WAR-TIME POLITICS: THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1864

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WAR-TIME POLITICS: THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1864

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CHAPTER I

THE PARTY DIVIDED

Presidential elections provide an invaluable source for the study of the American political system at work. The election of 1864 is one of the nation's most interesting and most significant, if for no other reason than that it proved that the American system could withstand the rigors of a civil war. However, to fully grasp the significance of the reelection of Abraham Lincoln, it is necessary to understand the political and military backdrop against which this election was held. Throughout Lincoln's first term one fact was apparent: the Republican Party was seriously divided. This division within the party ranks and the problems it created directly or indirectly form the background and set the stage for the election of 1864.

As the first Republican president of the United States, Lincoln faced problems of staggering proportions. Clouds of civil war threatened the nation, as seven of the Southern states had seceded. The Border States presented a problem, and Lincoln's official family lacked harmony. Furthermore, many in the remainder of the nation
held serious reservations about the new president. Lincoln was virtually a political unknown outside his home state of Illinois. His very appearance was ludicrous. His tall stature and gangling arms made him a target for cartoonists. Lincoln was accused of being weak in intellect and undecided on any sort of policy. Lincoln's friends and enemies criticized him for formulating no policy statements prior to his inauguration. His silence was interpreted as a weakness.

As time passed and civil war became a reality, the disenchantment with Lincoln continued. His enemies chafed at William H. Seward's influence in the cabinet. The press alleged that Lincoln's half-way measures would ruin the government. The New York Times editorialized that Lincoln was so afraid of doing something rash that he did nothing in time to accomplish any good.¹

The general discontent with Lincoln's early administration appeared also in private correspondence. An Illinois friend of Lincoln's, Joseph Blanchard, revealed to the President that the people in the North and the West were beginning to look around for someone who might be able to organize the forces of freedom more effectively. On April 4, 1861, Lincoln received a letter stating that thirty more days

¹New York Times, August 4, 1862.
of his "peace policy" in Washington would put the government on the road to destruction.\(^2\)

The press accused Lincoln of having no policy at all. An editorial in the National Intelligencer revealed that the entire country was posing the question as to what policy the Lincoln administration had. In early April, 1861, the same organ stated that for the past month Lincoln had put forth no policy on secession. The editorial accused the President of lacking the ability to perform his duties as set forth in the Constitution. Furthermore, the fact that the far-reaching problems of the administration had not been solved pointed to the fact that the Lincoln administration had no plan to enact relative to the seceded states. Such inactivity was detrimental to keeping the Border slaveholding states loyal to the Union. Others believed that Lincoln did not comprehend the real nature of the crisis with which he was faced because he failed to prosecute the war vigorously after the fall of Fort Sumter.\(^3\)

Not the least of Lincoln's problems lay within the divided Republican party itself. From its earliest days,

\(^2\)J. Jordon to Lincoln, April 4, 1861; Joseph Blanchard to Lincoln, March 28, 1861; "A Republican" to Lincoln, April 3, 1861; Robert Todd Lincoln Papers, on microfilm, North Texas State University Library, Denton, Texas. Hereafter cited as RTL Papers.

\(^3\)National Intelligencer, April 8, 9, 1861; New York Times, July 15, 1861.
the Republican party had very little organization or any substantial political program. From its inception it was organized as a sectional party devoted to halting the spread of slavery. From 1854 to 1860, Republicans had relied on the state organizations for what little planning they did as a party. The Democratic split in 1860 had resulted in the election of Lincoln as a Republican president, but neither the nation nor his own party had given him a mandate.4

Men of varied beliefs had found their way into the Republican party, and they elected a president. Their success was accomplished on a variety of issues, depending on the respective section of the nation. The presence of civil war tended to further disunite the various elements of the party instead of bringing them together against a common foe. The press speculated upon the division within the party, and pondered whether Lincoln would be able to unite the Republicans or if hostile wings might develop.5

Lincoln represented the moderate wing of the party. This wing saw the sole purpose of the civil war as the


preservation of the Union. Generally the moderates favored gradual compensated emancipation of the slaves in the Southern states. In addition, the moderate wing believed that slavery would die as a result of the war, and they did not propose to tamper with the "peculiar institution" unless such action might have a direct bearing on the outcome of the war.6

In opposition to the moderate Republicans stood a potent faction, often called "Radicals." This faction found powerful allies in the abolitionist leaders Wendell Phillips and William Lloyd Garrison. The Radicals distrusted Lincoln's tolerance, and they did not believe that he was a good "party" man. They also differed with Lincoln on the Negro question. This faction believed that slavery was the root of the nation's difficulties and that it should be abolished with no compensation.

Policy differences were not the only problems Lincoln had to face in his own party. His choice as a candidate by the convention meant that the party leaders, William H. Seward of New York and Salmon P. Chase of Ohio, had been overlooked. Seward was considered by most Republicans to be the party leader, and he was a moderate. Chase leaned toward the Radical wing of the party, and he had designs upon the presidency himself. Even as president, Lincoln

6Zornow, pp. 13-16.
was not looked upon as the party leader. Many Republicans looked to Seward to be the power behind the throne, as did Seward himself.

Lincoln's party problems were complicated further by the selection of his official family. Lincoln collected into his cabinet many of the disappointed men he had defeated in the party convention. Almost from the day of his nomination Lincoln had decided on at least two of his cabinet members, Seward and Chase. Both men had served in the United States Senate, and both had opposed the growing power of slavery. Much of the cabinet difficulty Lincoln subsequently faced centered around these two men.7

Early in his Senate career, Seward had been a forceful debater. His speeches had much intellectual content, and they showed evidence of persuasive reasoning. He had associated himself with Thurlow Weed's political machine, and it was Weed who held Seward back from the party nomination in 1856. Weed believed that Seward would have been defeated, and he was disappointed when Lincoln won the nomination in 1860.8

Salmon P. Chase began to change political parties early in his career; he gave every indication of being a political opportunist. Chase veered with the political wind, but he always had a plausible reason for his political changes, and

7Burton J. Hendrick, Lincoln's War Cabinet (Boston, 1946), pp. 6-7.
8Ibid., pp. 33-34; 38-39.
each one involved his own political fortunes. Chase developed an early hatred for slavery, and he became an abolitionist, representing that wing of the party in Lincoln's cabinet. His ability as a financial advisor has been criticized, but his worst fault was his insatiable lust for public office.\(^9\)

Though Lincoln's cabinet problems centered around Seward and Chase, other members of the official family caused discontent in many circles. Postmaster General Montgomery Blair and Navy Secretary Gideon Welles were among these, as was War Secretary Simon Cameron. Cameron's appointment was made for political reasons, and he was later replaced by Edwin M. Stanton. But Lincoln had his reasons for choosing his cabinet as he did. Seward and Chase represented the two wings of the party. Blair played a key role in Lincoln's relations with the Border States, since he was from Maryland. Welles was a good choice as Naval Secretary, though Seward disliked him and tried to keep him out of the cabinet. More than any other member of the cabinet, Welles possessed something approaching an accurate appreciation of Lincoln's abilities.\(^10\)

All in all, Lincoln's cabinet was a group of ill-assorted statesmen. Their opinion of each other left much to be desired. Welles and Blair were congenial, but neither had any use for Chase. Seward disliked both Welles and Blair. But these three

\(^9\)Ibid., pp. 8, 17, 26.

members had one thing in common: an aversion to Simon Cameron. In his self-appointed role as "prime minister," Seward refused to take any of the other members seriously; he did not believe that any of them would have a significant role in the conduct of the Lincoln administration. According to Welles, Seward as Secretary of State also wished to control the affairs of the War and Navy Departments even though he possessed no knowledge of either.\(^\text{11}\)

Perhaps Lincoln's biggest problem with his cabinet arose in December, 1862. The background to the crisis began earlier, and the two members most involved were Seward and Chase. Secretary Welles revealed in his diary that Postmaster General Blair told him that Chase was not fit to be in the cabinet because he was incompetent. Neither did Seward escape the venomous pen of Welles. He believed that Seward's influence upon Lincoln was often harmful and that Lincoln would be better off without the New Yorker. According to Welles, Seward's relationship with Lincoln was a thorn in Chase's side. To make matters worse, Seward often interfered in the Navy Department. Because both the Navy and State Departments dealt with foreign nations in their respective ways, it was necessary that the two work closely together, but Welles believed that Seward became too involved with the Navy Department.\(^\text{12}\)

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\(^{12}\)Welles, I, 127, 132-134.
Seward's position in the cabinet during the early days of the administration caused displeasure among the other cabinet members. He did most of the talking at the early meetings. The sessions were very informal, and the cabinet met irregularly. Its sessions revealed the lack of any system of communication among the members, and this situation prohibited the real concert which would have been a source of strength to the administration.\(^{13}\)

Chase had entered the cabinet with the determination to be Lincoln's successor. Though charitable to the President personally, Chase had nothing but contempt for Lincoln's administration. Almost immediately upon taking up the duties of his department, Chase began to question the fitness of Lincoln for the high office he held. He considered Lincoln's methods slipshod, and he believed that the President was inadequate to the fearful demands of the emergency of war. Chase also believed that Lincoln was inefficient as a military leader and lacking in the ability to compromise.\(^{14}\)

When a Republican senatorial committee requested his resignation in late 1862, Seward complied, but later agreed to withdraw it at Lincoln's request. Learning that Seward planned to withdraw his letter of resignation from the cabinet, Chase submitted his own resignation reluctantly. Having both

\(^{13}\text{Ibid., pp. 136-137.}\)

\(^{14}\text{Hendrick, pp. 371, 373; Randall and Current, IV, 91-92.}\)
resignations, Lincoln declined to accept either. Instead, he requested in writing that both men remain at their posts. In handling the crisis as he did, Lincoln retained in his cabinet representatives of both factions within the Republican party. Lincoln the politician had demonstrated that he would keep both Seward and Chase in his official family, despite Congressional attempts to the contrary.

By 1864, the cabinet had been reorganized, the cause being internal dissension, not pressure from without. Chase resigned and was replaced by the Radical-inclined William Pitt Fessendon. Chase received the appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court upon the death of Roger B. Taney. Simon Cameron had fallen earlier. The amazing fact was that the cabinet remained unchanged for so long. It could hardly have been less congenial, and on few matters did any two members agree. Despite this fact, Lincoln's cabinet was able to unite on enough issues to enable the Union to wage a successful war, even though their path was not an easy one.

Another major problem facing Lincoln and the divided Republican party was the role and status of the Border States. In his relations with these slaveholding states, Lincoln faced a situation which required the most delicate handling

\[15\] Lincoln to W. H. Seward, Lincoln to S. P. Chase, December 20, 1862, RTL Papers; Welles, pp. 201-202.

\[16\] Hendrick, p. 369.
and the greatest challenge to his ability to compromise. Lincoln's aim throughout the early war years was to prevent the secession of Kentucky, Delaware, Maryland, and Missouri. The fact that he was successful pointed to Lincoln's ability in the art of compromise.

Indeed, the president's handling of Border State affairs illustrated a significant change in the character of the national government. Gradually the federal government began to take more power into its own hands. This was not a deliberate attempt on the part of the government to increase its power, but, rather, it was due to the inability of the states to get things done and to their petty jealousies and administrative deadlocks. The several states of the Union jealously guarded what they believed to be their rights as sovereign states, and this situation resulted in many problems for Lincoln in his relations with the respective states, especially those Border States which recognized slavery.¹⁷

Lincoln was interested not only in keeping the populous Border States in the Union for the obvious military reasons. Political considerations also influenced Lincoln's Border States policy, and he used a political approach in his initial attempts to keep them in the Union. Lincoln's attitude toward secession was basically political; he believed that the Southern masses were inherently loyal to the Union but

had been misled by their political leaders. In general, the President sought support from the Old Whigs and the Constitutional Unionists, hoping to bind them to the Republican party by patronage. The cabinet appointments of Blair and Bates were part of this design. In those states where Lincoln could find Unionists to accept federal offices, he created a nucleus of Republican support. From this nucleus, he planned to initiate the beginnings of reconstruction. The Unionists' support in the South and the Border States in particular provided the necessary loyal element through which Lincoln could work to restore the Union. Lincoln's concept of reconstruction was largely political, and the Border States provided him with the ground in which to sow the seeds of reconstruction.18

Lincoln's initial belief that the primary aim of the war was the preservation of the Union resulted in an early clash with the Radical element within his own party. Though fundamentally political in nature, the Radical opposition to Lincoln had other consequences as well because the struggle finally evolved into a difference in approach to the possibility of emancipation and to the question of who would control military affairs and reconstruction. The Radicals in Congress believed that that body should exert more control over

these policies than Lincoln was apparently willing to give them. 19

Differences between Lincoln and the Radical wing did not stay quiet for long. In addition to early differences over cabinet selections, Lincoln’s conduct of the war was also unacceptable to the Radical element. Radical leaders wanted military men who were in sympathy with their aims, and Lincoln did not always agree. After the Union defeat at Manassas, General George B. McClellan was given command of the Army of the Potomac. Even though he was a Democrat, for some unexplained reason the Radicals believed that he was one of them, and they initially approved the appointment. This enchantment became short-lived when McClellan did not move his army, and after the Battle of Ball’s Bluff, McClellan came under Radical suspicion. Some even suspected that the general was fraternizing with the Confederacy. 20

McClellan was not the only general who widened the rift between Lincoln and the Radical wing of the party. Lincoln’s repudiation of General John C. Frémont first brought the conflict out in the open. In July, 1861, Lincoln had appointed Frémont to a command in Missouri. The Missouri appointment was a challenge to both Frémont and his ambitious wife, Jesse, the daughter of Missouri’s Senator Thomas Hart Benton. The

19 Hendrick, p. 280.

general was politically ambitious in his own right. He harbored strong resentment against Lincoln for replacing him on the Republican ticket in 1860. With such feelings Fremont assumed his command of a divided Missouri.  

Partly to endear himself to the Radical element of the Republican party and partly to defeat his enemies in Missouri, Frémont issued a general order declaring free all the slaves owned by Missouri secessionists. The order shocked Unionist slaveholders in all the Borderland. It also came as no small surprise to Lincoln, who quietly requested that Frémont rescind the order. The general replied that if Lincoln wished the order rescinded, he could do it himself. Lincoln promptly did just that, and then he recalled Frémont.  

Lincoln's repudiation and recall of Fremont caused a storm of protest from the Radical camp. The Radicals called for far-reaching changes in the cabinet and the army, but Lincoln refused to yield to their demands. Adding fuel to the flame, Lincoln appointed General Henry W. Halleck to command in the West, and Halleck was also a Democrat. The two major Union armies were then under the command of Democratic generals.

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22 Ibid.
To deal with Lincoln's proclivity for appointing Democratic generals and other military matters, the Radicals spearheaded the formation of a Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War. This committee became the nucleus of a Radical drive against administration military policies. The leadership of the Committee was largely Radical, "Bluff Ben" Wade of Ohio providing the brains and the momentum for the Committee as its chairman. It was the agency through which the Radicals hoped to direct the military operations of the Union to their own ends. It incessantly tried to purge the Union Army of its conservative officers.\(^{24}\)

Lincoln's command problem was not made any easier by the activities of the Committee. In December, 1861, it turned its full wrath on General McClellan. The general chronically demanded more troops, and he moved his army at a snail's pace. The Radical element objected because Lincoln agreed to McClellan's plan for the Peninsula Campaign.\(^{25}\)

After the failure of this campaign, McClellan was replaced by General John Pope. He fared no better and was in turn replaced by McClellan. McClellan's failure to pursue Lee at Antietam added more fuel to the flame of Radical discontent. Lincoln replaced McClellan with General A. E. Burnside, and after the disaster at Fredericksburg,

\(^{24}\)Ibid., pp. 64-65; 71, 74.

