AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION DURING CRISES IN JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY

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AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION DURING CRISES IN JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY

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PREFACE

In 1910 the American humorist Finley Peter Dunne forecast that one day there would be war over Pacific supremacy between the United States and Japan. Although Dunne died in 1936, his prognostication proved to be correct. Japanese-American relations were extremely cordial before the Russo-Japanese War. After Theodore Roosevelt mediated the war, however, the Japanese were very disappointed in the results. In the fall of the following year, a conflict over the admission of Japanese pupils to the schools of San Francisco incurred the wrath of the Japanese government, and many in America believed that war between the two countries was imminent. A brief thaw resulted from the Root-Takahira agreement of 1908, but another troubled situation developed as a consequence of alien land legislation in California in 1913. Afterwards, the Lansing-Ishii agreement of 1916 provided another thaw, but the Supreme Court decision of 1922 which declared that Japanese were ineligible for citizenship upset relations beyond any immediate repair.

The Japanese very keenly resented the exclusion act of 1924. They observed the day the law went into effect as a day of national humiliation. When Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, America favored the underdog Chinese. The Hoover and Roosevelt administrations continued a pro-Chinese policy, and one of the
topics discussed at Franklin Roosevelt's first cabinet meeting in 1933 was the possibility of war with Japan. On December 7, 1941, a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, forced the United States into a war with Japan and its Axis allies, Germany and Italy. During this period, a number of Japanese-Americans (Niesi) were removed by governmental orders from their homes in California and other places into relocation centers in the interior.

Throughout this period as one crisis in Japanese-American relations followed another, the American public opinion was divided. Some newspapers and personalities feared that there would be war over the San Francisco school board crisis, while others believed that talk of war was ridiculous. Although the South and West were most sympathetic to the actions of the San Francisco school board, even in those sections there were important exceptions. Division of opinion was even more marked in the Midwest and East. The same was true with American public opinion at the time of the Alien Land Law situation in 1913. The closest the American public ever came to presenting a united stand on Japanese-American relations came when Congress lacked only one vote being unanimous in its declaration of war against Japan in 1941.
ORIGINS OF THE CALIFORNIA ANTI-JAPANESE AGITATION

Whatever engagements the Federal Government may have made with Japan, with respect to our schools—if it has made any—are utterly void.

—San Francisco Chronicle, November 6, 1906.

The San Francisco school board crisis deteriorated Japanese-American relations. After the open door treaty which Matthew Perry made with Japan in 1854, Japanese-American relations were extremely cordial. The fires of discord between the United States and Japan as a result of the school board crisis, however, continued long after the settlement of the crisis. During all the subsequent crises in Japanese-American relations, the American public viewed the incidents in a divided manner. The school board problem resulted when that body refused to allow Japanese pupils to attend the regular public schools, and it almost caused a war between Japan and the United States.

Although there were some notable exceptions, the President's action against California received support in the Midwest and along the East Coast. The South sympathized with California because of its Negro problem. Sympathy for the school board also came from most of California, but Oregon and Washington sympathized with the President.
Long before this crisis occurred, there had been several outbreaks of anti-Oriental prejudice in the United States. A mob in Seattle, Washington, in 1886, had kept Chinese from returning to their homes. Similar outbreaks occurred in Wyoming, Colorado, and in California as well. Only in Seattle was there any public opposition to such mob action. Anti-Chinese rioters in Los Angeles had broken into and burned the homes of several Chinese. The Chinese were unable to make any strong protests against these actions, because China was a weak, underdeveloped country. The Japanese, however, had defeated the huge country of Russia, and many Americans felt they might could do the same to the United States. Such an opinion existed in many other nations as well.

During the early agitations, newspapers such as the New York Times were aghast at the anti-Oriental feeling. A Times editorial of August 30, 1885, had said that those who opposed Chinese immigration were insincere and naked hypocrites. Other editorials followed this lead, and the Western part

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of the country, which felt the Chinese were neither an ornament to the coast nor a desirable element, did not receive much sympathy in the East.²

During the years leading up to 1898, immigrants came to California from Japan at the rate of about a thousand a year. In 1898, the United States annexed Hawaii, and, as a result, in the year 1900, about twelve thousand Japanese arrived from there. Many Japanese came to California when they found Hawaii to be too humid and warm. What they found in the California of this period was worse than any climactic condition. As early as May, 1892, Dennis Kearney, a professional Californian politician and early leader of anti-Chinese activities, had warned a crowd in San Francisco about the "newly discovered Japanese menace."³

Californians gave many reasons for feeling that the Japanese were objectionable. They were unassimilable; they worked for such low wages that they undermined existing labor standards of American workmen; their standard of living was much lower than that of American workmen; and they lacked the proper feeling for democratic institutions. These statements sounded much like those made about the Irish,

²New York Times, August 30; September 4; November 7, 13, 27, 1885.

Poles, and Italians in earlier days. The Japanese (who largely came from the area around Hiroshima) settled in ghettos which they called "Little Tokyo" and "Little Osaka." Prejudiced outsiders called these sections "Japtowns." ¹

California's overt conflict with the Japanese first erupted in March, 1900, when San Francisco's mayor, James Phelan, using some idle gossip about a "bubonic plague" as an excuse, quarantined both the Chinese and Japanese sections of the city. In retaliation, the local Japanese formed the "Japanese Association of America." This should have been enough to convince Californians that their actions were not going to intimidate the Japanese. Instead, anti-Japanese Californians formed an organization called "Native Sons of the Golden West," reminiscent of the Ante Bellum Know-Nothing movement. The Native Sons worked in conjunction with the American Legion, the State Federation of Labor, and the Grange in the agitation against the Japanese. Working through their newspaper, the Grizzly Bear, they became an important political force in California for many years afterward. ⁵


⁵Daniels, "The Politics of Prejudice," p. 24. The fact that the Grizzly Bear was published in Los Angeles casts doubt on the belief of some that Southern California was completely free of anti-Japanese opinion; see McWilliams, Prejudice, p. 20 for the statement of such a belief.
While conflict was erupting in California, moves against the Japanese began in other states. On March 9, 1901, Governor J. K. Toole of Montana, approved "House Joint Memorial Number 8" which regulated Chinese and Japanese immigration. Five days later C. J. Bassett, Idaho's Secretary of State, approved House Joint Memorial Number 6 which regulated Chinese and Japanese immigration. Senator George Nixon of Nevada presented a petition "praying for the enactment of legislation to prevent unrestricted admission of Japanese into the United States."\(^6\)

The display of interest in Congress over Japanese exclusion was only temporary. Several Congressmen, including California's Duncan McKinlay and Everis Hayes, introduced Japanese exclusion bills, but not a single one was reported out of committee.

At the time that anti-Japanese agitation was brewing in California, the Russo-Japanese War occupied Japan's interest. Although Russia's humiliating defeat was partially due to the lack of discipline in the Russian army and the lack of initiative as well, many viewed the events with considerable alarm. They began to believe Germany's Kaiser William II when he cried out "gelbe Gefahr"—"yellow peril." When the war began, American sympathies were with Japan in a crusade

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\(^6\)Congressional Record, 57th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 135, 267, 306.
against Pan-Slavism. As the war neared its end, many Americans began to sympathize with Russia hoping she could check the advance of the yellow race. 7

Theodore Roosevelt wished to end the conflict when it became apparent that Russia was being slaughtered. He thought this would disastrously upset the balance of power in the Far East. 8 The Japanese may have recalled the American rapprochement with Russia during the War of 1812, the Crimean War, and the American Civil War, for they felt the United States had been on Russia's side all along. Such a conclusion was logical for another reason. The religion of most of the Russian people was the Greek Orthodox faith, which Americans preferred as a Christian religion, to the "pagan" Shinto and Buddhist ritual of the Japanese. Hence, the story of the crisis was one of religious as well as race prejudice.

In spite of infrequent outbursts of anti-Japanese sentiment elsewhere, the most explosive field of conflict, however, remained in the San Francisco area.

It was there that the Union Labor Party placed Eugene E. Schmitz in the mayor's chair in November, 1901. An engaging rogue with little education and no political experience whatsoever, he became mayor largely through the genius of the

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8 Beale, Roosevelt, p. 293.
crooked political boss Abe Ruef, and made an admirable tool for him. San Francisco then went through a period of political corruption with rampant boodling. The machine had almost complete control over the processes of California justice so that it was able to conceal the magnitude of its crimes. When Ruef and Schmitz finally came to trial in 1906, Ruef attempted to flee. Fremont Odler, who had exposed the boodlers, was the victim of a kidnapping, and the machine men hired a gunman to murder him. The machine men bribed the jurors to acquit the gunman. The fact that a union political machine controlled San Francisco during a period when working men considered Japanese immigration a vital issue made a conflict between the city and the Japanese inevitable. Furthermore, the Schmitz administration was desperate and would use any means possible to make the public forget about its crimes.\(^9\)

In a prelude of things to come, the San Francisco convention of the American Federation of Labor in November, 1904, voted in favor of applying Chinese exclusion laws to the Japanese.\(^10\)

This incident signalled the beginning of the next anti-Japanese campaign. The San Francisco Chronicle started the


drive on February 23, 1905, with a front-page article crying "Japanese Invasion: The Problem of the Hour for the United States." The introductory statement illustrates the nature of newspaper articles in the Chronicle.

In the accompanying article the Chronicle begins a careful and conservative exposition of the problem which is no longer to be ignored—the Japanese question. It has been but lightly touched upon heretofore; now it is pressing upon California and upon the entire United States as heavily and contains as much of menace as the matter of Chinese immigration ever did if, indeed, it is not more serious socially, industrially, and from an international standpoint. It demands consideration. This article shows that since 1880, when the census noted a Japanese population in California of only 86, not less than 35,000 of the little brown men have come to this State and remained here. At the present day the number of Japanese in the United States is very conservatively estimated at 100,000. Immigration is increasing steadily and, as in the case of the Chinese, it is the worst she has that Japan sends us. The Japanese is no more assimilable than the Chinese and he is no less adaptable in learning quickly how to do the white man's work and how to get the job done by himself by offering his labor for less than a white man can live on. Once the war with Russia is over, the brown stream of Japanese immigration is likely to become an inundating torrent and the class of immigrants is likely to become worse instead of better. Japan is intensely intolerant of the white man who visits her in any other capacity than that of the curio buying traveler. Industrially she has neither room nor welcome for the foreign devil from this side of the Pacific. It would seem to be about time for us to take a leaf out of the Japanese code of self-protective patriotism.11

This article, which came out just before the Battle of Mukden, contained much inflammatory material. It appeared on the same page as an article which stated that a settlement of the Russo-Japanese War was imminent. These statements,

11San Francisco Chronicle, February 23, 1905.
when read together with the above articles, indicated a large number of Japanese immigrants would soon flood California. Another article on the same page reported that Japanese agents were negotiating for the purchase or lease of certain islands near the Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean east of Zanzibar. The Japanese would use them as coaling stations. It is unclear whether the Chronicle had deliberately juxtaposed these articles to frighten readers into believing that the "Japanese menace" was truly present. But the Chronicle did not stop there. Instead, it continued publishing anti-Japanese articles. Other articles argued that crime and poverty would go hand in hand with Asiatic labor; that Japanese were a menace to American women; that brown men were an evil in the public schools; that adult Japanese crowded out children; and that brown Asians stole the brains of whites. The Chronicle described every Japanese immigrant as a spy.

It is a matter of conjecture why the Chronicle should write such articles since it was not a pro-labor newspaper. One possible explanation is that the newspaper desired to outdistance its rival, the Examiner, in the competition for subscribers. The proprietor of the Chronicle, Michael Harry de Young, may have desired to use the attack as a political

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12 Ibid.; Bailey, Roosevelt and Japan, p. 10.
13 Ibid.
base to renew his bid for the United States Senate, a position which he had previously held.

As a result of the Chronicle articles, a ten point resolution was introduced in the California legislature on March 1, 1905. Generally it explained why Japanese laborers were undesirable. The tenth point expressed the fear that the end of the Russo-Japanese War would bring hordes of discharged Japanese soldiers to America. They would fill the labor market and quickly displace American laborers. Both of the houses of the California legislature had unanimously approved this resolution by the following day.\(^{14}\)

Although one writer has said there was no anti-Japanese feeling outside California and the neighboring states before 1906, the truth appears to be that such attitudes did exist elsewhere. In the spring of 1905, a few days after the resolution passed the California legislature, the United States Immigration Commissioner in Dallas refused to naturalize some Japanese because he said they were ineligible for citizenship.\(^{15}\)

As a result of these events in California and elsewhere, the Japanese government first tried to restrict emigration to Hawaii and in April, 1906, suspended it altogether. They

\(^{14}\)Ibid.; p. 11.

were already too late. On the first day of April the San Francisco Board of Education had presented a budget which provided for the construction of additional facilities at the Chinese schools which would allow the Japanese to attend them. The Board of Supervisors, however, was not able to overstep the one dollar tax rate so money was unavailable. According to George Kennan, a correspondent in the Far East during the Russo-Japanese War, the San Francisco municipal government was so corrupt that it was completely indifferent to the proposal. On May 6, 1905, the Board of Education declared its determination to establish separate schools for Japanese and Chinese pupils, "not only for the purpose of relieving the congestion prevailing in [their] schools, but also for the higher end that [their] children should not be placed in any position where their youthful impressions may be affected by association with pupils of the Mongolian race." What the Board of Education had done was to apply an earlier California law, dealing explicitly only with Chinese. The law had gone into effect on March 12, 1872, and had undergone amendments several times, but the terms "Chinese" and "Mongolian" referred to immigrants from the Asiatic mainland and not Japan. The school board was stretching the law when it extended it to the Japanese.

On the day following the presentation of the budget, a mass meeting started the Japanese and Korean Exclusion League on its career. Its purpose was to exclude the Japanese. The League's leadership fell into the hands of the labor leaders whose machine held the city in its grip. Members received orders to boycott Japanese stores and merchants who employed Japanese. The leader of the California Exclusion League was the Swedish-born Olaf Tveitmoe, who had served a term for forgery, indicating strongly that the exclusion movement was under the leadership of the corrupt gangster class rather than the true citizenry.17

The anti-Japanese agitation disturbed Theodore Roosevelt, especially after June, 1905, when he felt such actions would interfere with his attempts to terminate the Russo-Japanese War. He described California's actions "as foolish as if conceived in the mind of a Hottentot." Even after the war ended, his attitude did not change. He wished to protect Hawaii and the Philippines, while his pet Panama Canal project was relevant to the Far East in both commercial and political aspects. He did not fear the possibility of a Japanese invasion of the American continent but he did fear losing Hawaii and the Philippines. The President also worried about another disturbing factor. Although the Chinese were not as demonstrative as the Japanese in their reactions, they

17Jessup, Root, II, 8.
were boycotting American commerce. In 1905 the American minister in China, W. W. Rockhill, wrote to Prince Ch'ing that in Shanghai, Canton, and other Chinese cities a movement had been organized to impede American trade and to intimidate the United States Government. Rockhill's letter said it would be a necessity for the Chinese government to stop this movement as it would cause a loss of trade, breed a spirit of animosity between the Chinese and American peoples, and perhaps result in acts of violence. If the Chinese and Japanese were to succeed in paralyzing American trade in the Far East, the result could be a financial depression similar to the one which preceded the War of 1812.

All of these factors combined to disturb Roosevelt. On June 3, 1905, he received a letter from Henry Cabot Lodge, United States Senator from Massachusetts, maintaining that the solution of the Japanese problem lay in "an arrangement with Japan by which she excludes our labor and we exclude hers." This statement phrases an idea that was to crop up repeatedly in the President's correspondence during the ensuing months.

Theodore Roosevelt did succeed in mediating the Russo-Japanese War in the Peace of Portsmouth. Japan received the southern half of Sakhalin Island but abandoned the demand

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18Bailey, Roosevelt and Japan, p. 1; Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918, 2 vols. (New York, 1925), I, 122 (hereafter cited as Lodge Letters); Pringle, Roosevelt, p. 280.
for a money indemnity and also failed to gain control over
the railroads in northern Manchuria. Japan wrongly and
illogically blamed this failure on the United States because
Theodore Roosevelt was the mediator. Americans had regarded
Japan as a friend and protege ever since Perry's Open Door
Treaty in 1854. After the Portsmouth Treaty, however,
Japanese-American relations became strained. Roosevelt in-
sisted that an American fleet be built and kept up as a safe-
guard against Japan. This evidenced concern as well as his
awareness of Japan's potential threat to America's newly ac-
quired territory in the Far East and to the balance of power
in Asia.

