THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES MILITARY POLICY ON NATIONALIST CHINA, 1941-1945

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The United States suffered a rather severe diplomatic defeat in the collapse of the Nationalist government of China following World War II. The failure of American policy in China has in turn produced controversy demanding explanation of past actions as well as current intentions. One authority sums up the entire China impasse as being a traumatic experience from which the American people have yet to emerge.\(^1\) The after-effects are not complete, but the symptoms of inflexibility and loss of confidence prevail.

Part of the dispute has been over whether or not the defeat was inevitable. The critics say it was not.\(^2\) The defenders maintain that the collapse of the Kuomintang was certain and that the only conceivable solution would have required a massive commitment of American military forces.


which public opinion would not support. Another viewpoint maintains that the entire story cannot be known and, hence, that speculation, analysis and assessment of what was correct or in error is fruitless.

In reality it may be possible, by reducing the policy to its essential elements, to determine if a course of action in one given component of the policy was correct or in error, or if it is the usual gray area—neither black nor white, neither totally correct nor totally in error—that defies a valid conclusion.

First it is necessary to specify just what American policy was, vis a vis China. The basic tenet was in two parts. First, the United States government sought to make the Nationalist government in China an effective ally in World War II. Second, the American government sought, as a supplementary effect from the first premise, China's acceptance of an increased role for stability in the post-war era.

The tangible components of policy announced by our government in an evolutionary process required as a minimum

3Department of State Publication, United States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949 (Washington, 1949), p. xvi.

4Ibid., p. xi.
the following segments: establishment of a unified democratic government; the correction of economic defects; the extension of China's territorial control to the periphery of the geographic area of the country; and, finally, the establishment of a competent unified military force.\(^5\)

In pursuing the military aspect of the problem, it is admitted that the other elements may in fact be of greater importance to the outcome. The military policy was but one phase of the total pattern. The prime factors in the defeat of the China policy may well be in other areas.\(^6\)

What is suggested is that one phase of the policy may be more accurately evaluated if it be taken momentarily out of context as a component part and examined in some detail to see wherein it was prudent and wise and wherein it was fallible and fatuous and to consider if the problem defied solution or if there were feasible alternatives.

In discussing feasible alternatives in military policy, an expanded connotation of the term policy is used for convenience to include strategy but excluding a detailed evaluation of tactical methods.\(^7\) The planning, decision making and

\(^5\)Ibid., p. xiv.


evaluation functions in policy and strategy formulation will be stressed rather than an analysis of operations.

The extent of the defeat of United States military policy in China is revealed by comparing the reports made by Brigadier General John Magruder just prior to the war and during the first phase of the war with reports of Major General David Barr in 1947 and 1948, shortly before the decision to withdraw and allow the Chinese to settle their own problems. In sum, the Magruder reports exposed a prevalence of waste, corruption, inefficiency, graft, and in general, failure to get American supplies into the proper hands and failure to put these supplies to correct use.8

The Barr report disclosed that after five years of effort by the United States and with Chiang Kai-shek in control, conditions were even worse and that supplies and equipment, as well as large numbers of American trained troops, were ending up in the hands of Communist forces via capture, surrender and desertion.9

8 Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, United States Army in World War II (Washington, 1953), p. 63. The authors, from 1946 to 1953, formed the C. B. I. section of the office of the Chief of Military History for the purpose of writing this portion of the Official history of the U. S. Army in World War II. Their research included the files of the War Department Classified Message Center, the Operations Division of the War Department, the Secretary of War, the Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, and one year of resident research in New Delhi, India and Chungking, China.

9 Department of State, United States Relations with China, pp. 326, 336.
In short, the United States did suffer a defeat in the failure of military policy in China. If the above reports were true, then the defeat was irrefutable. On this basis, it would seem that there would be some merit in assessing United States military policy toward China from the time of its emergence to the conclusion of the war.
CHAPTER II

THE EMERGING PATTERN OF UNITED STATES MILITARY POLICY FOR CHINA

When the Japanese attacked the Pacific fleet, the United States put into motion the previously determined military policy for winning World War II. The War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff had been working for several years on various plans to meet attacks from another nation or group of nations. Some of the plans involved rather remote possibilities regarding potential enemies, but the purpose was sound.¹

With some alterations the military policy decided on was close to the previous plan known as Rainbow Five.² The modification was made by Franklin D. Roosevelt by adding a hypothesis to the plan, that England and possibly France would be able to continue to resist the Axis powers.³


²Ibid., pp. 37-38.

³Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, The War Department: Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, United States Army in World War II (Washington, 1953), pp. 44-47. This is a volume of the official history of the United States Army in World War II, prepared under the direction of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army.
The premise of Rainbow Five was that Europe and the Atlantic were to be the immediate and continuing first concern of the coalition, while the United States assumed the defensive in the Pacific--writing off the extreme perimeter such as the Philippines as beyond our capability. The plan represented an attempt, in concert with Great Britain, to defeat Germany first and then to turn to the Pacific and defeat Japan.4

It would not be correct to say that the Germany first idea was adhered to absolutely or that it was unopposed. But in a general sense it was followed after the War Plans Division study of 1942.5 Some changes were made in troop commitments and some changes did occur in priorities for supplies and equipment. Also, the United States did manage to modify the Pacific defensive role to the extent that an offensive was carried out. However, the general priority of Europe first remained as a primary principle throughout the war.

Russia's entry into the war as an additional ally tended to buttress the Europe first concept. Russian pressure for a cross-channel invasion did not agree with British preference for the Mediterranean, but both concepts called for a European priority.

5Ibid., pp. 156-159.
The implications for China in such a policy seem obvious. But such was not the case, for the grandiose strategy of the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces involved attempted actions that frequently seemed beyond Allied capabilities. In most cases the Roosevelt grand strategy worked.6

Somehow, in spite of British opposition, Roosevelt sought to make China a major ally. This fitted exactly the ambitions of Chiang Kai-shek who, as early as December 8, 1941, proposed creation of a Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Pacific. Chiang's idea was that the major Allies—Great Britain, Russia and the United States—should immediately take the offensive against Japan in the Pacific. However, Russia and Great Britain were firm in the idea of a sustained concentration on defeating Germany, rather than attempting a two-front war. The United States was more sympathetic toward Chiang's ambitions but concluded that the realistic and compelling initial objectives of England and Russia should not be altered. Therefore, about the only positive results achieved by the Generalissimo were the designation of Chiang Kai-shek as Supreme

Allied Commander in the China theater, and the demonstrated support and aid of the United States.7

Initially, American aid to China consisted of the use of mercenaries, lend-lease and a commercial airline. Although a doubtful start, it was a basis on which to build, and a means of making China a full partner.

The first formal military plan for China represented the solution of a conflict between the views of General George C. Marshall and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson. Stimson, looking to the future, saw China as a major theater and sought to persuade Lieutenant General Hugh A. Drum to accept the assignment of Chief of Staff to Chiang. While conferring with Marshall, Drum received a different view and realized that Marshall's ideas would prevail. Marshall saw China as a minor theater at best and thought the assignment would be more in the nature of a mission. Marshall correctly assessed the possibilities of empire building and saw no possibility in the immediate future of making any commitment of infantry divisions to China. Drum then declined the assignment and Stimson looked for another officer.8

7Herbert Feis, The China Tangle (Princeton, 1953), pp. 5, 6, 12, 13. The author was a member of the State Department during the period of this study and was credited by Sumner Welles in Seven Decisions that Shaped History as playing an active role in evaluation of policy in relation to Japan and China. See also, Department of State, United States Relation with China, pp. 28-30.

8Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission, United States Army in World War II, pp. 64-71.
Chiang Kai-shek, in close touch with Washington at the time of the consideration of the assignment, said that the officer selected need not be familiar with China and specifically warned that an "Old China Hand," familiar with previous conditions in China, might not be a wise selection since he would be handicapped in visualizing the capabilities of Chinese forces.\(^9\)

The officer selected was Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell, and he was an "Old China Hand." He had been designated tentatively for command of American forces which were scheduled to land in North Africa. He was considered to be one of the best corps commanders in the army, had served in the Thirteenth Infantry in China, and in the late 1930's had been an observer with the Chinese army. He had also been one of the key instructors in the Infantry School and was one of the group, close to Marshall, destined for high command.\(^10\)

Stimson was later to apologize to Stilwell for asking him to accept this assignment.\(^11\) Nonetheless, Stilwell did accept, feeling that he need not be persuaded but would go where he was assigned, although he had discussed the assignment with Roosevelt and Marshall. It is significant, that Roosevelt was not impressed with the selection.\(^12\)

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\(^9\)Ibid., p. 66.  
\(^10\)Ibid., p. 70.  
\(^11\)Ibid., pp. 263, 379.  
also be noted, although of less importance, that Stilwell was not impressed with Roosevelt.\textsuperscript{13}

After assignment was made, Stilwell was allowed to draw up his own directive subject to the approval of the War Plans Division. In paraphrase, Stilwell's suggestions included the following:

1. That he be given a staff.
2. That equipment in sufficient amounts for thirty Chinese divisions be assigned and shipped as available.
3. That aviation and service unit forces be assigned.
4. That, in the event of the loss of the Rangoon Base, an alternate base in Calcutta, India, be established.
5. That air transports to facilitate supply shipment to China be assigned.
6. That there be established a base of operations which would include eventually a United States Army Corps to lead the offensive against Japan.\textsuperscript{14}

Stilwell arrived at his new assignment in Chungking March 6, 1942.\textsuperscript{15} By the time Stilwell assumed his new responsibilities the pattern of United States military policy toward China was beginning to take on certain characteristics. For example, Stilwell was sent to China with assurances of support, and yet the War Department overruled his request for the assignment of an American infantry corps to China. In a


\textsuperscript{14}Romanus and Sunderland, The Stilwell Mission, United States Army in World War II, p. 75.

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., p. 94.
sense, the fact that Stilwell even requested a corps demonstrated a lack of realism. This might be dismissed as the usual case of a general asking for more than he expected or even needed, but conditions in China were to put an even greater strain on the usual pattern of staff-field relations.
CHAPTER III

THE STILWELL PERIOD

The dubious and unlikely administrative organization for the China-Burma-India Theater and the bizarre conditions in the theater were vividly described by reporters and observers.\(^1\) Even allowing for exaggeration, the theater and the organization did produce some rather incongruous situations, such as the United States Navy training a Chinese Cavalry unit, and Chinese secret police.\(^2\) Moreover, the commander involved, Stilwell, had other command functions that limited his effectiveness in any one area. Stilwell was Chief of Staff to Chiang, commanding general of American forces in India, Burma and China, director of lend-lease, Roosevelt's military representative, and field commander in Burma.\(^3\)

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mentioned that these were not organizational blunders committed through ignorance, but were demanded by the political considerations involved. Marshall was well aware that organizational principles were being violated, and Stilwell did seek to have the situation corrected through the creation of a combined Chiefs of Staff for the Pacific. His position was that this would have tended to correct the difficulties that arose out of Chiang's designation as Supreme Commander-Allied Powers, which was actually a title only.

