A STUDY OF SELECTED DICHOTOMOUS TYPOLOGIES
IN MODERN SOCIAL THEORY

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IN MODERN SOCIAL THEORY

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

MY CHILD, YOU KNOW NOT WHAT TO DO;
YET ARTICHOKE ARE BY NO MEANS THE WORST OF
THOSE THINGS
WHICH DIMINISH THEIR NATURAL RESISTANCE
UNDER THE TOUCH OF DELICATE FINGERS.
TAKE HOLD OF THE PRICKLY LEAF WITH POWER
ADROIT.
THAT IS THE MEANING OF ALL SCIENCE.

Goethe

From the standpoint of archaeology the history of man for the last
250,000 or possibly 500,000 years has been the history of technological
development. From the Paleolithic Age to the present there have been a
number of technological revolutions, each of which has produced corres-
ponding revolutionary effects on man's social life. Thus the domestication
of plants and of animals, the discovery of the uses of metals, and
finally, the development of a machine technology and the factory system
all contributed to the progressive urbanization of society. It is true
that the city is not a recent cultural development—except, of course,
from the archaeological point of view again—since a few cities grew up
in the valleys of the Nile, Tigris–Euphrates, and Indus rivers about
5,000 years ago.¹ These cities represented exceptions, however, since
the great majority of the people lived in rural areas throughout ancient,

¹Gordon Childe, WHAT HAPPENED IN HISTORY, pp. 17-19.
MEDIEVAL, AND EVEN MODERN TIMES. IT WAS NOT UNTIL ABOUT 1800--AND THEN ONLY IN WESTERN CIVILIZATION--WITH THE ADVENT OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION PROPER THAT URBANIZATION BECAME EXTENSIVE. ENGLAND'S URBAN POPULATION, FOR EXAMPLE, REPRESENTED ONLY 20 PER CENT OF ITS TOTAL POPULATION IN 1800, BUT THE PERCENTAGE JUMPED TO 50 PER CENT IN 1850 AND TO 80 PER CENT IN 1930. SIMILARLY, THE URBAN POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES ROSE FROM 29 PER CENT OF THE TOTAL POPULATION IN 1880 TO 56 PER CENT IN 1930.  


Although it is possible to divide the sociological and anthropological theorists who have dealt with this problem into two groups—those who welcome industrialization and urbanization and those who look upon urban life with great distaste—there are a number of theoretical elements common to all of them. Agreement on many of the points has been so general that they have been widely accepted and incorporated in introductory texts. For example, the following texts devote one or more chapters to an explicit discussion of dichotomous forms of social life: John W. Bennett and Melvin M. Tumin, Social Life: Structure and Function; John F. Cubber, Sociology: A Synopsis of Principles; Robert L. Sutherland, J. L. Woodward, and Milton A. Maxwell, Introductory Sociology; Kimball Young, Sociology: A Study of Society and Culture. At least one introductory text, Don Martindale and Elio D. Monachesi's Elements of Sociology, is organized almost entirely around a sacred-secular dichotomy of types of social life, and it is highly significant that they discuss the dichotomies of various sociological theorists in a chapter entitled "The Sociological Tradition." In truth the contrast between opposite forms of social life has been the core of sociological theory in the past. Harry Elmer Barnes and Howard Becker, recognizing this, have made the sacred-secular dichotomy the organizing principle of their monumental survey of social theory, Social Thought from Lore to Science. Even at the present time a very large number of community
STUDIES ARE BEING CONDUCTED BY RURAL SOCIOLOGISTS AND ANTHROPOLOGISTS WITH THE DICHOTOMY OF TYPES OF SOCIAL LIFE SERVING AS THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE.

IN LIGHT OF THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE ACCOERED THE DICHOTOMIES IN SOCIAL THEORY, IT IS HIGH TIME THAT THEY BE RE-EXAMINED AND CRITICALLY APPRAISED. IT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS THESIS TO EXAMINE SYSTEMATICALLY THE THEORIES OF SELECTED SOCIOLOGISTS AND ANTHROPOLOGISTS WITH THE END IN VIEW OF DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT OR TO WHAT DEGREE THE VARIOUS DICHOTOMIES ARE VALID AND USEFUL. IN ADDITION TO SPECIFIC CRITICISMS OF DOCTRINES PECULIAR TO INDIVIDUAL THEORISTS, AN ATTEMPT WILL BE MADE TO ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS: WHAT ARE THE THEORETICAL SOURCES FROM WHICH THE DICHOTOMIES OF TYPES OF SOCIAL LIFE IN MODERN SOCIOLOGICAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY ARE DERIVED? ARE THE DICHOTOMIES BASED UPON LEGITIMATE CONTRASTS WHICH CAN BE DEMONSTRATED EMPIRICALLY? TO WHAT EXTENT DO THE VALUE ORIENTATIONS OF THE THEORISTS BIAS THEIR RESULTS? HOW VALUABLE ARE THE DICHOTOMIES AS GUIDES TO EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION? TO WHAT EXTENT DO THE DICHOTOMOUS THEORIES CONTRIBUTE TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE CAUSES AND DIRECTIONS OF SOCIAL CHANGE?

BECAUSE OF THE VAST RANGE OF THEORETICAL MATERIAL INVOLVING DICHOTOMOUS TYPES OF SOCIAL LIFE, IT HAS BEEN NECESSARY TO EXERCISE A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF ARBITRARY JUDGMENT IN SELECTING THEORISTS TO BE CONSIDERED. AN EFFORT HAS BEEN MADE TO SELECT THOSE THEORISTS WHO HAVE BEEN OF GREATEST IMPORTANCE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF DICHOTOMOUS TYPOLOGIES OR, IN A FEW CASES, THOSE THEORISTS WHO ARE MOST REPRESENTATIVE OF A PARTICULAR POINT OF VIEW. DICHOTOMIES SUCH AS THOSE FORMULATED BY VESLENN, SUMNER, ODUM, PARK, AND OGBURN, ALTHOUGH ADMITTEDLY RELATED IN SOME RESPECTS
TO THE DICHOTOMY CONSIDERED IN THIS THESIS, WILL NOT BE CONSIDERED, SINCE THEY CUT ACROSS THE LATTER TYPE OF DICHOTOMY. VESELEN'S DICHOTOMY OF TECHNOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, MAY REFER TO CONTRASTING CHARACTERISTICS WITHIN MODERN URBAN SOCIETY, WHICH ITSELF FORMS A SEPARATE BRANCH OF THE DICHOTOMIES CONSIDERED IN THIS THESIS. SIMILARLY, PARK'S SPATIAL ORDER-MORAL ORDER CUTS ACROSS THE OTHER DICHOTOMIES.

PARK, HOWEVER, ALSO DEVELOPED A SACRED-SECULAR DICHOTOMY WHICH, ALTHOUGH IT DOES NOT APPEAR IN HIS PUBLISHED WRITINGS, HAS BEEN EXTREMELY INFLUENTIAL THROUGH THE WORK OF HIS STUDENTS, BECKER AND REDFIELD.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL SOURCES

DID A POET SING THIS CENTURIES AGO?
HOW IS IT POSSIBLE? THE MATTER IS OF
YESTERDAY AND TODAY.

