RHODESIA, REBELLION AND THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN RESPONSE

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RHODESIA, REBELLION AND THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN RESPONSE

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INTRODUCTION

During a visit to the North Texas State University campus in the spring of 1966, the distinguished American historian, Allan Nevins, told a group of young history students what he considered to be the single most important piece of advice he could offer from his long career as a writer of history. That advice was simply that every historian should attempt to give his work a substantial thesis, a solid backbone, which would be clear to the reader. Professor Nevins suggested that the initial statement of that thesis and its logical development throughout the work was essential to good writing.

This study attempts to follow a great historian's cogent advice. The central theme in the following five chapters is that the native African in Rhodesia, confronted less than a century ago by modern civilization, has been deprived of his homeland and purposely restrained from progressing politically toward the leadership of his own nation. On a continent now almost completely under African control, the Zambezi River—Rhodesia's northern boundary—forms a barrier which separates black majority governments to the north from white minority regimes in the south.

In November, 1965, Rhodesia defied world opinion by unilaterally declaring independence from Great Britain. London retaliated with diplomatic and economic sanctions in a vain
attempt to bring down the white minority "cowboy" government of Rhodesia. The United States followed Britain's leadership but carefully avoided stronger action. Why had Britain allowed the crisis to develop in the first place? Why were the two most powerful western nations unwilling or unable to take stronger action against the rebellious government?

The American response to the developing crisis in central Africa is a classic example of the traditional American ignorance of, and lack of interest in, the African continent as a whole. Chapter I of this study begins with the assertion, "To most Americans Africa is now and always has been the continent of diamonds, giraffes, and the Mau Mau." This initial chapter continues by examining America's traditional policy toward Africa, so aptly termed "official unawareness" by Senator Mike Mansfield.¹

Chapter II, in an effort to record the historical antecedents which explain Anglo-American unwillingness to support majority rule in Rhodesia in 1965, goes back into the nineteenth century to trace Rhodesian history up until the country was granted "responsible government" by the British in 1923.

Chapter III briefly surveys Rhodesian history to the present decade with special emphasis on the discussions which went on throughout this period favoring a federation of

¹Cf. p. 7.
territories in central Africa. This chapter also attempts to investigate a sampling of the inter-war schemes which favored placing large portions of subsaharan Africa under some sort of international trusteeship.

The three critical years prior to Rhodesia's 1965 declaration of independence are the subject of Chapter IV. The climax of the chapter is the failure of both Great Britain and the United Nations to prevent the rebellion.

The concluding chapter returns to the subject of the United States to examine American official and public response to the Rhodesian rebellion. Co-operation by the American government in the diplomatic and economic boycott of Rhodesia represented the fullest extent of American willingness to act against the Smith regime. On the other hand, the conservative reaction was powerful and vocal, particularly in the South, advocating a reversal of official American policy which the conservatives contended was "opposing in Rhodesia the very things we say we are fighting for in Viet Nam."  

The conclusions of this study are contained in the final statement of Chapter V as well as in paragraphs appropriately placed throughout the thesis. Fundamentally, the United States has never been interested in Africa for humanitarian reasons. Africa's raw materials and the continent's strategic location

2The Dallas Morning News, April 14, 1966.
have been far more important to the United States than have been its most valuable resource—to its people. American provincialism has been reflected in its negligent policy toward Africa. The present Rhodesian crisis is one of the first fruits of Anglo-American neglect. Unfortunately, Rhodesia may be but a barely significant foreshadowing of far more violent crises yet to come in Africa south of the Zambezi.

"Little did they realize that inevitably one day, in his own good time, the African would throw off the chains of the past in Rhodesia and the white establishment the world over would tremble when it happened." 3

3 Cf. p. 120.
CHAPTER I
THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICA

To most Americans Africa is now and always has been the continent of diamonds, giraffes, and the Mau Mau. Precious gems, movie cameras and bloody and mysterious tales are the "sources" by which the people of the most powerful nation in the world have come to know the African continent. Hollywood, big game hunters and best-selling novelists have "rediscovered" Africa since World War II and have neatly packaged the continent for compact delivery to American minds, floors, and bookshelves.

Unfortunately Africa has thus come to be known in its most sensational aspects and only barely known in its incomparably more significant human terms. The incredible richness of African history and culture has gone largely unnoticed until very recent years. Historical research and archeological excavations since mid-century indicate that the people of East Africa possessed stone tools thousands of years before inhabitants of Europe are known to have had them. Indeed, very recent evidence suggests strongly that Africa, rather than the Middle

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1 Of the more than 600 articles printed in the distinguished American quarterly, Foreign Affairs, during the decade of the 1930's, for example, only nine were directly related to sub-Saharan Africa.
East, India or the Far East, was the first home of mankind. Africa definitely participated in the life of the old world—both European and Asiatic—as a donor as well as a recipient. In late modern times Africa has been instrumental in the developing popularity, among other things, of new forms of music and dance. Strange it is that a nation composed in part of a creative Negro minority of over 18 million individuals who trace their ancestry directly to the African continent has been so slow to recognize the vast human potential long neglected there.

If the human potential failed to attract even the least lethargic eye, consider Africa's more mundane resources. The continent produces three-fourths of the world's supply of cobalt, two-thirds of its gold, one-half of its antimony, one-third of its chrome and one-sixth of its lead. Africa enjoys a near monopoly on the world's diamond production, and its hydroelectric power and petroleum potential are immense.3

Yet, in spite of these apparently obvious assets, Africa has traditionally been known to most Europeans and Americans as simply "the dark continent." Senator Mike Mansfield (Dem., Mont.), in a Congressional address in 1956 on "Africa:

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The Beginnings of Policy described American policy toward the world's second largest continent as "official unawareness".

So great did Mansfield consider Congressional ignorance of basic African cartography to be that he felt constrained to point out that maps of Africa frequently showing red patches do not refer to Communist-controlled states but to "ancient and honorable" British possessions.

American "official unawareness" might be considered part of a recently coined proverb in Africa which claims that the continent is shaped like a huge question mark. From the American viewpoint it might be contended that this punctuation symbol indicates three important questions. Is the future of Africa Black? Is the future black for the African people? What is American policy toward the black continent? The answer to the first question, and possibly the second, is affirmative. Since Ghana led the way in 1957 the governments of the nations of subsaharan Africa have shifted rapidly from European to native African hands. This sudden change, for


5 At the conclusion of his remarks Senator Mansfield found himself being profusely congratulated by a Senator from Arizona later to play an even more prominent role in American politics. In offering his congratulations Senator Barry Goldwater supported his own deep personal interest in Africa with a reference to his recent visit to Egypt. After this exchange of pleasantries, the Senate floor was yielded to Senator Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas who turned the attention of the distinguished Senators to Senate bill 1614 defining nonfat dry milk.
which the Europeans did a poor job of preparing the African, has not been an entirely peaceful transition. On occasion it has been marked by violence and bloodshed, the most notable example in recent years being the Congo. The future of many Africans may yet be quite dark because the accumulated social problems of centuries are converging at a most critical time with the political and economic problems of new-born nations in the twentieth century. The British expert on international development and herself a long-time resident of Africa, Barbara Ward Jackson, sees the post-World War II period as having a tremendous impact on the continent. "Every prime mover of economic change—export income, agricultural productivity, public works, industrial development—has been at work in black Africa since the war," she has observed.  

South of the Zambezi River in the south-central and southern tip of the continent the future of the African people is indeed ominous. This portion of the continent is almost entirely ruled by oppressive white minority governments. The harsh policies of the Portuguese authorities in the territories of Angola and Mozambique are well known to even the most casual observer of African affairs. The white minority government of South Africa continues successfully to defy world opinion with its infamous apartheid policies. The most recent and widely publicized addition to the unwholesome African

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trio of totalitarian white governments is the rebellious ex-British colony of Rhodesia. It is here—south of the Zambezi—that future peace or war in Africa may be largely determined. It is here that increasingly rigorous racial repression has been used to counter the stirrings of African nationalism. It is here that blacks, supported by United Nations-sponsored whites, and rebellious whites could so paint the earth red with each other's blood that the entire world trembles at the prospect.

What has been the American response during the evolution of the whole incredibly complicated African drama? The historical answer is neither comforting nor promising. Much like the European nations, the U. S. has been interested in Africa primarily for materialistic and selfishly political reasons. Official American awareness of Africa, such as it has been, has had a two-pronged approach—a desire to share in the continent's vast natural resources7 (excluding development of the human resource) and a poorly defined policy aimed at keeping Africa loyal to the Western bloc.8 With the relatively insignificant exception of Liberia, the U. S. was certainly never interested in political colonialism in Africa in the traditional sense. However, American economic investment and preoccupation with the communist threat have prompted accusations

of economic imperialism and neocolonialism from the continent itself. European and American businessmen ordinarily did not invest in hospitals, ports, schools and roads, for these items, so valuable to the development of an area, produced little monetary return. South African diamonds were a different matter, adorning the fingers and necks of wealthy ladies in New York and Paris. Zambian copper played a role in modern American life, Ghanian cocoa warmed English bodies and Rhodesian tobacco filled London pipes. Wealthy white overseers supervised the diamond mines, the ore pits, and the plantations, while the Africans—the first owners of the land—worked unbelievably hard for mere pennies a day.

The American vision and flexibility in foreign policy which distinguished itself after 1947 was not directed toward the Afro-Asian bloc. Until John F. Kennedy entered the White House, Washington saw Africa primarily as a source of raw materials and an arm of its world-wide plan to contain the spread of "communism." In the spring of 1958, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, defined his government's policies as support for "strong and independent nations able and willing to resist the subversive efforts of international communism," promotion upon request of the security of these nations "recognizing that in a broad

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sense their security is our security," encouragement to African states to settle their disputes in accord with the United Nations charter, and partial direction of the economic progress and development of these nations.  

The first three of these four planks were clearly aimed at maintaining viable, strong, and pro-western governments which would be able to counter effectively any threat of communist influence. Only the fourth suggested that perhaps the best way to help build nations less vulnerable to communist subversion would be to raise the economic and social levels of the people themselves. Officials in the State Department generally favored the military solution of a string of air bases that surrounded the communist countries. Africa was an integral part of this defense posture, according to some military experts. In 1951 Brigadier General (retired) Bonner Fellers had advocated the increased construction of American air bases in Africa to counter the Soviet Union. He argued that in a war against Russia the United States would be required to consider Africa as a vast north and south corridor offering bases from which air power could strike and destroy the enemy's potential. Convinced of the increasing reluctance of European governments to permit American bases which invited Soviet retaliation, Fellers saw no alternative but to extend American influence in Africa. He advocated cultivating friendships in the Arab world by

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supporting nationalist movements. These grateful leaders would supposedly repay their benefactors later with approval for U. S. military installations on their soil. "The best air force in the world based in a friendly Africa can be the key to peace," concluded Fellers. Although he recognized that human resources had been long neglected, Fellers, like many others, saw the value of the continent primarily in terms of the role it could play in defending America from foreign threats.

By mid-century developing African nationalism rapidly forced the U. S. to face new and more sophisticated problems. Policy makers in Washington found themselves caught increasingly between the conflicting pressures of formal allegiance to the powerful North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies and traditional opposition to colonialism and support of self-determination.\(^\text{11}\) The refusal of the ruling white communities in Africa to jettison the nineteenth century concept that the blacks were there for them to exploit and the acceptance of minority rule by mother countries confronted these State Department people with a dilemma that offered no easy escape.\(^\text{12}\) The realities of the international power struggle dictated one course on colonialism; human dignity as the moral underpinning of policy dictated


another. In an attempt to reconcile the inconceivable, they promised to decide each colonial problem on its own merits, declaring the U. S. would not commit itself in advance. In short, Washington hoped to recognize legitimate independence movements, but not to alienate its NATO allies by opposing their colonial policy. As Senator Mansfield described the situation in his review of foreign policy in 1956, the United States government immunized itself against significant world changes until their impact, which executive and congressional neglect could not diminish, suddenly confronted America with a round of crisis diplomacy. Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (Dem., Minn.) criticized similar vacillation in the U. N. with the assessment:

Such unimaginative and conservative responses to the challenges of emergent Africa suggest the conclusion that the vigorous rail splitters of the 1850's have become the stolid fence-sitters of the 1950's.¹⁴

The European powers, desiring to relinquish their grip over their African colonies, saved Washington from some embarrassment. Only in the Congo and in Rhodesia did Washington become deeply involved, and there is every indication that this involvement in south and south-central Africa will necessarily increase. The disposition of the white minority governments to avert the trend toward majority rule portends additional trouble.


As the United States emerged from its isolationist shell, following the second world war, Americans slowly came to realize that the problems in Africa, Asia and Latin America were far more serious and vital than they had ever realized. The growing gulf between the rich and poor nations forced the U. S. government into an agonizing appraisal of its international responsibilities. The feeling that America must at least attempt to apply on the global scale the principles of social justice which had proven so meaningful domestically had other than altruistic motives. There existed the latent fear that the poverty-stricken nations of the world—the international proletariat—might rise up to strike down the privileged Western bourgeoisie, a fear compounded in the case of Africa by the racial complications.

A number of international plans calling for American participation have been introduced in the hope of helping significantly the developing nations. Barbara Ward Jackson, who in 1959 had dismissed American aid programs to Africa as "negligible," suggested rather economic expansion underwritten by the advanced Western nations through an income tax of one or two percent of their annual national income. In a


17 Spanier, op. cit., p. 191.
nation with a strong isolationist tradition, one which only recently had affiliated with the world body of nations and in which walked many patriots on guard against further internationalism, these radical suggestions could hardly take root. Proposals seeking greater aid to developing nations made by Americans, got no further. Governor Foster Furcolo of Massachusetts sponsored one such approach in 1960. He sent to President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Herter a draft calling for a Ten Year African Development Program designed to avert repetition of the Congo tragedy. With a minimum annual appropriation of $500 million for the next decade, it proposed to aid the free states of Africa, particularly in the field of education. Governor Furcolo avoided mentioning military aid, stressing the need for economic development. 18

In that same year in the Senate William Proxmire (Dem., Wis.) encouraged his colleagues to take greater interest in the "explosive pace of political developments in Africa." 19 Academic experts such as Arnold Rivkin, the director of African studies at the Center of International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, called for new institutional arrangements to maintain the mutually beneficial elements of the contact between Europe and Africa and to broaden external assistance to help new


African states progress economically. This new approach, which Rivkin called the Organization for African Economic Development, would be

a flexible multilateral organization for economic and technical assistance to Africa, which would group the independent African countries, Western European countries . . . . the United States and Canada, other free world countries likely to be interested in African economic development---e.g., India, Israel, and Japan---and, in a relationship to be worked out with the metropoles, the dependent African territories.  

The Organization was to mobilize available resources and serve as a clearinghouse and point of coordination for aid projects to Africa. Like Furcolo's, Rivkin's proposals were never acted upon.

In fact, in spite of the nation's wealth, Congress continued begrudgingly its post-war aid programs convinced that the U. S. was carrying far more than its fair share of the load. The State Department pressed the European countries to share the burdens of economic aid to the developing nations. Despite discussion of the feasibility of introducing a "Marshall Plan" for the developing areas of the world, Washington's moral heart was not in it. American solutions, in the form of limited international programs, reflected more a desire to ease American efforts than a genuine concern with the lot of poverty stricken people the world over.  

Walter Lippman saw through the American facade and warned the United States that "national duty must take

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precedence over private indulgence." He stated that the prevalent belief that privileged affluence is the chief characteristic of greatness needed to be shattered if the U. S. hope long to retain its position of world leadership.22

The American attitude toward Africa became even more suspicious as one-party governments emerged in the newly formed African states. Unacquainted with African politics and the overwhelming problems of developing nations, and overly impressed with the fetish of political democracy, Americans detected the foul scent of dictatorship. Understandably perhaps, they failed to comprehend the important role of the strong-leader image in the efforts of developing peoples to overcome tribal loyalties in the quest for national unity.23 Too many Americans distorted the entire African political framework when they saw government in these nations as a choice between democracy and dictatorship. Democracy, however, was not immediately at issue. In Africa the option was statehood or disintegration, not democracy or dictatorship. A strong leader and nationalism directed against the colonial powers proved to be the only cohesive factors in some young African states.

