JAPANESE-AMERICAN INTERNMENT: PRELUDE,
PRESSURES, PRACTICE

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JAPANESE-AMERICAN INTERNMENT: PRELUDE,
PRESSURES, PRACTICE

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

At the moment of the Hawaiian attack, December 7, 1941, some 120,000 persons of Japanese extraction resided in the United States. Approximately 112,000 were inhabitants of Pacific coastal states. During the spring and summer of 1942, these men, women, and children, both alien and citizen, suffered the brunt of governmental action which has been branded in the post-war years as "... hasty, unnecessary, and mistaken." This act was the incarceration of all western Japanese residents behind barbed wire enclosures for the duration of World War II.

The process of evacuation, this "trek to the interior" and the resultant confinement, has generally been recognized as one of the most disgraceful governmental acts in United States history. Possibly the only comparable situation was the mass movement of Indians into the Oklahoma territory under provisions of the Indian Exchange of Lands Act of 1830. In both instances the government's action was based on race alone and not on individual criminal guilt. Certainly, in

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2U. S. Statutes at Large, IV, Part 1, 411(1830).
the case of the Japanese, charges were never filed; no one
identified their crime. The test was ancestry.

Aliens within this Japanese minority, excluded from
citizenship by national law and restricted in property owner-
ship by state legislation, had accepted American values and
social traits. Families appreciated the American way of
life. They had achieved varying degrees of economic status.
However, within seven months after the Pearl Harbor bombing,
the complete group was under armed guard.

Some have suggested that the major importance of this
action was the legal precedent that it established. This
position was based at least in part on the majority opinion
in the United States Supreme Court decision in Korematsu v.
U. S. ³ In this ruling the Court in effect accepted the
judgment of the military that a Japanese relocation program
was necessary for successful prosecution of the war. A
projection of this philosophy would mean that future crisis
periods could produce identical, or at least related, ex-
tensions of military power beyond normal civil investigative
and judicial processes.

This study is not primarily concerned with the consti-
tutional or legal aspects of the Japanese evacuation nor of
the economic suffering of these people. These areas have

been extensively examined in previous studies. The present essay, studying the historical, social, political, and military factors, traces the development of ideas culminating in the detention. Considering the affair in this manner should more clearly explain the "why" of Japanese removal. Particularly, the concept of "military necessity," the Army's major reason for evacuation, is considered with emphasis on factors which contributed to the development of this position. The role of Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, the primary advocate of removal based on necessity, is explored.

Unquestionably, matters appear much clearer after the event. Therefore, some concluding suggestions are offered which possibly would have established a more satisfactory national program than the one the United States used, given the values inherent in a democratic society.

In Chapter Two the historical position of the Oriental in western United States society is developed. Japanese-American problems are viewed as the product of domestic Oriental-American clashes which extend to the earliest period of each group's settlement in the continental Pacific.

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4 The major economic study is Leonard Bloom and Ruth Riemer, *Removal and Return*, (Los Angeles, 1949). Constitutional studies are identified in the final paragraph of the Introduction.

5 DeWitt was the Commanding Officer of the United States Western Defense Command during the period of the Japanese removal.
region. It is concluded herein that American anti-Japanese attitudes developed historically as an outgrowth of hostilities directed initially toward Chinese and later toward all Orientals.

This chapter proved particularly difficult in that one is obviously hampered when attempting to analyze a problem directly connected with a distant region without visiting the locale. Undoubtedly, primary source materials would be available at libraries in this region which would strengthen the chapter in several areas.

Chapter Three examines the role of resident Hawaiian-Japanese in the Pearl Harbor bombing and the relationship of this incident to a revival of anti-Japanese attitudes on the United States mainland. The regional sabotage threat and various arguments advanced to support it are explored. The position and activities of the United States House Un-American Activities Committee, as they relate to the Japanese question, are presented and evaluated.

Pertaining not only to Chapters Two and Three but also to the paper in general, the advantage of hindsight should not be overlooked or underrated. Certainly the situation can be viewed with greater clarity after the lapse of twenty-five years. Materials are now available which were not at hand earlier. In 1942 Japanese Pacific advances raised the possibility of a West Coast invasion. Fear and hysteria
clouded the public vision and affected policy formulated by military as well as civil officials. Steps to prevent Japanese-Americans from joining hands with their Pacific brother seemed a logical if not necessary course of action.

Chapter Four analyzes the role of Congress and the extent of legislative involvement in evacuation - detention. The activities of the House Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration and hearings held on the West Coast receive some attention. The primary purpose of the hearings was to determine the extent of Japanese involvement in the economic structure of the western United States. Committee members were concerned about the effect of mass removal on the war oriented regional economy. Evidence presented not only provided answers to this question but also identified individuals and groups in the western states who favored Japanese removal as well as their reasons for supporting this position.

A requirement for protection against sabotage reaching beyond that which could be provided by the U. S. Department of Justice stimulated Presidential action which transferred the responsibility for resident Japanese control from the Attorney General's Office to the military establishment. Chapter Five traces the emergence of the Commander of the U. S. Fourth Army, Western Defense Command, as the official responsible for the evacuation. This section also delineates
the administrative formation of various detention centers. In conclusion, so that the incarceration story will be complete, the chapter provides a limited discussion of center facilities and the Japanese reaction to them.

Primary sources were used whenever available. Of particular value were the three volumes of testimony before the House Committee that investigated national defense migration. The Committee's final report was also very helpful. Another valuable primary volume was the United States Fourth Army's Final Report - Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast. This work presents, from the military position, the argument for a policy of confinement, the development of the evacuation process, and the formation of detention facilities to implement the confinement policy. The Congressional Record, the New York Times, and various California newspapers, were useful in the analysis of public opinion and areas of Congressional concern.

Several secondary sources which relate to the detention topic have also guided my research. Sociological studies conducted within the confines of various relocation centers should be cited in this listing. Primarily, these are attempts to discover the reactions of detainees to one another and to persons in authority, yet they also give much insight into the numerous administrative problems involved in the development of a mass evacuation - detention
program along racial lines. Possibly the most noted in this connection is Alexander H. Leighton's, *The Governing of Men*. A related study, conducted under the auspices of the University of California, is a three-volume set, *The Salvage*, Dorothy S. Thomas; *The Spoilage*, Dorothy S. Thomas and Richard S. Nishimoto; and *Prejudice, War, and the Constitution*, Jacobus tenBroek, Edward N. Barnhart, and Floyd W. Matson.

The historical agitation against the Oriental in the West, to be viewed in proper perspective, must be set upon a stage of racial conflict and indiscriminate antiforeignism which was identifiable as early as the renowned Gold Rush era of the 1840's - 1850's. Forty-Niners, migrating to western regions during this period, carried with them not only aspirations for abundant wealth but also clearly defined attitudes regarding the subordinate role of nonwhite racial groups. Among the alien group were minority elements, notably Frenchmen, Chileans, Mexicans, and Chinese, who were classed as "foreigners" and were either excluded from mining camps or forced to submit to various restrictions on their conduct and movement. Ironically enough, those frequently most active in enforcing restrictive measures on aliens were often themselves only recent arrivals in the United States.

Prejudice against "outsiders" led to such restrictive practices as the California Foreign Miners Tax Law of 1850, the avowed purpose being to exclude foreigners from the mining trade. The major provision of the statute levied a
tax of thirty dollars per month, through the sale of monthly licenses, upon each alien resident engaged in mining.¹

The "citizen miner" was frequently either of Southern stock, accepting the doctrine of white supremacy, or a previous resident of a border state, possibly Missouri. Either individual had survived the trek across the plains, including the perils of Indian attack, and often tended to subjugate beings whose skin was a shade darker or whose speech varied from the norm. Persons of this type, identified by one historian as "low-grade southerners" and "border ruffians," comprised the bulk of the gold rush population and generated "a general sense of irresponsibility and . . . a diseased local exaggeration of the common national feeling towards foreigners."²

Particularly during the Gold Rush period newcomers to the western states came into immediate contact with native Indians and residents of Mexican and Spanish extraction. During this same era the Chinese arrived, coming at first in small numbers to serve as laborers at the diggings. Combined with these ethnic groups were numerous Europeans who tended to enkindle traditional fires of white superiority, nationalistic sentiments, and in some instances, greed.

²Ibid., p. 275.
During these years Americans held a distinct sense of patriotic pride. The desire to plant the flag on the Pacific shores had been fulfilled; the Nation's manifest destiny had been realized. With Mexican influence reduced, vast western areas were available to be incorporated into the Union. Citizen and alien alike competed to achieve economic success in the region; however, attitudes and actions of Oriental immigrants in particular seemed to run cross-grain with much that was America.

An early study of California history has cited one William Downie, founder of the city of Downieville, as stating that his first involvement with a group established to drive away Asians was during October, 1849, near Bullard's Bar on the Middle Fork of the Yuba River. An assemblage of some twenty to thirty men approached him carrying a small U. S. flag. When they stopped, he queried them as to their purpose. One individual, who proved to be a recent immigrant from Ireland, answered that they were marching along both sides of the river to "drive off foreigners." Several of the self-appointed cluster were German, unable to speak intelligible English. The foreign constituents they were concerned about were Orientals (Kanakas), migrants from certain South Sea islands.³

The estimation has been offered that by mid-1849 there were about 20,000 persons working coastal mines, and that not more than one-fourth of them were American citizens. Of the gold mined to this period, three-fourths went to the non-citizen element. These percentages altered rapidly after 1849 as the number of Americans increased and as foreigners, particularly Asiatics, motivated either by hostility, wealth gained, or abject failure, departed the region. Those who remained were to incur the continuing wrath of persons objecting to their residence. The native "Digger" Indians, Mexicans, Spanish Americans, "Kanakas" from the south seas, "Ragheads" from India, and the multiplying Chinese, "'Infernals,' 'celestials,' and 'greasers,'" commented one observer, "or black men, yellow men, and Mexicans, it is hard to say which are most despised by the American whites in California."\(^4\)

Hostility toward the Japanese, the subject of this chapter, undoubtedly had its foundation during these years. In the main, such attitudes developed during the later years of an anti-Chinese movement, around the turn of the twentieth century. Inasmuch as there appeared to be a relationship between American Chinese and Japanese racial hostility, some

reference to the extent and consequences of nineteenth century Chinese immigration should be made.

Charles Crocker, a California railroad construction engineer, was apparently responsible for the introduction of Chinese labor forces into the Pacific region. He allegedly employed "coolies" in the construction of the Central Pacific Railroad during the 1860's at forty dollars a month. Subsequently, Chinese agencies, maintaining headquarters in San Francisco, brought in laborers under contract whereby the "coolie" agreed to reimburse the contracting firm for the cost of passage by having a specified amount withheld from his monthly earnings. Such companies guaranteed employment and return of the worker to China, in some instances even after death, in order that he might be buried with his ancestors.5

As the number of Chinese immigrants increased, economic competition increased, correspondingly, opposition and hostility toward the Chinese grew. It was claimed that widespread unemployment in the 1870's resulted from cheap Chinese labor. Mob violence occurred in several locations. The death of one policeman in Los Angeles was a result of a mob's invasion of the Chinese quarter and indiscriminate lynching

of twenty-two Chinese. A similar incident occurred during March, 1877, when five Chinese clearing land near Chico, California, were attacked by a gang of whites and, for no apparent reason, shot. A sixth, who escaped by feigning death, informed local authorities that the murderers burned the victims' buildings and crops and then fled. During this same month, and possibly related to this incident, numerous San Francisco residents employing Chinese received threatening letters stating in part, "get rid of your Chinese help within fifteen days or suffer the consequences."

This anti-Chinese sentiment seemed to stem from several factors. Traditionally, Chinese immigrants tended to isolate themselves from other ethnic groups. Whenever present in sufficient numbers they formed their own communal quarters within cities. One Californian reported these "Chinatowns" as areas where the overcrowded residents

. . . lived in squalor and stench, spoke an outlandish jargon, worked with a patience and industry beyond comprehension, worshipped strange gods, suffered from strange diseases, practiced strange vices, ate strange foods, regarded China as the land of the blessed, thrived under standards of living no white man could endure, administered his own law in his own way through his own agents without much regard for the officials and statutes of the State of California.

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6 Ibid., p. 157.
7 New York Times, March 16, 1877, Sec. 1, p. 1; March 18, 1877, Sec. 1, p. 1.
No charge was made against the Chinese more frequently, nor had a more sympathetic hearing from westerners who favored Chinese exclusion, than that relating to their low standard of living. Many resided in restricted communal quarters which constantly made inroads on the white sections of cities. Senator Aaron A. Sargent (Rep., Calif.), in a Congressional floor speech urging the enactment of Chinese exclusion legislation, described his impression of the San Francisco Chinese quarter.

In my excursions through the Chinese quarters in San Francisco, under the protection of the police, I have penetrated two stories underground, into opium and gambling dens, where the stench was almost unendurable, reached by passages where a man cannot walk erect, between walls dripping with the exhalations of neighboring sewers . . . . Here I found swarms of Chinamen, thick as maggots in cheese, smoking opium, cooking or eating rice, or lying in their bunks or squatting, indifferent to the invasion of their horrible domain.9

Many of these aliens were unmarried males who entered the United States not to reside permanently, but rather to accumulate a degree of wealth whereby they might return to China and live the remainder of their lives in comparative comfort. With a tradition of living on only a few cents a day, the laborer could avail himself of the higher wage scale of western areas and attain his goal in a relatively brief period. Hence the American laborer, considered as a desirable

influence in the West, who required a higher salary to main-
tain his customary living standard, could not compete with 
his Oriental counterpart.\textsuperscript{10}

Chinese morality was also the target of much American 
criticism. In some instances the complaint was simply that 
they were dishonest and unreliable, that they had no regard 
for legitimate business practices. Other vices which at-
tracted some attention were practices such as opium smoking, 
gambling, and prostitution, generally recognized in the 
United States as socially degrading. Particularly, games 
of chance were alleged to be the chief means of recreation 
for Chinese. During the 1890's the charge was made that 
within the San Francisco Chinatown there existed one hundred 
fan-tan games, nine organized lottery companies with three 
hundred agencies and two lottery drawings daily. Police, 
accused by some of conniving with the gambling element, 
claimed that inasmuch as gambling was a natural passion of 
Chinamen, they evaded every legal restriction, to the extent 
that games of chance were conducted behind heavily barred 
doors.\textsuperscript{11}

It would seem obvious, considering the economic problem 
presented by Chinese, that a leading force in any exclusion 

\textsuperscript{10}Sandmeyer, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 29.

\textsuperscript{11}Ibid., p. 34.
movement would be labor organizations. Such was the case. Organized labor appeared in California within a few years after statehood. The stimulus for this development came from such groups as the Knights of Labor, the International Workingmen's association, the Federated Trades of the Pacific Coast, and the California Federation of Labor.\(^\text{12}\) One analyst of California labor problems during this period summarized the union attitude toward the Oriental as follows:

The trade unionist first realized the possible menace of the overwhelming numbers of workers who, through many generations of discipline in the crowded Orient, have learned to live under conditions impossible to the working men of a younger civilization. This long camping in front of what was felt to be a common enemy has contributed more than any other factor to the strength of the California labor movement. . . . It is the one subject upon which there has never been the slightest difference of opinion, the one measure on which it has always been possible to obtain concerted action.\(^\text{13}\)

Californians initially resorted to local legislation to solve problems arising from the presence of Chinese. These attempts to maintain control were aimed at Chinese residents of mining districts. Later, as economic problems shifted correlating to an increase in urbanization, ordinances were adopted at the city level with concurrent legislation from the State. License taxes on miners, fishermen, laundrymen,

\(^{12}\text{Ibid., p. 40.}\)

\(^{13}\text{Lucile Eaves, A History of California Labor Legislation, (Berkley, 1910), II, p. 5-6.}\)
construction and operation of businesses, measures regulating residence locations, areas for recreation, and discriminatory poll taxes were a few of the approaches taken. In almost every instance these measures proved ineffective either because of enforcement difficulties or because they were not sustained in resultant court action.\(^\text{14}\)

Failing in these various regional regulatory attempts, westerners appealed to the national government. A complete history of state legislation as well as the corresponding national approach which ultimately resulted in Chinese exclusion would be unnecessary and somewhat unrelated to this study. It would appear in order, however, to at least identify those national statutes which established the exclusion process and which, in reality, demonstrated that an attitude of oriental debarment existed during the years when the number of Japanese in coastal regions was negligible.

The Scott Act of 1882, sponsored by Representative William L. Scott (Dem., Penn.), was in effect for a period of ten years and applied to both skilled and unskilled Chinese workers. The preamble to this statute explained its scope and purpose:

\[\text{. . . in the opinion of the Government of the United States the coming of Chinese laborers to this country endangers the good order of certain localities within}\]

\(^{14}\)Sandmeyer, op. cit., p. 110.
the territory thereof; therefore . . . the coming of Chinese laborers to the United States be, and the same is hereby suspended.\textsuperscript{15}

Debarment was extended for an additional ten year period by the Geary Act of 1892, and indefinitely by Public Law 90, 57th Congress. This latter act was entitled, "An Act to prohibit the coming into and to regulate the residence within the United States, its territories, and all territory under its jurisdiction, and the District of Columbia, of Chinese and persons of Chinese descent."\textsuperscript{16}

By 1900, the Chinese prohibition had been in effect approximately twenty years. Within the State of California alone, during the period 1890-1900, the population of these Orientals declined from 72,656 to 51,024.\textsuperscript{17} Although the national immigration policy was undoubtedly only one factor in this decline, the importance of the point is that exclusion created a noticeable labor shortage through which the Japanese could become a substitute for their Oriental neighbors.

It was not until 1885, however, that the Japanese government even authorized the emigration of its subjects. At this time it stipulated that emigrants should forever

\textsuperscript{15}U. S. Statutes at Large, XXII, Part 1, 59(1882).
\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., XXXII, Part 1, 176(1902).
retain their allegiance to the Mikado regardless of their national residence. Each subject was required to register in his native region, from which he could depart only with the consent of local authorities. To travel or emigrate from the country it was necessary to secure a passport which included the provision that the National return within three years.\textsuperscript{18}

Following traditional mores of paternal feudalism, the Japanese Parliament enacted an "Emigrants' Protection Law" in 1896, which endeavored to assure that persons abroad would properly represent the homeland. This statute provided that every laborer departing the country must maintain some financially responsible party in Japan to provide for return passage in case he became destitute abroad. The "protection law," in a manner, stimulated immigration to the United States. Inasmuch as only a limited number of laborers could provide such guarantees, emigration companies were formed which furnished the surety, transportation, and, working through labor contractors in the United States, employment upon arrival.\textsuperscript{19}


\textsuperscript{19}Ibid.
The overall result was a sizeable increase in Japanese emigration to the United States and Hawaii. The Census Bureau in Washington, D. C., reported the Japanese population in California during 1900 to be 10,151, including alien and American born. This represented a substantial increase over the initial reported figure of 33 in 1870. Subsequent decennial population statistics spiralled upward to 41,356 in 1910, to 71,952 in 1920, and to 97,456 in 1930, before dropping slightly to 93,717 in 1940. 20

What were the fundamental causes for this transfer to a new world across the Pacific? Within the Japanese nation there was no racial prejudice; apparently religious persecutions were nonexistent. There was no political pressure on immigrants. It has been suggested that rather than racial, political, or religious, the major causes were three: (1) population pressures; (2) economic pressures; (3) inducement or attraction of a more rewarding life in the United States. 21

During the early twentieth century, as nations competed for positions of dominant power, rapid population growth could be viewed as desirable. Within an island empire,


however, with no internal expansion possible, the increase had a detrimental effect on the masses who toiled at the base of the economic ladder. A Japanese proverb stated, "The more poor the more babies." It was from the peasant class that the greatest number of children came; consequently, the increase in population brought more laborers. The labor competition, in a nation of limited land with no national labor organization, resulted in thousands of struggling creatures in a hopeless and striken condition.22

In 1903, the earliest date available, Japan's population was reported as 46,732,140; a density of 316.9 persons per square mile. Among the world nations this figure ranked only behind England, Holland, Belgium, and Egypt, areas which imported, to a great extent, food for national consumption. Japan was feeding her millions.23

The United States did not follow a general policy of advertising for Oriental immigrants. More attractive, however, than any such advertising process were accounts of the experiences of successful migrants published journalistically, communicated privately, or related by visiting Japanese returning to Japan from tenure in America. Thus,
for those who were adventuresome by nature, had suffered an agricultural or business failure, or desired to join relatives and friends, the attraction of a new life in America outweighed immeasurably any anticipated hardships.  

Before turning to an examination of the historical development of opposition to Japanese migrants, a general comparison between Chinese and Japanese laborers by a California analyst during the 1920's provides a glimpse of attitudes which were to develop. This Californian was of the opinion that coastal sentiment was biased; that of the two groups, the Chinese simply fitted more closely into the position which Americans along the West Coast desired that they occupy - the ideal domestic or industrial machine, the "human ox" pressed into service for the white man's benefit.

He will transform less food into more work, with less administrative friction, than any other creature . . . . They are patient, docile, industrious, and above all honest in a business sense and keep their contracts. . . . The Chinese contractor delivers the agreed number of men, at the agreed time and place, for the agreed price, and if any one drops out he finds another in its place.  

The Japanese came to be viewed differently. As laborers they were less patient than the Chinese, but they were

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generally more alert. They appeared to have no comprehension of a business contract and the obligations involved. To cite an example, fruit gatherers would agree to gather a crop at a stated price. Before the work was completed, if an opportunity for increased wages became available elsewhere, the Japanese would move on. Should impending inclement weather require increased speed, the cost of Japanese labor would rise to the blackmail level. Though business practices were only one of numerous complaints registered against the Japanese, this point was frequently cited by those who resented oriental competition or who had suffered some injustice at the hands of Mongolian labor.²⁶

Raymond L. Buell, in a treatment of United States anti-Japanese agitation, traced original protests to March, 1900. During this period a controversy grew from their alleged contribution to the existence and spread of the bubonic plague in San Francisco. The City Board of Supervisors, acting through Mayor James D. Phelan,²⁷ quarantined only areas of the city populated by the Chinese and Japanese. The restriction was imposed on May 19, 1900, and remained in effect for several weeks. Of the nine deaths attributed to the

²⁶Ibid., p. 225.

²⁷Phelan later served as a U. S. Senator from California and has been identified with elements favoring Japanese exclusion. Buell, op. cit., p. 608.
disease, all were Chinese. News coverage of this situation did not substantiate the charge that Japanese had contributed in any way to the plague. Apparently there was no evidence that Japanese were involved even through illness. Nevertheless, they were not allowed to depart their communal area during the quarantine period. The Japanese branded the action discriminatory, and the incident served as one basis for the creation of the Japanese Association of America, whose major organizational goal was, and continues to be, the protection of Japanese interests throughout the United States.

During February, 1905, the San Francisco Chronicle analyzed the Japanese question in several editions, the articles beginning on the paper's front page. Although the author of the articles was not identified, the position taken was highly critical of continued Japanese immigration to the United States. The series stressed the rise in Japanese immigration, that they were beginning to flood California and were ethnically maladjusted in America due to their "very nature." Further, they constituted a social

28 New York Times, March 13, 1900, Sec. 1, p. 8; May 20, 1900, Sec. 1, p. 14; May 27, 1900, Sec. 1, p. 5; May 31, 1900, Sec. 1, p. 7.

29 Buell, op. cit., p. 608.
and industrial menace just as the Chinese did. The articles explained that both races were adept in quickly learning the skills of white laborers and securing positions in the labor market.  

As noted above, Japanese-Americans were in many instances a group residentially segregated. Because of social and economic pressures, and possibly by preference, they tended to dwell apart in separate city sections. Even in rural agricultural locations there appeared to be a high degree of geographic concentration. The February 23rd edition touched on this nonassimilability argument with the charge that the Japanese

... will never be more than an Asiatic, however much he may imitate the dress of the white man, learn his language and spend his wages. Nor will he ever have the slightest concern with our laws except to evade them, nor with our Government except to cajole it and deceive it. The Japanese in California is just as intensely, eternally and essentially Japanese as though he had never left Yokohoma ... . The Japanese will not mix or merge; all the documents in the world will not make of him an American citizen.  

A second Chronicle edition insisted that increased Asiatic immigration was a major factor in an apparent upswing in criminal activity among the San Francisco white population. Figures were presented to demonstrate that the city experienced twice as many arrests on charges of

31Ibid.
intoxication, burglary, grand larceny, and vagrancy in 1899, as Cleveland, Ohio, a city of comparable size, did. The assumption made was that caucasian workers were unable to compete with cheap oriental labor and were then forced to resort to criminal activity.\textsuperscript{32}

In an obvious plea for either State or National legislative assistance to combat this "Oriental horde" with exclusion legislation, and as an attempt to solidify labor agitation for such measures, the concluding article expressed the opinion that

\textit{... The legislatures will not fight battles for the working man if he is too apathetic to fight for himself; they will not remove barriers from his path unless he himself attacks those barriers ... the white men of the Pacific coast have now to ask themselves what is their duty in the present crisis; not to themselves alone and to their wives and families, but also to the Nation to which they belong.}\textsuperscript{33}

This anti-Japanese series, receiving banner headlines attention in a major California newspaper, was apparently the first major journalistic effort openly hostile to the Japanese immigrant. Those elements in California who desired to eliminate regional Japanese influence undoubtedly received some encouragement from this position taken by one of the State's largest news organs. Years of agitation for

\textsuperscript{32}\textit{Ibid.}, February 24, 1905, Sec. 1, pp. 1, 13.

