thus the World War Two history of Hungary is a treasure hunting ground for self-contradictions and oddities, judicially, militarily, politically, and philosophically. No country managed to incur an invasion by its principal ally before asking for a separate peace treaty or siding directly with the other party, except Hungary. No belligerent country allowed the opponent to fly over the national territory on the way toward

an ally without the firing of a gun, or sending up a fighter plane, as happened there until March 10, 1944, with respect to the British-American air command (although not with respect to Russia). At that juncture Hungary did not practice what neutral countries regard as their natural right. Nor did she allow establishing German defences, including radar installations, on her territory to shield Austria until the occupation of the country.³⁰ As a result, occupied France, Greece, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, and Norway were bombed and so was Ploesti in Rumania, but Hungary for a while enjoyed the same immunity as neutral Turkey, Sweden, Spain, and Portugal. This situation did not last. With German troops came Allied bombers.

In 1944 Budapest experienced British and American air raids against military installations, Russian ones against civilian targets, and then, from September onward the flight of German aircraft dropping anti-Horthy leaflets--a record expression of interest conflict. In October, 1944 Hungarian communications centers were raided by Royal Air Force bombers in order to interrupt German links with the capital, thus to shield the Lakatos government and Regent Horthy against German military interference with the Hungarian cease fire arrangement.

³⁰"The Allies, including the Soviet aircraft flying for Tito, were able freely to use the Hungarian air space. Germany, on the other hand, was allowed no air bases in Hungary." (Kállay, *op. cit.*, p. 376.) The reference to Soviet aircraft, it should be noted, is qualified. Budapest was bombed twice by Soviet aircraft in September, 1942 and AA guns opened up.

Indeed the terms of status neutralis, non-belligerency and status belli as accepted by international law and practices did not properly express Hungary's situation at any time. She never was neutral; her initial pro-Axis non-belligerency however became qualified with occasional shows of neutrality, as during the Polish campaign; she was in status belli with the United Nations, although never aiming at total warfare. Hungary made a conditional ally of a camp conducting total war, and expecting total adherence from all members.

She got the worst. Finland was the only Axis country to escape military occupation, Rumania the only pro-German state to finish in an active war against Germany, participating in behalf of both sides with substantial forces, and staging the only successful coup d'état against the pro-Axis government. Hungary, by contrast, became the only satellite being assaulted and subdued by both Germany and the Soviet Union, matching Poland, the only ally of the West to suffer the same fate.

Of all the satellite capitals, Budapest alone became a battlefield, and Hungary the lone satellite to be sacked by foe and original ally alike. Of the three coups staged against Germany, by allied governments, in Italy the government got away from German retaliation, in Rumania it was the Germans who ran and in Hungary alone the Germans became the absolute (although momentary) victors, installing a National Socialist regime and being able to continue the war with all resources and manpower available to the previous legal governments--and

using Budapest as a bulwark. Thus as Hungary introduced the German era in the Danubian valley by the policies of Gömbös (and with the assistance of Italy), it was Hungarian flesh and blood that ushered it out affording a protective shield, under Szálasi.

Such a record of total confusion, self-contradiction and inability to impose a more successful nationalistic policy leads to the question: what was Hungary--the first to join and the last to leave Germany--or the most recalcitrant son of the Axis family? Or both?

But the aim of this inquiry is not to re-establish the historic data, not to clarify the answer to these questions. Neither is it a study into the decision-making apparatus of Hungary to elaborate on such reasons for the paralysis as the non-coordination of government and society, or government and the military. The first would be a matter of simple study in Hungarian society. Instead, this study concentrates on the military milieu, geo-politically, and in terms of military capability as a major reason for the Hungarian paralysis and attempts to show that non-domestic forces in shaping the military environment are in part responsible for the paralysis and inconsistency in foreign policy. It tries to demonstrate, however, only to what degree this is true. In other words, after placing the Hungarian decision-making apparatus in the context of the objective situation in which it found itself from the military point of view, it examines the possibilities

of the Hungarians themselves to change this military milieu, and whether or not this was attempted in a determininate and intelligent way, and if so, in keeping abreast with requirements of the vital national interests.

There were three major factors determining Hungarian military capabilities: general principles of the nature of the first (Trianon Peace Treaty), and that of the second (German and Russian great power policies), are described in the two following chapters. Their practical result on Hungary's military situation, and the way Hungary responded, which is the third determining factor, is dealt with thereafter. Not until these factors are explored can the difficulties of the Hungarians be appreciated and their shortcomings measured in terms of causality.

CHAPTER III

THE FIRST GOVERNING FACTOR: TRIANON PEACE TREATY

The most important factor governing Hungary's fate between the two World Wars was rooted in the basic concept of the Trianon Peace Treaty. Its provisions were not based on the idea of Danubian interdependence in behalf of continental balance of power but relied only on Slavic succession states for such. In their interest Hungary was left a military vacuum, a political and economic wreck.

The Peace Settlement of 1919 was based on the principle of Nationality. It attempted for the first time in human history to erect States on an ethnical foundation. It is important to note that its frontiers cut across the geographical boundaries . . . Czechoslovakia from the north, Yugoslavia from the south, and Great Roumania from the east all extended well into the Danubian plain. . . . The conflict between geography and nationality is one of the fundamental factors in the modern Eastern European problem.¹

The verb "attempted" in the above quotation indicates that the institution of nation-states in East-Central Europe² was not fully successful. The Trianon Peace Treaty recognized the dissolution of the geographic, historical, economic and

¹Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918-1941 (Hamden, Connecticut, 1962), p. 10.

²The geographical terminology in Eastern Europe is confused. The Balkan is usually referred to as South-Eastern Europe; Poland, the Baltic States and Russia as Eastern Europe proper, Austria and the Bohemia basin as Central Europe. The

political unit called Greater Hungary, but, in addition, it also cut into the ethnic borderlines of the Magyar stock with state boundaries.

In old Hungary the Magyars had been the political leadership stratum and the centrally located ethnic component of the kingdom with roughly fifty percent of the ethnically varied population. (In this the four million inhabitants of the Croatian Kingdom are not included. Croatia had been a more or less autonomous part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Old Hungary proper, without Croatia, had been about twenty million inhabitants, half of them Magyar.) In order to make the new order viable and to give the Slavic succession states and Rumania some degree of strategic security and economic viability the nation-state concept in Trianon was brushed aside with respect to Hungary. It also violated the strategic and economic integrity of the new Hungarian state, depriving it of self-sufficiency in either sense.

The new borders detached from historic Hungary Slovakia, Carpatho-Ukraine as well as the northern perimeter of the central plain and hill country of the Carpathian basin, of which the latter was Magyar inhabited. These territories went to Czechoslovakia. Transylvania and the part called Crisana, the latter geographically part of the Great Hungarian

central section of the Danubian Valley (the Carpathian basin) is a separate geographic unit and is called in this paper East-Central Europe. But before Trianon it was called Central Europe in reference to its Viennese, that is, Central European, culture. As to this see Seton-Watson, Ibid., p. 9.

plain and its mountainous perimeter, in the east went to Rumania. In the south, the Banat with a mixed population of Rumanians, Serbs, Germans, and Magyars was split between Rumania and Yugoslavia. The Bacska (or Bachka), the southern section of the strip between the rivers Danube and Tisza, and preponderantly Magyar, was given to Yugoslavia. Croatia and a strategic beachhead north from the natural Croatian-Hungarian boundary, the river Drava, of which the second also is wholly Magyar, became Yugoslavian as well. The port city of Fiume (Rijeka), was taken by Italy. In addition, Hungary lost to Austria a smaller western province called Burgenland, with about 220,000 Hungarians and 300,000 Germans. Only here was a plebiscite permitted to become a regulating factor in establishing new boundaries.

All told, Hungary was reduced from her former size comprising (with Croatia) 125,000 square miles to 35,900 square miles,³ and to eight million in population. How many ethnic Hungarians were actually lost to other states is a matter of constant dispute between the interested parties who each accuse the other of manipulating census data.⁴ Nonetheless

³Emil Lengyel, 1,000 Years of Hungary (New York, 1958), p. 209. See also Appendix I.

⁴There were objective reasons too for the discrepancies between Hungarian census data of 1910 and their equivalents of 1930 from the disputed territories. Hungarian civil service officials left in great number the areas ceded to the Little Entente. Emigration to America picked up among middle class Hungarians and Jews considered Magyars in the Magyar census data. The urbanization process brought young Magyars from rural areas to Bucharest in the same way as Budapest had

it is unquestionable that approximately 900,000 to one million Magyars were ordered to Czechoslovakia living in most part immediately across the new border. About 500,000 Magyars shared the same fate in Yugoslavia. In neither case was there any Slavic population among them or dwelling between these Magyar inhabited territories and the motherland.⁵ In Rumania this applies to about half a million Magyars in Crisana where about 1,200,000 more were scattered around in Transylvania and Rumania proper, of whom the half constituted, and still do, a coherent ethnic island in Transylvania's southeastern most segment, called the Szeklerland or Szekelyland.⁶

Complicating the Hungarian problem was the fact that except for a few major cities with German culture and perhaps majority, all urban settlements above 50,000 population in Greater Hungary minus Croatia had a definitely Hungarian

attracted ethnic minorities before 1918. Once out of Transylvania they vanished from Rumanian tabulations discrediting Magyar figures concerning the parental Magyar stock of 1910 indirectly and without justification, although reflecting on a real situation. The Czechoslovak claim at the Paris Peace Conference that Trianon Hungary still had 450,000 Slovaks (see Alfred D. Low, The Soviet Hungarian Republic and the Paris Peace Conference [Philadelphia, 1963], p. 23), appears to have been done exactly on similar grounds, accounting for great many Slovaks already Magyarized in the urbanization process. Only about 200,000 Slovaks lived in Trianon Hungary in an ethnically homogeneous Slovak environment.

⁵Appendix II.

⁶This would bring, counting Burgenland as well, the Magyars detached from Hungary or who would have remained undisputably Hungarians, had the borders not been changed, to a grand total of about 3,300,000. Trianon Hungary had about half a million ethnic Germans, and, as seen 200,000 Slovaks.

character in culture and a Magyar or Magyar-German majority. Thus cities which happened to be separated from the core still constituted Magyar centers far beyond the ethnic boundaries enclosing Magyar masses.⁷

The loss of Magyar cities in or outside of the geographically coherent Magyar ethnic pool had less strategic-economic significance on Trianon Hungary than, for instance, the loss of Eastern Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine with their non-Magyar majority. They had little industry. But their separation when seen in context with the loss of Magyar rural areas became an emotional irritant to such an extent that, as it will be shown shortly, it placed serious limitations on national power by preventing the conduct of a foreign policy geared toward the saving of the national independence. The separation of more than three million Magyars, by great majority citizens of rural regions, undercut seriously Hungarian manpower potential from the point of view of a military balance of power with the Little Entente nations. These would have been stronger already without such a separation of Magyar vital energy from the Hungarian

⁷These cities did not become melting pots as did Budapest. Being administrative, commercial and cultural centers, their core was populated by Magyars and some Magyarizing elements in the old era, but did not absorb industrial workers from the outside in great numbers who would have re-stated their allegiance to the succession states in terms of ethnic-cultural belonging. Suburbia offered a varied, ethnically often non-Magyar picture, but mostly being rural in character, did not mix its culture with that of the core.

national body. Now the situation became completely upset from the point of view of basics of military feasibility.

In such a situation the need for an objective foreign policy focusing strictly on international power relations and realities was acute. In Hungary's case this was even more the case as the economic and industrial foundations of her military were also lost due to Trianon. Her power status with respect to foreign nations being essentially undermined, she needed consciousness of existing power relations more than smaller nations which were in a less precarious geopolitical situation and at liberty to build armies. Instead, due to the Trianon arrangement, she was given over to the furies of nationalistic passion and to the psychological need to mourn her lost territories. Reason never had a stronghold in Hungary when it came to matters political suggesting departure from emotional nationalism unless circumstances forced it. After 1920 one could have expected it would be brought into play as a healthy reaction to such a catastrophic defeat. It had been after the defeat of 1849. But the great patriarchs of Hungary were all dead by 1918. Hungary's Masaryk and Beneš--Francis Deák, and Count Julius Andrássy--were history, and even their spirit defunct. With the slowly emerging features of democratization that in Hungary too obeyed Tocqueville's dictum⁸ saying that all history moves towards its

⁸Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York, 1945), Vol. I, pp. 3-14.

aims, aristocratic rule and culture was modified by the political influence of the middle classes. The former as well as the latter met in a synthesis of romanticist nationalism even before World War One. Now the prospects of building a commercial republic and a state based on an objective political theory not only outwardly (as in some ways attempted before World War One) but also in the national conscience, were dealt a mortal blow.

The victory of reason in 1867 was possible because Hungary had gone down in glory in 1849 and because her Austrian opponent had been humiliated by a third party in 1865. After 1920 the victors, the Little Entente, as well as the vanquished, Hungary, were too deeply enmeshed in webs of their relative positions to allow reason to play a balancing and corrective role and become a tribunal of appeal in regulating their relations. The tragedy of the Trianon arrangement was that it refused to apply Wilson's principle of self-determination as far as Hungary was concerned and that if it had applied it, the new status quo would have stood a much better chance to survive in face of emerging National Socialism and Communism, Pan-Germanism, and the Muskovite empire.⁹ In this

⁹That one can speak about conscious rejection of the principle of self-determination at the Paris Peace Conference is made clear by the following remark of John Morton Blum: "Principles of justice or self-determination weighed light against the fact of possession, in international real estate nine tenth of the effective law." (John Morton Blum, Woodrow Wilson and the Politics of Morality [Boston, 1956], p. 165). That Wilson had no illusions about the new status quo but

sense Trianon had truly international significance. It also prejudiced Hungary's psychological ability to resist Germany and her military power to place a corrective on either German or Russian predatory ambitions. Trianon, therefore, is of essential significance for Hungarian national history not only internally, but also from the point of view of external events of 1938-1945 and thereafter.

It may sound exaggerated to say that Hungary could play a corrective role as to the super powers in any event. But Macartney has some classic words on this account when describing the political ideals of the only career diplomat whom Hungary inherited from the days of the Austrian-Hungarian empire to play some role in World War Two Hungarian history, Koloman Kánya, Foreign Minister of Hungary between 1933-1938:

He knew that every man and every nation was out for its own hand, and that politics, including international politics, was game in which the weakest went to the wall. He knew that big nations did not care a row of pins for small nations, but only used them as pawns, and he knew that the role of a pawn in a game is, too often, to be taken. On the other hand, in the right position and suitably guarded, it can check a king; or if it reaches the eighth square, itself become a queen.¹⁰

regarded it as subject to improvement is expressed by the following quotation of the President: "I am not hopeful that the individual items of the settlement . . . will be altogether satisfactory . . . no man and no body of men . . . know just how." "Yet if we are to make unsatisfactory settlements," he continued, "we must see to it that they are rendered more and more satisfactory." (*Ibid.*, pp. 162-163). But a mechanism of improvement was not provided for, at least not in terms rendering it effective.

¹⁰Macartney, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 109. Kertesz indicates (*op. cit.*, p. 20.) interest in Hungary as a pivot of France in 1920.

Had the Wilsonian principle of self-determination been more faithfully applied as regards Hungary, this would have built into the new status quo of 1920 a more stable Hungary. Emotionally, militarily and economically more balanced, Hungary may have become a pawn in the game that was "suitably guarded." Since she was in the right position, geographically speaking, to influence world history, especially when world history was determined by European history, her fate and the way she was treated in Trianon was not inconsequential with regard to the common good of nations. In a world rapidly becoming small and careless treatment of "the pawns" is increasingly dangerous, especially if they are in strategic positions. Their significance is in their geopolitical location and not in the number of their divisions and industrial production figures.

The policy of making the world safe for democracy would have required the application of distributive justice. Only healthy members of a society make for a healthy society. Hungary was crippled in Trianon and this in turn, crippled Central Europe. But Central Europe, or for that matter the Shatter Belt, comprising all nations between Germany and Russia, is essential to keep healthy in behalf of world balance of power and international security. In Trianon it was not recognized that without Hungary Central and Eastern Europe cannot be molded into a healthy international fraternity functioning

as one commonwealth. Yet to make it a commonwealth is essential for a balance of power situation in Europe.

There is nothing exaggerated in such a contention, regardless of its seeming overemphasis on the importance of one nation. It does not say, indeed, that Czechoslovakia, Poland or any other regional nation is an exception to this rule. All are needed. But that Hungary is needed too is born out by the fact that when Austria had tried to govern the region without Hungarian participation and against Hungarian will, she soon was led into defeats by third powers, such as at Königgrätz in 1865, forcing her to seek a compromise with Hungary.

1918 was the victory of the Slav over Magyars as 1848 had been a victory of Southern Germans over the same. The ultimate beneficiary of the second had been Berlin, as the ultimate beneficiary of the first has become Moscow. When that happened the regional problems of the Shatter Belt acquired universal significance. When things go wrong in the womb of the continent of Europe, hidden from the attention of maritime powers and global policy making, they are like the beginnings of a hurricane far out in unobserved regions. Nothing is small and unimportant that has a potential to lash with gale force at the centers of Western Civilization. Hungary was made one of the batteries of the engine pushing World War Two into motion--she was made such by Trianon. The function of a battery is to spark into combustive material--

nothing more and nothing less. She could have been made the opposite: she could have contributed to make Central and Eastern Europe healthy.

Austria-Hungary collapsed at least in part because of Hungarian reluctance to share the privileges of federal government with associate nationalities after she had risen to the level of equal partnership within the dual system from 1867 on. Yet in the situation prior to World War One, Europe's precarious balance of power securing equilibrium between Germany, Russia, Great Britain, and France presupposed the ability of the Dual Monarchy to keep the Danubian region together and thereby from falling into the hands of either Germany or Russia. This the Dual Monarchy accomplished for a while, by an alliance of Magyars with Middle and Southeast European Germans, providing for the military and political apparatus needed to keep Russia off the Balkan Peninsula. On the other hand, the attachment of Middle and Southeast European Germans to Hungary had equally saved these from falling into the arms of a Pan-Germanic, Berlin-controlled empire. At any rate the chemical composition of the Dual Monarchy was like the conglomerata of two hydrogen atoms (Germans and Hungarians, identical in the sense of equally sharing federal responsibilities in the imperial government) tying down an oxygen atom (the area Slavs, having at best self-government of a local nature only).

In 1918 in Paris this structure was recognized as being no more in existence. Thus the architects of the postwar order swung the pendulum in the opposite direction: area Slav nations plus Rumania were jointly given full responsibility to keep Central and Eastern Europe out of the reach of Russia and Germany. Area Germans and Hungarians were not allowed to participate in performing the same task.¹¹ While the first concept had resulted in the collapse of the Dual Monarchy, the second collapsed in an even shorter time, in a bare twenty years, by 1938.

Instead of two governments brought together under a monarch, securing prosperity and domestic peace (although not equal rights to all) by a common market and a common military command for all area nations, the new status quo established five entirely independent governments (those of Vienna, Budapest, Prague, Bucharest, and Belgrade) with no coordinated common economics, or unified military establishment. While two of the succession states were internally still split by the Czech-Slovak as well as Serbian-Croatian disputes, all of them were also divided into blocks, opposing each other. Moreover, the structure of these regional alliances were so weak and their aims in many respects so vague

¹¹Hungarian participation to aid Poland during the 1920 Russian War was sought by Poland and hindered by Czechoslovakia. See Kertesz, op. cit., pp. 22-23. Since Austria-Hungary had been deemed merely a satellite of Germany in the latter part of World War One, both Austria and Hungary were regarded as unreliable in the Western capitals from the point of view in curbing Pan-Germanism. (See Low, op. cit., p. 9).

that in most cases each of the governments in question conducted entirely incoherent foreign policies, bringing about a gradual yet complete fragmentation of these alliances. Thus all the member states became an easy prey first for Germany and then Russia. That this happened to the common detriment of Europe is well exemplified by the history of the last thirty years, although such consequences were obviously not foreseen in Paris in 1919.

One should consider at this point some of the practical consequences of the rejection of the Wilsonian solution with respect to the Hungarian problem, as well as the pros and cons of it. Only after such considerations one can put his finger on cruxes of Hungarian policies during World War Two.

Not only was the integrity of the regional power structure of the Shatter Belt undermined by one-sided policies favoring certain groups in Central and East-Central Europe, both in Trianon and before. The self-defence capability and the strategic and economic viability of Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary, each in itself, was made a practical impossibility. Each made weak, they had to fall before Germany in a classic display of the domino theory. But of the three Hungary had a theoretically better chance to survive. Austria was ethnically homogeneous with Germany. Czechoslovakia for ethnic reasons, and being associated politically with the Slav world, was essentially hostile to Berlin. She was a prime target of Hitler. Hungary, by contrast, was neither homogeneous

nor heterogeneous for Hitlerite thinking. That she did not survive was not due to Hitler's all-consuming racial love and hate complexes. As will be shown in the next chapter, it was due to strategic considerations. Once a problem was removed from the emotional spheres of Hitler's ego it assumed a certain rational quality. A militarily, economically, and especially morally stronger Hungary which was neither an immediate attraction nor an irritant for ethnic-racial reasons for Hitler, would have had a chance to counter German policies as long as Germany was not completely master of the continent. Germany needed agricultural areas where production did not depend on German military rules and especially so until she had organized the territories of Poland and Russia. Thus Hungary was handled on bases of rational and not racial considerations.

But Trianon denied Hungary the capacity for self-defence, and made her economy void of sources of strategic raw materials, especially iron, so that economic independence versus Germany was impossible as soon as all Europe was in German hands. Even worse, Trianon made Hungarian society emotionally subservient to the German cause, as Germany promised revision of the Treaty. Had it not been for these reasons, Hungary could have achieved a military status of sorts, an army not dependent on German controlled iron and not subservient in soul to Germany. In this case the basis of Hungarian-German relations would have become rational even as far as Hungary was concerned. This in turn, would have enabled the Hungarian government to

follow a foreign policy not motivated by economic, military, and emotional reasons that limited its freedom in resolving dilemmas such as entering or not World War Two.

It is always advisable to indicate the character of a political problem along lines of its evolution, thus historically, but especially so in the context of an evaluation where each of the agents or actors are influenced in their decisions by history.

The tragic quality of the East-Central European map is that its ethnic borderlines never coincided with the strategic ones, and that economic health for any of the states here could seldom be achieved if boundaries were drawn from either the strategic or the ethnic point of view. Nature created a strategic and economic unit in the Carpathian basin, but history upset this unity by a confusion between its native tongues and nationalities. Trianon legalized this confusion and gave even further impetus to political and economic separatism.