While these events were going on, nature intervened. A
great earthquake shook San Francisco on April 18, 1906. Al-
though the shock waves lasted less than half a minute, fires
continued for days. If it had been possible, San Francisco
would probably have blamed Japan for the holocaust! Although Japan gave the largest donation for foreign relief,
doctors from Japan who came to the city to provide relief
were victims of mob violence and near murder. The most
disgraceful assaults were on seismologist F. Omori, and
Professor of Architecture T. Nakamura, two visiting professors

19 Griswold, Far Eastern Policy, p. 124; Dennett, Roosevelt,
p. 164; William Henry Harbaugh, The Life and Times of Theodore
Roosevelt (New York, 1963), p. 263; Papers Relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1905, p. 213 (hereafter cited as
Foreign Relations).

20 Karig, Asia's Good Neighbor, p. 206.
from the Imperial University of Tokyo. The majority of people in San Francisco apparently did not approve of the assaults, but most of the attackers were young men who had been inflamed by the words of their elders. Many believed that Omori was mistaken for a strikebreaker when he was attacked in Eureka. Since it was common knowledge that several postal delivery boys were among his assailants the postmaster wrote a letter of apology to Omori. Even the mayor and the Chronicle joined the governor of California in expressing regrets to the seismologist. Such actions appeared to be a token attempt to remedy the sad situation into which the corrupt city government had fallen. The actions of the citizens had shown their unpardonable lack of appreciation for Japanese attempts to help them when the earthquake came. Despite their apologies, Schmitz and the Chronicle were not planning to stop anti-Japanese agitation. The real crisis had not yet begun.

A seemingly unrelated incident further inflamed the San Francisco mob. On July 16 and 17, 1906, American authorities repelled a series of raids by Japanese poachers on seal rookeries in the far north Pacific. The authorities killed five poachers, wounded twenty-one and captured twelve. The San Francisco attitude resulted from a belief that the Japanese attack had been a barbarous raid on American territory, and

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21 Ibid., Bailey, *Roosevelt and Japan*, p. 20.
the city's government decided to take its reactions out on
the local Japanese. 22

The power of the Exclusion League had continued to grow,
and boasted a membership of 78,500 by the fall of 1906. It
was a major force in leading the Board of Education to pass
a resolution requiring Chinese, Korean, and Japanese children
to be segregated in an Oriental public school. This was part
of a proposal the Exclusion League had made in the San
Francisco Chronicle almost a year before in an article re-
porting an Exclusion League meeting where the subject of grown
Japanese men in the schools had come up. The Chronicle noted
letters from hundreds who were sympathetic with the
"attempt to remedy [this] evil." 23

At the time of the school board order, Ruef and Schmitz
were on trial for sundry felonies. A statewide election was
coming up in November. James Gillett, who based his campaign
on opposition to the San Francisco scandals and machine
politics, was the Republican nominee for governor. 24 If
Gillett were elected, there was no doubt he would press for
the conviction of Schmitz and Ruef and expose all of the
scandals. This was what the city government feared most, and
it was definitely a reason why the school board segregated

22 Raymond Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan (Seattle,
23 San Francisco Chronicle, October 23, 1905.
24 Los Angeles Times, October 26, 1906.
Japanese. The Mayor had the entire delegation under his thumb. He went along with the school board apparently because he wished to raise his estimation among San Francisco's decent citizens. He would thus be in a good position to have the charges against him dropped.

Meanwhile, on October 21, 1906, Luke Wright, the American Ambassador to Japan, sent a telegram to the State Department which said, "All newspapers here publish dispatches from the United States giving accounts of agitation in San Francisco for Japanese exclusion including alleged hostile utterances of member of Congress [Julius] Kahn in public speeches; also the action of school authorities in segregating Japanese children in public schools." Five days after Wright's telegram had been received, Roosevelt promised Baron Kantaro Keneko that he would deal with the subject of the school board crisis and Japanese immigration at length when he delivered his annual message. He seemed willing to solve the problem, but before he was able to contact Victor Metcalf to investigate the situation, the Chronicle had launched another anti-Japanese barrage.

On election day, November 6, 1906, the editorial page of the Chronicle carried several articles on the subject of the Japanese-American crisis. The attack on Schmitz indicated

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the *Chronicle* was not the labor organ but was opposing the Japanese as the organ of the Exclusion League. Furthermore, a similar article attacked Abe Ruef. Another article deplored Japanese men attending classes with young American children. The article also objected to teaching English to pupils, old or young, who did not understand it. It was a reasonable requirement that students who entered the schools be familiar with the language in which instruction was conducted, and that there was no legal or moral obligation to teach foreigners the English language. The article expressed ignorance as to whether or not Japanese children were personally objectionable in grades made up of pupils their own age, but the conviction of the people in San Francisco was that the only way to keep peace between America and Japan was to keep the races apart. The paper denied that the Federal government had any control over the California schools, and backed up its argument by saying the southern states maintained separate schools for their colored children. The article concluded by saying Victor Metcalf, who had been sent by Roosevelt to investigate, would not be entitled to any information and what information he did receive would be given only as a matter of courtesy. Furthermore, it declared utterly void any engagements the Federal government may have made with Japan.  

This editorial harangue was reminiscent of previous incidents of state vs. Federal conflicts in earlier periods.

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26 San Francisco *Chronicle*, November 6, 1906.
of American history. The Chronicle based some of its statements on assumption rather than fact. When it stated, "We do not know that the Japanese children are personally objectionable in grades composed of pupils of their own age," it contradicted statements which the paper had made regarding the reasons for segregation.

On November 14, 1906, the Chronicle published another editorial on the problem of Japanese exclusion and gave its reasons for supporting such a plan. It began by saying the eastern press was continuing its attack on Pacific coast attitudes toward Japanese coolies by saying it was a trifling matter due only to the alleged unreasonableness of the demands the workingmen had put forth. According to the Chronicle, however, the people of San Francisco felt that Orientals threatened their standard of life right at the moment. Workingmen also had the moral right to demand protection for their countrymen from competition of all forms of Asiatic labor. Furthermore, the Chronicle favored Japanese exclusion because it felt the coolies were a menace to Western civilization. Oriental and Western civilization could not exist side by side because only the one that was able to maintain its standard of living at the least expense would survive.27 This was another way of saying Western civilization was doomed because Americans could not live as cheaply as Orientals.

27 Ibid., November 14, 1906.
The Chronicle raised the question of disloyalty by maintaining that the loyalty of the Japanese was not to the United States but to the Japanese Emperor. Operating on the theory of once a Japanese, always a Japanese, the article stated that even though the Japanese might become American citizens, they would still be Japanese. Furthermore, when the Japanese established a colony, they drove out all other peoples. In certain areas, they had driven out the laborers, merchants, and landowners. This was the intrusion which the article said must stop.

In these particular editorials one could find the reasons why the Chronicle had agitated against the Japanese. Not only did the newspaper consider them dishonest and a "moral poison," but also they could never become true American citizens and thus, they threatened American civilization. All of these arguments were broad, vague generalities. There were, in the San Francisco schools, only ninety-three Japanese pupils out of a total school population of twenty-five thousand. Twenty-five of these students were American citizens; twenty-eight were girls; only thirty-three were over fifteen; and the two oldest were twenty.\textsuperscript{28} The Chronicle greatly exaggerated in its reports that young men frequently sat next to young children in San Francisco schools.

\textsuperscript{28}Ibid., Senate Documents, 59 Cong., 2 sess., no. 147, p. 18 (hereafter cited as Metcalf Report).
The attitude of the Exclusion League annoyed Roosevelt. He wrote his son Kermit a letter in which he said the Japanese business bothered him horribly. The Californians, especially in San Francisco, recklessly insulted the Japanese. He worried that the nation as a whole would pay the consequences of such actions in California if war should break out between America and Japan over the school board crisis. He thought Japan had much to learn from the western nations, but he felt Americans could profit from contacts with the Japanese. He had worried that Japan might get the 'big head' and enter into a career of insolence, but he did not consider this likely to happen as long as the United States treated Japan with respect and recognized its "paramount interest in what surrounds the Yellow Sea."  

For a brief period, Roosevelt entertained some second thoughts about the matter. In a letter to Metcalf, he said he was uncertain whether or not the 1894 Treaty with Japan contained a "most favored nation clause." If it did not, Roosevelt said it would be better not to take any action regarding the school board ruling. The treaty, however, did contain such a clause in the following provision:

In whatever relates to rights of residence and travel; to the possession of goods and effects of any kind; to the succession to personal estate, by

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29 Harbaugh, Roosevelt, p. 263.
will or otherwise, and the disposal of property of any sort and in any manner whatsoever which they may lawfully acquire, the citizens or subjects of each Contracting Party shall enjoy in the territories of the other the same privileges, liberties, and rights, and shall be subject to no higher imposts or charges in these respects than native citizens or subjects of the most favored nation.  

Whether Roosevelt actually was uncertain about the provisions of the Treaty is a matter of conjecture. He said he sympathized with the Californians regarding Japanese immigration en masse, but he wished to slow it down in the way that would be most agreeable to Japan. Feeling that relations between the two nations should be those of reciprocal justice, he added that newspapers and public men were guilty of an intolerable outrage by the use of offensive and insulting language about a high-spirited, sensitive, and friendly people. In the whole matter Roosevelt clearly tried to help both California and Japan solve their misunderstanding by directing his attacks against what he felt was keeping the spirit of conflict alive. In mentioning newspapers, he was especially taking aim at the San Francisco Chronicle which continued to print articles against the Japanese. By public men, he meant people like Schmitz and his cohort Ruef who had brought the situation to a boil.

30 Griswold, Far Eastern Policy, p. 345.

Roosevelt delivered his annual message to Congress on December 4, 1906. He said Americans must treat all immigrants fairly, whether Catholic or Protestant, Jew or Gentile. Whether they came from England, Germany, Italy, Russia, or Japan meant nothing. All that Americans had the right to question was a man's conduct. He went on to say the hostility toward the Japanese was discreditable to Americans as a people, and added that the Japanese were welcome in all our colleges and institutions of higher learning. He had received assurances that Japan would also take all steps necessary to prevent a repetition of the sealing incident. He was fulfilling the promise he had made to Baron Kaneko to discuss the issue at length in his annual message.

In reaction, Maryland's Senator George Rayner said it would be a serious matter to criticize harshly San Francisco so soon after the city had been hit by such a serious disaster. This was a sympathetic gesture, but when a city's leaders, after being hit by a disaster, encourage lawless actions against citizens of the country that had given more aid than any other at the time of the disaster, there does not seem to be much room for consideration. The President had made it quite clear that there was sympathy in his heart for both the Californians and the Japanese, and the fault he felt lay with

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32 Congressional Record, 59 Cong., 2 sess., p. 31.
33 Ibid., p. 297.
the leaders of the city and not the citizenry. Nevertheless, Roosevelt should have recognized that the citizenry which responded to the harangue was also at fault.

Roosevelt had selected Victor Metcalf to investigate the San Francisco situation. Several factors were in Metcalf's favor for his selection. Not only was he the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, but he had been the Naval Secretary as well. He was also from Oakland, California, and the subject matter was of definite interest to him. Metcalf made a thorough investigation of the problem, and found that the only assaults on the Japanese occurred after the earthquake. He became convinced that the San Franciscans attacked the Japanese because they were Japanese.

Shortly after Roosevelt's message the Senate Foreign Relations Committee received Metcalf's Report. Roosevelt said upon the issuance of the report that he saw no opposition to the exclusion of Japanese from schools on the basis of age. Young men should not go to school with young children. The issue was the exclusion of the children themselves.\footnote{Metcalf Report, p. 2; Bailey, Roosevelt and Japan, pp. 85, 89; San Francisco Chronicle, October 27, 1906.} In so stating Roosevelt was not vacillating, he was merely restating a common sense attitude he had held all along. The Metcalf Report, however, printed an article from the Japanese American, a Japanese language paper printed in San Francisco,
which stated that the segregation of the Japanese children was an insult to Japan and a menace to the Empire's prestige.  

This article indicated that the Japanese opposition to segregation had to do with the whole question and not just the exclusion of the young men from the schools.

By the first of 1907, events had reached an impasse. The Board of Education was intent on maintaining its position, and Roosevelt became more and more convinced he could accomplish nothing by using force in his dealings with the Californians.  

The matter led to debate in both the United States House and Senate during January, 1907. Southern Congressmen led the arguments in support of California's stand against the President.

Tennessee's Finis Garret said that all the southern states had separate schools by law for colored and white children. One week later California's Everis Hayes questioned whether or not the United States could make a valid treaty with Japan to employ the Army and Navy to compel California or any municipality to tax itself to furnish free education for unnaturalized citizens. Such statements did not please Roosevelt at all, and he warned that there might be a great deal of trouble ahead.

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35 Metcalf Report, p. 20.
36 Bailey, Roosevelt and Japan, p. 123.
38 Congressional Record, 59 Cong., 2 sess., p. 1235.
On January 30, the entire California Congressional delegation met with Roosevelt at the White House about the school question but reached no agreement. The following day, James Gillett, the newly elected Republican governor of California, vainly urged that "all legislative action concerning the Japanese be deferred for the present."  

Meanwhile, on February 6, the San Francisco Chronicle reported that Richard Olney, formerly both United States Attorney General and Secretary of State, opined that the school question was not a Federal affair. At the same time Massachusetts Congressman Samuel McCall criticized Roosevelt's language in his annual message. It was very apparent that California's resolve was being strengthened.

On February 13, 1907, Roosevelt called Schmitz and his school board to Washington and told them he would have Congress pass a bill to bar Japanese laborers seeking to enter the United States by way of Hawaii, Mexico, and the Canal Zone. In return, San Francisco would remove the educational restrictions. After they had been in Washington for five days, they reported they had reached no agreement and would go into conference again on February 15 absolutely unpledged to accept the President's solution. They were delaying in

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40 San Francisco Chronicle, February 6, 1907.
order to see what Congress would do about an immigration bill before it which was applicable only to Japanese.\textsuperscript{41}

The proposed immigration amendment covered several important features which were easy to overlook. There was no mention of Japan. The amendment only covered Japanese who had secured passports for destinations other than the mainland of the United States. No provision discussed the exclusion of coolies coming directly to the United States, since Japan would be expected to abide by the terms of the Gentleman's Agreement of 1900 and continue to withhold passports from these immigrants. The amendment also made a provision for stopping the flow from Mexico and Hawaii even though these places did not receive specific mention. Authority to check this influx rested solely on Roosevelt's shoulders. This provision irked the Californians, who felt Roosevelt had not been favoring California and would never enforce such a law. California's James Needham, nevertheless, felt the law was a step in the right direction. Nevada's Francis G. Newlands thought it was very unsatisfactory unless there was an understanding on Japan's part that made the amendment more acceptable.\textsuperscript{42}

Back in Sacramento Olaf Tveitmoe urged the California legislature to pass the bill giving school authorities the right to exclude Japanese from white schools unless the Federal government postponed the San Francisco test case. This test

\textsuperscript{41}Ibid., February 14, 1907.

\textsuperscript{42}Congressional Record, 59 Cong., 2 sess., p. 3098.
case was pending action in Washington as a result of conferences between Roosevelt and San Francisco officials. Tveitmoe did not think it was fair that the Federal Government should ask the legislature to hold off its stand and at the same time refuse to stay the proceedings in the Federal court. There was speculation that the Federal Court might say the Japanese were not Mongolians. Such a finding would invalidate California's case because she had been using the terms "Japanese" and "Mongolians" interchangeably. 43

Congressional debate on the immigration bill continued into February. Benjamin Tillman of South Carolina said the West wanted relief from a threatened Japanese labor invasion. About a month earlier, Tillman had predicted that a race war would soon break out in America. With this attitude it was easy to see why he favored exclusion. A California Senator said that if it were possible to land the Japanese at Boston, Charleston, New Orleans, or New York, California would be better off. There was no doubt that Tillman disliked the mention of Charleston in this particular context. Southerners opposed the bill because they thought it favored Japan. Also as Democrats they wanted to embarrass the President by refuting the promise that Senator Henry Cabot Lodge had made to Roosevelt that the bill would go through on February 14. 44

43 San Francisco Chronicle, February 14, 1907.
44 Congressional Record, 59 Cong., 2 sess., pp. 3028, 3098; Fort Worth Record, January 13, 1907, I, 11.
But in a sudden turn of events, Schmitz decided to have Roosevelt submit a proposition to Japan for separate Japanese schools. If this did not please the Japanese, Schmitz and the members of the school board would agree to abolish the Japanese schools. On the morning of February 15 in Tokyo, however, Japan denied that it would agree to that solution. The New York Times carried on February 16 the headline, "Mikado may upset deal," but it added, "Schmitz is satisfied." Senate action came quickly as on February 16, it passed the immigration bill and sent it to the House, but Tokyo public opinion strongly opposed it because they felt it was discriminatory. In the vote for passage both the California Senators favored it and the opposition came largely from the South.