\textsuperscript{33}\textit{Ibid.}, February 27, 1905, Sec. 1, pp. 1, 9.
the exclusion of "coolie" labor seemed to condition Californians to rapidly respond whenever the oriental question was raised. Although Chinese immigration to this country was terminated in 1882, anti-Chinese opinions were not unknown in 1905. Opposition to the Chinese became, then, gradually associated with the Japanese; and, actually, with all Oriental racial groups.

The Exclusion League and Early Anti-Japanese Proposals

On May 7, 1900, the San Francisco Labor Council, the representative organ for the various labor units within the city, met to formulate a definite program opposing further United States Japanese immigration. Among the more influential speakers was Edward A. Ross, a professor of sociology, at Stanford University. His comments before the meeting included some of the same stock arguments used earlier against the Chinese. Briefly, these points were (1) Japanese could not be assimilated into American life; (2) They could be employed for wages which would undermine the existing labor standard of American workers; (3) They could exist on a living standard below that of the American workman; (4) They held political attitudes inconsistent with American democratic institutions. 34

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The theme evident here, and which carried through much that Ross wrote concerning immigration, was opposition to the idea that the alien could contribute significantly to the improvement of the American society. Writing in one volume relative to the social effects of immigration on the United States, he commented:

By their presence the foreigners necessarily lower the general plane of intelligence, self-restraint, refinement, orderliness, and efficiency [of a community]. With them comes an increase of drink and of the crimes from drink. The great excess of men among them leads to sexual immorality and the diffusion of private diseases. . . . The women go about their homes barefoot and their rooms and clothing reek with the odors of cooking and uncleanness. . . . The foreign men, three-eights of whom are illiterate, pride themselves on their physical strength rather than on their skill, and are willing to take jobs requiring nothing but brawn. 35

At the Labor Council meeting a resolution was passed which urged extension of the Chinese Exclusion Act to the Japanese. Subsequently, Representative Julius Kahn (Rep., Calif.) submitted the resolution to the United States House of Representatives. A resultant House Resolution, 242, was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs but was never reported from Committee. 36


Early "feelers" for Japanese exclusion were not limited only to the labor family. Following the publication of the Chronicle articles, the California legislature during March, 1905, voted 28-0 in the Senate and 70-0 in the Assembly for a resolution urging the National Congress to exclude the Japanese. During the summer of 1905, the Japanese and Korean Exclusion League (later renamed the Oriental Exclusion League) was formed in San Francisco. Reportedly, after one year the organization had enrolled 78,000 members. A majority of the membership lived in the San Francisco Bay area, where a majority of California's Japanese lived.37

The first major coastal anti-Japanese organization, the League soon affiliated with more than 200 local California labor organizations plus numerous fraternal, civic, and political groups. Offices were established in Stockton, Portland, Seattle, Denver, and various other Western municipalities. In the preamble of the League's constitution, it was asserted that the Caucasian and Oriental races were unassimilable, and that the organization's major goal was to preserve present and future generations of Americans from the Oriental. Reportedly, the League position and its influence was commented upon, as follows, in a 1911 report of the United States Immigration Commission:

37McWilliams, op. cit., p. 19.
The League has always been dominated by organized labor and the position taken by it has always had the support of organized labor in general. . . . It has frequently emphasized that its opposition to Asians was not alone on industrial but on racial and political lines as well. . . . By its agitation no doubt, the League has done much to increase the opposition to Japanese, especially in California.\(^{38}\)

The Exclusion League provided substantial support for legislation proposed in December, 1905, by Representative Everis A. Hayes (Rep., Calif.). Known as H. R. 8975, it was a measure "... to prohibit the coming into and to regulate the residence within the United States . . . of all Japanese persons and persons of Japanese descent and Korean persons and persons of Korean descent."\(^{39}\) As in the previous instance the proposal was referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and was not reported out of Committee.

In comments before the House on the bill, Hayes explained the economic and social problems interwoven in the California Japanese problem. Claiming to speak for 95 percent of Californians who supported the measure, he stated that because of population pressures in Japan, Japanese laborers were arriving in California at the rate of 1,000 per month and were taking employment that could otherwise be filled by white Americans. He cited the 1904 report of the California

\(^{38}\) tenBroek, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 36.

Commissioner of Labor reflecting 93 percent of the State's Mongolians as employed.

In fact, every industry necessary to maintenance of urban life has its Japanese representatives. They buy and sell and trade with each other, and no white storekeeper, not even a saloon, benefits one dollar by their presence in San Francisco or California.  

Hayes went on to consider some of the moral and social traits of Japanese:

. . . that unblushing lying is so universal among the Japanese as to be one of the leading National traits; that commercial honor even among her commercial classes is so rare as to be only the exception that proves the reverse rule, and that the vast majority of the Japanese people do not understand the meaning of the word 'morality', but are given up to the practice of licentiousness more generally than any nation in the world making any pretense to civilization. . . . Viewed from our standpoint they have no social standard; they have no morals, their women occupy a very inferior position; many of them are held merely as chattels and for immoral purposes just as long as they are profitable to their masters.

In view of these comments one might question whether Hayes maintained a personal prejudice against the Japanese race. Though it would appear that such was the case, it is interesting to consider his observations on prejudice in America:

It may be that the time may come when men of all nations will recognize the man of alien race as their brother and live with him in love and harmony. But that time is not yet. If it ever comes it will be far in the future. Race

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40 Ibid., XL, Part 4, p. 3752.

41 Ibid., pp. 3749, 3752-3753.
prejudice seems to be planted firmly in the average human nature. You may inveigh against it as barbaric and un-Christian, but that does not eradicate it. It would be foolish to shut our eyes to its almost universal presence.\textsuperscript{42}

To make only passing reference to California oriental legislation at the State level, largely as a result of pressure from labor and the Exclusion League, several anti-Japanese proposals of various types were introduced into the legislature during the first quarter of the century. In 1909 alone, seventeen measures were discussed that related to the Japanese in one manner or another. Possibly the most noted piece of State legislation during the period was the 1913 California Alien Land Law (The Webb-Henley Act), which barred aliens ineligible to citizenship from landed property ownership in California.\textsuperscript{43}

This act provided that aliens eligible to citizenship might enjoy the same property rights as citizens or as specified in existing treaties. Japanese aliens could not own residences, commercial buildings or agricultural land within the States. Corporations, a majority of whose members were aliens ineligible to citizenship or whose stock was owned by ineligibles, were likewise affected by the act.

It is generally recognized that the Japanese, by several devices, were successful in circumventing the provisions of

\textsuperscript{42}Ibid., p. 3753. \textsuperscript{43}tenBroek, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 37.
the Webb-Henley Act. Some purchased property in the name of a minor child born in the United States; others paid American citizens to purchase land for them and to allow them to reside on and utilize the property. A third method was the formation of pseudo-corporations in which possibly 51 percent of the stock was held by a caucasian citizen, an attorney perhaps, or by a Japanese-American citizen.

San Francisco 1906-1908: Restaurants, Schools, and Limited Immigration

On April 18, 1906, San Francisco suffered the historic earthquake and fire which isolated the city for several days. During the period the city experienced some interruption in normal municipal governmental activities, particularly transportation, electric, and water facilities. Although these problems were immediately more important than alien influences, developments during months of reconstruction renewed underlying racial quarrels. Several thousand Japanese were rendered homeless by the tragedy and in an effort to locate available residences and business locations, many of them moved to western sections of the city where damage was less severe. Racial friction became tense, since this area had previously been "white man's land."

During the reconstruction period other irritations developed. Before the earthquake, less than ten Japanese

44 Ibid.
restaurants served meals to white citizens. As the period of rebuilding began, approximately thirty restaurants opened in the areas of destruction and temporarily developed a clientele from workmen involved at construction sites. A reaction to the proliferation of Japanese eating establishments came in the form of a boycott by members of the local Cooks and Waiters Union. Although no formal resolution to that effect was passed by the Union, the suggestion was offered that members should urge the public to refrain from patronizing Japanese restaurants. Further, during early October, Union employees distributed in front of Japanese restaurants match boxes containing a label, "White men and women, patronize your own race." ⁴⁵

Minutes of an executive board meeting of the Japanese and Korean Exclusion League during June, 1906, illustrated that organization's discontent with union men patronizing Asians. The League minutes were reported in the San Francisco Chronicle of June 25, 1906.

To Send Protest to Labor Unions - Exclusion League Complains that White Men Eat in Japanese Restaurants

The executive board of the Japanese and Korean Exclusion League at the meeting held Saturday evening listened to complaints that many wage earners, laborers, and mechanics

patronize Japanese restaurants, while eating houses conducted by white persons are in easy access and more inviting than those of Mongolians. . . . None among the patrons are supposed to be men who hold membership in unions affiliated with central councils. The League requests the councils to urge upon all affiliated unions to enforce the penalties imposed by their laws for patronizing Japanese or Chinese.46

The League was concerned not only about restaurant patronage but also other Japanese commercial enterprises. Although the following quotation is somewhat unrelated, it illustrated the degree of League concern over Japanese food contributions in general.

The attention of the councils and unions is also directed to the fact that many berries sold in San Francisco are grown and shipped to market by Japanese and Chinese, and wage earners are cautioned against the danger of their health and that of their families in eating berries picked and packed by unclean and unhealthy Asiatics.47

For several years prior to 1906, the San Francisco Board of Education had under advisement the possibility of establishing separate schools for Asiatics. During August of that year the Exclusion League petitioned the Board protesting the alleged crowded conditions caused by the intermingling of Japanese students within the local school system. Reportedly, prior to the League's complaint, similar protests to the Board were received from citizens whose children attended the system. It was particularly disturbing to them that Japanese boys and men of ages 16-24 years were attending

46 Ibid. 47 Ibid.
primary classes populated with caucasian children in the 7-12 year age group. Difficulties of a social nature which could arise from these relationships were obviously of some parental concern.\textsuperscript{48}

The Board reacted to these complaints with a resolution issued October 11, 1906, which transferred all Asiatics to the City's one oriental school. The resolution stated:

Resolved that in accordance with Article X, Section 1662, of the school law of California, principals are hereby directed to send all Chinese, Japanese, or Korean children to the oriental public school, situated on the south side of Clay Street between Powell and Mason Streets, on and after Monday, October 15, 1906.\textsuperscript{49}

In July the city schools, which had been closed for several months as a result of the fire, were reopened with a total attendance of about 25,000. Allegedly, the board president announced within a few days that there was little over-crowding. Three months later, it seemed, matters were different. The resolution of October 11 affected only 93 Japanese students, and it received little attention in local newspapers. The secretary of the Japanese Association of America, however, immediately protested to the Board. A refusal to modify the order led the Secretary to then communicate this information to the newspapers in Japan.

\textsuperscript{48}Ibid., p. 4. \textsuperscript{49}Ibid., p. 3.
It was the adverse reaction of the Japanese press and embassy officials to the Board's directive which first attracted California, in actuality the United States, to the action of school authorities. To Japan the act constituted a major insult as well as a violation of treaty provisions which accorded Japanese immigrants identical treatment with those from other nations. In an October meeting between Japanese Ambassador Viscount Aoki and U. S. Secretary of State Elihu Root, Aoki requested that the United States comply with the Japanese-American treaty of 1894, and extend to Japanese aliens in California their rights under the treaty which guaranteed equal migrant treatment. This, in the Japanese view, included the right of attendance in state public school systems.50

The New York Times reported that the question did not concern only the education of

. . . a few young Japanese. It is the question of social equality that has been raised in San Francisco. The Japanese have smarted for years under the imputation of racial inferiority, and no single motive has so influenced their amazing progress in Western civilization as their determination to prove themselves the equals at all points of any people on earth.51


51 Ibid., October 28, 1906, Sec. 1, p. 9.
Further, the Times opined that the school board response stemmed from the anti-Oriental atmosphere in California and from comments expressed in exclusion campaigning of labor unions. The paper considered the school issue as possibly an initial step in "... an organized attempt to obtain a law barring the Japanese."^52

Due to the seriousness of the issue and as a consequence of ambassadorial involvement, President Theodore Roosevelt dispatched Victor Metcalf, Secretary of the Department of Commerce and Labor, to San Francisco to investigate and report on the situation. Additionally, in his annual message to Congress during December, the President expressed concern for the present condition of Japanese aliens and recommended that appropriate national statutes be amended to enable executive enforcement of the rights of aliens under treaties when such rights have been abridged at the state level. The President expressed his personal concern over the

... most unworthy feeling which has manifested itself toward the Japanese - the feeling that has been shown in shutting them out from the common schools in San Francisco and in mutterings against them in one or two other places, because of their efficiency as workers. To shut them out from the public schools is a wicked absurdity.^53

^52 Ibid., October 26, 1906, Sec. 1, p. 9.

To further illustrate the concern of President Roosevelt over this matter it is interesting to note his reference to the problem in a personal letter to his son Kermit dated October 27, 1906.

I am horribly bothered about the Japanese business. The infernal fools in California, and especially in San Francisco, insult the Japanese recklessly, and in the event of war it will be the Nation as a whole which will pay the consequences.54

During mid-December, Roosevelt forwarded to Congress the completed Metcalf report, indicating that the overcrowded argument was somewhat exaggerated. Of the 93 Japanese students in the 23 city public schools, all were in the primary grades and were between the ages of 7-20 years. Metcalf reported that the sentiment in the State was "very strong" against the Japanese young men attending the schools. He commented that many persons interviewed said that they would take the same stand against caucasian males of similar ages in the primary grades. The report stated that the press of San Francisco

... pretty generally upholds the action of the board of education. Of the attitude of the more violent and radical newspapers it is unnecessary to speak further than to say that their tone is the usual tone of hostility to 'Mongol hordes,' and the burden of their claim is that Japanese are no better than Chinese, and

that the same reasons which dictated the exclusion of the Chinese call for the exclusion of the Japanese as well.\textsuperscript{55}

Interestingly, teachers interviewed who were responsible for educating the Japanese failed to indicate a hostile reaction. The report stated that those interviewed held the opinion that Japanese students, "... were among the very best of their pupils, cleanly in their persons, well behaved, studious, and remarkably bright."\textsuperscript{56}

In summary, the Metcalf document agreed with San Francisco school officials, that several of these students were beyond the normal age for primary students. It concluded, however, that if the Board feared the association of older Japanese males with younger white students, the proper remedy would have been a rule to limit the age of pupils in primary grades.\textsuperscript{57}

The school question was eventually solved during February, 1907, when Roosevelt invited San Francisco officials to Washington. In a conference attended by the School Board members, San Francisco's mayor, the school superintendent, the President, and the Secretary of State, an agreement was reached which called for the withdrawal of the school ordinance and for negotiations between the United States and

\textsuperscript{55}U. S. Congress, Senate, \textit{Japanese in the City of San Francisco}, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{56}Ibid., p. 7.

\textsuperscript{57}Ibid.
Japan to seek a solution to the problem of increasing labor immigration to the United States. Roosevelt was of the opinion that, with the elimination of the school question, he could negotiate directly with the Japanese government for an exclusion treaty to keep Japanese laborers, skilled and unskilled, out of the country in return for the exclusion of American labor from Japan.\(^{58}\) During the latter months of 1907 the U.S. Department of State entered into negotiations with the Japanese embassy relative to the labor problem. For some unknown reason Ambassador Aoki was recalled to Tokyo during December, 1907, and upon his departure issued a public statement indicating that the Japanese Government itself had assumed strict control of emigration by the labor class, an intimation not at the time confirmed by the U. S. Department of State. Clarifying the matter on January 1st, the Japanese forwarded to the American Embassy a memorandum stating in part:

The Japanese Government through careful investigation, discovered the cause of the failure of former plans to regulate emigration and is determined to demonstrate its ability to effectively prevent the emigration of laborers who are needed in the development of Japan.\(^{59}\)

Though only obscure information concerning the negotiation of this arrangement (the "Gentleman’s Agreement") has

\(^{58}\) *New York Times*, February 16, 1907, Sec. 1, p. 1; February 20, 1907, Sec. 1, p. 1.

\(^{59}\) *Ibid.*, January 2, 1908, Sec. 1, p. 4.
been historically provided, the Japanese government did apparently agree to limit passports of laborers desiring to emigrate to the United States. As procedures developed, exemptions from restrictions were granted to those who had an established United States domicile, were seeking to join a parent, wife, or child in the United States, or who were assuming the control of a previously acquired agricultural enterprise in the United States.  

Any publicity the Agreement received did not affect anti-Oriental agitation. As early as February, 1908, a general conference of Exclusion League representatives in Seattle addressed a protest to Congress charging that the Agreement permitted a foreign ruler to stipulate the class and number of persons allowed to emigrate to the United States. In the League's opinion, such a topic should be the matter of domestic congressional legislation.

Although under attack from the exclusion front, the Agreement did undoubtedly have some effect on immigration to the West Coast. Authoritative figures for the year 1908, (exclusive of immigration to Hawaii) cite the number of adult Japanese immigrants to the United States at 7,250, a


figure rather consistent with years since 1900. In 1909, and 1910, immigration fell off considerably, to 1,593 and 1,552, respectively. The annual report of the Commissioner General of Immigration for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1910, indicated satisfaction with the degree to which Japanese officials had provided a "limiting influence" on prospective emigrants. 62

Other Sources of Leadership in the Exclusion Movement

An indication that a major portion of California inhabitants were definitely opposed to further Japanese labor increases is evidenced in the Republican and Democratic State party platforms of 1910 which contained "exclusion planks". Republicans stated, "We declare our faith in the unswerving opposition of the people of California to the further admission of oriental laborers, and we urge upon Congress and the President the adoption of all necessary measures to guard against this evil." 63 The Democratic platform contained statements in item 7 favoring the exclusion of all Asiatic labor, and in item 20 it called for the adoption of State legislation which would prevent Asiatics not eligible for citizenship from owning land. As noted previously, this latter goal was achieved in 1913 with the enactment of the

62 Ibid., p. 5. 63 Ibid., p. 173.
Webb-Henley Act. Candidates for both parties pledged to work for the elimination of oriental labor competition, a point alleged to have been discussed extensively during campaigns.64

Although California recognized the immigrant problem as one of commanding importance, let it not be said that the Japanese molded smoothly into the social and economic structures of other Western states. During 1909, the Nevada legislature attempted to pass strong resolutions commending a Japanese alien land bill and the abortive school segregation in California. Both resolutions were passed by the Nevada House but met defeat in the Senate by a narrow margin. Their defeat was allegedly brought about through the influence of United States Senators from Nevada. In the same year, a resolution was introduced in the Oregon legislature and narrowly defeated which called upon Congress to expand the scope of the Chinese Exclusion Act to include all Asiatics. Similar attitudes were evident among Montana legislators.65

In addition to anti-Japanese responses from State legislative bodies many governmental officials, business, labor and journalistic leaders during the first half of the century were members of, or in sympathy with a California historical and racist organization, The Native Sons of the Golden West.

64_Ibid._ 65_Ibid., p. 172._
The general immigration philosophy of this organization and its sister establishment, the Native Daughters of the Golden West, was to "... keep California white; to greater and more united efforts to stop the advance of the Japanese Government's peaceful invasion army." Membership was limited to caucasian men and women born in the State of California. The group gloried in the history and traditions of California, and acquired a degree of political power by stressing that the State, in essence the Nation, was being lost to the "yellow horde".

Members in good standing received a monthly copy of The Grizzly Bear, also available on newstands, which contained California historical articles as well as racist information relating to problem areas, and current legislative proposals for and against Oriental citizenship, alien property ownership, and exclusion. Membership roles included such personalities as United States Senators Hiram Johnson (Rep., Calif.), James D. Phelan (Dem., Calif.), newspaperman V. S. McClatchy, California State Senator, and for a period president of the Oriental Exclusion League, J. W. Inman, and Anthony Camenetti, formerly a California State Senator and U. S. Commissioner of Immigration during 1913. A review

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67 McWilliams, op. cit., p. 22.
of several editions of The Grizzly Bear during 1922-23 did not reveal the Association's total membership. From several general comments relative to the membership of larger city "parlors", however, one could conservatively estimate organizational strength at 10,000.

The May, 1923, issue of The Grizzly Bear contained a lengthy article by McClatchy entitled "Japs Organizing to Force Racial Equality". An accompanying editorial comment described the narrative as

... revealing some of the methods employed by the Japs to gain control of California and the Western part of the United States for their worshipped emperor which should stir the Native Sons and Daughters and all others who are keeping California white, to greater and more united efforts to stop the Japanese invasion.68

McClatchy, apparently a frequent source for Grizzly Bear material, exerted considerable political influence in the San Joaquin Valley through ownership of three newspapers, the Sacramento Bee, the Fresno Bee, and the Modesto Bee. One analyst has alleged that McClatchy solidified his anti-Oriental attitudes during a trip to Japan in 1919, after which he returned to California, his native State, and was influential in the formation of the California Joint Immigration Committee. This organization was sponsored by, or at least had a very close working relationship in matters

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concerning Oriental immigration with racially like-minded groups, the Native Sons, the California Grange, the California Federation of Labor, and the newly founded American Legion. McClatchy withdrew from his newspaper involvement during the 1920's and devoted his remaining years to anti-Japanese propaganda. In an article printed in the January, 1921, issue of the *Annals of the American Academy of Political Science*, he summarized his personal views on the menace of Japanese immigration in the following manner:

1. The non-assimilability of the Japanese race; the practical impossibility of making out of such material valuable and loyal American citizens.

2. Their unusually high birth rate per thousand population, notwithstanding that the estimated proportion of adult females to males among the Japanese is only 1 to 4, while among the whites it is, say, 1 to 1.

3. The great advantages which they possess in economic competition, partly due to racial characteristics, partly due to standards of living, organization, direction and aid from their government.  

McClatchy, reportedly, was a most influential member of the Joint Immigration Committee, an organization which increased its influence after August, 1924, when it assumed possession of the San Francisco office, records, and funds, of the old Oriental Exclusion League. The organizational aim of the Joint Committee was to support and lobby for state and/or national legislation which would provide for the

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exclusion of Oriental immigrants. It successfully lobbied for the deletion of passages favorable to the Japanese in textbooks used in California and Hawaii. They also encouraged passage of anti-Japanese coastal fishing laws as well as regulatory legislation within the California alien land law program. The organization was most influential during the late 1920's and early 1930's but lost most of its potency after the death of McClatchy in 1938.\footnote{Grodgins, op. cit., pp. 10-11.}

The Drive for Exclusion

Between 1910-1920, Japanese migrants entered the United States in increasing numbers. Their total plus that of resident alien and American born Japanese reached 110,010 in 1920.\footnote{U. S., Bureau of the Census, Fourteenth Census of the United States: 1920, Population, III, p. 19.} New arrivals included numerous women and children. Families emigrated to join the head of the household, a fact which possibly indicated the accumulation of a measure of economic security by their predecessors. The quest for a more settled life caused many to send for wives and children; others selected so-called "picture brides."\footnote{U. S. Congress, House, Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, Fourth Interim Report, p. 79. Males were acquainted with a prospective bride only through photograph exchange. A marriage ceremony was conducted in Japan which did not require the presence of the groom. The bride, considered legally married upon departing Japan, was entitled to U. S. entry under the terms of the Gentleman's Agreement.} During the
period that the female population was increasing there seemed to coincide a transfer in Japanese occupational standing; from farm laborer to farm owner-operator. The wife was an asset in farm operation, an extra worker in the field.

World War I increased national industrial and agricultural requirements which correspondingly intensified the labor demand. Many agriculturalists left the land and relocated in industrial districts; others who continued to till the soil were encouraged to expand their agricultural holdings because of higher food prices. In 1920, Toyoji Chiba, Managing Director of the Japanese Agricultural Association, stated in an Association annual report that 58 per cent of the Japanese in the State were in some manner involved in agricultural production. It was reported that land farmed by Japanese increased during the period 1910-1920 by 217.9 per cent. Certainly there were those in California, particularly caucasian farm associations, who viewed this rapid increase in agricultural lands occupied by Orientals with alarm. During the war years some land owners apparently took a different view of the Japanese farm laborer. A white farmer in 1920 commented,

Speaking as an orange grower, I will say we were mighty glad to get these Japanese laborers during the war when it was practically impossible to obtain men to pick our

74 Ibid., p. 14.
fruit and work our orchards. There was nothing said about menaces or yellow perils in those days.75

The climax of the Great War witnessed an intensification of anti-Japanese attitudes. Their agricultural progress during the war years drew the attention of white planters who were no longer preoccupied with war production. Returning soldiers, anxious to secure civilian employment, resented the heavy influx of Japanese into industrial positions. The wider utilization of Japanese labor suggested the charge that the Gentleman's Agreement was not being rigidly enforced.