The Slovak iron and textile industries, created under the Hungarian regime, were cut off from their market in Budapest. Iron ore from Slovakia was used to some extent by the heavy industry of the Czech Lands, but the cost of transport was a heavy burden, somewhat relieved as better railway connections were established from east to west. The ironworks, on the other hand, were condemned to stagnation for they could not compete with the metallurgical industry in Bohemia . . . and were eventually closed down . . . (The) peasants also suffered severely from the dislocation created by the new frontiers. The inhabitants of the unproductive mountain regions of Slovakia used before 1918 to find work as agricultural laborers in the Hungarian plain. Now, although Czechoslovakia had helped herself to a liberal chunk of the plain, most

of this employment was cut off. A large proportion of the peasantry of Slovakia made their living, not from cultivation but from the forests, which supplied the former Hungary with much of her timber. During the first years of the Republic this trade continued, if on a reduced scale. In 1930, however, the Czechoslovak-Hungarian Trade Treaty was denounced and, in accordance with the wish of the Agrarian Party, a policy of strict agricultural protection was adopted.¹²

Such economic dislocations, complemented with cultural and political ones were felt most everywhere along both sides of the new borders. They were bound to increase the feeling of insecurity both in the victorious succession states and Hungary. Any contentment by the Little Entente with less territory in 1919 was not regarded from the point of view that such arrangements might lessen ethnic, cultural, and economic tensions, but rather that it could provide Hungary with the opportunity of an economic come back and military revanche.

An opportunity is not identical with the realization of it. The fact, however, hiding behind the basic outline of the new status quo, was that the central location of the Magyars, when compared with the situation of the Slavs and Rumanians on the perimeter gave greater advantages, strategically speaking, to the former. A balance to this was available in Rumanians, Czechs, and Serbs beyond the basin. But it would have been a precarious balance if it had left all Hungarians pooled in the center under Magyar sovereignty, the more so

¹²Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 178. The Agrarian Party was Czechoslovak.

as such an arrangement was bound to bring Carpatho-Ukraine under Hungarian rule. Would then such a Hungary not have turned against the Little Entente at the first opportunity? The answer, as perceived in Prague, Bucharest, and Belgrade was that she obviously would. Hungarian heritage, culture, and basic dispositions suggested nothing to the contrary. Placed in the center geographically and made to be the political unifying factor of the Carpathian basin by history, between circa 900 and 1926, as well as 1867-1918, the Magyars had not demonstrated the wisdom to understand the Slavs of their neighborhood, or to organize them politically before some non-regional power would. They had never treated them as equals, just as the ruling Magyar historic classes never perceived the necessity of involving their own lower class ethnic brothers in building representative governments, either.

To put the argument this way places the responsibility for Trianon on the shoulders of established Magyar society. It also would inject a new element into strictly political, strategic, ethnic, and economic lines of reasoning, namely that of political culture, inferring that its quality must perhaps be considered first when decisions of political nature are being made. Had Hungarian society, so it says, been democratic and liberal, the application of Wilsonian principles could have been risked.

The position of this study is, surveying the catalogue of East-Central European events leading to disaster for all area nations, that in order to establish a viable new order of collective security in all of Europe the Wilsonian solution should have been implemented in spite of such well founded fears. Only the tactic of taking maximum risks would have paid off. Hungary turned against the Little Entente at the first opportunity, to be sure. But nothing undermined more the European balance of power in 1938 and subsequent years than the fact that Austria and Hungary had been left out of the Danubian Commonwealth of the new status quo of 1919, estranged from the rest of the Danubian and thus of the Western European nations as well. The concept that both nations would have allied themselves with Germany anyway if permitted to do so, due to their culture and heritage, should, however, be strongly contested as far as Hungary was concerned. The record of Hungarian history between 1938 and 1944 is by all means more indicative of a pro-German alliance than of anti-German policies, although signs of the latter abound too. But the point is, that partial identification with the German cause was the result of domestic Hungarian political forces pressured into frustration over Trianon, and of Hungarian defence capabilities being so much prejudiced by the political, economic and military provisions of the treaty that after 1920 only exceptional efforts and political skill could have saved this country from partaking in the decomposition of the

existing status quo. Since, however, Hungary even so did display a sense of self-restraint and independence, although to no avail, the assumption that a better treatment of her in Trianon would have led to a different situation in Central Europe and thus in Europe generally, is definitely a warranted one.

Feeling the impact of hostile neighborhood nationalism having its way a hundred percent with the leading democracies, Hungary inherited from Trianon not only a poor defence posture but also a resentment against the established world order and its representative forces. Her post-bellum mood can only be described as reactionary.

One must carefully qualify the latter part of this statement if a lapse into generalization and sloganry is to be avoided. Theodore Roosevelt, on his visit to Hungary in 1910 found this country the most progressive and most closely resembling the United States by her dynamism in all of Europe.¹³ By all means this had been said before World War One. But the Horthy era, building on the wreck of a once so hopefully developing country from the points of view of economic evolution and democratic process, displayed a melancholy kind of reactionary attitude, not the dynamic, totalitarian type of it. Further analyses would point out specifics of this spirit, including dangerous, dynamic types of extremism as well.¹⁴ Yet the

¹³May, op. cit., p. 227.

¹⁴See Macartney, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 29-33.

overall record of the era points to somewhat opposite evolution than that occurring in Germany, as the Hungarian government (not society, though) moved from the far right increasingly toward more and more conservative, and occasionally even liberal tenets. This lasted until Hungary came under the direct pressure of German might and the ideological heritage of the 1920 counterrevolution, surviving in parts of the Hungarian society, revived under German influence. The ultimate proof of the correctness of this analysis stems from the fact that the Horthy system fell as the victim of National Socialism.

Our concern with Hungarian domestic cultural evolution at this juncture is from the angle of what general consequences the Trianon Peace Treaty had on Hungary, the Carpathian Basin, and European collective security. The above outlined evaluation of the Horthy era indicates that a more highly reasoned arrangement in Paris could have strengthened the hands of moderate Hungarian politicians in the period of 1932-1944 and allowed free embarking in ventures more closely suiting European, Danubian, as well as long-range Hungarian interests. This is, however, only a conjecture and remains impossible to prove. What appears clear, is that Hungary due to Trianon could have become a genuinely totalitarian state too with all the negative military and political consequences of European history, as a result of a situation that had allowed her nothing but wearing her chains. That this did not occur, was not the merit of the Paris planners, but was due to domestic

landowner interests and conservative temper, which put the brakes on extremism sooner or later. However, Trianon made of Hungary a split society where in addition to territorial and economic dismemberment and military annihilation, moral union had to be sacrificed as a result of the struggle ensuing between ill-advised nationalistic passion and a cautious judgment taking its lights from reason. Nationalistic passion had found its home in Hungary before Trianon. It had been the major reason for the Dual Monarchy being unable to develop into a satisfactory political framework for its Slavic elements. But it had been the passion of Hungarians exercising political control.

After Trianon frustrated Hungarians grew embittered and psychotic.¹⁵ Taking the form of revisionist propaganda which of course was not unjustified per se in view of the exaggerations committed in Paris, it was fermented by government and society both. It soon reached the point, however, when even Germany could easily blackmail the government through her agents active in Hungarian political life. Revisionism in the hands of pro-German demagogues proved to be a boomerang for Hungarian national interests.

There is reason to believe that even the actual declaration of war against the Soviet Union by the government of Ladislao Bãrdossy was made under the impact of such influences. By that time the issue was not receiving back the Hungarian

¹⁵See Lengyel, op. cit., p. 210.

inhabited territories but rather clinging to them. Hungary did not participate in the original onslaught against Russia on June 22, 1941 but Rumania did. All Axis countries declared war on Russia in the first hours of the German surprise attack except Japan and Hungary. But as the days passed, two Hungarian politicians took off for Berlin, both pro-German and in the opposition, armed with the argument that if Hungary did not join the rest, Germany would reaward Northern Transylvania to a faithful Rumania, Southern Slovakia to the faithful government in Bratislava. At this point the issue, as seen by Bárdossy, was no longer revisionism but the existence of the national government. According to Macartney,¹⁶ Bárdossy originally did not even want to break diplomatic relations with Moscow. Now he was pressured into this measure expressly wanted by Berlin as a minimum sign of solidarity with the Axis, under the impact of Imrédy's and Mecsér's journey to Berlin and its ominous implications. He still did not think of declaring war until the news of the air attack on Kassa (Kosice) arrived. The planes were said to be, as seen,¹⁷ of Russian origin, but Bárdossy suspected with some reason that the attack had been staged by German planes or some Hungarian pilots acting under German instigation. If that was true, it could be taken as a sign that Germany indeed wanted Hungary to join the war, although she did not say so

¹⁶Macartney, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 22.

¹⁷See Chapter II.

openly.¹⁸ This was bad enough, but still could be easily resisted unless it implied a policy of the Wilhelmstrasse to remove the existing government in case of non-compliance. The latter, however, was a dreadfully realistic possibility. The reason for this was nothing less than the psychological condition of the Hungarian public. Any politician using the powerful organs of the right wing press could force the government into resigning by simply claiming that its policies jeopardized Hungary's acquisitions since 1938. This was exactly the case here, however. In fact, a few generals could accomplish the trick and get away with it, enjoying the support of a completely dazed pro-German public opinion. The propaganda campaign for the revision of Trianon, which in 1941 was twenty years old, now proved to be a deadly orientation eliminating the freedom of decision making. Thus Hungary entered the war in spite of no direct German call for doing it, and against Ciano's advice "to keep your powder dry."¹⁹

The following conclusions are appropriate at this point of the inquiry:

1. The Trianon Peace Treaty reflected on a continuation of old Danubian policies of ethnic discrimination instead of

¹⁸Ordinances of Operation Barbarossa provided for Finnish and Rumanian participation and not for Hungarian ones; see H. R. Trevor-Roper, Hitler's War Directives, 1939-1945 (London, 1964), p. 50.

¹⁹Macartney, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 25, footnote 1.

interdependence among all component nations and nationalities of the region. It was a treaty motivated by fear of a revanche among the victors. It led to a departure from the Wilsonian concept by mixing it with strategic and economic considerations in behalf of the pro-Western succession states.

2. Abandoning the Wilsonian concept led to a political situation where centrifugal regional policies dominated, splitting the area into juxtaposed fragments, and each nation and nationality seeking security in great powers disinterested in regional well being.

3. Centrifugal developments were accentuated by denying Hungary the core section of the Danubian area, a right to exist as a nation-state with economic viability, self-defence capability and dignity. This situation prejudiced the capability of the entire region to resist Germany and Russia.

4. By denying the right of self-defence, the Trianon Peace Treaty prejudiced Hungary's potential to resist Germany and Russia at least to a certain extent, and the potential of taking advantage of situations favorable for asserting a regional policy of self-determination.

5. By depriving Hungary of ethnic Magyar areas and economic viability, the Treaty generated a public opinion in Hungary inclining to the voice of emotionalism in foreign policy. Militarily, economically, and psychologically it put grave burdens on Hungary severely limiting her national power.

But the Treaty still did not paralyze this completely. Hungary still remained a state uncontrolled by any foreign power in the direct sense of the term. With a population of only eight million but an industrial potential roughly equivalent with that of Rumania and Yugoslavia combined in 1938, all did not come to end for Hungary with Trianon. The pawn still could be moved ahead and check the kings of the game. All that she needed was to grow in internal strength with every opportunity of the fast changing international situation. But that growth would have to be military and industrial in nature, affecting the country's economic basis and sociological and cultural climate. This did not happen. Hungary entered the era of the second round of great power confrontation in this century essentially in the same shape in which the first round had left her. Consolidation was achieved in terms of a superficial moral and economic stability. Growth of national power was not. As a result, even moral unity broke down under stress, as it has been shown.²⁰

²⁰An objective historical synthesis on Trianon Hungary is yet to be written. The above verdict is the result of condensation of a multiplicity of facts illustrated in this study from one angle, the military aspect, in Chapter V.

CHAPTER IV

THE SECOND GOVERNING FACTOR: NEITHER GERMANY NOR RUSSIA WERE PRONE TO TOLERATE NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF MILITARY CONSEQUENCE IN EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE

One of the numerous tragic episodes of World War Two drew to close in Warsaw on October 2, 1944. After two months of vicious fighting, remnants of the Polish Underground Army, some 25,000 men, surrendered to the Germans, putting an end to an uprising which was meant to last a few days. The strange circumstance of this story was that the entire battle as well as the surrender took place in the presence of a passively on-looking Soviet Army. On July 31, 1944, as Winston Churchill describes it, the Germans were as good as beaten east of the Vistula. The fast rolling Soviet offensive already had the city of Warsaw in sight, moving quickly toward the Polish capital. Russian planes strafed and bombed German installations there, artillery shelled them, and the Soviet radio called for an uprising against the common enemy.¹ As soon as the revolt erupted, however, the Soviet attitude turned into one of complete passivity. Their advance stopped. For six weeks none of their airplanes appeared over the city which became exposed to newly concentrated German troops and artillery barrages.

¹See Winston S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (New York, 1962), pp. 110-111.

Nor did the Red artillery, armor or troops see action either. Only on September 14 did the Russians start parachuting a few arms, when the hungered, beleaguered city's fate was already sealed.

"They wished to have the non-Communist Poles destroyed to the full, but also keep alive the idea that they were going to their rescue,"² commented Churchill. The refusal to permit United States aircraft to land on nearby Russian controlled airfields, in order to refuel after dropping ammunition supplies over the city provides further dramatic proof.

The Soviet Government cannot of course object to English or American aircraft dropping arms in the region of Warsaw, since this is an American and British affair. But they decidedly object to American or British aircraft, after dropping arms in the region of Warsaw, landing on Soviet territory, since the Soviet Government do not wish to associate themselves either directly or indirectly with the adventure in Warsaw.³

Reasons for such policies by the Soviet Government must be all too clear to anyone with knowledge of the history of Russian-Polish relations. These have been marred by constant Russian efforts to control Warsaw and a great part of Poland.⁴ Logically enough the non-Communist Poles in 1944 hoped to

²Ibid., p. 123.

³Ibid., pp. 114-115. Vyshinsky to United States Ambassador in Moscow on August 16, 1944.

⁴See "History of Warsaw," The Encyclopedia Americana, Vol. XXVIII (New York, 1958), pp. 716-717. With reference to the "Battle of Warsaw" August 15, 1920, see Arthur Bliss Lane, "Poland, History," Ibid., Vol. XXII, p. 290b; in reference to the Molotov-Rippentrop Treaty, p. 290c.

secure the capital for themselves in order to allow the Polish Government-in-exile a return to a central home base before the arrival of Soviet troops would have elicited the need of Russian consent. Success of the uprising would have nested an independent government in the capital of a nation consisting of thirty million, protected by Polish arms, and wedged between Germany and Russia. The inevitable consequence would have been that save an outright Russian military attack on Warsaw, the reconstruction of independent Poland could not have been easily prevented. Such a possibility was deemed intolerable by Stalin and his advisors.

Nor did the Germans regard the Warsaw uprising as a small matter either. According to Stalin and Churchill they concentrated four armored divisions, including the "Hermann Goering" division to crash it.⁵ In view of the fact that this operation coincided with the immediate aftermath of Allied breakthrough from their bridgehead in Normandy and the new invasion of the French Riviera with the result of taking Paris and France in a few weeks (Paris fell on August 25, 1944), one might be tempted to judge the German counter attack against Warsaw as an outstanding example of misplacing military energy and applying it for secondary tasks in a time of dire hardship.

Actually Hitler wished to make Germany the ultimate and indispensable barrier available to the Western Democracies

⁵Churchill, op. cit., p. 113.

blocking the Soviets. Germany could thus escape the consequences of the policy of unconditional surrender, announced already as the Allied war aim. The reinstatement of a free Poland would have interfered fundamentally with such hopes, diminishing the indispensability of Germany in a balance of power scheme. Thus the German attitude, exactly as the Russian one, was based on no immediate military but rather on far reaching political considerations. Ironically, as a result of such German and Russian machinations, the government in the behalf of which Great Britain and France entered the conflict in 1939, and the nation in behalf of which World War Two began, evaporated as an independent power and could not until today recapture its pre-war ability to freely determine her policies. Poland now must aid the Soviet Union in balancing the forces of NATO, mainly those of the new Bundesrepublic, instead of being a balance for Paris, or generally the West against both Russia and Germany.

The Warsaw episode is used here to project the background of Hungary's situation in World War Two. In a world built on principles of balance of power, the ultimate political considerations are of course based on strategic points of view. The conduct of German and Russian war policies exemplify that long range political and strategic considerations overruled immediate tactical ones. With respect to Warsaw, decisions were influenced not by military requirements of the conflict but by concepts of a postwar order.

The geo-political and strategic situation in Hungary is comparable to Poland's in great many ways. While control over Poland is a pre-condition of moving armies between Berlin and Moscow, strategic traffic between Germany and the Balkan Peninsula on one hand and between Russia and the Bosphorus, Italy and the Western Mediterranean, on the other, is equally impractical without control over Hungary. No matter how small this country had become after World War One, its capital remained the focal point of most railroad and highway communications in the Carpathian basin. Even those strategic tracks and roads which happen to avoid Budapest, as for example, the Vienna-Szombathely-Nagykanizsa-Pecs-Osice-Belgrade railroad, do traverse Hungary, making Hungarian facilities indispensable. The Carpathian basin is the heart of South East European traffic, of which the heart even after Trianon still remained Hungary.

To exemplify this further, in 1941 there existed only two direct railroads linking Austria to Yugoslavia: the Graz-Maribor-Zidani Most-Zagreb-Belgrade line, which in substantial portions was a single track railroad in World War Two, and the Klagenfurt-Ljubjana-Zidani Most line, which from that point on joined the previous one. Both were extremely vulnerable due to guerrilla activities in the mountain sections of Slovenia in the war years.

By contrast, railroad lines through Hungary reached Belgrade through plains easy to control. Since no railroad

and highway network existed in World War Two on the Yugoslavian side of the Adriatic Sea, Belgrade was the controlling gate over the Peninsula from the North. Yet Belgrade is easier to reach across Hungary either from Vienna or Kiev than via Bucharest or Graz, especially in war time conditions. The Germans built a superhighway linking Belgrade to Zagreb which, however, had Hungary gone pro-Allied and been able to endure, would have been exposed to airpower operating from a short distance.

An important transcontinental highway from the English Channel to Istanbul had been completed across Hungary and the Balkans before World War Two. In the post-war era an eastern fork was built to it, connecting the Soviet Empire with Budapest by a new strategic highway, thus making the Hungarian capital as important a merger point for the international European highway system as she is with respect to railroads. In addition to this a new strategic highway, Hungarian highway number six, was built in the Fifties, parallel to the Danube. Highway number six together with others gives the Soviet Union an increased capability of reaching the borders of Northern-Western Yugoslavia and Northern Italy rapidly with mechanized troops and armor. All these roads lead through the historic communication line of the Ottoman Turks between Belgrade and Buda. Both of these highways, along with three trans-Hungarian railroad lines, connect with Belgrade and the Northern mouth of the most important Balkan valley leading south to Sofia, Istanbul, Saloniki, and Athens.

But if Hungary was, and still is, almost indispensable to these continental powers to penetrate the Balkans or Italy, respectively, circumstances made her absolutely indispensable for conducting strategic traffic between Germany and Rumania, the oil country of Europe. In order to explain this situation one must reiterate a few historical and geographical facts. First, for transporting oil, the most feasible method was to use shipping on the Danube, straight across Hungary, among other countries. But to secure this oil, which was threatened by the Russian occupation of the Rumanian province of Bessarabia in July 1940, Germany had no other alternative but to ask from Hungary permission to cross the country with troops.⁶ Incidentally both the Hungarians and Rumanians agreed to this for a number of political reasons, among which the Soviet presence so close to Bucharest and the Eastern gates of the Balkans ranked first, the absence of any Western military power in the Balkans second. (More feared and hated among continental great powers in Eastern Europe was Russia, not Germany.) In 1940 Great Britain and France, not to mention the United

⁶Had Hungary resisted and thus forced Germany's hand against her, the Soviet Union could have been gravely tempted into an adventure to reach Ploesti first, since, while the Germans would have to cover a distance of approximately 400 miles across mountains, the Russians had only 120 miles of going across plains, unless deployment of parachutists would not change such arithmetic. (The distance from Vienna is greater--the 400 miles figure is measured from Eastern Slovakia.)

States, were military non-entities in the Danube Valley for all immediate practical purpose.⁷

Hungary proved to be the key link for the German Army in reaching Ploesti and blocking any possible Soviet expansion further into Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and down to the Straits. This if anything proves the geo-political significance of Hungary and underlines the proposition that her position is very similar to Poland's. Thus her military weakness ought to be a requirement for either of the two great continental powers, once they had the capacity and the will to build empires.

When Hungary let the Germans through, it was of necessity, as she could tolerate the presence of Russia in the Balkans even less than the presence of Germany. But if she were strong and allied with other area nations, notably Yugoslavia and Poland, and perhaps even others, she might have attempted or she might attempt in the future to withstand both Germany and the Soviet Union.⁸ Again, had she been strong militarily, she might have cooperated with Western Powers at a later stage of the war when Germany

⁷The Rumanian crisis began on July 10, 1940 with a Soviet ultimatum and the seizure of Bessarabia, immediately after the French debacle, armistice and Italy's entry in the war, reducing to zero the capability of the Near East Wavell army to play any other role but defending Suez. Thus even traditionally pro-Western Rumania had to seek German protection against "Stalin ante portas" if she was to avoid a grave danger of being treated like Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had been a few months earlier.

⁸See Appendix VI.

became weakened. With such a key position in communications, if this had been coupled with adequate military power, anything might have happened to Germany in South-Eastern Europe as soon as Hungary solidly entrenched herself in a strategic position in the Carpathian basin. Among other possibilities, Hungarian air power, had it been developed after Germany reached maximum power could have checked Germany through a capacity to attack the Ploesti oil fields.

Concluding this line of thought, Hitler could not contribute to the building of a strong Hungary at the time of Germany's advance in 1938-41. This might have meant new hardships for him, as shown by the close call with respect to reaching Rumania in time, and again with Yugoslavia.⁹ Nor could he tolerate a strong Hungary during and after his retreat from Russia for this would have enabled Hungary to play the game independently and fill the power vacuum left by Germany in South-Eastern Europe very much against Hitler's last hopes to survive as an indispensable barrier against Russia, covering Paris, London, and indirectly the Middle East.

The policies of the Truman doctrine which began to build Western defences in the Eastern Mediterranean area and the attention given to Yugoslavia, encouraging her

⁹The Russian-Yugoslav cultural and friendship treaty published on the day of Germany's attack on Yugoslavia would not have spelled good for Hitler, had a Balkan front solidified.

departure from the Moscow camp, actually secured the Western powers only a precarious defense line cushioning the Mediterranean. It is easy to see how Truman's policies might have benefitted Hungary at a later postwar date had she maintained her independent status. Still more importantly, this was easy for Hitler to see in advance too, which may have influenced his policies toward Hungary.

Finally, even between the years of German advance and German retreat, in the years of stalemate, when Hitler still could dream about his Thousand Years' Empire, but Hungary could also have built up some significant military potential, he showed signs of misgivings concerning Hungarian power, as a force interferring with his Danubian plans.¹⁰ Thus during none of the war phases, or for that matter before the war, was Hitler inclined to allow Hungary to overcome handicaps inherited from the Trianon situation to any substantial degree.¹¹

The concluding fact is that both Germany and Russia would go to any length to suppress Central and East-Central European military capability. Russia for example never fails

¹⁰Hitler's Secret Conversations 1941-44, translated by Norman Cameron and R. H. Stevens (New York, 1953), pp. 326-327. Hitler planned a German state at the Iron Gate, south of Hungary because "the Danube is . . . the link to Turkey. And it's only when one's lines of communications are safe that one can build a world empire."

