THE EXPEDITIONS OF NARCIO LOPEZ AND THE SOUTH, 1850-1851

APPROVED:

William Kaman
Major Professor

Jessie F. Pickrell
Minor Professor

Jackett Drago
Director of the Department of History

Robert B. Toulouse
Dean of the Graduate School
THE EXPEDITIONS OF NARCIO LÓPEZ
AND THE SOUTH, 1850-1851

THESIS

Presented to the Graduate Council of the
North Texas State University in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

By

John E. Simpson, B. A.

Denton, Texas
January, 1968
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter

I. SOUTHERN INTEREST IN CUBA .................................................. 1

II. THE CARDENAS EXPEDITION . .................................................. 14

III. DIPLOMATIC CONFRONTATION: THE CONTOY PRISONERS 36

IV. THE NEUTRALITY TRIALS ...................................................... 53

V. THE LAST EXPEDITION .......................................................... 72

BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................ 98
CHAPTER I

SOUTHERN INTEREST IN CUBA

Fanatical southern desires for Cuba during the early 1850's owed much to frustrated attempts to push southern institutions westward. The South, jealously facing a growing North and realizing clearly her particular interests, embraced a pro-slavery, expansionist ideology. This growing spirit of sectionalism beginning in the early 1800's, when the South became more aware of its own regional interests, originated over issues of a national banking system, high tariffs, and federally sponsored internal improvements. In the following decades the spirit of division mounted as the slavery question increased in importance. Anti-slavery sentiment grew in the North. Several protestant churches split into North-South branches because of the issue, and Southerners, generally, began to fear growing northern hatred for their peculiar institution.¹

Southern predilection toward slavery, and increased attacks by the North accounted primarily for the rising political isolation of the South. The rise of cotton culture had revitalized slavery, bringing it new importance in the southern economy. Attempting to defend themselves from these northern attacks, Southerners declared that slavery was a positive good. African bondage, they announced, was the very foundation of order and democracy. Slavery should expand to enrich White society. Northern Congressmen, on the other hand, worked to contain the institution. By preventing the geographic growth of slavery they would insure their own political hegemony in Congress while satisfying their anti-slavery constituents.

In 1844 an expansionist, pro-slavery Democrat, James K. Polk, ascended to the presidency. Polk had won the election with strong Southern support on a platform of expansion to Texas and Oregon. He was a slave owner and a plantation aristocrat—clearly a man to be trusted by the apprehensive South. Immediately before the new President took office,

---


Texas received admission to the Union as a slave state. This somewhat cooled Polk's ardor for the acquisition of all Oregon, although it was eventually annexed with greatly limited boundaries. His refusal to insist on all of Oregon angered northern and western free soilers, as did his refusal to sign an internal improvements law, the Rivers and Harbors Act. Polk's actions clearly favored southern interests which wanted maximum slave territory while keeping free soil expansion to a minimum. These actions isolated the South even further, and identified Administration Democrats with pro-slavery aspirations.

Another moving force for slave expansion was the ideology of Manifest Destiny. At this time in American history, virtually all Democrats and many Whigs identified themselves with this credo of national expansion. Manifest Destiny viewed the United States as a young, dynamic nation, expanding across the continent. The South saw it as an expansion of its slave domain, while most Whigs, and Northerners, saw Manifest Destiny as an expansion of free soil territory.

---


5Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism, 1848-1861, p. 35.

When the implementation of the ideology of Manifest Destiny appeared to advance the interests of slavery, as in the Mexican War, northern and western anti-slavery forces attacked the effort. Whigs quickly took partisan advantage of the issue. They claimed that Polk and the South had conspired to gain slave territory from Mexico in order to benefit the South, and to increase Democratic representation in Congress.\(^7\)

Whig attacks on Administration motives were not entirely without evidence. When the fire-eating Mississippian, John A. Quitman, wrote in 1848 that Polk should take all of Mexico, and "organize the country into civil departments with a view of permanent annexation," he must certainly have had in mind the establishment of slavery in at least a part of the territory.\(^8\) Unlimited support by southern Congressmen for the President's aggressive Mexican policy was especially distressing to Northerners.

---

\(^7\)Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism, 1848-1861, pp. 36-38; Sydnor, The Development of Southern Sectionalism, 1819-1848, pp. 328-330.

Surrounded by this atmosphere of partisan-sectional criticism and support, Folk accepted a limited territorial gain in Mexico, and refused to push the slavery question. The South, realizing the president's dilemma, turned its interests to a more likely area of possible expansion—Cuba.

American desires for Cuba were due in part to the spirit of 1848 which was sweeping the globe, stimulating peoples to throw off the old order and achieve political liberty. The European revolutions had a profound effect on American thought. The philosophy of liberation espoused by the revolutionaries of 1848 and their supporters formed an important corollary to the doctrine of Manifest Destiny. It was under this doctrine and its liberation corollary that John L. O'Sullivan, editor of the influential Democratic Review, led the Administration assault for Cuban annexation. O'Sullivan, influenced more by Manifest Destiny than by southern ambitions, emphasized the commercial and military importance of the island. Polk had long wanted Cuba as a part of the Union, but waited until Oregon was safely in before willingly succumbing to the

---


clamor for the island. The President initiated action in June, 1848, by authorizing Secretary of State James Buchanan to negotiate with Spain. Buchanan empowered Romulus Sanders, United States Minister at Madrid, to offer a maximum of $100,000,000 for Cuba. Following O'Sullivan's analysis, Buchanan explained that the government wanted to acquire the island for economic and strategic reasons. He warned that "if this island were under the dominion of Great Britain, she could command both inlets to the Gulf of Mexico." 

Spain refused to sell. So deeply was her pride hurt by the offer, she stated categorically Cuba would never pass from her hands. The refusal did not deter Polk. But the election of a Whig President, Zachary Taylor, in 1848, definitely quashed all official efforts at acquisition.

The particular interests of the southern states in annexing Cuba took on several aspects. Perhaps the primary

---

11Buchanan to Sanders, June 12, 1848, Caldwell, The Lopez Expeditions to Cuba, 1848-1851, p. 33.

12Ibid.


14Caldwell, The Lopez Expeditions to Cuba, 1848-1851.
motivation was political—a desire to obtain more Congressional representation through the addition of slave territory. The slavery issue formed an important part of this political motivation, for a hostile Congress, the South feared might endanger its social and economic system. It felt a special kinship to slave holding Cuba, which James D.B. DeBow, editor of the respected DeBow's Review, declared as "a part of our South, unnaturally and arbitrarily separated."  

That slavery might be abolished in Cuba presented an ominous picture to the loyal Southerner. After the system was ended in the British and French West Indies and in the Latin American Republics, Southerners feared Spain might do likewise in Cuba. Such a move could have dangerous effects on the slave system of the South. It would provide propaganda to northern abolitionists, and might even encourage their own Negroes to revolt. The only course to avoid eventual abolition or a successful slave revolt, they believed, was to bring the island into the Union as a slave state.

15James B.D. DeBow, "Editorial", DeBow's Review, X (May and June, 1848), 470.

16Sanders to Buchanan, July 29, 1848, D.C., XI, 445-446. This fear was due in part to tales of brutalities inflicted on French planters by their slaves during an earlier uprising on the island of Haiti.

17Caldwell, The Lopez Expeditions to Cuba, 1848-1851, p. 32.
In an effort to prepare the nation for the acquisition of Cuba, southern apologists worked fervently to proclaim the assets of slavery on the island. Cuban slavery, they stated, was far superior to the free labor system where the worker had an uncertain fate when he became too old to work. The Cuban Negro was basically a barbarian, unfit for freedom, "the same in all ages and under all circumstances, in the cane fields of Cuba as four thousand years ago in the streets of Thebes."18 Slavery, they maintained, was an absolute necessity for the Cuban economy which was almost totally dependent on sugar production. The slaves received good treatment from their Creole masters—as did their counterparts in the South. Southerners asserted that all propaganda of the widely read English abolitionists about Cuban slave atrocities was merely "malicious fabrication."19

Economic interests formed another rationale for the South's interest in Cuba. Territorial expansion would allow commercial expansion as well. Hopefully, benefits would accrue to the South, since Cuba was a geographic neighbor enjoying a similar socio-economic system. Southerners could

18DeBow, "Editorial", p. 487.

19Ibid., p. 471.
purchase sugar plantations in Cuba to augment their cotton land holdings on the mainland. Tariff discrimination in favor of Spanish shipping would end when the "Pearl of the Antilles" came under the American flag. The result would be favorable to the United States as a whole, but especially to southern ports because of the extensive trade carried on with the island.20 A potential market for American goods existed in Cuba. Situated between southern ports and the isthmian route to the West Coast, the island could form an important link in American shipping.21 Cuba's million-plus population had exported $6,500,00 in goods to the United States in 1844, while imports from the United States to Cuba had amounted to $7,500,000. The market appeared to be growing.22

A further stimulation to southern expansionist desires was the Cuban aristocracy's dissatisfaction with Spanish rule. The Creole planters and merchants who comprised this aristocracy chaffed under the Spanish policy on imports. The high duty on American grain was a particular nuisance. Islanders sent a delegation to Spain in 1848 in an effort to

20Ibid., pp. 461-464.
21Rauch, American Interest in Cuba, 1848-1855, p. 11.
22DeBow, "Editorial", p. 460.
have it reduced, but failed when Spanish grain growers in-
fluenced the Cortes.  

Like their southern counterparts, Cuban landowners also feared the possibility of abolition by the Crown. As an independent nation or as a part of the southern bloc in the United States, the Creoles believed their means of livelihood would be secure.  

Robert B. Campbell, United States Consul at Havana, had kept the Polk Administration informed about the revolutionary attitudes of the Cuban upper class. In 1848 he wrote that they desired freedom from Spain at all costs, and would apply for annexation to the United States if given the opportunity.  

So strong was the revolutionary sentiment that a group of wealthy Cubans financed an English-Spanish newspaper, La Verdad, to propagandize for annexation. The paper began publication in New York on January 1, 1848, with the aid of prominent Polk Democrats and the expansionist New York Sun. La Verdad advocated annexation for a number of reasons and was well received in the South where it greatly influenced public opinion.  

---

23 Sanders to Buchanan, December 14, 1848, D.C., XI, 457-458.  
24 Rauch, American Interest in Cuba, 1848-1855, pp. 52-54.  
25 Campbell to Buchanan, May 18, 1848, D.C., XI, 440.  
26 Rauch, American Interest in Cuba, 1848-1855, Pp. 55-64.
into power the following year, the Spanish Minister in Washington protested to the new President that the sole purpose of the paper was to incite political unrest in Spanish possessions. He complained "that there were in Havana some bad Spaniards—though their numbers were small—engaged in collecting funds for the support of that subversive newspaper..." It was even reported that these islanders had raised $200,000 to help finance a full-scale revolution against Spain.

Spanish authorities uncovered a real plot to overthrow the colonial government in 1848. A number of wealthy Cubans were arrested although one ring leader, General Narcio Lopez, managed to escape to the United States. In the United States Lopez became a primary force in the southern drive for Cuba. Born the son of a wealthy Creole rancher in Venezuela, Lopez, as a youth, enlisted in the Spanish army to fight rebels then leading South America to independence.

27 Calderón to Clayton, March 9, 1848, _D.C._, XI, 462.

28 Green to Clayton, July 21, 1849, _ibid._, p. 469.

29 Campbell to Buchanan, July 17, 1848, _ibid._, pp. 441-443. The father of one of the plotters revealed their plans to the Spanish authorities, only to see his son later jailed for his part in the affair.
When Spanish troops finally withdrew to Cuba in 1823, the then Colonel López followed. A few years later he transferred to Spain, and became associated with the royal court. With the help of an influential courtier, the young officer obtained another assignment in Cuba, this time rising to the rank of general. In 1843, due to a purge at the court, his influential patron fell from grace, leaving López without friends in power. Embittered, he began to intrigue against the Crown. His goal became that of freeing Cuba from Spanish domination.  

Upon arrival in the United States late in 1848, López made his residence in New York City, where he joined forces with the Americans and exile Cubans publishing La Verdad. There he learned of the strong American sentiment for annexation, and realized for the first time that he might capitalize on this sentiment.  

After an abortive attempt to sail with a small band of filibusters from New York for Cuba in 1848, and after the election of a Whig President, López decided to move his base

---

31 Campbell to Buchanan, July 17, 1848, D.C., XI, 442; Rauch, p. 91.
of intrigue to the South, where his schemes would be better received. The tremendous public reception accorded the General south of the Mason-Dixon line reflected the growing spirit of sectionalism and the increasing desperation of the South. Because the new Administration showed no readiness to further their interests, Southerners turned to a foreign adventurer who promised them Cuba if they would support or join his private army of liberation.

