INPUT MODEL FOR FOREIGN POLICY CRISIS

DECISION-MAKING

APPROVED:

[Signatures]

Major Professor

Minor Professor

Director of the Department of Government

Dean of the Graduate School
INPUT MODEL FOR FOREIGN POLICY CRISIS

DECISION-MAKING

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David W. Linn, B. A.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Crisis situations in the area of foreign policy decision-making have become more acute and dangerous since the end of World War II and the rise of nuclear weapons delivery capabilities. The purpose of this thesis will be to examine the decision-making process in such crisis situations. A Crisis situation is defined as one presenting a high threat and short decisional time.¹ A crisis, by nature, challenges a goal that the decision-makers hold as vital. A crisis situation is characterized by the short time period available for decision and action. The inputs of the crisis situation and the internal and external demands and supports, as these are perceived by the decision-makers, will limit the number of possible alternative actions open to the decision-makers and point the decision-makers to alternatives they consider, within the context of the crisis, to be best suited to the situation.

There is a tendency to look at each event as unique and offering separate challenges to decision-makers. Yet, every

crisis has certain broad features that suggest commonality. The decision-makers, regardless of who they are or what crisis they face, may be presented with similar demands and supports which might have a bearing on their decision. This thesis will examine these inputs of demands and supports and their relationship to the output, the decision. By looking at a crisis situation in this way, one may draw generalities. Such an approach requires an assumption of the existence of a system of foreign-policy decision-making.

No claim is being offered here that the discovery or proof of the system has been made. The thesis, rather, will explore several concepts which may eventually lead to a mapping of a decision-making system for foreign-policy crisis. If one moved forward only when he were certain, progress would grind to a sudden and permanent stop. Therefore, this study may be seen as an exploration of the terrain of decision-making to examine possible systemic relationships between the environmental inputs and decision-making in crisis situations.

The model to be presented is based on the theoretical work of a number of writers. The model, like a composite photograph, will be bits and pieces from many sources assembled to make a whole. The author makes no claims for originality, yet the responsibility for any errors rest solely on the author and his choice and method of assembly of the model.

The second chapter of the thesis will present an input model of foreign policy decision-making. The third chapter
will be an examination of the Cuban missile crisis in relation to this model. The Cuban crisis will be examined to view the effect the inputs, as proposed by the model, have on the decisional process. The model will identify the major inputs in broad, theoretical terms. The examination of the Cuban crisis will allow these inputs to be specified and presented in a particular case. The Cuban missile crisis was chosen because it presents elements of an ideal crisis—high threat, small decision-making group, and short decisional time. Also, there is a large amount of available information on the crisis from both primary and secondary sources. The Cuban crisis is recent enough to have direct application to problems facing foreign policy decision-makers today. The crisis inputs will be examined in two ways. The first will employ the historical method presented in relation to the model. The second will be developed through the use of simulation. The author has written a role-playing, simulation of the Cuban missile crisis based on Professor Guetzkow's "Inter-Nation Simulation" and the simulation work of Richard Brody.\(^2\) The results of several runs of this game will be used to examine the role of the crisis inputs in the decisional process.

It is recognized that the examination of only one crisis does not provide proof for a model, nor does a focus on the input structure verify the value of a systems approach for this type of a study. This is only a beginning, but with all the drawbacks such a limited approach presents, it is felt that valuable contributions can be made for the organization of future work in this area.
CHAPTER II

THE MODEL

Overview

The purpose of this chapter is to present and explain the proposed input model of foreign policy crisis decision-making. As explained in the introduction, this model will represent only a small part of the system of foreign policy decision-making.

The inputs are the demands and supports directed at the decision-makers. These inputs will limit or direct the decision-makers to certain alternative actions. The demands and supports arising internally, within their own nation, and externally, from the international system, will place bounds on what actions or decisions can be taken in a crisis situation. The nature of the crisis itself will also direct the view of the decision-makers to certain alternatives considered to be best suited to meet the crisis. Both the nature of the crisis and the demands and supports from the environments are weighed in reaching any decision.

Each crisis situation is different in the specific events that make up the crisis and the types and intensity of inputs focusing on the decision-makers. The generalizations drawn should be broad enough to apply to all crisis situations.
This requirement will help reduce the number of environmental inputs considered to a few inputs which seem to play an important role. These inputs were chosen by the author as those factors which have seemed predominant in the post-war crisis situations. The theoretical examination of these inputs will allow the interaction between the input and the decisional process to be traced and then viewed specifically in a case study of an actual crisis.¹

The inputs focus on the decision-makers, but are distorted by the perception, the values, and motivations held by the decision-makers. The inputs are not independent from one another. The formation of a demand or support in one sector of the environment will be influenced by conditions in the other environmental sectors. The demands are not made in isolation. The flow of a system means that a change or fluctuation in one sector will be felt and be an influence, no matter how small, in all others. The complete examination of even one input and its relationship throughout the system would be an impossible task. A crisis situation is one limited to a relatively short time period. The inputs can be frozen to those present at a more or less specific point in time. The flow of this model is uni-directional. There is no examination of the output and feedback process.

¹David Easton, Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1965), pp. 109-113. This section presents Easton's simplified model and his explanation and limitation of inputs.
For the purpose of viewing the relationship of inputs at a specific point in time to the decision process, there is no need to trace the birth or the channels for presenting and handling of these inputs.\(^2\) The inputs are directed at and act on the decision-makers. Though the nature of a system indicates that an exchange takes place, the concern here will be only with the focus of inputs on the decision-makers and the role of inputs in the decision process.

The need for a decision arises from events in the environment or from the decision-makers' perception of a need for a decision. The environment is viewed through a lens of perception and the decision-makers' values and motives are added to what they see coming from the environment. It has also been suggested that there exists an additional element independent of and outside both the environments and the decision-makers, which can be called morality.\(^3\) However, for the purpose of this model, morality can be considered as a distorting factor of perception and as an element of national culture and tradition.

\(^2\)For a model of the presentation of demands to foreign policy decision-making see James N. Rosenau, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1961).

\(^3\)Joseph Frankel, "Towards a Decision-Making Model in Foreign Policy," *Political Studies*, Vol. 7 (1959), 5.
INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
Political
Tradition
Military

EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
National Positions
Diplomacy
International Organizations

Figure 1 -- Input Model
The boundaries in this model serve to define the limits of the internal and external environments and help to distinguish the flow and effect of the inputs. Theoretically, these boundaries can be drawn. In reality, clear boundary distinctions are hard to set because individual actors perform roles in several sectors and the environments overlap at many places. The boundary lines allow, within the definitional limits of the model, the flow and source of the inputs to be established. They also allow the inputs and their effect to be more easily isolated and studied.

As stated in the introduction, the model has been constructed from bits and pieces from many sources. The structure for this model has been borrowed from Richard Snyder's and Glenn Paige's scheme for the analysis of the Korean crisis. They listed four sets of factors which influence the behavior of decision-makers: organization, internal setting, external setting, and situational properties. These correspond to the decision-makers, internal environment, external environment, and crisis inputs, as shown in the model in Figure 1. The organizational factors concern the decision-makers, their individual personalities, and the structure of their interrelationships as a group of decision-makers. The internal setting

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4Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics (Boston, 1966), pp. 18-20.

is made up of factors within the nation: social and cultural resources, technology, groups and elites, public opinion, political climate, values, and social wants, and expressed desires. The external setting concerns the international system: friends, neutrals and enemies, international organizations, diplomatic rules, treaties, and policies of other states. The situational properties are the specifics surrounding the particular event or problem. These four elements make up the basic structure of the model used here. To work with this model it will be necessary to look at some of the sources for it and to define the terms and concepts involved in it.

Sources

The concepts of environment and environmental limitations used in this thesis comes from Harold and Margaret Sprout's article, "Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics." It is their contention that in a study covering the broad range of environmental factors, hypotheses must be formed around the factors "relevant to the action under consideration and how these set limits to the operational results thereof." In a similar manner, the model presented in this

6Ibid., p. 195.

7Harold and Margaret Sprout, "Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, I (1957), 313.
thesis will restrict itself to inputs that are classed as, and thus have a relationship, by definition, to crisis decision-making situations.

Harold and Margaret Sprout's article shows the role that environment plays in international relations. The descriptions of environmental factors and their relationship to international politics are a basis for the construction of this model. As Easton does, they aim at a general and theoretical level of discussion and a model broad enough to have an application in more than one situation. They state that one does not need to have specific knowledge about particular people or decision-makers to be able to generalize about how they might behave in a situation. One can cross a street on a green light because he has a generalized model in mind of how the typical driver will react, even though he knows nothing specific about the particular driver of the approaching automobile. This is a general model of behavior and is not built to fit specific persons or groups of decision-makers. 3

The basic source for this model is the four-book series by David Easton on the political system. 9 The use of the system concept greatly aids the identification and tracing

3Ibid., p. 315.

out of the relationships between a set of variables. Systems analysis is merely a tool, one of many, that may be used to view political phenomena. Easton sees systems analysis as a broad and far-reaching tool for ordering and understanding available political data.

We can simplify problems of analysis enormously, without violating the empirical data in any way, by postulating that any set of variables selected for description and examination may be considered a system of behavior. . . . What commands our attention is the need to decide whether the set of activities is an interesting one, in the sense that it is relevant and helps us to understand some theoretical problems, or whether it is worthless or trivial from this point of view.

Easton's work deals with national political systems, and while it does not specifically treat foreign policy decisions, it is applicable, since these decisions are political decisions. As a tool this means of analysis is flexible. Easton judges this conceptual tool only on the basis of its usefulness. "Concepts are neither true nor false; they are only more or less useful."11 Easton's conceptual system is designed broadly enough so that it can be applied to any political system regardless of its complexity. The jump from theoretical consideration to practical application in a particular situation involves many problems, particularly in the scope of application and definition and selection of elements.

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10 Easton, Framework for Political Analysis, p. 30.
11 Ibid., p. 33.
Another source for this model is Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin's Foreign Policy Decision-Making. This work describes both decision-making and general systems theory and the problems encountered in their application to the Korean decision. The authors admit that in their effort to move from the general to the specific, they encountered many problems, and they were not always successful in solving them. One of the greatest problems is finding adequate material and verification from the available empirical data to support the model. Often, the actual decision-makers are not willing or for security reasons are unable to give the full story surrounding their decisions. Their considerations, analysis, and alternatives are often blocked as a source of information. There is a lack of good empirical data in the area of foreign policy decision-making. Care must be taken to distinguish between what is known as fact and what is speculated. Facts as to what general events and actions make up the crisis situation are usually obtainable. The information that is hard to obtain is the decision-maker's view of the relationship between those facts and their final output. Despite these difficulties, Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin feel that there are certain common

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"properties of action which will be shared by all specific states."14

Definitions

Crisis.—Social scientists have not been able to agree upon one definition or set of characteristics which all will accept as designating a crisis. The disagreement makes research in this field more difficult, particularly when comparability of results is sought. Realizing this limitation, this thesis uses a modified version of Charles Hermann's definition of a crisis, as a situation that "threatens one or more important goals of a nation", and "allows only a short time for decision".15 There are, of course, many more dimensions to a crisis than time and threat to goals. However, these two elements are assumed here to be the major factor. The others appear to be derived from or are secondary to them.

James Robinson's article discusses twelve dimensions of a crisis presented by Wiener and Kahn. Each dimension represents a specific characteristic or factor in a crisis situation. The examination of a crisis throughout its complete time span would allow each of these to be examined, but the extent to which a crisis is a turning point or changes relationships cannot be determined in a limited study focusing on input stage.

14Ibid., p. 187.

The following are the dimensions presented by Wiener and Kahn:

1. Turning point
2. High requirement for action
3. Threat to goals and objectives
4. Outcome shapes the future
5. Convergence of events results in new circumstances
6. Uncertainties in formulating alternatives
7. Reduces control over events
8. Increasing stress and urgency
9. Inadequate information
10. Increasing time pressure
11. Changes the relationship among the participants
12. Raises tensions

Yet each of these dimensions appears to be related to the factors of time and threat. The events and information about the crisis indicate the nature of the threat. The time limit plus the threat produce the urgency, pressures, and stress of a crisis. The two characteristics, time and threat, distinguish crisis decision-making from the ordinary operation of the system.

Stanley Hoffmann examines crisis in relation to the decision-makers and adds perception as a factor in the decision-makers' definition of a crisis situation. He feels that "a crisis is not any event that threatens the American positions, nor is it usually an event the administration simply decides to treat as a crisis; a crisis is an event it sees as a challenge and feels it must respond to." 17 He does not mention the


17 Stanley Hoffmann, Gulliver's Troubles, Or the Setting of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1963), p. 296.
time requirements in his definition. However, Hoffmann is not presenting a theoretical examination of crisis but is rather examining current American problems in foreign policy. One of the problems is the determination of the role that perception plays in the reaching of decisions. A model for foreign-policy crisis decision-making should aid in clarifying problems found in real world crisis decisions. All dimensions of a crisis need to be seriously considered in relation to the decision-making process. The definition of crisis used here and the dimensions studied are but a few of many and were chosen for their general application to all foreign-policy crisis situations.

System.—The concept of a system is based on the idea that political data can be ordered, that distinguishable patterns and relationships exist between the various elements, and that changes in one of these elements will have repercussions on the other elements. The processes occurring in the system are continuous and overlapping. To facilitate study of the system, the elements may be isolated and viewed at a particular point in time rather than as continuous processes. Once isolated and stopped in time, the relationships between the elements may be more easily seen.

The system is not one of structure but one of processes. Descriptions such as "bipolar" or "balance of power" refer to

18Ibid., p. 11.
actual or perceived physical or organizational relationships between states and should not be confused with the term "system" as applied in this thesis. The term "system" can be used to describe relationships between analytical elements at several levels of analysis. The concept of systems, for instance, can apply to patterns of structures, patterns of roles, or patterns of processes. These are not mutually exclusive levels; they may be viewed as concurrent and complementary. In this study the term "systems" refers to patterns of processes in foreign policy crisis decision-making. Structures and roles exist within this system but the examination of the processes does not require an analysis of either the structure or the roles present in the system.

The decision-making process involves the conversion of inputs into outputs. The decision-making process is made up of several sub-processes; among these are the definition of a problem, the consideration of goals, the selection of alternatives, and the carrying out of the decision. The pattern of relationships between the inputs and various sub-processes of the decision process will be explored in this thesis.

**Environment.**—A part of the environment, not specifically laid out in this model, is the setting. The setting is the backdrop or general conditions under which the decision-makers, as actors, must make their decisions. The setting
is made up of the elements of the internal and external environments; it is the general description of the environment at the time of the crisis. The setting gives the background conditions (which may be far removed from the actual crisis situation) that provide the researcher with the mood and scene in which the decision-makers as actors play their roles.

The environment is that part of the system that lies outside the boundary of the decision-makers. This model divides the environment into internal and external sectors. In theory "the environment of foreign policy decisions is limitless." The concept of environment, as used in this model, is borrowed from David Easton's works on the nature of the political system. Though not directly related to foreign policy decision-making, Easton's environmental system is adaptable to this study.

The internal environment refers to the national setting within the decision-maker's nation, and the external environment refers to the international setting. The decision-makers are part of both environments; as actors they are subject to the demands and supports coming from each, and their outputs are felt in both environments. This model places the decision-makers in a separate environment so that inputs from

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both the internal and external environments, which focus on the decision-makers, can more clearly be distinguished.

In an over-all view the extent of the environments is limitless. They are made up of physical and non-physical, human and non-human elements present in the system. These can be as material as physical resources and geography or as intangible as a social order or religious principles. All elements of the environment act as inputs in a decision process to the limited extent that they provide a setting for the decision. Some inputs are directed specifically at the decision-makers or are specifically related to a particular crisis situation.

Each crisis situation will vary in both the make-up of the decisional unit and the nature of the crisis. As a result, the hierarchical ordering of importance of the various inputs in each situation will be dependent upon the perception of the decision-makers and the specific crisis problem facing them. The specific events of each crisis tend to place greater emphasis on some inputs and decreased emphasis on others. A crisis involving political affairs in London might place particular emphasis on diplomatic inputs. In the same manner, a Chinese military threat might increase the emphasis on military inputs in reaching a decision.

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21 Sprout and Sprout, op. cit., p. 311.
The assumption that these environmental factors can influence foreign policy decisions does not mean the acceptance of the concept of environmental determinism. The Sprouts are careful to distinguish between a belief in environmental determinism, where the properties of the environment determine the decision-makers' actions, and free-will environmentalism, where these factors have a strong influence in directing the decision-makers. Man still remains an independent, if not at times an irrational, actor. It is the individual's own judgments, motivations, and perceptions that form his response to environmental inputs.

Decision-making process.—The special concern of this thesis is the effect of the environmental inputs on the decision-making process. Easton's work on the political system concerns itself with the decisional process, where environmental inputs are converted to outputs, what he refers to as "the authoritative allocation of resources." This conversion makes up the decision-making process.

Through its structure and processes the system then acts on these intakes in such a way that they are converted into outputs. These are the authoritative decisions and their implementation.23

Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin specifically examine the decision process in foreign policy situations. They define decision-making

22 Ibid., p. 312.
23 Easton, Framework for Political Analysis, p. 111.
as a process which results in the selection from a socially defined, limited number of problematical, alternative projects of one project intended to bring about the particular future state of affairs envisaged by the decision-makers.24

As the decision-makers become aware of the inputs, the process of converting these to outputs involves a pattern of identification and definition of a problem, the consideration of goals and the objectives, and the selection and carrying out of alternatives. These are three basic steps to which both Easton and Snyder, Bruck and Sapin refer: the input stage, being made aware of a problem and the demands it presents; the conversion stage, the processing of those inputs; and the output stage, the carrying out of the decision.

Because decisions are made by men, a complete decision-making analysis of a crisis situation will require an analysis of the particular men involved. This model purposefully sets aside the personal elements of a body of decision-makers that would distinguish them from any other group of decision-makers. These personal and psychological traits of the individual decision-makers will in some ways shape their perception of the crisis, and these traits must be recognized as playing an important role throughout the decision process.

The lack of a proper background in the area and an adequate means of obtaining data in this field requires that it be set aside in this model.

Inputs.—The inputs are made up of the demands and supports that are directed at the decision-makers. Demands, in part, are made up of the requests upon the decision-makers for certain allocations of goods, resources, services, psychic values, or changes in the rules or regulations on behavior. Generally we see these expressed as votes or through interest groups or the mass media. For the most part, demands are viewed as an internal function of the nation. In applying this concept to foreign policy a much broader view of demands must be taken. The source of demands is both internal and external to the particular nation. Foreign nations, like internal pressure groups, are focusing particular demands on the national decision-makers. A crisis situation limits the number of demands that are of primary importance. The high threat and specific issues limit the area of the decision-makers immediate concern. A foreign policy crisis generally concerns a problem arising from the external environment, and thus, inputs from the external environment are of major importance.