¹¹This is well exemplified by the type of strategic material Germany was willing to sell to Hungary. See the next chapter.

to exploit the propaganda values of moderation shown by political and military inaction and retreat when she can afford them, as she has demonstrated twice by abstaining from the occupation of Finland (1940 and 1941-45), and by pulling out of Iran in 1946. Both were done, or appearing to be, as concessions to Western interests and public opinion. Still in Warsaw in 1944, Budapest in 1956, and Prague in 1968, no amount of propaganda and moral prestige loss could prevent the Moscow government, be it under Stalin, Khrushchev, or the Brezhnev-Kosygin team, from acting as it did.¹²

One illusion among Hungarians afraid of a German occupation in 1943 and early 1944 was that Germany could ill afford such a move against an ally in view of possible reactions affecting German morale. Although obviously false, this argument must have had some hold on German decision making, as "Operation Margarethe" did not take place until Russian troops approached Hungary's borders, thus, until there developed some practical chance of a Hungarian surrender. By contrast, the Kállay government had continuously annoyed Germany for at least the previous fifteen months.

¹²The evacuation of Austria in 1956, weakening seemingly Russia's military position to some extent in Central Europe was from Moscow's point of view well worth the trouble. British, American, and French troops pulled out as well and Austria pledged neutrality while she was to remain militarily weak. The arrangement led to a separation of Italy from Germany with respect to NATO strategic traffic and prevented the building of a NATO defense position in this mountain country. It also lifted Russia's image of reasonableness.

Still, Hungary's invasion remains a good proof of the thesis that no matter what other considerations might advise, the two continental super powers cannot tolerate an independent decision making potential of a military nature by regional governments in East-Central Europe. The proof is in the fact that psychologically it would have been highly unlikely, if not altogether impossible, for the Hungarian government to make any decision which would bring Russian troops into Hungary. In March, 1944 the Red Army approached the natural barrier of the Carpathian Alps and the "Árpád" defense line, not the open Rumanian-Hungarian border within the Carpathian basin, well behind the Carpathians, as it did in September of the same year. To give up these fortifications was incompatible with Hungarian thinking. No government would have dared to do it. The people, or at least the military, would not have stood for it without engaging in a revolution. In fact, as long as the Carpathian ridge was not taken, Hungarian determination to fight Russia was unshakable, and would have been even under the leadership of Kállay. Whatever degree the dissent reached about Hungarian policies with respect to the Western powers and the qualifications of Hungary's alliance with Germany in that direction, the will of the nation remained unified concerning the need to defend the Carpathian line. No seeds of a pro-Communist rebellion were conceived either among the armed forces or among the population. Thus the closer Russian armies came to the

Carpathian line, the more likely it was that Hungary would increase the amount of her troops on the front and thereby engage in a more determined participation in a war which she now would have regarded to be in the prime national interest. Consequently, there was very little need for Germany to be afraid of a Hungarian about face as long as this opened Hungary to the troops of the power always considered to be her "Asian archfoe."

Perhaps Hitler was afraid that there might be a deal between Hungarians, Russians, and the Western Powers, putting troops of all three on Hungarian soil. Perhaps he was worried that Hungarian resistance against Russia not under the auspices of the German High Command would give the Hungarian government an increased potential to bargain with the Allies and thus undercut his own chances of defending Europe against the Russians. Or perhaps, he was simply hysterical about potential turncoats among his allies. At any rate, Germany decided not to take any chances. It seems that in executing "Operation Margarethe"¹³ Germany wanted to have unconditional control over Hungary rather than to rely on political reasoning which would have kept her from calling all the cards.

There are three possibilities open to Berlin or Moscow in making of East-Central Europe a power vacuum. They may,

¹³Macartney, op. cit., p. 226.

first, permit the existence of "regional" governments that are not controlled internally by their agents, but not allow them to build a military potential. Unless acute crisis sets in in global or continental great power relations, this may be a feasible way of controlling the area indirectly, by exercising pressure via military superiority ready to strike at a moment's notice from the neighborhood.

Or, secondly, they may control such a government via their agents internally, and then it is permissible to build up the military potential of these countries, so that it may serve the tutor power's interests. In addition, a third means is available by applying the ancient principle of divide and rule, turning the regional powers mutually against each other. For the first solution the example in the Hitler era was Hungary, for the second Antonescu's Rumania, and for the third the two country's feud.

But since availability of military means is a primordial necessity for conducting national defence policies, and political allegiance of any government is a mutable secondary value, Hungary was unable to help herself in spite of having a government made up of independent minded leaders (in part, and for a while, only), because she had not developed enough military capability. Rumania, by contrast, was able to use her German-built army against Germany, first, because she had a strong army, and secondly, because this army was willing to fight Germany when orders amounting to such were given. Thus she

profited directly from having a government trusted in Berlin, for it was Antonescu whose leadership elicited the pouring in of German arms. The arms remained, Antonescu was dispensed of, and Rumania, enjoying the new status of rendering invaluable aid to the United Nations and especially Russia, repossessed Northern Transylvania, making the country once again a viable geopolitical unit. Possessing armament and having national unity means that opportunities may be harnessed in behalf of national self-determination even if the place is East-Central Europe, and the enemy one of the great powers dedicated to oppress free nations in this area.

The following conclusions stand out from the thoughts expressed in this chapter:

1. It is essential for Germany and Russia to prevent nation-states becoming militarily strong, even more so the forming of strong, independent-minded regional alliances in Eastern, Central, and East-Central Europe.
2. No medium or small power in these areas can rely on any of its great power neighbors for armament and at the same time have a national government left internally uncontrolled by its tutor ally.
3. It is better for a second-rate power to have arms at the price of accepting a satellite government if society and the military is independent-minded than of trying to prolong the life of its independent government at the price of remaining militarily weak.

4. Hungary had a rather pro-German military and a middle class. This made the difficult choice outlined in No. 3 impracticable. It was imperative to keep her government internally independent and free from German agents even at the price of the country remaining militarily weak. The responsibility for this situation, however, rests mainly with Trianon and the historical evolution of Hungarian society, as indicated in the previous chapter.

5. The limitation of Hungarian national power which had been substantial due to Trianon thus did not improve after the collapse of the Trianon status quo.

CHAPTER V

THE THIRD GOVERNING FACTOR: DIFFICULTIES AND INADEQUACIES OF HUNGARIAN FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICIES IN MEETING THE CHALLENGE TO THE COUNTRY'S MILITARY POSTURE

The cumulative effect of the great power policies outlined in the previous two chapters on the military situation of Hungary was very serious. What the de facto consequences of the military clauses of the Trianon Peace Treaty amounted to is difficult to assess without indicating some of the facts. A country authorized an army of 35,000 men, 12,000 gendarmes, 12,000 police, 840 armed water police, 624 state forest rangers, 7,500 customs' and treasury officials (the majority of which were unarmed), without the right to keep an air force, or even to manufacture war planes and armor, or to possess artillery pieces larger than 105 millimeter in caliber, combed by allied military control committees checking whether these restrictions are faithfully kept is severely handicapped in obtaining a reasonable capacity of self-defence.¹ But there existed greater additional difficulties inherent in the overall strategic situation of Hungary. Such problems prevented a gradual and relative amelioration of

¹Kálmán Molnár, Magyar Közjog (Budapest, 1929), pp. 186-189. See also Appendix VIII.

the status of the military, as occurred for instance in Germany.²

The Germans managed to overcome many restrictions even before Hitler took control. No matter how similar the corresponding military clauses of the Trianon, Saint Germain, and Versailles Treaties had been, the latter's practical applicability to Germany remained disproportionately less than those forced upon the small states of Austria and Hungary. Consequently, while a nation of sixty-five million people, with a giant industrial network and clusters of expert scientists and technicians found little difficulty in building initially secret elements into her armed strength, Austria and Hungary lagged ever more critically behind as the years passed. In this it was not so much allied control³ as industrial and financial weakness and the lack of shrewdness, advanced planning and organizational talent in the military that played a major role. For instance, Germany found relatively little difficulty in exporting parts of her air industry to foreign countries (Fokker moved to Holland), and German engineers, technicians, and flying personnel soon found opportunities either abroad or at home to stay in business and thus become

²For instance, the Dornier Do 23 (later Do 11) bomber, disguised as a freighter built for the German State Railway, first flew on May 7, 1932. See Flying Review International, V, No. 21 (London, 1966), p. 317.

³By 1927 it relaxed, according to Macartney, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 87, which on the other hand does not mean that it came entirely to an end.

the core of a new team responsible for the success of a rapid build-up of the Luftwaffe in the early and mid-Thirties. By contrast, the respective prescriptions of the Paris Treaties⁴ in warding off subterfuges had a crushing effect on Austrian and Hungarian aerial development. There had existed an aircraft industry in these countries in World War One, of which nothing substantial survived, while the industrial and military team in its majority was allowed to scatter. It was not entirely due to the Treaty that this occurred, yet its negative impact could hardly be dismissed.

It is important to emphasize in this connection that the Imperial and Royal Army (K.U.K.) had stifled initiative and independent thinking as a protection for the only ideological tie holding it together, which was a tradition to cling to the Hapsburg dynasty. But the spirit of the early twentieth century had not been in accord with a non-nationalist ideal. The army of the Dual Monarchy therefore had to turn itself into a snail whose shell would protect it against exposure to contemporary culture. This meant utter helplessness in a moment of total collapse such as in 1918-19.

Moreover, speaking of Hungary alone, she was handicapped even further by Austrian watchfulness which did not allow many Hungarians to obtain the highest professional education in the so-called Common Army, which was the federal organ of the Hapsburgian armed services. In the purely Magyar branch, the

⁴See Appendix VIII.

Honvéds--equivalent to the National Guard in a sense--the equipment was of secondary quality,⁵ and men with a background for staff service were scarce. All in all, Hungary had not obtained a full-fledged military development in the Dual Monarchy. Thus there was no basis for overcoming the disadvantageous situation resulting from Trianon, even as far as brainpower on levels relatively comparable to Germany's was concerned. Bravery is one thing but brainpower with ability to organize for the future is another.

Also, it made a difference that if Germany had broken her treaty obligations, retaliation would have had to come by a major military effort, mainly from France. Due to the size of Germany this would have required mobilization of large forces, even if it had not gone beyond the seemingly simple task of occupation. It would have placed serious financial burdens on already exhausted France, while it also could have precipitated a guerrilla resistance in Germany's industrial cities leading to a danger of a take over by Communist elements backed up by Russia. Against such an eventuality and out of a sense of balance of power, Great Britain could never have backed up France either militarily or financially in a pre-emptive undertaking.

These factors virtually excluded the possibility of a serious retaliation against Germany inasmuch as rearmament took shape cautiously until the point when efforts to stop

⁵Macartney, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 87.

it would have already been met by large scale armed resistance. Yet again, war was the very thing that the governing Labor Party of Great Britain wanted to avoid most anxiously. With Germany reaching air parity⁶ by 1935, France could have ill afforded it without Great Britain's help, and against Russia's stake in assisting all policies conducive to a civil war of the "capitalist and imperialist world." Thus Germany's weight and the need to reckon with her in a balance of power scheme built a protective shell around her which no great power could easily dismantle.

No such protection existed around the truncated remnants of the core states of the former Dual Monarchy. There would have been no military and economic difficulties involved in overrunning Hungary if the Little Entente deemed that such action was warranted--as it would have been in case an illegal rearmament on a larger scale had been attempted. This country was surrounded by an undefended and undefendable border adjacent to hostile Czechoslovakian, Rumanian, and Yugoslav territories on three sides. This was roughly a 1,200 kilometer long boundary enclosing a small state of eight to nine million people between 1920-38, and ninety-three thousand square kilometers (35,907 square miles),⁷ so devised that no important Hungarian city lay beyond it farther than fifty kilometers.

⁶See Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (New York, 1961), pp. 99-116.

⁷Ernst Helmreich, editor, Hungary, A Volume of the Mid-European Studies Center (New York, 1956), p. 34.

The border cut through the river Drava in the south, so as to give Yugoslavia bridge-heads wedged into western Hungary, only two hundred kilometers away from Czechoslovakia. The latter established military air bases only minutes in flying time (even by 1935 standards) from the Hungarian capital and two other most important industrial cities, Győr and Miskolc.⁸ Ninety per cent of the potential or existing Hungarian armament industry was concentrated in these three cities. Neither the Czechoslovakian nor Yugoslavian borders in the North-East and South-East were based on rivers or mountains, while the eastern boundary was so devised as to secure Rumania a staging area for launching offensives from plains lying before the Transylvanian mountains on the Hungarian side.

The three Little Entente states had a total population of slightly less than fifty million in 1935. Their weight was decreased by the incorporation of about three million Hungarians, and by three million Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia. A further risk for these states arose with the increasing tensions between the dominating Serbs and Czechs on the one hand⁹ and other Slavic minorities, such as the Croats and Slovaks, on

⁸In Stúrovo, fifty kilometers from Budapest and Nove Zamsky, fifty kilometers from Győr. Komarno (forty kilometers from Győr) and Kosiče airport (ninety kilometers from Miskolc), especially the latter, were of commercial significance as well, at least potentially, and thus somewhat less obvious in their military portent.

⁹See Kurt Glaser, Czecho-Slovakia, A Critical History (Caldwell, 1961), pp. 21, 27, 30-32.

the other.¹⁰ But even so, and not forgetting that each of the trio had two more hostile states adjoining their other borders (Germany and Poland for Czechoslovakia, Russia, and Bulgaria and Italy for Rumania and Yugoslavia, respectively), their strategic and military superiority versus Hungary remained appalling. It was the more dangerous as their otherwise precarious situation and inherent structural weakness predisposed them to instant military reactions. In fact in two instances, in 1921 and 1934-35, Hungary came within a hair's breadth of being invaded by its neighbors, although in the first case only two years separated it from the day when the last Rumanian occupation troops had pulled out of the country, sweeping it clean of almost every armament left over from World War One which was beyond treaty limitations. Germany never underwent near total enemy occupation in the aftermath of World War One.

Against such overwhelming odds there still existed one way for Hungary to build a relative deterrent, if not effective defences against the constant threat of invasion, while keeping within the prescriptions of the Trianon Peace Treaty. This would have been the ancient way of relying on a militia, as envisaged by the American Constitution and the Swiss practice, adding a genuine republican and popular strength to defence capabilities of a professional army.

While arguing in behalf of the necessity of standing armies, as a militia is no substitute for such, Federalist

¹⁰Seton-Watson, op. cit., pp. 216-241.

Paper No. 29 points out that in certain circumstances, such as when being under "the disposal of that body which constituted the guardian of national security" a well regulated militia can be "the most natural defence of a free country."¹¹ Thus if armed with small arms¹² and established in inconspicuous ways, such as not wearing uniforms and organized into garrisons, a militia of armed citizens would have been for Hungary a natural way to circumvent at least some of the handicaps imposed on her by Trianon. It would have increased the risks for any invader, forcing him to consider the dangers of engaging in guerrilla warfare. Such militia was and is the ultimate weapon of Yugoslavia against hostile great powers, such as Austria-Hungary in World War One, Germany in World War Two, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Cold War.

Yet, ironically, the political and social structure of Hungary deterred established society from a recourse to this policy. Hungary was not a free country in the sense that her citizens' social and economic status shaped up in free competition so as to make them shareholders of the national wealth according to individual talents. The urban section of Hungarian society was more or less open to competition, yet feudalism surviving under disguises prevented at least one third of the

¹¹The Federalist Papers (New York, 1961), p. 176.

¹²The Treaty forbade production of hunting rifles of calibers matching guns in use with any European army. See Kálmán Molnár, op. cit., p. 186.

nation from entering the arena of free self-establishment. Three million people were barred from reaching the arteries of social, cultural, and financial development in the cities and better-off villages. In such a situation no government could dare facilitate revolution against the privileged by the under-privileged by distributing arms among the population on a large scale.

Depriving itself of the availability of such an "ultimate weapon" as the militia, Hungarian policy making had to go ahead with rearmament even more cautiously than otherwise. Hungarian foreign policy had been compelled to rely on any foreign power (except of course the Soviet Union) which would diminish Little Entente pressure on her. This in 1927 led logically to a pro-Italian line.¹³

Yet for Italy, weak as she herself was, Hungary in her weakness could not be a real asset in the military sense,¹⁴ because a beginning of substantial rearmament of the latter country could not be risked without evoking a situation in which Italy would have been called upon to defend her against the Little Entente. As in the case of Czechoslovakia, whose military alliance with France and the Soviet Union did not permit her to escape immediate foreign occupation in a conflict, once Germany became strong, no Italian intervention

¹³See Kertesz, op. cit., p. 27.

¹⁴Italy made good use of Hungarian food surpluses, available in abundance until 1940.

could save Hungary from being overrun as soon as her rearmament program showed some signs of progress.

The consequence was that although Italy would have badly needed a militarily strong Hungary to put pressure on Yugoslavia, Hungary never acquired the necessary means of achieving such a potential. In 1927, a secret credit of three hundred million lire (\$20 million) had been granted and used in most part for the construction of the strategic highway Budapest-Szentgotthard, to connect with Stiria, in Austria, and thereby with Italy.¹⁵ Except for anti-aircraft searchlights, a few hundred trucks, the licence to produce Ansaldo mini-tanks, already obsolete warplanes,¹⁶ together with production rights for a more modern, yet still inadequate fighter plane,¹⁷ as well as seventy somewhat more up to date Caproni 135 bombers¹⁸ (the latter two projects beginning however only with 1939), Hungary received nothing from Italy that could have reduced her basic inequity versus the Little Entente first, and with respect to Germany and Russia later.

Thus the overall situation, and a right-wing philosophy, led the Gömbös government to the policy of an Italian alliance

¹⁵See Macartney, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 86.

¹⁶See Appendix X.

¹⁷The Reggiane 2,000, a carbon copy of the American Seversky P-35 of 1935 vintage.

¹⁸Royal Air Force Flying Review, XV, 10 (London, 1960), 50.

with a German orientation, and also, ominously for Europe, toward playing occasionally the game of brinkmanship between Hitler and Mussolini. Conceivably this was done because not until a fundamental change in favor of the revanchist powers in Europe occurred could Hungary hope for any easing of her precarious military position within the jaw of her nervous and implacable neighbors.

A possible immediate reason for such a Hungarian policy in the years preceding the Anschluss is suggested when Macartney points out that "(Yugoslavia) was now most actively courting Germany."¹⁹ A Berlin-Belgrade alliance would have diminished Hungary's value in Italy's eyes considerably and also rendered Hungary's military situation even more precarious, if that were possible. The friendship between Herman Goering and the Yugoslavian regent Prince Paul²⁰ forecast political consequences. (In fact, Yugoslavia benefited at least militarily by being able to obtain Dornier Do 17 close-support bombers from Germany, which were lighter, but faster and more feasible in Eastern European skies than the Junkers Ju 86 bombers bought by Hungary in 1938).²¹ The only promising way to deal with this political danger was to make Italy,

¹⁹Macartney, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 149; see also Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 389.

²⁰Frischauer, op. cit., pp. 103-104.

²¹The inadequacy of the Ju 86 was pointed out in a memorandum written by the Regent--see Horthy Miklós Titkos Iratai (Budapest, 1965), p. 15.

Yugoslavia's principal opponent (due to the dispute over the Dalmation coastline), a friend of Germany. This would and actually did render Rome more valuable to Berlin than Belgrade ever might have become, with Hungary benefiting.

Yet the policy backfired in the long run on several accounts. Among others, it led to the Anschluss, the occupation of Czechoslovakia, and subsequent German manipulations to encircle Hungary from all sides by picking up the succession states one by one, while sabotaging Hungarian efforts to oppose even mildly such encirclement.²² Also the German hegemony in the Danubian region brought Hungary once again into a militarily untenable position. While the era of military restrictions officially ended, it was impossible to obtain adequate military hardware either from within Hungary, due to the lack of an efficient and quickly responding industry ready to switch to production of needed items, or from supply sources abroad, including Germany.

The history of both the domestic armament procurement and that which resulted from dealings as well as jealousies and controversies between the German and Hungarian governments is still largely unwritten and most of the documents are unobtainable. Thus it is impossible to establish what happened with accuracy. Yet there are certain revealing facts. One is that while there existed a relatively close industrial cooperation between Hungary and Italy the Hungarian armament

²²See Chapter VI.

industry, except for two late-coming projects, showed signs of complete non-coordination with its German counterpart. No significant hardware of German design was obtained for production in Hungary either in joint programs or solely for Hungary until the manufacture of Messerschmidt 109 and 210 fighters and their Do 605 engines as well as Fockewulf 58 trainers got under way in the Duna and Rába-Krupp aircraft factories in 1943.²³ Apart from the light Ansaldo tank all types of armor produced in Hungary were of Hungarian design and generally two to three years behind standards of the chief belligerents. From foreign sources Hungary obtained a few British armored cars in 1938 and Mark IV German tanks in 1942,²⁴ but the latter were delivered in lesser numbers than promised and, significantly, directly to those troops which already had left Hungary on their way to the Russian front. Similarly, no Hungarian patents were sold to Germany although the purchase of a heavy Hungarian jeep allegedly was sought by Germany for its outstanding qualities. If this is true, it came after Germany had promised to deliver specifications of the Goering howitzer, which promise had not been kept.²⁵

One of the remarkable paradoxes of modern Central European history is that Hungary between the early years of

²³Macartney, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 462.

²⁴Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 68, 98.

²⁵Ibid., p. 143.

the existence of her air force and 1944 relied for home built engines solely on Gnome-Rhone designs²⁶ obviously purchased not without the tolerant foreknowledge of the French government. Production of the Gnome-Rhone 14 K of about 880 horse power began in the Manfred Weiss Steel and Machine Works in early 1938. Whether this fact reflects the determination of the Hungarian government to establish an air force with minimum dependency on German or the results of a German determination not to permit Hungary self sufficiency in manufacturing crucial items for her military, or on both, cannot be clearly established.

After the death of Julius Gumböcs it became increasingly obvious that Hungary would not become a subdivision of National Socialism, in spite of bowing herself before Germany's might in order to secure boundaries compromising most of the Magyars. Without surrendering her soul to Hitlerism she could not be trusted. Yet it was obvious from every diplomatic note and dispatch, every domestic move of the government that Hungary did not try to hide her desire to be noticed and recorded not as a satellite of Hitler, but rather as a nation asserting her right to independence although belonging to the Axis framework.

Thus Hitler proceeded with a divide and rule policy in Eastern Europe. It cast Hungary, and rightly so, in the role of the recalcitrant son of the family, while docile Rumania,

²⁶Appendix X.

Slovakia, and Croatia were given all the blessings.²⁷ Earlier Hungary had been used to aid Germany, willingly or not, in establishing her power over the Little Entente nations. Now it was the opposite case; from bases established there as well as in Austria, Hungary became tightly controlled and firmly surrounded, like a fly in the web. That the spider was filled and busy weaving other webs and thus this fly was left behind for consumption on a postwar day at best,²⁸ occurred to few Hungarians.