\(^{25}\)Ibid., pp. 77 ff.; 111 ff.; 118, 140, 178.
the Committee had to rescue the Republican party from the charges of inefficiency in the conduct of the war, despite their dislike of Burnside.\textsuperscript{26}

Burnside's replacement was General Joseph Hooker, whom the Radicals wanted. After his defeat at Chancellorsville, the Committee took an about-face. It stopped its criticism of the war's conduct, and it halted its press campaign for an army purge. Indeed, it took no action at all after Hooker's defeat.\textsuperscript{27} The rise of U. S. Grant proved to be the ultimate solution to Lincoln's problem of selecting a commander.

Further complicating Lincoln's political future were the mid-year elections of 1862. While the Radicals were preparing their drive for emancipation, the Democrats were preparing for these elections, and their strength was still formidable. Exposure and denunciation became the tactics of the party. Their methods were so successful that both moderate and Radical Republicans sanctioned arbitrary arrests and the suspension of the writ of \textit{habeas corpus}. The Democrats, of course, jumped into the role of defender of personal liberty. They also made political capital of

\textsuperscript{26}Ibid., 178-179; 196-199; 205; T. Harry Williams, \textit{Lincoln and His Generals} (New York, 1952), pp. 200-201.

\textsuperscript{27}T. Harry Williams, \textit{Lincoln and His Generals}, pp. 267-268; 285, 214.
military incompetence and governmental aggression on personal liberty. 28

While the two parties battled, Lincoln was caught between the Radical element and their agitation for emancipation and the agitation of the Democrats. If he yielded to the Radical element on emancipation, the status of the Border States would be uncertain. But he could not ignore their strength. They controlled the machinery of Congress and held the governorships of a number of key states. Lincoln decided on a threefold plan to solve his dilemma. He presented a plan for compensated emancipation, he strengthened his control over the Border States, and he planned to yield the form of emancipation to the Radicals while keeping the substance of power in his own hands. The Border States, however, refused to accept Lincoln's plan of compensated emancipation, and the President realized that only military force would keep the Border States in line. In Maryland and Kentucky, the military authorities ruled the states, and prior to the 1862 elections they fastened their grip on the states' political machinery. Maryland gave no trouble, but in Kentucky the military assumed more control. The Union commander continued the arbitrary arrests, and later he ordered that "anyone hostile in the opinion of the government" 29 could not be a candidate for office in

28 Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors, p. 238.
29 Ibid., p. 245.
the upcoming elections. Governor Magoffin resigned, and James F. Robinson was chosen as his successor. The new governor had no wish for trouble with the Lincoln administration, but the federal troops were not removed.30

The use of federal troops in specific areas in Maryland was justified on the grounds that the government could not have disloyal men elected to office in a state so strategically located. Federal troops were also used at election time in Kentucky and Missouri. They patrolled the polls, discouraged the casting of disloyal votes, and arrested Democratic candidates for office. The press noted that in Pennsylvania a large number of native soldiers were going home for the election. Many furloughs had been granted, even to convalescents in hospitals. In Maryland on election day, a troop of federal cavalry appeared under the command of Captain T. H. Watkins. The troops were distributed in small squads at various polls. The Captain told the people that he was not there to interfere, but to protect the election officials. Two days later, another detachment of troops arrived, and they were also dispatched to the various polls. Soldiers were also brought into Baltimore in wagons for the election, taking possession of the four city precincts. The soldiers issued oaths to those who wished to vote and

30Ibid., pp. 244-245.
questioned voters as to their support of the Lincoln administration.  

The use of federal troops during the election raised another problem of the soldier and the election. Should the soldier be allowed to vote? The National Intelligencer, in an editorial on April 23, 1863, brought this question to the attention of the public. The writer asserted that soldiers who were defending their country should have a voice in its government. It was not a question, stated the Intelligencer, of whether the soldier should vote, but rather by what means their votes were to be obtained. The Boston Advertiser feared that the absentee voting of soldiers might mean fraud in the elections. General Grant expressed his views on the question for the Intelligencer. The general stated that if the soldiers desired and the state law permitted it, nothing would prevent the soldiers in his command from expressing their desires in the elections. The major problem was to enable the soldier to cast his ballot without interference with his military duty. The concept of voting in the field was a new idea. Generally, the Democrats opposed voting in the field, and the Republicans favored the measure. 

31 National Intelligencer, October 12, 1862; November 9, 21, 1863; Hesseltine, Lincoln’s Plan of Reconstruction, pp. 43-46.  

Whatever the role of the soldier in the elections of 1862, whether supervisory or participatory, the results were clear. The 1862 elections in November nearly doubled the number of Democrats in Congress. Many states returned Democratic majorities, among them Lincoln's home state of Illinois. Ohio and Pennsylvania returned a Democratic majority to Congress, as did Indiana and Wisconsin. Despite the increase in Democratic membership, the Republicans still maintained control of Congress, but their position had been weakened.33

Closely related to the military phase of the war was the question of emancipation. To the President, the question of emancipation was subservient to the preservation of the Union. Freeing the slaves was a last resort to Lincoln to be used only if absolutely necessary and then by him under the war powers of the chief executive, not by Congress. The Radicals believed that the war must not end without the destruction of slavery. A war to preserve the Union did not satisfy them. They desired fundamental changes in the South's socio-economic system, and to achieve that goal the cornerstone of the Southern system, slavery, must be destroyed. Many Radicals believed that if the war continued long enough, the people would force the government into a policy of emancipation, and they felt little enthusiasm for a war which did

33 Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors, p. 271.
not include the abolition of slavery as one of its objectives. 34

Although Lincoln had laid down his position on the slavery question in his first inaugural address, as Northern armies entered the Southern lands, slaves often escaped to follow the armies, and their presence became a serious problem to Union generals. Lincoln's eventual decision to issue the Emancipation Proclamation was justified on the grounds of military necessity, and under powers granted to him as Commander-in-chief of the armed forces. In the final analysis, the implementation of the Proclamation lay in the hands of the Union armies. But it also had serious political implications for the President and the party he led.

Many Union supporters believed that if the Proclamation transformed the war into a crusade against slavery, some in the North would withdraw their support from the Republican party. In addition, confidence in the President would also be undermined. Montgomery Blair feared that the Proclamation would result in a Republican defeat in the mid-year elections. This was a valid argument, especially in the Mid-West. Its issuance was one of many factors which contributed to the Republican defeat in the 1862 elections in this area. 35

34 Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors, pp. 204-205; T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and the Radicals, pp. 9-14.

35 John Hope Franklin, The Emancipation Proclamation (Garden City, 1963), pp. 78-79.
The Proclamation also aroused the bitter hostility of those in the North who were pro-slavery. Negro haters stated that the Proclamation would mean social and political equality for the Negro. The Democrats stated that it made the abolition of slavery a cause of the war. Now the white man was supposed to give his life to free the black man. On the other hand, the Proclamation partially cut the ground from under the Radical element's opposition to Lincoln on the slavery issue.

After a month, because of the impact of the Proclamation, certain facts became apparent. First, the people in the loyal Border States were ready to receive the Proclamation; it had been expected. At first, it did cause some excitement because many felt that the time was wrong. Secondly, it was the consensus that the people in the Border States would not be alienated by the Proclamation. Though it was not especially desired in the area, it caused no serious disaffection for the Union. In the third place, the Union army did not appear to be offended by the Proclamation. No officer resigned, nor was there any degree of insubordination as a result of the Proclamation. Indeed, it appeared that the army generally favored it, for it would help them crush the rebellion. Fourthly, it was believed that the Negroes, in time, would do their part to make the Proclamation

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practical and effective. And lastly, it was obvious that
the Rebel leaders feared the Proclamation. They were aware
of the potential damage it could cause in the Confederacy.\textsuperscript{37}

In the minds of many Southerners, the Proclamation
enhanced the possibility of a servile insurrection. The
Richmond \textit{Examiner} stated this fear succinctly when it termed
the document a "call for the insurrection of four million
slaves, and the inauguration of a reign of hell upon earth."\textsuperscript{38}
The Confederacy also realized, as did the North, that the
Proclamation would help prevent foreign recognition of the
Confederate States. In addition, many Southerners believed
with President Jefferson Davis that the Proclamation would
render restoration of the Union much more difficult.\textsuperscript{39}

Providing troops for the Union armies proved to be
another point of contention for the Lincoln administration.
The calling of volunteers did not prove satisfactory, and the
Union was forced to consider the possibility of a conscription
law. When civil war broke out, the military organization
relied on the regular army, the "volunteer," and the state
militia. However, the militia proved to be unable to meet

\textsuperscript{37}\textit{New York Times}, October 22, 1862.

\textsuperscript{38}\textit{Richmond Examiner}, September 29, 1862, as quoted in
Franklin, p. 64.

\textsuperscript{39}Franklin, pp. 65-67.
the demands of a serious war on a large scale; thus Congress passed the Conscription Act of March 3, 1863.40

Conscription also had political repercussions. Joseph Medill, editor of the Chicago Tribune, told Lincoln that the bill would do his administration great harm and cause the party to lose the state elections in the fall. The Copperheads gloated over the act, stating that it "puts the rich man's dirty dollars against a poor man's life."41 The draft aroused much hostility toward the government, especially in Democratic strongholds. Draft riots occurred in New York, Boston, and other heavily Democratic areas. Governor Seymour of New York was very bitter about the draft, and he urged Lincoln to suspend it in his state. Despite its ramifications, Lincoln maintained that the draft was constitutional and that it would be enforced.42

The draft and emancipation brought to Lincoln's attention the question of whether the Union should use Negro troops. Public opinion varied on the issue. The New York Times carried an unsigned letter expressing the opinion that the Union should arm the Negroes and use them as troops. It


41Joseph Medill to Lincoln, May 15, 1863, RTL Papers

42Ibid., Medill to Horace White, March 5, 1863; John Boyle to John P. Usher, March 14, 1863; RTL Papers; National Intelligencer, July 15, 1863; New York Times, July 25, 1863; Address to the opponents of the draft, August 30 (?), 1863, RTL Papers.
expressed the idea that it would be absurd to reject the services of anyone just because of the color of his skin. In Washington, however, visitors from the West stated that the Union lost more than it gained by the use of Negro troops. Men serving in the army from the Border States stated that they would resign if Negro troops were used. A regiment from Kentucky declared that they would lay down their arms if Negro troops were used. Despite opposition from within his own party and in the Border States, Lincoln did sanction the use of Negro troops. By the end of the war, some 186,000 colored troops were in the service of the Union army.43

With such a variety of problems the election year of 1864 opened with storm clouds billowing over the Lincoln administration and the Republican party. Discontent was apparent in every corner. Politically, the cabinet was at odds, and Congress was dominated by the wing of the party hostile to the administration as a result of the mid-year elections. As it convened in December, 1863, Congress rejected Lincoln's choice for the House Speakership, and the important committees were headed by men who opposed Lincoln's conservative policy. The Border States, politically important as the site of Lincoln's initial reconstruction plan, were kept in the Union by political maneuvering and military occupation. The President and the Radical element of the

party clashed over command problems and military affairs. In addition, emancipation aroused the Radicals, as well as creating military and political problems involving the Union's relationship to the Confederacy.

In such a climate, the nation prepared to elect a president. Lincoln had been noncommittal regarding a second term. But other presidential hopefuls had begun activities in behalf of their own candidacies, thereby deepening the division within the Republican party and hoping to consolidate the general discontent with the Lincoln administration.
CHAPTER II

ACTIVITIES OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ASPIRANTS

As discontent with the Lincoln administration became more widespread, dissatisfied elements within the Republican party began to seek a replacement for Lincoln. Many names appeared as possible candidates to replace the President, among them Benjamin F. Butler, U. S. Grant, John C. Frémont, and Salmon P. Chase. The effort by Chase and his friends to secure the nomination presented one of the more serious attempts on the part of some Republicans to replace the man from Illinois, and it further pointed out the serious rift in the Republican party.

From the early days of the Lincoln administration, Chase questioned the ability of Lincoln to fill the high office he held, and he soon began to look for some other man to give direction to the administration. Chase settled on himself as the most capable man for the job, and he began to try to convince others that he should be the leader of the Republican party. Thus Chase became the rallying point for many of the Radicals and other malcontents within the party.\(^1\)

\(^1\)Zornow, p. 28.
In its earliest stages, Chase's campaign was self-conducted via the mails, consisting of an endless stream of letters to men of all stations, trades, and professions. The general theme was much the same in all of them. He wrote that he believed the next president should possess qualities other than those possessed by Lincoln. This was only the beginning. Soon more tangible evidence of a "boom" appeared.2

In the autumn of 1863, Chase returned to his native Ohio for a state election. Clement Vallandigham was a candidate for governor, and Chase toured the state speaking against Vallandigham. The Secretary did not conceal the fact that he had designs upon the White House in 1864. In a published day-by-day account of Chase's tour, Whitelaw Reid pictured Chase as a popular hero, and soon editorials appeared in all parts of the North lauding Chase and his achievements. Chase recorded in his diary in August, 1863, that he did not desire the Presidency, though he knew that his name had been mentioned. The one position that he did desire was the Chief Justiceship. However, continued the diary, if his political friends should decide to nominate him for the Presidency, he would accept the honor.3 Chase's sincerity certainly can be questioned, in view of the fact that he had a consuming desire for public office.

2Hendrick, p. 400.

The "boom" for Chase was officially launched on December 9, 1863, at a meeting in Washington. A list of those in attendance revealed men who were uncommitted to Lincoln and favorable to Chase. Among them were Roscoe Conkling and John A. Stevens of New York, Andrew Johnson and W. G. Brownlow of Tennessee, Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, Hannibal Hamlin, and David Wilmot and Jay Cooke of Pennsylvania. Some three weeks later, Secretary Welles was informed that there was an active and zealous movement for Chase underway and that Chase clubs were being organized in many cities to control the nominating convention.4

Attempting to further his presidential aspirations, Chase worked hard to win the support of the press. In this endeavor he was only partially successful. Chase courted James Gordon Bennett's influential New York Herald and Joseph Medill's Chicago Tribune, but without success. For a time Horace Greeley's New York Tribune rendered him tacit support. Chase also tried to win the favor of William Cullen Bryant and his New York Evening Post. Bryant was hostile to Chase, and he warmed up but little to Chase's overtures.5

In addition to the press, Chase sought backing from other quarters. He attempted to win the support of the

4Welles, Diary, I, 498; Randall and Current, IV, 96; Charles R. Wilson, "The Original Chase Organization and The Next Presidential Election," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXIII (1936), 62.

5Hendrick, p. 406; Zornow, pp. 34-36.
Catholics by praising General William S. Rosecrans, a distinguished Catholic. The Secretary also used his treasury appointees to further his political aspirations. An example of Chase's use of the patronage came to Lincoln in a letter from John Donnally of Ohio. Donally wrote that one W. P. Mellon had requested a permit to purchase cotton in Ohio. Before the permit was granted, Mellon was questioned as to whom he considered best qualified to become the next president. If the reply was Chase, the permit was granted; but if it was not, the permit was refused. Though Chase had at least four areas from which he hoped to derive support, he never made a concentrated effort to coordinate the activities of the groups, and he never had a really effective organization behind him.

While Chase's friends were busy in his behalf, Chase himself was not idle. He kept up a steady stream of criticism of the conduct of the war and the Lincoln administration. Favorite points of contention were the lack of method in the cabinet meetings and the military failures, for which he blamed Lincoln. By early 1864, general unhappiness with the Lincoln administration had increased, and Chase had become its rallying point. It became increasingly clear that Chase was prepared to become a candidate. He became convinced that his

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6 John Donnally to Lincoln, November 26, 1863, RTL Papers; Zornow, p. 38.
chances were getting better, and he stepped up his criticism of the administration. Chase's steady refrain was that there was no administration in any real sense of the word.  