A demand is an expressing of a desire that the decision-making body act in a certain fashion. Easton defined a demand

as "an expression of opinion that an authoritative allocation with regard to a particular subject matter should or should not be made by those responsible for doing so." Though this model is not directly concerned with how demands are expressed, Easton uses this as a distinction between an interest and a demand. An interest is a desire for some action on the part of the decision-makers. An interest becomes a demand only when it is expressed to or directed at the decision-makers. Once received by the decision-makers, the demand becomes part of the decision process. The demand will have some influence on the final output, if only as a factor in limiting time available for consideration of other demands and alternatives.

Supports are the physical and non-physical resources of the system that either help or hinder the decision-maker's ability to process the demands. Supports can be material items like natural resources, geography, money, or population, or non-material items like organizational structure, friends, enemies, obedience, or allegiances.

Without supports it would be impossible to produce outputs. Supports aid in assuring stability in the rules and

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structure of the system and providing elements by which the
decisions are carried out. The demands and supports form
the inputs coming from the internal and external environments
that are focused on the decision-makers. The output is the
end-product of this decisional process. It is the action
or decision that is taken by the decision-makers after pro-
cessing and evaluating the inputs. No decision in the
real world is isolated from the time and events that precede
and follow it. Because of this each output in turn becomes
an input that these or other decision-making groups will
have to consider before reaching future decisions.

Decision Process

The decision process role is one of perception, choice,
expectation, and action. A decision-maker must first be
aware that a crisis exists. Each decision-maker will
individually perceive the crisis, and his view will be dis-
torted by his personality, values, experience and motivation.
He must choose from among an almost endless number of alter-
natives best suited to meet the crisis and achieve the goals
that he has established. He must look ahead to decide what
effect his actions might have and determine the expectations

30 Almond and Powell, op. cit., p. 183.
of the success or failure of any particular course of action. The last step is the carrying out of his chosen action or decision.\textsuperscript{31}

In formulating their decisions the decision-makers are limited by the objectives they establish and by the means available to achieve those objectives. The combination of these two will result in the strategies that they pursue. Further limitation will come from resources of time, energy, and skill that the decision-making group possesses, and by the degree of control they can exert upon the external environment.\textsuperscript{32}

The inputs are distorted by the perception of all decision-makers before they exert an influence on the decision process. When there is more than one decision-maker involved, these distortions can cause a conflict within the group over the very nature of the crisis. The first step of the decision-making body is to arrive at a common awareness of the crisis, a common definition of the threat that faces them. Even if no common agreement can be reached from among the various positions, the discussion of goals and alternatives that follows will make

\textsuperscript{31}Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, "Decision-Making Approach to the Study of International Relations," p. 189.

\textsuperscript{32}Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making, pp. 101-102.
the actors aware of their differences. These differences can then be accounted for in considering alternatives. Without the initial definitional stage, the actors might never realize they were arguing about different crises, since each was perceiving a different crisis or threat.

The crisis, once defined, can then be analyzed for possible solutions. This requires consideration, evaluation, narrowing, and finally a choice from among the alternatives. A decision is required to either take or not take some action which will, hopefully, lead to a solution to the problem or the obtaining of some goal or objective. Such decisions are deliberate choices made by some decision-making body. They may be in response to an event over which the decision-makers had no control, but the response is none the less a deliberate choice from among a number of possible alternative responses. In this respect, the output or decision can be viewed as the end-product of a rational system or process of selection. The scheme used by Snyder and Paige makes no assumption that the decision-makers will always act rationally. Yet the consideration of alternatives and selection from among them is a reasoning process, and despite the consequences of the resulting action, it is still the end-product of a rational process, an action

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Snyder and Paige, op. cit., p. 195.
planned and taken to achieve some goal. The rationality or irrationality of the decision would depend on the relationship between the perceived threat and the output and the objectives. Rationality, or the assumption that the actors will attempt to achieve their goals through a means most adequate in the face of the circumstances, is basic. Irrational actions or inaction due to fear or stress can occur, but it is not the end-product of a decision process; it is merely an emotional or physical response to the situation. How or why irrational actions come into this process is important, but the decision process and its end-product are assumed to be a rational process and response.

Decision-making requires the evaluation and selection of alternatives but more than this, it also requires the imaginative formulation of alternatives. James Robinson's article on crisis stresses this difference between the open-ended decision-making approach and the closed problem-solving method. "Decision-making differs from problem-solving in that decisions are not confined to the selection among alternatives but rather extend to the search for alternatives and to the formulation and negotiation of alternatives." \(^{34}\)

\(^{34}\) Robinson, op. cit., p. 512.
Theodore Sorensen laid out an eight-step decisional process which places emphasis on definition and evaluation:

1. Agreement on facts
2. Agreement on overall policy objectives
3. A precise definition of the problem
4. Canvassing of all possible solutions
5. List all possible consequences
6. Recommendation
7. Communication of selection
8. Provision for execution.

The "canvassing of all possible solutions", is the search for alternatives. Some alternatives will come immediately to mind as the required response, yet all possible alternatives should be considered. The process of consideration is one of matching objectives with alternatives and capabilities. This is a rational process and one that is individually tailored to each individual crisis.

The decision-makers need a wide range of alternatives for their consideration, not merely a consensus opinion of the best alternatives which is presented to them by a working staff. This leads to what Cleveland refers to as a "seat of the pants" type diplomacy.36 Despite this individual and loose approach to each crisis, the same general decision-making approach is followed. If the decision-makers are able

to carefully limit their objectives and alternatives, there is a much greater chance of obtaining these objectives. This is a three-step operation. The first is to decide how far one will go to achieve his stated objective and to inform the opponent of this, so there will be no misunderstanding. The second is to begin at a low force-level so that one can control the increases as needed. The third one is to widen the number of people concerned.\textsuperscript{37}

The freedom in choosing alternatives closely fits the mini-max principle used in game theory. Each is based on the desire to come as close to achieving a desired goal as possible. Hoffmann describes the desire of the statesman as the desire to make "the decision most likely to affect others (or his own people) in the way he intends; effectiveness is the art of reaching one's goal so that it serves one's interest."\textsuperscript{38} Game theory and the mini-max principle cannot be adequately applied to all decision-making situations. However, the similarity between mini-max principles and choice in decision-making offers hope for the future. The mini-max principle states that a person always attempts to maximize his gains while minimizing

\textsuperscript{37}Ibid., p. 639.

\textsuperscript{38}Hoffmann, \textit{op. cit.}, p. xvii.
his losses. A rational decision would be the one that gives the opponent in a crisis situation a combination of his greatest gain and smallest loss. Such an approach does not always fit a real world situation, and it is acknowledged that at times irrational actions have achieved the greatest gain. However, the principle can serve as a starting point for the examination of the decision process. Assuming rationality in the decision process, the mini-max principle serves as one criterion for the selection of one alternative over another.

The decision-makers in evaluating alternatives are looking for those alternatives most likely to bring them closest to their objectives. It was hypothesized by Snyder and Paige that the urgency of a crisis situation and the predominant demands of the crisis goals will narrow down the number of significantly different alternatives under consideration. The operation of a mini-max principle in the decisional process is one means by which alternatives are evaluated and chosen.

**Perception**

The perception and definition of a crisis vary with each decision-maker. No two decision-makers have the same

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mental make up, and each views the crisis in different terms. Where a decision-making body is made up of a group of individuals, their perceptions of the crisis may make group actions and decisions more difficult to arrive at. It is important to keep in mind that differences in perception can have an effect on the way the decision-making body defines the situation, and can be a cause of disagreement over the very nature of the crisis. Discussion and the reaching of a common definition of the crisis are one way to avoid the problem of individual perception.

As the Senator from Arkansas, J.W. Fulbright, has said:

There is an inevitable divergence attributable to the imperfections of the human mind, between the world as it is and the world as men perceive it. As long as our perceptions are reasonably close to objective reality, it is possible for us to act upon our problems in a rational and appropriate manner. But when our perceptions fail to keep pace with events, when we refuse to believe something because it displeases or frightens us, or is simply startlingly unfamiliar, then the gap between fact and perception becomes a chasm, and action becomes irrelevant and irrational.

Perception becomes more critical in a crisis situation. In a crisis there is less time for an incorrect definition of the situation to be reviewed and changed. The high threat of a crisis also makes successful action less likely when the actual events or nature of the crisis appear distorted. The way that nations act in a crisis situation depends on how the decision-makers define and perceive the inputs.

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directed at them. In so far as what actions or decisions are to be made in a crisis situation, it matters not what the situation actually is, but rather how the decision-makers see it.\textsuperscript{42} The observer, who later reviews the situation, sees the facts differently and draws his own conclusions from the way he sees the situation. However, he must be aware of the actors' perspectives as well as his own.

A crisis situation exists on two levels: (1) as events that actually occurred in the environments, and (2) as actions perceived and defined by the decision-makers. The perception of a crisis situation is also influenced by the position of the decision-makers as initiators of action or as individuals confronted by some action. A decision to initiate some action, which may or may not be perceived as a crisis by another nation, is not always a crisis decision. Usually such a decision is made over a longer period of time and without the fear of a threat or the stress associated with crisis decision-making. What may be considered a crisis for one party may not be considered a crisis for the other, due to the length of decisional time (usually longer) and the lack of stress and fear.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{42}Sprout and Sprout, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 314.

\textsuperscript{43}Robinson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 511.
Structure

A decision-making body acts within a structural framework. Whether it be a highly structural unit, working as a part of a highly organized bureaucracy, or as an ad hoc group, it develops some structure both internally and in its relation to other units in the government.

Both Hermann and Snyder and Paige hypothesized that the number of decision-makers will decrease in a crisis situation and that the unit will adapt a simpler internal role structure.44 Hermann, using variables of threat and time, found that "as threat increased, the number of participants increased".45 In one respect, these are contradictory because as time decreases the threat and stress usually increase. Hermann drew no conclusion from this, stating that more work was needed in this area. A possible explanation of this is that as threat increases more individuals feel the presence of the crisis and become more emotionally involved, even though the number actually involved in making the decisions decreases in size.46

44 Hermann, op. cit., p. 12, and Snyder and Paige, op. cit., p. 201.


46 The simulation runs described in Chapter Four indicated that the actors feel the greatest sense of involvement as the crisis point comes closer in time and the threat increases. This indication is not offered as proof of the hypothesis, but does point to a possible answer to the contradiction.
Internal Inputs

The inputs are focused into this decision-making process. These inputs, once perceived, become an element in the decision-making process and affect the evaluation of alternatives and the final output. The remainder of this chapter will present a few of these environmental inputs and their impact on the decisional process.

The demands and supports that make up the inputs from the internal environment are those that arise within the nation. Pressures upon the decision-makers to take certain actions or make certain decisions are the demands. In a complex national system, demands are focused on the decision-makers from many sectors of the internal environment. The economic sector can make demands for new tax laws or for the opening of federal lands and resources to private enterprise, such as the continuing controversy over off-shore drilling rights for oil companies. Demands can arise for public welfare or services, for increases or decreases in military spending, or for an endless number of causes and positions. Not all demands have a primary purpose of influencing foreign policy decisions, yet these demands can often have an effect on foreign policy decisions. Decision-makers have only a limited amount of resources—of money, men, time, equipment, and influence. A decision to meet a public-welfare demand,
for example, a negative income tax, may leave the decision-makers without sufficient funds or political influence to meet a foreign demand in a manner that they might wish.

The nature of a crisis reduces the influence of these internal demands as primary influencing factors. A crisis will normally arise from the external environment, as an action initiated by another nation, and because of the extreme nature of the threat and the time available in which to reach a decision, the internal demands assume less importance. The same factors would apply when considering the supports.

The internal inputs will be described here: traditional, military, and political. These three, while not assuming primary importance in a crisis situation, will confine the decision-makers' range of possible decisions. Tradition acts as a background and would serve decision-makers in much the same manner as a precedent serves a judge. Certain actions would have a natural validity and legitimacy by the fact they had been done in the past, while other actions would have to break the force of precedent in order to be taken. The military is a demand source when it suggests and endorses certain actions as response to a crisis situation. Another role of the military is as a support. The military's ability or inability to take the action that is
desired by the decision-makers is one key factor that the decision-makers must consider in determining an output. Internal political demands must also play an important background influencing role. Easton and Almond point out that it is the nature of a system to preserve itself, and so even in a crisis situation, the decision-makers must be aware of and strongly consider the political demands and supports within their own nation. To ignore these could mean the later political defeat of the decision-makers.

Tradition.—The input of tradition comprises the past history, customs, ideals, and morality of the nation. These cultural rules of society and the operation of the system act as inhibitors or channelers of demands. Some actions are historically or culturally more difficult for a decision-making group to take. Demands that these actions be taken would be weighed in light of the historical or traditional positions of that nation. Even where such action might be considered appropriate by the decision-makers, tradition can

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48 James N. Rosenau, editor, Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York, 1967), and Burton N. Sapin, The Making of United States Foreign Policy (Washington D.C. 1966). These works explain many of the inputs and factors involved in foreign policy decisions.

49 Easton, A System Analysis of Political Life, p. 102.
act as a force limiting the decision-makers' freedom of action. The position of the United States of never striking first, while it may not be entirely accurate historically, is a traditional belief which would limit consideration of a first strike by the decision-makers. This traditional belief would in turn limit the range of the decision-makers' choice. The decision-makers in a crisis may feel that a first strike is necessary, and while this American tradition would not make such an action impossible, it would make it more difficult and less appealing. This tradition can limit the force of a demand focused on the decision-makers, and it can also limit the support available to decision-makers for a proposed action.

Tradition places bounds on the range of the decision-makers' choice. These boundaries may be crossed, but only at high political costs, and with decreasing amounts of support for such action. Historical precedent and ideals, morality and customs all act as inputs on the decision-makers. As limiting factors they will place certain actions and responses to a crisis situation beyond the bounds of the decision-makers and make these actions possible only in highly unusual circumstances. The extreme threat of a crisis, particularly when this is a threat to the survival of a nation, can make this jump beyond traditional bounds possible.
Where time and the nature of the crisis allow a large number of alternatives to be considered and evaluated, the inputs of tradition become a stronger force on the decision-makers. The time for evaluation and a careful decisional process, according to Richard Fagen, will allow more rational, restrained decisions; and one of the restraints is tradition.50

Military.—The military also has an input role as both a source of demands and supports. As a demand source, the military performs the role of advisor to a decision-making body. The severest form of crisis is where the survivability of a nation is at stake, and this is normally in the form of a military threat. Crises of a non-military nature, such as political changes in the international system or even financial crises, have military consequences. In proposing solutions or alternatives to a particular crisis, the military is presenting a demand upon the civilian decision-makers. Also, the demands made and the positions taken by the military prior to the advent of a particular crisis will be inputs to the decision process in that crisis. Military intelligence and evaluations of a crisis situation provide much of the basis for defining the nature of the threat.

According to this model, the demands arising in one sector

will have some influence in the others. For example, a demand expressed by the military for a particular decision will be felt in the political sector, and will also be directed as an input to the decision-making body. The tendency for a "seat of the pants" type decision-making has already been mentioned, but the role of both military and civilian contingency plans in particular crisis situations could serve as guidelines and as a starting point for evaluation and selection of alternatives.

The military can act as a tool that the decision-makers can apply in a crisis situation. In this role the military input to the decisional process is in the form of a support. Can the military forces respond to a crisis in a manner desired by the decision-makers? Does the military possess the type of force needed to carry out the decision? If it does not, then the decision-makers must consider other alternatives. If the military does possess the required strength and flexibility, its supporting role can expand the number of alternatives open to the decision-makers. The Pueblo crisis showed that the United States military lacked the flexibility and strength in Korea to give the decision-makers the military options they might have desired. For example, the fighters stationed in South Korea were armed with nuclear weapons, and this degree of response was not desired by the decision-makers.51

51"They Mean Business," Newsweek, (February 5, 1965), pp. 16-17.
The ability of the military to provide airlift facilities in the 1948 Berlin crisis gave the decision-makers the choice of avoiding a direct confrontation with Russia over land access routes to Berlin.\(^5^2\)

**Political.**—Political inputs also take the form of both demands and supports. The political demands focusing on foreign policy decision-makers rarely comes from the masses. Public opinion polls are yardsticks, but even the attentive public is unorganized and unable to express and focus its demands effectively. Effective public opinion on foreign policy issues usually comes from organized groups and the mass media.\(^5^3\) In a crisis situation, the speed of events and the short time period, coupled with secrecy, make the organization and focus of public opinion even more difficult. In a crisis situation the decision-makers have little time to analyze and evaluate the demands arising from the public. Overwhelming general attitudes of the public will, of course, be a consideration in the decisional process, even if it is an unconscious consideration. At best, the decision-makers can anticipate public reaction to possible alternatives, but the factors of threat and time make effective public opinion difficult to assess and bring to bear on the decisional process.\(^5^4\)

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\(^5^3\)Rosenau, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*, p. 34.

\(^5^4\)Rosenau, *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*, p. 249.
Congress is a major source of political demands on foreign policy issues. Congressmen, with both an interest in and knowledge of foreign affairs, can be one of the few groups that can react in the short time of a crisis and make their demands felt. The demands they present are also tied in with their role as a potential source of support for the decision-makers. The decision-makers receive their jobs through politics and conduct their work in a political environment. "However internationally-minded they might be, the outlook of decision-makers is none the less determined mainly by their national culture. . . . they have to survive in their domestic setting to remain in power."\(^5\)

This prime consideration of domestic setting would not apply as strongly in a crisis situation. An increase in threat and a decrease in time for decisions would decrease the role of domestic politics. The demands would be most forcefully applied, either late in the crisis or after it is over. The time needed to collect and focus these demands would leave them little room to do anything but after-the-fact criticism.

\(^{55}\) Frankel, op. cit., p. 5.
Many researchers feel that an international crisis will consolidate public opinion in support for whatever actions the decision-makers take. A crisis forms a political truce at home.\textsuperscript{56} This is certainly not demonstratively provable in every case, as President Johnson's decision to bomb North Vietnam shows. This thesis hypothesizes that a crisis appears to gain automatic support for the decision-makers only because of the time limits that make it difficult to formulate and present the demands to the decision-makers. Public opinion usually can be effective only after the crisis situation has passed. The examination of only one crisis situation does not provide proof for this hypothesis, and the limiting of the examination to the initial inputs prevents the tracing of demands over the post-crisis period.