It is then necessary to determine the impact of the administrative and operational plan and the resulting strategy on the stated policy of creating a competent unified military force in China.

Planning for China involved three major phases during the Stilwell period: the Burma campaigns, the ground-air controversy and the Formosa-Luzon argument. The first two involved

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6Air Force Historical Division, United States Air Force, Plans and Early Operations, I, 244.
China directly. The third was a carry-over from the other two and did have direct implications for China.

These three phases represented the grand design and formed a frame of reference in which the problems were manifest in components and factors that occurred in varying degrees as efforts to accomplish the three phases were resolved. The sub-problems or components involved were logistics, which were never solved; the American Volunteer Group, which had to be dissolved; lend-lease, which Chiang repeatedly sought to control; the differences in interest between the British and the United States in the Far East; the idea of the United States withholding supplies from China as a modus operandi for achieving reform, and finally Chiang's reaction in the form of the "three demands."

The American Volunteer Group was necessary. It met a pressing need and Chiang and Roosevelt thought highly of the accomplishments of this group. However, their enthusiasm

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8Feis, The China Tangle, pp. 4, 10, 40.
was not shared for long by the War Department. It was this organization that brought on the first split between Stilwell and Brigadier General Claire Lee Chennault.9 The controversy, in brief, had to do with whether there was mutiny by the American Volunteer Group. Stilwell's view was that the American Volunteer Group revolted. Chennault thought that Stilwell had exceeded his authority. The alleged revolt had occurred in connection with the Burma campaign in which the group was assigned low-level strafing reconnaissance and bombing missions.10 The American Volunteer Group refused to carry out the missions as ordered by Stilwell. Chennault's attitude was that although the majority of the members of the group had been on active duty either in the Air Force, the Navy, or Marine Corps prior to their assignment to China, that they were by then under contract to the Chinese government and as such were not subject to Stilwell's command.11

This organizational weakness was corrected by the War Department by the simple expedient of changing the status of the American Volunteer Group to active duty in the Army Air

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The American Volunteer Group ceased to exist and the majority of the pilots declined to accept active duty. The American Volunteer Group had set a precedent regarding command problems as well as being involved in alleged illegal sale and misappropriations of large quantities of lend-lease supplies. These accusations, particularly regarding supplies, involved Chennault up to the end of the war.

Beyond the alleged misuse of supplies, there was an argument over the allocation of supplies that did reach designated supply points. It was this issue that was the heart of the first major controversy. The specific agency involved was the Munitions Assignment Committee. This agency was closely tied to the Munitions Allocations Board of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The committee decided, since supplies were not getting to China because of the lack of air transport from India, to cut Chinese allocations rather than stockpile them.

12 Air Force Historical Division, United States Air Force, Plans and Early Operations, I, 505.
on the basis of future availability of transportation. The problem had been approached with some realism. Supplies were, in fact, stock piling in India and air transport was in short supply.

The War Plans Division of the War Department took an opposite view that communication lines could be facilitated through emergency aircraft assignments and that cutting Chinese allocations would have disastrous results for Stilwell.

Another phase of the debate was that Chennault was not satisfied by the allocations made by Stilwell and began to seek outside support. The fact that Chennault sought support was the foundation for the arguments to be settled later regarding air-ground priority.

Still another aspect that grew out of the whole question of policy was the evolution of quid pro quo, the idea of

17Air Force Historical Division, United States Air Force, Plans and Early Operations, I, 354, 508.


withholding supplies as a condition for reform in the Chinese Army. This method of forced reform seems to have originated with Magruder, who was head of the original military mission to China sent to coordinate lend-lease supplies, but it would seem incorrect to conclude that Stilwell was not aware of, or did not support, this idea. The basic idea was that equipment for the contemplated thirty or forty Chinese divisions should be temporarily withheld until Stilwell was able to obtain Chiang's approval for improvement of the Chinese Army.

As a result of the First Burma campaign, Stilwell had placed the blame for defeat, at least in part, on the fact that the Chinese Army was poorly disciplined and poorly led, and he felt that this was one element of the problem that could be corrected by positive action. He therefore proposed reorganization providing that American officers be used in all command positions beginning at the regimental level and that over-all command be placed in the hands of an American general. The decision to withhold supplies as a vehicle for enforcement of reorganization actually came later. Initially, the question of supplies was settled in favor of

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the Operations Division's decision to facilitate transporta-
tion. Later this same agency was to support Stilwell's position of making supplies conditional and this idea received the support of Marshall and Stimson.\(^2\)

The question of conditional supplies was settled by the President. He overruled the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, the Operations Division and the Theater Commander. He scuttled the entire idea of *quid pro quo* and refused to accept shortages. Roosevelt's attitude was that withholding equipment was an improper method for dealing with Chiang and was improper treatment for a head of State.\(^2\)

Roosevelt apparently arrived at this decision through the influence of Madam Chiang Kai-shek, Harry Hopkins and T. V. Soong. These three people were active and efficient regarding Chiang's interests and through their influence Chiang did receive Roosevelt's support.\(^2\) The damage in the situation was that Soong blamed Stilwell for shortages of supplies. It is true that Stilwell did eventually take the position that supplies should be withheld as a condition for reform, but in the initial phase supplies were curtailed.


because of a shortage of aircraft. Actually, Stilwell was quite active in attempting to get the aircraft shortage corrected.26

The atmosphere of suspicion was highlighted by Soong's memorandums to Harry Hopkins and John J. McCloy, and his telegram to Stilwell, in which he implied that Stilwell had some strange influence with the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War and even the President.27 Apparently it did not occur to Soong that this presented an anomalous situation in which he, a representative of a foreign government, by implication should have greater powers than an American theater commander.

Although the argument over quid pro quo was settled in Chiang's favor, it did have a corrosive effect in creating an aura of watchfulness toward future American actions. To reassert his authority, Chiang issued an ultimatum. This ultimatum to the President of the United States demanded accomplishment of three conditions. If the conditions were not met, Chiang would then make a separate peace with Japan. These conditions were: (1) Shipment of 5,000 tons per month in lend-lease supplies, (2) assignment of three United States


Infantry Divisions to the China theater and (3) 500 aircraft for China's exclusive use. These demands overlooked the fact that shortage of aircraft was the key to the 5,000 tons per month shipment and that the highest previous shipments on any sustained basis had been around 3,000 tons per month. He failed to comprehend or ignored the fact that Allied commitments in North Africa, Italy, and Sicily, the build-up of the Sixth and Eighth Armies in the Pacific, and indeed, the whole plan of the war, tended to rule out the use of American infantry divisions in China, or high priority for aircraft and supplies for China.

Chiang was not content with the three demands; he also asked for the relief of Stilwell. All the special envoys to China, Lauchlin Currie, Henry A. Wallace, and Wendell L. Willkie brought back the identical request that Stilwell be replaced by a commander acceptable to Chiang. The degree of intrigue involved, in one instance, was indicated by the


fact that the draft communication, carried by Wallace, was written by Joseph Alsop, a member of Chennault's staff.31 Chiang was not consistent in his opposition to Stilwell and, in one phase of the Burma campaign during Stilwell's tour of duty, he actually favored Stilwell over British commanders and refused to allow Chinese troops to participate unless Stilwell was in command.32 The issue in this situation was settled by compromise, but out of it came a significant basis for adding a new condition to the United States military policy.33


33 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission, United States Army in World War II, p. 95.
The new concept had to do with unifying Communist and Nationalist troops. During this period of temporary support of Stilwell, Chiang made available for the first time the complete Chinese Army Order of Battle. For the first time it became apparent to Marshall, to the Secretary of War, and to the entire War Department that the bulk of the Chinese Army was engaged, not in fighting the Japanese, but in watching the Chinese Communist Armies. It apparently began to occur to all higher echelons of the United States Command that it might be well to use all of these forces in combination against the Japanese. The reasoning behind this position was that demands for United States infantry divisions could hardly be justified unless all Chinese forces were utilized. But again, the idea of unity was to place a further strain on Stilwell's usefulness as Chiang's Chief of Staff.

Chiang and Stilwell never agreed even on the exact status of Stilwell's position as Chief of Staff. Actually, Chiang's idea was that Stilwell was his Chief of Staff for

34 Air Force Historical Division, United States Air Force, The Pacific: Matteborn to Nagasaki, V, 266.


Chinese troops outside of China. That is, he was Chief of Staff to Chiang for Chinese troops in India and Burma, but was without authority in China proper. The War Department attempted to clarify the exact nature of Stilwell's authority, pointing out that McCloy and Soong had agreed, prior to Stilwell's assignment, that his duties as Chief of Staff to Chiang did include China as well as India and Burma. However, the versions of this clarification relayed by Soong and brought to China by Currie did not agree with the War Department's understanding. Chiang did not hesitate to test Stilwell's authority and tried frequently to order Stilwell to place aircraft at his disposal or give supplies to Chennault.

The aircraft and Air Force problem was highlighted by the carrier based air raids on the Japanese home islands, which were led by Colonel James H. Doolittle.

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entered the picture in opposition. He was not particularly opposed to the raids on Japan but was opposed to the pilot landing the aircraft in China once the raids were completed.\textsuperscript{40} The raids were carried out and the aircraft was landed in China. Marshall notified rather than consulted Chiang in this decision, for which he was later to apologize.\textsuperscript{41}

Although Chiang correctly blamed Marshall for the Doolittle raids, he incorrectly blamed Stilwell when the Tenth Air Force was taken out of China.\textsuperscript{42} Because Chiang and T. V. Soong continued to blame him for all of China's military problems, Stilwell's effectiveness in China had ended. Regardless of whether his actions justified Chiang's attitude, he was in fact persona non grata with the Supreme Allied Commander. The air-ground controversy had to be clarified by either limiting Stilwell's authority, or by the relief of Chennault.

The argument as to whether to favor ground or air strategy grew out of messages brought back from China by Wallace, Currie, and particularly by Willkie's message from

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{40} Romanus and Sunderland, \textit{Stilwell's Mission, United States Army in World War II}, p. 162.

\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 163.