GOETHE

PRE-MODERN SOURCES

INTRODUCTION.--THE CONSTRUCTION OF DICHTOMOUS TYPOLOGIES OF
SOCIEIES IS BY NO MEANS CONFINED TO THE MODERN SOCIAL THEORISTS, FOR
THERE IS A GREAT WEALTH OF SIMILAR MATERIAL IN BOTH ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL
SOCIAL THEORY. HERE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO SKETCH THE IDEAS OF ONLY A
FEW OF THE THEORISTS WHO ARE MORE OR LESS REPRESENTATIVE OF THEIR TIMES.
IT IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE PRE-MODERN
THEORISTS HAVE INFLUENCED THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUBSEQUENT THEORY, BUT
IT IS SAFE TO ASSUME THAT THEY HAVE HAD AT LEAST AN INDIRECT INFLUENCE.
THEORETICAL INNOVATIONS, JUST AS MECHANICAL INVENTIONS, HAVE A LONG
HISTORY OF GRADUAL DEVELOPMENT, AND IT IS AS ABSURD TO SAY THAT A PARTI-
CULAR THEORETICAL INNOVATION OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE IS "THOUGHT UP" BY A
BRILLIANT INDIVIDUAL AS IT IS TO SAY THAT THE AUTOMOBILE WAS INVENTED
BY A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL. SOME IDEA OF THE CULTURAL AND THEORETICAL BACK-
GROUNDS OF THE MODERN SOCIAL THEORISTS MAY BE DERIVED FROM A CONSIDERATION
OF THEIR ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL FORERUNNERS.

THE PRINCIPAL DICHTOMY WHICH IS FOUND IN PRE-MODERN SOCIAL THEORY
IS THAT BETWEEN THE RURAL AND THE URBAN WAYS OF LIFE, WITH THE FORMER
INCLUDING BOTH AGRICULTURAL AND PASTORAL FORMS. IN ALMOST EVERY CASE
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CITY AND COUNTRY WAS COUPLED WITH AN ATTACK UPON
URBAN LIFE AND URBAN INSTITUTIONS. AT THE SAME TIME THE VIRTUES OF RURAL
LIFE WERE EXTOLLED, AND MOST OF THE THEORISTS CALLED FOR A REVERSAL OF
THE URBANIZATION TREND.

**Hebraic Thought**—Until about the ninth century B.C. the Hebrews
remained a nomadic people with no central government, for patriarchy
and gerontocracy were sufficient to maintain order in such a society.
The conflict with the Philistines, however, made it necessary to form a
central government, and Saul was chosen as the first of the kings. The
conflict with the Philistines was not resolved until the time of Saul's
successor, David. David, in spite of his own shepherd background,
gradually drifted away from the nomadic ideals of the desert, and this
trend was carried even further by his son, Solomon. Public resentment
against Solomon and his violation of the traditional ideals resulted in
an unsuccessful revolt, and in a later revolt northern Israel split
off. The opposition and cleavage, however, did not prevent the insti-
tution of monarchy from consolidating its powers, and the old tribal
leadership was completely replaced by courtiers, counsellors, and
professional soldiers who maintained order. The population became
divided into two groups: the creditor patricians and the debtor
peasants and laborers. During this period the upholders of the nomadic
ideals compiled the Covenant Code, which reaffirmed the nomadic way of
life and called for special protection for widows, orphans, and the
poor. In spite of the code, however, the demoralization of the nomadic
IDEALS CONTINUED. 1

The strongest supporters of the Old Nomadic Way of Life were the prophets of the eighth century B.C., particularly Amos, Hosea, and Micah. Amos was a shepherd from the southern hills, and when he journeyed to the cities to sell his wool he observed with great indignation the breakdown of the nomadic ideals in the cities. The traditional ethos of mutual aid had been completely cast aside, and many of the Hebrews were even selling other Hebrews into debt slavery. Amos thundered against such practices, and he proclaimed that a society based on injustice and licentiousness could not long endure. Micah, who also came from a nomadic hamlet, believed that the urbanization of Israel was the principal cause of the deterioration of Hebrew society, and to remedy the situation he called for the complete destruction of all cities. The cities of iniquity where "the heads thereof judge for reward, and the priests thereof teach for hire, and the prophets thereof divine for money" must be destroyed and "... therefore shall Zion for your sake be plowed as a field, and Jerusalem shall become heaps" (Micah 6:16). Neither Amos nor Micah could be considered a revolutionary in the usual sense, however, since Yahweh, not man, was supposed to remedy the social evils. 2

In general the attitude expressed by the Old Testament of the Bible is favorable to rural life, particularly to its pastoral form, and is antagonistic to urban life. The cities of Sodom and Gomorrah

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1 Harry Elmer Barnes and Howard Becker, Social Thought from Lore to Science, pp. 120-122.

2 Ibid., pp. 124-126.
as well as the city of Babel were destroyed by Yahweh because of the sins of the persons who dwelt in them (Genesis 18:20-23; 11:1-8). There are a number of characteristics of the city which are mentioned in various parts of the Bible: the city is a source of sinfulness and depravity (Genesis 18); it is the place of refuge for criminals (Numbers 35); it is the place of refuge for strangers (Numbers 14); the city is a fortified place and is the center for the accumulation of wealth (Genesis 41; II Chronicles 8:6-7, 9:25); it is the center of luxury, magnificence, and beauty (Ezekiel 27); it is a place whose population has a short memory (Ecclesiastes 9:15); its streets are morally dangerous (Proverbs 7); and wisdom and folly live side by side in the city (Proverbs 8:9). An allusion to the heterogeneity which accompanies urbanization may also be seen in the story of the confounding of the universal language when Yahweh destroyed Babel.3 On the other hand, the Book of Ruth gives a picture of rural life which is wholesome and happy although rather hard during years of famine. Outstanding characteristics of these rural people are devotion, patriarchal attachment, justice, honesty, and mutual care of families and relatives.

Classical Thought.—The Greeks and the Romans, like the Hebrews, were also caught up in the process of urbanization, and the disorganization of the older rural way of life brought a theoretical reaction against cities in favor of rural life. One of the first persons to give expression to this reaction was Hesiod, a Greek who lived some

Time between the eleventh and the eighth centuries B.C. Hesiod believed that there were five periods in a regressive historical process: the ages of the gold race, the silver race, the bronze race, the hero race, and the age of iron. The original and highest culture was that of the gold race, and from that time man's culture has progressively deteriorated.

Hesiod believed that he himself lived in the age of the race of iron, the chief characteristic of which is the growth of cities. Hesiod complains about the city and its demoralization in the following terms:

In the city, father shall not be like to his children . . . neither shall guest to host, nor friend to friend, nor brother to brother be dear as of yore; and they shall give no honor to their swiftly ageing parents, and shall chide them with words of bitter speech, sinful men, knowing not the fear of gods . . . Right shall lie in might of hand, and reverence shall be no more: the bad shall wrong the better man, speaking crooked words and abetting them with oath. Envy, railing, rejoicing in evil, of hateful countenance, shall follow all men to their sorrow . . . Justice followeth weeping. . . into the city and the homes of men who drive her forth and deal with her crookedly. Where justice is respected there reigns peace, abundance, prosperity, fertility. Where, as in the city, it is discarded oftentimes a whole city reapeth the recompense of the evil men in the form of war, pestilence, sterility. Good husbandry is the best for mortal.