External Inputs

The external inputs are those demands and supports that arise outside the boundaries of the nation. The inputs coming from the external environments are complex. The demands focused on the decision-makers can come from other nations or international organizations. Crises or problems in the economic or social systems in the external environment will influence the decision process. The inputs of the external environment, like those of the internal environment, are

\textsuperscript{56}Hoffmann, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 295.
limitless. A foreign policy crisis is generally one in which some event or condition has been imposed upon the decision-makers from a sector of the external environment. The three inputs from the external environment which will be examined in this model are the positions of other nations, diplomatic rules and communications, and international organizations.

Positions of other nations.—The previous positions taken by friends, enemies, and neutrals are a primary influence being focused on the decision-makers. This input is important both as a source of demands and as a source of support. As a source of demands it represents the requests for aid or action or requests for supports for the decisions and actions of another nation. In a crisis situation, the demands arising from other nations would be subject to the same difficulties as public opinion at home. The time limits imposed by a crisis make it difficult to collect and focus demands on the decision-makers. As more time is available for the decisional process, more demands will be able to be presented from other nations.

The supporting role of other nations is a key element in the decisional process. The amount of support which the decision-makers can expect can be analyzed in two ways. The previous positions and statements by other governments give indications of how they might respond in a particular situation. Taking present conditions and these previous views,
the decision-makers can anticipate what reaction will occur if one or another alternative is chosen.

Nations, through treaties or alliances and through foreign policy statements, limit the range of their response to a crisis situation. A decision-making body must consider these ties by treaty as well as the public positions taken by allies, enemies and neutrals. These positions will indicate the limits and type of support and response that can be expected from these nations.

Diplomatic rules and communications.--Diplomatic rules and procedures and inter-nation communications are inputs to the decisional process. Although international law and diplomatic procedure lack the sanctions necessary to make them entirely effective, they do provide one accepted and legitimate means of responding to a crisis situation.57

The existence of these procedures places demands on the decision-makers and can influence their decisions toward alternatives which best fit those procedures. These procedures also act as a support for certain actions. Actions taken within the scope of established diplomatic procedures and international law assume some of the legitimacy and authority that these can provide. A diplomatic response, though most often considered a low level response in comparison to military or economic sanctions, is one alternative

response to a crisis situation and is an important input and consideration for the decision-makers.

Inter-nation communication in a crisis situation is both an input and an output to the decision process. During the decisional stage the incoming communications are a source of information and a means of defining the crisis situation. Incoming communications are in the form of both demands and supports. In a crisis situation in which many nations must act together, the communications provide a means of attempting to reach a common definition of the crisis. On an international level this definitional stage would be as vital for the many decision-making groups as it would be for the single decision-making body. In the case of a single decision-making body, the incoming communications present demands to that body to make certain decisions. They may also provide sources of support for one or several alternative actions.

One hypothesis that Hermann examined in his study of crisis was that "in crises, the volume of communication by a nation's decision-makers to international actors outside their country will increase".58 In his simulation runs, Hermann found the volume of external communications did increase and that the rate of increase went up as decision

58 Hermann, op. cit., p. 16.
time decreased.\textsuperscript{59} But when threat is also made a variable, this may not always be true.

Although the rate of such communication is always greater in short time than extended time situations, the variation in time affect the difference in communication much more in low threat than under moderate and high threat. It may be that as threat increases, the decision-makers in short time situations conclude that other tasks have priority over interacting with international actors.\textsuperscript{60}

It appears from Hermann's findings that though the volume of communications increases in a crisis, the increasing degree of threat will limit these communications to issues involving the crisis situation. As an input, the role of communications is to make the demands and supports known to the decision-makers. As an output, communications allow the decision-makers to make their decisions and desires known. These outputs then produce inputs in a continuing cycle.

\textbf{International organizations.}--The existence of international organizations acts as a support input to the decisional process. Like diplomatic procedures and international law, the appeal to use of international bodies can add legitimacy and authority to actions. At the same time their existence often places a demand on the decision

\textsuperscript{59}In the simulation runs described in Chapter Four, the volume of communications showed a considerable increase as decisional time decreased.

\textsuperscript{60}Hermann, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 16.
makers to make use of them. In the consideration of the alternatives, the role of international organizations and their usefulness or support for certain alternative actions may be considered. The anticipated actions and supports from these bodies become one criterion for evaluating possible decisions. The limited sanctions and collective actions that can be applied by international bodies, such as the United Nations or Organization of American States, are one possible means of response to a crisis threat. Few nations are not tied to one or another international organization; therefore a crisis in the external environment requires the decision-makers to at least consider the inputs such international organizations present.

Crisis Inputs

The final set of inputs to be examined in this model is the crisis inputs. In order that these may more easily be examined, they have been set apart from the internal and external environments. The three elements that make up the crisis inputs, intelligence, time, and stress, are three variables that distinguish crisis decision-making from normal foreign policy decisions. It is acknowledged that there are other elements that contribute to the distinction, such as organization and structure, but the crisis inputs, by using Hermann's
definition of a crisis, become the key elements. Intelligence acts as a key element because it is a means of making the threat known to the decision-makers, and time because it restricts the decision-makers to a limited period. Stress becomes the third element because it is a function of both time, and threat and is also a psychological factor affecting decision-making.

Intelligence represents information about a crisis situation which has been evaluated and weighed prior to presentation to the decision-makers. Intelligence is an element in both normal and crisis decision-making, but as a crisis input it conveys the nature of the threat and becomes a means of conveying demand. From this intelligence, the decision-makers must define the nature of the threat. The alternatives will be evaluated on the basis of this intelligence. The distortion caused by each decision-maker's perception of this intelligence will influence the decisional process. These inputs of information will place demands on a decision-making body. Unpleasant facts will pressure decision-makers to take some action which will rearrange conditions into what those decision-makers perceive to be a more acceptable structure.

One of the variables used to define a crisis is threat, and the nature of the threat is determined from the intelligence inputs focused on the decision-makers. The other
variable presented in the definition of a crisis was time. Time is the period available for defining the crisis, evaluating alternatives, and reaching a decision. For purposes of decision-making, time is not as important in its chronological meaning as it is in its meaning as a restricted period in which decisions must be made. Some situations require uncomplicated decisions, and a limitation on decisional time would not be felt as restrictive by the decision-makers. Other decisions may be so complicated or vital than any deadline for a decision is felt to be restrictive. Time is dependent upon the nature of the crisis and the threat as presented by the intelligence information.\textsuperscript{61} Stress represents the strain on the decision-makers caused by a combination of the urgency and threat of crisis.

\textbf{Intelligence}.—Intelligence inputs represent more than the bare reporting of the events that make up a crisis. Intelligence, at its best, should be predictive and provide a warning of developing crisis situations before they arise. At a minimum, intelligence should provide the decision-makers with the complete factual and accurate information about the crisis issue. Harry Ransom defined intelligence as "evaluated information about the capabilities and intentions of foreign governments, about foreign areas in which a government may maintain a strategic interest, or about

\textsuperscript{61}Robinson, "Crisis," p. 512.
international relations in general". In this definition there are two areas of controversy. If the role of intelligence is to provide accurate information to the decision-makers, how does an intelligence group arrive at its knowledge of the intentions of another nation? Can this ever be any more accurate than an educated guess? No answer will be provided here; none is known. But these questions must be asked by decision-makers in analyzing the intelligence given them. Also, is it the role of intelligence to evaluate information, or should it merely present facts to the decision-makers without evaluation? There is a problem of distortion in the decision-maker's perception and in the means of getting information to the attention of the decision-makers. Once the inputs of intelligence have been through this process and received by the decision-makers, the decision-makers then must weigh and evaluate this information and formulate it into an output.

It is from the intelligence inputs that a definition of the crisis situation is made and the nature of the threat determined. The need, on the part of the decision-makers, for fast, complete, and reliable information is vital. Information withheld from or misunderstood by the decision-makers is useless, and ignorance of such information may be quite

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destructive of effective decision making. If the information does not reach the decision-makers, it is as if the information did not even exist. To be of use when it reaches the decision-makers, it must be felt to be reliable and important. In the decisional process before definitions of the situation can be made and action is taken, the decision-makers must be made aware of and evaluate the intelligence inputs. The felt need for intelligence could be one factor in explaining the increase in the volume of communication as decisional time shortens.

Time is one of the major variables in crisis situations. Several of the hypotheses about crises, which have already been discussed, involve time as a variable in the decisional process in a crisis situation. Decisional time and clock time in a crisis situation should not be treated as equal. "Decision time, therefore, should not be treated as an absolute. It varies with the intricacies of the decision and with the number of participants." The length of the decisional time does not always mean a more rational decision or output can be reached. Longer decisional time does provide for the consideration of a greater number of alternatives and for less pressure and stress on the decision-makers (under conditions of equal threat). Some alternative

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63 Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making, p. 134.
actions, particularly those requiring direct and forceful military actions, can best be taken early in the crisis so that the responsive action can more clearly be tied to the action which initiated the crisis.

This is an input factor that to a limited extent may be controlled by the decision-makers. By foregoing actions requiring an immediate response, or postponing those actions, the decision-makers can to a limited point, control when they will have to make and act on a decision. Fagen's examination of crisis situations indicates that the lengthening of the decisional time will aid the decision-makers in reaching more calculated and rational decisions.66

Stress is a physical or emotional factor which interferes with the individual's ability to make optimum use of the decision-making process. It may lead to a dysfunctionality in that process. Robert North, in introducing a symposium on decision-making in a crisis, held that high stress is the most universal characteristic of international crisis and that it "tends to have a crucial effect upon the decision-making patterns of the leadership involved."67 He felt that stress places a higher emotional content on the

crisis and that this leads to a greater chance of miscalculation and irrational action.

Margaret Hermann used the Inter-Nation Simulation and variables of time and threat to test for stress. One result she found was that under stress the individual's perception of an obstruction to his goals as a threat is greater.68 This result would seem to fit North's findings concerning emotion and miscalculation. Stress appears to be a disruptive factor on the decision-making process, and a factor that is related to both time and threat.

Stress is the third of the crisis inputs to be examined. Easton says that stress can drive a system beyond "some normal range of operation" and that one way this stress can come about is through an overload on the system.69 A system can only handle a limited number of inputs at a time, and the time available to handle them is limited. When the number of inputs exceed the operational ability of the system to handle them, stress develops from an overload of volume. Another form of stress comes from the content of the inputs, and both forms of stress would have a direct relationship to time. Stress increases as time decreases.70 Stress that


comes from content would be the stress present in a foreign-
policy crisis situation.

The inputs and their relationship to the decisional pro-
cess that are presented here are by no means a complete repre-
sentation of a decision-making model. Rather, a few signifi-
cant inputs have been discussed and their effects on and re-
lationships to the decisional process have been examined.
This model provides no answers; it merely poses questions and
relationships. In time, answers should come by proposing
and examining such models. One means of finding answers is
to apply such models to actual crisis situations. Chapter
Three will apply this model to one crisis situation—the
Cuban missile crisis. Another method of testing the concepts
of the decision-making model is through the use of simulation,
which allows a crisis situation to be repeated many times and
provides for control of a number of variables. This method
will be examined in Chapter Four.
CHAPTER III

THE CRISIS

This chapter will present an examination of the Cuban missile crisis. The crisis will be viewed from the perspective of the model presented in Chapter Two. The limitations that were applied to the construction of the model will be applied to the examination of the crisis. The examination is limited to the input stage of the crisis, and no attempt will be made to view the decisional output or its effect on the crisis situation. Only those inputs proposed by and presented in the model will be discussed. The Cuban crisis is ideal for a crisis case study. It presents both high threat and short decisional time, the two key elements of a crisis situation. A large body of data exists on the crisis from historical, documentary, and other research sources, and an analysis of the crisis has relevance to the foreign policy problems facing today's decision-makers.

In the case of the Cuban crisis the demands and supports coming from the environments were indirect inputs. The initiators of the inputs did not know of the existence of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. The demands and supports that arose from
the sectors were not inputs directly relating to this particular situation. The inputs were related to the Cuban and Soviet question in general, and the decision-makers had the added job of evaluating how these inputs would apply in the particular circumstances of the Cuban crisis. Even Soviet inputs directed at the American decision-makers would be indirect because the Soviets would be acting under the assumption that the Americans knew nothing of the missiles.

Setting

The setting is made up of the general background of world and national conditions prior to the crisis. Cuba had become a sore spot for the American diplomacy. The Bay of Pigs disaster served to highlight America's special concern with the embarrassment over Cuba. President Kennedy's desire to obtain the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners held by Castro and the continuing flow of Cuban refugees to this country kept the Cuban question before the public eye. After the failure of the invasion, America's policy toward Cuba was one of attempting to establish an economic and political isolation of Cuba. America appealed to her allies to stop all trade with Cuba. As the crisis built up in September and October of 1962, Japan and Turkey announced a halt in

1 The speeches of Senator Keating, prior to the crisis may be an exception to this statement. The case of Senator Keating will be discussed at a later point in this chapter.


shipping to Cuba, and on September 27, 1962, Secretary of
State Rusk announced that a Latin American military organ-
ization would be formed to deal with the communist threat
to this hemisphere.⁴

In Europe the center of tension was still Berlin. In
previous policy statements both the United States and Russia
had linked the Berlin and Cuban questions. On August 29,
1962, President Kennedy attempted to establish a tie between
Soviet cooperation in Berlin and restraint by United States
towards Cuba.⁵ During the missile crisis one fear that arose
was that American actions against Cuba would be countered
by Soviet pressures on Berlin. In Asia the border conflict
between China and India had broken out just a week prior to
America’s discovery of the missiles in Cuba.⁶

At home, 1962 was a congressional election year. Many
political pressures and demands were directed at the Admin-
istration by the Republicans. Cuba, particularly since the
Bay of Pigs, had become a political sore spot for the Demo-
crats. Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, which began in the
summer of 1960, had increased greatly since July, 1962.⁷

⁵Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rusk, Strategic Power
and Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago, 1966), p. 150.
The Republicans were making Cuba the focal point of their campaign and were demanding that the Administration take some action in the face of the build-up. This is the general background in which the decision-makers found themselves. An endless number and variety of demands were being directed at them. Many of these will be examined here in their roles as inputs to the Cuban crisis. Many others not directly pertaining to this model have been set aside by the author. This is an indication of their lack of value to this model and not an indication of their importance in the Cuban missile crisis situation. The setting indicates the high degree of pressure that was building up on the decision-makers, and the fact that this pressure came from many sources other than the foreign policy pressures discussed here. Other foreign-policy decision situations were occurring throughout the world. An indication of the importance of the Cuban crisis can be seen in how completely the crisis overshadowed these events and how fully it occupied the time and activities of top United States decision-makers.

Therefore, it is assumed here that the events occurring in October, 1962, presented the United States with a grave crisis situation and that expert crisis decision-making and management were demanded. However, the Soviet decisions which led up to this crisis do not appear to have been crisis
decisions. Both the elements of high threat and short time were lacking. This is not to say that the Soviets did not find themselves facing a crisis situation on October 22, 1962, but that decisions prior to that time were not made in a crisis atmosphere. "To ship such missiles to Cuba required months of complicated preparation—a requirement that is not conducive to a strong component of emotional or irrational decision-making."  

On July 2, 1962, Raul Castro visited Moscow to make final arrangements for the arms buildup and placement of missiles in Cuba. Arthur Schlesinger says there is no clear indication of who originally proposed the idea. The Soviets claim that the missiles were placed in Cuba for defensive purposes and at the request of the Cubans, but Schlesinger is not prepared to accept this. Regardless of who requested the move, the decision was a radical departure from previous Soviet policy, which had not even placed missiles in her satellite countries of Eastern Europe.  

The decision to place the missiles in Cuba represented a complicated plan and required a major logistic effort. To maintain secrecy the movement of equipment and the establishment of facilities in Cuba were done entirely by Russian work

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8Klaus Knorr, Failures in National Intelligence Estimates The Case of the Cuban Missiles," World Politics, XVI (April, 1964), 463.

crews. The ships were unloaded and their cargo transported only at night. These movements were designed for both secrecy and speed.\(^{10}\) Along with the movement of the missiles came an increased amount of conventional military hardware to protect the missiles and also a large number of Soviet technicians to install and control them. Surface to air missile (SAM) sites were constructed throughout western Cuba to protect the medium range (MRBM) and intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) sites. The reports of the movement and installation of SAM's confused the evaluation of refugee reports concerning offensive missiles.\(^{11}\)

There were four offensive missile sites under construction, at San Cristobal, Guanajay, Sagus la Grande, and Remedios. A total of forty launching pads was being built.\(^{12}\) This move by the Soviets represented a major change in policy and also a major change in the balance of strategic power between the United States and Russia. The installation of IRBM's in Cuba would double the strike capacity of the Soviets. Prior to this IRBM's in Russia could only be used against European targets.\(^{13}\)

\(^{10}\)Hilsum, op. cit., p. 165

\(^{11}\)Ibid., pp. 159-160.

\(^{12}\)Ibid., p. 159.

\(^{13}\)Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 664.
Decision-Making Process

This was the crisis that faced American decision-makers on Tuesday, October 15, 1962, when photographic evidence of the missiles was presented to President Kennedy. Ted Sorensen, who took part in the decision-making group, described that day and those that followed; "that Tuesday was the first of thirteen days of decision unlike any other in the Kennedy years—or, indeed, inasmuch as this was the first direct nuclear confrontation, unlike any in the history of our planet." The nature of the threat that faced them was a military threat to the survival of the United States. The installation of offensive missiles in Cuba greatly increased the destructive potential aimed at the United States. The first factor, high threat, was present. The second factor of short decisional time was also present. On October 17, 1962 American military experts, after studying photographs, believed that at least some of the MRBM's could be operational within a week. This allowed only a little over a week of total time available for a decision. President Kennedy and his advisors were faced with a serious crisis situation.

14 Sorensen, op. cit., p. 678.

The most dangerous course a President can follow in time of crisis is to defer making decisions until they are forced on him and thereupon become inevitable decisions. Events then get out of hand and take control of the President, and he is compelled to overcome situations which he should have prevented. When a President finds himself in that position, he is no longer a leader but an improviser who is driven to action out of expediency or weakness.