It might be assumed that those in positions of leadership in the U. S. would have been the most richly informed on the intricacies and importance of developing Africa. Unfortunately

23 Ibid., p. 196.
such was not the case. Africa had few friends in the U. S. Congress. In his foreign policy critique of 1956, Senator Mansfield began by reminding his colleagues that prior to that year Africa had hardly been mentioned on the floor of Congress. As far as an awareness of Africa was concerned, he could give credit to only one Congressman, "the intrepid gentlewoman from Ohio," Mrs. Frances P. Bolton, who had singlehandedly blazed a "congressional trail through the dangerous recesses of that vast continent."

Not until the very late 1950's were Congressional sensitivities concerning African development awakened. Two Senators destined to play a most influential role in national politics during the following decade took the lead in the attempt to focus American attention on Africa. In September, 1959, Senator Humphrey argued that

> If the American people are true to their heritage, they will heed the cry for freedom and reach out in understanding to their fellow human beings in Africa who are asking only for a chance to walk erect and to enjoy the rights we in this blessed land take for granted.²⁴

During that same year Senator John F. Kennedy (Dem., Mass.) questioned American preoccupation with the communist threat. He saw the single most important test of American foreign policy to be the manner in which the United States responded to the challenge of imperialism. He defined American success neither

in a sophisticated international salesman's pitch on the virtues of free enterprise and the perils of communism, nor in winning allies in Africa simply by handing out tanks, bombs, and guns.

He concluded:

Let us never assist Africa merely because we are afraid of Russian assistance in Africa. Let us never convince the people of that continent that we are interested in them only as pawns in the cold war. Nor do we want them to regard us only as a military guardian, or a giver of goods, or a lender of cash . . . . No, the strength of our appeal to these key populations—and it is rightly our appeal and not that of the Communist—lies in our traditional and deeply felt philosophy of freedom and independence for all peoples everywhere.25

Unfortunately, but understandably, the Kennedy age effected no major revolution in America's African policy. The political limitation of the executive office, responsibility for the universal commitments and necessary restraint of the world's leading power, and the probability of Southern domestic repercussions prevented the President from inaugurating radical departures from traditional policies, regardless of the desirability of the goal. Yet the Kennedy Administration made acceptable progress in changing the American image in Africa. President Kennedy's tireless efforts at reducing world tensions, his deep interest in civil rights in the U. S., and his concern for the African people so endeared him to the black populace that in some parts of the continent his death was more widely and noticeably mourned than in many areas of the United States.

Nevertheless, the U. S. Congress proved to be one of the limiting factors thwarting Kennedy's aspirations for American policy toward Africa. Theoretically its members interested in Africa should serve on their respective subcommittees on African affairs. Of the two bodies, the Senate subcommittee generated the only substantial publicity, and then only for a few years when it was under the chairmanship of Senator Kennedy himself. While the group met infrequently under his leadership, his name and his speeches mentioning Africa enhanced its prestige considerably, especially after his nomination in 1960. When Kennedy moved to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue the subcommittee chairmanship fell to Albert Gore (Dem., Tenn.). But when Gore resigned in the midst of the Congo crisis, no Senator could be found willing to take his place. The majority leader, Senator Mike Mansfield, finally took the job to avoid the embarrassment of having an unchaired committee. Due to Mansfield's other commitments the subcommittee became almost completely inactive. At a most critical time Senate interest in Africa had fallen to a new low.

The House Subcommittee had a better, if quiet, record, based largely on the contributions of Representatives Barratt O'Hara (Dem., Ill.) and Mrs. Bolton. The latter, a Republican, was the Congressional pioneer in the area of African affairs, heading a study mission to Africa in 1955 and serving as one of

four official U. S. delegates to Ghana independence ceremonies in March, 1957.\textsuperscript{27} O'Hara kept the subcommittee up to date on the continent through periodic State Department briefings and hearings on African problems. However, after the initial burst of interest which accompanied creation of a number of new African states in the early part of this decade, the activities of even the House subcommittee slackened.\textsuperscript{28} In spite of their interest O'Hara and Mrs. Bolton watched their efforts to focus their colleagues' attention on the potential of Africa go largely unheeded.

Negative attitudes in Congress far outweighed the positive leadership of Congressmen like O'Hara and Mrs. Bolton. Indeed, the African governments had good reason to suppose that Congress was hostile. The most vocal of these Congressional spokesmen were southern Congressmen. Some, Senator Theodore C. Bilbo of Mississippi, as an example, championed "Back to Africa" movements, claiming that resettlement of American Negroes in Africa was "the greatest, most important, and far-reaching problem that has ever or will ever confront the American people."\textsuperscript{29} Senator Allen J. Ellender's 1962 trip to Africa, punctuated by the Louisiana senior Senator's unwise and unkind comments--such as his Salisbury statement condemning Negro African

\textsuperscript{27}U. S., Congressional Directory, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1966, p. 133.

\textsuperscript{28}Meisler, op. cit., p. 5.

leadership—did considerable damage to Afro-American relations. But it would be unfair to center all blame on Southerners. Thomas Dodd, a Democrat from Connecticut, hardly won friends with his statement that, "Ghana has become the first Soviet satellite in Africa." 30

Unquestionably, one reason for Africa's poor public relations in Congress has been the absence of pro-African pressure groups and lobbies. The American Committee on Africa is the only articulate champion of African freedom. The efforts of this organization, particularly directed at the questions of human dignity involved in U. S. policy toward southern Africa, have been more than offset by financial and racial interests pressing for support of continued Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique and increased trade with South Africa. In short, diamonds—reflecting an anti-communist glimmer—have carried far

30 Meisler, pp. 6-7. Dodd voiced his opinion from his position as vice-chairmen of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee after hearing testimony from Ghana's distinguished exile, Dr. Kofi Bushia. Dodd concluded, "It all boils down to the oft-repeated observation that if a bird looks like a duck, waddles like a duck, quacks like a duck, and associates with other ducks, it can be taken as a certainty that the creature is, itself, a duck." The State Department denied his accusation, but no member of Congress rose to contest him. For a complete account of Dodd's views and Bushia's testimony see U. S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee of the Judiciary, Hearing, Is U. S. Money Aiding Another Communist State? 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 1962. On July 16, 1963, the New York Times editorialized against Dodd's statements on Ghana. Two days later Dodd responded with a letter attempting to justify his remarks. Both the editorial and Dodd's unabridged letter may be read in U. S., Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1963, CIX, Part 10, T3202-T3204.
more weight than conscience, figuratively as well as literally. On these critical issues of human relationships and brotherhood that go to the very heart of all that America has preached to the world, the Congressmen have remained uniformly silent. When Senator Ellender stood in the privileged sanctuary of Salisbury and said that he had not seen any part of Africa where Negroes were ready for self-government and when Senator Dodd spoke his indirect words, they were merely reflecting the suspicions of many Americans. As late as 1963—in the midst of independence movements in Africa which were literally revolutionizing the continent--Congress displayed a remarkable lack of interest. Africa was consistently slighted more than any other continent in foreign aid bills passing Congress throughout the '50's and through the first half of the next decade.

Other divisions of the government took at least a greater verbal interest in Africa, with the State Department taking the lead. In the actual formulation of policy toward Africa, however, the Department's progress was agonizingly slow. Until 1958 its African division was linked to the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs. Not until August of that year did a separate Bureau of African Affairs come into existence. Belatedly it was noted, "Creation of the new Bureau constitutes recognition of the greatly increasing importance of the African continent."31

The revolutionary changes in Africa could not wait for the metamorphosis of attitudes and approaches by Americans. They could not wait for alterations from traditional thought patterns by Europeans. Africans had waited long enough. In 1957 Ghana led the way with the first of a series of explosions in the "revolution of rising expectations." A chain-reaction followed. Europe had given the African many things—roads, guns, tall buildings, hospitals, Christianity, and a first class racial problem. But, until faced with the awful prospect of violent revolution, Europe had refused to give the Africans dignity, their own continent, or training in how the land should be governed in order to survive in the twentieth century. The inevitable result has been instability, but, surprisingly, an instability of such minimal proportions as to be a substantial credit to the Africans who have assumed the reigns of government in the midst of incredibly treacherous obstacles.

The most significant area yet to be reclaimed by Africans is that south of the Zambezi River—the Portuguese territories, South Africa and Rhodesia. Here the privileged white minorities bent on perpetuating their rule over the African majority have successfully frustrated the revolution of rising expectations. Here the real essence of American policy toward "backward" peoples has yet to be decisively tested. Here all the progress that has been made in Africa as a whole since World War II may be put on trial. Here ultimate questions of human relationships are at stake.
Currently the United States, although not to the same degree as Great Britain, confronts a major international crisis in Rhodesia. This thesis will concentrate on that specific problem. It will investigate briefly the historical development of this troubled region and attempt to reach the root causes of its declaration of independence in defiance of world public opinion. It will seek to compare and contrast Anglo-American response to the worsening situation in south-central Africa. It will suggest that a more definite Rhodesian policy was necessary in both London and Washington and was consistently lacking in both cases. Finally, it will survey the world-wide response to Rhodesia's rebellion, particularly Anglo-American opinion, and attempt to assess the probable outcome of measures already taken to overcome the crisis now existing south of the Zambezi.
CHAPTER II

RHODESIA AND THE COMING OF THE WHITE MAN

Largely because subsaharan Africa and Europe spring from different historical traditions, Europeans have long believed that Africa was ahistorical prior to their arrival. As Africa's history combines oral tradition, skeletons and stones rather than the fruits of the printed pages of history books, literate men have often doubted its authenticity. Only recently has the true nature of African "pre-history" begun to come to light.

The Zimbabwe ruins of Rhodesia are perhaps the most eloquent testimony to the importance of south-central Africa's early history. Ancient stone buildings, excavations and mines sprinkle the country. A romantic accent is added through the legend that King Solomon, the Queen of Sheba and other Biblical, European and North African rulers derived great wealth from these regions. According to the legend, over $200,000 in gold might have been transported from south-central Africa to the north during this early period.¹ But the origin of the Zimbabwe ruins remains "one of the world's greatest riddles," an "irritating puzzle."²


Europeans, convinced Africans could not accomplish such a feat, have generally credited the Phoenicians as the originators of the Zimbabwe culture. Modern research, however, has confirmed it as medieval in date and Bantu-speaking African in origin. In the 1950's carbon 14 tests made at Chicago and London corroborated these findings, dating the majority of Rhodesia's Zimbabwe ruins in the eighth century. Supplementary evidence suggests strongly that the Zimbabwe builders maintained communication with the east coast of Africa and participated in a trans-Indian Ocean trade.

These early builders were of Bushmen and Hottentot ancestry. Bushmen paintings are still seen throughout Rhodesia. Portuguese, Persian and Arabian writers refer to territory currently called Rhodesia as the land of the Abutwa. Portuguese writings record communication with Bantu overlords of the Zambezi River area as early as 1600. By the nineteenth century a specific tribe, the Matabele, had established authority over Rhodesia. Having driven off a collection of tribes known as the Mashonas, the Matabele established the royal kraal at Bulawayo, later to

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3. Edwin W. Smith, *The Golden Stool: Some Aspects of the Conflict of Cultures in Modern Africa* (London, 1930), p. 45. Harris, pp. 42, 50. Harris holds that the Zimbabwe buildings could not have been a product of African negroid enterprise since no other stone works of such huge proportions are in evidence in Negro Africa.


6. Harris, op. cit., p. 32.
become an important Rhodesian city. In 1868 Umsiligazi, the chief of the Matsabeles, died, and his successor, Lobengula, had to face the full thrust of European colonialism. Lobengula would not survive the confrontation between the contrasting cultures.

Meanwhile, north of the Zambezi, the most important tribes were the Awemba of the northeastern plateau country and the Barotse nearer the river. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, when the Europeans arrived, the ruler of the Barotse was Lewanika, a chief who enjoyed the power derived from the image of his own personal perfection which he had been able to implant in the minds of his people.

In the middle of the nineteenth century Europeans first violated the sanctuary of these African tribes. In 1851 the famous missionary-explorer, David Livingstone, penetrated the continent to the Zambezi River. In 1854 the distinguished man of God, Robert Moffat, ventured briefly into Matabeleland. When he returned in 1859, he brought with him the first permanent European settlers. The group contained Moffat's son and daughter-in-law who gave birth that year to a child, reportedly the first white child born in what was to become Southern Rhodesia.

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8 Smith, White Fields, p. 37.


10 Smith, White Fields, p. 37.
Within twenty years, despite the loss of many pioneers to tropical disease and hardship, the Europeans had gained effective control of Matabeleland.\(^{11}\)

Unfortunately, not all Europeans were humanitarians like the elder Moffat. In 1866 two adventurers returned to Europe from south-central Africa full of exaggerated tales of unmined gold in Rhodesia.\(^{12}\) The desire for increased wealth, stimulated by such accounts, coupled with Henry M. Stanley’s widely reported expedition through the heart of the continent,\(^{13}\) fired the imaginations of Europeans looking for an opportunity or an excuse to escape the stratifications of European social life and the rigors and abuses of the industrialized community. As a result whites inundated Africa during the last two decades of the century. They conquered the entire continent with incredible speed. In 1876 they held less than a tenth of Africa. By 1926 barely a tenth lay beyond their rule.\(^{14}\)

Ostensibly these outlanders were driven by a civilizing zeal but, as one French writer has observed, the scramble for Africa was motivated by an admixture, one part humanitarianism and nine parts economic gain.\(^{15}\) The example of British south-central Africa lends weight to that statement. Cecil Rhodes,

\(^{11}\)Ibid., p. 74.
\(^{13}\)Smith, Golden Stool, p. 19.
\(^{14}\)Ibid., p. 23.
\(^{15}\)Ibid., pp. 24-25. Hole, p. 10.
who originated a romantically conceived imperial scheme of integrated British territory from Cape Town to Cairo, was largely responsible for the consolidation of the British position in southern Africa. His fear of the expansion of German establishments in southwest and east Africa and Portuguese settlements in Angola and Mozambique made Rhodes anxious to gain a firm hold over what came to be the Rhodesias. In 1887 he persuaded the High Commissioner at the Cape to negotiate a treaty with the Matabele chief, Lobengula, and losing little time, he sent emissaries who successfully obtained a monopoly on the minerals in Lobengula's kingdom. Known as the Rudd Concession, it led directly to the formation of the British South Africa Company (BSAC) which rapidly became the prime developer of the area. The Company, led by Rhodes, was sanctioned by a royal charter in 1889. Significantly, no formal land rights were ever granted the BSAC through the Rudd, or any other, concession.

Despite the absence of any formal permission to settle in either Mashonaland or Matabeleland, a heavily protected "Pioneer Column" of 200 colonists set out from Kimberly in 1890 and on September 12 founded Fort Salisbury in Mashonaland.

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18 Buell, I, 205-206.
19 Smith, White Fields, p. 58.
Upon its arrival the Pioneer Column raised the Union Jack, formally took possession of the area in the name of the Queen, and offered prayer. 20

In 1893 two expeditions left Salisbury and Victoria to establish farms near Bulawayo. The theft of cattle offered the whites the opportunity to invade the Matabele heartland with 670 irregulars. Lobengula had little alternative but to retreat north toward the Zambezi, evacuating his capital at Bulawayo. When the Europeans unwisely advanced too far the Africans isolated them and delivered a defeat, temporarily forcing them back to the security of Bulawayo. Lobengula, realizing the impossible odds his people faced, opposed the hostilities. However, militant leaders in his tribe, unhappy with indecisive victories and Lobengula's moderate leadership, eventually overthrew him. 21 The deposed African chief vanished into the bush to die alone, claiming that he intended to disappear like a needle in the grass rather than allow any white man to lay hands on him. Cecil Rhodes soon poured enough pioneers, money, and arms into Matabeleland and Mashonaland to wrest effective control of the area from the Africans.

On July 18, 1894 an Order-in-Council formally invested control of Mashonaland and Matabeleland in the ESAC. 22 The


21 Hawkin, p. 462.

22 The first Matabele War ended indecisively. It would require but one more such native revolt a few years later to silence the Africans for over fifty years.
following year the name "Rhodesia" was given to the area by friends of the imperialist who had guided the colony's development. By this time most of the 2,000 colonists were devoting the major part of their time to the mining and accumulation of gold.