32Caldwell, The Lopez Expeditions to Cuba, 1848-1851, p. 28. The Round Island expedition, as the first attempt came to be called, failed as a result of poor planning and the vigilance of the United States government. The force numbered about 400 men, chiefly European radicals who had fled to the United States and who harbored an intense dislike for monarchical government—Spanish or otherwise. Many of the would-be liberators were also ardent, pro-expansionist Southerners.
CHAPTER II

THE CARDENAS EXPEDITION

Before traveling to the South, Lopez sought aid from southern Congressmen at the nation's capital. In Washington he met John C. Calhoun several times late in 1849. The General begged Calhoun to support his plan to free Cuba and annex it to the United States. He spoke movingly of the plight of the Creoles under Spanish rule, the desires of the people for freedom, and the benefits annexation would bring to the slave states. Calhoun expressed support for annexation, but offered no public backing for Lopez. Later, the old South Carolinian lost interest in the entire matter because of his increasing concern over the Compromise of 1850.

Discouraged at his lack of success in Washington, Lopez, in the Spring of 1850, journeyed south to seek support. He knew that domestic political forces, the doctrine of Manifest Destiny, and economic motives would make the South more

---

1 Claiborne, editor, Life and Correspondence of John A. Quitman, II, 54-55.
2 Ibid., p. 57.
3 Caldwell, The Lopez Expeditions to Cuba, 1848-1851, p. 58.
receptive to his schemes. He must have realized that Southerners were essentially a military-minded people. No doubt he believed as DeBow, that the Mississippi Valley alone could produce half a million armed men "for any field where liberty and glory shall call." \(^4\)

Lopez traveled down the Mississippi via the Ohio, and met influential persons along the route in an effort to obtain backing for a second Cuban expedition.\(^5\) In Jackson, Mississippi, he met Governor John A. Quitman. Lopez cajoled and flattered the fire-eating Governor with the argument that Cuba "needed an infusion of American blood to vitalize its energies..."\(^6\) This reasoning appealed to Quitman, who ardently wanted to introduce southern institutions to the island. Lopez requested the Governor, a retired Major General in the United States Army, to lead the proposed expedition. Quitman declined, however, saying he would accept command only when a full scale revolt had begun within

\(^4\)James B.D. DeBow, "The Late Cuba Expedition", DeBow's Review, III (August, 1850), 168.
\(^5\)Caldwell, The Lopez Expeditions to Cuba, 1848-1851, p. 58.
\(^6\)Claiborne, editor. Life and Correspondence of John A. Quitman, II, 56.
Cuba. Until such time he would offer only moral and financial support.\(^7\)

With this promise, Lopez and his small group of followers left Jackson and continued on their way. Early in March they arrived in New Orleans, where the people warmly received them. Immediately the group began organizing the expedition, recruiting, publicizing, and financing with little secrecy. Many volunteers, often vagabonds and destitute adventurers, enlisted in the filibuster army.\(^8\) A prominent local citizen, Lawrence J. Sigur, obtained a large quantity of arms for the force from the Louisiana State Arsenal and from the local militia. He posted a bond on the weapons, promising that they would be returned in good condition.\(^9\)

Recruiting men and borrowing arms, however, was not the main concern of Lopez. Probably he could have enlisted many thousands of filibusters. His primary need was money. To meet this need he printed and sold Cuban bonds secured by public lands of the island once it came under revolutionary

\(^7\)Ibid., pp. 55-57.

\(^8\)New Orleans Daily Delta, January 14, 1851.

\(^9\)New Orleans True Delta, June 18, 1850.
control. The bonds sold at large discounts to Lopez devotees and speculators alike. Some $40,000 was raised in this manner.10

Equally encouraging to the volunteers and their backers were rumors published in the local press. Reportedly, Spanish troops garrisoned in Cuba were scattered in small and ineffective outposts. Success would thus be certain for the Lopez army.11

These events taking place in the South, particularly in New Orleans, greatly disturbed Spanish diplomats in the United States. As early as January, 1850, the Spanish Minister in Washington, Angel Calderón, had complained of rising sentiment in southern states for revolutionizing of Cuba. He wrote Secretary of State, John M. Clayton, that "the evils which these intrigues may occasion are evident. The incautious and ignorant are led astray—and plundered under false pretenses."12 Clayton, in turn, had informed the federal district attorney in New Orleans of Calderón's concern, and had ordered the official to be vigilant for any violations

10New Orleans Daily Delta, January 14, 1851.
11New Orleans Daily Picayune, April 11, 1850.
12Calderón to Clayton, January 19, 1850, D.C., XI, 474.
of the Neutrality Act of 1818. Clearly, the Taylor Administration was in no mood to stand by while an armed expedition left American soil to invade friendly territory.

After Lopez arrived in New Orleans, Calderón again complained to the government that men were being publicly recruited in the New Orleans area, and requested Clayton do something to stop these activities. He referred to the volunteers as "persons of the worst character." Likewise, in Havana colonial authorities showed great concern over the possibility of an invasion. Rumors swept the island. The Spanish controlled press attempted to quell these rumors by proclaiming readiness of the population to resist any encroachment on Cuban soil. The police kept American citizens on the island under close surveillance. Spanish soldiers took part in daily military displays to calm the people, who had been told that the filibusters were merely pirates bent upon plundering their properties.

It was widely believed that the expedition forming in the United States would invade the island via Panama in order

---

13Clayton to Hunton, January 22, 1850, ibid., p. 74.
14Calderón to Clayton, May 8, 1850, ibid., p. 477
15New Orleans Daily Picayune, April 24, 1850.
16Ibid., March 13, 1850.
to avoid violating the Neutrality Act. Clayton had long thought the filibusters would try to avoid a technical violation of the law in this manner. He felt that they would probably take passage to Chagres under subterfuge of going to California; once in Chagres they would re-group for a planned assault against Cuba. 17 A constant flow of information from the Spanish Minister supported Clayton's beliefs. Almost every day after March 1, the Minister voiced his government's concern over the hostile force forming in the South.

As the time drew near for the filibusters to leave New Orleans, rumors about their plans circulated across the nation. Federal authorities kept a close watch on the movement of men and ships. Groups of men reportedly were mysteriously leaving Kentucky and Mississippi for a rendezvous in New Orleans. 18 The pro-Lopez press argued that the proposed expedition was not illegal, that federal authorities should do nothing to hinder its departure. If the government tried to stop the filibusters, the press declared, it

17 Clayton to Hunton, January 22, 1850, D.C., XI, 74.

18 New Orleans Daily Picayune, April 14, 1850. Most of the reports came from river towns along the Mississippi, the major travel route to New Orleans in ante-bellum days.
would be a "spectacle to make every republican heart re-
volt."\textsuperscript{19}

The public and press opinion about the planned expedi-
tion and its goals caused much debate and excitement in the
South. Although most of the people and press supported
Lopez's schemes, a vocal minority at first opposed his
methods. This opposition was most evident among staunch
pro-Taylor Whigs in the South. They supported the President's
determination to stop an invasion attempt. An influential
Whig organ, the New Orleans \textit{Bee}, decried the plan to take
Cuba by force, declaring that it was a "desperate and law-
less scheme..."\textsuperscript{20} The paper argued that there was no
real proof the Creoles of the island would rise up in arms
to assist their liberators. It held forth the specter of a
possible arming of the slave population by the Spanish to
help prevent a Creole uprising.\textsuperscript{21} The \textit{Bee} later urged the
filibusters to discard their plans to avoid international
embarrassment for President Taylor. When Lopez reportedly
had 2,000 armed men ready to leave for Cuba, the same journal

\textsuperscript{19}\textit{Ibid.}.  
\textsuperscript{20}\textit{New Orleans Bee}, May 4, 1850.  
\textsuperscript{21}\textit{Ibid.}.  
suggested that even such a sizeable force would have no chance against 25,000 Spanish soldiers on the island and the Spanish fleet.\textsuperscript{22} The \textit{Bee}, however, supported Manifest Destiny, believing that Cuba would eventually become a part of the United States because of its economic and geographic importance.\textsuperscript{23}

But most southern journals did not show the same devotion to orthodox Whigism. The pro-Lopez majority reflected not only the traditional views supporting the acquisition of the island by force if necessary, but also urged its readers to contribute to the filibuster cause.\textsuperscript{24}

A sympathetic public and press in the South had much to do with Lopez's successful recruiting. As soon as he arrived in New Orleans, there were rumors of invasions believed to be already underway. The \textit{Daily Picayune} gave the impression that more than one expedition was being directed against the island when it reported rumors of a mythical force leaving Chagres for Cuba.\textsuperscript{25} After the filibusters organized by Lopez

\textsuperscript{22}Ibid., May 24, 1850.

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., May 28, 1850.

\textsuperscript{24}Rauch, \textit{American Interest in Cuba, 1848-1855}, pp. 122-123.

\textsuperscript{25}New Orleans \textit{Daily Picayune}, March 13, 1850; April 24, 1850.
left New Orleans in early May, the paper complained that American naval ships had been sent to stop the expedition. It was charged that "there were no treaty obligations which stipulate for [sic] the protection of Spanish interests in Cuba by the United States. . . ."26

The southern press further condemned Spanish authorities for refusing to curtail the Cuban slave trade, indicating that the practice could only be stopped if the island came under strict American control.27 This would enable Cuba to "enter on as rapid and stable a career of prosperity as that of Louisiana and Mississippi. . . ."28 Most Southerners held the view that Spain would never sell the island because of its importance to the mother country.29 They were convinced the military spirit of the South would provide the only means of acquisition, for their beloved section had entered a new era "which was predicted of her, and to which her institutions and position peculiarly inclined--one of

26Ibid., April 14, 1850.

27Ibid., May 4, 1850.


29New Orleans Daily Picayune, May 10, 1850.
war and conquest." After all, they reasoned, was it not man's destiny and nature to take advantage of his weaker neighbors as he moved forward in progress? 

The expansionist press also encouraged rumors from Havana which indicated the Creole population believed that Spain would not give full protection to the island. They thought they were being abandoned by the mother country when no additional troops arrived to bolster the garrisons. The royal government at Madrid even sent the Count de Mirasol on a special mission to Cuba in an effort to discover the feelings of the inhabitants toward the Crown. Thus, many Southerners believed that Spain would reluctantly accept the results of a successful Lopez-led revolution. All believed the island would some day certainly become a part of the United States, as would Canada.

Using the argument of acquisition, Lopez continued to enlist men and raise money during the month of April. On

---

30 DeBow, "The Late Cuba Expedition," p. 166.
31 Ibid., pp. 164-165.
33 Barringer to Clayton, March 14, 1850, D.C., XI, 475.
34 DeBow, "The Late Cuba Expedition," p. 176.
35 New Orleans Bee, May 28, 1850.
April 11 a force of some 250 Kentuckians arrived at Freeport, Louisiana. These adventurers had enlisted at the request of a Lopez supported from Kentucky, Colonel Theodore O'Hara. The contingent marched from Freeport to Lafayette, where they remained in garrison for several weeks, spending time practicing military skills. A few days later a group of about 130 men arrived from Mississippi and were shortly joined by 160 recruits from Louisiana.36

To circumvent the Neutrality Act, Lopez decided the three bodies of men would leave American territorial waters unarmed. Once outside United States jurisdiction they would rendezvous at some point to distribute weapons. As the meeting place, Lopez chose the tiny Mexican island of Mujeres, ideally situated off the main shipping route, yet near Cuba. On April 25 the steamer Georgiana set out from New Orleans with the Kentucky contingent; a week later the Susan Loud sailed with Colonel James Wheat's Louisiana regiment; and on May 6 the steamer Creole reached the three mile limit and took on the arms for the expedition from a barge which had sailed from Louisiana the night before.37

At sea, strong headwinds had prevented the *Georgiana* from maintaining a proper course. She finally anchored about twenty-five miles from Mujeres at the tiny desert island of Contoy, near the Yucatan coast. As the *Creole* and the *Susan Loud* waited in vain for the *Georgiana* at Mujeres, some of the men aboard the two ships became restless. They feared the Kentucky regiment had been captured or had turned back and began to have doubts as to the wisdom of the expedition.

