

THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER CONFRONTATION OF 1962

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CHAPTER I

HISTORY OF THE SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS--

A BACKDROP

Sino-Indian relations may be demarcated into six periods. The first begins with the early communication between the two peoples until the fourteenth century. This long period is primarily focused on the activities of culture and religion. The second includes the British occupation of the Indian subcontinent from the beginning of the eighteenth century. (The political history of the British in India begins in the eighteenth century, when King Aurangzeb died in 1707. But the French were also competing with the British in India at the time.) The main problem between Britain and China concerned Tibet. The third period begins with the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 and continues to the end of the second World War. This period marked the growing intimate friendship of the two nations. The fourth lasts from the formal exchange of ambassadors when India gained her independence in 1947 until the Communists took over mainland China in 1949. The fifth begins with India's recognition of the Communist regime, with relations established on the basis of the Panch Sheela¹, and lasts until soon after the

¹This is an Indian term for the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence.

first confrontation in 1960. The sixth period covers relations after the 1962 confrontation. The substance of this thesis concerns Chinese-Indian relations during the fifth period, and through the 1962 confrontation.

Sino-Indian Relations before the Fifteenth Century

Despite the natural difficulty of terrain, the topography of the Himalayas and the oceans, the Chinese communicated with countries to the South of the Himalayas by land and by sea at least by 200 B. C., during the Han Dynasty.

According to The Book of History, the autobiography of Tai-Yue, Chang Chin was the first border officer to know of the existence of the state of Hindu. During the Han Dynasty, Emperor Han Wu-Ti delegated to Chang Chin the complete authority to rule the territories to the West of China proper.² Chang was told of the state of Hindu by the people of Bactria (now in northwestern Afghanistan and Pakistan). The Bactrians said:

Hindu lies some thousand lis to the Southeast of Bactria. The Natives are the same as the Bactrians, but the climate is hot and humid, the people fight on back of elephants, and the boundary of the country extends far into the great waters.³

Later, Chang Chin was appointed the ambassador in this area twice (circa 123 B. C.) and he in turn appointed his

²Wu Chen-Tsai, "Sino-Indian and Sino-Burman Relations," in Essay on the Diplomatic History of China, edited by Wu, Chen-Tsai (Taipei, 1957), p. 3. (Writer's translation)

³Ibid., p. 4.

subordinates as envoys to Hindu. It was the period one hundred years after the death of King Ayub, and the Peninsula was divided by the generals into rival domains. Hindu was no longer a united country; yet the doctrine of Buddhism spread far along the course of the Ganges river and throughout the whole subcontinent. Later, during the East Han Dynasty, there are records of the state of Hindu, especially in The Book of Late Han, the record of The Article of the West Territory.⁴ Still, according to The Geographical Handbook of Late Han Dynasty:

By sailing from the island of Hainan through Yi-nan, Cheng-Choi, Shue-pu, and Hopu for five months, there is a state called Tu-Yuen (in Malaya peninsula today); and sail continually for four months, there is the state called Yalumi (Southwest coast of Burma today); and sail again for about twenty days, there is the state called Chani (Burma today); and walk for about ten days, there is the country of Fukaduno (Burma's Pegu today); and sail about two months, there is the country of Huangi (in the southeast coast of Indian peninsula, perhaps Vengipura in the north of Madaras today). To some extent, the custom and habit of these peoples are close to those of Hainan island. Within this vast continent, there are uncountable houses, and things are of great variety. . . .⁵

From this information, the Chinese, ever since the East Han Dynasty, have had some knowledge of the subcontinent; needless to say, this contact was mainly due to the spread of Buddhism.

Generally speaking, the theory of Buddhism came to China in 67 A. D., the tenth year of Han Ming-Ti. But it was already five and a half centuries after the death of

⁴Ibid., p. 4.

⁵Ibid.

the Buddha.⁶ However, Buddhism was Sinofied when it reached China. Owing to the pursuit of knowledge about Buddhism, Sino-Indian relations were greatly enhanced. Notably, the highest rank of Chinese Buddhists visited the subcontinent. The first Chinese Buddhist, Chu si-hang, visited Hindu during the Three Kingdom Period but only in the West of Hindu.⁷ According to Liang Chi-Ch'ao's research, it has been established that about 187 Chinese Buddhists visited Hindu from the end of the third century A. D., the last stage of the Three Kingdoms, until the eighth century A. D. at the middle of the Tang Dynasty. Among all these Buddhists, Hsuan-Tsang's achievement was the greatest.⁸ He braved the snow-capped mountains and sand dunes to the "Western Heaven" for the great doctrine. It was out of this pursuit of truth and wisdom that Hsuan-Tsang has so greatly contributed to the cultural heritage of the two nationalities. To these Buddhists, the friendship of the two countries should be eternal, for China and Hindu are brotherly states. During Hsuan-Tsang's seventeen-year stay in Hindu, he had brought home to China 520 volumes plus 657 doctrinal books.⁹ Later, he also translated seventy-five other volumes. The next famous contemporary

⁶Ibid., p. 5.

⁷Ibid., p. 5.

⁸Huang Tai-Sui, "An Outline of the Communication between China and Southern India in the Early Fifteenth Century," China Newsweek, No. 921 (December 18, 1967), p. 11. (Writer's translation)

⁹Wu, op. cit., p. 11.

Buddhist was Fauchin.¹⁰ They together had left in Hindu the kind yet sage-like image of the Chinese Buddhists. Their work has become indispensable research material concerning early Buddhism. The Chinese admire the great courage of these two monks, and this has influenced some Chinese to admire the people and the land south of the Himalayas. Although the works of these Buddhists can never substitute for the work of diplomacy, their contribution has gone beyond physical relations, and has contributed to the spirit of kinship between these two peoples in Asia.

The Ming Dynasty was founded in 1368, and after 1369, Ming Tai-Chu sent envoys to the countries in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean states.¹¹ In that year, Lau Su-Min was sent as envoy to the state called Chola. In 1370, the King of Chola sent a messenger to see the Emperor, Ming Tai-Chu, when Lau Su-Min was on his way home.¹² The messenger of Chola brought along with him special products as gifts to the Ming Emperor; and in return, the Ming Emperor sent back the best silk, together with a Chinese historical calendar.¹³

¹⁰P. C. Chakravarti, India's China Policy (Bloomington, 1962), p. 2.

¹¹Huang, op. cit., p. 11.

¹²Ibid., p. 11.

¹³A Chinese historical calendar is still used in China even today. It contains information about climate, seasonal changes that will coincide with farming, and mathematical calculations with relation to geographical location, and also mystic information as to how and when to do this or that so that it will not offend the gods and spirits.

It was not until 1403, after the death of Ming Tai-Chu, that his son, Ming Ching-Chu determined to display the strength and wealth of China by sending messengers of friendship and goodwill overseas. This year, 1403, Wun Ching was sent to Malacca, Calicut, Cohine, and Po Man-Lang, and Lin-Sen to Chola and other states in the Indian Ocean. Calicut, Cohine, and Chola are states of Southern India. These kings received much good silk from the Ming Emperor. In return, the king of Chola sent his envoys to China when the Chinese messengers returned home. They brought, along with letters, personal and special products from the king of Chola to the Ming Emperor. Moreover, they brought along pepper to sell in China, and the Ming Emperor granted them a special privilege by waiving their taxation and custom duty.¹⁴ Among all these messengers the Ming Emperor sent to the Southern Seas, Cheng-Wo achieved the most.¹⁵ He sailed to the Indian Ocean seven times from 1405 to 1433. The last three voyages, he reached East Africa (Kenya today). Each time, the ships were heavily loaded with at least 27,000 crewmen and other personnel. These ships were made of wood and each was equal to about 3,000 tons.¹⁶

¹⁴Huang, op. cit., p. 11.

¹⁵Wong Teh-Chao, "China in European Eyes Three Centuries Ago," New Asia Life (March 15, 1968), p. I. (Writer's translation)

¹⁶Huang, op. cit., p. 11.

However, the policy of China fluctuates with different emperors. After the heyday of the Ming Dynasty, the Japanese, attracted by the affluent society then in China, began to settle along the coastal areas and make trouble. Ming's policy was redirected to deal with "the new comers from the East Islands" and others from the north, the Manchus. It followed that after Cheng Wo not many Chinese had a chance to travel to Southern India by sea. People who followed Cheng Wo to the Indian Ocean states had written books describing in great detail the countries there, such as Chola, Cohine, and Ceylon. These are evidences of the interest the early Chinese had shown in the Hindis and TAMILIS.

Sino-Indian Relations During the British Occupation

In 1608, the first merchant fleet of the East India Company, led by Hopkins, reached India, and requested the Moghul King, Akbar, to trade with them and to allow them to build factories in the Hindu Peninsula. It was the heyday of the Moghuls, who came from Central Asia through the Khyber Pass under the leadership of King Babar, the father of King Akbar. The request was neglected and the British conquest of this land had to wait. The whole subcontinent came under the sway of the British Empire only after 1858.

Great Britain showed interest in acquiring Tibet after the East India Company was established, because the British believed that there were large gold deposits in Tibet, and

that the tea in Assam had to find markets there.¹⁷ Hastings, the Viceroy of British India, had twice, in 1774 and 1783, sent messengers to visit Tibet and learn the state of Tibetan affairs in order to make good their ambition for annexation. However, most of the work was carried out half-heartedly and the British only began to accelerate the process of acquiring Tibet when Russia began to show interest.¹⁸ In other words, the British exerted momentum to occupy Tibet only from 1890 to 1940. Apparently, it was the defense and security of British India against the expanding Russian Empire that motivated the British. Tibet, the "roof of the world," is important to China both in strategy and national defense, for below it, there lies more than half of the Moslem world; and from Tibet, people may reach any part of mainland China with ease. Such was the interest of both British and Russians to attempt to acquire "the land of mystery."

The ambition of the British in that part of China was neglected because the strength of the Ch'ing Dynasty was on the decline and its border policy lacked effective management. Yet, the most significant element was that the Ch'ing administration did not understand British thinking, so that in almost every diplomatic arena, the British gained the upper hand. This provided them with experience and

¹⁷Schuyler Cammann, Trade Through the Himalayas (Princeton, 1951), pp. 147-148.

¹⁸John Rowland, A History of Sino-Indian Relations (Princeton, 1967), pp. 29-31.

accessibility to China's periphery areas and tributary states, such as Sikkim, Bhutan, Burma, and Nepal. Then, by means of compulsion and persuasion, they were successful in separating these states from China. This encouraged the British to intrude finally into Tibet.

During the process of acquiring these Chinese tributary states, the British also demonstrated great interest in obtaining Tibet.¹⁹ However, owing to the international situation and Ch'ing administration's rejuvenating attempts together with Russia's equal interest in Tibet, the British thought it was to their benefit to let sleeping dogs lie. Therefore, their policy was steady and careful. Their method was first to make Sikkim, Nepal, and Bhutan their protectorates, followed by military occupation, and then to acquire privileges to trade in Tibet, with military occupation of its peripheral areas. Then, with de facto military occupation, the British proceeded to negotiate with the Ch'ing government, and later the Nationalist Republican administration. Thus, no matter how the Chinese government rejected the situation, British influence had already advanced deep into Tibet.

Influenced by the Russian movement in Mongolia, the British sent a force under a Colonel Younghusband to Tibet in 1903.²⁰ Younghusband encountered some resistance but

¹⁹Cammann, op. cit., pp. 21-23.

²⁰Rowland, op. cit., p. 35.

finally arrived at Lhasa. The Dalai Lama fled to Ching-Kai, and the British troops forced the Tibetan Lamas to surrender. However, this "expedition" was regarded by Vincent A. Smith, an authority on Indian history, as being "unnecessary and all but fruitless."²¹ For, later in 1906, the Ching administration's representative in Lhasa regarded the 1904 draft between Younghusband and the Tibetan Lamas as having been made under duress, and refused to ratify it.²² Therefore, in 1906, British envoys negotiated with Tang Choung Yi in Peking.²³ In 1908, as a result, the Tibet Trade Regulation amendment was made. This agreement limited the boundary of British merchant activities in Tibet and special routes were given as fixed roads where traders and merchants might pass through. It also prohibited the British merchants having their own security guards.²⁴

In 1913, two years after the Republic of China was founded, the British thought it was an opportune moment and so urged China to renegotiate their problems in Tibet. Chen Ivan was appointed as an extraordinary envoy to negotiate in British India. In 1914, the so-called Simla convention was

²¹Vincent A. Smith, The Oxford History of India, rev. ed. (1928), p. 771, cited by Tieh-Tseng Li, "The Legal Position of Tibet," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 48 (January-October, 1954), 395.

²²Wu, op. cit., p. 9.

²³Ibid., p. 9.

²⁴John V. A. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China 1894-1919, Vol. I, The Manchu Period 1894-1911, 2 Vols. (New York, 1921), pp. 582-5.

drafted, containing eleven articles and seven appendices.²⁵ This draft treaty was to China's disadvantage. Among its provisions, four points are most important. First, according to the draft, Tibet was divided into inner and outer Tibets and the boundary of Tibet was extended into the whole province of Ching-Kai, and a part of Ssuch'uan. Second, China's "sovereignty" in Tibet was replaced by "suzerainty." Moreover, the Government of China could not send troops into Outer Tibet nor station civil or military officers, nor establish Chinese colonies in the country.²⁶ In Article V, it specified that "the Government of China and Tibet engage that they will not enter into any negotiations or agreements regarding Tibet with one another. . . ."²⁷ This would exclude completely China's authority as a sovereign in the Outer Tibet region. In Article VIII, the British Trade agent was allowed to have its own escort in Lhasa, and in the Schedule (3), China's right to appoint officials in Tibet was denied. Finally, there was to be no representation in the Chinese parliament from Tibet.²⁸

Although China participated in the drafting of the Treaty, the central government never formally signed nor recognized it, and according to the common practice of the

²⁵G. V. Ambekar, Documents on China's Relations with South and South-East Asia 1949-1962, rev. ed. (Bombay, 1964), pp. 408-410.

²⁶Ibid., p. 408.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid., p. 410.

international law of treaties, such a draft was ineffective. As the First World War broke out in Europe and England became deeply involved in 1914, the Simla Treaty was suspended. After the First World War was over, China and England held no more negotiations on the Simla Treaty; but the strategy of the British was significantly changed. This time, special efforts were made to practically control Tibet. Namely, the office of Trade Commissioner in Tibet was greatly expanded so that it finally became the headquarters of administering Tibet; the communication route from Lhasa to the Indian border was stationed with military personnel; desperate efforts were exerted to prevent Chinese officials from going into Tibet; and food and grain and other materials were barred from shipment into Tibet in the hope that the Chinese officials might be short of supply.²⁹ A security system was built up along the Tibetan-Indian border in order to control Tibet, and the British border soldiers began to push and extend the border of the state of Assam into Tibetan or Chinese claimed areas.³⁰

In 1943, China and England ratified a new treaty in which articles two and eight were understood by both sides as being applicable to British India, but the content had little

²⁹Wu, op. cit., p. 10.

³⁰Alastair Lamb, The China-India Border (London, 1964), pp. 160-167.

to do with Tibet.³¹ Hence, the suspended case of Tibet was not yet solved. The treaty said:

It is further agreed that questions which may affect the sovereignty of the Republic of China and which are not covered by the present Treaty or by the preceding provisions of the present Note shall be discussed by the Representatives of the Government of the Republic of China and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and decided in accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law and modern international practice.³²

Such an understanding may be construed as meaning that questions concerning Tibet would be settled through negotiations. However, after eight years of war against Japan, China was exhausted, and the Chinese Communists supported by Russians launched military operations which finally ended in Communist control of most of China. Consequently, the Republican Government was compelled to evacuate to Taiwan. Since the British at once recognized the Chinese Communists, the Nationalist Government never had the chance of clearing up the unfinished old-time account before the British left the sub-continent.

The Close Relationship of the Two Peoples During World War Two

In 1937, Japan started its invasion of China in great strength. The Chinese were forced to resist aggression at all costs. On September 26, 1938, under M. Ghandi's

³¹Yin Ching Chen, Treaties and Agreements Between the Republic of China and Other Powers 1929-1954, rev. ed. (Washington, 1957), pp. 140-148.

³²Ibid., p. 147.

leadership, the Congress Party held a China Day in India and a manifesto was issued condemning Japan's act of aggression.³³ In 1939, the Indian poet, Sir Rabindranath Tagore wrote letters to his Japanese friends saying with confidence that China could never be conquered.³⁴ Nehru also wrote a letter to the Chinese pointing out that at all times, in all events, India would be a friend of China. He said that only when China gained freedom could India achieve her freedom; and if China could not gain her freedom, the freedom India then enjoyed would be threatened and also insignificant.³⁵ In 1940, Nehru paid a visit to China at the war-time capital, Chungking, to reinforce the Sino-Indian relationship and pay respects to the Chinese soldiers. As a result, Chiang Kai-shek wrote a personal letter to Nehru expressing the hope for further Sino-Indian collaboration.³⁶

On the other hand, many Chinese showed great sympathy for the non-cooperative movement and passive resistance led by M. Gandhi, and also greatly respected the selflessness of the spirit of Gandhi, who fasted in order to attain his goal--independence for the Hindustanis. When after the success of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan started the

³³Wu, op. cit., p. 11.

³⁴Ibid., p. 11.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Chiang Kai-Shek, "Letter to B. Nehru," A Bunch of Old Letters, edited by B. Nehru (New York, 1960), p. 452.

Pacific Ocean War, India was greatly threatened. However, the quest for independence still went on. Aiming at supporting India's struggle for freedom and independence, the highest leader of China, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, paid a two-weeks official visit to India with his wife in February, 1942.³⁷ Chiang, despite the fact that China was also engaged in the war against Japan, expressed the hope that

. . . without waiting for any demands on the part of the people of India, Great Britain will as speedily as possible give them real political power so that they may in a position further to develop their spiritual and material strength and thus realize that their participation in the war is not merely aid to the anti-aggression nations for securing victory but also the turning point in their struggle for India's freedom. From the objective point of view, I am of the opinion this would be the wisest policy which will redound to the credit of the British Empire.³⁸

This talk, which was unprecedented in modern Indian history, greatly inspired the Indians.

Again in August, 1942, Ghandi and Nehru were imprisoned because of the resolution at the Congress meeting in Bombay stressing that the British must "Quit India."³⁹ China at once showed much concern toward the situation and officially pointed out that

³⁷"Documentary Data," China at War, VII, No. 4 (April, 1942), 59-61.

³⁸Ibid., p. 61.

³⁹Chakravarti, op. cit., p. 6; for the text of the "Quit India" demand of the Indian National Congress, August, 1942, see K. S. Hasan, editor, The Transfer of Power: Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan, Institute of International Affairs (Karachi, Pakistan, 1966), p. 52.

This war is a war for freedom and against aggression, if such a spirit is lost the war will be meaningless. The struggle for freedom of the Indian people coincides with the main purpose of the United Nations' manifesto, we find no reason not to give them sympathy.⁴⁰

In September, 1946, Nehru was allowed by the British to organize a Cabinet as the interim government for India. This was the time Indians needed international support most, so that they might gain complete independence sooner. China at once changed the office of chargé d'affaires in Delhi to the Ambassador level; and in February, 1947, Dr. Lo Chia-lun was appointed as China's first ambassador to India. Ambassador Lo presented his credentials on May 16, 1947, the first ambassador to accredit in India.⁴¹ Chinese support for the cause of Indian independence is thus apparent.

Sino-Indian Relations After India became Independent

The British Government determined to return real political power to the Indian people on August 15, 1947. Having obtained its dominion status, and having made its constitution the same year, the Democratic Republic Union of India was approved by the King of England. On the other hand, the situation in China changed greatly because of the Communist insurgency. At this time, the Indian Union, under the leadership of Nehru, shifted its policy toward China.

India, which assumed itself to be the heir of the British heritage on the subcontinent, determined to hold all

⁴⁰Wu, op. cit., p. 12.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 12.

the British fruits of war or aggression regardless of the self-determination of the peoples concerned as specified in the United Nations' Charter;⁴² India's policy was also in disregard of protests from the countries concerned.⁴³

On October 9, 1948, China, according to the rule specified in the Tibet Trade Regulation amendment of 1908, sent a Note to India notifying her of the cancellation of that Trade Regulation, pending a new amended one. In reply, the Indian Government stated that when India became independent, she inherited all rights and duties contained in the treaties between Tibet and British India; that relations between India and Tibet should be determined by the Simla Treaty and its Trade Regulation Annex; and that the Tibet Trade Regulation of 1908 had lost its validity long ago.⁴⁴ From this reply, we observe how the Indian Government shifted its policy and its ambition in Tibet. Moreover, in July, 1949, the Indian Trade Mission in Tibet incited some Tibetan local officials to foment the Lhasa Incident on the pretext of an anti-Communist movement, and expelled the

⁴²When the British were about to transfer power to the Indians, they expected that since the Indian Empire included such a variety of nationalities, the people would have to be given a free choice of political affiliation. This meant that the peoples have a free will to join the Indian Union or to become independent nations. The Indian leaders promised to follow this process. But they did not carry it out.

⁴³China and her Tibetan Local Authority, Burma, and Pakistan have protested against India's action which had caused open confrontations, and China was the most tolerant one in comparison with other neighbors.

⁴⁴Wu, op. cit., p. 13.

central government officials from Tibet.⁴⁵ In November, Nehru paid a state visit to the United States.⁴⁶ Then on December 30, 1949, India officially announced its recognition of the Communist Regime and withdrew its recognition of the Republic of China.⁴⁷

Sino-Indian Relations from 1949 to 1962

Since 1950, India has sided with Soviet Russia in all international organizations to admit Communist China and expell the Nationalist representatives. A Sino-Indian Treaty was ratified in April, 1954, in which the Indian Government recognized that Tibet was an integral part of China.⁴⁸ This Treaty also specified the five principles of the Panchsheela --the five principles of peaceful co-existence. This was later approved in the Bandung Conference in Indonesia as an Asian contribution to world stability. During this Bandung Conference, Sino-Indian coöperation was obvious. Their relationship seemed apparently intimate, as both sides at such a period needed to help each other in the international arena. This situation lasted until 1959 when the first serious confrontation started. India was accused of being the major

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Times, November 14, 1949, pp. 29-30.

⁴⁷S. L. Poplai, editor, External Affairs, Vol. II of India 1947-50, 2 vols. (Bombay, 1959), p. 13.

⁴⁸K. S. Hasan, editor, China, India, Pakistan: Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan (Karachi, 1966), pp. 40-46.

sponsor of the Tibetan Revolt, and the Dalai Lama either fled Tibet voluntarily or was abducted by the Indians.⁴⁹ Since then, Communist China made many reasonable attempts to negotiate with Nehru about border delimitation questions, but India finally closed the door for negotiation after the Chou-Nehru meeting in 1960.⁵⁰ After this, India seemed to be preparing for a final show of force in the Himalayas.

Sino-Indian Relations after the 1962 Confrontation

After this 1962 confrontation, the two regimes significantly reduced communications with each other and exchanged protests quite often. Yet, underlying this hostility there still has been a reasonableness in their behavior, especially on the part of the communist regime. As this period is not within the scope of this thesis, it will not be discussed here.

⁴⁹Rowland, op. cit., p. 115.

⁵⁰Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, pp. 185-199.

CHAPTER II

CHINA'S LEGAL POSITION IN TIBET

As far as international law is concerned, China joined the family of nations only in the late nineteenth century. Not only is the "old China" significantly different from the West in the way of thinking, metaphysical concepts, faith, social order, and custom, but also in the methods of conducting relations among nations. It is, therefore, inappropriate to some extent to impose western concepts and terminology upon Chinese politics. Yet, no justice will be given to the parties involved unless we understand the background of the conventions; how they came about, under what circumstances, and why.

Many writers have indiscriminately employed the term "suzerainty" in the interpretation of the relations between China and her Tibetan region.¹ Care must be taken to note that China has never regarded herself as a "suzerain" of Tibet; she regarded Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang, or Yunnan and Kwongsi (Southern-western China) as integral parts of China enjoying a great measure of autonomy. The term "suzerain" was imposed upon China by the British and the

¹These authors--J. S. Bains, P. C. Chakravarti, G. N. Patterson, J. Rowland, S. Singh, and Fisher, Rose, and Huttenback--have used the term "suzerainty." For further detail, see the bibliography.

Russians, who believed it would be expedient to make Tibet an international issue so that it might become finally a buffer between British India, Russia, and China.² This term "suzerain" was agreed upon in a convention signed between Great Britain and Russia at St. Petersburg in 1907 at the expense of China, which was not a party to the convention.³ Thereafter, China was regarded by these two powers as the "suzerain" of Tibet.

It must be remembered also that Tibet, "the roof of the world," has been an integral part of China at least since 1720 after the invaders, the Dzungers, were driven out of the highlands by an army led by the fourteenth son of the K'ang-Hsi Emperor, Prince Yun-t'i.⁴ This army was composed of Mongol and Chinese troops;⁵ and the Seventh Dalai Lama was escorted back to Tibet. Further still, in 1792, after the Gurkhas, the invaders from Nepal supposed to have been incited and supported by the British to invade Tibet, were

²T. T. Li, "Legal Position of Tibet," American Journal of International Law, XLVIII (April, 1954), 394.

³MacMurray, op. cit., pp. 677-678.

⁴T. W. D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History (New Haven, 1967), p. 139.

⁵According to Chen Shen-Lin's research, the Manchu Emperors ruled and used the man-power in China as such: the Mongols are soldiers, the Manchus are high ranking officials and imperial advisors, the Tibetans are for the religious matters, the Hans are farmers, scholars, and local civil servants, but in the later years, the Hans have risen to high ranks in the Imperial Court, and the Moslems in Sinkiang are mostly farmers and miners.

driven out, the Ch'ien-lung Emperor reformed the whole administration in Tibet. "The Ambans, one at Lhasa, another at Shigatze, were given the same rank as the Dalai and the Panch'en Lamas."⁶

As a result of Colonel Younghusband's expedition into Tibet, the Tibetan Lamas signed the Lhasa Convention of 1904 under duress. Three days after the Convention was signed, the Amban⁷ put out a notice in Lhasa when the British armed mission was still in the city. It said that

. . . for more than 200 years, Tibet has been a feudatory of China. . . . In future, Tibet being a feudatory of China, the Dalai Lama will be responsible for the yellow-cap faith and monks and will only be concerned slightly in official matters, while the Amban will conduct all Tibetan affairs with the Tibetan officials and important matters will be referred to the Emperor.⁸

For this reason the negotiations of 1905 between the British and the Chinese were held for the legitimacy of the Lhasa Convention of 1904. The British had then in mind

⁶Ch'ing Shih-Lu (Imperial Records of the Ch'ing Dynasty), Kao-tsung shih-lu, Ch. 1411, pp. 15a, 24b; Ch. 1417, p. 3b; Li-fan-pu tse u (Regulations Enforced and Precedents Established by the Ministry of Dependencies), Ch. 61; Wei-tsang-t'ung chih (Records in connection with Tibet and Its Administration), Ch. 9, p. 179; Ch. 12, p. 201. It is cited by Li, op. cit., p. 396.

⁷A Chinese term for Imperial Resident, the highest rank of the official stationed in Tibet taking charge of all the decision making, policy planning, and administration in the local government of Tibet; concerning important affairs, he was responsible to the Emperor in Peking.

⁸Accounts and Papers, Cd. 2370, annex to encl. No. 362, pp. 274-5. The translation here used is the version sent by Younghusband to his government; Li, op. cit., p. 396.