Faced with a crisis the first act of President Kennedy was to gather a group of advisors. The *ad hoc* advisory group that he formed became the decision-making group for this crisis situation. Later this group was officially designated as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, or Ex Comm. As a body of foreign policy decision-makers, Ex Comm is distinct from normal decision-making channels. The members of Ex Comm were—from the Department of State: Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Under Secretary George Ball, Assistant Secretary for Latin America Edward Martin, Deputy Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson, and former Russian Ambassador Llewelyn Thompson; from the Department of Defense: Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Deputy Secretary Powell Gilpatric, Assistant Secretary Paul Nitze, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell Taylor; from the Central Intelligence Agency: Director John McCone and Deputy Director Carter. Others taking part were Robert Kennedy, Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, and advisors

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McGeorge Bundy and Theodore Sorensen. Those that sat in on a few of the discussions were Vice President Johnson, Dean Acheson, Adlai Stevenson, Kenneth O'Donnell, and Donald Wilson, of the U.S. Information Agency.\textsuperscript{17} To these men fell the responsibility of choosing an appropriate American response to the crisis situation. Though as a body of decision-makers this group is unique, the general inputs facing them were those that would be present in all foreign-policy crisis situations.

The discussions that took place in the Ex Comm meetings were free and wide-ranging. President Kennedy felt he needed the evaluation of a wide variety of alternatives, and he desired to have his advisors consider a wide range of possible responses. For this reason the President decided not to attend all the meetings of Ex Comm, and in this way leave them with more freedom of discussion. As Robert Kennedy pointed out, "personalities change when the President is present, and frequently even strong men make recommendations on the basis of what they believe the President wishes to hear."\textsuperscript{18}

As an \textit{ad hoc} group, Ex Comm had no official structure. All the members held important positions in the government but in the deliberations rank and prestige held little importance. The participants were completely unrestricted and free to

\textsuperscript{17}Kennedy, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 8. \textsuperscript{18}Ibid., p. 9.
express their views. This system allows a greater number of alternatives to be presented and discussed but also makes complete agreement on any one course difficult. Several men did assume leadership roles but they did little more than direct discussions and keep discussions on the issues. Robert Kennedy and Robert McNamara became the leaders of the Ex Comm discussions. The discussions moved freely and the absence of President Kennedy encouraged everyone to speak. In a crisis without precedence, rank and experience mattered little.

Security and secrecy were vital. If security could be maintained, then the United States would have the initiative in choosing a response. If Russia learned that the United States had discovered the missiles, she could take action before the U.S. decision-makers could prepare a response. Secrecy also prevented internal or external pressure groups from making demands on the United States. The top officials who made up Ex Comm did their work without the aid of a staff. This kept those who had knowledge of the crisis to a minimum. The concentration of these officials on the Cuban crisis meant other areas of foreign policy were neglected. The operation of this or a similar group of decision-makers over a long

19 Ibid., p. 149.  
20 Ibid., p. 149.  
21 Sorensen, op. cit., p. 679.
period of time would be impractical because of the strain it would place on the other areas of our foreign policy. 22

President Kennedy, withdrawn from the discussions, could keep his normal appointments and help maintain the secrecy. Likewise, the cabinet officers and other Ex Comm members met at a number of places, so they would not be seen entering or leaving one place too often. 23 The role of secrecy in the decision-making process will be fully discussed in the presentation of the crisis inputs.

President Kennedy and most of the Ex Comm members felt some form of action was required. 24 The United States was committed to some positive action in the face of this crisis. In defining the crisis the missiles were the key element; their presence in Cuba was unacceptable to the United States. In defining what strategy would be adopted to counter the missiles, the time limitations were a key element. Action could not be stalled out until the missiles became operational. 25


24 Kennedy, op. cit., p. 8.

25 Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 669.
Perception

Perception is a distorting factor that makes assimilation of the inputs difficult. Besides the distortions coming from the individual personalities and perceptions of the Ex Comm members, the severity and boldness of the Soviet action caused a distortion in perception from what the decision-makers expected in the way of Soviet action.

Thus the dominant feeling was one of shocked incredulity. We had been deceived by Khrushchev, but we had also fooled ourselves. No official within the government had ever suggested to President Kennedy that the Russian buildup in Cuba would include missiles. The Soviet Union had not taken this kind of step with any of its satellites in the past and would feel the risk of retaliation from the United States to be too great to take the risk in this case.

Because the crisis was so unexpected, the shock value of its discovery made the facts difficult to accept. President Kennedy and Ex Comm placed emphasis on obtaining hard intelligence, photographic evidence, as visual proof of the actions. This will be gone into in greater detail when intelligence as an input is discussed.

The potential threat of the missiles was also a distorting factor. Though the shift in strategic power was significant, Ex Comm perceive that this strategic shift would create an even bigger political change in the balance of power. Whether or not the Soviet actions rearranged the balance of power was and still is unanswered, but for the decision-makers,

26Kennedy, op. cit., p. 8.
Soviet action appeared to change the balance. The fact that they perceived a change is more important to their evaluation of alternatives than hindsight discussions as to whether any change actually occurred.

In the definition of a crisis situation one of the vital steps is the evaluation and perception of the position of the other side. President Kennedy tried to place himself in Khrushchev's position. In order to formulate an American response, he felt he needed to understand the Russian motives and their possible responses. Kennedy attempted to leave open to Khrushchev alternatives that were short of war. One restriction was placed on the decision-making body. Though war was to be avoided if possible, Kennedy decided, after viewing the intelligence on the missile sites, that the one goal to be achieved was the removal of the missiles from Cuba. Regardless of the Russian position this would be the objective of any United States action.

Soviet Motives

As President Kennedy realized, an appropriate American response would have to take into account Soviet motives.

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29 Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 668.
Despite Soviet boasts of their nuclear strength, their total strike capacity was much less than that of the United States. By using Cuba as a launching base, Russia would greatly increase her strike capacity. The United States would have little or no warning in case of attack from Cuba.30

In their discussions Ex Comm came up with five possible Soviet motives for placing missiles in Cuba.

1. Cold War Politics: Khrushchev believed that the United States was too timid to risk war and too concerned with legalisms to see a distinction between its own and Russian overseas bases. Cuba was a test to the American will.

2. Diverting Trap: Khrushchev hoped that a United States attack on Cuba would divide the allies and allow Russia to move on Berlin.

3. Cuban Defense: Khrushchev, after the Bay of Pigs, was committed to defend Cuba at all costs.

4. Bargaining Barter: Trade a Cuban for a Berlin settlement, or obtain the withdrawal of Americans from overseas bases.

5. Missile Power: The ICBM gap was too expensive for Russia to close and the use of MRBM's in Cuba would be an inexpensive way to close the gap. In appearance, such a move would greatly alter the balance of power.31

In a post-crisis evaluation, Roger Hilsman, an expert on U.S. intelligence, believed that the primary Soviet motive in placing missiles in Cuba was to buy time to build up her own ICBM fleet. Until the build up could be accomplished, the IRBM's and MRBM's in Cuba would provide Russia with a nuclear strike capability comparable to that of the United States.  

Robert Crane, in a review of Soviet motives, agreed with all the above possibilities but also saw the Russian actions as a political move. The Russian actions would show Latin America that Russia was willing to protect Cuba and was not afraid of the United States. Also, the movement of missiles to Cuba would probe the strategic response of the U.S. over an issue where it was not unacceptable for Russia to back down. The attempt alone would achieve most of the political goals.

Prior to the placing of missiles in Cuba, Russia had to consider what the American responses would be when the existence of the missiles was revealed. In the same manner the American decision-makers had to have an idea of what response the Soviets would be expecting. President Kennedy strongly desired to avoid miscalculation and war. The desire of the United States to avoid direct military action against Cuba during the Bay of Pigs may have given the Soviets the feeling that the same reluctance to act would apply in this case.

32 Hilsman, op. cit., p. 164.

The United States also accepted the buildup of conventional arms in Cuba and the increased Soviet involvement on the island.\textsuperscript{34} To make such a drastic change in the status quo the Soviets had to be fairly certain that the American response would not be an immediate nuclear strike.\textsuperscript{35}

The perception and definition of the crisis and the evaluation of the Soviet motives were two of the first steps in the decisional process. The way that Ex Comm defined the crisis would influence the perception of further inputs. The definitions and assumptions made at this stage would set the framework for the discussion and evaluation of alternatives and for the final choice of an output.

The geographical location of Cuba was one factor that greatly aided the United States. The Caribbean is an area where American conventional strength far outweighs the conventional strength of the Soviets. The supply lines are short enough to allow a speedy and full military deployment. The crisis occurred at a time in which Republican complaints of a weak stand on Cuba could be refuted in action prior to the congressional elections. These elements led C.L. Sulzberger to speculate that the crisis over Cuba may have been chosen and directed by the Administration. He assumes that the Administration knew about the missiles before October 14, 1962.

\textsuperscript{34}Horlick, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 380.

\textsuperscript{35}Horlick and Rush, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 141.
He believes that the intelligence reports of missiles were too strong for the leaders to have not discovered their placement earlier. The Administration delayed disclosure until a time when it could exploit the crisis to full advantage. There is little evidence in the conduct of Ex Comm or in the actions taken to suggest this is true. The Administration and the intelligence agencies did miss indications of the missile deployment, but public statements and actions of the decision-makers indicated a complete and genuine surprise at the discovery of the missiles.

The United States discovered the missiles prior to their completion and before the Russians could present the United States with a fait accompli in Cuba. Ex Comm had a limited amount of time to discuss and evaluate alternatives. Secrecy aided in preserving what little time was available and aided in allowing the United States to turn the tables and present the Russians with a fait accompli.

Alternatives

Ex Comm when it met for the first time had an endless spectrum of alternative responses open to it. The only

36 Horowitz, op. cit., p. 114.

37 The role of intelligence will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

38 Horlick and Rush, op. cit., p. 150.
limitations were in objectives. President Kennedy's objectives were that the missiles be removed, and that war be avoided. President Kennedy was undecided as to what action should be taken, and looked to Ex Comm to present several possible courses. As already shown, the discussions in Ex Comm were free, and covered a wide area. Robert Kennedy pointed out that in the course of discussing alternatives few of the members remained consistent or committed throughout the period to one or another course of action.

Fagen's hypothesis that a crisis creates a need to take some action as an emotional release is shown in the Cuban case by President Kennedy's statement about the need to do something. Full discussion and debate within Ex Comm aided in clarifying the nature of the threat and in holding appeals for irrational or emotional responses in check. Although the discussions began with an almost limitless number of possible alternatives, these were quickly reduced to a limited number of possible responses that were then discussed in detail. The search for alternatives was open to all possibilities but the restrictions on the internal and external inputs reduced the number to be considered. The first meeting of Ex Comm laid the choice between an air strike and acquiescence, and Kennedy had already ruled out acquiescence. Kennedy told Ex Comm to develop more alternatives.

41Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 469.
The alternatives proposed by Ex Comm varied from a full military invasion to a diplomatic protest. Throughout the period of Ex Comm's discussions the two alternatives most frequently brought up were an air strike on the missile sites and a blockade or quarantine of Cuba. The military was the strong advocate for an air strike. They argued that it would be a decisive action and directed at the heart of the crisis—the missiles. The air strike would present the Russians with a *fait accompli.* There were several major drawbacks to an air strike. One was the "bounce-back theory"; that is an air strike on Cuba could trigger a similar move by the Russians on West Berlin. The other major drawback to an air strike was based on moral or legal grounds; also, an air strike would undoubtedly kill Russians.

The idea of the blockade was brought up by the Secretary of Defense McNamara and discussed on Wednesday, the second day of discussions. McNamara stressed that the blockade presented a middle course of action and would emphasize American conventional superiority in the Caribbean. The blockade would be an action but a low-level action. It would provide time and stretch out the crisis avoiding miscalculation or emotional actions. Beginning at this level would also allow more serious steps to be taken later, if they were needed.

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The blockade, as a limited use of force, could be legally justified under Article Six of the Rio Treaty,\footnote{If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent." from David L. Larson, editor, \textit{The Cuban Crisis of 1962 Selected Documents and Chronology} (Boston, 1963), p. 215.} by a two-thirds vote of the Organization of American States.\footnote{Crane, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 542.} There were several important drawbacks to adopting a blockade as a course of action. A blockade would not deal with the central issue, the missiles. A blockade would not affect the missiles that were already in Cuba nor would a blockade stop the construction of the missile sites.\footnote{Schlesinger, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 671.} Also, a blockade would mean a direct confrontation between American and Russian ships and invite the Russians to impose a similar blockade on Berlin. Even with the full support of the O.A.S. the blockade would still be on legally shaky ground, and some advisors pointed out that a blockade was legally an act of war.\footnote{Hilansan, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 205.}

These two alternatives and actions that could be taken in conjunction with them because the central issues for the discussions.
The evaluation of these alternatives centered on three criteria. The first was the speed with which the action could be carried out and the independence of action it would provide at later decisional stages. The time requirements of a crisis excluded long-drawn-out courses of action or actions which locked the decision-makers into a set pattern with no flexibility to meet changing conditions. The second was the expected impact of a course of action upon Soviet strategy in Berlin. Berlin held for Russia the same logistical and conventional force advantage that Cuba held for the United States. The third criterion was conformity to international law and morality. No one alternative would be the best strategy for each of the three criteria. The blockade met the first criterion very well. It could be swiftly established and provided flexibility of action at later decisional stages. The blockade, however, would provide the Soviets with an excellent excuse to close access routes to Berlin. On the third point the blockade was a middle course. It was not as illegal or morally reprehensible as an air strike, nor was it as legally acceptable as working through the United Nations. Yet, the blockade would confront the Russians with the seriousness of the American attitude and commitment, and would show them that, on this issue, the United States meant business. At the same

50 Crane, op. cit., p. 538.

51 Wohlstetler, op. cit., p. 707.
time, it was short of a direct military action and provided each side with time to propose alternatives and compromises.

Robert McNamara was the leader of those in Ex Comm who favored the blockade. He argued that it was a limited pressure that could be controlled by the United States and increased if needed. "Further, it was dramatic and forceful pressure, which would be understood yet, importantly, still leave us in control of events."\(^\text{52}\)

The primary objective of the United States in this crisis was the removal of the missiles. When the various alternatives had been discussed and position papers presented to the President by Ex Comm, Kennedy chose the blockade route as the alternative most likely to secure that objective at the lowest cost to the United States.\(^\text{53}\) The primary crisis issue was the introduction of offensive missiles to Cuba. Kennedy sought to limit our objectives to the issue of the missiles, rather than see the crisis expand to the whole range of Russian and American disagreements, particularly that of Berlin.\(^\text{54}\)

The last stage in the decisional process, and one that is not a vital concern of this model, is the implementation and operational development of that decision into action. For the purpose proposed by this model, this last step need not be discussed in detail. The ability to implement the decision

\(^{52}\)Kennedy, op. cit., p. 9. \(^{53}\)Sorensen, op. cit., p. 693.  
\(^{54}\)Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 675.
is as important as the decision itself. The output must try to meet as many input demands and gain as much support as possible; and thus the way that the decision is carried out can be as complicated as the decisional process. Once the decision had been reached there was still much left to be done.

Resolutions for the U.N. and the Organization of American States had to be drafted. Special arrangements had to be made to brief our major allies. Presidential letters had to be prepared for forty-three heads of government, and messages had to be sent to all our posts overseas, explaining our action. The congressional leadership had to be informed. The Pentagon had to alert the Strategic Air Command, assemble the quarantine forces, and prepare the troops needed for an invasion if that should become necessary. 55

A complete scenario of all the things that had to be done and the time for doing them was developed by U. Alexis Johnson. The scenario was a complete schedule of what had to be done prior to and following President Kennedy's public announcement of the crisis, which was set for 7:00 p.m., Monday, October 22. 56 Just seven days had passed between the time that President Kennedy had been informed of the missiles and his announcement of the American response to that action.

Internal Inputs

Into the decision-making process discussed here came a large number of inputs that influenced Ex Comm to choose the blockade over other alternatives. This is not to say that

55 Hillsman, op. cit., p. 206. 56 Ibid., p. 207.
other choices were not available or that the blockade was the environmentally determined course of action. However, inputs from both the internal and external environments did play a role in making the blockade appear as the most favorable course of action. The remainder of this chapter will discuss these inputs and their role in the decisional process.

The totality of inputs focusing on the Administration prior to the Cuban crisis was enormous. Besides the routine of the responsibility of running the nation, 1962 was a congressional election year and internal demands and supports were of greater number and of greater political importance than at other times. From the external environment the increasing hostilities on the India-Chinese border were developing into an incident of international proportions. The vital importance that both President Kennedy and his advisors attached to the presence of offensive missiles in Cuba can be drawn from the dominant position this crisis assumed in the activities and available working time of these national leaders.

The inputs were only indirectly related to the missiles, since the existence of the missiles was kept secret. The inputs had to be adapted by Ex Comm to apply to this particular crisis. Direct demands could only come after the public announcement on October 22, and at this time the decision had already been reached. The demands of Senator Keating, who claims to have had knowledge of the missiles prior to the
crisis, will be examined, but they are still indirect because at the time they were made the decision-makers did not know of the presence of the missiles in Cuba.

**Tradition**

Tradition is an input to the decisional process. It places demands on the decision-makers to have their outputs conform to previous positions or actions and binds the decision-makers in borders of history and customs. Tradition sets guidelines for the decision-makers and performs much the same role as precedent would for a judge.

Cuba had always held a position of special significance for the United States. Independence for the island from Spain was obtained in the Spanish-American War. Since that time the United States has been deeply involved in the internal affairs of Cuba and the other Caribbean republics. A history of American intervention in Cuba through the authority of the Platt Amendment and the strong economic ties have made Cuba an area of special concern for the United States.57

The Monroe Doctrine also gave the United States the legal backing for intervention in the affairs of the Latin American nations. As a traditional input the importance of the Monroe Doctrine is less significant in its legal meaning than it is

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57 Henry M. Patcher, *Collision Course* (New York, 1963), p. 150, pages 145-167 present a complete review of the major events in United States-Cuban relations.
as a statement of United States feelings and obligations toward the security of this hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine can be a historical justification for the American actions in preserving the security of this hemisphere, particularly when a threat to security arises from outside the hemisphere.\(^{58}\) Since the growth of communism in Cuba and the fear of the expansion of communism to other areas of the hemisphere, the Monroe Doctrine has been put forward as a restatement of United States policy. On August 29, 1962, at a news conference prior to the crisis, President Kennedy affirmed that under the concept of the Monroe Doctrine the United States "would oppose a foreign power extending its power to the Western Hemisphere."\(^{59}\) The buildup of Russian arms and influence falls under the restrictions of the Doctrine. The Doctrine serves both as a warning of American intentions and as a statement of policy. As an input in the crisis the Monroe Doctrine provides a precedent and justification for United States actions in the face of a foreign threat in this hemisphere.

Coming under traditional inputs are past American actions. One of the most recent of these actions in regard to Cuba was the Bay of Pigs incident. The failure of the Invasion

\(^{58}\)Ibid., p. 152.

and the United States' assurances that nothing like that would happen again were considerations that had to be taken into account by Ex Comm. The buildup of Cuban defenses following the Bay of Pigs was expected by the Administration and served as a cover for the introduction of the offensive missiles. 60

Because of the Bay of Pigs, considerations of the alternatives involving military force or invasion would make United States actions less acceptable to the world and make United States charges of Soviet aggression less believable.