Finally, Lopez decided to search for the missing ship. After several days of wandering off the Yucatan coast, he spotted the *Georgiana*. The filibusters then anchored their three vessels at Contoy and made final plans for invasion.38

As a landing site Lopez chose the Cuban coastal town of Cardenas, where he believed the inhabitants were violently anti-Spanish and would freely join their liberators. He also realized the importance of its location—near a main railroad to Havana. Equally important was the very small garrison of Spanish soldiers at Cardenas.39

Before the filibusters set sail again, about 100 of the men expressed wishes to quit the expedition and return to

38 Cawdwell, *The Lopez Expeditions to Cuba, 1848-1851*, pp. 59-63
the United States. Lopez left them on the island with the Susan Loud and the Georgiana, while the rest of his force set out for Cardenas in the larger and swifter Creole.  

As these events transpired, the Spanish government had not remained idle. Rumors in the United States and Cuba told of thousands of filibusters leaving New Orleans and other Gulf Coast ports in a well coordinated invasion effort. The American press was alive with exaggerated reports of battles and contemplated battles.  

The Spanish Minister sent frantic dispatches to Secretary Clayton urging immediate American military action against the adventurers. Referring to the Lopez mission, he declared that the filibusters had violated the neutrality law by receiving arms at the Mississippi River plantation of Treme. Furthermore, an additional 1,500 men reportedly were ready to depart New Orleans to join Lopez. In righteous anger, the Minister claimed the expedition's departure had been so publicized that all of the

---

40Caldwell, The Lopez Expeditions to Cuba, 1848-1851, p. 63. Lopez left the men without arms or a command structure, but did leave them sufficient food and water for several weeks.

41New Orleans Bee, May 14, 1850.
American port authorities were aware of it.\textsuperscript{42} When additional rumors of expeditions converging on Cuba reached Calderón, his attitude toward the Administration became increasingly demanding. He denounced the filibusters as a "band of robbers, [who] have provided themselves with certificates of American citizenship as a safeguard . . . to save themselves from prosecution. . . ."\textsuperscript{43} He warned Clayton that any captured invaders would be punished regardless of the flag they flew.\textsuperscript{44}

Washington responded again that officials in all coastal districts were exercising vigilance to prevent any violation of the Neutrality Act. Admittedly, the government knew of the departure of the Lopez force, but confessed ignorance as to the number of persons involved. In anticipation of such a filibuster move, President Taylor had ordered three ships of the West India Station to prevent the invasion force from landing on Cuban soil.\textsuperscript{45} The three vessels patrolling Cuban waters were the frigates Saranac and Albany,

\begin{itemize}
\item Calderón to Clayton, May 16, 1850, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 478-479.
\item Ibid., p. 479.
\item Clayton to Calderón, May 18, 1850, \textit{D.C.}, XI, 75-76.
\end{itemize}
and the brigantine Germantown. Taylor ordered Commander Louis Tatnall, in charge of the naval force, to place himself at the disposal of the Cuban Captain General, Conde Alcocer. Spain too, saw fit to increase its protection of the island, for while the royal government refused to increase the number of troops stationed there, it had granted a supplemental $1,500,000 appropriation for more naval protection of Cuba. Neither government wanted the filibusters to succeed.

Southern reaction to Taylor's move was predictable. Senator Yulee of Florida characterized the general attitude of the South. On the Senate floor he strongly criticized Taylor for trying to destroy a "movement conceived in freedom." Yulee contended that the President's orders to the naval forces violated the right of the filibusters to emigrate to a foreign land, that the order to prevent the landing of additional supplies to any rebel force already in Cuba was a violation of freedom of commerce. Once the revolutionary flag was raised, he declared, any United States

---

46 Charleston Courier, June 6, 1850.
citizen could go to the island or supply the invaders. Such was the American tradition.\textsuperscript{49}

In the House of Representatives, southern Congressmen with the exception of a few Whigs, united in calling for the President to explain his action. The Representatives voted for a resolution demanding Taylor give all information about and reasons for ordering the naval ships to patrol Cuban waters. They expressed indignation over his desire to prevent the "revolutionizing of the government."\textsuperscript{50} Anti-slavery northern Democrats joined with Whigs to defeat the resolution by a vote of 100 to 72.\textsuperscript{51}

Even after the vote debate continued. Southerners denounced the President with vigor. Zachary Taylor, a slave holder himself, they declared, had turned against the South by ordering military curtailment of southern expansion. For those who, like Senator Yulee, hoped to "God that their Lopez's movement might be a successful one," the President's position made expectations indeed faint.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., pp. 1032-1033.


\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{52} Congressional Globe, 31st Congress, 1st Session, (Washington, 1850), II, 1033.
of ulterior motives, claiming he did not want Cuban expansion because he owned a large Louisiana sugar plantation. It was said that his sugar profits might decline if Cuban sugar were admitted duty free.53

Southerners expecting "to hear of a successful landing of the auxiliaries, and a hearty welcome by the Creole inhabitants" were disheartened at news of the American navy's opposition.54 The Daily Picayune reported caustically that Spanish authorities were giving polite attentions to the commander of the naval force near Havana.55

Some southern Whigs, however, continued to support the President's policy. They described Taylor as sympathetic with goals of the Lopez expedition—the acquisition of Cuba. But, they argued, he had ordered naval forces to Cuban waters only with great reluctance and under strong international pressure. Taylor was trying to enforce the Neutrality Act and to live up to obligations of one friendly power to another.56

53Marshall Texas Republican, August 24, 1850.
54New Orleans Daily Picayune, May 23, 1850.
55Ibid., April 11, 1850.
56New Orleans Bee, May 28, 1850.
They said he should be honored as "a man who never shirks from his duty. . . ." 57 Taylor later publicly defended himself on these same grounds. 58

Lopez and his men were aware of the possibility of American naval interference. For this reason the Creole steered clear of any smoke or sail sighted on the voyage to Cardenas. 59 On May 19, under a bright moon, the adventurers reached the coastal city. The Spanish garrison of some 100 soldiers was alerted shortly thereafter. Two detachments of filibusters captured the town's two railroad stations, while a larger force attacked the small garrison. After a short confrontation, some Spaniards surrendered to the superior force. However, most of their comrades escaped and barricaded themselves in the governor's mansion. Lopez proceeded to surround the house, set it afire, and demand an unconditional surrender. Soon, the trapped Spaniards gave up. 60

57 Ibid.


59 Caldwell, The Lopez Expeditions to Cuba, 1848-1851, p. 66.

60 Savannah Republican, May 25, 1850.
Of the original garrison, most had been captured, about twenty killed and several had escaped to warn the regional commander. Flushed with victory, enlisted ranks of the filibusters began a day-long celebration. Many became intoxicated and impossible to command. Their officers, however, had more important concerns. Rumors reported a contingent of several thousand royal troops on the road to Cardenasa from Matanzas. Lopez realized his dilemma. If the filibusters tried to reach Matanzas to cut the vital rail link to Havana as planned, the result might be a direct confrontation with a superior force. If they remained in Cardenas to do battle within the protecting walls of the city, the Spanish navy might blockade the escape route by sea. Furthermore, the local population had refused to rise in support of the invaders.

Thus, Lopez and his officers resolved to reboard the Creole and land at some other point on the island. Under cover of darkness the entire force silently retreated, but the vessel ran aground while slipping out of the harbor. Frantically, the men raced against the approaching dawn and

61Ibid.
certain discovery by throwing overboard many supplies and weapons to lighten the ship. Only in this way were they able to clear the harbor without detection.63 Once at sea, Lopez presented his plan to invade the nearby coastal town of Mantua. However, most of the men and officers opposed such a course, citing loss of supplies and failure of the natives to rise in support of their liberators. Further efforts, they declared, were surely doomed to failure. They voted to make a speedy retreat to Key West, the nearest friendly port.64

Meanwhile, the government at Havana had dispatched the Spanish warship, Pizarro to capture the filibusters. The Pizarro's commander also thought Key West was a logical destination for the Lopez force. Fortunately for the Creole, however, she took a course which avoided the swifter Spanish vessel. By the morning of May 21, the Creole had reached the shallow reefs off the coast of Florida, but was still several miles from Key West. At this point the Pizarro, in hot pursuit, came into view, but its deeper draught forced it to remain out of cannon range as it shadowed the filibusters who remained close to the treacherous reef. This allowed the

63Ibid.
64Savannah Republican, May 25, 1850.
Creole to take a more direct route to Key West. But speed was still important. If the Spanish could stay close to their quarry, they might catch the Creole immediately before it steamed into port. In desperation the filibusters began throwing anything into the ship's boiler that would burn. They stripped the vessel of its woodwork and threw several barrels of resin in the fire. This enabled the ship to gain a full head of steam and her engines ran as they had never run before. With only minutes and yards to spare, the filibusters steamed into port under the protecting guns of an American warship tied at dock. The men quickly abandoned ship, while the Pizarro could only lie off the harbor and watch.65

The citizens of Key West greeted Lopez and his men as heroes. Although they returned in defeat, their efforts in Cuba were considered the first which would eventually wrest the island from Spain. The jubilant population gave the men food and lodging as well as donations to buy their passage home.66 Within a few days the men had scattered, taking accounts of their adventures to homes and families throughout

66 Charleston Courier, May 27, 1850.
the South. The people of the South acclaimed them as they readied for further attempts to free Cuba. 67

67 Rauch, American Interest in Cuba, 1848-1855, p. 129.
CHAPTER III

DIPLOMATIC CONFRONTATION:

THE CONTOY PRISONERS

Learning of the filibusters' successful landing at Cardenas, the Cuban Captain General, Alcoy issued a statement attacking their intentions.\(^1\) Despite charges of the Captain General and the soldiers which he sent, the invaders had been able to escape. Only a few of the adventurers had been killed, and a mere five taken prisoner. After the futile attempt of the Pizarro to capture Lopez and his party near Key West, the thwarted Spaniards were determined to save face.

Desiring revenge, they moved to capture the expedition's deserters on the island of Contoy. After remaining only a short while off Key West, the Pizarro steamed to Contoy, known from previous intelligence to harbor the disenchanted men. Joined by the warship Habanero, the men of the Pizarro captured the deserters without a fight. Spanish sailors

\(^1\)Proclamation of the Captain General of Cuba, May 19, 1850, D.C., XI, 482-483.
herded the captives aboard the vessels and took the Georgianna and the Susan Loud in tow as prizes. The diplomatic confrontation which resulted between the United States and Spain over the capture of the Contoy deserters caused one of the most controversial issues of the day.

As soon as he learned of the incident at Contoy, the American Consul at Havana, Robert B. Campbell, wrote the Captain General asking for details. He wanted to know if the vessels had been flying the American flag and how many of the men were United States citizens. He also requested information about charges against the deserters. Alcoy replied that since the captives had not yet arrived in Havana he could give no information. That information was not yet available did not deter Campbell from reminding Secretary of State Clayton "that every person without regard to nationality in a regularly documented American merchant vessel is entitled to the protection of the American government."5

When the Pizarro and the Habanero arrived in Havana with their captives and prizes, Campbell had no instructions

2Campbell to Clayton, May 22, 1850, ibid., p. 481.
3Campbell to Alcoy, May 20, 1850, ibid., p. 481.
4Alcoy to Campbell, May 20, 1850, ibid.
5Campbell to Clayton, May 22, 1850, ibid.
from Washington and had to act as he saw fit. In so doing he reiterated the contention that the Georgiana and the Susan Loud were American ships and could not be legally captured on the high seas. He admitted Spain might have justification for temporary detention of the men, but warned against bringing them to trial as was publicly rumored. Campbell also requested Captain Tatnall of the United States naval vessel Saranac, then in Havana, to demand release of the men. The Spanish authorities rebuffed the Consul and the Captain, however, even when they requested only to see the captives.

Campbell then drew up a statement outlining his position which called for the Captain General to free the deserters and their ships on grounds that they were captured illegally. Alcoy refused to accept the declaration, declaring the Consul had no diplomatic powers. He advised that the matter had to be arranged between Clayton and the Spanish Minister.