John S. Chambers, California State Controller, believed the accusation was a fair one. Commenting in 1921, he noted that of the 100,000 Japanese in California, 50,000 represented an increase since enactment of the Agreement.

Before the Agreement, the Japanese population was not quite 30,000 and the births, less deaths, up to last year [1920] were 20,000, making 50,000. It is obvious, therefore, that the other 50,000, or the bulk thereof, must have come in under the 'Gentlemen's Agreement', and, as the large majority of these arrivals were laborers, in violation of that agreement; or else were smuggled across our borders or landed along our coastline, also a clear violation of the law.76

Chambers' figures on the number of Japanese in California are inaccurate, however, if one relies on United States Census


Bureau reports. According to the latter, the Japanese population in California in 1921, was 71,952, not 100,000, and did not approach the latter figure until 1930, when the State's Japanese population was reported to be 97,456. 77

California's Senator Phelan, testifying before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, charged that Japanese laborers entered the country under the Gentleman's Agreement disguised as students, professional men, and merchants. He also condemned the "picture-bride" concept as a means of evading international accord. These women, in the Senator's mind, were the medium for "Japan's plan of peaceful penetration" through colonization. "The women work in the fields," he said, "and so circumvent the Agreement and then give birth to children and thus defeat the purpose of the Agreement by increasing the horde of nonassimilable aliens who are crowding white men and women off the land." 78

Prior to Phalen's testimony, the Joint Immigration Committee had developed a four point program designed to solve California's Japanese problems. These suggestions


78 As reported in New York Times, July 7, 1919, Sec. 1, p. 18. Agitation against the "picture-bride" system became so intense that Japan entered into an agreement with the U. S. Government, referred to as the "ladies' agreement," which terminated the issuance of passports to Japanese picture-brides after February 25, 1920. Complaints then developed over the "Kankodan" process whereby males returned briefly to Japan, married, and immediately returned with a wife. (See Fourth Interim Report, p. 84).
were (1) Cancellation of the Gentleman's Agreement; (2) Exclusion of picture-brides; (3) Agitation for exclusion of all Japanese immigrants; (4) Development of a constitutional amendment to deny citizenship to children born in the United States of parentage ineligible to citizenship. 79

Operating within the spirit of this platform, the Committee supported in 1922 the passage of an amendment to the existing California alien land law. By its provisions, Japanese migrants were deprived of agricultural land leasing privileges, and could not act as a guardian for a native-born minor who owned property which the Japanese could not hold under the law. Similar debarment precluded their entry into corporations whereby property was purchased for their use by American agents. In addition to California, land laws with similar stipulations were enacted in Oregon in 1923 and in Washington in 1921 and 1923. 80

The 1922 United States Supreme Court decision, Ozawa v. United States, provided some legal justification for these land laws through its declaration that the Japanese were "outside the zone" of those immigrants eligible for naturalization. 81 This decision also supported the contention of

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exclusionists that the Japanese were not satisfactory material for American citizenship, and thus, should be excluded from American society. A further step toward the denial of entry to Japanese occurred shortly thereafter and was fostered by the actions of the Japanese embassy. On the basis of suggestions in the press that national exclusion legislation was a distinct possibility during the 1924 congressional session, the Japanese Embassy sent a note to the United States Department of State citing the grave consequences which would result from the passage of such legislation. The use of this terminology aroused the indignation of Washington officials, particularly Congressmen, and provided fuel for the claim that the Japanese Nation was attempting to unduly interfere with United States domestic affairs.82

The climax of a quarter century of prejudice toward the Oriental came in 1924 when an immigration bill, including an amendment for Japanese exclusion, came before Congress. Anti-Japanese organizations and legislators of like mind were instrumental in its passage. Guiding the measure through Congressional channels had been a major agenda topic of a San Francisco exclusionist meeting in October, 1923. Members of the California congressional delegation, State Representatives of the

American Legion, the Grange, and the Native Sons of the Golden West were present, and they united under the chairmanship of McClatchy.

The following March, McClatchy, California Attorney General U. S. Webb, and former California Senator Phalen appeared before the Senate Immigration Committee hearings in support of the legislative proposal subsequently to be known as the Quota Immigration Act of 1924. McClatchy, as spokesman for the group, expressed views which have been touched upon previously--the Japanese cannot merge with the American society, they are rapidly increasing their population percentage in western states, and their continued presence results in economic competition. He argued that if immigration was to be restricted, the logical beginning point would be the exclusion of Orientals who, under American law, could never become citizens.®

In the House this legislation, H. R. 7995, was sponsored by Representative Albert Johnson (Rep., Wash.) and in the Senate, S. 2576, by Senator David A. Reed (Rep., Penn.). Senator Samuel Shortridge (Rep., Calif.) secured the amendment to the Senate version designed to exclude Orientals from the United States.

®As reported in New York Times, March 12, 1924, Sec. 1, p. 13.
In a speech before the Daughters of the American Revolution in April, 1924, Johnson stated that his support for the exclusion provision was based on the "endless misunderstanding" arising from the Gentlemen's Agreement whereby American-Japanese immigration was regulated by Japan. Circumventing a major issue, the possibility of discrimination against the Japanese immigrant, Johnson emphasized United States sovereignty and the "grave consequences" statement of the Japanese Embassy.

It is our sovereign right to regulate immigration to our shores. Our right to say who shall live among us and be of us has been challenged, and our Nation has been threatened with 'grave consequences'. I say to you that this Nation will not compromise its sovereignty.84

The "Shortridge Amendment" was discussed at length on the Senate floor, April 14, 1924. Shortridge, claiming to express the view of the complete California delegation, cited social, economic, and racial problems as the basis for excluding Orientals, namely, Japanese. Senators George G. Moses (Rep., N. H.) and Thomas Sterling (Rep., S. D.) questioned the legality of such a process, in view of the existing Gentleman's Agreement, and they also questioned a national policy which would discriminate against the Japanese

nation while establishing a quota system as the controlling basis for immigration from non-Asian countries. Also stressing sovereignty Shortridge retorted,

... We are in the exercise of a sovereign power. ... I say now that in this contemplated legislation, we intend no offense. ... We are not covetous of any designs against her [Japan]. We wish her peace. ... We wish for her sovereign independence. ... We wish in a word, that she may prosper, that her people may be happy; but we do not propose to shape our legislation in any other fashion than as shall seem for the best interests of the men, women and children of America.85

A further review of positions of individual Congressmen in relation to this bill is unnecessary. Climactically, it might be stated that a conference committee considered the proposal and retained Section 13(c) which provided that "No alien ineligible to citizenship shall be admitted to the United States. ..."86 Certain exceptions were provided for near relatives of oriental residents in the United States. Final passage was secured on May 15, 1924 by a Senate vote of 69-9.87

During the final days of debate, several letters were entered in the Congressional Record, which further identify additional individuals and groups who favored the rejection of oriental immigration. California Attorney General Webb

85 Ibid., Part 6, pp. 6305-6306.
86 Ibid., Part 8, p. 8571.
87 Ibid., Part 9, p. 8589.
expressed his support for Section 13(c) in a letter to Representative John E. Raker (Dem., Calif.). Clarence Hunt, editor of the *Grizzly Bear*, corresponded with Raker stating, "... if Congress is American it will insist on immediate exclusion. Delay means surrendering the Pacific Coast to Orientals. We want protection now."88 Morton Keaton, Departmental Adjutant of the California American Legion, forwarded the following telegram to Raker:

The legionnaires in California urge you to be present when immigration bill comes up on floor as reported by conferees, and want you to know that we are standing behind you 100% in your fight to make this coast a white man's country. To defer effective date of ineligible alien exclusion until March 1925 [as had been proposed] is to provide open season on influx of Japanese. If the entire effort is one to avoid shocking sensibilities of the people of another nation, let us not forget that our own people still have sensibilities. It is probable that in its final action Congress will determine whether its action will be so framed as to please and satisfy people of another nation or preserve the interests of this Nation. In such event the decision should not be long delayed, not difficult to reach. Let us have dignified firmness and not vacillating weakness.89

To demonstrate the general exclusionist attitude of the American Legion, earlier during the legislative session the National Headquarters had submitted a statement of policy to Senator William J. Harris (Dem., Geo.) which supported his proposal to terminate all alien entry into the United States

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88 Ibid., Part 8, p. 8234.
89 Ibid.
for a period of five years. The Legion expressed concern for the preservation of American governmental institutions and principles which it believed were in jeopardy because of the "unassimilable and menacing alien population." These persons, the Legion claimed, did not understand and appreciate the American political method. Legislation forbidding entry was urged, specifically the five year suspension on all immigration, followed by a program which would lead to immigration only from nations possessing ideals kindred to those of the United States. ⁹⁰

Legionnaire involvement in this issue was ostensibly an aspect of its general opposition to "the foreigner." It would appear that the Legion associated the alien with "subversive" national elements. They seemed suspicious of persons who failed to contribute militarily to the American effort in World War I. In its first convention the organization had established a National Americanism Commission to combat anti-American tendencies, activities, and propaganda, and to work for the patriotic education of immigrants. Working then consistently for immigration restriction it was not particularly surprising that Legionnaire Albert Johnson sponsored the 1924

measure in the House resulting in debarment of Asiatics from the United States. 91

The Period After Exclusion

As the years transpired between adoption of the national exclusion policy and World War II, certain transformations occurred which had a limiting effect on United States Japanese resentment. Land laws and immigration restriction caused some decline in agricultural activity, a trend reinforced by young Japanese leaving the farms. Cultivated land controlled by the Japanese throughout the Nation diminished from 491,625 acres in 1920 to 324,300 acres in 1930. 92 Paralleling the decline in agriculture was the rapid industrialization of the coastal economy to the point where it was capable of absorbing laborers regardless of race or nativity. These transpositions, of course, were a gradual process during the 1920's and 1930's.

Of some importance during this period was a second identifiable change, the Americanization of Japanese residents. Although the early immigrants tended to cling to their traditional native customs, second and third generations born in the United States departed from Old World mores, thereby partially disproving the allegation that Asiatics could not be molded into

91 tenBroek, op. cit., p. 44.

the American social structure. A survey of the Japanese district in Los Angeles during 1935 manifested Japanese characteristics highlighted by a curious mixture of American cultural influences. Restaurants served hamburgers and hot-dogs as well as soya bean curd and rice. Retail drug firms advertised American cosmetics in addition to Japanese beauty aids. Assimilation was achieved even on the first day of the week because "... on Sunday morning small Japanese children (who spoke better English than Japanese) [would] gather in the Buddhist churches and sing, 'Stand Up, Stand Up for Buddha,' and 'Buddha Loves Me, This I Know.'"93

After 1924 and the victory of exclusion, those who had agitated for the elimination of Japanese influence were content to merely pass resolutions or privately affirm their hostility. By 1930, even much of this had disappeared. In reality, anti-Japanese incidents were infrequent in the western United States in the 1930's. With this decline in open hostility, there was a corresponding decline in material written concerning Japanese-American immigrant relationships. To an extent, this lack of information makes it difficult to truly evaluate the years just prior to World War II.

Some useful information is provided, however, by sociologist John A. Rademaker. While a member of the University

of Washington faculty during 1934, he observed that with the exception of public school experiences the coastal Japanese population continued to form a separate social segment. As a unit well integrated internally, they existed, in the main, separate from the dominant white population for political, religious, recreative, kinship, and fraternal functions.

In answer to the question, "Why this racial separation?", Rademaker cited historical factors previously explored in this chapter, language differences, racial characteristics, and differing customs and cultural values. He observed that, generally, it was groups within the white population who were interested in erecting and maintaining this barrier because they believed they would benefit by opposing the Japanese. Their efforts instilled anti-Japanese attitudes into virtually every aspect of life in the west coast region.

The point should certainly be stressed, and Rademaker did, that the movement toward social acceptance was rapidly accelerated during the 1930's by the maturity of second generation Japanese. Children of both races, because of integrated attendance in public school systems, mutual associations, and experiences, were frequently unwilling to accept the slanted racial observations of their parents. Language barriers were reduced, Japanese cultural beliefs
and habits were yielding, and harmonious social relationships between the youth were strengthened.⁹⁴

Any new tolerant mood, to the extent that one could be legitimately recognized, certainly did not represent social acceptance by the majority of the coastal population. Sociological surveys conducted during the mid-1900's suggested that prejudicial hostilities remained deep seated. Such studies tended to indicate a general public recognition that the proper role for the Oriental in western society closely paralleled the traditional position of the Negro in southern regions. In this way interracial marriages were banned, and the Japanese were denied membership in fraternal organizations. They could not purchase residential property in caucasian areas, and certain employment restrictions applied only to them.⁹⁵

One particular study, conducted among west coast caucasian subjects, required the selection from a list of adjectives those which best described a variety of ethnic groups. The most popular choices for the Japanese race were the words,


cruel, deceitful, treacherous, sly, shrewd.  It would seem, then, that the decades of racial strife had distinctly embedded in the public mind a Japanese stereotype which still existed in the 1940's.

Individual reasons for the development of this stereotype and the resultant social distance between the races were undoubtedly varied. Possibly an unpleasant experience with a single Japanese, or "hearsay" experiences, could change an opinion from favorable to less favorable. If the immigrant were an illiterate peasant and the citizen a person of culture, an adverse view might result. Undoubtedly, opinions acquired during youth, the result of anti-racial or immigrant traditions in the home, the influence of newspapers, schools, churches, these and other sources could contribute to racist views. One individual explained, when queried about anti-Japanese attitudes, that

My prejudice against Japanese dated from the night we heard terrible sounds coming from a Japanese farm house. My father went to investigate, and I was afraid my father would be killed. Many nights after that I would jump from my sleep, believing that the Japanese were attacking me.

Regardless of prevalent white hostilities, if any over-reaching conclusions can be drawn, it would seem that in 1941


97Bogardus, op. cit., p. 208.
social integration was at least foreseeable. Although, in general, social contacts were limited to youth and the education processes, barriers were being lowered, Old World traditions were giving way, and a degree of free social intercourse, given a period of years, was a definite possibility. There remained, nonetheless, a deep fissure in the regional social structure. Like a volcano potentially active, hostility could break forth if there were provocation. That provocation came on December 7th.
CHAPTER III

WORLD WAR II: THE SOLIDIFICATION OF ANTI-JAPANESE ATTITUDES

Hawaiian-Japanese-The Traditional American View

Radio announcements on December 7, 1941, described for the American public a scene of complete destruction at Pearl Harbor. The Sunday morning attack shattered the concept of Hawaii as a "first line of defense" for the United States in the Pacific. That such awesome destruction could come to this presumably well fortified installation without the aid of "internal enemies" seemed unbelievable. Thus, from the outset suspicious glances were directed toward Island residents of Japanese ancestry.

Regardless of the particular view held by individual Americans concerning Hawaii--that it was a resort area, a complex of pineapple and sugar plantations, or a military fortress--years of tension between the United States and Japan tempted one to wonder how Japanese migrants to Hawaii would react in case of war involving America and Japan as adversaries. Those who considered the loyalty question during and since World War II have reached different conclusions.
One group observed the Island minority as a peril of great proportions and opposed the freedom permitted Hawaiian-Japanese as a manifestation of governmental negligence surpassed only by the December bombing incident. Finding followers both in the United States and Hawaii, these were the people who cried, "Once a Jap always a Jap," and who assumed that no Japanese should be trusted in or near strategic military areas.¹

A second, and probably less vocal, group pointed to the population of Hawaii as demonstrative of the success of American democratic principles under trying conditions. William Allen White held such a view, characterizing Hawaii as "... the one place in the world where race antipathies have disappeared and race injustices are not in vogue."² This philosophy considered Hawaii as a miniature sample of global democracy, and cited the americanization of the Japanese and their contributions before and during World War I as evidence of this fact.


²Doremus Scudder, "Hawaii's Experience with the Japanese," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, XIVII, (January, 1921), p. 111. William Allen White, (1868-1964), was a life long resident of Emporia, Kansas, editor and publisher of the Emporia Gazette. He was the Author of several biographical works including the Life of Woodrow Wilson, 1924, and the Life of Calvin Coolige, 1925. He was a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations from 1925-1940.
One exponent of this position as early as 1921 stated that the assimilation of the Japanese into the Hawaiian culture was due in large part to Christian teaching within the Islands. Christian concepts included a plea for national loyalty by all racial groups. The Japanese were urged to depart from their traditional heritage and to embrace Hawaii and the Island culture on a permanent basis. Possibly this movement paralleled a similar call voiced by Americans to mainland aliens; that is, that the non-citizen surrender all thought of returning to his homeland, and approve of and adopt the culture, the pace of life in the United States.³

Sugar and pineapple interests in Hawaii were chiefly responsible (beginning about 1880) for the importation of Japanese laborers into the Islands. The plantation environment served as the home for the majority of these immigrants for some years, and during this initial period their reception was apparently cordial. Observers noted that the Japanese readily assumed the customs and habits of local plantation life, that they were willing, energetic workers, and that traditional prejudices against Chinese coolies did not seem to apply to the Japanese.⁴

³Ibid., p. 112.
The cordiality of this initial reception during the late 1800's apparently cooled as Japanese migrated to Hawaii in increasing numbers. Within a decade after the United States had annexed the Islands, their ratio to the total population had increased to over 40 percent, or approximately 100,000. By 1900, they were the most numerous ethnic group and remained so until after Pearl Harbor. Public resentment and hostility toward them also increased, in part because of the migration of Japanese from plantation labor into those skilled and semi-skilled occupations usually associated with urban life.  

Ill-feeling toward Hawaiian-Japanese after 1900 was also directly related to hostility toward the Japanese nation, a feeling which was influenced, in part, by Japan's militarist policy in the Far East. The program outlined in 1915 by which Japan proposed to absorb the territory of China, the secret agreements with England and France in 1917, the Shantung articles of the Versailles Treaty, these factors tended to encourage an attitude of distrust and dislike toward the Japanese nation.  

For an extensive period prior to December 7, 1941, a popular subject for after-dinner conversation among non-

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Japanese in Hawaii was speculation about Japanese conduct on the Islands should hostilities erupt with Japan. During the 1930's, as Japan pursued expansionist policies in the Orient, and as the United States countered by increasing its military expenditures and personnel in Hawaii, the question of Japanese loyalty assumed national importance. The boy from San Francisco, the Hawaiian plantation owner, the Chinese laundry employee, each felt qualified to voice his opinion. Ultimately one view gained strong support: the Japanese, whether alien or of Hawaiian birth, retained that mysterious, elusive, oriental quality which left their loyalty during a state of war open to conjecture.  

Hawaiian-Japanese and the Pearl Harbor Bombing

Subsequent to the Pearl Harbor attack, Blake Clark, professor of English literature at the University of Hawaii from 1930-1942, and author of the volume, *Remember Pearl Harbor*, published some interesting observations relative to the American image of the Japanese in Hawaii. In his analysis Clark noted that after the bombing raid he was consistently asked the following two questions during trips to the United States mainland: "What are you people in Hawaii doing with all those Japs out there? Have you got them in concentration

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7Lind, op. cit., p. 38.
camps?" In view of the frequency of such questions Clark suggested that a prevailing American attitude in 1942 was that Hawaiian-Japanese constituted a massive fifth column organization which provided active support for Japanese militarists during the Hawaiian raid and, as a result, should be incarcerated. 8 In view of later events this was a valid observation.

The reality of the situation was that America was basically unprepared for war. Distances were suddenly reduced. Honolulu had previously been too far removed from the mainland for a vacation cruise. Now the peak of Diamond-Head seemed almost visible over the horizon. Coastal residents drove along the beaches imagining that they could see periscopes and smell bomb smoke in the air. This lack of preparation was not only illustrated in mental attitudes but also through the lack of physical readiness for armed conflict. The necessity for the development for restrictive economic measures, ration coupons, strategic material lists, and numerous others were, in part, examples of this lack of preparation.

Unlike America, Hawaii had not been so completely unprepared. In 1939, Honolulu city officials, in cooperation

with the army, organized and conducted a blackout training program. The following year a comprehensive Emergency Disaster Plan was drafted which created a council of national guard and civilian personnel charged with the responsibility for administering and coordinating essential civilian activities in the event of war.

A volunteer police force of Honolulu citizens augmented the city's regular force. Further preparatory action was taken during September, 1941, when Governor Joseph B. Poindexter called the Hawaiian legislature into special session and urged the enactment of legislation which would grant extraordinary power to the governor during emergency periods. His plea resulted in passage of the Hawaiian Defense Act, October 3, 1941, a measure which outlined emergency powers for the territorial executive, including the power to establish martial law and to appoint a military official to serve as military governor.9

At 11:30 A. M. on December 7th, following the Japanese raid, Poindexter acted in accordance with this Act by issuing a proclamation which suspended the writ of habeas corpus, placed the Islands under martial law. The Governor's order further authorized and requested the regional U. S. Army

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Commanding General to assume the position of military governor. Immediately thereafter, Lieutenant General Walter G. Short issued a public proclamation declaring:

I announce to the people of Hawaii, that, in compliance with the above request of the governor of Hawaii, I have this day assumed the position of military governor of Hawaii, and have taken charge of the government of the territory. I shall therefore shortly publish ordinances governing the conduct of the people of the Territory with respect to the showing of lights, circulation, meetings, censorship, possession of arms, ammunition, and explosives, and the sale of intoxicating liquors and other subjects.

In order to assist in repelling the threatened invasion of our island home, good citizens will cheerfully obey this proclamation and the ordinances to be published; others will be required to do so. Offenders will be severely punished by military tribunals or will be held in custody until such time as the civil courts are able to function.

While the flames of ships still flickered at Pearl Harbor, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and intelligence organizations of the Army and Navy rounded up numerous suspect Japanese aliens, officials of the Japanese consulate, and a score of others who were considered as potentially dangerous. On December 23, 1941, Short testified before the Presidential Commission to Investigate

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10 "Proclamation, United States Army," Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, December 7, 1941. A photo-copy of the original document is reprinted ibid., p. 128.
the Japanese Attack\textsuperscript{12} of December 7, 1941, on Hawaii, that Bureau agents and G-2 military intelligence representatives utilized previously prepared suspect lists and immediately arrested 370 Japanese, 98 Germans, and 14 Italians. The persons were incarcerated on Sand Island in the Hawaiian group, and, according to Short, were not released unless they could "... prove absolutely that they are not dangerous and should be released. ... As far as I know," he noted, "most of these people are still there."\textsuperscript{13} 

Robert L. Shivers, Special Agent in Charge, Hawaiian Territory, Federal Bureau of Investigation, corroborated this part of Short's testimony when he told the Commission on January 6, 1942, that suspect alien Japanese had been interned, and, that to his knowledge, none of those originally detained had been released. The liberation of

\textsuperscript{12}On December 16, 1941, President Roosevelt appointed this Commission to investigate the circumstances surrounding the Japanese attack; to determine whether evidence existed to indicate negligence on the part of any military element which resulted in undue loss of life or excessive damage to U. S. facilities or property. If negligence existed, responsibility was to be affixed accordingly. Chairman of the Committee was U. S. Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts. Other members were Admiral William H. Standley, U. S. N., retired, Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, U. S. N., retired, General Frank R. McCoy, U. S. A., retired, and General Joseph T. McNarney, Army Air Corps. This Commission will hereafter be cited as the Roberts Commission.

prisoners supposedly depended upon the ruling of a five-member hearing board appointed by the military governor. According to Shivers, some Italian and German detainees were released by Hawaiian police prior to case consideration by the hearing board upon representations of friends willing to "vouch for them." All Japanese, he said, were still in detention status on January 6th, in that the review panel, if appointed, had held no sessions.  

Granted, the period was chaotic. Additional testimony by Shivers would seem to indicate, however, that the basis for alien arrests was questionable. He explained that prior to the Pearl Harbor attack F. B. I. activity in Hawaii extended only to August 24, 1939. Before this date, intelligence matters were controlled and coordinated by U. S. Army and Navy Intelligence units. When Shivers opened the Honolulu Bureau Office in 1939, he learned, through the coordination of organizational investigative interests with military intelligence units, that the latter detachments had accumulated names and identifying data of numerous Japanese and other Axis suspects who should probably be interned in the event of hostilities. Shivers concluded, after numerous inquiries throughout the Islands, that the Hawaiian white population was in no position to give credible intelligence.

14 The Federal Bureau of Investigation will be hereafter cited as the F. B. I. Ibid., p. 867.
information about resident Japanese, in view of the limited intercourse between these racial groups.

