ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA, 1920-1960

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ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA, 1920-1960

THESIS

Presented to the Graduate Council of the
North Texas State University in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

By

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Denton, Texas
January, 1966
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CHAPTER I

POSITION OF THE CATHOLIC IN THE 1920'S

As the decade of the "roaring twenties" opened, anti-Catholicism was prevalent. It was a mood confronting Alfred E. Smith in the latter part of the decade. Not a new nativist attitude, anti-Catholicism had passed through two major phases during the nineteenth century: the Know-Nothing Era of the 1850's and the heyday of the American Protective Association in the 1890's. The latter declined about 1900, and, while anti-Catholic sentiments were in evidence during the Progressive Era, no major organized movement emerged.

It was during World War I that a surge of patriotism prepared a suitable seedbed for more radical ideological movements. Part of that patriotism entailed a new ideology—the belief that all citizens should exhibit "one hundred percent" Americanism. The ideology demanded universal conformity in political and cultural attitudes. The result was a cultural nationalism occasionally amounting to a national hysteria which often curtailed individual freedoms.

When the war ended, much of the hysteria subsided, yet significant aspects of the ideology remained impressed on the American mind. The strong sense of nationalism survived along
with the intolerant insistence on 100 per cent Americanism. A new ingredient was isolationism. The war seemed to prove that European civilization was chaotic and corrupt and that further involvement with Europe would bring only entanglement in a net of confusion and decay.

While these two attitudes thrived in immediate post-war America, the influx of large numbers of immigrants from Europe continued. Since 1896, the majority of immigrants had come from the southern and eastern portions of Europe, whereas prior to that time most immigrants came from northwestern Europe—England, Germany, and Scandinavia.¹

Americans considered the culture of the "newer" immigrants alien, while they believed the culture of the "older" immigrants to be more in accord with our institutions.² Many

¹The following immigration figures are from United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Historical Statistics of the United States (Washington, D. C., 1960), p. 56.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Southern and Eastern Europeans</th>
<th>Northwestern Europeans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>108,867</td>
<td>149,669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>191,545</td>
<td>151,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>126,279</td>
<td>104,553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>138,673</td>
<td>90,626</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This trend continued in post-war America as illustrated below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Southern and Eastern Europeans</th>
<th>Northwestern Europeans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>159,297</td>
<td>86,998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>513,813</td>
<td>138,551</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

²Maldwyn Jones, American Immigration (Chicago, 1960), pp. 256-258.
Americans, therefore, clamored for measures to restrict the number of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe.

When, in 1920, the census showed that more people lived in urban than rural places,\(^3\) there was an intensification of opposition to unrestricted immigration. This trend in the direction of greater urbanization only stimulated the sentimental nostalgia for a rural way of life. If immigrants flocked to cities, and they did, it strengthened the conviction of many Americans that they were undesirable.

In addition to the attitudes on immigration, the "Red Scare" of 1919-1920 symbolized the rampant nationalism prevalent at the close of World War I. Afraid that Communism was threatening their government, many Americans defined the danger broadly. They stigmatized as Communists any who did not conform to the post-war ideology. The public considered labor strikes as evidence of Communist activities, and often suspected routine public and private meetings as being Communist inspired.

In reaction to the Red Scare, the federal government deported numerous alien communists and removed suspected periodicals from the mails, while local and state governments raided meetings and conducted searches without warrants.\(^4\) Another illustration of the tone of the post-war

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ideology was the infamous trial of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, Italian anarchists accused of murdering a paymaster in Massachusetts. The whole trial appeared extremely unfair since much of the evidence was circumstantial while the judge and jury seemed biased. Many liberals and conservatives regarded the trial as an example of how innocent men could be sentenced to death for political and economic beliefs.

Several events in 1920 indicated that anti-Catholicism flourished in this atmosphere of resurgent nationalism and nativism. One such incident was the notorious senatorial campaign of Tom Watson in Georgia. Watson had been active in Georgia politics for the past generation as a Congressman and influential newspaper editor-publisher. A remnant of the Populist era, Watson had obtained prominence among rural constituents on anti-Catholic platforms from 1910 to 1915. Still a rabid anti-Catholic in 1920, Watson revived the "tested and proved" Catholic issue. He toured Georgia by automobile and spoke to large crowds. Watson was using the same tactic he had employed in 1914 when he wrote, "I have forced the popery issue into Georgia politics, where it is now cutting a wide swath to the consternation of the old-line politicians." He insisted that Catholic priests ruined the

5Ibid., p. 174.
7Ibid., p. 426. "Mixing Politics and Religion," Literary Digest, LXXV (December 16, 1922), 34.
virtue of women while in the privacy of confession. He warned of a desire by the Pope to establish political control over the United States and of the thousands of women in Catholic convents at the mercy of priests and monks.

One of Watson's chief tools in the 1920 campaign was his attack on the Wilson administration. He incorporated anti-Catholicism into his criticism of Wilson in hopes of securing a larger following. He pictured Wilson as the puppet of the Vatican and accused Wilson's secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty, of being an agent of the Pope. An observer of the campaign noted, "Watson proclaimed and induced thousands of his credulous followers to believe that the League [of Nations] was an agency through which the Vatican seeks to impress a Romanist and Jesuit super-government upon the world."8 Despite the fact that almost all Georgia daily newspapers opposed Watson's senatorial bid, he won by an overwhelming majority. His victory cannot be attributed entirely to anti-Catholicism, but the outcome of the election called attention to the growing menace of religious intolerance in the United States.9

Alabama also mirrored an increase of anti-Catholicism in 1920. Thomas E. Kilby won the governorship that year by convincing the voters that he was the best opponent of the Pope.10

8 Charles P. Sweeney, "Bigotry in the South," The Nation, CXI (November 24, 1920), 585.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
The Alabama legislature enacted a law requiring the state police to inspect Roman Catholic convents regularly and ask all women if they were being held against their will. An anti-Catholic group won control of the Birmingham city government in 1920 and fired every Catholic city employee except two policemen. The newspapers in Birmingham purposely refrained from attacking bigots, a move in itself that encouraged bigotry. Describing anti-Catholicism in Alabama, one contemporary writer asserted: "It has become a matter of almost routine necessity in Alabama for candidates for public office to make announcements of their stand against Catholicism."^{11}

An incident in which a Catholic priest was murdered evidenced bigotry on the rampage in Birmingham. Reverend Father James E. Coyle, pastor of St. Paul's Roman Catholic Church, was shot to death by a Protestant minister because he had married the murderer's daughter in a Catholic ceremony. Moreover, the murderer was acquitted by a Birmingham jury. Clearly, Alabama's anti-Catholicism consisted of more than a few isolated incidents, it was a "predominate state of mind."^{12}

The South was not alone in attacking Catholics. In the spring of 1920 the Sons and Daughters of Washington was

^{11}Ibid., p. 586.

organized in Washington, D. C. The group described itself as a "'militant' fighting organization for Protestantism." J. W. Forest, a lawyer from Albany, New York, led the group. He described the Catholic church as a wheel in which the Pope constituted the hub, political control replaced the rim, and the Knights of Columbus represented the spokes.

The Sons and Daughters stated as its primary purpose the fight to maintain pure Americanism, best achieved by concentrating their efforts in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, the "stronghold" of Catholicism in the United States. However, the Boston Congregationalist, a Protestant newspaper, described Washington, D. C. as the stronghold of Catholics. The Congregationalist implied that Catholics opposed public education when it warned that "... excellent laws designed to improve the public schools have encountered the stout opposition of Roman Catholic authorities."

The New York Times voiced concern over the increase of anti-Catholicism. The editorial included a recent statement by James A. Flaherty, Supreme Knight of the Knights of Columbus, "There is increasing evidence that certain unscrupulous persons are bent upon reviving the ancient religious

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14 Ibid.
15 "A Protestant View of the Catholic Forward Movement," Literary Digest, LXIII (December 13, 1919), 34.
issues which we had all thought were settled once and for all. . . ."  

A few months later the Pope warned an audience of Knights of Columbus to be aware of anti-Catholic propaganda.  

The policy on immigration furnished a revelation of the strength of nativism during the decade of the twenties. As far back as the 1890's there had been agitation to limit the number of immigrants to the great "melting pot." In 1916 Madison Grant published The Passing of the Great Race, which exemplified many people's fears of "mongrelization" of America. These fears were aroused by what they called the inferior racial qualities of the increasing number of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. Over one and a quarter million immigrants entered the United States in 1914, of which the "newer" immigrants from southern and eastern Europe comprised roughly 62 per cent. Although a general literacy test was required in 1917, purposely to cut down the quantity of new immigrants, they still outnumbered the "older" immigrants from northwestern Europe. The passage of restrictive measures on immigration seemed certain in the

17Ibid., August 29, 1920, p. 16.  
19Bureau of Census, Historical Statistics, p. 56.
1920's since the non-Anglo-Saxons, whose distinctive appearance and cultural habits seemed strange to many American citizens, arrived in post-war America in the midst of a nativist revival. Furthermore, the arrival of large numbers of these people during the economic depression of 1920-1921 acted as a catalyst on the demands for restriction.20

Roman and Greek Catholicism constituted the principal religion of the southern and eastern European immigrants. In a dominantly Protestant United States, their Catholic faith complicated the process of assimilation. As Protestant Americans witnessed the religious-cultural activities of the "newer" immigrants, the conviction grew, as expressed by Representative William H. King of Utah, that the foreigners possessed qualities of character incompatible with the American way of life.21 The restrictionists stated that the steady influx of inferior peoples posed an immediate threat to the security of the United States. The newer immigrants, as charged by restrictionist Edward Conklin, practiced some forms of religion that were undesirable in the United States. 

"'Blood is thicker than water,' and some kinds of religion more potent than patriotism. . . ."22

20See footnote number 1.
21Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 3rd session, LX, 424.
The Ku Klux Klan added its voice to the chorus by demanding immigration restriction. Anti-Catholicism was the central force behind the Klan's demand for restriction.\textsuperscript{23} The Catholic immigrant usually lived in cities, so he was blamed, along with other immigrants, for the rising urban crime rate of the twenties. Indeed, one writer summarized the blame laid on the immigrant when he wrote, "As a result of all these factors the newcomers came to appear to many as un-American, as an alien people clutching strange idols."\textsuperscript{24}

Pressure to reduce the flood of newcomers produced the Immigration Act of 1921. Although it was a temporary piece of legislation, the law plainly discriminated against the southern and eastern Europeans.\textsuperscript{25} It limited the number of immigrants of each nationality in the forthcoming year to 3 per cent of the total of foreign-born persons of that nationality living in the United States in 1910. By using the 1910 census as the basis for establishing quotas, Congress reduced drastically the number of people from southern and eastern Europe that could enter the United States since

\textsuperscript{23}Jones, \textit{American Immigration}, p. 275.  
\textsuperscript{24}Thomas O'Dea, "The Catholic Immigrant and the American Scene," \textit{Thought}, XXI (Summer, 1956), 262.  
\textsuperscript{25}Handlin, \textit{Race and Nationality}, p. 75.
most foreign-born residents in 1910 had come from northwestern Europe. 26

Discriminate restrictive legislation did not cease with the Immigration Act of 1921. Although the measure caused a decrease in the number of "new" immigrants, the restrictionists desired permanent legislation that would reduce even more the number of non-Anglo-Saxons coming from Europe. 27 They demanded a more stringent quota system based on the census of 1890. The nativists advanced reasons identical to the previous ones.

Restrictionists considered "newer" immigrants inferior because of their religious and cultural customs. 28 Senator Ellison Smith of South Carolina outlined nativist fears when he claimed that immigrants not of Nordic stock—people not from northwestern Europe—threatened American institutions because of their social, political, and religious beliefs.

26 The following figures illustrating the reduction in the number of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe after 1921 are from Bureau of Census, Historical Statistics, p. 56.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Southern and Eastern Europeans</th>
<th>Northwestern Europeans</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>513,813</td>
<td>138,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>116,973</td>
<td>99,407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>151,491</td>
<td>156,429</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See also Jones, American Immigration, p. 276.


According to Smith's logic, only northwestern Europeans should be allowed into the United States. Hiram Wesley Evans, Imperial Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan, thought immigration the most serious problem of the United States. Theorizing that Catholics had a higher temporal than civil allegiance, Evans expounded that the immigrant "... must be of the right racial and national stock and finally, his highest allegiance, his most unselfish, unbiased love must be to and for America." Anti-Catholicism remained the principal force behind the Klan's insistence on discriminatory restriction.

The Nordic policy, with its implicit anti-Catholicism, encountered opposition before it became law. Representative Adolf Sabath of Illinois identified the discriminatory policy with the Know-Nothing philosophy of nineteenth century America. Senator LeBaron Colt of Rhode Island argued that the policy would be especially unfair to Italians. Representative Fiorello LaGuardia of New York tried to amend the policy so that their religion could never be used against immigrants.

29 Congressional Record, 68th Congress, 1st Session, LXV, 5961.
32 Congressional Record, 68th Congress, 1st Session, LXV, 5532.
He expressed concern that religion would be used in determining qualifications for entry to the United States, but his plea had no support.  

Despite the efforts to kill the proposed National Origins system, its passage came in May, 1924. It changed the quota from 3 per cent of 1910 to 2 per cent of the 1890 census. Representative Meyer Jacobstein of New York, who fought the measure, believed that its purpose was "... to reduce to a minimum the number of immigrants coming from southern and southeastern European countries." The anti-Catholic nature of the new quota system was discussed in the subsequent months. One journal, Current Opinion, proclaimed that the law exhibited religious prejudice. "Immigration from countries dominantly Catholic or largely Jewish will be reduced to negligible figures." Congressman LaGuardia demonstrated how more than half of the immigrants would come from England and Protestant Ireland. LaGuardia described the legislation as "... simply writing into the law part of the program of the discredited and disappearing order of the Ku Klux Klan in its intolerant and bigoted program against certain races and certain religions."  

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33 Ibid., pp. 6114-6115.  
34 Ibid., p. 5862.  
The reduction in the number of southern and eastern Europeans entering the United States clearly illustrated the discriminatory nature of the law.\textsuperscript{37}

Anti-Catholicism, as related to demands for restrictive immigration, reappeared in 1926-1927 when it came time for Congress to apportion immigration quotas. The National Origins system of 1924 had been arranged to remain in force until 1927 when an apportionment on the basis of the 1920 distribution of national origins would serve as the basis for a maximum quota of 150,000 per annum. Imperial Wizard Evans again welded Catholicism and immigration together as a single threat to American institutions, declaring, "They vote, in short, not as American citizens, but as aliens and Catholics."\textsuperscript{38} According to the Imperial Wizard, Catholics formed the largest alien bloc and the United States, therefore, must remain Protestant if the Nordic race was to complete its destiny. The chief purpose of restriction, as

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{ |c|c| } \hline
Southern and Eastern Europeans & Northwestern Europeans \\
\hline
1924 & 160,993 \\
1925 & 23,118 \\
1926 & 29,125 \\
1927 & 41,629 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{37}The following figures illustrate the drastic reduction in the number of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. The figures are from Bureau of Census, \textit{Historical Statistics}, p. 56. See also \textit{New York Times}, November 13, 1924, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{38}Hiram Wesley Evans, "The Klan's Fight for Americanism," \textit{North American Review}, CCXXIII (March, 1926), 47.
depicted by the New York Evening World and inserted into the Congressional Record by Representative William D. Boies of Iowa, was to preserve the "old colonial stock" which came from Great Britain and Protestant Ireland.39

Two factors linked anti-Catholicism to restrictive immigration: the law's discriminatory nature, and the organizations supporting it. Since Catholicism was the predominant religion in southern and eastern Europe, reducing the number of immigrants from those areas stopped the entrance of thousands of Catholics to the United States. Furthermore, this legislation owed much to efforts of the Ku Klux Klan. As claimed by a contemporary writer on the Klan, "It [the Klan] helped pass the immigration laws. . . ."40

The Ku Klux Klan did not limit its activities to pressuring for restrictive immigration. The Klan, in fact, became the most powerful and significant anti-Catholic organization in twentieth century America. Patterned after the original Klan of Reconstruction times, the new Klan had been organized by Joseph Simmons in Georgia in 1915.