Although Hungary did not have German garrisons until 1944, German troops were stationed in Slovakia, Southern Transylvania, which was Rumanian territory, in the Banat, Croatia and Austria, Hungary wanted and was allowed to build the so-called "'Árpád'" defence line in the Carpathian Alps. But as soon as she attempted to fortify the inverted parts of her new Transylvania acquisitions around the western lying borders of its most exposed bulge, "the Szeklerland" in a precautionary move against Rumania, Germany interferred and the plan had to be dropped. To build fortifications around Budapest by all means would have been a most risky undertaking: it would have signalled the taking of precautions against Germany and the coming of an independent foreign policy.

²⁷Hungary was denied arms on the pretext that she would use them against Rumania (Macartney, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 96), but Rumania, equally hostile to Hungary, had not been. See also Chapter VI.

²⁸See Louis P. Lochner, The Goebbels Diaries (New York, 1948), p. 117.

In fact, Hungary even now was not free to exercise her sovereign right to procure armament and construct whatever military installations she deemed necessary for her own protection. The era of Trianon restrictions came to an end only with respect to those military programs which were bound to serve German interests.²⁹ In every other respect Hungary had to remain as defenceless as butter is to the edge of the knife. Thus whenever Germany decided to overrun Hungary she could do so.

It happened in 1941 and 1944, in both instances without the authorization of the Hungarian government and in each case creating a fait accompli. The fact that Hungary had been deprived of a defensive capability made a great deal of difference in 1944. It saved already hard pressed Germany from an immense problem. At a moment when her divisions fought desperate holding actions in Russia and Italy, and made last minute preparations to encounter the Allied invasion in the West, Germany could ill afford to become tied up even if only for days in a war with Hungary in the center of Europe. Among other reasons, hostilities would have disrupted bauxite mining³⁰ and oil deliveries on the Danube and on rail from Ploesti to the Reich probably for weeks. This would have been a distinct possibility if Hungary could have mustered enough force and

²⁹This applies to the "Joint Aircraft Construction Program" as indicated earlier; see Macartney, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 462.

³⁰See footnote 33.

had placed it in reasonably good positions to put up resistance against German occupation.

Such potentialities also would have lent greater weight to Hungary in her bargaining for a separate peace treaty with the United Nations throughout 1943, possibly leading to specific promises of Allied aid via air power if resistance was indicated to a German attack, which in turn would have stiffened Hungarian willingness to fight. In other words, some degree of resistance potential in Hungarian hands may have broken the impasse existing between Hungary and the Allies.

At any rate Hungary did not obtain even a relatively improved condition for her military by the crucial years of 1943-44. The major reason for this was the decision of the Kállay government, originally made by Bárdossy,³¹ to allow twelve Hungarian divisions to join the Eastern Campaign in 1942. This army not only represented almost half of the available twenty-six Hungarian divisions, but with it went the best part of the armament procured by the Program of Győr³² in terms of armor, mechanized gear and artillery as well as the already obsolete, although irreplaceable aircraft inventory. This move of the government, whatever the reasons for it, stripped Hungary even of a minimum of self-defence. Moreover,

³¹Macartney, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 86. See also Chapters II and VI.

³²The Program of Győr in 1938 provided 600 million Pengoes for rearmament, 400 million P. for agricultural and other investments by means of surplus property tax slated for five years. Practically all of it was spent on the Army.

the continuous demands of the front not only exhausted the meager ammunition reserves but also swallowed up everything that the country could produce in hardware throughout the coming months, thus preventing the build up of a secondary self-defence capability covering Hungarian national territory.

As a result of this decision not only was it impossible to bring up to par the woefully lagging army originally available but now it proved to be a hopeless task to maintain the corps left back in Hungary even on that low measure of fighting capability which earlier had been shared by the whole. The condition of the military at home in early 1944 thus was more disastrous than it had been in 1939. The cumulative effects of the Trianon restrictions, the tardiness in finding effective remedies to correct the consequences, the slow pace in trying to catch up in armament when politically this would have been possible, the negative influence of German policies and Italian technology on the efficiency of the Hungarian army, and finally the participation in the 1942-43 Russian campaigns created a situation which was beyond salvation regardless of what the government now tried to do.

When in 1944 the blow to Hungarian independence came, it found a government still prisoner of the consequences of Trianon, German suspicions, Hungarian military inefficiency, and its predecessors' as well as its own mistaken domestic and foreign policy. In order to make the new line which Kallay had taken work, it would have been absolutely essential

to base it on a strong military position. This, however, would have required the undoing not merely of the decisions of 1942 but also of the shortcomings in building a strong defence capability and viable economy throughout the entire post-Trianon era.

The most tragic fact of all in this story of ineptness is that Hungary indeed, in spite of Trianon, possessed suddenly discovered riches of essential military significance, the foresighted and timely use of which could have changed the Central European military situation around the end of World War Two. In one of the ironies of modern technological evolution, Hungary, which was supposed to have been stripped bare in Paris of resources of strategically vital raw materials, found her soil to be the richest of all in Europe except for France, with respect to newly significant bauxite.³³ Moreover, a substantial amount of oil was discovered in Zala, in South-western Hungary in the Thirties.³⁴ With these two hard-to-get basic elements for operating an air force of consequence, and provided of course that an industrial chain had been immediately built to process bauxite and to build airplanes, Hungary was well within the possibility of obtaining a fighter and fighter bomber force by

³³"With an estimated one-eighth of the world's total reserve." J. H. Wheeler, Jr., J. T. Kostbade and S. Thoman, Regional Geography of the World (New York, 1961), p. 216.

³⁴Hungarian oil fields yielded 839,000 tons in 1943. See Helmreich, op. cit., pp. 287-288.

1943. This would have given the decision making apparatus a creditable protective shell.

The human reservoir of technological know-how basically existed, as indicated by the already operating aircraft industry in World War One. Hungary was far more advanced in engineering and skilled worker power than with respect to political science. Especially in the first category the country had managed to secure a position in East-Central Europe which ranked third after Austria and Czechoslovakia, giving her a solidified self-sufficiency in any field except military technology.³⁵

This does not extend to familiarity with American mass production methods. Except for Czechoslovakia, and there to a small extent only, these failed to penetrate contemporary Central Europe and simply eluded it on its way to the Soviet Union. Of the three discernible types of production philosophies, the American way which places the emphasis on quantity and quality via constant innovation, the Japanese-Russian, which places it simply on quantity, and the pre-Fordian classic method which emphasizes quality via cautious adherence to proven formulas with a minimum of revolutionism, Hungary was the adept of the third, as befitting a culture enslaved in spirit by Europe in general and the Wilhelmian-Hapsburg orbit in particular.

³⁵The industrial labor force amounted to 980,551 in 1943 (*Ibid.*, p. 261), half of whom were skilled. Total population amounted to 14,683,000.

For this basic shortcoming in modern production technology alone the situation would not have been altogether hopeless. It was not engineering and scientific interest in the new which was lacking but capital and managerial talent to think and act big and fast. Hungary was teeming with scientific and engineering prodigies, many of whom eventually landed in the United States, and whose inventions and understanding of new potentialities made an important chapter of the history of this century.³⁶ Thus the problem of this small country was not comparable to some of present day underdeveloped giants, such as India, Pakistan, or Indonesia, which countries must first raise a technologically learned class in order to obtain self-sufficiency in carrying out technical programs--which is the slowest process of all. Hungary, already possessing the technological brain power, already having a heavy industry as well as a secondary one, and finally, discovering bauxite and oil deposits, had completed two-thirds of the understructure needed for building a reasonably strong air power. What was lacking entirely was political leadership to integrate all elements into successful projects in order to lure foreign capital, concentrate

³⁶In reference to the immigration of ex-Hungarian Jewish intelligentsia Emil Lengyel writes: "These ex-Hungarian physicists, mathematicians and others played a truly historic role in the development of atomic and hydrogen arms. What a strange turn of fate it was that the anti-Semitic laws of Hungary should have helped the United States to acquire these supreme weapons." Lengyel, *op. cit.*, pp. 207-208. Communist persecution added to this wave of immigration a stratum of another group of Jewish as well as non-Jewish technological experts.

a domestic one and set the goals and timing. In other words, Hungarian leadership would have had to repeat the performance of their post-Compromise predecessors who had updated the country by building a modern, efficient railway network at an accelerated pace.³⁷

By 1932 it should have been obvious that air power was essential for saving national independence. Czechoslovakia in her precarious geographic situation was adamant in building an efficient aviation industry and air force. The United States possessed all the potential for obtaining an air force very fast. But it was decided to bring this potential closer to materialization and to set the stage for a quick build up by developing the prototype of the Flying Fortress as early as 1936. In view of the long lead time for mass producing airplanes Hungary would have had to begin with the perfectly legal construction of power plants and aluminum factories as well as the not legal but unobtrusive designing of engines and airframes from 1933-34 onward in order to have a fleet of its own in the air ten years later.

In view of the fact that Trianon Peace Treaty only interrupted but did not in principle deny Hungary the right of building airplanes, provided that such were non-military,³⁸ the inability of the Horthy regime to secure the country a specific air-minded technological and industrial understructure

³⁷May, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

³⁸Appendix VIII.

early, casts perhaps the most characteristic shadow on the ineptness of that government and society. Although it is obviously very easy to pronounce verdicts in retrospect, it is undeniable that a judicious over-view of the situation of Trianon-Hungary suggests nothing to the contrary of this statement. The Minister of Defence and the Chief of Staff came to Prime Minister Kállay with the proposal of conducting research for process-discovery and subsequent building of a synthetic rubber plant in 1943 (rather than in 1933), which well summarizes the problem.³⁹ It reflects painfully on a cultural inadequacy as it shows that not only could Hungarian leadership, especially the military, not look ahead into the future, but also that it could not even keep pace with the actual situation--as in Poland, here to, it was hopelessly out of step with political and technological reality to the very end.

As far as the military was concerned such a cultural inadequacy was the direct result of the heritage of the Hapsburg army which had been raised with a superiority complex basically much the same way, yet more visibly so, as the undemocratically and thomistically trained average contemporary Catholic clergy. The average Hungarian military officer looked upon the rest of the society as "the civilian

³⁹Kállay, op. cit., p. 320. Kállay also notes: "The Germans characteristically had not given us information . . . about the products."

bunch." To him the "what good can come from Galilee" attitude was a basic determinant in his approaches to the non-military world. Although members of the staff, like the Hungarian Jesuit in a corresponding situation within the Church, were provided with a more sophisticated intellectual armament, even they could not very well master this bias. Logically, any notion that something was to be learned from democratic societies and their technological and industrial accomplishments appeared to the average Hungarian officer regardless of rank, as sheer nonsense. If civilians were only a bunch, a society led and controlled by non-military values, where the military was kept in a controlled position, had to be regarded as inferior. To the Hungarian officer as to Goebbels, America was a military nonentity, as to him it appeared as a chaotic, disorganized society of lower discipline, inferior morality, and no heroism. After all, the Americans could not march very well, did not cherish a Spartan discipline or raise marionettes by the millions, as did German education. That they could build an air armada and continental army from scratch in a short time, surpassing the Axis powers in numbers of airplanes and ships three to one or better, not to mention the managing of the Manhattan Project, and die as they did at Guadalcanal, was not considered possible at all.

That the Soviet Union, after having applied American mass production techniques in procuring armament and engaging in a build up of a heavy industry for military use, would be

a different Russia from that of the Czars, who could see and predict it from just across two borders? The Russians publicly were anathema even to mention in an objective context after the 1919 Communist adventures in Hungary. What they were doing, namely, learning from America, buying American blueprints for modern airplanes, constructing power plants and dams by taking advantage of American engineering, as well as establishing an Ukrainian and Siberian Ruhr and aircraft factories where a few years earlier only taiga had existed--all were stories from a never-never land. Except for Julius Illyés,⁴⁰ who had visited the Soviet Union in 1935 and wrote a diary based on his impressions, which then remained largely unknown, and for underground or emigré Communists, Hungarian culture took the liberty of looking at Russia merely as a wasteland and testing ground for an evil experiment but which was believed to take place in utter irrelevance to European and world history. (After the Russian occupation and awakening, a typical Hungarian reaction was, and still is, to believe that Communism and Russia will flood its power all over the globe because the West is foolishly ignorant of the danger.) To deal with Russia on its own terms as a growing power and to envisage the reasons and importance of this growth not in the frame of reference of

⁴⁰Julius Illyés, prominent Hungarian author poet and sociologist, an awakener with regard to the rural situation. Because of his patriotism he was persecuted in the Stalin era, and had been disliked by the establishment in the Horthy era as well. His diary from Russia is untranslated and presently, for this student unavailable.

Communist, Fascist, or Catholic ideologies but in terms of industrial and technological evolution was a psychological impossibility for the Hungarian government, military, and urban society. Unaware of the political and military significance of both American and Russian industrial and organizing capabilities, their potentialities in advance planning, while wrapped in a culture denying Darwinian social evolution (and with it the fact that indeed, nations are in a race against each other), Hungarian leadership failed to grasp the modern world as it was, and could not master the portion of it that should naturally have remained or come under their tutelage. In this context the lack of military power as a prerequisite for an independent foreign policy actually raises a question of the crisis of information, knowledge and culture.

It was only in 1942 that a Hungarian Premier, Kállay, clearly recognized the task which "was to be at all cost to defend, preserve, and where it had been infringed, restore the complete independence, internal and external, of Hungary. . . . Towards the German, to develop the highest measure of spiritual and moral resistance. . . . The army, too, was to be kept as intact as possible."⁴¹

Such a program, had it been launched in 1933 and handled with determination, yet with caution in the face of international realities, likely would have given Hungary the capability of preserving herself amidst the storm and becoming a

⁴¹Macartney, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 86.

regional power center in postwar East-Central Europe. As things stood, Hungary never had a master plan, never even entered the race by obeying properly its terms. Indeed the necessity would emerge at this juncture to analyse the domestic society as a way of finding answers to the shortcomings of a nation with so much nationalistic passion to survive and so little intelligence and flexibility to succeed, but such analysis is clearly beyond the scope and possibilities of this study.

Conclusions emerging from these considerations are as follows:

1. While Germany was able to overcome treaty limitations on her military, her World War One allies were not, which in part accounted for her easy penetration into East-Central Europe.
2. The political situation resulting from the Trianon Peace Treaty, Little Entente, and German policies contributed to Hungary's military predicament already made serious by the cultural handicaps of the Austro-Hungarian military. Hungary could not find a powerful protector securing her the substantially advantageous distribution of benefits of an alliance.
3. Even remaining within the narrow possibilities entailed in the Trianon Peace Treaty and German policies, Hungary could have essentially improved her military position, had her culture and society been progressive and open to world political and technological reality.

4. Realization of some of the requirements came too late and was prejudiced not only by the time element but also by the decision in 1942 to send substantial forces to Russia.

5. Underdeveloped military capabilities prevented the conduct of a foreign policy of self-defence in harmony with the vital national interest. Hungarian foreign policy was dictated by the necessity of choosing between bad and worse, and not between a categorically advantageous and disadvantageous.

CHAPTER VI

SHORTCOMINGS IN IDENTIFICATION OF VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS

Comparing the basic thinking of "Publius" concerning foreign relations and the resulting institutionalization of this thinking via Federalist aims in the American Constitution with comparable thinking of the Hungarian political classes in the Horthy era, one recognizes one fundamental contradiction in scope. The American thinking had been to secure the American nation a defence environment into which no foreign powers might intrude. This translates into the language of practical American foreign policy, cemented even in the Constitution, first of all by allowing no members of the union independence of Washington so that they may be used by any foreign power against their sister states.¹

A similar goal was envisaged by the 1867 Compromise between Austria and Hungary, permitting no non-indigenous powers to set foot in East-Central Europe. After the disruption of this original union, Hungarian leadership, if inspired by "Publius" and the Fathers of modern Hungary, would have had to aim at the re-establishment of the Danubian union in some altered form. By all means, they would have

¹See The Federalist Papers Nos. 4 and 5.

perceived that from 1920 onward a situation was developing in the Danubian region the potential counterpart of which had been the strongest argument of the Federalists in avoiding the constitution of a loose Confederacy in North America.

This is what happened: in the Danubian region, after that imperfect union had broken up, its former parts began to dispute over territory, population, and wealth, exactly as predicted by "Publius," had something similar ever occurred in North America. In a sense it was as if the states of New York and Pennsylvania had engaged in murderous dissents and border wars. Hungarians, as did others, lost sight of the overall interests of the Danubian region. In this blindness, national society, national government, and the military were all in unison. Passion unified the nation to overrule reason.

From 1920 on the over-riding issue was not area defence.² This also infers that defence was not considered in the primary context of maintaining national independence amidst the rising great continental powers. It became important only to recover strips formerly belonging to the Magyar states, occupied by ethnic Magyars, and lost at the end of World War One. As if South Carolina had appealed to Spain for help against the North, and opened her territories to the Spanish armies sitting in Florida, Hungary became a tool of Danubian

²Most of the wisdom and vision needed to give area defence high priority in policy decisions had already died with the passing of the Ausgleich generation around 1875-80, but did not completely until 1920.

catastrophe by doing a similar thing; her Spain being Germany, her Florida Austria, her opposing neighbors the Little Entente states.

One key expression in the above recapitulation is the reference to the fact of Hungarian society not being defence oriented. This means of course defence in the sense "Publius" used the term. That is to say, defending national sovereignty in a foresighted way and making it rank first. Such is not only a military obligation but the responsibility of all elements of a nation, society, political leadership, and military included. It really is a political task, beginning to put its leverage on domestic issues and foreign policies long before a potential danger reaches the national boundaries. It is a task envisaging not merely concrete military and foreign policy measures but which affects long range planning well in advance. It embodies itself in national institutions as well as nationally based social, economic, cultural, and military activities inspired to give the nation the best amount of moral and military strength at any moment. In this sense self-defence policies encompass the entire range of national existence and activities.

In Hungary, had such thinking properly identified Russia and Germany as the main threats,³ it should have been inducive

³In view of agents of German nationalism agitating among Hungaro-Germans already in the Twenties, no prophetic talent was needed to recognize the existence of a real German threat in the early Thirties and onward.

of radical social reform, such as land distribution, as well as of equally self conscious radical industrialization programs, with the best possible use of every means (for instance, foreign capital) at its disposal.⁴ Orientation toward national self-defence thus would have had to call for a radical inner strengthening of the nation too, not merely for a foresighted foreign policy directed toward warding off Germany and Russia in cooperation with neighbors. In fact, neither the foreign nor the domestic parts of such a program were even conceived.

At this juncture one has to take a few more steps in order to show where Hungarian society as a whole, various governments, and the military missed the essential point. It is obviously not with reference to Russia, one of the two menacing major continental powers. Although it has been stated that the military men did not recognize the tremendous military capabilities of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, nor did the government deem it necessary to engage in sound social reforms in answering the Communist challenge, it has been established that Hungary showed determination not to permit Russia to cross the Carpathian Alps as much as this was in her power. Although the text is not available,

⁴In 1920 France was interested in Hungary. (See Chapter III, p. 46) Also major Western companies, such as Schneider-Creuzot, Ford, and later Standard Oil, made investment offers which, in case of Standard Oil, was accepted. This was not enough, however, to challenge the leading position of German and Austrian investments in Hungary, nor to give the Hungarian government means to expand the industrial chain in the direction of achieving military self-sufficiency.

the present author recalls as a good example of this attitude Premier Kállay's statement in 1942, at the peak of German penetration into Russia. He said that at present the front ran 2,000 kilometers from the Hungarian border but Hungary would feel even safer if it was 4,000 kilometers away.

The fear of Russia became as much a constant with Hungarian foreign policy making as the fear of Hungary and Germany was with Czechoslovakia. Logically, the latter country in turn invited the specter of Soviet military presence in Central Europe by the 1935 Czechoslovakian-Russian assistance pact. Thus mutual distrust of small Danubian nations led them to accept and promote the influence of at least one of the two juxtaposed continental giants. This policy fulfilled the tragedy of Danubian nations. The recognition that any growth of German or Russian power in Eastern Europe must lead to elimination of area independence was replaced by the thesis that influence of one of these two super-powers would not be tantamount to catastrophe but rather was needed to avoid it.

Indeed, Germany constituted a deadly threat to Czechoslovakia just as Russia did in Hungary. But Czechoslovakia did not realize until it was too late that the Soviet Union is an almost equally deadly threat to her national self-determination as is Germany. Hungary, on the other hand failed to recognize the magnitude of the German danger

prejudicing conduct of even a relatively independent foreign policy.

It was not entirely due to passions generated by the Trianon Peace Treaty that the Hungarians believed that Germany represented only, if at all, a secondary threat to the country, and the main enemies were the Little Entente and Russia. Historical traditions worked in behalf of a Hungaro-German alliance against the Slavs as well. It was in the line of the historically oriented Magyar psyche to think in terms of the past, and not of contemporary realities when it came to matters political.

But if this is true, then two historical traditions should have existed shaping the national frame of mind: one which remembered the miseries of colonial and vassal status as a result of having had been caught between two superior neighbors for centuries, and another one which pondered the interests of a nation in no actual danger of becoming deprived of self-determination. Of these two traditions, the first became defunct completely in the short period of relative independence and economic well-being between 1867 and 1914, so that not even the tragic misfortunes of World War One could revive it. So dull and blind was Hungary as a nation in the face of the gathering storm threatening the very core of national life, that no need was felt to make any extraordinary efforts in preparation for it, whether intellectually, or in domestic social, economic and military reforms, or by coalescing all

citizens of Hungary regardless of race and religion and marshalling potential friends abroad. Every phase of governmental policy remained faithfully motivated by the limited aspects of revisionism, either before the correction of the borders or thereafter, that is to say, by the secondary rather than vital national interest.

The emergence of German power was staggeringly fast. Hungarian policy planning and the mind of society was unable to come up with a correspondingly fast re-evaluation of fundamental foreign policy aims and goals. The public remained caught in emotional webs of its own revisionist propaganda. Part of the leadership lost perspective.

It is a fact that before German neo-resurgence no revision of Trianon had been forthcoming. Thus the claim of Germanophiles in Hungary had a versimilitude in it that return to Hungary of segments of Southern Slovakia, of Carpatho-Ukraine, Northern Transylvania, and the Bácska, comprising about five million people, important territories, historically and ethnically Hungarian cities and a strategically important boundary in the North East and East was the work of Hitler for which Hungary should pay--as she did then--with an alliance with Germany and the blood of her sons in Russia. These transient victories of revisionism, however, were by no means due to friendly gestures of Germany toward Hungary. A detailed survey of the records of the First and Second Vienna Award will show that in both cases it was

Italy's Ciano⁵ rather than Ribbentrop who promoted the case of Hungary (as understandable, because Hungary was Italy's only means of balancing Germany's growing influence in the Balkans). For the Transylvania Award Germany was already paid by Hungary with the permission given it to cross with troops into Rumania, a move that secured Rumanian oil for Hitler and helped to turn the campaign on the Balkans and against Russia into a successful proposition, at least at the beginning.⁶ As far as Carpatho-Ukraine is concerned, the occupation of which was sternly forbidden by the German government in November, 1938,⁷ and graciously permitted in March, 1939,⁸ the latter move had nothing to do with Hungary, but was a gesture paving the way for the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. It tried to demonstrate that Germany had given up the idea of stirring up revolution in Soviet Ukraine, for which Carpatho-Ukraine would have been an ideally suited propaganda spring board.⁹ Finally, for the return of Bacska Germany was paid by the prior use of Hungarian territory, bases and

⁵See for instance Diplomáciai Iratok Magyarország Külpolitikájához, 1936-45 (Diplomatic Documents Concerning Hungary's Foreign Policy, 1936-45) (Budapest, 1965), Vol. II, p. 879.