They could only give you surmises, they could only tell you what they thought would happen, but for factual information, it didn't exist. . . . To a large extent the average haole [caucasian] does not know the Japanese psychology, he does not know the Japanese mind, and for that reason he did not know what was going on within the inner circles of the Japanese community.15

Shivers also observed that truly valid intelligence information could not be secured from local Japanese either. Noting that they were a very close ethnic group, he replied that, "It is next to impossible to get one resident Japanese on whom you could rely who is sufficiently well informed or close enough to the alien enemy to actually be in a position to know what is going on."16

Even as late as December 7th, Shivers testified, the F. B. I. had not assumed complete investigative responsibility for the alien minority, but his staff of approximately twenty-five agents and clerks worked in close collaboration with Army and Navy intelligence. As of the bombing date, his local office was in the process of revising an alien suspect list based on reinvestigation of individuals identified by military intelligence. Names supplied to Shivers' office by the military contained some 700 Japanese on an

15Ibid., pp. 857-858.
16Ibid., p. 866.
"A" list, or persons who were to be interned in the event of hostilities with Japan. In addition, some 1000 names constituted a "B" list: those who were to be kept under surveillance in the event of war with Japan.\footnote{17\textit{Ibid.}, p. 858.}

In the hours following the air raid these lists provided the basis for Japanese arrests. From his testimony it was apparent that Shivers questioned the true reliability of data compiled by another investigative agency, by unknown military investigators under unknown circumstances. However, the F. B. I. used the lists because no better guides were available and because it seemed to be a normal requirement during wartime to detain those persons who could be expected to participate in fifth-column activities. Some Japanese were undoubtedly arrested and detained for extended periods who should have been free. Some were eventually released, and others were transferred during 1942 to the Japanese detention centers constructed on the mainland.

Were acts of sabotage actually committed by the Japanese during the Pearl Harbor disaster? This is the important question, and available evidence indicated that there was not a single verifiable incident. Shivers commented before the Roberts Commission that his office had primary investigative responsibility for such matters and that he had no personal knowledge of any acts of sabotage.\footnote{18\textit{Ibid.}} Blake Clark
supported this statement in an article in *The New Republic* in 1942. He was personally advised, he wrote, by the Chief Agent of the F. B. I. in Hawaii (not identified by name, though possibly Shivers) that, "You can say without fear of contradiction that there has not been a single act of sabotage either before December 7th, during the attack, or at any time since."\(^{19}\)

It would seem appropriate at this point to consider some of the major allegations of disloyal actions against Hawaiian-Japanese. Certainly public opinion could be molded by proven incidents, but it could also be formed by a sufficient number of news reports which simply related allegations of hostile Japanese actions. Such stories about internal subversive activity began to circulate throughout Hawaii within hours after the attack, and they had an effect on the status of alien Japanese both in the Islands and on the mainland. Obviously there was much in the chaotic aftermath which could give rise to distortions of fact, and it was probably remarkable that no more "tales of sabotage" were reported.

A widely circulated report was that one Japanese flier downed during the raid was wearing a graduation ring from McKinley High School, Honolulu. It was also reported that

\(^{19}\)Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 309.
a large arrow had been cut in a canefield along the coast to guide planes in the direction of military installations. Honolulu police officials were informed that enemy parachutists were descending on the Islands and intermingling with local Japanese residents. Stories were circulated of Japanese citizens blocking vital roadways during bombing and strafing passes. In every instance official sources reported that such allegations were nothing more than fabrications, the product of fear and hysteria resulting from the surprise raid.

Clark, in Hawaii during the bombing, has noted several heroic deeds performed by local Japanese. Among the incidents he referred to was one situation wherein two Japanese boys at work on a Hickam Field defense project assisted in the defense of the field during the attack. Seeing that a machine gunner was having difficulty getting his weapon into operation, they ran to his aid, helped to anchor it, and fed ammunition into the gun as it was fired. Because of the rapid loading and firing both later received emergency treatment for burns.

The House Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration also heard testimony relating to the possibility of an organized Hawaiian fifth column. Membership

\[\text{References:}\]


of this Committee included John H. Tolan (Dem., Calif.) Chairman, John J. Sparkman (Dem., Ala.) Laurence F. Arnold (Dem., Ill.) Frank G. Osmers (Rep., N.J.) and Carl T. Curtis (Rep., Neb.).

The Committee was formed originally during the 76th Congress as the Select Committee to Investigate the Interstate Migration of Destitute Citizens. In hearings which began during July, 1940, it completed a comprehensive study of the economic causes and effects of movements of destitute families across state lines during the 1930's. Of primary interest was the national effect of agricultural migration - people departing a location because they could not maintain a satisfactory living standard and relocating elsewhere, frequently urban areas, hoping to find employment. During the eight months tenure of this study the Committee recognized a new movement, that of the defense migrant. Population segments were rushing to the sites of various industrial and defense projects in search of employment, with a resultant strain on schools, housing capabilities, and other facilities necessary to community life.

During March, 1941, the House increased the investigative scope of the Tolan Committee to include the present

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23 Ibid., pp. 2730-2731.
and potential consequences of migrations caused by the national-defense program. Correspondingly, its title was changed as noted above. It was in this context that the Committee entered the Japanese controversy; namely, to study the effect of Japanese inland removal on the industrial and agricultural economic structure of western states. A series of public hearings was conducted in the states of Washington, Oregon, and California during the months of February and March, 1942. During the proceedings Chairman Tolan requested affidavits from various persons in authority in Hawaii who might be in a position to provide factual information concerning sabotage allegations. None of the evidence was detrimental to the loyalty of the Hawaiian Japanese to the United States.

Honolulu Police Chief W. A. Gabrielson forwarded to the Committee an affidavit drafted by Police Captain D. O. Mookini of the city patrol division. Mookini, who was on patrol during the bombing, stated that there was traffic congestion, but the Japanese did not purposely add to the congestion. He personally investigated several reported incidents of parachutists descending on the city and they all proved to be false. In one instance, he said, children playing on a

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hillside some distance from the city served as the basis for the report.25

John A. Burns, Captain of the Honolulu Police Vice Squad and personally in charge of the Espionage Bureau, submitted a statement to the committee dated April 10, 1942. He reported that since December 7, 1941, his department had investigated numerous reports of flares, parachute troops, unauthorized short wave radio sets, collections of guns, ammunition, and other war materials. These alleged subversive activities, reported by military personnel, police officers, and the general public, were, on every occasion, proved to be false. In one instance a Japanese junk dealer was found to have buried 10,000 rounds of .22 ammunition. Investigation disclosed that fear of arrest and conviction prompted his action.26

Statements to the Committee by prominent United States government officials only served to verify other testimony noted above. According to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, "The War Department has received no information of sabotage committed by Japanese during the attack on Pearl Harbor."27 The Department of Justice took the same position in a letter to the Committee dated April 20, 1942. James Rowe, Jr.,

25 Ibid., pp. 54-57.  
26 Ibid., pp. 57-58.  
27 Ibid., p. 48.
Assistant to the United States Attorney General, wrote that "Mr. John Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, has advised me there was no sabotage committed prior to December 7th, on December 7th, or subsequent to that time."\textsuperscript{28}

The Roberts Commission completed its work and published its findings in January, 1942, and, like the Tolan Committee, it was unable to identify resident Hawaiian-Japanese with an organized fifth column. What the Roberts Commission did release and what was apparently taken by the press and elements of the American public as indicative of subversive activity, was testimony which related to espionage by Japanese consular officials.

F. B. I. agent Shivers branded the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu as the center of Japanese Hawaiian espionage. Participating in a raid on the Consulate subsequent to the air attack on December 7th, he found its officials burning Japanese documents. The raiding party seized all available papers, decoded them, and discovered that some of the material related to a system of signals to off-shore Japanese forces.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{28}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 49.

A German agent, Otto Kuhn, (subsequently sentenced to death by a military commission and then commuted to fifty years in prison) apparently prepared the coded signal system and had a role in carrying it out. No other persons were ever charged with having had any definite function in the plot. In addition, the tapping of consular telephone lines by the F. B. I. and Naval Intelligence produced information prior to the December raid, when considered after the attack, indicated that consular officials were forwarding information to Japan concerning, in particular, military sea patrol plane routes, and the number and location of U. S. naval vessels at sea and in port.  

On December 24, 1941, Lieutenant Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, Chief Intelligence Officer, United States Army General Staff, Hawaiian Department, further clarified the activities of the Japanese Consulate for the Roberts Commission. Fielder was first aware that Consulate documents were being destroyed in excessive quantity on December 6th and admitted that such action could have been progressing for several days. He did not correlate this fact to the possibility of a Japanese attack until after the bombing.

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because various governmental agencies frequently burned classified waste in quantity.\(^{31}\)

Fielder, now retired, recently placed himself in the camp of those who hold that no local Japanese disloyalty occurred during the Pearl Harbor raid. He commented that not a single act of sabotage could be traced to the 160,000 citizens of Japanese ancestry in Hawaii of whom about 28,000 were citizens of Japan and considered pro-Japanese.\(^ {32}\)

The most prominent dissenter, publicly, to this line of reasoning was the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox. During December, 1941, prior to publication of the Roberts Commission report, Knox went to Hawaii to examine conditions as they existed after the Japanese assault. In a press release of December 15th, he stated that the invaders had extensive knowledge of naval and military concentrations in the Islands, and he proclaimed that "... fifth column activity was the most effective since Norway."\(^ {33}\) This observation by a high ranking United States official, issued only one week after the attack, apparently received wide circulation in the American press and was undoubtedly a major


\(^{32}\)Based on an interview reported in *The Dallas Morning News*, December 7, 1966, Sec. 1, p. 9.

factor in influencing an American view of resident Japanese as pawns of the Japanese government.

Blake Clark was one of the contemporaries who was not persuaded by such reasoning. He admitted that the truth would probably never be completely known regarding the sources and extent of advance information possessed by Japanese militarists. However, he rejected the fifth column thesis for the simple reason that an espionage organization was not necessary in order for the Japanese to achieve their objectives on December 7th. Realistically appraising the matter he commented:

Once the Japanese knew where Pearl Harbor is -- which any tourist map of Hawaii shows -- they did not need to know the berth each battleship normally took. The attackers struck at every battleship in the harbor, regardless of size or age. . . . nor was any special information needed by the Japanese pilots in order to locate the hangers at Hickam Field. . . . There they lay, not only the biggest objects on all the island but painted white and gleaming in the sunlight. They were an invitation which Japanese pilots could see for more than twenty miles. The attackers apparently needed no more information than an observant person in the Japanese Consulate could have furnished in one week's time.34


in disloyal activity. On December 7th, as a result of the air attack, the Territorial Guard was mobilized around a nucleus of University of Hawaii Reserve Officer Training Corps cadets. These University unit members were predominantly Japanese. Further, initial enlistees in the Territorial Guard immediately after the attack, came mainly from the Japanese population segment. Resulting in part from the white population reaction to this situation, the Hawaiian Adjutant General, on January 7, 1942, activated an inactive reserve infantry company. This, the Times reported, followed "... days of agitation by white residents against the possibility of hostile actions by the Territorial Guards of Japanese extraction." The newspaper summarized the Hawaiian attitude, stating, "It is an indication of the feeling of civil and military inhabitants of the Islands that they are sitting on a racial volcano."35

Stories of "what happened at Pearl Harbor" generally began to circulate during late December, 1941. "Aiding and abetting" the enemy by local Japanese received ample journalistic attention and was frequently charged in Congressional floor speeches during the first three months.

35New York Times, January 8, 1942, Sec. 1, p. 5.
of the war. Once the sabotage portrait was painted, it was a short step between what was alleged to have happened at Pearl Harbor and what possibly could occur on the Pacific Coast.

Disloyalty Allegations Concerning West Coast Japanese

From the initiation of hostilities until the Japanese were secured in detention camps the specter of possible fifth column actions hung over the West Coast. A variety of sources kept the issue alive: radio, newspapers, periodicals, statements by congressmen, and congressional hearings.

During the first months of the war there appeared to be a close identification in newspaper reports between resident Japanese and the foreign enemy. It became increasingly common to use the term "Jap", instead of "Japanese", to designate either, or both of the groups.


37 Apparently the New York Times did not use the abbreviated form. Numerous 1941-1943 editions were researched and they failed to produce a single instance of the use of the term "Jap", either in relation to the foreign enemy or Japanese in the United States. Conversely, The Dallas Morning News used the abbreviated form on an almost daily basis. To adequately determine national or coastal trends would, of course, require the examination of many more newspapers and editions than were available.
An example of this "term abbreviation" and application of the word "Jap" to both racial elements can be seen in the following series of headlines, all of which appeared on the front page of one newspaper:

American Guns Destroy Japs Massed to Raid Corregidor
U. S. Fleet Wrecks 6 Jap Isle Bases
Singapore Guns Shell Japs Massing Along Jahore Strait
Dutch Batter Jap Forces to Blunt Invasion
Bayonet-Wielding Imperials Wipe Out Whole Jap Outfit
The following headline referred to coastal Japanese Japs Rounded up for Running Radio at Pacific Port

Coastal newspapers ran such headlines as, "Los Angeles has the Largest Jap Population," and "Numerous Japs have been arrested."

Even the Dallas Morning News did not miss an editorial opportunity to match disloyalty allegations against Hawaiian-Japanese with the possibility of United States internal subversion. Under the headline, "750 Axis Aliens in the Dallas Area; How Many are Loyal to the U. S.?", the paper expressed the following opinion.

There are men in a position to know who believe Dallas and North Texas will wake up to the real danger of sabotage only after some catastrophe like Pearl Harbor jolts citizens out of their complacency. . . . Where will the thrust come? Nobody knows. When? Nobody knows that either. It may be a rapid series of fires, explosions, pollutions. It may be a single well timed

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38 The Dallas Morning News, February 2, 1942, Sec. 1, p. 1.
39 Los Angeles Times, December 30, 1941, Sec. 1, p. 2.
40 Los Angeles Examiner, December 8, 1941, Sec. 1, p. 1.
attack by all the tools of the saboteur on dozens of different objectives... The men who are in a position to know point to Pearl Harbor as a case of almost unrestricted fifth column activity. It could, they say, happen here.41

During the winter of 1942 an issue of Readers Digest contained an article entitled, "Japanese Saboteurs in Our Midst." The author questioned the wisdom of allowing 3500-5000 Japanese fishermen and cannery employees in the Los Angeles harbor area circumscribed with shipyards, dry-docks, oil storage tanks, and aviation gasoline. Japanese farmers who "seem to be located near every California flying field and seem rather indifferent about soil fertility" were also considered as subversive threats. The writer questioned the loyalty of American Japanese in that many recognized a Japanese-American dual citizenship status. Further questioned were the nationalistic sympathies of Japanese fraternal organizations and Japanese Buddhist adherents within the United States.42

American journalists were not only influenced by the success of the Hawaiian attack, other Japanese successes in

41The Dallas Morning News, February 1, 1942, Sec. 1, p. 1.

42Stanley High, "Japanese Saboteurs in Our Midst," Reader's Digest, XL, (January, 1942), p. 12. This article is cited neither because new arguments are presented nor because of the credence of the report; rather, it is included because the broad circulation of the Reader's Digest placed such information before a wide segment of the American population.
the Pacific, and questions of local Japanese loyalty raised by public officials, but also by the somewhat sensational alien investigations and raids conducted by the F. B. I. Results of these raids on Japanese residences and business establishments immediately attracted the attention of high governmental officials. F. B. I. Director Hoover commented during a radio interview that "In our searches of the premises of alien enemies we have uncovered thousands of guns, ammunition, dynamite, shortwave radio receiving sets, and a multitude of other contraband articles which will never be used against the American cause." In this same radio interview, U. S. Representative Fred V. Bradley (Rep., Mich.) commended the Bureau for efficiency in apprehending enemy suspects and in the conduct of related investigations.

Assistant Attorney General James Rowe reported in a nationwide radio address on February 20, 1942, that 2,192 suspect Japanese agents had been apprehended and contraband items in their custody had been seized. He urged the continued cooperation of citizens in reporting suspicious actions to the proper authorities.

43 Taken from text of a radio interview over station WS00, Sault Marie, Mich., October 18, 1942, entered in the Congressional Record, Appendix, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., XXCVIII, Part 10, pp. A3735-A3736.

44 Ibid.

45 Based on text of a nationwide radio address, February 20, 1942, entered in Ibid., XXCVIII, Part 8, pp. A667-A668.
U. S. Representative Emanuel Celler (Dem., N. Y.) particularly followed F. B. I. activity. He commented on the House floor on July 27, 1942, that searches of the 4,756 Japanese aliens apprehended to that date produced

... vast quantities of prohibited materials ... this contraband included 3,008 guns, 210,000 rounds of ammunition, 1,652 sticks of dynamite ... 1,600 radio sets, 2,400 cameras, ... hundreds of charts, maps, and documents relating to American forts, cantonments, stations, and various other defenses.46

Celler's contention that "vast quantities of prohibited materials" were seized in F. B. I. raids was the subject of a news item in the New York Times on February 12, 1942. The release reported that two days of F. B. I. raids in the Monterey Bay region alone netted

... 60,839 rounds of rifle ammunition, 18,907 rounds of shotgun ammunition, thirty one shotguns, rifles and revolvers, four knives, twelve binoculars, twelve cameras, nine radio receivers, and more than a score of assorted signal devices and other articles.47

It would be well to keep in mind, however, that incorrect inferences could be drawn from the above and similar information if facts harmful to the writer's intent were excluded or if the reader did not follow the material closely. Several examples might be cited. For instance, buried deep


in the Times news item was the comment that a portion of this contraband constituted part of the stock of a sporting goods store operated by an alien Japanese. Furthermore in a news release in a West Coast newspaper, items which had been rather sensationally described as "aerial bombs" were subsequently identified in a much smaller news item as "bomb casings" with no explosives included. In another news story firecrackers, flashlights, knives, and cameras made up the contraband described as "... potentially dangerous weapons." Material thus identified indicated that some contraband articles were in the possession of all American citizens, and that the seizure of these and other items such as road maps, ceremonial robes, and signal flags, constituted a rather liberal definition of "contraband." These raids, in retrospect, rather than producing evidence to indicate an internal Japanese conspiracy, demonstrated a singular lack of such evidence. The dissemination of such information, with the public very conscious of the war effort, nurtured the "sabotage hysteria" and had its ultimate effect on the evacuation program.

The question which should still remain to haunt those who waved "contraband as evidence of conspiracy" before the

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48 Sacramento Bee, January 17, 1942, Sec. 1, p. 10.
49 Ibid., February 18, 1942, Sec. 1, p. 2.
American public is, Why was no Japanese, alien or citizen, ever convicted in a court of law for a treasonous act or a conspiracy to commit espionage?

Morton Grodzins, while researching the legal basis for F. B. I. searches of Japanese property, acquired a Department of Justice memorandum written by Attorney General Francis Biddle to President Roosevelt in May, 1942. According to this document, contraband had been loosely defined so that law enforcement officers could detain individuals possessing anything which, under the broadest definition, might be considered contraband, and particularly if it were deemed advisable to detain such a person. Biddle wrote that the Justice Department was "... frequently aware that this procedure might well be in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution and certainly violated the historic right to be free from search except by search warrant."50 The Attorney General rationalized the wisdom of the official position, and explained in his memorandum to the President that

I do not regret having made this decision since I feel that every possible step must be taken to protect this country from the fifth column, even if necessary at the cost of some of our constitutional rights. I am sorry to say, however, that so far as I am aware searches without warrants conducted on the West Coast were without

50Grodzins, op. cit., p. 134.
utility in tracking down Japanese. No Japanese saboteurs were uncovered in this manner and no illegal radio transmitters were found at all.51

No Sabotage Means Future Sabotage

Many public officials, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, became increasingly apprehensive because of the obvious lack of west coast sabotage incidents. Highly publicized F. B. I. raids produced little evidence to indicate the likelihood of a mass Japanese uprising. Thus, the thesis subscribed to by some was that Japanese-Americans had intentionally refrained from subversive activity, that they were awaiting instructions from Tokyo which would "call forth" the mass uprising at a future and more opportune date. Three of the more prominent individuals who held this view were California Attorney General Earl Warren, Los Angeles Mayor Fletcher Bowron, and news columnist Walter Lippmann.

Warren described his position in detail before the Tolan Committee on February 21, 1942. He expressed his concern that Americans might conclude that as no fifth column activity had occurred, it was not likely to occur. "But I take the view," he said,

... that that is the most ominous sign in our whole situation. It convinces me more than perhaps any other factor that the sabotage that we are to get, the fifth column activities that we are to get, are

51Ibid., p. 135.
timed just like Pearl Harbor was timed and just like
the invasion of France, and of Denmark, and of Norway,
and all those other countries.\textsuperscript{52}

Mayor Bowron's testimony before the Committee on March 6, 1942, was in general agreement with that rendered by Warren. Even though no sabotage had occurred in the Los Angeles area, the Mayor reported that a city departmental inquiry revealed that many sensitive posts were held by Japanese with tenure, positions which would enable them to sabotage the city electrical system, gather maps and certain defense data, and gain useful information concerning the city water supply. The Mayor's solution was an all-inclusive city departmental program which

\ldots suggested rather forcibly to all these employees that they should immediately ask permission to retire from city service by asking for a leave of absence. While it was voluntary, it was suggested to them in such a way that all applied for such leaves and we have no Japanese employees at this time.\textsuperscript{53}

Bowron was one of the early supporters of an evacuation program for the Japanese. He suggested during February, 1942, that the National Government select agricultural sites distant from coastal defense systems or transcontinental railroad lines and detain alien and resident Japanese at these locations. The


\textsuperscript{53}Ibid., Part 31, pp. 11644-11645.
Mayor specifically mentioned one suitable area, the Parket Indian Reservation, along the Colorado River in Arizona, as the Indians cultivated only 2,000 acres of the 187,000 available. According to Bowron, the area constituted "... some of the finest vegetable land in the United States, and 12,000 acres of it could be easily irrigated."

Walter Lippmann also raised the question of possible future sabotage in his news column, "Today and Tomorrow." Given the wide circulation of Lippmann's syndicated writings, his opinion undoubtedly reached a broader segment of the population with greater impact than the less widely circulated views of public officials such as Bowron and Warren. Lippmann's article of February 12, 1942, entitled, "The Fifth Column on the West Coast," assailed Japanese residents in the Western United States as a particularly serious domestic problem. In essence, he feared that the enemy might attack the United States, utilizing forces both from within and without the national border. The following quotation illustrated this fear of attack, the extent to which he was convinced that

54 New York Times, February 20, 1942, Sec. 1, p. 11.

55 According to the Congressional Record, Lippmann's column originally appeared in the Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times on February 12, 1942, but newspaper section and pages are not recorded. On February 18, 1942, Representative Harry R. Sheppard (Den., Calif.) entered the column in the Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., XXCVIII, Part 1, p. 1412.
fifth column incidents contributed to the Hawaiian disaster, and his tendency to accept the thesis, "no sabotage means future sabotage."

It is a fact that communication takes place between the enemy at sea and enemy agents on land. . . . It is also a fact that since the outbreak of the Japanese war there has been no important sabotage on the Pacific Coast. From what we know about Hawaii and about the fifth column in Europe this is not, as some have liked to think, a sign that there is nothing to be feared. It is a sign that the blow is well organized and that it is held back until it can be struck with maximum effect.56

Lippmann's article cited no incident to demonstrate that "communication takes place between the enemy at sea and enemy agents on land" or what it is that "we know about Hawaii." Rather, he apparently based his position on what now appear to be assumptions, misrepresentations of fact, and rumors stemming from the Hawaiian attack. In reality, his argument concerning possible future sabotage rested not on fact but on the absence of fact. This approach would seem to directly contradict the American legal principle that individuals are innocent until proven guilty. Even if one assumed that this tenet of law did not apply under wartime conditions when suspicious actions were evident, the question which would still remain unanswered in relation to domestic Japanese is, "What suspicious actions?"

56 Ibid.
Thomas C. Clark, Enemy Alien Control Officer for the U. S. Army Western Defense Command, challenged Lippmann to answer this question, and to substantiate his Lippmann's observations that the coast was in danger of imminent attack, and that Japanese residents on the mainland were communicating with Japanese naval units. Clark publicly requested Lippmann to "give us the names and places" (in reference to the communications allegation) and termed his statement that the coast was in imminent danger as a "gross exaggeration."

This challenge apparently did not receive the journalistic attention which accompanied Lippmann's syndicated column. The February 15, 1942, issue of the New York Times did publish a news item concerning Clark's query, on page thirty, section one:

Geographical Distribution of Japanese Aliens

Another major charge against coastal Japanese during the early war months was that they intentionally settled close to West Coast defense areas. This argument is merely a corollary of the "potential sabotage" position. Several American military and civil officials equated domicile with potential sabotage and expounded this "truism" as a major reason for the military necessity of evacuating the Japanese from coastal regions.