Still lacking instructions from Washington, Campbell again communicated with Alcoy on May 29. He tried a different approach at this point. The new strategy came as result of

---

6 Campbell to Alcoy, May 24, 1850, ibid., p. 488.
7 Charleston Courier, June 10, 1850.
8 Campbell to Alcoy, May 29, 1850. D.C., XI, 489.
a letter from William Marvin, Federal District Judge at Key West. Judge Marvin had investigated the Cardenas affair when the Creole had landed at Key West and was convinced the men left at Contoy had not intended to go with Lopez to Cuba. He believed they had been deceived into thinking they were being taken to Chagres and then to California. From such reasoning Campbell thought Spain had no cause for action against the captives and he included Judge Marvin's analysis in his letter to the Captain General. The Consul cautioned, however, that this new approach should not "be construed into an admission of the legal right... to capture American vessels with persons on board on the high seas or beyond Spanish territory."9

The Captain General was unimpressed. He curtly reminded Campbell of his status as a commercial, not a diplomatic agent of the American government. Alcoy charged that the Contoy prisoners had been fully aware of Lopez's intentions against Cuba. He further observed that contrary to Campbell's beliefs neither the Georgiana nor the Susan Loud were flying the American flag when apprehended.10

9Ibid.
10Alcoy to Campbell, May 29, 1850, ibid., pp. 489-490.
A few days later Judge Marvin and the American Customs Collector from Mobile arrived in Havana under presidential orders to seek release of the men. Together with Campbell they attempted to see the unfortunates, who were confined aboard a Spanish warship at Havana. Alcoy, refusing permission, said he did not personally object to such a visit but he did not have authority to allow them to do so. Thus the situation remained until the Consul received instructions from Washington on June 19. Meanwhile the Havana authorities prepared the captives for trial, denying them counsel or any communication with fellow countrymen.

Campbell was not entirely pleased with instructions from the State Department. Secretary Clayton gave his support to some of the Consul's actions, but refused to give him full backing. He assured Campbell that the President had made clear that the nation would deal with all those who had violated treaties with Spain or the Neutrality Act. He warned the Spanish authorities not to be overzealous in prosecuting the men. To do so might very well arouse public feeling.

---

11 Campbell to Clayton, May 31, 1850, ibid., pp. 491-492; Houston Democratic Telegram and Texas Register, July 18, 1850.

12 Campbell to Clayton, May 31, 1850, D.C., XI, 491-492.

13 Campbell to Clayton, June 19, 1850, ibid., p. 499.
in the United States which would "result in peril to Spanish
dominion in that island." Clayton also reminded the Consul of his status as a commercial representative—not a diplomat. He asked, however, that Campbell remain vigilant that the prisoners receive a fair trial and, if they did not, he should so inform Washington in order that the proper steps might be taken. Clayton refused to uphold the Consul's expressed belief that Spain had no right to take armed enemies from American registered ships in peacetime on the high seas. The Secretary felt the deserters may well have abused their privileges as United States citizens and thus were not entitled to full protection under the American flag. He also flatly rejected the contention that any foreign nationals who might have been aboard the Georgiana or the Susan were entitled to any sort of American protection. With evident disappointment the Consul replied that all instructions would be obeyed.

Meanwhile, lively conversations were going on in Washington and Madrid about the fate of the prisoners. On June 3

---

14 Clayton to Campbell, May 31, 1850, ibid., p. 77.
15 Ibid., pp. 77-78.
16 Campbell to Clayton, June 19, 1850, ibid., p. 499.
Clayton expressed concern for the men to the Spanish Minister. He urged Calderón to recognize the sole right of the United States government to punish the men, thus taking a more determined stand than when corresponding with Campbell a few days earlier. The capture of men and ships outside Spanish jurisdiction, he warned, was far beyond the reasonable rights of Spain. Calderón assumed an intransigent position. He replied that the Contoy prisoners were no better than pirates "and as such entitled to the protection of no government, but worthy only of the execration of mankind." Public feeling in Madrid ran in the same vein.

Believing that public excitement in Spain might induce the Madrid government to take drastic action against the prisoners, Clayton informed David Barringer, the American Minister, to remind the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pidal, that the United States wished to deal with the filibusters and bring them to justice in American courts. The Secretary expressed deep concern over the captives and ordered

17 Clayton to Calderón, June 3, 1850, ibid., p. 81.
18 Calderon to Clayton, June 7, 1850, ibid., p. 495.
19 Barringer to Clayton, June 19, 1850, ibid., p. 507.
Barringer to demand their release. War might result, he warned, should Madrid fail to heed Barringer's request.20

Thus, by the end of June the Taylor Administration was taking a stronger stand over the Contoy question. The official American position had evolved from one of relative moderation to one virtually identical with that earlier espoused by the Consul at Havana. On June 29, Taylor ordered the war-steamer Vixen to Havana to order release of the men. He cautioned Spain not to punish any of the filibusters, for he would view such "punishment by the authorities of Cuba as an outrage upon the rights of the country."21 The Administration refuted Spanish charges that the prisoners were merely pirates. They had not committed any crime on the high seas to place them in the category of pirates.22 The American attitude was clear. Taylor and his cabinet refused to recognize Spain's right to detain or try the captives.23 Meanwhile, the American Consul in Havana, gratified over vindication


21Clayton to Morris, June 29, 1850, ibid., p. 4.

22Clayton to Calderón, June 25, 1850, D.C., XI, 84-85.

23Clayton to Calderón, July 9, 1850, ibid., p. 88.
of his earlier position, again labored diligently for their freedom.  

The reversal of the Administration's earlier policy over the Contoy question was due in large part to an increasing domestic belligerence toward Spain. Not only the press, but the public at large revealed a dangerous anti-Spanish sentiment. Both Democrats and Whigs, calling for release of the captives, declared that Spain had acted beyond her authority. Especially in the South, where feeling ran highest, there were cries of war unless Madrid changed its course in desiring to prosecute the men.  

No doubt too, Washington's refusal reflected the politics of approaching Congressional elections and fear of Taylor Whigs that Democrats would capitalize on the Contoy issue by advocating a harder line against Spain.

In the South verbal assaults against Spain by the Democratic majority began immediately after receiving news of the Contoy event. The *Daily Picayune* warned that Spain should release the men and ships and "show a more scrupulous respect for the rights of American citizens. . . ."  

---

25 New Orleans *Daily Picayune*, June 18, 1850.
26 *Ibid.*, June 1, 1850.
argued that since the men had been captured while aboard ships flying the American flag, they had been taken illegally—a matter of national honor was at stake. Moreover, since the men had decided not to invade Cuba with Lopez, they should not be disciplined. In face, the journal sponsored a petition, signed by many local residents of Spanish birth, calling for release of the prisoners.27

The southern Whig press followed suit. Although a long-time critic of Lopez, the New Orleans Bee, expressing outrage over the Contoy incident, roundly criticized the legality of the entire affair; it called for immediate pardons for the men. The Bee also contended that intention to commit a crime did not constitute a crime. Thus, the Lopez deserters had shown their true intentions when they refused to follow the fiery Cuban in the Cardenas assault. President Taylor, the influential journal urged, must work unceasingly through diplomatic channels to obtain freedom for the unfortunate men. Failure might bring war between the two nations.28

Public sentiment in the South worsened when the five American prisoners captured at Cardenas were executed by a

27 Ibid.
28 New Orleans Bee, June 4, 1850.
firing squad in Havana. If more leniency were not shown to
the Contoy prisoners, southern newspapers predicted an over-
whelming cry for war against Spain.29

During the first three weeks in June, however, the
Administration had not presented a strong public posture over
the Contoy question. For this it was severely taken to task.
Southerners pointed to the example of the Caroline incident,
where the government had stoutly defended American rights
against Canada when Canadian loyalists destroyed the American
registered Caroline.30 Pressure for military action against
Spain reached its peak a few days prior to public announce-
ment of a policy reversal by the Administration. Political
prophets predicted the national popularity of a war in de-
fense of American rights on the seas.31 Although even the
ardent pro-Lopez press admitted that "nothing of good would
come out of such a conflict . . . the acquisition of renown
[Cuba] would be an unsubstantial return for the prodigious
cost of armaments. . . ."32

29 Washington National Intelligencer, June 8, 1850.
30 New Orleans Daily Picayune, June 12, 1850.
31 Ibid., June 18, 1850.
32 Ibid., June 26, 1850.
When the public learned that Taylor's policy had changed to the satisfaction of the South, he was acclaimed as a mighty defender of American rights. Thus, popular sentiment died down and people became more optimistic about the captives' release.33

The calming of public feeling did not halt continued Administration efforts to free the men. The unrelenting positions of the two countries continued into July. Neither side showed any indication of moderation or compromise. However, the death of President Taylor on July 9 helped break the diplomatic log-jam and opened the way for accommodation.34 Even before the President's death, rumors had swept the nation that government officials were privately hopeful of an early release. A yellow fever epidemic was currently raging in Havana and it was thought the Spanish might detain the men without trial as long as possible in the hope that they might contract the disease and die. 'Thus, their revengeful feelings would be gratified without the danger of a rupture with the United States by executing the prisoners.'35

33 Houston Democratic Telegram and Texas Register, July 4, 1850.

34 Rauch, American Interest in Cuba, 1848-1855, p. 137.

35 Houston Democratic Telegram and Texas Register, July 4, 1850.
people believed that if the men were not freed within the next few weeks the American naval squadron in the area would rescue them by force. Spain too expected war would ensue unless the men were soon released.

Madrid's desire for moderation became evident when the Spanish Minister requested Clayton to remove Campbell from his Havana post. The Consul, declared Calderón, was a hindrance to settlement of the prisoner problem. He described the American representative as rude and an "obstacle to the re-establishment of a good understanding." Apparently, Spain was searching for a peaceful solution which would allow placement of the blame on Campbell for unnecessarily prolonging the crisis.

The Secretary of State quickly took advantage of this opportunity to move toward a détente. He immediately granted Campbell leave of absence for an indefinite period. However, before the Consul received word of his leave he had

---

36 Ibid., July 18, 1850.
37 Barringer to Clayton, August 7, 1850, Senate Executive Document No. 41, p. 8.
38 Calderón to Clayton, July 8, 1850, D.C., XI, 519.
39 Clayton to Campbell, July 8, 1850, Senate Executive Document No. 41, p. 5
learned about the release of forty-two of the prisoners by the Marine Court of Havana. The men were freed with the warning that should they ever return to Cuba they would be jailed for two years. The remainder were retained for further investigation and trial.\textsuperscript{40} By that time their number had been greatly depleted by disease.\textsuperscript{41}

At the same proceeding which released the forty-two men, the court adjudged the Georgiana and the Susan Loud as prizes and delivered them to the Spanish government because "they conveyed arms, munitions, and provisions for the piratical expedition of Lopez. . . ."\textsuperscript{42}

After these important events, diplomatic activity on behalf of the remaining prisoners stopped in Washington. Since Millard Fillmore, the new President, desired Daniel Webster for his Secretary of State, Clayton thought it best to initiate no new actions which might be negated by his successor.\textsuperscript{43} Nevertheless, negotiations continued in Madrid. Barringer, unaware of Clayton's predicament, continued to

\textsuperscript{40}Campbell to Clayton, July 12, 1850, D.C., XI, 520.
\textsuperscript{41}Houston Democratic Telegram and Texas Register, July 25, 1850.
\textsuperscript{42}Campbell to Clayton, July 12, 1850, D.C., XI, 520.
\textsuperscript{43}Rauch, American Interest in Cuba, 1848-1855, p. 137.
press for freedom of the remaining prisoners. On August 7 he wrote Washington that Madrid's attitude was softening appreciably. After several conversations with Pidal, he believed the government would free the remaining men. Clearly, Spain took encouragement in the appointment of Webster late in July. Known to be intensely opposed to Cuban annexation, he had been the late President's strongest Senate supporter when the latter had sent American naval vessels to stop Lopez. Webster had recently spoken out on the Senate floor in favor of guaranteeing the island to Spain. Thus, Madrid believed the new Secretary would be easier to deal with.

Such was the case. Although Webster continued to demand freedom for the filibusters still in Spanish hands, he worked actively to prevent further incursions against the island. His major efforts were directed toward calming Spain's renewed anxiety resulting from rumors of another proposed expedition.