President Kennedy recognized the importance that his previous statements on Cuba and historical traditions would play in reaching a decision. On Tuesday, the first morning of the crisis, the President requested Ted Sorensen to review all previous public statements on Cuba and the introduction of offensive weapons. 61 Since the increased arms buildup had begun in late July and early August, the President had issued a series of statements warning the Russians of the seriousness of their moves and warning that offensive weapons in Cuba would not be tolerated. These statements did not explain what the American response would be if offensive weapons were introduced into Cuba, but they clearly presented the seriousness with which the United States would view such a move.

60 Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 665.

61 Sorensen, op. cit., p. 674.
On September 4, 1962, the President issued a statement explaining that the United States had no evidence of any offensive weapons in Cuba but that their introduction would present a grave issue. This position was more clearly defined at a Presidential news conference on September 13, 1962.

But let me make this clear again: If at any time the Communists buildup in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security in any way, . . . . or became an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies.

These statements, while not restricting the United States to a particular response, did indicate that positive action would be taken if offensive missiles were placed in Cuba. The seriousness of the situation and these past statements would be inputs favoring positive and forceful action in this crisis. President Kennedy's call for an immediate review of these statements indicates a decisional need to remain consistent with past actions and a desire to keep the response within limits that could be expected. A response that falls within the degree of seriousness of the warnings should not be considered a surprise by the Soviets. American intentions had been laid out in Kennedy's series of statements and these intentions would be an influence on Ex Comm in choosing alternatives. For example, the seriousness of

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62Department of State, American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1962, p. 369.

63Ibid., p. 374.
the September warnings would make it politically difficult for the President to take no action or even a mild action in the face of this crisis.

Traditional aspects of American history and customs played a major role in the rejection of an air strike as a first action to be taken. During the Ex Comm discussions, Robert Kennedy strongly opposed an air strike against the missile sites.

... America's traditions and history would not permit such a course of action. What ever military reasons he (Dean Acheson) and others could marshal, they were nevertheless, in the last analysis, advocating a surprise attack by a very large nation against a very small one. This I said, could not be undertaken by the U.S. if we were to maintain our moral position at home and around the globe. Our struggle against Communism... has as its essence our heritage and our ideals, and these we must not destroy. ... We spent more time on this moral question during the first five days than on any other single matter.

Military

Military inputs played an important role in the Ex Comm discussions. Was America's military strength adequate to deter a Russian attack and did the military have the resources to apply the type and amount of pressure that might be desired? The Institute for Strategic Studies estimated that at the period of the crisis the U.S. had a large lead in nuclear delivery capability. The U.S. had 450-500 operational ICBM's and Russia had about seventy-five. The U.S. also

64Kennedy, op. cit., p. 148. 65Horowitz, op. cit., p. 111.
had a bomber fleet of about 700 B-52 and B-58 bombers and 900 older B-47 bombers. At the time of the crisis the Navy had nine Polaris submarines in operation, each carrying sixteen nuclear armed missiles. The strength of these forces seemed sufficient to deter a Soviet attack. However, once the missiles in Cuba became operational, their ability to strike without giving any warning meant that much of the American force could be destroyed in a surprise attack. Particularly vulnerable were bombers, which required fifteen minutes warning time to get airborne.

The geographic location of Cuba allowed the U.S. to quickly mobilize and move troops and equipment to this area. The flexibility was present to provide any degree of military response desired. Tactical forces had already been assembled in the Caribbean area for naval maneuvers which had been planned months prior to the crisis. PHILBRIGLEX - 62 was a joint Navy-Marine exercise involving forty ships, 20,000 sailors, and 5,000 marines. This exercise was to be a mock assault on Vieques Island, where the marines were to free a mythical republic from a mythical dictator named Ortsac (Castro spelled backwards). Sufficient forces existed in the area or could be rapidly moved to the area to provide any military response that Ex Comm might desire. This ability opened up

66 Crane, op. cit., p. 537. 67 Ibid., p. 537.
a wide range of military options and did not restrict the
decision-makers to either a high or a low military response.

The buildup of the Cuban defenses also spurred Kennedy
to request that Congress renew the authority it had given
him the year before to call up 150,000 reservists if he felt
they were needed.69 This authority was requested September 7,
1962, and the granting of this by Congress on September 24, 1962,
provided Kennedy and Ex Comm with even greater flexibility
of military forces when the crisis situation arose. The
ability of the military to be an effective tool that could
be used by Ex Comm shows the military role as a source of
support that can either hinder or enhance the number or type
of alternatives open to the decision-makers.

The military also played an input role as a creator of
demands. The demands took the form of preparation and advice
prior to the crisis and in the advice given to Ex Comm during
the crisis as to what alternatives should be taken. The mili-
tary's important role as a support unit and the intelligence
and evaluation that it supplies make the military a vital
input factor in any foreign policy crisis situation.

The House of Representatives Appropriations Committee
hearings conducted in January, 1962, showed that the military
were concerned about the possibility of the introduction of
missiles to Cuba and had examined the feasibility of a

69 Pachter, op. cit., p. 2, and The Department of State,
blockade. The answers to questions about the placement of missiles in Cuba were off the record for security reasons, but the mere fact that they were asked and responded to indicates a consideration of that possibility by the military. Questioned about the possibility of a blockade, Admiral Anderson replied that a blockade of Cuba could be imposed and in a matter of hours stop the flow of all shipping into Cuba. He also pointed out that a blockade would be traditionally considered an act of war. 70

During the Ex Comm deliberations the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that a blockade would not be effective and that immediate military action was required. The military strongly advised Ex Comm that either an air strike or an invasion was needed. General LeMay, Air Force Chief of Staff, felt that the Russians would not respond to an attack on Cuba. President Kennedy rejected this advice. He felt that any attack on the missile sites would kill Russian technicians and the Russians would have to respond to that, if not in Cuba then certainly in Berlin. 71 It was also pointed out by technical military advisors that there was no assurance that an attack could destroy all the missiles. 72 When confronted with a military threat, as in Cuba, the advice and evaluation


coming from the military are important considerations to be examined in reaching a decision.

It was previously pointed out in this chapter that David Horowitz in his article on the crisis brings up the possibility that the existence of the missiles had been known by the decision-makers for some time prior to October 14. The showdown was postponed to provide greater effectiveness for United States actions and charges. One of the interesting facts he presents is the activity of the U.S. Air Force in preparing for actions in Cuba before the first evidence of the missiles was supposedly obtained. General LeMay had ordered a buildup of supplies in Florida and the completion of this buildup was to be accomplished by October 10, four days before the photographic reconnaissance flight over Cuba. General LeMay had also ordered the Tactical Air Command, the unit which would conduct an air strike or provide air support for an invasion, to be combat ready by October 20. Assuming that Horowitz's belief that these actions indicate a prior knowledge of the crisis was incorrect, then these actions would still remain as an important input for Ex Comm. The preparedness of TAC and the existence of the supplies in Florida increased the number of military options open to Ex Comm. General LeMay said that his actions were in accordance with long standing contingency plans on Cuba. One of those plans was for an invasion of

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Cuba, and the movement of supplies was required if those plans were ever to be put to use.  

Political

The political inputs were among the most numerous ones focusing on the decision-makers. These inputs were in the form of both demands and supports. They were augmented during the Cuban crisis because of the coming congressional elections. Though the political inputs are by their nature vital in a political system, there is some question as to the degree they influence the decision in the Cuban crisis. The political inputs put pressures on Ex Comm and limited its freedom of action. The demands placed on the decision-makers to do something about Cuba made some form of direct action a political as well as strategic necessity. Yet, for all its importance, domestic politics was not discussed by Ex Comm. Other issues overshadowed the influence of internal political pressures. But as Roger Hilsman points out, the political demands were certainly felt as an unspoken or unconscious issue.

The congressional elections were scheduled for November 6, and the Republicans had made Cuba the major campaign issue.

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75 Hilsman, op. cit., p. 196.
The Republicans believed that the average person was impatient over the Russian influence in Cuba and that a get-tough policy as an election issue would win votes. The Republicans' Senate and Congressional Campaign Committee cited Cuba as the major issue and used opinion polls as evidence of the frustration of the voters over Cuba.

The Republican call for a firmer policy against Castro gained increasing support from the voters questioned in public opinion polls. One poll conducted in early October and reported in the New York Times indicated that most of the people were dissatisfied with American policy toward Cuba and that many favored United States action to remove Castro. Public opinion was also being expressed by pressure groups. The American Legion Convention, which met a week before the crisis, adopted a resolution that called for economic sanctions, boycott on imports and exports, and if needed, unilateral military action against Castro. All of these demands were indirect to the central crisis issue, the missiles. None of these groups knew of the missiles and they could not make demands directly concerning the crisis point. The secrecy in

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77 Sorensen, op. cit., p. 670.
which EX Comm conducted its discussions also prevented an increase in political demands. A decision had been reached before the general public became aware of the crisis.

The increased flow of Soviet arms to Cuba in August and September brought an increase in the demands for action from the Republicans. Senators Goldwater, Capehart, and Keating all demanded that Kennedy take some action against this violation of the Monroe Doctrine. The demands of Senator Keating were the ones most directly related to the crisis situation that developed. Keating had received many reports of missiles in Cuba from refugees. On October 9, Keating attacked the U.S. Cuban policy, and on October 10, from the Senate floor, he claimed that six IRBM sites were under construction in Cuba. The administration replied that it had no evidence of this, but Keating claimed he had received his information from government sources. Keating never made his sources public but he charged that he received his information from government intelligence sources and that the Administration had the same information that he had. Keating's primary source of information appeared to be unanalyzed and

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80 Sorensen, op. cit., p. 669.
81 Hileman, op. cit., p. 177.
unconfirmed refugee reports. These reports had spoken of missiles in Cuba for over a year. Regardless of the reliability of these reports, Keating’s charges placed pressure on Kennedy and Ex Comm to take action, now that they had been proven correct. It would be politically difficult, in the face of the elections, to do nothing about the introduction of missiles to Cuba.

Throughout his news conferences in August, September, and October, Kennedy stressed that events in Cuba were being watched. His statements made repeated attempts to refute the refugee claims of missiles. At a news conference on August 29, 1962, Kennedy stated that the United States had no information about the setting-up of anti-aircraft missiles in Cuba. He also stressed the American policy that Cuba could not be allowed to become an offensive military base. These statements served to inform Russia of the U.S. position and to stem domestic political pressure.

The request for the authority to call up reserve forces was another means of checking political demands. Still Congressional concern over Cuba was high. In mid-September the House and Senate passed a joint resolution stating that the United States would do all that was needed to prevent the

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83 The difficulty of using and evaluating these reports by intelligence agencies will be discussed at a later point in this chapter.

further spread of Cuban communism into this hemisphere. The only congressional debate on the resolution was as to whether it was worded strongly enough. The Republicans argued that it was too weak and too vague. 35

The scope and intensity of these pre-crisis political demands had a direct effect on the decisional process of Ex Comm. Domestic politics was not discussed by Ex Comm, but it had to be an unconscious and powerful influencing force. Political supports, like political demands, could not be directly focused on the crisis situation, because of secrecy. Support from the political sector had to be sought after the decision had been reached and made public. However, the anticipated response of the various political groups may have played a role in the decision process. The only attempt at gathering support prior to the public announcement was at a meeting of congressional leaders at the White House at 5:00 o'clock on Monday, October 22, 1962. The meeting was called solely to inform the Congressmen, because the decision had been reached and at that moment was being implemented. 36

Neither this model nor a study of the Cuban crisis confirms or denies the theory that a President receives automatic political support in the time of a grave crisis. The Cuban crisis did not show this to be true. The agreement and support of all the Congressional leaders was not forthcoming.

35 New York Times, September 27, 1962, Sec. 1., p. 11.
36 Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 675.
And even though the actions proved successful, critics attacked them from both sides as too reckless or too little. Political demands take time to form and be expressed and the short time restrictions of a crisis place the role of political demands about the specific crisis more with that of the feedback rather than input process.

External Inputs

The external inputs are those arising from outside the decision-maker's nation. As with the internal inputs, the short time restrictions of the crisis and the secrecy in which it was carried out prevented demands and supports directly relating to the crisis situation from being presented to President Kennedy and Ex Comm. The anticipated response of the other nations to the various alternatives was a consideration that had to be made.

Positions of Other Nations

Dean Rusk was assigned the job of analyzing possible allied reactions. In Rusk's analysis the U.S. would get its greatest support only if the evidence against Russians was convincing and only if U.S. actions offered Russia a way out. Too strong an action would turn the allies against the U.S. for provoking war and too weak an action would turn them away in fear that they could not depend on American protection.  

\[37\] Sorensen, op. cit., p. 682.
Prior to the crisis, European feeling was that Cuba was essentially a United States problem and that if the U.S. could not deal with so close a problem, there was little that Europe could do. European opinion as expressed through editorials in the leading papers was generally opposed to the American trade blockade of Cuba. They felt that it was not wise to isolate Cuba and make her completely dependent on Russia. The extreme danger of the crisis was going to force each nation to take a stand. The Ex Comm was sure that in the heat of the crisis the allied governments would give their verbal support to the United States.

When the nature of the crisis was made public, world public opinion did not rise up and protest the Soviet action. The direct opinion did, rather, center on the U.S. actions in blockading Cuba and the immediate fear of nuclear war. European praise for the United States action came only after Russia had backed down and the threat of nuclear war was decreased. The Cuban problem was an American problem, not a European one. Even the introduction of ICBM's to Cuba did not cause alarm in Europe. Europe had lived successfully under the threat of Soviet ICBM's for years and the problem did not seem as serious to them as it did for the United States.

90 Pachter, op. cit., p. 33. 91 Ibid., p. 34.
As a source of inputs, the possible reactions of the other nations of the world had to be considered; however, the opinion of allies was not sought in reaching a decision. The action would be an American action and there was no prior consultation with other nations. The other nations were merely informed and asked to support the U.S. actions. No direct demands from the external environment were focused on the American decision-makers.

**International Organizations**

Before the October crisis the United States had taken steps to build support for pressures against Cuba. The Cuban's successful revolution had stirred unrest throughout Latin America and the United States had little trouble in gaining support from the Organization of American States. The OAS conference in Punta del Este, Uruguay in January, 1962, had declared that the Cuban form a government was incompatible with the inter-American systems and Cuba was to be expelled from the OAS. The OAS action closely fit the United States policy of isolating Cuba. Secretary of State Rusk expressed hope that our European allies would take into account the OAS desires and formulate their own policies on Cuba in line with the principles expressed at Punta del Este.  

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93 Sorensen, op.cit., p. 669.

World opinion and the support of the other nations was one criterion for judging the various alternatives open to Ex Comm. Ex Comm felt that the conformity of their response to international law would aid in gaining a favorable world opinion. A legal basis for their action was necessary.\textsuperscript{95} Llewellyn Thompson, the former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, expected that any course of action that conformed to legal standards would leave a greater impression on the Russians. He said, "Soviets have a feeling for legality," and that such an action would make it easier to bring world opinion to bear on the Russians.\textsuperscript{96}

Of all the alternatives open, the blockade appeared to be the one that would best satisfy both the demands for action and the demands for legality. The State Department explained that the blockade did conform to international law.

The validity of the action in international law depends on affirmative answers to two questions: 1) Was the action of the Organ of Consultation authorized by the Rio Treaty; and 2) Is the action consistent with the provisions of the U.N. Charter to which the Rio Treaty is, by its own terms and by the terms of the Charter, subordinate?\textsuperscript{97}

The State Department replied in the affirmative to both questions. The question of the legality of the blockade was never settled, and as was pointed out by Admiral Anderson a year before, a blockade was traditionally considered to be an act of

\textsuperscript{95}Crane, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 541. \textsuperscript{96}Ibid., p. 541. \textsuperscript{97}"The State Department Legal Brief on the Quarantine of Cuba," Pachter, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 167.
war. The OAS could provide a cover of legality and international sanction for American actions. But this crisis was too severe a threat to trust its solution to the actions of international law or the United Nations. Adlai Stevenson, while urging thatEx Comm consider diplomatic approaches, advised that he saw little hope of getting enough votes in the United Nations to secure backing for the United States.98

Diplomatic Procedures and Communications

The role of inter-nation communication plays a vital role in any crisis. The communications between the United States and Russia before the crisis were largely limited to public statements from both sides about their positions on Cuba. During the crisis the lack of a rapid and accurate means of communication made solution more difficult to achieve. In an address to the Foreign Policy Association, Secretary Rusk said the inability to communicate was one of the lessons learned from the crisis.99 It was this lesson that led to the establishment of the hot line between Washington and Moscow.

Early in September, Ambassador Dobyrynin met with Ted Sorensen and Robert Kennedy and assured both that the weapons being placed in Cuba were of a defensive nature. He, also,

98Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 675.
99Department of State, American Foreign Policy Current Documents, 1962, p. 43.
gave Sorensen a letter from Khrushchev stating that Russia would do nothing that would increase tensions before the American elections.\textsuperscript{100} This assurance was followed up on September 11, with a statement that the Soviet Union was strong enough that it had no need to station missiles outside its borders.\textsuperscript{101} These Soviet statements were in response to the growing demands in the United States for some action against Cuba and in reply to President Kennedy's severe warning of September 4th.

After the formation of Ex Communiqué, it was imperative to keep America's knowledge of the existence of the missiles a secret. American communications to Russia could not draw undue attention to the missiles. If Russia knew of the U.S. discovery, she could take the initiative away from Ex Communiqué before a decision had been reached. On October 17, President Kennedy held a previously scheduled meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at this time because the United States had not yet reached a decision; President Kennedy decided against presenting the evidence of the missiles existence. Gromyko, again, assured Kennedy that the weapons being sent to Cuba were for defensive purposes only.\textsuperscript{101}

Secrecy was important to assure the maximum time for the decision-making process. However, once the crisis became public knowledge, the need was for rapid and accurate communications. Soviet denials of offensive missiles in September

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., p. 668. \textsuperscript{101} Kennedy, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 148.
made the Soviet statements in the crisis period harder to believe. Added to this was the problem that no clear channel of communication was open between the two nations. Dean Rusk spoke of this as a major problem.

... Then during the next several days there was a variety of contacts at the United Nations. But I think the--as a matter of fact, the most crucial exchanges were the public exchanges. The President's letter of October 27 and the broadcast message from Mr. Khrushchev on October 28, in combination, unlocked the crisis and made it possible to work towards a peaceful solution. ... I think these public communications turned out to be the fastest communications. 103

This model is not concerned with communications after the crisis became public knowledge and the decision made. The communication problem was a handicap in working for a solution to the crisis. The problem in communication was only increased by the difficulty in assimilating and evaluating the inputs of information.