China's sovereignty in Tibet as the Chinese delegate, Tong Shao-Yi, citing as evidence the investiture of the Dalai and Panch'en Lamas, the appointment of bka'-blons (or cabinet ministers) and of the local Tibetan officials and officers by the Chinese Court, and the supervision of the Tibetan troops by the Imperial Resident (or Amban).⁹ Before the conclusion of the negotiations, Tong Shao-Yi departed and Chang Ying-Tang, who afterwards introduced reforms there, replaced Tong as chief delegate and signed the "Adhesion Agreement"; Chang had this to say: ". . . that virtual recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet was involved in the signature and that 'Chinese authorities in Tibet' should consequently be the interpretation placed on the phrase 'Tibetan Government' wherever the latter occurs in the Lhasa Convention."¹⁰ Moreover, Sir Francis Younghusband, in his book, India and Tibet, stated that "he worked throughout with the Chinese Amban and never directly with the Tibetans to the exclusion of the Chinese."¹¹ Still, in connection with the payment of the indemnity imposed by the Lhasa convention on the Chinese, the British Blue Book recorded that she saw "firm determination

⁹Ibid., p. 395.

¹⁰Accounts and Papers, printed by order of the House of Commons, Cd. 5240, Vol. LXVIII, No. 141 (1910), p. 86; Ibid., p. 395.

¹¹Sir Francis E. Younghusband, India and Tibet, pp. 421-422 (1910), cited by Li; Ibid., p. 396; see also Rowland, op. cit., p. 36; and also Stuart Gelder, The Timely Rain (London, 1964), p. 65.

that the Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, to be exclusive of all local autonomy, shall be indicated."¹²

However, in spite of this, the British and the Russians signed the 1907 Convention aimed at making Tibet an international issue. Rowland pointed out that "London found useful Peking's 'suzerain' role since it provided China with some legal primacy yet deprived it of effective control. Its legal presence prevented a vacuum which Britain still feared might be filled by Russia."¹³ Aware of a threat to Tibet, the Ch'ing Government in 1905 again exercised its sovereignty by sending Chao Erh-Feng to introduce reforms and secure peace and good order. By 1910, Chao was so successful that China was able to reassert influence in Nepal, Bhutan, and also the Assam Himalaya.¹⁴

It must be remembered that the new interpretation of the relationship between China and Tibet advanced by the Viceroy of India was contrary to that of the British Government at home, which regarded Tibet as a province of China.¹⁵

¹²Account and Papers, printed by order of the House of Commons, Cd. 5240, Vol. LXVIII, No. 218 (1910), p. 140; cited by Li, ibid., p. 395.

¹³Rowland, op. cit., p. 46; see also Gelder, op. cit., p. 65.

¹⁴Lamb, op. cit., pp. 135-6.

¹⁵Rowland's use of London in the above statement which has been cited is incorrect, because the policy or the Viceroy of British India, Lord Curzon, was objected to by the British Government at home. See Account and Papers, Cd. 1920, No. 78, p. 185; Parliamentary Debates, 4th Ser., Vol. 130 (1904), pp. 1116-1117; Accounts and Papers, Cd. 2370, No. 55, p. 18; see Li's reference to the original data.

Joseph H. Choate, United States Ambassador to Great Britain, was instructed in connection with Younghusband's expedition in Tibet to remind Great Britain that she had three times recognized Chinese sovereignty by negotiation with the Chinese Government on questions concerning Tibet, and that the Chinese had never waived any of their sovereign rights there since.¹⁶ It was only after the fall of the Ch'ing Dynasty in 1911 that the British attitude toward Tibet changed. The British saw that Russia had successfully incited the Living Buddha in Mongolia to declare independence on November 30, 1911. Great Britain followed suit and incited the Dalai Lama XIII to declare the independence of Tibet in 1912. But the president of the New Chinese Republic, Yuen Sai-Kai, at once reasserted Tibet as an indivisible part of China. The British then notified the New Chinese Republic in 1913 that a conference between China and Great Britain should be held to discuss problems relating to Tibet.¹⁷

¹⁶Department of State Archives, Great Britain Instructions, Vol. 34, No. 1455, Hay to Choate (June 3, 1904), 636-639; Li, op. cit., p. 399.

¹⁷Gelder, op. cit., p. 67; it stated: "In 1911, when the Manchu Dynasty was overthrown by the forces of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the Dalai Lama from exile declared his country's independence from Peking and in January 1913 returned to the Holy City where in the confusion of revolution Chinese authority had collapsed. It is on this declaration that the fourteenth Dalai Lama has based his claim to the United Nations that the Chinese Communists violated his country's sovereignty in 1951."

China reluctantly agreed to negotiate. Ivan Chen was named chief delegate, and Lon-Chen Shatra was his associate from Tibet. The British Chief delegate, Sir Henry McMahon, presented a draft to the Conference which was not acceptable to China. The main purpose of this conference for the British was their hope to secure China's consent to the independence of Tibet. In order to do so, Great Britain would have to force China to accept her terms. Thus, Britain unilaterally acted as the guarantor of Tibet's independence even though she never officially recognized Tibet as independent from China. Britain's behavior was against the Dalai Lama's wishes as well as those of the Government of China.¹⁸ Most important of all is the wording of Article II, drafted by McMahon himself. It said:

The Governments of Great Britain and China, recognizing also the autonomy of Outer Tibet, engage to respect the territorial integrity of the country, and to abstain from interference in the administration of Outer Tibet (including the selection and appointment of Dalai Lama), which shall remain in the hands of the Tibetan Government at Lhasa. The Government of China engages not to convert Tibet into a Chinese province and Tibet shall not be represented in the Chinese Parliament or any

¹⁸It was against the wish of the Dalai Lama. Because of the historic association with China, he did not wish Tibet to be independent from China only to be under British domination. The Dalai Lama, because of his investiture by the Chinese Court, expected to have more freedom in the spiritual sphere than the political. See also Chang, *op. cit.*, p. 277; Letter to the New York Times editor, January 7, 1962, by Tieh-Tseng Li, in which he also wrote: "It [the McMahon Line] aroused the displeasure of the thirteenth Dalai Lama (Sir Charles Bell's Account) and the Lhasa Government also expressed strong dissatisfaction with it [the McMahon Line]."

similar body. The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibet or any portion of it.¹⁹

Therefore, Ivan Chen asked McMahon to define the political limits of suzerainty in a separate agreement, but was refused.²⁰ Later, Ivan Chen stated that he was incapable of signing the convention. McMahon then warned that if China would not sign, Britain would sign it with a Tibetan and in that case, China would even be deprived of her position as a suzerain of Tibet. McMahon was not successful, and Ivan Chen left Simla with his Tibetan associates.

The conference at Simla never even discussed the China-India boundary question. Neither was the boundary between India and China's Tibet mentioned in the text of the Simla Convention put forward at the conference.²¹

As the Chinese and the Tibetan local representatives left Simla without any conclusion to the negotiation, the intent of the British was frustrated. McMahon, however, later in 1914 requested Lon-Chen Shatra, who never confided to his associates from Tibet, to have the Convention signed at Delhi. According to A. L. Strong's research, it was only

¹⁹W. F. V. Eekelen, *Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China* (The Hague, 1964), p. 140. This is the original draft by McMahon; its modified statement can be found in G. V. Ambekar, *op. cit.*, pp. 407-9, and also in Hasan, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-35; namely, the words "a state" and "but not the sovereignty" were omitted, the word "appointment" was replaced by "installation" and the prohibition of representation in the Chinese Parliament was limited to Outer Tibet.

²⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 141-142.

²¹Teh Kao, "A Chinese View on the 'McMahon Line,'" *Eastern World*, Vol. 17 (February, 1963), 13-14.

after McMahon had bribed the Tibetans that the Convention was signed. Yet, Dalai Lama XIII did not say that Tibet had signed bi-laterally with the British and he later repudiated that signature.²²

China never committed herself to the recognition of the Simla Convention because she was not a signatory, and contended that even if Britain made a Tibetan sign, such a Convention was not effective.

First, according to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, Britain solemnly promised the Russians not to negotiate or to sign any convention or agreement bilaterally with the Tibetans to the exclusion of the Chinese.²³ It implied that if Britain violated her promise, Russia would not hesitate to intervene.

Second, this convention was only to be held between China and Great Britain. It was bilateral in nature, and

²²A. L. Strong, When Serfs Stood up in Tibet (Peking, 1960), p. 321. It further stated: "Interesting details about the McMahon Line have been lately revealed in Lhasa by an aged man who was a delegate to Simla and by a nephew of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama who was for years in charge of official records. These state that Shatra wrote the Dalai Lama of McMahon's proposal and the Dalai Lama angrily forbade Shatra to yield an inch of Tibet. Shatra therefore at first refused McMahon, but when offered a bribe of five thousand rifles and half a million rounds of ammunition, Shatra signed but told no other Tibetans. When Shatra returned to Lhasa, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama got the information from him and at once wrote to the British repudiating the agreement. This, say the Tibetans, is why the British never dared claim that Line."

²³Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, pp. 20-23.

when China refused to sign, it was automatically cancelled. In fact, Britain herself did not announce publicly until 1938 that such a convention was signed. ". . . The Convention and exchange of notes referred to signed by the British and Tibetan representatives on July 3rd, 1914 have not yet been officially made public." "It is understood that no change has since occurred in the status of the situation thus outlined."²⁴

However, Eekelen argued that since China allowed Tibetan representation in the conference, this could be interpreted

. . . that China accepted the treaty making power of Tibet which would be effective externally regardless of any possible bilateral obligation of Tibet towards China to enter into agreements only when they were concurrently concluded by Peking.²⁵

When the Republic of China was founded, Tibet was represented by a white color in the national flag, which had five colors representing the five main races of China.²⁶ The present Dalai Lama and Panch'en Lama were respectively installed in office on February 21, 1940, at Lhasa and on August 10, 1949, at Sining. These ceremonies were conducted officially by the Chairman of the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs of the Chinese Government: and in 1946

²⁴MacMurray, op. cit., p. 582.

²⁵Eekelen, op. cit., p. 143.

²⁶James Cantlie, Sun Yet-Sen and the Awakening China (London, 1912), pp. 144-6.

and 1948, Tibetan delegates took part in the National Assembly in the making of the new Chinese Constitution.²⁷ Further, there were Tibetan members in the Legislative Yuen and the Control Yuen even when the National Government evacuated from Nanking to Taipei in 1948. Most importantly, contrary to many writers who alleged that Tibet remained neutral during the last war, "the Regent of the Lhasa Government dispatched a special delegate to the wartime capital, Chungking, pledging Tibet's sincere co-operation with the central government in the struggle for national existence."²⁸ Finally, the national ensign of the Communist Regime has four small stars and one big star. Among the four small stars, one is designed to represent Tibet; that national flag was made before the "Liberation" of Tibet.

These are only a few of the many significant evidences that Tibet was still de facto and de jure an integral part of China at the most critical period of Chinese history. On May 23, 1951, the Peking Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet was signed and China's full sovereignty in Tibet was further strengthened and agreed upon by the Tibetans themselves.²⁹

²⁷For details, see Mong-Tsang Yoh-Pao (the official publication of the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs), XIX, No. 6, and see Li, op. cit., 398.

²⁸C. Y. Meng, "Tibetans Are Praying for China's Victory," China Weekly Review, LXXXVIII (April 15, 1939), 205.

²⁹Gelder, op. cit., pp. 241-4 (The Chinese-Tibetan Agreement of May 23, 1951).

At the United Nations in December, 1950, the British delegate proposed to defer action on a request of El Salvador to have the Tibetan appeal placed on the agenda of the General Assembly, because no one knew exactly what was going on in Tibet nor was its legal status very clear. At this point the Russian chief delegate seconded the British proposal of deferment and went on to say that the United Kingdom, the United States, and the U. S. S. R. had recognized Chinese sovereignty over Tibet a long time ago.³⁰ He also refuted the El Salvador delegate, saying that there was no international instrument in support of his argument that China was the aggressor in Tibet. No one challenged the Russian delegate's statement.

It is for these reasons that India recognized China's sovereignty in Tibet in a Treaty, "Trade and Intercourse Between Tibet Region of China and India," in 1954.³¹

Last, it is necessary to point out that countries that have not recognized the Communist Regime in China may also not recognize her legal status in Tibet. But as far as Tibet is concerned, the stands of the Nationalists and the Communists are identical on its legal status.³² Pakistan's

³⁰O. M. Lee, "The Myth of Chinese Aggression," The Nation, CCV(Nov. 6, 1967), 460.

³¹Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, pp. 40-47.

³²Werner Levi, "The Sino-Indian Border War," Current History, XLV (1963) 136; see also China Daily News (New York, March 23, 1955), note 35; and see also Li, op. cit., p. 404 and Lee, op. cit., p. 460.

Foreign Minister, Mohammad Ali, said in the National Assembly of Pakistan November 22, 1962, that:

In regard to the Chinese Government's refusal to subscribe to the validity of the McMahon Line even the Kuomintang Regime in Formosa is in complete agreement with the stand taken by the People's Republic of China, and has, therefore, protested to the Government of the United States when they announced their recognition of the McMahon Line.³³

³³Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, p. 373.

CHAPTER III

THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE BOUNDARY IN DISPUTE

With China's sovereignty in Tibet largely identified in Chapter II, we shall examine the legal aspects of the boundary in dispute, which has three sectors: the Eastern, the Middle, and the Western Sections.

The area of the Eastern Section in dispute is about 32,000 square miles (or 90,000 square kilometers). It runs from the crest of the Assam Himalaya in Bhutan to Burma. This ribbon-like stretch of mountainous terrain exceeds 700 miles in length and contains much good farmland and virgin forest.¹ It is inhabited mostly by people of Tibetan extraction and some aboriginal tribes called the Aka, Dafla, Miri, Abor, and Mishmi groups.² These tribal groups are Mongoloid, and are believed to have migrated from Kwangsi and Yunnan provinces long ago.³ India claims the area by virtue of the "illegal McMahon Line." The Indians named it the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and incorporated it into

¹Strong, op. cit., p. 320.

²Lamb, op. cit., p. 21.

³Kwangsi and Yunnan Provinces contain most of the minority groups of China. There are more than ten groups, who have had their own way of life until recently.

the Indian Constitution in 1950.⁴ China flatly denies the validity of this line and claims that the traditional boundary runs along the foot of the Himalayan Range. The traditional line, however, has never been satisfactorily delimited.⁵

The Middle Section lies to the west of Nepal, is about 400 miles long, and is patched with disputed spots; it is where Tibet's large pastoral province, Ari, meets India's Punjab and Uttar Pradesh. The total spots in dispute are nine: Lapthal, Sangcha, Tsungsha, Sang, Puling-Sumdo, Shipki pass (Niti pass), Chuji, Chuva, and Parigas.⁶ The total area of these points is under 200 square miles, but they have good pastures and are populated. Though this section is less important than the other two, the first boundary dispute began there when China sent a note to the Government of India on July 17, 1954.⁷ Some writers ignore this first note from China and begin their discussions with the Indian note of July, 1955.⁸

⁵Documents on the Sino-Indian Boundary Question (Peking, 1960), pp. 41-42.

⁶Ibid., p. 19.

⁷Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, p. 61; it states that "According to a report received from the Tibet region of China, over thirty Indian troops armed with rifles crossed the Niti Pass on June 29, 1954, and intruded into Wu-Je of the Ari Area of the Tibet region of China. (Wu-Je is about one day's journey from the Niti Pass.) . . ."

⁸Wayne A. Wilcox, India, Pakistan and the Rise of China (New York, 1964), p. 107.

The Western Section includes Aksai Chin and Ladakh (or little Tibet). It exceeds 15,000 square miles and is over 1,000 miles in length. Much of the disputed territory lies in Aksai Chin, a jumble of high peaks, crags, glaciers, and mountain pastures that runs to 17,000 feet elevation. It is peopled regularly by the Tibetans and Uighur herdsmen of Sinkiang (Chinese Turkistan), who use the area for transhumance--coming up for the high pasture in summer and leaving in winter. India lays claim to it by virtue of a treaty between Tibet and Kashmire, the validity of which is denied by China. The Chinese have used the land for two hundred years at least. The Indian claim is also refuted by many qualified writers.⁹

Before any further discussion of these three sections it is necessary to point out again that the Simla Convention upon which the Indian Government so heavily relied is not a valid treaty. The background of the conference and why it was held, its results and some of its questionable legal aspects have been discussed in Chapter II and will not be duplicated here. The following concerns mainly one point which has not been discussed so far.

Generally speaking, the formation of a treaty must pass through the process of negotiation, signature, and ratification. Any treaty that has not gone through such a process

⁹These writers are A. Lamb, A. L. Strong, D. Wilson, R. A. Huttenback, and many others; see the bibliography for their works.

should not be considered valid.¹⁰ From this point of view, the Simla Convention should be considered as an abortive one, as it has never gone through the process. Ivan Chen only negotiated, and the Tibetan delegate, Shatra, not having full power because Tibet is a dependent of China, signed the convention. However, it was later repudiated by Dalai Lama XIII himself.¹¹ Even if Shatra had the right to sign on behalf of Tibet, the Simla Convention is not binding, because no government concerned in the negotiations except the British has ratified that convention.

A treaty will not be binding simply because it has been signed. In principle, it should still be ratified before its binding force become effective. Therefore, signature means solely that the negotiation of contracting a treaty has come to its end.¹²

Thus India's justification of her boundary in the Eastern Section is not valid. In other words, the McMahon Line is not an established line as far as international law is concerned. This is so even though the British and India enforced the validity of the McMahon Line from the 1920's to the 1950's over the protests of China and the Tibetan authorities.

¹⁰Paun Ming-Min, International Law: Peace and War (Taipei, 1957), p. 29; see also Starke, International Law (London, 1963), p. 337; see also E. C. Stowell, International Law: A Restatement of Principles in Conformity with Actual Practice (New York, 1931), pp. 401-2.

¹¹Strong, op. cit., p. 321.

¹²Paun, op. cit., p. 35; see also Starke, op. cit., p. 335.

Although the North East Frontier Agency was incorporated by the Indian Constitution in 1950, many of the areas by that time were beyond the administration of the Indian Government. It was only by 1951 that India was able to occupy these territories over the protests of the Tibetan local authorities.¹³ It must be remembered that "the so-called McMahon Line was drawn in March, 1914, outside the Simla Conference, by McMahon and Shatra, . . . as the result of a secret exchange of notes in Delhi, and without the knowledge of the representative of the central government of China."¹⁴ Concerning this aspect, A. Lamb has a discussion which justifies the above statement. He says,

The notes of 24-25 March 1914, together with the accompanying map (in two sheets), do not appear to have been communicated to the Chinese: but, on a much smaller-scale map which served the Conference as the basis for discussions of the Inner Tibet-Outer Tibet boundary, the 24-25 March line, which I will from now on call the McMahon Line, was shown as a sort of appendix to the boundary between Inner Tibet and China proper. The McMahon Line as such was never discussed by the Chinese at the Conference, or so the available information would indicate, and the Chinese have subsequently, both under the Koumintang and the Communists, maintained that the negotiating of the McMahon Line was a British trick: hence their constant prefix of the term "illegal" to any mention of this boundary.¹⁵

The McMahon line was never fully administered by the British Indian Authority. The legal aspects of this alignment have been discussed above to some extent, but it must be

¹³Strong, op. cit., p. 322; and Lamb, op. cit., pp. 166-167.

¹⁴Kao, op. cit., p. 14.

¹⁵Lamb, op. cit., pp. 144-145.

emphasized that Britain never publicly claimed this line. It became known only in 1938, when China was deeply involved in the war with Japan. Britain then began to occupy parts of the territory and put it on maps as "disputed boundary." Sir Henry Twyuan, Governor of Assam in 1939, wrote in The Times, September 2, 1959, saying that "the McMahon Line does not exist, and never did."¹⁶ Yet, the present Indian Government not only insists that the McMahon Line is the Sino-Indian boundary, but has repeatedly revised it. According to the original map on which the "McMahon Line" was marked in 1914, the western end of the line is at latitude 27 degrees 44.6 minutes north. Today, the Indian government puts it at 27 degrees 48 minutes, pushing the alignment six kilometers farther north into Chinese-claimed territory.

An examination of the authoritative maps of the Chinese and western countries indicates that the NEFA now claimed by India is within China. To name a few, the 1784 and 1820 editions of The Historical and Geographical Records of the Great Ch'ing, the Eastern Turkistan Map (1870, Hayward), the

¹⁶The Times (London), September 2, 1959, p. 11:
 ". . . But the McMahon Line, which sought to secure the main crest of the Himalayas as the frontier, does not exist, and never has existed. . . . In 1939, when acting as Governor of Assam, I was shown by the political officer of the Balipara Frontier Tract lantern slides which established beyond all doubt the Tibetan character of Tawang, which he had recently visited with an escort of Assam Frontier Rifles. Since then, exploration has shown that there comes a point in many areas along this frontier where Assamese contacts give way to Tibetan. . . ."

Henry Royal Atlas of Modern Geography (1924, Edinburg edition), the Times Survey Atlas of the World (1920, London edition), Encyclopaedia Britannica (1929 edition), the China Atlas (1935, Harvard), Asia Physical Atlas (1935, U. S. S. R.), History and Geographical Atlas (1939, France), High School Atlas by In Hof (1955, Switzerland), the Faber Atlas (1956, London edition), and the Map of the Republic of China, published by the Republic of China in Taiwan.¹⁷ These are some of the significant indications of the fact that the NEFA has been a part of China accepted and recognized the world over.¹⁸

The following evidence may be more convincing. First, the survey maps of the Government of India for 1938 on Tibet and adjacent countries, followed by the 1943, 1950, 1951 and even 1952 editions, did not mention the McMahon Line.¹⁹ It marked the boundary as "undelimited" showing the line of "customary usage" which is south of the McMahon Line. Second, John O. Crane wrote a letter to the New York Times for November 18, 1962, after the serious fighting started. He said:

¹⁷Wu Chen-Tsai, "Background and Perspective of the Peiping-New Delhi Conflict," China International Educational Association (Taipei, 1962), pp. 7-8.

¹⁸These maps and atlases are also applicable to the other two sections in dispute.

¹⁹Documents on the Sino-Indian Boundary Question, p. 40.

This evening (November 14), we pulled out our 1940 Oxford Advanced Atlas by Bartholomew to show our 12 and 14-year old sons the McMahon Line. Imagine our surprise to find, instead, the boundary line between India and Tibet to be virtually that now claimed by China.²⁰

Third, most important, Nehru's own book, The Discovery of India (third edition, 1951), put the boundary much closer to the line of the Communist Chinese claim than to the border fixed by India.²¹

With all this evidence that the NEFA is traditionally China's, the Communist Regime still says that the Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited. It proclaimed unilaterally that it would not cross the McMahon Line until after China and India agreed upon a common boundary through negotiations.²² In fact, China never crossed the McMahon Line until 1962 when the Indians occupied areas north of the line: Longju, Che Dong, and Khinzemane.²³ In the process of the fighting which ensued, China fought the Indians on her own soil. Evenso, after the Indians were driven back, China unilaterally withdrew to the line of actual control before the confrontation

²⁰The New York Times, November 18, 1962, Sec. 4, p. 10E.

²¹J. Nehru, The Discovery of India (New York, 1946), see the Map of India attached to this book.

²²Documents on the Sino-Indian Boundary Question, pp. 41-42.

²³The Sino-Indian Boundary Question (Peking, 1962), as used by W. A. Wilcox, op. cit., p. 122.

pending negotiations. Can such an action of the Chinese be construed as aggression in international law?

The middle section received less attention in the dispute not because the area is less than 200 square miles, but because India produced less evidence than with the other two sections that the section belongs to her. The nine places just mentioned belonged very recently to Tibet, and have been occupied by India. Sang and Tsungsha were occupied by British troops in the 1930's, an action which has since been protested by China. The other seven points (Parigas, Chuva, Chuje, Shipki Pass, Puling-Sundo, Sangchu and Lapthal) were occupied by Indian troops after 1954 over Chinese protests.²⁴ One outstanding case is Puling-Sundo, listed in the 1954 Sino-Indian Treaty as a market town, which gave India trading rights. It was seized by Indian troops in 1956. China protested but refused to see change by force, hoping to negotiate for its return. India claims that it was listed in the 1954 Treaty as a town which traders and pilgrims might use; therefore, that China agreed with India's interpretation of the border. Peking replied that a right to trade is not a deed to a town, and that the 1954 negotiation was a trade treaty, not a boundary

²⁴Documents on the Sino-Indian Boundary Question, p. 19; see also Strong, op. cit., pp. 319-320.

treaty.²⁵ It is believed that these Indian-occupied areas were returned to China after the 1962 confrontation.

The Western section, the Aksai-Chin and Ladakh, is called "Rudok Country" by China and "Eastern Ladakh" by India. India (Kashmir) has never occupied this area. There is a natural barrier to the access of the Kashmirans which runs in a zigzag direction from Karakoram Pass to the southeast until it meets the spur running south from the Kun Lun Range. This is a little east of 80 degrees east longitude. This high range caused the area to be impenetrable from the south.²⁶

India's claim that the Western section of the border was delimited by the 1842 Kashmir-Tibet Agreement is not true. The agreement was concluded unilaterally by the Tibetan local government and did not contain any concrete stipulations concerning the boundary. It merely provided that the boundary line between Ladakh and Tibet would be maintained and should not be infringed by either side.²⁷

²⁵Documents on Sino-Indian Boundary Question, p. 35; it stated: "Vice Foreign Minister Chang Han-Fu, in his talk with the Indian representative, Ambassador Mr. N. Raghavan, on April 23, 1954, clearly stated that the Chinese side did not wish, in those negotiations, to touch on the boundary question. And Ambassador N. Raghavan agreed forthwith. . . ."

²⁶R. A. Huttenback, "A Historical Note on the Sino-Indian Dispute Over the Aksai Chin," China Quarterly, No. 18 (April-June, 1964), pp. 202-203.

²⁷Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, pp. 1-2.

China has been using this area for centuries because it is the only practicable traffic route between Sinkiang and Tibet. Thus, even during the Ch'ing Dynasty, armed "check-posts" were established along the ancient caravan route, and were maintained right through the time of Chiang Kai-shek.²⁸ It is the route through which the People's Liberation Army marched into Tibet from the west. A substantial literature has given backing to the claim that Ladakh is a part of China. A. Lamb said,

The retention of the northern part of Aksai China on the British side was due to no more than a misunderstanding of the terms of the British note to China of 1899. It is certainly a fact that this note has been misquoted by a surprisingly large number of authorities. Perhaps this misquotation can be traced back to British times.²⁹

This statement is further held by R. A. Huttenback in the China Quarterly;³⁰ and D. Wilson's article, "Who's Right in the Himalayas," supported Lamb's argument that "the crucial section of Aksai Chin seems to have remained cartographically within India almost by default."³¹ Other information points out the position of Ladakh. Alexander

²⁸Documents on Sino-Indian Boundary Question, p. 43.

²⁹Lamb, op. cit., p. 174.

³⁰Huttenback, op. cit., pp. 204-205.

³¹D. Wilson, "Who's Right in the Himalayas," Far Eastern Economic Review, XLVII (March 18, 1965), 485.

Cunningham stated that

Ladakh is the most westerly country occupied by the Tibetan race who profess the Buddhist faith [as distinguished from Hinduism in India]. Ladakh is derived from the Tibetan word La-'Tags. The relations with Tibetans are those of two peoples speaking the same language and holding the same faith.
 . . . [They] are all of one race and intermarried and eat together.³²

Sir John Davis, the first British Minister to China, in his book, Chinese Miscellanies, published in 1865, said that "China's frontier is between Ladakh and Kashmir."³³

G. W. Haywood in his article on Ladakh in the Royal Geographical Society Journal of 1870 stated that "Ladakh stretches from the Karakorum Pass to Changchenmo," which is what the Chinese have always said.³⁴

The Cambridge History of India says that "Ladakh is a province of Tibet."³⁵ The "Official Survey of India" as late as in its 1943 edition gave no boundary at all. Even in the maps of 1950, it is still put: "Boundary undefined."³⁶

H. C. Hinton, in his book, Communist China in World Politics, had this to say:

³²Alexander Cunningham, Ladakh, cited by Chang Hsin-Hai, America and China (New York, 1965), p. 185.