---

44 Barringer to Clayton, August 7, 1850, Senate Executive Document No. 41, pp. 6-7.


46 Webster to Calderón, September 3, 1850, D.C., XI, 91-92.
Meanwhile, negotiations which had apparently been progressing so well in Madrid between Pidal and Barringer broke down. Pidal curtly informed the American Minister that the entire matter of the Contoy prisoners had been debated sufficiently. The United States, he said, should await the outcome of the trials in Havana before taking any further action.\(^47\) At this point, however, both Pidal and Calderón were impressed by Webster's efforts to hinder further filibustering schemes. Appreciating these efforts, Pidal consulted with the Queen and sent orders to Havana "to suspend entirely the execution of any sentence which might be given to those still on trial..."\(^48\)

As it turned out, only three of the men remaining in captivity were sentenced by the Marine Court at Havana. These were the Captain of the Georgiana, given ten years; while his two mates received eight and four year sentences respectively.\(^49\) Because of a direct plea by Webster to the Spanish government, the Queen pardoned the three men in

\(^{47}\) Pidal to Barringer, September 25, 1850, \textit{ibid.}, p. 565.
\(^{48}\) Barringer to Webster, October 9, 1850, \textit{ibid.}, p. 571.
\(^{49}\) Barringer to Pidal, November 5, 1850, \textit{ibid.}, p. 576.
October, 1850. Thus, the diplomatic confrontation resulting from the capture of some 100 men and two ships at Contoy ended. Its favorable outcome, from the American viewpoint, probably reflected Spain’s fear of war, but primarily Madrid’s desire to remain on good terms with the new Administration in Washington. Madrid saw in Webster a powerful friend—an statesman who would oppose Cuban annexation. The successful resolution of the Contoy question had revealed the necessity of working together to maintain support of American opinion for Spanish sovereignty in Cuba. The South still remained a minority in its desire for the island. With release of the Contoy prisoners that section lost a valuable opportunity to capitalize on the issue. National support for pushing Spain out of Cuba over the professed issue of defending American maritime rights did not materialize.

50 Pidal to Barringer, November 6, 1850, ibid., p. 577. The three men were sentenced to hard labor in the Spanish salt mines at Cuenta, but had not been transported there when word came of their pardon. They left Havana for the United States aboard an American warship.
CHAPTER IV

THE NEUTRALITY TRIALS

Concomitant with southern excitement over the Contoy prisoner question was the furor engendered by the neutrality violation indictments of Lopez and his leading supporters. This excitement, oddly enough, was limited to the South, for Congress remained silent over attempts to bring the men to justice. The indictments by a New Orleans federal grand jury eventually led to the trial of a prominent filibuster supporter, John Henderson, former United States Senator for Mississippi. Failure of the government to obtain conviction against Henderson on three separate occasions evidenced the strong public support General Lopez and his cause enjoyed in southern states.

The defeat at Cardenas had not diminished this support. From the moment the discouraged and bedraggled filibusters had arrived at Key West, they met with public praise.¹ The defeated Cuban leader remained in the Florida city only a short time. He then took passage to Savannah, Georgia, where

¹Charleston Courier, May 27, 1850.
a massive public demonstration awaited his arrival. After a hero's welcome, he was dismayed to learn that the Spanish Consul in that city had obtained a warrant for his arrest. The warrant charged Lopez had violated the Neutrality Act by organizing the Cardenas expedition. His subsequent arrest on May 26, 1850, stirred the people of Savannah, where several noted lawyers offered to defend the General without a fee. A raucous hearing held the following day before a local judge resulted in dismissal of all charges due to lack of evidence. Lopez marched triumphantly from the courtroom as spectators stood and cheered. All the while the local press brought pro-Lopez sentiment to a new height by lavishly praising the General and his exploits. His followers were described as "the very best of our Mexican [War] volunteers..."3

Before leaving Savannah, Lopez was again honored by a public celebration at his hotel where he delivered an impassioned speech calling for Cuban liberation.4 He praised

---

2Savannah Georgian, May 27, 1850.
3Savannah Republican, May 25, 1850.
4Savannah Georgian, May 27, 1850. The General's command of English usually required that he speak through an interpreter. So convincing were his arguments, however, that this handicap failed to hinder the effectiveness of his speeches.
the South for supporting freedom's cause. That section, he declared, possessed "the same noble enthusiasm that warmed the hearts and nerved the arms of Lafayette and Kosciusko..." Such excitement arose among the male population of the city that he could have enlisted a thousand volunteers on the spot. His plans, however, did not call for immediate organization of a new expedition. First, financial backing had to be obtained. This, he knew, could best be gotten from old supporters in the New Orleans area. Thus, he decided to return to the Delta City. The only important city visited by the Lopez party enroute was Mobile, Alabama. There, he enjoyed a public celebration similar to that in Savannah, and in an effort to obtain money for a third expedition he called on several prominent citizens.

He soon left Mobile and upon reaching Pass Christian, Louisiana, on June 6, he learned that a New Orleans federal

---

5Marcio Lopez Proclamation to the People of Savannah, Marshall Texas Republican, June 7, 1850.

6Savannah Georgian, May 27, 1850. Several adventurous youths contacted Lopez while at Savannah in an attempt to join his next expedition, but were told they would be notified when the time was ripe.

7Mobile Register, June 1, 1850.
marshall had an arrest warrant for him. Believing himself innocent of any wrongdoing, Lopez decided to turn himself in when he arrived at New Orleans the next day. He prepared for the preliminary hearing before New Orleans Federal District Judge T. H. McCaleb. The charge, like that levied at Savannah, was that he had violated the Neutrality Act of 1818.

Meanwhile, the public and press response to the defeat at Cardenas and the Cuban leader's subsequent return to the United States had been tremendous. While virtually all newspapers continued to back the General in his cause, some criticism was evident in a few Whig journals, dubbed the "submission press" by anti-Taylorites. One Whig paper condemned alleged deceptions used by Lopez and his organizers in encouraging enlistments for the Cardenas expedition. These deceptions, the editor pointed out, were promises that simultaneous landings were to be made at several points on the Cuban coast and that most of the Creoles would rise in support of the filibusters. These promises, declared the paper,

8Jackson Weekly Mississippian and State Gazette, June 14, 1850.

9New Orleans Bee, June 8, 1850.

10Jackson Weekly Mississippian and State Gazette, August 2, 1850.
were actions of an "unprincipled foreign adventurer." It urged people not to welcome the General should he return to the city. Another pro-Administration organ, the New Orleans Bee, loudly congratulated itself for predicting the failure of the Cardenas expedition. This failure the paper blamed on the weakness of Lopez forces on the island and a misreading of Creole sentiment by filibuster leaders.

The annexationist press, however, followed the general sentiment in the South vis-à-vis Cardenas and Cuba. President Taylor came under renewed attack for his role in attempting to stop the filibusters. Far from being condemned for his defeat, Lopez was praised as a fearless leader and defender of southern interests. Few blamed him for failing to take Cuba and fewer believed he had violated any American laws. In fact, southern men were urged to "pick your flint and try

---

11 New Orleans Bulletin, May 30, 1850. A favorite with wealthy Louisiana sugar planters, the Bulletin emphasized the danger of competition by Cuban sugar should the island become part of the Union.

12 Ibid.

13 New Orleans Bee, May 29, 1850.

14 Jackson Weekly Mississippian and State Gazette, June 14, 1850.

15 New Orleans Courier, June 5, 1850.
it again. Those who criticized Lopez were generally castigated as unpatriotic. Annexationists proudly compared the Cardenas expedition with the fight for Texas independence in which ample assistance from the United States resulted in a Texas victory. The time was ripe, they thought, to do the same for Cuba. Lopez took advantage of strong sentiment in his favor and, while in New Orleans, made numerous speeches calling for renewed efforts to topple Spanish rule in Cuba.

The first Lopez hearing held June 7, aroused much curiosity and excitement in New Orleans where residents wildly cheered the General when he entered the courtroom. The judge found it difficult to keep order because Lopez supporters crowded the chamber. The celebrated Sargent S. Prentiss acted as counsel for the defense. Although Prentiss had little sympathy with filibustering per se, he offered his legal services free to the penniless Cuban leader, whom he regarded as a true patriot. The United States District

---

16Jackson Weekly Mississippian and State Gazette, June 7, 1850.
17DeBow, "The Late Cuba Expedition," pp. 168-169.
18New Orleans Bee, June 10, 1850.
19Ibid., June 8, 1850.
Attorney in New Orleans, Logan Hunton, presented the government's charges. He read an affidavit sworn out by the Spanish Consul in New Orleans accusing Lopez of organizing an armed expedition against Cuba in violation of the neutrality law. After lengthy legal quibbling, Judge McCaleb released the accused on a $2,000 bond and ordered him to return for further investigation on the next day. On June 8 the federal grand jury returned an indictment which directed Lopez to stand trial as soon as the prosecution had prepared its case.

News of the indictment brought an upsurge in public feeling. The ailing McCaleb found it increasingly difficult to maintain order as huge crowds gathered outside the courtroom and noisy partisans demonstrated on the inside. Thus, he hesitated to proceed with further indictments. Declaring himself ill, he transferred the hearings to the court of Judge Joshua Baldwin. This action upset Lopez proponents even more because Baldwin had a reputation as an outspoken Taylor man.

After numerous hearings the grand jury returned indictments against fifteen Lopez associates. They too were charged

---

21New Orleans Daily Picayune, June 7, 1850.
22Ibid., June 8, 1850.
with violations of the Neutrality Act. Their number included many prominent Southerners: John Henderson, former United States Senator from Mississippi; C. Pickney Smith, Mississippi Supreme Court Judge; John L. O'Sullivan, editor of the Democratic Review; John A. Quitman, retired Major General and presently Governor of Mississippi; L. J. Sigur, wealthy New Orleans businessman and sugar planter; and General C. N. Rowley, Commander of the Louisiana State Arsenal. Virtually all witnesses as well as those indicted had refused to testify at the hearings or had disclaimed any knowledge of an expedition having been formed in the United States. This was exemplified in the indictment of General Rowley, when a witness, the keeper of the public magazine, testified that he had known nothing about assisting the proposed Cardenas expedition when he had loaded 351 half kegs of powder aboard the Creole under cover of darkness.

The Government, under intense diplomatic pressure from Spain, exerted strong pressure to obtain convictions against

---

24Ibid., June 22, 1850.
25Ibid., June 14, 1850.
26New Orleans Bee, June 18, 1850.
the indicted men.\textsuperscript{27} Taylor wanted to show American good faith in respecting the Spanish rights in Cuba.\textsuperscript{28} This was especially true after the previous assurances by the United States that it would exercise great vigilance in preventing an expedition against Cuba—an expedition which subsequently embarked from American territory.

In fact, Administration efforts to apprehend and punish the filibuster leaders and organizers had begun the moment Lopez returned to Key West. The Secretary of State had immediately informed federal officials at Mobile, Savannah, and New Orleans to arrest the General should he enter their jurisdictions.\textsuperscript{29} Lopez did enter Savannah, but after his arrest was n~billed by the grand jury for lack of evidence.\textsuperscript{30} His release at Savannah greatly upset the Spanish government. Calderón viewed it as an act of bad faith on the part of the United States. He indignantly declared that the man who had "piratically invaded in the midst of peace, has been set at

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{27}Calderón to Clayton, May 27, 1850, D.C., XI, 484.
\item \textsuperscript{28}Clayton to Calderón, June 4, 1850, \textit{ibid.}, p. 81.
\item \textsuperscript{29}Hunton to Clayton, May 30, 1850, \textit{ibid.}, p. 79; Hamilton to Clayton, May 30, 1850, \textit{ibid.}, p. 80.
\item \textsuperscript{30}Savannah Georgian, May 27, 1850.
\end{itemize}}
liberty and has gone either to Mobile or New Orleans.”\(^{31}\) In Mobile the authorities ignored Clayton’s request. The District Attorney there claimed lack of evidence to authorize the detention of Lopez.\(^{32}\) As events turned out, however, Hunton in New Orleans had enough evidence to obtain a number of indictments.

The likelihood of prosecution pleased Spain.\(^{33}\) Spanish hopes rose even higher with the appointment of Webster as Secretary of State, for they believed the new Secretary would do his best to obtain convictions.\(^{34}\) Nevertheless, few informed Southerners believed any of the men would be convicted. With public sentiment overwhelmingly in favor of the accused, a jury composed entirely of pro-Administration Whigs would be likely to vote for conviction.\(^{35}\) Southerners were convinced that not only would the government fail in its efforts to punish the leaders, but the very issue of Cuban annexation

\(^{31}\)Calderon to Clayton, May 27, 1850, D.C., XI, 484.

\(^{32}\)Hamilton to Clayton, May 30, 1850, ibid., p. 80.

\(^{33}\)Barringer to Clayton, June 19, 1850, ibid., pp. 501-503.

\(^{34}\)Calderón to Webster, July 26, 1850, ibid., pp. 524-525.

\(^{35}\)Houston Democratic Telegram and Texas Register, July 4, 1850.
would enable an expansionist Democratic candidate to defeat the Whigs in the next presidential election.\textsuperscript{36}

Public sentiment in support of Lopez and expansion to Cuba was perhaps best demonstrated by the furor which ensued. Actually, the excitement caused by the Quitman affair overshadowed that caused by the indictments of the other men.\textsuperscript{37} To many, the Governor represented a true southern hero. He was an ardent expansionist, a vociferous defender of southern rights, and a brilliant military leader who had proven himself in the Mexican War. Moreover, when indicted, he held the highest office in the state of Mississippi.