\end{footnotesize}
Chennault to Roosevelt that, given a free hand and 147 aircraft, he, Chennault, could knock Japan out of the war.\textsuperscript{43} As a result of this message, Roosevelt decided to have the situation settled by bringing Stilwell and Chennault to Washington in April of 1943 to assist him in arriving at a decision.\textsuperscript{44} This decision revoked Marshall's and Stimson's suggestion that since Chennault was only the deputy commander, the Air Force commander in China should take part in the discussion. Roosevelt insisted in talking to both Stilwell and Chennault.\textsuperscript{45}

A cursory examination of the debate between Stilwell and Chennault might support the interpretation that this was the usual squabble between a commander tied to infantry thinking and an air power visionary.\textsuperscript{46} An element of this must have been involved since this was one of the few cases in which


General Henry H. Arnold did not agree with Marshall. Although Arnold indicated some personal animosity toward Chennault, he did support him in the idea of giving first preference to air action.

Stilwell's view was that heavy air attacks on Japan from China bases should be delayed until the Chinese Army was united, reorganized and trained. If this were not done, and Stilwell suggested that Roosevelt force Chiang's hand, the Japanese would launch ground attacks which could not be met by Chinese troops in their existing state of chaos. In all this, Stilwell had Marshall's support. Stilwell predicted the outcome that did actually follow—capture of Chennault's East China air fields by Japanese ground troops.

In favoring air strategy Roosevelt ruled against the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Stimson, Marshall, the War Plans Division and Stilwell. This decision was not as unrealistic as it might at first seem, since the only American units in China were air force, but in ruling against Stilwell in favor

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47Feis, The China Tangle, p. 56.
48Ibid., p. 59.
50Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs Out, United States Army in World War II, p. 4.
of Chennault, Soong, and Chiang, Roosevelt provided for a rather unique method for continuing to make Chennault's information and advice available. He directed that Chennault was to write the President personally, ignoring the formal organization which would have required correspondence from Chennault through Stilwell and the War Department and then to the President.

In a sense Chennault's position was not tenable. He was not a young visionary, but an "Old 'Carny' Hand." He was a stunt flier, a leather-faced soldier of fortune; an enigma who would strain the most forward looking staff organization. Therefore, the War Department's insistence on supporting Stilwell can be understood, as well as the attitude of consternation toward the President's decision. Nevertheless, it should have been clear that Stilwell and the theater would have benefited from Stilwell's transfer out of the China-Burma-India theater. Leaving Stilwell in command offered a potential source for violation of the meaning and spirit of Roosevelt's orders. Stilwell was a continuing source of controversy, but in spite of his loss of power the Joint Chiefs of Staff still gave a high evaluation to Stilwell's recommendations on any problem relating to China. Therefore,

his warnings had a very real impact on the question of selecting the new objectives for the Allied drive north to Japan, the question of Luzon versus Formosa.53

The question of Luzon-Formosa had been the subject for continuous debate for some time.54 Originally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been in unison favoring by-passing Luzon and landing on Formosa.55 The forces involved were the Sixth and Eighth Armies.56 These two armies were moving north along a line relatively close to the Asian mainland. The other arm of the Pacific movement was moving north on a line 500 miles out to sea.57 It was debated whether or not these two forces should converge on Formosa or Luzon. The obvious advantage of Formosa was that it was 200 miles closer to the Japanese home islands.

The Luzon-Formosa question had significant implications for China.58 If the Sixth and Eighth Armies converged at


54Air Force Historical Division, United States Air Force, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, IV, 570.


57Ibid., pp. 220-221.

58Ehrman, Grand Strategy, August, 1943--September, 1944, United Kingdom Military Series, IV, 487.
at Formosa, American forces would have to open the Chinese port of Amoy. Opening this port would have given a strong supply point for delivery of Chinese aid and would have removed the necessity for the use of the road complex or airline flights over the Himalayas.

The eventual decision, of course, ruled for an offensive against Luzon. Although conditions in the China theater played a part in the decision, there were other considerations. For example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that landing on Formosa and concurrently opening the Port of Amoy would have required service troops that would not be available until the end of the war in Europe. Another factor was that Roosevelt accepted the argument that political considerations compelled a return to Luzon. Finally, there was Stilwell's warning to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the East China air fields were going to be lost and that this might require commitment of a large number of American troops as a perimeter defense for the Port of Amoy.

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After Stilwell's prediction regarding loss of the air fields was corroborated by the Japanese offensive starting in April of 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made one final effort to persuade Roosevelt to push for unification of all China's military forces under the command of Stilwell. The plan was agreed to by Roosevelt and it seemed possible that unity might be achieved. Chiang had been asking for a political advisor and in this atmosphere unity, through the efforts of Roosevelt's personal envoy, Patrick J. Hurley, seemed to offer the most persuasive means of progress. Hurley did get agreement, but once again Chiang changed his mind and became even more determined to insist on having his own personal choice, either in over-all command or Chief of Staff.

Whether justified or not, Stilwell's delivery of Roosevelt's firm note to Chiang demanding that Stilwell be placed in over-all command brought on a renewed effort by Chiang to accomplish Stilwell's relief as a point of personal privilege.


In the renewed effort Chiang had the support of Soong, H. H. Kung, Hopkins, and Hurley.  

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union confirmed a commitment previously made that three months after the defeat of Germany a sixty-division attack against the Japanese forces in Manchuria and China would be launched by the Soviet Union. This was a commitment which had been insisted upon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If the Japanese Army in Manchuria, estimated to be 3,000,000 men, matched the tenacity of other Japanese forces, victory would be more certain if the best available Allied troops were able to sustain a maximum effort. In contrast to the Chinese Army, the sixty Soviet divisions were competent, unified troops. Since military conditions had changed to this extent, it was now possible


Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings: Military Situation in the Far East*, U. S. Senate, 82nd Congress, 1st session (Washington, 1951), pp. 562-564, 3332. These hearings were primarily concerned with the relief of the General of the Army, Douglas MacArthur, but did involve the military policy for China during World War II, particularly Russia's entry in the War against Japan, confirmed by the Yalta agreement.  

for Roosevelt to yield to Chiang's request without endangering the Allied war effort. The apparently futile efforts toward Chinese Army reform, accomplishing very little except to strain relations between Chiang and Roosevelt, were no longer vital.70

It was now possible for Roosevelt not only to resolve the controversy between himself and the Generalissimo, but to resolve the differences between Stilwell and Chiang and between Stilwell and Chennault. Roosevelt relieved Stilwell from his assignment on October 18, 1944.71

During Stilwell's assignment in China there were some reforms. What Stilwell's total accomplishment in China might have been is conjecture. His maximum effort required approval of the idea of *quid pro quo*, both in Chungking and in Washington. Stilwell was transferred because he lacked the political attributes required for success in Chungking.

The relief of Stilwell was more than a change in commanders. It was a definite and demonstrated alteration in United States military policy toward China. Stilwell's removal had been accomplished against the determined opposition


of Stimson, and especially Marshall. According to Leahy, Roosevelt finally had to resort to a direct order to Marshall to accomplish the relief.\textsuperscript{72}

From this point the United States abandoned the policy of assisting China in making a major contribution toward the defeat of Japan. Roosevelt's agreement to Marshall's resolute demand that no other American officer be assigned to command Chinese troops demonstrated that a new policy was being formulated.\textsuperscript{73} The orders issued October 24, 1944, assigning Major General Albert C. Wedemeyer to replace Stilwell clearly demonstrated that Roosevelt would continue to support Chinese aspirations and reform, but had abandoned the idea that China could function as a major ally.\textsuperscript{74}

As a reflection of the change in policy, the orders to Wedemeyer de-emphasized military expectations and sought to create a climate favorable to a greater diplomatic orientation in United States military policy toward China. The orders

\textsuperscript{72}Leahy, \textit{I Was There}, pp. 271-272.


\textsuperscript{74}Romanus and Sunderland, \textit{Time Runs Out, United States Army in World War II}, p. 15.
made it clear that Wedemeyer would not command but would advise, and they attempted to mitigate the air-ground controversy:

a. Your primary mission with respect to Chinese forces is to advise and assist the Generalissimo in the conduct of military operations against the Japanese.

b. Your primary mission as to U. S. Combat Forces under your command is to carry out air operations from China. In addition you will continue to assist the Chinese air and ground forces in operations, training and in logistical support.

c. You will not employ United States resources for suppression of civil strife except insofar as necessary to protect United States lives and property.75

75Ibid.
CHAPTER IV

THE WEDEMEYER PERIOD

Wedemeyer's role in China was considerably different from that of Stilwell's. His job was easier, partly due to his own actions, partly due to changes in organization, and partly from changes in policy. The relief of Stilwell, in an atmosphere of bitterness, paved the way for a period of tolerance. There was less reason after this time, as far as the United States was concerned, to create any issues over anything in China.1 The United States view, though never stated officially, was that China was to be written off as a major ally. Friendship had not declined; it was just that less would be expected of China.2

The fact that China's potential role in the war declined is seen in the sharp decrease in the number of messages from Roosevelt to Chiang. Perhaps even more important to harmony was the fact that after the relief of Stilwell, Roosevelt's


2Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs Out, United States Army in World War II, p. 10.
messages that were delivered to Chiang were handled by Hurley.3 This was a change from the Method during the Stilwell period, for as was demonstrated by Stilwell's insistence on personally delivering Roosevelt's firm note to Chiang, courtesies of diplomacy and protocol had been violated. Stilwell and Hurley had actually argued over who should deliver the note, and even though Stilwell delivered it, Hurley was not convinced that this was proper and felt that it came correctly within his function as Roosevelt's personal envoy.

Soon after Wedemeyer's assignment to China, he and Hurley reached agreement that Wedemeyer would confine himself to military considerations and leave to Hurley political matters including all messages from Roosevelt to Chiang and correspondence between the United States and the Kuomintang. They also agreed to a practice of friendly and courteous exchange of information. This meant that if political errors were committed, they were less likely to be committed by Wedemeyer.4

3Ibid., pp. 10, 16. Cf. Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Hearings: Military Situation in the Far East, pp. 3669, 3676-3679; Department of State, United States Relations with China, p. 71.

4Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs Out, United States Army in World War II, pp. 72-75.
The atmosphere of acrimony was lessened by the change in Stimson's attitude. Stimson was no longer prepared to make an issue on China, particularly regarding personnel. He had been a strong partisan supporter of Stilwell without success. After Stilwell's relief, Stimson took little interest in China.5

There is evidence of an unofficial determination at all levels to let Chiang have his own way. For example, there was an initial concerted drive in the War Department to assist Wedemeyer in getting Chennault relieved in spite of Chiang's opposition. Wedemeyer agreed with the Operations Division of the War Department that it would be better if Chennault were transferred out of the China theater. A method to accomplish this was actually worked out and Wedemeyer suggested that the War Department put in motion plans to retire Chennault for medical reasons. However, the fact that this plan was shelved and that one week after Roosevelt's death Chennault was actually relieved supports the idea that the key to Chiang's success was the White House.6

Although this acquiescent attitude may not have been official, its existence was recognized in Washington.