The Chase "boom" reached its peak with the publication of two documents, the first of which was a pamphlet entitled "The Next Presidential Election." It was distributed by Senator Samuel Pomeroy and his Congressional committee. The pamphlet soon filled the mails. It did not advocate the candidacy of Chase; rather, it contented itself with pointing up the futility of the Lincoln administration and the absurdity of electing the President for a second term. The pamphlet also pointed out Lincoln's failures as an administrator, and it accused him of being a military despot.  

The other document, the "Pomeroy Circular," went a step further in that it put forth a name to fill the presidential chair—Salmon P. Chase. The "Circular" stated that when the party in power was not handling the war and the nation properly, the interests of the country demanded a change. It stated several conclusions. In the first place, Lincoln's reelection was impossible. Secondly, if the President should be reelected, his tendency toward compromise and temporary expedients of policy would cause the nation to suffer.

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7 Donnal V. Smith, *Chase and Civil War Politics* (Columbus, 1931), pp. 92, 99, 102.

8 Zornow, p. 49; Hendrick, p. 413.
Thirdly, Chase had all the desirable qualities needed in a president; and lastly, the Chase committee was at work to promote his nomination.\(^9\)

Chase maintained that he had not known that the "Circular" had been printed until he saw it in the press. He wrote the President to that effect, to which Lincoln replied that he had been aware of the circular though he had not read it and did not think he would read it. The President also told Chase that he had known of Pomeroy's committee and its activities. Chase tendered his resignation to Lincoln, who promptly refused it. To dismiss Chase would precipitate a deeper split in the Republican party and probably a defeat in the 1864 election.\(^10\)

The "Pomeroy Circular" and the "Election" pamphlet destroyed any chance Chase might have had for the nomination. Rather than helping Chase, these two publications served to rally support to the President. The New York Times editorialized that the circular not only had hurt Chase but had done harm to the Union as well. Chase finally withdrew his name from contention on March 11, 1864.\(^11\) The publications had

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\(^11\)Chase to James C. Hall, March 5, 1864, RTL Papers; New York Times, February 24, 1864, March 11, 1864; Hendrick, p. 421; Zornow, p. 57.
caused the Chase bubble to burst, but there were also other reasons for the failure of the Chase "boom."

Chase also failed to receive support from other quarters, chiefly in Congress and from the powerful Blair family. Congress's Radical element gave the Secretary little encouragement. Though their views coincided and though the Radicals disliked the President, Chase did not appear to them as a satisfactory replacement for Lincoln. And in the cabinet, only Stanton encouraged Chase in his presidential aspirations. This lukewarm feeling on the part of Congress was explained in part by politics. Congressional representatives depended on the grassroots voter for their very jobs, and it appeared increasingly certain that Lincoln had the people with him. Therefore, for the Congressional representatives to support Chase would mean risking their political futures, and that most of them could not afford to do. Chase overrated his support. He believed that he had the backing of important men, but he failed to win it. They gave him lip service, but not their public support.12

The most vociferous and not the least effective opposition to Chase came from the Blairs. They were never silent, and the entire family apparently basked in the favor of the President. Frank Blair had been elected to the House of Representatives from Missouri, even though he held a commission in the Union Army. At Lincoln's request, Frank temporarily resigned his

12Hendrick, pp. 384-385; Zornow, p. 28.
commission, with Grant's permission, and took his seat in the House. Lincoln wanted him to be elected to the Speakership, but the attempt failed. Before resuming his military duties, Blair verbally attacked Chase from the House floor. The first tirade came on February 27, 1864. Blair, who had been trying to secure an investigation of the Treasury Department, accused Chase of refusing to permit the investigation. Some two months later, on April 23, Blair again took to the House floor to castigate Chase. He accused the Secretary of crimes varying from forgery to outright treason. Chase was understandably upset at the tirade, and he believed that the President had full knowledge of Blair's intentions. However, this was not the case.

For months, Chase had been toying with the idea of resigning. In June, 1864, his excuse came. John Cisco resigned an important post in New York. Chase wanted Lincoln to appoint one of his own followers, M. B. Field, to the position, but Thurlow Weed and Senator Edwin D. Morgan objected to Field. The President told Chase that he could not, without embarrassment, appoint Field because of the Senator's objection. He also stated that he did not feel that Field was the right man for the job. Lincoln asked Chase to withdraw Field's name.

and presented the Secretary with three names from which to choose a successor to Cisco. Chase then wrote to Cisco asking him to remain at his post, which he did. The Secretary then tendered his resignation to Lincoln, stating that he did not believe that he could remain at his post without causing embarrassment to the administration. Lincoln accepted Chase's resignation. The Secretary recorded in his diary that he had suffered a good deal of embarrassment at the hands of the President and that Lincoln had never given him the support to which he believed he was entitled.¹⁴

In addition to the Chase activities, friends of John C. Frémont were busy promoting his candidacy for the Republican nomination. Frémont's friends received ample help from his wife, who had encouraged him to seek the presidency since his retirement from the army in 1862. Many of Frémont's friends blamed Lincoln for his resignation from the military.¹⁵ This fact, coupled with the Frémont-Blair feud, renders a better understanding of the general's role in the election of 1864.

The Frémont-Blair difficulty began while the general was in Missouri. When Frémont received the Missouri command, Frank Blair, Jr. supported him, and in the early months

¹⁴Lincoln to Chase, June 28, 1864, Basler, VII, 412-413; Lincoln to Chase, June 30, 1864, ibid., 419; Chase, Diary, pp. 223-224; Donnal V. Smith, Chase and Civil War Politics, p. 144.
¹⁵Zornow, p. 73; Randall and Current, IV, 113.
relations between the two were cordial. But this rapport
was not destined to endure. 16

The primary causes of the break between Frémont and
Frank Blair were essentially concerned with prestige and
leadership. St. Louis was simply not big enough for both
Blair and the "Pathfinder." In addition, the two disagreed
over the prospects of St. Louis being captured by the Con-
federates. Blair minimized the possibility, while Frémont
emphasized protecting the city against a probable attack.
Blair also disapproved of Frémont's suppression of the press,
and Blair viewed Frémont's emancipation proclamation as en-
dangering the Union cause in Missouri. 17 It was generally
known that the Blairs were influential with Lincoln until
1864. This fact, along with the Frémont-Blair feud, might
easily lead to a deepening of the Republican split.

The movement for Frémont's candidacy probably began in
Missouri through the efforts of B. Gratz Brown, one of the
leaders of the Radical Republicans in the state and a champion
of Frémont's. Brown had been associated with the Blairs in
Missouri politics early in his career, but he severed connec-
tions with the family over Frémont's proclamation and his
handling of the Missouri Department. In February, 1863, Brown
arranged a meeting in Louisville, Kentucky, ostensibly to

16 Ruhl Jacob Bartlett, John C. Frémont and the Republican
Party (Columbus, 1930), p. 76.

17 William C. Smith, The Francis Preston Blair Family In
unite the Border States and give them an opportunity to outline a program of emancipation. However, the actual objective of the meeting was to block Lincoln's renomination. Brown already had a candidate in mind, John C. Frémont. This initial call received little support. Shortly thereafter, however, a pro-Frémont movement began in New York, New England, and the Old Northwest.  

Throughout 1863, Frémont clubs sprang up in Missouri, Iowa, and Indiana. Generally, they advocated the abolition of slavery, territorial status for the conquered Confederate states, and the one-term presidency. New York City was the center of another Frémont group. The club appeared openly in February, 1864, and organized a Frémont journal, the *New Nation*. New England boasted two Frémont groups, one under the leadership of the abolitionist Wendell Phillips, and the second made up of the German element.  

Two groups were important to the Frémont "boom." The first was the German population across the country, especially in Missouri and the Midwest; the second was the abolitionist element. Reports came from St. Louis that the German population would support Frémont through thick and thin. It is hard to determine their numerical support, but it may be supposed that the great majority of Germans would have voted for him.

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18Zornow, p. 73 ff.; Peterson, pp. 108-109, 134.

19Bartlett, pp. 97-100.
The abolitionists' numerical support of Frémont likewise is difficult to evaluate, but he did command a certain following among them. Thus in early 1864, it appeared that Frémont might prove to be a formidable contender for the Republican nomination.20

Thus with plans formulated, the old-line abolitionists called a "Frémont meeting" at Cooper Institute on March 19, 1864. Most of the men attending were political unknowns. Friedrich Kapp, a German-American, opened the meeting with a speech advocating the need for a change in the government. Other spokesmen equally obscure followed his lead and threw out abuses of Lincoln for good measure. The platform called for the vigorous and concentrated prosecution of the war.21

At this point, little attention was paid to the Cooper Institute meeting. But shortly after it, Frank Blair launched his verbal attack on Chase. This attack created an uproar among the Radical leaders and increased the resentment they felt for the administration. With Chase out of the running, it seemed clear that Lincoln would be nominated by the Republicans, but his election in November was another matter. To have Lincoln again lead the Republican party was anathema to many extremists, and they turned to the possibility of a third

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20Ibid., pp. 111-113.

ticket. It might force Lincoln's withdrawal, and it would increase the chances of his defeat by splitting the party.  

In addition to Chase and Frémont, General Grant represented another possible alternative to Lincoln by 1864. Apparently the general was approached by both major parties as a potential candidate, though neither party made a concerted effort to determine whether Grant would make a good president. Regarding his candidacy, the general told the press that he could handle only one thing at a time, and for the time being he was busy fighting a civil war. Moreover, Grant reportedly stated that under no condition would he be a candidate in opposition to Lincoln. The President himself was informed that there was a move underway to promote Grant for the nomination. However, it is doubtful that there was any concerted effort to persuade Grant to toss his hat into the presidential ring.

The overtures on behalf of Benjamin F. Butler were a bit more serious. In early 1864, one of Butler's friends approached him about the second spot on the ticket with Chase. Butler declined, stating that he was not interested in an elective office. After Chase's withdrawal, Butler's name was put forward by the Radicals. The general was originally a War Democrat, but his military activities had endeared him to the Radical element of

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22 Ibid.

the Republican party. Butler managed to capture the imagination of the public, and his treatment of the Rebels in Louisiana won him the support and praise of the Radicals.\(^2\)

In March, 1864, Lincoln selected Simon Cameron to approach Butler as a possible running mate. Lincoln's action apparently was due largely to his desire to placate the Radicals, because he had no delusions about Butler's character; but Lincoln was also aware of the general's popularity. Cameron visited Butler at Fortress Monroe, but he declined the offer because it held no apparent political future. Furthermore, when the Chase "boom" collapsed, Butler's chances for the presidential nomination appeared to increase. However, as with Grant, the movement for Butler did not materialize.\(^2\)

As activities to promote other presidential aspirants were under way, Lincoln's friends were not idle. As early as October, 1863, Lincoln was reminded that it was time to think about the next presidential election. It was suggested that the President let some of his confidential friends know his wishes concerning a second term. In early 1864, Joseph Medill told Lincoln that if he did not help his own cause, his friends

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\(^2\)Bartlett, p. 118; Trefousse, Butler, p. 162; Merrill, pp. 549-551.
certainly would be unable to help him. Medill casually mentioned that Lincoln could enhance his chances of renomination by creating more harmony in his cabinet, and Medill mentioned Blair and Seward specifically. Meanwhile, other friends of the President were at work creating the idea that the public desired the reelection of Lincoln. The tactic used was to have the state legislatures pass resolutions endorsing his renomination.\textsuperscript{26} They were remarkably successful.

The President received warnings about the inactivity in his own behalf from other quarters. J. Henry Mulford, a friend of the President's, warned Lincoln that Chase was out to defeat him for the nomination or at least to ruin the administration. Mulford reported much the same thing about Blair, and he urged Lincoln to rid himself of these two liabilities. Lincoln also received reports that the Germans in the West harbored much resentment against his renomination and election.\textsuperscript{27}

Though Lincoln was warned about the activities of Chase and Frémont and reprimanded for his draft call of July 18, 1864, because it would hurt his popularity, he took little part in promoting his own renomination or in the campaign that

\textsuperscript{26}Elihu B. Washburn to Lincoln, October 12, 1863; Joseph Medill to Lincoln, February 17, 1864, RTL Papers; Bartlett, p. 105. The RTL Papers contain nearly all the state legislatures' endorsements of Lincoln's candidacy, far too numerous to be cited here.

\textsuperscript{27}J. Henry Mulford to Lincoln, April 27, 1864; William H. Horose to Lincoln, May 12, 1864; RTL Papers.
followed. Lincoln's answer to his inactivity was "'What is the Presidency to me if I have no country?'" Occasionally the President did visit local and area fairs to deliver short speeches. He also visited sick and wounded soldiers and returning regiments to thank them for the service rendered their country. At no time, however, did Lincoln ever make any personal references to his opponents, Democratic or Republican.  

By no means did the Republicans have a monopoly on pre-convention maneuvering. Prior to the nominating conventions the Democrats were engaged in trying to unite a severely divided party. Though victorious in the 1862 elections in many areas, the Democratic party had been placed in a more and more untenable position. The cry of the Republicans to join the Union party made it appear that those who refused to do so were maintaining a position bordering on treason. Those who did join the Union ranks became known as War Democrats.  

The second faction within the Democratic party occupied the middle ground. This group, led by Horatio Seymour of New York, believed that the restoration of the Union was the paramount aim of the war. They did not endorse the Lincoln administration; as did the War Democrats because of Lincoln's alleged arbitrary, unconstitutional acts. These were not

30 Zornow, pp. 119-120.
Copperheads per se; they merely opposed emancipation, suppression of the press, and the suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*.\(^{31}\)

The third Democratic faction was the ultra-peace wing, or the Copperheads. The chief spokesman for this wing was Clement L. Vallandigham of Ohio. Although the principle seat of the Copperhead movement was in the Midwest, it also gained a following in the East, especially in New York City and the adjacent parts of New Jersey. The eastern leaders were Fernando Wood, three-time mayor of New York City, and James W. Wall of New Jersey. Though influential, the eastern Copperheads never gained control of the party machinery as did the faction in the Midwest.\(^{32}\)

Copperhead activities in the Midwest centered around Vallandigham, the acknowledged leader of the Western Democrats. He had served as a member of the House of Representatives from Ohio, resigning his seat to run for the governorship in 1862. Vallandigham campaigned on a platform of denunciation of the Lincoln administration, the war, and conscription. During the course of the campaign, Vallandigham was arrested by General Burnside, tried by a court martial, and sentenced to prison. The hue and cry from the Democrats almost overwhelmed the administration. Lincoln, embarrassed by Burnside's actions,

\(^{31}\) *Ibid.*, p. 120.

commuted the sentence, banishing the Ohioan to the Confederacy. Going to Canada, Vallandigham continued to spearhead the drive for peace.\textsuperscript{33}

Though the Peace Democrats were made up of many groups, they all opposed the Lincoln administration. Their common bond was the promotion of peace. By their constant agitation, they managed to help elect Democratic majorities in several states in 1862. Some went so far as to demand an armistice, threatening independent action if the government did not fall into line. The Peace wing of the party argued that the war was wicked and its successful termination would destroy the nation. Under Vallandigham's guidance, they opposed conscription and urged resistance to it. At a peace meeting called by Fernando Wood on June 3, 1863, the Copperheads displayed their sympathies with the secessionists. Wood maintained that the government did not have the right to wage war on the South, and he condemned the administration in general and the armies and their leaders in particular. He stated that he was not for preserving the Union if it must be done by war.\textsuperscript{34}

Thus the Democrats were faced with the necessity of uniting the three factions within their party, nominating a candidate, and drafting a platform that would please all of

\textsuperscript{33} Basler, VI, p. 215, n. 1; p. 235, n. 1; Lincoln to Burnside, May 29, 1863, \textit{ibid.}, p. 237; \textit{ibid.}, pp. 267, 303-304, 306.