39 Congressional Record, 69th Congress, 1st Session, LXVII, 11897. Congress continually debated until 1929 the rule to apportion the quota with a 150,000 maximum per annum based on the 1920 census. Other than a few incidents as illustrated, few anti-Catholic outbursts occurred since Congress was concerned with redistributing the quota allotments of the northwestern Europeans.

40 William Robinson Pattangall, "Is the Ku Klux Klan Un-American," The Forum, LXXIV (September, 1925), 329.
Simmons had little success with his Invisible Empire until 1920 when it was refashioned. It was then that Hiram Wesley Evans, a dentist from Dallas, took over leadership. The Klan preached its basic doctrine, Native White Protestantism, until it numbered 4,000,000 at its peak. The Klan attacked several groups, among them, Jews and Negroes, but the core of the Klan was its anti-Catholicism.41

The Klan became so firmly entrenched that in several instances it controlled state politics. A well-known incident of Klan anti-Catholicism was the Oregon School law of 1922. On this issue, the Klan had the support of the Scottish Rite Masons, but the School law was primarily a Klan affair. Passed by statewide referendum, the law required children of ages eight to sixteen to attend public schools.42

It was aimed strictly at Catholic parochial schools. In its campaign against Catholics, the Klan asserted that all presidential assassins were Catholics and that "indulgence" in Catholic doctrine meant permission to sin.43 In the Republican primary prior to the election of state officers in 1922, a Klan candidate came within 500 votes of defeating


42Provisions of the law were described in New York Times, December 3, 1922, Sec. 2, p. 8.

incumbent governor Ben W. Olcott. Governor Olcott was defeated for re-election by Klan-endorsed Democratic candidate Walter M. Pierce. Eventually, the Supreme Court declared the Oregon School law unconstitutional. The Klan's success in Oregon, however, intensified its efforts to pass similar laws throughout the United States.

The real significance of the Klan's anti-Catholicism was the phenomenal support it enjoyed. The Klan, undoubtedly, owed much of its success to the fact that many Americans had beliefs in accord with fundamental doctrines of the hooded order. Klanism, for example, attracted many followers because it warned that the Pope was a political autocrat, who, with his Roman hierarchy, planned to take over the government of the United States. This argument was the central force in making the Mid-West, and especially Indiana, one of the strongholds of religious prejudice during the decade of the twenties.

Indiana had been noted for its anti-Catholicism when the American Protective Association had found support there in the late nineteenth century. Now in the rebirth of

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44 "Intolerance in Oregon," Survey, XLIX (October 15, 1922), 76.


nativism, the Klan utilized Indiana's anti-Catholic spirit and gave it new life.

Various rumors circulated in Indiana, each resembling typical Klan accusations. One rumor reported that Catholics buried a rifle under their church each time a male Catholic baby was born in preparation for the day when the Pope would conquer America with massive armies. Many citizens of Indiana thought the church, through parochial schools, deliberately kept its members in ignorance. Tales of its miseducation spread freely through the state. Frequent reference was made to the "downfall" of the Indianapolis school district after Catholics had gained control of the school board. As recognized by one man familiar with the Klan in Indiana, "The Klan is feeding on a revival of anti-Catholic feeling and renewed circulation of Catholic goblin stories." In Herrin, Illinois, another midwestern town, Klansmen raided homes and seized temporary control of the government because municipal officials who were Catholic and of Italian origin had allowed open saloons.

The Klan was a national organization as evidenced by its widespread anti-Catholicism. Although never equal to

48 Ibid., p. 587.
49 Ibid., p. 588.
50 Ibid.
that in other areas, there were evidences of the Klan's bigotry in the eastern United States. Protestant ministers often received letters from the hooded order urging them to wage war against Catholics.\(^2\) Klansmen circulated pamphlets condemning any kind of public ceremony in which priests officiated. When President Coolidge telegraphed a message to a convention of Knights of Columbus praising their patriotic and loyal service, high-ranking Klansmen took fierce offense at what appeared to be presidential admiration of a Roman Catholic organization.\(^3\) In Virginia, Klansmen helped defeat a Catholic candidate for public office by circulating the following statement:

Do not overlook the important factor that the movement is now underway for the mother church to place at the head of the government of the United States of America a most faithful servant obedient to the Holy Father of Rome, whose infinite power cannot be questioned.\(^4\)

One contributor to the *New York Times* wrote that the letters "K.K.K." had been painted on the pavement at the entrance to a Catholic seminary in New York.\(^5\)

The Klan received support in the East from another crusading group. W. H. Anderson, an officer of the New York

\(^3\) Ibid., August 18, 1923, p. 18.
\(^4\) Ibid., November 2, 1925, p. 6.
\(^5\) Ibid., December 13, 1925, Sec. 2, p. 12.
Anti-Saloon League, occasionally attacked New York Catholic Governor Alfred E. Smith as an ambitious politician anxious to reach the White House. Anderson, always friendly to the Klan, stated that only it stood in Smith's path to the Presidency. Anderson admired the group so much that when he set up the American Prohibitionist Protestant Protective Association to unite Protestant churches and fraternal orders, he invited the Klan to join since it was a Protestant fraternal body.56

Texas also became a stronghold of Klanism during the 1920's, so much so that the Klan held its annual convention in October, 1923, at Dallas. Evans, the Imperial Wizard, spoke to a large crowd at the State Fair of Texas on "Klan Day." He described Catholics as an "... element among our people whose assimilation is impossible without the gravest danger to our institutions."57 Among the distinguished guests on the stage with Evans were prominent officers of Dallas' municipal government. Furthermore, the Dallas Morning News editorially praised Evans' leadership in the Klan.58 While in Dallas, Evans warned, "... to them [Catholics] the presidency of Washington [sic] is subordinated to the priesthood in Rome."59

56Ibid., June 27, 1925, p. 15.
57Dallas Morning News, October 25, 1923, p. 8.
Indeed the Invisible Empire was endorsed by millions of Americans because they believed it fought only those groups foreign to American ideals. Demonstrating its truly national scope, the Klan held a parade in Washington, D. C. in 1925. President Coolidge received numerous pleas to prevent the parade, but replied that he was powerless to do so.60

Besides the Ku Klux Klan, additional groups organized to combat Catholicism. The Evangelical Protestant Society typified the crass bigotry becoming increasingly rampant in the 1920's. Established in 1922, it hoped to defend American democracy from "encroachments" by the Vatican.61 Under the leadership of eminent businessmen and theologians, the Society spread its message through the mails. Listed as charter members were Bishop William Burt of the Methodist Episcopal Church in New York City, Reverend Oscar M. Voorheas, General Secretary of Phi Beta Kappa, and E. C. Miller, President of the Magnolia Metals Company. In its preamble, the Society declared that the papal hierarchy wished to rewrite history for its own interests, that all Catholics were trying to bring war between the United States and Great Britain, and that Catholics wanted to undo the Reformation of the

61 Ibid., April 6, 1922, p. 10.
sixteenth century. This group, however, never caught the attention of many people outside New York.

Relentless attacks against Catholics did not always stem from organized groups. Individuals acting independently made charges against the church hierarchy. Reverend Dr. Charles E. Jefferson, pastor at Broadway Congregational Tabernacle in New York described the Catholic Church as arrogant and stated that it snubbed and slandered Protestants. Furthermore, he asserted that the church participated in politics and would attempt to capture public funds for parochial schools.62 It was claimed by one prominent Baptist minister that the Catholic Church was an enemy of the Bible. Unless action was taken by Protestants, the Bible would be solely in the hands of the "Roman hierarchy."63 One pamphlet, circulating in various areas of the country, identified Abraham Lincoln with anti-Catholicism. Entitled "An American Protestant Protest Against the Defilement of True Art by Roman Catholicism," it exemplified the anti-Catholic propaganda prevalent in the United States by the mid-twenties.64 The Christian Advocate, weekly magazine

63Ibid., December 31, 1923, p. 6.
64Carl Russel Fish, "Lincoln and Catholicism," American Historical Review, XXIX (July, 1924), 723-724. This is not an article but a short announcement showing how anti-Catholics were misusing history for their advantage.
published by the Methodist church, carried an article which labeled Catholics as enemies to public education.\textsuperscript{65}

Statements made in defense of Catholics reflected the rise of anti-Catholicism in the 1920's. The \textit{Enquirer Sun} in Columbus, Georgia, deplored the importance of religion as a measure of qualification for public office. "The religious yardstick has no place in American politics..."\textsuperscript{66}

As guest speaker at a gathering in New York's Hotel Pennsylvania in honor of Miss Sara McPike, first woman to become Secretary of the State Industrial Commission, Catholic Reverend Joseph H. McMahon instructed his audience to keep their Catholic ideals in "...this country where there is ingrained hostility to everything Catholic, and where there is also the cloud of bigotry that arises from suspicions that were taken in with mother's milk."\textsuperscript{67} Martin H. Manton, Judge of a United States Circuit Court of Appeals, warned that religious freedom of Catholics was being abridged by lawmakers in some parts of the nation.\textsuperscript{68} Hilaire Belloc, noted Catholic figure, wrote, "Now the culture of the United States is, from its original religion and by its

\textsuperscript{65}\textit{The Christian Advocate}, LXXXIV (February 23, 1923), 228.

\textsuperscript{66}Quoted in "Mixing Religion and Politics," p. 34.

\textsuperscript{67}\textit{New York Times}, May 21, 1923, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{68}\textit{Ibid.}, June 14, 1923, p. 16.
momentum and whole tradition, opposed to the Catholic Church."69

In spite of the defenses of Catholicism, bigotry increased. Anti-Catholics propagated the rumor that the United States planned to establish diplomatic representation with the Vatican. This rumor became so widespread that it was denied by what the New York Times described as an "authoritative source" of the government in Washington, D.C.70 Catholics throughout the United States were accused of seeking political control when Cardinal O'Connell of Boston, speaking only for himself, asked Catholics in Massachusetts to fight the proposed Child Labor amendment to the Constitution. The Cardinal's view opposed that of the Catholic Welfare Council, but he furnished ammunition for the charge that the Catholic Church strived for ultimate political and social control of the nation.71

President Coolidge felt that religious bigotry had increased greatly and appealed for tolerance and freedom of thought. Speaking before the American Legion Convention in 1925, he urged respect for the differences in race and

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69Hilaire Belloc, "The Catholic Church and Anti-Catholic Culture," The Catholic World, CXIX (September, 1924), 744.

70New York Times, January 24, 1925, p. 3.

religion among the nation's people. He considered religious bigotry repugnant to the ideals on which the nation was founded. One victim of anti-Catholicism would be Alfred E. Smith.

Governor Alfred E. Smith of New York received much attention from the anti-Catholics by the mid-twenties. A leading contender for the Democratic nomination in 1924, he encountered opposition to his religion at the national convention held at Madison Square Garden. Since 1918, with the exception of one term, Smith had served as Governor of New York and had built a remarkable record. He acquired a strong political following, but he possessed definite political liabilities. Coming from New York, he represented the urban classes and, as a wet, he opposed the Prohibitionists. Furthermore, Smith was Catholic. When rural, dry, and Protestant elements dominated America, a presidential aspirant with Smith's background seemed foredoomed.

Prior to the Democratic Convention of 1924, it became apparent that Smith's religion would be an issue. Frank P. Walsh, former member of the War Labor Board, voiced concern over the political implication of Smith's religion, "There has been a prejudice in this country to the effect that an

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unwritten law had it that a man of certain religious faith could not be President of the United States." Some outstanding persons wanted Smith nominated in 1924 in order to test the validity of the premise that a Catholic could never become President. The mayor of Boston, Edward Woodhouse, asked, "... can it be possible that this great man, the idol of a great state, will be denied a chance to be voted for by the American people because he is a Roman Catholic?" August Thomas, playwright, stated before the National Democratic Club that he would choose a Catholic "... to see whether that man had the right to hold the office which was given to him under the Constitution."

Attacks on Smith's religion often were simply part of the general anti-Catholicism existent at that time. The Ku Klux Klan declared that Smith's religion disqualified him for public office, and if he won the nomination, the Klan would fight him nationwide. The Southern Baptist Convention of 1924, by formal resolution, voiced indirectly its disapproval of Smith's potential candidacy for President.

"Some very unworthy men are aspiring to the presidency and

75 Ibid., June 27, 1924, p. 8.
76 Ibid., March 9, 1924, Sec. 1, pt. 2, p. 8.
77 Ibid., April 27, 1924, Sec. 1, p. 2.
have had publicity in the press as possible nominees."78
The Convention declared it would not support a wet candi-
date or anyone "... about whose Americanism there can be
any question."79

Smith lost the nomination for many reasons, but during
the convention opposition to his religion was evident. One
delegate later wrote to the New York Times that many of his
colleagues at the convention disliked Smith because he was
Catholic.80 Soon after the election in November, 1924,
Franklin D. Roosevelt corresponded with the convention
delegates about party ills. In the letters he received from
them, there were many statements showing considerable resent-
ment in the Democratic Party against the "Catholic element."81

As a result of Smith's loss of the nomination in 1924,
concern arose over the political power of Catholics. There
was a belief that Catholics, in retaliation, would form a
third party.82 Meetings of Catholic churchmen sparked
charges of conspiracy. Reverend H. E. Woolever in the Zion's
Herald, a Methodist weekly, warned that recent meetings in

79 Ibid.
81 Moore, A Catholic Runs for President, pp. 33-40.
82 "Is a Catholic Party Probable," Literary Digest, LXXXII (August 2, 1924), 36.
Washington, D. C. by Catholic clergymen proved the existence of a Catholic conspiracy to "wear down Protestants" and establish "Roman ideals" in the United States.\(^3\) The Forum, a national journal, ran a series of articles on the possibility of a Catholic President. One contributor concluded that if all other issues were equal between Catholic and Protestant candidates, the Protestant would be the victor.\(^4\)

Re-elected as Governor of New York in 1924 and 1926, Smith became the leading contender for the Democratic nomination of 1928. Although the Ku Klux Klan was beginning to dwindle in size and strength, it fought Smith. Internal corruption and not a decline in bigotry had caused multitudes of members to withdraw from the Klan.\(^5\) But it did not retreat from its anti-Catholic stance. In the North American Review, Hiram Wesley Evans maintained the Klan fought Catholicism because the Catholic Church, through its prominent political leaders, wished to establish political control over America. He accused Catholics of wrecking the Democratic Party in 1924. In addition, Evans accused the Catholics in the party of attempting to set up political

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\(^3\)H. E. Woolever, "A Drive Against Protestants in Government Employ," Zion's Herald, CII (October 29, 1924), 1400.

\(^4\)Martin Conboy, "Can a Catholic be President," The Forum, LXXII (July, 1924), 77.

machines such as Tammany Hall and thereby control American politics. An indication of the Klan's opposition to Smith could be seen when the success of Klan-endorsed candidates in the 1926 primary in Alabama was interpreted by some political analysts as an attack against Smith.

That same year an event occurred that convinced a great segment of the American people that the "Roman hierarchy" wished to control America. The International Catholic Eucharistic Congress met in Chicago. The Eucharistic Congress was an annual gathering in which Catholic theologians from around the world heard addresses by prominent Catholics and reviewed problems of the Catholic Church. A papal delegate usually presided over the meeting. As hundreds of robe-clad Catholic clergymen descended upon the United States, and while enroute to Chicago, they were seen at train stations, hotels, restaurants, and other public places. When Cardinal Bonzano, the papal delegate, reached New York, he was greeted publicly by New York's Mayor Jimmy Walker and Governor Smith. Observing normal Catholic custom, Smith bent down and kissed Cardinal Bonzano's ring. This mere act of ritual, and the appearance of foreign Catholic prelates, caused many Americans to think that Catholics were attempting to secure political control of the United States.

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86 Evans, "The Klan's Fight for Americanism," p. 47.
The Ku Klux Klan utilized the Eucharistic Congress as proof of the subservience of Catholic office holders to the Pope. Smith received anti-Catholic literature similar to that of the nineteenth century. One Texas Klansman fulminated, "... in your official capacity you have set a dangerous precedent in that you recognize the Roman Pontiff as civil ruler, which the Government of the United States does not recognize." The most significant charge growing out of the Eucharistic Congress came from Bishop Adna W. Leonard, General Superintendent of the Methodist Church in New York State. Addressing the New York Anti-Saloon League, the Bishop proclaimed, "No governor can kiss the papal ring and get within gunshot of the White House..." Bishop Leonard's proclamation touched off a renewed discussion on whether a Catholic should become President.