... We had great difficulty in our relations with China during my last years in office because

of the loose procedure followed by Chiang Kai-shek in dealing most irregularly with our Government through the Treasury, War, and Navy Departments, and other agencies of the Government. He sent numerous cables direct to different officials of this Government, taking up political subjects that should have been handled through the State Department. His brothers-in-law, H. H. Kung and T. V. Soong, were in Washington dealing on political matters with officers, for example, of the Treasury, war, and Navy Departments. They were circumventing the State Department and our Ambassador in China. The President unfortunately permitted this condition to continue.7

Chiang and Chennault had won their point. Their strongest adversary had been Marshall. He had been overruled in the choice of air power and the relief of Stilwell. Marshall's request that no other United States officer be assigned to command seems to have been made to protect the succeeding commander, but regardless of reason its practical result was that Chiang was in almost complete control.8

Chiang had won the power struggle with Stilwell. Roosevelt had bolstered Chiang's authority and prestige in yielding to Chennault's demands for Stilwell's relief as a point of personal privilege. If Roosevelt had failed to respond once the demand was placed on such a basis, Chiang's prestige would have of necessity declined. Chiang had power with Roosevelt in any given situation if he chose to use it.


8 Stimson, On Active Service, p. 538.
However, Roosevelt did alter his expectations for China. While he no longer expected China to make a major contribution to the defeat of Japan, the President continued to urge the development of a competent Chinese military establishment.9

More progress was made under Wedemeyer than was made under Stilwell. Assisted by temperament and prior training, Wedemeyer was able to approach Chiang with greater diplomatic skill. Wedemeyer had considerable experience in high level staff functions that emphasized respect for the views of heads of State. He had served for a period of time as Chief of the Operations Division of the War Department. He was better suited for the advisory role, and the counseling role was better suited to Chiang who was at least able to decline advice without threats of discontinuing support. The atmosphere was more favorable since Wedemeyer had been Chiang's personal choice as Stilwell's replacement and Chiang had even offered to place Wedemeyer in direct over-all command of Republican armies. This favorable milieu helped Wedemeyer. Also, some organizational errors were corrected that improved the position of the new Chief of Staff.10

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One of the most important changes was that the field command in Burma, formerly assigned to Stilwell, was not given to Wedemeyer. It is significant that another controversy was settled by eliminating this assignment. It had been argued during the Stilwell period whether the Chief of Staff should be with the troops in Burma or should remain in China with Chiang. It was clear that Wedemeyer would have no reason to visit the Burma front.

The role of Chief of Staff was made clear by saying less in Wedemeyer's instructions. He was allowed to accept Chiang's offer of position as Chief of Staff. There was no explanation or limitation in duties. Wedemeyer was therefore free to advise Chiang in any area, and some of the approved recommendations were rather remote from military considerations. For example, late in 1945, he recommended to Chiang that motor vehicles be required to drive on the right side of the road, rather than on the left side as had been the previous custom. Chiang agreed, and this change was rather dramatically ordered on December 31, 1945.

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13Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports, p. 355.
Another organizational improvement had to do with increased control of autonomous units and re-assignments of non-essential units. There were several semi-independent organizations that had created minor controversies in the Stilwell era. Navy Group China, Office of Strategic Services, and British intelligence units were operating separately and were reporting directly to various headquarters without regard to Wedemeyer.\(^1^4\) Wedemeyer did achieve some success in getting some coordination between these units and his headquarters.\(^1^5\)

There were some units in China that were a drain on the supply system and yet gave little direct support to the China theater. Wedemeyer was effective to some extent in solving this problem. For example, he did get the Twentieth Bomber Command reassigned to the Mariannas.\(^1^6\) This unit had been consuming approximately 14 per cent of China’s total supply allocation without taking part in any campaigns in the China theater.\(^1^7\)


\(^{1^5}\)Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs Out, United States Army in World War II, pp. 19-25, 161.

\(^{1^6}\)Air Force Historical Division, United States Air Force, The Pacific: Mattehorn to Nagasaki, V, xv.

\(^{1^7}\)Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs Out, United States Army in World War II, pp. 23, 161.
Although it might be debatable whom the British admired less, Stilwell or Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer seems to have had more success in dealing with the British than did Stilwell.\(^{18}\) In one instance Wedemeyer was trying to obtain the return of two Chinese divisions from Burma to China. He asked specifically for the two divisions which had the best records during Stilwell's command.\(^{19}\) The Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff again compromised, but Wedemeyer did get two Chinese divisions returned from Burma and the promise of increased air support. This tended to demonstrate the growing dominance of the United States in Combined Chiefs of Staff decisions.\(^{20}\)

One of the most vital improvements made by the new Chief of Staff was the reorganization of American forces into a team. It is true that Air Force predominance continued, but the Air Force was now working in greater harmony toward the total mission. The air-ground controversy ended at the beginning.


of the Wedemeyer period. 21 Wedemeyer avoided open controversy and sought relief of Chennault by more subtle means.

Wedemeyer also made important improvements in the Chinese Army in two vital areas, supply and compliance with orders. He installed a liaison system through the use of American officers to insure compliance with orders or notification of refusal to comply with orders. 22 Secondly, he set up a supply depot system to facilitate issuing food and equipment. 23

Wedemeyer provided a workable vehicle for exchange of information and advice between himself and Chiang and a means to establish responsibility and authority in attempting to enforce Chiang's decisions. This was accomplished by the creation of a China-United States Joint Staff. This staff agency was to draw up plans for Chiang's approval and was granted authority to enforce the plans agreed to by the Generalissimo. The theory was that by utilizing the staff system the approved strategy or plans could be enforced and by utilizing the supply system the strategy would be feasible. 24

21 Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs Out, United States Army in World War II, pp. 25, 155-159.

22 Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports, p. 297.

23 Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs Out, United States Army in World War II, pp. 244-247.

However, the degree of effectiveness in the reorganization was in part an illusion and in part a transition phase accomplished apparently to please the United States. In actual practice the China-United States Joint Staff system did not end Chiang's interference. In a sense, interference might be the wrong word. Under the Joint Staff system, plans and operations were presented to Chiang and from time to time he did give his approval to broad objectives and minute detail. Whether it was interference or not, Chiang frequently rescinded or altered objectives and details of execution. Chiang continued to handicap Wedemeyer by following the same pattern of interference described by Stilwell. In summing up Chiang's orders, Stilwell had said, "They direct all sorts of action and preparation with radical changes based on minor changes in the situation."25

In the final stages of the war Chiang was still issuing directives from his Chungking headquarters concerning troop movements. It is true that, through his position as head of State in China and Supreme Commander Allied Powers in China, he had authority to intervene or rescind orders at will. It is also true that the troops involved were Chinese, but the significant point is that Chiang had agreed to a Joint Staff system that allowed him to make use of expert advice and

25Stilwell, Stilwell Papers, p. 76.
information and still preserve his military and political prestige. Chiang often refused to be guided by this expert advice and information. Because of his determination to become personally involved in the campaigns, Chiang's Joint Staff system was unable to protect him from a demonstrated lack of military ability. There were examples over a period of time showing the issuance of conflicting orders and a pattern of resistance to organizational authority. For example, the Fifty-third Army on the Salween River, the Fifth Army at Yunnan and the Fifty-seventh Army at Hsian, all refused orders issued by the Joint Staff and indicated from time to time that they could accept orders issued only from Chiang and not through liaison officers. Therefore, the normal operational pattern of the Joint Staff was that Chiang would approve a given plan, that orders were then conveyed by liaison officers, that Chinese Army commanders would then refuse to comply. The liaison system would then provide notification of refusal to Wedemeyer and Chiang. Wedemeyer would then seek the support of Chiang in enforcing the Chief of Staff's authority. During Wedemeyer's conferences with Chiang it was usually revealed that Chiang had issued clarifying orders during the

interim period that were in some cases in direct conflict with the orders issued by Wedemeyer.27

The interference was not just in troop movement. For example, in one instance Chiang refused to issue supplies to a Chinese army commander defending one of the last remaining air bases in China. He was using refusal of supplies as a means to force a pledge of loyalty from the commander concerned. The outcome was that supplies were finally authorized three weeks after the fall of the air base.28

Interference by Chiang was further complicated by the uncertainty of his authority. Army commanders alluded to Chiang's supreme powers to avoid compliance with staff orders, but once orders were received, even directly from Chiang, they were refused if the army commander concerned was not in agreement.29

Another facet of the problem of creating a competent Chinese Army that Wedemeyer attempted to correct was the defective supply system, particularly supplies of food.30 A strong case could be made for the argument that the ration system was the key defect in the many problems challenging

27Ibid., pp. 165-167.
28Ibid., pp. 178-179.
29Ibid., pp. 165-167.
reform of the Chinese Army. The subsistence problem was highlighted by the return of Chinese divisions from Burma. Chiang's divisions in Burma may have left China in poor condition, but they had grown accustomed to being paid, fed, and equipped under British and United States supervision. Once these divisions returned to the China theater, British and United States administration ceased. It was not practical to feed the mass of China's army through the means of air transport from India over the Himalayas. In solving this problem Chiang again took an adamant stand against any sign of favoritism toward specific units in the China army.

Chiang insisted that troops returning from Burma should be given no special privileges. By this he meant that the Burma divisions were to be placed on normal Chinese rations which consisted of an issue of rice and salt and a monetary allowance providing for approximately one pound of meat per month for each Chinese soldier.

Wedemeyer protested and suggested that it would be much better policy to raise China's standards to the Burma level, at least for the nucleus thirty divisions. He suggested


32 Ibid., p. 168.

33 Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs Out, United States Army in World War II, p. 168.
raising the subsistence level to one dollar per month in United States currency. Chiang, in a counter proposal, suggested that the United States pay the Nationalist Government one dollar per month per soldier and that China pay each individual soldier $100.00 per month in Chinese money. The fallacy in this reasoning was that the black market exchange rate of American dollars was 500 to one, rather than the 100 to one rate suggested by Chiang. His plan would have amounted to a direct subsidy to the Nationalist government of China without any benefit to the Chinese soldier.34

Eventually a compromise was worked out in which the rice-salt ration was supplemented to provide for a fairly stable diet. Again, this was accomplished in spite of Chinese army command opposition. The system of ration depots and local procurement under the United States supervision was repeatedly challenged by China's army commanders.35

The simple fact was that prior to the establishment of the United States supply system providing for an adequate ration, which was finally approved February 1, 1945, China's army commanders were issued the money to supplement rations

34 Ibid., p. 242.
for their entire command. It was left to the discretion of the army commander whether he spent all the funds or a lesser amount on food. In practice, this method of supply had become a source of income to the Chinese generals and helps to explain the opposition to United States supply direction and to reforms aimed at reducing the number of Chinese divisions; numbers meant income and power.