On July 19, 1943, the United States Fourth Army forwarded to the Secretary of the Army its *Final Report - Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast*. Submitted through General DeWitt's office, the document summarized the role of the Army in the execution and administration of evacuation. "Dispersed residence" was cited as a major factor contributing to the evacuation decision. The fact that thousands of Japanese resided adjacent to strategic points seemed to verify, for the military, the existence of some vast conspiracy to which all resident Japanese were parties.58

Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen, Assistant Chief of Staff, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, similarly touched upon this point in a speech before the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco in May of 1942. In his address, presented as a summation of the military position relative to the coastal Japanese problem, Bendetsen noted that either "By design or by accident, substantial numbers of the Japanese coastal frontier communities were deployed through very sensitive and very vital areas."59

Attorney General Warren of California was a leading civilian advocate of this viewpoint. During his appearance


before the Tolan Committee he presented maps that depicted "every Japanese ownership and occupancy in the State," and remarked that

These maps tell a story, a story that is not very heartening to anyone who has the responsibility of protecting life and property either in time of peace or in war. To assume that the enemy has not planned fifth column activities for us in a wave of sabotage is simply to live in a fool's paradise.60

Warren further advised the Committee that the maps were the product of his request to California district attorneys that they prepare county maps to illustrate land owned, controlled, or occupied by Japanese. The completed maps pinpointed Japanese all along the coast, from Marian County in northern California to the Mexican border, and always in the immediate vicinity of every important defense installation. A similar population distribution existed in the interior, particularly in Sacramento, the San Joaquin Valley, and in San Bernardino, Riverside, and Imperial counties. The Attorney General specifically directed the attention of Committee members to the distribution near air fields, railroads, power lines, gas pipes, oil fields, water reservoirs, radio stations, water conduits, and telephone transmission lines. According to Warren, all of these areas were locations of strategic importance.61

61 ibid., p. 10974.
Warren concluded that the demographic pattern was more than mere coincidence. However, before the validity of his presentation could be assessed, one should consider additional factors, other than population distribution charts. Apparently this was not done. In the first instance, it would seem illogical that all locations mentioned in Warren's testimony were truly areas of "strategic importance." Webster has defined strategic as "... critical, of great or vital importance within an integrated whole or to the taking place of a planned or unplanned occurrence." Water reservoirs, radio stations, and water conduits might well be strategic but selectivity would be essential in identifying them as such. In essence, Warren seemed to apply Webster's definition in a rather broad manner. Consideration should also have been given to the possibility that Japanese land owners occupied the property in question before construction of an installation. Were there strategic areas where no Japanese resided? The Committee record did not indicate that these possibilities were examined.

Two other regional officials who supported the demographic theory were the California Governor, Culbert L. Olson, and Los Angeles Mayor Bowron. Both men testified before the

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Tolan Committee that they feared a concerted internal sabotage program utilizing the dispersal of Japanese as an added advantage. 63


Representative Martin Dies (Dem., Tex.) was one of the most unrelenting Congressional opponents of the Japanese-Americans. As the first chairman of the House Un-American Activities Committee, he stirred controversy both inside and outside governmental circles. The Committee itself became a center of controversy, with a divergence of opinion on whether its life should be extended. Numerous newspaper editorials entered in the Congressional Record revealed the opposition. 64 Nevertheless, the House voted in 1940 to continue appropriations for Committee investigations with only 21 representatives opposed to the measure. Opposition dwindled in 1941 as the minority was reduced to six. 65

As early as the summer of 1941 the Committee claimed that it had uncovered evidence of Japanese espionage.


65 U. S. Congressional Record, Appendix, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 1941, XXCVII, Part 10, p. A1162. Created as a special committee in May, 1938, it was given permanent status as a Standing Committee in 1945.
in Pacific Coast states. Dies and various news organs particularly stressed the importance of additional public inquiries to explore the nature and extent of such activities. In July, 1941, the Los Angeles Evening Herald and Express noted that proposed hearings would follow a "... long secret investigation by a corps of Committee investigators. ... it is asserted that many Japanese societies are under the control of Japanese propaganda agencies and are actively engaged in promoting the interests of a foreign power." Later in the month the paper quoted Committee investigators as declaring that they had "sensational evidence" concerning propaganda and "other activities" of Japanese agencies in this country.

Under a page one headline, "Japanese Spying Faces Dies Quiz - Coast Fishing Fleet Called Cover for Navy Plot," the Los Angeles Examiner stressed that the United States was "literally pockmarked" with foreign agents promoting Axis interests. "Japanese companies and societies," according to the Examiner, "are working actively for foreign powers under the command of the Japanese Government. Nazis, and Fascists have increased their membership and their espionage

66 Los Angeles Evening Herald and Express, July 5, 1941, Sec. 1, p. 1.
67 Ibid., July 22, 1941, Sec. 1, p. 2.
to a highly dangerous degree."\textsuperscript{68} A statement by Dies, quoted in the December 8th edition of the paper, enabled both to claim consistency in their views. "We are," Dies said, going to face serious trouble unless we clear up this whole situation at once. The Japanese and Nazis in this country have been working in close collaboration. We should proceed immediately not only to round up Japanese aliens known to be potential saboteurs, but also should clean out the Nazis from our defense industries.\textsuperscript{69}

On December 17th two days after Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, released a statement to the press that coincided with Dies' views, the latter was quoted as stating that the United States Government "... had not been alert in dealing with fifth columnists in the Hawaiian Islands."\textsuperscript{70} On January 28, 1942, Dies again touched upon the issue. Speaking on the House floor in support of an amendment to the Foreign Agents Registration Act, he stated that more than 2000 American soldiers died at Pearl Harbor because of fifth column activity in Hawaii which his committee had "... fully documented two or three months before."\textsuperscript{71} Though not recorded in the \textit{Congressional Record}, Dies is reported by the \textit{New York Times} as having added that "... the West Coast is likely

\textsuperscript{68} \textit{Los Angeles Examiner}, July 6, 1941, Sec. 1, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{69} \textit{Ibid.}, December 8, 1941, Sec. 1, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{70} \textit{New York Times}, December 17, 1941, Sec. 1, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{71} U. S. \textit{, Congressional Record}, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 1942, XXCVIII, Part 1, p. 800.
to see a tragedy that will make Pearl Harbor sink in comparative insignificance" unless the United States gives this matter more attention.\(^{72}\)

Newspaper coverage such as this undoubtedly influenced the formation of an anti-Japanese atmosphere, given the trend of events, the tenor of the times, and the fact that the loyalty of Japanese-Americans was questioned by a Congressional investigating committee. Dies was not content, however, just to have press coverage. He wanted official support, and, more importantly, action. With this objective in mind, he had corresponded with the United States Attorney General in the summer of 1941, seeking executive sanction for his proposed Committee hearings. By letter dated September 8, 1941, Matthew F. McGuire, assistant Attorney General, replied that "The matter was discussed with the President and the Secretary of State, both of whom feel quite strongly that hearings such as you contemplate would be inadvisable. The Attorney General is of the same opinion, and accordingly is unable to approve the course which you have in mind."\(^{73}\) The letter did not specify why this negative position was taken, and Dies later charged before the House that the Executive Department

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\(^{72}\) *New York Times*, January 29, 1942, Sec. 1, p. 15.

"... assumed this attitude because of a fear of displeasing foreign powers and a maudlin attitude toward fifth columnists. ... If our committee had been permitted to reveal the facts last September [1941] the tragedy of Pearl Harbor might have been averted." During subsequent House debate Dies further explained that his committee had not conducted hearings, but if it had it would have "... arranged to subpoena and bring to Washington 52 witness," including a former member of the Japanese consulate in Honolulu. "Their testimony," he said, "would comprise the major part of the evidence which our Committee had assembled."

Rebuffed by the White House, but undaunted, the Congressional probers compiled the evidence in their files and released their report to the nation several months after the Pearl Harbor attack. Though their work had been done without the aid of public hearings, the Committee believed that its report would have an "... important educational advantage since the people of this country have yet much to learn about the operations of the fifth column in the U.S." With knowledge of the pending Committee release, an item in the New York Times of February 5, 1942, stated that the

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75 Ibid., Part 2, p. 1922.
report purported to disclose every phase of Japanese espionage in the United States. Dies was quoted as stating that "... 150,000 American-Japanese have banded together in an organization for the advancement of the Rising Sun - an espionage agency for Toyko.\(^7^7\) In late February the Times reported that the Dies Committee claimed to have seized maps which revealed a planned Japanese invasion of the United States through Alaska and Canada, utilizing to the fullest advantage the internal Japanese spy network.\(^7^8\)

A summation of the major items of evidence collected by the Committee and published in its Report of Japanese Activities, appeared in the February 28, 1942, edition of the New York Times. C. P. Trussell, Times Washington correspondent at the time, reported that

\begin{quote}
It [Committee Report] is a story of knowledge, on the part of the Japanese, of virtually every navy vessel of our fleets, and of effective means, as disclosed by diagrams and accompanying photographs, of attacking them from the surface, under the sea and from the air. ... supposedly, [these] innocent Japanese fishermen working by hundreds off the West Coast are secret battle formations, accurate in detail.\(^7^9\)
\end{quote}

Section IV of the Committee's report was particularly revealing. Entitled "Techniques for Japanese Espionage," it

\begin{itemize}
\item \(^7^7\)New York Times, February 5, 1942, Sec. 1, p. 7.
\item \(^7^8\)Ibid., February 24, 1942, Sec. 1, p. 11.
\item \(^7^9\)Ibid., February 28, 1942, Sec. 1, p. 1.
\end{itemize}
included pictorial illustrations of spy techniques allegedly followed by those who were engaged in clandestine activities, such as the concealing of documents in secret compartments of handbags, inside bars of soap, boxes of matches, mechanical pencils, fountain pens and minute compartments in phonograph records. Other examples of this technology were coded messages embroidered on handkerchiefs and engraved on cigarette cases.80

A criticism of the entire Committee report and one particularly applicable to this section is that sources from which the evidence was gathered were not always identified. The validity of such information cannot be accurately accessed without some knowledge of its source. The subjects pictured were certainly not Japanese; rather, they were caucasian. From the style of dress they appeared to be European, possibly German or Italian. The Dies Report did not indicate that such techniques were at any time actually used by Japanese. No specific incidents were mentioned. The document stated that the illustrations were included

... in order that some light may be thrown on the way in which a vast amount of information has been transmitted by Japanese spies to their home government.31


31 Ibid., p. 1750.
This section of the report also treated an issue which has previously been discussed at some length--the threat to American national security posed by the residence of Japanese around strategic areas in the western United States. Referring to them as "potential saboteurs," the Committee criticized the national government for permitting Japanese to farm or operate a business in the immediate vicinity of important defense establishments. Though numerous pictures were used to demonstrate that Japanese resided near defense and supply locations, no specific allegations, acts of sabotage, or espionage were cited.

In Section V the Committee contended that the operation of the United States resident Japanese fishing fleet in and about Los Angeles harbor was a menace to port security. The success of the Hawaiian attack was attributed in part to similar observations and collection of information for the foreign enemy by Hawaiian Japanese fishing vessels in the Pearl Harbor area. In both instances, the United States Government was accused of negligence. Again, no evidence was included to support such a claim, unless photographs of fishing boats and two telegrams from Committee investigators indicating the extent of resident Japanese fishing along the Pacific Coast could be classified as incriminating.

\[82\text{Ibid.}, \text{p.} 1798.\]  
\[83\text{Ibid.}, \text{pp.} 1808-1811.\]
It would appear that the Dies Committee had fallen considerably short of preparing an objective document, an error which was repeated in the other sections of the report. For example, one chapter was a reproduction of a list of Japanese foreign merchants who operated in the United States, accompanied by the unsubstantiated accusation that "... many of these Japanese treaty merchants were engaged in espionage work for their home government."\(^4\) In addition there was a list of Japanese in the United States who had received decorations (both military and civilian) from the Japanese Emperor. Another section of the report charged that Japanese language schools in the United States were the major sources of Japanese nationalism, specifically among the younger Japanese-Americans. In all of these instances, as in those previously referred to, the information was nonspecific. The document contained little more than vague generalizations from "fairly reliable sources." In reality, many of the charges made could equally have been made about aliens of other enemy nations.

Representative Vito Marcantonio (Amer. Lab., N. Y.) and Thomas H. Eliot (Dem., Mass.) attempted during March, 1942, to expose the shallow nature of the Dies Report and to influence the House to terminate its support of the Committee.

\(^4\) *ibid.*, p. 1841.
In a speech before the House membership of March 7th, Marcantonio charged that portions of the Japanese Report were copied verbatim from a publication entitled News Letter, published by the News Research Service of Los Angeles, California. He read into the record extensive passages, alternatingly, from the News Letter and from The Report of Japanese Activities. The latter apparently had been plagiarized. Much of the information Marcantonio cited related to the Committee's contention that the curriculum in Japanese-American schools was pro-Japanese. Marcantonio's point, however, was that the identical information could be secured from the News Letter, a periodical selling for "... $5.00 per year; .10 cents per copy. The Committee Report is the report of a committee which has cost $385,000 to date."\(^85\)

On the same date Eliot took the House floor to demonstrate further emptiness in the Report. He charged that the Committee's findings revealed "nothing new or even anything important" about the possibility of a Japanese fifth column. Describing much of its contents as "background material," he observed that it merely referred to the extent of Japanese fishing along the West Coast, evidence to indicate that Japan

was a member of the Axis powers, and the presence of several hundred treaty merchants in the United States. 86

In relation to a Japanese map reproduced in the report purporting to illustrate Japanese plans for the conquest of Hawaii and the United States, Eliot introduced a duplicate copy which was printed in a West Coast Japanese periodical, King. Far from being secret, the magazine was registered as second class mail in the Los Angeles Post Office and could be purchased on California newsstands. According to Eliot, the map in King was entitled, "An Overall View of National Defense in Time of Crisis." Committee investigators claimed that this evidence was acquired under extraordinarily difficult circumstances. 87

The charges by Eliot and Marcantonio were only part of what had become an annual House debate over the continuation of the Un-American Activities Committee. As in the preceding years, the dissidents lost. On March 11, 1942, only four days after these rather serious criticisms, the House voted 331 to 46 to extend the Committee's life for a fifth year. 88

If this vote of confidence could be taken as an indication


87 Ibid.

of House support, the comments of Representative Leland A. Ford (Dem., Calif.) in the closing minutes of debate might best sum up the views of those 331 legislators who voted to continue the Committee's investigative activity:

Mr. Dies, I commend you, I congratulate you and your committee of real, courageous, red-blooded Americans for the splendid work you have done; I am surprised to know that any man in this House would ever come out and take up the other side of this question. I may be prejudiced, but I cannot see anything but the American side on your side of the question.\textsuperscript{89}

In contrast to the rather extensive coverage given the Dies Japanese Report, the New York Times, stated in a single one column news item that Representatives Eliot and Marcantonio had charged the committee with "some plagiarism" and had cited a few limited examples to that effect.\textsuperscript{90} After the House vote of confidence, the Times reported that the majority vote was "... somewhat of an ovation for Representative Dies of Texas, the Committee chairman."\textsuperscript{91}

In summation, the Dies report of several hundred pages contained a lengthy list of possible charges against the Japanese in both Hawaii and the United States. Committee members could see disloyalty in virtually every aspect of Japanese life in the United States. Maps, charts, lists, pictures, and testimony were included to present the Japanese

\textsuperscript{89}Ibid., p. 2295.

\textsuperscript{90}New York Times, March 7, 1942, Sec. 1, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{91}Ibid., March 12, 1942, Sec. 1, p. 1.
as a deadly enemy of the West Coast. The document received more publicity than was accorded evidence which might have indicated a gross exaggeration of the Japanese peril. It would seem that the release of this information during the spring of 1942 simply aided the cause of those who favored a program of Japanese detention and thus served as another foundation pier for incarceration.
CHAPTER IV

JAPANESE EVACUATION - THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

While the Dies Committee report was a major aspect of congressional involvement in the Japanese-American controversy, other legislative action more closely governed the development of the evacuation - detention program. In the 77th Congress measures were introduced which legalized the removal of coastal Japanese and prescribed penalties for those persons who might refuse to be removed.

Although the Executive role is more closely examined in Chapter V, it is necessary at this point to state that Executive Order 9066, Authorizing the Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas, directed the Secretary of War and subordinate military commanders to designate restricted areas from which any or all persons might be excluded. Further, entry into or departure from these areas was subject to restrictions imposed by the Secretary of War or the appropriate military commander. Under the terms of this order, issued February 19, 1942, the authority and responsibility previously exercised over aliens by the Department of Justice under similar Presidential orders of December 7 and 8 were directly transferred to the War Department.¹

President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066 by virtue of his authority as commander-in-chief. No statute existed to cover this specific action, and Congress was not requested to enact such legislation prior to February 19. Soon after this date the War Department, apparently desiring to strengthen the legal position of evacuation, requested Congress to, in effect, sanction military directives issued in accordance with the President's February order. A draft of suggested legislation, with Justice Department concurrence, was simultaneously forwarded to the Chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The letter of transmittal outlined the character of the military proposal.

There is enclosed herewith the draft of a bill entitled, 'A bill to provide a penalty for violation of restrictions or orders with respect to persons entering, remaining in or leaving military areas or zones, which the War Department recommends to be enacted into law.

The purpose of the proposed legislation is to provide for enforcement in the Federal Criminal Courts of orders issued under the authority of Executive order of the President No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942.

On March 9, 1942, the Chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, Robert R. Reynolds (Dem., N. C.) introduced the proposed measure in the Senate, and on the


following date Representative John M. Costello (Dem., Calif.)
introduced the bill in the House. These bills, S. 2352 and
H. R. 6758, were referred to the Military Affairs Committees.
Given only brief committee consideration, from which there
came no published record, the measures received unanimous
approval in both houses on March 19 after only limited floor
debate. This legislation, Public Law 503, as enacted, read:

An Act

To provide a penalty for violation of restrictions
or orders with respect to persons entering, remaining
in, leaving, or committing an act in military areas or
zones.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States assembled, that whoever shall
enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in any mili-
tary area or military zone prescribed, under the authority
of an Executive order of the President, by the Secretary
of War, or by any military commander designated by the
Secretary of War, contrary to the restrictions applicable
to any such area or zone or contrary to the order of the
Secretary of War or any military commander, shall, if
it appears that he knew or should have known of the
existence and extent of the restrictions or order and
that his act was in violation thereof, be guilty of a
misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be liable to a
fine of not to exceed $5,000 or to imprisonment for
not more than one year, or both, for each offense.

The unchallenged comments of Reynolds, as he urged
passage of the bill, illustrate the extent to which Con-
gressional opinions and attitudes were apparently influenced

4Ibid., p. 2230.

5Ibid., pp. 2722-2726.

6Public Law 503 was signed March 21, 1942. U. S.,
Statutes at Large. LVI, Part 1, 866(1942).
by the rumors and hysteria which emerged from the Pearl Harbor bombing. The Senator made several allegations against Hawaiian-Japanese, most of which have been previously mentioned in this paper. In summation, however, he cited reports of arrows cut in cane fields pointing to military objectives; that vegetable merchants kept records of U. S. Naval supplies purchased in order to ascertain the number of Naval personnel in Hawaii; that coastal Japanese fishing vessels communicated with the Japanese fleet; that Hawaiian-Japanese, on December 7, wrecked automobiles along major arteries in efforts to obstruct traffic; that Japanese pilots downed above the island of Oahu were wearing United States and Hawaiian school and college insignia; and that one highly regarded Japanese Honolulu citizen of twenty years was immediately arrested for espionage activity. In relation to the home front, the Senator cited reports that "... West Coast raids on Japanese colonies have yielded truckloads of guns, ammunition, dynamite, and bombs, as well as cameras and radio sets in various quantities and numbers. Even Japanese Army and Navy uniforms have been found."

Reynolds then stated that his proposed bill was necessary for the enforcement in Federal Courts of orders issued under the Presidential proclamation. Again and again

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the Senator referred to the problem of enemy aliens. At no point, however, did he mention or discuss the possibility of evacuation. Rather, he emphasized that the measure, if enacted, would provide the War Department with authority to establish restrictions for entering and departing military zones. In one instance, after a lengthy definitive statement concerning dual citizenship, Reynolds remarked, "This explains evacuation plans which I shall later mention." His remaining published comments contain no further reference to evacuation.

The atmosphere in the House was similar. Representative Andrew J. May (Dem., Ken.) requested consideration of the bill on March 19. During the brief floor discussion on this date, May explained that the legislation was required in order "... to protect any citizen of the country against being caught up who is unaware of the order or of the restrictions or regulations made by the Secretary of War." He emphasized the positive protection the bill afforded the innocent individual who might unknowingly "wander" into a restricted area, rather than the possible utilization of the proposed measure as a means under which an evacuation program could receive congressional sanction. Regarding a comment of Representative Earl C. Michener (Rep., Mich.)

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8Ibid., p. 2723.
9Ibid., p. 2729.
that bills which interfered with or protected the rights of citizens should be thoroughly understood and debated prior to passage, Mays commented, "It [H. R. 6758] is intended to apply particularly to the situation that exists on the West Coast at this time. The gentleman knows the purpose of the legislation." Representative Robert F. Rich (Rep., Penn.) questioned May concerning the extent to which the restricted zones would be marked, and he again commented, "Citizens of this country will never be questioned about them, as a matter of fact. This is intended for a particular situation, about which the gentleman knows."11

With the introduction of S. 2352 and H. R. 6758, the 77th Congress was actually being asked to approve a program of limitations affecting a sizeable group within the American society. From the questions put to those who spoke in favor of the measure it seems logical to assume that either the Congressional membership was not aware of the ultimate purpose of the legislation or they were not particularly concerned about the welfare of resident minorities from enemy nations. One might further question the true necessity for such legislation given the Executive order which had previously authorized the military to act. In other words, was it necessary that legislation follow an

10 Ibid., p. 2730. 11 Ibid.
Executive Order which was apparently a proper exercise of Presidential military power? Assuming that the legislation was advantageous to the development of security in and about military areas, one might further question the speed with which the measure moved through the Congressional body. Could not public hearings have been held to explore further the effect of this legislation on alien subjects before the final House and Senate votes were taken?

It would seem that Congressional representatives during these initial war months were reflecting the same attitudes and fears that affected regional officials, journalists, military leaders, and the American society in general. The uncertainty and concern which stemmed from early Japanese successes in the Pacific motivated Congress to react rapidly and provide what was considered a system of maximum internal security regardless of the cost. Apparently the only important argument used in support of Public Law 503 was that it was recommended and considered essential by the military. No individual member, or Congressional committee for that matter, fully investigated the reasonableness of this claim. Congressional members were either anxious to provide the executive branch with legislative justification for military restrictions, or they were indifferent to or completely misunderstood the problems involved in the mass removal of an alien minority.
One duty of the legislature is continual examination of power exercised by administrative units. This role, which one might term legislative criticism, is both necessary and a mark of strength under a matured concept of democracy. During a war period, Congressional functions, particularly that of legislative criticism, assume an increasingly important position in the process of continual examination of powers assumed by the Executive branch.