The New York Times editorially denounced Bishop Leonard's charge as bigotry. Dr. Nicholas Butler, President of Columbia University, also denounced the charge and claimed that both Republican and Democratic parties joined with him. Multitudes of letters poured into newspaper offices supporting Smith as a possible candidate for President. However, Bishop Leonard had supporters as well. During the whole commotion

89 Ibid., August 9, 1926, p. 1.
connected with the Eucharistic Congress, Smith remained silent. The episode, however, strengthened the anti-Catholic opposition to Governor Smith.

As 1926 drew to a close, attacks on Smith as a potential Catholic President increased. In parts of the South, Methodist and Baptist ministers were taking steps to prevent his nomination in 1928. Several southern newspapers announced that Smith should not become President since he was Catholic. A Protestant minister in Michigan told the *New York Times* the people of his state feared a Catholic President. Senator William C. Bruce of Maryland stated that the Board of Temperance, Prohibition, and Public Morals of the Methodist Episcopal Church was employing bigotry against Smith. As election year drew nearer and Smith emerged the probable nominee of the Democratic Party, the Ku Klux Klan, Prohibitionists, many Protestant theologians and laymen, and others who feared a Catholic President took it upon themselves to prevent Smith's ascension to the White House.

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92 *Congressional Record*, 69th Congress, 2d Session, LXVIII, 50-53.
CHAPTER II
A CATHOLIC CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT

By the opening months of 1927, Alfred E. Smith was the chief quarry of the anti-Catholics. Dr. Albert C. Dieffenbach, editor of the Unitarian Christian Register in Boston, wrote a series of editorials in January challenging the idea that a Catholic could be a worthy President. Dieffenbach's editorials, as compared to some anti-Catholic literature, maintained a high level of decency. He argued, nonetheless, that Catholics owed allegiance to a "Catholic State" and Governor Smith should abandon his presidential ambitions. Anxious to carry his case further, Dieffenbach polled many non-Catholic editors who were asked if Smith's Catholic faith affected his qualifications for the Presidency. Their consensus was that Smith's religion disqualified him.

In The Searchlight, a fundamentalist Protestant newspaper in Fort Worth, Methodist Reverend W. F. Bryan accused Catholics of controlling the American press. In 1926 The

1Moore, A Catholic Runs for President, pp. 61-62.

2Editorial note in Mark Mohler, "The Protestant Church and Religious Tolerance," Current History, XXVI (April, 1927), 47.

Searchlight had condemned all Catholics holding public office. The newspaper now contended that Catholics condemned all non-Catholics to Hell and, therefore, Smith would make a poor President of the United States. The same weekly, renamed the **Fundamentalist** in April, 1927, questioned what **Bible** Smith would use in the inauguration ceremony since, it charged, Catholics denounced Protestant Bibles.⁴

The Mexican problem, as an anti-Catholic issue, reached its peak in early 1927 when employed as a device against Smith. This problem had arisen when a new Mexican government led by Plutarco Calles came into power in 1925. The new government had compelled foreign oil companies in Mexico to renew their leases under a new law requiring royalties, a move which had angered American oil interests. Calles had confiscated land owned by the Mexican Catholic Church, deported foreign priests and monks, and banned religious instruction in private primary schools.⁵ American Catholics had attempted to persuade President Coolidge to use the resources of the United States government to alleviate the discrimination against their brethren in Mexico. Differences of opinion had arisen on whether the government should intervene on behalf of American Catholics and oil

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⁴ The **Fundamentalist**, May 20, 1927, pp. 3-4.

⁵ Hicks, *Republican Ascendancy*, p. 156.
interests. In some instances, bigots had accused the church of wanting intervention in Mexico.6

As Smith's political prestige grew in 1927, anti-Catholics utilized the Mexican situation as an issue against him. Senator Thomas Heflin of Alabama accused the Catholic press and Knights of Columbus of engaging in political activity to produce war between the United States and Mexico. He demanded that the Catholic hierarchy in America dissolve because of its alleged un-American conduct in regard to Mexico.7 By assailing Catholics in the Democratic Party in his remarks on Mexico, Heflin identified Al Smith with the Mexican issue. He charged that Smith Catholics had wrecked the Democratic Party in 1924. "Mobs from Tammany," he contended, had hissed William Jennings Bryan when he called for unity at the 1924 Democratic Convention.8 Describing the convention as a fiasco, Heflin further stated, "The Roman Catholic army of Al Smith was on the warpath."9 Arguing that the New York delegation was now a liability to the Democratic Party, he thought they should learn to be 100 per cent Americans.

6"Mexico vs. The Roman Church," The Nation, CXXIII (August 4, 1926), 99.

7Congressional Record, 69th Congress, 2d Session, LXVIII, 4126.

8Ibid., p. 4129.

9Ibid.
Senator Heflin was not alone in his denunciations of Al Smith and the Mexican issue. Anti-Catholic cartoons showed a secret plot by Catholics to invade Mexico. More respectable opinion expressed suspicion that Smith, if elected President, might be influenced by his religion to intervene in Mexico. The New Republic proclaimed that Smith must demonstrate "... that he will not regard Mexico's policy toward Catholicism as any reason for outlawing the Mexican government. . . ."

Views enunciated in church newspapers and discussions of the Mexican issue stirred fears of a Catholic President, but they were minor compared to those resulting from the Marshall-Smith exchange. It consisted of two articles that appeared in the April-May issue of The Atlantic Monthly in 1927. The first article, by Charles C. Marshall, was entitled, "An Open Letter to Honorable Alfred E. Smith." Marshall was a New York lawyer well versed in canon law who believed there was an irreconcilable conflict between principles of the Catholic Church and the American democratic state. The second article was Smith's answer, "Catholic and Patriot: Governor Smith Replies." The editor of The Atlantic Monthly termed the exchanges a "historic incident."

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10Moore, A Catholic Runs for President, p. 91.
Marshall first stated that many Americans were concerned about possible conflict between Smith's religion and his duty to public office if elected President. He objected to the teaching of Pope Leo XIII, as stated in the Catholic Encyclopedia, that governments could tolerate non-Catholic religions only by favor and not right. The Governor replied that Pope Leo XIII was describing a purely Catholic state. Discussing the Catholic Church in education, Marshall wrote, "The Roman Catholic Church, if true to her doctrinized dogma, would have to assert exclusive jurisdiction over determination of this point." Quoting from the Catholic Encyclopedia, he argued that in cases of jurisdictional conflict between the civil government and the church, the latter claimed sovereignty. According to Marshall, it determined what cases were temporal or ecclesiastical. Quoting from the Syllabus of 1864 of Pope Pius IX, he further contended that the church, in regard to the institution of marriage, ignored civil law and claimed the power to annul the bond of a civil contract. The thesis of the letter was that Catholicism conflicted with the Constitution, and Smith consequently was disqualified to be President.


15Ibid., p. 542.
In his reply, Smith announced that he stood "... squarely in support of the provisions of the Constitution which guarantee religious freedom and equality." As far as a conflict between Catholicism and American democracy was concerned, he answered that in his career as a public servant, such conflict had never occurred. To repudiate Marshall's charges about Catholicism and education, the Governor pointed out that public school funds comprised the largest single appropriation item during his administrations. Furthermore, he asserted, Catholics had never taught discrimination against non-Catholics. On the matter of church and state sovereignty, the presidential aspirant declared that an incident would never appear to produce a conflict except in nations not granting religious freedom.

The most significant aspect of Smith's reply was his conclusion that he saw no conflict between the Constitution and the Roman Catholic Church. The "Happy Warrior," a name Franklin D. Roosevelt later gave Smith, stated his belief in public education, separation of church and state, and freedom of conscience. The Governor of New York called upon his fellow Americans to join in a fervent prayer that never again would a public servant be challenged to defend


17Ibid., p. 726.

18Ibid., p. 728.
his faith in God as a qualification for office. Those who defended Smith offered his statement as an example of his loyalty to American ideals.

The response to the Marshall-Smith exchange varied. Smith's friends and supporters believed it would settle forever the religious issue except for occasional outbursts from extremists. In fact, they now considered prohibition the most serious issue facing their candidate. At the annual Jefferson Day dinner of the National Democratic Club, Senator William King of Utah advanced the notion that neither religion nor prohibition threatened Smith's future political success. Jesse H. Jones, millionaire publisher of the Houston Chronicle and strongman in the Democratic Party, responded with more caution. As he viewed it, the exchange quieted some fears, but it would have no effect on others. The New Republic editorialized that it was outrageous to rule out a candidate merely because he was Catholic, but it was legitimate to question how a Catholic candidate "wore" his Catholicism. As a result of the exchange, the journal noted, no doubts should remain over the governor's loyalty to American democratic principles.

19 New York Times, April 10, 1927, p. 3.
21 Ibid., April 20, 1927, p. 1.
Not everyone reacted favorably to Smith. The Atlantic Monthly received "scores of contributions" in reply to both articles.23 The editors refused to publish the letters, but described them as being very biased. Imperial Wizard Evans of the Ku Klux Klan typified extreme anti-Catholic response to the exchange when he declared it a fundamental failure because Smith was unable "... to separate the faith of his Church from the politics of his Church..."24 Therefore, asked the Imperial Wizard, how could Smith uphold separation of church and state once President? Outlining the topics which he considered unanswered by the New York Governor, Evans listed supremacy of church over state, patriotism of American Catholics, disloyal teaching and control of schools by Catholics, and jurisdiction of the church over "all marriages."25

Despite the hopes that the religious question would vanish, the Marshall-Smith episode stimulated anti-Catholic attacks. Bishop James Cannon, Chairman of the Board of Temperance of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, testified that Smith was a loyal son of the Catholic Church, and


24 Hiram Wesley Evans, "The Catholic Question as Viewed by the Ku Klux Klan," Current History, XXVI (July, 1927), 564.

25 Ibid., pp. 567-568.
if elected, would endanger the security of the nation.26 Reverend Henry R. Rose of Newark, New Jersey, thought it unfair to be labeled a bigot for opposing Smith, especially, he alleged, since the Catholic Church wished to control all governments.27 Reverend Rose emphasized that thousands of citizens in New Jersey shared his attitude. One Dallas resident said many Protestants feared Smith's church and would not vote for a Catholic candidate.28

As the probability grew that Smith would capture the Democratic nomination in 1928, attacks against his religion increased. The Sons and Daughters of Washington circulated pamphlets showing that he favored parochial schools.29 The leader of the dying Ku Klux Klan, Hiram Wesley Evans, continued denouncing Smith and Catholicism. At a gathering in Des Moines, Iowa, Evans accused the Happy Warrior of "... seeking to nullify the Eighteenth Amendment, to foster the ideas of Tammany Hall and to bring religion into politics."30

That religion would be a central factor in determining Smith's future political success was fully recognized by

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27Ibid., May 14, 1927, p. 18.
many observers in 1927. Numerous articles analyzed the issue of religion in politics, and one such article appeared in Current History, a national journal. Written by George Barton, it reminded readers there was no religious test for public office in the United States. Despite this fact, it continued, a major candidate for President in 1928 was under attack because he was an adherent of the Catholic faith. Barton acknowledged bigotry as part of human nature, but he declared, "... the kind we now have is the open variety rather than the secret hostility of previous days."31 The supporters of Smith who had hoped the Marshall-Smith exchange ended the religious controversy now thought differently. They learned of propaganda bombarding the South and expressed concern that anti-Catholicism blocked their candidate's route to the White House.32 A biography of Smith written by Norman Hapgood and Dr. Henry Moskowitz and published in 1927 concluded that religion and prohibition furnished the largest impediments in the Governor's political future.33

Protestant churchmen contributed significantly to the pre-campaign attempts to block Smith's nomination. A rabid anti-Catholic employing the lowest level of bigotry was


33 Ibid., November 4, 1927, p. 3. This was a news article describing the book and not an ordinary book review.
Fundamentalist Baptist Reverend J. Frank Norris of Fort Worth. The chief instruments by which Norris reached his audiences were his malevolent sermons and the *Fundamentalist*, a small weekly newspaper he controlled. Its circulation seldom encompassed areas outside Texas and Oklahoma, but Norris attracted considerable attention. He preached that the candidacy of Smith endangered the moral, political, and religious life of America. The following statement exemplified the tone of Norris' sermons: "Do the American people want a man in the White House who is a product, a devotee, a worshipper of an ecclesiastical tyranny which gave the world the bloody record of St. Bartholomew's massacre?" The *Fundamentalist* advertised anti-Catholic propaganda, usually selling for ten cents per item. One advertisement offered a list of "red hot books" which, allegedly, told the inside truth of Roman Catholicism. Titles included *Is Your Brain for Sale*, *Rome's Traffic in Nuns*, *Crimes of Priests*, *Priest and Women*, and for light reading, one could purchase the *Anti-Catholic Joke Book*. These pieces of propaganda resembled the anti-Catholic literature of the nineteenth century.

Reverend Norris represented the extreme anti-Catholic feelings of Protestant clergymen, while their more normal arguments paralleled those of Charles H. Fountain, a leading

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34 *The Fundamentalist*, February 17, 1928, p. 3.

Fundamentalist Baptist. His principal objection followed the old argument that Catholicism contradicted the principles of democracy. He regarded Smith's creed, as expressed in *The Atlantic Monthly*, completely contrary to real Catholic doctrine. Insisting that ultimately the Pope wished to place all governments in control of Roman Catholics, Fountain concluded that "... no Catholic should be elected to any political office. He cannot logically swear allegiance to the Constitution because of his religion."  

Fountain received support from Protestant leaders. Urging continual resistance to encroachments on liberty by the Catholic Church, William W. Rockwell, librarian of Union Theological Seminary in New York, proclaimed, "We Protestants must resist from the beginning anything which may endanger liberty of conscience, freedom of the press and the independence of our Chief Magistrate."  

Resolutions of Southern Baptist Conventions reflected the attitudes of many Protestant ministers on Smith's candidacy. The Convention of 1927 refused any support for candidates against prohibition.

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36 Charles H. Fountain, "The Case for the Opposition to a Catholic President," *Current History*, XXVII (March, 1928), 770.  
37 Ibid., p. 778.  
Reporting on the presidential campaign, the Convention of 1926 resolved that all political parties should nominate men who were "... for the maintenance and support of the Constitution of the United States in all its parts and with all its amendments. ..." Neither resolution explicitly objected to Smith's faith; but each strongly reinforced objectives to his candidacy.

Al Smith remained the likely nominee of the Democratic Party when the presidential primaries began. The primaries caused little stir in the pre-convention activities, for their importance had been steadily declining since 1916. In fact, only seventeen states required presidential primaries. Presidential candidates obtained the majority of their delegates by means of state and district party conventions. Furthermore, and it cannot be overemphasized, Smith had a large and powerful enough political following that he encountered no major opposition within the Democratic Party. The Happy Warrior lost certain primaries to favorite son candidates, but these aspirants had little political force. The fact that neither Smith or Hoover left their desks, but allowed

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41 Clyde L. King, "Legislative Notes and Reviews," American Political Science Review, XXII (February, 1928), 108.

their campaign managers to handle the primaries illustrated the insignificance of pre-convention campaigning in 1928.\textsuperscript{43} The campaigning was done almost entirely by mail. Indeed a feature of the primary campaigns was the absence of stump speakers representing their candidates. One political observer believed that in no primaries since 1912 had candidates campaigned less.\textsuperscript{44}

A short-lived attempt by Thomas J. Walsh of Montana to challenge Smith's position in the Democratic Party illuminated a crucial aspect of the Governor's candidacy. A dry and a Catholic, the admired Teapot Dome prosecutor came from a rural state, while Smith represented the wet, urban element. By promoting Walsh, certain party leaders hoped to show the Democratic Party that prohibition, not religion, formed Smith's greatest political liability.\textsuperscript{45} Walsh made no gain. After participating in one primary, he withdrew and pledged his support for Smith.\textsuperscript{46} The move to make Walsh head of the Party, however, demonstrated that Smith confronted, besides religious prejudice, the rural, dry sentiment of America. For this reason, the social issues in the campaign of 1928 equaled the political.