Quitman was both enraged and confident of vindication when he learned of the true bill returned against him at New Orleans. He declared a willingness to take his case before the courts, where he believed he would be exonerated.\textsuperscript{38}

Actually, his role in assisting the expedition had been a large one. Although he had declined the offer to lead the

\textsuperscript{36}Mobile Register, November 15, 1850.

\textsuperscript{37}Rauch, \textit{American Interest in Cuba, 1848-1855}, p. 148.

\textsuperscript{38}Quitman to Thompson, August 15, 1850, Claiborne, editor, \textit{Life and Correspondence of John A. Quitman}, II, 62. The Governor was so unconcerned over the possibility of conviction that he loudly declared his desire for an early trial.
ill-fated force against Cardenas, he had generously aided it with money and influence.39

The Governor's enthusiasm for southern expansion did not wane after Cardenas. At his mansion in Greenville, Mississippi, Quitman hosted Lopez and a small party of adherents after the New Orleans indictments. They planned another expedition and took special pride in doing so while under federal indictment.40

Seemingly, the majority of the southern press and the people of Mississippi were far more concerned over the charges against Quitman than he was himself. The leading newspaper of the state claimed that the case against him was totally "unfounded and only intended to subserve an ulterior motive."41 This motive, it said, was an Administration desire to ruin the Governor politically. Mississippians accused the federal government of trying to bring the honor of the state into disrepute and declared that a governor could only be tried by a state legislature, not a federal court. Thus, the rights of the state were being violated.42 After a few Whig

39 Ibid., pp. 55-57.
40 Ibid., pp. 59-60, 70.
41 Jackson, Weekly Mississippian and State Gazette, June 28, 1850.
42 Ibid.
newspapers entered the verbal struggle in behalf of the President, the expansionist attack assumed a more bitter tone. Savage Whig attacks on Quitman by the "submission press" drew scathing counter-offensives from his supporters.43

Finally, in early February, 1851, eight months after Quitman's indictment, the Governor learned he would soon be arrested and taken to New Orleans for trial. Still confident, he declared his innocence. In an address to the people announcing his resignation from office, he sarcastically noted

that the whole South, patient as she is under encroachment, might look with some jealousy upon the employment of military force to remove a Southern governor . . . when force had been withheld from her citizens seeking to reclaim a fugitive slave from Massachusetts.44

Mississippians regarded his resignation as a heroic act. The Daily Picayune called Quitman's arrest a violation of Mississippi's sovereignty, an insult to the people of the state. It cautioned, however, that the Governor should not regard himself above the law.45 Many believed he had resigned

43Ibid., August 2, 1850.
44Governor Quitman's Address to the People of Mississippi, Vicksburg Sentinel, February 4, 1851.
45New Orleans Daily Picayune, February 5, 1851.
the governorship to avoid direct conflict between state and federal power, for it had been rumored earlier he might call out the state militia to prevent his arrest.\(^{46}\)

Immediately after his resignation a local federal marshal arrested Quitman and took him to New Orleans.\(^{47}\) There he awaited trial and viewed with intense interest the proceedings then in progress against another Mississippian, John Henderson. As it turned out, when the government failed repeatedly to convict Henderson of violating the Neutrality Act, it dismissed all charges against Quitman because of the futility in obtaining convictions in the South.\(^{48}\)

Events leading to the government's dismissal of indictments against Quitman and the other men had their origin in the trials of Henderson in the spring of 1851. The three trials took place in the court of Judge McCaleb in New Orleans.\(^{49}\)

Although the lengthy proceedings did not aroused public passions as much as the arrest of Quitman, the people viewed them with interest.

\(^{46}\)Jackson, Weekly Mississippian and State Gazette, February 7, 1851.

\(^{47}\)New Orleans Daily Picayune, February 5, 1851.

\(^{48}\)"The Late Cuba State Trials," Democratic Review, XXX (April, 1852), 313.

\(^{49}\)Ibid., p. 307.
District Attorney Huston chose to try the former Senator first because of the supposed strength of the case against him. Henderson also requested an early trial, desiring speedy justice. The other indictees as well as the prosecution regarded the trial as a test case. It centered on the question of whether or not Henderson had actually violated the Neutrality Act of 1818, which stated that

If any person shall, within the territory and jurisdiction of the United States, begin to set on foot or provide or prepare the means for any military expedition to be carried on from thence against the country or dominions of any foreign prince or state . . . every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of high misdemeanor. . . .

The government contended that a military expedition organized on American soil and which possessed military organization before leaving the jurisdiction of the United States was a violation of the law. Hunton declared that the Cardenas expedition came within this definition.

Henderson countered that the expedition had no degree of military organization while in the United States,

---

50 Ibid., p. 308.


52 "The Late Cuba State Trials," p. 309.
although he admitted purchasing the Oréole for the filibusters. All organization, he contended, had taken place at Contoy—not in New Orleans. Moreover, the filibusters had received no pay or military commissions while on American soil. All the men had thought they were going to California instead of Cuba and arms had not been taken aboard while the ships were within American jurisdiction. On these points the defense rested.53

Trying to break defense arguments, the prosecution faced many difficulties. Although the jury at the first trial was composed mainly of pro-Administration Whigs from New Orleans, no helpful witnesses could be found. Often, those who could give damaging testimony regarding the military organization of the expedition had been involved themselves and feared self-incrimination. As a result the proceedings failed to progress and became enmeshed in legalistic quibbling. Finally, eight jurors voted for conviction and the remainder voted not guilty.54

A second trial began in late January after a new jury had been selected with great difficulty. Again the government

53 Ibid., pp. 309-310.
54 Ibid., 313.
failed to get a conviction, when eight jurors voted not guilty. Hunton, hoping Congress would in the meantime change the law which permitted jurors to be chosen only from the local parish instead of the entire judicial district, requested that a third trial be held during the next judicial term. McCaleb denied the motion. Hunton then asked the court to try Quitman next, but the former Governor objected, saying Henderson should have his case decided first. The court agreed.55

Judge McCaleb scheduled the third Henderson trial for February 17, 1851. Choosing an impartial jury proved more difficult than before. Hundreds of men were questioned before twelve were picked.56 Even then, people predicted that the prosecution would have a difficult time obtaining a conviction. If Henderson escaped conviction a third time, it was believed the government would drop its case to avoid the appearance of persecuting the ex-Senator.57 After days of delay, the trial began on March 1. No new evidence was presented and the jury lacked agreement. Only one juror

55 New Orleans Daily Picayune, February 13, 1851.
56 Hunton to Webster, March 7, 1851, D.C., XI, 101.
57 New Orleans Daily Picayune, February 15, 1851.
voted for conviction. On March 7 Hunton disappointedly entered a *nolle prosequi* in the case and in the other fifteen indictments. He informed the court he "could adduce no stronger testimony against any of the persons indicted for participating in the Cuban expedition, than had been offered against Henderson." 58

The Spanish government was no less disappointed. Calderón asked Webster whether he thought the District Attorney had taken the proper course in dismissing the charges against the men. He could not understand why a conviction had not been obtained when Henderson's role in assisting the Cardenas expedition had been so evident. 59

Webster expressed regrets to the Spanish Minister, but reminded him of the sincerity of the government in the matter. It had gone to great expense in trying the men, although there was great difficulty in procuring an impartial jury in New Orleans, where Webster admitted "the case is one which attracts a great deal of attention." 60

---


59 Calderón to Webster, March 17, 1851, *ibid.*, p. 586. Calderón had been keeping informed of events in New Orleans through the Spanish Consul stationed in the city.

As for the South, it cheerfully received news of Hunton's action. Quitman and Henderson, after their release, were feted at a huge public banquet at the St. Louis Hotel in New Orleans. Supporters proposed toasts in favor of Cuban liberty and a number of speeches called for continued efforts in freeing the island. Clearly, the failure of the Administration to convict Henderson and the subsequent release of the others demonstrated the affection of the South for their cause. In fact, the government's attempt to punish the filibuster organizers produced a severe reaction in the South. Southerners viewed Taylor's and Fillmore's resort to the courts as an act of unrestrained arrogance—an act which encouraged the South even more to acquire Cuba for sectional advantage.

---

61 New Orleans Daily Picayune, March 13, 1851.

62 DeBow, "The Late Cuba Expedition," pp. 172-173.
CHAPTER V

THE LAST EXPEDITION

Even before the Henderson neutrality trial began, Lopez and the other indicted men started planning another armed incursion against Cuba.\footnote{1} Despite recent failure at Cardenas, sentiment in the South still favored the filibuster's goals and methods. The press, with an unsurpassed fervor, propagandized for the acquisition of Cuba. All the old arguments for annexation were repeated and explained in southern Whig and Democratic journals alike. The latter, calling for a candidate who would support expansion, linked the Cuban issue with the coming presidential elections.\footnote{2} Southern Whigs advocating with equal vigor such expansion, tended to ignore the role of the national Whig Administration in hindering slave territory expansion.\footnote{3}

\footnote{1}Claiborne, editor, \textit{Life and Correspondence of John A. Quitman}, II, 70. The meeting at Greenville, Mississippi, between Lopez and Quitman marked but the beginning of an ardent campaign on their part to organize a new expedition.

\footnote{2}New Orleans \textit{Daily Delta}, November 13, 1850.

\footnote{3}New Orleans \textit{Bee}, August 28, 1850.
Not to be outdone by older slave states, Arkansas even passed a formal resolution in the state legislature which demanded the acquisition of Cuba by the United States.\(^4\) Throughout the South the rumor was kept alive that Cuba was on the verge of revolt and that large segments of the Spanish army were ready to support those Creoles desiring independence.\(^5\) Clearly, Lopez and his adherents remained in an ideal position to form a new military force in a dissatisfied yet hopeful South.

As early as August 1850, the Spanish Minister in Washington complained to Secretary Webster that another expedition was being planned. Spanish spies in various port cities reported a flurry of activity by American citizens and Cuban exiles known to be interested in liberation of the island. Calderón produced a copy of a circular allegedly written by Lopez in which he addressed himself to Cuban planters visiting the United States.\(^6\) In it the General

\(^4\)Congressional Globe, 31st Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, 1851), I, 424. The resolution, which passed the Arkansas legislature easily, used the usual Manifest Destiny arguments for Cuban expansion.

\(^5\)Savannah Morning News, April 11, 1851.

\(^6\)Calderón to Webster, August 20, 1850, D.C., XI, 543. Calderón showed particular concern over the Lopez circular, which he regarded as a violation of Spanish-American amity and urged Webster to take action against its author.
expressed his resolve to carry out the project of liberation.

He urged that

you [planters] will be pleased to inform me whether you are willing to contribute either by personal services or pecuniary aid toward said enterprise; because I do not wish that any Cuban hereafter shall complain, that he was not invited to participate in the holy work of achieving political redemption of his country.  

The Secretary of State consulted President Fillmore and drew up a memorandum directing all federal marshals and port authorities to remain vigilant for evidence of renewed schemes against Cuba. Webster assured Madrid of the good intentions of the United States in trying to prevent further military incursions. Such pledges failed, however, to alleviate all fears harbored by Calderón and the Spanish Consuls in southern port cities. The Consul in New Orleans, Juan Y. Labrode, viewed Lopez's September meeting with Quitman at the Mississippi Governor's home as evidence of renewed filibuster plotting. Labrode repeated rumors that hundreds of

---

7Narcio Lopez Circular to Cuban Planters Visiting in the United States, August, 1850, D.C., XI, 544.

8Circular by Daniel Webster, Secretary of State, to the Marshals, District Attorneys, and Collectors of Customs of the United States, September 3, 1850, ibid., p. 91.