In 1895 the abused Africans rebelled in an attempt to throw off European control of their land, cattle and labor. In March, the Matabele launched the effort, followed in June by the Mashonas. The results of the conflict were a foregone conclusion. European strength had grown so quickly that never again would the Africans be able to challenge it. By 1897 permanent peace had been enforced in the southern part of Rhodesia and native "unrest" became a thing of the past.

Northern Rhodesia's history was not so turbulent as its southern neighbor's, principally because the British Colonial Office maintained control more effective over the dependent government. Though the white administration of the northern colony was no paragon of justice, it was at least more enlightened toward the African than the policies employed in Southern Rhodesia. This was especially true on all-important racial matters where the Colonial Office took a more liberal view than did local white leadership. This situation goes a long way toward explaining why Northern Rhodesia was later able to achieve majority rule with relatively little difficulty while Southern Rhodesia exploded into a crisis of international proportions when the white minority government refused to relinquish power.
Missionaries also led the white penetration into Northern Rhodesia. Livingstone's explorations in 1852-1856, 1858-1864, and 1865-1871 took the missionary into the heart of south-central Africa. In 1878 Francois Coillard, the famous French Protestant missionary, made a trip to the Zambezi to make a preliminary survey on behalf of the French Protestant Mission. There he discovered that he had been preceded by one George Westbeech, an adventurous trader who had long been active in the area. Coillard returned in 1885 to establish a mission and build a friendship with the Barotse chief, Lewanika.

Coillard apparently realized that white domination of the African was inevitable. Convinced that the Crown was a lesser evil than white settlers within the territory, he encouraged the Africans to seek the protection of the British government. But Coillard failed to reckon with the fact that Rhodes frequently moved faster than the Crown. Acting on self-delegated authority, Rhodes dispatched an agent, Mr. F. L. Lochner, to bargain with Lewanika. Lochner deceived the chief, convincing him that a treaty with the BSAC and an alliance with the great white Queen in London were synonymous. In 1890, for a meager subsidy of only £2,000, the Company obtained control over all the mining and commercial rights in the Barotse Kingdom.23 Lewanika and his successor, Yetsa III, salvaged stronger guarantees for native rights than had the African leaders in the south, but these guarantees were neither satisfactory nor just.24

23Buell, I, 238. Smith, White Fields, pp. 41-44. Katz, p. 70.
24Buell, I, 238-239.
In Northern Rhodesia permanent white rule extended into two widely separated regions. In 1899 an Order-in-Council sanctioned the Company's administration of the western portion, while a 1900 Order-in-Council placed the eastern region under the Commissioner for Nyasaland. Finally, in 1911, they were amalgamated under the single title "Northern Rhodesia." Not until 1924 did the Crown assume control of Northern Rhodesia from the Company.

In the Rhodesias, as in much of Africa, the question of land ownership was the first important irritant between Africans and Europeans. Once the whites had gained control of the choice land, the broader problem of race relations became the vital concern. In reality, of course, ownership of the land and the race conflict were inseparable issues. European expropriation of native land increased the African's fear of the white man's power. On the other hand, the African's primitive living conditions and farming methods confirmed, in the European's mind, his belief that the African was ignorant, inferior and incapable.

In 1918 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council handed down a decision which formed for many years the legal basis for British land policy in East and Central Africa. In its judgment

25Lockhart, p. 405.

the government body rejected the argument that the Africans, being the original owners of the land, possessed all unalienated property. Asserting that the communal nature of the African land system made it impossible to determine the original and/or present native owners, the Committee stated

The estimation of the rights of aboriginal tribes is always inherently difficult. Some tribes are so low in the scale of social organization that their usage and conceptions of rights and duties are not to be reconciled with the institutions or the legal ideas of civilized society... By the will of the Crown... the old state of things whatever its exact nature, as it was before 1893, has passed away and another and... a better has been established in lieu of it. Whoever now owns the unalienated lands, the natives do not. 27

In pressing its claims, the BSAC, cited the previous concessions, holding that Lobengula had "sold his country out and out to the company." 28 Rejecting this argument, the Crown showed that the concessions themselves had included no transfer of land. The Judicial Committee had no alternative then but to name the Crown itself as the permanent owner of the unalienated lands. It denied the Company's objection that the Government had no legitimate right to land in territory never formally annexed, asserting that there were other ways to annex territory besides issuing formal proclamations.

27 Buell, I, 209-210. Hole, p. 188.
28 Buell, I, 211. The claims of the BSAC had been opposed by the white settlers themselves as early as 1906. In 1914 the BSAC was notified that simply because the Crown had vested it with administrative authority did not mean that it had also secured title to the land. It came to be an accepted fact (in London, at least) that upon the termination of Company rule the land rights would be completely in the hands of the Crown.
In effect, then, the Privy Council ignored both formal claims and thereby assured Crown control. In practice, especially in Southern Rhodesia, the decision left the Europeans in control of the land because they maintained local power. During the lengthy discussions of the problem, the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society in England suggested to the Colonial Office that Africans who could prove that they had occupied and developed the land for twenty years should be granted legitimate ownership. The Colonial Office ignored the proposal. Three years later, in 1921, the Privy Council rendered a decision on a similar case in Nigeria which took native rights into account. In this judgment it held that the Crown must respect the usufructuary land rights of the African communities. 29

The upshot of these decisions was that in east and central Africa, the native people could be legally deprived of lands they formally occupied whereas in west Africa they could not. 30 The difference in the land policies of the two areas was a fundamental reason why British native policy proved more successful in west Africa than it did in central and east Africa.

29 Ibid., I, 212. Harris, in The Chartered Millions, pointedly contended that the Africans were robbed by the BSAC which misled both the Africans and the British government. The concessions, said Harris, were worthless. He argued that the "acid test" of British post-war colonial policy would be the Crown's willingness to reopen the land question and seek to right the wrongs that had been done in Rhodesia.

30 Buell, I, 213.
A related problem was the question of native reserves. By 1894 the most valuable gold territory had been alienated to various companies and individuals. As the white immigration in the area continued, the white government in Southern Rhodesia decided to demarcate certain lands in the country to the Africans. These reserves would be closed to white settlement, with Africans allowed to live mostly under their own tribal system. What those who support a system of native reserves have failed to note in this arrangement is that the whites retained exclusive control over the larger and more valuable areas of the country. To perpetuate this system, pass laws, limiting native mobility, were instituted and have remained a restriction upon the Africans even until the present day.\(^{31}\) Indeed, since mid-century, with the steady increase in political tension in central Africa, the pass laws have been among many pieces of legislation designed to limit the freedom and activity of the African.

As early as the 1890's the first native reserves were established in Rhodesia. In 1911 a Native Affairs Committee of Inquiry, all of whose members had been in the employ of the BSAC, reported "a wide-spread feeling" that natives should not be allowed to possess land around farms occupied by Europeans.\(^{32}\) In 1913 almost a million acres were shaved off the African reserves. In the process 35,000 Africans were evicted from their homes. By 1920 the Africans in Southern Rhodesia

\(^{31}\)Ibid., 221.
\(^{32}\)Ibid., 216.
occupied a total area of about 22 million acres. Europeans had acquired approximately 31 million acres of the best land in the country. Another 43 million acres remained to be allocated. In many cases, when land passed to white settlers, the African residents had been forced, without compensation, to move from homes which they had occupied for years.33

Two contemporary events, the death of Cecil Rhodes (March 26, 1902),34 and the Boer War (1899-1902), had a profound impact on modern Rhodesian history. Prior to 1899 Rhodes had been the centripetal force in the development of the territory. His demise, and the dispatch of 5,000 Rhodesians to war, contributed to the rise of a new feeling of independence.35

Just as Rhodesia became spiritually more independent of the Cape, its whites became politically more independent of Company rule. Agitation against the continuation of the Company's control grew steadily, enhanced by the lack of capital for internal improvements and investment. In 1911 the settlers won their first round in the fight for responsible government. An Order-in-Council authorized a government for

33Ibid., 213-216. Another interesting chapter in Rhodesian legislation was the Immorality and Indecency Act, passed by the Rhodesian legislature in 1916. It prohibited white women from soliciting Africans and Africans from soliciting white men, but remained silent on the problem of white men soliciting African women.

34Lockhart, p. 491.

Rhodesia of seven elective members and five company members. Through this measure Whitehall hoped to insure continued Company control of financial matters while mollifying settler demands for adequate representation. The Rhodesians had little choice but to accept this not completely satisfactory compromise, the only other alternative being incorporation into the Union of South Africa. Of the two evils, partial representation or complete loss of nationality, the hardy and independent-minded settlers preferred the former. 36

The Privy Council decision of 1918, declaring that the land belonged to the Crown by right of conquest, gave additional impetus to the pressure for political progress. By 1920 it had become clear that the BSAC could not long continue as a governing body. In April, 1921, an investigating commission from London proposed that the Colonial Office draft a constitution which the electorate in Southern Rhodesia would approve or reject. The option would be between "responsible government" under the constitution or incorporation into South Africa. When faced with this decision, some in Rhodesia had second thoughts. The prospect of landlocked isolation plus the unpredictability of a more independent future bothered these people. Nevertheless,

36 Buell, I, 208-209. An Order-in Council in 1898 had created a Legislative Council for Southern Rhodesia and established a Resident Commissioner as a representative of the British government. The Commissioner was required to submit all acts of the Legislative Council to the Imperial High Commissioner in Cape Town (later Pretoria). In practice the Resident Commissioner found himself ranking second to the Administrator of the BSAC.
on October 27, 1922, the advocates of "responsible government" prevailed at the polls, 8,774 to 5,989.\(^{37}\) A year later Britain annexed the territory officially, the Constitution went into effect, and Sir John Chancellor became Rhodesia's first Governor and Commander-in-Chief. In April, 1924, the residents elected their first Legislative Assembly. It convened the following month and Sir Charles Coghlan, the leading politician of the territory, became the first Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia.

In Northern Rhodesia economic and political developments had taken a different turn. The 1918 Privy Council judgment did not apply to the northern territory. The Company and the Crown sidestepped ajudication by coming to direct agreement. Great Britain took over the land except for three freehold areas left to the Company. In return, for a period of forty years, the Company was to receive half of the proceeds derived from the sale of lands in Northwestern Rhodesia.\(^{38}\)

As previously noted, until 1911 Northern Rhodesia was divided into the Northwestern and Northeastern regions. The territories were never self-supporting and communication between the two was difficult. No serious lobby for self-government ever arose and a 1924 Order-in-Council, which made

\(^{37}\)Newton, et al., VIII, 667-668. Obviously, the Africans were never consulted on the matter.

\(^{38}\)Buell, I, 235-236.
Northern Rhodesia a Crown colony, seemed a normal stage of evolutionary development. A Legislative Council was established and Sir Herbert Stanley was appointed first Governor and Commander-in-Chief.39

Parenthetically, in Northern Rhodesia political developments in the 1920's were at times overshadowed by religious events. The British government became very concerned with the activities of an American religious sect among the Africans. The American Watch Tower group, based in New York, appeared first in Central Africa in 1906, in what is now Malawi. When its missionaries apparently encouraged neophyte native preachers to interpret portions of the Old Testament to mean that the Europeans were the modern Nebuchadnezzar and would be overcome, the movement came under the scrutiny of local authorities. Advocating passive resistance to British requisitions for porters during the World War brought the sect into direct conflict with local governments. In the Rhodesias at least forty were jailed for their part in such campaigns. According to at least one authority, some of their activities were incredible:

In the fall of 1925, another Watch Tower leader, proclaiming himself to be the Son of God, preached the doctrine that in order to gain eternal life man must first die. As a result of his exhortation about one hundred and seventy natives deliberately drowned themselves in a river near the Congo-Rhodesia border. This led the Congo and Rhodesian Governments

39Newton, et. al., VIII, 669-670.
to make effort to apprehend the leader who was the cause of these deaths. The Rhodesian officials finally arrested and sentenced the leader to death. The general policy of the Rhodesian Government is to tolerate the movement until its members definitely violate law and order.

By the end of the first quarter of the twentieth century, then, the two Rhodesias had emerged as British possessions. The southern colony, proud possessor of "responsible" self-government, was only nominally dependent upon the Colonial Office. Capitalizing on this weak link, the whites successfully defined "responsibility" negatively. They recognized no positive responsibility to the Rhodesian people as a whole. The Negro majority in the colony was totally disregarded in the political arena. Although the African profited economically, little was done for him in the fields of education and political advancement.

Unfortunately, the Colonial Office never perceived the magnitude of the problem, or lacked sufficient intuition to intervene in time to avoid disaster. In the far-flung British Empire Rhodesia was not a major subject of concern. Domestic politics seemed tranquil enough in that distant colony. Britain was content to let the local settlers continue their exclusive leadership. For Whitehall, refusing to act meant one less colonial headache. Even in the final months prior to Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence in November, 1965, the...
British government refused to act decisively. The fruits of neglect and vacillation have been one of the most serious crises in African history.

The story of the settlement of the two Rhodesias, typical of the white invasion of so much of Africa, presented provocative questions. How long could people professing democratic ideals hope to maintain rule by minority in the colonies? What were the prospects of genuine racial partnership in politics? Given the existing conditions of initial inequality, would genuine racial integration ever be a possibility? And ultimately, from an historical perspective, were European standards superior to African? In Southern Rhodesia subsequent events provided tentative answers to these questions.

There were, however, more tangible reasons behind these developments in Rhodesia. The consolidation of the USAC hegemony over south-central Africa roughly coincided with a dramatic change in British colonial policy. Having enjoyed a period of relatively "liberal imperialism," resulting largely from democratic and humanitarian forces unleashed by the French Revolution, Britain reverted to the old exploitation capitalism characteristic of its earliest colonial period. British policy tended to depart from its guidelines based on principles of Christian civilization. Certainly these had always been violated, but rarely had they been so completely negated by the hypocritical or negligent action of European colonists.
The BIAAC itself is a perfect example of this unfortunate development. Knowledgeable and sensitive men made great efforts to protect native rights from the BIAAC, but these attempts were, as one authority put it, "grossly ignored." Exploitation of the African became an accepted pattern of behavior. Public opinion in England, still largely under the influence of the complacent modes of thought established during the more liberal period of the colonial era, remained almost completely unaware of the changes which were occurring. With hardly a word raised in protest, the European settlers were able to secure their empire with little difficulty. Until the failure of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1963, optimistic observers in England believed an equal partnership between blacks and whites in Rhodesia was feasible. Responsible government betrayed the hope that Africa could be the one continent on which the application of experience and goodwill would prevent the development of bloody racial difficulties. In short, responsible government ushered in a grotesque era of irresponsibility.

"Progress" in Rhodesia posed difficult moral questions. What did modern medicine mean when one secured it with the land he loved and the freedom he enjoyed? What were the real benefits of modern cities to the African laborer who had to

leave his family on a native reserve for long periods of work for subsistence wages in a "bidonville" segregated from the luxury of the white establishment? What real benefit existed for an African who had been told his soul would be saved only after his family and tribe had been uprooted and his traditions demolished? Perhaps the answer to these questions is coldly impersonal. If white immigration was inevitable in Africa and no part of the world could hope to remain isolated from the sweep of technology, perhaps an uprooting of African traditions was and is necessary to catapult the continent into the twentieth century.⁴² Perhaps the Europeans in south-central Africa can be exonerated because they did not solve their difficulties with the original occupants of the land as did the Americans—by simply annihilating the opposition. But certainly exploitation and discrimination were and are not inevitable when a new civilization confronts the old. The problems dealt with in this thesis are, after all, not "native" problems in Africa. Europeans brought the "native problem" with them when they came.

CHAPTER III

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH-CENTRAL AFRICA

Between the two world wars two main themes ran through central African history: in Africa itself consolidation of their privileged position by European settlers and, on the international scale, an attempt by the major world powers to place large portions of sub-Saharan Africa under some sort of international trusteeship. Uninterested in utopian schemes, the white minorities in central and southern Africa were intent on preserving a white community in the Negro continent.