\textsuperscript{34} New York Times, February 12, 24, March 10, April 9, June 4, September 6, 1863; Edward C. Smith, \textit{Borderland}, p. 324.
them. The cogent question to be resolved was whether the war and peace faction could be harmonized. Despite the desire of some to choose a civilian candidate, only the "Young Napoleon," George B. McClellan, appeared to command enough of a following to merit the nomination. McClellan had much support from some influential Democrats, and among the soldiers his following could not be disputed. But the peace faction was hostile to McClellan. The strongest opposition came from the Copperheads, but they could find no substitute.  

McClellan's interest in the nation's political future appeared first in his Harrison's Landing letter to Lincoln. The occasion was Lincoln's visit to the army in July, 1862. The general had retreated after the failure of the Peninsula Campaign. During the course of the President's visit, McClellan handed Lincoln a letter in which he set forth his views on the great issues and the political controversies of the time. It has been asserted that this letter, though addressed to Lincoln, was McClellan's bid for the Presidency in 1864.  

Lincoln never mentioned the letter to McClellan again, nor did the general show any interest in politics until late 1863, keeping aloof from political currents until October of that year. At that time, McClellan wrote to Charles Biddle endorsing George W. Woodward for the governorship of Pennsylvania.

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35 Zornow, pp. 121-123.  
36 McClellan to Lincoln, July 7, 1862; George B. McClellan, McClellan's Own Story (New York, 1887), pp. 487-489; Hendrick, pp. 303-305.
It has been suggested that this letter placed the general squarely in the presidential race. Its political views were the same as those earlier expressed by McClellan in his Harrison's Landing letter to Lincoln.37

Having chosen McClellan, the conservative Democrats gradually brought him into the open. He possessed all the qualities of availability, despite the fact that his military exploits had been less than successful. In Boston and New York McClellan was entertained by the "best" people. He also commanded the allegiance of the railroad interests, having been president of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad before receiving his military command.38

McClellan's possible nomination stirred varied reactions in the nation's press. The New York Times editorialized that his nomination would indicate that the Democratic party was in serious want of a leader. Another commented that the general's candidacy seemed to spring from those who hated the Union and wanted its destruction. McClellan was chided for being committed to no definite policy. On the other hand, the National Intelligencer reported enthusiastic support for "Little Mac." A meeting at Cooper Institute was attended by thousands, and many people stood in the streets outside the hall. A


demonstration held in Union Square reportedly was attended by thirty to forty thousand people. McClellan's candidacy was also hailed in New Jersey and Philadelphia. In Newark, the Intelligencer reported, the biggest crowd ever assembled in the city stood outside as the state convention met to ratify McClellan's candidacy.\(^{39}\)

Thus as convention time approached, both major parties were in difficult straits. Both were seriously divided, and both might anticipate at least some difficulty in reconciling their warring factions. The various groups within both parties had their own conceptions of a platform, and the Republicans faced the possibility of candidates in opposition to Lincoln. It remained to be seen whether the nominating conventions could placate the respective factions within each party and select a candidate and platform upon which all could agree.

\(^{39}\)New York Times, January 4, March 19, March 27, 1864; National Intelligencer, March 19, August 12, 1864.
CHAPTER III

THE NOMINATING CONVENTIONS

The first of the nominating conventions to meet was the one called by a group of Radicals for the purpose of nominating a third ticket. The call for this convention was an outgrowth of the activities to secure Frémont as a potential candidate. It met in Cleveland on May 31, 1864, with the meeting called to order by Pennsylvania governor William F. Johnston. About four hundred delegates attended, representing sixteen states. The convention completed its organization early, selecting John Cochrane as its president. Cochrane's speech set the purpose of the convention as being in the interest of the country, not any particular party. Governor Johnston appointed the Committee on Permanent Organization. The creation of the Credentials Committee stirred some debate, but there was little real dissension. The first session closed with very little else being accomplished.¹

The afternoon session found the convention nominating candidates. It soon appeared that there were two factions present. A small group, mostly from the East, favored U. S.

¹New York Times, June 1, 1864; Nevins, Frémont, II, 655-659.
Grant for the nomination, and the larger group favored Frémont. The Grant faction tried to get the convention to postpone the nomination of a candidate, but it failed. Instead the convention nominated Frémont by acclamation and chose John Cochrane as his running mate. The platform was the next order of business in the afternoon session, and the Radical platform was adopted. It called for the abolition of slavery, the one-term presidency, and free speech and a free press. The platform also called for the placing of Reconstruction exclusively in the hands of Congress. The final plank called for the confiscation of rebel lands to be divided among Union soldiers.²

Frémont accepted the nomination and the platform except for that plank dealing with the confiscation of rebel property. In his acceptance speech, Frémont defended himself and assailed Lincoln for having abandoned the principles upon which he was elected. He told the convention that if the Republicans nominated a man whom he could support, he would withdraw in favor of him; but if Lincoln were renominated, he would try to defeat his reelection.³

Frémont's nomination failed to engender much excitement among Republicans. No one really expected him to make any

²New York Times, June 1, 1864; Bartlett, p. 103.
³New York Times, June 1, 1864.
great showing at the polls should he remain in contention. According to George Templeton Strong, the Chairman of the United States Sanitary Commission, Frémont's nomination attracted little attention in New York. Strong confided to his diary that Cochrane's nomination was a confession of weakness, and that Frémont was not as strong as he had been in 1856. But the calling of the Cleveland convention before the Republicans met enabled all the malcontents to enhance the chances of a party split. The Frémont convention, however, showed the ineptitude of the anti-Lincoln faction when it came to political action. Many people wondered whether the Radical element had any real program or if it was a catch-all for party discontents.⁴

The real importance of Frémont's candidacy, aside from its significance as a protest movement against the administration, depended upon the closeness of the contest between the two major parties. Indeed, it appeared that the action of the convention was designed not so much to promote Frémont as to defeat Lincoln. In addition, Frémont's nomination pointed to the continued division and the general discontent with the Lincoln administration. The New York Times termed the Cleveland convention as nothing more than a "flank movement"

against Lincoln, seeking to combine all the hostile elements against him and break down his administration.\(^5\)

On the eve of the Republican nominating convention, opposition to Lincoln was still strong. Many Republicans objected to the President's indecision on slavery. Others believed that he was too friendly with Seward and the Blairs and too lenient regarding reconstruction. Still others felt that Lincoln lacked backbone and had failed to carry out his military responsibilities. The lack of military success was another factor in the mounting discontent with the administration. Grant's appointment had been favored by most Republicans, but as midsummer approached and he made no apparent progress against the Confederate forces, there was a reaction against the General. His prestige declined as many people feared another Rebel invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania. George Templeton Strong noted in his diary that people were saying that the government was preventing its generals from gaining victories for fear of bringing into focus one or more anti-administration candidates for the presidency.\(^6\)

In the face of such opposition to the administration, many urged the postponement of the nominating convention which had been called for June 7, 1864. Those who favored a postponement hoped that such action would prevent the selection of

\(^5\)New York Times, June 2, 1864; Bartlett, p. 113.

\(^6\)Strong, Diary, III, 287, 407-408; Randall and Current, IV, 117-118; Bartlett, p. 115.
Lincoln, and they wished to hold the convention in September. The New York Times, however, urged that the convention not be postponed.7

Despite this opposition, the convention opened on June 7, in Baltimore. It was apparent immediately that Lincoln had strong support. Much of the President's strength lay in the Republican party machinery and organization. Party politicians had managed the choice of many state delegations, and numerous state legislatures had passed resolutions endorsing his candidacy. Furthermore, many citizens' groups, such as the Union Lincoln Association and the New England Publication Society, favored his renomination.8

The convention met at noon amid much enthusiasm. The meeting was called to order by Edwin D. Morgan of New York, who addressed the convention. Morgan reminded the delegates of their solemn responsibilities. The convention then adopted the rules of the House of Representatives as its rules. The next order of business was the selection of the Credentials Committee, one member from each state delegation being selected to serve on the Committee. Missouri was excepted, as she had sent two delegations.9

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7New York Times, April 27, 1864; Randall and Current, IV, 118.
8Randall and Current, IV, 120-122, 124.
9New York Times, June 8, 1864; William E. Smith, The Blairs in Politics, p. 266.
The evening session heard reports from the Committee on Permanent Organization. Then William Dennison of Ohio, president of the convention, addressed the body. He again reminded the convention of its responsibility, especially in view of the fact that the nation was in the midst of a civil war. Parson Brownlow then called upon the convention to seat the delegates from the reconstructed state of Tennessee, stating that the people of that state had never believed that they were out of the Union. The delegates were seated, but they were not allowed to vote.  

The second day's session of the convention met in a very crowded hall. Various committee reports were given before the convention heard from the Credentials Committee. This report centered around Missouri and her two delegations, one representing the Radical element and the other representing the Blair-Union faction. The presence of the rival delegations from Missouri set off a heated debate. Preston King and others made a motion that if both delegations agreed on a candidate, the vote of Missouri would be allowed to stand. However, if the two delegations could not agree on a candidate, Missouri would have no vote. The motion failed to carry, whereupon another motion was made to split the Missouri vote, and it, too, failed to carry. At this point, Curtis of New York Times, June 8, 1864.

Ibid., June 9, 1864.
York rose to remind the convention that the question of Missouri's rival factions was not a new one to the nation. He also pointed out that the Credentials Committee had already decided to seat the Radical delegation in the interests of the Union. Curtis implored the convention to follow the Committee's recommendation, and the Radical delegation was seated.12

The seating of the Radical delegation from Missouri meant that the Blair-Union men were excluded from the convention, and they controlled the Missouri patronage. Though a popular decision at the convention, the move was clearly a defeat for the Blairs. In effect, the Republican party had served notice to Lincoln that it had no more need for the services of the Blairs.13

After the seating of the Missouri delegation, the convention heard Chairman Henry J. Raymond read the platform. It reiterated the party pledge to maintain the integrity of the Union and the authority of the Constitution. It called for the unconditional surrender of the states in rebellion, the abolition of slavery, and a constitutional amendment forever prohibiting slavery. The tariff and the banking system of the nation were not mentioned in the platform, nor was there a plank on reconstruction. The reading of the platform

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12Ibid.

13William E. Smith, Blair's in Politics, pp. 266-267.
occasioned a wild outburst of applause from the floor, and it was adopted by acclamation.\(^1\)

Having adopted the platform, the convention next turned to the nomination of the candidates. An initial move to re-nominate Lincoln and Hamlin resulted in a reverberation of "No's!" throughout the hall. Many delegates asked that the motion be divided. A debate over a point of order ensued as an attempt was made to nominate Lincoln by acclamation. Chairman Raymond settled the matter by calling for a poll of the states on the motion to select Lincoln as the presidential standard bearer. The roll call of the states showed all states voting for Lincoln except Missouri, who gave her twenty-two votes to U. S. Grant.\(^1\)

The selection of a vice-presidential nominee proved to be a bit more difficult for the convention. It has been asserted that Lincoln desired Andrew Johnson of Tennessee as his running mate. In the first place, Johnson could conceivably bring the War Democrats into the Union camp. Secondly, the Union party might expect favorable reaction from abroad if the second spot on the ticket went to one from a reconstructed state. Alexander McClure alleged that, prior to the convention, Lincoln sent Daniel S. Sickles to Nashville to investigate Johnson as a possible running mate. Lincoln also

\(^1\)New York Times, June 9, 1864; Randall and Current, IV, 127-129.

\(^1\)New York Times, June 9, 1864.
spoke to Simon Cameron and McClure about Johnson, asking their support in his behalf. Seward and Henry J. Raymond were also aware of the President's activities, but among the New York delegation there was a move to nominate their "favorite son," Daniel S. Dickinson. However, Thurlow Weed opposed Dickinson because his nomination would likely force the resignation of Seward from the cabinet since he, too, was a New Yorker. Charles Sumner, meanwhile, worked for Dickinson's nomination because it would send Hamlin back to Maine where he might secure the Senate seat of W. P. Fessenden, Sumner's political enemy. Despite these efforts, the Johnson movement gained headway in New York, thanks to the efforts of Henry J. Raymond.

Though the convention generally knew Lincoln's wishes concerning his running mate, it heard many nominations, with Johnson, Hamlin, and Dickinson the leading contenders. However, Johnson proved to have more support, and he was chosen on the first ballot. The Republicans had selected their candidates. All that remained for the convention to do was to notify Lincoln.

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16H. M. Dudley, p. 509. Lincoln's role in Johnson's nomination is in dispute by historians. The accounts of Nicolay and Alexander McClure, a close friend of Lincoln, differ greatly on this point. See Randall and Current, IV, pp. 130-134. See also Noah Brooks, pp. 141-142. Brooks stated that Lincoln was non-committal on the vice-presidency.

17Riddle, Recollections, p. 282; Zornow, pp. 100-101.

A committee headed by Governor William Dennison notified the President of his renomination and presented him with a copy of the platform. Lincoln told the committee that he had no reason to doubt that he would accept, but he felt that he should at least read the platform before making a formal acceptance. Lincoln indicated that he did favor the constitutional amendment prohibiting slavery.\footnote{New York\textit{ Times}, June 10, 1864; \textit{National Intelligencer}, June 10, 1864.}

The Republican convention had completed its work. The renomination of Lincoln pointed to the fact that Lincoln's popularity with the people was a potent force. His choice by the convention also revealed the effectiveness of the Republican party machinery and the use of the federal patronage in guiding the selection of convention delegates at the state level. Having chosen their standard bearers, the Republicans prepared to watch the activities of the Democrats in convention.

As the Democrats convened in Chicago on August 29, 1864, the diarist Gideon Welles drew a depressing picture of the delegates. Welles pictured them as "extreme partisans of every hue—Whigs, Democrats, Know-Nothings, Conservatives, War men and Peace men, with a crowd of Secessionists and traitors to stimulate action—all uniting as partisans, few as patriots."\footnote{Welles, \textit{Diary}, I, 120.}
George B. McClellan appeared to be the obvious choice as a candidate. However, many Democrats wondered if a military man would run on a peace platform. Furthermore, at least one attempt had been made to secure McClellan's withdrawal from contention. As the military situation deteriorated in July, 1864, Frank Blair, Sr., made an effort to have McClellan restored to military command. The elder Blair went to see McClellan's managers, and he also asked the general to ask Lincoln to restore him to command. Blair believed that if McClellan were given a military post, it would thwart any bid he might make for the Democratic nomination. However, McClellan declined to consider a military reappointment.21

Also, in the pre-convention caucusing a move arose to nominate Horatio Seymour of New York.22 The Seymour movement was probably initiated by Fernando Wood. Seymour had no great affection for Wood, but he made no move to stop Wood's activities. By the same token, Wood had no great love for Seymour, but he hoped to kill McClellan's chances of nomination by using the Governor. As a result of Wood's activities, the New York caucus ended in a stalemate. Individual delegates from at least sixteen other states favored Seymour as


a compromise candidate, but they operated under the unit rule and were powerless to act alone. The result was Seymour's withdrawal from any consideration as a nominee.\textsuperscript{23}

The opening session of the convention was called to order by August Belmont, who told the assemblage that the nation had been brought to the brink of ruin by four years of Republican rule. He promised that America would rally to the support of the Democratic party candidate and his platform if it offered her a true patriot.\textsuperscript{24}

After Belmont's speech Temporary Chairman William Bigler of Pennsylvania charged the Republicans with all the woes of the country. Following Bigler's address the usual committees were appointed, and Governor Seymour of New York was chosen permanent chairman of the convention. The Governor made a long and eloquent speech about the party's devotion to the Union. He told the assemblage that the Lincoln administration could not save the Union even if it would. According to Noah Brooks, a correspondent on the scene, Seymour's speech was not well-received. Brooks reported that the convention kept calling loudly for Vallandigham, who kept out of sight.\textsuperscript{25}

The platform was presented late in the afternoon of the second day. Hostility developed almost immediately between

\textsuperscript{23}Zornow, p. 130.