By the following day, a solution appeared near. California accepted the immigration bill as a solution for fear that "coolie" immigration would continue to increase, and some action would have to be taken sooner or later. This was the proposition available at the time, so they accepted it.

Debate, however, continued in the House, and as in the Senate the southern Congressmen were the leading spokesmen on behalf of California. Mississippi's John Sharp Williams stated that he favored California partly because of his desire to keep the Pacific area a white man's country. He said

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45 New York Times, February 16, 1907; Congressional Record, 59 Cong., 2 sess., p. 3098.
he did not feel this way because he was a blind chauvinist or because he felt Americans were the only people on the surface of the earth. But he considered this land our land—the land of our traditions and ideals. He maintained that the influx of another radically different race would mean racial antagonism and eventual race war.\textsuperscript{46}

\textit{Alabama's Oscar W. Underwood opposed Asiatic immigration as well as European immigration which was not homogeneous or easy to assimilate. Ironically seventeen years later at the 1924 Democratic convention, Underwood was so certain the Ku Klux Klan, which stood for the same principles that he had supported in his 1907 speech, was contrary to the principles of Thomas Jefferson, and he attacked it in no uncertain terms. This action kept him from receiving the Democratic nomination for the Presidency, and ended his political career as well.}\textsuperscript{47}

\textit{Representative George Burgess of Texas felt that if exclusion would lessen labor competition, nobody should object. He felt no race should immigrate here if Americans were unwilling to intermarry with them and their blood was too unworthy to blend with Americans in a vein of common posterity.}\textsuperscript{48} This statement automatically excluded Orientals, since few Americans, if any would be willing to intermarry with them.

\textsuperscript{46}Congressional Record, 59 Cong., 2 sess., p. 3222.
\textsuperscript{48}Congressional Record, 59 Cong., 2 sess., p. 3224.
Statements by various southern Congressmen objecting to Japanese immigration strongly indicated their concern with the Negro question. They feared any attempt to interfere with the Plessy vs. Ferguson decision which had given the southern states the right to maintain separate but equal schools for the white and colored children. They reasoned that if the Federal government were to force the San Francisco school board to accept Japanese pupils, it might lead to an end of segregated schools in the South.

California's Julius Kahn expressed the viewpoint of his state in a speech made in Boston. He said the Californians were very tolerant people and that San Francisco was the most cosmopolitan city in the world. He said, however, that most Japanese who came to California were males, and that most Japanese women came to this country for immoral purposes. He added that if Japanese were to come to Boston, they would drive white fishermen from Gloucester, and white people would then realize what competition between Asiatic and Caucasian labor meant. In the roll call of votes, however, the negative votes on the immigration bill came largely from the southern Representatives who opposed the bill for the same reason that southern Senators had.49

In March, 1907, the California legislature debated a new series of anti-Japanese bills, and Roosevelt countered with a

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49Ibid., p. 3230.
series of vigorous telegrams and letters opposing their passage. He told Gillett that the extremists were responsible for the actions against the Japanese and that they were continuing to use the question to secure notoriety and temporary influence. He then told Gillett about the report he had received that California was going to establish Jim Crow cars and other like measures. Apparently as a result of Roosevelt's remonstrance, on March 12, Gillett dropped the bills, and Roosevelt wired Schmitz a congratulatory telegram. Roosevelt desired to end the situation with as little trouble and hard feeling as possible, and he felt that he had been successful.

Hopes that the crisis was over disappeared three weeks later. Violence broke out on May 20, 1907. A mob of about fifty San Franciscans attacked a Japanese restaurant, assaulted and drove off the customers, and rendered the place unfit for business. Authorities, however, received enough warning by this incident to enable them to prevent further outbreaks. The Japanese Foreign Minister, Viscount Hayashi instructed the Japanese ambassador Viscount Aoki to see Secretary of State Root and insist on protection for the Japanese. San Francisco authorities said the trouble was due to the employment situation and labor union agitation against the non-union shops. One report, printed in the

New York Times, had said not a single Japanese had any remote connection with the labor troubles. The truth about these incidents lay somewhere between these two statements. It was probably true the attacks originated as a result of troubles on the labor scene, but racial hatred in San Francisco was the reason for violence.  

Shortly after the riots, the anti-Japanese leaders were speaking openly about war. France, according to some press reports, was ready to promote an understanding between the two nations. This report apparently was without foundation even though it contributed to the belief that American-Japanese relations were nearing a crisis stage. The San Francisco riots of 1907 seemed to be much less serious than the earlier school board crisis. Observers were at a loss to explain why the Japanese press had become so alarmed. Party politics in Japan were a major reason, for the attitude of the opposition Progressiveist part was against the American racial attitude.  

On June 10, 1907, the Japanese signed a treaty with Russia whereby the latter agreed to recognize Japan's rights of influence and propinquity in Mongolia, Manchuria, and Fukien. This was a plan whereby not only Japan, but also Russia, would be able to encircle Manchuria against American dollars. According to a Soviet historian, Anatole Kantorovich,  

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51 Bailey, Roosevelt and Japan, p. 194.
52 Ibid., p. 201.
the Russo-Japanese treaty of 1907 was a foreshadowing of very unhappy prospects for the United States. He had a very futuristic approach to the treaty, as he saw it as meaning ultimate American involvement in a war that had as one of its purposes the liberation of China from the Japanese yoke only to have China fall to Soviet Russian-oriented influence four years later. There was no doubt that Japan had taken the series of crises into consideration when she signed the treaties with Russia and France.

Roosevelt's personal files show that he had become alarmed at continued anti-Japanese feeling after the Gentleman's Agreement. On June 22, 1907, he received from Secretary of War Taft a detailed report on proper defense of the Philippines, Hawaiian Islands, and Guam, as well as the Pacific coast. He told Secretary of State Root that another group of San Francisco fools, the Board of Police Commissioners, had refused to license six Japanese to conduct employment bureaus. He said he did not know what the outcome would be. He told Henry Cabot Lodge that in order to offset the worst outcome he would continue to do everything possible with politeness and consideration. He did not believe that war would break out. This statement showed a marked change in his attitude as he had said that

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there was a definite possibility war would break out in the spring or summer of 1907. He was definitely expecting the best but preparing for the worst. If the Californians had seen any of the personal and confidential letters of Roosevelt, the war alarm might have reached untold heights. 55

In September of 1907, events along the northern Pacific coast tended to focus eyes away from California. The first was a serious riot in Vancouver, British Columbia. When the Lieutenant-Governor of the Province vetoed an immigrant exclusion measure that the Provincial Parliament had passed, about a thousand men attacked Hindus, Chinese, and Japanese and wrecked over fifty Oriental stores. Sydney Brooks, a British Journalist, said the outbreak shocked, humiliated, and surprised the English. On September 5, 1907, an anti-Hindu riot took place in Bellingham, Washington. 56 These riots not only aroused British concern over the problem, but also showed that prejudice was not confined to California.

Then on October 14, 1907, a drunken logger crashed into a window of a Japanese laundry in San Francisco. The proprietor attempted to hold the logger until the police could arrive; but the logger's friends came to his rescue. Police acted quickly taking definite action to curb possible disturbances. 57 By this time San Francisco authorities were

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55 Pringle, Roosevelt, p. 282.
56 Bailey, Roosevelt and Japan, p. 253.
57 Ibid., p. 254.
so aware of the situation that they were able to prevent any further trouble.

In the same month, October, 1907, Taft took a trip to China. He said while in Shanghai that Americans should encourage the Chinese to develop their natural resources, reform their government, and improve the lot of their people. The Japanese, upon hearing of the report, became very upset because they had gone to a great deal of trouble to achieve the opposite. The Japanese were still mindful of the Boxer Rebellion, and they desired to keep the Chinese subservient. Japan wanted dominance in Asia and resented any attempt to interfere with her ambitions. After leaving China, Taft went on to Japan where he received an enthusiastic welcome, indicating that Japan was not carrying any grudges against him.\(^{58}\) As a result of this treatment, Taft became convinced that there was not going to be any war with Japan.

In November, 1907, Charlemagne Tower, the American ambassador to Germany, wrote that Japan was arming to the teeth and would seize the Philippines and then Panama. Japan was a treaty ally of the Triple Entente of England, France, and Russia, and ready to stand in opposition to the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy.\(^{59}\) The Kaiser wanted to warn

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\(^{59}\) Pringle, Roosevelt, p. 282; Zabriskie, American-Russian Rivalry, p. 137.
America of the yellow peril for he felt Japan was upsetting the balance of power, and he desperately needed some help from another country. He realized that the German and Austrian influence was strong in the American Midwest, even though he knew the United States was on the fence. His desire may have been for America to become the fourth member of the Triple Alliance to balance the four major powers that his alliance faced.

To a large extent as a result of the California crisis over the Japanese, Roosevelt decided to send the American fleet on a cruise around the world. He wanted to impress Japan with the seriousness of the situation. The St. Louis Globe-Democrat had written that the school board situation should awaken the Americans to the fact the Pacific area was important. Roosevelt may have also taken this into account when he ordered the cruise. Atlantic coast citizens, however, felt this was stripping them of their defenses. A southern newspaper, apparently feeling this was the last straw as far as Roosevelt's foreign policy was concerned, suggested impeachment. In a speech at Cairo, Illinois, on October 3, 1907, Roosevelt said that some were inclined to forget that the Pacific was as important as the Atlantic. Nevertheless, the Battleship Fleet received a wonderful welcome in Japan, and people in Australia felt the fleet meant
that Americans were taking Far Eastern problems seriously as well as coming out of their isolation.  

After 1908, anti-Japanese feeling began to spread into the rural areas of California such as the Great Central Valley. The San Francisco Chronicle, however, felt that any further agitation was unnecessary because immigration had virtually ceased, and the Japanese government would stop any additional trickles. American public opinion did not appear willing at this time to support any vigorous steps to maintain the integrity of Manchuria and China. Roosevelt, however, had only delayed not settled California's Japanese problem. It would continue to be an issue for many years. By January of 1909, the flames of discord would start blazing again. Pressure grew in California for the passage of a bill to prohibit the Orientals from owning land, but White House pressures kept the law off the books until the end of the William Howard Taft administration.

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CHAPTER II

THE SCHOOL BOARD CRISIS DIVIDES

AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION

They (the Japanese) are not specifically granted the right to enter the public schools. It can be claimed only as one of the rights of residence, and that would be stretching the words too much. --Chicago Daily Tribune, December 6, 1906.

"...it appears from reports that our correspondent was right in his conclusion that the California problem is more industrial than racial in its nature."—Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 10, 1907.

The school board crisis split the American public. Some have seen it as a geographical division. The Chicago Daily Tribune, according to the Roosevelt historian Howard K. Beale, was a pro-Administration paper as were most of the newspapers in the Midwest. Another analyst wrote that the President received support in New England, while another wrote that the only newspapers which endorsed the President's attitude on the West Coast were the Los Angeles Times, Seattle News, and the Tacoma Daily News. The South sympathized with California because of the Negro problem.

This was, however, not always the case with the San Francisco school board situation. The Chicago Daily Tribune believed that the Administration had no right to tell California what to do. This was also the attitude of another
Midwestern daily, the Saint Louis Globe-Democrat which objected to the President's solution of the school board problem. The Boston Globe failed to endorse the President. The New Orleans Picayune also failed to endorse the President, but several Texas papers, especially the Houston Daily Post, endorsed him on this issue. The Seattle Post-Intelligencer was another newspaper that endorsed him on the West Coast. The chief pro-Administration newspaper in the East was the New York Times. There is also ample evidence that periodicals and informed persons divided along similar lines.

The Chicago Daily Tribune opposed the Administration's attitude toward the San Francisco school board. In a series of editorials between October 2 and December 11, 1906, the Tribune stated that the Japanese were in the process of building a large navy. It also explained the California problem as it saw it, saying that separate schools existed for the Oriental races before the earthquake and fire. The separation, however, had been forgotten ever since the disaster, and natives and foreigners had mingled freely in the open schools. Pointing out that discrimination did not exist in Oakland and at the University of California, it concluded

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that the recent outburst did not merit serious attention. Prejudice against Chinese had been widespread. Prejudice against Japanese would be local and unimportant. The paper blamed the situation on the California legislature. The Tribune carried the headline on December 1 that Roosevelt had stirred a "hornet's nest" by saying that the Treaty overrode the San Francisco Law. The Tribune even stated that some Californians might advocate secession, adding that the President had overwhelmed the Japanese with compliments and given San Francisco a hard rap, and that the right of the national government to regulate the schools was nevertheless something which could not be conceded. Another editorial pointed out that although the Constitution of the United States had stated that Treaties were the supreme law of the land, it added that, nevertheless, the treaty making power of the United States was not limitless. "...Government cannot lawfully make a treaty wherein it shall agree to do any of the above things; i.e., to assume powers that are rightly delegated to the states and people." Although the Daily Tribune criticized Roosevelt's attempts to force the school board to conform, it supported the position that the Japanese deserved protection and would support federal intervention to preserve law and order. ²

²Chicago Tribune, October 2, 26, 29, December 1, 2, 4, 6, 15, 1906; Letter from Leslie Biert, Chicago Tribune correspondent, to author dated February 28, 1968.
The editor and publisher, Robert W. Patterson, was probably responsible for the criticism of the Administration. He attempted to follow the tradition of his predecessor and father-in-law, Joseph Medill, of straight news writing coupled with courage and independence in the editorial columns. Patterson, therefore, might have found it advantageous to adhere to the line of independence and individual rights rather than that of Administration endorsement.

The New Orleans Picayune, in a series of editorials from October 26 to December 19, 1906, revealed sympathy for California, but it made its position clear inasmuch as it presented the consequences. In an editorial on October 26, 1906, one analyst stated that if Americans were to refuse admission to the Japanese, Japan would exclude our interests in Japan, Formosa, Korea, and Manchuria. He went on to say that the situation would be very unfortunate if such a trivial incident as the school segregation policy were to disturb the friendly relations with Japan, and that the conflict did not represent in any way our true national feeling toward the Japanese. He also stated, however, that a war with the Asiatics would not be as serious a matter as would the violation of the Constitution and the deflowering of rights of states with regard to public schools. The worst thing that could happen in a war, he insisted, would be the loss of the Philippines. Many, he thought, would
regard this loss as inconsequential. The paper also stated that the fact Japan was preparing to send a battleship to our western coast on a courtesy visit demonstrated that Japan had no more thought of going to war than America. The southern paper insisted that although an apology might have to be made to satisfy Japan, the schools were under the control of California and its rights could not be infringed upon. If Japanese could go to California schools, then Negroes could go to white schools in the South. "Any Negro with German, French, or British citizenship would be done so."

The Picayune also covered Roosevelt's message of 1906. It seemed strange, the editor felt, that in his desire to treat Asians fairly, Roosevelt could not see that what was good enough for China was good enough for Japan and solicitude for Asia applied only to Japan. To appease Japan, the President felt it necessary to overturn, overrule, and overrun the state schools, while he had shown no particular concern for the Chinese. The editor felt that because of its urgent recommendations and imperious demands, the speech was the most radical annual message ever given.

Another Picayune editorial avowed that the controversy with Japan was the most important issue facing the United States at that time. The editor believed that if a conflict were to break out between Czarist Russian troops and the Japanese over Manchuria, as a result of the school board
crisis, Russia, not Japan, would have United States sympathy this time. Furthermore, if a war came with Japan, Americans would probably lose possession of the Philippines, but this would not be as bad as the loss of State rights. Consequently, the Picayune was a State rights newspaper, but it may have been a realistic one as well.

The Boston Globe was another paper which sympathized with California. The Globe stated, in a series of editorials during February and March, 1907, that it was well known that Japan did not want its laborers to come to the United States, and that no sensible person would believe there was any possibility of war. The Globe's policies took a definite leaning toward California when it endorsed a letter concerning the crisis that former Secretary of State Richard Olney had written to Massachusetts Congressman Samuel McCall. It endorsed the position that Olney had taken because the editor believed that no conflict existed between California law and the treaty with Japan. Even if there were, the Japanese position would be untenable because Olney said the Treaty called for explicit reservations in favor of California and the other states. The editorial concluded by saying that the rights of the states were still inviolable as the Constitution had described them.