⁶Although direct connections between these two occurrences were denied by Hungary, circumstantial evidence such as chronological order leads to the above conclusion.

⁷See Appendix VII.

⁸See Macartney, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 336.

⁹See A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (New York, 1961), p. 188.

communications lines in the attack against Yugoslavia, which all but ruptured British-Hungarian relations.¹⁰

In neither of the four subsequent increments of Hungarian territory did Germany play a role which remained short of long range imperialistic aims for encircling Hungary as a part of the new Drang nach Osten. In this, German policy makers used remnants of the old Little Entente (Slovakia, Croatia, and Rumania) very well. All of them turned into principal German allies with much more favor shown to them than toward Hungary, while each became a German military and cultural base ringing the Hungarian plains from North, and South, in addition to Austria in the West, and the former Yugoslavian Banat in the South-East. This policy re-enacted the old Viennese line, which during the 1848-49 Hungarian Freedom War instigated Croatian, Serb, and Vallachian (Rumanian) revolutions against Hungarian supremacy. In fact, radio stations in Slovakia, Croatia, and Rumania attacked Hungary brutally, and the respective governments continued to persecute Hungarian minorities in all the years of German military presence in their respective countries.¹¹

Thus there was nothing more unjustified for Hungarian public opinion than to feel obligated toward Germany on account of a revision of the Trianon borders, to submit to

¹⁰See Chapter VII.

¹¹See Documents of German Foreign Policy, Series D, Vol. VIII, Doc. 45, pp. 430-444.

moral pressure calculated to raise sentiments of indebtedness, and thus enter the war on Germany's side. The brutal fact instead was that with respect to an Ostpolitik eighty million Germans were allied with successors to the succession states, such as Slovakia and Croatia, as well as with Rumania primarily against Russia, but potentially against Hungary too, adding another twenty million people to the column of forces directed from an often hostile Berlin against the latter country. Adding to this the fact that within Hungary itself there existed powerful forces ready to place their allegiance with Germany above Hungary, and that National Socialists both in Germany and in Hungary were genuinely hostile toward the Magyar state for racial, ideological, and anti-religious reasons, it is hard to perceive how any Hungarian could believe that the old Hungarian-German alliance was still alive and that a Berlin-Budapest Axis would not lead to a German betrayal and Gleichschaltung in the postwar era. Hungary's vital interests were definitely incompatible with the survival of a Pan-Germanic power, just as they were concerning a Russia bolstered at the expense of Central Europe. Here hid the mental junction where Hungary should have departed the Axis and said no to a war participation on Germany's side, no matter what the risks in the short run were. However, memories of the days of former Hungarian-German identity of interests obfuscated clear thinking.

Some prominent Hungarians were blinded by the heritage of the Ausgleich of 1867 which had envisaged a Vienna-Budapest Axis to prevent Russia from inundating Central Europe. Even more Hungarians became blinded by memories of a Tripartite alliance between Berlin, Vienna, and Budapest before and during World War One, aimed at the same goal. In 1938 and thereafter it slipped their minds that the number of Germans Hungary had had to cope with within the framework created by the Ausgleich about matched the Magyars living in the old Hungarian kingdom. The significance of this original balance of power became clear only too late.

In 1918 there had lived approximately eight million Austrians, three and one half million Sudeten Germans, and about one and one half million Svabians as well as Saxons in the territories then still belonging to the Dual Monarchy. Against them about eleven million Magyars could be pitched. Such a numerical balance between Southern Germans and Magyars had been a most important guarantee that a co-existence by jointly controlled faculties in exercising power with respect to foreign, military, and monetary matters ought to work.

It was forgotten in 1938 that as long as Hungary had made up a part of the Austrian empire, she had been shielded from Germany, as had been Austria herself, the latter in part by Hungarian military and economic contribution to the common defence. But from 1938 onward with Austria and Czechoslovakia for all practical purposes absorbed by Germany,

and then Poland subdued and so forth, almost all European Germans fell under a single dynamic dictatorship of Spartan discipline. Nothing was there to fence off the pressure of eighty million Teutons from the ten million Magyars Hungary then incorporated. This was a far cry from a feasible balance of power.

Yet without a balance of power situation National Socialistic Germany could not be trusted to hold herself to the letter or spirit to an alliance in the long run that was based on the "historical community of fate" (törtenelemi sorsközösség).¹² This term was concocted by Hungarian historians and then used by publicists in an attempt to marshal the record of past centuries of Hungarian-German political and cultural interdependence against the record of contemporary reality. Facts indicated that Germany did not need Hungary anymore, once the war was finished. Interdependence involves a policy based on the recognition of mutual needs. The "historical community of fate," once Germany had won, would by contrast have meant nothing else but either a slow systematic process of Gleichschaltung or the naked imposition

¹²The "historical community of fate" was a much used expression in contemporary Hungarian press referring to a special need of Germany and Hungary to ally themselves against the Slavs and Rumanians, emphasizing that only Hungarians are trustworthy friends of Germany in East-Central and South-Eastern Europe whose allegiance is not based on momentary interest but rather on a longstanding tradition. It was typical rethoric based on sentimentality and historicism. The Germans preferred not to use it in view of Rumanian, Slovakian and Croatian jealousy.

of a National Socialistic government. In either case Hungary as a land of Hungarian culture, of independent decision-making and economy would have been finished and replaced by a Hungary where German descent held the membership card to all circles of social privilege. To risk such a future expropriation of the country by a policy that helped Germany to penetrate East-Central Europe under the guise of correcting Trianon was bad enough. But at that stage of events one still could argue that Germany, surrounded by Russia, France and Great Britain, was kept at bay and needed Italy, and that since Hungary was a kind of Italian protectorate Germany would have to respect essential Hungarian interests.

In 1941 all this was no more true. Then the only hope for Hungary was that the situation would revert to the point where France was re-established as a great power on the continent, Italy freed from the Axis and possibly Poland resurrected between Germany and Russia. In other words, the only hope for Hungary was an Axis defeat, but one which left behind a not completely defeated Germany. To enter in the war on Germany's side with the secret hope that she would be defeated and Hungary would escape unpunished was nonsense. To enter the war in the expectation that Germany would be able to establish her rule in Central Europe meant opposing vital national interests, and was thus shortsighted. But Hungarian leaders allowed this turn of events either under the influence of the first or the second scheme, depending upon their

individual alignment to Germany. It was meant to be an insurance policy against Germany in order to gain time. But time was not used to gain strength.

Futurabilia, such as Hungary's absorption in the Thousand Years German empire, some may object, ought not be made a basis for post-facto reasoning, since they never materialized. Yet the issue is not raised here from the angle of historic retrospection, but as the problem which should have appeared to the Hungarian elite in the 1938-44 contemporary context, especially before Stalingrad. It must be dealt with for the reason that Hungary based her entry into World War Two on Germany's side on the pretext that the Reich would be the dominant continental power even if she were to be compelled to compromise with the Western Democracies.¹³

Considering the already clear record of the National Socialist government with respect to neighboring nations, Hungary's war on Germany's side based on such an anticipation was equivalent either to a fatalistic consent to a postwar elimination of her national self-determination, or to the nurture of a rosy, optimistic fantasy. It contained the most rudimentary self-contradiction from the point of view of the survival of an independent nation. Such an alliance provided aid for the victory of a super-power of racist, nationalistic, totalitarian tendencies against which

¹³See Macartney, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 60.

nothing and nobody could be enlisted for common defence once it was allowed to gain control over the central part of the continent. Thus the very consideration that impelled the Hungarian government to join the ranks of the Axis should indeed have been made the basis of a foreign policy aimed at securing a future freedom of choice for Hungary which implied the opposite policy.

Long-range considerations after Trianon and from the Thirties onward especially pointed to the following facts:

1. With the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy Hungary had lost her defence perimeter constituted by the various parts of the Austrian empire beyond the Carpathian Alps, and the various nations and nationalities surrounding the Hungarian plain, within the Carpathian chain. Hungary stood defenceless and alone.
2. German and Russian power meanwhile were alarmingly on the rise.
3. In this condition the policy of seeking protection against the Slavs in a German alliance was dangerous and potentially even suicidal in the same way as had been its historic antecedent of seeking protection in Austria against the Ottoman Empire. One enemy being warded off, the country would have nothing to rely on against the other one.
4. Thus the contention that a German-Hungarian alliance made a feasible answer to Little Entente and Russian policies lacked awareness of the fundamental importance of a balance

of power situation, as a check on both Germany and Russia. The ultimate guarantee of national independence for any small nation in Eastern Europe was the combination of British, French and Russian power in balance with Germany. The idea of preferring Germany as the sole ruler of the continent should be disturbing, a policy aiding its realization should be regarded as suicidal.

From the basic situation it followed that if all possible, Hungarian attention would have been obligated to focus on a search for some other solution, rather than to apply the kind of policy which "Publius" had opposed in America at the dawn of the nineteenth century. Two ways stood open:

1. To follow "Publius" in establishing a Danubian union.

This would mean ignoring the advice of emotional nationalism to concentrate on the "Little Hungarian Way" (Kis Magyar Ut), involving an emphasis on the nation-state concept, introversion, isolation, and exaltation of Hungarian folkish values, as advocated by Christian agrarians such as Julius Szegfű and Bishop Ottokár Prohaszka, in the late Tens and early Twenties. This concept led to losing the inner balance of power in connection with international developments.

(The "Little Hungarian Way" implied that Hungary should
a) give up the policy of the Liberal Era between 1867-1918
to pair the Austrian-Hungarian alliance with a domestic
alliance between Hungarian upper class and Jewish urban

strata to balance domestic German middle class influences.¹⁴

- b) rely on the Hungaro-German minority for complementing brain power resources. The "Little Hungarian Way" was essentially anti-cosmopolitan, anti-urban, anti-aristocratic and anti-proletarian, all of which tendencies were simply outflows of developments within the Southern-German cultural milieu and found most sympathetic responses among Hungaro-Germans as well.
- c) develop an acute antipathy against Jewry, the Slavs of the Little Entente, the Great Western Democracies and Russian Communism, leaving Hungary no alternative but to build on Italy and Germany.)¹⁵

Thus "Publius" line would have to be followed in spite of domestic cultural trends, as they developed in a reactionary way to Trianon. Such a policy did not stand much chance of success.

2. To be on the constant alert as to what policies the interests of Hungarian independence required after a careful inventory of the possibilities represented by both the German and Russian dangers had been taken into account. Such alertness demanded

¹⁴See May, op. cit., pp. 242-245.

¹⁵Julius Szegfű, the chief ideologist of the trend, had formulated his views long before the Axis became a political reality. His main work was Three Generations and What Follows After (Három Nemzedék és Ami Utána Következik, Budapest, 1934), and is not translated to English.

- a) a military basis;
- b) a policy of intense communication with the Western powers, secret in the years of overwhelming German power in Europe;
- c) a determination to retain the Hungarian army from the war with the minimum of risk of a German or Russian invasion.

The first solution required long range thinking, unavailable in the circumstances, the second model refers to contemporary policies measured in short range terms. Had it been established that Hungary could not survive in case of a total German victory or defeat in Europe,¹⁶ in order to be able to hope for the continuation of national independence, entering into World War Two in 1941 clearly would have shown incompatibility with the vital national interest. But what about immediate dangers?

¹⁶M. Szvatko, a government publicist is quoted by Macartney (spelling his name Svatko), as saying that the fall of Germany and Italy would mean "the tragic fall of Hungary-- a defeat more fatal from the national point of view than that of Trianon. . . . We know Benes' and Stalin's ideas, we know what awaits us. . . . If we are defeated, there are only two possibilities: either a resuscitation of Little Entente aggression, much greater, much more frightful than before . . . or Bolshevism. . . . England and America are bound, as things stand, to back Beneš against us. There is no changing this-- no recrimination, false optimism or self-deception can help. . . . If Germany does not win, we fall with her, and perhaps deeper than she, as we are weaker than she is." And Macartney adds: "But the argument was not popular." (Macartney, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 65) Szvatko probably expressed the then Premier Bárdossy's view on the matter, or tried to rationalize the Premier's policy. Nonetheless, parts of the public felt he was right. Szvatko was not a Hungaro-German, later challenged Germany with his articles and died a prisoner in a concentration camp.

The question may be raised whether or not Hungary could have afforded not to enter the war, if she wanted to avoid German tampering with her government or occupation of the country. It has been pointed out that Hungary was in danger in the long run if she joined Germany to help her to achieve victory. But would she not have been in danger in the short run for not satisfying German wishes? In other words, was the vital national interest incompatible with whatever policy Hungary tried to follow?

Hungarian vital national interests actually would have been in danger as a result of not joining Germany. If so, did the Hungarian government have any reason at the time of these decisions to conclude to the contrary of the accepted line?

The answer is that risks should have been taken. The only hope for this country lay in the chance that Germany's victory ultimately would be a limited one. In fact, the more limited this victory was to be, the better the chances for the survival of the de facto, and not only formal independence of Hungary. Thus Hungary's best interests suggested no actual military contribution to Germany's war, for this had to hurt such interests in at least two ways. First, every Hungarian division joining in the battle, as things looked in 1941, might have shortened the war, leaving a stronger Germany behind than if the war lasted longer. Secondly, every Hungarian division leaving the country prejudiced the military

posture of Hungary, had vital interests of the country later called for taking an independent stance with respect to Germany.¹⁷

It was obvious that in 1941 the government did not anticipate the ability of Russia to resist Germany longer than a few months. Here was the crucial moment when the cultural shortcomings of the Hungarian leading classes, and especially the military, referred to in Chapter Four, resulted in the most tragic miscalculations.¹⁸ Hungary entered the war perhaps

¹⁷A defender of Hungarian policies may object here that the first year contribution of Hungary in the Russian campaign was so low, (36,000 men, weak equipment, see Macartney, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 52) that it did not weigh on the military scale while politically amounted to an insurance against Germany. It must not be forgotten, however, that this was only the beginning.

¹⁸In assuming a quick Russian collapse the Hungarians were incidentally not alone. Alexander Werth mentions with respect to the British military in June and July, 1941 that "(they) were almost unanimous in believing that Russia would be defeated in a short time." (Alexander Werth, Russia at War, 1941-45 (New York, p. 272)) He also refers to split opinions of Americans in Moscow pointing out that Harry Hopkins visiting there had no doubts. Neither did President Benes, who, according to Dorothy Thompson, as quoted by Werth was "the only person in London she met in July 1941, who believed the Russians would not be crushed." (Ibid., p. 285) But the Hungarians should have been equally good experts in Russian matters, as Russia was their chief obsession. The outcome of the Japanese-Russian confrontation in Manchuria in 1939 was, for instance, a clear indication that the Soviets were much stronger than Czarist Russia. This record was forgotten due to what was called the lessons of the Russo-Finnish Winter War in 1939-40, showing Russian weakness. Yet any Kremlinologist should have been able to predict from the comparison of the Manchurian and Finnish battlefield record keeping the British, French, and the German fighting a war that as Moscow calculated, will have to be a long and exhausting battle leaving Russia in a controlling position in Europe. A show of strength in Finland could have made the European

due to panic, believing that she would be punished in a few months, as soon as the Russian campaign was over, for not helping Germany in the campaign. Had there been any clear notion that Hungary after 1941 could be easily punished only if she willingly neglected to build up her military in a hurry, and failed to keep the army within the borders, as Germany would be occupied in Russia for years to come, the reasons for such a panic would have been much less alarming.

The margin of error permissible for a small power is comparable to its smallness. Hungary wanted to take the minimum chance and follow the most cautious line possible. Locked into the center of the continent it just did not seem feasible to challenge this awesome power sprawling all around, especially since Germany's defeat would generate an at least equally serious problem, Russia getting out of hand. It is safe to say that very few in Hungary and indeed in all Axis Europe anticipated in June, 1941 that the United States, even if it entered the war, would be able to produce and man the armies, air force, and navies bringing Italy, Germany, and Japan on their knees in such a short time. 1941 was the fourth consecutive year that Germany continued to pile up victories, adding by early summer to her trophies Yugoslavia and Greece in the South, after having overrun Austria,

powers so worried as to attempt a compromise which was the last thing Stalin wished to see. Thus the Finnish balance sheet should not have led Hungary so easily into believing in a Russian collapse in two months.

Czechoslovakia in the center, Poland in the East, Denmark and Norway in the North, and Holland, Belgium, and France in the West during the previous years.

Cracks already appeared, however, in the massive walls of the Axis by Italy's miserably poor performance, looking even poorer by comparison with Germany's record. But even this helped to push Hungary down, since in the case of Axis victory only in the shadow of a strong and respected Italy could she feel any hope of maintaining her independence. At any rate, Italy's weakness, revealed so dramatically by her inability to launch a successful offensive against France in the West, or against the British in the Middle East and Mediterranean, and her subsequent humiliating defeats in Greece, North Africa, and Ethiopia should have implied two logical consequences for Hungary.

First, were Germany to win the war, in spite of Italy's weakness, Hungary stood no chance of continuing an independent statehood. Such hope, to be sure, originally had been based on an infra-Axis balance of power the main stay of which was supposed to have been Italy.¹⁹ Italian weakness, in consequence, ought to have acted as a deterrent for the school of thought maintaining that the best possible future for Hungary would result from a strong Germany keeping Russia from Central Europe, and a strong Italy keeping Germany from Hungary proper.

¹⁹See Kirkpatrick, op. cit., p. 392.

One basic tenet of this thesis had fallen to pieces many months before Hungary was faced with the choice whether or not to follow Italy into belligerence. But this argument is still in reference to long range considerations.

Secondly, Italian weakness, already revealed in 1940, strongly hinted at the possibility that the Axis-Anglo-Saxon war would either end in a tie, or that the Axis might lose it altogether. The latter possibility incidentally had not come as a new idea for Regent Horthy, who being a Navy man himself fully realized the significance of British naval power. He had told Hitler in plain language what he thought of the Supreme Leaders' chances in this connection in 1938.²⁰ Yet it is obvious that shock reactions to the 1939-40 series of German victories, especially the collapse of France, and the tandem exhibition of German air and ground power obfuscated this clear perception of reality in Hungarian leaders. In late 1940, however, after the Battle of Britain, the sinking or damaging of Italian battleships at Taranto, and fiascos in the North African desert and on the Greek-Albanian border, Great Britain, still fighting alone, gave ample indication that the issue was far from being settled. It was so concluded by the governments in Madrid and Ankara, which strengthened their neutralism, and by the people of Belgrade, who challenged the Axis.

²⁰See Macartney, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 252.

Thus when a few months later the prestige of the Axis became somewhat restored, such change should have misled no one in Hungary. Germany won in the Balkans, but Great Britain still was not defeated. The dreams of a blitz and early victory were gone. With Russia becoming a powerful new ally to Great Britain, with the United States developing into the armament factory of democracies even before Pearl Harbor, with the record of the months between August, 1940 and June, 1941 showing clearly that air power could not force England to accept peace, and with the Axis without naval power except submarines,²¹ what logical conclusion should have been drawn in Budapest? The conclusion was, as seen, that Germany would win the continental war against Russia, rather than that Axis weakness in the West and South already foretold the final outcome in every respect.

The whole concept of the future as seen by Hungarian leadership in 1941 reveals one self-contradiction. From the moment that Germany became entangled with Russia the chances of Hungary's survival grew immensely, provided she stayed neutral. From that day on almost all of Germany's military might was concentrated either against Russia, in the

²¹Loss of the Bismarck against the Hood meant the loss of one of three German battleships in service against one out of sixteen British ones. There is no evidence what impressions on Horthy, (an old timer in naval affairs, and the only Austro-Hungarian naval commander engaging the British-French fleet in surface battle) such a "tie" made. If belonging to believers in battleships, however, the Pearl Harbor disaster ought to impress the Regent unduly.

Mediterranean, or on Europe's West coast. Thus by the end of 1941, when Hungary already had entered the war officially, but still had not committed any major portion of her army, it appeared clear that the blitz concept had failed not only with respect to England and air power but also concerning Russia and continental warfare. The comparison between 1812 and late 1941--early 1942 could be perceived as being in no way without substance just when twelve Hungarian divisions began to reinforce the Eastern front.

Similar to the effects of the Balkan campaign, the Japanese intervention and her early successes in the Orient now evened the score once again. As the shock of the first German victories in Russia had helped many to forget what it meant to have her join the anti-Axis camp, Pearl Harbor, Singapore, and Corregidor obfuscated the meaning of having the United States of America hurried into the war with all of her titanic resources, energy, and manpower. But as in the case of Russia, here again no expert knowledge existed in Hungary to assess United States armament capabilities in realistic figures.

It is at this point that the intrinsic contradiction comes to light. If Hungary entered the war on Germany's side for fear that the revisionist acquisitions would be turned back to Rumania and Slovakia which was a major reason for the decision, this fear had become largely unrealistic at the moment when the first German tanks began to roll over the

Russian border. It became even more so after the failure of 1941 campaign in Russia, and entry of the United States of America into the war. For Hungary to survive against Germany all that would have been needed now was to maneuver for a little more time until the aggregation of Western military energy came to show its hand at all fronts.

This of course does not mean that Hungary should have antagonized Germany with harsh actions and prematurely at a time when the country was still very much exposed to Germany. It is at this juncture that Hungary would have profited immensely from a creditable military, an effective air force, and a national spirit similar to that of the Yugoslavs to oppose an eventual German aggression. Such resources coupled with an economic contribution to the German war machine would have made Germany think twice before deciding upon an immediate retaliation against a "faithless ally." Had such German action resulted in serious resistance, no matter how short its actual duration may have been, the latter would have led to the temporary disorganization of the hinterland as far as food, bauxite, and oil supplies of Germany were concerned. An action promising to end in a few hours or perhaps days, as occurred in March 19, 1944, could be risked by Berlin. But a centrally positioned country living in instant readiness, determined in case of trouble to attack Ploesti with warplanes, to block the oil routes both on water and land by blowing up bridges, rail installations, and by mining

the rivers would have held a certain lid on the potential aggressor.

Yet the air force barely existed. Nor did the national spirit to resist if the attacker happened to be Germany. The absence of the first forces the mind back to the Trianon Peace Treaty as the principal although by far not the only reason for the weakness of the country's military posture. So does the second. On one hand Hungarian society remembering the bad days of the 1918-19 cataclysm, wanted no part in making the country once again a land of ruins. On the other hand, Hungarian public opinion, whatever the government's misgivings were, generally considered Germany as being the great friend, the restorer of justice, the country that helped Hungary to recapture some of her lost territories.