³³Sir John Davis, Chinese Miscellanies (1865); cited by Chang; Ibid., p. 186.

³⁴G. W. Haywood, cited by Chang; Ibid., p. 186.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Documents on Sino-Indian Boundary Question, p. 40.

In the autumn of 1963, I examined all the official maps of India that had been published both before and after 1947 and were then available in the Map Reading Room of the Library of Congress. No map published before 1954, the year in which the Government of India realized that it had a serious frontier dispute on its hands, shows without any reservations the entire boundary now claimed by India.³⁷

There are statements by Nehru himself refuting India's claim to the area. He said on August 28, 1959, that "this is the boundary of old Kashmir state with Tibet and Chinese Turkestan. Nobody has marked it."³⁸ And on September 10, 1959, he said again: "This area has not been under any kind of administration."³⁹ Finally, on November 23, 1959, he said: "During British rule, as far as I know, this area was neither inhabited by any people nor were there any outposts."⁴⁰ These statements support the assertion above that India has never occupied that area. It is understandable why Nehru stressed that the area had never been administrated by any authority. The terrain--the high crest of impenetratable crags--physically barred the Kashmirans from knowing what has been going on the other side of the crests. His mistake is natural, as few people in India even in the British occupation ever dared to brave the hazards to the north of this natural barrier. Further, this was during the Ch'ing

³⁷H. C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics (Boston, 1966), p. 280.

³⁸J. Nehru, "India's Foreign Policy," Selected Speeches, September 1946--April 1961. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Government of India (1961), p. 329.

³⁹Ibid., p. 349.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 371.

Dynasty in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when China followed a policy of isolation, which prevented the rest of the world from knowing about China.

The present situation in the area is that the Chinese have widened the former caravan route into a modern motor highway linking Sinkiang and Tibet. This road was constructed between March, 1956, and October, 1957, without the knowledge of India. In 1959 India protested.⁴¹ Nehru explained it to the Lok Sabha (lower house of the Indian Parliament) on February 23, 1961:

[The Chinese action] was not clear to us whether the proposed motor road crossed our territory. The first suspicion that this might be so came to us in 1957 from a map published in Peking. We did not even then know definitely whether this transgressed our territory. . . .⁴² As we did not have proof, we did not protest then.

Let us examine India's claim. According to the law of nations on the conditions and effectiveness of occupation, China's occupation is lawful. India's attitude toward that land may be construed as having given up title to it. When a land (without an owner) which is deserted by others is occupied by another who effectively administers it, that land belongs to the latter.⁴³ International lawyers would agree that India has no title to that land because she only

⁴¹Ibid., p. 331.

⁴²Ibid., p. 332.

⁴³Paun, op. cit., pp. 225-227; see also Starke, op. cit., pp. 152-154; see also D. P. O'Connell, "The Concept of Effectiveness in Occupation," International Law: Volume One (New York, 1965), p. 471.

claimed it and never ruled it. In fact, by any standard allowed by the law of nations, India's claim is without support.

Judging from all the claims and counter claims, it is logical to infer that if India wishes to reach agreement with her northern neighbor, the dispute in this western section at least should not be difficult to solve.

CHAPTER IV

INDIAN POLICY FROM 1947 TO 1962

In 1947, the British left the Indian Peninsula with an expectation that two independent nations under the names of Pakistan and the Union of India would be set up together, with the Native States having a free choice of independence or of association with either Pakistan or the Indian Union. If these Native States sought association with either Pakistan or the Union of India, they still were to retain their statehood but the power of foreign affairs, communication, and defense would be delegated to the one with which they were to associate.¹

The Union of India gained its complete independence in 1947 and was much better endowed in land mass, administrative organization, public facilities and establishments, and communication system than Pakistan. Moreover, much of British India's financial reserve was transferred to the new state. To the revolutionary Indian leaders, this independence was a new hope and a great ordeal. For with such a big political entity to inherit, they were overwhelmed with the responsibility of nation-building lying ahead. Like other great nation-founders past and present, the Indian leaders were

¹T. W. Wallbank, India in the New Era (Chicago, 1951), pp. 166-167.

concerned with their nation's growth, security, integration, national, industrial, economical, and educational development and progress. But there were social, racial, religious, and other disruptive forces running counter to their ardent desire and expectation. It was a combined political, cultural, and economic factor left by history.

Thus endowed by history, there came with independence the most disastrous religious events caused by the communal antipathy between the Muslim and the Hindus and Sikhs in Punjab.² On the eastern side, the partitioned Bengal almost had the same tragedy; fortunately, Gandhi prevented this holocaust almost single-handed by an appeal and fast. There were serious outbreaks in Delhi also. Owing to this extreme anti-Muslim atmosphere, Gandhi started his last fast on January 13, 1948, to induce Indian leaders to pledge their opposition to any anti-Muslim program. He was assassinated on January 30, after a successful beginning.³

On the other hand, the integration of the Native States posed another serious problem. Some wished to become independent while others wished to accede to Pakistan.⁴ In order to prevent a return to its historical setting--Indian

²As a result, 500,000 Muslims were killed and 6,500,000 refugees crossed into Pakistan territory by the end of 1947; and more than five million Hindus and Sikhs fled from the Punjab, and large number of these people were massacred en route. For further detail, see Ibid., p. 178.

³Ibid., pp. 181-182.

⁴Ibid., pp. 162-167.

"Balkanization"--the Indian leaders had to resort to force. Ironically enough, Gandhi, who asked Britain to surrender to Hitler in 1940 for the sake of victory in non-violence, found it possible to support the dispatch of Indian troops to fight against the Muslim tribesmen in Kashmir.⁵

Added to these two important problems was the problem of the shortage of food. Facing these troubles, the Indian leaders almost lost their confidence.

To most historians, history teaches that India never knew political unity. Toynbee has expressed it: ". . . a society of the same magnitude as our Western civilization . . . a whole world in herself."⁶ The major cause of this political disunity of India, despite its geographical and economical unity, has been its multilingual small principalities. They have caused India to fail as consistently as Europe to hold together as a united political entity. Sir John Strachey pointed out in 1888 that "there is not and never was an India, no Indian nation, no 'people of India.'"⁷ Sir John R. Seeley, writing in 1883, also remarked that

⁵Ibid., p. 182.

⁶Arnold J. Toynbee, The World and the West (Oxford, 1953), p. 34, quoted in S. S. Harrison, India: The Most Dangerous Decades (Princeton, 1960), p. 3.

⁷Sir John Strachey, India: Its Administration and Progress (London, 1888), p. 4, quoted in S. S. Harrison, ibid., p. 4.

"India is a mere geographical expression like Europe or Africa."⁸

The above historical facts point to the necessity for the Indians to set their house in order. Nehru's speech delivered to the Constituent Assembly (Legislative), New Delhi, on December 4, 1947, clearly revealed this critical situation. He said:

We are not yet out of those difficulties, internal and other. We have not had a free hand in our external relations, and, therefore, I would beg the House to judge of this period in the context of what has been happening in this country, not only during the past year when we lived in the middle of internal conflict and confusion which drained away our energy and did not leave us time to attend to other matters.

Thus compelled by circumstances, Nehru determined to meet the challenge by all means.

As the Indians were fully occupied with their domestic affairs, there was little room left for them to lay out a definite policy in foreign affairs. Thus, Nehru stated:

Foreign policy is normally something which develops gradually. Apart from certain theoretical propositions you may lay down, it is a thing which, if it is real, has some relation to actuality and not merely pure theory. Therefore, you cannot precisely lay down your general outlook or general approach, but gradually it develops. . . .¹⁰

⁸Sir John R. Seeley, The Expansion of England (London, 1883), p. 92; ibid., p. 4.

⁹J. Nehru, Independence and After (New York, 1950), p. 199.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 253.

Yet concerning the flexibility of its emerging policy, the Indian Prime Minister stated again,

We cannot perhaps be friendly always with every country. The alternative is to become very friendly with some and hostile to others. That is the normal foreign policy of a country--very friendly with close relations with some, with the consequence that you are hostile to others. You may be very friendly to some countries and you cannot just be equally friendly with all countries. Naturally you are more friendly with those with whom you have closer relations, but that great friendliness, if it is active friendliness is good; if it merely reflects hostility to some other country, then it is something different. . . .¹¹

Admittedly, Nehru's approach to Indian foreign policy was pragmatic and realistic, as was his policy in internal affairs. He believed that "what ever policy we may lay down, the art of conducting the foreign affairs of a country lies in finding out what is most advantageous to the country."¹² As India itself was overwhelmed by internal disturbances, the most urgent need was time to regiment its heterogeneous society and to run its governmental apparatus effectively and efficiently. Furthermore, in the cold war era, the bipolar power distribution left room for states to remain unassociated with either bloc. Thus, "to keep out of Power Blocs"¹³ was the best policy for the Indians. D. E. Kennedy observed that by so doing India "is able to receive military and economic assistance from the West as well as the

¹¹Ibid., p. 254.

¹²Nehru's Speech as quoted in Wilcox, op. cit., p. 39.

¹³J. Nehru, Independence and After, pp. 212-222.

Communist Bloc."¹⁴ In this spirit, Nehru declared:

Therefore, we propose to look after India's interests in the context of world co-operation and world peace, in so far as world peace can be preserved.

We propose to keep on the closest terms of friendship with other countries unless they themselves create difficulties. We shall be friends with America. We intend co-operating with the United States of America and we intend co-operating fully with the Soviet Union. . . .¹⁵

Since Indian foreign policy is interest oriented, anything which runs against its fundamental interests is destined to be opposed. It, therefore, unavoidably, and naturally gave birth to a discrepancy between its words and deeds.

Nehru was by no means a follower of Gandhi as far as Ahimsa¹⁶ is concerned. Nehru believed that:

The concept of Ahimsa had a great deal to do with the motive, the balance of the violent mental approach, self-discipline, and control of anger and hatred, rather than with physical abstention from violent action, when this became necessary and inevitable.¹⁷

Such an attitude towards the doctrine of non-violence had a significant impact upon the formation of the Indian foreign and domestic affairs which were emerging. Nehru stated again:

¹⁴D. E. Kennedy, The Security of Southern Asia (New York, 1965), p. 64.

¹⁵J. Nehru, Independence and After, p. 205.

¹⁶An Indian Term for non-violence.

¹⁷Nehru, The Discovery of India, p. 97.

The first duty of every country is to protect itself. Protecting oneself unfortunately means relying on the armed forces and the like and so we build up, where necessity arises, our defence apparatus. We cannot take the risk of not doing so, although Mahatma Gandhi would have taken that risk no doubt and I dare not say that he would have been wrong. Indeed, if a country is strong enough to take that risk it will not only survive, but it will become a great country. But we are small folk and dare not take that risk. But in protecting oneself, we should do so in such a way as not to antagonize others and also so as not to appear to aim at the freedom of others.¹⁸

Under such a philosophy, inevitably, a dichotomy of Indian foreign policy emerged. For India was prepared to protect its interest even at the risk of violence. Let us listen to Nehru again:

We do not wish to interfere in international affairs, except where we feel that we might be able to be of some help, where something affects us directly--for instance, in regard to Goa, or when military help is given to Pakistan. Then we have to express our views clearly, strongly and unequivocally. . . . Where world peace is concerned, naturally we want to have our say, as a member of the world community. Where India's interests are directly threatened, . . . we must have our say, a loud say, a positive say. There we cannot be quiet.¹⁹

Indeed, at no time was India more concerned internationally than with the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and the Baghdad Pact. For, according to the India's stance, they are not only vital to India's interest but also a threat to her national security. Here is what the Indian Prime Minister said about them.

¹⁸Nehru, Independence and After, pp. 254-255.

¹⁹Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, pp. 71-72.

We in India have ventured to talk about peace. We have thought that one of the major areas of peace might be South-East Asia. The Manila Treaty rather comes in the way of that area of peace. It takes up that very area which might be an area of peace and converts it almost into an area of potential war. I find this development disturbing.²⁰

Likewise with the same logic for the consideration of peace and a non-military approach to world or regional problems, he criticized the Baghdad Pact, or CENTO, saying that

It seems extraordinary to me that this military approach to a problem should be persisted in. I am not saying that the military approach can be completely given up in this world. I am not speaking like a pacifist. But I submit that thinking of the world's problems in terms of military power and trying to solve them only in terms of military power are doomed to failure and have failed.²¹

Let us see how Nehru advised the two super-powers during the cold war era.

So, whether one of the countries is a little ahead of the other or not, the fact is that either of these giants has enough bombs to destroy the other completely. Therefore, any attempt on the part of one, however powerful, to coerce the other through military means, involves destruction of both. It becomes more and more obvious that policies of toughness and brandishing of the sword do not lead anywhere.²²

Because Nehru thought what he was doing was according to his best judgement, he said in a debate on foreign affairs in Lok Sabha on December 9, 1958,

From the larger point of view of the world also, we have laboured to the best of our ability for world peace. . . . Our influence has not been negligible. This is not because we ourselves are influential, but because we do believe that what we have said in regard

²⁰Ibid., p. 89.

²¹Ibid., p. 95.

²²Ibid., p. 76.

to peace has found an echo in people's minds and hearts in all countries. . . . The people have appreciated what we have said and reacted to it favourably. I can say with some assurance that our influence on peoples generally all over the world in regard to the matter of peace has been very considerable. Any hon. Member who happens to go to any part of the world will always find India's name associated with peace. It is a privilege to be associated with peace, but it brings a great responsibility. We should try to live up to it. In our domestic sphere also we should work on lines which are compatible with peace. We cannot obviously have one voice for the world outside and another voice internally.²³

However, regardless of what Nehru said, India's acts, as those of others, were carefully studied by political scientists in international affairs. Wilcox thus commented on the India foreign policy:

The dichotomy of Indian foreign policy was thus compounded. To the world, and on world issues, India was the dove of peace, whereas within the region she stood accused of power politics.²⁴

This two-faceted diplomacy of India has made a false impression upon western society that she is a peace-loving country. D. E. Kennedy observed that

After 14 years of Independence under Nehru's leadership, when New Delhi acted as a moulder of Asian opinion, India found herself more isolated in Asia than ever before.²⁵

And anti-Indian sentiments are widespread in Southern Asia. . . .²⁶

²³Ibid., pp. 79-81.

²⁴Wilcox, op. cit., p. 38.

²⁵Kennedy, op. cit., p. 60.

²⁶Ibid., p. 64.

This consequence may be ascribed to the big-nation mentality of Nehru as well as other Indian politicians which emanated after Independence. Nehru said,

Look at the map. If you have to consider any question affecting the Middle East, India inevitably comes into the picture. If you have to consider any question concerning South-East Asia, you cannot do so without India. So also with the Far East. While the Middle East may not be directly connected with South-East Asia, both are connected with India. Even if you think in terms of regional organizations in Asia, you have to keep in touch with the other regions. And whatever regions you may have in mind, the importance of India cannot be ignored.²⁷

With this in mind, Nehru proudly said that India was the number four super-power of the world next only to the United States, the U. S. S. R., and China. But he implied that India was the third super-power because he said India was industrially and economically more advanced than China:

Remember, China is still far less industrially developed than even India is. Much is being done in China which is praiseworthy and we can learn from them and we hope to learn from them, but let us look at things in proper perspective. India is industrially more developed than China. India has far more communications, transport, and so on. China, no doubt, will go ahead fast; I am not comparing or criticizing, but what I said was that this enormous country of China, which is a great power and which is powerful today, is potentially still more powerful. Leaving these three big countries, the United States of America, the Soviet Union and China, aside for a moment, look at the world. There are many advanced, highly cultured countries. But if you peep into the future and if nothing goes wrong--wars and the like--the obvious fourth country in the world is India.²⁸

This chapter thus far has discussed some of the ideas involved in Indian policy. Next comes a brief account of the

²⁷Nehru, Independence and After, p. 231.

²⁸Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 305.

national and international behavior of India after independence.

North East Frontier Agency

As the British Indian Administration was not successful in bringing the NEFA²⁹ within complete control for the reasons discussed in the previous chapters, the Nehru Government determined to occupy it. This policy inevitably aroused protests from the Tibetan authorities. On October 16, 1947, Tibetan authorities sent a telegram to the Indian Government claiming that India should recognize that the territories such as Zayul and Walong and in the direction of Pemako, Lonag, Lapa, Mon, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and others on this side of the River Ganges and Lowo, Ladakh, et cetera, up to the boundary of Yarkhim belong to Tibet.³⁰

The Indian Government replied:

The Government of India would be glad to have an assurance that it is the intention of the Tibetan government to continue relations on the existing basis until new agreements are reached on matters which either

²⁹The last British Political Officer there in 1947, Colonel Betts, told G. N. Patterson that there was no alteration in the position when he was there and that it was still necessary to obtain permission from the Tibetan authority in Tawang to travel in that area, that Indian authority extended only to the Se-La Sub Agency, south of Tawang, and that token tribute was paid to Tibet in recognition of this. For the works of G. N. Patterson, see the bibliography. This information can be found in G. N. Patterson, Peking Versus Delhi (New York, 1963), p. 174; also see the maps in the Appendix.

³⁰Ibid., p. 174 (quoted by Patterson).

party would wish to take up. This is the procedure adopted by all other countries with which India has inherited Treaty relations from his Majesty's Government. . . .³¹

However, not a single meeting was held to discuss the matter. Yet the Indians sent military personnel to occupy those areas. In 1949, the remaining part of the Sadiya Frontier Tract was divided into Abor Hills and Mishmi Hills divisions. In the same year, the Subansiri Divisional Headquarters were established. In February, 1951, Tawang was occupied by Indian troops when the Chinese government was in the midst of the Korean struggle and was engaged in efforts to bring Tibet within effective control. In 1954, the NEFA was divided into five divisions: Kameng (2,000 square miles), Subansiri (7,950 square miles), Siang (8,392 square miles), Lohit (5,800 square miles), and Tirap (2,657 square miles).³² A special administrative unit of some 31,438 square miles under the Foreign Ministry with the Governor of Assam acting as the agent of the President of India was created, and the NEFA divisions were within its jurisdiction. India was not satisfied with this; she continued to push northward and established many frontier posts which resulted in protests from China. Its details and the situations of Ladakh and the Middle sector will be discussed later.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid., pp. 175-177.

Sikkim and Bhutan

Sikkim and Bhutan, former protectorates of the Ch'ing Dynasty, are small states of the Himalayas. The British brought them within their sphere of influence, though not without struggle. These Himalayan states assumed strategic importance after World War II, which resulted in near loss of statehood to India.

Sikkim.³³ There was discontent in Sikkim in 1947, called by some "the Sikkim Revolution." It was due to a "No Tax" campaign initiated by political agitators. Immediately, the Sikkim State Congress, the first political party in Sikkim, was formed. Later, two more political parties were formed. These political parties agitated for greater reforms and freedom. They called on the peasants to join in a "No Rent" campaign and marched on to the capital, Gangtok. The Indian Political Officer in Sikkim intervened, the leaders of this movement were released and serious trouble was averted. Facing pressure for reform, the Maharaja was compelled to make concessions. He announced the formation of an Interim Government with Congress participation. It took office in May, 1949. The "Interim Government" was composed of five members. Three of them, including the Chief Minister, came from the State Congress. The

³³A Himalaya Kingdom of 2,818 square miles with a population of 165,000. Much of its former territories are now within the states of Bhutan, Nepal, India, and Tibet Region.

other two were nominated by the Maharaja. This "Interim Government" did maintain peace and good order.³⁴

But, Sikkim, "a dagger aimed at the heart of India,"³⁵ soon invited the Indians to occupy it entirely for the sake of "Indian Security." Therefore, at the end of May, 1949, Dr. B. V. Keskar, Deputy Minister in the Indian External Affairs Ministry, was sent on a mission to Gangtok. He left Gangtok on May 27. The Ministers of Sikkim met him on two occasions and were instructed on various matters. Dr. Keskar stressed that Sikkim was important to India and said that he expected peace and good order there; and that in case of a contingency arising in Sikkim which might disturb the security of the Indian frontier, the Government of India would be obliged to exercise its authority.³⁶

Ten days after Keskar's return to India, on June 5, H. Dayal, Political Officer in Sikkim, sent for all five Ministers and dissolved the "Interim Government" or the Ministry in the name of the Government of India. The next day, June 6, 1949, the Government of India announced that it would send personnel to take over the administration of Sikkim, and annexed it as one of the states of the Indian

³⁴Patterson, op. cit., p. 232.

³⁵Sir Charles Bell called Sikkim as "a dagger aimed at the heart of India," because it lies in the inverted triangle of the Chumbi Valley.

³⁶Patterson, op. cit., p. 233. (A "Memorandum on Sikkim Affairs," drawn up by the Sikkim State Congress was submitted to the Government of India at the time. Patterson reprinted it in his book in full.)

Union.³⁷ Thus, the month-old "Interim Government" which enjoyed the confidence of at least 75 per cent of the population ceased to exist.³⁸

This sudden dissolution of the "Interim Government" came as a shock to the people of Sikkim, who were defenseless before the big neighbor to the south. However, the leaders of the Sikkim State Congress determined to find a solution for the situation and requested negotiations with Nehru. They were refused, however. It was not a bloodless annexation. On December 5, 1950, Sikkim was compelled to sign a treaty which made it a protectorate of India. It was only allowed to retain internal autonomy and external affairs were left to the Government of India. Details of the aftermath of the annexation will not be discussed here.

Bhutan. Following the events in Sikkim in June, 1949, India determined to regularize her relations with Bhutan. Thus a treaty was signed on August 9, 1949, in Darjeeling, in which the government of India undertook to recognize the provisions of the Anglo-Bhutanese Sinchula Treaty of 1865 and the amended Treaty of 1910, and agreed to exercise no interference in the internal affairs of Bhutan.³⁹ Concerning external affairs, however, the Government of Bhutan agreed to be advised. The Government of India was to pay

³⁷Ibid., pp. 233-234.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Pradyuma P. Karan, Bhutan: A Physical and Cultural Geography (Lexington, 1967), pp. 97-98.

Bhutan 500,000 rupees annually to compensate for the territory previously annexed by India, and the thirty-two square miles of territory at Dewargiri was to return to Bhutan.⁴⁰

India observed the Treaty and Bhutan remained peaceful for about eleven years after the ratification of the newly amended treaty. India was not represented in the country directly, for the Indian Political Officer in Sikkim took care of the work. Nehru paid Bhutan a visit in the autumn of 1958, when he was refused permission to visit Tibet by China and was advised to go to Bhutan instead.⁴¹ Nehru did so. His first visit there may be taken as an Indian signal that Bhutan was within her legitimate sphere of interest. For Nehru stated:

In the event of any aggression against Bhutan by any country, India would consider it as an act of aggression against herself and act accordingly.⁴²

Nehru's visit was followed by some Indian aid which enabled the Bhutanese Government to start on a program of road-building; and some Bhutanese students were encouraged to study at Indian schools. Such gestures, however, did not

⁴⁰Ibid.; see also the Map of Bhutan.

⁴¹There was no direct communication between India and Bhutan at that time, and all Indians who wished to go to Bhutan had to travel fifteen miles across the Chumbi Valley of Tibet.

⁴²Patterson, op. cit., p. 215.

put Bhutan firmly on India's side; for she feared that India was not strong enough to protect her in case of real danger.

With regard to the Sino-Indian border dispute, the acting Prime Minister, Jigme Dorgi, stated that his country would not like to be involved; and added:

Bhutan did not want to get involved in the dispute, he would not support the Indian stand that the McMahon line was the valid boundary between India and Tibet.⁴³

As India still holds the right to control Bhutan's foreign policy according to the amended treaty of 1949, a Sino-Bhutanese border treaty was supposed to have been concluded secretly in 1961 which guaranteed the Chinese the right of transit across its territory in exchange for China's recognition of the boundary which Bhutan claimed.⁴⁴ This information may be reinforced by the fact that when the People's Republic of China lists the boundary agreements it has signed it never mentions Bhutan but always implies that the list is incomplete.⁴⁵

When India displeased Bhutan, the latter threatened that if Indian aid was cut off, she would get aid from the United Kingdom, the United States, the U. S. S. R., and other sources, and demanded the withdrawal of Indian troops from Bhutan. In 1965, the Bhutanese National Assembly

⁴³Ibid., p. 218.

⁴⁴G. N. Patterson, "Recent Chinese Policies in Tibet and Towards the Himalayan Border States," The China Quarterly, No. 21 (October-December, 1962), 199.

⁴⁵Hinton, op. cit., p. 323.

adopted a resolution asking for United Nations membership.⁴⁶ India advised that it was a "premature" request in view of the Kingdom's shortage of money and experienced men to provide effective representation. When King Wangchuk visited New Delhi in May, 1966, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi assured him that India would sponsor Bhutan's membership whenever Bhutan was ready for it.⁴⁷

There is strong anti-Indian feeling in Bhutan; but there has been no desperate action taken so far.

Nepal

Although India has recognized Nepal's political independence, Nehru still considered it as part of India at least geographically. Indian personnel were sent to the Nepalese Government to strengthen its guard on its border with Tibet. And on many occasions, Nehru stressed that the interests of the two nations are identical and that he would not tolerate Nepal being invaded:

It is not possible for the Indian Government to tolerate any invasion of Nepal from anywhere, even though there is no military alliance between the two countries. Any possible invasion of Nepal . . . would inevitably involve the safety of India.⁴⁸

On this basis, Nehru undertook to control Nepal. A Nepal-Indian Friendship and Peace Treaty was ratified in 1950

⁴⁶Karan, op. cit., p. 84.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 84.

⁴⁸J. Nehru, Speeches 1949-53 (Delhi, 1954), p. 147.

which made Nepal India's protectorate. However, Nepalese politics entered a period of crisis at the end of 1950 when a coup d' état by the Nepali Congress party and the then powerless King Tribhuvana, both supported by India, toppled the Government of the Rana family, Nepal's de facto rulers.⁴⁹ The reason for this Indian behavior is that India wanted Nepal to become democratized, which might facilitate India's influence and increase Nepal's dependence.

This Indian attitude was as old as 1947. When the coup d' état was not successful, King Tribhuvana Bir Bikram Shah found asylum in India and obtained help from India for an attack.⁵⁰ The attacks were made from Indian territory from six points.⁵¹ Finally, Nehru acted as an arbiter, and the Ranas were forced to come to terms with the King and the other leaders of the insurrection.⁵² Subsequently, a coalition government was formed, and the King returned to Nepal holding the supreme power. This was followed by the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in 1951.

At the turn of 1951-52, a revolt broke out in Nepal, and the local communist party was outlawed by the Government,

⁴⁹Shen-Yu Dai, "Peking, Katmandu and New Delhi," The China Quarterly, No. 16 (October-December, 1963), 87.

⁵⁰Eugene Bramer Mihaly, Foreign Aid and Politics in Nepal: A Case Study (London, 1965), pp. 15-17.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Dai, op. cit., p. 88.

then dominated by the pro-Indian Nepali Congress Party. The leader of the Opposition, K. I. Singh, escaped to Tibet.⁵³

At this time, blessed with the Sino-Indian rapprochement, Nepal began to be cordial with Peking. The Bandung Conference helped nurture their relations. When the Bandung Conference was just started, King Tribhuvana of Nepal died in Paris, and his son Mahendra ascended the throne.⁵⁴ He immediately despatched Subhang Jang Thapu to Bandung and instructed him to endorse the principles of peaceful co-existence in the presence of Nehru and Premier Chou En-Lai.⁵⁵ As a result, China's ambassador to India, Yuan Chung-hsien visited Katmandu shortly after the Bandung Conference; and an agreement was concluded on August 1, 1955, which established diplomatic relations between Nepal and China.⁵⁶

The young King Mahendra gradually showed that he wanted to move away from total Indian influence by trying to use the strength of China as a lever against India. His attempt irritated Nehru, who finally planned, according to the Nepalese Foreign Minister Dr. Tulsi Giri, an assassination

⁵³K. I. Singh returned to Nepal in 1955 denying any conversion to communism or inappropriate connections with Peking.