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\(^3\)New Orleans Picayune October 26, 27, 30; November 22; December 2, 5, 13, 18, 19, 1906.
An editorial of February 11 declared that if Roosevelt should succeed in the present crisis he would have achieved a victory that would be classed among the most remarkable achievements of tact masquerading as tactlessness. In commenting on the telegram that Schmitz had received from Tveitmo to appeal for a no-concession proclamation in which Schmitz said that if Roosevelt wants to humiliate the United States, let him tell Gillett to repeal the school board ruling, but he cannot force California to bow to the mikado. The editorial said that Roosevelt had become involved in an endeavor to humiliate the American flag, if this telegram were true.

He, according to Schmitz and Tveitmo, had the mikado prostrate free California and plant the imperial heel on that state. Such a spectacle, opined the editorial, froze young American patriotic blood. The editorial added that it was fortunate that the Japanese Exclusion League and Tveitmo were not the American flag. Nevertheless, an editorial of February 17 had said the policies of Roosevelt had, for the first time, made a state a treaty making power. The editor lapsed into satire pointing out that Roosevelt had been mediating with Schmitz and the Mutsuhito as if they were equal sovereigns, with equally virtuous and illustrious ancestors. The Globe maintained that this was the way that Roosevelt got out of his difficulties, and, as a result of this crisis and the way that Roosevelt handled it,
the old ideal of State rights was gone forever. It also raised the main question of what would happen if America were to get into a war with Japan, and as usual concluded that the outcome would be the possible loss of the Philippine Islands.

Congressmen at the time began raising a question of the true worth of the Islands. If the Philippines were costing what Congressmen thought they were, said the editorial, those who opposed the purchase must receive credit for being wiser than the original purchasers. The paper endorsed the proposal that Americans should either incorporate them, make them a colonial government in which the Filipinos would have a voice, or else sell them to Japan or some other country and retain them as a coaling station. Thus the United States would be relieved of a burden.

Then when the crisis appeared to be finally over, the Globe concluded it was apparent that the main issue had been racial mixing. The editor added that it was fortunate that when Roosevelt stated his policy of restricting coolie immigration, people of San Francisco were willing to drop the issue. In this evaluation, the Boston Globe revealed its favorable leaning toward the stance of the school board in San Francisco.  

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4 Boston Globe, February 2, 4, 11, 12, 25; March 5, 15, 18, 1907.
The Texas newspapers were fearful of a possible outbreak of war with Japan over the school issue, but they did say some kind things about the Japanese immigrants which did not appear in other Southern papers. The Fort Worth Record of February 3, 1907, argued that America had not been in a position to wage war against a first-rate power in over forty years. It added that it would be wise to tell the jingoers in what a fix America was before commencing any war talk, and referred to George Dewey, the hero of Manila Bay, as the champion of American jingoists. The editorial also said that if diplomacy should fail and Americans felt they had to fight, they must be mindful of the hard road ahead of them. Over 200,000 Russian troops fought the Japanese behind modern fortifications, and were "licked right out of their boots."  

The Houston Daily Post may have been so anxious to get its opinion expressed that it made an error in word derivation. In commenting on an article in the Washington Post, a Houston Daily Post editorial of November 8, 1906, said: "Washington Post reports Japanese to be studying jingo. Come off it...Japan gave us that word." The word jingo, however, originated in the language of the Basques in southern France and became popular as a word in an English song at the time of the Russo-Turkish War in the 1870s. The

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5 Fort Worth Record, February 3, 18, 1907.
Houston Daily Post also editorialized that the Japanese immigrants were clean, industrious, and thrifty. It was for this reason that people liked to employ them and added that there was not the slightest danger that they would ever become large enough to harm the Caucasian majority. This was a definite departure from the views expressed in most of the southern newspapers.

An editorial in the Dallas Morning News of February 10, 1907, angrily stated that the Japanese press behavior and actions against Americans by top Japanese had humiliated American citizens. The editorial remarked that "there was a time when a bloodthirsty tyrant would start a war almost at will," and contended that there would be as many wars as there were then if Americans would submit to this method as a people. Many editorials expressed a definite fear of war, but the Houston Daily Post editorial of November 13, 1906, stood out as one of the most important exceptions. Since Texas was a southern state, one might say that Texas papers sympathized with California. This editorial proved that not all of them did.

The Saint Louis Globe-Democrat in editorials on February 3, 11, and 14, 1907, dismissed the possibility of war.

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7 Dallas Morning News, February 10, 1907, p. 16.
called for more interest in the Pacific, and exposed the San Francisco school system as a political machine. Arguing that it would be easy to exaggerate the importance of the Japanese incident, the paper on the other hand noted that it would be foolish to dismiss it as unworthy of serious consideration. The attention it was receiving had shown serious American concern. The main point was to await decision of the courts. There must be a new treaty to replace the one that would expire on March 12. The easy Japanese victory over Russia had made Japan very vain and autocratic, but Japan was not going to talk to America vainly or autocratically over the California incident. Duty, said the editor, demanded that the United States increase its strength in the Pacific. This view reappeared in another editorial which implied that the crisis had been a blessing in disguise that awakened Americans to their excessive attention to the Atlantic and their ignorance of the Pacific. Although the *Globe-Democrat* had minimized the danger of war and pointed out why America should become more interested in the Pacific, it did not fully support the way Roosevelt solved the immigration problem. It is unusual that a mid-continental paper like the *Globe-Democrat* expressed such an interest in Pacific involvement. Perhaps it was significant that the city of Saint Louis had once been a gateway to the American West, and in emphasizing the importance of the Pacific, the

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8 Saint Louis *Globe-Democrat*, February 3, 11, 14, 1907.
Globe-Democrat had thought that such an action could help preserve the tradition of the older days in the city.

A series of editorials in the New York Times, one of the strongest pro-Administration papers, appeared between October 25, 1906, and February 11, 1907. The Times expounded on the issue on October 25, 1906, with an editorial on the relations between the Japanese and Chinese. It said that no two Asiatic countries were as far apart as were China and Japan. While the Chinese emphasized their separateness, Japanese emphasized their modernity, and desire to be assimilated wherever they emigrated, and this was what had aggravated them so much about the restrictions in America. Another editorial stated that to stretch the original statute to include the Japanese was an absurd and notorious perversion of statutory and ethnological facts. An editorial reported the fact that hoodlums who were under indictment for crimes were running San Francisco and proclaiming the inferiority of the Japanese race, adding bitterness to what would be termed under any circumstances an international insult. Another editorial on the following day expressed the opinion that Japan was now becoming established as one of the world's great nations and the most fatal or destructive thing Japan could do in this predicament would be to start a war.\(^9\) It is impossible to say whether the New York Times had endorsed Roosevelt's policies because he was a native of New York City. Perhaps a more significant and more logical explanation was

that the Times desired to increase its circulation among New Yorkers, and, since the New York World and Herald cried out about the danger of war, the New York Times decided to take up the cause of moderation on the issue.

The Richmond Times-Dispatch maintained that the entire question was not racism but commercialism and industrialism. Its editorial of February 10, 1907, said that if there had not been any "race prejudice," which to the editor was a term improperly used for race instinct, there would not have been any mixed schools. If the Chinese and Japanese were white, the editor said, there would have been no separate schools. Nevertheless, the North did not worry about the Negro problem because of their small number of Negroes, but the South did worry about it because of its large number of Negroes. A large number of persons of the same nationality, according to the editor, did make a race problem. The situation showed, in his opinion, that the San Francisco mayor was willing to sacrifice "the tender solicitude" for the white children and the "racial instinct" for the commercial interests. This was something the Richmond Times-Dispatch could not accept. The editor concluded by saying: "...A cold-blooded commercial view robs the questions of all sentiment and of all sentimental interest, so far as the Times-Dispatch [was] concerned. Mayor Schmitz [was] truly a man of expediency." 10

The editor felt that the white children had been betrayed by

10 Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 10, 1907.
both the mayor and the President as well, since the President had been the one who had disputed the school board order in the first place. Schmitz was at fault for having yielded to him. Although this newspaper represented the feelings of the South, there was another reason why it took such a strong southern stand. Its editor, Joseph Bryan, even though he had many industrial interests, was an excellent soldier in the Confederate Army during the War Between the States and always had a strong devotion for the South and southern traditions.

The same page in the Richmond *Times-Dispatch* contained a section called "Points from Paragraphers," in which an article from the Chicago *Inter-Ocean* cried: "Can this be the same Jap whom we were applauding so warmly only a short time back when he was doing things to our ever faithful friend, the Russian Empire?" The article was a commentary on the treatment America had received as a result of the school situation and its endorsement of the Japanese against a country which had formerly been so friendly with the United States.

The Seattle *Post-Intelligencer* showed very little sympathy with San Francisco. In a series of editorials from January 1 to February 21, 1904, the *Post-Intelligencer*

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11Ibid., November 23, 1908.

12Ibid., February 10, 1907.
stated that the flames of race prejudice were being fanned by labor leaders whose past political affiliations were a distinct reflection on their motives. It expressed the opinion that it had always been the way of San Francisco to be the football of demigods and the prey of plunderers whose rabid utterances had astonished people in all parts of the country, but this astonishment would die down as soon as people understood what it was—a meeting of the mob. Its opinion was that there was no danger that California might go to war over the issue, because it would be settled in court. Another editorial stated that, according to Elihu Root, the people of California had been paying too high a price for good government. The federal government was thus justified in stepping in to resolve the situation. In another editorial, the Post-Intelligencer quoted a speech by Senator John Gearin of Oregon that California had no obligation to have public schools or any other schools at all. If they did so, it was their province and not that of the general government. The editor believed as a result of this that California's friends were standing where sand was quick while they should be standing on sounder principles. Another editorial indicated that Japan had no direct interest in the controversy and was looking solely to the Federal Government for support in the solution to this crisis. In other words, Japan had the high ground in the dispute. When the crisis appeared settled, the Post-Intelligencer believed that the settlement of the San Francisco school board crisis
might have been a swindle. The Japanese were wrong if they should feel that there was any attempt to stop immigration of its people or put it on the same footing as Chinese immigrants. The editor continued by saying that Chambers of Commerce in Los Angeles and other cities showed disapproval of such an application of terms. The editor also said that the Japanese presence had always been very valuable. These articles showed a general lack of sympathy for the San Francisco view, and also a strong approval of the President's handling of the situation.

The Los Angeles Times was another Pacific coast daily which did not sympathise with the actions of the San Francisco school board. Many of its articles contained commentaries on the San Francisco graft immediately before the general election of November, 1906. One of its prominent editorials on the crisis appeared on November 6, 1906. It stated there was doubt whether the school board could hold the position of exclusion, because it appeared to be untenable. The United States Constitution was the law of the land, and all should bow to its authority. If a state law were to contradict the Constitution, it would have to be the state law that was invalid. If this method were not observed, there could be no Federal union, and it had been affirmed forty-one years before that America was one. All treaties made up the supreme law

13Seattle Post-Intelligencer, January 1, 2, 4, 7, 9; February 7, 21, 1907.
of the land, according to the Constitution. Americans did not deny the children of French, German, or English parents the right to enter the public schools, and, under our treaty with Japan, America had no right to deny education to Japanese children in America. There was no reason why America should insult such a friendly power just because a few narrow-minded people in San Francisco wanted to make trouble. There were several possible reasons why the Los Angeles Times criticized San Francisco's actions. One of the reasons was the desire of the editor, Harrison Grey Otis, to expose the graft of the San Francisco machine. Another was that there was considerably less prejudice against the Japanese in southern California. Another logical explanation also seemed to be the desire to remedy the past, and this may well have been the case in Seattle as well. Both cities experienced anti-Chinese riots in the 1870's and 1880's, and they were trying to live down this experience. Accordingly, their newspapers wrote editorials that criticized the San Francisco school board's stand against the Japanese.

The school board crisis had divided the opinion of magazine editors as well. Outlook, one of the major journals of opinion, explained well the situation at the time of the crisis, and its editorials, while at times showing sympathy for both the Japanese and certain actions of the President, were not always anti-California. Their editors did write that such

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14 Los Angeles Times, November 6, 1906.
segregation of pupils was often in the interest of the children themselves. If San Francisco violated a treaty, the national government must take action to compel San Francisco to observe the provisions of the treaty and/or to allow Japan to secure redress. This meant such action should be taken only if the school board was guilty of a treaty violation and did not mean that Roosevelt should take such action regardless of circumstances. This editorial expressed confidence in the Administration and felt it would do everything within its power to carry out the provisions in the treaty. It believed Japan would understand that the action of a school board was not the action of the government. It stated there was no doubt that an understanding would result. The Outlook retracted its strong stand in a subsequent editorial in which it said there was no injustice unless the school board located the separate schools in an area where Japanese students could not attend or if they were inferior to the white schools. This was not an injustice the Government could remedy by Congressional or executive action, and the only thing the Federal government could do was appeal to the conscience of California citizens. The apparent softening of attitudes was the result of a growing feeling that Roosevelt never had any right to overstep and invade the rights of the states.

In June, 1907, George Kennan, the correspondent for the American press during the Russo-Japanese War, wrote that the crisis could not be used as an effective weapon of the labor
unions if anyone were to admit that Japanese were studious scholars, diligent and moral, and only six of them above the age of fifteen were in the primary grades. Other Outlook articles declared that the Orient and Occident must learn to live together in mutual self-respect and that the Japanese were not looking for trouble. 15 The Outlook, although it would appear to be Roosevelt's chief mouthpiece during the progressive era and a pro-Japanese journal also, 16 showed some signs of deviating from this position at the time of the San Francisco school board crisis.

Although diverse opinions appeared in the North American Review, it appeared to have favored the school board because of the authorship of the articles. The editorials which expressed criticism of the President's desire to force California to yield were the direct opinions of the editor. Others were simply guest articles. The "Editor's Diary" of December 7, 1906, appeared under the subheading of "Races Cannot Mingle." It stated that the result of Japan's protest had been a deadlock, and it would be necessary to use some other force besides


that of moral persuasion. It hoped the Administration would seriously consider the necessary precautions, and there was no way by which the government could enforce the provision of the 1894 treaty with Japan without risking civil war. An article by C. W. Fulton asked a very pertinent question when it asked if Americans would be willing to face the possibility of having aliens vote in school elections. This was a right the aliens could gain only if they were able to send their children to the public schools. Fulton added that the state had the power to conduct the schools in its own way and to prescribe its own qualifications for admission and exclusion. The Federal government could not, even by treaty, invade or annul this. The same magazine presented a somewhat conflicting view in its issues for January 4 and February 1, 1907. The first editorial, by the Japanese consul in Boston, had pointed out the similarities between the Japanese and Chinese as well as the differences. He said the Japanese would be indignant if America were to adopt a policy of exclusion, but they would not resort to arms since they would have nothing to gain by such an action. The loss of Far Eastern trade and Asiatic commerce would be the final result of an American policy of excluding Japanese. The other article by Thomas L. James, the former United States Postmaster-General, said that the California action was a revival of the Know-Nothings movement as it opposed the foreign born. He stated that the Japanese and Chinese had opened their gates to Americans, and the
Americans should, for this reason, not fear any reciprocity. He believed that it was morally, if not legally, wrong for a state to adopt a policy that seriously tended to impair relations with foreign nations. Although these latter articles tended to attack the California position, they did not say the President was justified in stepping into a California problem. Moreover, the editors wrote the articles which appeared to attack the President's actions. This would mean that the North American Review, while it published articles which warned against the consequences of California's actions, in its editorial opinion, opposed Roosevelt's stepping into what actually was a local matter.