The primary occupation of those in Southern Rhodesia was the building of a nation, not Pan-African schemes. A political structure based on the British pattern had developed, but the basic problem of a satisfactory native policy remained unsolved.¹

The extraordinary success of the Rhodesian whites in consolidating their position of power was well demonstrated in 1925 when the government of Southern Rhodesia appointed a commission to conduct a "full and impartial" inquiry into the native land problem. The report of that commission is as clear a manifestation of settler thought as could be desired.² It


declared that the European farmer, considering his possessions endangered by his African neighbors whose archaic methods tended to spread disease to his crops and cattle, overwhelmingly favored segregation. Building on a supposed fear for his property, the white objected "for social reasons" to equality for the blacks. They were to be laborers who knew their place in society. The commission continued that the Africans themselves endorsed segregation because they preferred to live among their own people, doubting the white man's ability to comprehend and respect their way of life. It recommended limited contact between the two races

and a lengthy period afforded for the whole question of the future of . . . . (their) relations . . . . in an atmosphere which is freed as far as possible from the set-backs which would ensue from the irritation and conflicts arising from the constant close proximity of members of races of different habits, ideals and outlook on life.

In the commission's opinion, Europeans should possess the right to purchase land in predominately white areas, Africans to acquire farms only in or near districts heavily Negro. All Africans would thus reside in the vicinity of native reserves as desired by the white inhabitants.

White domination had become so apparent by the end of the decade that the British government could avoid the question no longer. The Hilton-Young Commission of 1927-1929, though favoring some sort of closer economic and administrative association between Southern Rhodesia and its northern neighbors, Nyassaland and Northern Rhodesia, balked at recommending
union with its extension of Southern Rhodesia's native policy to the northern colonies. 3 Significantly, however, Britain took no steps to reverse the increasingly segregationist implications in Southern Rhodesia's way of life. Moreover, Whitehall never exercised its one real authority over Southern Rhodesia, the veto power. Theoretically, it could have invalidated discriminatory legislation. 4 Some observers believe that the mere existence of this power, even though never used, acted as a moral restraint against grossly discriminatory acts, but the question is moot. The key was what constituted "grossly discriminatory" legislation.

In 1930 the Passfield Memorandum, drawn up primarily for East Africa and named after the Labor government's Colonial Secretary, reiterated the doctrine of native paramountcy, making it clear that if the interests of the Africans and those of the immigrants should come into conflict, the former should prevail. 5 It was the liberating philosophy of Livingstone reigning temporarily triumphant over the imperial view of Rhodes. The native paramountcy doctrine was indeed short lived, for the very next year a Joint Select Committee of Parliament tried to reconcile the irreconcilable by declaring, in a glittering generalization, that everybody's interests would be considered paramount. This remained the


5 The London Times, June 20, 1930.
heart of British policy toward these territories until 1951. Although, theoretically, "The control of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom must remain unimpaired," the white settlers in Southern Rhodesia were steadily increasing their power over the majority of the population.

Focusing on Passfield's work, the London Times declared that it "reasserts the purpose of British policy towards the native races of tropical Africa and the determination of the British Government to assist these backward races to develop themselves socially, politically and economically." The Times cautioned that the doctrine of native paramountcy "might have been more happily worded," and it prophetically concluded that the idea did not necessarily close any doors on the development of separate institutions for the Africans. Progressive opinion during the inter-war years was dominated by the thought that Africans should be encouraged to seek autonomy through the development of their own tribal institutions, a sort of old time separate-but-equal doctrine. Not until after the second World War did liberals come to realize that tribal society could not become the basis of modern African states. The willingness of the liberals to go along with separate

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7Leys and Pratt, p. 42.

8Ibid., p. 43.
institutional development facilitated the attempt by European settlers in Rhodesia to secure unchallengeable control.

Europeans in Africa flatly rejected the liberal ideas of Lord Passfield. The Rhodesian position was made clear with the passage, by the Legislative Assembly, of the Rhodesia Land Apportionment Act of 1931. The Act reserved for the sole use of Europeans about half the colony's land and prohibited Africans from occupying plots in the main towns.

While the white settlers were building the racial barriers ever higher, the Crown continued to flirt with the idea of a central African union. The Hilton-Young Commission led to discussion of the possibilities of close co-operation among the British protectorates of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia and the self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia. Such a plan afforded obvious benefits. At present each territory had notable deficiencies. Although the most advanced politically, Southern Rhodesia lacked mineral resources and adequate population. Northern Rhodesia also lacked an adequate labor supply to exploit her mineral wealth. On the other hand, Nyasaland, limited in arable land and possessing little beyond primitive agricultural resources, had an unemployment problem. In the 1920's copper deposits, destined to become among the largest and best in the world, were discovered in Northern

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Rhodesia. Advocates of a closer association of the territories immediately pointed out the obvious economic advantages accruing from an integration of efforts and resources. Nyasaland's people were a potential labor force for Northern Rhodesia's copper mines and Southern Rhodesia's farms and plantations. Northern Rhodesia's growing copper industry, by attracting European and American capital, promised a profitable future for both races. The political experience of Southern Rhodesia would contribute to a larger, more stable, and more responsible political entity. Thus, union portended a mutually attractive package bringing at least economic reward to everyone.\(^{11}\)

Unfortunately, federation had inherent liabilities. Because of its larger and more politically experienced white community, Southern Rhodesia would necessarily dominate any integrated government. These white segregationists believed firmly that only through political and economic supremacy could they preserve their gains. Indeed, throughout the long debate on the virtues of fusion, the settlers consistently advocated independence from Britain.\(^{12}\) England, at least partially sensitive to the predicament of the African, never gave that possibility serious consideration. The tragedy of South Africa provided eloquent testimony to the results of a policy which gave complete control to the whites. Fears that the racial policies of Southern Rhodesia might come to dominate

\(^{11}\)Easton, p. 177.

\(^{12}\)Ibid., p. 178.
the other two protectorates were borne out when Europeans flooded into Northern Rhodesia after the discovery of the rich copper deposits. Whites took the skilled jobs, leaving the rest for the Africans. Educational opportunities for the black were limited. The power structure, especially in Southern Rhodesia, took steps to freeze the present status of the "inferior" African.

The British government reflected ambivalence throughout, choosing not to interfere with these local developments but continuing with its inquiries. In 1938 the Bledisloe Commission studied further the possibility of a closer union in south-central Africa. Its lengthy report, submitted the following year, favored in principle a closer economic and political relationship but suggested strongly that the wide disparity in the political development of the three territories precluded a successful federation in the near future. The Bledisloe Commission rejected as completely unworkable the idea of total amalgamation. In effect, then, these men predicted eventual political unity but repudiated the two policies—federation and amalgamation—most likely to bring this about, without offering a third alternative. They further recommended that Whitehall accept this nebulous statement as its official policy.


14Ibid., II, 1271.

15Ibid., II, 1269-1270.
Doubtless a policy statement was a desirable first step toward meeting the crisis then developing in central Africa, but the Hledisloe Report lacked the proper force to qualify. Nothing ever came of the report because World War II intervened.16

Token African progress in Southern Rhodesia, such as mildly improved economic and social conditions, convinced the British that the whites in Africa were progressing toward the creation of *bona fide* democracy. The truth, however, was something else. The white settlers became increasingly apprehensive of both their own eventual political inferiority and black reprisals if the Africans attained equality. They had no intention of letting this happen.

After World War II Britain became deeply concerned with South Africa's *apartheid* policies. Fearing that this facsimile was spreading northward to the Rhodesias, Britain began to soften its position on union. Whitehall reasoned that a central African federation would give London a more powerful voice to insure liberal attitudes toward the Africans. Certainly creeping *apartheid* threatened to take over one colony after another unless the restraining influence of Britain could be imposed on the threatened territories. In the spring of 1951 it took a decisive step toward federation at a London Conference. The delegates recommended the integration of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland into an entity to be called British

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16 Leys and Pratt, p. 10
Central Africa.\textsuperscript{17} The policy of proposed "partnership," it declared, was necessary for compelling economic, strategic, administrative, moral and social reasons.\textsuperscript{18}

Besides those Africans educated enough to comprehend the political complexities, liberals in England realized that any federation without African support would be doomed to failure. Labor had always been quick to attack the Conservatives for supporting the privileged status of the white settler in Africa, especially after the Tories came to power late in 1951.\textsuperscript{19}

Laborites argued that provisions would insure an increasingly expanding political role to the black majority and must be incorporated into the constitution of the new federation.\textsuperscript{20} They further warned of the apprehensiveness among the Africans that they were being handed over to a white dictatorship. An experiment in partnership, opened in hope and in haste, might well conclude in a tragedy of bitterness and despair.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{17}Mansergh, \textit{Documents, 1931-1952}, II, 1278.

\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., II, 1274-1275. "Extracts From the Report of the Conference on Closer Association Held in London in March, 1951." The delegates were very much concerned with the economic implications of a closer association. They reported, "If economic policy can be effectively integrated and such economic barriers as exist between the territories can be broken down, the task of developing Central Africa as a whole will be very much eased. In external economic relations Central Africa operating as a single unit would be more effective than the three territories operating singly."

\textsuperscript{19}Easton, p. 180.

\textsuperscript{20}\textit{Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons)} (Fifth series) DXV (May 6, 1953), 419-420.

\textsuperscript{21}Ibid., pp. 449-453.
Undeterred, Britain officially established the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyassaland on August 1, 1953. Overwhelmingly opposed by the Africans, it stimulated their political consciousness by providing a target for their hostility. The attempt at "partnership" utterly failed to reconcile the two races. The inherent weakness of the Federation was its predication on a relatively minor consideration—the economic viability of an integrated central Africa. The failure to recognize that the major problems besetting the area were political questions springing from the deeper conflicts between the ruling white minority and the prostrate Negro majority doomed the experiment from the beginning.

If that were not enough, federation had to compete with a rival force in Africa—freedom from white control. The example of Ghana in 1957, the extension of autonomy to the former French territories, and the progress toward independence of many of the British possessions in Africa made Africans within the Federation unhappy with anything but complete self-government. Early in 1959 the Federation witnessed the inevitable, a series of riots, particularly bloody in Nyassaland.

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23Africans in Southern Rhodesia tended to support the Federation much more than their northern neighbors simply because they anticipated that federation would lead to a liberalization of Southern Rhodesia's native policy. They were wrong.

24Easton, p. 194.
The British Government immediately appointed a four-man Commission of Inquiry, headed by Sir Patrick Devlin. In its report the Devlin Commission held that the success of the Federation depended upon drastic changes in the racial policies of Southern Rhodesia. \(^\text{25}\) Reflecting its awareness of the grievances of the natives, it noted:

Federation means the domination of Southern Rhodesia; the domination of Southern Rhodesia means the domination of the settler; the domination of the settler means the perpetuation of racial inferiority and of the threat to the African's land. \(^\text{26}\)

The Conservative Government responded most ambivalently to the Devlin inquiry. It espoused the portions of the report which it found satisfactory and ignored the rest. When it refused to implement the suggestions of the Devlin report, the Crown forfeited its last opportunity to gain the confidence of the Africans in the Federation. \(^\text{27}\)

A contemporary article entitled "The Choice for Africa—Implications of the Devlin Report," appearing in *Round Table*, a highly respected British periodical on colonial affairs, presented the conservative case. In an excellent book concerning the demise of European colonialism Stewart C. Easton


\(^{26}\) Ibid., p. 139.

\(^{27}\) Easton, p. 195.

strongly criticized this viewpoint. He contended that the article had a "slightly condescending" tone "customary in British literature on the subject." Easton added that defense of the government was based on the typical British assumption that the European alone has the right to determine what is good for the African. At the heart of the problem was the inescapable fact that most Europeans believed the African to be intellectually inferior. In the white mind the illiterate African could not think, but his literate brother, precisely because he could think, was held politically dangerous. This situation was analogous to attitudes in the American South, where the segregationist white had equal contempt for the illiterate fieldhand, who he considered an intellectual inferior and the fieldhand's college-educated brother who was considered dangerous because he obviously was not intellectually inferior. As Easton described this popular British view of the educated African, "He is a black nationalist or racist and he does not have the good of his people at heart."

Whether this view was widely held in Britain, it certainly prevailed among Europeans in central Africa. To disguise these attitudes, they and their defenders in Great Britain stressed the Federation's economic benefits to the black as well as to themselves. But more and more, on both sides of the racial

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29 Easton, pp. 517-521.
barrier, closed societies became the natural response to liberal challenges. In 1958, for example, Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister Garfield Todd attempted a token liberalization of the franchise laws only to be faced with rebellion and eventual removal from office by his own United Federal Party.30 Looking at the obvious failure of "partnership" and the growth of closed societies, the Listener lamented that the Federation had been advertised to the world as a test case of human values in a situation so torn by turmoil and prejudice that the values had precious little chance of success.31

Not until 1960 did the Conservative Government in Britain jettison its support to white regimes in south-central Africa, a reversal termed "a characteristic Conservative policy change, a calculated surrender of traditional attitudes to political realism."32 In February Prime Minister Harold MacMillan clarified the new policy in a speech to both Houses of the South Africa Parliament at Capetown. He condemned the racial policies of South Africa, declaring the British Government's attitude toward those African territories for which they still had responsibility to be

not only to raise the material standards of life, but to create a society which respects the rights of individuals—a society in which men are given the opportunity to grow to their full stature, and that

must, in our view, include the opportunity to have an increasing share in political power and responsibility; a society in which individual merit, and individual merit alone, is the criterion for a man's advancement whether political or economic.33

This was the great turning point. MacMillan was heard in silence. After the speech South African Prime Minister Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd pointed out that his country saw itself as an important part of the western world—"a true white state in Southern Africa with a possibility of granting a full future to the black man in our midst." Verwoerd's statement summarized the attitude of all white minority governments south of the Zambezi and the pivotal words "possibility" and "future" were almost unanimously considered remote and distant. They refused to heed MacMillan's prophetic words, "The wind of change is blowing through the continent," even when that wind later came to batter at their very shutters.

The white inhabitants of the Federation received another shock in 1960 with the publication of the Monckton Commission Report.34 Appointed in 1959 over the Labor Opposition's refusal to nominate its candidates because it wanted the terms of reference to mention explicitly the possibility of dismantling the Federation, the Commission recommended an increase in the number of African seats in the Federal Assembly. An eventual common voting roll for both Europeans and Africans, the elimination of racial discrimination (especially in Southern

Rhodesia) by appropriate legislation, passage of a Bill of Rights to protect collective rights and prevent discrimination, and a right of secession to be allowed upon request, particularly after a territory had reached a particular stage of constitutional development, were also suggested. The Commission termed the dislike for the Federation among the Africans of the two northern territories as "almost pathological." Finally, the commissioners warned the government of Southern Rhodesia that change in Central Africa was "moving like an avalanche."

The reaction among the settlers in Africa was predictable. In December, just before the opening of a London Review Conference on Central Africa, Sir Malcolm Barrow, Kenya’s Minister of Home Affairs, played on Western fears of communist subversion by claiming the red flag would be flying from the Cape to Cairo within a decade if the Federation were dissolved. Apparently lumping all potential enemies together and not bothering to distinguish between fascism and communism, he claimed, "all the so-called African nationalist leaders are would-be dictators and are in fact Fascists, and Fascist methods and Fascist objectives, /sic/." He saw an African Munich if Britain acceded to the demands of African nationalists. Sir Roy Welensky, the Federation’s Prime Minister, probably came closer to reflecting settler frustration with the new British

position and the increasing influence of African leaders when he returned from London and uttered a classic statement, "Africa stinks—let's face it."  

In May, 1961, the Economist sneered at Southern Rhodesian promises to reform. "The apartheid (there) is soft and has icing," but it was no less real than that in South Africa.  

Two months later that same periodical predicted that Britain's "troika" for central Africa could not be expected to survive much longer. By 1962 even conservative British opinion held out little hope for a continued Federation.  

In the meantime African nationalist leaders within the Federation brought their appeals for support to the international level. Early in 1962 Joshua Nkomo, president of the Southern Rhodesian African nationalist Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), spoke before the United Nations Special Committee of Seventeen on Colonialism, largely in the hope of pressing the British Government into a reappraisal of its responsibilities in central Africa. In June, 1962, the United Nations passed a resolution urging Great Britain to reassert

36 Ibid., December 22, 1960.  
38 "Rhodesian Troika," Economist, CC (July 1, 1961), 15-17.  
40 "Zimbabwe" is the name African nationalists plan to use in place of Southern Rhodesia when the country attains African majority rule. Nyasaland became independent Malawi in July, 1964. Northern Rhodesia became independent Zambia in October of that year.
control over the white minority government of Southern Rhodesia. Britain did nothing. Nkomo returned to Rhodesia, apparently convinced his United Nations mandate meant something there. When he declared that he intended to deal only with the British and not the white Rhodesian officials, Sir Edgar Whitehead, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, responded by banning ZAPU and restricting over 1,000 of its members.41

The long anticipated climax finally came in December, 1963, when the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland dissolved. Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, under the guidance of African nationalist leaders Kenneth Kaunda and Dr. Hastings Banda respectively, began the hard work of twentieth century nation building as they looked forward to promised independence. The European leaders in Southern Rhodesia, however, withdrew to their own fortress of privilege, ready apparently to defy the world.