\textsuperscript{24}New York Times, August 30, 1864; Nicolay and Hay, IX, 254.

\textsuperscript{25}Noah Brooks, p. 167; New York Times, August 31, 1864; Nicolay and Hay, IX, 255-256.
the extremists and the conservatives over the platform. Clement L. Vallandigham, the Copperhead from Ohio, headed the Committee on Resolutions, and the platform difficulties were debated in committee. The fight against Vallandigham was led by the delegates from New York. Despite difficulties, a platform was drafted and presented to the convention, and it was not altogether ordinary.  

The platform declared the Party's devotion to the Union and denounced military interference in the elections in the Border States. It listed the illegal acts of the Lincoln government and charged it with the denial of civil rights. But the key plank in the Democratic platform was Vallandigham's peace resolution:

Resolved, That this convention does explicitly declare, as the sense of the American people, that after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war during which, under the pretence of a military necessity, or war power higher than the Constitution, the Constitution itself has been disregarded in every part, and public liberty and private right alike trodden down and the material prosperity of the country essentially impaired, justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an ultimate convention of the States, or other peaceable means, to the end that at the earliest practicable moment peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States.  

26 Brooks, p. 167; Kirkland, p. 131.

According to Horace Greeley, Nicolay, and Hay, the War Democrats, though not approving of the platform, were so intent on the nomination of McClellan that they failed to contest it. Therefore, the platform was adopted without debate. Upon Vallandigham's motion, the adoption was made unanimous.²⁸

Following the adoption of the platform the convention turned its attention to the selection of its standard bearers. J. C. Stockton of New Jersey nominated McClellan. After the nomination, Representative B. G. Harris took the floor in opposition to the general. The Chairman ruled Harris out of order, but the convention encouraged him. Harris proceeded with vitriolic oratory to denounce McClellan, accusing him of instigating tyranny before Lincoln had thought of so doing. Harris also chastized the general for his arrest of the Maryland legislature as a military measure. Some of the War Democrats objected to Harris's tirade, telling him that if he could not vote for the convention's nominee he was not fit to be a member of the convention, let alone address it. General George Morgan of Ohio rose to the defense of McClellan, after which Alexander Long pointed out that McClellan's statements to date were opposed to a peace platform. Long also echoed Harris's statement that McClellan had surpassed the President in abridging civil liberties.²⁹

After the nomination of McClellan was made unanimous, the crowd on the convention floor went wild. When order was restored, the convention heard nominations for the second place on the ticket. George H. Pendleton, D. W. Voorhees, George Cass, and James Guthrie were nominated, among others. New York, with its large vote, abstained until it became apparent that her vote would decide the choice. At that juncture the New York delegation cast its votes for Pendleton, assuring him of second place on the ticket.30

Following Pendleton's nomination, Charles A. Wickliffe moved that the convention not adjourn sine die. Wickliffe told the group that events prior to March 4, 1865, might necessitate the calling of another convention. The motion was applauded by the convention, who took it as a warning that something extraordinary might happen and they were to be prepared.31

Before Governor Seymour notified McClellan of his nomination, Atlanta fell and the military tide had turned. The general accepted the nomination, but he refused to stand on the peace plank of the platform. For McClellan, the restoration of the Union was the one condition of peace. Furthermore, the general expressed the belief that the platform would


31Ibid., p. 171; New York Times, September 1, 1864; Nicolay and Hay, IX, 259.
render the Democratic cause hopeless if he accepted it in full.  

McClellan's statement on the platform upset the Democrats. Some of the Peace Democrats wanted to repudiate McClellan and call a new convention to nominate someone else. Others preferred to support the general, thus making the best of a bad situation. Some War Democrats came out for Lincoln after the convention. Confiding to his diary, George T. Strong wrote that if McClellan were elected, the general would betray the country.

Thus by September, 1864, both major parties had selected their respective candidates. The Republicans placed their faith in the President, even though their ranks were divided. Compromise had helped to secure Lincoln's renomination, but his renomination did not necessarily mean that the party approved of administration policies. The Democrats had served notice to the nation that the war had been a failure and that peace must be sought in a convention of the warring parties. But their candidate held views incompatible with the platform. Moreover, there was a third ticket, headed by John C. Frémont. The battle lines had been drawn. The ensuing campaign presented the candidates to the American people, and they would make the final choice.

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32Appleton's *Cyclopaedia*, p. 794; Nicolay and Hay, IX, 260-261.

33Strong, *Diary*, III, 477; Randall and Current, IV, 220-221.
CHAPTER IV

ISSUES AND THE CAMPAIGN

As the presidential campaign opened, Lincoln's re-election looked virtually hopeless. Campaign Manager Henry J. Raymond wrote that Lincoln could not possibly carry Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Indiana; and that he would lose New York by at least 50,000 votes. The military picture was dark; there was no good news from Grant in Virginia. To make matters worse, the Confederate cavalryman, Jubal Early, swooped down on Maryland and created a panic in the capital.1

Moreover, there was still a move afoot to remove Lincoln from the Republican ticket. On August 6, 1864, a group of malcontents met in Ohio to try to force the withdrawal of Lincoln and Frémont. The meeting amounted to little except to give rise to another conclave in New York. The New York meeting, called for August 13, was held in the home of Mayor George Opdyke of New York City. It was spearheaded by journalistic leaders such as Horace Greeley, Theodore Tilton, and Parke Godwin. Political luminaries also attended; among them were Wade Davis, Governor John A. Andrew of Massachusetts, David D. Field, and Charles Sumner. This august assemblage urged all who would desire another candidate to meet at

1Zornow, p. 113.
Buffalo on September 22. The September meeting suffered a blow when Governor Andrew refused to attend. He switched his support to Lincoln when he learned that the President favored a constitutional amendment banning slavery.2

As the campaign began in earnest, both major parties relied on similar techniques and procedures. The most important campaign tactic was the pamphlet, and it was via this media that both parties disseminated their information. The distribution was handled by special organizations for the Republicans, such as the Union League of America and the New England Publication Society. There were others, and they were all secret. The Democrats also had their organizations to spread campaign literature; among them were the Sons of Liberty and the Order of the American Knights. In addition, both parties relied on colorful personalities of the times as speakers in behalf of the respective candidates. Also, both parties attempted to capitalize on the word "Union." The Republicans used it as their party label. Democratic speakers constantly appealed to the friends of the Union in their addresses. But they were never able to identify themselves with it as convincingly as did the Republicans. Both parties tried to woo the labor vote. The Democrats used the high cost of living as an issue, blaming it on the Lincoln

administration. To get the labor vote, the Republicans sought to define the issue of freedom on broader terms than the abolition of slavery. Some Republicans stated that the election was simply a question of Democracy versus Aristocracy.\(^3\)

Though Lincoln refused to take part, the Republicans, along with the Democrats, attempted to bring personalities into the campaign. The Democrats charged Lincoln with wishing to become a dictator. He was called a tyrant and a scoundrel. The President was also chided for his appearance, his lack of education, and his proclivity for telling funny stories. The Democrats also accused Lincoln of being an atheist. The New York World termed the Lincoln-Johnson ticket as one made up of a "'rail-splitting buffoon and a boorish tailor, both from the backwoods, both growing up in uncouth ignorance.'"\(^4\)

The Republicans turned their political guns squarely on McClellan, using his acceptance speech and his military failures as ammunition. The New York Times accused McClellan of practicing his favorite strategy, fighting shy. Referring to his acceptance speech, the editorial stated that McClellan

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\(^3\)Randall and Current, IV, 242, 244-245; Zornow, pp. 179, 183. See also Frank Freidel, "The Loyal Publication Society: A Pro-Union Propaganda Agency," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXVI (1939), 359-376, for the work of one Northern agency.

\(^4\)New York World, June 20, 1864, as cited in Randall and Current, IV, 247; Zornow, p. 174; Randall and Current, IV, 247, 245-247.
did not give the people a clear knowledge of where he stood on any crucial issue, especially peace. McClellan hedged on the point of cessation of hostilities, charged the *Times*. Furthermore, McClellan's speech was designed not to offend any faction within the Democratic party, but not to offend the rebels as well. The *Times* also accused the general of being a traitor and termed those who supported him as traitors. The paper believed that the Democratic ticket was the stimulus the Union cause needed. Thurlow Weed indicated that McClellan was not the party choice, and that the Chicago platform offended every loyal party member. According to Weed, the platform contained nothing to indicate which side of the war the convention favored. George Templeton Strong, the head of the Sanitary Commission, termed McClellan's letter of acceptance as being made up of "platitudes floating in mucilage, without a single word against treason or rebellion."5

Governor Oliver P. Morton of Indiana believed that the question was not one of men, but of policy as represented by the two candidates. Speaking to a New York City Union meeting in late October, the Governor chided McClellan for his Harrison's Landing letter to Lincoln, pointing out that McClellan had no political career. Indeed, whatever position the general had attained he owed to Lincoln. McClellan's

5New York *Times*, September 2, 10, 16, October 3, 4, 1864; Thurlow Weed to Abraham Wakeman, October 13, 1864, as cited in the New York *Times*, October 17, 1864; Strong, *Diary*, III, 484.
reputation, stated Morton, "does not consist so much of what he has done, as of what he would have done if he had been let alone by the President and the Secretary of State."⁶

Despite attacks on his military career, McClellan was not without his defenders. Albert Gallatin praised the general's military career and heartily condemned the Republicans' attacks on it. Gallatin placed the blame for McClellan's failure at the door of the Lincoln administration. Robert C. Winthrop, speaking in New York in late September, defended the general and also played up McClellan's youth.⁷

Both parties also sought to woo the votes of the military. Since their candidate was a former general, the Democrats hoped to secure McClellan's endorsement by leading army officers. In so doing, they hoped to influence the vote of the soldier and civilian. In New York, the Democrats were very eager for the soldier vote. The state used the proxy system of voting, whereby the soldier voted and returned the ballot to his home precinct. Some zealous Democrats "interrupted" some of the ballot boxes. The ringleaders were caught and sentenced to long prison terms.⁸

⁷National Intelligencer, September 21, 1864.
⁸Randall and Current, IV, 252-256. See also New York Times, October, 1864, for numerous editorials on draft frauds.
Nor were the Republicans idle in attempting to secure the soldier vote. It was widely known that General Grant favored Lincoln, and as the campaign progressed, most Republicans believed that the majority of the armed forces favored the President. But the Republicans did not take the soldier vote for granted. The Congressional Campaign Committee sent agents to distribute Union literature to the troops in the field. And Lincoln himself was careful not to offend soldier opinion. When addressing the troops, the President praised their labor and sacrifice in upholding the Union cause. Upon occasion, Lincoln also used his appointive power as Commander-in-Chief. In some instances promotions were contingent upon party loyalty.9

The President also recognized that the soldier vote would be important in Indiana, a key state. He asked General William T. Sherman to do anything he could to let Indiana's soldiers go home to vote, since that state prohibited voting in the field. Sherman received a similar request from Schuyler Colfax. In his reply to Colfax, the general wrote that he did not have enough men to allow any of them to go on furlough

just to vote. But he assured Colfax that the soldiers would vote when given the opportunity.\textsuperscript{10}

The Union picture brightened after the fall of Atlanta on September 1, and even Lincoln became more optimistic. He asked General John A. Logan to leave the army and help in the campaign, especially in Illinois. The President also arranged for Carl Schurz to leave his military post to make speeches. Despite Lincoln's activities in this area, he did not attempt to manage his own campaign; that was left to Henry J. Raymond. Lincoln did interfere, however, when he believed the party organization managed the campaign poorly. He believed that Cameron had botched the job in Pennsylvania, so he called on Alexander McClure and discussed the matter with him, asking McClure to help the State Committee with the campaign.\textsuperscript{11}

Lincoln did express himself on at least three occasions during the campaign. In an interview in August, 1864, with Governor Alexander Randall of Wisconsin, the President spoke on the interrelation of the campaign issues. Lincoln stated that no wing of the Democratic party offered a program that would not result in the permanent dissolution of the Union.


\textsuperscript{11}Bartlett, p. 127; Carman and Luthin, p. 238; Randall and Current, IV, 240.
The President re-emphasized that the purpose of the war was the restoration of the Union, but emancipation must be a prerequisite. In October, speaking to a group of serenaders, Lincoln stated that he believed the people still wanted to preserve their country and their freedom, but their vote was their own. Speaking in Maryland on October 19, 1864, Lincoln asserted that his administration had been designed to maintain the government, not to overthrow it.\textsuperscript{12}

Though actively participating in the campaign very little, Lincoln did aid his own cause and that of his party by reorganizing his cabinet. One of the storm centers of the official family was Montgomery Blair. Attempts to keep him out of the cabinet had failed. As a cabinet member, Blair made enemies by his stand to reinforce Ft. Sumter and by his outspoken condemnation of General Winfield Scott and Secretary Seward. The anti-slavery men of the North broke with Blair after the Fremont feud. The Republican convention also passed a resolution calling for more cabinet harmony. Although Blair and Chase were not mentioned specifically, it was generally known that the convention wished Lincoln to remove the two men. Throughout the summer, pressure for Blair's removal increased, and Lincoln soon realized that it was not good politics to retain in his

\textsuperscript{12}Randall and Current, IV, 245; Nicolay and Hay, IX, 359.
cabinet a man with whom the majority of the party had become disenchanted.\textsuperscript{13}

Therefore, Lincoln asked Blair for his resignation. The President told Blair that he believed the time had come when his resignation would be a relief to the administration. Blair was replaced by ex-Governor William Dennison of Ohio.

After Blair's resignation, Radical orators took the stump for Lincoln, thoroughly denouncing McClellan. They made the basic issue of the campaign appear to be the Peace party, disunion, and the restoration of slavery as opposed to the Union party, reunion, and the destruction of slavery.\textsuperscript{14}

Though the removal of Blair brought some degree of unity to the Republicans, the candidacy of Frémont might conceivably prove to be a threat, especially since Republican fortunes appeared to be on the wane. It has been asserted that Frémont learned that some unnamed practical politicians were consulting Lincoln about the possibility of both his and Frémont's withdrawing in favor of a third candidate. In view of this fact, Zachariah Chandler suggested that Lincoln come to terms with Frémont. This was apparently the source of the so-called "Lincoln-Frémont bargain." In a letter written much later,
Chandler asserted that he had the consent of Lincoln and the National Congressional Committee to talk with Frémont.  

Supposedly the interview took place in the office of Frémont's lawyer and political advisor, David Dudley Field. Field had prepared the way for the "deal." He told Frémont that he should do what he could for party unity. Chandler told the general that Lincoln would not withdraw, and if Frémont failed to do so, McClellan would win the election. Chandler then informed the "Pathfinder" that he was empowered to offer the general a return to active service in the military with a high command if he would withdraw, but Frémont declined. However, on September 22, 1864, Frémont did withdraw in favor of Lincoln and the Republicans. The general's withdrawal removed another stumbling block to Republican unity.