\textsuperscript{43}\textit{New York Times}, June 10, 1928, Sec. 9, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{44}\textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{45}Moore, \textit{A Catholic Runs for President}, p. 93. This author concluded that had Walsh been the party's choice, the religious issue in 1928 would have had less importance.

\textsuperscript{46}\textit{New York Times}, June 10, 1928, Sec. 9, p. 5.
Fear of a Catholic political party revealed the apprehension of many Americans toward Catholic candidates. This fear resulted from the fact that the two front-runners for the Democratic nomination were Catholics. Many Protestants worried about the "rise" of Catholicism. Journalist Mark Sullivan foretold that if Al Smith lost the election, three to four million Catholics would leave the Democratic Party. Stanley Frost, well-known journalist of the Washington Post, predicted that a Catholic party would emerge as a result of the Governor's candidacy.

The Democratic Convention met in Houston. The strong support of Governor Smith almost guaranteed his nomination. On the eve of the convention, the Happy Warrior had 703 delegate votes, while Senator James A. Reed of Missouri, his principal rival, mustered only 36. Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas, minority leader in the Senate, was chosen permanent chairman. Robinson had gained the favor of the northeasterners when he rebuked Heflin's attack on the Catholic Church. The Arkansas Methodist pleaded for religious tolerance, among other things, in his acceptance speech as chairman.

47"Is the Papal Power Increasing," Review of Reviews, LXXVII (February, 1928), 209.


49Peel and Donnelly, The 1928 Campaign, pp. 16-17.
Franklin D. Roosevelt nominated Governor Smith, while other nominees included Senator Reed, Jesse H. Jones of Texas, and Evans Woollen of Indiana. Democrats wanted to avoid the fiasco at Madison Square Garden in 1924. This attitude helped explain why the Happy Warrior encountered little opposition at the convention. Furthermore, the delegates thought that only Smith could bring victory.\textsuperscript{50} Although sidewalk speakers in Houston prophesied that God would block Smith's nomination, the delegates chose the Governor on the first ballot. Southern states cast some complimentary votes for favorite sons. This move by southerners could not safely be classified as an anti-Catholic demonstration since every national convention has favorite son candidates on its first ballot. Picked by the northeasterners, Senator Robinson was nominated for Vice-President as an effort to balance the ticket, since he was a southern dry Protestant.\textsuperscript{51}

Once the Happy Warrior had been nominated, anti-Catholic attacks increased in frequency and peaked during the last few weeks of the campaign. One popular charge dealt with Smith's choice of John Jacob Raskob as his campaign manager. Hoping to draw business support away from the Republican Party, the Governor selected Raskob, executive chairman of General Motors. However, Raskob was also Catholic, and his appointment

\textsuperscript{50}Ibid., p. 33.
\textsuperscript{51}Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, p. 203.
brought outcries of a Catholic conspiracy. It was alleged that in appointing Raskob, Smith had followed orders from the Pope. The Christian Advocate editorialized

And if in the presence of an issue made menacing by the nomination of SMITH and his selection of RASKOB as campaign manager, the Catholic church keeps aloof and dumb, it better quit claiming to be "strictly religious" and "serving the kingdom of God."^53

Once the campaign was underway, the New York Governor decided to remain silent on the religious question. It has been suggested that he never realized the full significance of the issue. The New York Times opined that the Democratic Party mishandled the religious question. There appears to have been no agreement among Smith's advisors on whether his faith should be discussed openly. Apparently the decision rested with the candidate, for on September 20 in Oklahoma City, disregarding advice from his staff, Smith spoke on the religious controversy. This was the only instance during the campaign that he dealt with the issue.

Oklahoma was a nucleus of anti-Catholicism during the campaign. The almost defunct Ku Klux Klan enjoyed strength there after it had disappeared elsewhere. Smith's staff

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^52The Fundamentalist, October 12, 1928, p. 6.

^53"Politics," The Christian Advocate, CIII (July 26, 1928), 923.

^54Peil and Donnelly, The 1928 Campaign, p. 94.

greatly feared for their candidate's safety in Oklahoma City. It was for these reasons, however, that he decided to speak on the religious issue. Lashing at bigots, he repudiated the accusation that only Catholics served in his administrations as Governor. Striking back at the Klan, the candidate declaimed, "The world knows no greater mockery than the use of a blazing cross . . . as a symbol to install into the hearts of men a hatred of their brethren, while Christ preached and died for the love and brotherhood of man." Refuting anti-Catholics, he stated, "I here and now drag them into the open and I denounce them as a treasonable attack upon the very foundation of American liberty."

Response to the Oklahoma speech signified a turning point in anti-Catholic attacks. Whereas previously the religious question had been dubbed the "Whispering Campaign," it was now considered an open issue. Protestant churchmen interpreted the speech as an attempt to obtain sympathy votes. John Roach Straton, prominent minister of the Calvary Baptist Church in New York City, believed that Smith "... deliberately and with calculated purpose dragged the religious issue into the Presidential campaign."

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56 Ibid., p. 396.
58 Ibid., p. 55.
According to Straton, the Governor represented three groups—wets, Catholics, and Tammany Hall. Reflecting the attitudes of many Methodists, The Christian Advocate editorialized that Smith raised the question in hopes of appearing as a victim of religious prejudice.\textsuperscript{60} Zion's Herald, another Methodist weekly, weighed the speech in more dramatic terms, "At Oklahoma City he set up his man of straw, the religious issue, and whined about bigotry and religious tolerance."\textsuperscript{61} Yet Reverend M. F. Ham, pastor of the First Baptist Church in Oklahoma City, warned his congregation that a vote for Smith was a vote against Christ. The New York Times assessed the northeasterner's religion as the largest issue in Oklahoma.\textsuperscript{62}

With the religious question publicly recognized by Smith, Protestant theologians revitalized their crusade against him. Baptist ministers were urged to preach politics in the pulpit in order to protect the religious freedom and morals of the nation.\textsuperscript{63} Some Protestant clergymen claimed that Catholicism alone should not keep a Catholic candidate from the White House, but Catholicism, they argued, entailed

\textsuperscript{60}"The Whispering Presidential Campaign," The Christian Advocate (October 18, 1928), 1270.

\textsuperscript{61}"Not a Campaign But a Crusade," Zion's Herald, CVI (October 24, 1928), 1359.

\textsuperscript{62}New York Times, October 3, 1928, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{63}Baptist Standard, September 27, 1928, p. 4.
a world-wide political party anxious to control national governments. Therefore, they maintained, Catholics had brought opposition on themselves.\textsuperscript{64} Frequently, Protestant organizations denounced Smith's candidacy. The Southern Methodist Educational Association had resolved that the New Yorker's nomination would be unfortunate. In the heat of the campaign, Methodists continued to flail Smith. They defined the religious issue as a matter of governmental control by the Catholic Church because allegedly its hierarchy interfered in the affairs of nations.\textsuperscript{65} Reverend J. W. Hunt, president of Methodist-supported McMurray College in Texas, warned of a "Catholic shrine" in the White House and of Smith's obedience to foreign influences.\textsuperscript{66}

The Tennessee Baptist and Reflector typified many less known Protestant weeklies expressing anti-Catholicism. It warned of Catholics massacring Protestants, the revelation of state secrets to priests by the Democratic nominee, and the political dreams of the "king of the Catholic world."\textsuperscript{67} Touring West Texas, Fundamentalist J. Frank Norris condemned Smith as a political representative of the Catholic church.

\textsuperscript{64}Ibid., September, 1928, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{65}"Bigotry," The Christian Advocate (October 11, 1928), 1227.


\textsuperscript{67}Ibid.
Morris played upon white supremacy in his demagogic appeal. His *Fundamentalist*, for example, showed a huge photograph which depicted a Negro official in the Governor's administration dictating to a white secretary. The same weekly reported, however valid, that the National Lutheran Editors Association had adopted a resolution charging that Catholicism conflicted with the best interests of the United States.

Methodist Bishop James Cannon was an outstanding anti-Smith leader of Methodists. Along with the Baptist figure A. J. Barton, he had held a conference of southern, dry, Protestants prior to the campaign. The conference had launched a drive to convince dry Protestants to vote for Hoover. Cannon was instrumental in persuading many Democrats to bolt and support Hoover. Although he emphasized the prohibition issue, Cannon did resort to anti-Catholic tactics. He once asked if Catholics had the right to pass judgment on all Protestant marriages and declare all Protestant children bastards.

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70 *New York Times*, August 26, 1928, Sec. 2, p. 5. Edmund Moore considered Cannon's activities the principal force in persuading the South to vote for Hoover. See *A Catholic Runs for President*, p. 169.

Responsible people besides Protestant theologians contributed to the anti-Catholic movement in 1928. Mrs. Mabel Willebrandt, Assistant Attorney General of the United States, advertised her bigotry by addressing only Protestant groups. Although concerned primarily with the prohibition issue, she incorporated anti-Catholicism into her logic. Reviewing Smith's speech in Oklahoma City, she accused the Governor of bringing the religious issue into the campaign. Carrying her argument further, she remarked, "In this case he . . . is trying to hide behind it [church] . . . ."\textsuperscript{72}

William Allen White also intensified Protestant fears. A popular midwestern journalist, White symbolized rural, small town America. Although he frequently censured bigotry, White charged that Smith threatened Puritanism. Warning of the "sinister forces" behind the Democratic candidate, White portrayed the New Yorker as the representative of cosmopolitan groups wanting to impose an urban culture on America.\textsuperscript{73} By such a portrayal of Smith, White heightened Protestant fears.

The Ku Klux Klan was considerably less effective than ministers or popular anti-Catholic spokesmen. By 1928 the


hooded order was almost defunct. Its remaining members, however, conducted anti-Smith rallies and circulated literature. Imperial Wizard Evans identified the Happy Warrior with aliens—an identification reflecting the conflict between rural and urban America. One contemporary writer believed the Klan the central force in connecting Smith with immigrants. Picturing him as the champion of immigrants, Evans proclaimed, "It has come about that the majority of our unassimilated aliens are Roman Catholics... Governor Smith is the hope and candidate of them all." Klansmen held many demonstrations against the Catholic candidate. While enroute to Helena, Montana, Smith passed by such a gathering. In Wahouma, Alabama, Klansmen burned, beat, stabbed, and dragged Smith in effigy. The Invisible Empire distributed literature condemning Smith on the issues of religion, prohibition, and his affiliation with aliens.

74 Although the United States Attorney General in Kansas believed Smith's candidacy revived the Klan in Kansas, its campaign activity was secondary compared to other bigoted groups. For Klan in Kansas, see New York Times, February 9, 1928, p. 8.

75 Edward J. Byrne, "The Religious Issue in National Politics," Catholic Historical Review, XIV (October, 1928), 360.


with Tammany Hall. One such example was the Kourier Magazine, the group's monthly periodical of limited circulation.\footnote{Ibid., p. 88.}

Extremely virulent rumors and pamphlets attacking the Democratic nominee and his church circulated during the campaign. The most debased rumor, and widely published, was the oath attributed to the Knights of Columbus. This oath had appeared prior to World War I, and a Congressman had inserted it into the \textit{Congressional Record} in 1913 as an illustration of anti-Catholic propaganda. During the 1928 campaign, many bigots claimed that insertion in the \textit{Congressional Record} proved its validity. Anti-Catholics charged that members of the Knights of Columbus took the oath during their initiation.

\begin{quote}
I declare and swear that His Holiness, the Pope, is Christ's vice regent . . . he hath power to dispose heretical kings, princes, States, Commonwealths . . . to extirpate the heretical Protestant doctrines . . . to make and wage relentless war against Protestants . . . I will spare neither age, sex, or condition and I will hang, burn, waste, boil, flay, strangle, and bury alive these infamous heretics . . . witness the same further with my name written with the point of this dagger dipped in my blood. . . .\footnote{\textit{Congressional Record}, 62d Congress, 2d Session, XLIX, 3216.}
\end{quote}

This type of propaganda, most extensive in the South, resembled that of the nineteenth century. Examples of rumors included the accusation that the Pope would be placed on a
battleship overlooking the Capitol if Smith won the election. Another rumor warned that the New York Governor would build a throne in the White House for cardinals of his church. Still another reported that once elected President, the Catholic candidate would decree that all future marriages be performed by priests. The National Democratic headquarters in Washington, D. C., kept a Chamber of Horrors containing samples of anti-Catholic campaign propaganda. It has been estimated that ten million pieces of propaganda were circulated in one week.

The Republican Party showed no unanimity on the religious issue in 1928. In his speech accepting the nomination, Herbert Hoover declared, "By blood and conviction I stand for religious tolerance both in act and in spirit." The Caldwell letter, however, furnished an illustrous example of different attitudes in the Republican Party. Mrs. Willie Caldwell, a Virginia National Committeewoman, wrote a circular letter inspiring women party workers in her state to save the country from being "Romanized and rum-ridden."

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80 "Whisper's Credo," Outlook, CL (October 10, 1928), 935.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
The letter created enough stir that Hoover promptly denounced it, "I cannot reiterate too strongly that religious questions have no part in this campaign." Oliver D. Street, Republican National Committeeman in Alabama, utilized religious bigotry. He circulated pamphlets showing the Catholic church as a live issue because it allegedly claimed superiority over the government.

Anti-Catholic activity by Republicans did not go unnoticed. The New York Times had editorialized before the campaign that gossiping tongues had been employed for the Republican Party. One journal editor charged Hoover with providing only negative statements about religious prejudice.

As the campaign drew to a close, the New York Times accused Republican leaders of deliberately exploiting bigotry. In fact, the great daily newspaper laid considerable blame on Republicans for the impact of the religious issue.

As election night progressed, it was apparent that Hoover had won. Of the total 531 electoral votes, Hoover received 444. Moreover, the solid South split its vote. The Democratic

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86 Ibid. See also Hoover, Memoirs, II, 208.
87 "Governor Smith's Religion," Literary Digest, XCIX (October 20, 1928), 32.
candidate lost Florida, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and North Carolina. Nonetheless, the Happy Warrior polled over 40 per cent of the popular vote and obtained the largest number of votes ever cast for a Democratic candidate.\textsuperscript{91} Smith gained most support from huge urban areas—areas containing many Catholics and immigrants.\textsuperscript{92} It followed, therefore, that he received the votes of most Catholics, who comprised roughly 16 per cent of the total population.\textsuperscript{93}

There have been assertions that Smith's faith prevented his ascension to the White House.\textsuperscript{94} In spite of the anti-Catholicism in the campaign, religion was not the sole reason for his defeat. Prosperity, for example, outranked religion as an issue. In 1928 the public identified the Republican Party with prosperity and connected the Democrats with economic depression. There appears to be some correlation between the business cycle and presidential popularity;\textsuperscript{95} if so, people were voting Republican in 1928. The mid-term elections of 1926 revealed that Republicans were the favored party.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{91}Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., \textit{The Crisis of the Old Order} (Boston, 1957), p. 129.
\item \textsuperscript{92}Hicks, \textit{Republican Ascendancy}, p. 212.
\item \textsuperscript{93}The total population in 1928 was 120,501,000 with Catholics contributing 19,689,000. See Bureau of Census, \textit{Historical Statistics}, pp. 7, 228.
\item \textsuperscript{94}Richard Hofstadter, "Could a Protestant Have Beaten Hoover in 1928," \textit{The Reporter}, XXII (March 17, 1960), 31.
\item \textsuperscript{95}Ibid.
\end{itemize}
Besides prosperity, prohibition was an important issue. Two well-known analysts of the campaign labeled it the second most important campaign subject. Another analyst concluded that prohibition was three times more decisive than religion in the campaign. Individuals such as Bishop Cannon and Mabel Willebrandt, active in the religious issue, fought the Governor's stand on prohibition.

Smith's faith, however, contributed to his defeat. In terms of the electoral vote, anti-Catholicism probably swung Florida, Texas, and some states in the Upper South to Hoover. Hoover clearly failed to realize the impact of anti-Catholicism when he concluded that "... the religious issue had no weight in the final result."  