To conclude this chapter without a closer look at the central African role in international trade and politics during the inter-war years would be to neglect one of the most important and interesting facets of its history. The Great War, by undermining several colonial empires, provided impetus to the doctrine of self-determination. At the Paris Peace Conference the most significant development for Africa as a whole was, of course, the establishment of mandated territories under the League of Nations. Germany renounced

41 Carter, p. 378.
all her rights over foreign possessions. Her former African colonies became Class B mandates over which Belgium, England and France assumed control.\(^4\)\(^2\) In the settlement of colonial affairs the welfare of the native populations was to be the primary consideration. The interests of the outside world were theoretically relegated to second place.\(^4\)\(^3\) The post-war settlement was, at least in part, a reflection of a half-century of European diplomacy aimed at "preventing the friction generated by the partition of Africa from bursting into the flames of a European war."\(^4\)\(^4\) International interest in subsaharan Africa had been intense during the inter-war period.\(^4\)\(^5\)

During the 1930's European powers saw Africa as potentially offering significant trade outlets and a splendid opportunity to divert the German war machine to purposes of peaceful development.

The peace settlement did not directly affect British central and southern Africa. However, schemes soon developed to expand international co-operate activity in the continent beyond joint action against the slave trade, tropical diseases, and the liquor traffic. The British possessions would necessarily be included in any overall political entity in Africa. The most


\(^4\)\(^4\)Ibid., p. 193.

\(^4\)\(^5\)Ibid., p. 279.
popular theme called for a huge African trusteeship to be administered under League supervision. Individual nations would retain their mandates and possessions within the larger unit but League guidance would, hopefully, assure uniformity of law, equality of trade and, most importantly, protection of native rights. The creation of a trusteeship along these lines would serve as a two-sided buffer, discouraging collisions among European powers over their African claims and ensuring European supremacy against premature and irresponsible African nationalist movements.

This new international interest in Africa took form as early as the 1920's. In 1924 a German writer revealed the conviction that conflicts would arise over Africa which would lead to "altogether new national affiliations." Even in America some observers took note of the potential importance of Africa. In 1928 the "dark" continent was described as "the dark horse, the unappreciated contender for some first place among the continents." Usually these American observers were little interested in Africa for Africa's sake, but rather in what Africa could provide for the benefit of

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their own country. Some even feared that a developed Africa would provide such fierce competition that it would erode America's coveted prestige. Fierce nationalist rivalries among the European powers prevented any of these schemes from coming into effect.

One such rivalry deserves closer scrutiny as a fascinating game of international politics in which British interests in Central Africa played a prominent part. The Benguela Railway, running from Lobito Bay in Portuguese Angola across the Congo into Katanga, was constructed by a company controlled by a British corporation, Tanganyika Concessions Ltd. Some 800 kilometers of the railway ran through Belgian territory and 1,300 kilometers were in Portuguese-owned lands. In 1914 the Tanganyika Company carried on negotiations with Germany, probably with the idea in mind of granting the Germans a financial stake in the Benguela enterprise. At about the same time the British and German governments drafted a secret convention which divided the Portuguese colonies into spheres of influence, with northern portions of Mozambique and Angola to go under German control and the southern half to fall under British protection. The agreement provided that in the event the Portuguese government did not adequately protect German or British interests in their territories the latter two countries would take such measures as were deemed necessary to assure the protection of these interests in their respective sphere of influence. World War I killed the scheme but not until

Portugal had become aware of British cunning in central Africa. Whether Britain intended to use the plan to bait Portugal into a confrontation which could lead to the expulsion of Portugal from central and southern Africa is impossible to determine. The evidence cited here would seem to indicate that this was the case. Certainly in later years Rhodesian demands for some sort of British control over the key port of Beira in Mozambique did nothing to diminish Portuguese suspicions.

During the 1930's schemes for an international trusteeship in Africa evolved toward the more expedient idea of appeasing German demands for restoration of her colonies. In 1937 the American Ambassador to France, William C. Bullitt, reported to the State Department on a long talk he had had with the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Yvon Delbos. Delbos had in mind an African project so secret that he had discussed it with only one other man, Léon Blum, President of the French Council of Ministers. Delbos felt that it was "unfair to Germany to ask her to stop arming and to turn her factories to peaceful purposes unless the nations of the world are prepared to give her outlets for her products of peace." Specifically, he had in mind consortiums to develop sections of

51 Albert Guérard, "The Next War and How to Nip It," Scribner's Magazine, LXXXI (April, 1927), 396-400. Guérard advanced the proposal that Britain and France match mile for mile what they expect Portugal and Belgium to jettison in order to create "a very handsome mass . . . to satisfy Italy and Germany." He termed it "the City Planning Ideal" on a continental scale.

Africa. Since Germany would not have the capital to finance her part of an international consortium, he proposed instead that the Reich provide the machinery to be used in African development projects. The money could be found in France, England and the United States, if the latter could somehow be induced to take part. The next step would be to form the African consortiums by placing all the African colonies (except French North Africa and British South Africa) into a "common pot." British, French, Belgian, Portuguese and German colonies would be developed by international groups bound to rely largely on the use of German products. Delbos saw this as the only possible method of inducing Germany to retreat from preparations for war. He believed that enough fruitful challenge existed in Africa to consume the energies of the entire civilized world for at least half a century. It was the only hope of turning the manufacturing genius of Germany from war to peace. At the conclusion of the meeting Bullitt informed Delbos that his ideas were in line with the thinking which had gone on in Washington on the subject. However, it is very doubtful that such thinking at all had been done on the subject on the west side of the Atlantic. At any rate, neither pushed the plan further before war intervened.

This foreign interest in the trade potential of south-central Africa also took other forms. The depression accentuated the need for a closer economic relationship, particularly to members of the United Kingdom. In July, 1932, at the Imperial
Economic Conference held in the Canadian capital city, the United Kingdom negotiated several trade agreements with other members of the Empire. Although there were conflicting opinions on the better course to follow, the men in control of these negotiations wanted trade within the empire to be more exclusive. This meant particularly that normally American commerce would be diverted to imperial channels. Great Britain guaranteed continued free entry for Dominion natural products, while the Dominions granted preferential treatment to British manufacturers. Twelve trade agreements were signed, including one between Britain and Southern Rhodesia.

This trend toward economic nationalism, of which the United States was by no means guiltless, spelled an economic setback for the Americans. The U. S. Department of Commerce estimated that about 180 million dollars' worth of exports would be affected in some measure by the Ottawa Agreement. The Economist revealed duty-free American imports into Britain had stood at around seventy percent of the total in 1930 and would probably be near twenty percent when the Ottawa Agreement took effect. However, the British duties proved to be relatively low. Nevertheless, the United States government continued to be concerned by what it considered extreme imperial preferences.

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54 Southern Rhodesia did not have Dominion status, but this distinction was not made at the Ottawa Conference.

The Americans contended that world-wide economic liberalism, with a progressive reduction of trade barriers, was the only alternative to "cut-throat, trouble-breeding, trade methods and a wild, run-away race in military armaments." 56

Through all these economic schemes and proposed development projects for central Africa runs a single connecting thread. Despite the noble words about the necessity of making African welfare the paramount interest, in actual fact European leaders and promoters had other ends in mind. Even Delbos' scheme grew more out of the desire to maintain peace in Europe than from any concern for the progress of the Africans themselves. The Ottawa negotiators certainly did not spend a great deal of time agonizing over the economic plight of the African in Rhodesia.

Significantly however, whether the white considered the native or not, the first half of the twentieth century saw the destruction of that "indefinable entity known as the white man's prestige." 57 The white powers were no longer able to treat most of the rest of the world as vassals. The Russo-Japanese War, characterized partially by naval victories of the Oriental at the expense of the Slavic power, launched the new era. World War I, by encouraging colonial nationalism through the agent of self-determination, gave it additional

force. The Japanese assault in the Pacific, with their appeal of Asia for the Asians, completed the undoing of what had been a fundamental premise in world politics. Suddenly it became clear that the real issue had never been a conflict between whites and non-whites or, more nakedly, between supposed superiors and inferiors. The real issue was a conflict between empire and colony on the question of independence. It was this conflict which led to the disintegration of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Finally, it was on this issue that in November, 1965, Rhodesia declared its independence unilaterally. In an overwhelmingly non-white continent a white oligarchy declared independence from a white government! In so doing the "cowboy" regime in Rhodesia unwittingly removed itself from the arena of empire and colony and into the much more dangerous sphere of race and the issue of color. The comparatively unimportant problem of independence was no more; Rhodesia had seen to that. But now the infinitely more complex and volatile question of human dignity could no longer be avoided. In their former status, after reasonable reform, there was hope for survival. The decision not to accept rational change slammed shut the last door of compromise and invited disaster.

_ibid., p. 27._
CHAPTER IV
RHODESIA'S REBELLION

On October 10, 1965, the British weekly, The Observer, printed a prescient cartoon depicting the grim Oliveira Salazar and Hendrik Verwoerd seated precariously atop kegs of gunpowder as a smugly confident Ian Smith approached them holding aloft the flaming torch of independence. A month later Rhodesia unilaterally declared independence from the United Kingdom. By this act the white minority government in Rhodesia drew a "symbolic Battline" across Africa.1

Instructive are the policy choices open to Britain between the dissolution of the Federation in 1963 and the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in the fall of 1965 and internal reaction to the worsening situation in central Africa.

After 1963 Whitehall had three possible courses of action. It could acquiesce, suspend the 1961 Rhodesian constitution and summon a conference to broaden the country's franchise, or lend strong support to liberal opinion in Rhodesia while extending various economic and political bribes in return for internal political reform. The Labor government's slim majority in Parliament, public sentiment in England, and assurance that any invasion would be met by Rhodesia's capable armed forces, precluded serious consideration of military sanctions. The

first two of these factors also prevented the most necessary of the options, the measure looking toward majority rule. The 1961 constitution (which was voted on in 1961 and came into effect in December, 1962) for the first time allowed some degree of African representation in the Rhodesian Legislative Assembly.\(^2\) The British government saw this as a reassuring sign of a liberalizing trend. In 1962 the Rhodesian authorities went to great lengths to publicize the fact that they intended to abolish all racially discriminatory legislation of a non-political nature. By the new constitution their thirty member Legislative Assembly was increased to sixty-five members, fifteen of whom were to be elected by the lower, or predominately African, of two complicated voting rolls. The Rhodesian government hailed this as proof that African progress, even of a political nature, was real in Rhodesia. The white leaders later consistently argued that they conformed with British and international demands in principle, but that the world, unfamiliar with the "native problem" in Rhodesia, was utterly unrealistic in its conception of the pace at which these reforms should be accomplished.

Even at the time these minor concessions should have been seen as a subterfuge to make it appear that political partnership in Rhodesia was possible. Undoubtedly some Rhodesian whites sincerely favored an evolutionary solution to the problem.  

The majority, however, endorsed the more "liberal" proposals as a new method of ensuring white political dominance while, at the same time, parrying criticism. The best evidence of this is the non-applicability of the Declaration of Rights in the new constitution to pre-existing discriminatory laws, including the famed Land Apportionment Act and the security legislation which so limited the activities of the Africans. Moreover, the white government at any time could suspend the Declaration of Rights by declaring a "public emergency." Not content with these safeguards, the whites moved steadily toward monolithic political activity which reflected a powerful rightist influence.

On December 14, 1962, the rightist organization, the Rhodesian Front Party, upended the relatively moderate government of Sir Edgar Whitehead, and Winston J. Field became the new prime minister. Initially opinion in Great Britain supported the verdict. Most believed that Field, supposedly a reputable man, would prove to be responsible even though his earlier career suggested strongly that he unequivocally

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supported white political control. Once in power, the new prime minister remained consistent with his past by denouncing concessions to the Africans and openly stressing the possibility of independence from Britain. The Economist viewed the situation as "depressing," commenting that "the most optimistic view must be that widespread bloodshed in the coming few years will be avoided. But the mess will remain on Britain's doorstep."

As the chasm between the two races widened, the Africans increased the tempo of their demands for equality while the whites became more reluctant to offer meaningful concessions. To the latter, African impatience with evolutionary progress was evidence that they were not ready for or able to handle the new responsibilities and rights already granted. Deputy Prime Minister Ian Smith summed it up in London in 1963 when he said, "The vast bulk of Africans are quite inarticulate. They just don't know what is going on." While true, the statement overlooked the more significant fact that the minority of Africans, those individuals who were articulate and knew what was "going on," opposed the white government and were considered subversive by it.

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5 "Front Against the Tide," Economist, CCVI (February 16, 1963), 589. Nielson, p. 41.

The economic slump resulting from the collapse of the Federation complicated further the racial situation in Rhodesia. Union had obviously favored Southern Rhodesia economically, permitting it to use Northern Rhodesia's favorable trade balance in the pursuit of its own development. After 1963, however, Southern Rhodesian exports dropped, unemployment increased, the debt burden mounted, and relatively large numbers of whites left the colony. The Rhodesian whites who remained, frustrated by this economic pressure and the increased political tension, retaliated with reactionary resistance to all control and change.

On April 13, 1964, the militant rightists in the Rhodesian Front forced Winston Field, now too moderate for their inclinations, to resign, and replaced him with Ian Douglas Smith the 45-year-old Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Treasury. On the following day Smith reshuffled the 11-member cabinet, changing every ministerial post except one. The prime minister himself assumed control of the External Affairs and Defense portfolios. Two days later he arrested and placed

8 Nielsen, p. 42.
9 Ian Smith had distinguished himself as a former Royal Air Force pilot. He entered politics in 1948 and was a founder vice-president of the Rhodesian Front in 1961.
under detention the country's most important African nationalist leaders. Mass demonstrations and riots by Africans led to the arrest of some 300 in less than a week.

The absence of a cohesive African nationalist movement thwarted sympathetic liberals. Large demonstrations and protests, poorly organized and directed, accomplished little. The African cause was split over support for Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), and the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole's more moderate Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). In August, 1963, Sithole and the intellectual faction of ZAPU had broken away to form ZANU which subsequently had its greatest success in the African labor movement. Nkomo was arrested three days after the Smith regime came to power. The white authorities arrested Sithole shortly thereafter, charging him with making seditious statements and publishing subversive documents. This joint incarceration prompted the London Times to suggest that it might inadvertently lead to reconciliation between the rival elements.\textsuperscript{11} A few days later the influential Economist voiced the same opinion.\textsuperscript{12} However, the black nationalists could not compose their differences, a weakness that assured continued white supremacy. Until such time as the divisive tribalism, disunity, and mediocre leadership within the nationalist movement are overcome, the government will


\textsuperscript{12}"Making a Bosh of It," \textit{Economist}, CXI (June 27, 1964), 1456.
not have to concern itself with a significant organized political threat representing the majority of the population.

The detention of Nkomo produced another internal crisis in June when the white Bulawayo High Court ruled that his confinement was illegal. While the unhappy Smith government planned to appeal the judgment, false reports spread that Nkomo had been released. Amidst the resulting jubilant demonstrations, at least one African was fatally shot.13

Between July 8-15 eighteen prime ministers met in London for the thirteenth post-war Commonwealth Conference. Rhodesia, though not invited to the meeting, was the primary issue.14 The Conference supported the British position that "the existence of sufficiently representative institutions would be a condition of the grant of independence to Southern Rhodesia."15 In any case, it would recognize no unilateral declaration; constitutionally, as the guardian of Rhodesian external affairs, only the British Parliament could grant independence. In the meantime, Prime Minister Smith told a press conference in Salisbury that he hoped by the end of the year Southern Rhodesia would have independence through negotiations.16

In September Prime Minister Smith traveled to London for four days of talks with the British leader, Sir Alec Douglas-Home. The political pressures on both shaped the resulting compromise. Britain promised and Smith accepted Rhodesian independence when there was satisfactory evidence that it was "acceptable to the people of the country as a whole." Although the arrangement left unanswered the criteria to determine mass support, Smith returned to Salisbury confident that his plan for independence could be realized by Christmas.