⁵⁴Dai, op. cit., p. 89.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Ibid.

of Mahendra; but Nehru's scheme, if it existed, failed.⁵⁷ Anti-Indian feeling was aroused, which pushed Nepal closer to China. During Mahendra's state visit to Peking in 1961, China offered aid to Nepal; and, at the same time, the King accepted China's offer to build a highway linking Lhasa and Katmandu.⁵⁸ Thus could be seen as an open defiance of India by Nepal.

Kashmir

Kashmir, the most northerly state of British India, has an area of 84,470 square miles with less than five million people according to the 1941 census. Almost the whole population except 880,000 are Moslems. About 807,000 Hindus live in the Jammu district. This state is commonly known as Jammu and Kashmir.⁵⁹

After the partition of British India in 1947, the Maharajah, Sir Hari Singh, a Hindu, announced the accession of Kashmir to the Republic of India. This decision was against the wish of all Moslems and unacceptable to Pakistan. As a

⁵⁷Hemen Ray, "Communist China's Strategy in the Himalayas: Nepal, A Case Study," Orbis, XI (Fall, 1967), 838; it states: "During 1962 relations between Nepal and India continued to deteriorate, mainly because of an abortive attempt to assassinate King Mahendra on January 22 of that year, which Nepalese Foreign Minister Dr. Tulsī Giri blamed on Indian 'Inaction.'"

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 837.

⁵⁹The Indian Prime Minister, Nehru, was a native of Kashmir; it is for this reason, according to some writers, that India originally took such an intransigent stand towards Kashmir.

result of the fighting between the Hindus and Moslems, India and Pakistan sent in troops. In December, 1947, the Government of India referred the dispute to the Security Council of the United Nations, charging armed aggression by Pakistan. Therefore, a Peace Commission was set up which resulted a cease-fire line on July 26, 1949, between the two parties. But the Indian Government rejected the Commission's suggestion for the appointment of an arbitrator having the power to decide the issue for both sides.⁶⁰ If India had agreed to this proposal, a plebiscite would be held to decide the fate of Kashmir. As one out of six Kashmirans is a Hindu, the result of the plebiscite would be to the disadvantage of India. From 1948 to 1957, the Security Council passed five resolutions urging that the plebiscite be held so that the status of Kashmir could be decided. India rejected all these resolutions. Instead, over the protest of the United Nations, India incorporated Kashmir into the Union on January, 1957.⁶¹ Thus India precipitated a conflict with her former friends.

Junagadh and Hyderabad

Junagadh. Junagadh is a former small princely state, located at 21.33 north latitude and 70.25 east longitude in the Kathiawar Peninsula of India, not a part of the state of

⁶⁰Eekelen, op. cit., p. 66.

⁶¹A. Lamb, The Kashmir Problem: A Historical Survey (New York, 1966), p. 75.

Gujarat. Its population is predominately Hindu, speaking a language called Gujarati. Unlike Kashmir, it had chosen to accede to Pakistan. India acted carefully and suggested a referendum. Pakistan rejected this and stated that the accession was a matter between the Nawab and his subjects only. But the dispute was redirected to a second issue purposely by India as two small areas around Junagadh chose to accede to India. As these two small areas were under the suzerainty of Junagadh, the Nawab sent in troops to stop them from joining the Indian Union. Taking this chance, Sardar Patel, the Indian Deputy Prime Minister called it an act of aggression; and said that it must be met by strength. Lord Mountbatten, the Governor General of British Indian Administration, proposed to refer the question to the United Nations, but Sardar Patel rejected it. The British pressure was effective only in delaying Indian military action; the two areas were finally taken over by India.⁶² The Nawab of Junagadh was forced to escape and the remaining authorities of Junagadh asked for Indian assistance in administration. Three months later, a referendum was held and Junagadh was thus incorporated.

Hyderabad. Hyderabad is a very big state, located at 23.29° north latitude and 76.50° east longitude almost at the center of the Deccan Plateau of the Indian subcontinent.

⁶²Eekelen, op. cit., p. 65.

It had enjoyed a semi-autonomous status since its creation in 1724. Throughout the years, it relied on the support of the Moghul Emperors at first and later upon the British. India failed to persuade Hyderabad to accede to India. Its population is eighty-five per cent Hindu, but it was governed by a Muslim minority. It sent a message to the United Nations requesting membership and help after it declared independence. India used economic blockage; when that failed, Nehru sent in troops, and some serious fighting ensued. The situation did not involve the participation of Pakistan though its help was requested. The campaign was known as the five-day military campaign in September, 1948; as a result, the Nizam was forced to accept the Indian Constitution.⁶³ This campaign, in which there were "eight hundred casualties, mainly on the Hyderabad side, served as the first evidence that India would resort to force to meet a threat to her vital interest."⁶⁴

The Occupation of Goa

Goa, a Portuguese settlement on the West coast of the Indian peninsula since 1510, had a population of about 600,000 before Indian occupation, but only 1,438 of them are of Hindu origin. It is economically dependent on India.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴v. P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States (Chapter VI, Junadagh; Chapters XVII-XIX, Hyderabad), cited by Eekelen, ibid., p. 65.

Most of the industries are run by Indians and Indian laborers. After 1953, the Indian Government accelerated its attempt to bring Goa into the Indian Union. India organized an economic blockade; and the Satyagrahis or non-violent resisters, intruded several times into Goa, making disturbances without using arms. Portugese troops drove them back. But an incident involving three thousand Satyagrahis on August 15, 1955, caused at least thirteen casualties; consequently, India and Portugal broke diplomatic relations. Nehru threatened that India would not hesitate to use her power to solve the problem if necessary.⁶⁵ Later, New Delhi described the firing from the island of Arjadev as "aggressive action taken by the Portuguese against Indian shipping."⁶⁶ As there was "intensified oppression and terrorism" inside Goa, Nehru thought it about time to use force.⁶⁷ On the other hand, Lisbon ascribed the incident to Indian preparations for an attack on Arjadev. In order to show its reasonable approach to the dispute, Portugal proposed the despatch of an international mission to study the situation and determine the responsibility for the incidents. The proposal was ignored.⁶⁸ United Nations Secretary General

⁶⁵Eekelen, op. cit., p. 74.

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 75.

⁶⁸Ibid.

U. Thant urged both sides to an early peaceful solution in accordance with the principles of the Charter.⁶⁹ Nehru replied that it was impossible to negotiate with Lisbon because it had a sixteenth-century concept of colonial conquest.

Two days later, at midnight between December 17 and 18, 1961, India launched an invasion with about 30,000 troops. Within two days, Goa surrendered. When the campaign was over, reports in the Times and The Guardian stated that there were repressions of nationalists, the administration was in chaos; and a military build-up was in process.⁷⁰ The captured garrison numbered 3,240, excluding the African troops.

At the Security Council, India maintained that since Goa was part of India, her action was not aggression. France, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States drafted a resolution which deplored the use of force by India. It called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and an immediate Indian withdrawal, and urged an early solution through peaceful means. This draft obtained the necessary seven votes, but was vetoed by the U. S. S. R.⁷¹

⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰Ibid., (The Times, December 20; The Guardian, December 26, 1961. The Indian allegations were contained in the letter dated December 12, 1961, from the Permanent Representative of India to the President of the Security Council. Document S/5020.)

⁷¹Ibid., p. 76.

United States Ambassador Stevenson regarded the Indian military action as clearly an act of aggression, and pointed out that India as a member of the United Nations had violated its Charter, because a dispute which could endanger international peace and security had to be presented to the Security Council. He also cited India's refusal to accept an American offer of good offices to assist in negotiations.⁷² Despite much talk in Europe and North America about India's aggression, no action was taken to sanction India.

The Nagaland

Nagaland is a hilly terrain bordering Burma, the NEFA, and the Assam state of India. The people are of Mongolian extraction, and are called the Nagas. Their approximate number was one million in 1947, scattered through sixteen different tribes. They are called "Subject Nagas" and "Free Nagas." The subject Nagas were those which came within the British jurisdiction after the military annexation of a part of the Naga territory in 1879, while the free Nagas were those who remained free and lived in the adjacent areas outside of anyone's jurisdiction.⁷³

⁷²Security Council Debates of December 19, 1961; Press Conference by Adlai Stevenson, December 21, 1961; "Security Council Considers Situation in Goa; Soviet Veto Bars Call for Cease-fire," Department of State Bulletin, XLVI No. 1178 (January 22, 1962), 145-7.

⁷³G. N. Patterson, "The Naga Revolt," Spectator, Vol. CCIX (September 14, 1962), 356.

On two important occasions, the Simon Commission to investigate Indian constitutional reform in 1929 and the 1947 British India partition, the representatives of the Nagas (both the Subject and the Free Nagas) demanded to be left out of any arrangement with India, because they were not Indians.⁷⁴ Nehru supported the Naga revolts against the British administration in the 1930's. But after independence, Nehru suppressed the Nagas himself. As a result, the Nagas hated the Indians more than the British. They chose to become independent, but were finally persuaded to negotiate a Ten-Year Agreement with India when Nehru obtained help from the moderate Nagas. The agreement provided for the Nagas to choose whatever form of government they like after ten years. The preamble to the Agreement stated: "The right of the Nagas to develop themselves according to their freely expressed wishes is recognized. . . ."⁷⁵ But the negotiation broke down over "clause nine" because the wording was ambiguous and equivocal. It said:

The Governor of Assam, as the Agent of the Indian Union, will have a special responsibility for a period of ten years to ensure the due observance of the agreement; at the end of this period the Nagas National Council will be asked whether the above agreement is to extend for a further period or a new agreement regarding the future of the Naga people arrived at.⁷⁶

⁷⁴Verrier Elwin, Nagaland (Shillong, India, 1961), p. 39.

⁷⁵Patterson, "The Naga Revolt," op. cit., p. 356.

⁷⁶Ibid.

This clause confused the Nagas. Some thought that it was acceptable as a basis for further discussion. But in conversation with the Indian leaders, they were made to realize that the clause implied that they would always remain within some form of association within the Indian Union. The moderates of the Nagas were shocked, for they had accepted the negotiation of the Ten-Year Agreement because they envisaged their ultimate independence. As the clause was equivocal, they finally construed it as an Indian plot to enslave them.

The Naga National Council decided to appeal to Mahatma Gandhi. A nine-man delegation was sent to Delhi on July 19, 1947. Mahatma Gandhi failed to persuade them to remain within the Union, and finally said:

Nagas have every right to become independent. We did not want to live under the domination of the British and they are now leaving us. I want you to feel that India is yours, that this city of Delhi is yours. I feel that Naga Hills is mine just as much as it is yours. But, if you say that it is not mine, the matter must stop there. I believe in the brotherhood of man, but I do not believe in force and forced unions. If you do not wish to join the Union of India, nobody will force you to do that. . . . I will ask them to shoot me first before one Naga is shot.⁷⁷

No agreement was reached, and the Naga National Council proclaimed the Independence of Nagaland on August 14, 1947.

As India was busy with its own matters after independence, the Indian Government did not do much to increase the anger of the Nagas. It must be pointed out the sixty per

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 356.

cent of the Nagas had by that time been converted to Christianity after a century of Baptist preaching.⁷⁸ Ironically, the Nagas adopted Gandhi's passive or non-violent resistance to any Indian attempt to subjugate them. Finally in 1955, they appealed to the United Nations, but the United Nations ignored their appeal. When the Indians publicly dishonored two highly respected Naga chiefs by exposing their dead bodies in a public square, the Nagas could not hold back any longer. They organized to revolt.

In 1956, the Nagas attacked Kohima. The Assam Rifles were almost totally defeated. Nehru sent in the regular units of the army--Gurkhas and Sikhs. The regular army continued to increase, according to Indian sources, but only to about 40,000 regular troops. But according to the Nagas, it was nearly 200,000. Since 1956, the Government of India has refused all journalists, Western and Indian alike, permission to visit Nagaland. Nagaland was put under total military control.

In 1959, the Indians reported that the leader of the Naga Council disappeared, but later he appeared in England. A. Z. Phizo claimed that he came to ask for help to put a stop to the Indian behavior in Nagaland and protest the Indian military occupation. He charged that "since 1955, 70,000 Nagas had been killed, over 100,000 were in

⁷⁸Elwin, op. cit., p. 62.

concentration camps, five hundred villages and one hundred fifty churches had been destroyed."⁷⁹

As there was no help from the British, he sent for a delegation to join him to appeal to the United Nations. In May, 1959, a team of heavily armed Nagas escorted the delegation into East Pakistan in safety. The delegation was made up of "General" Kaito, two Cabinet Ministers, and Phizo. They then went to London to make the case of Nagaland against India to the world. The Nagas are still fighting the Indians today with help from Burma, Pakistan, and Communist China.⁸⁰

Military Expansion

Now let us review briefly the military condition of India since its independence. From the period of 1947 to 1962, the Indian Government had spent a sum exceeding Rs 3,000 crores (about US\$6,300 million) on national defense.⁸¹ This sum is between twenty-one and forty-six per cent of the current expenditure of the Indian administration. By 1962 India possessed the largest navy (including one new

⁷⁹Patterson, "Naga Revolt," p. 357.

⁸⁰It must be pointed out that the Nagaland is one of the sixteen states within the Union of India. For further details, see Elwin, op. cit., pp. 83-89.

⁸¹Lorne J. Kavic, India's Quest for Security: Defense Policies, 1947-65 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967), p. 4.

aircraft-carrier)⁸² and air force of any country in the Indian Ocean region. Before 1962, agreement had been reached between the Russians and Indians for MIG 21 aircraft to be sold to India. At the same time, Russia also promised to provide India a MIG 21 factory. The Indian military build-up is mainly bought from outside. Aircraft and other military equipment also was bought from the United States, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere before the Confrontation of 1962. The military equipment of the Indian soldiers, as a result of various sources, is of great variety. By 1962, India had one of the largest standing armies in the world. At the same time, India was trying to make its own atomic weapons.

The above cases have served only to illustrate how far India had deviated from its lectures to the other countries about Ahimsa and Panch Sheela, and the necessity of living up to them. The reader may draw his own conclusions from the events discussed above. A quotation from a speech Nehru made in February, 1956, will end this chapter:

I am not aware of our Government having ever said that they adopted the doctrine of Ahimsa to our activities. They may respect, they may honor that doctrine, but as a government, it is patent that we do not consider ourselves capable of adopting the doctrine of Ahimsa.⁸³

⁸²According to estimates of the Navy of the Communist Regime by the Government of the Republic of China, Communist China did not even have one single aircraft-carrier before 1962.

⁸³Kavic, op. cit., p. 3.

CHAPTER V

SINO-INDIAN RAPPROCHEMENT

China and India established relations in December, 1949, and since then there have been attempts to strengthen the tie. They both felt it necessary to do so. But the Government of India took a pragmatic approach to the situation and China was cautious and watchful.

The Indians, like the Communists in China, were concerned with nation-building and economic development. They have had too much to deal with at home, as we have seen. It therefore was wise to be friendly with each other so long as there was no major physical conflict of interest. But with the Chinese entry into Tibet and the Indian expansion of their administration in the NEFA and other bordering areas, there existed a situation of deep concern to both sides--a concern of vital interest.

The Indians demonstrated, on the one hand, their friendship towards China on many occasions, while on the other they strengthened and expanded their control of the frontier areas and protectorates. Examples of the first policy are India's constant advocacy of a Peking seat in the United Nations, her hostility towards the Nationalist Government in Formosa, Nehru's criticism of the United States' non-recognition of Communist China, her mediator

role in the Korean War, joining the Soviet bloc against the resolution in the United Nations General Assembly condemning "Chinese Aggression" in Korea, refusal to vote in the General Assembly to impose an arms embargo against China and North Korea, and refusal to participate in the San Francisco Conference held in September, 1951, for the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty, because Communist China was not represented and because of the absence of a provision in the Treaty to restore Formosa to China. Delegations of all kinds, good-will, cultural, student youth, trade union, and judicial were sent by both countries for promoting friendship.

When in 1951 India suffered from an acute food shortage, Peking offered to send one million tons of grain. The Indian Communist agencies advertised it as a free gift by the Chinese as a sign of "unselfish and sincere friendship for the Indian people."¹ And "Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai" (Indian-Chinese are brothers) was a popular utterance.

This was followed by India's relinquishment of its special rights in Tibet established by the former Indian Government. In September, 1952, the Indian Political Agency was transformed into a Consulate General at Chinese suggestion.² Two years later, on April 29, 1954, the representatives of the two governments signed an Agreement on Trade

¹Chakravarti, op. cit., pp. 51-52.

²Ibid.

and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India.³

This agreement recognized Tibet as an integral part of China; and India was given the right to trade with Tibet.

It also established the famous Panch Sheela:

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,
2. Mutual non-aggression,
3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs,
4. Equality and mutual benefit,
5. Co-existence.⁴

But this Treaty was not ratified without some controversy at home. Nehru was attacked by the opposition leader, Kripalani; Nehru replied that he only accepted the treaty to recognize a fait accompli.⁵ However, it is true that the international situation impelled him to do so because India's relations with the United States and Pakistan continued to deteriorate. Most important of all was the pending United States military aid to Pakistan.⁶ The aid was publicly announced by President Eisenhower on February 24, 1954.⁷

When the South-East Asia Collective Defense Treaty was signed on September 8, 1954, and Pakistan was one of the

³Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, pp. 41-44.

⁴Ibid., p. 48.

⁵Nehru, Indian Foreign Policy, p. 304.

⁶Rowland, op. cit., p. 83.

⁷"Military Aid for Pakistan: Statement by the President," Department of State Bulletin, XXX, No. 768 (White House Press Release, March 15, 1954), p. 401.

eight signatories,⁸ India considered it as a threat to peace in Asia and especially to herself. This Treaty, in the eyes of the Indians, was a circle of military strength to protect Pakistan in her two regions. With Pakistan thus strengthened, India would find it more difficult to solve its problems with this Moslem neighbor, especially the question of Kashmir. The Treaty drove the Indians closer to China. For it was also one of the many military alignments designed to encircle Communist China by the United Kingdom and the United States in particular.

In April, 1955, an Afro-Asian Conference was held at Bandung, in Indonesia.⁹ This Conference was jointly sponsored by India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia. China and India were seen to be in close collaboration to demonstrate their interest in peace and cooperation particularly among Afro-Asian peoples. Chou En-Lai headed the Chinese delegation to the Conference. He was reported to be most successful in bringing to the conference China's

⁸The signatories were the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Australia, Thailand, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Pakistan; and for further detail, see The Bangkok Conference of the Manila Pact Powers, February 23-25, 1955, Department of State Publication 5909, International Organization and Conference Series II, Far Eastern 5, Released August, 1955.

⁹The Delegate from the United States to the Bandung Conference was a Negro Congressman. There were differences between the pro-western, pro-communist, and neutralist bloc, but the Conference passed resolutions supporting economic and cultural cooperation, and self-determination; and for further details, see Chou, En-Lai, China and the Asian-African Conference (Peking, 1955), Foreign Languages Press.

hope of peace and development, and international collaboration. He even offered to negotiate with the United States on relaxing tensions in the Taiwan area. In fact, according to reports, Krishna Menon, under instructions from Nehru, had journeyed to London, Washington, Ottawa and Peking before the Bandung Conference was held to find a solution for the Taiwan Crisis. He worked behind the scenes for this purpose at the Conference. The India Praja Socialist Party Organ, Janata, normally critical of Communist China and the Nehru Government, commented:

Asian and African nations did not quite agree with the United States and her allies when they branded People's China as an aggressor. . . . Now their stand has been vindicated at Bandung. People's China has once again, as she had done at Geneva, demonstrated her willingness to steer clear of the Moscow axis, at least, in so far as Asian affairs are concerned.¹⁰

This mutual assistance of the two largest nations of Asia had made them realize the benefits of collaboration. Thus, even though there were disputes in connection with territorial intrusion by the border guards or Assam Rifles, the two countries still went on as if nothing had happened. From 1954 until October 1958, there had been nine incidents. The first protest came from China when "over thirty Indian troops armed with rifles crossed the Niti Pass on June 29, 1954, and intruded into Wu-Je of the Ari Area of the Tibet region of China."¹¹ Then there came counter protests from

¹⁰Rowland, op. cit., p. 101.

¹¹Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, p. 61.

India on August 27, 1954.¹² Protests and counter protests followed. The other incidents were Bara Hoti (June, 1955), Damzen (September, 1955), Nelang (April, 1956), Shipki La (September, 1956), Walong (October, 1957), Khurnak Fort (June, 1958), Aksai Chin Region (September-October, 1958), Lohit Frontier Area (September, 1958), Sangcha Malla and Lapthal (October, 1958).¹³ Finally, the Sino-Indian honeymoon period slipped away; and the Panch Sheela, the "Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai" became words of yesterday.

¹²Ibid., pp. 61-62.

¹³Indian Affairs Record, VIII (2) (November, 1962), 291-2 (as cited by Wilcox, op. cit., p. 107.

CHAPTER VI

EVENTS LEADING TO THE 1960 SUMMIT CONFERENCE

It must be recalled that in 1956, the Dalai Lama traveled to India on the occasion of the 2,500th anniversary of Buddha's birth. The Dalai Lama was invited to visit New Delhi for the ceremonies. But his presence in New Delhi strained Sino-Indian relations somewhat. Most importantly, he was exposed to the influence and persuasion of the pro-Indian Tibetan leaders who were in exile in India. These people stepped up their anti-Chinese propaganda efforts with Indian encouragement behind the scenes.¹

Openly, the Indians expressed their concern over the Tibetan situation; there were rumors that the Dalai Lama would stay in India, and that he discussed the problem of Tibet with Nehru himself. News of all this soon reached Peking. Chou En-Lai came to India to look into the situation.² It was the only visit paid by Chou to India which did not result in a communique.

¹Rowland, op. cit., pp. 101-102; the Indians that have been reported to have encouraged the Tibetans and the Dalai Lama to take an anti-Chinese stand include people who are in the Indian Parliament and long-time residents of India from Tibet.

²H. E. Richardson, A Short History of Tibet (New York, 1962), pp. 202-204; see also Rowland, op. cit., pp. 102-103.

The Dalai Lama did return to Lhasa in early 1957. What was discussed between Nehru and the Dalai Lama, who was then at the age of twenty-one to twenty-two, is unknown. But it must be pointed out that Nehru as the head of the Indian Government violated the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse of 1954, mentioned in Chapter V. His behavior could not fail to arouse suspicion. His concern with Tibet alone had shown that he was concerned with the internal affairs of China. China, however, always avoided interference with India's behavior towards her minority groups. The "Bandung Spirit" and India's Panch Sheela seemed no more than a mirage to China.

Sino-Indian relations did not turn for the better. But there was only one incident of territorial intrusion in 1957. However, the incidence of these activities soon increased. Then in July, 1958, Peking officially protested to India, stating that

[There were] subversive and disruptive activities against China's Tibet region carried out by the U. S. and the Chiang Kai-Shek clique in collusion with fugitive reactionaries from Tibet using India's Kalimpong as a base.³

In this note, five evidences were cited for the attention of the Government of India. The note concluded:

The Chinese Government is confident that the Government of India, pursuing a consistent policy of defending

³Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, p. 75.

peace and opposing aggression, will accept [this note's] request and take effective measures.⁴

The Indian Government replied on August 2, 1958, listing eleven points as answers to the Chinese request. It admitted the facts of the existence of those agencies pointed out in the Chinese note, but defended their activities. It promised to take note of their activities from then on, and that India would take the responsibility should their activities be found to be subversive against Tibet.⁵

In the 1959 New Year Message to Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, the Dalai and Panchen Lamas pledged to help turn Tibet into a Communist Chinese State. The Lamas thus said to Mao:

To consolidate the successes already gained, we shall continue to make our best efforts in study and work and strive hard to build the new Tibet and great socialist Motherland.⁶

Then by the end of February in the same year, the Dalai Lama "ceremonially passed the Gishe, a five-fold examination in classical Buddhist logic, canon law, philosophy and metaphysics" required of every "incarnate Lama."⁷ But during this examination, the Dalai Lama was reported to have called a special meeting of the Tzongdu (National Council) to discuss what steps should be taken to bring an end to the

⁴Ibid., p. 78.

⁵Ibid., p. 78-82.

⁶The New York Times, January 2, 1959, page 2.

⁷The New York Times, March 1, 1959, p. 23.

Khamba rebellion⁸ and the Central Government's administrative directive for him to attend the National Assembly which was scheduled to be held in Peking in April.⁹ The safety of the Dalai Lama's traveling to Peking was questioned because of the Khamba rebellion that had caused much damage to the communication system.¹⁰ Concerning the Khamba's rebellion, The New York Times thus commented:

It is difficult at this distance to judge what motives have inspired the Khamba's somewhat erratic actions during the last year [1958].

One theory advanced here is that their show of force around Lhasa last summer may have been planned in expectation of a visit there by Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Prime Minister, which as a result of their action was cancelled.

Another possibility is that, after two years of campaigning professedly on the Dalai Lama's behalf, but without his approval, they hoped thereby to force his adherence to their cause.¹¹

Meanwhile, reports of unrest in Tibet increased, and the situation in Lhasa worsened, to the grave concern of the Central Government in Peking. It was the result of Tibetan

⁸The Khamba are a tribe living in Eastern Tibet close to Sikang; they are the most adventurous and daring people living along the border provinces. This disturbance was started in the summer of 1958 and lasted through the winter. It was believed that they were assisted with weapons from outside, but the source of the weapons was unknown to common people. But Communist China made a protest to India in July, 1958, stating that India's Kalimpong was a base for this Khamba revolt (see page 87).

⁹The New York Times, March 1, 1959, p. 23.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid. (Refer to Chapter IV concerning J. Nehru's visit to Bhutan in 1958.)

civilians who surrounded the Norbulingka Palace in order to stop the Dalai Lama from going to Peking after they heard the rumor of a plot to kidnap him. The rumor was that because the Khamba rebellion was not completely suppressed, the Peking Government wanted to make the Dalai Lama stay for a long time in Peking as a hostage so that the Khamba rebellion might be calmed down sooner.¹²

It has been said that the National Assembly was to be held in Peking in April; the Central Government had asked the Dalai to attend, and this administrative directive was given to him by General Tan at the end of February, 1959. However, the Tibetans were incited by charges that once the Dalai Lama left Lhasa, he would not be allowed to return. It was out of care for the safety of the Dalai Lama that the people surrounded the Norbulingka. But this unrest was made use of by the rebels. They were mostly junior officials of the Government in Lhasa and the Khambas. They took the chance to force the Dalai Lama to support a resolution declaring that Tibet no longer recognized China's authority. These activities would seriously upset the situation and the Dalai Lama was torn between responsibility to the Central Government and concern for maintaining peace in Tibet. He was uncertain what to decide.¹³

¹²The New York Times, March 8, 1959, p. 19.

¹³G. Ginsburgs, Communist China and Tibet (The Hague, 1964), pp. 121-123; M. Mathos, op. cit., pp. 126-129; Gelder, op. cit., pp. 211-214; Nehru, The Statesman (Calcutta, April 25, 1959) as seen in Rowland, op. cit., p. 116.

During this siege, the Dalai Lama communicated with General Tan Kuan-San, the Political Commissar in Tibet, concerning his situation and what he thought of doing. These letters written by the Dalai Lama will be quoted in full.

A Reply on March 11.