The divisions that were directly under the United States controlled supply system were properly fed and equipped. In the divisions outside the system the troops were starving, barefooted, and poorly equipped. To survive they frequently resorted to pillage. Therefore, the reforms that were made were dependent on United States supervision and control.

Along with a feasible supply system Wedemeyer simplified China's military objectives into one coordinated plan of grand strategy. He recommended that the isolated pockets of China's armies consolidate in the general area of the Kunming-Chungking perimeter. The defense of Kunming was imperative since it was the terminal point of the air transport

36Ibid., pp. 244-245.
37Ibid., pp. 369-373.
38Ibid., p. 168.
supply from India. The defense of Chungking was logical and psychologically sound since it was the final provisional capitol of China.\textsuperscript{40}

After the consolidation was completed, Wedemeyer proposed taking up a temporary defensive position for the purpose of gaining time to train and re-equip a nucleus of approximately thirty Chinese divisions for counter-attack. He proposed assignment of the best potential Chinese commander to lead China's army as it moved from the defensive to the attack.\textsuperscript{41}

The culmination of the attack was to be a drive to the sea anchored to the thirty-division force. This final objective was to be the seaport of Canton. Once this port was open, China could be supplied and aided from the Pacific. The flights from India would then be less important.\textsuperscript{42}

Canton was to be the key to the greatly expanded China effort. It was not contemplated as a massive Normandy type invasion, but it was a rather ambitious plan. For example, at one time use of the Tenth Army from Okinawa was proposed and an increased air potential was planned. Five liberty ships were to take part in the initial increase of supplies.\textsuperscript{43}

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\textsuperscript{40} Romanus and Sunderland, \textit{Time Runs Out}, \textit{United States Army in World War II}, pp. 56, 61, 330. \\
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., pp. 58-59. \\
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., pp. 330-336. \\
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., pp. 366-367.
\end{flushright}
Marshall had made a definite commitment to Wedemeyer, assigning Generals George S. Patton, Lucian K. Truscott and William H. Simpson to the China theater. 44

The plan seemed feasible. It represented a last chance for Chiang to emerge with his prestige enhanced by a military triumph at the end of the war. But this was not to be. The advance that was made was not by means of attack and defeat of the enemy, but through Japanese withdrawals. 45 When the massed Chinese armies neared their objective and it seemed possible that action would be joined, other events made the attack unnecessary—the atomic bomb and the entry of the Russians. 46

Chinese forces were near Canton and seemed sure of success in August of 1945. But once again, the major plan of the war, Rainbow Five, worked against the interests of the Nationalist Government of China.

The United States was just as serious about the second premise of Rainbow Five as it had been about the premise of Europe first. Once the defeat of Germany became a reality the United States was able to turn its capability against


Japan. Once the United States turned to Japan, it was evident that the full force of its military might was to be utilized in revenge for Pearl Harbor and enforcement of unconditional surrender. Whether justified or not, the United States was to use its best available means to accomplish its final objective.

With the use of the Atomic bomb and the Russian declaration of war against Japan the importance of any effort on the part of China ceased to exist. Canton was no longer important, and Japan had been defeated without any major effort on the part of China.

Thus at the end of the war, China would have to look back to the defense of Shanghai in 1937 to remind her allies of any major effort. It is true that an army of approximately 2,000,000 Japanese had been kept in China, but there is some doubt as to whether they remained in China because of Chinese action. There is also some evidence that a separate peace made between Chiang and the Japanese was in effect.

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47 Ibid., p. 244.
49 Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports, p. 279. 50 Ibid., p. 281.
Also there is the fact that shortage of sea transport and loss of air superiority ruled out any mass return of these Japanese units.\textsuperscript{51}

In the final phase of the war the United States in effect ceased its efforts to realize another aspect of its military policy. The idea of uniting the Communist and Nationalist forces in China became increasingly difficult.

Soon after Harry S. Truman succeeded to the Presidency the State Department issued a position paper repeating the idea that a united army was still one of the United States objectives in China. But in the China theater the situation was different from that stated in Washington. As a matter of fact, the policy of unity, for all practical purposes, was given up by Wedemeyer and Hurley.\textsuperscript{52}

Wedemeyer and Hurley had very cogent reasons for giving up the policy of unity, the most compelling of which was that by pragmatic test, it would not work. The problem reached its climax in plans to use Chinese Communist forces in guerrilla action in coordination with the Office of Strategic Services and the United States parachute troops. The plans had been approved by Wedemeyer, and it was agreed that the Communist


\textsuperscript{52}Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs Out, United States Army in World War II, pp. 249-254.
forces would be given United States supplies. The fact that plans for use of the Communists had been approved became known to Chiang and the Communists. Hurley had been trying to get the opposing factions together; that is, he was trying to realize the American concept of unifying the Nationalist forces of Kuomantang under Chiang with those of the Communist forces under the political leadership of Mau Tse and the military direction of Chu Teh. Regardless of whether the agreement was feasible or a mere exercise in dialectics, Hurley had received some definite commitments that a working coalition would be achieved. His strongest weapon to insure Communist compliance had been that if definite agreements were made the United States would then issue supplies and equipment to the Communist forces. This was the one instance in which Wedemeyer, in Hurley's opinion at least, made a political error. In granting his approval of coordinated Communist-United States attacks he had in fact undercut Hurley's strongest bargaining point for reaching coalition.\(^5\)

Out of the accusations and recriminations in this situation came the first clash between Hurley and Wedemeyer. The settlement was decided in China rather than in Washington, and the decision was that any idea of coalition would be

subject to Chiang's veto, at least for the period of the war.\textsuperscript{54} Wedemeyer dropped plans for use and supply of Communist troops, and the Americans who had been suggesting coalition were transferred out of China.\textsuperscript{55}

At the end of World War II the United States military policy had not been achieved. China had not fulfilled its role as a major ally. The Chinese Army had not been united. The final goal of a competent army for China had not been realized because a subtle part of this competence required that Chiang be taught to accept military advice to compensate for his own military deficiencies. And Chiang continued to ignore advice. For example, he was determined to occupy Manchuria in spite of Wedemeyer's advice to the contrary. Wedemeyer pointed out that the supply problem of occupying Manchuria in the winter of 1945-1946 would tax the most efficient supply system. Chiang's only concession was that he would agree to a temporary delay in flying China's armies to Manchuria until Wedemeyer could arrange for a United States air shipment of winter clothing from Alaska for Chinese divisions, and to allow time to inoculate the China army of occupation for smallpox, typhoid and cholera.\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{54}Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs Out, United States Army in World War II, p. 254.
\textsuperscript{55}Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports, pp. 312-320.
\textsuperscript{56}Ibid., pp. 346-349.
By the end of the war Chiang began to realize that occupation of the entire area of China was going to be difficult. He therefore demanded that the United States now train and equip ninety Chinese divisions. The cost of the program of assistance during the war period had amounted to $870,000,000 and the United States had achieved, even by the most optimistic evaluations, only limited success with a thirty-division program.

The United States military policy toward China was uncertain at the end of the war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, the War and Navy Departments could not reach a consensus as to whether the China theater should be closed down, nor as to whether there should be a return to emphasis on political and economic policy in solving China's problem.

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CHAPTER V

ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF POLICY

The United States military policy for China was basically unrealistic. It was an illusion that the United States could provide China with a competent unified army. The idea that Chiang's regime could either contribute to the war effort as a major ally or exercise a dominant role in the Pacific in the post war era was a false premise. All these things became apparent as the policy was implemented and they were eventually recognized as illusions by the United States Government.¹

The basic errors in United States military policy may be more clearly illuminated if they are considered separately. The following factors and components of policy implementation are examined: lend-lease; transportation; British influence; China's military establishment; quid-pro-quo and the "three demands"; air power; China's declining role; Roosevelt's contribution and Chiang's achievements.

Lend-Lease

One major area of United States activity in China was the lend-lease program. Lend-lease, even in the initial stages, demonstrated that aid to China would be difficult. Initially there were three procurement agencies involved in purchasing supplies for China. They were the United States War Department, the United States Foreign Economic Administration and the Universal Trading Corporation. Supplies were ordered by Chinese officials without any written confirmation, and, up to September of 1942, there was no reporting regarding issues and receipts. The Chinese Board of Transport Control provided what little supervision there was. This board was charged with the responsibility of transporting, storing and handling all material for China. The Services of Supply of the United States Army took over the function in September of 1942. The declining role of the Chinese Board of Transport Control was in direct proportion to the decreasing use of the China National Aviation Corporation as a means of transport. By increased reliance on United States aircraft Stilwell was able to shift control from the Chinese Board of Transport Control to United States Army Services of Supply.3

2 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission, United States Army in World War II, p. 211.

3 Ibid., p. 212.
The first major request from the Chinese government was submitted immediately after passage of the Lend-Lease Act by the United States Congress in March of 1941. The Chinese government requested 1,000 aircraft for a Chinese air force; equipment for 30 divisions; construction for a railroad from Yunnan to Burma; construction of a road from India to Burma; and trucks and air transport to supplement the road and railroad routes.\textsuperscript{4}

Certain defects in the first request were apparent. The Chinese government had asked for four-ton trucks which were in extremely short supply in the United States and would have been impractical on the unimproved roads in China. Thirty thousand tons of rails had been ordered without any specifications. It was obvious to the War Department that the Chinese government had no conception of what was needed and was ordering all types of supplies in hopes of setting a precedent for permissive and excessive requisitioning.\textsuperscript{5}

Some of the difficulties involved in delivery and proper use of lend-lease supplies were anticipated. The assignment of the Magruder mission to China prior to the start of the war lends credence to the idea that the United States was less naive than the Chinese suspected. The United States dispatched

\textsuperscript{4}Ibid., p. 14

\textsuperscript{5}Ibid., p. 15.
the Magruder mission to aid and advise the Chinese in maintenance of equipment and material; transportation and procurement of munitions; to train the Chinese in the use and maintenance of supplies; and to coordinate the agencies and communications to facilitate supplies.\(^6\)

Rather than using government agencies, lend-lease supplies were shipped, prior to September, 1942, under private accounts for private use and picked up by local business firms in Burma.\(^7\) There was graft involved. For example, the Chinese general in charge of shipments in Rangoon, Yu Fei-peng, a cousin of Chiang's, was making a side profit on lend-lease by diverting trucks and fuel for private shipments of rice, gasoline and consumer goods.\(^8\)

Stilwell brought to the surface the fact that there was dishonesty among the Chinese in handling lend-lease. He accused the Chinese National Aviation Corporation of allowing supplies to be stolen along the transport route and, further, concluded that the Chinese government was unable to control smuggling.\(^9\)

While the Burma Road was still open, a series of investigations revealed that 50 per cent of the goods shipped by


\(^7\)Ibid., p. 60n.