In October a narrow Labor victory in England brought Prime Minister Harold Wilson into office with a promise of "The New Britain," including a Labor Government which would "legislate against racial discriminations," and pursue a tougher policy toward white minority regimes in the colonies. Smith declined Wilson's invitation to discuss independence with him in London, preferring instead to wait until after the referendum on the issue in Rhodesia. He counted on the Rhodesian voters' giving him stronger bargaining power in any talks with the new British Prime Minister. To strengthen his position further, Smith sought to demonstrate that the Africans themselves approved the new Rhodesian government. On October 26, after a week of secret deliberations, African chiefs and headmen, in the pay of white Rhodesian authorities, declared their

\[17\]Ibid., September 12, 1964.
\[18\]Ibid., September 12, 1964.
unanimous support of independence under the Smith government and the 1961 constitution. Although both Great Britain and the United States refused to send observers, delegations from six European nations plus New Zealand, Australia and South Africa witnessed the African testimonials in favor of the status quo. Whitehall responded to these actions of Smith's "cowboy" regime by warning the voters of Rhodesia about the severe consequences of UDI, a position endorsed by the United States Government.

In November Smith continued to strengthen his "mandate." In a national referendum on the 6th, testing the electorate's desires for independence, he secured an expected smashing victory. Ninety percent of those who voted endorsed the Smith approach. Two factors account for the nearly unanimous support for independence. The great majority of Africans could not vote under existing franchise laws and those who could boycotted the election at the urging of their African nationalist leaders. Smith insisted that his November mandate would not precipitate any unilateral action, but feeling in Britain was strong that at some future time he would use this vote of confidence to underwrite Rhodesian independence.

In general sympathy among the British for their kith and kin in Rhodesia influenced considerably Wilson's policy

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21 Ibid., November 9, 1964.
toward the Smith government. A nationwide sampling of public sentiment in Britain in the summer of 1964 indicated that 43 per cent of those interviewed favored full recognition of Rhodesia if the colony declared itself independent without the consent of the British Parliament. When asked, "In these circumstances (UDI) do you think Britain should or should not apply economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia?" 44 per cent said that Britain should not employ economic sanctions, and only 12 per cent expressed approval of such action. A mere 6 per cent thought Britain should send in troops to put down the rebellion. 22 If these figures reflect British sympathies even broadly, they suggest strongly why the British government vacillated in its policy toward Rhodesia. Military intervention could not be seriously considered because the nation as a whole would never support it. In fact, it appeared that the opinion of the British people on Rhodesia was so divided that any policy the government adopted—from full recognition to military intervention—would have had difficulty securing the support of the majority of the people at home. Undoubtedly the Rhodesian government was aware of this, and could guess that economic sanctions would be the most severe penalty that Britain could levy in the event of UDI.

With Labor's hands thus tied for the present, the Smith government, during the winter of '64-'65, stiffened security

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legislation and censorship. It made the mere possession of a bomb punishable by death, illegal possession of weapons other than a bomb punishable by up to twenty years in prison. It banned opposition newspapers, replaced certain BBC news broadcasts with those of the more reliable Radio South Africa and prohibited pro-African publications.\(^\text{23}\)

In another attempt to reconcile differences, Wilson sent the Commonwealth Secretary, Arthur Bottomley, and the Lord Chancellor, Lord Gardiner, to Rhodesia in February, 1965. In their effort to measure attitudes of a cross-section of Rhodesian society, they talked with Smith and members of his cabinet, former prime ministers, Lord Malvern and Sir Edgar Whitehead, former Federal Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky, and African nationalist leaders, many of whom were under detention. At the end of his ten-day visit Bottomley rejected any contemplated unilateral declaration, but denounced also any British military intervention in the colony on behalf of the Africans. A supporter of majority rule, he stated nevertheless that Britain proposed not to dictate how or when it would come. To do so would be to violate the convention that "Parliament 'does not legislate on matters within the competence of the Assembly of Rhodesia, except with the agreement of the Rhodesian government.'"\(^\text{24}\)


Bottomley's remarks were typically political and ambivalent, leaving the initiative regarding further action clearly with the Rhodesian government.

In April verbal pressure from London increased slightly. On the 29th, Prime Minister Harold Wilson, speaking in the House of Commons, cautioned Rhodesia against defying the world with UDI. Both opposition leaders, the Conservative Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Liberal Jo Grimmond, seconded Wilson's warning. The Prime Minister's remarks were in response to a Rhodesian white paper detailing how the nation's economy could survive a British economic blockade. Wilson emphasized that the entire Commonwealth had approved economic warfare as early as the previous October and that Rhodesia could expect to face almost unanimous international opposition in the event of UDI. However, the British leaders did not seem to realize fully that their public threats did little more than allow the Rhodesians time to prepare counter-measures.

Early in May Rhodesian confidence in the policies of the Smith government was reflected in his party's overwhelming victory in the general elections for the new Legislative Assembly. During the same month ZANU's President Sithole finished one term in jail only to be placed under a new

25Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons) (Fifth series) DCCXI (April 29, 1965), 637-641.


27"Who's Bluffing?", Spectator, CCXIV (May 7, 1965), 587.
detention order for five years. But the African nationalist movement grew in spite of the arrests which curtailed the activities of its leaders. In fact, the restrictions served to create a new militancy which extended far beyond Rhodesia's borders. ZAPU Treasurer Jason Z. Moyo, arriving late in May in Dar es Salaam from the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization conference in Ghana, said that AAPSO must assist in the fight against imperialism by providing arms for the struggles in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), Angola, and Viet Nam. In June ZAPU published a statement directed at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London asserting that the Rhodesian Africans might soon resort to violence to secure their rights.

The prospect of an imminent UDI plagued Britain through the late summer and into the fall of 1965. Knowing that the element of surprise was his ally, Smith utilized it astutely. Late in July Salisbury announced the appointment of Harry Reedman, former Minister of Immigration and Tourism, as Rhodesia's "diplomatic representative" to Lisbon. Some observers in London contended that if Portugal received Reedman in that

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capacity, Britain had no alternative but to suspend diplomatic relations with Salazar's government and to take action against Rhodesia. In a public statement, meanwhile, Bottomley had said that cooperation by the blacks in the May elections would have averted the contemporary crisis. Smith, for his part, threatened that independence was "imminent." Early in September the Rhodesian Minister of Defense and External Affairs (Clifford Dupont) made it known that his country planned to send diplomatic representatives to any countries that would accept them.

With Reedman's position in Lisbon still undefined, the London Observer of September 12 predicted for that very day the recognition of Reedman as an official ambassador and the reality of UDI. A combination of factors had made the time ripe, reasoned the Observer. The Indo-Pakistani war had stymied the Commonwealth, the United Nations financial crisis had momentarily overtaken the world body, its slim majority in Parliament inhibited the Wilson government, and a confident Rhodesia, having just completed the bulk of its tobacco sales for the year, stood ready to challenge British economic reprisals. Rational though this analysis was, Smith still refused to make the predicted move. But he became no more cooperative, as attested by the fruitless exchange with Prime Minister Wilson in London at the end of the first week in October. After the meeting Smith was quoted as stating, "Having considered all

the problems most carefully, in the end we (Rhodesian Government), came to the conclusion that if we have to go down...

... we would rather go fighting than go out crawling on our hands and knees."  

In his opinion, talk of an African majority government for any time within the next fifty years was unrealistic. It was the old question of principle and pace all over again. He had seen "civilization go out the window" in African countries ruled by black majorities and he did not intend to see the same thing happen in Rhodesia.

Incredible as it may seem, Smith had gone as far left as he dared to go. Evidence suggested that the powerful right wing of the Rhodesian Front suspected that the Prime Minister, like his predecessors, was "going soft" on the Africans. Pressure was building to oust Smith unless he produced independence by the end of the year. Time was growing short.

When Smith returned to Salisbury from the London talks he was greeted at the airport by a demonstration of over 1,000 whites chanting support for UDI. With the increasing initiative of the movement toward independence came a commensurate

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33London Observer, August 8, 1965. On October 10 the Observer began a long analysis with these strong words, "Britain may yet come to regret the fact that her leaders were yesterday too timid to order the detention of Rhodesia's Prime Minister... and to send troops into Rhodesia to support the Governor in resisting the proclaimed intention of Mr. Ian Smith's Colonial Government to commit a plain act of treason."

34Africa Report, XI (December, 1965), p. 27.
growth of repressive measures. On October 18, former Prime
Minister (1953-1958) Garfield Todd was arrested as he prepared
to board a plane for England where he planned to participate
in a "teach-in" on Rhodesia. He was restricted to Rhodesia
for a year because of alleged illegal association with African
nationalist groups.\(^{35}\) On that same day Smith refused to receive
a delegation of Commonwealth prime ministers.

In a final effort to avoid disaster, Wilson, accompanied
by Bottomley, flew to Salisbury on October 25. By October 30
the two prime ministers had agreed in principle to establish
a three-member Royal Commission to study the problem of inde-
pendence. Mr. Wilson left for London reiterating his position
that all of the Rhodesian people must be consulted on the vital
issue, and declaring that Britain reserved its freedom of action
in the event of disagreements over or within the Royal Commission.

On November 5, Smith declared a nationwide state of emer-
gency, allegedly to head off subversive activities by African
nationalist saboteurs. On the following day he charged that
Wilson merely hoped to use the proposed Royal Commission to
enhance his own position on the problem. In reply Wilson
suggested another meeting at a symbolic half-way point, such

\(^{35}\)Manchester Guardian Weekly, October 21, 1965. Todd
had notified Smith, as a matter of courtesy, of his plans to
go to Edinburgh to participate in a teach-in on Rhodesia.
Upon Todd's arrest, his daughter, Judith, flew from New York
to substitute for her father. She urged Britain to seize the
initiative from Rhodesia, to suspend the constitution and to
use force if necessary to bring majority rule to Rhodesia.
as Malta, to iron out differences. Sir Hugh Beadle, the Rhodesian Chief Justice, who was to have chaired the proposed Royal Commission, was scheduled to visit London prior to the summit gathering. Smith rejected Wilson's suggestion and when Beadle flew to London on November 8 the Rhodesian prime minister told him that he represented only himself.36

Underlying this repudiation of further discussions was the decision that had been made in Salisbury. On Thursday, November 11, 1965, Ian Smith's white minority government announced to the world Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence. The Rhodesian problem, heretofore a Commonwealth irritant, quickly became an international issue.

The most influential and persuasive international body concerned with Rhodesia was, of course, the United Nations. The U. N. had turned to the divisive question subsequent to Rhodesia's promulgation of its constitution in 1962. The U. N. Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (better known simply as the Committee of 24) devoted more than one-third of its time (36 of 101 meetings in 1963) to territories under Portuguese administration, Rhodesia, and South-West Africa.37


In the spring of 1963 the Committee of 24, having expressed its concern that little attention had been paid to previous General Assembly resolutions condemning the white minority government in Southern Rhodesia, decided to send a subcommittee to London in the hope of urging a stronger policy upon the British government. On April 8 it had adopted a resolution appealing to Britain "to apply all the resolution of the General Assembly relative to Southern Rhodesia and to take all measures to prevent a deterioration of the already explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia." The United States abstained and the United Kingdom refused to participate in the voting, contending that the U. N. had no jurisdiction over the Rhodesian problem. The American abstention and the non-participation of the United Kingdom became characteristic of U. N. votes on Rhodesia.

The U. N. Subcommittee visited London between April 20-26 and subsequently expressed confidence that Britain, aware of the situation in Central Africa, wanted a "compromise solution" which would quickly lead to majority rule. The Subcommittee asserted, however, that the United Kingdom needed to take "a more direct and positive position" and suggested further that, in spite of Britain's argument to the contrary, Whitehall had both the right and the means to intervene in Rhodesia in the interests of the African people.

In June the Committee of 24 adopted a draft resolution calling upon the United Kingdom to abrogate the 1961 Rhodesian
constitution, and hold a constitutional conference aimed at independence on the basis of universal suffrage. If necessary, the resolution continued, a special session of the General Assembly might be convened to consider the deteriorating situation in Rhodesia. Nineteen members, representing all of the populated continents except North America and Australia, voted in favor of the draft resolution. The United States, along with Denmark, Italy and Australia, abstained, while the United Kingdom did not participate.

By September the Security Council of the U. N. had become concerned over the prospect that the United Kingdom would allow the powerful armed forces of the old Federation to be transferred to Southern Rhodesia at the end of the year. On September 13 it voted on a resolution asking the United Kingdom not to allow the white minority government any additional political powers or military forces. Whereas both France and the United States abstained, the British delegate killed the proposal with his veto.

The General Assembly acted the following month. Its Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories (Fourth) Committee adopted a similar resolution (with the U. S. abstaining and the U. K. not participating), and subsequently the General Assembly endorsed it by a vote of 90 to 2 (South Africa and Portugal). In November the General Assembly resolved (the vote was 73 to 2 with the U. S. again abstaining and the U. K. again refusing to participate in the voting) that the U. K. not allow
independence for Rhodesia until such time as majority rule based on universal suffrage had been established in the territory.38

But the influence of the world organization was minimal and their pleas had had no significant effect when, in the spring of 1964, the pressure began again. The Committee of 24 opened discussions on Rhodesia by deploring the "continued refusal" of the United Kingdom to implement U. N. resolutions. Over British protests it urged the Security Council to give attention to this explosive situation. On May Day Prime Minister Smith rejected a Committee proposal that a delegation of Rhodesian African leaders meet with a U. N. delegation in London, arguing that the U. N. had no authority to intervene in Rhodesia's domestic affairs.

With the electoral victory of Harold Wilson, one other significant development occurred. Sir Hugh Foot became chief of the U. K. mission to the U. N. Foot's appointment itself portended change. Two years earlier he had resigned as Britain's representative to the U. N. Trusteeship Council in protest over the Conservative government's Rhodesia policy. Yet Britain continued to take no part in U. N. voting, holding that the question lay beyond the jurisdiction of the world body. The U. S., despite all of its "deep concern" for the African people and the "deteriorating situation" in Rhodesia, continued to

abstain from key votes, usually on the grounds that the U. N. had an oversimplified approach to the Rhodesian problem. 39

At the same time Washington consistently refused to press its closest ally. American leaders expressed their approval of the United Kingdom's wealth of experience in colonial matters and pledged their confidence in Whitehall's ability to resolve the problem equitably. When cleared of verbiage, political considerations dictated American policy. Promoting the helpless African at the expense of British support and confidence would gain the U. S. nothing. American initiative, particularly during a presidential election year, might backfire. With Britain unwilling to act boldly in central Africa, Rhodesia itself continued to set the pace. Had the U. K. acted with resolution at any one of a number of points the final result might well have been different. Timidity and lack of moral courage, not inexorable forces, made the schism in central Africa possible.

In May, 1965, the Security Council passed an Afro-Asian sponsored resolution requesting Britain to take "all necessary action" to prevent Rhodesia from declaring independence unilaterally after its May 7 general elections. A proposal by the Soviet ambassador, calling upon Britain to cancel the election and to "take the necessary measures for the immediate

granting to Rhodesia of independence by a democratic system of
government in accordance with the aspirations of the majority
of the population," was defeated as moderate African opinion
rose to the challenge. Its spokesman, Arsene A. Usher of the
Ivory Coast, argued that immediate independence along the lines
the Soviets had suggested might lead to catastrophic confusion
in Rhodesia.40

Between May 25-28 the U. N. Committee of 24 met in Lusaka
in a fact-finding capacity. At one point during these investi-
gations two eggs were thrown at the U. S. delegate as he left
the conference hall. It was reported that the African nation-
alist demonstrators responsible for the act apparently mistook
him for the British delegate, who had earned their animosity by
not pressing the Rhodesian authorities to allow Nkomo to attend
the hearings.41

The Committee moved its meetings to Dar es Salaam and
continued into June. From the Lusaka and Dar es Salaam
gatherings came requests for Britain to secure the release
of African nationalist leaders like Nkomo and Sithole as well
as various suggestions for U. N. measures to be taken against
Portugal, including the implementation of sanctions by the
U. N. Security Council. 42 With southern African beginning to
simmer in this fashion it was little wonder that Chou En-lai,
visiting in East Africa at the time, rather unwisely described
the continent as "ripe for revolution." By mid-June the
Committee of 24 had concluded its tour of Africa. From Addis
Ababa it again approved a resolution urging the General Assembly
to seek a quick termination to the illegal rule of the white
minority in Rhodesia.