Dear Comrade Political Commissar Tan,

I intended to go to the Military Area Command to see the theatrical performance yesterday, but I was unable to do so, because of obstruction by people, Lamas and laymen, who were instigated by a few evil elements and who did not know the facts; this has put me to indescribable shame. I am greatly upset and worried and at a loss what to do. I was immediately greatly delighted when your letter appeared before me--you do not mind at all.

Reactionary, evil elements are carrying out activities endangering me under the pretext of ensuring my safety. I am taking measures to calm things down. In a few days, when the situation becomes stable, I will certainly meet you. If you have any internal directives for me, please communicate them to me frankly through this messenger.

The Dalai Lama,
Written by my own hand.

A Reply on March 12.

Dear Comrade Political Commissar Tan,

I suppose you have received my letter of yesterday forwarded to you by Ngapo (Apei). I have received the letter you sent me this morning. The unlawful activities of the reactionary clique cause me endless worry and sorrow. Yesterday I told the Kasha to order the immediate dissolution of the illegal conference Underground Tibetan Resistance Movement and the immediate withdrawal of the reactionaries who arrogantly moved into the Norbulingka under the pretext of ensuring my safety and have seriously estranged relations between the Central People's Government and the local government, I am making every possible effort to deal with them. At eight thirty Peking time this morning, a few Tibetan army men suddenly fired several shots near the Chinghai-Tibet Highway. Fortunately, no serious disturbance occurred. I am planning to persuade a few subordinates and give them instructions.

Please communicate to me frankly any instructive opinions you have for me.

The Dalai

The Last Reply on March 16.

Dear Comrade Political Commissar Tan,

Your letter dated the 15th has just been received at three o'clock. I am very glad that you are so concerned about my safety and hereby express my thanks.

The day before yesterday, the fifth day of the second month according to the Tibetan Calendar, I made a speech to more than seventy representatives of the government officials, instructing them from various angles, calling on them to consider seriously present and long-term interests and to calm down, otherwise my life would be in danger. After these severe reproaches, things took a slight turn for the better. Though the conditions here and outside are still very difficult to handle at present, I am trying tactfully to draw a line separating the progressive people among the government officials from those opposing the revolution. In a few days from now, when there are enough forces I can trust, I shall make my way to the Military Area Command. When that time comes, I shall first send you a letter. I request you to adopt reliable measures. What are your views. Please write me often.

The Dalai¹⁴

But when his last letter reached General Tan on March 17, two heavy mortar shells exploded outside the gate of the Norbulingka Palace. That night, the Dalai Lama decided to escape. Was he really abducted by Tibetan reactionaries with help from Indians, as the Chinese have claimed?¹⁵ Or did he escape out of fear of death, as he is not a military man and inexperienced in handling a crisis like this? It seemed

¹⁴The New York Times, March 31, 1959, p. 1; Gelder, op. cit., pp. 217-219.

¹⁵The New York Times, April 19, 1959, p. 1.

possible that he was also afraid that the reactionaries would harm him. Moreover, he was also warned that if the rebels did not disperse, General Tan would send the army to crush the rebels, and this would involve the security of the Norbulingka Palace. This information was given to him in the personal message by Apei which enclosed the last letter from General Tan; it said:

If Your Holiness with a few trusted officers of the bodyguard can stay within the inner wall of the Norbulingka and hold a position there and inform General Kuan-San exactly which building you will occupy, they will certainly intend that this building will not be damaged.¹⁶

In fact, his movements were followed by observation aircraft and his arrival in India was reported by Peking radio before it was known in Delhi.¹⁷ Marshal Chen Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister had this to say as to why no attempt was made to capture the Dalai Lama. He said:

It is certain that the rebel escort would have resisted any attempt to contact him. They wouldn't have hesitated to shoot at our soldiers and if their fire had been returned the Dalai Lama might have been accidentally wounded, if not killed. We didn't wish him to go. We believe he was taken against his better judgment, expressed in his letters to General Tan which accurately described the situation and his personal dilemma. We had no reason to harm him. His own account of the rebellion proved his innocence of personal complicity in the rebellion whatever he may have said or been

¹⁶Gelder, op. cit., p. 216.

¹⁷The New York Times, April 4, 1959, pp. 2-3; April 3, 1959, p. 1; April 19, 1959, p. 12.

reported to have said since--unless he now wishes to accuse himself of eight years of deception.¹⁸

In fact, the Chinese Government has never criticized him or denounced him since, because they could not find any proof that he was responsible for the rebellion.

The Dalai Lama and his party reached Indian-controlled territory on March 31 at an obscure location just south of

¹⁸Gelder, op. cit., p. 220; and in connection with the last phrase of the quotation, it is necessary to point out that the Dalai Lama had written Chairman Mao a poem adoring him. This poem was written by his own hand and presented by him when he visited the capital, Peking, in 1954. The introduction and opening lines of this poem are as follows:

"The great national leader of the Central People's Government, Chairman Mao, is the Cakravarti born out of boundless fine merits. For a long time I wished to write a hymn praying for his long life and the success of his work. It happened that the Klatsuang-kergun Lama of Kantsu Monastery in Inner Mongolia wrote me from afar, saluting me and asked me to write a poem. I agreed to do so as this coincides with my own wishes.

The Fourteenth Dalai Lama Dantzen-Jaltso
at Norbulin-shenfu Palace, 1954.

"O, the Triratna,* (Buddha, Dharma and Sangha) which
bestow blessings on the world,
Protect us with your incomparable and blessed light
which shines for ever.

"O! Chairman Mao! Your brilliance and deeds are like
those of Brahma and Mahasammata, creators of the
world.

"Your writings are precious as pearls, abundant and
powerful as the high tide of ocean reaching the
edges of the sky."

* Triratna--Trinity of Buddha, Dharma (the Law) and
Sangha, the congregation of believers.

the Tibetan village of Mangmang, where he had received Indian permission to enter as a political exile. China was the first to announce the Dalai Lama's entry into India.¹⁹ The party traveled for fifteen days from Lhasa to the NEFA and publicly appeared on April 6 at the Towang Monastery.²⁰ They finally reached Tezpur in Assam. On reaching Tezpur, amidst a group of Indian officials, the Dalai Lama announced in a written statement that he had escaped of his own will.²¹

Chou En-Lai and Penchen Lama charged that the Dalai Lama's statement was not genuine, and contended that "the impersonal literary style was not Tibetan at all but European or 'near European.'"²² They insisted that Dalai Lama was abducted.

On learning that the Dalai Lama had entered the NEFA, as Peking had announced, the Indian Government immediately sent units of the Assam Rifles to the point of entry on the McMahon Line in order to protect him.²³ When he reached Bomdila, he was awaited by P. N. Menon, the Indian Deputy Prime Minister.²⁴ Yet, before he reached

¹⁹The New York Times, April 3, 1959, p. 1.

²⁰The New York Times, April 7, 1959, p. 12.

²¹The New York Times, April 19, 1959, p. 1.

²²Ibid.; and The New York Times, April 23, 1959, p. 12.

²³The New York Times, April 3, 1959, p. 1; Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, pp. 86-87.

²⁴The New York Times, April 13, 1959, p. 6.

Tezpur, a small town known for its tea-growing, a group of high Indian officials and nearly two hundred newsmen had arrived to prepare to welcome the Dalai Lama.²⁵ The party reached Mussoorie on April 20 from Tezpur.²⁶ There, according to some reports by foreign newspapermen, the Dalai Lama was put behind barbed wire.²⁷ Three days after the Dalai Lama's arrival, the Indian Prime Minister went to see him there and had a long talk with him. This was a person to person conversation without a third party present.²⁸ After this secret conversation, Nehru held a press conference at Mussoorie which confirmed that the letters written by the Dalai Lama to General Tan were authentic.²⁹

However, when the Dalai wrote his book, My Country and My People, he said he wrote those letters to gain time for

²⁵The New York Times, April 19, 1959, p. 1; Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, pp. 86-87.

²⁶The New York Times, April 21, 1959, p. 4.

²⁷Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 327. Reply to debate on Tibet in Rajya Sabha (Upper House), May 4, 1959. Nehru explained: "Some foreign newspapermen said, about two days after the Dalai Lama had come to Mussoorie, that we were keeping him behind barbed wire. That sounds horrible. The fact was that the Mussoorie police, to lighten their burden, because of all kinds of curious people trying to go into the compound of the house, had put a little barbed wire on the compound before he came, for his security and general protection. It was not to keep him in, and I believe he goes about in Mussoorie."

²⁸Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, p. 85.

²⁹The New York Times, April 25, 1959, p. 1.

anger to cool and for him to urge moderation on the rebellious people. He said he also decided to write in a way which he hoped would calm down General Tan and that he could only do that by pretending to accept his sympathy and welcome his advice.³⁰ Then he added: ". . . and although my letters to the Chinese General were written to disguise my real intentions, I felt and still feel that they were justified."³¹ But concerning the purpose for which he wrote those letters or under what conditions he repudiated himself, it is impossible for others to know.

Let us at this juncture discuss the question, to what degree might India be accused by China of having interfered in its domestic affairs?

Generally speaking, it is in accord with international law practice to grant asylum to political dissenters for humanitarian reasons. Let us assume that the Dalai Lama belongs to this category. Knowing that the Dalai Lama is a political dissenter from China, it is India's right to grant him asylum. China cannot blame India for this. Yet the subsequent behavior of India after the granting of asylum permits the question to be raised as to whether or how far India has violated the 1954 Treaty with China. Her concern extended to the Tibet region of China violated the third

³⁰Dalai Lama, My Country and My People, as seen in Gelder, op. cit., p. 215.

³¹Ibid.

principle of the Panch Sheela which India initiated: "Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs."

Further, it was an act unfriendly to China for Nehru to meet the leader of this revolt, ex-Premier of the Tibetan local government (1949-54), Lokongwa. It was unfriendly also for him during this meeting to assure the Tibetan of India's diplomatic support of their cause.

Mr. Lokongwa quoted Mr. Nehru as having said that it would not be impossible to send the Indian Army to help Tibetans, but that he would "try to help the Tibetan cause through diplomatic means."³²

This Nehru assurance given to the Tibetan leader could be understood to imply that Nehru directly encouraged the Tibetans to fight against the Chinese. And, should diplomatic means fail, India would risk itself to help the Tibetans by confronting the Chinese with Indian divisions. Or, it might also be thus explained that Nehru wished, by giving such oral assurance, to encourage the Tibetan revolt to last longer so that China would lose prestige and arouse resentment internationally. Moreover, the Indians said that Tibet was to some extent linked with India in religion and culture. This could be interpreted that the Indians had indirectly claimed a right to interfere. Nehru stated the Indian policy towards the situation:

I stated some time ago that our broad policy was governed by three factors: (1) the preservation of the security and integrity of India; (2) our desire to maintain friendly relations with China; and (3) our

³²The New York Times, April 1, 1959, p. 1.

deep sympathy for the people of Tibet. That policy we shall continue to follow, because we think it is a correct policy not only for the present but even more so for the future.³³

Nehru explained what kind of sympathy the Indians have for the Tibetans:

It was largely one of sympathy based on sentiment and humanitarian reasons; also on a certain feeling of kinship with the Tibetan people derived from long-established religious and cultural contacts. It was an instinctive reaction. It is true that some people in India sought to profit by it by turning it in an undesirable direction. But the fact of that reaction of the Indian people was there. . . . We have no desire whatever to interfere in Tibet; we have every desire to maintain the friendship between India and China; but at the same time we have every sympathy for the people of Tibet, and we are greatly distressed at their helpless plight. We hope still that the authorities of China, in their wisdom, will not use their great strength against the Tibetans but will win them to friendly co-operation in accordance with the assurances they have themselves given about the autonomy of the Tibet region. Above all, we hope that the present fighting and killing will cease.³⁴

These quotations from Nehru seemed somewhat contradictory to his assurance to Lokongwa. In fact, they worked for the same purpose. Nehru's assurance to Lokongwa was a secret one which was not supposed to be made public. The statements were public and documented. It also showed that Nehru treated this event with two different methods for the greatest benefit to his country. All in all, this is Indian verbal and diplomatic interference.

³³Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 323.

³⁴Ibid., p. 325.

While the Dalai Lama remained in India, Sino-Indian relations continued to degenerate; when this was coupled with the border intrusions, the two countries were almost at the brink of open conflict.

However, it must be remembered also that serious border disputes happened one year before the Dalai Lama took up his residence in India. His living there only served to add salt to the wounds. There had been many official communications between the two governments since August 21, 1958. They first argued about the accuracy of the maps published in both countries in a polite form; then followed the correspondence between Chou and Nehru discussing and arguing their positions with regards to the border. After the beginning of the Dalai Lama's stay in India, three more border incidents occurred. They were the West Pangong Lake (July, 1959), Khinzemare and Longju (August, 1959) and Kongka La (October, 1959).³⁵ In order to avoid further unhappy events, Chou suggested in his letter to Nehru on November 7, 1959, that

The Chinese Government proposes that the armed forces of China and India each withdraw 20 kilometers at once from the so-called McMahon Line in the east, and from the line up to which each side exercises actual control in the west, and that the two sides undertake to refrain from again sending their armed personnel to be stationed in and patrol the zones from which they have evacuated their armed forces, but still maintain civil

³⁵Wilcox, *op. cit.*, p. 107, citing Indian Affairs Record, VIII (2) (November, 1962), 291-292.

administrative personnel and unarmed police there for the performance of administrative duties and maintenance of order.³⁶

At the same time, Chou suggested a meeting with Nehru as soon as possible to discuss their border problems.

On November 16, 1959, Nehru replied; he agreed to hold talks for the solution of the boundary in dispute, but refused to comply with Chou's suggested withdrawal of armed forces. On the contrary, he suggested that

We think that there should not be the slightest risk of any border clash if each Government instruct its outposts not to send out patrols. It is only when armed patrols go out in these difficult mountainous areas that there is likelihood of clashes taking place. . . . It would be extremely difficult in practice to establish a new line of outposts in the rear, whether they are to be ten or twenty kilometers from the international boundary. The risk of border clashes will be completely eliminated if our suggestion is accepted by your Government.³⁷

A month later, on December 17, 1959, Chou replied and accepted Nehru's proposal of not sending out patrols. Meanwhile, Chou reiterated his former proposal of November 7 and emphasized that

[It] is aimed at thoroughly eliminating the risk of border clashes not wholly foreseeable, completely changing the present tense situation on the border where the two countries are facing each other in arms, and creating a favourable atmosphere or mutual confidence between the two countries. These aims are unattainable by other provisional measures. . . . As to how far the Armed forces of each country should withdraw, the Chinese Government is entirely willing to decide on a distance which will be deemed appropriate

³⁶Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, pp. 168-169.

³⁷Ibid., p. 173.

by both sides through consultation with the Indian Government.³⁸

After a long discussion of the areas in dispute, Chou concluded that "under these circumstances, the speedy holding of talks between the two Prime Ministers is our unshirkable responsibility not only to our two people but also to world peace."³⁹

Nehru's reply to Chou on December 21, 1959, stated that Chou had not yet replied to his letter of September 26 and the Note of November 4, and insisted that only after he had received replies to this recent correspondence could he agree to a place of negotiation with Chou. Then, after Nehru received Chou's reply on December 26, 1959, to the two communications mentioned, Nehru replied on February 5, 1960:

But, I found that the respective view points of our two Governments in regard to the matters under discussion were so wide apart and opposed to each other that there was little ground left for useful talks. . . .

Still I think it might be helpful for us to meet. I am afraid it is not possible for me to leave India during the next few months. . . . I would, however, be glad if you could take the trouble to come to Delhi for this purpose at a time convenient to you and us. . . . I would suggest that some time in the second half of March. . . .⁴⁰

On February 26, 1960, Chou expressed in his reply that he was looking forward to revisiting the capital of Great India, meeting the great Indian people fighting for the prosperity, strength, and progress of their motherland; and suggested a certain date in April for their meeting.⁴¹

³⁸Ibid., p. 177.

³⁹Ibid., p. 183.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 186.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 188.

Chou decided to come to New Delhi to meet Nehru on April 19. Two days before he arrived there, on April 17, an estimated five thousand Indians demonstrated outside the residence of Nehru protesting the imminent negotiation. They shouted "Chou En-Lai Hai Hai."⁴² And, at a mass rally organized by the political opposition, Nehru was warned to be firm; and the press railed against the Indian Government for holding the talks before China relinquished its occupied "Indian Territory." It was amidst such a hostile atmosphere that Chou and his party composed of Marshal Chen Yi, Vice-Premier of People's China, Chang Han-Fu, Vice-Foreign Minister, and other officials arrived at New Delhi on April 19.⁴³ Soon after Chou arrived, he made an opening speech that was most revealing about his visit to India. He said:

Both . . . China and India are now engaged in a large-scale and long-term construction. . . . Both of us need peace. . . . There is no reason why any question between us can not be settled reasonably through friendly consultations.⁴⁴

For about six days, from April 19 to April 25, the two parties held several long talks, but with no definite consequence. However, in the process of the negotiation, Chou made a suggestion which, if accepted by India, would have avoided the confrontation which was to come two years later. Chou said:

⁴²The New York Times, April 18, 1960, p. 3.

⁴³The New York Times, April 20, 1960, pp. 1, 38.

⁴⁴The New York Times, April 20, p. 8.

China might have been prepared to relinquish its claims to 36,000 square miles in the eastern sector if India would recognize China's claim to 15,000 square miles in the Ladakh Sector.⁴⁵

Even this concession on the part of China was not acceptable to India, because India insisted that China should give up all the territory in dispute to India as it was "traditionally" India's.

After a joint communique was issued on April 25, Chou and his party concluded their almost fruitless negotiation and left for home on the morning of April 26. In the communique, they agreed

That Officials of the two Governments should meet and examine, check and study all historical documents, records, accounts, maps, and other material relevant to the boundary question, on which each side relied in support of its stand, and draw up a report for submission to the two Governments.⁴⁶

They further agreed that the officials of the two Governments should meet between June and September, 1960, in order to hear the reports of their study of the border.

Indeed, a report was made which was called Report of the Officials of the Governments of the People's Republic of China and India on the Boundary Question. It was published by the Chinese Foreign Ministry on April 13, 1962, and issued by the Hsinhua News Agency on April 28, 1962. This report is about 500,000 words long. After a careful study of the Report of the Officials, K. S. Hasan and

⁴⁵The New York Times, April 27, 1960, p. 5.

⁴⁶Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, p. 189.

K. Qureshi commented:

The report of the officials show that there is serious divergence between the two sides in their comprehension of the facts concerning the boundary question. But the factual material provided and the comments made by the two sides objectively and indisputably testify that the position of the Chinese Government is correct, namely, the Sino-Indian boundary indeed has not been formally delimited, and the Sino-Indian traditional customary line as pointed out by China is well-grounded, while the boundary line claimed by India has no treaty, historical or factual basis, and there is between it and the traditional customary line pointed out by China a difference of about 120,000 square kilometers. The Indian side can in no way negate these facts. The report further proves that the Chinese Government's advocacy of a settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question through friendly negotiations and formal delimitation is logical; while the Indian Government's position of refusing to negotiate and insisting on China's acceptance of the alignment claimed by India is totally untenable.⁴⁷

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 190.

CHAPTER VII

EVENTS LEADING TO THE OCTOBER

HIMALAYAN CONFRONTATION

The failure of Nehru and Chou to reach any agreement of consequence for the boundary dispute in April, 1960, may be ascribed to a variety of factors. Most important was China's reluctance to yield to India's demand and refusal to negotiate certain areas claimed by India. These included the western end of the NEFA, which involved the interest of Burma, the boundary of Bhutan and Sikkim whose foreign affairs are held in the hands of the Indians, and the area west of the Karakorum Pass of Kashmir (HUNZA) under Pakistan occupation, which India insisted was Indian territory.¹ Moreover, Nehru was encouraged by a favorable international climate towards the dispute with China, which thus became one of the major causes of the October Himalayan Confrontation. For both the U. S. S. R. and the United States gradually shifted to the Indian side. This climate was partly the reason for China's careful behavior throughout the course of the boundary dispute. For she was almost isolated by the international situation.

¹The difficulty for China in discussing these boundaries with India was that it would undoubtedly involve China in many unpleasant and unnecessary troubles with these neighboring countries. The price was too high.

International Environment

Eisenhower in India

On November 4, 1959, President Eisenhower announced that he would shortly visit eleven Afro-Asian countries, including India and Pakistan.² This was interpreted by the Chinese Communist Government as an American response to the October Kongka La incident on the Sino-Indian border.³ Apparently, it was an unfavorable signal to the Chinese; for it might lead the United States to support India in the dispute.

On November 12, 1959, Secretary Herter held a news conference in which he said that Nehru would discuss with President Eisenhower the border dispute with China when he arrived at New Delhi in December.⁴ Secretary Herter was asked who was right in the dispute and he answered that

[The United States] has not taken sides . . . the border has been for many years ill defined . . . particularly from the point of view of the North-Western area [Ladakh and Askai Chin] with respect to the

²"Visit of President Eisenhower Proposed Statement," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLI, No. 1045-1070 (July 6 - December 28, 1959), 742.

³Kongka La border incident is the third and the last border incident of 1959; the position is in Ladakh; see the maps in appendix.

⁴"Secretary Herter's News Conference," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLI, No. 1045-1070 (July 6 - December 28, 1959), 782.

definitive border that could rightly be claimed by either side.⁵

He also answered that he did not know if the United States had ever backed the McMahon Line. But he added:

We naturally presume that the claims made by the Indians are entirely valid claims, but from the point of objective reading we have no basis to go on. We have only the word of a friend.⁶

Such was the American attitude towards the Sino-Indian border before 1960. After Eisenhower's visit to India, during which he expressed sympathy for the Indians,⁷ there was an obvious policy change towards the China-India border dispute. It became apparent in the succeeding Kennedy administration. It is possible that Eisenhower had been talked into siding with the Indians by Nehru. In any event, the words of Herter notwithstanding, the Kennedy administration announced its recognition of the McMahon Line during the dispute, which resulted in a protest from the Republic of China on Taiwan.⁸ This policy change may have been explained by Secretary Dean Rusk in his news conference of December 10, 1962, in which questions about the Sino-Indian border war were raised. He emphasized that "the central issue for us there is not outside relationship but the security of India as a great Asian

⁵Ibid., p. 783.

⁶Ibid., p. 786.

⁷"Indo-American Joint Communique, New Delhi, December 14," Department of State Bulletin (January 11, 1960), pp. 46-52.

⁸Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, p. 373.

democracy."⁹ Thus, defence of the democratic political system of India was a major reason the United States rallied behind India. It may be pertinent to bring in the idea of American national interest as put forward by W. W. Rostow, a special adviser to the President.

It is, therefore, equally the American interest that the societies of Eurasia develop along lines broadly consistent with the Nation's own ideology; for under modern conditions it is difficult to envisage the survival of a democratic American society as an island in a totalitarian sea.¹⁰

No attempt will be made here to evaluate the motivations behind American military aid to India, to which Pakistan, an American ally, also strongly objected. Nevertheless, Nehru had this to say:

It is not a mere matter of India's being invaded by China; it raises issues of vast importance to the world and Asia. Realizing this, they [the United States and the United Kingdom] help us--they feel this involves many issues in which they themselves are intensely interested.¹¹

Khrushchev-Nehru Detente

The growing tenseness of Sino-Indian relations along the border after the Tibet incident of 1959 drew the Russians closer to the Indians. For Chou's reply to Nehru's letter of March 22 on September 8, 1959, strongly stated

⁹"Secretary Rusk's News Conference," December 10 Department of State Bulletin (December 31, 1962), p. 1,000.

¹⁰W. W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena (New York, 1960), p. 544.

¹¹Time (November 16, 1962), p. 16.

that China would not recognize the McMahon Line because it was "a complicated question left over by history," and that it was a British imperialist aggression against China.¹² This idea reminded the Russians of its thousand-mile-long border with China, which was also the product of Czarist imperial expansion. It therefore appeared that the Russo-Indian interests were similar vis-à-vis China.

During the Middle Eastern Crisis in the summer of 1958, Khrushchev proposed on July 19 a five-power summit conference to be held in Geneva to prevent the crisis from degenerating into a world war.¹³ This conference should be attended by the leaders from these nations: the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France, and India. China was greatly displeased. Mao thought Khrushchev had made a great mistake. In order to comfort Mao, Khrushchev and his party went to Peking towards the end of July. He and his party (which included Marshal Malinovsky, Deputy Prime Minister Kuznetsov, and Ponomarev, member of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party) stayed in Peking for four days from July 31 to August 3, 1958.¹⁴ Later, Khrushchev had to drop the proposal. This was not all, however. The same year, according to documents of the Chinese

¹²Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, p. 134.

¹³The New York Times, July 20, 1958, pp. 1, 3.

¹⁴v. P. Dutt, China and the World (New York, 1966), p. 70 (the information is obtained from Jen-Min Jih-Pao, People's Daily, August 4, 1958).

Communist Party, Khrushchev sought to bring China under Soviet military control. "These unreasonable demands were rightly and firmly rejected by the Chinese Government."¹⁵

Khrushchev then began to reach an entente with the United States. After the Camp David visit to the United States in 1959, Khrushchev immediately came to Peking to report what had developed between the U. S. S. R. and the United States. Along with him he brought the idea of a "two China Policy" and urged Mao not to test the stability of the capitalist system.

This would be wrong: the people would not understand and would never support those who would think of acting in this way. . . . No, we have no need for war at all. If the people do not want it, even such a noble and progressive system as socialism cannot be imposed by force of arms.¹⁶

This was meant to warn China not to have an independent foreign policy, though it might be the same as Soviet policy prior to Camp David. To this Mao strongly objected. This second visit by Khrushchev to China immediately after his talks with Eisenhower should be noted seriously, because President Eisenhower paid a five-day visit to India shortly after the Camp David meeting. Shortly after Eisenhower's

¹⁵The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves--Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU (1) September 6, 1963, text in full in Document 10 of W. E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, 1964), p. 399.

¹⁶Dutt, op. cit., p. 84 (cited from Peking Review, No. 34 (August 25, 1959), pp. 7-10.

visit, India received another notable of equal power and prestige. Khrushchev came to India on February 17, 1960, two months before Nehru and Chou met in New Delhi. Khrushchev's presence in India was a warning to Chou "not to test the stability of the capitalist system," but to yield to India's demand for the sake of peace.¹⁷ Throughout the Sino-Indian border dispute, despite the fact that China and the U. S. S. R. were allies, the language of the U. S. S. R. appeared to be neutral.¹⁸ But their actions, from the Chinese point of view, appeared to be in support of India. This Soviet policy greatly angered Mao and Chou. There were also reports of Russian troops violating the border of China. This was kept a secret by the Chinese Government at that time.

There followed a Russian endorsement of the Indian stand in the dispute. At the same time the Soviet Union not only refused to give Soviet assistance for China in its

¹⁷Concerning this Khrushchev visit to India, some writers, such as V. P. Dutt, China and the World, and J. Rowland, A History of Sino-Indian Relations, had just the opposite view and interpretation; see pp. 206-207 and pp. 138-139, respectively. They said Khrushchev's presence in India was to put pressure on Nehru to accept Chou's notion of holding talks between Nehru and Chou, and that Khrushchev was impatient to see the Indian-Chinese dispute settled. This writer feels that if they had carefully read the information they would not have made such an observation.

¹⁸Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, pp. 285-290.

atomic energy development, but also withdrew all the Russian technical assistance and personnel then working in China and tore up the Sino-Soviet agreement reached only two years before. This put China's national reconstruction in great jeopardy. Moreover, Khrushchev pushed Mao to pay back the Korean War Loan. On the other hand, he began to redirect aid to India. On July 30, 1959, a preliminary Soviet commitment to a new development credit of about \$378 million was extended to India. Russia still kept this promise even though India ousted the Communist Government in the state of Kerala the following day.¹⁹

All of these facts point to a Russo-American policy change. The then Senator John F. Kennedy reported that since 1949, the economic and industrial development of China until 1959 was three to four times faster than that of India. He urged aid to India immediately.²⁰ Because of this great success, the Chinese government launched its Great Leap Forward Program with great ambition. Unfortunately, parts of the Program depended upon Soviet assistance. But Russia failed to carry out its promised assistance to Mao. Mao spoke of Soviet behavior towards China as "a bourgeois woman jealous of China's growing strength."²¹ On December 15,

¹⁹Hinton, op. cit., p. 450.