\(^8\)Ibid., p. 104.

\(^9\)Ibid., pp. 167, 282.
truck over the road disappeared between the Burma-China border and the terminal point in Kunming, and 25 per cent of what did arrive was yarn and piece goods, rather than military supplies. During the period prior to 1942 where were sixteen Chinese business agencies operating the Burma Road.\(^{10}\)

The intricacies of lend-lease continuously occupied the attention of United States military personnel in China. One of the Wedemeyer letters, in 1945, dealt specifically with these problems.

If the American public ever learned that we poured supplies to a questionable organization such as Tai Li operates, without any accounting, it would be most unfortunate. . . . I rather question the Navy's concern about the Chinese attitude. Miles (commanding Navy Group, China) has been Santa Clause out here for a long time and just between you and me, Chennault has given supplies to a certain war lord friend without accounting for them.\(^{11}\)

In the fall of 1944 the Kuomintang attempted to gain control of lend-lease by passing an "organic law" which stated that the Chinese government would have exclusive control over lend-lease furnished by the United States. Wedemeyer objected, and reminded Chiang that because of his responsibilities to the American government he could not allow lend-lease to divert from his control. Wedemeyer then went further and suggested that United States control of

\(^{10}\)Ibid., p. 45.

\(^{11}\)Romanus and Sunderland, *Time Runs Out, United States Army in World War II*, p. 254.
supplies coming into China be increased and that the Chinese agencies be required to submit requisitions to United States military officials in order to determine whether or not the supplies requested were actually needed in furthering the war effort. There was no immediate response from the Chinese concerning the recommendations.\textsuperscript{12}

In January of 1945, T. V. Soong and Chiang, on three different occasions, requested that Wedemeyer refute publicly press reports in the United States which charged misappropriation, mishandling, and misdirection of foreign supplies coming into China. Each time Wedemeyer at first evaded and then diplomatically refused to issue such a statement. Finally, it was necessary for Wedemeyer to inform Chiang and Soong that the policy of the War Department would not allow refutation of the charges.\textsuperscript{13}

The official State Department account of United States aid to China discusses lend-lease, military and financial assistance. This account points up two factors in lend-lease which need to be emphasized.\textsuperscript{14} One was the fact that a great deal of what was shipped to China was consumed by American Air Force units stationed in China. The second point had to

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., p. 255.


\textsuperscript{14}Department of State, \textit{United States Relations with China}, pp. 26-34.
do with transportation; the essence of the problem was that the road and railroad complex and pipeline ideas were terminated by the Japanese ground offensive in Burma in 1942. The basic difficulty for China was transportation.

Transportation

Chinese officials never seemed to appreciate the problems and capabilities of modern war logistics. For example, Soong and Chiang suggested to Roosevelt that a "coolie route" be established to help overcome the problems of transportation. Roosevelt asked the War Department to study the feasibility of the plan. The War Department evaluation was that since Burma was occupied by the Japanese, the only route open would be through the mountains of Tibet, and since Tibet was an unfriendly nation, the Chinese would have to carry enough rations to sustain the march through the entire route from India to China, and that even by Chinese standards the rations alone required for each individual would be a maximum load.15

Therefore, it was not by utilization of "coolie routes," pipelines, or the Burma Road that China received any appreciable increase in supplies. Actually, for a three-year period the only means of supply to China was by air transport.16

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16 Department of State, U. S. Relations with China, pp. 26-34.
The problem of air transport was in three parts: shortage of aircraft, shortage of pilots and the nature of the route from Assam, India to Kunming, China.\textsuperscript{17} The initial point of the air route was approximately 90 feet above sea level while most of the route required flying above 16,000 feet over the Himalayas. The elevation of the Kunming air terminal was over 6,000 feet. The differences in elevation presented problems of adaptability of aircraft. Because of the altitude, severe icing occurred. Another handicap was that at the initial point, the wet monsoon often hindered air transport efforts.\textsuperscript{18}

Other complications were the shortage of engines and spare parts, and the fact that during certain seasons repairs had to be made at night. Temperatures in India, except for rainy days, reached 100 to 130 degrees Fahrenheit in the daylight hours, and second degree burns often resulted for those attempting to make aircraft repairs.\textsuperscript{19} The tonnage figures indicate the sacrifice and effort in the air transport record. From December, 1942, to July, 1943, the total monthly tonnage never reached 4,000 tons, but in 1943 and 1944, the 10,000 ton goal was reached, and by August of 1944 a 20,000 ton


\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., p. 116.

\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., p. 127.
monthly shipment was being made. This was increased to 30,000 tons at the end of the year. The high point was in July of 1945, when the Air Transport Command flew in 70,000 tons of equipment and supplies. The total amount for the period of the war, shipped by air transport, amounted to 650,000 tons.\textsuperscript{20} But again, this effort was not accomplished without sacrifice. By rough approximation, for each 50,000 tons there were from 20 to 40 major accidents, and for each 50,000 tons from 20 to 40 crew fatalities.\textsuperscript{21}

The official Air Force history challenged the benefit of this effort:

But a fundamental question remains: What good end was served by the emergency delivery of 650,000 tons of this and that into China? Certainly little went directly to the aid of the Chinese people and relatively little to the Chinese armies, though it can be urged that the regime of Chiang Kai-shek would have collapsed without the support of General Chennault's command, that Chennault's men were wholly dependent upon the Hump lift. It can be argued that it helped to prevent the Japanese from overrunning all of China and preserved for the forces of the United Nations a base for launching air attack upon the Japanese shipping, vital Japanese industrial installations in eastern China, upon Formosa, and even upon the Japanese homeland. Thus it may have speeded somewhat the conclusion of hostilities against Japan.\textsuperscript{22}


\textsuperscript{21}Ibid., p. 143.

\textsuperscript{22}Ibid., p. 151.
Transportation for supplies was limited in China. The Chinese did not know what was needed, and it was evident that much of what was being sent to China was not getting into the hands of Chinese troops. Also, some of what was shipped was wasted. For example, Chiang boasted, early in the war, that, if given a supply of Martin bombers, China could destroy the Japanese Navy. The planes were delivered and all the bombers were lost because they were committed to action without fighter cover.23

In addition to the difficulties of transportation and misuse of supplies, efforts to carry out United States military policy for China were hindered by the fact that China failed to appreciate one of the basic tenets of United States military policy, that is, the priority of United States commitments to Europe. The Kuomintang failed to understand that China's needs were subordinate to those of the British, and that implementation of Rainbow Five would have implications for China.

British Influence

Although basic differences did exist between the United States and Great Britain in the approach to military policy and strategy, the two powers did have a firm alliance. The British view was that United States military officials were concerned only with victory, and that from Marshall down,

political consequences and political motives in policy and strategy were ignored. The British considered that the United States, with its ample reserves of men and materials, approached each operation with greater confidence and greater willingness to take marginal risks. Because of these basic differences there were some periods of stress and strain in British-United States relations. But the strength of the alliance was that the British and the United States were much closer to working as equals than the United States and China.24

The British, at Roosevelt's insistence, attempted to cooperate with China. They gave to China, in exchange for later models, 100 P-40 Aircraft, which had been allocated to the British by the United States Government.25 But British cooperation was not always reciprocated by China, as demonstrated by the "Tulsa" incident. Once again the Generalissimo's cousin, General Yu, was involved. The cargo ship "Tulsa" had arrived in Rangoon, Burma, with a high priority shipment of small arms and artillery for the Chinese Army. Transportation was not available to transship these supplies to China. The British sought permission to confiscate the equipment since they were under heavy attack in Burma by the Japanese. Yu refused to yield to British demands. Ultimately,

24Ehrman, Grand Strategy, History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series, VI, 348-349.

the British seized the cargo, in spite of Chinese resistance. Chiang's reaction was a threat to end all military cooperation with the British, and it was only through United States intervention that an open break was avoided.26

British influence did not always act against the interests of China; for example, the United States overruled British requests for Chinese divisions to be retained in Burma. Even so, United States efforts to persuade the British to attempt a cross-channel invasion of Europe were dependent on a massive build-up of supplies and equipment, with little left over for China.

Attempts by the United States to aid China were complicated by lend-lease, and by difficulties of transportation and were curtailed to some extent by the interests of the other allies of the United States. In view of these complications, it would seem appropriate to analyze and evaluate the armed forces of China to determine whether China's army was capable of receiving and properly using United States aid and assistance.

China's Military Establishment

Implying that the Kuomintang forces constituted one army was a misconception for this was not a united army but twelve independent armies under the uncertain direction of the

26 Ibid., pp. 57-60.
National Military Council. In each of the war areas the commander performed a dual role as Provincial Governor and Military Commander.

Chiang attempted to hold the coalition together by scattering his own loyal divisions through the rear echelons of each major area. The test of military success imposed on area commanders was in terms of loyalty to Chiang rather than military victory. In the entire army there was a total of only 800 artillery pieces which were carefully guarded and were used only on "great occasions." For an army of almost 3,000,000 men, China had only 1,000,000 rifles. A shortage of explosives and nonferrous metals limited the production of ammunition.27

In each of the war areas, the commander viewed local troops as the exclusive property of the commander.28 If men or material were lost in combat, the loss likely would not be replaced. Therefore, Chinese generals displayed a noticeable lack of aggressiveness. The campaigns that were conducted tended to concentrate in specific provinces and many of the major advances by Japanese armies were made by following provincial borders. The normal pattern was that the Chinese leader in a given province suggested that meeting the

27 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission, United States Army in World War II, pp. 33-34.