96 Pell and Donnelly, The 1928 Campaign, p. 57.  
97 Ibid., p. 128. This was the conclusion of Professor William F. Ogburn who made a detailed study of the election returns.  
99 Hoover, Memoirs, II, 209.
CHAPTER III

ANTI-CATHOLICISM BETWEEN SMITH AND KENNEDY

In the aftermath of the 1928 election, anti-Catholicism dwindled greatly. The campaign settled for the moment the issue of a Catholic President and a period of "less acute" religious bigotry followed.¹ Certain extremists such as Senator Heflin and Reverend J. Frank Norris, however, continued believing that the Pope wished to control America. Warning of papal authority, Norris preached of "Rome's defiance of Protestant America" and the "Pope King's desire for world supremacy."² On the Senate floor Heflin charged that with the nomination of Alfred E. Smith in 1928, the Democratic Party had forsaken public education, separation of church and state, and white supremacy. Heflin's accusations provoked demonstrations against him in the Senate gallery and refutations from several Senators.³ Protestant ministers left politics and returned to their pulpits and congregations. They often discussed their differences with

¹Anson Stokes, Church and State, II, 411.

²The Fundamentalist, February 1, 1929, p. 3, and March 8, 1929, p. 2.

Catholicism on topics such as mixed marriages, but did not revive the degraded issues of 1928.

After the campaign, Catholics wished to improve their image, while many non-Catholics desired to combat religious prejudice. An important organization designed to fight bigotry was the National Conference of Jews and Christians, a nation-wide agency composed of Protestants, Catholics and Jews. Although originally set up in 1928, the Conference never became significantly active until after the election. Nationally known figures such as Charles Evans Hughes, former Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, and Dr. S. Parkes Cadman, President of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ led the group. Describing the Conference's purpose, Evans stated, "When we lose the right to be different, we lose the right to be free." More explicitly, Baker announced that it would fight prejudice and attempt to minimize hatred and bigotry.

The Conference carried out an educational campaign through the mails. Moreover, it sponsored teams composed of priests, rabbis, and ministers who visited towns and presented doctrines of their church. The teams had an instructive

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4One article exemplifying this type of discussion is Thomas Quinn Beasley, "What It Means to Marry a Catholic," The Forum, LXXXII (October, 1929), 226-230.

5"What Shall the Catholics Do," The Commonweal, IX (January 2, 1929), 250-251.

6Quoted in Stokes, Church and State, II, 462.
instead of competitive nature. Catholics participated fully in the Conference, still active today.

Once the depression began, the Democratic Party became confident of winning the presidency in 1932. In the 1930 mid-term elections, the Party obtained a majority in the House of Representatives and won many gubernatorial races. Alfred E. Smith again became a leading contender for the nomination. Party workers, however, rumored that a Catholic candidate simply could not be elected President. Summarizing the Party's attitude toward the religious question, Arthur Mullen, midwestern Democrat, declared, "We are tired of this religious issue." Although Smith polled over 200 votes at the Convention, the political force of Franklin D. Roosevelt removed any fears of another Catholic candidate. One observer asserted that Roosevelt won the nomination only because the delegates avoided a Catholic nominee.

The depression witnessed other manifestations of anti-Catholicism. Preaching that Catholics were barred from public office, Reverend Henry F. Hammer of New York City charged that nation-wide forces were working "... to keep Catholic men and women out of high national office." Hammer believed

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7Quoted in Oscar Handlin, Al Smith and His America (Boston, 1958), p. 156.


that Americans considered the Catholic church foreign. The Zion's Herald, a Methodist weekly journal, denounced Catholicism, proclaiming, "Instead of seeking primarily spiritual power, Roman Catholicism by its very genius strives constantly for temporal domination." These bursts of anti-Catholicism did not typify Protestant sermons or editorial outlook. The Zion's Herald published no series of articles denouncing Catholicism, and Hammer's sermon likewise was an isolated incident manifesting no wide-scale concern over religious bigotry.

Indeed, during the depression anti-Catholicism declined as a nativist movement. John F. Moore in his contemporary work, Will America Become Catholic, attributed the decline to the belief that Catholics could never establish a majority in the United States. One observer noted a decrease in the number of ex-priests telling "weird Tales." Speaking under the auspices of the National Conference of Jews and Christians, Henry Breckenridge, legal advisor to Charles A. Lindbergh, thought religious tolerance had never been greater.

10 "Romanism in a Thoughtful World," Zion's Herald, CXI (August 23, 1933), 795-796.

11 The following is an article on Moore's book. "Will America Become Catholic," Literary Digest, CX (September 19, 1931), 18.

12 Ritchie Low, "The Road to Rome," Zion's Herald, CX (January 6, 1932), 10-12.

Praising the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, the *New York Times* editorialized that the gap between Protestant and Catholic was steadily closing. The same newspaper believed that in temporal and spiritual matters, the Council had contributed greatly to a cooperative spirit.\(^\text{14}\)

The depression affected many social attitudes in America. Economic problems left little time for nativist movements. The New Deal had a liberal philosophy encouraging a spirit of cooperativeness and public responsibility. Recognition of minority groups and appointments of many Catholics and Jews in the Roosevelt administration enhanced the climate of tolerance.\(^\text{15}\) The assimilation of Catholic immigrants and a general wider class distribution during the 1930's contributed to the decline in anti-Catholicism. The bigotry of the 1920's did not completely expire, but it declined to a negligible level.

Toward the latter part of the 1930's, however, there was an outcropping of anti-Catholic feeling. Although it never approached that of the 1920's, the ill-feeling stemmed from the hierarchy's position on Spain's Civil War.

\(^{14}\)Ibid., March 5, 1933, Sec. 4, p. 4.

\(^{15}\)Handlin, *Race and Nationality*, pp. 146-147. Outstanding Catholics were Postmaster General James Farley, Ambassador to England Joseph P. Kennedy, Assistant Director to the Bureau of Mint Mary O'Reilly. Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury, was the most outstanding Jewish appointee.
When the Spanish army revolted in July, 1936, Spain plunged into civil war. The Catholic Church of Spain supported and aided the insurgents led by Francisco Franco. President Roosevelt imposed an embargo on the sale of arms and munitions to Spain. The Catholic press and hierarchy in America favored the rebellion, although the majority of Catholic laymen and non-Catholics were pro-Loyalists. Pro-Franco Catholics denounced the Spanish government and, among other things, launched a fund-raising campaign to help finance the Franco movement.

The activities of Father Charles Coughlin, the radio priest of the 1930's, intensified the ill-feeling toward the Catholic hierarchy. Coughlin was pro-Franco and opposed shipment of munitions to the Spanish government. Furthermore, Coughlin had been instrumental in setting up the Union Party, a short-lived combination of dissatisfied elements. A rumor spread that Coughlin's Union Party and the pro-Franco support of the hierarchy marked the entrance of the Catholic Church into politics. Alfred E. Smith and John J. Raskob allegedly were part of a grand movement to "get Roosevelt." Respectable journals believed the rumor had considerable truth.

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17For illustrations of the Catholic position, see "An Attack on Democracy," The Commonweal, XXV (March 12, 1937), 537-538, and Newsweek, VIII (September 19, 1936), 16-17.

The New Republic contended that the Catholic Church purposely refrained from interfering with Coughlin's political activity. It argued further that as a result of losing power to fascist governments, the Catholic Church wished to strengthen itself in the United States. Another journal, The Nation, advanced this argument. Asserting that Catholicism was dying in Spain and other nations, a contributor to the journal thought the church needed new strength in capitalistic countries. Hence, the Pope allegedly had political dreams for America. One journal suggested that the press presented biased discussion of the Spanish Civil War because of pressure from Catholics. Taking the same view, George Seldes, contemporary author of The Catholic Crisis, insisted that the Catholic press present unbiased discussion of the war before pressuring the country's newspapers.

As the civil war continued, demands that the President remove the embargo increased. Franco received aid from Fascist Germany and Italy, and the Catholic Church, consequently, was identified with the Fascist movement. The New Republic

19Ibid., p. 266.
claimed that the hierarchy had caused the embargo, and urged Roosevelt to remove it without fear of Catholic recrimination at the polls.24 The Nation also demanded a renewal of the embargo.25

Despite these appeals, the President refused, and Catholics were accused of influencing him. Although this has never been confirmed, Harold Ickes, Secretary of Interior, later recorded that Roosevelt feared a removal of the embargo "... would mean the loss of every Catholic vote next fall."26 Roosevelt's concern, said Ickes, proved that Catholic minorities dictated American policy with Spain.

In addition to the Spanish situation, another Mexican issue comparable to that of the late 1920's contributed to the ill-feeling toward the church. In 1938 the Mexican government enacted a series of laws discriminating against the Mexican Catholic Church and expropriated foreign-owned oil industries. There were demands that Roosevelt intervene in Mexico, but he refused, a move that one Protestant journal interpreted as his unwillingness to obey the Knights of

24 "A Telegram to the President," The New Republic, XCVII (February 1, 1939), 357.

25 "The President Must Act," The Nation, CXLVI (April 9, 1938), 400.

Columbus.27 Denunciations of the Catholic stand on Spain included accusations that the hierarchy wanted to involve the government in Mexico. The Nation, for example, simultaneously attacked the church's attitude on the situations in Spain and Mexico. Describing the church as anti-democratic, The Nation advanced the notion that Catholicism tried to "eat up the state."28 Roosevelt, it insisted, had offended the hierarchy by keeping Josephus Daniels as ambassador to Mexico. The New Republic likewise argued that the church considered Daniels, a southern rural editor, anti-Catholic.29 Moreover, it continued, when certain members of the Roosevelt family had divorced their mates, they allegedly antagonized the hierarchy.

The Mexican issue, as an anti-Catholic charge, never equaled that relating to the Spanish situation. Anti-Catholic expressions, nonetheless, followed these two episodes. The Christian Advocate described the Catholic Church as an institution practicing toleration only when it was a minority church.30 Resembling the more respectable

27Baptist Standard, February 20, 1936, p. 3. Leuchtenburg has argued that Catholics threatened Roosevelt with political reprisal if he failed to intervene in Mexico. However, he presents no supporting evidence. See his Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, p. 209.


anti-Catholic literature of the 1928 election, the most notable attack was a series of articles in The New Republic. The author, Leo H. Lehmann, discussed several facets of the Catholic issue.

One topic concerned the role of the church in censoring movies. Charging that the hierarchy wished to control all movie and radio productions, Lehmann accused the church of inflaming public opinion so that the government would establish a censorship agency over which Catholics would gain control.31 He thought that the church stopped distribution of films on the Spanish Civil War. Expanding this theme, he argued that the hierarchy considered political censorship under its surveillance. Lehmann reasoned that ratification of the Child Labor amendment was lacking because of Catholic opposition. Attacking church doctrine on marriage, he argued that on this matter it claimed sovereignty over all civil law. His use of terms such as "Catholic agents" dramatized the tone of the articles.32

As a result of its pro-Franco sentiment, the church was considered a Fascist ally. Lehmann utilized this issue in his effort to show a conflict between the principles of Catholicism and democracy. He charged that when Pope Pius XI signed

31Leo H. Lehmann, "Censorship by the Church," The New Republic, XCVII (November 23, 1936), 64.

the Lateran Treaty with Mussolini in 1929, Catholics aligned themselves with the rising dictatorial powers of Europe. Actually, the Lateran Treaty simply made the Vatican a separate state of about 100 acres and did not end friction between Fascists and the church. Lehmann, nonetheless, warned of Catholic "Fascist colonies" in America. He insisted that in Jersey City, New Jersey, one such colony had suppressed freedom of speech. The local Protestant churchmen feared to protest because allegedly members of their congregation would receive economic pressures from Catholic citizens. Arguing that Catholic laymen blindly followed orders from the hierarchy, Lehmann declared, "The fact must be faced that Catholics as a group cannot be counted on in any struggle against the forces of fascism in America."

The anti-Catholicism sparked by the Spanish war never became a widespread movement. There was, for example, an absence of propaganda comparable to that of the 1920's. Although there was some limited evidence of anti-Catholicism in other journals, The Nation and The New Republic furnished

33Herman Finer, Mussolini's Italy (London, 1935), pp. 458-460.

the significant literature attacking the church. Moreover, European racism sparked an outbreak of anti-semitism in the United States in the late thirties. The fact that Jews were the chief target of bigots helped explain the lack of a significant anti-Catholic movement in the late 1930's.

President Roosevelt contributed somewhat to ill-feeling against the Catholic Church when, in late 1939, he appointed Episcopalian Myron C. Taylor as his personal representative to the Vatican. Although Taylor did not have official ambassador rank, certain editors and Protestant groups protested the appointment. The Christian Century published articles denouncing it as a move to obtain political support from Catholics. The journal considered Taylor's appointment illegal since it did not include Senate confirmation. The Council of Bishops of the Methodist Church represented the attitudes of many Protestant ministers when, in 1940, it opposed representation to the Vatican, but urged close

35For discussion of these slight anti-Catholic outcroppings, see The Commonweal, XXIX (November 25, 1938), 116-117. For a study of religious preference in personnel positions of this period, see A. L. Severson, "Nationality and Religious Preferences as Reflected in Newspaper Advertisements," American Journal of Sociology, XLIV (January, 1939), 540-545.


39The Christian Advocate, LVII (January 3, 1940), 3-4.
cooperation with the Catholic Church. The New Republic theorized that Taylor could accomplish little for the United States.

These elements attacking the church in the late thirties never resorted to the virulent anti-Catholic issues of the 1920's. They made no reference to political ambitions of the Pope or attempts by Catholics to destroy Protestantism. Likewise, the protests had no organized force, nor did rumors circulate condemning Roosevelt as a political puppet of the Pope.

Anti-Catholicism remained insignificant during World War II. The racist activities in Europe made religious bigotry unattractive. The New Republic continued to warn of a pro-Fascist Catholic movement, but attracted little attention. Even The Nation, which had accused the church of political ambitions, stopped attacking the hierarchy. The Commonweal, a noted Catholic journal, editorialized that intolerance was declining in Georgia, a state known

40 New York Times, April 26, 1940, p. 10.

41 "Pope, President, and Peace," The New Republic, CII (January 1, 1940), 6-7.


43 The following demonstrated the tone of the journal's articles: George P. West, "The Catholic Issue," The New Republic, CVIII (March 1, 1943), 278-280.
for its religious prejudices. In a later issue, the same journal stated that its brethren now commanded greater respect and instructed its readers not to label everyone as a bigot who disliked Catholic practices.

Although anti-Catholicism declined remarkably during World War II, it soon returned. It was limited, however, to professional agitators. This increase in bigotry was recognized in its early stages. In 1945 Methodist Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam, president of the Federal Council of Churches, warned of growing tension between Protestants and Catholics and called on his colleagues to combat it. Concerned about a re-emergence of intolerance, The Commonweal editorialized, "It is a sad portent for the American future that anti-Catholic propaganda in the United States is on the increase." The Protestant War Veterans of the United States was founded after the war, an organization the Assistant Attorney General of Georgia described as a "front" for the Ku Klux Klan.

44"Catholics in Georgia," The Commonweal, XXXVII (March 5, 1943), 501.
46"Unbrotherly Division," Time, XLVI (November 5, 1945), 61.
47"Intolerance," The Commonweal, XLII (July 13, 1945), 299.
The significant post-war attacks on Catholicism came from a group of writers led by Paul Blanshard. Blanshard had served in various official capacities, including a position in the Department of State in World War II. In late 1947, he began a series of articles attempting to show an incompatibility between the principles of democracy and Catholicism. Discussing issues such as marriage, birth control, medicine, and education, he emphasized that Catholic laymen were good Americans, but regretted that they blindly obeyed the hierarchy.49 On the issue of Catholic practices in medicine, the former public servant considered church doctrine on sterilization, insemination, and sexual relations inconsistent with modern life. He termed the Catholic position on sexual conduct, for example, as an "anti-sexual code."50

Insisting that the church claimed jurisdiction over public education, Blanshard alleged that it had already launched a full-scale campaign against public schools. Arguing further that Catholic education was inferior, he declaimed: "The parochial-school system has been imposed upon them [Catholic laymen] by the hierarchy at the point

49Paul Blanshard, "The Catholic Church in Medicine," The Nation, CLXV (November 1, 1947), 466.

of a theological gun."\textsuperscript{51} In similar articles, the former civil servant accused the hierarchy of trying to establish censorship over not only books and motion pictures, but people as well.\textsuperscript{52}

To conclude his series, Blanshard published two essays on Catholicism and democracy. In these he deduced from his previous discussions that Catholicism was repugnant to a democratic form of government. He expanded this theme by speculating how Catholics would amend the Constitution if they ever became a majority. Besides declaring the nation a Catholic Commonwealth, the hierarchy, he alleged, would maintain only church courts.\textsuperscript{53} Freedom of religion would prevail, but it would be closely supervised by the priesthood. The maintenance of public education, he continued, would determine the outcome of the struggle between Catholicism and democracy, and therefore, Protestants must defend their public schools.\textsuperscript{54}

In 1949 Blanshard incorporated the foregoing essays into his first book attacking Catholics—\textit{American Freedom and Catholic Power}. This work reached a wider audience than his series of

\textsuperscript{51}Paul Blanshard, "The Catholic Church and Education," \textit{The Nation}, CLXV (November 15, 1947), 527.