Crisis Inputs

Of the inputs examined in this model, the most important and the most difficult to view are the crisis inputs. Time and stress are difficult to measure in a crisis situation. The role of intelligence is difficult to determine because much of the material is classified or are fictitious accounts of events which have become popular. It is the total effect

103 Larson, op. cit., pp. 268-269.
of these three elements that distinguish a crisis decision from the normal foreign policy decision-making system. The threat comes from both the factual conditions presented by intelligence and the perception and evaluation of that information by the decision-makers. Stress is a product of both the time and the threat factors. Because of the difficulty in measuring time and stress, they will be examined in Chapter Four through the use of simulation.

**Time**

Ex Comm operated in a restricted period of time. The restriction on time was the estimated date that the missiles in Cuba would be operational. The estimates varied but the military experts felt that the missiles could be operational by the 24th of October.¹⁰⁴ Robert Kennedy spoke of the thirteen days of the crisis, but this thirteen-day period covered the time from discovery to solution. The actual time available for reaching a decision was much less. A decision would have to be made and an action taken before the missiles could be in operational status. That allowed about nine days in which to reach a decision and take an action. In the Cuban crisis President Kennedy was informed on Tuesday morning, October 16, and he made public his action on Monday evening,

¹⁰⁴Kennedy, op. cit., p. 9.
October 22. This involved seven days for the decision-making process. Considering the threat and the multitude of factors involved, seven days is not a long period of time.

The blockade as a course of action presented a valuable asset in regard to time. Though the blockade presented the Russians with a *fait accompli*, it also stretched the crisis time out over a longer period.\(^{105}\) No direct confrontation or use of force had been applied, its application would come in the future. This stretching of time allowed the Russians to make decisions and evaluate positions rather than forcing an emotional or irrational response to an American attack. At the same time a blockade applied pressure and presented the fear of a later, more forceful action.

The importance of secrecy has already been mentioned. Keeping the American knowledge from the Soviets gave Ex Comm the longest possible time to reach an initial decision and to carry it out. A breakdown in secrecy would have alerted the Soviet Union who could then take actions that would change the situation. The secrecy of the Ex Comm meetings was difficult to maintain. The members of Ex Comm were some of the most important men in Washington and their unusual activity did not go unnoticed. When this activity was linked to the

\(^{105}\)Sorensen, *op. cit.*, p. 687.
preparatory troop movements ordered by Secretary McNamara, the press began to uncover the story. By Saturday, James Reston had put together the details of the story but with White House intervention the New York Times killed the story. The President telephoned the papers that had uncovered the story, told them the truth about the crisis, and asked them to hold the stories. The fact that extensive efforts were undertaken to maintain the secrecy and the success in maintaining it shows the importance the decision-makers placed on the time restrictions of the crisis.

Intelligence

Most of the writers on the Cuban crisis agree that the United States intelligence missed several clues that pointed to the existence of the missiles. Although the Russians continually denied anything but defensive weapons were being sent to Cuba, they made no effort to camouflage the sites under construction. The Russians expected the sites to be discovered and hoped that the speed of construction would make up for camouflage. The testimony of Admiral Anderson at the Appropriations Committee Hearings in January, 1962,

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106Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 674.


108Morowitz, op. cit., p. 108.
indicated that intelligence was alerted to the possibility of the introduction of missiles to Cuba.\textsuperscript{109}

Intelligence received its first input in the development of the crisis when Raul Castro visited Moscow in July, 1962. Following that visit more of the shipping to Cuba was restricted to Soviet ships. These ships carried a large number of technicians. Shortly after Raul Castro's visit, top Russian rocket force generals arrived in Cuba. These movements were noted by the United States and on August 23, the Central Intelligence Agency issued a warning about these developments and reported cargo containers the size of missiles.\textsuperscript{110} During July and August, there was a large increase in the conventional arms shipments to Cuba, including MIG fighters, patrol boats with ship to ship missiles, and helicopters. Certain dock areas in Havana were closed to Cubans and the ships were unloaded at night. It was later determined that these early shipments were Surface to Air Missiles (SAM's). Reconnaissance photos taken on August 29, 1962, identified these as SA-2's the most recent Soviet air defense missiles. The SAM's were to provide an air defense for the missile sites and to discourage further reconnaissance by the United States.\textsuperscript{111} The increase in arms shipments was


\textsuperscript{110}Crane, op. cit., p. 534.

\textsuperscript{111}Horelick and Rush, op. cit., p. 143.
interpreted as a buildup of Cuban air defenses and the reports of missiles were considered to be sightings of the SAM's. On September 12, an intelligence report reached the United States which stated that Castro's pilot while drunk had been bragging of long-range missiles in Cuba. These reports were largely discounted by the intelligence community.

This flow of information directed at the United States was not evaluated as firm proof of the existence of offensive weapons. Throughout this period the U.S. continually published statements denying that there was evidence of offensive missiles. The evidence had to overcome the block in the minds of both intelligence experts and the decision-makers that the Soviets would not place missiles in Cuba. Possibly John McConie, the head of the CIA, was the only intelligence expert who speculated that the increase in conventional arms and the placement of SAM's might be both cover and protection for the introduction of offensive missiles. He was, however, on his honeymoon prior to the crisis and his views never reached President Kennedy.

The press, which was alarmed over the Cuban buildup, also noted these movements and considered them ominous. The press indicated that there was a gap between the belief of

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112 Hillsman, op. cit., p. 175.
113 Department of State Bulletin, April 16, 1962, pp. 644-646.
114 Sorensen, op. cit., p. 670.
intelligence officials in the field and those in Washington. One report from the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, said that "competent military authorities at this U.S. Naval base believe Washington is underplaying the Soviet buildup in Cuba—and are puzzled why."\textsuperscript{115} Also, appearing in the October 1, 1962 issue of \textit{U.S. News and World Report} was a letter that had been smuggled out of Havana.\textsuperscript{116} The events reported in this letter agreed with the facts that were later released on the Cuban buildup. The letter reported that starting with the second week in September some of the piers in Havana were blocked off from Cubans. An area in western Cuba between San José de las Tajus and Santiago de las Vegas was blocked to civilian traffic and that blasting and construction activity had been in progress for weeks.

The suddenness of the crisis led many to the belief that U.S. intelligence had failed. This reaction by the American public was also felt by the U.S. allies. James Reston reported on their reaction to the intelligence.

Privately, there were several misgivings. First, many people find it hard to believe that the offensive Soviet missile sites in Cuba suddenly mushroomed over the weekend, and accordingly, there is considerable suspicion either that the official intelligence was not so good as maintained, or the Administration withheld the facts.\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{116}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 48.
\textsuperscript{117}Horowitz, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 114.
The evidence points to an intelligence failure. The facts were known to the public and press and were reported widely. The intelligence failure was not a failure to obtain information but a failure to correctly evaluate it. One of the reasons for this failure was the belief that such actions would not be taken by the Russians. The evidence was not great enough to overcome their belief. Another reason was the distinction between hard and soft intelligence. These are terms used to classify types of intelligence information. This distinction is one of type and source of intelligence and it will be discussed in detail at the end of this chapter.

Many different sources and types of intelligence act as inputs on the decision-making process. The process of using this information is one of assimilation and evaluation. Robetta Wohlstetter has written an excellent analysis of the difficulties of intelligence in the Cuban crisis. The problem, as she sees it, was not one of obtaining information but one of picking the real clues, the signals, from the mass of irrelevant or inconsistent background information, the noise.\footnote{Wohlstetter, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 691.}

Refugee reports of missiles had been made for over a year; all were checked out and all proved false. The continued flow of these reports had the same effect as the boy crying wolf, \emph{wolf}; they began to lose their seriousness. Also, the refugee reports of general dissatisfaction with Castro
that came before the Bay of Pigs had proven false during the invasion. ¹¹⁹

There were other sources of intelligence available besides the refugee reports. There was the routine shipping intelligence of counting the number and types of ships en-route to Cuba. The Navy had air reconnaissance flights cover all shipping into and out of Cuba. Intelligence reports were also coming from trained agents in Cuba, however, there was a delay of between ten to fourteen days before this information reached Washington. The swiftest and most accurate source of intelligence were the U-2 photo reconnaissance missions flown over Cuba. ¹²⁰

In response to the arms buildup in Cuba, Kennedy doubled the number of U-2 flights over Cuba. Flights were conducted on the 5th, 17th, 26th, and 29th of September and on the 5th and 7th of October. These missions did not bring back evidence of the offensive missiles but these missions were not concerned with the area in western Cuba where the missiles were being erected. The mission on October 14, 1962 which discovered the sites were the first over that part of Cuba in over a month. ¹²¹ The mission September 5th had covered this area and discovered nothing. ¹²²

¹¹⁹Ibid., p. 669.
The positioning of SAM's in Cuba in early September created a hazard for the U-2's. On September 9, 1962, a Nationalist Chinese U-2 was shot down over Red China and President Kennedy did not want to lose one of ours over Cuba. Because of the SAM's and the weather, missions were not flown over the northwestern area of Cuba. Later intelligence showed that Soviet radar for the SAM's was not yet operational and they could not have detected the U-2's flying at an altitude of fourteen miles.

The U-2's provided the hard intelligence, the visual proof of the existence of the missiles. Hard intelligence is a body of data confirmed by photographic or electronic evidence or confirmed reports of trained personnel. Soft intelligence is the mass of unconfirmed and often contradictory reports that in the Cuban case usually came from refugee sources. Many of these reports later proved to be true; however it is doubtful if positive action may regularly be based on this type of information. Clear and undisputable intelligence was required, and this came in the form of the U-2 photographs. A gap existed between the decision-makers and the experts in interpreting that intelligence. Ex Comm had to rely solely on the experts interpretation of the photos. Robert Kennedy commented on the first view of evidence by Ex Comm.

123 Wohlstetter, op. cit., p. 697.
124 Hilsman, op. cit., p. 200.
I, for one, had to take their word for it. I examined the picture carefully, and what I saw appeared to be no more than the clearing of a field for a farm or the basement of a house. I was relieved to hear later that this was the same reaction of virtually everyone at the meeting, including President Kennedy.125

To the intelligence community the refugee reports were soft intelligence. These reports of missiles were made by untrained observers and were unsubstantiated by factual, hard proof. The arrival of the weapons shipments at Havana and Mariel in late July brought an increase in the refugee reports of missiles. These refugee reports did not reach U.S. intelligence until August 14, 1962. A U-2 flight was requested to attempt to obtain photographic proof for the reports. The mission was flown on the 29th of August, almost a month after the first reports. The photos showed no proof of offensive missiles. There was usually a lag of thirty days between the first reports from exiles, the soft intelligence, and the U-2 flights sent to confirm these reports, the hard intelligence.126 The intelligence experts found that most of the reports of offensive missiles, when checked out by U-2's or other sources, proved to be surface-to-air missiles.

The exiles were untrained observers. The mass of refugee reports proved to be false when checked. Reports of missiles had begun early in 1961, and as shown earlier it was not until August or September, 1962, that Russian offensive missiles

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125Kennedy, op. cit., p. 7.
were shipped to Cuba. The inability of the refugees to distinguish between offensive and defensive missiles led to further difficulty in evaluating their reports. While a few of these reports were later proved to be valid, they must be seen in the light of the mass of refugee reports. By their numbers alone these reports represented a vast amount of intelligence, but until confirmed, this soft intelligence was difficult to use as a basis for action. The following is an account given by one Cuban exile, Mr. Emilio Perea, an architectural engineer, who now resides in Dallas. There is no means available to evaluate his report and it is presented only as an example of the type of soft intelligence which the intelligence community received.

Mr. Perea was a member of the underground. The underground was large and mainly used to harass the Castro government and keep up the spirit of the people. It was patterned after the communist cell organization system. A man knew only the members of his own cell and the leaders knew only the leaders of two other cells. The biggest operation that Mr. Perea was aware of, was the burning of two warehouses in Havana and the constant burning of crops. Perea left Cuba in July, 1961, a year before the arms buildup was said to have begun. When he arrived in the United States, he was questioned by a man who said he was from the CIA. Perea gave the following report based on his own observations and the reports of others in the underground.
In late April or early May 1961, following the Bay of Pigs invasion, several dock areas were completely closed off. Truck cabs were brought to the dock area along with a large number of other vehicles. A special Russian ship arrived and was quickly unloaded at night. Large crates with their own trailers were unloaded and attached to the truck cabs to be hauled away.

In a valley near Managua, fifteen miles west of Havana, the Cubans had an army officer school. It was a large base extending into the hills surrounding the bay. Just prior to and after the arrival of the ship, tight security was established around the base. The hills were filled with huge caves that had been used for munitions storage. During this period many new radar sites were being built in the area.

Returning from a farm he owned in the hills, Mr. Perea passed a convoy of these trailers and other trucks headed toward Managua that was about ten miles long. He did not get a good look but estimated the trailers were thirty to forty feet long. He could not tell whether the personnel were Cubans or Russians.

Mr. Perea feels that the CIA did not trust the information from the exiles for two reasons. First, the CIA did not control the underground and so did not fully trust its

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127 A SAM is thirty feet in length and an IRBM about sixty feet in length. Hillsman, op. cit., p. 5.
reports, and second, Castro had infiltrated some cells of the underground and the CIA was afraid of being fed false information. Mr. Perea said that reports from recent Cuban exiles say that the offensive missiles have not been removed from Cuba. They have been hidden in the caves near the Managua army base and only the permanent sites have been destroyed. 128

The soft intelligence was not a reliable enough input to allow the decision-makers to take action. Hard and undisputable evidence was needed and this came in the form of the reconnaissance photos. Hard intelligence was to provide proof for U.S. charges and aided in gaining support for U.S. actions. Hard intelligence made it easier to define the specific crisis situation and plan a response. Intelligence was a vital input to the decision process. The intelligence not only had to be available, it had to be believed and trusted by the decision-makers. The more specific and concrete the intelligence and the more trustworth its source, the better equipped a decision-making body is to make a decision.

In justifying the blockade before the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson commented on the importance of hard intelligence information.

128 Interviews with Emilio Perea, engineer, Dallas, Texas on November 24, 1968, and May 23, 1969.
Even after the first hard intelligence reached Washington concerning the change in the Soviet military assistance to Cuba the President of the United States responded by directing an intensification of surveillance. And only after the facts and the magnitude of the build-up had been established beyond all doubt did we begin to take this limited action at barring only these nuclear weapons equipment and aircraft. 129

To say that there was an intelligence failure in the Cuban crisis is not entirely correct. Information on Soviet moves was available and the possibility of the establishment of ICBM's in Cuba had been considered. The predetermined attitude by the intelligence community toward the possibility of such moves by the Russians in all probability prevented the piecing together of the clues gained from soft intelligence sources into a pattern that would show the presence of the missiles. However, the reliance on hard intelligence provided for undisputable proof and aided in gaining support and defining the threat.

Stress

The intelligence inputs and the time restrictions focus on the decision-makers and place stress on them as individuals. As pointed out in the model, time and stress can act to cause irrational actions by the decision-makers. No way could be found in a review of the material on the Cuban crisis to measure the stress under which the members of Ex Comm acted.

Stress was undoubtedly present but to what degree would vary with each individual. The effect of stress on them is impossible to judge by reviewing these writings.

The crisis inputs of time, intelligence, and stress and their effect on individuals can be observed through the use of a simulation of the Cuban crisis. Though a simulation can not tell what pressures the actual decision-makers felt, it can aid in determining how others respond to the same inputs in a similar simulated situation. Chapter Four will describe the simulation used in the test and the results of several games.
CHAPTER IV

THE GAME

In an attempt to obtain a clearer view of the role of inputs in the decision-making process, a simulation of the Cuban missile crisis was developed. The simulated game called "Crisis: A Game of Decision-Making" was played on two occasions. The first was on the evenings of February 11, and February 12, 1969. The players were Air Force ROTC cadets and upper division government majors with a background in International Relations. The second game was on March 28, 1969, and used graduate students in government and senior history and government majors.

These two games were long runs involving three or more hours of time. Besides the two long runs, six short runs of the game were conducted in conjunction with class projects in the Government Department and the Department of Aerospace Studies. The short runs were used for educational purposes. All the information presented in this chapter is taken from the long runs which were controlled and designed for research purposes. Any information taken from the short runs will be identified as such.

1see Appendix I.
Simulation is one of the newer research tools being applied in the social sciences. Interest in simulation has grown along with the interest in game theory as a means of better understanding the behavior of men in various roles and situations. The Second World War and the Cold War have placed an emphasis on simulation as a means of identifying diplomatic and strategic strategies and it has been used extensively in this role by the military. Simulation has been defined as the operation of a model which is representative of a system and from studying the model, the behavior of the actual system is inferred. The model is, of course, less than a total representation of the details of the system. Certain details, interactions, or phenomenon are focused on in the model and the close observation of these in the model is then related to the operation of the entire system.

The first thought of using a simulation approach in this study came after reading Michael Banks' article on simulation in international relations. In this article he explained the simulation approach to the decision-making process at high levels of government. It is an intriguing thought that social scientists can gain some understanding

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3Michael H. Banks, "Gaming and Simulation in International Relations," Political Studies, XVI (February, 1968).
of the decision-making process of national leaders by observing how others, playing their roles, react in similar simulated situations.

Simulation has three main uses. The first is educational in which simulation is used as a teaching aid. The second is as an aid to policymakers, and in this role it has been used extensively by both the State Department and the military. The third way is in research or theory development. In the first two roles simulation's successes and values are well known. It is the area of research that the usefulness of simulation has been questioned. Simulation holds great promise as a research tool by "allowing the researcher to handle a large number of variables and complex relationships." The growing use of simulation in the social sciences is helping to make simulation a more acceptable research tool. It is neither the purpose nor the desire of this thesis to present a detailed account of the values of simulation. For the purposes of this chapter it is assumed that simulation can be a valid and valuable means of observing interactions in complex systems. The following is a brief description of how the game was set up and played.

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5Ibid., p. 169.
This simulation was structured following an outline presented by Richard Brody. There are three types of simulation, the machine or computer simulation, the mixed man-machine simulation, and the all-man role playing simulation. It was the latter, the role playing simulation, that was adopted for the study of this proposed model. The model proposed and developed in this study is admittedly a simplification of reality, but then, that is the purpose of a model—to bring a simplification and better understanding of the actual system. In the same manner, the model of the Cuban crisis used for this simulation not only simplifies the actual crisis details but also totally removes from consideration many political, economic and social variables that faced the actual decision-makers. The object of this game was to place the players in loosely structured roles within the context of a particular crisis situation. The game was structured so that the inputs focusing on the simulated decision-makers would be those inputs we have so far examined in this decision-making model. In particular, the game was to focus on the crisis inputs of intelligence, time, and stress.