A few hundred years later Plato also expressed a nostalgia for the pre-urban way of life:

In the primeval world, and a long while before the cities came into being there is said to have been a blessed state and way of life . . . The desolation of these primitive men would create in them a feeling of affection and friendship towards one another; and they would have no occasion to fight for their subsistence; for they would have pasture in abundance . . . Hence in those days there was no great poverty. . . . And the community which has neither poverty nor riches will always have the noblest principles; there is no insolence or injustice, nor, again, are there any contentions or envying among them. And therefore they were good, and also because of what would be termed the simplicity of their natures; for what they heard of the nature of good and evil in their simplicity they

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BELIEVED TO BE TRUE, AND PRACTICED. • • • WOULD NOT MANY GENERATIONS LIVING ON IN THIS WAY, ALTHOUGH RUDE, PERHAPS, AND MORE IGNORANT OF THE ARTS GENERALLY • • • AND LIKewise OF OTHER ARTS, TERMED IN CITIES LEGAL PRACTICES AND PARTY CONFLICTS, AND INCLUDING ALL CONCEIVABLE WAYS OF HURTING ONE ANOTHER IN WORD AND DEED; WOULD THEY NOT, I SAY, BE SIMpler AND MORE MANLY, AND ALSO MORE TEMPERATE AND IN GENERAL MORE JUST?

FOLLOWING THIS PRE-URBAN STAGE THERE APPEARED CITIES AND GOVERNMENTS IMMERSED IN VICE AND INjustice. ANY CITY, Plato believed, is actually made up of two parts, a city of the poor and a city of the rich, and the two parts are continually at war with each other. WITH URBANIZATION THERE IS ALSO AN INCREASE IN INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM, WHICH Plato regards with some alarm: "Consequent upon this freedom comes • • • disobedience to rulers; and then the attempt to escape the control and exhortation of father, mother, elders, and when near the end, the control of the laws also; and at the very end there is the contempt of oaths and pledges, and no regard at all for the gods; and thus they • • • lead an evil life, and there is no cessation of ills." 

Reaction against urbanization occurred in Roman social theory too, as may be seen in the writings of Cato, Varro, Cicero, Sallust, Virgil, Horace, Columella, Seneca, Pliny, Tacitus, Juvenal, and others. Varro, for example, made the following comment:

In the history of mankind we find two modes of life, that of country and that of the town, and it is obvious that these two differ not only as to place, but as to time when they began to be. The country life is much the more ancient of the two; seeing that there was once a time when men lived in the country and had no town at all. • • • And not only is farming more ancient, it is also better; wherefore our ancestors with good reason sent their citizens

5 Ibid., pp. 30-31. Translation from Plato's Laws.
6 Ibid., pp. 32-33. Translation from Plato's Republic.
FROM THE TOWN BACK TO THE LAND, FOR IN PEACE THEY WERE FED BY THE RUSTIC ROMANS AND IN WAR WERE DEFENDED BY THEM.

OF GREATER IMPORTANCE, HOWEVER, IS THE WORK OF COLUMELLA, WHO FORMULATED A NUMBER OF PRINCIPLES WHICH HAVE BEEN SUMMARIZED BY SOROKIN, ZIMMERMAN, AND GALPIN AS FOLLOWS:


IBN-KHALDUN.—ALTHOUGH HE STANDS OUTSIDE THE MAIN LINE OF DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL THEORY, IBN-KHALDUN, A MOSLEM BERBER OF TUNIS OF THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY, IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO A CONSIDERATION OF PRE-MODERN DICHOTOMOUS TYPOLOGIES. SOROKIN, ZIMMERMAN, AND GALPIN GO AS FAR AS TO CALL IBN-KHALDUN THE FOUNDER OF SOCIOLOGY OR AT LEAST THE FOUNDER OF THE

7 Ibid., pp. 41-42. Translation from Varro's Rerum Rusticarum Libri Tres.

8 Ibid., p. 45.
Rural-Urban Sociology. At any rate Ibn-Khaldun made a remarkable contribution to social theory which anticipates by five centuries many of the theories of Tonnies, Durkheim, Giddings, and Desmoulins and other members of the Le Play school in France.

Ibn-Khaldun's theory is organized around two basic polar types: the nomadic life of the desert and the sedentary life of the cities and the towns. The most important difference between the two is to be found in the kind of social bond which unites the members of each type of community. Ibn-Khaldun's term for this social bond is 'Asabiyya, which is most closely translated as esprit de corps. Esprit de corps is found in its most typical and purest form in the case of the pastoral nomads, and it is, of course, weakest among urban people. The solidarity of the nomadic group grows out of the nature of nomadic life and the needs for defense and mobility.

Among the tribes of the desert, hostilities cease at the voice of the elders and of their rulers, to whom everyone shows the greatest respect. In order to protect their camps against external enemies they each have a select troop composed of their best warriors and young men who are most distinguished for their bravery. But that band would never be strong enough to repulse attacks unless all its members belonged to the same family and were animated by the same esprit de corps. It is precisely this fact which renders the troops composed of desert Arabs so strong and formidable; each combatant has only a single thought, that is to protect his tribe and his family.

An invariable concomitant of esprit de corps, Ibn-Khaldun believes, is a "bond of blood" or parentage.

Esprit de corps is known only among people linked by blood or similar ties. The ties of blood have an influence which most men recognize by a natural sentiment. The influence of these ties is

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9 Barnes and Becker, op. cit., pp. 270-272.
10 Sorokin, Zimmerman, and Galpin, op. cit., p. 58.
shown when one is troubled over the condition of his parents or kin when they suffer an injustice or are in danger of losing their lives. The evil that someone has done to one of our parents, the outrages that oppress them, appear as injuries to ourselves; with the result that we would wish to protect them by interposing ourselves between them and the source of danger. Since men have existed, this sentiment has been in their hearts. When two persons extend mutual aid and are related closely enough to be united in heart and sentiment, it is due to the influence of ties of blood which are manifest in the conduct of these related persons. 11

Ibn-Khaldun's further discussion reveals that "bond of blood" does not necessarily refer to biological ties literally; it is, at least in some cases, a metaphor for cultural bonds which cause a person to identify himself wholeheartedly with a tribe or family. Thus it is possible for a man to be taken into a tribe as a "blood relative" on an equal footing to other members of the tribe if he severs all his ties with his former tribe and adopts the new tribal name, symbolic of his promise to heed the sacred customs of the new tribe. The isolation of the nomadic tribes prevents their contact with other peoples having different customs and character, and the unity of the tribe is preserved: "Their isolation is thus a sure guarantee against the corruption of blood which results from unions contracted with strangers." 12

Sedentary life in the city, Ibn-Khaldun maintains, is characterized by a general weakening of esprit de corps and an irreversible trend toward more and more luxury, ease, and sensualism. He mentions, among other things, dishonesty and vulgar and obscene speech as characteristic of this tendency; there is also a loss of resourcefulness, health,

11 Ibid., pp. 58-59.

12 Barnes and Becker, op. cit., p. 272. See also Sorokin, Zimmerman, and Galpin, op. cit., p. 59.
SELF-REL IANCE, TRANQUIL I TY, BRAVERY, INDEPENDENCE, AND MOR ALITY.