²⁰John F. Kennedy, "The Dollar Gap," India and the United States, edited and with an introduction by S. S. Harrison (New York, 1961), pp. 63-64.

²¹Time (November 30, 1962), p. 28.

1961, L. I. Brezhnev, President of the U. S. S. R., arrived in India. Following his visit, India received massive Soviet economic and military aid, including MIG 21 airplanes to be made for India and a MIG 21 factory to be built for India on its soil. The Soviet position towards India's dispute with China is obvious.

This was not all. The Soviet Union began to put pressure on the Sino-Soviet border to remind the Chinese that they still had the Russians to consider.²² For as long as China's border problems were not settled with India, the Soviet Union would be safer while the Chinese were busy with the Indians. It is logical that the Chinese would hesitate to make enemies on two fronts. It has been said previously that in 1960 there were reports of frontier clashes with the Russians which were caused by movements of nomadic herdsmen to and fro across the Sinkiang frontier. But the Chinese remained quiet. Again in the spring of 1962, a substantial number of dissidents in Sinkiang, mainly Kazakhs, fled across the border into the Soviet Union. The Chinese Government then claimed that it was subversive activity by the Russians which incited these incidents.²³ This was followed by the closing of Soviet Consulates in Sinkiang at

²²Griffith, op. cit., p. 15. (More information may be obtained from Document 10, pp. 389-420; Brian Crozier, "China's Soviet Border Problem," Forum Service, August 24, 1963.)

²³Ibid., p. 21.

Urumchi and Kuldja in July, 1962.²⁴ However, the Chinese Government did not make it known to the world until March 8, 1963. Apparently, they were heavily engaged with the Indians on both the East and West sectors, where the Indians were reported to have received support from the Russians.

China's Internal Problems and the
Taiwan Strait Crisis

In 1958, the People's Republic of China started its ambitious program of the "Great Leap Forward." Unfortunately, by 1960, it was almost in total collapse, partly because of natural calamities--floods and droughts in various parts of China--and partly the result of the withdrawal of the Russian technical assistance and personnel. When they withdrew, they took along their machinery and tore up or burned the schemes of the projects. In 1961, the situation became worse still as a result of an uneven distribution of precipitation. Consequently, a food shortage was reported for the first time since the Communist ascendance to power in 1949. It culminated in the spring of 1962 when hundreds and thousands of Chinese in Kwongtung province crossed the Hong Kong and Macao borders in the hope of obtaining relief. Chinese overseas were encouraged to send food parcels to relatives on the mainland. For this economic difficulty, Wu says:

²⁴Hinton, op. cit., p. 324, citing Daniel Tretiak, "Peking's Policy Towards Sinkiang: Trouble on the 'New Frontier,'" Current Scene, II, No. 24 (Hong Kong, November 15, 1963), 11.

As the communique of the 10th plenary session of the eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party has confessed, the Peiping Regime has been beset by internal difficulties. Diplomatically, it finds itself isolated. With most basic construction programs suspended, most factories closed, goods in short supply and a fourth consecutive year of bad crops, Mao Tse-Tung had no alternative except economic retreat. Given such an internal crisis, Red China is in no position to launch a large-scale war at this moment.²⁵

Politically there was dissension among top party members, and the opposition was still there even though Peng Te-Huai and Huang Ke-Cheng had been purged. In order to remedy its shaky control, the party elected Lu Ting-i, Kang Sheng and Lo Jui-Ching as secretaries of the Central Secretariat late in 1961.

Militarily, according to Wu's description, there was still a lack of modern equipment despite an all-out effort to improve it. This situation included the navy and the air force. Moreover, as a result of the purge of Peng Te-Huai (the defense minister) and Tan Cheng, and Huang Ke-Cheng, the loyalty and morale of the People's Liberation Army was questionable. Thus, Wu asserted:

Under such conditions and knowing that it is difficult to send supplies to such a distant area as Tibet, the Chinese Communists naturally are unwilling to launch a large-scale war against India. . . .²⁶

On the other hand, aware that the Communists were encountering difficulties, the Government in Taiwan was

²⁵Wu, "Background and Perspective of the Peiping-New Delhi Conflict," pp. 11-12.

²⁶Ibid., p. 13.

reported to have prepared for an attack on the mainland. The New Year's message to the Chinese People for 1962 by President Chiang Kai-Shek revealed the preparations. It was followed by statements made by high-ranking Nationalist officials suggested an imminent "counter-attack on the mainland." Special envoys were sent to persuade the United States Government to modify the Sino-American Defense Treaty of 1954 and to convince the Kennedy administration that it was time to eliminate Mao's Regime. On May 1, a special new tax called "National Mobilization Tax" was imposed, and the military was told to be ready.²⁷

But the Kennedy administration did not accept the Nationalist arguments. On the contrary, a number of high American officials, including Averell Harriman and Allen Dulles, visited Taiwan in the early months of 1962.²⁸ Presumably, they were sent to advise the Nationalists to give up their plan. At the same time, a new American ambassador, Admiral Alan G. Kirk, was appointed to the Republic of China with the same purpose--to advise the Nationalists not to attack the mainland.²⁹ There were rumors on the island that this new American ambassador, an Admiral in the Second World War, was instructed that if the Nationalists happened to

²⁷Throughout all these events, the writer was studying in Taiwan. As he recalls it, everybody seemed very excited for various reasons.

²⁸The New York Times, March 15, 1962, p. 16.

²⁹The New York Times, May 5, 1962, p. 11.

bypass or neglect the Sino-American Defense Treaty (according to some authorities in international law, the principle of Rebus sic stantibus would permit the Nationalists to go ahead without violating the Sino-American Defense Treaty or international practice because they had consulted the other party concerning the change of the situations) and unilaterally release its military to attack the mainland, he would command the Seventh Fleet to intercept the advance and even attack the Nationalists before they could attack the Communists on the mainland.³⁰

The People's Republic heavily reinforced its troops opposite Taiwan in June.³¹ On June 23, People's China issued a statement accusing the Nationalist government "of preparing, with the support and encouragement of United States imperialism, for a large-scale military adventure, an invasion of the coastal areas of the mainland" and warning these enemies that they would be crushed if they attempted

³⁰This rumor was related to us--a class of sophomore students of the Department of Diplomacy, National Chengchi University--by Professor Cheng Jun-Yue, Oxford University Ph. D. and Ambassador to Panama and various important posts in the United Nations. He was lecturing the course of International Politics; and concerning the principle of Rebus sic stantibus, please refer to Paun, op. cit., pp. 72-74, and Starke, op. cit., pp. 354-357. It said: "According to this doctrine a treaty may become null and void in case there is a fundamental change in the state of facts which existed at the time the treaty was concluded. . . ."

³¹Frank Robertson, "Refugees and Troop Moves--A Report from Hong Kong," The China Quarterly, No. 11 (July-September, 1962), 114-115.

the invasion.³² On the same day, the Communist Chinese and American ambassadors met at Warsaw to discuss the crisis. Ambassador John M. Cabot denied that the United States had given any support to President Chiang Kai-Shek.³³ President Kennedy confirmed this by stressing the defensive character of the American commitments to the Republic of China.³⁴ Then, on July 2, Khrushchev announced the U. S. S. R.'s support of the People's Republic of China and assured the world of Communist solidarity in the face of the capitalist challenge.³⁵ Because of this unfavorable response, the Nationalists were undecided, and the Taiwan Strait Crisis gradually abated.

China's Diplomatic Moves and Agreements

After his April, 1960, conference with Nehru, Chou prepared for the worst. This preparation may be seen in Chou's effort to negotiate with neighboring countries. On the one hand, he was trying to demonstrate China's reasonableness in dealing with its neighbors even though they were much weaker. On the other, Chou was trying to secure the other frontiers so that these countries would not be involved or be incited

³²Hinton, op. cit., p. 272 (New China News Agency dispatch, June 23, 1962).

³³The New York Times, June 27, 1962, p. 1.

³⁴Ibid., June 28, 1962, p. 1.

³⁵Ibid., July 3, 1962, p. 1.

by unpredictable reasons to join the Indians should the worst border confrontation happen to come.

With Burma. Looking at earlier history, a preliminary border agreement had been signed by Ne Win when he went to Peking in January, 1960. It was the same tentative agreement reached in 1956 except that People's China promised to cede Nam Wan Assigned Tract to Burma in exchange for some apparently unimportant tribal territories further to the South, and the Northern end of the frontier was to include the eastern approaches to the Diphy Pass within China, not Burma. Simultaneously, a treaty of friendship was signed pledging mutual non-aggression and refusal to participate in any alliance directed against China or Burma. When Chou returned home after the conference with Nehru at Delhi, he ordered a survey of the Sino-Burman border in July, 1960.³⁶ Then U Nu went to Peking in October to sign the final boundary Treaty which was the same as the preliminary one. In 1961, U Nu and Ne Win both visited Peking for the purpose of celebrating the completion of the demarcation process.³⁷ The Government on Taiwan promptly attacked this behavior of People's China as "sell-out of traditional Chinese territory." This attitude of the Nationalists was reflected in almost all the editorials of the newspapers on the Island and also in Hong Kong.

³⁶Hinton, op. cit., p. 315.

³⁷Ibid., p. 316 (New China News Agency dispatch, April 17, 1961).

Concerning the Sino-Burmese boundary agreement, the Indians raised a point of concern to them. A note was given to Peking on December 30, 1960, saying that:

Although Article 5 of the Treaty does not specify the exact location of the Western extremity of the Sino-Burmese boundary, in the map attached to the treaty the boundary is shown as ending at the Diphu L'ke Pass.³⁸

It stressed that India would be unable to recognize it because with regards to the location of the tri-junction at the Diphu L'Ke Pass, it has "an adverse implication on the territorial integrity of India."³⁹

On February 21, 1961, Peking disputed the Indian note saying:

No proof of this assertion can be found either in the Treaty itself or in the attached maps. Diphu Pass is shown on the attached maps not as the western extremity of the Sino-Burmese boundary. . . .⁴⁰

With Nepal. The Sino-Nepalese boundary was never regarded as important. But, in a deteriorating situation, it could not be left unheeded. By signing a boundary treaty with Nepal, China could isolate India in the boundary dispute and at the same time the dissenters in Tibet could find no refuge in Nepal border areas.

Before the meeting of Nehru and Chou, the Prime Minister of Nepal, B. P. Koirala, went to Peking in March, 1960, and a boundary agreement was signed which provided a

³⁸Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, p. 201.

³⁹Ibid., p. 202.

⁴⁰Ibid.

demilitarized zone of twenty kilometers on both sides of the border.⁴¹ But they still argued about possession of Mount Everest, or Jolmo Lungma.⁴² The Nepalese said it belonged to Nepal because the mountain cannot be climbed from the north. On May 25, 1960, however, two Chinese and one Tibetan mountaineer successfully reached the summit from the northern side, which was unprecedented.⁴³ King Mahendra of Nepal, during his state visit to Peking in October, 1961, signed a final boundary treaty. But the treaty only had the boundary "pass through" Mount Jolmo Lungma or Everest without giving the exact location of the boundary.⁴⁴ King Mahendra further agreed to the construction of a highway linking Lhasa and Katmandu which was scheduled to be completed by 1966, and accepted Chinese aid for many development projects.

This amity between Nepal and China was conducted bilaterally and voluntarily. To the Nepalese, it would help lessen their dependence on India. But the Indians regarded it as objectionable.

With Pakistan. To the Indians, the agreement reached between Pakistan and China to discuss the boundary was

⁴¹Dai, op. cit., p. 93.

⁴²Jolmo Lungma (Mount Everest) was the name originally given by the Ch'ing Emperor, Kiang-si, when he first went there.

⁴³Dai, op. cit., p. 93; and Hinton, op. cit., p. 321.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 95; see text in Ambekar, op. cit., pp. 209-215.

irritating and unacceptable because they regarded Kashmir as India's. Thus, China's willingness to negotiate a boundary treaty with Pakistan would indirectly endorse Pakistan's stand in Kashmir on its side of the cease-fire line. For, except for Kashmir, there was no border between the two countries.

Although the U. S. S. R. formally endorsed the Indian stand on Kashmir in 1955, the Chinese Government has never formally committed itself. The Pakistanis never regarded their boundary with China as important because they were occupied with a territorial and boundary dispute with India and Afghanistan respectively. Thus, the Sino-Pakistani border was tranquil and undisturbed.

But after the 1959 Sino-Indian border hostilities, the Pakistan Government felt the boundary question was important as a means of putting pressure on India in the hope of reaching Pakistani-Indian amity. Thus, on October 23, India and Pakistan reached a final agreement on a long-pending boundary dispute in East Pakistan. Ayub Khan, taking the opportunity, expressed his desire to Nehru for a common defense pact with India, so that the entire northern border would be sufficiently protected.⁴⁵ Nehru rejected the notion. Pakistan was displeased.

⁴⁵Nasim Ahmed, "China's Himalayan Frontiers: Pakistan's Attitude," International Affairs, XXX, No. 40, (London, October, 1962), 481-482.

A year later, when the Kennedy administration, unlike its predecessor, gradually became more favorable to India and less to Pakistan, Ayub Khan considered it necessary to reassess his foreign policy.⁴⁶ On March 3, 1961, therefore, a note was sent to China requesting consideration of a border agreement. There was no definite reply until February, 1962, when the Sino-Indian border dispute became once again serious after a relative silence for two years.

On May 3, Peking announced that China had agreed with Pakistan to negotiate the border between the two countries. But it was only a preliminary talk after all, because, as the Peking Review stated:

After the settlement of the dispute over Kashmir between Pakistan and India, the authorities concerned shall reopen negotiations with the Chinese Government regarding the boundary of Kashmir, so as to sign a formal Boundary Treaty to replace this Provisional Agreement.⁴⁷

India protested this announcement on May 10, 1961.⁴⁸ This note stated the Indian frontier extended from the tri-junction of the frontiers of India, the People's Republic of China, and Afghanistan in the west to the tri-junction of the frontiers of India, the People's Republic of China, and Burma in the east. This Indian frontier would deny Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal's independence, which India later had to

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 482.

⁴⁷Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, p. 366.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 388-389 (India's note, May 10, 1962).

clarify. China then replied that Sino-Pakistani border negotiations were necessary as it would bring about amity and understanding between the two countries. They continued to ask the Indians:

Since the Burmese and Nepalese Governments can settle their boundary questions with China in a friendly way through negotiations and since the Government of Pakistan has also agreed with the Chinese Government to negotiate a boundary settlement, why is it that the Indian Government cannot negotiate and settle its boundary questions with the Chinese Government.⁴⁹

However, it is well to note that the date for the initial Sino-Pakistan border negotiations coincided with Nehru's announcement on October 12, 1962, of an impending offensive by the Indian army to drive Chinese troops out of the Indian-claimed territory.⁵⁰

"Edging Forward Policy" of India

So far this chapter has discussed the Chinese situation before the 1962 confrontation; now, let us turn to see what had happened on the Indian side.

After the unsuccessful negotiations with Chou, the Indians determined to retake their "lost territory." Nehru thought that being firm was the only way to reach his goal. They then strengthened their positions in the NEFA. This was a process started in late 1959. The Indians crossed the

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 401 (Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, May 31, 1962, pp. 398-402).

⁵⁰Hinton, op. cit., p. 318 (New China News Agency dispatch, October 12, 1962).

McMahon Line to the north, where they had never before been, and which had been under Chinese control. These areas were Che Dong, Khinzemane, and Longju.⁵¹ When the Indians saw that the NEFA was under their full control according to their own version, they thought their most urgent attention should be paid to the western sector. By 1960, this section was completely under Chinese control.

As has been mentioned, the difficult terrain of the Aksai Chin and Ladakh region had in the past closed off any attempt to penetrate from the south.⁵² In order to assert that Aksai Chin was "traditionally" India's, the Indians first of all had to solve the problem of communication. A road had already begun to be constructed from Kashmir into Ladakh in February, 1960, and later in August, 1960.⁵³ Earlier on July 8, 1959, India signed an agreement with the British Hawker-Siddeley Aviation Company to build AVRO transport planes in India.⁵⁴ Then, in mid-1960, transport aircraft and high altitude helicopters were bought from the United States.⁵⁵ In the autumn, from October to November, they brought in from Russia large amounts of similar

⁵¹Kao, op. cit., p. 13 (see the sketch map showing the positions of these three posts).

⁵²See Chapter III.

⁵³The New York Times, February 6, 1960, p. 3.

⁵⁴Wilcox, op. cit., p. 105.

⁵⁵The New York Times, June 10 and September 12, 1960, p. 1.

equipment both for air and surface communication and road construction.⁵⁶ This deal included MIG 21 aircraft.⁵⁷

With all this material supporting the "Indian Himalayan Escalation," the Indian troops were able, beginning in the spring of 1961, to move into this area, challenging the Chinese positions. As the situation began to favor the Indians, due to their persistent effort, their Prime Minister was able to say optimistically on November 28, 1961, in the Lok Sabha that

Progressively the situation had been changing from the military point of view and we shall continue to take steps to build up these things so that ultimately we may be in a position to take action to recover such territory as is in their possession.⁵⁸

Then on June 29, 1962, Nehru jubilantly reported to the Lok Sabha that

India had opened some new patrol posts endangering the Chinese posts, and it was largely due to movements on our side that the Chinese had also to make movements. It is well known in knowledgeable circles in the world that the position in this area had been changing to our advantage, and the Chinese are concerned about it.⁵⁹

⁵⁶Ibid., October 5, 1960, pp. 1, 2; November 15, 1960, p. 5.

⁵⁷Ian C. C. Graham, "The Indo-Soviet Mig Deal and Its International Repercussions," Asian Survey, Vol. IV, No. 5 (May, 1964), pp. 823-832. It emphasized that this purchase was mainly for dealing with Pakistan.

⁵⁸Nehru Speech of November 28, 1961, in Parliament (quoted in Klaus H. Pringsheim, "China, India, and Their Himalayan Border 1961-1963," Asian Survey, Vol. III, No. 10 (September, 1963), 474.

⁵⁹Nehru Speech of June 29, 1962, in Parliament (quoted in Chang Hsin-Hai, op. cit., p. 188).

By the autumn of 1962, the Indians had built, mostly in the form of all-weather barracks, forty-three outposts in this territory, which they have never advanced into before 1960.⁶⁰ Nehru then declared that these Indian outposts were three times as many as the Chinese outposts. They were built roughly one hundred miles away from and parallel to the first Chinese Highway (Aksai Chin Road), but within the vicinity of the more advanced second modern Chinese highway and very near to the Kongka Pass.⁶¹

These provocative acts of the Indians brought protests from Peking. The Indians made counter protests, claiming that Chinese troops intruded into Indian territories. Throughout these arguments, the Indians continued their activities. Nehru said that so long as the Chinese did not vacate the Aksai Chin, there would be no peace on this frontier. He also instructed the Indian troops that "Where we want to fight, we fight; the posts fight and others fight."⁶² In order to pressure the Chinese to pull back from this area, Nehru declared: "How do we get that aggression vacated? By diplomatic means, by various means, and ultimately,

⁶⁰Hinton, op. cit., p. 294.

⁶¹The New York Times, July 25, 1962, p. 6.

⁶²Nehru Speech of December 5, 1961 in Parliament (Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations, Vol. 1: Indian Parliament: Part II, New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1963, p. 59). Quoted in Hinton, op. cit., p. 295.

if you like, by war."⁶³ These statements were made soon after Nehru's return from the United States and Japan.

Up to this point there was no Chinese reaction. Marshal Chen Yi, in Geneva in 1961 while attending the Laos Conference, met Krishna Menon privately. During their conversation, he still "regarded the conflict as a purely localized one which would not break out into open war. . . ."⁶⁴ In fact, had the Indians envisaged any Chinese reaction to their acts, they would hardly have dispatched an infantry brigade to the Congo in March-April, 1961, or conducted the operation against Goa in December of the same year. In fact, the operation against Goa would be indirectly interpreted as an Indian attempt to demonstrate to her neighboring countries the effectiveness of the Indian troops.

It may also be important to point out that on March 4, 1961, the first Indian aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, began to serve in the Indian Navy in Belfast, Northern Ireland.⁶⁵ Then on June 24 of the same year the H. F.-24, an Indian designed supersonic fighter, made its maiden flight, but experienced difficulties in exceeding the speed of sound.⁶⁶

⁶³Nehru Speech of December 6, 1961 (Ibid., p. 47); Ibid., p. 295.

⁶⁴"Light on Ladakh," Economist (July 28, 1962), p. 344.

⁶⁵Kavic, op. cit., p. 122; and Wilcox, op. cit., p. 106.

⁶⁶Ibid., pp. 110-112, 135-140; and Ibid., p. 106.

The Indians continued, however, to probe forward, and by early 1962, the Aksai Chin was in confusion, for both the Chinese and the Indians were present there. However, there was no serious fighting because Chou ordered a stop to armed patrols unilaterally at the end of 1959, as suggested by Nehru in their correspondence. The Indians, however, did not reciprocate. By taking such chances, the Indians were able to establish forty-three outposts in Aksai Chin. A report in the Economist said:

The core of the matter is that this spring . . . India's defense forces were in a position to do their job and are doing it. A massive logistic complex has been built up based on Srinagar and the air base at Chandigarh in the Punjab. Forward posts have been dug in and fortified and supplied by air drop and helicopters. Behind them hundreds of miles of jeepable roads are now building and already built, notably from Leh to Chusul and from Chusul to Dam Chok.

At the front, it is the Chinese who are on the defensive. . . .⁶⁷

By April, the Indians outflanked a Chinese post near the Karakoram Pass and continued to come close to a long established Chinese post on the Chip Chap River; then they established a few posts about one mile apart. On the other end of Ladakh, the Indians established other posts in Spanggur Lake and on the Chang Chenmo River. They all are very close to the Chinese posts. Nehru described the situation as "a game of military chess" with each side maneuvering for position.⁶⁸ In many cases, Nehru declared, Indian troops had

⁶⁷"Light on Ladakh," op. cit., p. 344.

⁶⁸Ibid.

gone behind Chinese positions; for instance, in the Galwan Valley incident. This was an attempt by the Indians to cut off Chinese communications. By June 29, Nehru reported to the Lok Sabha that the military initiative was in their hands and that new Indian posts were outflanking and endangering Chinese posts.⁶⁹

This provocative behavior of the Indians was reported to have been ordered by Krishna Menon, the Indian Defense Minister, as an answer to election criticism that he was "soft" towards the Chinese.⁷⁰

Chinese Reaction

In response to the actions of the Indians, China reacted. In the second half of April, 1962, China announced that it had ordered its "frontier guards to resume border patrols in the Sector from Karakoram Pass to Kongka Pass,"⁷¹ and warned that if the Indians continued such hostile activities, the Chinese Government would be compelled to consider resuming border patrols along the entire Sino-Indian boundary. India replied that the protest was unacceptable

⁶⁹Kavic, op. cit., p. 171. A map published in Peking Review on July 20, 1962 (No. 29, p. 15), showed fifteen Indian "strongpoints" purportedly set up since the spring. It was subsequently charged in the same source (November 2, 1962, No. 44, p. 23) that India had set up forty-three "aggressive strongpoints" in Ladakh between May, 1961, and October, 1962.

⁷⁰Foreign Report (September 20, 1962), p. 6.

⁷¹Hinton, op. cit., p. 296 (quoted from Indian White Paper VI, p. 39).

and repeated its demand of Chinese withdrawal and added:

The Government of India is prepared, in the interest of a peaceful settlement, to permit, pending negotiations and settlement of the boundary question, the continued use of the Aksai Chin road for Chinese civilian traffic.⁷²

Although the Chinese rejected this Indian proposal in their reply on June 2, they said that they were satisfied with the status quo along the border and expressed a desire to have an overall settlement through negotiation.

One may ask why it was that China was still so inactive and the Indians so venturesome? The answers to these questions would certainly have to take into account the facts brought out in previous pages, that China was involved in a serious quarrel with Russia, that she had reason to fear a Nationalist-American attack on the mainland from Taiwan, and that both Russia and the United States were giving diplomatic and material support to the Indians in their dispute with China. When the Sino-Soviet rift came into the open later on, Peking made public its conviction that the Indian-Himalayan escalation had been encouraged by the Russians.⁷³

⁷²Ibid., p. 297 (quoted from Indian note of May 14, 1962).

⁷³"The Truth about How the Leaders of the CPSU Have Allied Themselves with India against China," People's Daily, November 2, 1963, and Peking Review, VI, 45 (November 8, 1963), 18-27; and "The Origin and Development of the Differences between Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves. . . ." in Griffith, op. cit., Document 10, p. 410.

Then, on July 9, The People's Daily warned that "it is still not too late for India to rein in on the brink of the precipice."⁷⁴ In order to warn the Indians from moving any further, Chinese troops began to surround an Indian outpost on the next day, July 10, but with an outlet for the Indians to escape. The attempt was not successful as a warning; the Indian troops continued to move forward, and China continued to protest.⁷⁵ Finally, on July 21, Chinese troops returned fire on an Indian patrol for the first time since 1959.⁷⁶

By August 4, China protested that Indian troops had violated the McMahon Line, saying that the Indians had crossed the Line which they had never penetrated previously. Still, they insisted that negotiations should be held at once, saying: "If only the Indian side stop advancing into Chinese territory, a relaxation of the border situation will be effected at once."⁷⁷ This was to no purpose. On August 13 and 14, Nehru addressed the Lok Sabha:

We have concentrated on increasing our strength, military strength, strength in communications, roads, et cetera. We have a special border-roads committee which has done very well--I do not know how exactly-- thousands of miles in very difficult terrain. We built up our air supply position by getting aircraft--big

⁷⁴Pringsheim, op. cit., p. 482 (quoted from People's Daily).

⁷⁵The New York Times, July 25, 1962, p. 3.

⁷⁶Hinton, op. cit., p. 297 (information from Indian White Paper, p. 92. The CPR accused the Indians of firing first Indian White Paper VII, p. 1).

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 298 (information from Indian White Paper, pp. 14-18).

aircraft--from various countries; we have got some helicopters too, but in the main it consisted of big transport aircraft. There were some from the United States and some from the Soviet Union. . . . We improved our military situation, our supply situation, got our troops in various areas there with forward posts. If they [the Chinese] have got nine posts, we have got twenty-two or twenty-three or twenty-four.⁷⁸

Since the situation was such, he asked for a free hand to deal with the situation.

Then on August 22, the Indians said that no negotiations would be held until after the border in Ladakh was restored to the status quo, that is, the complete withdrawal of Chinese posts from the alignment defined by India.⁷⁹

In reply to this, the Chinese Government proposed again that each side withdraw twenty kilometers (12.5 miles) and start negotiations on October 15 in Peking and then in New Delhi alternately with no preconditions.⁸⁰

On September 9, the Indian note agreed to the proposed date and place for negotiation but reiterated India's stand that the discussions should have the prescribed object of "defining measures to restore the status quo in the western Sector."

⁷⁸Chang, op. cit., p. 189 (quoted from Nehru's Speech).

⁷⁹Hinton, op. cit., p. 298 (Indian Note of August 22, 1962); see Indian White Paper VII, pp. 36-37.

⁸⁰Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, p. 251.