During the course of the campaign, Lincoln applied the pressure of the patronage, and often he did not consult the party leaders in so doing. Lincoln consistently refused to

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15Nevins, Frémont, II, 663-664; Randall and Current, IV, 227-228. The so-called "deal" between Lincoln and Frémont has long puzzled historians. In 1880, the Detroit Post and Tribune published the life of Zachariah Chandler. The author of the "deal" episode was George W. Partridge, Chandler's secretary, who had access to Chandler's papers. See Charles R. Wilson, "The Lincoln-Blair-Frémont Bargain," American Historical Review, XLII (October, 1836), 71-78. See also the letters from Chandler to his wife and to Ben Wade reprinted in Winfred A. Harbison, "Zachariah Chandler's Part in the Reelection of Lincoln," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXII (1935), 271-276.

16Nevins, Frémont, II, 664-665. James G. Randall states that it appears more apparent that Frémont made a deal with McClellan. On September 20, 1864, McClellan was told that Frémont had authorized agents to make whatever arrangements with the Democrats that they considered best regarding his withdrawal. Randall and Current, IV, 229-230.
consider Senator Pomeroy's requests for offices. The President also removed Horace Binney, the Collector of the Port of New York and a Chase man. Following Binney's removal, Lincoln appointed Simon Drapee to the post. Then he proceeded to bring all the employees of the Customs House into line, but only a few underlings were removed.17

The Brooklyn Navy Yard was the source of the most serious incident to Lincoln and his use of the patronage. In August, 1864, Charles Jones, the Chairman of the Union State Committee, reported to Campaign Manager Raymond that nearly one-half of the Yard's employees were hostile to the President. The Yard employed between six and seven thousand persons, and it was impossible to dismiss half of them. Nevertheless, some dismissals resulted, over the objections of Secretary Welles.18

Lincoln's use of patronage did not always result in a negative approach. The President helped members of Congress who favored him, for Lincoln expected officeholders to be loyal party members. The President reprimanded federal officeholders for trying to defeat administration members of Congress. Federal employees were also expected to contribute to the campaign fund.19

17Randall and Current, IV, 241, 250; Carman and Luthin, p. 283.
18Welles, Diary, II, 136; Randall and Current, IV, 251.
19Randall and Current, IV, 252; Carman and Luthin, pp. 282, 288.
As a means of insurance in the election, Lincoln used the device of getting new states in the Union. The territories of Colorado, Nebraska, and Nevada had many enthusiastic sponsors, and Louisiana and Arkansas were ready to be readmitted to the Union under the President's plan of reconstruction. James W. Nye, the Territorial Governor of Nevada, was particularly anxious that his territory be admitted prior to the election, as was Secretary of State Seward. Nevada's entrance into the Union would mean three electoral votes for Lincoln. Therefore, at the request of Governor Nye, Congress set up the date of Nevada's constitutional referendum from October 11 to September 7, 1864. After the state constitution was ratified by the people, Governor Nye wired a copy of the Constitution to Lincoln, who wished to read it. Positive action by Congress followed, and eight days prior to the election Lincoln read a proclamation admitting Nevada into the Union.20

Thus Lincoln did work in his own behalf during the campaign, though it may be considered as indirect participation, and he did have the backing of the party organization. But the key to the campaign per se lay in the issues to be resolved. The most discussed issues were treason, the Lincoln administration itself, union or disunion, freedom or slavery, and war or peace.

20Basler, VIII, 83-84; Randall and Current, IV, 235-237.
The issue of treason was initiated by the Republicans, and the way was paved for it by the Chicago convention. Actually, few Democrats were traitors, but their disloyalty to the Lincoln administration, their complaints on the conduct of the war, and their many secret societies left the party open to charges of treason. In July, 1864, the issue was presented to the American public by General Rosecran's report on secret societies in Missouri. Rosecran's report alleged that the state's secret societies were trying to overthrow the government.²¹

However, the Republicans found their real ammunition in the Democratic platform. Even the party's candidate could not stand firmly on the platform, and this fact put the Democrats on the defensive. The Republicans attacked the platform from four basic avenues. Generally, the Republicans characterized the Democratic convention speeches and deliberations as treasonable. Secondly, they charged that the Democrats showed sympathy toward the Confederacy because the platform failed to censure it while it did not hesitate to condemn the administration. The third avenue of attack claimed that the platform was written at the instigation of Southern agents. Lastly, the Republicans charged that the Democratic Convention was a phase of a well-laid plan by the secret societies to rebel against the government. The New York Tribune stated that

²¹Greeley, II, 556; Strong, Diary, III, 482; Zornow, pp. 149-150.
"'the Democrats were ready to barter the integrity of the Union for the sake of political power,'"²² George Templeton Strong viewed the Chicago platform as a "shameful disavowal of honor." According to Strong, the infamy of the Chicago traitors seemed likely to produce a reaction and make the administration party more vigorous and united.²³

The Republicans directed some of their heaviest fire at McClellan and Pendleton. It was rumored that McClellan had visited Lee before the Battle of Antietam and offered his services to the Confederacy. Benjamin Wade condemned McClellan, calling for the people to do their duty to down the "infernal traitors" who supported him. Speaking after the fall of Atlanta, Secretary of State Seward accused the Democrats of plotting to overthrow the Union by nominating McClellan. Writing for the Atlantic Monthly, C. C. Hazewell stated that to elect McClellan would mean that the nation would have to choose between constant warfare, because the general's election would theoretically approve of secession, and despotism, the only alternative against anarchy. Some Republicans accused Pendleton of hurting the Union cause. Even some Democrats joined the opposition in condemning their own party, and they were hard pressed to formulate a reply to the Republican charge of treason. Their chief defense was that the Democratic party


²³Strong, Diary, III, 480.
was not a disunion party. Perhaps Thurlow Weed was a competent authority on judging the campaign when he wrote that "the disloyalty of the Democratic party...worked its own over-throw. Mr. L/lncoln7 is to be re-elected (if at all) on the blunders and folly of his enemies." 24

Indeed, the Democrats were not only hard pressed to answer the Republican charges but also to find an issue to inject into the campaign. In an attempt to find an issue, the Democrats chose the conduct of the Lincoln administration in general. Their cause was aided for a time by the adverse war news from Virginia. The Democrats charged that administration policies were designed to encourage Southern resistance. The country was on the brink of ruin and unless a change of administrations occurred, the nation would face national bankruptcy and military despotism. To prolong the war, stated the Democrats, would decrease the national wealth, diminish the national work force, set back national progress, increase the cost of goods, and increase the national debt. 25


25 Millard Fillmore to John B. Robinson, as cited in National Intelligencer, October 4, 1864; Speech of Sanford E. Church, New York Times, October 16, 1864; George S. Hillard to the Boston Post, as cited in the National Intelligencer, September 2, 1864; Zornow, pp. 169-170.
Other Democrats also condemned Lincoln's policies. Writing to the National Intelligencer, Reverdy Johnson charged that Lincoln's administration proved that the President was unequal to his duties. Johnson pointed out that with all at his command, Lincoln had failed to restore the Union. Indeed, if anything, the Union was more broken in 1864 than when he assumed the Presidency. Johnson called for a change, stating that "none, if loyal [could] be worse."26 Speaking at a Democratic Union Association meeting, Sanford E. Church told his audience that the Union was no nearer to victory than it had been at the firing on Ft. Sumter because the policies of the Lincoln administration were all wrong. If they were not changed, Church stated, the Union would never be restored. In addition, Church accused the administration of using trickery and treachery to deceive the poor white man and to cheat the soldier out of his vote.27

Democrats also accused the administration of trying to stifle all sentiments of Union loyalty in the South and to implant instead a determination never to be reconciled. Quoting Fernando Wood, the New York Times stated that the reelection of Lincoln would mean a bloody revolt in the North and West. Governor Wickliffe, speaking to a Democratic rally, told the

26Reverdy Johnson to the National Intelligencer, September 24, 1864.

27Speech of Sanford E. Church, as cited in New York Times, October 19, 1864.
audience that the nation and the Constitution were in danger of being destroyed "by a foul despotism unparalleled in the history of man." According to the Governor, the administration did not intend to restore the Union until it "had emancipated the poor negro, subjugated the state, destroyed the Constitution, and broken down the spirit of the white man."28

The Democrats also condemned the administration for its suppression of civil liberties. They hoped this question would place the Republicans in an embarrassing position and woo those in the Unionist ranks who opposed such suppression. The Democrats charged that Lincoln's continued violation of civil liberties was undermining the Constitution. If allowed to go unchecked, they claimed, the pattern of American freedom would be permanently warped. Democrats concentrated most of their efforts on the suspension of habeas corpus, stating that no one had any means of protection against arbitrary arrest.29 Democratic opposition hoped to make its strongest appeal on this point, but they failed apparently because they misjudged the public reaction. The Republicans justified Lincoln's violation of civil liberties on the grounds of military necessity.30 This defense may have been flimsy,

28National Intelligencer, September 21, October 20, 1864; New York Times, October 5, September 9, 1864.

29Zornow, pp. 171-172.

30Speech by T. G. Alvord to Union Meeting, as cited in the New York Times, October 15, 1864; ibid., p. 173.
but with succeeding military victories, it proved to be sufficient.

The third major issue in the campaign was the question of union or disunion. The Democrats charged that the war as waged by Lincoln was not a war for the preservation of the Union. Speaking to a Columbia County Democratic Convention on September 17, 1864, R. H. Gillet told his audience that the Union could not be restored under the present administration. However, he stated that the Democrats could persuade the South that her interests lay with the Union. Robert C. Winthrop argued that the issue was not one of personalities, but union or disunion. In his opinion, the best interests of the country demanded a change. If Lincoln were reelected, he charged, the nation would be plunged "into the fathomless abyss of disunion."31 War Democrat F. B. Cutting assumed the position that secession was illegal and that one state could not impose her will on the rest of the Union. Cutting rejected the Chicago platform because it was humiliating to the country and because it sought to have a convention of each of the states in its sovereign capacity, thereby in fact dissolving the Union.32

31 Speech by Robert C. Winthrop, as cited in the National Intelligencer, September 21, 1864.
32 National Intelligencer, September 21, October 22, 1864; New York Times, November 2, 1864; Randall and Current, IV, 244; Zornow, p. 169.
Answering Democratic charges that Lincoln's policies were promoting disunion, the New York Times editorialized that the Democrats were hiding behind the term "union," accusing them of desiring to unite with the South. The editorial termed the party's alleged or self-styled fidelity to the Union "sheer impertinence." The words of Carl Schurz were more vitriolic. Speaking in Brooklyn in early October, Schurz stated that by some perversion of human logic, the party of the slave power called itself the National party. He accused the Democrats not of being pro-slavery, but of not stating that they were against it. Apparently Salmon P. Chase agreed with Schurz. As Chase saw it, the war was still one to preserve the Union.33

Perhaps the most clear-cut of the issues was whether the war should be continued. The Peace Democrats' position on the issue of war or peace was probably best expressed by Horatio Seymour in the early days of the campaign. Seymour was running for the governorship of New York in 1864. Speaking in Milwaukee on September 1, 1864, he declared that the nation could do no worse than to elect Lincoln again, because it would offer no hope for the future. According to the Governor, the unequal representation in the Senate would result eventually in a minority imposing its will on the

33 New York Times, September 21, October 11, 20, 1864.
majority. He urged the North to negotiate a peace before taxation and tyranny ruined both sections.34

Speaking to an audience in Philadelphia in early October, Seymour declared that this was no time to ask what brought the war about; the question was what the country could do to "'preserve its existence and perpetuate its liberties.'" The Governor continued that the price of conquest would be a government by bayonets.

. . . victories will only establish military governments at the South, to be upheld at the expense of northern lives and treasure. They will bring no real peace if they only introduce a system of wild theories, which will bring us to bankruptcy and ruin. The administration cannot give us union or peace after victories.35

According to Seymour, returning the Republicans to power would result in two bitter lessons: first, it would be dangerous to give a government more power than it could exercise wisely, and second, that government could "'not trample upon the rights of the people of another state without trampling on its own as well.'"36

Governor Seymour was not alone in his desire for peace. An editorial in the Intelligencer expressed a similar desire, but also pointed out that a premature peace might result in


35Horatio Seymour, Public Record, p. 253, as cited in ibid., p. 375.

36Ibid., p. 258, as cited in Mitchell, p. 375.
disunion. A later editorial opposed subjugating the South. The South could be reduced to submission, but not to obedience. It pointed out that a republican government was the least fitted for conquest and subjugation. Therefore, if this be true, must the North give up the Union, questioned the Intelligencer.

Not so, but we must give up the policy which renders a restoration of the Union impossible, and we must give up the Administration which has adopted this policy, while at the same time leaving on record its deliberate judgment that it is a policy as impracticable as it is unconstitutional....

Continuing, the editorial stated that if the administration's policy of conquest was pursued with success, the government would be lost. If the policy were unsuccessful, the Union would be lost. The basis for union must be sought in wise "measures of political conciliation and constitutional justice," stated the Intelligencer.

Republicans and War Democrats took up the cry that the war should be prosecuted with vigor until its conclusion. General John A. Dix charged that the Democratic Convention, in calling for peace, misrepresented the feelings and opinions of the majority of the party. Roscoe Conkling denounced the rebellion and advocated the continuance of the war. He stated that the life of the nation and free institutions

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37 National Intelligencer, September 24, 27, 1864.
38 Ibid., September 27, 1864.
depended upon the reelection of Lincoln. Some Republicans charged that the Democrats, in calling for a cessation of hostilities, wished to yield to the rebels, for the rebels had not asked for peace. Governor Morton charged that those who supported McClellan had never favored war in the first place. Vice-President Hamlin stated that he favored peace, but it must be a lasting peace that would secure the future liberty of the nation. Hamlin believed that peace must not result in the surrender of the vital principles of government. Speaking in celebration of Farragut's and Sherman's victories, Senator Charles Sumner called for the prosecution of the war to the fullest extent. The Senator stated "...if you take care of liberty, the Union will take care of itself—or better still, do not forget that if you save liberty, you save everything."  

On the issue of emancipation, there was little doubt where each party stood. In April, 1864, the Thirteenth Amendment had been defeated in the Senate by sixty-five Democratic votes, making emancipation an issue in the campaign, and it was introduced at all levels. All factions of the Union Party agreed that slavery had no place in the reconstructed Union.

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40 Speech by Charles Sumner, National Intelligencer, September 13, 1864.
If peace were to be permanent, slavery must be destroyed. The party insisted that emancipation be a part of reconstruction. Despite this fact, the Unionists carefully avoided any mention of the Negro's position in society.41

The Democrats argued that Lincoln had embraced emancipation as an aim of the war. Refuting this argument, Chase told an Odd Fellows Convention in late October that the President had not made emancipation an aim of the war. Rather Lincoln realized that he could not put down a rebellion with one hand and hold up slavery with the other. Chase asserted that emancipation struck "the main prop" from under the rebellion. He saw it as a question of what should be saved, the Union or slavery. Carl Schurz saw emancipation as the destruction of a major contribution to the entire war effort of the Confederacy.42

On the other hand, the Democrats accused the Unionists of attempting to restore the Union on the basis of emancipation, not the Constitution. According to the argument, the Republicans were trying to promote racial equality for the Negro by their policy of emancipation. The Democrats closely associated emancipation with reconstruction by claiming that the former should not be made a basis for peace or readmission

41Lornow, pp.167-168.
to the Union. By so doing they hoped to bring the issue of reconstruction into the campaign because they realized it was the Achilles' heel of the Union party.\(^{43}\)

The problem of reconstruction was not a new issue. Lincoln's earliest attempts at reconstruction were the establishment of military governments, one of the first being Tennessee. The President realized the necessity of creating state political parties which would be sure to place political offices in the hands of pro-administration men. Lincoln announced his basic plan of reconstruction on two occasions, his Amnesty Proclamation of November 8, 1863, and his Annual Message to Congress on December 8, 1863. The plan was relatively simple. A full pardon would be granted to those who took part in the rebellion, with certain exceptions, on the condition that they take an oath to support and defend the Constitution and to abide by the acts of Congress. Those excepted were persons who had held places of trust and honor in the military or civil service of the Confederacy and those who were guilty of mistreating colored troops. Whenever ten per cent of the voting population of 1860 had fulfilled these requirements, a state government could be reestablished.\(^{44}\)

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\(^{43}\)Zornow, pp. 165-166.