The inhabitants of the cities are usually occupied with their pleasures and they abandon themselves to luxurious living. They seek the things of this transitory world and surrender completely to their passions. Among townpeople the soul corrupts itself with the evil qualities which are acquired in great number; and the more it perverts itself, the more it strays from the path of virtue. It sometimes happens that the people even forget all the ordinary decencies in their conduct. We have frequently met persons who indulge in vulgar and rude expressions in their meetings and before their superiors; they did not abstain even in the presence of their women.13

Coupled with this negative evaluation of sedentary urban life is a theory of a cyclical social process. The urbanization process never results in a complete disappearance of esprit de corps. For before this point is reached, a city becomes institutionally so weak that it is conquered or destroyed by outside forces. Out of the decay of the sedentary life arises once more a vigorous nomadic way of life.14

Thomas Hobbes: Social Contract Theory

In the works of the social contract theorists of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries in Europe may be found a basic dichotomy involving the distinction between man in his original "natural" state and man as a member of political society. The growth of commerce and of capital in Europe during this time made necessary the development of strong, centralized national governments to guarantee and enforce contracts and to maintain a certain amount of order in economic relations. An impressive problem was presented to social philosophy as to the explanation of the origin and the justification of the new

13bid.
POWERFUL POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY REPRESENTED
THE FIRST OF THE "SOLUTIONS" TO THE PROBLEM. FOR THE MOST PART THE
CONTRACT THEORISTS PLACED A NEGATIVE EVALUATION ON MAN IN HIS "NATURAL"
STATE, SINCE THEY BELIEVED THAT ONLY IN A POLITICALLY ORDERLY SOCIETY
COULD MAN'S NATURE BE BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL AND CHANNELED ALONG CON-
STRUCTIVE LINES OF DEVELOPMENT. THE INSTRUMENT WITH WHICH POLITICAL
SOCIETY WAS ESTABLISHED, THEY BELIEVED, WAS THE SOCIAL OR GOVERNMENTAL
CONTRACT.15

ALTHOUGH THE DOCTRINE OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT HAD DEVELOPED IN THE
THEORIES OF HOOKER, SUAREZ, MARIANA, AND GROTIAUS, IT RECEIVED ITS FIRST
CLASSIC STATEMENT IN THE WORK OF THOMAS HOBBES, AN ENGLISH PHILOSOPHER
OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY. HOBBES ATTEMPTS TO DISCOVER THE STATE OF
EARLY MAN BY DEDUCING IT FROM WHAT HE ASSUMES TO BE THE UNIVERSAL TRAITS
OF HUMAN NATURE. HE DENIES ARISTOTLE'S DICTUM THAT MAN IS BY NATURE
SOCIAL, FOR HE BELIEVES THAT RELATIVELY PERMANENT SOCIAL GROUPS CAN ORIGI-
NATE ONLY IN THE MUTUAL FEAR WHICH ALL MEN HAVE FOR ONE ANOTHER. MAN'S
BASIC CHARACTERISTIC IS "... A GENERALL INCLINATION ... A PERPETUAL
AND RESTLESSE DESIRE OF POWER AFTER POWER, THAT CEASETH ONELY IN DEATH."16
THUS IN THE NATURAL STATE ALL MEN ARE ENEMIES, FOR THEY ALL DESIRE TO
ATTAIN THE SAME ENDS OR TO POSSESS THE SAME GOODS. EVEN UPON THE ATTAIN-
MENT OF GOODS, EACH MAN MUST LIVE IN CONTINUAL FEAR THAT THEY WILL BE

15BID., pp. 378, 437-438. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORISTS WERE THE
FIRST THEORISTS TO VIEW THE PROCESSES OF SOCIAL CHANGE POSITIVELY. EVEN
SOME OF THE CONTRACT THEORISTS, HOWEVER, WERE DISSATISFIED WITH THE TREND
OF EVENTS. SEE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE DISCUSSION BELOW OF ROUSSEAU, WHO IS
USUALLY CONSIDERED THE LAST OF THE IMPORTANT PHILOSOPHERS OF SOCIAL CON-
TRACT.

16THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, p. 49.
TAKEN FROM HIM BY HIS FELLOWS. JEALOUSY, PRODUCED BY MAN’S INEVITABLE
PRIDE AND VANITY, ADDS TO THE GENERAL MISERY OF THE NATURAL SOCIETY OF
FORCE AND FRAUD. IN A FAMOUS PASSAGE HOBBES DESCRIBES THE PRE-GOVERNMENTAL
SOCIETY:

WHATSOEVER THEREFORE IS CONSEQUENT TO A TIME OF WARRE, WHERE
EVERY MAN IS ENEMY TO EVERY MAN; THE SAME IS CONSEQUENT TO THE
TIME, WHEREIN MEN LIVE WITHOUT OTHER SECURITY, THAN WHAT THEIR OWN
STRENGTH, AND THEIR OWN INVENTION SHALL FURNISH THEM WITHALL. IN
SUCH CONDITION, THERE IS NO PLACE FOR INDUSTRY; BECAUSE THE FRUIT
THEREOF IS UNCERTAIN: AND CONSEQUENTLY NO CULTURE OF THE EARTH,
NO NAVIGATION, NOR USE OF THE COMMODITIES THAT MAY BE IMPORTED
BY SEA; NO COMMODIOUS BUILDING; NO INSTRUMENTS OF MOVING, AND
REMOVING SUCH THINGS AS REQUIRE MUCH FORCE; NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE
FACE OF THE EARTH; NO ACCOUNT OF TIME; NO ARTS; NO LETTERS; NO
SOCIETY; AND WHICH IS WORST OF ALL, CONTINUALL FEAR, AND DANGER
OF VIOLENT DEATH; AND THE LIFE OF MAN, SOLITARY, POORE, NASTY,
BRUTISH, AND SHORT.17

HOBBS DOES NOT INSIST UPON THE HISTORICITY OF HIS THEORY OF THE STATE
OF NATURE, SINCE HE INTENDS IT PRIMARILY AS A TOOL FOR THE ANALYTIC
INTERPRETATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN SOCIETY:

IT MAY PERADVENTURE BE THOUGHT, THERE WAS NEVER SUCH A TIME,
NOR CONDITION OF WARRE AS THIS; AND I BELIEVE IT WAS NEVER GENERALLY
SO, OVER ALL THE WORLDS: BUT THERE ARE MANY PLACES, WHERE THEY LIVE
SO NOW. FOR THE SAVAGE PEOPLE IN MANY PLACES OF AMERICA, EXCEPT
THE GOVERNMENT OF SMALL FAMILIES, THE CONCORD WHEREOF DEPENDETH
ON NATURALL LUST, HAVE NO GOVERNMENT AT ALL; AND LIVE AT THIS DAY
IN THAT BRUTISH MANNER, AS I SAID BEFORE.18

HOBBS MAINTAINS THAT MAN’S NATURE IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE “LAWS
OF NATURE” AND THEREFORE SOME EXTERNAL POWER MUST BE SET UP TO FORCE
MEN TO CONFORM TO THE NATURAL LAWS.