\textsuperscript{52}Paul Blanshard, "The Catholic Church as a Censor," \textit{The Nation}, CLXVI (May 1, 1948), 459.

\textsuperscript{53}Paul Blanshard, "The Catholic Church and Democracy," \textit{The Nation}, CLXVI (May 29, 1948), 601.

\textsuperscript{54}Paul Blanshard, "The Catholic Church and Democracy," \textit{The Nation}, CLXVI (June 5, 1948), 631.
articles and brought him greater recognition as an anti-Catholic. In his review of the book in the *New York Times*, John W. Chase particularly disliked Blanshard's "... willingness to stir up old passion."\(^{55}\)

Besides Blanshard's writings, other evidences of anti-Catholicism appeared. In 1948 Joseph Dawson, author of several volumes on church and state, published *Separate Church and State*, a work attacking parochial schools and warning of encroachments by the Catholic Church.\(^{56}\) The *Baptist Standard* frequently referred to "un-American" Catholic activities. The church, the journal once editorialized, believed its dogma provided the only definition of a free society.\(^{57}\) The Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State (P. O. A. U.), founded in 1947, concerned itself with the issue of Catholic infringement on public education. The organization published *Church and State*, a monthly magazine expounding its views. The P. O. A. U. feared that federal aid to education would cause ultimate Catholic control of public education. Moreover, Reinhold Niebuhr, noted theologian, warned of a rising tension between Catholics and Protestants.\(^{58}\)

\(^{55}\) *New York Times*, May 15, 1949, Sec. 7, p. 15.


Anti-Catholicism, however, never became a large-scale movement in post-war America. The well-known antipathy of the Catholic Church toward Communism contributed to this fact. As the "Cold War" developed, Americans shared a common enemy. Americans remembered the loyal service of Catholics in World War II and no longer identified their church as an ally of fascism. The church, furthermore, strongly supported the United Nations in its efforts to keep world peace. As a result of their church's opposition to Communism, Catholics enjoyed greater respect.59

An example of the decline in anti-Catholicism can be seen in the reaction to President Truman's appointment of General Mark Clark, a well-known military figure, as ambassador to the Vatican in 1951. Although considerable protests ensued, they were not bigoted accusations, but expressions of concern over the principle of separation of church and state. The principal opposition to the appointment came from Protestant organizations and ministers.

Dr. J. Howard Williams, executive secretary of the Baptist General Convention of Texas, deemed the appointment Truman's worst administrative act. The National Council of Churches of Christ passed a resolution asking Truman to withdraw the nomination.60 Dr. Carl McIntire, noted Fundamentalist


and president of the International Council of Christian Churches, also opposed diplomatic relations with the Vatican. The American Council of Christian Churches, a right-wing organization, planned a Protestant pilgrimage to the Capitol in protest of the nomination.61 Other organizations of Protestant denomination likewise expressed hostility to the appointment.62 Preaching that only Protestant denominations supported democracy, Reverend Ernest R. Palen of New York City exemplified the mild anti-Catholic attacks when he described the Catholic Church as "authoritative and totalitarian in concept and practices."63 Henry Van Dusen, president of Union Theological Seminary, more correctly expressed Protestant feelings when he wrote in the New York Times that official recognition of the Catholic Church as a political power violated the deep rooted principle of separation of church and state.64

Newspaper opinion on Clark's appointment varied. The Chicago Tribune disliked the new ambassadorship, while the San Francisco Chronicle favored it.65 Large amounts of mail

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61Ibid., October 25, 1951, p. 15.

62Other such groups were the National Council of Churches, Evangelical United Brethren Church, and Methodist Bishop Council. See Ibid., November 1, 1951, p. 17 and October 30, 1951, p. 19.

63Ibid., November 5, 1951, p. 28.

64Ibid., November 21, 1951, p. 24.

65Ibid., October 23, 1951, p. 22.
protesting the appointment arrived at the White House, and the nomination met stout opposition in the Senate. Appointed while Congress was not in session, Clark received no action from the Senate when it reconvened. Finally, in early 1952, Clark, perturbed by the controversy, withdrew as ambassador, and Truman never appointed another.

Shortly after the opposition to Clark's appointment quieted, another discussion of Catholicism and democracy flared. Much of this discussion, however, related to McCarthyism since Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin, notorious investigator of alleged Communist activity in the government, was Catholic and received early support from the hierarchy. Leaders of the church viewed his investigations as a struggle against their avowed foe—Communism. As McCarthy's investigations continued, the Senator became extremely unpopular, and Catholics were identified with him, especially since he claimed their support.

The non-denominational Christian Century editorially suggested that the Catholic Church helped McCarthy launch his "crusade." Stating that McCarthy enjoyed immense support in heavily Catholic populated areas, The New Republic contended that it was rare "... for a Catholic to be called

66 Jack Anderson and Ronald May, McCarthy: The Man, the Senator, the "ism," (Boston, 1952), p. 394.
on the carpet before McCarthy..." However, not all members of the church supported the Wisconsin senator, a fact limiting anti-Catholic sentiment.

More explicit examples of anti-Catholicism were evident than those relating to McCarthyism. In 1951 Blanshard released *Communism, Democracy, and Catholic Power*, his second book challenging Catholicism. That same year V. T. Thayer, noted writer on education, published a work attacking parochial schools. Several Catholic writers responded to these accusations, responses that heightened concern over Catholicism and democracy. *The Christian Advocate* devoted increasing attention to questions relating to Catholic doctrine. It featured an article proclaiming that Catholicism and democracy had conflicting principles.

*Look* magazine manifested the concern over the compatibility of Catholicism and democracy when it featured two articles on the issue. In the first article, Dr. James H. Nichols of the University of Chicago Divinity School presented one Protestant view of the Catholic Church in America. Claiming that certain political and social issues caused

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69 The most notable reply to Blanshard was James O'Neill, *Catholics and the American Tradition* (New York, 1952).

tension between Catholics and Protestants, he concluded that Catholicism and democracy were contradictory. In the second article, John Cogley, executive director of The Commonweal, answered questions on Catholic doctrine and practices. The nature of these questions illustrated the anti-Catholicism of the mid-fifties. Look asked Cogley whether his church contributed to democracy, and if Catholics considered public education godless. The executive director answered another question asking if Catholics boycotted publishing firms criticising the church. He also dismissed the accusation that in Catholic hospitals, "therapeutic abortion" was a common practice. The article indicated that anti-Catholicism indeed thrived.

The anti-Catholic issues of the mid-fifties, however, were refined. The degraded propaganda, such as the Knights of Columbus oath, constituted a major portion of religious prejudice in the 1920's. Church doctrine on such matters as birth control and medicine concerned anti-Catholics in the mid-century. Despite their refinement of issues, anti-Catholics still concluded that Catholicism threatened democracy.


72 John Cogley, "Must Protestants Distrust Catholicism," Look, XVIII (June 1, 1954), 34.

73 Ibid., p. 38.
Catholic Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts stimulated concern over anti-Catholicism when he became a front-runner for the Democratic Party's nomination for Vice-President in 1956. Speculating on whether a Catholic could become Vice-President, Look presented the view that bigotry had declined since 1928 and that a Catholic running mate would attract votes in large urban areas. When Reverend Hampton Adams of the Park Avenue Christian Church in New York City objected to a Catholic national candidate, he exemplified the attitude most feared by the Kennedy group. United States News and World Report, however, featured a report from the Kennedy staff contending that in spite of some religious prejudice, their candidate would draw votes to the party. Kennedy lost the nomination in 1956, but his defeat did not result from attacks on his faith. His political strength, nonetheless, had attracted anti-Catholic attention.

As Kennedy's political prestige developed after 1956, anti-Catholicism increased. Anti-Catholics emphasized that Catholics wished to abolish the principle of separation of church and state. All loyal Catholics allegedly owed strict

74 Fletcher Knebel, "Can A Catholic Become Vice-President," Look, XX (June 12, 1956), 33-35.
allegiance to their "rigidly controlled" church, and voters, therefore, must seriously consider a Catholic's religion as a qualification for the Presidency. One contemporary observer, however, thought that if Kennedy was nominated for President in 1960, there would "... not be a repeat performance of the 1928 contest." She listed the absence of first generation Catholics and the issue of prohibition as the reasons.

As it drew to a close, the ear between Smith and Kennedy had demonstrated only insignificant flurries on anti-Catholicism. As Kennedy became a leading contender for the Democratic nomination for President in 1960, however, anti-Catholics mobilized their forces.


CHAPTER IV

A CATHOLIC IS ELECTED PRESIDENT

By early 1959, the concern over Senator Kennedy's religion demonstrated that anti-Catholicism was a persisting factor in American politics. The sweeping success of his bid for re-election in 1958 had enhanced his position as a leading contender for the Democratic nomination for President; it also caused anti-Catholics to mobilize.¹ The religious question obviously perplexed leaders of the Democratic Party. They reasoned Governor Smith had proven that a Catholic could not be elected President. But they feared also that if Kennedy lost the nomination, many Catholics would abandon the party.² A poll of Democratic Congressmen showed that they favored Missouri Senator Stuart Symington as the party's nominee because he was from a central state and was a Protestant.³

Hoping to reduce the concern over his faith, Senator Kennedy stated his attitudes on separation of church and


state in Look magazine in March, 1959. His views closely resembled those of Governor Smith in Harper's of May, 1927. Kennedy insisted that for all public servants their duty to the Constitution took precedence over their conscience. He considered separation of church and state a fundamental American concept, and he praised the First Amendment. Moreover, the Senator opposed diplomatic relations with the Vatican and federal aid to parochial schools. In demonstrating the success of other Catholic office holders, the article concluded that a Catholic could win the Presidency in 1960. The article emphasized Kennedy's loyalty to the government, but it intensified discussion of the religious issue.

The article provoked harsh criticism from Kennedy's fellow Catholics. America, a Jesuit weekly, denounced the interview as an appeasement to bigots. Assailing the Senator's contention that duty took precedence over conscience for public office holders, the journal declared, "No religious man, be he Catholic, Protestant, or Jew, holds such an opinion." America argued that Kennedy violated the Constitution by granting such an interview. The Commonweal, a

5 Ibid., p. 17.
6 "On Questioning Catholic Candidates," America, CII (March 7, 1959), 651.
7 Ibid.
liberal and respected Catholic journal, criticized the presidential aspirant. Announcing that it had "reservations and regrets" over his statements, the noted journal considered Kennedy ill-informed on Catholic doctrine. He oversimplified the matter of public funds for private schools, and, it continued, failed to point out the absence of a definite Catholic policy on the relationship of church and state. *Ave Maria*, another national Catholic weekly, believed the candidate's statement dangerous and unrealistic. The *Monitor*, the Catholic Diocese newspaper of Trenton, New Jersey, feared he fell into an anti-Catholic trap. The *Commonweal* later expressed the hope that the Catholic criticism would not heighten Protestant distrust of Catholicism.

Non-Catholics generally approved the Senator's position. The *Christian Century* endorsed Kennedy's belief because

"... the [Catholic] hierarchy has steadily refused to accept responsibility for maintaining the secular and pluralistic basis of American life or the separation of church and state in law." One Presbyterian replied to the journal,

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8"A Catholic for President," *The Commonweal*, LXIX (March 6, 1959), 588.

9*Ave Maria*'s editorial view was discussed in *New York Times*, February 24, 1959, p. 26.

10This editorial was discussed also in *Ibid.*, February 28, 1959, p. 23.


however, that no Christian could allow his allegiance to the state to outrank all else.13 C. Stanley Lowell, associate director of Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State (P. O. A. U.), described Kennedy's outlook as "a courageous stand."14 Later, however, Lowell led his organization against Kennedy's bid for the Presidency.15 Another non-Catholic journal, Christianity and Crisis, editorialized that Kennedy's assessment of conscience was unrealistic. Historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., replied that the Senator referred only to public servants.16

The excitement engendered by the Look interview gradually dissipated, but discussion of the political implications of Kennedy's religion increased. Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois optimistically argued that less anti-Catholicism prevailed than in 1928. He attributed this decline to the reduction in anti-immigrant attitudes since Americans identified Catholics with immigrants.17 To support his claim, Douglas

13Letter to the editor from Chairman of Department of Government at Louisiana State University, Rene De Visme Williamson. See The Christian Century, LXXVI (April 1, 1959), 394-395.


16"Did Kennedy Downgrade Conscience," The Catholic World, CLXXIX (June, 1959), 183.

reviewed the election of several Catholic governors, Congress-
men, and mayors, including Governor Edmund Muskie of Maine, Senator Frank Lausche of Ohio, and Mayor Robert Wagner of New York City. The news media conducted numerous polls hoping to ascertain opinion on a Catholic President. One Gallup poll showed that bigotry had declined since 1928, but it remained a political issue. Supposedly, the poll revealed less intolerance among the "younger generation," yet a pres-
idential candidate would lose one-quarter of the total votes if he were Catholic. The same pollsters concluded that the South was the center of anti-Catholic sentiment.

Politicians of the Democratic Party worried most about Kennedy's faith. They believed the election of 1928 had proven the futility of a Catholic presidential nominee. Lew Wallace, former Democratic National Committeeman, expressed their reservations when he proclaimed, "Kennedy is a high-
class fellow, but a hell of a lot of people woul not vote for him because he is Catholic."19

Not all Democratic leaders were dubious of a Catholic's chances to enter the White House. Although these optimists acknowledged the prevalence of religious prejudice, they believed that Senator Kennedy could win. Catholic Senator

18"Can a Catholic Win," Time, LXXIII (May 18, 1959), 23.
19"Catholics, Protestants, '60," Newsweek, LIII (June 1, 1959), 28.
Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota, for example, thought anti-Catholicism had declined since 1928. Even Southerners expressed a belief that bigotry had declined. Senator John J. Sparkman of Alabama asserted that religious bigotry had less impact than in 1928, while Alabama Governor John Patterson supported the Massachusetts candidate.\textsuperscript{20} Although National Democratic Chairman Paul M. Butler had experienced opposition to his Catholic faith, he agreed with Senator Thruston B. Morton of Kentucky that prejudice had dwindled since 1928.\textsuperscript{21} Declaring that a Catholic could become President, former governor and senator Herbert H. Lehmann of New York summarized this optimism in the Democratic Party when he affirmed: "Religious prejudice is much less than in the days of Al Smith."\textsuperscript{22}

Other expressions of optimism came from outside the party. Dr. Allyn P. Robinson, officer of the National Conference of Jews and Christians, noted enough general improvement in the climate of tolerance to enable election of a Catholic to the Presidency.\textsuperscript{23} One scholar believed that Catholicism had finally become part of the American culture,

\textsuperscript{21}\textit{Ibid.}, July 14, 1959, p. 16.
\textsuperscript{22}\textit{Ibid.}, August 26, 1959, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{23}\textit{Ibid.}, June 11, 1959, p. 16.
while the American Society of Newspaper Editors considered the chances for a Catholic President equally divided.\textsuperscript{24}

Indeed suspicion and fear of a Catholic President did not disappear. The fifty-one man Council of Methodist Bishops manifested the great intensification of anti-Catholicism. The Council visited Washington, D. C., to discuss matters with various high-ranking officials, including President Eisenhower and Chief Justice Earl Warren. They met with several promising candidates for the Democratic nomination in 1960, among whom were Senators Kennedy, Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota, and Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas. As Kennedy entered the conference room to speak to the group, one reporter quipped, "Boy, that's Daniel, going into the lion's den."\textsuperscript{25} In what \textit{Time} magazine termed an "odd inquisition," the Council quizzed the presidential aspirant on whether his religion would affect his decisions if elected Chief Magistrate. Kennedy dismissed such question with the observation, "... I regret the fact that some people get the idea that the Catholic Church favors a church-state tie."\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{24}Robert D. Cross, "The Changing Image of Catholicism in America," \textit{Yale Review}, XLVIII (June, 1959), 575. This article does not provide as much information on the subject under discussion as might be expected, but it does offer generalizations on anti-Catholicism since colonial America. For opinion of newspaper editors, see \textit{New York Times}, April 19, 1959, p. 76.