Harper's Weekly published several articles regarding the San Francisco school situation. William Inglis, in the first article, stated that the Californians wanted to be rid of the Japanese, and they did not care if it caused a war or not. San Francisco was a city of labor, and the loyalty of the Californians was to their state first and their nation was a distant second. They saw the Japanese as a threat to their situation and felt that in case of war they would fight for the Emperor. American authorities had been able to solve the same problem in Hawaii, which had more Japanese than California. Why, Inglis asked, could the same not be done in California? The answer lay in the nature of the Californian. Another article by the same author in the same magazine argued that Japan strongly opposed war, and the entire issue resulted from
equating the Japanese with the Chinese, whom the former believed to be inferior. There was no rioting in Japan as a result of the crisis, but there was widespread indignation. Although many Americans, according to the article, felt the Japanese held a grudge against the United States as a result of the sealing incident and the Portsmouth Treaty, the belief did not appear based on reliable facts. The Japanese had directed their criticism against their own minister, Baron Kantaro Komura. He added that war with Japan was unlikely, because it was a business proposition and nobody would loan to Japan because France, Germany, and England had too much interest in America. War would also ruin Japan’s commerce for nobody would buy their tea or silk. Inglis based his article, however, on assumptions rather than sound evidence. He did not satisfactorily show that the Japanese directed all their attacks against Komura. He did not say anything about Czarist Russia, a country which would soon make a treaty with Japan. He may have believed only what Americans said about their wonderful treatment in Russia as the St. Louis Globe-Democrat reported and ignored other possibilities with regard to Russia. At any rate, this was something Inglis failed to deal with. The Inglis articles, therefore, had their basis in desire and not historical fact.

Meanwhile, in reaction to the Vancouver riots, Sydney Brooks, the London correspondent for Harper’s Weekly had said both disorders resulted from an attempt of British Columbia
to resist a unilateral treaty regarding immigration. After scolding the British for being unwilling to face facts as they had been in the Vancouver case, Brooks pointed out that he thought the true cause of trouble was the question of social and economic supremacy. The urgent need was for removing the Asiatic problem from the hands of mobs and vesting it in the hands of statesmen. Brooks attacked the judgment of the mob, but he also pointed out the dangers of excessive and unlimited immigration as well. Most of all, however, his article was a warning about the seriousness of the situation and that smugness about it was unwarranted. Americans and British had to get together to settle this difficulty, or the mob would become the law regulating Japanese immigration.

Articles in the working-class magazine, World's Work, attacked Roosevelt's judgment. One editor wrote that the Japanese question became important only after the Federal government intervened. The Japanese capitalists had been pouring money into the upbuilding of the Japanese fleet, and they would retaliate in every way short of war. The British would be the big gainers for they could take over all of America's markets and help Japan out as well. In the same

issue, another writer pointed out that California feeling against the Chinese had become less hostile and semi-friendly, at the same time fear of the Japanese was growing. The protest against interference had received more unanimous approval than any other previous incident for Californians had felt that Roosevelt erred in his version of the case and had wrongly interfered. They felt that Japan was playing a diplomatic game. The article agreed with the California opinion, and there was little doubt why the magazine felt the way it did in the light of the situation. This was a magazine of the workingmen, who were behind the drive for Japanese exclusion. Such a magazine would have to yield to the interest and desire of the worker if it were not to lose its circulation, even though it later said that the Federal government should settle the question.

Another magazine, World Today, published a letter in which Dean Mitsukari had said the loss of American prestige in Japan might not mean very much to Americans. As the Dean of the College of Science at the Imperial University of Tokyo, he had said there would be tremendous convulsions throughout the Far East, and great nations like America could not hope to keep out of them. There was no doubt that this article was a plea to

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California authorities and to all others involved in the situation to cool down. Such a situation, if allowed to get out of hand, would make any trade with the Orient almost impossible.

An article in Independent magazine maintained that there was danger of eventual war with Japan. The article was written by Julius Kahn, a California congressman who wanted exclusion. He counseled that there was no point in losing one's temper over the Japanese question because it was still possible to discuss it calmly and dispassionately. It would be a part of wisdom to study it in the light of the present as well as the past, but Japan would become a greater threat with the passing years. According to him, Americans should prepare for war. This article was an attempt to warn Americans about the Japanese attitude. It was a confession that Japan resented the attitude of the school board. The fact that the magazine published such an article implied that its opinion was sympathetic to the school board.

The school board crisis divided the opinion of the law journals as well as the popular journals. Secretary of State Elihu Root wrote an article in the American Journal of International Law in which he said the Treaty of 1894 asserted the right of America, by treaty, to assure foreign citizens of equal treatment when residing in American territory. Root added that the main question was whether America was about to

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break off its friendship with Japan; the answer was, fortunately, no. This article was the expression of an individual's opinion and not an editorial opinion, as were several of the articles noted above. Nevertheless, the editors and owners of the magazine did have a say as to who the contributing writers were, and it is necessary to conclude that the American Journal of International Law supported the position that Roosevelt had taken in regard to the San Francisco school board crisis.

Columbia Law Review was another law periodical which expressed similar views. The article in the February, 1907, issue stated that the San Francisco school board had acted under California law, and Japan complained that this was a violation of the Treaty of 1894 with Japan. The anti-Japanese argument usually followed the line that the Treaty did not affect laws, ordinances, and regulations regarding police and public security of the United States. The writer pointed out that it was possible to narrow the disputed question to the proper meaning of two documents—the Constitution and the Treaty, and such a situation was suitable only for the courts to decide. A more explicit article appeared in the March, 1907, issue which said that relatively few disputes occurred over interpretation of international law on such matters. The Supreme Court would

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probably never question the Treaty of 1894 because of a dis-
taste for doing so and because of the right of residence
guaranteed by the treaty with Japan. The article said that
there could be no dispute between the treaty-making organs and
the states in respect to the categories of legislation in the
Constitution. The most the States would be able to ask the
Federal government was whether the Federal branch had violated
the legislative powers of Congress. In the opinion of the wri-
ter, this restriction was essential to the treaty power and
representing the nation in relations with foreign powers. It
was also wholesome because it tended to prevent war, and was
also consistent because the Constitution had denied treaty
power to the states without Congressional consent. All the
states had equal representation in the ratifying body (Senate)
where two-thirds must concur.22 The Columbia Law Review had
taken a definite stand against California on this particular
issue.

A differing opinion, however, appeared in the Michigan
Law Review. An article written by Theodore P. Ion, a professor
at Boston University Law School, stated that in civilized
nations foreigners were far from enjoying civil rights attached
to citizenship and no country had more rights for foreigners

22Arthur K. Kuhn, "The Treaty Making Power and the Re-
served Sovereignty of the States," Columbia Law Review, VII
(March, 1907),172-185; Simeon E. Baldwin, "Schooling Rights
and Our Treaty with Japan," Columbia Law Review, VII (Feb-
uary, 1907), 85-92.
than citizens. Nothing had contradicted the law of the country, and there was nothing in the letter or spirit of the 1894 Treaty that substantiated the Japanese claim for the right of education. This attitude was also another substantiation for the doctrine of state-rights and shows that the South was not the only region supporting this attitude.

The *American Law Register*, a publication of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, in its February, 1907, issue, published an article by William Draper Lewis, a biographer of Roosevelt. He said that the United States could by treaty confer the right to attend public schools. The question as to whether or not a treaty could override the Constitution was as absurd as asking whether or not an act of Congress could override the Constitution. Lewis believed the treaty-making power of the Federal government was almost completely academic. He said that it was possible to find limitations in treaty-making power either in the nature of power or in the words of the Constitution. As a treaty was a contract between two nations, and much of the conduct of the two nations must be regulated by the treaty's terms. He believed that nothing in the nature of power could limit the subjects on which treaties could be made. In admitting that the Treaty with Japan had provided Japanese residents with the right to attend public schools, it

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was evident that such a Treaty did not violate any clause of the Constitution as written. If this was correct, said the article, the only remaining question was if it was in violation of any implied limitation on treaty-making powers. As it was for protection that the states became a union in the first place, dealing with foreign nations was best done through an agency representing all the states. The power to admit or to exclude aliens from a state's territory would, as a result, definitely reside in the Federal government. In such Constitutional exercises, the whole must not injure the part, and the part must not injure the whole. For this reason, Lewis believed the Japanese could attend public schools under the Federal decree, because it was a reasonable case for them to do so.  

Another important law journal was the *Green Bag*, a 'humorous' magazine which dealt with certain problems of the law. It said that the question, which involved the United States and its relations with Japan, should be a matter for the diplomat and not the lawyer. It added five main points: the Japanese contention about the meaning of the Treaty was a matter for a judicial tribunal. It felt the United States courts would probably not regard the treaty as invalid even in part. It believed the Treaty, if violated, would make the American liability manifest; and the chief inquiry about the

24 William Draper Lewis, "Can the United States by Treaty Confer on the Japanese Residents the Right to Attend the Public Schools?" *American Law Register*, LV (February, 1907), 73-90.
Treaty was one of interpretation. It concluded by saying that a final judgment would definitely be that a treaty was the supreme law of the land. 25

As already noted above, to some extent the school board crisis divided the opinion of important individuals of the time as well. Finley Peter Dunne was one of the most important humorists of the period. The creator of "Mr. Dooley," his remarks became a national sensation. He believed that war with Japan was imminent, and he said that the Russo-Japanese War began the trouble between America and Japan. He felt that Chinese were much nicer than the Japanese, whom he termed "our old friends." He believed the only way Roosevelt could get the Japanese into the San Francisco schools would be for them to be "shot from a cannon." He said Americans were still enjoying Japanese food, but it would not be long before this situation changed. War was coming, and it would be over Pacific supremacy. 26 In spite of this, however, it was apparent that


26 According to Amos S. Hershey, the junior professor of Political Science at the University of Indiana, the Federal government had no right to encroach upon police power or reserved rights of states to the extent of directing or contesting the school systems. Across the Continent, meanwhile, the citizens of Venice, California, near Los Angeles, had held a Chamber of Commerce meeting where they declared that the San Francisco sentiment did not represent the true opinion of Californians. Amos S. Hershey, "The Japanese School Question and the Treaty-Making Power," American Political Science Review, I (May, 1907) 393-409; Dallas Morning News, February 15, 1907. Finley Peter Dunne, Mr. Dooley Says (New York, 1910), pp. 106, 109, 195.
Dunne felt the situation was serious and there was no way to stop the growing threat to peace.

Such actions clearly show that the issue of the San Francisco school board crisis had divided American public opinion, and on this issue, there was no united front. Some had spoken in favor of the President, while others sympathized with California. Some became very panicky over the possibility of war; others said that there would be no war over this issue. The important point was that the issue did not conclude with the settlement of the school situation, but continued to plague California and the nation for many years afterwards. It returned in 1911 over a commercial treaty, and in 1912 the California Democrats presented an even stronger anti-Japanese plank than the Republicans. In the spring of 1913, the question of alien land ownership would once more divide the opinion of the nation. The Japanese question, then, was an issue that would not die down, and as long as it continued to be an issue, the American public would be disunited, until 1941, when one vote kept the declaration of war against Japan from being unanimous.
...The act (Section II) provides in effect that aliens ineligible to citizenship may acquire, possess, enjoy or transfer real property or any interests therein, only in the manner, and to the extent, and for the purposes prescribed by any treaty now existing between the United States and the country of which such aliens are subjects or citizens.—Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 630.

The school board crisis upset Japanese-American relations. The warm friendship that had begun with Commodore Perry's Treaty, froze in the events following 1906. The 1908 agreement between Elihu Root and Kogoro Takahira was only a brief thaw. The Root-Takahira Agreement of November 30, 1908, was not a treaty but an executive agreement binding the Roosevelt administration. Briefly, it provided that both nations agreed to subscribe to the policy of maintaining the status quo in the Pacific area; to respect each other's territorial possessions in that region; to uphold the Open Door in China; and to support Chinese independence and integrity by peaceful means. Europeans received these notes with marked favor because they felt the notes were consonant with the treaties that several of the powers had concluded with Japan. American public opinion favored the Agreement because Americans believed that it represented a Japanese pledge to respect the Open Door and the
Philippines. The Chinese, however, objected to the fact they were not consulted before the agreement.

In the Gentlemen's Agreement, Japan agreed to exercise care in the issuance of passports, and promised not to issue them to laborers. The Japanese Government also agreed to temporarily suspend all further emigration to Hawai'i. These and other measures might have been good enough to provide friendlier relations between America and Japan. Events, however, proved otherwise.

Theodore Roosevelt, in 1908, did not choose to run for re-election. His successor was William Howard Taft, who believed the best course was to maintain the status quo with Japan since he felt that if the Japanese were to be treated as unequal with other races, the result might be war.\(^1\)

Taft had to use public pressure to block the passage of a bill which would have kept Orientals from owning land. The California legislature, nevertheless, passed a bill which appropriated funds for a general investigation of the Japanese in agriculture. A horrified state legislature found the report was quite favorable to the Japanese. As a result the California Senate adopted a resolution which criticized the State Labor Commissioner for preparing such a report and also disapproved


\(^2\)Pringle, Taft, II, 304.
of it as a misrepresentation of the will of the people. This report never went to press, and a copy is still unavailable to the public.³

Anti-Japanese agitation continued unabated in California through 1909 and 1910. When the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Japan and the United States was under consideration in 1911, Taft had to intervene in California once more to stop anti-Japanese legislation. Such actions were unusual for Taft who was a quiet man who disliked becoming involved in politics. He had in fact never wanted to be President because of this and he was very unhappy in the White House as a result of such controversies. In 1912, when Japan brought some Korean nationalists to trial for treason against Japanese occupation forces, the Californians used this as an excuse to stir up more anti-Japanese rumors.⁴

In 1912, Theodore Roosevelt returned to battle for the Presidency. He ran, not as a Republican, but as a "Bull Moose" Progressive. He not only had to face opposition from the Republicans, but also from the Democratic party. The Democratic candidate was a born and bred Southerner from Virginia, Thomas Woodrow Wilson. His belief was that the entire Japanese-American question was one of assimilation. Believing this to be the case, he said Americans could not make a homogeneous

³McWilliams, Prejudice, p. 38.

population of a people who did not blend with the Caucasian race. This was exactly what Californians wished to hear. The Democrats, therefore, staged an even stronger anti-Japanese campaign than the Republicans had in previous years in California. As a result of this split in the anti-Japanese sentiment, Theodore Roosevelt was able to carry California in 1912. His California victory was not enough, and to the satisfaction of many Californians, Woodrow Wilson took the oath of office on March 4, 1913.

Woodrow Wilson was not about to interfere in California politics the way his predecessors had. Knowing this, California legislators drew up an Alien Land Law in the spring of 1913. This law provided that aliens who were ineligible for citizenship under the laws of the United States might not acquire, possess, enjoy, transmit, or inherit real property, or any interest therein, if no treaty said so. The existing treaty with Japan did not refer to agricultural lands, so this was not considered a violation of the treaty. The sponsors of the bill said that the purpose was to exclude the Japanese from the state of California. Continuing the agitation which had reached its climax previously in the school board situation, Californians appeared confident such a bill would pass now that there would be no Presidential interference.


6 McWilliams, Prejudice, p. 53.
In this the Californians were only partly correct. Wilson would not interfere directly with the passage of the bill, but he did seek to prevent its enactment. Accordingly, he sent William Jennings Bryan to Sacramento. If Wilson's aim was to prevent passage of the bill, his selection of Bryan was a serious mistake, for Bryan had sided with California on the school board issue, and the circumstances were similar. Wilson also acted differently than Roosevelt had in handling the school board question. Roosevelt had called Schmitz and the board to Washington; Wilson sent an emissary to California to meet the principals. The fact that Wilson acted as he did did not necessarily mean he was less anxious to prevent anti-Japanese action. He simply desired to handle the situation in a different way. Furthermore, it would have been more difficult for Wilson to have called the whole California Assembly to Washington.

The Alien Land Bill contained certain points which made it very significant to Japanese-American relations. It came up at a very inopportune time, for the United States had shortly before recognized the Republic of China which aroused considerable resentment in Japan. The law's purpose would affect 45,000 Japanese who in 1914 owned a total of 331 California farms and leased 282 more. The situation was such that the courts might have to decide whether the treaty infringed

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*Daniels, "Politics of Prejudice," p. 46; Link, Wilson, II, 293.*
on the rights of the states. When Japanese Ambassador S. Chinda went to see Wilson, the President told him that he could not stop any move in the California legislature. In Tokyo, on April 17, 1913, a crowd of about twenty-thousand Japanese staged an angry demonstration against the California Land Law, cheering wildly as a Diet member demanded that the Japanese fleet be sent to California to protect the dignity of Japan. This incident clearly indicated further deterioration of America's relations with its former ally.

Hiram Johnson stated on April 21, 1913, that Californians could not understand why an act within the jurisdiction of the California legislature would create such tumult and confusion. He remarked that Arizona had an act whereby an alien or any person who did not intend to become a citizen could not acquire any land in that state. Why should California be picked on when similar laws existed elsewhere?