FOR THE LAWS OF NATURE (AS JUSTICE, EQUITY, MODESTY, MERCY,
AND DOING TO OTHERS, AS WEE WOULD BE DONE TO) OF THEMSELVES,
WITHOUT THE TERROR OF SOME POWER, TO CAUSE THEM TO BE OBSERVED,
ARE CONTRARY TO OUR NATURALL PASSIONS, THAT CARRY US TO PARTIALITY,
Pride, Revenge, and the like. And COVENANTS, WITHOUT THE SWORD,
ARE BUT WORDS, AND OF NO STRENGTH TO SECURE A MAN AT ALL. THEREFORE

17 Ibid., pp. 64-65. 18 Ibid., p. 65.
NOTWITHSTANDING THE LAWS OF NATURE, (WHICH EVERY ONE HATH THEN
KEPT, WHEN HE HAS THE WILL TO KEEP THEM, WHEN HE CAN DO IT SAFELY)
IF THERE BE NO POWER ERECTED, OR NOT GREAT ENOUGH FOR OUR SECURITY;
EVERY MAN WILL, AND MAY LAWFULLY RELY ON HIS OWN STRENGTH AND
ART, FOR CAUTION AGAINST ALL OTHER MEN. 19

THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH A POWER TO ENFORCE CONFORMITY IS LACKING IN THE
STATE OF NATURE, BUT IN ORDER TO ESCAPE THE MISERIES OF LIFE IN THE
STATE OF NATURE, HOBSES ARGUES, A SOCIAL CONTRACT IS MADE BY EACH MAN
WITH EVERY OTHER MAN "... IN SUCH MANNER AS IF EVERY MAN SHOULD SAY
TO EVERY MAN, I AUTHORISE AND GIVE UP MY RIGHT OF GOVERNING MY SELFE;
TO THIS MAN, OR TO THIS ASSEMBLY OF MEN, ON THIS CONDITION, THAT THOU
GIVE UP THY RIGHT TO HIM, AND AUTHORISE ALL HIS ACTIONS IN LIKE MANNER." 20

SUCH A CONTRACT SETTING UP AN ABSOLUTE GOVERNMENT IS NECESSARY, HE FEELS,
FOR "THE ONLY WAY TO ERECT SUCH A COMMON POWER, AS MAY BE ABLE TO DEFEND
THEM FROM THE INVASION OF FORRAIGNERS, AND THE INJURIES OF ONE ANOTHER,
AND THEREBY TO SECURE THEM IN SUCH SORT, AS THAT BY THEIR OWNE INDUSTRIE,
AND BY THE FRUITES OF THE EARTH, THEY MAY NOURISH THEMSELVES AND LIVE
CONTENTEDLY; IS, TO CONFERRE ALL THEIR POWER AND STRENGTH UPON ONE MAN,
OR UPON ONE ASSEMBLY OF MEN... 21

IN THE COMMONWEALTH WHICH IS FORMED BY THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, ALL
IMPORTANT RELATIONS BETWEEN MEN ARE GOVERNED BY CONTRACTS ENFORCEABLE BY
THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT. THIS CONTRASTS SHARPLY WITH THE STATE
OF AFFAIRS PRIOR TO THE DRAWING UP OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, SAYS HOBSES,
SINCE WITHOUT A COERCIVE POWER THERE WAS NO WAY TO FORCE A PERSON TO
HONOR HIS CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS:

IF A COVENANT BE MADE, WHEREIN NEITHER OF THE PARTIES PERFORME
PRESENTLY, BUT TRUST ONE ANOTHER; IN THE CONDITION OF MEER NATURE,

19 IBID., P. 87. 20 IBID., P. 89. 21 IBID.
(which is a condition of warre of every man against every man) upon any reasonable suspicion; it is voyds: But if there be a common power set over them both, with right and force sufficient to compell performance; it is not Voyd. For he that performeth first, has no assurance the other will performe after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle mens ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions, without the feare of some coercive power; which in the condition of meer nature, where all men are equall, and judges of the justnesse of their own fears, cannot possibly be supposed. And therefore he which performeth first, does but betray himselfe to his enemy; contrary to the right... of defending his life, and means of living.

But in a civill estate, where there is a power set up to constrain those that would otherwise violate their faith, that feare is no more reasonable; and for that cause, he which by the covenant is to perform first, is obliged to do so.22

Hobbes has undoubtedly had a great influence on the development of subsequent theories of dichotomous types of social life, but his influence has been almost wholly on the formulation of one branch of the dichotomy. His particular theory of the natural state of man has been almost universally rejected, but his emphasis upon contractual relations in the modern commonwealth has met with greater acceptance. Tonnies, for example, acknowledged a great debt to Hobbes, and Heberle makes the following comments:

That Thomas Hobbes should have recognized the radically new principle of the modern state as opposed to all earlier "communal" forms of political bodies and should have undertaken to make it conceivable by the doctrine of a social covenant, Tonnies appreciated as the sociologically significant feature of Hobbes' theory of the state and of the rationalistic doctrine of social contract in general; for the modern omnipotent centralistic state, independent as it was in principle of any ethnic basis, could, in fact, be understood only by a rationalistic construction. . . .23

22bid., pp. 70-71.

23Rudolf Heberle, "The Sociological System of Ferdinand Tonnies: 'Community' and 'Society'," An Introduction to the History of Sociology, edited by Harry Elmer Barnes, pp. 241-242. See the discussion of Tonnies' Gesellschaft in Chapter III below for an indication of how Hobbes influenced the formulation of this polar type.
Jean Jacques Rousseau: Romantic Theory

Romantic theory during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe represents a sharp reaction against the rationalistic theories of Hobbes, Locke, and others. In contrast to the dominant faith in the progress of civilization, the romanticists tended to idealize a more or less fictional past, at the same time condemning civilization as the corrupter of man's inherently good nature. In many respects there is a close parallel between many of the classical theorists of Greece and Rome and the romantic theorists, for there is a primitivistic bias running through the theories of both. The romantic theory of society has influenced the development of theories of dichotomous types of social life in modern sociological and anthropological theory, but its influence, like that of the rationalistic theory of society of Hobbes, has been almost entirely on one branch of the dichotomy. It emphasized the opposite side from that which Hobbes emphasized, however, and subsequent theory represents more or less a synthesis of the two points of view. Tonnies, for example, stated that his theory represented a combination of Hobbesian theory and romantic theory.24

The work of Jean Jacques Rousseau, a French philosopher of the eighteenth century, represents an extreme romantic reaction against civil society and particularly against the city. In his Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality among Men, Rousseau maintains that the happiest of all periods of human existence was that period of pure savagery preceding and thus being uncontaminated by civilization.

24 See the discussion of Tonnies in Chapter 11 below.
He pictures man in this state of nature as a free and easy-going savage without any cares or worries. The savage supposedly was governed wholly by instinct and was concerned only with his own welfare. The limitation of ideas within a very narrow range was compensated for by the general blissful and simple life which the savage led. Later in his *Emile*, Rousseau attempts to discover the natural man by hypothetically removing from modern man all those elements which are held to be the effects of society and its institutions. His attitude has been summarized admirably by Taine:

Strip off the artificial habits of civilized man, his superfluous wants, his false prejudices; scatter all systems, return to your own heart, listen to the intimate sentiments, permit yourself to be guided by the light of instinct and conscience; and you will re-discover the primitive Adam, like to a statue of incorruptible marble that, fallen into a marsh, has long been buried under a crust of mold and slime, but that rescued from its enclosing filth, can again be placed on its pedestal in all the perfection of its form and in all the purity of its whiteness.

Actually Rousseau does not claim that the state of nature ever existed, for he explicitly states that it is a pure "idea of reason" reached by abstraction from the state of society. He does not favor a return to the state of nature, but rather to a state of savagery intermediate between the natural and societal states, so that the simplicity and advantages of nature could be preserved along with a certain amount of security and comfort to be found in society.

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26 Barnes and Becker, op. cit., p. 449. Translation from Taine’s *L’Ancien Régime*.