9Webster to Calderón, September 3, 1850, ibid., p. 91.
recruits were gathered in New Orleans awaiting a chartered steamer to arrive from New York to transport them to Cuba.\textsuperscript{11}

Aware of the Consul's charges, the District Attorney in New Orleans made a complete investigation in the fall of 1850. He found no evidence to support Labrode's accusations. Local custom house officials also were "unable to ascertain any fact confirming these rumors."\textsuperscript{12}

Thus, on the diplomatic front the matter rested until the following year. Spanish agents continued to discover evidence of filibuster planning and duly reported it to their superiors. Finally, in January 1851, the Spanish Minister informed the American government of his latest suspicions. The Steamer \textit{Fanny}, then in New York harbor, was known to have taken on four cases of rifles and was believed destined for New Orleans where the arms would be used to equip an invasion force.\textsuperscript{13} When the \textit{Fanny} left New York in late January, Spanish authorities had come to believe she carried an additional twenty cases of weapons in a false bottom. The vessel reached its destination, New Orleans, where its deadly cargo came

\begin{footnotes}
\item[11]Labrode to Calderón, October 10, 1850, \textit{ibid.}, p. 574.
\item[12]Hunton to Webster, October 24, 1850, \textit{ibid.}, p. 97.
\item[13]Calderón to Webster, January 17, 1851, \textit{ibid.}, p. 97.
\end{footnotes}
into the bands of filibuster organizers.\textsuperscript{14} The Fillmore Administration took no action against the \textit{Fanny} or its owners, but continued to assure Spain of its vigilance.\textsuperscript{15}

By April, however, Washington had become more concerned about the Cuban situation. Its own intelligence system had uncovered plans of an approaching military campaign on the part of Lopez and his supporters.\textsuperscript{16} In fact, these schemes almost reached fruition before they were discovered. From a spy employed simultaneously by the United States and Spain, Fillmore learned that an invasion force was destined to sail from Savannah, Georgia, late in April.\textsuperscript{17} Other sources in the Savannah area also reported mysterious movements of small groups of men by rail to that city. It was rumored that they were bound for Cuba.\textsuperscript{18}

The President recognized the danger. He informed Savannah authorities to prevent any violation of the neutrality law and ordered the navy to prevent any filibuster force

\textsuperscript{14}Calderón to Webster, January 28, 1851, \textit{ibid.}, p. 584.

\textsuperscript{15}Webster to Calderón, January 22, 1851, \textit{ibid.}, p. 98.

\textsuperscript{16}Derrick to Calderón, April 16, 1851, \textit{ibid.}, p. 102.

\textsuperscript{17}"The Late Cuba State Trials," p. 317.

\textsuperscript{18}Reneas to Fillmore, April 10, 1851, \textit{ibid.}, p. 103.
from leaving Savannah. On April 24, federal authorities at New York seized the steamer Cleopatra before she could leave for a scheduled rendezvous with the filibuster force in Savannah. On board were about 200 German and Hungarian radicals under command of Major Louis Schlesinger and Major John L. O'Sullivan, former editor of the Democratic Review and author of the term "Manifest Destiny". These men were more concerned about Cuban liberation than slavery expansion by the South, but they had been unknowingly recruited for a cause which was basically pro-southern.

After the capture of the New York contingent and their ship, Fillmore issued a proclamation calling for disbandment of the Savannah expedition. He warned Americans that their participation in a Cuban invasion would make them liable for heavy penalties and if captured they would lose protection of their government. Meanwhile, federal officials in

---

19 Graham to Parker, April 12, 1851, ibid., p. 103.

20 "The Late Cuba State Trials," p. 314. The government later tried O'Sullivan and the other ringleaders of the Cleopatra affair. Several trials ended in hung juries and eventually charges against the men were dismissed.

21 President Fillmore's Proclamation to the People of the United States, April 25, 1851, Senate Executive Document, 32nd Congress, 1st Session, No. 1 (Washington, 1851), p. 27.
Savannah labored to prevent the filibusters from organizing and sailing. 22

Their efforts met with success. Early in May the last group of recruits arrived in Savannah only to find their predecessors already discouraged and their ranks decimated by desertions. Almost unanimously they voted to abandon the affair. Another company of adventurers had formed at Jacksonville, Florida, and were to have joined the Savannah force while the latter was enroute to Cuba, but they also disbanded when word came of events in Georgia. 23

The excitement aroused by the Savannah plotting was primarily diplomatic. Few in the South had been aware of the invasion plans, although it was general knowledge that Lopez and his cohorts had been scheming and organizing for months. Knowing these activities, Spanish authorities made preparations to fend off the feared invasion. The noted military leader, General José Concha replaced Alcoy as Captain-General and Madrid sent 5,000 additional troops to bolster Cuban garrisons. 24 As the Savannah crisis had drawn

22 Savannah Morning News, April 28, 1851.
23 Ibid., May 5, 1851.
24 Barringer to Clayton, August 7, 1851, D.C., XI, 542.
nearer, Spanish officials in the United States were convinced that invasion forces would leave New Orleans and Galveston as well as Savannah. Calderon had frantically warned the American government of a school of military tactics in Arkansas where allegedly men were training for the invasion. The Administration, finally convinced of the reality of the threat in the South, had taken action. For the time being, Calderon and the authorities in Havana felt safe and they expressed gratitude for Fillmore’s resolve to maintain cordial Spanish-American relations.27

The relative calm that prevailed in the minds of Cuban authorities was short lived, however. In early July, 1851, a revolt broke out on the island. At first the rebellion was entirely local in character. It began in the city of Puerto Principe, about 200 miles from Havana, and came as a result of controversy over political status of the city council. Concha had thought the council too independent; so he

25 Savannah Morning News, April 25, 1851.

26 Calderón to Webster, April 14, 1851, D. C., XI, 587-588.

27 Owen to Webster, May 16, 1851, ibid., p. 590. Although the local city council was not a radical or anti-government body in itself, its reaction to Concha’s efforts to curtail its traditional power in city affairs played neatly into the hands of a youthful pro-liberation minority.
restricted its powers and dismissed a local military leader who sympathized with the body. Immediately, local radical and anti-government Creoles seized the opportunity to rebel against the Havana authorities. Some sixty men, armed themselves and under leadership of a dynamic young radical, José Artega, took to the countryside. They also sought fellow Cubans in nearby cities, urging them to join the rebellion.

Soon, fighting spread to the seaport of Trinidad and other important cities.

Not until the latter part of July, however, did news of the insurrection reach the United States. American news sources in Havana enthusiastically declared that the island would be free of Spain within Sixty days. Some of the rebel leaders contacted Lopez and other Cuban exiles in the United States. They pleaded for assistance in the fight for independence.

---

28 Caldwell, The Lopez Expeditions to Cuba, 1848-1851, pp. 87-88.
29 Savannah Morning News, July 30, 1851.
30 New Orleans Bee, August 1, 1851.
31 Ibid., July 31, 1851.
32 Ibid., July 23, 1851.
In the South excitement over the revolution became intense. Numerous public meetings were held in support of the rebel cause, with collections taken up to aid the Cuban patriots. A declaration of independence by the people of Puerto Principe received wide publication by the southern press.

Before news of the Cuban revolt had even reached the United States, Lopez had helped organize several volunteer military companies in New Orleans. The purpose of these companies had been to arouse public feeling in favor of Cuban liberation. Although Lopez did nothing to aid the rebels when they requested help, these military companies became the nucleus around which he and Sigur formed a new filibuster force. The rebellion gave the military units increased importance in the public eye.

It was not strange that the public and press response to the revolt should differ across the nation. In the North the revolt reports as printed in the southern press were regarded as exaggerated or even false. The rebels were depicted

---

33 *New Orleans Daily Delta*, July 25, 1851.
34 *New Orleans Bee*, July 28, 1851.
35 *New Orleans Daily Delta*, July 9, 1851.
as a tiny, ineffective minority engaged in a quixotic undertaking.\textsuperscript{36} Spanish diplomats and agents produced numerous "news reports" for the northern press which always placed Havana authorities in a favorable light while minimizing the importance of the outbreak. So contradictory were reports given the northern press via Spain and the southern press by pro-liberation sources, that some journals admitted that the true state of affairs in Cuba was almost impossible to ascertain. Each side in the domestic sectional controversy tended to believe sources which best supported its own position.\textsuperscript{37}

Southern newspapers responded quickly to attacks and derision of their northern counterparts. One Savannah editor declared "that the southern people are fully sensible of the motives and policy of the enemies of Cuba in the free states."\textsuperscript{38} Another argued that the revolution was widespread, and almost certain of success. Americans, it declared, had a moral

\textsuperscript{36}New Orleans Bee, August 13, 1851. The Bee severely criticized the general attitude of the northern press toward the Cuban revolt, attributing this attitude to the influence of Spanish propaganda as well as a hostility of free soil advocates toward southern ambitions in Cuba.

\textsuperscript{37}Charleston Courier, July 29, 1851.

\textsuperscript{38}Savannah Morning News, August 5, 1851.
right to help the Cubans toward liberty. Even the normally reserved southern Whigs denounced motives of their own free soil party members in playing down the revolt. The Spanish language New Orleans newspaper, La Union, came under attack from both Whigs and Democrats in the South as a Madrid propaganda sheet when it gave favorable coverage to the Spanish side in Cuba. Regardless of party affiliation, Southerners believed Cuba would soon be free with filibuster help and would soon be annexed to the United States. With annexation, they predicted an early end to free soil hegemony in Congress.

With Spanish military units busy trying to suppress the rebels, Lopez believed the time was suitable for an invasion. He readily believed the rumor of demoralization in the Spanish army in Cuba and expected that many Spanish troops would refuse to fight his men. So, after making intricate plans and inflaming the public by mass meetings from Baltimore and

39 New Orleans Daily Picayune, August 7, 1851.
40 New Orleans Bee, July 24, 1851.
41 Jackson Weekly Mississippian and State Gazette, August 1, 1851.
42 New Orleans Bee, August 6, 1851.
New Orleans, the General and his fellow plotters were ready to embark on what was to be the last Cuban expedition.43

By the last week in July, recruiting and organizing for the proposed expedition reached a peak. A company of men were reported in Cincinnati enroute to New Orleans. A Kentucky sympathizer of Lopez had enlisted them and paid sixty to seventy dollars per man each month.44 Another contingent of thirty Mississippi men departed Vicksburg amid cheers of the local population.45 From all over the South hundreds of young adventurers converged on the Delta City to join the filibuster force. Most traveled in small groups to avoid suspicion among federal authorities.46 As with the Cardenas expedition, Lopez raised $50,000 by printing and selling Cuban liberty bonds.47 To transport the force the wealthy Sigur purchased the steamer Pampero for a reported $40,000.48

43 Charleston Courier, August 1, 1851.
44 New Orleans Bee, August 12, 1851.
46 Charleston Courier, August 7, 1851.
47 Caldwell, The Lopez Expeditions to Cuba, 1848-1851, p. 89.
48 New Orleans Daily Delta, September 25, 1851.
Finally, on the morning of August 3, the men were sufficiently organized to depart for Cuba. Although over 1,000 had enlisted, Lopez decided only 450 of the best enlistees could be carried aboard the Pampero, already burdened with heavy cannon and thousands of arms. They boarded the ship and it pulled away from the Lafayette Street landing while thousands of well-wishers cheered. On August 11 the Pampero stopped at Key West to take on fuel. There Lopez decided to invade Cuba near the city of Bahia Honda, some twenty miles from Havana. The next day the filibusters made their landing without incident. They separated into two groups. One under Lopez marched inland to the village of Las Posas, while a smaller contingent under Colonel William L. Crittenden remained behind to guard the supplies and establish a base camp. Meanwhile, the Pampero steamed back to Key West under orders to return with another load of filibusters. Upon arrival, however, the captain learned of the presence of American naval vessels near Jacksonville, Florida, where the second group of invaders had assembled. This news was

49 Savannah Morning News, August 5, 1851; New Orleans Daily Picayune, August 9, 1851.

sufficient discouragement to prevent sailing to that city. So the Pampero headed toward New Orleans. There, another large force of recruits awaited passage to Cuba.51

After hearing of the expedition's departure on August 3, the government had taken immediate steps. Fillmore determinedly set out to prevent the sailing of reinforcements. He sent the warships Albany and Vixen to patrol the Cuban coast near Havana.52 The Preble and the Dolphin were ordered to patrol the coast at other likely points of invasion.53 The President reasserted his earlier orders which warned federal officials not to become accomplices with the filibusters by allowing illegal departures.54 This admonition came partially because the Spanish Minister had complained that

the masses have been excited to join expeditions, publicly organized, for the purpose of invading the island of Cuba. One of these meetings was presided over by Mr. M. M. Cohen, a salaried officer of the Federal Government.55

51Charleston Courier, August 25, 1851.
52Owen to Webster, August 16, 1851, D.C., XI, 599.
53Savannah Morning News, August 4, 1851.
55Calderón to Derrick, August 10, 1851, D.C., XI, 597.
Consul Labrode in New Orleans further charged the local Collector of Customs with gross negligence in not preventing the Pampero from sailing. He informed Calderon that he had requested detention of the vessel on August 1, on grounds it had not been properly cleared for sailing and was openly known to be engaged in filibuster activities. The Collector, he charged, had politely listened to his request but took no action to prevent the illegal departure. Rumors in the South tended to substantiate Labrode’s charges. Because of sympathy for the Cuban cause and for Lopez, southern federal officials had refused to stop the expedition.