28 Ibid., p. 34.
Japanese attack was a military problem for the neighboring province to solve.29

The effect of such a policy was that the various Chinese armies were unable to consolidate in any given area that would have offered easy access for receiving American aid. If the armies of China had been united, it would have seemed possible to concentrate in mass and hold at least one seaport along the China coast.30

In addition to the fact that there was no united Kuomintang Army, there was a determined attitude of non-aggression that pervaded the Chinese command. Chinese army officers believed that external pressures would force Japan out of China, but that China still needed large shipments of artillery, tanks, and airplanes to provide a stockpile for use in suppression of any insurrections created by the vacuum of Japanese withdrawals. There was a cautious attitude toward using up supplies in what was thought to be unnecessary offensive action against the Japanese.31

Stilwell attempted to make some realistic changes by suggestion that China did not need 10,000 planes, or masses of tanks, or large quantities of heavy artillery. Stilwell

29 Ibid., p. 35.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., p. 43.
wanted to concentrate on reducing the total number of 300 poorly equipped divisions by 50 per cent, to weed out those that were physically unfit, and to provide proper equipment and training of the remaining divisions. Instead of heavy tanks and heavy artillery, Stilwell wanted rifles, machine guns, mortars and light artillery. In advocating that the organization be done quietly and progressively without moving the troops out of the war zones in which they were located, Stilwell showed accurate political analysis of the situation. Stilwell reasoned that after re-equipment, reorganization and training were completed, mobility and consolidation would be more expedient and would encounter less opposition at the provincial level.\textsuperscript{32} The closing statement of an early Stilwell report displayed an understanding of Chiang's position:

"I realize and appreciate the objections that are raised when changes in command are advocated. The Generalissimo alone can decide whether changes are worthwhile, and since I have already brought up the subject, I will not repeat it here, except to reiterate that an efficient unit deserves to have an efficient and capable commander.\textsuperscript{33}"

During the Wedemeyer period, the United States succeeded in training approximately thirty Chinese divisions, but the consolidation of Nationalist and Communist forces was never achieved, and it would be incorrect to say that a competent military force was established. The Chinese Order of Battle

\textsuperscript{32}Romanus and Sunderland, \textit{Stilwell's Mission, United States Army in World War II}, p. 176.

\textsuperscript{33}\textit{Ibid.}
at the end of the war listed a total of 290 Kuomintang divisions with a total strength of 2,700,000 men. The divisions were still scattered in twelve war areas. It is true that part of this 290 division force did receive American training, but it was only a small part. For example, if only 30 of a total of 290 divisions received training and equipment, and the rest of the divisions continued to operate at sub-standard levels, then by rough approximation, less than 15 per cent of China's army was even exposed to the potential benefits from American military assistance.

Part of the explanation as to why so little was accomplished, in the area of Chinese military reforms, may be found in examining the conflict involved in quid pro quo and the "three demands."

Quid Pro Quo and the "Three Demands"

The idea behind quid pro quo was that aid to China was to be on a continuously conditional basis. Conditional release of supplies was not new to China, and was used from time to time by Chiang in his relations with the various Chinese army commanders. There was considerable power behind the use of this method by the United States to force reforms on the Chinese army. Those favoring quid pro quo included Stimson, Marshall, Stilwell, Magruder and the Operations Division of

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the War Department. The most powerful means of enforced reform seemed to be by withholding aid until agreements from Chiang and the Chinese army commanders were firm commitments.

The prior commitments that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff required included the reduction of the twelve army groups to one cohesive military force, and the reduction of the total number of men under arms from 3,000,000 to 1,000,000. Once these conditions were met, the United States would then be able to start a realistic program of equipping, training and testing, based on the initial goal of thirty combat divisions.

Stilwell's attitude toward these reforms were adamant, but his motives seemed sound in that they were directed at the realization of a competent army for China. Stilwell's sincere enthusiasm for China's military potential is demonstrated by the fact that he pushed strongly for a second thirty division force, and the War Department gave its approval.

By Stilwell's plan, the sixty division Chinese force was to be committed to action using United States army officers in key command positions. Each unit and organization in the sixty division force was to be evaluated on the basis of its combat performance. Incompetent Chinese officers were to be relieved and replaced; those guilty of disobedience to orders were to be punished; and those who performed well were to be rewarded by promotion. There is some evidence from later
experience, in training the Republic of Korea Army, that similar methods could have produced beneficial results for China. If the plan had succeeded Chiang would have emerged at the end of the war with a competent unified army of around sixty divisions consisting of 1,000,000 men. A hope for an efficient Chinese army was the reason for Stilwell's insistent attitude toward *quid pro quo*.

Chiang's reaction to Stilwell's suggestion was implicit in the "three demands," issued in the summer of 1942. The ultimatum required: (1) that the United States provide three United States Army divisions; (2) that 5,000 ton monthly shipments should be guaranteed; and (3) that "beginning from August, the Air Force in the China Theater of War should consist of 500 planes continuously fighting at the front." 35 The essential point was Chiang's growing insistence on air power.

**Air Power**

The implication that escaped Chiang was that even if the United States granted his request for air power, it would be United States air power, not Chinese; for after the activation of the American Volunteer Group, Chiang's claim to a privately owned air force ceased. Efforts to train and equip a Chinese Air Force declined as the lack of ability in this

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organization was demonstrated. For example, Chennault related that the Chinese failed to realize that airplanes and pilots did not necessarily mean air power. In discussing China's "native" air force, Chennault referred to a specific squadron of Chinese pilots who were flying Martin B-10 bombers. Chennault's evaluation was that he had "never . . . seen such unenthusiastic airmen."36 The Chinese pilots felt that practice flights would be a confession of inability and would cause loss of face. The squadron refused to make practice flights even after being ordered to do so by Chiang. According to Chennault's account, the Squadron Commander deliberately "side-slipped" his aircraft in landing.37 The Chinese commander explained to Chennault that this was what happened when "practice" was attempted. Therefore, when heavy and expensive equipment was involved some of the prevailing Chinese attitudes made organization of a "native" Chinese Air Force difficult and costly.

Chennault's account of a discipline problem involving leaders of bomber and fighter pilots demonstrated another facet of the problem. The bomber pilots were to make a mutual support strike on Japanese naval vessels near the China coast. Once in the air, the bomber pilots refused to attack the Japanese, jettisoned the bombs and returned to base


37Ibid.
without taking part in the action. The fighter pilots pressed the attack and actually sank two Japanese vessels, even though three of the five Chinese planes were destroyed by Japanese fighters. But, according to the Chinese military code, since the rendezvous with the bombers had not been carried out as ordered, both commanders had violated orders. The bomber squadron commander was immediately executed before a firing squad, and it was only by a sustained effort on the part of Chennault that the fighter squadron commander escaped severe punishment. In solving the dilemma the Chinese reduced the fighter commander one grade because the orders were disobeyed. The next step in the ceremony was to promote the same officer two grades for bravery in action.38

But Chiang insisted on air power. Also, he assured Roosevelt that the Chinese Army was capable of meeting a renewed ground attack on the East China airfields. Chiang failed to perceive that he would have neither air power nor an efficient army at the end of the war. Once the war ended, it would be difficult to justify keeping large commitments of United States Air Force units in China, and further, it would be impossible to use American air power against the Chinese Communist forces without a direct violation of United States policy implicit in Wedemeyer's initial instructions.39 This

38Ibid., p. 76.

fact in itself attested to the improbability of China attaining major air power status at the end of the war. If China was to be a major power, it would have to be through creation of a united, trained and disciplined "native" army. The United States eventually began to realize that creating such an army for China was an unrealistic goal.

China's Declining Role

Disregarding sequence, a series of events began to reduce China to minor role status. Roosevelt's rejection of _quid pro quo_, his decision to support air power rather than China army reforms, and the loss of the East China airfields probably had no particular effect on winning the war in the Pacific and was certainly not disastrous. However, loss of the air fields did cause the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discard plans for landing United States forces on Formosa, and opening the port of Amoy, which would have facilitated United States efforts to supply China. Even an increase of supplies would have had little impact on the potential for realization of United States policy without the enforced reforms advocated by Stilwell. The relief of Stilwell concluded one phase of the United States policy: the idea that China could make a major contribution as an ally in World War II. It was evident

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that the policy was terminated by the declining interest in China on the part of Roosevelt, Stimson, and Marshall, and by an awareness at all levels of the United States Army that China could not be depended upon to make a major effort in World War II. For example, General Douglas MacArthur said, regarding Stilwell, "there was no more reason for replacing Stilwell than there would be for replacing me."\textsuperscript{41} The Forrestal records have this entry of Wednesday, February 28, 1945:

\begin{quote}
... On the ... question of the war against Japan and our objectives vis-a-vis Japan afterward, he (MacArthur) expressed the view that the help of the Chinese would be negligible. He felt that we should secure the commitment of the Russians to active and vigorous prosecution of a campaign against the Japanese in Manchukuo of such proportions as to pin down a very large part of the Japanese army; that once this campaign was engaged we should then launch an attack on the home islands, giving, as he expressed it, the coup de main from the rear while substantial portions of the military power in Japan were engaged on the mainland of Asia.\textsuperscript{42}
\end{quote}

The fact that Stilwell was not placed in over-all command had an important implication for Chiang. For, if this had been done, it would have tended to relieve Chiang of his military responsibilities and at the same time would have made it possible for Chiang to continue to exercise political sovereignty. If Chiang were militarily incompetent, such a


\textsuperscript{42}Ibid., p. 31.
change would have aided, rather than hindered, Chiang's position. But in relieving Stilwell, as a point of personal privilege for Chiang, Roosevelt reaffirmed that as far as the United States was concerned, Chiang was the military as well as the political leader in China.  

The policy of making China a major ally was given up, but the United States, at Roosevelt's insistence, continued to adhere to two other concepts of policy: to aid China as much as possible in efforts to create a competent military force, and somehow, through continuing United States aid and assistance, to increase the feasibility of China's exercising some degree of power in the post war period. In assessing and evaluating United States military policy for China during World War II Roosevelt's continuous and unrelenting support of Chiang requires some attention.

Roosevelt's Contribution

Roosevelt may have waivered slightly, but there was a general pattern of continuous assistance to Chiang. The question is, whether Roosevelt's support of Chiang constituted a violation of the rules of power diplomacy. Diplomatic rules have been stated in different terms in a long historical

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search for principles. One advocate of power politics suggests eight specific rules:

1. Diplomacy must be divested of the crusading spirit.
2. The objectives of foreign policy must be defined in terms of the national interest and must be supported with adequate power.
3. Diplomacy must look at the political scene from the point of view of other nations.
4. Nations must be willing to compromise on all issues that are not vital to them.
5. Give up the shadow of worthless rights for the substance of real advantage.
6. Never put yourself in a position from which you cannot retreat without losing face and from which you cannot advance without grave risks.
7. Never allow a weak ally to make decisions for you.
8. The armed forces are the instrument of foreign policy, not its master.  

Roosevelt's leadership of the United States government in a two-front war is an example of magnificent achievement, but a question arises. Was his effort to promote China as a major ally in World War II in error? Did such a policy make an unreasonable demand beyond United States capabilities? In supporting Chiang did Roosevelt commit a violation of a basic principle, i.e., allowing a minor power to dictate policy?

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46 Ibid.