As the tension mounted throughout the fall the U. N. tried
increasingly to avert UDI. On October 11 the Trusteeship
Committee approved a resolution requesting the U. K. to do every-
thing possible to block UDI, a statement the U. N. General
Assembly immediately endorsed. By November a Committee of 24,
resolution had recommended and the General Assembly had approved
a set of proposals requesting Britain to use military force
if necessary to insure a Rhodesian constitution based on
universal suffrage. The vote on this issue reflected signifi-
cant divisions within the world body. Eighty-two nations voted
in favor of the proposals, nine voted against, and eighteen coun-
tries abstained. The Afro-Asian nations were solidly aligned with
the Communist countries in favor of the use of force if necessary.
The United States combined with Portugal and South Africa and
six other pro-Western nations to oppose the resolution. The

\[^{43}\text{New York Times, June 6, 28, 1965.}\]
\[^{44}\text{U. S. Participation in the UN 1964, pp. 255-257.}\]
\[^{45}\text{New York Times, October 12, 1965.}\]
\[^{46}\text{Ibid., October 13, 1965.}\]
\[^{47}\text{Ibid., November 2, 6, 1965.}\]
disunited nations now faced the results of their equivocation. The fundamental weakness of the world body of nations—its lack of enforcement authority—was illustrated anew with Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence in defiance of the overwhelming weight of world opinion. Now the U. N. machinery shifted into a new gear—from what to do to prevent UDI to what to do after it was already an accomplished fact.

Almost exactly two years separate the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the Smith government's unilateral declaration of independence. Throughout the period, neither the most involved external party, Great Britain, nor the world's most powerful nation, the United States, showed a willingness to take significant steps to avert the impending crisis. The opposition of these two powers to the main body of sentiment in the U. N. effectively prevented the world body from stepping in. Wilson's Labor government found its hands tied on such a controversial issue by its slim majority in Parliament and public opposition to military action against a recalcitrant Rhodesia. The U. S. government, with no vital interest at stake in Rhodesia, consented to follow the British lead. Consequently, a general policy of wait-and-see developed in the covert hope that somehow things would just work themselves out for the best. Undoubtedly both the American and British governments, realizing that the key issues in Rhodesia
were more moral than political and equally aware that interven-
tion would mean fighting a black man's battle against a white
power, decided, despite their virtuous pronouncements, that
the moral battle was not worth the cost. Therefore the situa-
tion was permitted to grow more and more perilous until in
November, 1965, it became a significant world problem.
CHAPTER V

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN RESPONSE

One of the most incredible aspects of Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence was its rationale. In November, 1965, Ian Smith boldly purloined America's declaration of independence, claiming that his government had "struck a blow for the preservation of justice, civilization and Christianity." Life in the new country was defended as "civilized conditions on a nonracial basis."

The Rhodesian dictionary had become a veritable "double-think" document. White Rhodesians irrationally mouthed words like "justice," "civilization," "Christianity" and "civilized conditions" in spite of pass laws, native reserves, and franchise restrictions. They had no problem using the word "justice" to describe a Rhodesia which was spending roughly ten times as much educating its white school children as it did its African pupils, or the word "civilization" to include a situation in which the average per annum industrial wage per white was $2,894 as against only $190 per African.

This rationale, coupled with the obvious political implications of another white minority government in Africa, stirred Americans, no newcomers to the problem of racial

prejudice and its political ramifications, on both sides of the issue. The extreme conservative viewpoint in America launched a two-pronged argument attempting to prove the validity of minority rule in Africa. The political threat of the "international communist conspiracy" and the social threat of black rule were married, thus building an attractive case for those conservatives in America inclined to find international conspiracy in recent and contemporary events. This "paranoid style"—to use Richard Hofstadter's term—paints the issues in clearly defined and easily understood colors and provides a simple philosophy of history that effectively commands dedication without the vicissitudes of inquiry and thought. Hofstadter's words, though meant neither for this specific issue nor directed primarily at matters of foreign policy, help explain the conservative reaction to the central African dilemma:

The paranoid spokesman sees the fate of conspiracy in apocalyptic terms—he traffics in the birth and death of whole worlds, whole political orders, whole systems of human values. He is always manning the barricades of civilization. He constantly lives at a turning point. Like religious millenialists he expresses the anxiety of those who are living through the last days and he is sometimes disposed to set a date for the apocalypse.²

He sees himself as entirely in the right, abominably persecuted, yet assured that, in spite of all, final victory is certain.

The voice of the ardently conservative John Birch Society, American Opinion, represents well this reaction. In February,

1966, Eric D. Butler, national director of the League of Rights, Australia's "most significant anti-communist organization," contributed an article entitled, "Rhodesia, the Black Nationalist Alternative." Mr. Butler interpreted as the objective of the communists the removal of the European from Africa. He cited Dr. Thomas Molnar's book, Africa--A Political Travelogue (1965), to show that "there are fundamental differences in temperament between Europeans and Africans which ideological theories cannot remove." To Butler, the European exit from Africa had been the result of "insidious propaganda designed to create a guilt complex among the Europeans, and of Communist-promoted terrorism against the African natives themselves," not the ramifications of economic and social revolutions. This Australian saw the communist conspiracy manifested in everything from the Kenya Mau Mau to the Angola rebels. He alluded to what he called the "Communist axiom" that "Western Europe without Africa is like a plucked bird ready for the pot." Thankfully, the Europeans in Rhodesia recognized this, and "supported by the overwhelming majority of the Africans there" put a stop to the "Communist strategy" even though "that strategy had the backing of those who manufacture world opinion." Repeatedly, Butler termed the African nationalist leaders "thugs," and condemned Joshua Nkomo and the Rev. Ndaboningi Sithole as "paid agents of the

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3Eric D. Butler, "Rhodesia, the Black Nationalist Alternative," American Opinion, IX (February, 1966), 12, 14-16.
International Communist Conspiracy." He even stressed the time-honored "black-man-rapes-white-girl" threat. In conclusion he asserted that the Chinese communists--apparently the real culprits--intended to gain control in Rhodesia so that through various tactics they could exterminate most of the Africans and use the area as their own breeding ground.4

Paranoid or not, racists and political archconservatives in the United States saw the dilemma in Rhodesia in these simplistic terms. Among the most prominent of many American societies which sprang up in support of the Rhodesian government was the National Coordinating Committee, Friends of Rhodesian Independence (FRI), under the leadership of Taylor Caldwell. The Coordinating Committee and groups under its general supervision issued huge advertisements condemning "socialist Prime Minister Harold Wilson" and, in the words of columnist Ralph de Toledano, "'African extremists . . . financed indirectly by international Communist paymasters.'" These pro-Rhodesian groups favored removal of all trade sanctions, American participation in the economic growth of Rhodesia, and diplomatic recognition of the Smith government in accord with "the timeless and universal principles of our (U. S.) Declaration of Independence and Constitution." The National Coordinating Committee, FRI, concluded its appeal by soliciting contributions in return

4Ibid., p. 20.
for a "Support Rhodesia" automobile bumper strip and an
"Independence Kit" which "will be helpful . . . in reaching
others with the truth about Rhodesia . . . ."5

Fortunately the great majority of interested Americans
were more rational, if disinclined to militancy in the African
cause. This was particularly true among church groups which,
through their own missionaries, had direct contact with Rhodesia.
For some years there had been a reaction against fundamentalist
missionaries who in the interest of law and order had urged
support of the white minority government. Many Christians
back home were repulsed by the condescending missionary
who, because he did not like to pronounce the long name of
his African household servant, called him "Chapter" and
his little brother "Verse."6 Christian Century reported
in 1959, "Fundamentalism exported from the USA has little to
say to the Africans."7 When UDI came in 1965 these liberal
Christians supported a program of economic sanctions and even
police action to establish majority rule in Rhodesia. The
ultimate aim for these observers was a "color-blind society"
which had already seen "fragile beginnings" in other parts of

5Letter to the author from Hobson Whitmore, Richardson,
Texas, May 11, 1966. This letter was accompanied by a large
advertisement sponsored by and promoting the National Coordinat-
ing Committee of the Friends of Rhodesian Independence.

6Mary Cable, "We and They in Rhodesia," New Yorker, n.v.
(February 19, 1966), 38.

7"Too Much Religion a Dangerous Thing?" Christian Century,
LXXVI (July 15, 1959), 321-822.
Christians in America were also quick to praise their liberal brothers within Rhodesia itself. Christian Century pointed out that some white Rhodesian Christians had denounced UDI through the Christian Council of Rhodesia and the Roman Catholic bishops of Rhodesia.

Secular opinion in America was less concerned with the moral implication of the Rhodesian dilemma than with political action, particularly the matter of sanctions after UDI. There was a general revulsion at the long-standing British failure to protect adequately the rights of the African majority, though Americans must have realized that they were throwing stones from the sanctuary of glass houses. This criticism of Britain came even as the Americans generally advocated support of Britain's post-UDI policy of economic and diplomatic sanctions against the Rhodesian government.

American liberals doubted that economic sanctions would crush the Smith regime before incredible chaos—a sort of "super-Katanga"—resulted. The essential British sanction, though strong, would be felt very slowly. Expulsion from the

8Klein, "Rhodesia and the World's Conscience," p. 158.
10George Ivan Smith, "The Rhodesian Rebellion, I, The Chips Are Down," Reporter, XXXIII (December 2, 1965), 27-29. Russell Warren Howe, "The Rhodesian Rebellion, II, How Tight Is the Squeeze?" Ibid., p. 29. Mr. Smith holds that London outsmarted Ian Smith in the game that was played over UDI in 1965. However, he concludes, "in winning the battle London could in fact lose the war, because the vast African majority and its scores of supporters among national governments in Africa and abroad are becoming impatient of European games."
bloc, the boycott on Rhodesian tobacco and sugar, and the exclusion of Rhodesia from the London credit market would cause a retrenchment, but not collapse in Rhodesia. 11 Rhodesia could count on some aid from South Africa and Portugal as well as the usual run of international profiteers who stood to gain from ignoring the international sanctions imposed on the rebellious country. Rhodesia's close economic ties to hostile neighbors, such as Zambia and Malawi precluded full participation in total sanctions. This compromising attitude extended even to London, where the Government blocked, rather than froze, Rhodesia's assets so as to discourage confiscation of British properties in Smith's bailiwick. The threat of counter sanctions, especially against Zambia's copper industry, vulnerable because of its dependence upon both a trans-Rhodesian rail link to the sea and power from the Rhodesian controlled Kariba dam, kept Britain's response limited.

It seemed certain that the slow process of attrition would lead to additional violence and repression in Rhodesia, which, in turn, would increase the international cry for the use of force to replace the white government. Wilson feared particularly that some African states would precipitately carry the

U. N. flag into Rhodesia. Failing support from either Britain or the U. S., the leaders of this invasion had little choice but to turn to the Soviet Union for support. In the Prime Minister's conjecture, this could mean "a Red army in blue berets" in Africa.12 With the arrival of 1966, Wilson still believed that the Rhodesian government could be brought to its knees by the weight of steadily increasing economic sanctions alone.

In spite of noisy racist minorities in America, the United States government gave him verbal endorsement in this effort. But government support for meaningful sanctions against Rhodesia was made difficult by the fact that Americans are among the most race-conscious people in the world. As one authority put it, "white Americans had dealt with Negro and Indian minorities in the dominantly white American environment, and these minorities had had to adjust to white standards or die."13 The traditional British contact with communal life, moderate socialism, and non-white peoples throughout the world may not have completely relieved them of the burdens of racial snobbery but it made them more prepared to cope with racial problems than the Americans, whose experience in the matter was mostly confined to the United States, where whites dominated numerically. From the more optimistic viewpoint, however,

Americans enjoyed an historical tradition of unparalleled idealism. The Declaration of Independence and the philosophy that all men are created equal took on renewed significance at mid-century in the crusade to eliminate racism in the U. S. Abroad, the leaders of the "revolution of rising expectations" in Asia, and particularly Africa, were not quoting Marx and Lenin nearly so often as they quoted Paine, Jefferson and Lincoln. In the twentieth century, from Wilson to Kennedy, support for national self-determination became America's pragmatic solution to anti-imperialist revolutions. Once the people of the United States were convinced of the relevance to American interests of a given problem they tended to spare no effort in meeting the challenge. Lack of interest in the Rhodesian problem to date can be explained partly by the fact that its relevance to American interests has yet to be adequately demonstrated and publicized.

In an address before the Chicago Chapter of the Federal Bar Association in June, 1965, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Mr. G. Mennen Williams, outlined American policy toward Rhodesia. He stated that his government had supported, and would continue to support, a peaceful transition to an independent Rhodesia "under a government based upon the

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14 Ibid., pp. 119-120.

15 G. Mennen Williams, "Southern Rhodesia Today," An address to the Chicago Chapter of the Federal Bar Association, December 1965 (July 12, 1965), 71-76.
consent of the governed." Williams pointed out that American investment in Rhodesian industry, mining and agriculture totaled about fifty-six million dollars. In 1964 Rhodesian exports to the United States were eleven million dollars, while imports from the U. S. amounted to about twenty-one million dollars. Some 1,825 Americans, mostly missionaries and their dependents, were resident in Rhodesia.

Williams made it clear that insincere promises of reform in the 1961 Rhodesian constitution had not deceived the U. S. Washington had already informed the Smith government of its dissatisfaction with the new constitution, angry that it failed to move toward establishment of a democratic society. On the other hand, it had urged the African nationalist leaders, especially the American-educated Rev. Sithole, to be more co-operative in seeking a workable solution to Rhodesia's perplexing problems.

Before the United Nations the U. S. had remained consistent, continued Williams, in its policy of support of British action. On May 6, 1965, during the Security Council discussions on Rhodesia, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson had pledged American faith in the British position. Williams characterized American policy toward Rhodesia in the summer of 1965 as "correct but cool." In answer to accusations that the U. S. had been supplying aid to the white military establishment in Rhodesia,

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16 British trade with Rhodesia amounted to about six times that figure.
Williams answered, "The U.S. is not, I repeat not, supplying military arms or equipment to Southern Rhodesia. Nor have we supplied these items since the dissolution of the federation in December, 1965." He added that the operations of the U.S. Agency for International Development, never very large in Rhodesia, had been terminated in June, 1964. In short, the only formal contacts between the two nations were missionary enterprises, private business interests and official diplomatic relations. Also, student scholarship programs that "bring about 50 qualified young people of both major races to the United States to study annually" were sponsored by the U.S. Department of State.

With the announcement of UDI in November, the Secretary of State himself spoke. At a news conference in Austin, Texas, on November 11, Dean Rusk declared that the U.S. was recalling its consul general, Roswell McClelland, from Rhodesia and terminating the work of the U.S. Information Service in that country. The Minister for Rhodesian Affairs in the United Kingdom Embassy and his four staff members were denied further diplomatic status in the U.S.

On November 12 the American Ambassador to the U.S., Arthur Goldberg, reported to the Security Council that his government was

17 Comments by Secretary of State Dean Rusk at a news conference on November 11, 1965, Department of State Bulletin, LIII (December 6, 1965), 395.
firmly and irrevocably dedicated to the principle of self-determination and independence for the people of Southern Rhodesia, self-determination by and for all the people of the country as a whole.18

According to this same spokesman, on October 8, 1965, the U. S. Charge d'affaires in London had handed Ian Smith a note outlining the American position on Rhodesia. Later that same month President Johnson himself had sent a personal message to Smith warning him that UDI would be a tragic mistake. After UDI the American government declared that loan and credit applications from Rhodesia would be denied and American investors would be encouraged to invest in areas other than the rebellious colony. Finally, in a dramatic move, the Administration turned back 9,500 tons of sugar—the entire 1965 Rhodesian quota—which was on the high seas in transit to the U. S. 19

On December 8, Rusk announced that the U. S. would cooperate with Britain by placing the deposits of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia in this country under the authority of a new board of directors in London. On December 3, the United Kingdom had dismissed the original members and appointed a new board, all residents in London. 20


20 Comments by Secretary of State Dean Rusk at a news conference on December 9, 1965. Department of State Bulletin, LIII (December 27, 1965), 1008.
On occasion official American opinion seemed incredibly uninformed and naive. In an address before the International Relations Council at South Bend, Indiana, in January, 1966, Assistant Secretary Williams stated that as far as the world was concerned Rhodesia was still under British sovereignty. Mr. Williams failed to note that since Britain was unwilling to intervene in Rhodesian domestic affairs—an intervention which would have to be supported by military force in order to be meaningful—"British sovereignty" extended only to those external matters over which Whitehall had some measure of control, such as economic and diplomatic relations. Optimistically, and perhaps prematurely, Williams termed the economic sanctions already imposed "remarkably effective."