On September 20, the Chinese announced resumed patrolling along the entire border. And on October 3, a Chinese note repeated that both sides should speedily start the talks without raising any objection to the discussion of any question that either side might see fit to bring up.⁸¹

On October 5, Krishna Menon, Indian Defense Minister, announced that Lieutenant General B. M. Kaul was the commander-in-chief of a new border command in the Northeast Frontier Agency. Two days later, on October 7, the Indian Government rejected the Chinese proposal and unilaterally called off the meetings which were scheduled to begin on October 15 at Peking.⁸²

On October 12, the Indian Prime Minister announced that "instructions had been issued to the troops to throw the Chinese out of our territory."⁸³ The news media of the world were this time taken by surprise and regarded Nehru's words as being in the nature of an "ultimatum" (Manchester Guardian) or "a formal declaration of War" (New York Herald Tribune).

However, China was still patient enough to call upon Nehru on the next day, October 13, "to pull back from the brink of the precipice" as she was absolutely unwilling "to

⁸¹Chang, op. cit., p. 189.

⁸²Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, p. 252.

⁸³Ibid., p. 204.

cross swords with India." But on the next day, October 14, the appeal to India was solemn and firm. It said in The People's Daily that:

We want at all costs to avoid exchanging fire with you. . . . Let us settle the dispute by peaceful means. . . . Give up your aggressive plans and do not interpret our peaceful offers as a sign of weakness. . . . Do not embark on a futile venture. . . .⁸⁴

But Krishna Menon publicly declared, "We will fight to the last man, to the last gun." On this same day, The People's Daily announced that "a massive invasion of Chinese territory by Indian troops in the Eastern Sector of the Sino-Indian boundary seems imminent" and exhorted the People's Liberation Army to be ready.

On October 15, Nehru called on his people for discipline and sacrifice very much like Churchill's famous speech of "blood, tears, and sweat." On October 16, the Indian Defense Minister instructed ordnance factories to start maximum production even if it meant three shifts on a round-the-clock schedule.

On October 17, China began charging India with repeated violations of China's air space and invited India to shoot down any Chinese planes if they flew over Indian territory.

Finally, India began large scale hostilities along the entire border early in the morning on October 20, 1962, and

⁸⁴Karol, op. cit., p. 401 (quoted from Jenmin Jih Pao, People's Daily).

the People's Liberation Army was reported to have suffered heavy losses.⁸⁵

On the basis of these facts General Maxwell Taylor told the House Appropriations Committee on February 14, 1963, that it was India which actually started this military operation.⁸⁶

⁸⁵Chang, op. cit., pp. 190-1 (Chang stated he was indebted to Felix Greene, to The Far East Reporter, and to the Monthly Review of January, 1963, for making these facts available to him); Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, pp. 251-252; Karol, Ibid., pp. 402-403.

⁸⁶Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964. Hearings Before a Sub-Committee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 88th Congress, First Session (Washington, 1963), pp. 9-10.

CHAPTER VIII

THE OCTOBER HIMALAYAN CONFRONTATION AND THE COLUMBO POWERS MEDIATION

After a long silence from the autumn of 1959, the Chinese Army spoke on October 20, 1962. The counter-offensive was a coordinated one on all frontiers. On the same day, the Chinese Government dispatched a protest to India accusing Indian troops of having fired first beginning very early in the morning, and that "the Chinese frontier guards were compelled to strike back in self-defense." This preliminary warning attack lasted only four days and when compared with the November counter-offensive, it was minor. For it only drove the Indians back to the south of the McMahon Line and took the Tawang area. But on the Western sector, the Indians were driven out of the territory which China claimed. On the fourth day, October 24, 1962, Premier Chou made a statement to India as well as to the world describing what had happened since autumn, 1959, and expressing China's regret:

That China and India should cross swords on account of the boundary question is something the Chinese Government and people are unwilling to see, it is also what the peace-loving countries and people of the whole world are unwilling to see.

He then put forward three proposals:

- (1) Both parties affirm that the Sino-Indian boundary must be settled peacefully through negotiations. Pending a peaceful settlement, the Chinese Government hopes

that the Indian Government will agree that both parties respect the line of actual control between the two sides along the entire Sino-Indian border, and the Armed Forces of each side withdraw 20 kilometres from this line and disengage.

(2) Provided that the Indian Government agrees to the above proposal, the Chinese Government is willing through consultation between the two parties, to withdraw its frontier guards in the eastern sector of the border to the north of the line of actual control; at the same time, both China and India undertake not to cross the line of actual control, i.e. the traditional customary line, in the middle and western sectors of the border.

(3) The Chinese Government considers that, in order to seek a friendly settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question, talks should be held once again by the Prime Ministers of China and India. At a time considered to be appropriate by both parties, the Chinese Government would welcome the Indian Prime Minister to Peking; if this should be inconvenient to the Indian Government, the Chinese Premier would be ready to go to Delhi for talks.

The Chinese Government appeals to the Indian Government for a positive response to the above three proposals. The Chinese Government appeals to the Governments of Asian and African countries for an effort to bring about the materialization of these three proposals. The Chinese Government appeals to all the peaceful-loving countries and people to do their part in promoting Sino-Indian friendship, Asian-African solidarity and world peace.¹

This announcement might be interpreted as the hope on the part of the Chinese Government that a minor defeat of the Indians would deter them from advancing any further into the western sector. So early a proposal also gave time for the Indian Government to restrain itself from pushing the conflict into a war; at the same time, it might be a face-saving device for the Indians.

¹Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, pp. 211-212.

On the next day, the proposal was endorsed by U. S. S. R. in Pravda, which called it constructive. Implicitly, the Russians called upon the Indian Communists to support the Chinese stand or at least to restrain their Government.²

On October 27 Nehru replied but did not reject the proposals nor accept them. He raised a question as to the line of actual control.³ To him, the line of actual control should be the one prior to September 8, 1962. Thus, indirectly, he advanced a condition for the talks. The first essential was that the Chinese forces along the Indian-China border should go back at least to where they were prior to September 8, 1962.⁴ On the same day, Nehru wrote a letter to the Heads of Governments claiming "Chinese Aggression" on India.⁵

²"In the Interests of the Peoples, in the Name of Universal Peace," Pravda, October 25, 1962 (reprinted in full in People's Daily, October 26, 1962); Griffith, op. cit., p. 59; it stated: "The initial Soviet reaction, on October 25, in the midst of the Cuban crisis, was mildly pro-Chinese; but by carefully avoiding offending Delhi too much, it disappointed the Indians and angered the Chinese. After the Cuban crisis the second Soviet editorial on November 5 took an even less pro-Chinese position; in spite of some indirect criticism of the super-nationalism of the Indian Communists, it marked Moscow's return to the 1959 'neutral' position. Moscow also continued to make friendly gestures toward India, including, after much hesitation, sending four Mig fighter planes."

³Ambekar, op. cit., p. 181.

⁴Ibid., p. 182.

⁵Ibid., pp. 183-186; Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, pp. 234-237.

This reply may have been an effort by India to gain time for preparation both for defensive and offensive purposes. On October 25, two days before the note was sent, a state of emergency was signed by the President and proclaimed on the following day.⁶ On this day, October 26, New Delhi sent an urgent request for military supplies to London and Washington. An immediate response was received from these two Governments. On October 29, two Royal Air Force Britannias arrived, and the first American aid for the purpose arrived on November 1.⁷ Moreover, Nehru rejected the advice of Bertrand Russell to accept the present Chinese terms "in the interest of world peace."⁸ It seems proper to note that Nehru had often given the same kind of advice to the West. Nehru's argument was that "the Red terms would imply a major loss of Indian territory."⁹

Taking advantage of the restraint of the Chinese after the October 24 proposal, the Indians began to fight back under Kaul's command. Their action was reported to be successful, but very costly.

Chou did not let Nehru gain time, however. He next sent Nehru another letter on November 4 in which he

⁶Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, p. 214, citing extracts from a statement of the Prime Minister of India, J. Nehru, on the India-China Border Situation, November 8, 1962.

⁷Time (November 30, 1962), pp. 23-28.

⁸Time (November 16, 1962), p. 16.

⁹Ibid.

reiterated the Three Point Proposals of 20 Kilometers withdrawal by the armed forces. The letter stated clearly why China could not accept the Indian version of the Line of Actual Control of September 8, 1962. It said:

So far as the eastern sector is concerned, I believe the Indian Government must be in possession of the 1914 original map of the so-called McMahon Line. According to the original map, the western end of the so-called McMahon Line clearly starts from 27°44.6' N. Yet, the Indian Government arbitrarily said that it started from 27°48' N. and, on this pretext, it not only refused to withdraw the Indian troops from the Kechilang River area north of the Line, but made active dispositions for a massive military attack, attempting to clear the area of Chinese frontier guards defending it. Such was the position in the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian boundary prior to 8 September 1962. How can the Chinese Government agree to revert to such a position? As for the western sector, the Aksai Chin area has always been under China's jurisdiction. It was through this area that back in 1950 the Chinese People's Liberation Army entered the Ari district of Tibet from Sinkiang. Again, it was through this area that, from 1956 to 1957, the Chinese Government constructed the Sinkiang-Tibet Highway involving gigantic engineering work. Yet the Indian Government arbitrarily said that it was not until 1957 that the Chinese side came to this area and, on this pretext, unilaterally altered the state of the boundary in the western sector by force from 1961 onwards, occupied large tracts of Chinese territory east of the 1959 line of actual control and set up over 40 military strongpoints. Such was the position in the western sector of the Sino-Indian boundary prior to 8 September 1962. How can the Chinese Government agree to revert to such a position?¹⁰

To Chou En-lai, the temporary frontier should therefore mainly be the traditional customary line existing between the two countries before 1960. The letter expressed a desire to talk at once.

¹⁰Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, pp. 304-305.

On November 14, Nehru wrote to Chou rejecting the proposal of October 24.¹¹ The only alternatives left for China under Nehru's policy were to yield to the Indian demand in the name of seeking peace (which would be a dishonorable one), or to stand firm for an honorable negotiated peace by showing the Indians they could not make China yield through force. The second alternative was the only one acceptable to the Chinese. Thus, on November 16 Chinese forces took Walong and launched other offensives at various points. On November 18, they took the town of Bomdila. By this time the border of the rich state of Assam, from which India derives one-third of her foreign exchange and most of her petroleum, was within an hour's distance of the Chinese forces--about thirty miles.¹² Many Indians, both civil servants and ordinary people, abandoned their homes and fled down the river Brahmaputra to Bengal. And at the other end of the border, the western sector, the Indians fled to Kashmir. On the one hand, Chou showed China's determination to hold what China felt was rightfully hers; on the other hand, he worked to find peace for the two countries. Before this second counter-offensive, on November 15 after having received Nehru's rejection of the October 24 proposal, Chou En-Lai wrote a long letter to the Afro-Asian Government Heads

¹¹Ibid., pp. 306-310.

¹²Time (November 30, 1962), pp. 23-28.

telling of the crisis and inviting them to persuade Nehru to come to the conference table.¹³

On the next day, November 19, Nehru sent an urgent and specific request for American fighting air support, and to England for more military aid. Washington, this time, had not answered the Indian request when the Chinese announced their unilateral cease-fire.¹⁴

According to a report from Time, the Chinese force engaged in this border war numbered 100,000 men commanded by General Chang Kuo-Hua, a veteran of the Communist Party and Communist wars, including the Korean war.¹⁵ The Indian forces were a little fewer than 100,000 and were commanded by General B. M. Kaul, a veteran of the Burma Front in the Second World War and the commander of the Kashmir warfare against Pakistan. After the first defeat in October, Krishna Menon was compelled to resign due to unfavorable public opinion. The new Defense Minister, Y. B. Chavan, came from Bombay and was experienced in warfare.¹⁶ Throughout this confrontation until November 21, 1962, China had not lost a

¹³Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, pp. 237-260.

¹⁴Michael Edwardes, "Illusion and Reality in India's Foreign Policy," International Affairs, X L I (London, January, 1965), 52. The request was fifteen bomber squadrons to attack the advancing Chinese troops.

¹⁵Time (November 30, 1962), pp. 25-26.

¹⁶Ibid.

single prisoner of war but had taken three thousand Indian prisoners. By the spring of 1963, they were released.¹⁷

During this border war, the Government of India sponsored an anti-Chinese campaign in all the major cities of India. A Nationalist on Taiwan had this to say:

The overseas Chinese in India, even those naturalized as Indian citizens, have been denied governmental protection of their freedom and safety. The Indians argued: "If this means brutality on the part of the Indians, the Chinese Communists have been more brutal. You Chinese had better call the Communists to task." [The Indian Government] wrongly said that the "government and people of a nation are necessarily in the same boat. As India becomes a country hostile to Red China, all Chinese have naturally become India's enemies."

A reasonable people can feel only great regret at such an abnormal, unlawful behavior on the part of the Indian Government. India's national father, Mahatma Gandhi, devoted his lifetime to the search of truth. In recent years, India has been advocating peace and non-violence. Now its maltreatment of innocent Chinese, something not to be expected from a civilized government, has departed seriously from that tradition. . . . The Indian Government and people should reconsider their attitude and deplore the wrongs they have done.¹⁸

On November 21, the People's Republic of China made a statement which not only repeated the October 24 three-point proposals, but also announced a unilateral cease-fire effective "from 00:00 hours" the following day.¹⁹ The statement also announced withdrawal beginning December 1, 1962, behind positions which existed between China and India on November 7,

¹⁷Christian Science Monitor (June 17, 1963), p. 17.

¹⁸Wu, "Background and Perspective of the Peiping-New Delhi Conflict," p. 16.

¹⁹Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, p. 211.

1959.²⁰ And it declared that

Should the above eventualities [i.e. if the Indians began to reoccupy western sector or north of the McMahon Line] occur, China reserves the right to strike back in self-defense and the Indian Government will be held completely responsible for all the grave consequences arising there from.²¹

It concluded with a call to the friendly Afro-Asian countries to mediate the conflict.

The Chinese Government kept its word. On November 22 all fighting stopped. On December 1, 1962, the Chinese troops moved back to where they said they would go.²² On the day when the Chinese forces were withdrawing, Nehru again received a letter from Premier Chou En-Lai reiterating that both countries had an urgent task of terminating the border conflict; and the only means was to separate the armed forces of the two parties, and create a proper atmosphere so as to settle the boundary differences through

²⁰Readers should be reminded that this line which China holds as actual control is that this was the line held by the two countries before their relations began to deteriorate. In other words, it was the line the two countries held before significant border disputes started. It was the line the two countries held while they were in good terms of friendship. To put it more clearly, it was the line help by the Chinese Government as a temporary line (short of any formal delimitation of boundary line) pending for negotiation for a formal final settlement. It was the line held by the Chinese Government before the Indians began their "creeping forward" policy and the building of the new Indian border posts among and behind the Chinese positions north of the McMahon Line and east of the line of actual control in the Askai Chin and Ladakh areas in the Western sector.

²¹Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, p. 213.

²²The New York Times, December 15, 1962, p. 2

negotiation and added that the Chinese Government, "in taking its decision on the cease-fire and present withdrawal had given full consideration to the decency, dignity, and self-respect of the two countries. "²³ India, however, still rejected it.

The Columbo Powers Mediation

Undoubtedly, this Sino-Indian conflict was an important international issue. Within less than a month after Chou's letter was sent asking Afro-Asian leaders to mediate the conflict for the interest of regional and world peace, many heads of state offered various proposals and mediation. They included the United Arab Republic, Ghana, Tanganyika, and Indonesia. On December 10, 1962, the Government of Ceylon organized a Conference at Columbo of six Afro-Asian nations (Burma, Ceylon, Cambodia, Ghana, Indonesia, and the United Arab Republic) to discuss how to mediate the Himalayan Confrontation.²⁴ India was greatly distressed as she found only the U. A. R. took a pro-Indian stand in the conference. After the conference, a communique was issued.²⁵ It did not describe the Chinese actions as aggression nor endorse the Indian demand for a return to the line of September 8, 1962--

²³Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, p. 316.

²⁴The New York Times (December 14, 1962), p. 3.

²⁵Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, p. 260.

the line of actual control in India's version.²⁶ The proposals of the Columbo Conference were delivered to India and China on December 15, 1962. They were released on January 19, 1963, after the Columbo delegation had visited both China and India to explain them to the two governments. The proposals were as follows:

1. The Conference considers that the existing de facto cease-fire period is a good starting point for a peaceful settlement of the Indian-Chinese conflict.

2. (a.) With regard to the Western sector, the Conference would like to make an appeal to the Chinese Government to carry out their 20 kilometres withdrawal of their military posts as has been proposed in the letter of Prime Minister Chou En-Lai to Prime Minister Nehru 21 November and 28 November 1962.

- (b.) The Conference would make an appeal to the Indian Government to keep their existing military position.

- (c.) Pending a final solution of the border dispute, the area vacated by the Chinese military withdrawal will be a demilitarized zone to be administered by civilian posts of both sides to be agreed upon, without prejudice to the rights of the previous presence of both India and China in that area.

3. With regard to the eastern sector, the Conference considers that the line of actual control in the areas recognized by both the Governments could serve as a

²⁶This September 8, 1962, line of actual control the Indians strive to maintain differs much from the November 7, 1959, of the line of actual control. Most importantly, this September 8, 1962, was created by the Indians beginning in 1960 by creeping forward and building Indian military outposts one after another under repeated Chinese protests. Thus, this September 8 line was made by the Indians across their own line of actual control of November 7, 1959. In other words, this is the line of Indian aggression and which they insisted to maintain; and this fruit of encroachment was obtained from 1960 to September 8, 1962. It is advisable to compare this footnote with number 20 of this chapter.

cease-fire line to their respective positions. Remaining areas in this sector can be settled in their future discussions.

4. With regard to the problems of the middle sector, the Conference suggests that they will be solved by peaceful means, without resorting to force.

5. The Conference believes that these proposals, which could help in consolidating the cease-fire, once implemented, should pave the way for discussion between representatives of both parties for the purpose of solving problems entailed in the cease-fire position.

6. The Conference would like to make it clear that a positive response for the proposed appeal will not prejudice the position of either of the two Governments as regards its conception of the final alignment of the boundaries.²⁷

The wording of the proposals amounts to a vague compromise outlining the conditions for cease-fire and the speedy holding of negotiations. A careful reading, however, would suggest the following interpretations. It urged the Chinese Government to withdraw its troops twenty kilometers. In fact the Chinese troops were doing this even without the Columbo proposal. On the other hand, they urged the Indians to remain where they were; in other words, they did not have to withdraw twenty kilometers from the line of actual control because they were already behind the previous line of control after they were defeated by the Chinese troops. Therefore, the picture appears that both the Chinese and the Indian had withdrawn, the former voluntarily whereas the latter was due to their defeat in the fighting. Thus there existed a belt of no man's land on either side of the line

²⁷Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, pp. 261-262.

of actual control of November 7, 1959. This belt was to be administered by non-military personnel of both sides, each exercising their authority up to the line of active control. But this line is not a final delimitation of the boundary of the two countries. The above interpretation may be applied to both the Western and Eastern sectors, with the latter somewhat ambiguous.

After the Proposal was dispatched to China and India, a Columbo powers' delegation went to the two countries respectively for explanation of its contents. From January 1 to 9, the powers were represented by the Ceylonese Premier, Mademoiselle Bandaranaike, who visited the People's Republic of China in order to explain the proposals and to secure the Chinese Government's acceptance. She was assisted by Subandrio, Deputy First Minister and Foreign Minister of Indonesia. Following their talks, a joint communique said that "The Chinese Government gave a positive response to the Proposals of the Columbo conference."²⁸ But it also agreed that "the Columbo proposals should not be published for the time being."²⁹ Further,

The reactions of the Government of China to the proposals would also not be made public before the Prime Minister of Ceylon discusses the Conference proposals with the Prime Minister of India and until the results of the talks in Peking and New Delhi are communicated to all six participating countries.³⁰

²⁸Ibid., p. 264.

²⁹Ibid., p. 265.

³⁰Ibid.

This positive response on the part of the Chinese Government was qualified by a telegram sent by Mademoiselle Bandaranaike to Nehru telling him of Chou's attitude toward the proposal. It said:

In response to my [Mme. Bandaranaike] telegram of 14 January, I have received to day a reply from Prime Minister Chou En-Lai. Prime Minister Chou En-Lai has reiterated his earlier acceptance in principle of proposals of Columbo Conference as a preliminary basis for the meeting of Indian and Chinese Officials to discuss the stabilization of cease-fire and disengagement and to promote Sino-Indian boundary negotiations.³¹

After their mission to Peking, Mademoiselle Bandaranaike and her colleagues arrived in India, and had a four-day visit from January 10-14.³² The Indian Government requested the Columbo power delegates to clarify their proposals before they could accept them even in principle. The clarifications given India on January 13, 1963, read:

Western Sector

(I) The withdrawal of Chinese forces proposed by the Columbo Conference will be 20 kilometres as proposed by Prime Minister Chou En-Lai to Prime Minister Nehru in the statement of the Chinese Government dated 21 November and in Prime Minister Chou En-Lai's letter of 28 November 1962, i.e., from the line of actual control between the two sides as of 7 November 1959, as defined in maps III and V circulated by the Government of China.

(II) The existing military posts which the forces of the Government of India will keep to will be on and up to the line indicated in (I) above.

(III) The demilitarised zone of 20 kilometres created by Chinese military withdrawals will be administered by civilian posts of both sides. This is a substantive part of the Columbo Conference proposals. It is as to the location, the number of posts and their composition that there has to be an agreement between the two Governments of India and China.

³¹Ibid., p. 277.

³²Ibid., p. 265.

Eastern Sector

The Indian forces can, in accordance with the Columbo Conference proposals, move right up to the south of the line of actual control, i.e., the McMahon Line, except for the two areas on which there is difference of opinion between the Governments of India and China. The Chinese forces similarly can move right up to the north of the McMahon Line except for these two areas. The two areas referred to as the remaining areas in the Columbo Conference proposals, arrangements in regard to which are to be settled between the Government of India and China, according to the Columbo Conference proposals, are the Dong or the Thagla ridge area and the Longju area, in which cases there is a difference of opinion as to the line of actual control between the two Governments.

Middle Sector

The Columbo Conference desired that the status quo in this sector should be maintained and neither side should do anything to disturb the status quo.³³

From these clarifications we may draw the following interpretations. They envisaged, first, a Chinese withdrawal from the line of actual control of November 7, 1959. Second, India could retain military posts existing up to November 7, 1959. Third, it envisaged both the Chinese and Indian Civilian Officials would administer the demilitarized zone after the Chinese withdrawal. In other words, it may be interpreted that after the Chinese withdrew from their line of actual control of November 7, 1959, the demilitarized zone would be administered by both the Chinese and Indian civilian personnel. Thus, it clearly shows that the Indians could maintain the positions which they held from 1960 until September 8, 1962. Fourth, in the Eastern sector, each side

³³Ibid., pp. 266-267.

could move up to the McMahon Line except the Western end and Longju, because the location of the McMahon Line at these two points was in dispute. With such a favorable clarification, Nehru replied on January 26, 1963, to Mademoiselle Bandaranaike, saying:

In my letter of 13 January and the Memorandum attached to the letter, I indicated to you the acceptance by the Government of India in principle of the Colombo Conference proposals in the light of the clarifications given by you and your colleagues during our meetings in Delhi on 12th and 13th.³⁴

Chou En-Lai wrote to the Prime Minister of Ceylon on January 19, 1963, authorizing her to publish the Colombo Conference proposals at any time she deemed it appropriate. However, the letter not only stressed China's desire to hold talks with the Indians in spite of the many differences in the interpretation of the Colombo proposals, but also stipulated two points, which were taken by the Indians to be qualifications on their acceptance:

(1.) In the interest of stabilizing the cease-fire and disengaging the troops of the two sides, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw 20 kilometres along the entire Sino-Indian border on China's own initiative in accordance with the plan announced in the statement of the Chinese Government dated 21 November 1962, the stipulation in the proposals of the Conference regarding the Indian troops keeping their existing military position should be equally applicable to the entire Sino-Indian border, and not to the western sector alone. It is the understanding of the Chinese Government that in the eastern sector, India will continue to refrain from sending its troops to re-enter the areas south of the line of actual control as of 7 November 1959, vacated by the Chinese frontier guards, and will send

³⁴Ibid., p. 283.

there only civilian personnel carrying arms of self-defense, as India says it has done up till now.

(2.) After their continued withdrawal all along the border to positions 20 kilometres from the line of actual control of 7 November 1959 in accordance with the statement of the Chinese Government, the Chinese frontier guards will be far behind their positions 8 September 1962. Thus no Chinese frontier guards will be stationed in the Che Dong area and Longju in the eastern sector, Wu-je in the middle sector and the areas in the western sector where India once set up 43 strongpoints. Since all these places are on the Chinese side of the line of actual control as of 7 November 1959, it is a matter of course for China to set up civilian check-posts there. However, with a view to responding to the peace call of the Colombo Conference and promoting direct negotiations between China and India, China is willing to move another step forward on the road of reconciliation by refraining from setting up civilian check-posts in those places, provided Indian troops or civilian personnel do not re-enter these places.

The above-mentioned two-point interpretation by the Chinese Government helps to carry through, in the proposals of the Colombo Conference, the principle of being equitable to China and India and the principle of equal application to all the sectors of the Sino-Indian boundary, and does not in the least prejudice the positions held by China and India as regards the final alignment of the boundary. . . .³⁵

From the above quotations, the difference between the two Governments were wide. Because of this difference, Nehru made a statement after a joint Indian-Ceylon Communique was issued on January 13, 1963.³⁶ This statement on January 23, 1963, ten days after the Joint Communique, gave Nehru's attitude toward the Colombo proposals. He said:

Therefore, to put it succinctly, the position before us is that, firstly we cannot have any kind of talks, even preliminary talks, unless we are satisfied that the

³⁵Ibid., pp. 268-269.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 265-266.

condition we had laid down about the 8 September 1962 position being restored, is met; secondly, even if it is met and even if talks take place, they have to be about various preliminary matters. Then they may lead to other matters. On no account, at the present moment or in these preliminary matters, do we consider the merits of the case. They are not changed.

When we asked for the restoration of the 8 September line, that had nothing to do with our accepting the line as a settlement; of course not.³⁷

This precondition for talks not only took away China's fruits of victory, but also continued to ask China to yield to Indian demands. It therefore was unacceptable to China and Chou rejected it. Thus the hostile situation in the Himalayan Mountains remained unresolved. But the Indian defeat along the Himalayan frontiers had already made India unable to strike back in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the Indian build-up on this frontier was much faster after the confrontation than was the Chinese.

³⁷Ibid., p. 279.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

We now have come to a summing up. Historically, Indian-Chinese relations have been friendly because of the Buddhist religion and geographical limitations. This friendliness ended when the British became masters of the Indian peninsula. When after about three hundred years of domination in that Peninsula, the British left it, Pandora's box was opened for the Indian leaders. As legal successor to the British Raj, the Indians have had few uneventful days since their independence. To some extent their problems are self-inflicted. Since independence India has followed a policy of power politics for expansion of territory and prestige. As a result they have come to have more friends abroad than at their home region.¹ As recounted in this thesis, their policy finally brought on trouble with China.²

The British attempts to open Tibet for trade were unsuccessful and they had to use force eventually. The English were not content with their influence in the Himalayas; they wished to control the entire Tibet region of China. They incited the Tibetans to declare independence

¹Eekelen, op. cit., p. 199.

²Chang, op. cit., p. 177.

when the first Chinese Republic was founded, but without avail. However, it left trouble for China because the British, to save face after the failure of the Simla Conference, drew a boundary line on Chinese territory. Since this line was drawn by the British delegate, McMahon, behind the back of the Chinese delegate, the British made no attempt to impose their view on China until 1938 when China was invaded by the Japanese. Since then, the British began to explore the areas north of the customary line between China and British Assam. During the process of their exploration, they outflanked many Chinese boundary marks.