Many in California opposed the Land Law. Strong opposition developed from the backers of the Panama Pacific International Exposition to be held in San Francisco in 1915. The representatives of European-owned land and mining interests in the state also became alarmed for their property rights were threatened by the provisions which discriminated against aliens.

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and even corporations with alien stockholders. After the original bill was changed, this opposition abated,\textsuperscript{10} for during Bryan's visit Ulysses S. Webb and Francis J. Heney drew up a new bill. Webb was California's Attorney-General at the time, while Heney was a leading California progressive.\textsuperscript{11} Although the new land bill was permissive in its nature, Wilson, somewhat belatedly to be sure, worked to prevent its passage and warned Johnson that the bill would cause delicate litigation. Johnson denied that the Californians violated any treaty rights and remarked that the people of his state were showing no shadow of discrimination. He added that his state's actions gave no nation the right to take offense.\textsuperscript{12}

Chinda wrote Bryan a letter revealing that the Japanese received the news of the bill's passage with great disappointment. He opined that the act was unfair and discriminatory and added that it was impossible to ignore the fact that the Japanese were the object of the legislation. He asserted that the act contradicted Article I of the Treaty which provided constant protection for the property of Japanese subjects in the United States, and he went on to state that all the restrictions were irreconcilable with the first and third clauses of Article I of the Treaty. He hoped the difficulties "would be set to rest in a manner worthy of the historic relation of

\textsuperscript{10}Mowry, \textit{California Progressives}, p. 155.
\textsuperscript{11}Daniels, "Politics of Prejudice," pp. 123, 125.
\textsuperscript{12}Ibid.
cordial friendship between the two neighboring nations." Chinda knew that the law offended the Japanese people. Bryan, however, held that it disappointed him that such an act was offensive to the Japanese. Bryan explained to Chinda that he and Wilson had urged the California legislature not to act as a separate unit in this case but to support the Federal government's attitude. He let Chinda know that the United States Government was powerless under the circumstances to do anything else. He also told him that he believed the Japanese government had some misinformation regarding the spirit and object of the land legislation, and he reminded him the issue was wholly economic and based on the economic conditions in California as the people there interpreted them. He concluded by telling Chinda that the Land Law respected and preserved all Japanese rights under the existing treaties. Bryan's message conveyed his belief that the Japanese objections were due to a misunderstanding on the part of the Imperial Government. Japan apparently felt the legislation was an attack on them as a people. Japan still believed the Federal government could tell a state not to pass a law. Bryan, therefore, tried to settle the misunderstanding in his letter to Chinda. As a result of this letter, the Chicago Daily Tribune carried the headline "California's Law Upheld by Bryan in Reply to Japan." Another headline in the same paper asserted: "Answer to protest,

\[13\] Link, Wilson, II, 87.
\[14\] Ibid., II, 293.
however, will show United States has made cause of California its own." This illustrated that Bryan sympathized with both California and Japan and substantiated the attitude of Arthur S. Link that Bryan failed to see the seriousness of the situation, or to realize its actual international ramifications.

Governor Johnson stated on May 19, 1913, that he was aware of the three-fold opposition to the California alien land law.

I repeat what I have before said: that California, for the first time in its history has an anti-alien land law.

Any man who wishes another kind of law may consistently invoke the initiative. No man who really wishes another kind of law will sign a referendum to this law. If another law is sought, it may be presented by means of the initiative and in the meantime the present law will be in operation. To tie up the present law means no law until November, 1914.10

In the last part of his statement, Johnson was referring to Bryan's suggestion of a referendum on the bill. At the time of the suggestion, the New York Times reported such action would delay the bill nineteen months. Johnson's statement then shed no new light on the issue, but it did indicate his general attitude toward the matter.

Naval Secretary Josephus Daniels wrote that America was dangerously close to war in the spring of 1913, but believed that Japan did not really want a conflict. The Navy Department, however, prepared for war. Daniels believed strongly

15 *Chicago Daily Tribune*, May 17, 20, 1913.
that nobody could have handled the situation any better than Bryan, because, while he did not satisfy Japan, he managed to keep the situation in diplomatic channels.  

Daniels, therefore, felt there might have been war if the mediation had been handled by one less tactful than Bryan.

At this time, the Japanese Emperor became ill with pneumonia. Wilson immediately cabled the nation's sympathy, saying he "desired to offer to your majesty for myself and for the government and people of the United States the assurance of my sincere sympathy and to express the ardent hope that your illness may prove to be of brief duration and your recovery rapid and complete." Nevertheless, at the same time the Japanese received the note on passage of the land law with great disappointment. The Japanese received these events calmly and with great reserve and war talk was completely absent in Japan. Perhaps this was an example of Asian patience; it certainly demonstrated that in spite of American fears, the Japanese were not about to go to war over the question of land ownership in California.

By the end of May, 1913, relations between Japan and the United States had improved. Yet Theodore Roosevelt, exasperated by the situation even though he had retired from public life, telegraphed a protest to Hiram Johnson. He stated


18Chicago Daily Tribune, May 22, 1913.
that the Federal government was the only body which could decide the issue. His own opinion was that both Wilson and Bryan had a hopelessly weak attitude, and that the Democratic President should have adhered to the Rooseveltian precedent. The Japanese ambassador declared that the Imperial Government was still willing to maintain the agreed on restrictions on emigration of laborers to the United States. On June 23, 1914, Bryan told Chinda that America shared the express desire of the Japanese government to bring an end to negotiations and have a conventional settlement of the controversy with Japan over the California Land Laws.\footnote{Foreign Relations, 1914, p. 427; Pringle, Roosevelt, p. 290.} These events indicated an improved situation over the previous May despite the fact that Roosevelt felt that such a situation was preventable.

Five days after Bryan's letter, the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand relegated the Japanese-American crisis to an obscure place in international affairs. Japan entered the war on the Allied side, and this pleased many Americans. It was not long, however, before anti-Japanese agitation resumed in the various Hearst papers.\footnote{Pringle, Roosevelt, p. 290; McWilliams, Prejudice, p. 51.}

These newspapers had always been anti-Oriental. The senior Hearst had not been hesitant about the use of anti-Chinese politics to gain a seat in the United States Senate. His son began to show professional talent in his anti-Japanese harangues at the time of the outbreak of the first World War.
Throughout 1915 and 1916, anti-Japanese stories appeared in the Hearst press, especially in the New York American and the Los Angeles Examiner. Partially as a result of these inflammatory articles, anti-Japanese feeling continued in the United States during the period of war on the European continent. Hearst's anti-Japanese stand resulted also from his pro-German attitude.

Robert Lansing, who became Secretary of State after William Jennings Bryan resigned in 1915, sought the adoption of ideas which were frequently different from Wilson's. During the summer of 1916, Viscount Kikuiro Ishii, a distinguished Japanese diplomat, arrived in the United States to come to grips with the whole problem of Japanese-American relations in China and to quiet American suspicions of Japan. Ishii hoped to have America recognize that Japan had "paramount interests" in China, while Lansing wanted Japan to reaffirm the Open Door and the integrity of China. Since neither negotiator desired compromise, there would have been no agreement had Lansing and Ishii not taken refuge in ambiguous language. The understanding the two reached on November 2, 1917, recognized that "territorial propinquity created special relations between the two countries," and that Japan had special (not paramount) interests in China. A solemn endorsement of the Open Door followed.

21 McWilliams, Prejudice, pp. 51-53.
At this time Japan published a series of Twenty-One Demands on China which if met would give Japan near control over China. Japan had already taken the province of Shantung from its German-leased holdings. Serious tensions resulted between China and Japan, and these tended to distract Japan and prevent her from lodging any serious protest about the Hearst papers. On February 25, 1915, the Japan Society gave a dinner at New York's Hotel Astor where Chinda foresaw continued friendship with the United States and remarked that the Panama Canal united America and Japan. Two days afterward, as a result of the Demands, Chinese in San Francisco declared a boycott on all Japanese industries in that city. These various incidents showed that Japan was not going to make war with the United States over the new outbursts in the Hearst press, and was too preoccupied with problems closer to home to take any action at that time. The outbursts, however, were a signal of future anti-Japanese agitation and crises in Japanese-American relations following the end of the war. Some of the incidents would be tragically regrettable in the light of future events.

The Zimmerman Note also related to the anti-Oriental agitation. This communication was between the German government and Mexico, stating that the latter could regain the

territory it lost in the Mexican War of 1846-1848 if it joined Germany in waging war against the United States. Accordingly, Japan would come in, and the three nations would wage war in common.

On April 1, 1919, during the Versailles Peace Conference, two California State Senators sought to introduce a number of anti-Japanese bills. Robert Lansing said the Californians should withdraw the bills because of the circumstances. On the day of the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, a wave of anti-Japanese agitation swept California. The agitation was largely a result of Japanese military action against Korea, China, Siberia, and Shantung. It was significant that organized labor played no part in this movement. The agitation was largely the result of the campaign of James D. Phelan, by that time a United States Senator, who was seeking re-election as a Democrat. Since everything pointed to a Republican landslide, Phelan planned to conduct his campaign almost entirely upon the white supremacy issue. Accordingly, much of the feeling against Japan arose because the agitators felt it would help Phelan. When William D. Stephans, the Governor of California, refused to call a special legislative session to pass the bills, the agitators demanded his removal from office. Although he finally decided to side with the agitators, they went ahead with plans to punish him by putting an anti-poll tax bill and a new Alien Land Act on the ballot in November, 1920. They were successful for the Alien Land Act passed by a vote of 668,483 to 222,086. This agitation produced wide resentment
in Japan and students in Tokyo debated the question "Shall Japan declare war on the United States?" The agitation spread to Fresno where Americans discriminated against Armenians and to Lodi where the Native Sons of the Golden West circulated petitions against Armenians, Turks, Greeks, and Hindus as well as Japanese.  

It may be correct to say the agitation of 1919-1920 was the most serious of all the agitations because it consisted of the circulation of fantastic rumors, most of them untrue, about Japanese perfidy along with a clamor for complete removal of the Japanese from the United States.

The main question by then was that of naturalization. Although American public opinion generally opposed the stand that California had taken in 1906, 1907, and 1913, the American public, according to Roger Daniels, agreed with California's stand on naturalization in 1924. There were several reasons for this change of heart, such as racist ideology, the growing uneasiness about Japanese military prowess, and the consistent anti-Japanese propaganda of the California exclusionists. The first two attitudes had grown to some extent because the anti-Japanese agitation was widespread in the Pacific States. The postwar period saw the organization of Japanese Exclusion Leagues in other parts of California. Los Angeles had the Anti-Asiatic Association; the Fourteen Counties

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23 Bernhard von Bulow, World War I and Germany's Collapse, Vol. II of Memoirs, 4 vols., tr. by Geoff Dunlop (Boston, 1932), III, 301; McWilliams, Prejudice, p. 56.

Association existed in the Sacramento Valley; the Alien Regulation League was in the Imperial Valley; while the Americanization League held sway in the San Joaquin Valley. Although this diversity seemed to indicate a division, the Exclusion Leagues approved a five point program which stated their attitude toward the situation. They called for:

1. An end to the Gentlemen's Agreement
2. Exclusion of 'Picture Brides'
3. Rigorous exclusion of the Japanese immigrants
4. A confirmation of policy that Asiatics shall forever be barred from American citizenship
5. An Amendment to the Federal Constitution to provide that no child born in the United States shall be given rights of citizenship unless both parents are of a race eligible for citizenship

The controversy caused deep concern on the part of Roland Morris, American Ambassador to Japan. He reported that in the matter of naturalization Japan could not legally complain, because the United States had seen fit to select those whom they were willing to admit to citizenship. He believed that in the matter of land ownership the state of California had enacted discriminatory legislation, but that the legislation did not violate any solemn treaty obligations of the Federal government. He declared that his investigations had convinced him that the only thorough means to remedy the discrimination was for Congress to take action and grant to persons of the yellow race the privilege of naturalization. Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court, however, heeded his advice.

Instead the Court declared that the Japanese were ineligible for citizenship. This decision of November, 1922, was the culmination of events that had been taking place ever since Phelan, in 1901, had ordered the quarantining of the Japanese and Chinese sections of San Francisco. There had been uncertainty, therefore, whether or not the Japanese were eligible for citizenship, even though the Californians who opposed them believed they were not. During this period, a number of Japanese were reportedly naturalized illegally.

The news of the Supreme Court decision was ill received in Japan, for the Japanese felt it was an affront to their national honor. 26

Before this Supreme Court decision, an important Naval Disarmament Conference took place in Washington. At this conference, the United States renounced the strengthening of any of her bases that lay west of Pearl Harbor, and Great Britain did the same with her bases that lay east of Singapore and north of Australia. 27 Such action was a tremendous boon to Japan and made it dangerous to offend them. The American public seemed motivated by racist tendencies, along with the cries of the Exclusion League, or else they did not know how to handle the growing Japanese power and sense of strength. They, therefore, gave support to the Congressional moves for

exclusion of the Japanese without full awareness of the consequences of their actions. The general consequence was all out war with Japan beginning seventeen years after the Japanese Exclusion Bill of 1924.

An argument in favor of the Exclusion Act was that Japan also regulated any immigration to territory contiguous to the United States. This excuse, however, appeared weak in view of the fact that the Japanese government received the news of the immigration act with deep concern. Another telegram from Tokyo reported there was no lessening of the deep-seated resentment and bitterness throughout the Japanese nation. It added that the Japanese were solidly behind their government's protest to Washington, and it would be wrong to say the protest was the result of actuation by domestic political urgency. The Japanese took these actions very seriously, and the day that the Exclusion Law went into effect was observed in Japan as a day of national humiliation. They clearly felt the United States had, by the enactment of this law, insulted their honor and dignity as a people. Whether Japanese really wished to come to this country was purely a secondary matter. The primary point was that they had been told they could not do so. This was what the Japanese resented most about the Exclusion Law which Albert Johnson and David Reed authored in 1924. The once friendly relations between the two countries had become frozen in the chills that began with the crisis of the San Francisco school board.

28Foreign Relations, 1924, I, 218; II, 398, 402, 403.
Calvin Coolidge regretfully signed the Immigration Bill. He said that he would have vetoed the anti-Japanese measure had it stood alone. The only reason he signed the bill was that it gave the country a comprehensive immigration law which the country desperately needed. He declared it would have been much better had the United States continued to act on the basis of the old Gentlemen’s Agreement with Japan, which would possibly have averted much ill will. In other words, as far as the Japanese were concerned this was an unnecessary statutory enactment. He expounded on this issue when he declared:

That course would not have derogated from the authority of the Congress to deal with the question in any exigency requiring its action. There is scarcely any ground for disagreement as to the result we want, but the method of securing it is unnecessary and deplorable at this time.

In final form, revised and amended up to and including December 31, 1936, the exclusion clause provided that:

No alien ineligible to citizenship shall be admitted to the United States unless the said alien belonged to certain stipulated categories: immigrants previously admitted to the United States and returning from a temporary visit abroad; ministers and professors, their wives and children under 18; bona fide students at least 15 years of age; government officials, their families, servants, and employees; tourists and business travelers, seamen, aliens in continuous traffic...and Chinese wives of American citizens married prior to May 26, 1924.29

During the 1920's, Japan became increasingly alarmed at the growing possibility of a Russian conquest of China, especially after Russia had taken Mongolia from China in 1924. The Japanese government feared that unless defensive bastions were built, Communism would overrun North China and threaten the security of Japan. On April 6, 1927, Chinese troops under the command of Chang Tso-lin, lord of Manchuria, raided the Soviet Embassy in Peiping and discovered documents which "abundantly proved that members of the Embassy staff" were distributing Communist literature in violation of the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1924. On May 27, 1928, Chiang Kai-shek led a raid in Harbin which turned up forty-two Soviet consular officials who were engaging in anti-Chinese activities. These incidents alarmed the Japanese, who felt this was a definite indication that Russia planned to take over China, thus threatening the security of Japan. The fact that Japan worried about these incidents in China may have kept her from taking any further action in regard to the new American Immigration Laws.

Opposition to the Immigration Laws developed in the United States itself. The National Foreign Trade Convention in Los Angeles, after deploring the effects of the 1924 Law on American exports, adopted a law favoring revision in 1930. Not long afterwards, the Chairman of the House Committee on

Immigration announced that he would introduce an amendment giving Japan her proportionate quota of immigrants. The Immigration Committee of the United States Chamber of Commerce reported strongly in favor of a quota. In 1931, an organization called the California Council on Oriental Relations began working for the quota system. Under quiet fostering by the State Department, the move for revising the Immigration Law of 1924 made considerable progress. As a result by the fall of 1931, Henry L. Stimson, American Secretary of State, hoped that he and the Japanese could settle misunderstandings between the two nations. He hoped that it was possible to place the Immigration Laws upon some basis which would not offend the sensibilities of the Japanese people. Before this could go into effect, however, new developments in Manchuria blocked his path.  