In his speech Assistant Secretary Williams reiterated a statement first made by Ambassador Goldberg before the U. N. Security Council on November 12 that the American government was "immediately instituting a comprehensive embargo on the shipment of all arms and military equipment to Southern Rhodesia." In view of Williams's own speech before the Chicago Federal Bar Association more than six months previous—comments which declared that no military equipment had been...

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21 G. Mennen Williams, "The Crisis in Southern Rhodesia," An address to the International Relations Council, South Bend, Indiana, Department of State Bulletin, LIV (February 21, 1966), 265-270.

supplied by the U. S. to Rhodesia since the dissolution of
the Federation in 1963—one must wonder if the U. S. Govern-
ment was finding it necessary to restrict some to its own
private citizens who may have gone over the head of the govern-
ment to supply the Rhodesian military establishment with arms.
Or had Secretary Williams's declaration in Chicago been incorrect?
Whether American arms had been supplied to Rhodesia during 1964-
1965 remains moot.

Perhaps the most definite step in Anglo-American sanction
procedure was the oil embargo imposed by Britain on December 17,
1965.23 Even though American oil companies were technically
unaffected by this restriction, they almost immediately adhered
to the ruling, much to the chagrin of the Rhodesians.

According to Williams, American industry was co-operating
to an extraordinary degree in export-import sanctions against
Rhodesia. Imports from Rhodesia, said Williams, had been cut
in half since UDI and the oil embargo had proven "almost com-
pletely successful." However, in the December 18, 1965, New
York Times reporters in Salisbury cited expert resident opinion
which declared that at least six months would pass before oil
sanctions could force an economic slowdown in Rhodesia. A
month later the U. S. News and World Report commented that
Wilson's advisers had warned him that if sanctions dragged out

as long as six months they would lose their bite. Williams thought economic measures would make the Smith regime more co-operative. He contended that the Rhodesian pound, having lost its sterling backing, had fallen to nearly half its value, and claimed that the only tire manufacturer in Rhodesia had recently laid off sixty percent of its work force. Those observers who were primarily interested in the welfare of the African people might have pointed out that among those suffering the most from the process of attrition would be the Negroes themselves. They would be the first to be sacrificed as the economic fortunes of the country deteriorated. Williams himself admitted this, but reassured that, since they were used to a low standard of living anyway, the suffering would not be as noticeable to them as comparatively milder hardships would be to the whites.

Salisbury added a further note of pathetic irony. George W. Rudland, the Rhodesian Minister of Commerce and Industry, claimed that his government found it deplorable that Wilson "should even contemplate action of this sort (oil embargo) at Christmas time when people throughout the world expect kindliness and goodwill from others."25

Secretaty Williams also mentioned the drought which was threatening Rhodesia and thus supporting the sanctions.

24 "End of the Road for Whites in Rhodesia?" U. S. News and World Report, LX (January 17, 1966), 52.
Undoubtedly he over-emphasized the point, however, when he said, "Cattle are reported dying by the thousands per week." He also failed to note that Britain, Canada and Australia had offered emergency grain to drought-stricken Rhodesia.26

Williams's incredible optimism reached unbounded proportions at the conclusion of his speech when he said that South Africa and the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique and Angola had shown a "correct attitude" and had given "every sign of continuing to practice their neutrality in what they see as a domestic British problem." The truth was, of course, that South Africa and Portugal, though reluctant to make a full commitment to Rhodesia, were not in the least neutral. Secretary Williams neglected to mention the November 26, 1965, issue of the New York Times, which reported that Portugal had refused to join the international blockade of Rhodesia on the ground that the stability and progress of entire central Africa were at stake. The Times said further that Portuguese Foreign Minister Alberto Franco Nogueira had announced that ports in his country and railroads in Angola and Mozambique would be kept open to Rhodesian trade.

Four days earlier the Times stated that a Pretoria economic review had summarized the general feelings among South African businessmen toward Rhodesia, "It is not a question of 'can we afford it' but 'can we afford not to support them.'"

On January 10, 1966, the Times reported that under long-standing agreements "thousands of gallons of lubricants are still being sent from South Africa to Rhodesia. Prime Minister Hendrik F. Verwoerd has made clear that South Africa would not disrupt normal trade relations with Rhodesia." The Times also said that the Anglo-Portuguese Pipeline Company of Mozambique had rejected a British request that it stop pumping oil to Rhodesia even though a British company held 62 percent of the shares of the organization. The most "neutral" act of the Portuguese directors of the company was the denial of a Rhodesian request to transfer the 14,000 ton contents of the pipeline directly into storage tanks in Umtali, Rhodesia. Had it done so, the pipelines themselves would have suffered seawater damage. In spite of these facts, Britain agreed with Assistant Secretary Williams in insisting that the Portuguese government was "relatively neutral."

A week after William's South Bend remarks the New York Times definitively refuted the Assistant Secretary's argument, writing, "Gasoline is reaching Rhodesia in fairly substantial quantities from South Africa despite the boycott by British and United States companies." With the new supplies it was receiving, Rhodesia could meet fuel needs for at least six months under its rationing system. Though admittedly under severe economic and diplomatic pressures, Rhodesia had no intention of capitulating.

28 Ibid., February 6, 1966.
Americans of various stripes offered solutions to the Rhodesian complexities. Dr. William B. George, an assistant professor of history at the University of South Florida in Tampa, found his inspiration in an historical precedent of 1833.29 Basing his ideas on an act of Parliament in that year—a measure which freed the slaves and compensated their former owners—Dr. George recommended that Britain make available funds which could be utilized by a reconstituted government of Rhodesia to purchase gradually over a period of years and at generous prices the present holdings of the white population of that country. In his carefully thought out response to possible objections to his plan, Dr. George never considered the charge that he had placed the cart before the ox. Unquestionably a "reconstituted government" would be able to buy out many white landowners if Britain put up the money, but the more basic task was the very act of reconstituting the government. Indeed, this was the crux of the whole problem: Britain's entire policy was aimed at a "reconstituted government." Unfortunately the white power elite in Rhodesia, bent on making good their defiance of world opinion and unalterably convinced that their cause was just, were more interested in the success of UDI than financial settlement.

If the future of Africa is black, then a rationally and honestly conservative assessment of the situation probably

approached the truth. Anthony Lejeune, writing for the National Review, suggested that economic sanctions against Rhodesia, far from toppling the Smith regime, would strengthen ties among whites in Rhodesia, South Africa and the Portuguese territories, thus tightening their grip on south-central Africa. Lejeune reasoned that economic sanctions merely toughened the resolve of a country and increased its self-reliance. He saw Rhodesia as capable of outlasting all sanctions short of massive armed African intervention—an intervention which could, again in the words of Prime Minister Wilson, bring in "a red army in blue berets." Expressing a theme current in very rightist expression, whether in England or America, Lejeune concluded,

I certainly wish them good luck. If I had been Ian Smith, I should have done what he has done, and would probably have done it sooner. I may be proved wrong. The gamble may fail and the results may be terrible, but to take it was neither unreasonable nor reckless, and reasonable me should try to understand Mr. Smith's calculation.

Lejeune was not the only American to "wish them good luck." Editorial staff writer, Larry Howell, of the Dallas Morning News, employed the popular right-wing literary device of comparing Rhodesia's UDI with the Declaration of Independence of his own country in an article entitled "Rhodesia: A Revolting Development." He termed the November 1965, declaration an "instant replay" of the 1776 document. Incredibly, he asserted that

the United States government was "opposing in Rhodesia the very things we say we are fighting for in Viet Nam." He suggested that the U. S. was attempting to save South Viet Nam from outside domination while conspiring to restore Rhodesia to external control. He also contended that the American soldier was fighting for self-determination in Asia while his government worked against it in Africa. He wrote that American forces were attempting to "inaugurate the nucleus of a freely functioning and healthy economy" in Viet Nam while U. S. pressure sought to destroy the same in Rhodesia. Reflecting the race-consciousness of the South, Howell dismissed the role of the African majority with the unbelievable assertion that the African "tills the white man's soil, scrubs his floors, runs his errands, waits his tables, and apparently he prefers that to finding for himself in the jungle." Howell expressed fear that the U. S. might actually be drawn into a friendly Anglo-American coalition with the Soviet Union against the white Rhodesians. Utterly ignoring the African majority in Rhodesia, he concluded that such a development "will mean that all our lofty talk about self-government and self-determination for the South Vietnamese may be just so much propaganda."\[31\]

Condemning the United Nations activity toward Rhodesia became another favorite line of conservative attack. In a

\[31\] *Dallas Morning News*, April 14, 1966.
In Rhodesia, the United States—dirtying its hands with those of socialist Great Britain—has joined in a campaign to topple the freely elected government of Rhodesia because it declared its independence in terms which did not suit the neo-colonialists of Number 10 Downing Street.\(^{32}\)

According to de Toledano, sanctions and an economic boycott had failed, so the Anglo-American alliance, working with African "police states," were seeking to blockade Rhodesia's neighbors to prevent oil from reaching the rebellious territory. He found the real danger to be the establishment of a precedent whereby

> If, next month, there are riots in New York, Detroit, or Los Angeles, the African states can, in all propriety, cite the Rhodesian action and the United States position in enthusiastic support, and call for intervention to protect Negro rights.

Most Americans, however, did not seem to be beset by the same fear. They continued to counsel patience.\(^{33}\) They foresaw the Smith government as the inevitable loser. American optimism and faith in the ultimate victory of righteous causes reigned supreme, encouraging the American government to remain as noncommittal as possible. If matters were allowed to take their course justice would surely triumph in the end. Unfortunately the Rhodesian government had its roles mixed. Quite

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\(^{32}\)Denton Record-Chronicle, April 19, 1966.

\(^{33}\)"An Argument for Patience," America, CXIV (January 8, 1966), 32.
obviously the white Rhodesians thought of themselves as builders of a "City of God." Also the long-standing British policy of minimum involvement had already been proven a failure by UDI. Few questioned that the future of Africa was black, but to what extent that black would be diluted with blood red was the more serious question. Anglo-American reluctance to act decisively indicated that the threat of possible bloodshed was directly proportional to the "patience" of the Western powers. If Britain failed to intervene to bring down the white regime, then obviously the overthrow would have to wait on an African initiative. It might require months, even years, but the African nationalist cause would grow in strength, would be supplied with weapons and inspiration by militant independent African states, and unquestionably would plunge Rhodesia into a war of national liberation which potentially could surpass the Congolese Rebellion in bloodshed. If that happened, South Africa and the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique could expect the war to be no respecter of boundaries. All of white-ruled south-central and southern Africa would explode.

Early in 1966 Britain was counting on economic and diplomatic pressure to bring down the Smith government and give rise to a transitional body, progressing rapidly toward majority rule. Despite Anglo-American optimism, the likelihood of such a peaceful solution to the problem seemed remote. In
addition American restiveness, of which de Toledano's columns were an extreme example, emerged over an apparent double standard in the United Nations. The fact that the U. N. acted against Rhodesia but not against "Communist warmakers" in Vietnam caused confusion in the United States, especially since the U. S. co-operated with Britain on Rhodesia even while Britain continued to trade with North Vietnam, Red China and Cuba. Charges of double standard were leveled at both the U. N. and Britain. In support of these accusation the U. S. News and World Report pointed out that on April 9, 1966, Ambassador Goldberg voted in favor of a U. N. resolution which called upon Britain to prevent, by force if necessary, the arrival at Beira, Mozambique, of ships believed to be carrying oil bound for Rhodesia. On the following day the British used that authority to turn back an oil tanker and thus engaged in an act of armed force "taking place not in a war, but in a dispute between Great Britain and a former colony." The magazine cited Senator James O. Eastland (Dem., Miss.) and Representative John M. Ashbrook (Rep., O.) who suggested that a double standard had arisen in the U. N., and UPI columnist Lyle Wilson who saw race emerging as the compelling force in the modern world body. While ignoring war in Asia, the United Nations seemed ready to go the brink of war with a peaceful nation in Africa over the issue of race. In addition an

ungrateful Britain was not repaying a co-operative America in kind, particularly in relation to U. S. efforts in Asia.35

The entire British approach to the Rhodesian dilemma was limited by inherent weakness. Indeed, a tragic note of desperation ran through the whole affair. Strong action by Wilson at a time when resolution might have solved the problem (prior to Salisbury's decision in November, 1965) was almost impossible due to powerful conservative public opinion in England and the very narrow majority Wilson had to work with in Parliament. These facts help to explain British impotence and may even go a long way toward exonerating her. It was even argued that Britain no longer had the military might to act effectively against Rhodesia. As a nation dependent on world trade, Britain could not afford moral scruples when it came to American pleas of co-operation with regard to Red China, Vietnam and Cuba.

Of course the real problem goes even deeper than the complexities of compromise for political survival. The odds are very great that even had the Labor government enjoyed a huge majority in Parliament the British policy toward Rhodesia would have followed essentially the same lines. The people of Britain, like the people of the United States, might not have shared with the white Rhodesian the same low opinion of the Africans (the Rhodesian settler would argue that was true

35Ibid., p. 52.
only because neither the Englishman nor the American lived in Rhodesia where he could understand the racial situation as it really was), but they were not about to use force to unseat a totalitarian white regime in Africa. The Africans were not worth whites coming to blows with each other. If the Africans didn't like the situation, let them change it themselves! Let them tackle their own problems and show that they were worth enjoying majority rule! From this smug and condescending fortress people in Britain and America counseled patience. Little did they realize that inevitably one day, in his own good time, the African would throw off the chains of the past in Rhodesia and the white establishment the world over would tremble when it happened.

Until that day the white Rhodesians, encouraged by British timidity and African disorganization, remain confident. As an American observer on the scene put it, "Failure is not even considered in Salisbury or on the tobacco farms, where there is an unshakable belief that the British always put profit, and sometime politics, before principle."36

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A brilliant study of the African in his own continent. The author spent over a year researching in Africa and in the European capitals responsible for the administration of African colonies. His achievement is setting forth the problems which have arisen out of the impact of primitive peoples with an industrial civilization and to what extent these problems were being met by the governments involved.

In a penetrating 480-page study, Professor Carleton explains the twentieth century revolutionary process which transformed America from introverted isolationism to leadership in a world of pluralistic and complex international relations.

An excellent collection of studies on the Congo, Dahomey, the Cameroun Federal Republic, the Rhodesias and Nyasaland and South Africa. Substantial bibliographies conclude each section. The chapter on the Rhodesias and Nyasaland was contributed by Herbert J. Spiro of Amherst College.

A technical (archaeological) study of some of Africa's most famous and controversial ruins.


With admirable insight Easton's book covers the gamut of the world's most significant colonial areas. Five hundred forty-two pages, 8 maps, a detailed index and comprehensive bibliographical notes at the conclusion of each of five sections of the book.


This book is composed of a collection of articles relative to American political, social, and economic interest in Africa with heavy emphasis on the prospects of progress in Africa.


An attempt to get to the heart of the injustices done to the Africans by the British South Africa Company (BSAC), this book still favors self-government for the Rhodesias primarily because the author is convinced that the average white Rhodesian is "a very reasonable person, and he possesses a very keen sense of justice." (286).


A resident of central Africa for over a score of years, Hole accepts the validity of the "inexorable march of civilization." (p. 66). He praises the work of Rhodes and generally supports BSAC activities.


A heavily prejudiced history completely dedicated to proving the moral validity of the white man's actions in Rhodesia.


A brief secondary text for South African school children.
A 500-page paperback published as part of the Penguin African Library series, this book, written by a Canadian political journalist, is a hard-hitting attack on white minority rule in Rhodesia.

An excellent 810-page history with a bibliographical guide.

A thorough study into the origins of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

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A brief but worthy attempt to explain the outlines of American policy toward Africa south of the Zambezi River, published for the Council on Foreign Relations.

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