Rousseau believes that the urbanization process and its concomitants, the growth of knowledge and the development of commerce and communication, are responsible for man's degradation. He states that although the sciences and the arts are probably the "most abundant and efficient" sources of corruption, there are a great many others too. For example, "... commerce and all that facilitates communication and contact between nations carries to each of them not the virtues of the others but their crimes and perverts their mores, which were adapted to their climate and to the constitution of their government."28 The following selection from Narcisse describes the process by which man is corrupted:

When a taste for study and arts and literature begins to develop among any people in the world, the mores begin to degenerate. ... The appearance of such an inclination always signifies the beginning of corruption. ... An inclination to literature, philosophy, and the arts annuls our primary sense of duty and our real glory. ... It softens our body and soul. ... It weakens all the ties of esteem and benevolence which attach a man to society. Family and native country become for such a man mere words, empty of meaning; for such a philosopher there is neither parent, nor citizen, nor man. ... From it there originate on the one hand, a refinement of taste, politeness, vile and defiling flattery, and other insidious, childish, and seductive proclivities, which, in the long run, dry up the soul and corrupt the heart; on the other hand, jealousy, rivalry, the hatred of artists so well known, pernicious calumny, treason, unfaithfulness, insincerity, and everything that is the vilest and odious in vice.29

Rousseau attacks the cities as "the source of perdition of mankind"; as a "source of physical and moral degeneration"; as "the suckers who bleed the nation"; and as "the school of vices and contempt."30 He also

28. Sorokin, Zimmerman, and Galpin, op. cit., p. 135. Translation from Rousseau's NARCISSE.
29. Ibid., p. 135.
30. Ibid., p. 136. Translation from Rousseau's OEUVRES COMPLETES.
HEAPS SCORN ON THOSE URBANITES WHO ASSUME AN ATTITUDE OF SUPERIORITY WITH REGARD TO THE RURAL PEOPLE IN THE FOLLOWING PASSAGE:

According to them to evade Paris means to hate mankind; the rural people are nothing in their eyes; if we are to believe them, there is no human being outside of the boarding houses, academies, and dinner parties. . . . Rural life and agriculture have their own pleasures; and these pleasures are less insipid and less rude than they think them; among rural people there may be found a taste, exquisiteness, and delicacy; a respectable man who would retire with his family to the country and would become his own farmer can enjoy a life as sweet as that amidst the amusements of the city; finally, the most tender sentiments of the heart may animate rural society more pleasantly than the artificially exquisite language of the city circles, where our satirical and morbid laughter is a poor substitution for a natural gaiety lost by us. . . . The country's lessons are in loving and serving humanity while the city's lessons are in despising it.

Thus Rousseau makes use of a rural-urban dichotomy as well as the more general and inclusive distinction between the natural state of man and the civilized state of man.

**Karl Marx: Socialist Theory**

One of the most important influences on the theorists of dichotomous types of society is the socialist theory of Karl Marx, a German philosopher and economist of the nineteenth century, and his associate, Friedrich Engels. Although few of the theorists admit a direct debt to Marx, probably because of his association with revolutionary socialist activity, the approach which they generally use is distinctly Marxian in some of its aspects. Marx's devastating attack upon capitalistic society particularly has had a great influence—even more so when it has not borne a Marxian label—for essentially the same arguments have been taken over by romantic and reactionary theorists as well as by socialist theorists.

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Marx's concern with the dialectical process of history in which contrasting forms of society replace one another perhaps obscures the basic dichotomy of societal types to be found in his writings. This dichotomy is not that between capitalistic society and feudalistic society but rather a more general distinction between societies based upon private property on the one hand and societies based upon the common ownership of land on the other hand. Both capitalistic society and feudalistic society are based upon the institution of private property and its invariable complement, class struggle between oppressor and oppressed, and therefore they are much the same in basic respects.

"The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society ... has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones." The real contrast in ways of life, Marx maintains, is to be seen in the contrast between societies based on private property and societies based on common ownership of land.

Marx believes that prior to the development of civilization there was a period of primitive communism in which all land was held in common. These primeval men presumably led idyllic lives in which cooperation rather than class struggle was the organizing principle. With the growth of civilization, however, this golden age of the primitive gradually began to be replaced: "With the dissolution of these primeval communities society begins to be differentiated into separate and finally antagonistic

Even in the feudal stage, Marx argues, the system of social relationships was not totally alien to that found in primitive communism, but with the advent of capitalism the last vestiges of truly personal relationships among men have disappeared. A cash nexus for all human relationships has been substituted.

The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his "natural superiors," and has left no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous "cash payment." It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom—Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.

The introduction of the factory system has speeded the impersonalization of relationships and has made life progressively more drab for the bulk of the people.

Owing to the extensive use of machinery and to division of labor, the work of the proletarians has lost all individual character, and, consequently, all charm for the workman. He becomes an appendage of the machine, and it is only the most simple, most monotonous and most easily acquired knack that is required of him. These laborers, who must sell themselves piecemeal, are a commodity, like every other article of commerce, and are consequently exposed to all the vicissitudes of competition, to all the fluctuations of the market... Not only are they the slaves of the bourgeois class and of the bourgeois state, they are daily and hourly enslaved by the machine, by the overseer, and, above all, by the individual bourgeois manufacturer himself. The more openly this despotism proclaims gain to be its end and aim, the more petty, the more hateful and the more embittering it is.

33 Ibid., p. 321. See also Karl Marx, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, p. 89.

34 Marx and Engels, OP. CIT., pp. 323-324.

THE PROLETARIANS ARE NOT THE ONLY ONES WHO HAVE SUFFERED UNDER CAPITALISM, however. "The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honored and looked up to with reverent awe" and "it has converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage laborers." Not even the family has escaped the disorganizing influence of capitalism. It has degenerated among both bourgeoisie and proletarians.

The bourgeoisie has torn away from the family its sentimental veil, and has reduced the family relation to a mere money relation. . . . The bourgeois sees in his wife a mere instrument of production. . . . Bourgeois marriage is in reality a system of wives in common. . . . Our bourgeois, not content with having the wives and daughters of their proletarians at their disposal, not to speak of common prostitutes, take the greatest pleasure in seducing each other's wives. . . . But this state of things finds its complement in the practical absence of the family among the proletarians, and in public prostitution. . . . The bourgeois clap-trap about the family and education, about the hallowed correlation of parent and child, become all the more disgusting, the more, by the action of modern industry, all family ties among the proletarians are torn asunder and their children transformed into simple articles of commerce and instruments of labor.

In contrast to persons such as Amos and Rousseau who called for a return to an older way of life, Marx is oriented toward an idyllic socialistie society of the future. Capitalism, because it carries within itself the seeds of its own destruction, he believes, will inevitably crumble and be replaced eventually by a communistic society with common ownership of land and freedom from class conflict. Thus man will come into a second golden age which is superior even to the first, that of primitive communism, because of the greater production of technology. A glowing description of this final stage in man's development is found

36 Ibid., p. 324.
IN THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT FROM MARX'S CRITIQUE OF THE GOTAHA PROGRAM:

In the highest phase of Communist society, after the disappearance of the enslavement of man caused by his subjection to the principle of division of labor; when, together with this, the opposition between brain and manual work will have disappeared; when labor will have ceased to be a mere means of supporting life and will itself have become one of the first necessities of life; when with the all-round development of the individual, the productive forces, too, will have grown to maturity, and all the forces of social wealth will be pouring an uninterrupted torrent—only then will it be possible wholly to pass beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois laws, and only then will society be able to inscribe on its banners: "From each according to his ability; to each according to his needs." 38

HENRY SUMNER MAINE: HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE

Henry Sumner Maine, an English professor of law in the mid-nineteenth century, is considered to be one of the founders of historical jurisprudence, but his influence has extended beyond the field of legal history into general social theory. In his dichotomy of societal types is to be found the root of the distinctions later elaborated and systematized by various sociological and anthropological theorists. Many of these theorists, particularly Tonnies and Durkheim, have recognized a direct debt to Maine, and the others, of course, have been indirectly influenced. Although Maine is very clearly biased in favor of the kind of society found in modern civilization, he comes closer to an objective study of types of societies than most of his predecessors. In sharp contrast to the latter, whose analyses for the most part have a definite polemical character, his objectivity seems remarkable for his times. Although Maine feels that knowledge of primeval society might be gained from a study of current primitive societies, he rejects this approach to