\textsuperscript{25}Quoted in "Political Notes," \textit{Time}, LXXIII (April 27, 1959), 16.

\textsuperscript{26}Ibid.
One Bishop felt that Kennedy did not change the group's opinion. They questioned no others on religion.

After this episode with the Methodist Bishops, Protestant churchmen provided the significant attacks against Kennedy's faith for the remainder of 1959. In May, the Annual Spring Conference of the American Council of Christian Churches declared its opposition to a Catholic nominee by either party. The Conference more explicitly attacked Kennedy when it resolved that the Democratic Party must avoid nominating a Catholic.\(^27\) The annual meeting of the Southern Baptist Convention prophesied that a Catholic candidate would meet serious opposition. The group's newly elected president, Reverend Dr. Ramsey Pollard, later warned, "There is a great deal of feeling . . . that Kennedy would meet with severe opposition in many circles consonant with Baptist life."\(^28\)

Besides the warning issued by the general Southern Baptist Convention, individual state Baptist Conventions adopted harsher resolutions denouncing Catholicism. The Oklahoma Baptist Convention resolved to oppose any person belonging to a church owing allegiance to any other power. The Baptist General Convention of Texas advised its one and


one-half million members to think carefully before voting for a Catholic. The Texas Baptists, furthermore, adopted a resolution declaring, "The Roman church is both a religion and an ambitious political system aspiring to be a state." It stressed that no Catholic public servant could resist pressure from his church. By the year's end, Baptist Conventions in Arkansas, Alabama, and Arizona passed similar resolutions. Dr. W. C. Fields, public relations secretary for the Southern Baptist Convention, paraphrased the fears of his brethren, proclaiming, "... many Baptists feel that a Roman Catholic candidate would prove a real danger to many of those freedoms that we enjoy."30

The Methodists also denounced a potential Catholic nominee. The Christian Advocate frequently questioned a Catholic's worthiness as President. The journal praised the Council of Methodist Bishops for its conduct toward Kennedy. The Methodist weekly received response from individuals declaring their hostility to a President owing "higher allegiance."31 Methodist Bishop John W. Lord of Massachusetts contended that Protestants must question Catholic presidential candidates. He considered such

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31Letters to the editor frequently expressed such a view. See Christian Advocate, III (October 15, 1959), 8.
questioning every Protestant's "right and duty." Alabama Methodists attacked their governor, John Patterson, for supporting Kennedy. Theorizing that the people of Alabama did not want a "power hungry Romanist hierarchy," the Methodist Christian Advocate of Alabama editorialized, "It is cause for regret that Gov. Patterson is willing to ignore harsh laws of history to give support to a Roman Catholic for the highest office in the United States." Other ministers expressed reservations over Kennedy's presidential ambitions. Reverend Oswald Hoffman, public relations director of the Lutheran Church--Missouri Synod, foretold that religion would be an issue if Kennedy obtained the nomination. The Lutheran minister thought the Massachusetts Senator had failed to make a clear statement of his views on separation of church and state. Reverend Angus Dun, Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Diocese of Washington, saw little chance of a Catholic nominee in 1960. He reasoned that the Democratic Party would avoid choosing a Catholic candidate.

33 Ibid., June 25, 1959, p. 16.
34 Ibid., May 9, 1959, p. 9.
continued lambasting the alleged political ambitions of the Catholic church.\textsuperscript{36}

Although many Protestant theologians contributed significantly to anti-Catholicism prior to Kennedy's nomination, others urged tolerance. A leading Episcopal weekly, The Living Church, saw no harm in a Catholic President. Reviewing anti-Catholic accusations, the weekly editorialized that the history of Catholicism, "... does not indicate that it crushes our national interests."\textsuperscript{37} Another Protestant journal, World Outlook, recommended that voters disregard the religious issue, claiming it only inflamed emotions. Denouncing bigotry, it stated that "... some Protestant discussion of Senator Kennedy falls into this less desirable class."\textsuperscript{38} The Christian Advocate, never friendly to Kennedy, deduced, nonetheless, that anti-Catholicism would continue declining.\textsuperscript{39} This plea by Protestants undoubtedly lessened the degree of prejudice in the campaign of 1960.

In spite of anti-Catholicism, Kennedy and his followers considered his faith a political asset. They repudiated the myth that Alfred E. Smith had proven a Catholic cannot be elected President. As far back as 1956, they accepted the

\textsuperscript{36}For a typical article see "Protestants Barred From Presidency," Church and State, XII (June, 1959), 4.

\textsuperscript{37}New York Times, June 9, 1959, p. 75.

\textsuperscript{38}Ibid., July 19, 1959, p. 47.

\textsuperscript{39}The Christian Advocate, III (October 29, 1959), 3.
premise of a "Catholic vote." Arguing that Catholics constituted one-fifth of the eligible voters, his staff prepared a report illustrating 14 states comprising a total of 261 electoral votes. These states had major cities with a large Catholic population capable of affecting their state's electoral outcome. The presence of a Catholic on the ticket would bring these votes to the party. Some Kennedy supporters even regarded the nomination and not the presidential campaign as the central problem facing their candidate. Moreover, they continued, the Catholic population had increased to almost 23 per cent of the nation's total population. The Commonweal speculated that Catholics would favor a candidate of their faith.

Politicians in the Democratic Party, nonetheless, refused to believe that Catholicism aided the Massachusetts Senator. Democratic Governor Buford Ellington of Tennessee, for example, thought that a Democrat could carry his state in 1960, but questioned if a Catholic candidate could accomplish the same. Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana, assistant Senate Democratic

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41 Ibid., p. 811.
42 Burns, John Kennedy, A Political Profile, p. 255.
44 Ibid., December 14, 1959, p. 1.
leader, feared that the religious issue might cause defeat for the party. The strong city bosses in the party held a similar opinion. Upon entering the primaries, Senator Kennedy realized that he must overcome his religious handicap.

The Wisconsin and West Virginia primaries cemented Kennedy's position as the likely choice of the Democratic Party. His faith, moreover, emerged as the paramount issue in these two state campaigns. Catholics constituted approximately one-third of Wisconsin's total population, meaning that the New Englander badly needed to win the Protestant vote. The Catholic candidate, however, did not discuss the religious question in Wisconsin, but dealt with social reform. The only significant anti-Catholicism in the primary was a newspaper advertisement urging a strong turnout for Senator Humphrey, Kennedy's chief rival, in order to "counteract the Catholic forces." Senator Kennedy described it as the only bigoted propaganda he encountered during the primary. Other anti-Catholic activity, however, included pamphlets once distributed by the P. O. A. U. outside a Kennedy rally, and a statement by Lutheran Reverend William T. Eggers in Milwaukee that Kennedy owed allegiance to the Pope.

47 New York Times, April 1, 1960, p. 16.
The significance of the religious issue is seen in the vote. The Massachusetts Senator won with only a 56 per cent margin of the popular vote. He lost the four heavily Protestant districts, obtaining his margin from four predominantly Catholic areas. The strong support he received from Catholics made it appear that only Protestants could be elected President. The Wisconsin primary gave the religious issue greater significance, and it compelled Kennedy to demonstrate that he could win the primary in West Virginia, a state less than 5 per cent Catholic.

In West Virginia, Humphrey again opposed Senator Kennedy. The latter's staff agreed that religion was the principal issue, but most advised their leader not to discuss it. A poll taken by a Kennedy staff member, Lou Harris, showed that the Senator was behind Humphrey in the primary due to the bias against Catholicism. As a result of this poll, the Kennedy group changed tactics and made religion the chief issue. They made it appear that the primary was a battle between tolerance and intolerance. Kennedy accused his opponents of "ganging up" on him and stated, "Is anyone going to tell me that I lost this primary forty-two years ago when I

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48 The voting results were described district by district in *Ibid.*, April 7, 1960, p. 28.
50 *White, The Making of a President*, p. 106.
was baptized?" 52 Speaking before the student body at Bethany College, the Catholic candidate proclaimed that he would keep "... going to the church I wish to go, regardless of whether I am elected President or not." 53 He continued emphasizing the religious question as demonstrated by his speeches in the hill country and his television broadcasts. 54

The strategy of the Massachusetts group worked. The result of Harris' polls showed the people gradually shifting to Senator Kennedy. Senator Humphrey was helpless against the religious issue since he deplored bigotry. The Massachusetts Senator easily won the primary with strong support throughout the state. He continued to be victorious in other primaries, and seemed to have accomplished his goal "... to demonstrate that it [Smith myth] is not a valid conclusion." 55

The religious issue, however, never disappeared. The American Baptist Association representing about one million members adopted a resolution opposing the election of a Catholic President. Claiming that the Vatican sought political power, the group's president believed that, "No man can be loyal to the United States and the Vatican at the same

52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., April 20, 1960, p. 28.
54 Ibid., April 21, 1960, p. 16.
55 Ibid., April 4, 1960, p. 21.
time."56 Time magazine assessed the fear of losing religious liberty as the cause of anti-Catholicism. Speaking before the American Society of Newspaper Editors in April, 1960, Kennedy emphasized again that he was not a "Catholic candidate."57 Denying rumors that he now wanted the Vice-Presidency because of the religious controversy, he insisted that, "If . . . bigotry is too great to permit the fair consideration of a Catholic . . . then we ought to know it."58 In Illinois the annual meeting of the Augustana Lutheran Church with 600,000 members stated that a Catholic President would be subject to pressure from his church.

Despite the prior evidence of anti-Catholicism, the Democratic Convention of 1960 manifested no significant religious prejudice. Paraders outside the convention hall frequently carried signs warning against a President controlled by Rome, but they created no stir. One contemporary analyst believed that the delegates were "divided" between Protestant and Catholic attitudes, but he failed to elaborate.59 No speeches were made on the religious issue, nor did the Democratic platform mention religious tolerance as a goal of

56 Ibid., June 23, 1960, p. 23.


58 Ibid., p. 92.

the party.\textsuperscript{60} Senator Kennedy, however, discussed the problem in his acceptance speech. Demonstrating that he fully understood the importance of anti-Catholicism, he stated, "... that the Democratic party, by nominating someone of my faith, has taken on what many regard as a new and hazardous risk ... new at least, since 1928."\textsuperscript{61} Although there were no instances of anti-Catholicism at the Convention, it was a crucial problem confronting the Catholic nominee. Hoping to offset some of the bigotry in the South, Kennedy chose Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, his chief rival, as his running mate.\textsuperscript{62}

Anti-Catholicism was evident soon after the Convention. Baptist Reverend R. C. Barbour of Danville, Virginia, began a movement to defeat Kennedy because he was Catholic.\textsuperscript{63} Jubilee, a Catholic publication of 50,000, asked its subscribers if the New England senator's faith was an issue in the campaign. Their consensus showed that 80 per cent considered his Catholic faith a liability and a live issue.\textsuperscript{64}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[60]\textit{Congressional Quarterly Almanac}, XVI, 776-788.
\item[61]Quoted in \textit{ibid.}, p. 805.
\item[62]\textit{ibid.}, p. 771.
\item[63]\textit{New York Times}, August 10, 1960, p. 20.
\item[64]\textit{ibid.}, August 21, 1960, p. 49.
\end{footnotes}
Planning to embark on a campaign tour of Texas, Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson stated, "There is such a thing as a religious issue. That we all know."\(^\text{65}\)

As the campaign got underway, the anti-Catholic agitation increased. Early in September, the National Conference of Citizens for Religious Freedom met in Washington, D. C. Its leaders included Dr. Norman Vincent Peale, Dr. Daniel A. Poling, editor of the Christian Herald, and Dr. Glenn Archer, director of the P. O. A. U. In a five point resolution, the Conference termed the Catholic Church a political organization frequently repudiating the separation of church and state. It stipulated that a Catholic President could not participate in interfaith meetings.\(^\text{66}\)

After the meeting, Peale held a press conference. Answering reporters' inquiries, he testified that he considered Kennedy's faith an important campaign issue. When asked whether the Senator, if elected, could avoid pressure from his church, Peale declared, "Not unless he renounces his church's doctrine, and this would risk his immortal soul."\(^\text{67}\)

Later, however, Peale claimed that he did not know the purpose of the meeting and regretted having been involved in the

\(^{65}\)Ibid., August 24, 1960, p. 19.


\(^{67}\)Quoted in Douglass Cater, "The Protestant Issue," The Reporter, XXIII (October 13, 1960), 30.
campaign.\textsuperscript{68} Perhaps the noted clergymen misunderstood the aim of the National Conference of Citizens for Religious Freedom, but he certainly expressed his beliefs at the news conference. Regardless of Peale's views, however, the episode of the National Conference focused greater attention on the religious issue.

When the campaign started, the Democratic nominee planned to avoid discussing his faith until late October.\textsuperscript{69} Such strategy hopefully would have most effect in reducing his loss of votes to prejudice. The activity of Peale and his colleagues in Washington, however, stimulated anti-Catholicism, and now the Democratic campaigners deemed quicker action necessary. The Kennedy strategists also utilized the services of Simul-\textsuperscript{68}matic Corporation, a firm specializing in computer analysis of social issues. The Democratic Advisory Council fed a sample of the nation's electorate into an I. B. M. 704 computer, the "A-bomb of the social sciences."\textsuperscript{70} The machine placed Kennedy slightly behind Richard M. Nixon, the Republican nominee. Suggesting that Kennedy had already lost as many anti-Catholic votes as he was likely to, the computer finding sustained those who recommended open discussion of the

\textsuperscript{68}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{69}White, \textit{The Making of a President}, p. 259.

religious issue in hopes of attracting Catholics and minority groups. It is unknown whether the Catholic candidate followed this advice, but soon afterwards he spoke on the religious matter.

Kennedy addressed the Greater Houston Ministerial Association on September 12. Reasserting his conviction in the separation of church and state, he favored a nation "... where no Catholic prelate would tell the President (should he be a Catholic) how to act and no Protestant minister would tell his parishioners for whom to vote. ..."71 Following his speech, Kennedy answered questions on his religious conscience and public duty. Offering to resign if conflict arose between his conscience and presidential responsibility, the nominee favorably impressed the Association. Reverend John W. Turnbull, faculty member at Episcopal Seminary of the Southwest in Austin, Texas, who attended the meeting, stated: "Was it really the young senator from Massachusetts who was on trial, or was it we."72 Turnbull contended that his view generally represented that of the Association.

On September 12, 100 noted clergymen and scholars of various faiths sponsored a leaflet denouncing campaign bigotry. Hoping to reduce the prejudice against a Catholic nominee,

71 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, XVII, 806.
they circulated it widely, advising voters to disregard a candidate's religious affiliation.\textsuperscript{73} The statement commanded much respect because of its prestigious signatories.\textsuperscript{74} This resolution combined with Kennedy's Houston address dispelled many apprehensions of a Catholic President, and gave the Democratic campaigners new confidence on the religious issue.

In combatting bigotry, the Democrats enjoyed the support of the Republican Party. Although the Kennedy staff feared exploitation of the issue by their opponents, \textsuperscript{75} Nixon and his running mate, Henry Cabot Lodge, denounced any support from the bigoted anti-Kennedy forces. During the campaign, members of the Nixon camp urged discussion of the issue, but their candidate "flatly refused."\textsuperscript{76} Clearly indicating Republican policy on the issue, President Eisenhower revealed that he and Nixon had agreed not to discuss the issue in the campaign.\textsuperscript{77} Early in the campaign, on a television interview, the Republican nominee suggested a "cut-off" date on all

\textsuperscript{73}Barrett, Religious Liberty and the American Presidency, p. 152.

\textsuperscript{74}Ibid., pp. 157-160. Examples are Reinhold Niebuhr, Professor Harry W. Jones of Columbia University, New York Episcopal Bishop Horace Donegan, Methodist Bishop William C. Martin of Texas, and Professor Jerome Kerwin from University of Chicago.

\textsuperscript{75}"Catholics, Protestants, '60," p. 26.

\textsuperscript{76}White, The Making of a President, 1960, p. 297.