The government of Ladislao Bárdossy deemed it impossible to continue anymore with stalling tactics, denying Germany a Hungary of true Kameradschaft. This government seemed to have eyed the country's internal weakness rather than the international situation.²² Thus it opted to gain time in the wrong way. Bárdossy chose entering the war instead of neutralism, because the other way, in his view, would have deprived Hungary of the only shield she possessed in avoiding a German invasion and imposition of vassalage; the good will of the German government, purchasable by rendering all kind of services.

²²See Chapter III.

Yet the second decision of sending half of the army to Russia could not be justified even from this point. The fact is that by the end of 1941 Hungary had just begun to approach a more favorable situation concerning regional distribution of power. Not only did German military might suffer staggering losses in Russia and were her military prospects very dim by that time, which advised the utmost caution for her to collect more enemies. But, in addition, at the end of 1941 Rumania and Slovakia, two potential allies of Germany against Hungary also became considerably weakened by their substantial military contribution against Russia.²³ On the other hand Hungary now incorporated more than fourteen million inhabitants, contrasted with nine million in 1937. Hers was then the only army in Europe, except for the neutrals, practically not yet committed in battle. Weak as it was concerning armament and spirit, its presence at the moment still gave the government a measure of free decision making that had been unthinkable only a few months earlier when German divisions packed East-Central Europe ready to attack first the Balkans and then Russia. This was true in spite of the lack of air power and resistance spirit.

Thus as seen, objective long range considerations advised against becoming more involved in the war and short range considerations showed it was quite feasible to stall. In case

²³Rumania's casualties by the end of 1941 reached about 200,000, according to Macartney, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 65, footnote 1.

skillful diplomatic tactics were applied, such as borrowing German's own method in misleading allies and friends as to her real intentions,²⁴ there was not even a very great immediate danger in stalling Germany's requests in January, 1942 concerning mobilization and sending more troops to Russia. They may have been granted in half way only, namely, the part of mobilization. Then the Hungarian government, had they had daring and imagination in implementing clever delaying tactics, could have raised more forcefully the issue of persecution of Hungarian ethnic minorities in Southern Transylvania than they actually did, as an excuse for withholding the promised troops.²⁵ Coming at a later date (late with respect to the jumping off day of the 1942 summer campaign), and with some Hungarian divisions already in Russia, it is hard to see what retaliation could have been staged against Hungary in 1942, had the bulk of the force been stopped from joining the campaign. Confrontation would have had to be considered by Germany with 1943 as the earliest date, that is to say, after Stalingrad, El Alamein and the landing in North Africa. A retaliation would have come, if at all, against a Hungary that meanwhile had gained one more year to build up her military instead of wasting it in

²⁴Italy was led to believe even in early August, 1939 by German leaders that there will be no war over Poland. A pact to avoid war until 1942 was signed between the two in May, 1939. See Kirkpatrick, op. cit., p. 395.

²⁵The threat of not sending all of them was actually made by Kállay; see Macartney, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 96.

Russia. By that time a Hungarian deterrent of complex economic-military-political ingredients could have been readied. A shell may have been built around the only independently functioning government, apart from those in Berlin, Rome, and Bern in the whole Stockholm-Madrid-Ankara continental triangle.

What influence such a fact would have had with regard to the war and postwar situation at a moment when Central European interests were represented by no other government in actual power, is difficult to assess. Yet whatever the consequences of filling a power vacuum in Central Europe would have been on Western great power thinking, the fact is that all options that Hungary, and the entire region, might have had, were played away by the decision stripping Hungary militarily on one hand, and not developing enough military at the first place, on the other.

There is no telling what the actual consequences of such a situation would have implied for the shaping of the postwar order. But an attempt at restoring Danubian independence under the leadership of a far sighted Hungary would have been worth trying. Had it failed, either because of Germany's crushing such an attempt, or due to Anglo-Saxon interests trying to satisfy Russia in view of great calamities in store for them if they did not do so, the responsibility for the present tragic situation of Europe in no way would have rested even minimally on the succession states of the former Dual Monarchy, or Hungary, specifically. It would have been a

gallant attempt to iron out consequences of the mistakes committed prior to the dissolution of the Danubian Commonwealth.

This study has tried to show that such an attempt per se would have been possible. A long list of missed opportunities were needed to prevent it from becoming a reality. Correct identification of the vital national interest would have left the national government with less option as to whether to follow Germany into the war. It showed that it was imperative that they should not. But if concession was to be made to Germany in this respect in order to avoid internal turmoil and German repercussions, there was no need to continue with substantial concessions after the Battle of Moscow. The situation then made it possible to give consideration to the vital national interest and to embark on a policy of taking, instead of minimum chances, its opposite, as far as the essential task, preservation of Hungarian military potential, was concerned. The policy of taking minimum chances involved the military weakening of the country which was a maximum risk. The policy of military build up at the cost of not heeding German interest would have been one that sought primary protection of Hungary not in foreign good will but in the ability to put up resistance. Possessing a military capability actually would have meant less danger. Diplomacy without being based on military power has no choice but unconditional subjection to foreign powers. Diplomacy

paired with military power may fare badly or it may fare well. It has a choice and a chance.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

The search for the explanations of the military and foreign policies, or rather the shortcomings of such, of the Hungarian decision-making apparatus in the era preparing for Hungary's downfall has come to the point where conclusions may be summarized.

Using the schemes of evaluation established in the introductory chapter,¹ first of all it should be clear that the Hungarian leaders remained unaware of the dangers threatening Hungary and Hungarian self-determination from German quarters at least until the spring of 1939 and for the most part even thereafter. The total unawareness of society, especially of the military, of this kind of danger, lasted until Hungary's occupation by German troops in March, 1944. Yet to many even this event did not spell disenchantment from the mania Germanica. The record of Hungarian governmental thinking for the years between 1939-44 with respect to anticipating a German crack-down indicates fear of eventual German repercussions for Hungarian luke warmness not prior to the postwar era and only with regard to territories awarded to or occupied by Hungary in the years 1938-41. The possibility of German

¹See pp. 6-7.

interference by taking advantage of Hungarian quislings was clearly noticed. But neither the government of semi-active pro-Berlin policies nor those engaging in relatively anti-German ones ever seem to have calculated the serious possibility of a German military occupation of the country. Such an act against the code of ethics of the old Austrian-Hungarian social world simply lay beyond the grasp of conservative Hungarian leadership mind in general, whereas an influential, pro-German part of the middle class could not care less if it happened.

Thus realistic appraisal of eventualities broke down with respect to German behavior exactly as they did concerning evaluation of Russian resistance potential and American military might. As a result of such general shortsightedness the Hungarian government never did feel it was mandatory to prepare the country for emergencies from whatever quarters they might come. Subsequently it played away every chance to strengthen the government's position militarily, no matter how relatively few these were. Perhaps it would not have done so had the nation built an early military and moral resistance potential consciously against Germany the same way as she did, although for the most part morally only, against the Little Entente and Communist Russia.

Hungarian failure to build a defensive shell both morally and militarily, thus politically and economically as well, preparing for every eventuality to the absolute limits

of contemporarily given possibilities, is the crucial point made in this inquiry. Realization of total danger requires total alertness and willingness to face it with every available means. This is so even when such means would have required serious sacrifices emotionally and economically, both of the nation as well as the ruling feudalistic upper and urban middle classes. In other words, the vital national interest, the defence of national independence, had it been properly identified in time as being in danger, should have suggested a policy of reason summarized in the following points:

1. There should have been no resistance in cooperation with the Little Entente, thus overruling the fundamental tenet of Hungarian foreign policies in the years prior to German hegemony.

2. No oppression of social reform movements which prevented the building of a militia in the Twenties and Thirties, and a feeling of limited reliability on the lower classes.

3. No policies handing control over the military to the Hungaro-German segment of Hungarian society after 1932.

4. No neglect of building an air industry in the Twenties and an air defence force based on domestic production in a proportionately large scale from the mid-Thirties onward, and no neglect of other measures required to make Hungary at least relatively self-sufficient concerning other modern military procurement as well.

5. No informational and educational policies saturating the Hungarian public with right wing ideology, even through official channels, in all the years of the Horthy era.

6. Supposing all previous points were not kept, still there was a possibility of following Germany with none but economic and symbolic means into the war against Russia in 1941.

7. Supposing even this was deemed too risky, still there was a possibility of sending no substantial military forces to Russia in 1942.

8. No neglect in building a military guard-force around the capital using reliable troops especially after 1942, or at least in building an identical defence belt just prior to the armistice declaration of Regent Horthy in October 1944.

9. No neglect in seeking active support among Slovaks and Croats to balance anti-Hungarian German influences in governmental circles in Bratislava and Zagreb after 1938 and 1941, respectively, and among all minorities incorporated into the Hungarian state, including Jewish, Rumanian, and Ruthenian ethnic-religious groups.

10. No reliance on old-time ethical codes and late nineteenth-century notions in judging world reality instead of keeping abreast of the principles presently shaping international political, military, economic, and cultural developments.

Had these points been kept the following options would have remained open to the Hungarian government, diminishing her predicament in exercising national powers:

As to No. 1:

a) The possibility of building up a regional defence sphere against both Russia and Germany (which was a small chance due to Little Entente and Hungarian nationalism).

b) The possibility of achieving some early agreement with the Little Entente concerning cancellation of limitations in armies and armament (also doubtful, although not entirely, depending on how much foresight would have been available in Prague, Bucharest, and Belgrade) after a changed Hungarian attitude.

c) More freedom for the Hungarian government to act in foreign policy matters without the pressure of an excited public opinion, preventing reasonable decisions on bases of long range considerations (which, as seen, would have been extremely important to avoid entrance into the war on Germany's side in 1941).² Such a foreign policy, however, would not have been possible without placing the blame for Trianon at least in part on Hungarian pre-World War One attitudes, in order to introduce the use of an objective tone in judging these matters, which in turn would have implied the need of criticism of Hungarian traditional values and classes; in other words the necessity of democratizing political life.

²See Chapter III.

This, had it all been accomplished, would have served as a tremendous asset for Hungary in the forthcoming great test.

As to all clauses of No. 1, one should note that a peace treaty based on the principle of Wilsonian self-determination would have prepared for easier ways and lesser opposition among the public to such policies and the situation would not have needed an heroic practice of intellectual virtues fighting widespread political emotionalism, in order to serve the vital national interest in all the concerned countries.

As to No. 2, in case no agreement had been possible with the Little Entente, a militia would have given the Hungarian government more flexibility to achieve gradually some military status at an earlier time. Such more advanced capability in the vacuum following the collapse of the Central European status quo should have signalled the possibility of expanding Hungarian positions, securing better economic bases for further military build ups, calculated to strengthen chances of national survival in relative independence in preparation for the final stage of the war.

As to No. 3, the options here are self-explanatory in view of damage done by the officer corps to Hungarian political leadership and independence in 1941, 1942, and 1944.

As to No. 4, beneficial consequences of air force, artillery and armor build ups would probably not have been felt before the early Forties in any case, but then may have served as a prime argument to deter a German invasion and thus create

an entirely new political situation in Central Europe. The rest of this refers to No. 2.

As to No. 5, sane public education, as observed in comment on No. 1 too, would have freed the government from domestic right-wing pressures. It also would have created a psychological atmosphere favorable to negotiations with the West. German attitudes, however, toward Hungary would thereby have been also seriously affected, much earlier than 1943-44.

As to No. 6, not entering into the war in 1941 would have removed Hungary from the list of states against which Russia pressured Great Britain into declarations of war. It could have, however, generated early conspiratory moves involving the German government and Hungarian quislings, the outcome of which would have depended on whether or not the Hungarian military was reliable. On the other hand, refusal to enter the war would have signalled a clear departure from the Axis, as was the case with Spain. For the increased danger from without, a public opinion not drawn into war hysteria to any extent, but awakened to essentials of true national interest would have been the reward from within.

As to No. 7, it is at this point that a Hungarian Realpolitik could have attempted a cautious departure from Berlin, should No. 3 have been a reality, and especially if realization of No. 4 (the existence of an air force, etcetera) had acted in conjunction with this on the international situation (with the implication of an effective disruption of traffic in the

German hinterland via air attacks and armed resistance in case of a German invasion of Hungary. Retaining the Don army would have given a chance to conduct separate peace negotiations with the West (had this been needed at all), in an atmosphere of realism in 1943 and 1944, and would have complicated German military counter-moves considerably.

The cumulative effects of such events could easily have changed the postwar map of influence spheres between East and West. If Hungary after putting up resistance had succumbed to Germany, and subsequently to Russia, it would have happened with the knowledge and self-conscience that the nation at least had tried to assert her right to independence.

As to No. 8, this point would have opened the possibility of giving the Hungarian government a last ditch deterrent against German aspirations to control the nation. As in the case with No. 1, the chances of success appear to have been small, as the situation calling for implementation of this measure had to be quite desperate at any rate. Yet, had this measure been applied in October 1944, when the German tanks, rumbling through Budapest without encountering resistance, lacked ammunition for their guns,³ at least the capital city would have been spared from the fate of becoming a Danubian Stalingrad, and the national government would have survived for a transition period, preventing thereby much of the misery the Hungarian population suffered due to the total absence of

³Macartney, op.cit., Vol. II, pp. 389, 414.

authoritative representation of Hungarian interests versus the Soviet Union. (The question whether Budapest would not have suffered Warsaw's fate and bled to death under German attack with Russia happily looking on cannot be dismissed. Although no evidence bears it out, such a specter must have haunted Hungarian leadership during their agony as the Warsaw events were just recent history in September-October, 1944. But no matter how great the similarities between the geopolitical "givens" between Budapest and Warsaw, the differences of the actual situation were essential as well. Since the Warsaw uprising Germany lost France, Belgium, and The Netherlands with the necessity to defend the all important Ruhr and South-Western Germany. Now political considerations determining the location and strength of military operations advised a counter-attack in the West, as it actually came to materialize with the Battle of the Bulge in December, 1944. It was motivated by the same wish for a separate peace treaty with the West as the suppression of the Warsaw uprising. The policy of priorities, the necessity to concentrate on one project was a military must in view of essentially diminished German capabilities. The loss of Rumania meanwhile cost Germany not only one more satellite and one German army, but eliminated Hungary's importance as a link to Ploesti. But as the most important difference between the situation of Budapest and Warsaw one can list two factors: The Warsaw uprising force had only small arms; a Budapest defence force had within

its capabilities to fight with anti-aircraft guns right on location [which had two kinds of ammunition, anti-aircraft and anti-tank]. Budapest, if prepared, had essentially better defence positions in the Buda hills than Warsaw, and the government may have accumulated there as well as in the Pest suburbs tanks and field artillery as well. On the other hand, Budapest was closer to Italy than Warsaw. Her resistance most probably would have brought in Allied air power in support, as evidenced by Royal Air Force strikes against Bahhida and other communication centers near Budapest just prior to Horthy's armistice declaration. That these attacks were intended to shield Horthy from the Germans rather than to press him into surrender is born out by the fact that Budapest was spared, while on the 7th of October the "Western Allies recommenced their air offensive . . . a fleet of several hundred American bombers appeared and bombed Szombathely, Érsekújvár, Komárom and Győr."⁴ Horthy's mind by that time was already made up and the Allies knew that he only waited for the opportune moment. (A Hungarian committee was already flown to Moscow on Stalin's private plane, from Zolyom in Slovakia, indicating thus that now Hungary was accepting unconditional surrender even to the Russians.⁵) Thus Allied air support for Budapest if she resisted, was of realistic expectation, which, in turn, should have motivated the Russians to

⁴Ibid., p. 375.

⁵Ibid., p. 372.

reach Budapest from their positions a hundred miles east as soon as possible, exactly in order to avoid the forming of a pro-Western nucleus for the postwar time. The risks of course for Horthy still would have been heavy. Macartney reports that a 65 cm giant German mortar was moved south from Poland which only had been used twice in the war, against Sevastopol and Warsaw.⁶⁾

As to No. 9, the increase of power inherent in this policy seems to have promised little even if it had turned out to be successful, which must be considered doubtful in retrospect. Yet the point has been made in Chapter Five that all of Central Europe (as far as its political will was concerned) constituted a vacuum in the period between April, 1941 and May, 1945, except for the limited power wielded by Budapest until March, 1944. Accepting in theory that the military "givens" for Hungary were as they should have been if at least some of the policies indicated in this scheme had been adopted, a realization of, or an attempt to realize No. 9 would have created the following possibilities:

a) An increase of Hungary's and decrease in Germany's power as well as the influence of the government-in-exile of Czechoslovakia and a various Yugoslavian components in the border regions of Hungary, with the result that both short and long range political and military dangers to Hungary's independence and integrity would have slightly diminished.

⁶Ibid., p. 389.

The representatives of the former Little Entente may have been influenced toward seeking cooperation with Hungary, had this policy proved fruitful. As far as Germany and Russia were concerned, a cluster made of Hungary (then advanced to the rank of a medium power), and third rank powers associating themselves within the Carpathian basin would have wielded strength roughly equivalent to Turkey's and Spain's⁷ both of which notably survived World War Two in independence although caught between the warring great power blocks. A power conglomeration of sorts in Central Europe, emerging toward the end of the war, thus unobtrusive to Hitler in the era of the initial German onslaught and predominance, and now caught between warring Germany and Russia, the first to retreat, the second advancing, should have caused some reverberations in political planning in London and Washington. Everything points to the reasonable assertion that it certainly would have done so in Winston Churchill's mind at least.⁸ As an

⁷But with the addition of the presupposed air capability which Spain and Turkey essentially lacked.

⁸See D. F. Fleming, The Cold War and its Origins, 1917-1956 (New York, 1961), Vol. 1, pp. 161, 163-164, 189-191, clearly showing Churchill's constant pre-occupation with the Balkans, plans to rush to Vienna before the Russians do, splitting the peninsula into temporary influence spheres. Stettinius states that Churchill and Stalin agreed in October, 1944 behind the back of the Americans "that the Soviet Union would have 75/25 or 80/20 predominance in Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania. Britain and Russia would share influence in Yugoslavia 50/50; and the British would have full responsibility in Greece." (Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference [New York, 1949], pp. 12-13) The date is significant, however, as it was after all hopes for Horthy to survive in power were already gone. In Fleming there is every indication that earlier Churchill did not consent more than 50/50 power share over Hungary to the Russians.

initial step toward a Slavic-Hungarian regional union and by no means as a policy of returning to the historical Hungarian concept of Magyar domination within the Carpathian Alps, such a policy could have been the nucleus of a new Danubian stability inviting Prague, Belgrade, and Bucharest to cooperation and as such conquering the imagination of Western statesmen as well.

The widespread notion among Hungarian domestic and emigré circles that President Roosevelt and his team are responsible for the postwar fate of Eastern Europe cannot be allowed to pass without the remark that there was a genuine American interest in a postwar Catholic Danubian Confederation as a balance to both National Socialist and Communist Russia, before Teheran.⁹ There was also a genuine interest in Hungary if she had been ready to quit the Axis camp. However, no power, skill and determination existed for the realization of such a concept within Central Europe itself. The increment in available options for the Hungarian government inherent in

⁹Kállay refers to such plans when mentioning that "the idea of a Danubian federation to replace the Monarchy or of a block of states was written off," giving the reasons as follows: "Our Western partners in the discussions did not have complete freedom of action vis-à-vis the Russians. The possibility of a German-Russian agreement hung like a sword of Damocles over the Anglo-American negotiators. It was the fear of such an agreement (fostered by Goebbels' propaganda), that was largely responsible for their docile acceptance of Russia's wishes." Kállay, *op. cit.*, pp. 391-392. But Kállay remains silent about the local, that is to say, Carpathian background and its discouraging features as regards to offering a power base to the Democracies with some element of realism.

a policy of Hungarian, Slovakian, and Croatian cooperation lay in showing exactly this kind of power basis, skill and determination to Washington and London (not in contrast to the Czechs and Serbs, but rather the Germans and Russians).

As to No. 10, increased possibilities resulting from avoiding a cultural lag cannot be determined in exact terms since such a change in intellectual potential would have by necessity affected the entire modus operandi of the Hungarian government and the entire thinking of Hungarian society, or at least its key segments. Recognition of the importance of the air force, creation and mobilization of modern managerial talents in industry pertains here. Also it is here that the delicate and all important question must be discussed of how German leaders should have been handled in feasible ways and not according to the code of ethics of the old Austrian-Hungarian Imperial and Royal Court.

It can be reasonably objected to the entire line of this study that the policies advocated in it, if realized, would have set Hungary on a collision course with Germany and that Hitler's personality being what it was, impetuous and irrational, especially under duress, he would not have tolerated a Hungarian military machine and a political will endangering German supply lines, no matter what their elimination had cost Germany. A Hitlerian rage would not have respected arguments of reason against an invasion of Hungary no matter how prohibitive the costs in view of the Hungarian

defence capability. The answer to this objection is that if vassalhood and its consequences were to be avoided serious risks would have been to be taken. But Hungary's policy in the long run proved to be much more risky anyway. On the other hand, Hitler had a strangely irrational personality, the study and handling of which could have yielded the benefit of delaying a Hungarian-German crisis until Hungary had a military ability to put up resistance and then deal with the situation entirely as warranted according to Hungarian interests.

The chances to know Hitler intimately and to use this knowledge were much greater for Hungarian leaders than for any of their contemporary non-German colleagues. Had they equalled the post-World War One world in shrewdness, and mastered its principles without identifying themselves with the latter's expediency about human life, but rather acting in defence of such, Hungarian leadership might have introduced psychology as a diplomatic weapon in behalf of Hungarian independence.¹⁰ In a neo-romanticist, non-objective world, to which they themselves belonged, such transcendence

¹⁰The difficulties in Hungarian-German relations on the leadership level were often due to personal incompatibilities between "plebeian" National Socialists and "aristocratic" Magyars. Foreign Ministers Kanya and Ribbentrop developed deep personal dislikes for each other, and Goebbels was notoriously ill-disposed toward Hungarians. Old-time diplomats, such as von Papen and Weiszäcker, and soldiers, got along very well with Hungarian old timers such as Horthy. Among the new leaders Goering can be counted as best suited to cope with the Magyar temper.

into the scientific would have given them a superior chance to weather the storm. Soothing Hitler in non-essentials without yielding to him in matters of vital national interest would have gained precious time. Actually there were attempts at such a policy, which unfortunately were not carried to their logical conclusions and based on the power of guns as well as persuasion. Also as seen in Chapter One,¹¹ the reverse policy of capitulating before Hitler in essentials and irritating him in minor matters such as by the de facto recognition of the Salo Republic, was a more constant line with Hungarian policy making. The mixing of the two resulted in the worst conceivable consequences, be it in Berlin, London, Washington, or Budapest itself.

There appears, however, to be a contradiction between the need to serve the vital national interest by appeasing Hungary's ethnic and religious minorities, as indicated in No. 9, and a similar need for the same reason to sooth Adolf Hitler, indicated in No. 10. It is hard to see how the latter could have taken place while Hungary assumed an obviously protective attitude toward her Jewry. Since Hitler's psyche had some absolutes that no human persuasion could ever have changed, and the most powerful of them was his hatred of Jewry, a psychological approach to Hitler and efforts to pacify him with secondary means while withholding the backbone of Hungarian national power would have been impossible, so it appears

¹¹ Page 28.

at first sight, if the suggestions of No. 9 had been heeded.