It should be noted further that military action did not await the outcome of legislative consideration of Public Law 503. On March 2, seventeen days prior to the statute's approval, General DeWitt issued *Fourth Army Public Proclamation No. 1*, which brought the military into direct involvement with evacuation. This order designated the western half of Washington, Oregon, California, and southern Arizona as Military Area No. 1, and prescribed within this area various restricted zones adjacent to strategic locations. Japanese aliens residing in this region were required to voluntarily move from the military area.12

The role of individual West Coast Congressional representatives in the formation of the overall Japanese detention project is a most difficult one to evaluate. Apparently, with

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12The process of evacuation will be more thoroughly examined in Chapter V. U. S. Fourth Army, *Final Report*, 1942, p. 32.
the exception of Representative John M. Coffee (Dem., Wash.) each approved the military program while it was being formulated. Whether these opinions had as their basis a prejudicial attitude toward Japanese, were developed because of pressure from constituents, or were merely attempts to "get on the bandwagon" after the program was in the formative stages seems relatively unimportant. The delegations from California, Washington, and Oregon did, however, form an ad hoc bipartisan group vitally interested in all aspects of war activity affecting the Western region. As early as February, 1942, this political group backed the mass evacuation of the Japanese.\(^\text{13}\)

Congressman Coffee's moderate position was the exception to the general anti-Japanese attitude. He clearly illustrated his attitude on December 8, 1941, when he made the following statement:

> It is my fervent hope and prayer that residents of the U. S. of Japanese extraction will not be made the victim of pogroms directed by self-proclaimed patriots and by hysterical self-anointed heroes. It would be a shame and a travesty on democracy if blatant and excited vigilantes should raid the homes of Japanese-Americans, without first according the victim due process of law. As one who has lived as a neighbor to Japanese-Americans, I have found these people, on a whole, to be law-abiding, industrious, and unobtrusive. Let us not make a mockery of our Bill of Rights by mistreating these folks. Let us rather regard them with

\(^{13}\)Grodzins, *op. cit.*, p. 63.
understanding, remembering they are the victims of a Japanese war machine, with the making of the international policies of which they had nothing to do.\textsuperscript{14}

Representative Leland M. Ford (Rep., Calif.) was the first to state on the floor of the House that Japanese coastal evacuation was a necessity. Reporting that he had information regarding Japanese propaganda radio broadcasts from Western states, on January 20, 1942, he stated to the House that any patriotic American born Japanese who desired to make a contribution to his Nation would willingly depart from strategic regions and submit himself to a "concentration camp."\textsuperscript{15} He further elaborated on the topic in a radio address delivered February 23. In this statement he concluded that alien and citizen evacuation would be a "humanitarian" approach to the total problem in that if only aliens were removed those who remained might be children unable to properly care for themselves. According to Ford, total evacuation was necessary primarily to avoid separating families.\textsuperscript{16}


\textsuperscript{16}\textit{Ibid.}, Appendix, Part 8, pp. A661-A662.
The Tolan Congressional Committee

While the House Select Committee headed by Representative Tolan was in the process of investigating and assessing the effect of a Japanese removal program on the coastal economy, Congress passed Public Law 503. Even though the activities of this Committee were not directly related to the language of the act, both ultimately involved the future of resident Japanese in the Pacific states. Passage of this legislation then, weeks before the Congressional membership had an opportunity to review the Tolan Committee's final report, negated the possible influence the Committee's effort could have had on the voting position of members. Further, when the group convened in San Francisco on February 21, General DeWitt had, a week previously, made his decision to evacuate the Japanese. On February 19, the War Department authorized him to execute this decision. Therefore, the possibility that Committee results could have effected executive or military policy was equally remote. 17

Evidence presented to the group was, however, valuable because it served to identify individuals and arguments in support of evacuation. Witnesses testified at hearings held in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Portland, and Seattle

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17 The basis for the formation of the Tolan Committee is discussed in Chapter III, pages 78-82.
between February 21 - March 12, 1942. At these sessions the majority of leading pro-evacuation voices were heard: governors, state attorneys-general, county officials, mayors, city managers, chiefs of police, representatives of the American Legion, spokesmen for agricultural interests, and journalists.18

An analysis of the arguments favoring evacuation, either on a mass scale or through some selective process, demonstrated that the major position, by a wide margin, was fear of fifth column activity (see graph, page 127). Other arguments frequently mentioned during testimony were vigilante possibilities, difficulties in segregating loyal elements from the disloyal, support for Japanese militarism, and pro-Japanese training in Japanese language schools.

Of the forty-three persons who orally testified in the San Francisco sessions, nine were of Japanese ancestry. In the Portland and Seattle hearings there were four Japanese witnesses from fifty; in Los Angeles six were heard from forty-four witnesses.19 It is difficult if not impossible at this date to determine whether the lack of Japanese testimony resulted from their reluctance to testify or from


19Ibid.
This chart was devised by condensing the three volumes of testimony before the House Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration into a one page chart. The chart represents the division of both oral and written evidence into the various suggested arguments for Japanese removal and incarceration. Inasmuch as numerous witnesses were called to provide the answer to a specific question or to furnish technical information (number of Japanese involved in various agriculture pursuits, coastal fishing, etc.), or because Committee questioning did not lead them to the detention topic, the graph does not represent the total number of witnesses called. Also, of course, the points offered by those witnesses who opposed evacuation are not included as they do not relate to the chart's purpose.
some limitation on the number of individuals allowed to testify. There were, of course, various caucasian witnesses who spoke in opposition to evacuation. These persons did not, however, compare in number with those who favored Japanese removal.

Mike Masaoka, national secretary of the Japanese-American Citizens League, was one Japanese-American who testified. His comments illustrated the official position of the League and also that the Japanese were, in general, willing to cooperate with the spirit of Executive Order 9066. He stated that the League was in complete agreement with any policy of evacuation definitely arising "from reasons of military necessity and national safety." But if evacuation were "... primarily a measure whose surface urgency cloaks the desires of political or other pressure groups who want us to leave merely from motives of self interest," then members of the League felt that they had every right to protest and to demand judgement on their merits as American citizens. 20

James M. Omura, a florist and part-time editor of a Japanese-American magazine, presented testimony in opposition to the position of Masaoka. He was strongly opposed to mass evacuation and stated that such a policy would strip Japanese

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20 Ibid., Part 29, pp. 11137-56.
citizens of their opportunity to prove their loyalty. He read into the record his statement which declared that "... the forceful evacuation of citizen Americans on the synthetic theory of racial fidelity -- 'Once a Jap always a Jap' -- would be an indictment against every racial minority in the United States." Such a policy would introduce "... the bigoted and misguided belief that Americanism is a racial attribute and not a national symbol." The remaining "scar" would be "broad and deep -- a stigma of eternal shame." Omura pleaded: "Has the Gestapo come to America? Have we not risen in righteous anger at Hitler's mistreatment of the Jews? Then, is it not incongruous that citizen Americans of Japanese descent should be similarly mistreated and persecuted?" 21

The testimony of these individuals served to indicate a weakness in the resident Japanese ranks; namely, that the Japanese themselves were divided over the proper course of action the National government should take relative to evacuation. Should the Japanese oppose the action and risk further condemnation? Or, should their position be one of cooperation as an attempt to demonstrate loyalty to the national cause? This lack of agreement limited the forcefulness which could have come from a united front.

21 Ibid., pp. 11229-32.
Others who presented testimony, orally or in written statements, favorable to the Japanese were in the majority of instances either private individuals or representatives of non-governmental organizations. These persons were usually members of religious organizations (ministerial associations, Young Woman’s Christian Association, religious conferences), or civil liberties groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Friends Service Committee.

At the opening Committee session the first witness was San Francisco’s mayor, Angelo J. Rossi, an individual of Italian extraction. Rossi’s testimony set the general tone of the Tolan hearings; he was quick in his condemnation of the Japanese. He observed that the seriousness of having alien enemies circulating freely should be self-evident.

Their presence might not only affect the property of our citizenry and our Government, but it might also affect the very lives and welfare of all of our people. . . . The activities of the Japanese saboteurs and fifth columnists in Honolulu and the battle fronts in the Pacific have forced me to the conclusion that every Japanese alien should be removed from this community. I am also strongly of the conviction that Japanese who are American citizens should be subjected to a more detailed and all-encompassing investigation. After investigation, if it is found that these citizens are not loyal to this country, they too should be removed.22

22Ibid., Part 29, pp. 10966-10967.
Rossi's attitude toward German and Italian aliens was somewhat different. He was of the opinion that problems involving these persons should be considered separately from those of the Japanese. Rossi was concerned about the "extreme hardship and mental anguish" which Germans and Italians would suffer, many of whom, he noted, were in business occupations which they had pursued for years. His statement did not mention the hardships for Japanese who similarly had pursued occupations in the San Francisco area for years.\footnote{23}

One major Committee objective was to determine the regional economic effects of removing the Japanese. As a result, some pro-evacuation witnesses attempted to refute a strong anti-evacuation argument, that Japanese removal would disrupt the agricultural economy of the West Coast. Witnesses favoring removal, particularly from Southern California, held that figures regarding the dominant Japanese agricultural pursuit, vegetable production, were misleading. They argued that such production consisted mainly of non-essential vegetables, that is celery, escarole, chard, watercress, and leeks.\footnote{24}

A report submitted to the Committee by the U. S. Department of Agriculture failed to support this "nonessential"

\footnote{23}{Ibid.}

\footnote{24}{Ibid., Fourth Interim Report, 1942, p. 118.}
argument. Statistics introduced as evidence indicated that the Japanese portion of California's fresh vegetable production included 67 percent of the state's tomato crop, 40 percent of the green peas, 95 percent of the green beans, 44 percent of the onions, and 34 percent of the cabbage. The Departmental report contended that the knowledge, experience, and managerial skill of Japanese agriculturalists could only be acquired by years of competing on the market. Their skill in soil preparation, crop selection, planting, spraying, and cultivation were talents which could not be immediately replaced.25

Witnesses who touched upon this topic generally agreed that agricultural production should not affect evacuation policy either in reference to the selection of areas to be evacuated or to persons selected. Certainly, differences did exist as to the degree to which vegetable production would be affected by the transfer. Food producers' associations, generally the group adversely affected by Japanese competition, tended to minimize the importance of the Japanese role. Their contention was that by eliminating Japanese agricultural interests, Caucasians previously forced to discontinue vegetable production because of Japanese competition would reenter the vegetable market. A second point frequently

25Ibid., p. 118-119.
stressed was that any loss of production caused by evacuation would exist only for a short period. If temporary shortages did occur, the increased demand to meet war needs would simply mean that additional acreage would be utilized for vegetable production.

The Committee, in final, made several recommendations designed to alleviate certain problem areas encountered in the development of the removal program. These, of course, were suggestions only. One should keep in mind that evacuation did not follow as a result of action by the Tolan group. Rather, the program, during the period of the hearings, was being implemented by the War Department and was proceeding in its normal course.

Probably the most notable Committee contribution was the suggestion that a council be established to examine procedures for disposing of real and personal property owned by evacuees. This proposal suggested that such a body should consist of representatives from the various agencies involved in evacuation and detention. The recommendation specifically mentioned that council membership should be selected from the Federal Security Administration, the Farm Security Administration, and the Federal Reserve Board, each of which was responsible for some aspect of property disposition or security. Other members, it was stated, should come from the Wartime Civil Control Administration, responsible for
the Japanese Evacuation, and the War Relocation Authority, responsible for Japanese detention.26

The report specifically cited the need to examine policies being followed in transferring and disposing of vehicles and farm machinery. Because of the developing transportation shortage as military requirements increased, the Committee suggested that individuals, especially farmers, be extended the opportunity to purchase vehicles owned by the Japanese which were not desired by the military or other governmental agencies. These automobiles and other items of machinery, according to the report, should be disposed of by public sale at market value prices.27

The existing program for the protection of the property of evacuees was based on Executive Order 9066. As implemented, the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Security Agency jointly participated under the supervision of the U. S. Treasury Department. Basically, the Federal Reserve Board was responsible for the disposition of urban property, and the Federal Security Agency was authorized to dispose of agricultural property. The report criticized what the Committee termed a

26 The Activities of the Wartime Civil Control Administration and the War Relocation Authority will be examined in Chapter V. U. S., Congress, House, Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, Fourth Interim Report, 1942, pp. 32-33.

27 Ibid., p. 32.
"lack of planning and coordination" between each of these agencies and the federal agencies established to evacuate and detain the Japanese. Particularly, the Committee study noted that the Federal Reserve banks seemed to emphasize a policy of immediate liquidation of property rather than storage. Such a policy, the report held, would hinder eventual resettlement. Assuming the rapid curtailment of manufactured consumer household goods and appliances, it would be extremely difficult to supply required items either to the detention sites or to evacuees under any future plan of resettlement. Because of these suggestions the Division of Evacuee Property was created as a Department within the War Relocation Authority, during May 1942, to coordinate and improve the property storage and liquidation program.

In addition to property considerations, the Committee's final recommendations stated that it would be unwise, in view of prevailing hostile public attitudes, for Japanese evacuees to be privately employed without military guards in interior communities in the vicinity of detention centers. Noting that to provide guards for such an undertaking would constitute a sizeable manpower drain, the Committee suggested that the War Relocation Authority should give priority to public projects within the confines of the various centers.

28 Ibid., p. 13.  
Work projects should be selected which would provide a maximum contribution to the war effort and, to the extent possible, make the camps self-sustaining.

One final matter receiving attention was what the committee termed the "grave responsibility" of the War Relocation Authority to promote and provide the "proper detention atmosphere" for the detainees because a majority of them were American citizens. The Committee emphasized the serious obligations that responsible agencies faced in connection with Japanese removal. Appropriate governmental units, it was stated, were obligated to provide opportunities for productive employment that would enable the detainees both to earn their livelihood and to contribute to the war effort. Furthermore, at a subsequent date, governmental organs would be honor-bound, if not legally so, to assist the uprooted persons in re-establishing their position in post-war American society. 30

30 ibid., pp. 32-33.
CHAPTER V

EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY AND THE EVACUATION PROGRAM

The United States Department of Justice had been in charge of the enemy alien program from December, 1941, to February 19, 1942, when President Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 9066. As a result of the United States declaration of war against Japan, the President announced, on December 7-8, 1941, a series of orders for controlling enemy aliens residing in the continental United States. The Attorney General was responsible for implementing the orders identifying zones from which aliens were excluded, searching for contraband articles, and interning enemy aliens whenever their free movement was regarded as dangerous to national security.¹

Armed with this authority, the F. B. I. and military security agents began on December 7 the apprehension of some two thousand aliens along the West Coast. These arrests were based on suspect lists compiled by the arresting agencies prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. The fact that such arrests were made tended to create an attitude of

¹U. S. Fourth Army, Final Report, p. 3.
suspicion and added to the uneasiness of residents in California, Oregon, and Washington.  

Numerous attacks on ships leaving Pacific ports further heightened regional anxiety and led to the suspicion that a hostile ship-to-shore submarine communications system was in existence. General DeWitt urged the War Department to, through coordination with the Justice Department, establish a program of spot raids on alien residences in an effort to seize radio equipment which could be used for this purpose.

Based on this request, representatives of the Justice and War Departments conferred during January 2-5, 1942, and established a program whereby searches would be conducted under the guidance of the F. B. I. To support the issuance of a warrant to conduct these raids it was necessary to state only that the premises belonged to an alien enemy.

The initial handling of enemy alien affairs by F. B. I. agents did not satisfy General DeWitt. His office complained soon after the establishment of the program that restrictions on alien travel and contraband possession were not being enforced. Representatives at the January conference had also agreed on the necessity to establish prohibited zones around strategic locations in the Western Defense Command region. DeWitt was particularly concerned that such a program was

\[2\text{Ibid.}\]

\[3\text{Ibid., pp. 4-5.}\]
not being rapidly established. The Department of Justice apparently realized at the outset that creation of these restricted areas implied the possibility of a mass migration of aliens to inland areas. U. S. Attorney General Francis Biddle indicated even prior to the January conference that his organization was in no position to direct such a mass movement. F. B. I. personnel limitations and the questionable legality of complete evacuation apparently influenced the Department of Justice to take little action. In any event by mid-January this inaction was producing serious interdepartmental conflicts.

Utilizing procedures outlined in the January meeting and relying upon surveys conducted by subordinate commanders, DeWitt recommended the establishment of 99 prohibited zones throughout California. Based upon these suggestions, Biddle designated the areas "off limits" to enemy aliens and notified the public through a series of press releases. Subsequently, DeWitt prepared and submitted similar proposals for additional prohibited zones in Arizona, Oregon, and Washington. Pending Departmental study of the need for additional security, Biddle declined to act immediately on the latter requests. Ultimately, on February 9, he advised the Secretary of War that DeWitt's recommendations could not be accepted. His letter stated in part:

\[^4\text{Ibid.}\] \[^5\text{Ibid.}, \text{pp. 6-8.}\]
Your recommendation of prohibited areas for Oregon and Washington include the cities of Portland, Seattle and Tacoma and therefore contemplate a mass evacuation of many thousands. . . . No reasons were given for this mass evacuation. . . . I understood that . . . Lieutenant General DeWitt has been requested to supply the War Department with further details and further material before any action is taken on these recommendations. I shall, therefore, await your further advice.

. . . The evacuation . . . from this area would, of course, present a problem of very great magnitude. The Department of Justice is not physically equipped to carry out any mass evacuation. It would mean that only the War Department has the equipment and personnel to manage the task.

The proclamations directing the Department of Justice to apprehend, and where necessary, evacuate alien enemies, do not, of course, include American citizens of the Japanese race. If they have to be evacuated, I believe that this would have to be done as a military necessity in these particular areas. Such action, therefore, should in my opinion, be taken by the War Department and not by the Department of Justice.6

In compliance with Biddle's request for additional supporting data, DeWitt submitted a resume of various military considerations prompting his proposals. His reply, in effect, outlined the concept of "military necessity" and spanned several problem areas relating to Japanese residents. He particularly cited the failure, or at least inability, of the F. B. I. to enforce contraband regulations.

In reality, searches to discover prohibited items were frequently difficult to conduct because many alien residences

6Ibid., pp. 7-8.
were owned and inhabited by Japanese-American citizens and required the use of a warrant issued in the normal manner. In some instances the period required to secure such warrants, according to the F. B. I., reduced the effectiveness of the raids. High officials in Fourth Army Headquarters were disturbed by the limited results; however, the spectacular news releases about F. B. I. raids conducted which produced prohibited items contributed to coastal anti-Japanese attitudes. The Fourth Army's final report noted not only military concern for security but also fear that vigilante activity might begin.  

Another stated justification for the "military necessity" argument was the often repeated argument--the geographic location of Japanese adjacent to military installations. The military believed that some vast conspiracy planted Japanese in these areas to secure important defense information. There seemed to be no means whereby loyal Japanese could be separated from the disloyal. Customs and the bond of common tradition made the Japanese society, in the military view, a tightly knit racial group.  

In addition to these factors the numerous Japanese organizations in the Western Defense Command region had engaged in an assortment of pro-Japanese activities varying from Emperor worshipping ceremonies to the collection of funds for Japanese

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7Ibid., pp. 8-9.  
8Ibid., p. 11.
army and naval units. The prospectus issued by one of these fraternal organizations, the Heimusha Kai, advertised the following goals,

The world should realize that our military action in China is based upon the significant fact that we are forced to fight under realistic circumstances. As a matter of historical fact, whenever the Japanese government begins a military campaign, we, Japanese, must be united and everyone of us must do his part.

As far as our patriotism is concerned, the world knows that we are superior to any other nation. However, as long as we are staying on foreign soil, what can we do for our Mother country? . . . Today, we Japanese in the United States, who are not able to sacrifice our lives for our National cause are now firmly resolved to stand by to settle the present war as early as possible. We are proud to say that our daily happy life in America is dependent upon the protective power of Great Japan. We are facing a critical emergency, and we will take strong action as planned. We do hope and beg you all to cooperate with us for our National cause.9

This particular concept, the personal identification of migrant Japanese with the cause of Japan, was a point frequently cited in news articles, speeches, and congressional committee testimony by those fearful of the latent possibility of fifth column incidents. Of course, organizations such as the above, submitting a prospectus which very well may have been drafted in Japan, had no guarantee that each member in a foreign territory would subscribe to every concept emitted from the homeland. Secondly, the prospectus discussed and urged support for Japanese military action in

9Ibid., pp. 11-12.
China. Immigrants, because of racial ties, might be willing to support Japanese militarism, both financially and spiritually, in Asia. On the other hand, they might be quite unwilling to support such militaristic activities when directed toward their new homeland, a nation which offered many opportunities for property ownership, basic freedoms, and an improved living standard. When United States military authorities observed unification between Japanese-American fraternal organizations, this—the initial appeal of the United States and the opportunities it offered—was an aspect of the matter which was possibly overlooked.

The Army's final report stressed several additional reasons for the conclusion that the evacuation of Japanese from designated areas was a military necessity. As the resume noted, it was particularly important that steps be taken to provide maximum security against internal uprisings in the Western United States.

That part of the States of Washington and California which lies west of the Cascade and Sierra Nevada Ranges, is dominated by many waterways, forests, and vital industrial installations. Throughout the Puget Sound area there are many military and naval establishments as well as shipyards, airplane factories and other industries essential to total war. . . . The lumber industry is of vital importance to the war effort. The State of Washington, with Oregon and California close seconds, produces the bulk of sawed lumber in the United States. The large area devoted to this industry affords saboteurs unlimited freedom of action. . . . The petroleum industry of California and its great centers of production for aircraft and shipbuilding are a vital part of the life blood of a Nation at war.10

10 Ibid., pp. 15, 17.
Such points correlated with the Japanese dispersal argument as it related to the possibility of fifth column activity, and further served to illustrate why sabotage was a regional fear. This anxiety was a summation of not only the possibility of hostile internal Japanese actions but also the horror of external invasion.

One writer, touring western cities during February, 1942, to observe coastal war attitudes, reported a "jittery" atmosphere. Wealthy families, expecting war damage along the coast, departed urban centers for the relative security of Arizona and Nevada. Another example of this hysteria was the victory garden program which in California received added support from housewives fearful that Japanese truck farmers would poison vegetables prior to store delivery.11

Returning again to the military argument that a hostile ship-to-shore communications system existed, the question arises as to whether the evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry provided a solution to the signaling problem. During the early war months news sources reported sightings of signal lights at sea visible from the coast as well as interceptions of unidentified radio transmissions. The Army noted in its final report that "... following the evacuation, interceptions of suspicious or unidentified radio signals and

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shore-to-ship signal lights were virtually eliminated and attacks on outbound shipping from West Coast ports appreciably reduced."^{12}

The Army related the signaling to the hostile actions of enemy forces in the coastal region. There is an interesting relationship between the West Coast attack incidents and the evacuation of resident Japanese. Three hostile actions were perpetrated against the continental United States in the Pacific coastal region during the course of the war. The first incident was the submarine shelling of the Ellwood oil field, twelve miles west of Santa Barbara, California, on February 23, 1942.\(^1^3\) A similar shelling occurred in the vicinity of Fort Stephens along the northern coast of Oregon on June 23, 1942.\(^1^4\) On September 9, 1942, an unidentified seaplane was observed flying inland over the northern Oregon coast line. Several hours after the sighting United States Forest Service personnel recovered incendiary bomb fragments bearing Japanese markings from a small crater near the center of a small forest fire in the area of Brookings, Oregon.\(^1^5\) Damage in all instances was

\(^1^2\)U. S. Fourth Army, Final Report, p. 8.

\(^1^3\)New York Times, February 24, 1942, Sec. 1, p. 1.

\(^1^4\)Ibid., June 23, 1942, Sec. 1, p. 1.

\(^1^5\)Ibid., September 15, 1942, Sec. 1, p. 1.
minimal; however, there were rumors of coastal signaling in connection with each event. In all cases police authorities investigated the claims and were unable to verify that signaling had occurred.

The Fourth Army final report made an identification between signaling and these incidents. The report stated that

. . . the several incidents of enemy attacks on West Coast points . . . were evidences of the successful communication of information to the enemy, information regarding positive knowledge on his part of our installations. . . . The Commanding General, charged as he was with the mission of providing for the defense of the West Coast, had to take into account these and other military considerations. He had no alternative but to conclude that the Japanese constituted a potentially dangerous element from the viewpoint of military security - that military necessity required their immediate evacuation to the interior. The impelling military necessity had become such that any measures other than those pursued along the Pacific Coast might have been too little and too late.16

DeWitt could not have "taken into account" these incidents in making the removal decision because his final recommendation to the Secretary of War which outlined the evacuation program was dated and forwarded to the Secretary of War on February 14, 1942, over one week prior to the first coastal attack.17 Apparently, subordinate military officials drafting

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17Ibid., p. 33.
the final report included the above argument as merely another justification for Japanese removal.

Further, in relation to the two Oregon incidents, Fourth Army Japanese removal schedules indicated that evacuees were removed from the Portland assembly point to the various detention centers during the period, May 26, 1942—August 10, 1942.18 Assuming these dates to be correct, resident Japanese involvement, through signaling or radio communication, in the incendiary bombing action, would have been impossible as all Japanese had been removed from the area.

Some who have considered the constitutional implications of the Japanese episode have discounted the validity of the official explanation, military necessity, as the basic reason for evacuation. Rather, the hypothesis has been advanced that relocation measures resulted from "pressure" on national officials, particularly on DeWitt and members of his staff. Remnants of anti-Japanese groups as well as western state and local officials have been cited as the source of this pressure.

Several sources illustrate this suggestion. Bradford Smith, in his volume, Americans from Japan, states that

. . . the preponderantly loyal Japanese minority were rounded up in an illegal fashion, chiefly in response to pressure from a bluntly intolerant, grasping element on the Pacific Coast. . . . it was not even

18 Ibid., pp. 282-283.
mistaken patriotism that caused evacuation but greed masked as patriotism.\textsuperscript{19}

Similar views were held by Eugene Rostow. He stated in 1945 that

The program of excluding all persons of Japanese ancestry from the Coastal areas was conceived and put through by the organized minority whose business it has been for forty-five years to increase and exploit racial tensions on the West Coast.\textsuperscript{20}

Morton Grodzins also accepted this analysis. He noted that the hatred for the Japanese held by large segments of the West Coast population made evacuation a popular issue. The war provided an excellent opportunity for pressure to rid the West of its Japanese population.\textsuperscript{21}

Grodzins, Rostow, and Smith identified numerous groups which favored the removal of the Japanese minority from the Western region. They are not, however, successful in correlating this "pressure" with the developing process of evacuation. Smith attempted a correlation with the observation that the Tolan Committee provided a field day for the special interests which desired the removal of the Japanese. On the date that the Tolan Committee ended its hearings, according to Smith, DeWitt announced that he would evacuate all Japanese from the Western Defense Command region. Smith then concluded that

\textsuperscript{19}Bradford Smith, \textit{American from Japan}, (New York, 1948), p. 276.