38 Barnes and Becker, op. cit., p. 656.
THE PROBLEM BECAUSE OF THE INADEQUACIES AND ERRORS DUE TO BIAS IN THE
DATA COLLECTED BY CONTEMPTUOUS OBSERVERS OF PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES. SIMI-
LARLY HE BELIEVES THAT HISTORICAL RECORDS OF A PARTICULAR SOCIETY ARE OF
LITTLE VALUE, SINCE THEY ARE DISTORTED BY CULTURAL MYTHS ATTRIBUTING
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOCIETY TO IMAGINARY GODS AND MYTHICAL HEROES. IT
IS IN THE STUDY OF ANCIENT LAW THAT MAINE DISCOVERS THE NATURE OF PAST
SOCIETIES, FOR LAW TENDS TO BE PRESERVED AND THUS SERVES AS AN EXCELLENT
INDEX TO THE SOCIAL LIFE OF THE PAST.39

THE DICHOTOMY WHICH MAINE INFERS FROM HIS STUDY OF LEGAL SYSTEMS
INvolVES, ON THE ONE HAND, SOCIETY BASED UPON STATUS RELATIONSHIPS AND
THE BONDS OF KINSHIP AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, SOCIETY BASED UPON CONTRACTUAL
RELATIONS AMONG INDIVIDUALS AND UPON TERRITORIAL CONTIGUITY. MAINE SETS
FORTH A PATRIARCHAL THEORY OF ANCIENT SOCIETY WHICH IS BASED UPON THE
BIBLICAL HISTORY OF THE HEBREW PATRIARCHS. IN THE PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY
THE FAMILY WAS THE BASIC SOCIAL UNIT: "... SOCIETY IN PRIMITIVE TIMES
WAS NOT WHAT IT IS ASSUMED TO BE AT PRESENT, A COLLECTION OF INDIVIDUALS;
... IT WAS AN AGGREGATION OF FAMILIES."40 THE SOCIAL RELATIONS OF THE
PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY MAY BE SUMMED UP IN THE RELATIONS OF THE FAMILY, FOR
BEHAVIOR WAS ORGANIZED ALMOST ENTIRELY AROUND THE STATUS WHICH A PARTI-
CULAR PERSON HAD WITHIN HIS FAMILY. MAINE DESCRIBES SOME OF THE FEATURES
OF SUCH A SOCIETY:

The eldest male parent—the eldest ascendant—is absolutely supreme
in his household. His dominion extends to life and death, and is as
unqualified over his children and their houses as over his slaves; in
indeed the relations of sonship and servitude appear to differ in little
beyond the higher capacity which the child in blood possesses of

39 HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW, THIRD AMERICAN EDITION, P. 116.
SEE ALSO HENRY SUMNER MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM, P. 232.
40 MAINE, ANCIENT LAW, P. 121.
BECOMING ONE DAY THE HEAD OF A FAMILY HIMSELF. THE FLOCKS AND HERDS
OF THE CHILDREN ARE THE FLOCKS AND HERDS OF THE FATHER, AND THE
POSSESSIONS OF THE PARENT, WHICH HE HOLDS IN A REPRESENTATIVE RATHER
THAN IN A PROPRIETARY CHARACTER, ARE EQUALLY DIVIDED AT HIS DEATH
AMONG HIS DESCENDANTS IN THE FIRST DEGREE. . . 41

MAINE DEVOTES MOST OF HIS ATTENTION TO THE CHARACTERISTICS OF ANCIENT LAW,
WHICH HE FINDS TO BE SCANTY IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETY BECAUSE IT WAS SUPPLEMENTED
BY THE ARBITRARY DECISIONS OF THE HEAD OF THE HOUSEHOLD. IT WAS
ALSO CEREMONIOUS, FOR "... THE TRANSACTIONS TO WHICH IT PAYS REGARD
RESEMBLE INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS MUCH MORE THAN THE QUICK PLAY OF INTER-
COURSE BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS." 42 SINCE THE FAMILY RATHER THAN THE INDIVIDUAL
WAS THE BASIC UNIT OF PRIMITIVE SOCIETY, ANCIENT LAW RECOGNIZED THE INDIVIDUAL
ONLY TO A VERY LIMITED EXTENT:

THE MORAL ELEVATION AND MORAL DEBASEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL APPEAR
TO BE CONFOUNDED WITH, OR POSTPONED TO, THE MERITS AND OFFENSES
OF THE GROUP TO WHICH THE INDIVIDUAL BELONGS. IF THE COMMUNITY SINS,
ITS GUILT IS MUCH MORE THAN THE SUM OF THE OFFENSES COMMITTED BY
ITS MEMBERS; THE CRIME IS A CORPORATE ACT, AND EXTENDS IN ITS CON-
SEQUENCES TO MANY MORE PERSONS THAN HAVE SHARED IN ITS ACTUAL
PERPETRATION. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE INDIVIDUAL IS CONSPICUO-
USLY GUILTY, IT IS HIS CHILDREN, HIS KINSFOLK, HIS TRIBESMEN, OR
HIS FELLOW-CITIZENS, WHO SUFFER WITH HIM, AND SOMETIMES FOR HIM. 43

MAINE BELIEVES THAT A REAL OR ASSUMED BOND OF KINSHIP UNITED THE MEMBERS
OF THE PRIMITIVE SOCIETY. THE SOCIETY ITSELF WAS MERELY AN EXTENSION
OF THE PATRIARCHAL FAMILY.

OF THIS WE MAY . . . BE CERTAIN, THAT ALL ANCIENT SOCIETIES REGARDED
THEMSELVES AS HAVING PROCEEDED FROM ONE ORIGINAL STOCK, AND EVEN
LABOURED UNDER AN INCAPACITY FOR COMPREHENDING ANY REASON EXCEPT
THIS FOR THEIR HOLDING TOGETHER IN POLITICAL UNION. THE HISTORY OF
POLITICAL IDEAS BEGINS, IN FACT, WITH THE ASSUMPTION THAT KINSHIP IN
BLOOD IS THE SOLE POSSIBLE GROUND OF COMMUNITY IN POLITICAL FUNCTIONS
NOR IS THERE ANY OF THOSE SUBVERSIONS OF FEELING, WHICH WE TERM
EMPHATICALLY REVOLUTIONS, SO STARTLING AND SO COMPLETE AS THE CHANGE
WHICH IS ACCOMPLISHED WHEN SOME OTHER PRINCIPLE—SUCH AS THAT, FOR

41bid., p. 119. 42bid., p. 122. 43bid.
INSTANCE OF LOCAL CONTIGUITY—ESTABLISHES ITSELF FOR THE FIRST TIME AS THE BASIS OF COMMON POLITICAL ACTION. 44

With the passage of time, however, societies began to increase in population by means other than natural increase. A conflict thus resulted between the theory that all were related through descent from a common ancestor and the fact that the group had multiple origins, but the conflict was at first resolved through the use of legal fictions. "The expedient which in those times commanded favour was that the incoming population should feign themselves to be descended from the same stock as the people on whom they were engrafted; and it is precisely the good faith of this fiction, and the closeness with which it seemed to imitate reality, that we cannot now hope to understand." 45

Although Maine does not consider the sources of social change, he does describe the process of change from ancient primitive society to modern civilization. There has been, he believes, a uniform movement of all societies from a social organization based upon status in the family to one based upon contracts.