September 18, 1931, Japan, using as an excuse the fears that the Soviets would take advantage of Chinese weakness in Manchuria, launched an invasion of that country. As a result of the Japanese invasion, Mukden, Changchun, and several other cities in southern Manchuria quickly fell to the Japanese. One of the reasons why the Japanese attacked at this time was that the world had just begun to feel the full effects of the great depression in the late summer of 1931. Accordingly, the Japanese expected freedom from interference from the rest of the world.

world. The American Government, even though it did not desire to be hasty in the formulation of any conclusions stated that it felt a very unfortunate situation existed and that it would seem that the responsibility for the liquidation of the situation rested with Japan as the Japanese forces had seized and had exercised de facto control in south Manchuria. This was later termed Stimson's Non-Recognition Policy whereby he refused to recognize the Japanese conquests in Manchuria. Franklin D. Roosevelt continued this policy after he took office in 1933. Thus the United States had already reached a verdict in the case and found Japan guilty. Japanese-American relations, therefore, began to worsen once again in the fall of 1931. They would become worse as the Japanese began their invasion of China in earnest in 1937 and sided with Germany against Russia in the Anti-Comintern Pact. At Franklin D. Roosevelt's first cabinet meeting, the members of his cabinet discussed the possibility of war with Japan. When the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor brought the United States into World War II there would be another outbreak of prejudice against the Japanese living in the United States. Many of these people, who were called the Niesi, were herded into refugee camps throughout the American West.

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32 Senate Document No. 55, 72nd Congress, 1st Session, pp. 3-5; Griswold, Far Eastern Policy, pp. 411-413.

CHAPTER IV

THE AMERICANS REMAIN DIVIDED ON
THE ALIEN LAND QUESTION

That all this should be brought about by a piece of very cheap partisan tactics and without any apparent consideration of the situation to be created is a matter of deep concern and humiliation. It discloses a very grave defect of the federal system and a very serious need for measures to prevent any further precipitation of dangerous and far-reaching complications by small groups, cliques, or interests operating upon the two responsive powers of a state. That California has acted within her constitutional rights emphasized the unpleasant potentialities of this situation. Chicago Daily Tribune, May 26, 1913.

The American public viewed the events which followed the San Francisco school board crisis in the same divided manner as they had that controversy. After Theodore Roosevelt retired from the Presidency in March, 1909, he continued to write editorials in Outlook in which he voiced his opinion on the Japanese-American question. In one of the editorials he wrote that there were certain bases on which the American people must act in their dealings with the Japanese. He declared that Americans already had an admiration for them. He added, however, that the people of the United States did not approve of allowing them to settle here indiscriminately; even Japan would object to allowing an unlimited number of Americans to settle in Japan. He went on to state that people should go to Japan as travelers, students, teachers,
scientific investigators, international businessmen, et cetera. He concluded by opining that the government should take no further action until it was certain that such policy of reciprocal travel was successful. In this article, which appeared on May 8, 1909, Roosevelt expressed the opinion that the Japanese situation was quite significant and had developed because of resentment among the Californians regarding the indiscriminate settlement of the Japanese in California. This was not a change in his attitude as he always admired the attitude of the Japanese but never maintained that they should settle here indiscriminately.

In a series of articles in the September, 1909, issue of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences writers covered several viewpoints concerning the Japanese situation after the San Francisco school board crisis. In the first article, Walter MacArthur, the editor of "Coast Seaman's Journal" published in San Francisco, wrote about opposition to Oriental immigration. He stated that it was possible to see the situation only from a racial standpoint, and he added that exclusion was the only basis on which to secure our national safety. He continued by stating that the instinct of race preservation was mankind's strongest impulse. His conclusion was that the only alternative to exclusion was race degeneracy or race war. Another article was by A. E. Yoell,
the Secretary of the Asiatic Exclusion League of North America, who wrote that the average daily wage for Japanese workers was less than for white workers by an average of about fifty cents. He added that the Pacific coast could not have both American and Oriental labor. Other articles, however, such as those written by John P. Irish, the director of Naval Customs for the port of San Francisco, expressed the opinion that Japanese immigrants had less money per capita than did most other immigrants and were receiving less public aid than any national group of immigrants. These articles appeared in a magazine which deliberately designed this special issue to express both sides of the case, but the most prominent articles were in favor of Japanese exclusion.  

A writer published an article in the North American Review of March, 1909, commenting on the battleship cruise. He expressed the opinion that the voyage of the battleship fleet meant America had changed its attitude toward international politics and was no longer to be a spectator in international diplomacy. He felt that commercial interests now compelled the United States to take part in shaping the destinies of the world. For this reason the battleship cruise, in the view of this author was the beginning of a new

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era for the United States, and meant the government would have to take a definite stand on the Japanese situation.

Another article published during a sort of lull between the school board crisis and the alien land act stated that the southern part of California, with some exceptions, still raised no strong objection to the admission of Japanese. This writer, however, ignored the implication of an important point he brought out. The article explained that the total value of California crops on the land unaffected by Japanese labor was about ten million dollars higher than that of crops affected by Japanese labor. The author of this World Today article added that Hindus were coming to California, and asked if they were going to replace the Japanese and repeat the experience of South Africa where they drove out the whites. He concluded by expressing the opinion that America might become a race of mongrels, and believed that if this were to be America's fate it should not happen without a struggle. World Today was therefore a magazine which believed the Japanese immigrants threatened American interests, and this could seriously upset the "purity of the American race."

The American Journal of International Law editorial commentary pointed out that the 1911 commercial treaty with Japan had proved the desire of Philander Knox and President Taft to maintain a condition of peace based on principles of justice.

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and proper regard for the interests of a foreign and progressive country.\(^5\) This statement conveyed the view that Japan remained a friendly nation which did not want war and whose citizens should not be pushed around.

Chester H. Rowell in an article in *World's Work* of June, 1913, expressed his opinion that the Japanese problem was the origin of the biggest problem Americans had ever faced. He believed that if Americans dealt with them unjustly, they would not die off or submit as had the Indians and Negroes. He felt the problem in California was not an acute one at that time, and remarked that that fact might jeopardize the position of California in the eyes of the rest of the nation. The greatest need, according to Rowell, was for the two races to exchange their goods, ideas and things of the spirit in peace and friendship.\(^6\) This article exposed the gravity of the situation, but it also reported that the Japanese problem was much less serious than it might become. Alarmist views in California, therefore, might lead to a decline of the state's position on the matter in the opinion of the rest of the country. The article was a warning to California that the situation might get worse. This was a change of opinion from the stand that *World's Work* took at the time of the school


board crisis, and it also indicated that the labor journals no longer sided unanimously with the Californians.

A *Forum* article by Kiyoshi Kawakami, a Japanese citizen, reported that Americans condemned Russia for its persecution of the Jewish people, but treated the Japanese similarly. He contended just as in the case of the Russian Jews, that it was the untiring industry of the Japanese that enabled them to succeed where white men failed. He asked why Americans should blame the Japanese for living thriftily in order to exonerate indolent or shiftless whites, thereby making themselves guilty of oppression in America while they championed the cause of an abused race under the flag of another government.\(^7\) Kawakami called for a reassessment on the part of the Californians and those who championed them. He saw a definite inconsistency in the American attitudes.

In a series of articles in *Outlook* during the month of May, 1913, several writers expounded on the Alien Land Law. The first article declared that America believed that it should be clear that the national government must lead and not follow in any matters relating to national honor and obligation. The writer termed this the opposite of what happened in 1906 and insisted that the present action was inconsistent with duty. Another article reported that the Japanese had negligible

\(^7\)Kiyoshi Kawakami, "Japanese on Our Farms." *Forum*, L (July, 1913), 82-93.
landholdings and were only a local menace and then only for the future rather than the present. An article entitled "Webb Alien Land Bill" explained that State Attorney General Ulysses S. Webb's opinion was that a treaty held that the state was within its proper sphere regarding ownership of land when it recognized the treaty rights. In yet another article the author remarked that the surest way to provoke a war would be to let loose tongues have their way, adding that it might be impossible without violating the Bill of Rights, but it was possible to deny the right of those with loose tongues to force upon America the unready hand of a possible war.

This indicated that Outlook believed the situation was being handled differently from the way it was in 1906-1907 and the handling of the alien land controversy was an affront to duty. It also felt the Japanese problem was localized because the situation was prominent only in a small part of America, but the situation might worsen in future years.

Independent published a revealing article on interracial amity in California. This article pointed out that in some parts of California Americans and Japanese were friendly despite the resentment over the Alien Land Law, the school board crisis, and other events. Neeta Marquis, the author of this


9Neeta Marquis, "Interracial Amity in California." Independent, LXXV (July 17, 1913), 138-142.
article which dealt with southern California, asserted that she was certain the Japanese situation would improve.

During and after the debate on the Immigration Bill of 1924, several journals opposed exclusion. An article in *Living Age* on April 14, 1924, expressed such a view. The author stated that if Americans desired immigrants of Anglo-Saxon and Germanic races only, their attitude was unbecoming to people who posed as apostles of justice, humanity, equality, and philanthropy. Such an article made it clear that American magazines were not unanimously in favor of the exclusion of the Japanese.

In a series of editorials between April 9 and May 16, 1913, the Dallas *Morning News* expressed the opinion that there would be no war over the issue and added that the matter was purely diplomatic. One editorial opined that embarrassment between America and Japan over the California legislation was a precedent that would sorely tax Bryan's and Wilson's diplomacy. The question, one editorial writer went on to report, would go to the Supreme Court which would end the matter unless California decided to strike out the law or the State Department decided to amend the Gentlemen's Agreement with Japan. An editorial two days later held that Japan should propose an amendment if the Supreme Court held the Alien Law to be against treaty obligations, and thereby created an embarrassing

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situation. The editor also commented that there was no law giving Japanese the right to own real property in the United States, indicating that the editor believed alien land acts were constitutionally justifiable. Concerning the question of naturalization, the editor asked whether the oath of allegiance would not put naturalized Japanese under a strain in case of war. If so, he believed that there was a natural reason for America to oppose citizenship. The editor in another editorial reminded readers that Americans must deal with people and there would be a feeling of rankling as a result of all the difficulty in California, making sincere cordiality impossible.

Another editorial in the same paper stated that there was no reason why Bryan's solution of the problem should not lead the world out of barbarism. An editorial a week later echoed this attitude for it expressed the belief there would be no war because of Japan's financial condition. An apparent contradiction appeared in the editorials of April 24 and May 16, 1913, but there was actually no contradiction. The first editorial stated that the end of the matter would come if the Supreme Court said the Japanese were eligible for citizenship. Otherwise, there would have to be a revision of the treaty. The other editorial declared that the Hague was the proper tribunal for the settlement of the treaty and not the Supreme Court because this was a diplomatic matter. The first article
was a statement of fact, while the second was the expression of the opinion of the newspaper.\footnote{Dallas Morning News, April 9, 1913, p. 10; April 11, 1913, p. 10; April 15, 1913, p. 10; April 17, 1913, p. 10; April 18, 1913, p. 10; April 20, 1913, III, 6; April 24, 1913, p. 10; May 3, 1913, p. 10; May 10, 1913, p. 10; May 14, 1913, p. 16; May 16, 1913, p. 10.}

In a series of editorials between May 1 and 29, 1913, the Chicago Daily Tribune expounded on a pro-California course which praised Bryan as a true peacemaker. A front-page cartoon had one character asking how long Wilson would be able to keep his scholarly calm as the other wondered what the next move on the California question would be. An editorial stated that Wilson must be certain by that time that his salary was not too large, implying that the California situation, among others, was taxing on his nerves. Another front-page cartoon showed Uncle Sam holding an army umbrella as a shield against the Japanese war cloud. The Kaiser who was in the background, said "Don't pay any attention to it, you will only provoke it."

Another editorial commentary reassured readers about the California situation, as it explained that readers might, in forgetting about the Japanese muddle, note that the Washington Street Bridge would soon be open for traffic. This was an endorsement of the Kaiser's position that it was better not to become too excited about Japanese moves as the result would be to provoke them. An editorial on May 12 explained that when the Japanese came, the Californian encountered pride greater than his own. He met a resourceful, shrewd, alien who was as well bred and as cultured as himself. According to
the editorial, this was why Japanese and Californians had always baited each other. The Californians were sure that their state's honor had been involved, and California in the view of the editor, stated and asserted its sovereignty. \(^{12}\)

According to another editorial, Bryan was a man of peace who had nothing to do with the consequences and much with the cause. According to a subsequent editorial, Hiram Johnson's telegram to Bryan presented the case for California with lucidity and good feeling. The Japanese could remain in California and no exodus of Japanese from there would follow. California needed the Japanese inasmuch as the Japanese were prospering there and should continue to prosper. Japan did not plan any hostilities, and, the editorial continued, American interest was still peace and trade. This editorial concluded by explaining that no substantial interest of the Japanese in California was under serious threat from the California legislation, and that America was in an excellent position to negotiate another treaty if Japan wanted to make it on profitable terms. \(^{13}\)

A letter to the Daily Tribune from J. A. Palmer of Chicago declared that yellow journals were trying to get the United States involved in a war with Japan. The truth was, the letter continued, that the ranchers originally welcomed the Japanese

\(^{12}\)Chicago Daily Tribune, May 1, 7, 9, 11, 1913.

\(^{13}\)Ibid., May 12, 14, 15, 1913.
but objected to their refusal to remain peons. The latter, the letter concluded, were very desirable immigrants if the racial question was overlooked. A subsequent front-page cartoon carried the heading, "Peaceful Adjustment of Our Differences with Japan" in which Uncle Sam met with the Japanese. Uncle Sam told them that if he would allow Japan's most undesirable class, the coolie laborer, to come over here and acquire property, would Japan allow America's most undesirable class, the predatory trust, to go to Japan and acquire land and property? The Japanese in the cartoon appeared shocked. According to an editorial of the same day, Japan should not be dismayed at the concentration of American forces in Hawaii because the United States decided to do this long before California became an issue. Other editorials asserted that this was not the same Japan that in 1854 let an American Commodore scare the Shogun into doing exactly what the President wanted and maintained that the Japanese were economical but their recent history had shown them not unwilling to spend money on war. 

The most important editorial contained an adjoining letter from the Daily Tribune's own correspondent who corroborated evidence showing that the alien land legislation was trumped up for political purposes. This legislation, added the editorial, left the Japanese in the same situation as they were before. The letter reiterated statements made by various

\[14\] Ibid., May 17, 18, 1913.
other well-informed persons that the Japanese were not increasing and therefore there was no crisis to be met. The correspondent added that there was opposition to the Japanese in California, but it was no greater than at any other time. The editorial explained that if the correspondent's reports were true, California's actions disclosed a grave defect in the federal system. Accordingly, a Republican Governor with Presidential ambitions trumped up the situation as a political issue to gain national importance by embarrassing a Democratic President. The fact that California's action was within her constitutional rights emphasized the unpleasant potentialities of this situation; i.e., it was constitutionally possible for any state to do so.\footnote{Ibid., May 20, 21, 22, 23, 1913.}

In his letter the Daily Tribune correspondent declared that the only solution seemed to be elimination of the Japanese from California, explaining that this anti-Japanese agitation had its origins in racial antipathy, but passage of the anti-Japanese land law ended up as a slap in the face of the Japanese government. Union labor had been working for years to drive out the Japanese. The correspondent reported that he had traveled through the Imperial Valley where the landowners said they did not know any Japanese who wanted to buy land since they could lease about ten times as much land as they could afford to buy and make big profits each year on every acre of it. The Japanese, contrary to most beliefs,
received the same, or even higher, wages than white men. The correspondent also reported that until Japan, the Wilson administration, and the eastern newspapers stirred up the issue and touched the pride of the "sovereign State of California" the alien land bill was by no means certain of passage. These editorials exposed a situation that had its political trimmings. The editorials pointed up the weakness of the federal system for they stated that California did all of this without violating any constitutional provision. While the Daily Tribune believed this, it nevertheless felt the situation was a political move on the part of Hiram Johnson and Woodrow Wilson and nothing more. Actually, the Daily Tribune was very kind to the Japanese, both at the time of the school board crisis and at the time of the alien land law. What this newspaper opposed was the federal government's attempt to solve the problem of a state.