\textsuperscript{20}Rostow, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 204.

\textsuperscript{21}Grodzins, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 38.
... the actions of General DeWitt were increasingly those of a man not sure of himself, or being subjected to pressures he could not withstand. ... If the evacuation was as DeWitt claimed, a military necessity, why was it necessary on March 12th, but not March 7th? ... How did it happen that DeWitt's decision corresponded with the end of the Tolan hearings?22

Smith's analysis was only correct in part. DeWitt's public announcement of evacuation did correspond with the conclusion of the Tolan Committee investigation; however, this did not necessarily mean that DeWitt was influenced by the activities and results of the Congressional Committee. Apparently DeWitt's decision was formulated much earlier. Coastal defense problems were outlined and the exclusion concept was described in his memorandum of February 14, 1942, forwarded by DeWitt to the Secretary of War. The document, sent several days prior to the first Tolan Committee hearing, contained the recommendation that prohibited zones be created and that the War Department be empowered to remove both Japanese aliens and citizens from these zones.23

Evidence also indicates that the Western Defense Command had emergency plans providing for Japanese removal which had been drafted as early as December, 1941. During May, 1942, Lieutenant Colonel Bendetsen, DeWitt's Assistant Chief of Staff, mentioned the existence of such a plan which would

22Smith, op. cit., p. 265.
have moved Japanese "practically overnight." On one occasion he stated that

Plans were made to move the 113,000 Japanese into already established Army cantonments in a mass movement which could have [in the event of an emergency] been undertaken immediately. Prepared in this manner against the possibility of fifth column activity, or for any outbreaks of anti-Japanese feeling, the Army continued with its plan for a permanent program.24

Reference to such an emergency arrangement was also made in the Army volume, Command Decisions. On December 10, 1941, a United States Treasury agent reported to the Army's Ninth Corps Headquarters in San Francisco that 20,000 Japanese residents in the local area were ready for "organized action." Reportedly, the Ninth Corps Staff worked until "late that night" on a plan for Japanese evacuation. This incident was reported to Washington with the "... recommendation that plans be made for large scale internment."25

The actual extent to which military decisions were influenced by regional demands will probably never be known. Until his death in 1962, DeWitt consistently recognized the position taken in the Fourth Army's final report, "military necessity," as the only factor which brought about the inland


transfer. His limited references to the topic after re-assignment as Commandant of the Army and Navy Staff College, did not deviate from this position. The General retired in 1947 and lived the remainder of his days in Washington, D. C., undoubtedly aware that the Japanese-American Citizen League held him primarily responsible for the detention program. Allegedly, the League planned a sizeable libel suit against him for his role in the evacuation should he have ever returned to California.

Establishing Military Control

The memorandum, Evacuation of Japanese and Other subversive Persons from the Pacific Coast, submitted by DeWitt to the Secretary of War on February 14, 1942, recommended that some method be established whereby the national government would provide for total evacuation of all Japanese from sensitive areas. Prior to receiving this communication the War Department had submitted the following questions in writing to the President:

1. Is the President willing to authorize us to move Japanese citizens as well as aliens from restricted areas?

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2. Should we undertake withdrawal from the entire strip DeWitt originally recommended, which involves a number of over 100,000 people, if we included both aliens and Japanese citizens?

3. Should we undertake the intermediate step involving, say 70,000, which includes moving Japanese from large communities such as Los Angeles, San Diego, and Seattle?

4. Should we take any lesser step such as the establishment of restricted areas around airplane plants and critical installations, even though General DeWitt states that in several, at least, of the large communities this would be wasteful, involve difficult administrative problems, and might be a source of more continuous irritation and trouble than 100 percent withdrawal from the area? 29

On February 11, 1942, Secretary of War Stimson met with the President to obtain an answer to these questions. During this meeting Roosevelt expressed complete confidence in military planning and told Stimson to do "whatever is necessary" under the circumstances. The President authorized the Army to proceed with citizen and alien evacuation with the observation that in all probability there would be repercussions. He noted, however, that "military necessity" must remain the primary consideration. Reportedly, his only qualification was, "Be as reasonable as you can." After the conference Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, who also attended the meeting, informed military subordinates, "We have carte

29Department of the Army, Command Decisions, p. 142.
blanche to do what we want to as far as the President's concerned."30

In this respect, Executive Order No. 9066 issued one week later merely confirmed the position taken by the President at the conference. The Order further authorized the military to provide transportation, food, shelter, and other such accommodations as necessary for evacuees. The term "military area" was inserted to supersede previously used terms, "prohibited" or "restricted" areas. Further, the document relieved the Department of Justice of all responsibility for removal and control of civilians within these zones. The F. B. I. did retain investigative responsibility with respect to specific allegations of sabotage or espionage regardless of the location within the continental United States, territories, or the individuals involved.31

In a subsequent press release Attorney General Biddle stressed that the Order was issued only after joint War and Justice Department conferences and upon the recommendation of each of these agencies. He also emphasized that the Order did not imply a condition of martial law, that in this instance there was no abolition of civil rights, and that no civil processes, including the right to seek a writ of habeas corpus,

30 Ibid.
had been suspended. Biddle further justified military intervention by emphasizing the scope of the undertaking. It was "perfectly obvious," he said, that the Justice Department was in no position to cope with the problem as only 350 F. B. I. agents operated along the West Coast.32

The Evacuation Program

General DeWitt's Fourth Army Public Proclamation No. 133 was followed by a similar order on March 14, 1942, which designated the remaining geographical area within the states of California, Washington, Oregon, and Arizona as Military Area Number Two. Additional orders issued at later dates established Idaho as Military Area Number Three, Montana as Military Area Number Four, Nevada as Military Area Number Five, and Utah as Military Area Number Six. These regions and the restricted zones created therein, were identifiable by signs erected along roadways in order that persons concerned could be placed on proper notice.34

The military evacuation procedures subsequently developed ordered the exclusion of the following groups from Military Area Number One: (A) Japanese aliens; (B) Japanese-American


34U. S. Fourth Army, Final Report, p. 32.
citizens; (C) Enemy aliens other than Japanese aliens; and (D) All other persons suspected for any reason by the administering military authorities to be actual or potential saboteurs, espionage agents, or fifth columnists.  

Directives initially issued called for persons in categories (A) and (C) to be evacuated and interned under guard at designated locations. Individuals in category (B) were to be offered an opportunity to accept voluntary confinement at the time of evacuation and, if they accepted, to be delivered to the internment centers. Japanese-American citizens who rejected the offer were to be excluded from the region and left to their own resources. Persons in category (D) were also excluded and could accept internment or resettle on their own initiative when insufficient evidence existed to justify their arrest in relation to fifth column activity.

Two points should be emphasized. First, that the portion of the program which called for the internment of enemy aliens other than Japanese did not materialize. Second, that the plan as outlined permitted the voluntary departure of Japanese-American citizens. The voluntary exodus, which began on March 2, proved unsatisfactory. Many Japanese could not afford an inland journey, nor did they know where

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35 Ibid., p. 36.  
36 Ibid., pp. 36-37.
to relocate. Reports of hostility in central regions created an attitude of apprehension. State governors and local officials issued public statements that Japanese, regardless of citizenship status, were not welcome. Some were turned back by armed posses at the Nevada border, others were jailed, and numerous communities posted "No Japs Wanted" signs. The Governor of Kansas, Payne Ratner, ordered the state highway patrol to turn back any Japanese attempting to enter Kansas.37

A similar opinion was expressed by the chief executive of Arizona. During the Tolan Committee hearings, Governor Sidney Osborn wrote a letter to the Congressman, dated February 28, 1942, in which he stated that

We do not propose to be made a dumping ground for enemy aliens from any other state. We do not only vigorously protest but will not permit the evacuation of Japanese, German, or Italian aliens to any point in Arizona. I cannot too strongly urge that such aliens be placed in concentration camps east of the Rocky Mountains.38

Because of this animosity and the relatively limited success of the voluntary approach, DeWitt issued Fourth Army Public Proclamation No. 4 on March 27, 1942, which abruptly altered Japanese treatment. Whereas the initial military order had instructed them to leave Military Area Number One,

37 *New York Times*, April 2, 1942, Sec. 1, p. 3.

they were now directed to remain in their home community.

The edict, effective at midnight, March 23, 1942, declared that

... it is necessary in order to provide for the welfare and to insure the orderly evacuation and resettlement of Japanese voluntarily migrating from Military Area No. 1, to restrict and regulate such migration, ... the present situation requires as a matter of military necessity that all alien Japanese and persons of Japanese ancestry who are within the limits of Military Area No. 1 ... are hereby prohibited from leaving for any purpose until and to the extent that a future proclamation or order of this Headquarters shall so permit or direct.39

Proclamation Number Four authorized a few exceptions to its provisions. Doctors, nurses, students and faculty members of interior universities, and those who had purchased homes outside the military area and were caught by the freeze could leave Military Area Number One. The order further exempted those persons who desired to join their immediate families who had previously departed the zone and also mixed families if either husband or wife was caucasian.

Regarding race, command policy varied. Initially, the regulations were rigid so as to include those who were only part Japanese. This policy was altered in the late spring of 1942 to allow persons of mixed blood (one-half Japanese or less) to return to, or to remain in the evacuated area with approval of the intelligence services.40

39 U. S. Fourth Army, Final Report, p. 43.
40 tenBroock, op. cit., p. 122.
This "freeze deadline" produced an immediate large scale exodus of residents hurrying to take advantage of an apparent final opportunity for freedom of movement. With household goods piled high on automobiles and trucks, Japanese residents slowly moved from various communal areas such as San Francisco's "Japantown". Merchants who had been liquidating merchandise at a leisurely pace were forced to sell the remainder at sacrifice prices. A druggist, one of many such cases, reportedly sold his $2,000 stock for $250 in an effort to freely depart the California area and escape eventual detention.41 A Japanese-American University professor, not identified by name, commented on similar incidents:

I was down there then. A woman would come into a house without even asking and demand, 'What you got to sell?' If the people didn't want to sell, they tried to force them to. Buyers were everywhere, offering small prices for things. People would try to keep them out but they would force their way in.42

Such examples have been frequently cited by authorities who have examined the economic effects of internment on the Japanese. The comments of an unidentified college student interviewed at the Poston, Colorado, detention center illustrated that Japanese problems prior to evacuation were not all economically oriented.


Coming home from school I was told that all Buddhist reverends had been taken to the city jail and the wife of one preacher was also taken, leaving behind their two small daughters without any care. It was hard to explain such 'Gestapo' methods to my parents and other older people to whom I had often said that the American Government would not be unjust in whatever it did. The strain and the tension on the men in the community was terrific. Most of them had a little parcel of food, night shirt, etc., ready in case they were next on the list. It was a pathetic sight to see their faces. It was as if they were awaiting an execution.  

As noted previously evacuation centered almost exclusively on persons of Japanese ancestry. Although the early military regulations required the removal of alien enemies other than Japanese, the Fourth Army did not remove either Italian or German aliens or citizens. Reasons for this diversity in treatment were several and revolved around the image of resident Germans, Italians, and Japanese held by Americans in 1942. As far as the administration of the military's removal program was concerned, residents of European extraction were not disturbed on orders from the Secretary of War. On February 20, 1942, Secretary Stimson forwarded a communication to General DeWitt which read in part:

I desire, so far as military requirements permit, that you do not disturb, for the time being at least, Italian aliens and persons of Italian lineage except where they are, in your judgement, undesirable or

43 Ibid., p. 19.
constitute a definite danger to the performance of your mission to defend the West Coast. . . . I consider such persons to be potentially less dangerous. . . . Because of the size of the Italian population . . . their inclusion in the general plan would greatly overtax our strength.44

To carry the evacuation program to completion it was obviously necessary to create appropriate administrative machinery for assistance to, and control of, persons removed from restricted locations. Thus, on March 10, DeWitt created by military order the Wartime Civil Control Administration (hereafter cited as the W. C. C. A.). Lieutenant Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen was appointed to head the organization. This agency was responsible for the actual physical removal of Japanese and for coordinating the activities of other agencies seeing to their welfare.

In total, forty-eight W. C. C. A. offices were eventually established within Military Area Number One near locations of high Japanese concentration. In addition to the military personnel assigned to duty with the organization, the U. S. Departments of Agriculture, Treasury, Commerce, Interior, the Office of Emergency Management, and other agencies all provided staff assistance and representatives. Not only did the W. C. C. A. direct the transfer, but they were also available for guidance in property storage or

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44U. S. Fourth Army, Final Report, p. 25.
disposal, financial or social welfare assistance, and counseling on other individual problems potential evacuees might experience.45

Japanese Detention

The establishment of detention facilities constituted a separate phase in the overall relocation program. After Executive Order 9066 was issued during February, 1942, Justice Department and military officials conferred in Washington relative to the possibility of establishing a separate agency to undertake Japanese detention after the Army completed the evacuation. A primary Army concern was that military resources should not be used for purposes not actually essential to the successful conduct of the war. Based then, upon the recommendation of the Justice and War Departments, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9102, March 18, 1942, which established the War Relocation Authority as an agency within the Office of Emergency Management.46 Milton S. Eisenhower, an official of the U. S. Department of Agriculture, was appointed director of the newly created organization.47 The mission of

46This agency will hereafter be cited as the W. R. A. U. S., Federal Register, March 20, 1942, p. 2165.
the W. R. A. was to provide for the detention of evacuees and to assume responsibility for their personal needs during the period. The organization supervised their activities and employment in industrial, commercial, agricultural, and public works projects, and established a program for their final relocation and resettlement.48

Prior to the issuance of Proclamation Number Four, when it was assumed that the evacuation would be a voluntary one, at least for the Japanese-American citizens, DeWitt had directed the establishment of two detention facilities, at Manzanar, California, in Owens Valley, and the Colorado River War Relocation Center. This second site was situated on the Colorado River Indian Reservation in Arizona, along the Arizona-California border. The original plan was that each of these centers would have a capacity of 10,000 persons, and would provide quarters for all enemy aliens, those Japanese-American citizens unable to provide for their personal evacuation, and other individuals who were forcibly removed from restricted areas. When total evacuation under military supervision became the policy, it was obvious that two relocation centers would not be sufficient. Accordingly, the W. C. C. A. sought the assistance of R. L. Nicholson, Western

U. S. Regional Director for the Works Progress Administration, in the selection and construction of additional internment facilities. 49

The scope of the program, as it developed after Proclamation Number Four, established the impracticability of attempting evacuation and relocation in the same operation. It became evident that intermediate assembly facilities were necessary. Therefore, assembly centers were selected within each zone to be evacuated, near Japanese communities, to provide a central point for military vehicles to load evacuees. Fairgrounds and race tracks were primarily chosen. Fifteen locations were selected, twelve in California, and one each in the states of Washington, Oregon, and Arizona. 50

California's famed Santa Anita Park was utilized chiefly because of its proximity to Los Angeles. Evacuees were either transferred or came on their own volition to these areas, and, as permanent detention centers were completed by advance parties of Japanese workmen or Works Progress Administration construction personnel, they were moved to their permanent facilities.

The task of the W. R. A., as initially seen by its officials, was two-fold. First, the organization would

50 Ibid., p. 48.
provide financial assistance to Japanese during the transfer period, and, secondly, it would establish small work camps of the Civilian Conservation Corps style throughout the Nation. Such sites were to contain from 1,000 to 1,500 evacuees. The administration thought that at each of these locations some of the camp residents could be employed in nearby communities within commuting distance of the detention center. Hopefully, some might eventually be resettled in these locations. Others would be employed on public works projects such as land development, farm production, and the manufacture of war materials all within the confines of the center.51

Eisenhower announced this small camp program on April 2, 1942; however, the plan had to be abandoned during mid-April when it became evident during a conference of W. R. A., state, and military officials that state authorities were unwilling to support it. Some governors charged that West Coast states were merely attempting to eliminate long standing social problems by transferring Japanese inland. Others suggested the possibility of civil reaction in the form of vigilantism.52 Because of this adverse criticism the W. R. A. developed the program of mass detention. While formulating this change, Eisenhower reportedly informed the President that "A

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51 tenBroek, op. cit., p. 122. 52 Ibid.
genuinely satisfactory relocation of the evacuees into American life must await the end of the war when the prevailing attitudes of increasing bitterness have been replaced by tolerance and understanding."53

The "mass detention" solution was particularly popular with military authorities. Evacuation and transfer could remain simple. With limited dispersion, fewer troops could effect the move. Also, a limited number of army personnel would be required to police the detention centers.

During the late spring of 1942 the W. R. A. established several large relocation sites. The Manzanar Center, built by the Army prior to the creation of the W. R. A., was transferred to the new agency's jurisdiction on June 1, 1942. The Colorado Army Center was also eventually released to the W. R. A. Eight additional sites were selected, and all were in operation by November, 1942. Because of some difficulty in securing suitable locations, as well as the low priority given the agency for securing materials and equipment, the final transfer from the assembly areas to the permanent facilities was delayed in some instances to four months.54

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53 As cited in Ibid., pp. 123-124.

54 These locations are identified and briefly described in Appendix I, p. 196. U. S. Fourth Army, Final Report, p. 51.
Camp Facilities and Evacuee Reaction

The overall design of the centers, as well as that of individual barracks, presented a problem as no precedent for such housing existed. In devising a construction format, authorities determined that permanent buildings were neither necessary nor desirable. Construction should be as economical as possible to avoid the utilization of critical materials and should proceed without delay as it was obviously desirable to relocate the Japanese from the assembly locations as quickly as possible. Camps bore some similarity to military installations; however, an unyielding, standardized use of military construction plans was not considered satisfactory. The requirements for quartering troops differed from those of housing women, children, and elderly persons on a semi-permanent basis. Building plans were ultimately developed by the Wartime Civil Control Administration and provided the basis for the trend toward uniformity in construction at the various locations.\(^55\)

The centers provided the necessities of life but few of the comforts. There was some limited diversity in construction and equipment because of material shortages, but in most instances housing consisted of barracks structures, twenty by one hundred feet. These were usually divided into

\(^{55}\text{Ibid., p. 264.}\)
one room "apartments," twenty by twenty feet, with one family assigned to each apartment. Exterior walls and roofs were commonly of shiplap or other sheathing material covered with tarpaper. Toilet, bath, and laundry facilities were included in a separate building and served all barracks in one block. Centers designed for 10,000 persons usually contained thirty-six housing blocks. Inside the individual rooms one drop light was provided. A resident commented that the rooms contained only

... bare boards, knotholes through the floor and into the next apartment, heaps of dust, and for each person an army cot, a blanket and a sack which can be filled with straw to make a mattress. There is nothing else, no shelves, closets, chairs, tables, or screens. In this space five to seven people, and in a few cases eight men, women and their children are to live indefinitely.

Mess halls with facilities for seating three hundred persons were standard. A kitchen equipped with three ranges, electric refrigeration, sinks and hot water was included in each mess hall. One recreation building was constructed for each block of twelve barracks. A central hospital was installed in each center and consisted of surgical rooms and equipment, x-ray units, a dental clinic, wards including an isolation section, and a mortuary. Each was provided with drug and medical supplies requisitioned through the Office

56 Ibid., p. 243.
of the Surgeon General, Western Defense Command. Bedding, foodstuffs, and other subsistence items were furnished by the Quartermaster of the Western Defense Command. Many of these supplies came from the assembly points as these areas were cleared of evacuees and ceased to be necessary.

An administrative section for each project contained buildings which served as non-evacuee resident dormitories for supervisory personnel, offices, warehouses, post office, fire station, and a camp exchange. The residence area for military police was separated from the center proper, and the necessary military buildings, headquarters, mess hall, and barracks, were consolidated in this sector.58

Throughout the program, and particularly during the early months, there were seemingly insurmountable problems relating to construction, material procurement, and cooperation between the several participating agencies. Decisions to obtain certain items of equipment were frequently delayed because of uncertainties as to whether the particular matter was within the jurisdiction of the War Relocation Authority, the Wartime Civil Control Administration, the Office of Emergency Management, or some other organization. Considering the sheer size of this governmental undertaking, the speed with which the program was instituted, and the

58 Ibid.
general war-induced emergency atmosphere of the period, such
confusion seems understandable.\textsuperscript{59}

The reception process at each relocation project became
known by administrative personnel as "intake" and imprinted
a lasting impression on all who witnessed or participated
in it. Alexander Leighton, an administrator at the Poston,
Colorado, detention center recalled that as

\begin{quote}
... the bus stops, its forty occupants quietly peer
out ... a friend is recognized and hands wave ... the
people look tired and wilted ... they have been
on the bus for twenty-four hours and have been hot
since they crossed the Sierras ... they begin to
file out of the bus, clutching tightly to children
and bundles. Military Police escorts anxiously help
and guides direct them in English and Japanese. They
are sent into mess halls where girls hand them ice
water, salt tablets and wet towels. In the back are
cots where those who faint can be stretched out, and
the cots are usually occupied.\textsuperscript{60}
\end{quote}

The Project Director of the Colorado River Center com-
mented that recollections of the "intake" process would
remain with him longer than any of his varied experiences
with the project. The arrivals appeared lost, not knowing
what to do or think. On one occasion he observed a woman
standing, holding her four-day-old baby, and he sent her
with the child to his room to rest. Another official from
this Center recalled a vivid picture of new arrivals in an
"apartment." The elderly mother, who had been in a hospital

\textsuperscript{59}Leighton, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 91. \textsuperscript{60}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 63-64.
some years, was propped on her baggage being fanned by daughters, while the son was hurriedly attempting to set up a bed. Shortly thereafter the elderly woman died. 61

Another reaction to detention appeared in The Nation during June, 1942. Marion R. Parsons, a faculty member in the Department of Home Economics, University of California, forwarded to the editor a letter from a previous student. Parsons did not identify the student or the center, stating, "I do not know how the neighboring American citizens would be disposed toward criticism of their local assembly center."

The letter read in part:

We are now in our 'apartment' . . . having arrived here yesterday after a heavy shower. . . . Lunch was a horrid affair - one frankfurter, a mess of overboiled cabbage, white bread and rice. . . . The apartments are rooms with four, six, and eight beds. Usually they assign one apartment to a family . . . since they will not allow less than four in one room my brothers are living with me. . . . My parents feel humiliated but are quite resigned. I admire their stoicism or whatever it is that enables them to hold up under so much. . . . Last night it rained -- for many people on their beds. Our head nurse says she cries every night when she thinks of the old folks, many of whom will most likely die here very soon, and of the children, who don't understand why they can't leave this horrid place. . . . Until our dying day we'll not forget. 62

A similar letter from a detainee, Ted Nakashima, appeared in The New Republic. He described the plight of his family,

61 Leighton, op. cit., p. 66.

thoroughly American in background, and their early period in and initial reaction to an unidentified assembly center. After the usual complaints in reference to facilities and food, the writer mentioned his personal feelings:

It all seems so futile, struggling, trying to live our lives under this useless, regimented life. The senselessness of all this inactive manpower. Electricians, plumbers, draftsmen, mechanics, carpenters, painters, farmers -- every trade -- men who are able and willing ... thousands of men in these camps, energetic quick, alert, eager for hard constructive work, ... I left a fine American home which we built with our own hands. I left a life, highballs with our American friends on weekends, a carpenter, laundry truck driver, architect, airlines pilot -- good friends, friends who would swear by us.63

There are other reports of Japanese attitudes and reactions recorded in sociological investigations conducted at the centers. The author of one such study reported that some detainees simply considered the total program unnecessary because Japanese had not engaged in fifth column activity. These persons thought that they were the victims of racial prejudice and war hysteria. Many were fearful that they might eventually be required to return to Japan. Others envisioned thirty or forty years of economic struggle destroyed by the requirement to depart their home region.64

A report from an individual who was detained at the Tule Lake detention site described some of the social problems

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64 Leighton, op. cit., pp. 45-56.
and group conflicts among the Japanese during confinement. In this study interviewees were identified only by code number -- in this instance, CH-64.