News of the filibuster departure brought additional evidence of public support in the South. This support increased as fanciful reports of overwhelming filibuster and rebel victories filled the papers. Lopez’s men were said to have wounded three thousand Spanish soldiers and to have killed several hundred. Some claimed that as many as 1,000 Creoles joined the invaders. One Havana correspondent wishfully reported that 4,000 Spanish soldiers had changed

56 Labrode to Calderón, August 6, 1851, ibid., p. 601.
57 New Orleans Bee, August 8, 1851.
58 Charleston Courier, August 22, 1851.
sides and that 7,000 more would change in a few days. Pro-
liberation sources urged Southerners to beware of "false
statements and reports put forth by the Spanish authorities
of Cuba for the purpose of smothering the progress of the
revolutionary fire in the island." The press became completely engrossed with Cuban events. Again, huge public meetings were conducted throughout the
South in support of the revolution. Cities vied with one
another in proclaiming adherence to the filibuster cause.
Although many admitted Cuba should be obtained by peaceful
means if possible, they praised the violent movement for
freedom.

When northern journals gave credence to reports unfavor-
able to the filibusters and tried to divide the South by re-
minding Whigs of that section that Fillmore's policy toward Cuba
and Lopez was not in accordance with their own, influential

59 New Orleans Bee, August 20, 1851.
60 Charleston Courier, August 12, 1851.
61 New Orleans Daily Delta, August 20, 1851.
62 Savannah Morning News, August 11, 1851. Demonstrations usually took the form of marches by local militia,
followed by speeches and a collection for equipping filibus-
ter recruits.
63 New Orleans Daily Picayune, August 21, 1851.
party leaders responded that both parties in the South were completely united behind Lopez. Southern Whigs warned that they would not reject Fillmore because they happened to disagree with him over the Cuban question.64

While the filibuster issue was hotly debated in the United States, Lopez and his followers were not faring well in Cuba. Their unopposed landing at Bahia Honda preceded general disaster for the force. Spanish intelligence had discovered the invaders' intentions at Key West and had dispatched the Pizarro from Havana with 700 soldiers under command of General Enna. On August 13 Enna landed at Bahia Honda. He divided his force, placing one contingent under General Brutillos while keeping the remainder under his command. Enna pursued Lopez and Brutillos attacked the smaller filibuster supply guard. Realizing their inferior position, Colonel Crittenden and his men boarded some nearby fishing boats after nightfall. Their attempt to escape by sea was thwarted by the Habanero, which captured the entire company. The Spanish took the unfortunate men to Havana, where they were summarily executed by firing squad on August 16. Spanish

64New Orleans Bee, August 28, 1851.
sources indicated some 20,000 persons witnessed the executions. Reportedly, they cheered loudly as the men died.\textsuperscript{65}

In the meantime, General Enna had engaged Lopez's main force at the village of Las Posas on August 13. The filibusters possessed advantage of terrain and successfully drove the Spaniards back, inflicting some eighty casualties.\textsuperscript{66} Later, Enna regrouped and attacked, but again he was repulsed, losing over forty men. Finally, reinforcements from Havana forced the filibusters to withdraw from Las Posas.\textsuperscript{67} What ensued was disastrous for the invaders. They realized that Spanish troops had totally pacified the Creoles and for this reason they refused to rise in support of the Americans. Discouraged and low on food and ammunition, the men wandered off individually, trying to hide in the dense jungle. Most were captured, including Lopez, on August 24.\textsuperscript{68} His captors took him to Havana, where he was hanged. The authorities imprisoned the remaining captives.\textsuperscript{69}

\textsuperscript{65}London \textit{Times}, September 9, 1851; President Fillmore's Address to Congress, December 2, 1851, \textit{Journal of the Senate}, 32nd Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1852), p. 9.

\textsuperscript{66}Charleston \textit{Courier}, August 27, 1851.

\textsuperscript{67}London \textit{Times}, September 9, 1851.

\textsuperscript{68}New Orleans \textit{Bee}, September 18, 1851.

\textsuperscript{69}Owen to Webster, September 5, 1851, \textit{D.C.}, XI, 605.
News of the execution of Colonel Crittenden, son of the Attorney General of the United States John J. Crittenden, and his men reached the United States long before that of Lopez's defeat and capture. On August 21 reports of the mass execution reached the South, where people were outraged. They protested the summary manner of the executions as well as the alleged brutalities committed against the bodies of the men. Papers printed gruesome accounts of the affair, along with detailed descriptions of mutilation of corpses. The dead, they reported, had been thrown on slaughter house carts to be taken to a mass grave.70

Instead of discouraging southern ardor for Cuba the executions caused an opposite reaction. An enraged South demanded retribution. Southerners predicted new filibuster attempts and declared that they would "laugh to scorn proclamations of amity and treaty stipulations" so loudly touted by the Administration in its relations with Spain.71 Many people blamed the executions on the President. His role in trying to prevent Cuban liberation by the filibusters came under heavy attack and the new American Consul at Havana,

70Savannah Morning News, August 27, 1851.
71New Orleans Bee, August 23, 1851.
Allen F. Owens, was bitterly castigated for not working to save the unfortunate Crittenden force. One Georgia paper denounced the Consul, a native Georgian, as unworthy of citizenship in that state.\textsuperscript{72} So intense was the pressure, Fillmore finally recalled Owens from Havana.\textsuperscript{73}

When a few southern Democratic journals attempted to exploit public sentiment over the execution issue for partisan advantage, the Whig press caustically reminded them of the southern Whig record in support of the filibusters and liberation.\textsuperscript{74} The people of the South demanded a non-partisan espousal of the filibuster cause and believed no party should take political advantage of the popular anger over the executions.\textsuperscript{75}

Public indignation reached its highest point in New Orleans, origin of the ill-fated expedition. Angry crowds gathered in the streets and vented their wrath on Spanish-owned property. After sacking several coffee houses and a

\textsuperscript{72}\textit{Savannah Morning News}, August 28, 1851.

\textsuperscript{73}Anderson C. Quisenberry, \textit{Lopez's Expeditions to Cuba, 1850-1851} (Louisville, 1906), p. 49.

\textsuperscript{74}\textit{New Orleans Bee}, August 27, 1851.

\textsuperscript{75}\textit{Savannah Morning News}, August 27, 1851.
cigar store, the mob turned on the Spanish consulate, destroying the building's contents. The Consul fled for his life. Later, the Spanish language newspaper, *La Unión*, received similar treatment. Finally, the mayor had to call out the militia to restore order. The Madrid government vigorously protested the entire affair.

Offsetting this protest, however, was Washington's effort, under southern pressure, to investigate details of the executions. Fillmore ordered Commander Foxhall A. Parker to Havana to obtain particulars of the trials and executions. Parker was also to convey the President's belief that the sentences had been far too harsh. Not wishing to acknowledge that there had been no formal trial, Concha refused.

---


78 *New Orleans Bee*, August 22, 1851.


80 Derrick to Parker, August 23, 1851, *ibid.*, pp. 28-29. Fillmore had his Acting Secretary of State, William Derrick, word the protest in the mildest manner possible in order not to give the impression that he supported the filibusters or that he actually favored the South in the domestic sectional debate.
to give the Commodore an account of the proceedings on grounds that he did not have authority to do so.\textsuperscript{81} Washington did nothing further, although later the President did extend his sympathies to the families of the unfortunate men.\textsuperscript{82}

News of Lopez's death and the capture of his men reached the United States early in September. In the South it was received with sorrow.\textsuperscript{83} The failure of the expedition also evoked a profound change in the southern attitude toward the filibuster movement. Defeat so sapped the militant spirit of the South that people called for an end to attempts to acquire Cuba by force.\textsuperscript{84} Even members of the disunionist minority, the most radical element of society, pointed to the futility of invading Cuba again. The best course now, they maintained, was to purchase the island from Spain.\textsuperscript{85} Many southern Whigs, once ardent supporters of Cuban

---

\textsuperscript{81}Parker to Webster, September 6, 1851, \textit{ibid.}, p. 30.

\textsuperscript{82}President Fillmore's Address to Congress, December 2, 1851, \textit{Journal of the Senate}, 32nd Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1852), p. 10.

\textsuperscript{83}New Orleans \textit{Daily Picayune}, September 5, 1851.

\textsuperscript{84}\textit{Ibid.}, September 6, 1851; New Orleans \textit{Bee}, September 6, 1851.

\textsuperscript{85}Jackson \textit{Weekly Mississippian and State Gazette}, September 12, 1851.
annexation despite party contradictions, began to backtrack. They complained at having been misled into supporting Lopez by exaggerated reports of the Creole sentiment for liberation. Other Whigs felt it necessary to change their positions in order to defend Fillmore's actions. Certainly, Whigs were confused and divided—a condition which would soon be a factor in causing their demise as a meaningful political force in the South.

The Democrats, for their part, quickly attempted to take advantage of the division and weakness which plagued their political opponents. While advocating an end to filibustering, they attacked the Whig Administration for its past actions. One writer charged the President with responsibility for "the butchery of his countrymen, . . . for the failure of the attempt to give liberty to Cuba."  

86"Narcio Lopez and His Companions," Democratic Review XXIX (October, 1851), 299.

87Ibid. The President's critics based their arguments primarily on the contention that he had wrongly interpreted the Neutrality Act of 1818. They charged that the law should be "liberally, republicanly, and democratically understood, as contradistinguished from the Austrian or Fillmore-Webster-Whig interpretation of it. . . ." They pointed to the previous Administration failures in gaining convictions against the filibuster leaders as proof that the American people did not accept Fillmore's interpretation of the law. "The Neutrality Law: What Does It Mean, What Prohibit and What Permit," Democratic Review, XXX (June, 1852), 510-511.
Along with these bitter attacks on Fillmore and the Whigs in general, came posthumous praises for Lopez and his men. The South extolled their bravery and urged that the invaders' goals now be attained through diplomacy. DeBow's Review declared Lopez had not died in vain, that the fiery Cuban would someday be regarded as a hero by his countrymen. Summing up southern feelings after the last expedition, an unnamed gentlemen wrote in the magazine that

The safety of the South is to be found only in the extension of its peculiar institutions, and the security of the Union in the safety of the South. The great beauty of our government is in its power of expansion. What a bright gem will she, the Queen of the Antilles, be in the coronet of the South, and how proudly will she wear it. 88

Even the late John C. Calhoun was resurrected as one who would have supported wholeheartedly peaceful expansion to Cuba now that filibustering proved useless. 89 But Calhoun was dead, as was Lopez. The chance to obtain Cuba for sectional advantage had died with the latter. Years of Whig rule in Washington had seen to that. Democratic presidents after Fillmore halfheartedly attempted to purchase the island,

89 Jackson Weekly Mississippian and State Gazette, September 12, 1851.
but Spain's refusals were discouraging as were charges of favoritism toward the slave states.

The sectionalism which had begun as a slight flaw in the national fabric in the early 19th century was destined to rip the nation apart within a few years. The expeditions of Narcio Lopez would be remembered as but one short chapter in the long history of sectional struggle which culminated in civil war. While the methods of the filibuster lost popular appeal with most Southerners after the final Lopez defeat in 1851, the desire for Cuban acquisition remained with the South until the eve of that tragic national conflict a decade later.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Books, Diaries


Public Documents


Articles


"Narcio Lopez and His Companions," Democratic Review, XXIX (October, 1851), 291-310.

"The Late Cuba State Trials," Democratic Review, XXX (April, 1852), 307-319.


Newspapers

Charleston Courier, May, 1850-August, 1851.

Houston, Democratic Telegraph and Texas Register, July, 1850-August, 1850.
Jackson, Weekly Mississippian and State Gazette, June, 1850-September, 1851.

London, Times, September 9, 1851.

Marshall, Texas Republican, June, 1850-August, 1850.

Mobile Register, June, 1850-November, 1850.

New Orleans Bee, May, 1850-September, 1851.


New Orleans Courier, June 5, 1850.

New Orleans Daily Delta, November, 1850-September, 1851.

New Orleans Daily Picayune, March, 1850-September, 1851.

New Orleans True Delta, January 18, 1850.

Savannah Georgian, May 27, 1850.

Savannah Morning News, April, 1851-August, 1851.

Savannah Republican, May 25, 1850.

Vicksburg Sentinel, February 4, 1851.

Washington, National Intelligencer, June, 1850.

Secondary Sources

Books