\textsuperscript{77}United States News and World Report, XLIX (September 19, 1960), 90.
discussion of his opponent's faith. The Nixon forces, in fact, fully endorsed Kennedy's position on the matter. Nor did the rank and file Republicans follow their predecessors who in 1928 frequently exploited religious prejudice.

The campaign of 1960, nonetheless, witnessed a re-emergence of anti-Catholicism. As in 1928, Protestant clergymen expressed the greatest opposition to a Catholic candidate. Numerous Protestant sectarian organizations had already voiced opposition to a Catholic President. At their quadrennial General Conference in May, 1960, Methodists referred to encroachments on the separation of church and state, and pledged to fight diversion of public funds into parochial schools. That same month, the Southern Baptist Convention reaffirmed its fear of a Catholic President. It resolved that a candidate's religion should concern the electorate, especially when his church conflicted with the "American way of life." One delegate explicitly demonstrated the purpose of the resolution, declaring, "I don't think it helps to beat around the bush. If we're against Catholics, let's be specific about it."

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78 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, XVII, 807.
79 General Conference of the Methodist Church, Daily Christian Advocate (Denver, 1960), pp. 44-64.
During the campaign, Protestants became more precise in their denunciations. Well-known Methodist Bishops Eugene Blake and G. Bromley Oxnam disliked Kennedy's presidential bid. Expressing their uneasiness over possible church pressure on a Catholic President, they cited the Catholic attack on the Massachusetts Senator's statement in early 1959. They did not advocate voting against Catholics, but argued that the Catholic church ignored separation of church and state. The Christian Advocate emphasized Kennedy's religion in its attack against Catholics. The Catholic Church, the journal alleged, was a political institution sending representatives to Rome, its capitol. The journal reported that one Methodist district superintendent requested his pastors to preach against a Catholic candidate. Another superintendent supposedly arranged a seminar explaining why Catholic candidates were undesirable. The same weekly editorialized that Kennedy's religion was not the issue, rather it concerned our modern culture. With a Catholic President, it continued, American culture could undergo drastic change.

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Southern Baptists outperformed Methodists in attacking the Catholic candidate. Resembling the activity of J. Frank Norris in 1928, Reverend W. A. Criswell, pastor of the First Baptist Church in Dallas, warned his congregation that election of Kennedy would "... spell the death of a free church in a free state ... and our hopes of continuance of full religious liberty in America." Remarking on the meeting of the Greater Houston Ministerial Association, Criswell proclaimed, "The more I listen to him [Kennedy] the more I ha-ha." Baptist Reverend Harold Lindsey of Waco joined his Dallas colleague by insisting that the Knights of Columbus would execute their alleged oath if Kennedy won. Lindsey stated that he mailed 10,000 copies of his sermon charging that, "Whenever Catholics come into political power, they change the complexion of the political process." The Baptist Standard published much material attacking the Democratic nominee. A typical article warned that Catholics worked for the downfall of American freedom. In another, Professor W. R. Estep of Southwestern Baptist Seminary contended that the Catholic Church seeks domination of Protestants.

87 Dallas Morning News, September 14, 1960, Sec. 4, p. 1.
89 Baptist Standard, October 26, 1960, p. 7.
The *Fundamentalist*, published in Florida and not related to the paper of 1928, described itself as the official voice of the World Baptist Fellowship. Warning that the Knights of Columbus "... have three hundred thousand men trained, armed and equipped, ready to cut their way to the White House," the monthly believed the Pope cursed freedom.91 Labeling Kennedy as a threat to America, it claimed that he favored public education only for political reasons. These publications represented much Baptist sentiment and literature in the campaign of 1960.

Other Protestant clergymen also fought the Democratic nominee. The P. O. A. U. assailed Kennedy in its monthly publication *Church and State*. The group's leader, however, Dr. Glenn Archer, wished the Catholic hierarchy would adopt Kennedy's position toward separation of church and state.92 The National Association of Evangelicals, in connection with the P. O. A. U., distributed "millions" of anti-Catholic pamphlets.93 The Protestant crusade climaxed when word circulated that ministers in America would use Reformation Sunday, October 30, to ask their congregations not to vote for Kennedy. Although this movement never materialized,

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91 *Fundamentalist*, August, 1960, p. 3.
92 *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, XVI, 808.
there occurred that Sunday some anti-Catholic, but also some anti-bigot, sermons.94

An incident in Puerto Rico intensified the anti-Catholicism of the campaign. In October, three Puerto Rican Catholic Bishops signed a letter protesting the reelection of Muñoz Marín as the island's governor. Marín had disregarded Catholic wishes on matters pertaining to divorce laws, sterilization, and birth control.95 Anti-Catholics in the United States magnified this incident into an example of political ambitions of the hierarchy.

Anti-Catholicism peaked in the last few weeks of the campaign. The total amount of prejudiced literature exceeded that of 1928,96 but there seemed a reduction in the volume of extremely virulent propaganda. This large amount of bigoted literature caused speculation on whether anti-Kennedy conservative groups financed anti-Catholic clergymen. James Reston, a political analyst for the New York Times, reasoned that such a link existed.97 Reston especially emphasized that this situation existed in Texas. Noting

94Congressional Quarterly Almanac, XVI, 808.
95"Church and State," Time, LXXVI (August 1, 1960), 33.
96Facts, XVI (February, 1965), 306. This pamphlet printed monthly by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith dealt with the increase in total volume and said nothing about the reduction of virulent material.
that extreme anti-Catholicism thrived well in strongly conservative areas, another observer believed that conservative attitudes paralleled those of bigots. Regardless of its support, propaganda circulated throughout the nation. The Osterhus Publishing House in Minnesota produced the largest amount of literature, distributing it from Florida to Oregon. A popular piece of propaganda furnished by this firm was "Abraham Lincoln's Warning." One estimate named the Midwest and border states as the concentration of anti-Catholic sentiment, but deduced that comparable literature appeared in all but four states.

Some anti-Catholic issues in 1960 resembled those of 1928. The infamous Knights of Columbus oath spread over the nation. One accusation asserted that America had a Protestant Constitution and Catholics threatened it. Another charged that Catholics were responsible for all presidential assassinations. The National Association of Evangelicals with ten million members insisted that America

98John C. Bennett, "The Roman Catholic Question Again," Christianity and Crisis, XX (September 19, 1960), 126.


101"Bigotry at Large," America, CIII (September 3, 1960), 586.


103Ibid.
would no longer be a Protestant nation if it elected a Catholic President.\textsuperscript{104} Baptist Reverend W. A. Criswell of Dallas called the Catholic Church a political tyranny trying to end religious freedom.\textsuperscript{105} There were, however, new arguments. Southerners feared that if a Catholic won the Presidency, the government would only use Catholic personnel.\textsuperscript{106} In San Francisco, a rumor claimed that a Catholic President would lead the country into war.\textsuperscript{107}

The Fair Campaign Practices Committee provided the best study of bigotry in the 1960 campaign. A private organization, the Committee concluded that there were 392 different items of propaganda with a circulation of twenty to twenty-five million.\textsuperscript{108} It further reported that three states accounted for one-third of the total anti-Catholic literature—Pennsylvania, California, and Minnesota.\textsuperscript{109}

Despite anti-Catholicism, Senator Kennedy won the election. Although the electoral college gave him a wider margin, he polled only 113,057 votes over Nixon. One study of the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{104} Ibid., October 17, 1960, p. 24.
\item \textsuperscript{105} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{106} "Can a Catholic Win," p. 23.
\item \textsuperscript{107} New York Times, October 17, 1960, p. 24.
\item \textsuperscript{108} Barret, Religious Liberty and the American Presidency, p. 31.
\item \textsuperscript{109} Ibid., p. 29.
\end{itemize}
election returns showed that anti-Catholicism cost him one-fifth of the total vote. The same tabulation, however, demonstrated that Catholic support offset this loss.\(^{110}\) Public opinion polls, moreover, manifested the difficulty in ascertaining the impact of the religious question. One lengthy study of polls by Dr. George Gallup, had shown that Kennedy's faith caused much uncertainty among people in their choice of a candidate. The study revealed, for example, that farmers in Wisconsin and Iowa almost to election day kept switching between Nixon and Kennedy because of the religious issue.\(^{111}\) It also demonstrated that the religious issue helped the Massachusetts Senator in the industrial East, but gave Nixon a boost in the rural areas.\(^{112}\) Although there was an increase in the Catholic population since 1928, a detailed poll study of the "Catholic vote" concluded that Catholics could hardly affect an election.\(^{113}\) Pollsters, however, usually picked Kennedy as the winner, but these studies included the other campaign issues.\(^{114}\)


\(^{111}\)United States News and World Report, XLIX (October 31, 1960), 45.

\(^{112}\)Ibid., pp. 50-51.

\(^{113}\)Congressional Quarterly Almanac, XVI, 809.

\(^{114}\)Time, LXXVI (November 21, 1960), 81.
opinion polls and tabulations of the election returns, therefore, did not accurately determine the extent of the religious question, but they demonstrated the importance of the religious issue.

Other issues were important in 1960. The questions of national security and domestic prosperity had great affect on the electorate, showing that religion was not the dominant issue. Senator Kennedy, furthermore, emphasized social reform during the campaign, demonstrating that it ranked as a major issue. Foreign policy increased as a significant question. The U-2 crisis in May, 1960, highlighted the problem of national security. Moreover, Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev announced early in the campaign that he was coming to the United Nations, enhancing the issues of foreign policy and national security. When Kennedy asserted in his television debate with Nixon that the islands of Quemoy and Matsu were not worth saving from the Chinese Communists at all costs, he invoked the issue of a "hard" or "soft" Cold War policy into the campaign. The importance of civil rights influenced some minority groups and segregationists. These other issues meant that the victory

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116 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, XVI, 803.
alone of a Catholic candidate for the Presidency did not prove that anti-Catholicism had declined since 1928.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Anti-Catholicism has been a significant attitude in contemporary America. It emerged in 1920 during the rampant nationalism of post-war America. Prejudice against Catholics prevailed throughout the United States, demonstrating that it was a national instead of a regional sentiment. During the decade of the twenties, America witnessed its greatest wave of religious bigotry in the twentieth century. Besides affecting some state elections, it affected immigration policies and stimulated the growth of the Ku Klux Klan. Rumors and pamphlets such as those accusing Catholics of political tyranny constituted a great portion of anti-Catholic expression. Publications and speeches relating to the doctrine of the Catholic Church on matters such as papal infallibility, separation of church and state, and marriage reflected a large part of this sentiment and resembled those of the nineteenth century.

The anti-Catholicism of the twenties climaxed in the campaign of 1928. Catholic Governor Alfred E. Smith had been the central target of bigots prior to the election, but as he became the leading contender for the Democratic presidential nomination, the crusade against Catholics intensified.
There was no change in the accusations against the church, only an increase in their frequency. Many people feared that Smith's victory would bring a downfall of the government at the hands of a massive Catholic army. Comparable literature circulated during the campaign, warning against a Catholic controlled government. Studies have shown that prejudice cost Smith the electoral vote of several states; however, since he was identified with several other sensitive issues, especially prohibition, bigotry was not the decisive cause of his defeat.

Since its peak in 1928, anti-Catholicism has gradually declined. Although several bigots remained vocal after the election, the campaign seemed to have settled the issue of a Catholic becoming President. During the depression, anti-Catholicism dwindled. Economic hardships raised other issues, and President Roosevelt's appointment of many Catholics into his administration helped to change the image of the Catholic office holder.

Because of the Catholic Church's position toward the Spanish Civil War, a flurry of anti-Catholicism occurred. While most Americans favored the Loyalist forces of the Spanish government, the Catholic hierarchy endorsed the insurgent movement led by Francisco Franco. Articles and editorials in popular journals provided the significant attack against this position of the church. The journals, rather than utilizing the once popular derogatory charges,
alleged that an alliance existed between the church and the rising fascist countries of Europe. Moreover, they argued that Catholics would not assist in any war against Fascists.

When President Roosevelt appointed his personal representative to the Vatican late in 1939, he caused a slight stir among anti-Catholics who insisted that he sought the political support of the Pope's parishioners. Although these episodes intensified ill-feeling against the church, they did not produce a widespread movement.

Prejudice against Catholics receded during World War II. The racist philosophies of fascist Europe made discrimination extremely unpopular. Furthermore, Catholic participation in the war demonstrated to Americans that the hierarchy was not an ally of the Fascists. As the Cold War developed after 1945, the hostility of the church to Communism brought greater respect to its members, and even Catholic journals noted a decline in religious bigotry.

Although Catholics enjoyed a better popular image after World War II, certain professional agitators attempted to revive anti-Catholic sentiment. This element was led by Paul Blanshard and the Protestants and Other Americans United for the Separation of Church and State. Although they criticized church doctrine on marriage, birth control, and sterilization, they centered their attacks on education. Much less frequent were the crudities of the twenties when
Catholics were accused of burying a rifle under a church each time a male Catholic baby was born in preparation for the day when the Pope would conquer America. Although more credible, the critics of the thirties failed to ignite any widespread anti-Catholic movement, only serving to illustrate the growing respect for American Catholics.

President Truman's appointment of General Mark Clark as ambassador to the Vatican again illustrated the decline in anti-Catholicism. Protestant groups protested the ambassadorship, but they refrained from accusing the church of political activity. The protesters, instead, simply insisted on the strict application of the principle of separation of church and state. Although General Mark Clark resigned, the incident produced no nation-wide wave of bigotry.

Following the incident over Clark's appointment, a slight intensification of anti-Catholicism occurred. It stemmed primarily from two sources: agitation by Blanshard and his followers, and McCarthyism. Senator Joseph McCarthy became extremely unpopular during his notorious investigation of alleged Communists in the government. Some members of the Catholic hierarchy supported him, thereby identifying their church with him. At the same time, Blanshard released a book contending that Catholicism contradicted democracy. Several church publications and popular magazines discussed the issue, suggesting a slight re-emergency of religious prejudice.
When Senator John Kennedy became a likely choice for the Democratic Vice-Presidential nomination in 1956, concern over a national Catholic candidate reappeared. However, Kennedy failed to get the nomination, and the anti-Catholics subdued. But they were back at work when Kennedy emerged as a leading contender for the Democratic nomination for President in 1960.

Kennedy's bid for the White House in 1960 inspired the greatest anti-Catholic crusade since 1928. Bigoted literature resembling that of the nineteenth century began to appear in religious journals. Political oratory also reflected the rise of prejudice. There were, however, notable evidences of tolerance in the election. Although the total volume of literature attacking Catholics exceeded that of 1928, it did not have the exaggerated quality of the Smith campaign. Democrats now had an optimism non-existent in 1928. Also unlike 1928, many more Protestant leaders pled for religious tolerance. Finally, Republicans in 1960 followed the example of their candidate Richard Nixon in refusing to capitalize on Kennedy's faith.

Several factors accounted for the reduction in anti-Catholicism in 1960. Senator Kennedy was not as closely identified with his church as Governor Smith, and his church held no meetings in the United States comparable to the Eucharistic Congress of 1926 which excited the fears of many
Protestants. The Massachusetts Senator never kissed the ring of a papal delegate in public as did the New York Governor. In addition, the absence of a Mexican problem comparable to that in 1927 reduced the prejudice against the Senator. Furthermore, the emotional issue of prohibition, which had religious overtones, was lacking in 1960.

It proved impossible to separate entirely the attitudes on Catholicism from other social questions in contemporary America. Since Governor Smith's views on prohibition and his urban background greatly offended the rural, Protestant element, it shall remain a mystery how much opposition to his candidacy was the result of religious intolerance. The possible connection between anti-Catholicism and conservatism in the campaign of 1960 furnished a similar difficulty. There had been a strong conservative sentiment since World War II, but significant anti-Catholicism appeared only when the Democratic Party nominated a Catholic for President. Immigration policies since the mid-twenties, moreover, drastically diminished the number of Catholic immigrants and allowed quicker assimilation of foreign-born members of the church. The growth of urbanization also removed much prejudice against Catholicism, long noted for its urban culture.

Anti-Catholicism manifested three characteristics in contemporary America. It greatly intensified whenever a Catholic campaigned for the Presidency, it hurled the same
accusations popular in the nineteenth century, and it diminished in the post-World War II era, but never completely disappeared.
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