In a series of New York Times editorials from April 15 to May 20, 1913, that newspaper took the side of the Japanese on land ownership before the bill became law, but after its passage an editorial remarked that the Japanese would have no further quarrel with California over the issue. The editor began by stating that the government would welcome a test of the alien land law in the Supreme Court. He added that Japanese were not Mongolians as the Californians alleged. Another editorial criticized Japan for its many agitators and yellow

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., May 29, 1913.
newspapers, for once in a while a demogogue would become owner and editor of a paper and wild agitators took advantage of the situation. The editor continued by reporting that the courts might settle the question with quiet diplomacy, and that Japan understood the limits of Federal government power in the matter. The editor favored an amicable and liberal land settlement anyway, as Japan had an anti-alien land law. The editor said he hoped that the Japanese had a sufficient sense of humor to enjoy the ridiculous aspects of the issue, and he felt it was fortunate that Japan had shown considerable moderation and wisdom. The editor also expressed the opinion that a law was not urgently needed, and that it was by treaty and not state legislation that the matter should be settled.17

In response to the New York Times editorials on this subject, Robert Casamajor, a resident of South Pasadena, California, wrote a letter to the Times. He especially opposed an editorial which reported that the Japanese tended to decrease in number. Casamajor wrote that the Japanese actually grew in numbers from 1,147 to 41,356 in 1910, while the Chinese were decreasing in numbers from 72,472 to 36,248 in the same period. He continued by stating that once the Japanese moved in, the whites moved out, the price of property declined, and the Japanese then bought it up at a reduced value. The series of editorials concluded by opining that since it was evident that the land law did not violate America's treaty with Japan, but

17 New York Times, April 15, 19, 29, 30, 1913.
actually conformed to American commitments, Japan did not have any new grounds for protest.\textsuperscript{18}

The editor saw no reason why Japan would show opposition, because she had always opposed any large migration of workers. He also called absurd the claim that denial of citizenship to Japanese meant accusing them of racial inferiority. He also refused to believe that Californians, as had been claimed, looked upon Japanese as inferiors because they could not compete with them in agriculture. The \textit{Times} changed its attitude toward the Japanese in 1922 after the Supreme Court had delivered its decision that the Japanese were ineligible for citizenship. An editorial at that time declared that the Japanese understood perfectly they could not be citizens.\textsuperscript{19}

Not all of the West Coast newspapers supported the alien land legislation. Those opposing it included the Los Angeles \textit{Times}, Portland \textit{Oregonian}, Fresno \textit{Republican}, Pasadena \textit{News}, Oakland \textit{Tribune}, and the Visalia \textit{Daily Times}. Even the San Francisco \textit{Chronicle} did not support the legislation. These were, however, minority views in the West. Other newspapers which opposed the legislation were the Philadelphia \textit{Enquirer}, Buffalo \textit{Enquirer}, Chicago \textit{Inter Ocean}, and Saint Louis \textit{Globe Democrat}. Papers outside California which were sympathetic to the alien land law were the New Orleans \textit{Picayune}, the

\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., May 18, 20, 25, 1913.

\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., November 25, 1922.
Richmond *Times Dispatch*, and The Chicago *Daily Tribune*. The
Detroit *Journal*, Indianapolis *News*, and the Cleveland *Plain
Dealer*, however, were papers which had no sympathy whatsoever
with the California views.20

The change of newspaper opinion on the Japanese-American
question was not very great when it came to the Exclusion Law
in 1924. Only about five per cent of the eastern newspapers
favored exclusion as compared with forty to fifty per cent of
the midwestern, fifty per cent of the southern, and eighty
per cent of the western. According to one survey forty out
of forty-four newspapers east of Chicago criticized the new
immigration law. The Sacramento *Union* thought the entire
affair was discourteous and forecast the danger of approaching
war. The New Orleans *Picayune* and the Mobile *Record* accepted
the inevitable but felt that Congress had erred.21 This was
a departure from the attitude in 1906, but it was not definitely
one in favor of the passage of anti-Japanese legislation as
Daniels has asserted. The same was true with the Saint Louis
*Globe-Democrat*, which feared Roosevelt's growing power in 1907
but in 1913 believed that California should listen to Washing-
ton's solution to the land crisis.

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20 Tupper, *Japan in American Public Opinion*, p. 235; Higham,
*Strangers in the Land*, p. 325; Daniels, *The Politics of
Prejudice*, p. 128.

21 Griswold, *Far Eastern Policy*, p. 357; Tupper, *Japan in
CHAPTER V

WORLD WAR II: THE CLIMAX OF ANTI-JAPANESE SENTIMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

...The Pacific Coast is in imminent danger of a combined attack from within and without...It is true...that since the outbreak of the Japanese war, there has been no important sabotage on the Pacific Coast. From what we know about the fifth column in Europe, this is not, as some have liked to think, a sign that there is nothing to be feared.—Walter Lippmann in Salt Lake City Tribune, February 20, 1942.

Relations between the United States and Japan worsened following the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. American public opinion became more and more pro-Chinese as warfare between China and Japan loomed. When Japanese planes in 1937 attacked the American ship Panay near Nanking, the United States demanded and received an apology. When Japan signed an anti-Comintern (anti-Russian) treaty with Germany that same year, it became apparent in American eyes that Japan was becoming anti-American because of Hitler's avowed opposition to the freedom of man. When Hitler attacked Poland in 1939 and the Low Countries in the following May, the United States remembered Japan's alliance with Germany. Accordingly, the United States placed an embargo on iron shipments to Japan. From then on a continuing series of crises constituted steps in the deterioration of relations between the two countries.  

1Bailey, A Diplomatic History, pp. 745, 790, and passim; Charles C. Tansill, Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 1933-1941 (Chicago, 1952), pp. 488-490.
The headlines of December 8, 1941, in newspapers throughout the United States were all similar in wording. "Japan attacks Hawaii; declared war; Many in Honolulu killed by bombers." Although there was no repetition of the "witch-hunt" craze that hit America during World War I, fear that the Japanese-Americans might be disloyal and dangerous to American security hit the West Coast. After all since early in the twentieth century, Americans had questioned whether Japanese-Americans could avoid being loyal to the Emperor. The long years of anti-Japanese agitation bore fruit as those who had opposed them wondered if the exclusionists and "yellow perilists" had not been right all along.

As a result of growing fear, on December 29, orders came from the Department of Justice to have enemy aliens in California, Oregon, Washington, Utah, Montana, Nevada, and Idaho surrender radio transmitters, short-wave radio receiving sets, and most cameras. The same tension existed in Hawaii itself, where many believed that the Japanese who manned the Hawaiian fishing fleet constituted a potential menace.  

In this climate of fear, Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 which gave the army blanket power to deal with the enemy alien problem. On February 25, 1942, the

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California press, especially the Los Angeles Examiner, made an erroneous report that the Japanese had bombed Los Angeles and its environs the previous evening. This incident resulted in an increase of warnings from military authorities that the Japanese who lived close to military bases were dangerous. Apprehension grew when a Japanese submarine shelled the California coast at Goleta near Santa Barbara.3

The evacuation in California was largely under the direction of Earl Warren, who was the state's Attorney General. It is uncertain as to when Warren decided about the Japanese-Americans in California, but he publicly declared on January 30, 1942, that something needed to be done if a Pearl Harbor in California was to be avoided. Shortly afterward he warned California law enforcement agencies that the state was wide open to sabotage and Fifth Column activity. He added on February 7 that the only thing that could protect California from the Japanese was the Armed Forces of the United States.4

The Japanese-Americans received their orders to move in the spring of 1942. It may not have been necessary as a strategic measure, but the relocation may have been needed as a measure to protect the property and lives of the Japanese-Americans. There is no apparent evidence, however, that this


4 Katcher, Warren, pp. 142-143.
was the reason it was done. Everything points to the real fear of the Japanese. There was, in the opinion of one historian, Leonard Arrington, no danger from the Japanese-Americans after the Battle of Midway on June 6, 1942, which ended the Japanese threat of invasion. This opinion does not seem to hold water in the light of the fact that Japanese troops landed on Attu in the Alutians on June 12, 1942.5

Still not all Americans were unsympathetic about the plight of the Japanese-Americans. In an attempt to aid evacuees at the Topaz center in Utah, the Forestry Department of Utah State Agricultural College in the summer of 1943 donated seventy-five large and seventy-five hundred small trees along with ten thousand cuttings of tamarisk shrubs, willows, and wild currants to beautify the relocation center. This was a generous effort but it was too little and too late. The trees and shrubs soon died in the alkaline soil and heat while the wind foiled efforts to grow grass and flowers.

Finally in 1944 the aliens were allowed to begin leaving. The Western Defense Command lifted the evacuation order on January 2, 1945. Only forty-four per cent of the evacuees returned to the West Coast. Many of the Nisei moved to the Midwest and East and never saw their old homes again.6

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Division of opinion about relocation was merely a continuation of the divergence of opinion that had marked the American agitation toward Japanese-Americans from the late nineteenth century onward. During the San Francisco school board crisis and the California Alien Land Law controversy, some newspapers and magazines cried that there would be war while others maintained that any talk of war between the United States and Japan was ridiculous. Some newspapers and magazines sympathized with the position of California, while others felt that the California position was wrong. Over the years, such groups as the American Civil Liberties Union took a significant part in attempting to protect the Japanese. 7

The Far West always took the most active part in the anti-Japanese protests because there were more Japanese there than in any other part of the country. The East had few Oriental problems, so they usually failed to understand why the West was alarmed. The South, however, had a Negro problem and did not want any more trouble, so they sympathized both with Californians and exclusionists.

Partisan politics often affected the course of affairs on the Japanese question. The Midwest, the most isolationist section of the country, was probably more divided in its

reaction than any other large geographic section. Some southern Democrats during the administrations of Republicans apparently wished to frustrate presidential efforts to solve the problem and voted accordingly. At the time of the Democratic administration of Woodrow Wilson, Hiram Johnson, a Republican governor with presidential aspirations, frustrated the President's effort to solve the problem. In summary, therefore, political differences hindered dealing with the question, and may well have kept a division in American public opinion. The closest that American public opinion ever came to viewing an incident in Japanese-American relations unanimously occurred on December 8, 1941, when one vote prevented the declaration of war on Japan from being unanimous.
APPENDIX A

THE JAPANESE QUESTION

The constitution reads that all treaties made "under authority of the United States" shall be the supreme law of the land. But the treaty-making power is not limitless. There are some powers which the constitution reserves to the states and the people. There are some things which it says the national government shall not do. That government cannot lawfully make a treaty wherein it shall agree to do any of those things. Such a treaty would not be made "under authority of the United States" and would not be the supreme law of the land.

The Japanese government contends that by virtue of a treaty with the United States, its subjects domiciled in California have a right of entrance to the public schools and a free education. The treaty reads that the courts of justice shall be open to the Japanese, and in matters connected with the administration of justice, they shall enjoy the rights and privileges of native citizens. They are granted full rights to acquire and dispose of property. In "whatever relates to rights of residence and travel" they are put on a parity with native citizens. They are not specifically granted the right to enter the public schools. It can be claimed only as one of the rights of residence, and this would be stretching the words too much.
If the treaty had said directly that the Japanese might use public schools in the state, would the treaty be lawful? Senator Rayner of Maryland does not think so. The resolution offered by him reads there is no provision in the treaty with Japan which relates directly to the public schools, and that the public education institutions of a state are outside the jurisdiction of the federal government. Most persons thought so until the controversy arose with Japan.

Suits have been begun which will end, sooner or later, in a settlement by the courts. If they shall say that there is no way in which the national government can force a state to admit to any of its schools any persons it does not see fit to admit, the Japanese will have to take the school regulations of San Francisco as they find them.

There is no question that under the treaty Japanese are as much entitled to protection of life and property as native citizens. If the people of California or any other Pacific state take to mobbing Japanese as some of them are showing an inclination to do, they will put themselves hopelessly in the wrong and will put the national government in the unpleasant position it has been in before when mobs have murdered aliens who had been guaranteed American protection. If some Japanese should be murdered by a west coast mob, the probabilities are that local sentiment would make the arrest and punishment of the offenders impossible. The laws should be amended so as
to provide that in such a case, the national government may assume jurisdiction and inflict punishment.

It would be unwise for the people of San Francisco or of California to lash themselves into a frenzy over the President's message. He may accuse them of bad manners and a failure to appreciate Japanese good traits, but he cannot forthwith put Japanese into schools they are forbidden to enter. The people of the west coast must learn to keep their hands off Japanese who are lawfully in this country and are breaking none of the laws.

Chicago Daily Tribune, December 6, 1906.
APPENDIX B

THE JAPANESE ADJUSTMENT

At last the terms of the San Francisco-Japanese school adjustment began to shape themselves. Japanese coolies are to be excluded from the mainland of the United States. But the Japanese are not named specifically in the act which will shut them out. The provision sets forth that "whenever the president shall be satisfied that passports issued by any foreign government to its citizens to go to any country other than the United States or to any insular possession of the United States or to the canal zone are being used for the purpose of enabling the holders to come to the continental territory of the United States, to the detriment of the labor conditions therein, the president may refuse to permit such citizens of the country issuing such passports to enter the continental territory of the United States from such other country or from such insular possessions or from the canal zone." On the face of things this interdict is not aimed at anybody in particular, but could be used against Russians, Italians, Hungarians, or any other immigrants who are coming here in any considerable numbers. Though it is intended to hit the Japanese, the fact that there is not the remotest reference to any race or color may make the exclusion a little less objectionable to the mikado's government.

A good deal of skill is shown in both the wording of the exclusion and in the bill on which it is placed as a rider.
It is incorporated in the immigration bill, which is now in its final stages in congress, but which was never expected to carry any such stipulation at the time it was framed. The early enactment of the prohibition is thus assured, and probably the incident will quickly be closed. As compensation for the exclusion of coolies from California the San Francisco school authorities will make some concessions to the Japanese children who are already on the ground. To a certain degree the Californians will, by this exclusion, get all they wanted. And while giving the Californians the protection which they asked, Japan's sensibilities at the same time are spared to a considerable extent. The Philippines, Hawaii, and the canal zone will still be open to the mikado's subjects but they will be shut out from the mainland. Hawaii's sugar planters and Panama's canal builders will be free to employ all the Japanese whom they want, just as they can at present. Comparatively few Japanese have gone to the Philippines but all who want to go there will be as free to make the journey after the exclusion act is passed as they are now. But none of these can enter the United States if the president puts up the bars against them, as he very likely will just as soon as the act gets on the statute book.

This has been a three-sides contest and consequently has been difficult. The president, the San Francisco school board and the Japanese government have been separate terms in the equation. Each viewed the matter from a separate angle. To
a considerable degree the wishes of each diverged from those of the other two. But seemingly all acquiesce in the stipulation which is incorporated in the immigration bill. Each of these interests recedes a little from its original position, but as all appear to be satisfied the adjustment is likely to stay adjusted. All the concern which the masses of people of the United States have felt in the affair was to get some sort of accommodation between the contending parties which would be agreeable to all of them, and which at the same time, would not assail the nation's prestige for fair dealing with everybody and everything.

The purpose of the present stipulation is to bridge the time between its enactment and the framing and ratifying of a new treaty between Japan and the United States. The treaty will necessarily have to be on something of the same line as that which are marked out in the immigration bill's new provision. Incidentally, the modus vivendi puts a new power in the hands of the president. He is the person who will have to set up the barriers. It will be his province to decide when the immigration of the Japanese from Hawaii or anywhere else to California or any other part of the United States mainland will be to the "detriment of the labor conditions therein."

As the labor unions of San Francisco started the anti-Japanese crusade, in the first place, the president can easily get "pointers" from them as to the proper moment
to raise the bars against Mongolians. The country, however, is glad to feel that the end of the Japanese incident is in sight.

*Saint Louis Globe Democrat*, February 14, 1907.
APPENDIX C

OPINION OF NEWSPAPERS REGARDING SAN FRANCISCO SCHOOL BOARD CRISIS AND CALIFORNIA ALIEN LAND LAW

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EXPLANATION OF SYMBOLS
- OPPOSED STAND OF CALIFORNIA
+ FAVORED STAND OF CALIFORNIA
NA INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE

ACCORDANCE WITH REGION MEANS ATTITUDE SIMILAR TO MOST NEWSPAPERS OF PARTICULAR REGION ACCORDING TO TUPPER AND McREYNOLDS, JAPAN IN AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION, p. 437.
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Article


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