The game was built around two teams, an American and a Russian group of decision-makers. The game director was to

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represent nature as well as all other nations or international organizations, and he was to be the one who determined the feasibility of all actions and decisions. By limiting the number of teams and players, it was hoped to make the game easier to control and also to allow the results to be more easily examined. The game director held the controlling influence in the game and he could manipulate the input variables, particularly those of intelligence and time, as he felt necessary. Though the game director held complete power over the game, provisions were made to allow the participants to challenge the game director when they felt his decisions were in error.\(^7\) The participants were also told, both in the game rules and in the pre-game briefing, that only those actions which were "grossly unfeasible or out of character" would be disallowed. For analysis purposes, the concern was not so much with what actions were taken but with what relationship the actions had to the inputs as presented in the scenario and crisis input sheets.

There were three sources of information for the teams. The scenario gave a general background of world conditions and provided some specific information relating to the United States team. The scenario was written in terms of what the American team should know in order to play the game. Though

\(^7\)Brody suggested that this be part of the game rules in order to allow the players greater freedom of action.
largely based on the reality of the conditions in the world in October, 1962, it could of course only present a small part of the total inputs. Since the game was being played in 1969, two specific things were mentioned, the fact that the violence in the cities had not yet occurred and that there was no large scale American involvement in Southeast Asia. It was felt that if these points were not clearly made, their influence might over-ride the variables the game director was attempting to control. Though the scenario was written for the American team, a copy was given to the Russian players so that they might understand the general setting in which they were playing. The scenario was very general and presented only a few of the input variables of tradition, domestic political positions, and general world conditions.

The major variables to be examined were the crisis inputs, and these were given by the crisis input sheet and in the form of intelligence from the game director.

Separate crisis input sheets were given to each team. In the pre-game briefing it was emphasized that these sheets were different. This was done so that each team might feel that the other team held vital information which they did not have, and that they would be operating from a position of incomplete information. In actuality, the two sheets were almost identical but neither team knew this. The crisis input sheets provided specific information as to events leading
up to the crisis. The sheets also suggested that goals be established before actions were taken and that only the most unfeasible actions would be disallowed. The sheets pertaining to the rules, background and role playing were given to the participants several days before the game was to be played so they could become familiar with these and save valuable game time in explanations. The crisis input sheets were withheld until the start of the game for two reasons. First, and most important, in attempting to simulate an actual crisis situation, it was felt that the presentation of the sheet at the opening of the game would put more realistic inputs on the participants. None of the other sheets detailed what exact crisis or conditions would face the decision-makers. By following this procedure no prior thought could be focused on the particular crisis and the game director would be able to observe the entire decision-making process. Also, it was felt that this procedure would put more realistic inputs of stress, time, and intelligence upon the players. Second, by withholding the sheets the players could not research the actual crisis and would hopefully be freer to think of their own solutions to the problems. The result of the game would be examined in terms of the players reactions to the inputs. More reliable results could be obtained if they were acting in a manner they felt was an adequate response to the situation rather than as they knew
the real decision-makers had acted. A further means of checking this tendency was the game director’s ability to change the situation at will by inputs of intelligence. He could force them away from a total reliance on knowledge of what actually happened. In studying the results of the test and the game, it can be seen that teams initially began to plan responses in terms of what they knew to actually have occurred. The initial moves were not decision-making but rather the application of what was known to have occurred. However, it soon became apparent to each team that the slight variation from reality presented by the crisis input sheets and intelligence information made it essential that they seek their own goals and solutions. Because they were forced to be on their own and were faced with finding their own solutions, the inputs of time and stress could assume more realistic proportions to the players. The players usually kept their actions and criteria close to those that developed in the actual crisis, but the difference between the game scenario and the reality of the Cuban crisis placed realistic inputs on the teams.

The third source of information for the team was intelligence information either requested by the teams or given out by the game director without prior requests. The rules pointed out that this information did not have to be reliable. Each team was told it was free to feed the other team
false information, or lie in their communications. In this way, each team was faced with the problem of analyzing and evaluating the intelligence they received. The rules stated that intelligence requests had to be written; however, the game director found this was too time-consuming for himself and the team. To solve this problem, the game director informed each team that it could orally request intelligence and that it would receive an oral reply. The game director noted each request and reply on paper so that a record would be kept. The information requested by the teams pointed to what types of specific knowledge they required in order to make decisions. Unrequested information given out by the game director was used both to control the game inputs and to give one team knowledge of another team's action decisions when in the game director's opinion such action would normally have been discovered by the other nation.

Communications between the teams and all actions and decisions were to be written. In this way a written record was easily kept of the game. The results to be examined were the relationships between the inputs and these communications and decisions. These communications and decisions also created new inputs for the team to which they were directed. To compare these relationships the game director kept a sheet for each team noting the time of each decision or communication and the discussion that led to the action.
The short runs, because of the limited time available, required that the interaction communications be written. Two of the short runs made use of continuous communication through the use of transceivers. This provided instantaneous communication and allowed the game director to monitor all communications. This system proved very effective for the short-run games.

The game was designed and run to gain information about the crisis inputs. The relationship of these inputs to the general model has already been discussed. The crisis game was designed to place stress on the participants. The stress was a result of the nature of the threat and would vary with perception by the individual team members and with the time available for decisions. Information about goals and perception during the crisis were obtained by having each participant fill out a post game review questionnaire and also by direct observation of their decisions and actions. Stress could also be observed in the outward physical signs of tension, nervous actions and impatience. Besides stress from the nature of the crisis, stress would also be a function of the time available for making decisions.

8 see Appendix II.

9 Margaret G. Hermann, "Testing a Model of Psychological Stress," Journal of Personality, Vol 34 (September, 1966), 381-396. This article reviews the effects of stress on participants in a simulation exercise.
Game time was controlled by starting each team off on day one, the day the United States discovered the missiles in Cuba, and advancing the days as the game progressed. No fixed period of real time equaled a day of game time. To test for stress produced by a lack of time for decision, the game director advanced the days at his own discretion. Generally the director tried to imagine how much activity could be undertaken in one day and advance the days in a realistic fashion. In determining this, the game director used the actual time length for taking actions in the real Cuban Missile Crisis as the basis for his decisions. Also, to test time in its relation to stress and the nature of the crisis, the game director could vary the time limits for the decision process in relation to the crisis points in the game. For example, through intelligence information the game director could say that vital supplies for the missiles were on Russian ships which would arrive in Cuba on the eighth day. In the context of a crisis where the missiles would be operational at the end of the fourteenth day, this gave another crisis time point in the game. The game director could then advance the days in order to observe any increase in stress as decisional time shortened. The short run games reduced the time by making the missiles operational on day seven. In this way the crisis point could be reached within the shorter time period available.
The flow of intelligence was controlled by the game director. The teams were operating under conditions of incomplete information. The lack of knowledge about the motives and actions of the other team contributed to stress within the team. The game director closely observed the type of information that was desired by the teams and how the obtaining or denying of that information influenced decisions and the degree of observable stress.

The crisis inputs of intelligence, time and stress, as defined, have a direct effect on the decision-making process. They may lead to an increased tendency for emotional rather than rational decision-making. Richard Fagen, in his analysis of the Cuban crisis, states that most decisions are a mixture of both rational and emotional processes.10 Fagen hypothesizes that the emotional content of decision-making produces a felt need within the decision-makers to take an action that can be impulsive or reactive in a crisis situation.

Such a reaction was observed in the game, particularly as decisional time decreased or a crisis point was reached. If this hypothesis is correct, then as a crisis point approaches and decisional time decreases, one should be able to observe both outward physical signs of stress and also a tendency to want to do something in the form of actions and communications.

The simulation was designed to show the decision-making process and the effect of the crisis inputs on that process. The game director could directly control the inputs of time and intelligence and indirectly the degree of stress. The observations of the game director and the post game review would examine the role and degree these inputs played in the decision-making process.

The first step, before discussing the results of the simulation, is to examine the teams' roles and the participants' perception and definition of the crisis. The way they originally define the crisis and issues at stake will effect their perception of the inputs. This has been discussed both in the model and in the examination of the actual crisis. Though the game itself attempts to define the crisis in the crisis input sheet, each team could, and did, view the crisis and the major issues differently than did the game director.

None of the actors in either long run, showed outward signs that he felt this type of role playing was silly. All the participants were volunteers and they easily seemed to adapt themselves to their individual roles and also to the team roles as decision-makers. Each team became emotionally involved in the game and its outcome. The teams adopted different internal means of reaching decisions. The President of the U.S. team in the first run was a more forceful leader and assumed a domineering role. The premier of the Soviet
team in the first run saw his position as a mediator of ideas and discussion leader, as a result the Russian team was more decentralized. Each member of the Russian team wrote communications and action decisions in the area he was concerned with. These were then given to the team leader and were held for release until the team felt the situation called for them. There was a much freer and wider range of ideas exchanged on the Russian team than on the American team. The domineering role of the U.S. team leader tended to shut off discussions or ideas coming from his advisors. Early in the game this situation prevented the American team from functioning as a unit. The assumption of this role by the U.S. team leader hurt the efficiency and decisional ability of the American team. The problem was not that he completely dominated the team but that he perceived the crisis and the goals the U.S. team should strive for in totally different terms than the other members.

For a group of decision-makers to work jointly to decide actions, it is imperative that they agree on what problem they are dealing with. Once the crisis situation became apparent to the Russian team, their first action was to discuss the nature of the crisis and what goals they should work to achieve. Once they had clearly defined their goals, they had some common basis for deciding what actions should be taken. The Russian team agreed upon a flexible goal: to keep
the missiles in Cuba and or to remove U.S. missiles from Turkey. The American team did not discuss what their common goals should be. The post-game review indicated that each member of the American team defined the crisis differently. The crisis input sheet placed emphasis on the buildup of missile sites in Cuba and it was expected that the actors would see this as a primary issue. The American team leader did not identify the major issue as the removal of those missiles. He saw the Soviet ships approaching Cuba as the primary factor. His advisors all felt the missiles were not the central issue. The failure to reach a common agreement on the nature of the crisis prevented the American team from working together to meet the crisis. The dominant role of the President made his view the representative one for the American team.

The second long run used graduate students and seniors as participants. These participants had a more sophisticated and detailed knowledge of international relations, but for the most part the two runs were similar. The Russian team, in the second run organized themselves very thoroughly and made up a list of goals, proposed actions, and expected American actions. Once this was done, they had only to pick the most appropriate of the pre-planned responses. Only when communications broke down toward the end of the game did the Russian team face any serious decisional and organizational problems. The American team was less structured
and had greater freedom of discussion and debate. Its original decision to establish a blockade was more a copy of known actions than decision-making. But the continuing decisions following that major decision presented real challenge to the team. All the teams in both runs took their roles seriously and indicated from their comments that they felt very real physical and psychological pressures. In the second run the successful organization and agreement upon the goals by both sides made the perception of the crisis clearer and decisions easier to make.

The way in which the participants initially perceived the crisis was a major factor in determining what decisions were reached. The input variables, particularly the crisis inputs, were controlled by the game director through the game sheets and through intelligence information given out during the game. One variable, which could not be fully controlled by the game director, was the inter-nation communication. These communications became inputs to the game. Leaving content aside, the volume and means of these communications had a direct effect on the teams' decision process, particularly on the American team. Two forms of communications were predominantly used, the press release and a direct communication between the teams. The press releases were used mainly for propaganda. The Russian teams in both runs relied heavily on this and cited world public opinion as a major influencing factor on their actions. Question nine of the post-
game review asked the participants to rank thirteen inputs in order of importance. The Russian teams considered world public opinion to be one of the most important influencing factors. As each of the two crisis points approached, the Russian teams gave out a number of these propaganda releases aimed at embarrassing the United States. The volume of these releases directed at the U.S. teams forced the United States to give up valuable decision-making time to reply to them. It is interesting to note that while the U.S. team did not consider these propaganda statements as important factors in influencing their decisions, they did consider it necessary to reply to them, even before making very serious action decisions about the crisis. This was especially true in the first run. In the second run the U.S. team replied to all the propaganda charges but only after the more important action decisions had been made. The volume of these releases by the Russians took time away from decision-making by the United States, though the need to reply was itself a decision. This propaganda demand increased the observable stress of the U.S. teams but was more pronounced in the first run.

The other form of communication was the direct communication between teams. The notes intended for the opposite decision-makers were aimed at stating or clarifying positions. The teams experienced a difficulty in determining to what extent these messages represented the true position of the other team and to what extent they were propaganda or bluff.
The only significant role that this form of communication seemed to play was in opening the door for negotiations. The first game was stopped before the negotiations could be carried out to the point of settlement. The second game was longer and reached the negotiation stage; however, time requirements did not allow the negotiations to be completed. Each team's perception of the crisis seemed to be the most important influencing factor on negotiations. Initially each team in the first run perceived the crisis differently; the Russians were willing to trade their Cuban missiles for removal of United States missiles from Turkey. The U.S. President focused his attention on the ships approaching Cuba and he was willing to trade the U.S. missiles in Turkey for the return of the ships to Russia. A tentative agreement was reached on this basis. At this point both the Russian team and the American President felt they had achieved their goals, and the Russians were elated because they still had their missiles in Cuba. Only when this first crisis point had passed did the President become fully aware of the significance of the missiles. At this point the time for the game ran out. The actions and communications of the Russian team were built around goals focused on the primary crisis point, the missiles in Cuba. The Americans, through the mistaken perception of the crisis, by the team leader, took a short-range view and focused on the first crisis point and took no action about the
missiles, the primary threat. In the early stages of the game this misperception produced organizational conflict within the American team.

In the second run the Russian goals were flexible. They sought to keep the missiles in Cuba but were willing to trade their removal for the removal of American missiles from Turkey. The Russian team also expressed a strong desire to avoid war. The American team in the second run did not have the internal conflict of perception and definition that the first run had. Their primary goal was the removal of the missiles from Cuba. The Russian ships approaching Cuba presented another crisis point, but the second U.S. Team did not allow this issue to overshadow the missiles. Better team organization and a more detailed discussion of the nature of the crisis was one way in which the second team avoided the definitional problems encountered by the first. Also, no personality conflicts developed, and the president saw that everyone had a chance to present his views.

Perception of the inputs and the definition of the crisis are key factors in determining for the decision-makers what their decisional outputs will be. The primary crisis issue in the simulation was the presence of the Russian missiles in Cuba. There were three reasons for the first American team's misperception of the crisis. First, the American players failed to organize their team
and failed to define their issues and goals before acting. The failure to define long range goals, in terms of the missiles, made the first crisis point in the game seem more important than it would have if it had been seen the context of the entire crisis situation. Second, the first crisis point was the easier of the two situations to deal with. The ships were still enroute to Cuba; negotiations and preparations could be made without a direct confrontation. However, in the simulation the U.S. team did not connect the settlement of the problem of the ships with the primary issue. Third, the game director placed attention on the ships by indicating through intelligence that the ships were thought to be carrying nuclear warheads to Cuba. This was done to see if stress and a reaction to that stress could be produced. Noticeable stress was created. Tension, in the form of pacing and nervous actions such as tapping the desks with their fingers, was very noticeable. Also, this nervous action was not present before the input of this information or at the later stages of the game. Fagen hypothesized that such stress would cause a need to take some form of action. This seemed

11President Kennedy liked the idea of a blockade because it was action short of war and in the context of the crisis it allowed more forceful action to be taken later. Sorensen, *Kennedy*, p. 693. By placing attention on the ships, the U.S. in the simulation was creating a second, less severe, more manageable, crisis point. A solution to this problem may make a solution to primary problems easier by solving more easily settled problems first.
to prove true in the simulation. More communications and action decisions were produced in the fifteen minute period following the input of this information than at any other time in the game. The stress did not produce dysfunctional or irrational responses, in terms of wild, non-calculated actions. It was at this point that the Americans sought negotiations. This action by the game director may have actually made the issue of the ships seem to be the more important of the two crisis points. However, in the post game review only the player representing the American president indicated that the issue of the ships was the central issue for the crisis. The results indicated that it was his short range view in combination with the stress inputs that produced the misperception of the crisis.

In the second game, the game director did not indicate that the ships were carrying nuclear warheads, only important military cargos. Stress on the American team was not as noticeable in the second run. However, the same communications pattern was noted; as the crisis point approached the volume of communications increased significantly. The need to take action was present but much more controlled and with little outward sign of stress as shown in the first run. One possible explanation for this was the team's organization and higher level of sophistication in the second run. The Russian team showed little outward emotion or stress until
the communications broke down in the negotiation stage. After the Soviet premier decided to concede a point to the Americans, he was informed by his negotiators that the action gave the United States new hope and that the United States immediately withdrew a concession they had previously offered. At that point the Soviet premier, a graduate student in government, showed the real pressures that the simulation built up, and he almost put his fist through the blackboard. The players in both runs felt the tensions and stresses of the crisis. This was observable in their actions and communications patterns and was also expressed in the post game review.

In the post-game review the participants were asked to rank thirteen inputs in order of importance. The results indicate the perception each team held of the nature of the crisis and the priority of issues as they saw them. These rankings also indicated their opinion of which inputs had the greatest effect on their decision-making process.

The numbers in parenthesis in the rankings below are average rankings of all United States team members for that run. Some inputs are excluded because they were not ranked by the players.
The U.S. teams strongly emphasized the importance of the crisis inputs of time and intelligence and direct communications as influencing factors on their decisions. In the post-game review all the participants on the first American team said that they felt they were under stress, and all but two on the second team felt likewise. They indicated in the post-game review that the time limitations were the major source of stress. It is possible that the role of direct communications increased through the written procedure.
This was a crisis situation for the Russians, but a crisis of a different nature. The Russians had flexible goals. Any gain in either keeping the missiles in Cuba or forcing a United States withdrawal from Turkey would be a positive gain. A key input for the Russians was the demands of public opinion, the necessity of backing down from their primary goal gracefully and in doing so, force the United States into making concessions. The Russian team also claimed to feel the importance of the physical location of Cuba. This gave the United States a stronger tactical position. Each side faced a different crisis, due to differences in perception and goals, and thus, different inputs assumed dominant roles in each team's decision process.