The problem of Hungarian domestic anti-Semitism, serious as it was, lent an added dimension of gravity to this, limiting faculties of the government even further. The discussion of intricacies of the problem in detail pertains to the study of Hungarian society and history. Still, two outstanding facts should be mentioned here in this connection. First, foundation of the new liberal Hungarian state in 1867 resulted in active cooperation between the aristocracy and gentry on one hand, and Jewry on the other, in order to balance the presence of Germanic middle class and the absence of its Magyar equivalent in the Hungarian social structure. This situation helped the mass immigration of Jews from Vienna-controlled Galicia to Hungary. Secondly, the debacle of World War One, the Trianon Peace Treaty, and Jewish participation in democratizing or even socializing attempts, combined with a reaction to such involvements that had been fomented by Christian patriotism at its worst, that is, appearing as intellectual agrarianism and anti-urbanism, developed into a Hungarian-Germanic alliance based on the emerging lower middle classes. This, in turn, resulted in potent and dominating anti-Semitic currents. Controlling these emotions in the atmosphere of indignation over Trianon was almost impossible. German propoganda added to this problem, while the Churches, all important cultural agents in

Hungary, initially added to it too, and later did not do enough to rebuke the rising passions. Thus the conservative Hungarian establishment, partly by its own fault, partly by historic circumstances, was caught, concerning the Jewish problem, between two pressures, Hitler and the Hungarian anti-Semitic middle classes. How in these conditions the vital national interest may have been served without the Hungarian government suffering repercussions from without and within was the prime leadership problem beyond revision of Trianon.

Yet there is an answer to how both Hitler and the Jewish minority, Hungarian anti-Semitism and Jewish interests may have been reconciled. That this answer is not mere theorizing is shown by history which proves clearly that a solution was achieved contrary to Hitler's wishes for a "final solution" of the Jewish question in Hungary up to the very moment of German occupation of the country. The Hungarian government had a powerful argument to put the brakes on Hitler's drive against Hungarian Jews. Paradoxically enough this was discovered in an unusually high percentage of the Jewish population in Hungary, and the key role the Jewish intelligentsia played in the country's everyday life,¹² since the claim

¹²According to Macartney Hungary had about five percent of her population professing Jewish religion (900,000 in Greater Hungary in 1910, 444,567 in Trianon Hungary in 1930, and about 750,000 in all Hungarian territories in 1941), to which comes the number of those who would count Jewish, had the Nuremberg law been fully implemented in Hungary. Their contribution in the commercial, industrial, and intellectual

could thereby be made that Hungary (and later the Hungarian war effort) would break down in case of a drastic removal of Jews in pursuance of the German pattern. Thus the government was able to channel anti-Semitic drives, although not without exceptions, into cultural and economic paths. Hungarian Jewry up to 1944 on the whole remained untouched by the fate their brethren shared all over Europe where German boots marched. Clearly, the only safeguard of Hungarian Jewry remained Hungarian sovereignty and the control of a non-National Socialist government over the country. The strengthening of such would have been a vital Jewish interest in spite of the anti-Semitic laws of 1938 and 1939. It would have been of paramount importance for both the Hungarian government and Hungarian Jewry to drive this fact discreetly home in all free countries of the world, especially in the United States, so as to avoid a public opinion condemning Hungary as a mere satellite of Hitler. To discover in Hungary a barrier to National Socialism, as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., discovered in North Vietnamese nationalism a potential barrier to Red China¹³ and to help Hungary tacitly, as Titoism had been helped by Great Britain and the United States ever since

fields were much higher. Budapest in 1910 had a Jewish population of 200,000 (20%). See Macartney, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 18, 19, 318, 423 as to census data; 19, 20, 219, 325 as to occupational distribution. The number of Jewry in Carpatho-Ukraine and the Bacska is not referred to by Macartney.

¹³Conference held at Texas Christian University February 21, 1966.

1943, required intellectual penetration and a deep analysis of the situation.

At any rate, the Hungarian government should have established channels of communication with Jewish religious and community leaders pointing out to them that it was Hungary's intention to make contemporary anti-Semitic laws transitory only. It should also have urged Christian religious leaders in Hungary to engage in determined moral efforts to curb the vice of anti-Semitism, since the government could not openly do it in view of its precarious position. Of course the Christians should have engaged in such a program on their own and much more outspokenly, as happened marginally here and there.

But the Hungarian leadership in principle was not against every kind of anti-Semitism. The wish to reduce Jewish economic and cultural influence, deemed to coincide with the interests of nationalism, was genuine and not merely calculated to appease domestic and German racists. Nor did the churches take any other position. Thus the correct guidelines for shrewd and farsighted policies remained unestablished, principles serving both Hungarian majority and Jewish minority interests unspecified. Hitler probably knew that he could have his way with the Hungarians at least to an extent and that no collusion between the leadership, conservative

as it was, and the Jewish minority would materialize behind his back.¹⁴

To make this absolutely clear, the Hungarian government, in dispatching an opposition political figure as an unofficial Hungarian emissary to the United States, with diplomatic relations breaking and war being declared, sent Mr. Tibor Eckhardt, not a known friend of the Jewish cause.¹⁵ This perhaps had to be so, to spare Hitler's sensitivity even when acting in defiance. But to establish channels of communication behind this unofficial facade and its equivalents,¹⁶ (the task of which should have signalled the ultimate intentions of the Hungarian government to return to a pre-World War One Hungarian-Jewish alliance once Hitler was finished) must be regarded in retrospect as an essential. Had this been accomplished Hitler

¹⁴Contrary to what Arrow Cross leaders constantly claimed with respect to such a collusion actually existing.

¹⁵According to Hugh Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 189: "Eckhardt originally belonged to the anti-Semitic, right wing organization called "Awakening Magyars" with Julius Gombös." Among personal qualifications for such a sensitive job featured the fact that he was the chief delegate of Hungary at the League of Nations during the Yugoslavian-Hungarian crisis of 1934-35, defending his country from the accusation of being involved in the regicide at Marseille. As such Eckhardt became acquainted with Eden and Benes. According to Seton-Watson (Ibid., p. 393), Eckhardt in 1936 and 1937 together with Milan Hodza favored the formation of a Vienna-Prague-Budapest triangle.

¹⁶Such as the channel established between President Roosevelt and Premier Kállay via Otto von Hapsburg, the head of the dynasty, then in exile from Austria in Washington, D. C. The Archduke in a conversation with this student referred to the existence of such a channel, bearing out Macartney's statement (op. cit., Vol. II, p. 205), in saying that negotiations ended due to "hesitancy" from Kállay's part.

still could have been mollified and yet Western cooperation aimed at saving the life of the Hungarian Jewish community via aiding Hungary on high levels of government may have been secured as well. Perhaps all this was attempted, but published records do not reveal it. Yet knowing the givens of Hungarian cultural trends and philosophy as well as the lack of sophistication, it appears to be highly unlikely.

Such a communication would have been essential for the Jewish community, not merely to help save the Jewish population of Hungary but to aid Hungarian governmental circles in discovering the feasibility of the Zionist movement as a long range positive means to decrease interracial tensions. For the solution of the Jewish situation in Hungary if sanely conceived was not anti but pro-Semitism. A return to pre-World War practices of free migration in a "world made safe for democracy" would have triggered as it actually then did, emigration of great numbers of Jews from Europe mainly to Israel, although likely to other Western countries as well. A secret commitment by Hungary to aid in building the state of Israel by allowing it to be populated with Hungarian Jews in the postwar era would have been of great benefit for both sides. It could have motivated the Hungarian government to protect persecuted Jews in the newly re-acquired eastern regions who in their unintegrated condition stirred animosity.¹⁷

¹⁷In these parts the majority of Jewry preserved their Yiddish customs. They went along very well with the local population but presented themselves as conspicuous targets

Such a policy, in turn, may have stilled Jewish worries on international and domestic levels concerning the real character of the Hungarian government, diminishing thereby the total isolation into which this government fell. This isolation was one contributive factor in the loss of Hungarian de facto sovereignty to Germany, and thereby signalled one important station on the road to Auschwitz for many Jews.

Hungary in the critical years needed Jewish advice and energy more and more as German influences grew within the country. Instead she had to rely on such less and less. Equally, the vital national interest of keeping the country strong and independent called for a continued Jewish presence in post World War Two Hungary, with the condition that the assimilation process, begun in the nineteenth century would further mature. Thus promoting prospects of emigration to Israel should not have signalled any peril to such a presence from the part of Hungarian policy making but merely a recognition of the concept of the Jewish state, leaving to the individual Jews the decision as to which of them did or did not participate in its realization. In view of the high percentage of orthodox village Jews among Hungarian Jewry,

to the anti-Semitism of lower echelons of the Hungarian civil service, now re-installed in these areas. Among them lived about 30,000 Jews who had filtered in illegally from Poland after 1939; 14,700 of them were put back in the hand of German authorities in 1941, thus before the German controlled mass deportations of 1944 began. (See Macartney, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 37) The right wing exerted heavy pressure on the government in this matter. (Ibid., p. 38) By contrast, Polish refugees were aided in reaching Allied territory.

Israel could have gained at least one quarter of a million inhabitants from Greater Hungary¹⁸ alone, had some chain of political miracles prevented their doom.

Let us now turn to policies of the subsequent Hungarian governments, which even if mostly unsuccessful because of weakness of the Hungarian state and military, indicated some degree of action in harmony with the vital national interest.

1. Attempts to seize Carpatho-Ukraine and Eastern Slovakia before Germany did, in order to

- a) prevent German political influence from placing a wedge between Poland and Hungary;
- b) to set the geo-political pre-condition for an alliance with the Axis, including Poland, Hungary, Italy, and possibly Yugoslavia, in order to balance German over-ponderance;
- c) to secure for the Hungarian war economy essential raw material sources, such as the iron ore mines of Eastern Slovakia, in 1938 and 1939.

2. Hungarian neutralism in the time of the 1939 Polish campaign, resistance to German pressure aiming at passage through Hungarian territory, assistance to Polish refugees to reach Allied territory (all of moral significance to strengthen Hungary's international position, although with no conceivable immediate practical benefits).

¹⁸Meaning its 1941-1944 configuration.

3. The Budapest-Belgrade "eternal friendship" pact. The suicide of Count Paul Teleki, as a moral gesture, calculated to mitigate British reaction against Hungary on account of her participation in the German campaign against Yugoslavia in 1941.
4. The low level of military participation in the 1941 phase of the Russian campaign.
5. Removal of Henrick Werth as Chief of Staff, and his replacement by a person dedicated to following Hungarian orders rather than German wishes in military matters, and resignation of the Bárdossy cabinet in 1942.
6. Some policies of Premier Nicholas Kállay, such as
 - a) Orders to the Air Force in 1943 not to shoot at British-American aircraft until shot at, and secret negotiations with the Western powers to extract Hungary from the war in 1943 and 1944.
 - b) Punishment of officers responsible for the Novisad massacre, and refusal to participate in anti-Tito military operations in 1943.
 - c) Refusal to replace the Don army with new divisions, and diplomatic efforts to return all Hungarian troops from Russia, in 1943 and early 1944.
7. The building of a defence line in the Hungarian controlled segments of the Carpathian Alps by taking advantage of strong natural defences, against Russia and eventually both great

continental powers whichever was allied to Rumania against Hungary, in 1939-1944.

8. Refusal to allow Germany the deportation of the Budapest Jewry in 1944.
9. Replacement of Premier Döme Sztojaj at the first opportunity with General Lakatos; preparation for an unconditional surrender and armistice, in August-October, 1944.
10. Resistance to efforts by Hungarian quislings to control especially the Premiership, the Interior and Foreign Ministries, and generally the government in all the years of German hegemony.

Of these ten points, carried out with pressures from Germany bringing total or partial reversals, parts of No. 1, No. 2, as the quick collapse of Poland made further German pressures unnecessary, No. 6-b (the punished officers escaped in a German military aircraft from the Budaörs airport,¹⁹ but Hungary never sent military forces against Tito), and No. 8 were successful.

Policies outlined in Nos. 3 and 4 were abandoned under German pressure. No. 5 led indirectly to the upset of March, 1944; No. 6 did so directly. No. 7 was prevented from becoming effective by the fact that the Rumanian border was left unmanned in August, 1944, when Rumania turned against

¹⁹At least so held the contemporary Hungarian public at large, although Macartney (*op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 201) offers a less dramatic version concerning the way they escaped.


Germany and Hungary, due to German orders to the Sztojay government sending Hungarian troops to Poland and some units to other parts of occupied Europe, scattering them around. No. 9 was upset by German military counter-moves against Budapest. No. 10, a limited but all important goal by itself, had been upset only shortly but with tragic consequences between March and August, 1944, and again, when Regent Horthy was removed from office and the whole decision-making apparatus fell to the Arrow Cross.

The above analysis thus indicates some signs of fighting German impositions but very little success in resisting, and no success at all in any matter involving German interests of importance.

It also very clearly shows how little appreciable influence, not to mention control, the Hungarian leadership was able to exert in Hungary in those times. Hegel's axiom defined the purpose of the state in its existence and functions as removing the possibility of the accidental and irrational. This abstract formula becomes eo ipso inapplicable to the small state of the modern world, or for that matter, on any state which is unable to control the entire international spectrum. Such a state has not yet come to be, and Hegel himself would never have accepted its possibility, since his vision never exceeded the notion of a nation-state. Yet his concept has a certain relative validity with respect to any national society in foro interno over which the nation-state


is supposed to exist in this kind of controlling manner and function. The formula also should be amended along lines of reasonable approaches to international reality, which is the source of accidents and irrationals (from a particular nation's point of view) directly or indirectly affecting any given nation-state. Thus it is the task of any political leadership to attempt to exert as much controlling or at least mitigating influence on events taking place in the international milieu as possible. Isolationism is the very death of this concept. But Hungary was essentially an isolated and isolationist nation whose leadership had a special predilection to disregard political as well as cultural reality while conceiving the world in terms of historical rights and moral configurations, on the basis of retrospection and stationary concepts, instead of circumspection and foresight. But the virtues of philosophers and monks are not those of statesmen, responsible to their people for their fate and relative happiness. It is, therefore, only natural that the victory of change over stagnation in Hungary did not merely hit on national self-determination, but on the very fabric of the nation, that is to say, its society and culture as well. And this time it hit with a blow from which there is no recovery in the direction of the past.

APPENDIX I




Source: Alfred D. Low, The Soviet Hungarian Republic and the Paris Peace Conference (Philadelphia, 1963), p. 29.

APPENDIX II



Areas populated by Hungarians in 50% or more

From Low, op. cit., p. 23.




MAGYARORSZÁG GYÁRIPARA
1910-ben.


100 gyári munkás = ■

0 25 50 75 100 km

Industrial concentration of Greater Hungary, 1910, from Balint Homan and Julius Szegfu, Magyar Történet (Hungarian History), vol. V (Budapest, 1936).



Budapest as highway and railroad center, based on Hungary's Highway Chart (Budapest, 1967).



APPENDIX VI

140/76174

No. 118

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Minister

No. 174 of November 15

Telegram

Budapest, November 15, 1938

5:05 p.m.

Received November 15,

8:30 p.m.

The Regent, who asked me to come to see him in order to present me with his portrait in connection with the Vienna Award, made a few friendly remarks and mentioned that he was worried over the problem of Carpatho-Ukraine. The Hungarian Government was being besieged with requests to put an end to the untenable conditions there. At Ungvar, 121 of the communities remaining in Czechoslovakia and the former Minister there, Fencik Hiam, had made representations on these lines. Because of the course of the rivers the needy population of the mountainous remainder of Carpatho-Ukraine was entirely dependent on Hungary as a market. Troops with a leaning toward Bolshevism (Katljura), who had previously been driven out of the Ukraine and incorporated into the Czech Army, were terrorizing the population.

Since the Führer's statement in Munich to Daranyi (who should have countered senseless rumors about an anti-German Polish-Hungarian bloc) that we were not interested in the question of setting up a Polish-Hungarian frontier, there is the possibility that, in the event of an explosion in Carpatho-Ukraine, Hungarian troops would march in and remain there until the population was guaranteed the right of self-determination, perhaps through the sending of international troops for the duration of the plebiscite. The mountainous country of Carpatho-Ukraine, intersected by deep valleys running north and south, was moreover ill suited as a line of communication for the German activity to be expected in the future in the Ukraine, which must be brought about in conjunction with similar action by Italy and Japan in order to stem the Bolshevist danger.

Erdmannsdorf

Source: Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Vol. IV, Series D (1937-1945) p. 148.

APPENDIX VII

No. 122

140/76175

The Director of the Political Department to the
Legation in Hungary

No. 245

Telegram

Berlin, November 18, 1938
e.o. Pol. IV 8456

For the Minister.
With reference to your telegram No. 174.

Please tell the Hungarian Foreign Minister that the German Government objects to the action apparently envisaged by the Regent in Carpatho-Ukraine. According to reports in the possession of the German Government, Czechoslovakia would just not endure such action. If Hungarian action gave rise to difficulties, Germany could not support Hungary. Hungarian action therefore, on the lines apparently contemplated, appears to the German Government to be inopportune.

The Hungarian Minister has in the meantime been instructed in the same sense and has been reminded of the obligation to do nothing without us. Furthermore, the Italian Ambassador has been given a broader view of the situation.

Woermann

Source: Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Vol. IV, Series D (1937-1945) p. 153.

APPENDIX VIII

(The military provisions of the Trianon Peace Treaty¹)

PART V.—MILITARY, NAVAL AND AIR CLAUSES.

In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Hungary undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow.

SECTION I.—MILITARY CLAUSES.

CHAPTER I.—GENERAL.

ARTICLE 102.

Within three months of the coming into force of the present Treaty, the military forces of Hungary shall be demobilised to the extent prescribed hereinafter.

ARTICLE 103.

Universal compulsory military service shall be abolished in Hungary. The Hungarian Army shall in future only be constituted and recruited by means of voluntary enlistment.

CHAPTER II.—EFFECTIVES AND CADRES OF THE HUNGARIAN ARMY.

ARTICLE 104.

The total number of military forces in the Hungarian Army shall not exceed 35,000 men, including officers and depot troops.

Subject to the following limitations, the formations composing the Hungarian Army shall be fixed in accordance with the wishes of Hungary:—

(1) The effectives of units must be fixed between the maximum and minimum figures shown in Table IV annexed to this Section.

(2) The proportion of officers, including the personnel of staffs and special services, shall not exceed one-twentieth of the total effectives with the Colours, and that of non-commissioned officers shall not exceed one-fifteenth of the total effectives with the Colours.

(3) The number of machine guns, guns and howitzers shall not exceed per thousand men of the total effectives with the Colours those fixed in Table V annexed to this Section.

¹Excerpt from Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements between the United States of America and other Powers, 1910-1923, Vol. III., Washington, 1923.

APPENDIX I—HUNGARY.

3575

The Hungarian Army shall be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within the territory of Hungary, and to the control of her frontiers.

ARTICLE 105.

The maximum strength of the Staffs and of all formations which Hungary may be permitted to raise are given in the Tables annexed to this Section; these figures need not be exactly followed, but must not be exceeded.

All other organisations for the command of troops or for preparation for war are forbidden.

ARTICLE 106.

All measures of mobilisation, or appertaining to mobilisation, are forbidden.

In no case must formations, administrative services or staffs include supplementary cadres.

The carrying out of any preparatory measures with a view to requisitioning animals or other means of military transport is forbidden.

ARTICLE 107.

The number of gendarmes, customs officers, foresters, members of the local or municipal police or other like officials may not exceed the number of men employed in a similar capacity in 1913 within the boundaries of Hungary as fixed by the present Treaty. The Principal Allied and Associated Powers may, however, increase this number should the Commission of Control referred to in Article 137, after examination on the spot, consider it to be insufficient.

The number of these officials shall not be increased in the future except as may be necessary to maintain the same proportion between the number of officials and the total population in the localities or municipalities which employ them.

These officials, as well as officials employed in the railway service, must not be assembled for the purpose of taking part in any military exercises.

ARTICLE 108.

Every formation of troops not included in the Tables annexed to this Section is forbidden. Such other formations as may exist in excess of the 35,000 effectives authorised shall be suppressed within the period laid down by Article 102.

CHAPTER III.—RECRUITING AND MILITARY TRAINING.

ARTICLE 109.

All officers must be regulars (*officers de carrière*). Officers now serving who are retained in the Army must undertake the obligation to serve it up to the age of 40 years at least. Officers now serving who do not join the new army will be released from all military obligations; they must not take part in any military exercises, whether theoretical or practical.

Officers newly appointed must undertake to serve on the active list for 20 consecutive years at least.

The number of officers discharged for any reason before the expiration of their term of service must not exceed in any year one-twentieth of the total of officers provided for in Article 104. If this proportion is unavoidably exceeded, the resulting shortage must not be made good by fresh appointments.

ARTICLE 110.

The period of enlistment for non-commissioned officers and privates must be for a total period of not less than 12 consecutive years, including at least 6 years with the Colours.

The proportion of men discharged before the expiration of the period of their enlistment for reasons of health or as a result of disciplinary measures or for any other reasons must not in any year exceed one-twentieth of the total strength fixed by Article 104. If this proportion is unavoidably exceeded, the resulting shortage must not be made good by fresh enlistments.

CHAPTER IV.—SCHOOLS, EDUCATIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS, MILITARY CLUBS AND SOCIETIES.

ARTICLE 111.

The number of students admitted to attend the courses in military schools shall be strictly in proportion to the vacancies to be filled in the cadres of officers. The students and the cadres shall be included in the effectives fixed by Article 104.

Consequently all military schools not required for this purpose shall be abolished.

ARTICLE 112.

Educational establishments, other than those referred to in Article 111, as well as all sporting and other clubs, must not occupy themselves with any military matters.

CHAPTER V.—ARMAMENT, MUNITIONS AND MATERIAL.

ARTICLE 113.

On the expiration of three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, the armament of the Hungarian Army shall not exceed the figures fixed per thousand men in Table V annexed to this Section.

Any excess in relation to effectives shall only be used for such replacements as may eventually be necessary.

ARTICLE 114.

The stock of munitions at the disposal of the Hungarian Army shall not exceed the amounts fixed in Table V annexed to this Section.

Within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Hungarian Government shall deposit any existing surplus of armament and munitions in such places as shall be notified to it by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

No other stock, depot or reserve of munitions shall be formed.

ARTICLE 115.

The manufacture of arms, munitions and war material shall only be carried on in one single factory, which shall be controlled by and belong to the State, and whose output shall be strictly limited to the manufacture of such arms, munitions and war material as is necessary for the military forces and armaments referred to in Articles 104, 107, 113 and 114. The Principal Allied and Associated Powers may, however, authorise such manufacture, for such a period as they may think fit, in one or more other factories to be approved by the Commission of Control referred to in Article 137.

The manufacture of sporting weapons is not forbidden, provided that sporting weapons manufactured in Hungary taking ball cartridge are not of the same calibre as that of military weapons used in any European army.

Within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, all other establishments for the manufacture, preparation, storage or design of arms, munitions or any other war material shall be closed down or converted to purely commercial uses.