Probably the most pertinent question is whether or not Chiang's influence on decision-making constituted allowing a minor power to dictate policy. Two members of Roosevelt's cabinet, Hull and Stimson, would seem to answer the question in the affirmative. Hull, in particular, felt that there was too much interference on the part of Chiang and his special envoys in the formulation and execution of United States foreign policy for China. Roosevelt acquiesced to Chiang's influence by:

1. Relieving Stilwell.
2. Vetoing quid pro quo.
3. Deciding to support air power over Chinese Army reforms.
4. Allowing Chiang to select senior United States Army personnel to serve in China.
5. Continuing to favor Chiang in spite of State Department and War Department preference for exploring means of shifting power in China to other leadership.
6. Yielding to portions of the "three demands."
7. Allowing Chiang to persuade the United States to exercise its good offices in bringing about the Sino-Russian Treaty.

One of the high points of China's interference with United States policy did not occur during the war, but before the war. This incident shows China's influence in that the modus vivendi for ending Japanese aggression short of war was
abandoned because of unilateral action on the part of China, particularly through the efforts of T. V. Soong in Washington, D. C. Sumner Welles relates that Soong learned of the particulars of a tentative agreement on the part of France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States which provided cessation of further aggression on the part of the Japanese in return for de facto recognition of certain Japanese advances in China. Soong released the contents of the agreement to the United States press. Public reaction in the United States was immediate: that the United States should not "sell out" China. In releasing the information Soong's disclosure was in perfect accord with one of Roosevelt's favorite devices. No sinister design was implied. Roosevelt simply used this incident as a "trial balloon" to gauge the stiffening attitude of American public opinion in relation to Japanese aggression.

In endeavoring to promote China into a capable, reasonably strong nation, the usual debate of morality versus realism and national interest was manifest. Should Roosevelt have dropped Chiang for some other political control? Abandoning Chiang for a so-called "third force" in China would not have been suitable, since the "third force" commanded no

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divisions.\textsuperscript{50} Deserting Chiang in favor of the Communists would have been another alternative. There seems to be no agreement as to the morality-realism argument, but most political observers are cognizant that national interest based on cold reality is difficult to achieve when the rest of the world continues to expect the United States to mix in a certain amount of ethics and morals with foreign policy.\textsuperscript{51}

The observer who compiled the eight principles of diplomacy mentioned above, Hans J. Morgenthau, considers Roosevelt to be one of the two Presidents in United States history who achieved a degree of excellence in foreign policy and finds little to censure in his conduct of foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{52}

When the need for an active American foreign policy became manifest in the late 1930's, there was nothing to build on but a mediocre foreign service, the condemnation of power politics and of secret diplomacy transformed into moral indignation at "aggressor nations," and the tradition of the big stick which had worked so well in the Western Hemisphere. Thus it was improvisations of President Roosevelt alone, guided by an intuitive grasp of the international realities, which kept American foreign policy in tune with American interests.\textsuperscript{53}

In evaluating United States military policy in China during World War II, Chiang's role should also be analyzed.

\textsuperscript{50}\textsuperscript{50} Fitzgerald, \textit{The American Political Science Review}, XLVII (December, 1953), 1164.


\textsuperscript{52}\textsuperscript{52} Morgenthau, \textit{Politics Among Nations}, p. 108.

\textsuperscript{53}\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Ibid.}
Chiang aspired to military power, as well as to political control in China. Once this ambition was unquestionably evident, Roosevelt yielded to Marshall's insistence that the United States should make it clear that Chiang was in supreme military control, and that the function of the United States was only to advise. Therefore, an appraisal of Chiang's proficiency as a military commander, and an assessment of whether or not he was skillful in this capacity is appropriate.

Chiang's Achievements

Reports and letters from both Stilwell and Wedemeyer to various United States government officials and to United States Army command and staff agencies acknowledged that Chiang was not anxious for, and in fact avoided, offensive action. Rather than attacking the Japanese he preferred to wait and see if the Japanese troops would reinforce, and, if they did, he ordered his troops to take defensive action. Flanking attacks and counter attacks were seldom employed.\(^{54}\)

In justifying these tactics to Stilwell, Chiang related an example of defensive action, early in the war, against the Japanese by the Chinese Army which "proved" that his management of forces was superior. Chiang had three divisions available for the defense of a Chinese city which was under

\(^{54}\)Stilwell, Stilwell Papers, pp. 53-56.
attack by the Japanese. Chiang placed one division within the walls of the city and ordered this division to fight to the last man. The other two divisions were ordered to take up reserve positions fifty miles to the rear. The consequence was that the isolated division within the city was destroyed while the forces to the rear were powerless to give aid or assistance. Chiang's reasoning was that the Japanese were so impressed with the fighting ability of the sacrificed division that the attack was halted and the other two divisions were able to flee without having suffered any casualties.55

Chiang explained that Stilwell would have to harden himself to such tactics in order to insure ultimate victory. Chiang urged that Stilwell should observe the Generalissimo during a six-month period of tutelage in tactics and the psychology of war.56

Chiang was nevertheless very critical of the lack of the offensive spirit among the British forces, but he never hesitated in giving orders of withdrawal to Chinese troops fighting in conjunction with the British, which frequently left the British flank positions exposed to attack. He often executed such orders without notice to the British commander concerned.57

55Ibid., p. 66.
56Ibid., pp. 67-68. 57Ibid., p. 77.
Stilwell relates another example of Chiang's inefficiency. He tells of a battle in which a Japanese army had been thoroughly beaten by the Chinese, and in which it would have been possible for the Chinese to capture men, material, and equipment. Instead of taking advantage of this situation, Chiang gave orders to halt all operations and the Japanese were given time to destroy material and equipment, and then to escape while two Chinese armies observed in reserve positions.58

Stilwell's feeling toward Chiang and the situation in China in general, was summed up in July of 1944.

The cure for China's trouble is the elimination of Chiang Kai-shek. The only thing that keeps the country split is his fear of losing control. He hates the Reds and will not take any chances on giving them a toehold in the government. The result is that each watches the other and neither gives a damn about the war (against Japan). If this condition persists, China will have civil war immediately after Japan is out. If Russia enters the war before a united front is formed in China, the Reds, being immediately accessible, will naturally gravitate to Russia's influence and control. This condition will directly affect the relations between Russia and China, and therefore indirectly those between Russia and the U. S.

If we do not take action, our prestige in China will suffer seriously. China will contribute nothing to our effort against Japan, and the seeds will be planted for chaos in China after the war.59

Although Wedemeyer was less caustic, his radio message to Marshall in December of 1944, displayed the same basic evaluation. He recounted to Marshall that although he

58 Stilwell, Stilwell Papers, p. 158.
59 Ibid., pp. 321-322.
believed that the Generalissimo was aware that the situation was serious, he was nonetheless apathetic. Wedemeyer had come to the conclusion that due to false pride, political intrigue, and mistrust, the leaders were not psychologically prepared to adequately handle the problem. "... I think that the Chinese officials ... are actually afraid to report ... conditions for two reasons, their stupidity and inefficiency are revealed, and ... the Generalissimo might order them to take positive action ..."^60

In December of 1944, Wedemeyer again wrote to Marshall telling him of Chiang's requests for him to move large numbers of men by air, and then, when the plans were nearing completion, of receiving instructions from Chiang rescinding the orders. Wedemeyer suggested to Marshall that neither Chiang nor his advisers understood the problems of movement of supplies, and that the Chinese strategy was a "piecemeal, uncoordinated employment of forces."^61

It might have been possible for Chiang to correct military efficiencies by surrounding himself with an excellent military staff, but both Stilwell and Wedemeyer confirm that this was not done. Both specifically referred to the inadequacies of Chiang's Chief of Staff, General Ho Ying-chin.


^61 Ibid., p. 166.
Stilwell illustrates instances of Ho's preoccupation with details concerning United States matters rather than concentrating on Chinese problems, and of misrepresentations concerning the number of troops Stilwell was depending on for support in Burma.62

Wedemeyer, in his letter to Marshall on December 16, 1944, evaluated Ho as an inefficient Chinese general. Wedemeyer's opinion was that Chiang was retaining Ho for political reasons.63

Chiang's military capabilities as seen by Great Britain were summed up as follows:

The British, with only a slight strategic interest in the Chinese theatre, and doubtful of the Generalissimo's capacity to stage an offensive, were content simply with his continued resistance; the Americans, whose more direct strategic concern was supported by a traditional affection, were prepared to foster him in a more active role.64

The above analysis tends to support the evaluation that Chiang's military competence was also an illusion. Chiang's eventual downfall was due to his overwhelming defeat in the interior of China, rather than by events in Manchuria or alleged devious activities on the part of four men in the

62 Stilwell, Stilwell Papers, pp. 150, 238.
United States Department of State. It seems plausible that the possibilities of defeating Chiang became clear to the Chinese Communists as they observed the futility of United States efforts to aid Chiang in World War II. Chiang did achieve some minor military successes in the late 1920's, the mid-1930's, and to a lesser extent, during the period of World War II. But it needs to be kept in mind that these successes were dependent, in the same sequence, on Russian, German, and finally, United States military aid.

Postscript

The strangest thing about the entire war was our reaction to it after we had won it. America did the most colossal job in history and came out of it with an inferiority complex and a deep sense of fear.

During the period of the war United States military policy dominated all other United States-Chinese policy consideration. But, in the late stages of the war, and under the new President, other components of policy were given greater attention. The United States began to emphasize Chiang's idea that settlement of China's internal problems was a political question to be solved by the Chinese. The United States made tentative preparations to return to the

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65 FitzGerald, The American Political Science Review, XLVII (December, 1953), 1164-1166.

traditional policy of nonintervention in China's internal affairs.

The United States' decision to abandon the World War II military policy toward China seemed justified as the Allies entered the post war period. In a series of pragmatic tests and frustrating defeats it became clear that, as an institution, the army of China could not be isolated from the total inept system that represented Nationalist China. Under such circumstances improvement of the military institution of the Kuomintang to the point of becoming a modern disciplined army was beyond United States capabilities. It was possible to correct some of the defects, but the permanence of improvements was an illusion. Reform was a temporary transition endured to please the United States. From December, 1941, to August, 1945, the Chinese Army Commanders were opposed to two vital United States ideas; an improved communications system and an improved supply system. The Chinese Army Commanders opposition was, in part, the key to Chinese military problems.

Any American guilt complex regarding China seems inappropriate. It is true that the United States military policy failed to achieve what, at first, seemed to be at least an attainable goal. But the cause of the failure does not rest with the United States. The cause of the fall of the Nationalist government of China must rest with Chiang Kai-shek. The degree of Chiang's incompetence was the major factor in
defeat. Failure to realize United States policy aims did have a major impact on the fall of the Kuomintang. But the cause of the failure has been incorrectly assigned to the United States.
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