\(^{44}\)Lincoln's Amnesty Proclamation, Annual Message to Congress, RTL Papers; Hesseltine, Lincoln's Plan of Reconstruction, pp. 64, 70-71.
The President's plan rested on the assumption that the recognition of a state government, a purely political function, was the exclusive function of the Executive. The constitutionality of Lincoln's plan was questioned, however. The determination of the time when a territory met the constitutional requirements of having a republican government traditionally rested with Congress, not the Executive. Lincoln crossed swords with the Radicals on these points.⁴⁵

Realizing by the spring of 1864 that there was little chance of preventing Lincoln's renomination, the Radicals determined to prevent the President from controlling the process of reconstruction. Distrusting Lincoln's lenient plan, they formulated one of their own, the Wade-Davis Bill. The bill was designed to stop the work of reconstruction already begun in Tennessee and Louisiana and to prevent the extension of Lincoln's plan into any more of the Southern states. The plan presented in the Wade-Davis Bill did not differ greatly from Lincoln's. It had seven steps to reconstruction rather than two steps as did Lincoln's plan. The bill was not strong nor was it well thought out. It appeared to be more a means of striking at the power of the President than a process of reconstructing the Union. The cogent fact about the bill was that at each of its seven steps, Congress had control, not the Executive.⁴⁶

⁴⁵Hesseltine, Reconstruction, pp. 72, 78-79, 100.
⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 110-114; Nicolay and Hay, IX, 115-116.
The bill was extensively debated in the House, but the Senate showed little interest in it. The principle point of argument for the bill was that Congress, not the President, should control reconstruction. The bill passed both houses and went to Lincoln for signature on July 4, 1864, the last day of the session. The scant majorities in the vote, the absence of debate, and the number of absentees bore testimony to the general apathy of the lawmakers to the bill.\textsuperscript{47}

Lincoln did not sign the bill, but laid it aside, stating that it was too important a measure to be signed in haste. In addition, Lincoln had constitutional reservations about whether Congress could prohibit slavery in the reconstructed states. On July 8, 1864, Lincoln quietly issued a proclamation on the bill. The President stated that he was not prepared to set aside the new governments in Arkansas and Louisiana. Lincoln continued that any Southern state that wished to do so could use the plan. The decision was left to the South.\textsuperscript{48}

The fact that Lincoln refused to sign the Wade-Davis Bill further pointed to the different points of view within the Republican ranks. Congress, controlled by the Radical

\textsuperscript{47}Hesseltine, \textit{Reconstruction}, pp. 114-118; Randall and Current, IV, pp. 188-190.

\textsuperscript{48}Basler, VII, 433-434; Randall and Current, IV, 191; Nicolay and Hay, IX, 120, 123.
element, made allegiance to the Union a past question, whereas Lincoln did not. Supporters of the Wade-Davis Bill maintained that it was more democratic, but the idea was deceptive. Under the provisions of the bill the Southern governments would be in the hands of a minority because too many people had served the Confederacy and could not take the oath of allegiance. Furthermore, the bill implied that the states could secede from the Union, and Lincoln steadfastly maintained that secession was illegal. He believed that the Union could not survive such an admission. Moreover, the Wade-Davis Bill would tend to retard restoration of the Union, and Lincoln desired a rapid and peaceful restoration. Thus Congress and Lincoln reached a stalemate over what policy to pursue regarding the Southern states. Such a stalemate would affect the presidential election because, at adjournment, the relations between Congress and the President were at their lowest ebb.49

The Congressional reply to Lincoln was the Wade-Davis "Manifesto," published in the New York Tribune on August 5, 1864. It denounced the President for pursuing his policy of reconstruction without the aid of Congress, and it condemned his state governments in Arkansas and Louisiana. The "Manifesto" insinuated that Lincoln's desire to hasten reconstruction was a device to secure more electoral votes. The pocket veto

49Randall and Current, IV, 193-197.
was termed a blow to the friends of the administration, the rights of humanity, and the basic tenets of republican government. The "Manifesto" brought reconstruction into the presidential campaign, but only between Lincoln and the Radical element. 50

The "Manifesto" was designed to so sway public opinion against Lincoln that he would be forced to withdraw. The military prospects were not bright, the treasury was empty, and the nation was war weary. But it did not bring the desired results. The "Manifesto" failed to change the mass view of Lincoln. Rather it tended to lift the spirits of the pro-Lincoln faction. Though reconstruction was an issue in the campaign, the voter was never presented with a clear conception of the various modes of reconstruction, and the campaign literature on the issue did little to enlighten him. Popular opinion was confused at best on this one issue. 51

To complete the picture of the election of 1864, the role of Horace Greeley must be explored. Lincoln sought the support of Greeley, but he was not always successful in his efforts. Greeley never doubted Lincoln's integrity; he simply did not believe that Lincoln was big enough for the Presidency.

50Ibid., p. 207; Nicolay and Hay, IX, 125-126; Hesseltine, Reconstruction, p. 121.

He had no real concept of Lincoln's real stature and no vision of the place history would accord the man from Illinois.\(^{52}\)

Greeley strongly favored emancipation, and he vehemently expressed his attitude to Lincoln. In an open letter to the President on August 19, 1862, the editor severely criticized Lincoln's policy on slavery. Waxing hot and cold toward Lincoln's administration, by the spring of 1863 Greeley began looking for a replacement for Lincoln. He was disappointed when Chase withdrew, but he favored Frémont's withdrawal.\(^{53}\)

Greeley hoped the presidential nomination could be postponed as late as the day before the Baltimore Convention convened, but he stated that the \textit{Tribune} would stand behind the ticket. Despite this statement, throughout the summer Greeley nursed the hope that Lincoln might be supplanted. By mid-August the editor suggested that there be two sets of candidates in the hope of finding one who could outdistance Lincoln. Then Mobile and Atlanta fell and with them the hopes of any second Union convention.\(^{54}\)

The Niagara Falls peace mission was another facet of the election in which Greeley was involved. On July 5, 1864, Greeley received a letter from William C. Jewett, a friend in Niagara Falls. Jewett's letter revealed that there were

\(^{52}\)Randall and Current, IV, 157; Horner, pp. 211, 331.

\(^{53}\)New York \textit{Tribune}, August 19, 1862, as cited in Horner, pp. 263-265.

\(^{54}\)Horner, pp. 350, 352.
two peace emissaries from the Confederacy in the city to
discuss a possible settlement of hostilities. Greeley for-
warded the letter to Lincoln, whereupon the President
appointed the editor as an informal ambassador to meet with
the Confederates. Greeley protested violently, but Lincoln
insisted that he attend. The President also sent his sec-
retary, John Hay, along. Lincoln gave Greeley a "To Whom
It May Concern" letter, in which he stated that anyone in
authority from the rebellious states and interested in peace
would be received and considered by the Executive of the
United States.55

Hay, arriving in Niagara Falls after Greeley, learned
that the editor had bungled the entire affair. Greeley had
failed to show the emissaries Lincoln's letter. Moreover,
he had not learned that the Confederates had no authority to
conclude any agreements. The entire mission had proved to be
a failure. But it did prove Lincoln's point that peace nego-
tiations were futile. Commenting on the failure of the peace
mission, Secretary Welles was convinced that the President
and the administration had been misrepresented and misunder-
stood on the subject of peace, and he believed that much of

55W. C. Jewett to Horace Greeley, July 5, 1864; Greeley
to Lincoln, July 7, 1864; Lincoln "To Whom It May Concern,"
July 18, 1864, RTL Papers. See also Appleton, Cyclopaedia,
pp. 780-782, for correspondence among participants in the
Niagara meeting. Trietch, pp. 262-263; Randall and Current,
IV, 159-162.
the responsibility for that misrepresentation should be placed with Greeley.  

With the peace mission a failure and the nomination of Lincoln a fact, Horace Greeley finally openly agreed to support Lincoln. He wrote: "'The work is in his hands; if it is passed out of them, it will be as there are no better, but far worse, to receive it, to our utter ruin. We must re-elect him, and God helping us, we will.'"  

Greeley kept his word. The Tribune supported the President in his bid for re-election. Perhaps Greeley was not totally committed to Lincoln, but he was committed to a belief in free men and free institutions. Greeley's erratic role in the election may possibly be explained by the fact that he lacked the objective point of view to see Lincoln's renomination in the light of his accomplishments and his ability to carry on until the conflict ended.  

Lincoln, McClellan, and the issues, clouded though they might be, had been presented to the American people. Reconstruction could conceivably cause a split among the Republicans, and charges of treason would hurt the Democrats. A war-weary nation would go to the polls in early November to elect a president. Their choice would dictate the course of the war, emancipation, and reconstruction.  

56Welles, II, 84; Trietch, pp. 263, 265.  
57New York Tribune, September 6, 1864, as cited in Horner, p. 353.  
58Horner, pp. 345, 361.
CHAPTER V

A LINCOLN VICTORY

Election day, 1864, dawned upon a war-weary land. Even the climate lent an atmosphere of gloom, for it was dark and rainy. A cabinet meeting had been scheduled, but only Attorney General Bates and Navy Secretary Welles attended, and they did not stay long. The President did not hide his concern, for he had a difficult time putting his mind to the routine jobs of his office. Late in the evening, the only returns came from Indiana. Lincoln went to the War Department to await the final results. The returns trickled in slowly because the heavy rain storm had disrupted telegraph transmission. However, by midnight returns from Maryland, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and the New England states showed that Lincoln had a safe lead. The President was disappointed that he had not heard from Illinois or Iowa. Satisfactory returns from west of the Mississippi River did not reach the capital until two days after the election. But by shortly after midnight, it became apparent that Lincoln was the victor.

The President had carefully calculated the electoral votes he expected to receive after he learned the results of

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1Noah Brooks, pp. 195-197.
the state elections in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana. His prediction was amazingly accurate. Of the 233 electoral votes Lincoln counted, he received 212. Lincoln carried all the states except Kentucky, Delaware, and New Jersey, amassing a popular vote of 2,213,665. McClellan's popular vote was 1,602,237, and he received 22 electoral votes. 3

During the campaign Lincoln had not taken victory for granted. In August, 1864, the President was apparently resigned to the fact that he would not win reelection. He penned a note to that effect, and had each cabinet member endorse the back of it, not knowing what they signed. The note stated that Lincoln feared that the administration would not be reelected, and it was his duty to cooperate with the President-elect in an attempt to save the Union before inauguration, and he "will have secured his election on such ground that he cannot possibly save it afterward." 4 Only after the election was won did the cabinet learn the contents of the memo they had signed.

To fully understand the significance of the Lincoln victory, it is necessary to look behind the scenes of the election at the national level. In at least five of the

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3Appleton, p. 796; New York Times, November 10, 1864. See the Appendix for a complete breakdown of the presidential vote.

4Lincoln memorandum, August 23, 1864, RTL Papers.
states, there was intrastate political maneuvering that bore directly on Lincoln's victory. Political activity at the state level pointed up the significance of the work done by the Republican party organization to assure the election of Lincoln. At the same time it illustrated the extent of the opposition to the Lincoln administration, as exemplified by the election in Kentucky.

Relations between Kentucky and the federal government were strained at the outbreak of the civil war, and they became no better as the war progressed. Sentiment in the state was divided, and Kentucky wished to remain neutral. However, this proved to be virtually impossible. Realizing the ambivalent situation in Kentucky, high federal military officers soon began to arrest those persons suspected of being Confederate sympathizers. McClellan early warned General Don Carlos Buell that the purpose of the war was the preservation of the Union, requesting that Buell exercise caution in his arrests. The main difficulty on the question of arrests was that there was no unified authority, and the arrests continued.5

Kentuckians objected to the meddling of the military with the judiciary, as well as to its interference in elections. Military officers often took it upon themselves to

be the judges of the loyalty of state courts. All court officials, including jurors, were required to take a special oath. Moreover, the military interfered with the electoral process of the state. Those who did not favor the Union ticket were subject to arrest and prosecution.  

Slavery and the Negro question placed an additional strain on Kentucky's relations with the national government. Lincoln's plan of compensated emancipation engendered much excitement and despondency in the state. The Emancipation Proclamation was a stunning blow to the people of the border area, and Lincoln had few supporters in the Blue Grass State after September, 1862.  

Further complicating Kentucky's position was the presence of rival factions within the state, each claiming to be the real Kentucky Democratic party. The Union Democracy was headed by Joshua F. Bell, an old line Whig, and Thomas E. Bramlett. This faction leaned toward support of Lincoln. Bramlette's nomination for governor caused a split in the party, and the Peace Democrats ran their own candidate, Charles A. Wickliffe. Bramlette won the election, but it appeared to many Peace Democrats that he was too subservient to the President.  

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6 Coulter, pp. 154-155.
7 Ibid., pp. 156-161.
8 Ibid., pp. 172-178.
However, Bramlette's position soon changed. Arrests in the state continued, and the order came to make soldiers out of the Negroes. These factors, coupled with the interference of the federal officers and troops in Kentucky's internal affairs, made the Lincoln administration far from popular as the election year 1864 drew near. There was little doubt about the outcome in Kentucky; the state decidedly repudiated Lincoln and his administration.\(^9\)

The situation in Indiana was somewhat different. At best, Republicans viewed Indiana as a doubtful state in 1864. Her people were weary of war, and they were depressed. Lincoln's July draft call did not help the party in the state. Furthermore, the legislature had adjourned without providing the necessary funds to finance state government, and Governor Oliver P. Morton had to resort to extra-legal means to maintain state operations. The Democrats could be counted upon to call him to account if they should win the election.\(^{10}\)

Some of the Democrats, led by William A. Bowles, a Southern sympathizer, and Harrison H. Dodd, the proprietor of an Indianapolis printing firm, formed secret societies as

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\(^{10}\)Kenneth M. Stampp, "The Milligan Case and the Election of 1864 in Indiana," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXXI (June, 1944), 41-42.
outlets for their discontent. They viewed these societies as agencies for the distribution of propaganda and a defense against arbitrary arrests. In late 1864, the Order of American Knights appeared. Its strength was concentrated in the northwestern part of the state, and Dodd was its leader. The organization was supposedly secret, but its proceedings were never kept quiet. Bringing the issue of treason into the campaign, Governor Morton had the Knights investigated, but he found no treasonable activity.\(^{11}\)

The military commander, General H. C. Carrington, employed a detective, Felix Stidger, to check into the Knights' operations. Stidger became a member of the organization in Kentucky and soon acquired a position of leadership in the local unit. He made periodic reports to Morton on the organization's activities. Stidger managed to secure copies of the constitution and other written materials which he forwarded to Morton. The Governor edited and published the material in the Indianapolis Journal on July 30, 1864.\(^{12}\)

Meanwhile, Dodd envisioned a scheme which played directly into Morton's hands. Dodd and other Knight leaders devised a plan to free the rebel prisoners at Camp Morton and seize the arsenal. Dodd gave this information to Stidger, who immediately reported it to Morton and Carrington. Democratic

\(^{11}\)Ibid., pp. 43-46.