The simulation cannot tell us much about the actual Cuban crisis; it was neither designed nor meant to do that. It can provide insights in viewing the relationships between the variables of time, intelligence, and stress and their influence on the decisional process. Time and stress can lead to dysfunctionality in the decisional process though it did not appear to do so in either the Cuban crisis or in the simulated runs. Yet, time and stress did have an observable influence on the actions of the participants as shown by their communications patterns in this simulation. The organization of the decision-making body and the care that is
given discussion and definition of the crisis will greatly influence the ability of the group to react to the crisis.

This was a crude simulation, and one based on a real situation. Because of its basis in reality, the participants were influenced by what they knew of the histories, traditions and positions of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. For the purposes of this model, this is good because it places the inputs of tradition and previous positions on the teams. For a view of the actual decision-making process, it had a drawback in that the players tended to copy action they knew to have taken place rather than search for their own solutions. While this simulation served its purpose, a more detailed study of crisis through the use of simulation should involve a completely hypothetical situation with teams from hypothetical nations. In this way, the researcher could create and control all of the game inputs. Game theory in general and simulation in particular hold great promise as effective research tools.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

It has been the purpose of this thesis to examine some of the inputs into a crisis decision-making system. The drawing of any hard, firm conclusions from the preceding work would be premature. The research report here concerns but a section of a crisis decision-making system—the inputs. Even this small section could not be examined fully because there exists an endless number of inputs to any decisional situation. The idea that such a system, indeed, exists still lies in the realm of theory. The work presented here can neither confirm nor deny the existence of such a system; however, the basis for this work lies in the assumption that such a system does exist. This assumption is formed from a confidence in the methods of the behavioral sciences and acceptance of the idea that the more we learn about actions of men as a social being the more we will be able to understand the basis for his actions and decisions. This thesis examined one potential avenue for understanding the effect of certain inputs on the decision-making body faced with a foreign policy crisis.

Though the work here does not warrant the drawing of conclusions, it does lend weight in support of a number of
previously drawn hypotheses. In the second chapter a possible decision-making model was presented and discussed. The model was drawn from the theoretical and research work of many individuals. The decision-making effort begun by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin has been continued and expanded by a great many others. New methods involving tools developed by other social science disciplines offer hope that proof for such a system can be obtained and that it can be adequately described and studied.

The model traced out some of the relationships between inputs and the decisional process. The examination of the Cuban crisis shows the role of these inputs in a particular case. The simulation allowed certain input variables to be isolated and examined under conditions of some control. Looking at these three elements together certain indications of the role and importance of inputs can be gained.

Tradition sets a stage upon which the decision-makers carry out their roles. It sets the limits in which the decision-makers must act. The boundaries set by tradition may be crossed but only at high costs in the form of supports. In the case of the Cuban crisis, Pearl Harbor, and America's tradition of not attacking first set serious limits on Ex Comm in considering military alternatives. Each nation presents a mental image of itself and its neighbors. It sees itself in a certain role and attempts to project the
image of that role to others through its actions and statements. Once having adopted a role, a nation acts as if it must attempt to live within the structure of that role. In this way, tradition acts as both a demand and a support in a foreign policy decision-making situation. In the same way the previous statements and actions of a nation in the international sector become inputs to a crisis situation. It is by these statements that an opponent judges what actions or responses he might take.

Of all the inputs discussed, the most determinant appear to be the crisis inputs of time, intelligence and stress. Indeed, it is the element of time and the nature of the crisis that distinguish a crisis from normal decision situations. As decisional time shortens, the chances of dysfunctional or irrational action increases. Fagen's hypothesis seemed to be affirmed by the simulation runs described herein. As decisional time shortened the flow of communication and action forms increased markedly. To some extent, time in a crisis situation can be controlled by the decision-makers. In the Cuban crisis the missiles would be operational about eight days after their presence had been discovered. Ex Comm had a fixed time period in which to act. Yet, depending on their action they could control the amount of time available. A sudden attack would remove all further decisional time or options. A blockage had the advantage of stalling the
confrontation out over a longer period of time and allowing for better control of both the situation and negotiations.

Stress is the psychological and physical reaction to the crisis situation. In the simulation runs most all players on the American teams responded that they felt stress. Physical indications of this stress were apparent in several of the players. Stress can become a disruptive force in the decision process; however, it may also be considered as a stimulant that can be of value in some crisis situations.

Intelligence is the available factual data about the crisis situation. Intelligence is differentiated from raw information by the fact that it has been analyzed and evaluated before being presented to the decision-makers. The decision-makers have to determine the reliability of the evaluations. The greater the amount of intelligence and the clearer it presents the situation the easier it is for a decision-making group to define a crisis in common terms. The key is that the decision-makers must have faith in the information they receive. Hard intelligence information makes decision-making much easier by providing visual or undisputable proof. The complicated intelligence problems surrounding the Cuban crisis point dramatically to the value of hard intelligence as a decisional input.

Though not solely concerned with the decisional stage, the speed and reliability of inter-nation communications can
greatly help in defining the crisis, judging the motives and anticipating responses of your opponents, and negotiating a settlement. This proved to be a major lesson of the Cuban crisis, where the communication failure led to the establishment of the Washington-Moscow hot line. Two of the short run simulations made use of transceivers for instantaneous communication between the teams. The rapid communications aided the teams in reaching quicker decisions and allowed each side to get better feel of the other's motives and desires. Much remains to be learned about crisis decision-making. While this thesis and the research connected with it have provided no concrete answers, it has surveyed avenues in research methodology that may lead to such answers.

Man is a complicated animal, but his behavior can be studied and answers as to why and how man does things may be discovered. The discovery will not be the isolated achievement of one branch of the social sciences but rather the collective success and effort of all. While this limited project does not provide answers, it may be considered successful to the extent it asks needed questions and begins to look for paths for finding their answers. With the growing power of modern weapons, nations can no longer afford to enter crisis that put those weapons on a hair trigger. Finding solutions to these crisis, or better yet understanding them and finding means of avoiding them are searches well worth the time and effort.
APPENDIX I

CRISIS: A GAME OF DECISION-MAKING
CRISIS: A Game of Decision-Making

1. PARTICIPANT:
   U.S. Team
   1. Sec. of Defense
   2. Sec. of State
   3. Attorney General
   4. Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff
   5. Director of CIA
   6. Presidential Advisor

   USSR Team
   1. Minister of Defense
   2. Minister of State
   3. Minister of Information
   4. General of the Army
   5. Chief of Intelligence

2. TIME:
   The game will be played in a limited (fixed) time period as explained by the game director. One (1) hour of actual time spent playing the game may equal many hours of game time. You may in 3 hours simulate 2 or 3 weeks of activity in the real world. Remember as you play the game that you are working within a fixed time limit for the game.

3. INFORMATION:
   A scenario will provide all relevant background information and participant sheets will provide needed role information. Any further information desired, in the form of intelligence, or clarification, can be asked of the game director through proper communication channels after the start of the game.

4. COMMUNICATIONS:
   All intergroup communications must be written (eg., between US-USSR, US-Game Director). Discussion within the team will be done orally. Ultimate decisions as to actions rests with the President (Premier) his word is final but any other team members may present a minority report (written) to be submitted along with the decision to the game director. Decisions will be written following a prescribed format, and must be signed by the President or Premier. Your method of communication must be specified (see example) and be submitted to the game director. A word of warning, information that you receive during the course of the game may or may not be correct. All communications between groups will go through the game director.

5. GAME DIRECTOR:
   The game director has absolute power over the game. He will determine the feasibility of all actions, and
decisions and he will determine the outcome of any conflicts. He may introduce factors of natural occurrence (e.g., death of a team member, weather information, changes in world opinion) at his discretion.

6. PURPOSE:
   The purpose of this exercise is not to win or lose but to gain a better knowledge of decision-making and to educate the participants as to the problems that can be encountered. A winner or a draw may be declared by the game director on the basis of established goals. It is hoped that the participants can gain a fuller understanding of the strategies and difficulties involved in all decision-making situations.
GAME RULES

Teams will be observed during the game. Observers are to be ignored and nothing said by them is to be taken into account. The game may be ended before the time limit if the game director determines that either the crisis situation has been solved or the world destroyed. The game director may stop play at any time to conduct debriefings. A debriefing will allow him to determine what your strategies are: no strategies, actions, or conduct are ruled out for your possible decisions but the game director may rule out unfeasible actions.

You are free to use any means, to make any decision or conduct any operation that you feel is required. The game director can challenge the feasibility of your actions and accept or reject them. His word is final, but you may request a debriefing (stop the game) to explain your decisions or moves, if you feel he has made an error. His decision after this stage cannot be disputed.

All the communications directed at other nations or international organizations must be written following the communications format. There are only two teams, US and USSR. All communications between the two teams must go through the game director. Your written communications will be given to the other team. As in real life, the information you want conveyed may be distorted or may be misunderstood by the other team; likewise, you may deliberately give the other team false information — you are free to lie as in a real life situation. The game director will represent all other nations and world organizations. He may, at any time, introduce their influence into the situation. (eg. world opinion, UN, OAS, Action of Allies.)

You are free to decide what military, economic, political, or diplomatic resources that you have, and you may use your mythical forces in any way that you want. Your only limitation is that it must be a rational, feasible action within the time of the crisis; the game director will decide what is rational. For example, you could not in 1969 airlift an army division to the moon, but you could airlift forces to Europe, you could call for UN meetings, or you could have talks with your allies, or enemies. You are free to take any actions that you think are realistic. All action decisions, communications with other nations, or requests for intelligence, must be written according to the following format.
COMMUNICATION FORMS

ACTION-DECISION FORMS:

1. To: eg. USAF
2. From: eg. USA
3. Action: eg. Bomb Moscow
4. Goals of Action: eg. World Conquest

Signature of President (Premier)
Signature of Game Director.

Before approving, the game director may orally question the President to see if his means is feasible. He can not make you change your goals but he can forbid an action if it is unfeasible or grossly out of character. The game director may offer advice; advice does not have to be followed.

COMMUNICATION FORMS:

You may wish to communicate with the USSR (USA), other nations, or international organizations. These will be written according to the following forms and presented to the game director.

1. To: eg. USSR
2. From: eg. USA
3. Message: eg. We love you

(Leave space so (4) can be detached)

4. Purpose: eg. To get the USSR to think we love them while B-52's bomb Moscow

Your message will be delivered by the game director to the other team. The game director can give no further explanation of what the message means. If it is not clearly understood by the other team, it will be the fault of the message.
INTELLIGENCE FORMS:

Requests for further game information or crisis intelligence can be directed at the game director. For the clarification of Game Rules or procedures, write your questions down and give them to the game director. (No special form is required) If you wish further intelligence information, you may request it from the game director using the special following form.

1. Information Requested By: eg. USSR
2. Information Desired: eg. US Troop strength in Germany
3. Reason you need Intelligence: eg. To take action

WARNING: The intelligence you receive may or may not be reliable. The reliability depends on the game director's analysis of whether your means would be able to obtain the desired information.
SCENARIO

U.S.: It is a congressional election year. The Democrats control the Congress and we have a Democratic Administration. The Republicans are attacking the Administration strongly, particularly on its stand on Communism and its spread in the Western Hemisphere. It was a Democratic Administration that failed in the Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba and now Cuba is a major disruptive force in our hemisphere. The Republicans strongest attacks in this election year are the Administration's foreign policy. The U.S. is not involved in an Asian war at this time, though it seems pressures in this region are again rising. There has been some easing of tensions between U.S. and USSR, and the Administration would like to see this continue. In the U.S. the civil rights movement is applying greater pressure on the Administration and Congress, but the cities have been quiet.

In Europe, our NATO alliance is beginning to show signs of breaking up and talks are under way to determine ways to strengthen it. Berlin is quiet, but Intelligence feels that the Russians may be building up to some new action, possible closing off access to Berlin.

The relative military strengths of the US and USSR are equal. The US has a small nuclear lead particularly in the ICBM's and ICBM's in Europe and Turkey, and the Russians have a much larger conventional force. Recently, the President asked for and received authority from Congress to call up 150,000 reservists if needed at some future time. Congress passes a Joint Resolution saying the US would use force of arms, if necessary to prevent further extension of Cuban communism in this hemisphere. Russia replied that an attack on Cuba would mean nuclear war. A National Intelligence Estimate by the CIA said that the introduction of offensive weapons to Cuba was unlikely because the Russians would fear our response; however, there are unconfirmed reports that a large Soviet arms buildup exists in Cuba.

The crisis situation will be based on this background. More precise information will be given with a crisis input sheet. Either team may request further intelligence information during the course of the game.
The President:

You will play the role of the President of the United States. The other six (6) members of the team are your most trusted advisors.

You will determine how your team is to function and how it will arrive at decisions. In the end you are wholly responsible for all actions and decisions. History will judge you and not your advisors by the outcome.

You will be presented with a crisis situation which will require swift analysis and action on a particular problem. There is no best answer in solving this problem. Act as you feel the President would act in a similar situation.

Advisors:

You are advisors to the President. It is not necessary to know a great deal about the individual role you are playing although you may find some general background information useful. Give the President the best possible advise you can. There is a great number of possible actions that can be taken in the face of this crisis. Analyze all the alternatives and advise the President to take those actions you feel are best.

GOOD LUCK.
Your team is much less structured and controlled than the American team. The same general rules apply to you. The American team will be reacting to some crisis situation that you have caused. Your actions were deliberate and planned. The crisis is based on a real life situation.

(THESS IS CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. KNOWLEDGE THAT IT IS A REAL LIFE SITUATION WILL AID THE AMERICAN TEAM. DO NOT DISCLOSE THE CONTENTS OF THIS SHEET TO THEM.)

You are not tied to what happened in real life and like the American team, you may take any actions that you feel are appropriate to the situation. Once you have been informed that nature of the crisis, determine your goals and take actions that you feel are necessary. Remember the game director can disallow unrealistic actions.

Premier:

You are the head of the Soviet team. Responsibility for its actions rest on your shoulders. Act as you feel the Soviet Premier would act in a similar situation.

Advisors:

You are the Premier's closest advisors. Help him determine which actions are best to achieve your goals. Act as you feel Russian advisors would act.

Anything goes.............Be realistic.

GOOD LUCK.
Day 1 minus 200: Raul Castro visits Moscow. US Intelligence notes an increase flow of Soviet supplies and technicans into Cuba.

Day 1 minus 30: A National Intelligence Estimate says there is little chance that the Soviets will introduce offensive weapons into Cuba.

Day 1 minus 29: The Soviet Premier tells an American poet visiting Moscow that he feels modern American liberals will never fight; if pushed they will go no farther than appealing to the UN.

Day 1 minus 25: Senator X attacks the Administration for showing weakness in the face of a Soviet arms buildup in Cuba. He says his informants tell him that offensive missiles are being introduced into Cuba.

Day 1 minus 20: Joint Congressional Resolution on Cuba.

Day 1 minus 4: The President orders photo reconnaissance of Cuba.

Day 1 minus 1: The photo mission shows 6 ICBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) sites under construction in Cuba. Intelligence estimates it will be 12 to 14 days before they can become operational. Their range can allow them to hit most vital targets (including large cities) in North and South America. There are also reports of MIG-21's and Russian bombers on Cuban air fields.

Day 1 minus 0: The Game Begins.

(The USSR HAS NOT BEEN GIVEN A COPY OF THIS CRISIS INPUT SHEET)

The President is informed of the crisis. Many Soviet ships are reported on the way to Cuba with hatches large enough to accommodate missiles. The Russians do not know that you have discovered the missiles. Only your actions or statements will let them know.

You are the decision-makers. Your decisions and actions along with those of the Russians will determine the course of events. All possible actions from doing nothing to nuclear war are open to you. Put yourself into the role you are playing; act as you feel your man would act in this situation.

Suggestion: You might wish to determine your goals and alternatives before taking action. Keep in mind the rest of the world and their relation to US. Also, remember the time limits for the game. BE REALISTIC.
Day 1 minus 200: Raul Castro visits Moscow. Russia begins shipments of weapons and technicians to Cuba, including IRBM's (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles).

Day 1 minus 30: The Soviet Premier tells an American poet visiting in Moscow that he feels the US liberals would never fight; if pushed they would go no further than appealing to the UN. The US has not yet discovered the construction of the missile sites.

Day 1 minus 25: The US press reports that American Senator X has attacked the Administration for allowing Soviet arms buildup in Cuba. He said his informants tell of offensive missiles that are being introduced to Cuba.

Day 1 minus 20: The US Congress passes a Joint Resolution on Cuba. (see scenario)

Day 1 minus 1: Reports reach Moscow of an American photo reconnaissance flight over Cuba. It is two weeks until the IRBM's can become operational.

Day 1 minus 0: The Game Begins.

Several Soviet ships are enroute to Cuba with more missiles in their holds. They have extremely large hatches to accommodate the missiles. Americans are going to discover your actions and take some action in response. You will have to react to their actions in accordance with the goals you establish.

You are the decision-makers. Your decisions and actions along with those of the Americans will determine the course of events. All possible actions from doing nothing to nuclear war are open to you. Put yourself into the role you are playing, act as you feel your man would act in this situation.

Suggestion: You might wish to determine your goals and alternatives before acting. Keep in mind the rest of the world and their relation to the USSR. Also remember the time limits of the game.

BE REALISTIC

A debriefing will follow this game where the teams will have an opportunity to get together with their opponents and discuss their strategies.
APPENDIX II

CRISIS: POST GAME REVIEW
CRISIS: Post Game Review

1. When you were deciding what action should be taken, how much did you consider what the response of others would be to your action?

Response of Russia (or the USA):

did not consider  considered strongly
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Response of other nations:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Response of public opinion in your nation:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

2. Briefly define what crisis situation faced you? What was the problem (the most important issue with which you had to deal)?

3. When considering what actions to take, which of these was the most important in influencing your decision?

USA TEAM
Desire to remove missiles
Keep USA stronger than USSR
Avoid nuclear war
Avoid military confrontation
Remove Castro from Cuba

USSR TEAM
Desire to have missiles remain
Keep USSR stronger than USA
Avoid nuclear war
Avoid military confrontation
Keep Communism in Cuba

4. Did you think it was possible to avoid using military force? yes no

5. Briefly what were your goals?
6. Did these goals change during the course of the game?
   yes   no

7. Why did these goals change or not change?

8. How did these goals change?

9. Rank the following by number as to their order of importance in helping to formulate or influence your decisions and actions. Cross out any that had no influence on your decision.

   Public opinion at home
   Political demands on government
   Previous positions taken by government
   Diplomatic resources of your nation
   Other international organizations
   The physical geography of the crisis
   The time limits for making decisions
   World public opinion
   Military resources of your nation
   Treaties and alliances
   United Nations
   Intelligence information about the crisis
   Direct communication with USSR (USA)

10. Did you feel you had adequate time to reach good decisions?

11. Did you feel you were under stress; if so, in what way?
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