We hear all this talk about cooperative camp living. Camp living was an utter failure as there were too many factions and jealousies. . . . There were conflicts between J. A. C. L. vs. non-J. A. C. L. members, [Japanese-American Citizen League] fights between church groups, and fights between Nisei cliques [second generation Japanese]. Some of these small groups formed coalitions with each other and Tule Lake was a hotbed of group struggles. I was pretty disgusted with the constant complaints of the Issei [first generation Japanese]. The Issei tended to be anti-administration on every issue, even those which would have benefited them. My own reaction to all these conflicts was to withdraw into my private life and do as little as possible for the community.65

During the war years the American public did not, in many instances, receive an accurate picture of center facilities and living conditions. Journalistic evaluations tended to gloss over some of the undesirable aspects of camp life. One such report,66 relating particularly to the Manzanar site, emphasized the opportunity for detainees to cultivate vast arid western lands, locations such as the Colorado River Delta in Arizona previously untilled and "as rich as the fabulous valley of the Nile." In an obvious reference to the patriotic aspects of detention and food


production, the article stressed the wartime emergency, the necessity to mobilize America's resident Japanese to "make the deserts blossom." In the case of facilities, it was stressed that Manzanar contained "700 one story buildings, including recreation halls, arts, crafts, and hobby centers." Pictures of cheerful, smiling Japanese were included which could give a reader the impression that governmental concern for detainee welfare resulted in the creation of a western resort atmosphere.

Colliers examined detention in a feature article complete with color photographs on location and a panoramic snow-topped mountain background. This article stressed the absence of military restrictions inside the camp area, and the friendly attitude of inhabitants. Center life was compared with life in the average American small town.

You wander around, up and down the streets, noting what you see, and suddenly you realize there is almost nothing very unusual here. It's just another typical American city - the sort of boom town the West has been familiar with for decades.67

An article in Business Week, and to a lesser extent one in Life, also noted the more acceptable conditions of reception centers. Few references were made to miseries created by improper shelter, limited interior furnishings, shortages

of building materials, limited farm equipment, improper food, unpaved streets, and barbed wire which enclosed the compound.68

At least one official governmental report should be included in this group. In 1943 the U. S. Office of War Information, Domestic Branch, produced a motion picture entitled, *Japanese Relocation*. 69 The film, narrated by Milton Eisenhower, was made available for public viewing through the U. S. Office of Education. In some areas the film was inaccurate. Eisenhower reported that the Army provided vans to transport household goods for evacuees to assembly and detention centers. According to the Fourth Army Final report, evacuees could take with them only what they could hand carry. Further, the film reported that assembly centers provided "excellent housing and plenty of healthful food for all." This last point cannot be correlated with the experiences of many detainees.

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68 "Business in Evacuation Centers," *Business Week*, (July 18, 1942), pp. 19-20. "Coast Japs are Interned in Mountain Camp," *Life*, XII (April 6, 1942), pp. 15-19. Articles in *Colliers*, *Business Week*, and *Life* are cited only to illustrate a popular journalistic method of portraying camp life to the American public. Realizing that many articles appearing in such sources are not scholarly efforts, they are nevertheless an important media affecting the formation of American attitudes.

For instance, Mime Okubo and her brother entered the race track assembly center at Tanforan, California, during June, 1942, and remained there for several weeks. When they departed the bus at Tanforan they were searched for knives and razors and examined to see whether they had been vaccinated. They were then assigned to stable 16, stall 50. The floor was covered in manure. After standing in the mess line for an hour they received boiled potatoes and two slices of bread. After supper the two were issued bed ticking bags and told to "stuff them with straw." They stated that for a long time they "... just sat on these, listening to the gradually subsiding murmur of hundreds of bewildered people." 70

Japanese student relocatees were instrumental in calling attention to the plight of the internees and improving the image of Japanese in the United States. Some had voluntarily transferred from western universities prior to the exclusion order. Others were released after a period of detention to continue their education at universities in the interior. Reports which reached center authorities indicated that their treatment was vastly different than that received on

70 Bosworth, op. cit., pp. 116-117. The previously cited studies of Leighton and Thomas include numerous examples of treatment similar to that experienced by Okubo.
the Coast. One girl reported that the President of the college to which she transferred was waiting in the rain upon her arrival at three o'clock in the morning at the local railway station. The student advisor at the Manzanar center reportedly informed departing students that in their future conversations they should stress the contributions of their people to the Nation's war effort; Japanese in the United States Army, the agriculture and manufacturing activities of the detainees. This approach, according to the advisor, would do the Japanese in America more good than discussions about injustices and discriminatory treatment.71

Even more significant in "image portrayal" were the achievements of the two World War II Japanese-American Army units. The first, the 100th Infantry Battalion made up of Hawaiian national guardsmen, was a leading component in the United States advance into Italy. Of the 1000 men assigned to the unit, approximately 300 were killed and 650 were wounded during the Italian campaign. The second organization, the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, was formed during 1943 of volunteers from the various internment camps. Operating also in the European theater, with the normal complement of approximately 5000 troops, it reportedly suffered 4500 casualties,

over 500 were killed in action, and received unit and individual citations to the extent that it has the distinction of being the most decorated unit in United States military history.\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{72}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 35-36.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Three years after Pearl Harbor the Western Defense Command terminated their rule in the evacuation-detention program. The policy change became effective on January 2, 1945. Correspondingly, on this same date the War Relocation Authority announced a decision to close all relocation centers during 1945. Instructions were forwarded to these sites advising administrators to terminate crop production, industrial activity, and to prepare to close the center schools by the end of the spring term.¹

The Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation was the agency directly responsible for disposition of center property. As an example, at the Topaz location, after movable property had been inventoried and in some instances transferred to other federal units, the center was processed for liquidation. Eventually it was sold for one dollar per acre; buildings valued at $4.5 million were purchased at nominal fees by Utah State Agricultural College, public schools, agriculturists, or Utah businessmen. Camp residents were returned to the main stream of American society. Topaz returned to the desert from which it came. Today all that has remained

is a laundry boiler smokestack and a maze of concrete foundations.\(^2\)

In the intervening years, assimilation, one historic complaint against Japanese-Americans has occurred. "Little Tokyos", in the main, have dissolved. The residents of these locations, possibly in part due to wartime confinement, have developed a spirit of independence and have merged into American society. Entering all walks of life, both professions and trades, this minority has left its permanent mark, one not achieved by parade, placard, or riot, but rather through dedication, the silence of confinement, and the passage of time. Undoubtedly one could find along the West Coast segregated churches, communities, or social groups. These, however, are less frequently observed in the modern period. Since World War II the Japanese have found friendliness, freedom of occupation, and relatively few barriers to community integration. In this context, as harsh, disruptive, and inconvenient as coastal removal was, it can, to an extent, be viewed as a "blessing in disguise."

Twenty-six years after the fact, if one considers the evacuation as simply an incident on the stage of history,

\(^2\)Arrington, op. cit., p. 41.
it would be difficult to contest the governmental action as other than a tragic and costly blunder. In evaluating causes, it seems evident that underlying public acceptance of and support for the program were prejudices and discriminatory treatment which extended to the earliest years of Oriental immigration into western states. The immediate reasons for these prejudices were varied and numerous. They included economic competition, differing physical, traditional, and moral characteristics, a language barrier contributing to the lack of association between caucasian and Japanese, and the fear that the increasing "Oriental horde" would restrict western territorial development as "truly American."

Such attitudes established the Oriental, ultimately the Japanese, as a stereotype wherein the yellow man was conceived as a sub-human whose economic and social position was beneath that of the white American. State alien land legislation, the San Francisco school incident, the "Gentleman's Agreement" excluding Japanese labor, early Chinese exclusion measures, and Japanese exclusion under the 1924 Immigration Act were major examples of discriminatory treatment.

White supremacy was publicized and advocated by individual exclusionists, such as McClatchy and Phalen. Organizations including the Oriental Exclusion League, the Joint Immigration
Committee, the Native Sons, and in later years the American Legion, attempted to impress on the American public various moral, social, and economic dangers inherent in Asian immigration. During the years 1900-1941, advocates of these views unknowingly created an atmosphere whereby, given the proper conditions, a resident Japanese removal program could be developed with general public approval. World War II provided those conditions.

During the years after exclusion, hostility toward Japanese-Americans decreased but did not vanish. This trend developed because the passage of exclusion legislation represented victory to the anti-Japanese groups and resulted in a temporary loss of interest in further restrictions. During the period 1924-1941, Japanese achieved only limited social and economic integration. Causes were undoubtedly communal Japanese living and remaining regional animosity based on the tradition of anti-Oriental sentiment.

The force of this regional animosity was released after the 1941 Hawaiian disaster. Initially, the existence or extent of local Japanese involvement in the Pearl Harbor bombing was unknown. There were conflicting reports. Coastal hysteria received some nourishment from hearsay, false reports, rumors emitted by governmental officials or from journalistic sources. Navy Secretary Knox advanced the theory, immediately
after viewing damage to American-Hawaiian facilities, that a fifth column ring was in operation. His hypothesis and investigation received widespread attention in the press. Along the West Coast, as suspects were arrested and "contra-band" seized, the public clamor increased for restrictions on Japanese-Americans.

Amplifying the importance of these factors were news reports from the Pacific. Guam, Hong Kong, and Manila fell to the Japanese. Wake Island, Bataan, and other island areas were under heavy attack. Some form of Japanese action against the American mainland seemed a definite possibility. Given this background, many white citizens, naturally and logically, began to question the loyalty of a minority which could be racially identified with the enemy. The allegations of disloyalty were well circulated before Hawaiian investigative authorities were able to refute the argument that local Japanese were involved in the December disaster.

No one factor seemed to place the American-Japanese in this difficult position, though some might be classed as primary. A damaging blow was struck by the investigation of the U. S. House Un-American Activities Committee and the release of its Report on Japanese Activities. Purporting to demonstrate the extent of a fifth column within the United States, the study pictured numerous techniques which the
Committee identified as being used by Japanese agents in the conduct of espionage and sabotage.

The fact that prominent figures, including California Attorney General Warren and news columnist Walter Lippmann, could take the absence of mainland sabotage as an indication that resident Japanese were refraining from violations of internal security while awaiting Tokyo instructions, illustrated the hopeless paradox facing Japanese in America. American harbingers seemed to assure the public that sabotage would occur. After World War II and from the vantage point of hindsight, some of the outspoken were able to reconsider their position. Los Angeles Mayor Bowron was one such person. Appearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee of the Judiciary, House of Representatives, which held hearings during 1954 for the purpose of examining Japanese-American property claims, he testified:

I was mayor during all of the war period . . . and I know of the hysteria, the wild rumors, the reports, that pervaded the atmosphere and worried a great many of us in responsible positions. We were quite disorganized. . . . There were many rumors floating around, as a result of which, this order of evacuation was made. . . . I rather hold myself somewhat responsible, with others. . . . I realize that great injustices were done. . . . I thought it was the right thing to do at the time; in the light of after events, I think it was wrong, now . . . I have been impressed with the fortitude of the Japanese people, the way they took it, and then how they came back and reestablished themselves in this community.3

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Others, among them the present Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, have simply shrouded their opinions in silence since the war.

During the early war months public feeling and official orders seemed to be a reaction to the realization that the Japanese were dispersed, through residence or employment, near most strategic locations and defense installations. In fact, several coastal authorities took the position that this development had been planned and had fifth column implications. Therefore, it was argued, since loyal Japanese could not be distinguished from the disloyal, evacuation and detention were the logical course of action. To those who favored removal, anything less than total segregation and incarceration was "too little and too late."

A most valuable source for measuring coastal reaction toward local Japanese in 1942 was the hearings conducted by the Tolan Committee. The region's major pro-evacuation advocates appeared, including state and local officials, journalists, representatives of agricultural, labor, and business interests, and the agents of various patriotic groups. They argued for removal based chiefly on the common fear that widespread sabotage and espionage would erupt if this course of action were not taken. Other supporting arguments which were mentioned, the possibility of vigilante
reprisals against the Japanese minority, Japanese-American support for Japan's militarism, and the basic argument, the difficulty of separating the loyal from the disloyal.

One who reviews the transcript today is amazed at the lack of a non-questioning attitude on the part of Committee members. Social contributions of Japanese-Americans were not recalled. The fact that they had been law-abiding and that none had been tried on fifth column charges was apparently forgotten. Committee members simply seemed to be immune to these arguments and unable to consider the possibility that continued Japanese residence in the Western Defense Command region would be peaceful.

In addition, the fact that an evacuation-detention program could be formulated under executive and legislative sanction without knowledge or consideration of evidence presented before the Tolan group is a sad commentary on coordination and cooperation between governmental units during time of war. If the Committee had convened several weeks earlier, if a final decision on the question had been delayed until the hearing results were evaluated and published, or if Committee members themselves had not held preconceived attitudes, they might have forestalled, reduced in scope, or even eliminated the entire evacuation program.

None of these things happened, however, and the removal policy was formulated during the tense, early period of
hostilities. Uppermost in the minds of authorities was the apparent effectiveness of the fifth column as it existed in the European theatre. Further, the war at first was a losing struggle and the Pearl Harbor disaster had been a serious setback. Because of the uncertainties of the final outcome it was understandably difficult for civilian officials to question and overrule responsible decisions of the Army. When the latter explained the situation in military terminology, the requirement for Japanese removal became simply "military necessity," and steps were taken to make it official policy.

After this recommendation was forwarded to Washington, higher officials approved it for a number of reasons. Some may have found it difficult to oppose a military leader during time of war, others possibly feared civil reaction to the continued integration of the Japanese minority in the West Coast region. Authorities may have identified Japanese successes in the Pacific with the likelihood of an organized internal conspiracy, or they may have been convinced of the necessity of a security protection program because of European experiences with Nazi intelligence agents. These explanations were, however, no justification for the detention program implemented.

What then would constitute justification? It would seem that a nation contemplating such a task should have
strong evidence to indicate that an organized fifth column exists. Dispersed residence of long standing in strategic areas, possible external attacks, the existence of racial fraternal organizations and language schools remotely related to the enemy, and the possession of cameras, radios, and weapons when all members of the national society owned such items were, in this instance, given too much weight in reaching a decision. Before any group within a democratic society is required to sacrifice freedom of movement or of residence, that nation should have experienced some internal sabotage which can conclusively be attributed to some national segment or should have direct evidence that such action is contemplated and is imminent. At this point a decision should be made to effect either a condition of martial law or to investigate and prosecute persons involved in sabotage-espionage conspiracies on an individual basis.

Following this reasoning the 1942 evacuation was certainly not militarily necessary. One hypothesis advanced since World War II has held that this judgment was reached only after responsible military officials succumbed to regional pressure. Certainly these pressures existed either as the result of long range racial difficulties or were based on attitudes formulated as a result of the immediate confrontation with Japan. But, to explain the detention program in this manner is incomplete, if not incorrect.
One could defend the position that, rather than "pressure," exclusion activists produced a background, an atmosphere of approval, whereby the military, specifically DeWitt and Bendetsen, could create a plan for solving a problem of internal security with regional applause. Regional hostility, then, would constitute civilian support for a program which the army could justify as a wise and necessary course of action. The initial emergency Japanese removal plan, drafted by the Western Defense Command during December, 1941, would strongly support this position.

A formal recommendation sent from DeWitt's office to Army General Headquarters further illustrates the minimal effect of regional pressure. In this letter DeWitt suggested that all alien subjects of enemy nations, fourteen years of age and over, be removed to inland locations. It is interesting to note that the term "alien subjects" was used. One would assume, then, that the General was referring to Japanese, German, and Italian aliens. The letter, however, further stated:

Records indicate that there are approximately 40,000 such enemy aliens and it is believed that they constitute an immediate and potential menace to vital measures of defense.\(^5\)

\(^4\)See Chapter Five, p. 149.

\(^5\)Department of the Army, Command Decisions, p. 142.
The figure, 40,000, was the approximate number of Japanese aliens in the Western Defense Command region and the number who were eventually placed in relocation camps. Apparently army officials were either improperly informed as to the total number of enemy alien subjects in the region, or they planned from the beginning to evacuate only members of the Japanese race.

Regardless which above position is valid, the "military expediency" of evacuation further negated the role of public pressure. The primary military mission of the Western Defense Command was the defense of the Western United States. The major threat to the successful execution of this objective was the questionable loyalty of the Japanese in the area. Hence, elimination of this Oriental faction served to advance the security of the region and aided the accomplishment of the Command mission.

DeWitt was certainly aware of the consequences of poorly planned defense efforts. The effects of the Hawaiian attack were immediately before him. General Walter C. Short and Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, responsible commanders in Hawaii, as a result of the conclusions and recommendations of the Robert's Commission, were pressured into retirement for lack of foresight in military planning. In a period when the Nation had suffered the most serious defeat in its history
because of a lack of preparedness, DeWitt undoubtedly profited from the experiences of his peers. Any commander would be inclined to take precautions not only in the best interest of national defense but also in the best interest of his command. For DeWitt these precautions happened to be the "final solution" to the Pacific Coast's Japanese problem.

This solution was both a departure from basic American philosophy and a disturbing precedent for the future. Yet, thorough consideration of the merits of detention, with due emphasis on national welfare, was frustrated at many levels of the policy making process. Regional considerations, half-truths, and racial prejudices took their toll among those who might have otherwise opposed DeWitt's proposal. Similarly, these and other factors clouded the public discussion and, ultimately, the final decision. At no point during the entire history of the process did the actual necessity of the move receive full, impartial, discussion and evaluation. Throughout the decision making process, detention was never honestly balanced against the facts of Japanese loyalty. Further, responsible officials seem to have given only minimum consideration to alternative methods of control or to the long range implications for American democracy inherent in the incarceration of a racial minority.
One who has criticized a public program while suggesting the possibility of an alternative approach is obligated to complete his analysis by identifying and outlining the alternative(s). It has been suggested that Japanese detention should have been based on individual guilt ascertained by individual investigation. The question, it seems, then, is, How could a workable program of investigation have been developed, given the requirements of speed and F. B. I. limitations?

In the first instance, responsible authorities--the U. S. Department of Justice or the military--could have divided resident Japanese into three groups, (1) first generation Japanese, aliens born in Japan, (2) second generation Japanese, those born in the United States, (3) second generation Japanese born in the United States but who had, for some purpose, temporarily resided in Japan. It should be noted that Japanese-Americans themselves make a social distinction along these lines, referring to the first group as Issei, the second as Nisei, and the third as Kibei.

Considering the Nisei, the United States government had extended to these people the rights and privileges of citizenship. Hence, it should have been assumed that they would reciprocate with a recognition of their corresponding duties and obligations. In short, their loyalty should not have
been questioned any more than the loyalty of other American citizens.

Of the Issei, undoubtedly the large majority were at least passively loyal to the United States. Most were elderly persons, and none had entered the United States since the 1924 Immigration Act imposed Oriental exclusion. It was an illogical approach to assume that a sizeable portion of these persons would have maintained connections with Japanese intelligence services for the eighteen years that had elapsed since the 1924 Act.

Possibly the Kibei were the most potentially dangerous of all Japanese-Americans. Many of these citizens had been educated in Japan and had served in the Japanese military service. Others maintained business connections in the Orient. Conceivably any number of them could have been returned to the United States to act as agents for the Japanese government.

Although figures are not available, this group would have constituted only a small segment of the total Nisei population. Undoubtedly the identity of these persons could have been ascertained through publicly requesting their registration and through review of the records of the U. S. Department of State, Passport Office. It is obvious that some loyal and honest persons would have fallen into this category, and they could have been given an opportunity to
make an application for a change of status. On the basis of information submitted in request for this change, a complete inquiry into background, reputation, and employment could have been conducted along the lines of loyalty-security employment investigations. Certainly, if loyalty could not have been established, a review of the results would have given some indication of probable menace in the majority of instances.

If the investigation demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that the individual was trustworthy, he could have been placed in the non-suspect group. A person whose background remained questionable could have appeared before a permanent screening committee comprised of Nisei members of the Japanese American Citizen's League. This group could have been permanently established to review such cases and recommend detention or freedom for the party involved. Some form of League surety could have been established whereby a committee of its members could have stated in writing whether they would be willing to sponsor the individual.

Similar tests could have been established for Issei who resided in Japan into maturity, served in its military services, or made frequent or extended trips to their native homeland. Determining factors could have been age at the time of U. S. entry, number and duration of trips to Japan, membership in nationalistic Japanese societies, contributions
to past Japanese war funds, kinship with relatives in Japan, and reputation among caucasian-American friends. Questionable Issei could likewise have been passed upon by the League Committee described above.

In addition to this process, the United States government could have publicly stated that Japanese residents who desired to be recognized as Japanese nationals should so identify themselves. Such persons could have been given assurances that this admission would not result in bodily harm, that they would be interned, have their American citizenship revoked, and returned to Japan as soon as possible.

If the American public had been assured through a strong and vigorous publicity campaign by the national government that these programs were in being and were effective, much of the hysteria and resentment evident in the Pacific region probably never would have developed. If this approach had been used, much suffering and economic loss could have been averted. Constitutional implications could have been avoided, and the Nation would have recognized an appreciable saving in governmental funds and effort.

In conclusion, one should recall that during time of war United States military representatives have traditionally presented posthumous awards to the families of fallen service-men. To military officers responsible for the presentation
of such awards, this obligation has forever been recognized as a sad and depressing task. If the American nation had selected some approach other than mass incarceration, military officers who presented numerous purple hearts to mothers and wives in Minidoka, Manzanar, Tule Lake, and other detention camps, in clear view of machine gun guard and search light watch towers, would have been spared a wartime memory which, above all others, they will surely never forget.
APPENDIX

The following summaries describe the ten Japanese detention locations which were constructed to house, in total, approximately 120,000 persons. Building and equipment costs for center operation was reported by the War Relocation Authority to be, $56,482,638.81. The total amount expended by the Army and other national agencies, with the exception of the War Relocation Agency, was, $88,679,716.69. The total expenditure for Japanese evacuation and relocation was then, $145,162,355.50.¹

Abraham, Utah. This location consisted of approximately 19,000 acres in Millard County, Utah. The area contained 1400 acres of public domain, 8,000 acres county property, and the remainder was secured from private sources. The land was generally quite level and was covered with greasewood brush. Average rainfall in the region was eight inches per year which fell, in the main, during the winter months. Irrigation was necessary for successful crop production. The facilities contained some 10,000 evacuees.

Gila River, Arizona. This center was some 16,000 acres on the Gila Indian Reservation in Pinal County, Arizona.

The soil was exceptionally fertile, so much so that by utilizing irrigation procedures excellent crops of cotton, alfalfa, vegetables, and melons could be produced. Water for irrigation was obtained from the Gila River Reservoir through canals developed by the Indian Service. The capacity of the site was 15,000 Japanese.

**Granada, Colorado.** The Granada Relocation Project comprised approximately 10,500 acres chiefly in Colorado; however, some acreage extended into Kansas. A portion of the land was secured from the American Sugar Beet Company and, although not an extremely fertile region, the site produced vegetable crops with irrigation. The capacity was 8,000 detainees.

**Heart Mountain, Wyoming.** This property, located in Park County in northwestern Wyoming, was previously under the jurisdiction of the U. S. Bureau of Reclamation. Soil varied from light sand to heavy clay and was suitable for vegetable production, primarily beans, peas, sugar beets, and potatoes. Conditions were generally favorable for dairying and poultry production; however, temperature was a factor in that the range in this region was from 101 degrees above zero to 30 degrees below. The site's capacity was 11,000 evacuees.

**Jerome, Arkansas.** Jerome was a 10,054 acre project adjacent to the town of Jerome, Arkansas. The land, within the Mississippi River Delta, was obtained from the U. S.
Farm Security Administration and was suitable for cotton and vegetable production. The number of Japanese detained at Jerome was 10,000.

Manzanar, California. This location was one of two secured from the Western Defense Command which had originally been selected as reception centers under Army control. The 60,000 acres were in Inyo County and were leased from the city of Los Angeles. Previously this region had been farm and ranch territory; however, during the approximately thirty years of City ownership, the area reverted to desert conditions. The Japanese were successful, through irrigation, in producing excellent vegetable crops on the land. Manzanar contained 10,000 Japanese.

Minidoka, Idaho. Minidoka was a 33,000 acre project obtained from the U. S. Department of the Interior. The terrain was rolling and the soil was well suited to the production of vegetables, particularly potatoes, beets, and peas. Minidoka housed 10,000 evacuees.

Rohwer, Arkansas. This project site was adjacent to the town of Rohwer in Desha County, Arkansas. Of the 10,161 acres, 9,560 were secured from the Farm Security Administration. The balance had been privately owned. Cotton was the chief crop in this region also located in the Mississippi Delta. Much of the center land was heavily wooded and some was quite swampy. Again, the capacity was 10,000 persons.
Tule Lake, California. The U. S. Bureau of Reclamation had previously controlled the land in this site. Situated in Modoc County, California, approximately forty miles south of Klamath Falls, Oregon, the region was formerly the bed of a lake. Bumper crops of garden vegetables and barley could be raised on the sandy loam soil. There were 7,400 acres in the tract which contained 16,000 Japanese.

Poston, Arizona. Known also as the Colorado Relocation Center, this project was previously under Army jurisdiction. The site was situated on lands controlled by the U. S. Indian Service and was part of the Colorado River Indian Reservation at Poston, Arizona. The area consisted of 71,000 acres in the Japanese center of which only a part was suitable for irrigation. Much of the acreage was high in alkali and salt content and was virtually worthless under cultivation. There were 20,000 evacuees detained at Poston.
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