\(^{12}\)Ibid., pp. 46-47.
leaders, learning of the plot, extracted a promise from Dodd that the insurrection would be called off, and Dodd kept his word. There was never any overt act by Dodd's group.¹³

Governor Morton and the Republicans capitalized on the fact that Dodd had planned an insurrection, even though it never became a reality. The Governor had Dodd's printery raided, and he found a storehouse of arms and ammunition, which were used as evidence of treason. Dodd was arrested and tried for treason. During the trial, he escaped, and no effort was made to recapture him.¹⁴ The insurrection, though abortive, and Dodd's and Milligan's trials tainted the Democratic party in Indiana and contributed heavily to the Lincoln victory in that state in 1864.

Maryland's role in the election of 1864 was influenced by the adoption of a new constitution by the state. In early 1863, the Unionists of the state met to determine how they could more effectively support the Lincoln administration. At the Unionist meeting in July, 1863, a resolution was adopted requesting Lincoln to require all male citizens of voting age to take an oath to support the Union. These Union meetings tended to drive the Democrats, who were trying to revitalize their party, under cover.¹⁵

¹³Ibid., pp. 49-50 ¹⁴Ibid., pp. 51-55.

¹⁵Charles B. Clark, "Politics in Maryland During the Civil War," Maryland Historical Magazine, XXXVIII (September, 1964), 240-243.
Though striving to present a united front, the Unionists split over Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, and martial law was declared in June, 1863. General R. C. Schenck brought in federal troops for the 1863 elections, ordering that an oath be taken by voters prior to the casting of their ballots. Disloyal persons were arrested, and the Republicans carried the state.\(^\text{16}\)

Meanwhile, Governor Bradford wanted to revise the constitution to prohibit slavery. A constitutional convention was called for April 27, 1864, and a new constitution was drafted. By November 1, the state was seriously split over the new constitution and emancipation. Although the soldier vote enabled the new constitution to win approval in the state, military authorities considered reestablishing martial law in the state, especially along the eastern shore since it was a Confederate stronghold. However, this did not prove to be necessary. The close vote on the constitution did demonstrate, however, that the eastern coastline and southern Maryland were hostile to the Union. The use of troops and the soldier vote in Maryland enabled the Republicans to carry the state in 1864.\(^\text{17}\)

In Illinois, the peace movement had a bearing on the outcome of the presidential election. The movement began at

\(^{16}\)Ibid., pp. 243, 249.

\(^{17}\)Charles B. Clark, "Suppression and Control of Maryland, 1860-1865," Maryland Historical Magazine, LIV (September, 1959), 270; Hesseltine, War Governors, p. 382.
the Constitutional Convention of 1862, reached its zenith during the session of the Twenty-Third General Assembly, and subsided during the final year of the war. The movement for peace can hardly be detached from the Democratic party or the geography of the state. Southern Illinois was closely tied to the Confederacy, sympathetic toward her, and largely Democratic. In this section of the state the peace movement began.

The Constitutional Convention of 1862 indicated a growing dissatisfaction with the Lincoln administration, as did the General Assembly. Both houses of the Assembly had Democratic majorities. In his opening speech, the Speaker of the House sounded the keynote of the Assembly when he stated that he assumed the Assembly felt it their duty to enter the protest of the people of the state of Illinois against the policies which had allowed the rebellion to go unchecked. The Assembly criticized the conduct of the war, termed the Emancipation Proclamation unwarranted, and recommended the cessation of hostilities. Burnside's suppression of the Chicago Times did nothing to endear the Union cause in the President's home state, nor did the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

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Governor Yates feared that the Democrats would capture the state by violence. He, along with Rosecrans, requested that Lincoln suppress the secret societies in the state. The governor reported that the people were losing faith in the government because of the lack of protection from the gangs of cutthroats that roamed the state. 20

The situation in Illinois was complicated further by the Radical wing of the Republican party in the state. They objected to Lincoln's rescinding Frémont's emancipation proclamation and his subsequent removal. Illinois Radicals found fault with military operations, diplomatic relations, and the cabinet. Discontent subsided for a time after the successful military campaigns of the summer of 1863, but it reappeared as the election campaign opened. With the fall of Atlanta and Mobile, however, the Radicals made a truce and united with Lincoln supporters to carry the state for the President. 21

Illinois Democrats were delighted with McClellan's nomination by the party. But as Sherman's and Farragut's military efforts proved successful, the Democratic platform lost some of its appeal, and it appeared more impracticable to the people. 22 Thus, by election day, Illinois was safely in the Lincoln column.

22Hofer, p. 123.
The Republican party in Missouri was split into two factions, the conservatives and the radicals. The Democrats were also active in the state. Thus Missouri was rent with conflict as the three factions battled for control of the state. Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation angered the Democrats and split the Republicans. Governor Gamble called a convention in hopes of settling the difficulties caused by emancipation. The convention compromised and decided to endorse a policy of gradual emancipation. The Radicals opposed this decision, and they determined to impeach the governor. But in January, 1864, Gamble died and was succeeded by W. P. Hall. The new governor did not have the qualities needed to lead the conservative forces, and the Radicals gained control of the state. Their delegates were seated at the nominating convention. After Frémont's withdrawal and Blair's resignation, the Radical element supported the President. Thus in Missouri, as well as other key states, the political activities within the states had a direct bearing on the outcome of the election.

The votes of the soldier in the field were another contributing factor to Lincoln's victory. It has been hard to determine the exact number of ballots cast by troops because of the varied means used from state to state. Some allowed voting in the field, while others did not. In New York the soldiers voted by proxy, but the votes were not tallied. In

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Missouri the soldier vote was not designated as such. The army vote from Kansas and Minnesota arrived too late to be counted. The largest proportion of the soldier vote came from the large pivotal states. \(^{24}\)

In Iowa, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, the soldier vote was important to Lincoln. Iowa's soldier vote represented slightly more than fourteen per cent of the state's vote, and in Ohio about twelve per cent of the state vote. In Pennsylvania, the soldier vote represented approximately seven per cent of the state's total vote. The vote in Ohio and Pennsylvania indicated that the army would go for Lincoln by a large majority. Lincoln's large majority of soldier votes also verified that the men who had fought to suppress the rebellion would be the last to vote for one who would come to terms with it. \(^{25}\) In the last analysis, with the soldier vote, Lincoln's majority was 411,426; without it his majority would have been 328,289. Thus Lincoln would have won the election without the votes of the soldiers, but his margin of victory would have been decreased.

Although the activities within several key states and the votes of the troops in the field played their part in the reelection of Lincoln, other factors contributed to his victory. Military successes in the autumn of 1864 helped the Republican cause, as did Lincoln's use of the patronage. Even the

\(^{24}\)See Appendix; Benton, p. 44.

\(^{25}\)New York Times, October 13, 1864; Benton, pp. 52, 78, 203.
Democratic party played its part in Lincoln's victory. But perhaps the real success of Lincoln in 1864 lay in the fact that he had the man in the street with him, for in the final analysis, it was the people who endorsed the incumbent President.

The military victories of Farragut at Mobile and Sherman at Atlanta in August and September, 1864, helped restore faith in the administration's ability to conduct the war successfully. Then in late September, Sheridan laid waste to the Shenandoah Valley, driving out Jubal Early's forces and ending the threat to the Union capital. These victories brightened the military picture and helped to convince the people that at last the tide of war was turning. The New York Times editorialized that Grant's use of the Union army was hurting the Democrats because every military success advanced the success of the Lincoln administration. According to the Times, the civil leadership of Lincoln and the military leadership of Grant were just the combination that the nation needed.26

The fact that the Republican party controlled the patronage played a large part in Lincoln's victory. The most important men on the national committee were federal officeholders, and they were determined to protect their own welfare. Lincoln used the patronage and the party organization to help secure the nomination, and he used these same tools to secure

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endorsements from state legislatures and state party conventions. Furthermore, the endorsements had the support of the people.27

Though in opposition to Lincoln and the Republicans, the Democratic party helped Lincoln in his bid for reelection. The ambiguous expressions in their platform, the questionable principles of some of the men who played key roles at the convention hurt the party. Not to be overlooked were the charges of treason brought against the party by the Republicans. Many Democrats had taken up the cry of "peace at any price," and they wrote a platform endorsing the cessation of hostilities. Moreover, their platform offered nothing to draw support away from Lincoln. Gideon Welles confided to his diary that many who were opposed to Lincoln would support him in order to prevent the election of McClellan.28 The Democratic cause was not aided by the fact that their candidate could not stand firmly on his platform. In addition, the party was looked upon as the secessionist party. It was a minority of the southern wing of the party that had torn the Union asunder, and it suffered in 1864 and in subsequent elections because people associated the Democrats with the secession movement that split the nation and resulted in four years of bloody civil war.

27Zornow, pp. 39, 42, 44.

28Welles, Diary, II, 140; Zornow, pp. 217-218.
Of the several factors that influenced the second election of Lincoln, the faith of the people in their president was perhaps the most noteworthy. The election results proved that all the abuses of Lincoln by his antagonists did not shake the faith of the common man, and demonstrated the capacity of the people for intelligent self-government. Lincoln was a man of the people, and he identified himself with the great national cause of the people, serving that cause to the best of his ability. The plain common sense of the people taught them that Lincoln would prosecute the war until the rebellion was put down and the Union restored. His victory was ample proof that the people would stand by the government as long as the government stood by the flag.29

Lincoln moved slowly in dealing with the Radical element in his party because he realized that the public moved even more slowly. But the people learned to trust Lincoln's deliberative action. Though Lincoln issued no early policy, he used time as his prime minister, and it served him exceedingly well.30 The people may not have always agreed with his policies, but they did understand the difficult situation in which Lincoln found himself.


The President was the most popular man in the nation, despite the difficulties he had faced in the past. Nicolay and Hay expressed the belief that no Republican general in the field could match names with Lincoln. Furthermore, no member of Congress could match the President's stature. The Chicago Tribune editorialized that Lincoln's popularity was due to the people's belief that he was willing to do everything within his constitutional power to end the rebellion. As Henry J. Raymond wrote, to Abraham Lincoln, more than any other one man, was
due the success which crowned the efforts of the American people to maintain the Union and the institutions of their country, to widen and confirm the foundations of justice and liberty on which those institutions rest, and to establish inviolable and eternal peace within the borders of their land.31

Moreover, Lincoln's victory was not sectional. All the loyal states combined to make the victory national in character.32

The national character of Lincoln's triumph points up at least two lasting results of the 1864 presidential election. First, it demonstrated that the American electoral process had recuperated from the collapse it suffered in 1860. Lincoln's initial election witnessed a complete breakdown of


32Chicago Tribune, November 8, 1864, RTL Papers; Nicolay and Hay, VIII, 310.
the nation's electoral system for the first time in its history. An entire section seceded rather than accept the duly elected president.\textsuperscript{33} Not only did the electoral process break down, but the party system toppled as well. In 1860, the Democratic party split, and with the Lincoln victory, it virtually collapsed. Furthermore, all attempts to save the Union through compromise failed with the defeat of J. J. Crittenden's efforts. The labors which resulted in the compromises of 1820, 1833, and 1850 were not present in 1860.\textsuperscript{34} Though Lincoln's victory in 1864 was not the result of a compromise, an agreement of sorts was made to secure the support of the Radical element within the party.

However, the 1864 election witnessed the American electoral system functioning again, as well as the operation of both political parties. All sections of the North accepted the reelection of Lincoln, and their acceptance was peaceful. The Democrats had attempted to revitalize their party, and with it the operation of a two party system in the nation. The successful operation of the electoral system demonstrated further that, despite a previous breakdown and the rigors of a civil war, the democratic concepts of the American political system were operable.

\textsuperscript{33}C. Vann Woodward, \textit{Reunion and Reaction} (Boston, 1951), p. 3.

\textsuperscript{34}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 4.
Perhaps more important to the future of the nation than the mending of the electoral process was the changing character of the national government and of the nation itself which resulted from Lincoln's reelection. This change in the character of the national government has already been pointed out; as the war progressed, the central government gradually extended its powers. Underlying this change was the issue of reconstruction, of bringing the seceded states, with their peculiar socio-economic system and their different constitutional concepts, back into their proper relationship to the federal union.

The doctrine of State Rights, held not only by the Southern Democrats but by many Northern Democrats as well, was gradually invalidated as the war continued. Lincoln's use of conscription, his suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and his use of the military in state elections pointed out the gradual decline of the State Rights doctrine. Throughout the war, the growing force of nationalism battled the State Rights concept.

This struggle between nationalism and State Rights was clearly pointed out in the gradual change Lincoln underwent during his first term of office, and it was exemplified in his vocabulary. Until 1863, the President thought and spoke in terms of the federal union, its perpetuity, and his desire to restore it. He never referred to the United States as a
nation. However, in his Gettysburg Address, Lincoln referred to "the nation" for the first time.\textsuperscript{35}

Though Lincoln's basic plan of reconstruction \textit{per se} failed, he did reconstruct a nation. He rejected the compromise of political dualism in the United States, and by taking advantage of the exigencies of war and the necessities of politics, Lincoln concentrated political power in the hands of the national government. His idea was to bring the Southern states back into a centralized union wherein the states were subordinate parts.\textsuperscript{36} Thus the triumph of nationalism and its concept in the minds of the American people was perhaps the most far-reaching result of the election of 1864, for it resulted in a lasting change in political thought and constitutional interpretation in the United States.

\textsuperscript{35}Hesseltine, \textit{Reconstruction}, pp. 33-36.

\textsuperscript{36}Ibid., p. 141.
## APPENDIX

### THE VOTES IN THE 1864 ELECTION*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATES</th>
<th>POPULAR VOTE</th>
<th>SOLDIERS' VOTE</th>
<th>ELECTORAL VOTE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abraham Lincoln, Illinois</td>
<td>George McClellan, New Jersey</td>
<td>Abraham Lincoln</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calif.</td>
<td>62,134</td>
<td>43,841</td>
<td>2,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conn.</td>
<td>44,693</td>
<td>42,288</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Del.</td>
<td>8,155</td>
<td>8,767</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ill.</td>
<td>189,487</td>
<td>158,349</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ind.</td>
<td>150,422</td>
<td>130,233</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>67,321</td>
<td>49,260</td>
<td>15,178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kan.+</td>
<td>14,018</td>
<td>3,011</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ky.</td>
<td>27,765</td>
<td>64,301</td>
<td>1,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Me</td>
<td>72,278</td>
<td>47,736</td>
<td>4,174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Md.</td>
<td>40,153</td>
<td>32,739</td>
<td>2,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass.</td>
<td>126,742</td>
<td>48,745</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mich.</td>
<td>85,352</td>
<td>67,370</td>
<td>9,402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minn.+</td>
<td>25,060</td>
<td>17,375</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mo.</td>
<td>72,991</td>
<td>31,026</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nev.</td>
<td>9,326</td>
<td>6,594</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. H.</td>
<td>36,595</td>
<td>33,034</td>
<td>2,066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. J.</td>
<td>60,723</td>
<td>68,014</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Y.</td>
<td>366,726</td>
<td>361,986</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>265,154</td>
<td>205,568</td>
<td>41,146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ore.</td>
<td>9,888</td>
<td>8,457</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pa.</td>
<td>296,389</td>
<td>276,308</td>
<td>26,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. I.</td>
<td>14,343</td>
<td>8,718</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vt.</td>
<td>42,422</td>
<td>13,325</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Va.</td>
<td>23,223</td>
<td>10,457</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wis.</td>
<td>79,564</td>
<td>63,875</td>
<td>11,372</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the three Nevada electors died before the election. The army vote from Kansas and Minnesota arrived too late and could not be counted.

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