Within the same length of time, all arsenals shall also be closed down, except those to be used as depots for the authorised stocks of munitions, and their staffs discharged.

ARTICLE 116.

The plant of any establishments or arsenals in excess of the amount required for the manufacture authorised shall be rendered useless or converted to purely commercial purposes in accordance with the decisions of the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control referred to in Article 137.

ARTICLE 117.

Within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty all arms, munitions and war material, including any kind of anti-aircraft material, of whatever origin, existing in Hungary in excess of the quantity authorised shall be handed over to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Delivery shall take place at such points in Hungarian territory as may be appointed by the said Powers, who shall also decide on the disposal of such material.

ARTICLE 118.

The importation into Hungary of arms, munitions and war material of all kinds is strictly forbidden.

The manufacture for foreign countries and the exportation of arms, munitions and war material shall also be forbidden.

ARTICLE 119.

The use of flame throwers, asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all similar liquids, materials or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden in Hungary.

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Material specially intended for the manufacture, storage or use of the said products or devices is equally forbidden.

The manufacture and importation into Hungary of armoured cars, tanks or any similar machines suitable for use in war are equally forbidden.

TABLE I.—Composition and Maximum Effectives of an Infantry Division.

Units.	Maximum Effectives of each unit.	
	Officers.	Men.
Headquarters of an Infantry Division	25	70
Headquarters of Divisional Infantry	5	50
Headquarters of Divisional Artillery	4	30
3 Regiments of Infantry (on the basis of 65 officers and 2,000 men per regiment) ¹	195	6,000
1 Squadron	6	150
1 Battalion of Trench Artillery (3 Companies)	14	560
1 Battalion of Pioneers	14	500
Regiment Field Artillery ²	80	1,200
1 Battalion Cyclists (comprising 3 Companies)	18	450
1 Signal Detachment ³	11	320
Divisional medical corps	28	550
Divisional parks and trains	14	940
Total for an Infantry Division	414	10,740

¹ Each Regiment comprises 3 Battalions of Infantry. Each Battalion comprises 3 Companies of Infantry and 1 Machine gun Company.

² Each Battalion comprises 1 Headquarters, 2 Pioneer Companies, 1 Bridging Section, 1 Searchlight Section.

³ Each Regiment comprises 1 Headquarters, 3 Groups of Field or Mountain Artillery, comprising 3 Batteries; each Battery comprising 4 guns or howitzers (field or mountain).

⁴ This Detachment comprises 1 Telegraph and Telephone detachment, 1 Littering Section, 1 Carrier Pigeon Section.

TABLE II.—Composition and Maximum Effectives for a Cavalry Division.

Units.	Maximum number authorised.	Maximum Effectives of each unit.	
		Officers.	Men.
Headquarters of a Cavalry Division	1	15	50
Regiment of Cavalry ¹	6	30	720
Group of Field Artillery (3 Batteries)	1	30	420
Group of motor machine guns and armoured cars ²	1	4	50
Miscellaneous services		30	(70)
Total for a Cavalry Division		250	5,350

¹ Each Regiment comprises 4 Squadrons.

² Each group comprises 9 fighting cars, each carrying 1 gun, 1 machine gun, and 1 spare machine gun, 4 communication cars, 2 small lorries for stores, 7 lorries, including 1 repair lorry, 4 motor cycles.

NOTE.—The large Cavalry Units may include a variable number of regiments and be divided into independent brigades within the limit of the effectives laid down above.

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TABLE III.—Composition and Maximum Effectives for a Mixed Brigade.

Units.	Maximum Effectives of each unit.	
	Officers.	Men.
Headquarters of a Brigade.....	10	50
2 Regiments of Infantry ¹	130	4,000
1 Cyclist Battalion (3 Companies).....	18	450
1 Cavalry Squadron.....	5	100
1 Group Field or Mountain Artillery (3 Batteries).....	20	400
1 Trench Mortar Company.....	5	150
Miscellaneous services.....	10	200
Total for Mixed Brigade.....	198	5,350

¹ Each Regiment comprises 3 Battalions of Infantry. Each Battalion comprises 3 Companies of Infantry and 1 Machine gun Company.

TABLE IV.—Minimum Effectives of Units whatever organisation is adopted in the Army.

[Divisions, Mixed Brigades, etc.]

Units.	Maximum Effectives (for reference).		Minimum Effectives.	
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.
Infantry Division.....	414	10,780	300	8,000
Cavalry Division.....	259	6,380	180	3,650
Mixed Brigade.....	198	5,350	149	4,250
Regiment of Infantry.....	65	2,000	52	1,600
Battalion of Infantry.....	16	650	12	500
Company of Infantry or Machine Guns.....	3	160	2	120
Cyclist Group.....	18	450	12	300
Regiment of Cavalry.....	30	720	20	450
Squadron of Cavalry.....	6	160	3	100
Regiment of Artillery.....	80	1,200	60	1,000
Battery of Field Artillery.....	4	150	2	120
Company of Trench Mortars.....	3	150	2	100
Battalion of Pioneers.....	14	500	8	300
Battery of Mountain Artillery.....	5	320	3	200

TABLE V.—Maximum Authorised Armaments and Munition Supplies.

Material.	Quantity for 1,000 men.	Amount of Munitions per arm (rifles, guns, etc.).
Rifles or Carbines ¹	1,150	500 rounds.
Machine guns, heavy or light.....	15	10,000 rounds.
Trench Mortars, light.....	2	1,000 rounds.
Trench Mortars, medium.....		
Guns or howitzers (field or mountain).....	3	1,000 rounds.

¹ Automatic rifles or carbines are counted as light machine guns.

N. B.—No heavy gun, *i. e.*, of a calibre greater than 105 mm., is authorised.

SECTION II.—NAVAL CLAUSES.

ARTICLE 120.

From the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty all Austro-Hungarian warships, submarines included, are declared to be finally surrendered to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

All the monitors, torpedo boats and armed vessels of the Danube Flotilla will be surrendered to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Hungary will, however, have the right to maintain on the Danube for the use of the river police three patrol boats to be selected by the Commission referred to in Article 133 of the present Treaty. The Principal Allied and Associated Powers may increase this number should the said Commission, after examination on the spot, consider it to be insufficient.

ARTICLE 121.

The Austro-Hungarian auxiliary cruisers and fleet auxiliaries enumerated below will be disarmed and treated as merchant ships:

<i>Bosnia.</i>	<i>Gastein.</i>
<i>Gablonz.</i>	<i>Helouan.</i>
<i>Carolina.</i>	<i>Graf Wurmbbrand.</i>
<i>Lussin.</i>	<i>Pelikan.</i>
<i>Teodo.</i>	<i>Herkules.</i>
<i>Nixe.</i>	<i>Pola.</i>
<i>Gigante.</i>	<i>Najade.</i>
<i>Africa.</i>	<i>Baron Bruck.</i>
<i>Tirol.</i>	<i>Elizabet.</i>
<i>Argentina.</i>	<i>Metcavich.</i>
<i>Pluto.</i>	<i>Baron Call.</i>
<i>President Wilson (ex Kaiser</i>	<i>Gaea.</i>
<i>Franz Joseph).</i>	<i>Cyclop.</i>
<i>Trieste.</i>	<i>Vesta.</i>
<i>Dalmat.</i>	<i>Nymphe.</i>
<i>Persia.</i>	<i>Buffel.</i>
<i>Prince Hohenlohe.</i>	

ARTICLE 122.

All warships, including submarines, now under construction in Hungarian ports, or in ports which previously belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, shall be broken up.

The work of breaking up these vessels will be commenced as soon as possible after the coming into force of the present treaty.

The mine-layer tenders under construction at Porto-re may, however, be preserved if the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control and the Reparation Commission consider that for economic reasons their employment for commercial purposes is desirable. In that event the vessels will be handed over to the Reparation Commission, which will assess their value, and will credit such value, in whole or in part, to Hungary, or as the case may require to Austria, on the reparation account.

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ARTICLE 123.

Articles, machinery and material arising from the breaking up of Austro-Hungarian warships of all kinds, whether surface vessels or submarines, may not be used except for purely industrial or commercial purposes.

They may not be sold or disposed of to foreign countries.

ARTICLE 124.

The construction or acquisition of any submarine, even for commercial purposes, shall be forbidden in Hungary.

ARTICLE 125.

All arms, ammunition and other naval war material, including mines and torpedoes, which belonged to Austria-Hungary at the date of the signature of the Armistice of November 3, 1918, are declared to be finally surrendered to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

ARTICLE 126.

Hungary is held responsible for the delivery (Articles 120 and 125), the disarmament (Article 121), the demolition (Article 122), as well as the disposal (Article 121) and the use (Article 123) of the objects mentioned in the preceding Articles only so far as these remain in her own territory.

ARTICLE 127.

During the three months following the coming into force of the present Treaty, the Hungarian high-power wireless telegraphy station at Budapest shall not be used for the transmission of messages concerning naval, military or political questions of interest to Hungary, or any State which has been allied to Austria-Hungary in the war, without the assent of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. This station may be used for commercial purposes, but only under the supervision of the said Powers, who will decide the wave-length to be used.

During the same period Hungary shall not build any more high-power wireless telegraphy stations in her own territory or that of Austria, Germany, Bulgaria or Turkey.

SECTION III.—AIR CLAUSES.

ARTICLE 128.

The armed forces of Hungary must not include any military or naval air forces.

No dirigible shall be kept.

ARTICLE 129.

Within two months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, the personnel of the air forces on the rolls of the Hungarian land and sea forces shall be demobilised.

ARTICLE 130.

Until the complete evacuation of Hungarian territory by the Allied and Associated troops the aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall enjoy in Hungary freedom of passage through the air, freedom of transit and of landing.

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ARTICLE 131.

During the six months following the coming into force of the present Treaty, the manufacture, importation and exportation of aircraft, parts of aircraft, engines for aircraft, and parts of engines for aircraft shall be forbidden in all Hungarian territory.

ARTICLE 132.

On the coming into force of the present Treaty, all military and naval aeronautical material must be delivered by Hungary and at her expense to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Delivery must be effected at such places as the Governments of the said Powers may select, and must be completed within three months.

In particular, this material will include all items under the following heads which are or have been in use or were designed for warlike purposes:

Complete aeroplanes and seaplanes, as well as those being manufactured, repaired or assembled.

Dirigibles able to take the air, being manufactured, repaired or assembled.

Plant for the manufacture of hydrogen.

Dirigible sheds and shelters of every kind for aircraft.

Pending their delivery, dirigibles will, at the expense of Hungary, be maintained inflated with hydrogen; the plant for the manufacture of hydrogen, as well as the sheds for dirigibles, may, at the discretion of the said Powers, be left to Hungary until the time when the dirigibles are handed over.

Engines for aircraft.

Nacelles and fuselages.

Armament (guns, machine guns, light machine guns, bomb-dropping apparatus, torpedo apparatus, synchronisation apparatus, aiming apparatus).

Munitions (cartridges, shells, bombs loaded or unloaded, stocks of explosives or of material for their manufacture).

Instruments for use on aircraft.

Wireless apparatus and photographic or cinematograph apparatus for use on aircraft.

Component parts of any of the items under the preceding heads.

The material referred to above shall not be removed without special permission from the said Governments.

SECTION IV.—INTER-ALLIED COMMISSIONS OF CONTROL.

ARTICLE 133.

All the Military, Naval and Air Clauses contained in the present Treaty for the execution of which a time limit is prescribed shall be executed by Hungary under the control of Inter-Allied Commissions

specially appointed for this purpose by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

The above-mentioned Commissions will represent the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in dealing with the Hungarian Government in all matters concerning the execution of the Military, Naval and Air Clauses. They will communicate to the Hungarian authorities the decisions which the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have reserved the right to take or which the execution of the said Clauses may necessitate.

ARTICLE 134.

The Inter-Allied Commissions of Control may establish their organisations at Budapest and shall be entitled, as often as they think desirable, to proceed to any point whatever in Hungarian territory, or to send a sub-commission, or to authorise one or more of their members to go, to any such point.

ARTICLE 135.

The Hungarian Government must furnish to the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control all such information and documents as the latter may deem necessary to ensure the execution of their mission, and all means (both in personnel and in material) which the above-mentioned Commissions may need to ensure the complete execution of the Military, Naval or Air Clauses.

The Hungarian Government must attach a qualified representative to each Inter-Allied Commission of Control with the duty of receiving from the latter any communications which it may have to address to the Hungarian Government, and furnishing it with, or procuring, all information or documents demanded.

ARTICLE 136.

The upkeep and cost of the Commissions of Control and the expense involved by their work shall be borne by Hungary.

ARTICLE 137.

It will be the special duty of the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control to receive from the Hungarian Government the notifications relating to the location of the stocks and depots of munitions, and the location of the works or factories for the production of arms, munitions and war material and their operations.

It will take delivery of the arms, munitions, war material and plant intended for war construction, will select the points where such delivery is to be effected, and will supervise the works of destruction, and rendering things useless, or of transformation of material, which are to be carried out in accordance with the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 138.

It will be the special duty of the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control to proceed to the building yards and to supervise the breaking-up of the ships which are under construction there, to take

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delivery of arms, munitions and naval war material, and to supervise the destruction and breaking-up provided for.

The Hungarian Government must furnish to the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control all such information and documents as the Commission may deem necessary to ensure the complete execution of the Naval Clauses, in particular the designs of the warships, the composition of their armaments, the details and models of the guns, munitions, torpedoes, mines, explosives, wireless telegraphic apparatus, and in general everything relating to naval war material, as well as all legislative or administrative documents or regulations.

ARTICLE 139.

It will be the special duty of the Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control to make an inventory of the aeronautical material which is actually in the possession of the Hungarian Government, to inspect aeroplane, balloon and motor manufactories, and factories producing arms, munitions and explosives capable of being used by aircraft, to visit all aerodromes, sheds, landing grounds, parks and depots which are now in Hungarian territory, and to authorise where necessary a removal of material and to take delivery of such material.

The Hungarian Government must furnish to the Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control all such information and legislative, administrative or other documents which the Commission may consider necessary to ensure the complete execution of the Air Clauses, and, in particular, a list of the personnel belonging to all the air services of Hungary and of the existing material, as well as of that in process of manufacture or on order, and a list of all establishments working for aviation, of their positions, and of all sheds and landing grounds.

APPENDIX IX

HUNGARIAN PREMIERS, 1938-1944

Name and Date of Office	Characterization of policies
Imrédy, Béla May 13, 1938 to February 15, 1939	Pro-German policies in the Czecho-slovakian crisis, paralled with negotiations with the Little Entente, trying to obtain Four Power decision in the Highland (Southern Slovakia) dispute but refused in London and Paris. First Vienna Award. Policies to occupy Carpatho-Ukraine against German wishes, failure in this, joining the Anti-Comintern Pact, introducing the "Second Anti-Semitic" and a Land Reform Bill, scuffled by conservatives on the pretext of having a distant Jewish ancestor. (After his resignation an agent of unqualifiedly pro-German policies, but hostile to Arrow Cross leaders. Executed in 1945 in Russian occupied Budapest.)
Count Teleki, Paul February 16, 1939 to April 3, 1941	Obtains German permission to occupy Carpatho-Ukraine, refused in enlarging Hungarian territories in Eastern Slovakia substantially, official policy of non-belligerency on Germany's side, refusal of German demands to cross Hungary toward Poland and helping Polish refugees to reach Allied territory. Obtaining via pressure on Rumania the grants of the Second Vienna Award. Permits German troops to cross over Rumania; joins the Tripartite Pact. Signs a Yugoslavian-Hungarian "eternal friendship" pact; faced with German demands to cooperate in attack against Yugoslavia and with collusion between the German and Hungarian High Command commits suicide over conflict of conscience.

Bárdossy, Ladislao

April 3, 1941
to

Follows Germany against Yugoslavia on a limited scale; declaration of war on the Soviet Union and the sending of a small force to Russia. After receiving the British declaration of war the day before Pearl Harbor, declares war on the United States. Commits a major Hungarian army to the battle in Russia for 1942. (Executed in Russian controlled Budapest in 1945.)

Kállay, Nicholas

April 1, 1942
to March 19, 1944

Introduction of a more independent Magyar foreign policy although carrying out Bárdossy's commitments to the Germans about the Second Army sent to Russia. (The army perishes at the Don.) Secret negotiations with the West, anti-German gestures, failure to reach agreement with London and Washington at Moscow's and Berlin's account. Resigns due to the German invasion of Hungary. (Takes refuge at the Turkish embassy and dies in exile in Italy.)

Sztojay, Döme

March 22, 1944
to August 24, 1944

Integration of Hungary's war effort with that of Germany, anti-Semitic persecution, resistance along the Carpathian Alps against the Russians, allowing the dispersal of the Hungarian army outside of Hungary, British-American air attacks beginning. (Executed in 1945.)

Lakatos, Imre

August 26, 1944
to October 1944

Head of a government of generals, attempts restoration of Hungarian self-determination in order to secure an armistice with the Allies while resisting the Russians and Rumanians along the Carpathian Alps and Southern Transylvania unsuccessfully; cooperates with Regent Horthy in preparing an armistice declaration. After the German attack on the Royal Palace, is captured and together with the Regent resigns.

APPENDIX X

The following interview was conducted in Los Angeles by the student with Mr. Steven Fereghy, formerly a test pilot of the Royal Hungarian Air Force.

Question 1: Was the cover name of the Hungarian Air Force prior to 1938, Bureau of Hungarian Aerial Affairs, or Bureau of Royal Hungarian Aerial Affairs, or something else?

Answer: Bureau of Royal Hungarian Aerial Affairs.
Correct.

Question 2: What secret and admitted budget expenditures were available to the Bureau in 1933-37?

Answer: I am unable to answer the question.

Question 3: What was the number of pilots and other personnel employed by the Air Force between 1935-38?

Answer: I don't recall exact figures but the number of appointed employees was very small.

Question 4: What types of aircraft engines were produced at the Manfred Weiss Works prior to 1938?

Answer: Gnome and Rhone Titan and Jupiter radials.

Question 5: When did WM¹ receive the production rights of a Gnome and Rhone radial (presumably G & R 14 K of

¹"WM" stands for Weiss Manfred, the Hungarian version of the name of the founder of the Manfred Weiss Works.

880 h.p.); what was its capacity, when did production begin and until when did it last?

Answer: Production of G & R of 14 cylinder radial began in the spring of 1938.

Question 6: Was there any other factory producing aircraft engines prior to and after 1938, except for WM? If so, what types?

Answer: No, there was none.

Question 7: A single engine reconnaissance or trainer biplane of some 200-240 km maximum speed, presumably of Italian make existed in 1935-37. What was its type, task, and quality?

Answer: I don't have any information on such a plane.

Question 8: Was there any fighter planes in service with the Air Force prior to the coming of the Fiat Cr 32?

Answer: Yes.

Question 9: There existed a Caproni Trimotor serving as heavy bomber and transport, openly from 1938 on, recognizable in two versions. What was the type and performance?

Answer: There were a few of Caproni 101-s.

Question 10: From 1936 onward Fiat Cr 32-s operated in Hungary. How many?

Answer: From the spring of 1936 there were two squadrons.

Question 11: A two-engine Caproni bomber, observable in the winter of 1938-39 was the first version of the Caproni 1935 Bis (A), or another type?

Answer: It was Caproni 135.

Question 12: Two Heinkel fighters were stationed for a while at WM's Csepel airport, probably for evaluation. The following questions emerge:

- a) Exactly of what type were they?
- b) Was their evaluation connected with the negotiations concerning the purchase of the Reggiane Re 2000, Falcon?
- c) Was purchase of them dropped because delivery of the Heinkel He 112 to Rumania made this type impractical (or because Germany would not yield production rights either concerning the whole plane or the liquid cooled engine, and radials available to Hungary were inapplicable)?

Answer: They were experimental planes.

- a) Heinkel 112.
- b) No, not.
- c) No, but because the plane did not live up to specifications.

Question 13: What was the history of the Hawk reconnaissance? Is it true that its engine was G & R Radial, maximum speed about 320 kilometer per hour and produced by Rába-Krupp? When did the production begin, how many, and when did it come to an end? How many survived the campaign of 1941?

Answer: There were thirteen squadrons equipped with Hawks, with G & R K-14 radials and they soon became trainers.

Question 14: How many of the Heinkel 46 reconnaissance planes survived the campaign of 1942-43 in Russia?

Answer: The Heinkel He 46-s took the place of the Hawks and served their purpose very well with fighter escort as close-range reconnaissance planes until the Russians obtained U.S. anti-aircraft guns. After that they had to be phased out.

Question 15: After 1941 one could not observe Fiat Cr 32-s, 42-s, Junkers JU 86-s and those mentioned beforehand anymore. Did all these perish in 1941, or did some of them survive until 1942? How many, if at all, remained in existence at home by 1943?

Answer: Cr 32-s were used only for advanced training. Cr 42-s and Ju 86-s served with occupation forces in Russia. The Cr 42-s were substituted by Hungarian built Me 109-s, and Ju 86-s were used in behind-the-front tasks, such as transportation and liason. In substitution for the Ju 86 the Germans delivered other Junkers of different type, of which the type and number, I do not know. Due to lack of fuel the majority of the planes had to be destroyed during the retreat.

Question 16: Did Hungary obtain production rights of the Caproni 135 Bis? Did they produce them at all, and if so where and how many? Italy delivered some seventy.

Answer: No production rights were purchased and no production.

Question 17: In connection with the Ca 135 Bis and Re 2000 Falcon what was the situation concerning engines? Were they powered by G & R engines or did Hungary buy or produce an Italian engine?

Answer: The Falcons were produced by Mavag and were powered by the G & R K-14 engines. Their production came to an end with the increase of the number of available ME 109-s.

Question 18: Were there any plans to produce, or did Hungary produce the Re 2002, powered by DB 601 engines?

Answer: The Danube aircraft factory (an affiliate of WM, author's remarks) produced DB 605 liquid cooled engines.

Question 19: Did the Falcon go to the front in 1943? How many may have been available in March, 1944 at home?

Answer: I am unable to answer this question.

Question 20: There had been rumors of the existence of Ju 87 and Me 109 with the Hungarian Air Force at an early date, around 1938. Both appeared, however, from 1943 onward, and the Me 109 as well as 210

were produced. (448 Me 109, 273 Me 210, all counted.) But it is not clear how many of these remained in the possession of the Hungarian Air Force, nor is the number of Junkers Ju 87 available to Hungary clear.

Answer: I do not know of any such rumors. Later the Danube factory produced Me 210-s, and the Waggon Works of Győr Me 109-s. Brucker 131 basic trainer and its Hirth engines were manufactured by Mavag in Budapest.

Question 21: There was an ill-fated long range reconnaissance, the Heinkel He 70, ill suited to take the G & R radials. Is this true?

Answer: Two squadrons of He 70 were available using G & R engines. Several accidents occurred so that after they became run down they were substituted by Heinkel He 110-s, with DB 605 engines, in 1939.

Question 22: Allegedly the Hungarian Government asked Germany to sell Fiat Cr 32-s that had been inherited from Austria, in 1938 and the deal did not come off. Is this true?

Answer: No such deal. Only parts were purchased in order to further operate Cr 32-s of the Hungarians.

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