When the Indians became masters of their own house in 1947, they followed their former ruler's policy of exploration into this area which they called the North East Frontier Agency. Such exploration included military action to occupy Tibetan positions such as the Tawang area. This action was made when the Chinese army was in the process of "liberating" Tibet. Despite these Indian movements along the Chinese frontier, however, they still maintained a friendly relationship with the Chinese Government. For the policy of the Chinese was that their boundary with India was nowhere well defined, although there were traditional demarcations. The Chinese expected a final delimitation of the border line by means of negotiation; and they believed that through such a process peace between India and China could be maintained.

The Tibetan Incident in 1959 had awakened the Chinese to the importance of their boundary with India; therefore, they began to safeguard the outposts in the border areas. But the Indians had the support of the Russians and the Americans. They thus began to become more intransigent, even when Chou offered Nehru almost the whole area South of the McMahon line to the Indians for a formal and final delimitation of the Sino-Indian border. When China was in simultaneous crises over a possible Nationalist-American attack from Taiwan, with serious internal difficulties after the failure in the Great Leap Forward, and with problems stemming from the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Indians thought it was time to impose their view on the Chinese. Although China offered favorable conditions for holding talks, not only by means of cease-fire but also by unilateral withdrawal of troops, the Indians refused to negotiate and insisted on having their way, the Columbo proposals notwithstanding. Therefore, the situation in the Himalayas appears to be a diplomatic stalemate, with the effective boundary being determined for the time being by the position of Chinese troops after they withdrew from their farthest penetration.

Many students of international relations and politics favor an interest approach to international issues. It is therefore worthwhile to view the Indian-Chinese confrontation in terms of national interests of the parties to the dispute.

Hinton asserted that neither side desired to make a real war over the Himalayas.³ On the Chinese side, the difficult terrain and high altitude vetoed the full-scale war; this was also true for the Indians. It is true that the Chinese never prepared for a war in the Himalayas except for the purpose of national security and defense. Several points render weight to this hypothesis. First, the Chinese did not use their superior air force; second, they could have chosen a better time to attack than in the late October-November months when snows covered most of the Himalayan valleys and passes. The situation also vetoed the mobilization of forces to deliver an all out attack. Moreover the strategic highway net was not yet completed and it was difficult to arrange logistics. Owing to these limitations, the Chinese were not interested in a border war with India. As for the Indians, their positions over the Himalayas were never better than the Chinese because their outposts in the Eastern Sector, at least, were on the lower level. Their forces were not prepared for a full-scale war in the Himalayas, and it was also a time when snows covered many of the passes and valleys. But amidst these similarities between the two sides, there was one dissimilarity. This was that India made use of the war to convince the world and their fellow-Indians that they were the victim of

³Hinton, op. cit., p. 281.

aggression.⁴ However, on the other side of the Himalayas, it was another story. According to Tyson's book, Nehru: The Years of Power:

A friend of the writer, who was one of the very few English businessmen allowed to reside in China throughout this or any other period of Communist rule, reports that the frontier war aroused remarkably little general interest and that, considering the scale of the operations, the newspapers did not have much to say about it. It is difficult to explain this apparent indifference.
⁵

This tends to confirm that Communist China had no intention of making the border fighting serve internal purposes. From this information, it is more likely that the Indians planned the confrontation. If this is so, what national interests were the Indian leaders seeking in their "Himalayan Miscalculation," as it was termed by Hinton?⁶ This is a difficult question to answer. According to authorities and information that is available, Indian interests may have involved the following: prestige, national unity, economic and military aid from the United States, United Kingdom, and the U. S. S. R., the division of the Indian Communist Party, a reduction of the influence of the left wing of the Congress party, the reassertion of Indian influence in Tibet, and control of strategic passes in the Himalayas. However, in

⁴Hasan, China, India, Pakistan, pp. 234-237; Nehru, "Changing India," Foreign Affairs, X L I (April, 1963), 453-465.

⁵Tyson, Nehru: The Years of Power (London, 1966), p. 111.

⁶Hinton, op. cit., p. 299.

order to obtain these interests, the Indian leaders would have to plan carefully in order to confine the war to a limited scope. For the Indians thought of a confrontation that would cause the Chinese to give what the Indians demanded, short of major war. Thus they took the Cuban crisis as the most opportune moment to start their campaign. This was also a time when the Chinese Communists had great troubles both internally and externally. The Indians therefore thought the Chinese might not be ready to attack them if they did not attack the Chinese too strongly.

Ever since their independence in 1947, the Indians had a dream of great India. But the fact remains that in Asia China is the largest state, with a potential for world power. Patterson said:

In 1961 China's steel production was over 13 million tons compared with India's 4 million tons. China's coal production was 350 million tons compared with India's 50 million tons. China's average food-grain growth was about 180 million tons compared with India's 70 million tons. Even making allowances for the disparity in population--China, over 600 million, and India, over 400 million--the figures would seem to prove conclusively that China's industrial and agricultural rate of production was much greater than that of India.⁷

However, the Indians believed that India should at least be equal with China in power and prestige. Her international activities after independence denoted this ambition. Therefore, in order to show the world that China was not the

⁷Patterson, Peking Versus Delhi, p. 282.

dominant power in Asia, India challenged China's hegemony. Thus Wilcox asserted that the confrontation was for hegemony in their region,⁸ and Hinton deemed this was more so for India, because of its Kashmir problems with Pakistan.⁹ Furthermore, by such a policy India might gain greater influence in the "Third World."

If India could not gain more influence than before by a policy of "brinkmanship" with China, it might still be beneficial to them internally. For Indian unity had never been solidified. Therefore, there was a need to promote and accelerate the process of national integration. On one occasion, Nehru had said: "My profession is to foster the unity for India."¹⁰ Thus in order to generate a common feeling of Indian unity and patriotism, the most effective way would be to tell the people of the imminent danger which threatened them. Thus there seemed to be an indirect gain to India from a "Chinese aggression."

Even if the Indians could not be successfully united under a common destiny as described, the impasse with China still had a purpose for them. The three authors, Fisher, Rose, and Huttenback, said in the preface of their book, Himalayan Battleground, that China was jealous of India's

⁸Wilcox, op. cit., p. 83.

⁹Hinton, op. cit., p. 281.

¹⁰Harrison, The Most Dangerous Decades, p. 8, quoted from National Herald, February 10, 1956, p. 1.

economic development, which "gained world-wide commendation," and so they started this campaign against India.¹¹ However, there are reasons to believe that the opposite was almost the truth. According to official reports, even though there has been some increase in Indian industrial output, it was far behind the target set for the Second Five Year Plan; and as for the agricultural sector, it was almost a failure. Generally, the rate of population growth had eaten away all the gains from the slow economic growth.¹² Therefore, as a whole, India's Second Five-Year Plan was a failure, if not a complete one. And there were no resources to implement the Third Five-Year Plan. According to the Indian Finance Minister's account:

Our resources are almost at rock bottom; there is no scope for running them further down; we have thus to depend wholly on foreign aid for the financing of our developing plans.¹³

However, the prospect for large sum of aid from the United States and other European countries were not very optimistic, mainly because of the Indian military action against Goa. So, in order to foster and maintain the western world interest in New Delhi, the Congress Party Administration had to make use of a crisis; and since there was no crisis, they needed to precipitate one. Thus, India could present a case

¹¹Fisher, Rose, and Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground (New York, 1963), p. v.

¹²P. Singh, India and the Future of Asia (New York, 1966), pp. 67-73.

¹³Chang, op. cit., p. 194.

for more aid. On the other hand, New Delhi also wanted to reinforce its military build-up which was reported to have been neglected by Krishna Menon.¹⁴ Time magazine reported how Nehru explained military aid to India during the confrontation period:

"The House knows that the arms racket is the worst racket of all. If they know you want something, they will make you pay for it through the nose." By waiting until China invaded India, Nehru pointed out, he was able to get British and U. S. arms "in large numbers" and "on very special terms."¹⁵

Nehru was confident that the Soviet Union would keep faith on the delivery of MIG airplanes promised before the border fighting. Indeed, after the first few symbolic MIG 21 fighter planes delivered to India, the Soviet Union stepped up its economic and military aid.¹⁶ Wilcox thus commented:

India found it possible to play a key role in alienating the U. S. S. R. from China, by accepting military equipment from arsenals in Prague as well as Washington. Economic aid has been forthcoming in large quantities from both blocs.¹⁷

There was yet another factor shaping the confrontation: the Congress party's fear of the popularity of the Indian Communist Party. Unlike the Congress party, the ruling party, which was showing signs of disintegrating into rival

¹⁴Time (November 9, 1962), pp. 31-32.

¹⁵Time (November 23, 1962), p. 16.

¹⁶Wu, "Background and Perspective of the Peiping-New Delhi Conflict," p. 1; Eekelen, op. cit., p. 181.

¹⁷Wilcox, op. cit., p. 81.

factions, the Communist Party of India was gaining strength. Before the border fighting, it was already the second most influential party in India.

Although the Communists hold only twenty-eight seats in the Indian Parliament, they are, nevertheless, the strongest opposition party, and Mr. Nehru is known to fear any further increase in their representation, especially in large cities such as Calcutta and in delicately balanced states such as Kerala.¹⁸

Then there was the fact that the Indian Communist Party was almost completely pro-China. For instance, on September 29, 1959, the Central Executive Committee adopted a resolution concerning the Sino-Indian border dispute which said:

But these differences can be resolved through friendly discussions and negotiation without either side making prior acceptance of its own claims, viz. the McMahon Line in one case and the Chinese maps in the other, the precondition for commencing negotiations.¹⁹

This resolution, in other words, is almost identical to the position of China expressed in the correspondence between Chou and Nehru. Further, concerning the Tibetan Incident, the Indian Communists strongly condemned their government for having supported the revolt.²⁰ Nehru therefore determined to split the Communist Party into factions. In fact it was soon divided into nationalist (pro-India) and internationalist (pro-China) elements. After the fighting

¹⁸Patterson, Peking Versus Delhi, p. 281.

¹⁹Eekelen, op. cit., p. 183.

²⁰The New York Times, April 4, 1959, p. 4; April 6, 1959, p. 1.

on the frontier broke out, important members of the pro-Chinese faction were arrested. As more important leaders were imprisoned, the Communist Party leadership began to condemn Peking's military action as "aggression" and called upon all Indians to unite in defense against such a threat.²¹

Thus India's hostile posture toward Communist China could be seen to be effective. It had a further effect of toppling the growing influence of the left wing elements of the Congress Party. Krishna Menon, as the leader of the left wing who was known to be the most anti-American and pro-Chinese figure in India, was soon downgraded and ousted from all political importance.²²

The impasse with China would also inspire the Tibetan refugees in India and along the border to lean to the Indian side. Hinton pointed out that China's fear of subversive action in Tibet under Indian influence was no less than India's fear of the Nagas, who turn to China for aid.²³ And Patterson wrote:

It is no secret that India is already arming Tibetan guerrillas in anticipation of further fighting on the borders. But it is a futile gesture unless it is linked with a practicable and attractive policy. The same applies to the tough Naga guerrillas, who will

²¹Eekelen, op. cit., p. 183 (Mukherjee, A. N., "Sino-Indian relations and the Communists," pp. 54-57; Dange in Lok Sabha Debates, February 20, 1961, Vol. I, Col. 898.)

²²Tyson, op. cit., p. 112.

²³Hinton, op. cit., p. 281.

inevitably turn to China for arms in opposition to India's stiff-necked militancy.²⁴

From this point of view, it is one of the dreams of India, like the British and Russians, to have Tibet become independent of China. By arming the Tibetan guerrillas, the Indians may hope that some day the situation in Tibet may turn out to the advantage of the Indians; and Tibet will finally become a buffer between China and India. In that case, India and Southern Asia would be free from the shadow of China, and India would become the dominant country in the Indian Ocean.

So much for the Indian interest in this confrontation. Now let us turn to the Chinese interests. These would include a desire to control strategic passes, to wipe out subversive activity bases along the border, to achieve political and military ascendancy in the Himalayas, to preserve its prestige as a great Asian power, and to impress upon the U. S. S. R. and the United States that there are problems which could not be settled without Chinese participation. Other suggestions have been that China's attack was intended as an indirect admonition to the Russians that China would reject unequal treaties imposed by imperial countries; as a way to coerce the Indians to the conference table; and as a warning to them not to advance any further.

²⁴Patterson, op. cit., p. 291.

The Central Daily News (Taipei) said that China had no interest in the control of snow-capped mountains. They argued that the Communist Regime had already given Burma and Nepal pieces of Chinese territory in exchange for a border agreement.²⁵ But Hinton said that this border dispute, to some extent, was one "over the control of strategic passes."²⁶ However, it is closer to the truth to say that the Communist regime was taking the opportunity to eliminate any bases along the border intended for subversive activities inside Tibet. Of course, the control of strategic passes certainly permits China to deny any outsiders access to Chinese territory. But since these passes to the north of the McMahon Line were already within Chinese control, they had no need to fight the Indians. As to the western sector, the Chinese also withdrew to the line of actual control of November, 1959. It therefore would be more pertinent to say that the Indians' intransigence in this border dispute was based on a desire to control some of the strategic passes on the Chinese side of the line of November, 1959.²⁷ If the Indians could succeed in doing so, it would facilitate their assistance to the Tibetan rebellious elements.

²⁵"Communist China's Ultimatum to India," Central Daily News, Maps weekly, Chinese edition, XIX (September 20, 1965), 37.

²⁶Hinton, op. cit., p. 281.

²⁷Ibid.

The Central Daily News pointed out again that since its independence, the Nehru administration struggled to maintain the power and prestige left by the British. But the Indians were short of resources to support such a struggle. Nehru therefore had to resort to diplomatic maneuver by playing the Soviet Union against the United States.²⁸ To be non-aligned would facilitate Indian influence in the two areas north and south of the Himalayas which the British had had before.²⁹ But unfortunately for them, the Indians had to deal with a strongly organized Communist China. However, as both the United States and U. S. S. R. supported Nehru in this dispute, the Nehru administration believed it was not too risky. Therefore, the confrontation in the Himalayas was the result of two expansionists each trying to gain ascendancy.³⁰ However, the difference was that the Indians were trying to preserve the fruits of aggression which were obtained from a weak China by the British Empire.

There are evidences that China's border attack was a warning to the Russians that China had the power to defend its territorial integrity. The Russians had tried to coerce China into accepting the Indian demands during the dispute,

²⁸"Communist China's Ultimatum to India," Central Daily News, p. 37.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰"Communist China's Ultimatum to India," op. cit.

by putting pressure on China-Soviet frontiers after 1960.³¹ To defeat the Indians would be a warning to the Russians also that if they did invade China, they would pay a high price.³² Thus, as we have seen, after the Columbo powers came to mediate the conflict, there were, since the spring of 1963, reports of the Chinese army moving away from the Sino-Indian border to the Sino-Soviet frontiers.³³ Since then, Mao and Khrushchev had disputes over the unequal treaties which Russia had imposed on the Ch'ing Dynasty.³⁴ This may also be one of the reasons for the Chinese unilateral cease-fire and withdrawal.

Some other writers take the view that it was a manifestation that China would not accept an unequal treaty.³⁵ To the Chinese, the McMahon Line was "illegal," in the sense that it had never been accepted by China as binding in international law. Even Nehru himself had this to say in 1954 regarding this Line:

³¹Hinton, op. cit., p. 306.

³²Ibid., p. 307.

³³Ibid., p. 306; Christian Science Monitor, February 28, 1963.

³⁴Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965, pp. 365-366, citing Document 16: Interview with Chairman Mao Tse-tung by a Delegation of the Japanese Socialist Party, July 10, 1964.

³⁵G. F. Hudson, "The Frontier of China and Assam: Background to the Fighting," The China Quarterly (October-December, 1962), p. 206; Eekelen, op. cit., p. 188.

It was in the time of Lord Curzon that the Britishers in India started on an expansionist drive and entered into some arrangements with countries neighbouring India. But it is quite clear that it is impossible today to continue any such arrangements created by British Imperialism. . . .

All these maps were prepared by British imperialists. Is Dr. Sinha [a member in the Lok Sabha who asked Nehru in the Parliamentary debate on May 18, 1954 about the maps relating to Tibet and the McMahon line maps] proposing that we should follow these maps prepared by British imperialist? . . .³⁶

No matter what the regime, China would be reluctant to accept unequal treaties. The unequal treaties are vital to the Chinese because they have so many unequal territorial treaties which need to be redressed. To accept the McMahon Line formally would set an example of accepting unequal treaties. It would surely weaken China's position in dealing with the Russians in connection with territorial issues.

There is still another factor which would explain the Chinese cease-fire and withdrawal. This factor lies in the fact that China, the Middle Kingdom, was built at least 2,500 years ago upon the philosophy of forgiveness. Thus history has shown that though China has been often attacked, it remains one of the oldest countries or civilizations on earth.³⁷ History has seen great empires rise and fall in

³⁶Patterson, op. cit., pp. 235-286, citing Nehru, Speech in Lok Sabha on May 18, 1954.

³⁷In the history of China, it shows that she has been attacked by a variety of peoples, such as the Huns (the same Huns who ultimately brought the downfall of the Roman Empire), the To-Pa Tartars of the fifth century, the Khitans and Jurchens of the Sung Dynasty, the Mongols, the Manchus, the Western world particularly the Russians, the British, the French, the Germans, and finally the Japanese, and to the Chinese Communists, the Americans as well.

Europe and elsewhere, but the Chinese empire continued until the twentieth century when it became a Republic and then a nation divided. But after all, she is still very much alive. China's traditional policy in conducting international relations is to forgive. President Chiang Kai-Shek forgave the Japanese aggression on China after World War II and demanded nothing from the Japanese; instead, he wished the Japanese to rise again. This Sino-Indian confrontation is but a second manifestation in modern Chinese history of the traditional Chinese policy of forgiveness. This policy is an interest policy for the Chinese. The traditional policy is to make no enemy and implant no hatred. Confucius taught the Chinese that "within the four seas all men are brothers." To love our neighbor is the best policy. At the same time, in international politics, to forgive an enemy nation is to cut the roots of future war. If the Allies had not punished Germany so harshly at the Peace Conference at Paris in 1919, the Germans might not have started the Second World War. Therefore, the withdrawal of the Chinese after their victory on the border created for the Chinese themselves a condition which might result in a peaceful solution to their dispute with the Indians. Viewed from this angle, in the long run and in the short run, it is in the interest of China and also of India. At the same time, the cease-fire and withdrawal was another manifestation of the Chinese philosophy that has governed them at least since the time of Confucius:

the doctrine of the Mean. This philosophy tells the Chinese where and when to stop. The Great Learning says:

The point where to rest being known, the object of pursuit is then determined; and, that being determined, a calm unperturbedness may be attained to. To that calmness there will succeed a tranquil repose. In that repose there may be careful deliberation, and that deliberation will be followed by the attainment of the desired end.³⁸

Eekelen speculated that one of the Chinese motivations in this cease-fire and withdrawal was to "force the Indians to the conference table."³⁹ This appears to the writer to be unlikely. For the Nehru-Chou meeting in April, 1960, turned out to be fruitless, and that after this, officials had held many conferences and produced a joint report on the issue; but there was no result. Now, if the Chinese were to force the Indians to come to the conference table again, could the Chinese Government be sure that the two would reach agreement this time?

Nehru, in his article in Foreign Affairs, charged that the Chinese "aggression" was motivated by a desire to force India out of the bloc of non-aligned countries.⁴⁰ But what of the consequence if India was pushed into the Free World camp? If India became an ally of the United States, what would the Chinese gain in this policy?

³⁸Confucius, "The Great Learning," The Four Books, edited and translated by the Weun Yuen Book Store (Taipei, 1954), p. 2.

³⁹Eekelen, op. cit., p. 188.

⁴⁰Nehru, "Changing India," Foreign Affairs (April, 1963), pp. 453-465.

There are reasons to suggest that the confrontation was the consequence of the United States policy toward India. For there were those who regarded India as a possible weight in the balance of power vis-à-vis China.

Oliver E. Clubb, the last United States Consul General in Peking, remarked:

For the United States, in one sense, the Sino-Indian conflict has been a windfall, Soviet influence in India has been weakened; leftist Indian Defense Minister Krishna Menon, until recently a possible successor to Mr. Nehru, has been toppled from power; and America's ties with India have been strengthened as a result of prompt American military assistance. . . . Neutralist India, not pro-western Pakistan or Thailand, clearly has become the strategic key to Southern Asia and principle balance to Communist China. . . . It was essential that the United States support India against the Chinese.⁴¹

The Wall Street Journal wrote: "The administration is defending its request for a boost in economic assistance to India on grounds that India is a bulwark against Red Chinese encroachments in the Far East."⁴² Senator John J. Sparkman, Acting Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, speaking on television on June 9, 1962, said:

We know right now that India is pressing very hard against Communist China on her northern boundary line and her Northeast Frontier. . . . I feel we ought not to be discouraging India at the very time she is moving in the direction we have been wanting her to move for a long time.⁴³

⁴¹Oliver E. Clubb, "War in the Himalayas," National Observer (November 12, 1962), p. 4.

⁴²Chang, op. cit., p. 195, citing The Wall Street Journal, July 9, 1962.

⁴³Ibid., pp. 195-196.

Further, Defense Minister Krishna Menon said during the election campaign in the fall of 1961 that "the United States has been pushing us to go to war with China."⁴⁴

If this is so, it has been a questionable policy. The balance of power policy has failed to ensure peace in Europe, and is therefore a dubious support for peace in Asia. Because of United States and Russian support in the Sino-Indian border dispute, Nehru deviated from his policy of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism in the case of Goa at least, and adopted a double standard in the Himalayan border disputes with China.⁴⁵ On the one hand, the Indian Government proclaimed a policy of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. On the other hand, India strove to hold the fruits of British expansion. Therefore, to some extent the United States and the U. S. S. R. have to bear a degree of responsibility for the Sino-Indian confrontation.

In conclusion, it is likely that some Americans believe that a strong Communist China would be a threat to American interests in Asia. This, however, is a misconception. The late Senator Robert F. Kennedy pointed out in his book, To Seek A Newer World, that "We must realize that every extension of Chinese influence does not menace us."⁴⁶ Hans J.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 169.

⁴⁵The New York Times, January 2, 1962, p. 28.

⁴⁶Robert F. Kennedy, To Seek A Newer World (New York, 1968), p. 160.

Morgenthau remarked in his discussion of national interest that

The national interest of a nation which is conscious not only of its own interests but also of that of other nations must be defined in terms compatible with the latter. In a multinational world this is a requirement of political morality; in an age of total war it is also one of the conditions for survival.⁴⁷

This thesis will conclude with the advice given by the Chinese sage Mencius to a King of the state of Leang:

The King said, "Venerable sir, since you have not counted it far to come here, a distance of a thousand li, may I presume that you are likewise provided with counsels to profit my kingdom?"

Mencius replied, "Why must Your Majesty use that word 'profit'? What I am 'likewise' provided with, are counsels to benevolence and righteousness, and these are my topics.

If Your Majesty say, 'What is to be done to profit my kingdom?' the great officers will say, 'What is to be done to profit our families?' and the inferior officers and the common people will say, 'What is to be done to profit our persons?' Superiors and inferiors will try to snatch this profit the one from the other, and the kingdom will be endangered. In the Kingdom of ten thousand chariots, the murderer of his sovereign shall be the chief of a family of a thousand chariots. In a kingdom of a thousand chariots, the murderer of his prince shall be the chief of a family of a hundred chariots. To have a thousand in ten thousand, and a hundred in a thousand, cannot be said not to be a large allotment, but if righteousness be put last, and profit be put first, they will not be satisfied with snatching all.

There never has been a man trained to benevolence who neglected his parents. There never has been a man trained to righteousness who made his sovereign an after consideration.

⁴⁷Hans J. Morgenthau, "Another 'Great Debate': The National Interest of the United States," Contemporary Theory in International Relations, ed. by Stanley Hoffmann (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1960), p. 78.

Let Your Majesty also say, 'Benevolence and righteousness, and these shall be the only themes.' Why must you use that word--'profit'?"⁴⁸


⁴⁸Mencius, "The Works of Mencius," pp. 1-3.

APPENDIX


Sources of Maps

1. Map Showing Indian Geographical Relations with Neighboring Countries, Integrated States, and Disputed Areas with China. Source: T. Walter Wallbank, India in the New Era, Chicago, Scott, Foresman and Company, 1951, pp. 60, 146.
2. Map Showing British India and Its Native States about 1940. Source: T. Walter Wallbank, India in the New Era, Chicago, Scott, Foresman and Company, 1951, p. 146.
3. The Western and Middle Sectors. Sources: Sketch Map of the Sino-Indian Boundary in Document of the Sino-Indian Boundary Question, 1960, p. 72; The Sino-Indian Boundary Question, Peking, 1962, enlarged edition, as seen in Wilcox, op. cit., pp. 122-123.
4. The Eastern Sector. Sources: Same as number 3 above.
5. Sketch Map showing Location of Che Dong and 1914 McMahon Line as Different from the 1960 Indian-Neo-McMahon Line. Source: Sketch Map from Kao, op. cit., p. 13.
6. The Indo-Chinese Conflict 1962: Western Sector. Sources: Compiled from official Indian and Chinese Maps as Seen in Kavic, op. cit., Appendix: Maps; the Map in "Light on Ladakh," p. 344.
7. The Indo-Chinese Conflict 1962: Eastern Sector. Sources: Compiled from Official Indian and Chinese Maps as seen in Kavic, op. cit., Appendix: Maps.

MAP SHOWING INDIAN
GEOGRAPHICAL RELATIONS
WITH NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES
AND DISPUTED AREAS WITH
CHINA




INDIA ABOUT 1940




"The Mountbatten Plan reiterated the policy on the Indian States expressed in the proposals of the Cabinet Mission of May 1946. The British Government took the view at that time that the former overlordship or Paramountcy as it was called, exercised by the British Crown over the Native States would lapse once Britain ceded her authority and would not be transferred to any new Government. In theory, at least, each Native State had three choices: it could join with Pakistan, enter the Indian Union, or remain unattached from either and endeavor to go it alone." P.166.

THE WESTERN AND MIDDLE SECTORS






THE EASTERN SECTOR


The boundary alignment as claimed by India is pushed farther north of the "McMahon Line," including into India Che Dong, Khinzemane, Longju and other places which lie north of the Line.



Legend

-  Boundary in dispute
-  The McMahon Line
-  Traditional customary boundary between India and China

Sketch Map showing Eastern Sector
of the positions : Che Dong and
Longju, as in the north of the
McMahon Line



Legend

Location of Western extremity of " McMahon Line " on original 1914 map (27° 44.6'N., 91°39.7'E. approx.).


Location of Western extremity of " McMahon Line " on 1959 Indian Map (27°46'N., 91°39.6'E. approximately).

Location of Western extremity of " McMahon Line " provided by Indian side on June 27, 1960, at meeting of Chinese and Indian officials (this is about 13 miles south of the Mela Pass).

Location of Western extremity of " McMahon Line " provided by Indian side on July 13, 1960, at meeting of officials of the two countries (27°48'N., 91°40'E. approximately).


The Indo-Chinese Conflict 1962

WESTERN SECTOR



THE INDO-CHINESE CONFLICT 1962

EASTERN SECTOR



Legend A

K.F.D.	=	Kameng Frontier District
S.F.D.	=	Subansiri Frontier District
Si.F.D.	=	Siam Frontier District
L.F.D.	=	Lohit Frontier District
T.F.D.	=	Tirap Frontier District

Legend B

	Indian	Chinese
Posts as of 8 September 1962	●	△
Roads	—	—
Line of actual control, November 1959	—	—
Line of actual control, September 8, 1962	—	—
Indian View	—	—
Traditional customary boundary between India and China	---	---
Chinese claim line	---	---
territory to be vacated by India under Chinese cease-fire proposals	—	—

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