The movement of the progressive societies has been uniform in one respect. Through all its course it has been distinguished by the gradual dissolution of family dependency and the growth of individual obligation in its place. The individual is steadily substituted for the family, as the unit of which civil laws take account. 46

The bond which holds modern society together is no longer kinship, but rather contract between individuals:

.Contract . . . is the tie between man and man which replaces by degrees those forms of reciprocity in rights and duties which have their origin in the family. . . . Starting, as from one terminus of history, from a condition of society in which all the relations

OF PERSONS ARE SUMMED UP IN THE RELATIONS OF FAMILY, WE SEEM TO HAVE STEADILY MOVED TOWARDS A PHASE OF SOCIAL ORDER IN WHICH ALL THESE RELATIONS OF PERSONS ARSE FROM THE FREE AGREEMENT OF INDIVIDUALS. IN WESTERN EUROPE THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED IN THIS DIRECTION HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE. THUS THE STATUS OF THE SLAVE HAS DISAPPEARED—IT HAS BEEN SUPERSEDED BY THE CONTRACTUAL RELATION OF THE SERVANT TO HIS MASTER. THE STATUS OF THE FEMALE UNDER TUTELAGE, IF THE TUTELAGE BE UNDERSTOOD OF PERSONS OTHER THAN HER HUSBAND, HAS ALSO CEASED TO EXIST; FROM HER COMING OF AGE TO HER MARRIAGE ALL THE RELATIONS SHE MAY FORM ARE RELATIONS OF CONTRACT. SO TOO THE STATUS OF THE SON UNDER POWER HAS NO TRUE PLACE IN THE LAW OF MODERN EUROPEAN SOCIETIES. IF ANY CIVIL OBLIGATION BINDS TOGETHER THE PARENT AND THE CHILD OF FULL AGE, IT IS ONE TO WHICH ONLY CONTRACT GIVES ITS LEGAL VALIDITY.

THE SHIFT FROM STATUS TO CONTRACT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVILIZATION IS PARALLELED, MAINE BELIEVES, BY ANOTHER CHANGE FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSANGUINITY TO THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIAL CONTIGUITY AS THE CONDITION OF COMMUNITY IN POLITICAL FUNCTIONS. "THE PRINCIPLE OF LOCAL CONTIGUITY, NOW RECOGNISED EVERYWHERE AS THE CONDITION OF COMMUNITY IN POLITICAL FUNCTIONS . . . PROVED TO BE ENDOwed WITH A FAR HIGHER MEASURE OF VITALITY."

IN SUMMARY, MAINE'S PICTURE OF ANCIENT SOCIETY INVOLVES THE FOLLOWING CHARACTERISTICS: KINSHIP WAS THE BASIS OF SOLIDARITY, PROPERTY WAS JOINTLY OWNED, THE FATHER WAS POLITICALLY AND SOCIALy DOMINANT, LAW WAS INITIALLY FAMILY LAW INTERPRETED BY THE FATHER, AND THE INDIVIDUAL WAS COMPLETELY SUBORDINATED TO THE GROUP. IN MODERN SOCIETY, ON THE OTHER HAND, CONTRACTUAL AND LEGAL RELATIONS ARE PREDOMINANT, PROPERTY IS INDIVIDUALLY OWNED, SPECIALIZED INSTITUTIONS ARE DOMINANT POLITICALLY, AND THERE IS A MUCH GREATER DEGREE OF INDIVIDUALISM. WHEREAS KINSHIP WAS THE BASIS FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF ANCIENT SOCIETY, TERRITORIAL CONTIGUITY SERVES AS THE BASIS FOR MODERN SOCIETY.

47 ibid., pp. 163-164. 48 ibid., p. 128.
EARLY EUROPEAN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

INTRODUCTION.—Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer, who are generally recognized as the founders of sociology as a separate discipline, were both concerned primarily with the study of human progress. Comte, for example, defined sociology as the science of social order and progress. As a necessary by-product from the consideration of social evolution and progress, each elaborated contrasting societal types. Progress or evolution, they believed, consisted of the movement from one extreme type to the other. Although the influence of Comte and Spencer was considerable upon early American sociologists and upon subsequent European sociologists, their influence declined rapidly after the turn of the century. The dichotomous types of society of Ward and Giddings, however, were taken almost directly from Comte and Spencer with little modification.

Auguste Comte.—Comte's theory of progress is derived from the works of Turgot, Burdin, and Saint-Simon, who held that there are three stages in the psychological evolution of man: (1) the conjectural stage, (2) the "niconjectural" stage, and (3) the positive stage. Comte elaborates this doctrine with his own formulation of the progress of the development of the mind:

In the theological state, the human mind, seeking . . . final causes (the origin and purpose) of all effects—in short, absolute knowledge—supposes all phenomena to be produced by the immediate action of supernatural beings.

In the metaphysical state, which is only a modification of the first, the mind supposes, instead of supernatural beings, abstract forces, veritable entities (that is, personified abstractions) inherent in all beings, and capable of producing all phenomena. . . .

49 Barnes and Becker, op. cit., p. 565.
In the final, the positive state, the mind has given over the vain search after absolute notions, the origin and destination of the universe, the causes of phenomena, and applies itself to the study of their laws.

Paralleling the three stages of mental development, there are also three great stages of social development, but since the middle stage, the metaphysical, is "merely a state of transition," Comte's system actually involves dichotomous types of society.

Comte makes a further distinction between military and industrial societies which is closely tied up with the more general dichotomy. The theological is invariably found in connection with the military.

"... examination will always show the necessity of the military system to consolidate, and yet more to extend, the theological authority, developed in this way by a continual political application. . . ." At the same time, the military system is dependent upon the theological mentality, since "it is plain that no military system could arise and endure without the countenance of the theological spirit, which must secure for it the complete and permanent subordination essential to its existence." On the other hand, the positive or scientific spirit is found in connection with industrialization, since both are hostile to the theological spirit and to militarisms. "He cannot . . . overlook the political influence by which the gradual expansion of human industry must aid the progressive ascendancy of the scientific spirit, in its antagonism to the religious; to say nothing of the daily stimulus which

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51 See Ibid. 52 Ibid., Vol. 11, p. 331. 53 Ibid., p. 330.
INDUSTRY AND SCIENCE IMPART TO EACH OTHER, WHEN ONCE STRONG ENOUGH FOR MUTUAL ACTION. The course of progress, Comte maintains, involves the shift from military society to industrial society.

All political investigation of a rational kind proves the primitive tendency of mankind, in a general way, to a military life; and to its final issue in an industrial life. No enlightened mind disputes the continuous decline of the military spirit, and the gradual ascendency of the industrial. We see now, under various forms, and more and more indisputably... the repugnancy of modern society to a military life.

Comte describes some of the effects of industrialization upon social life in the following passage:

... Industrial life has unquestionably developed new intellectual and sympathetic power in the very lowest class of the population. Industrial life favours a universal goodwill, because every man's daily toil may be regarded as concerning others quite as much as himself; whereas the military life encouraged the most malignant passions... The influence of the change on domestic life has been vast; for it opened that mode of existence for the first time to the most numerous class--there being nothing in the condition of slaves or serfs which is worthy the name of family life... The increasingly special character of employments, favoured... a closer agreement between aptitudes and destinations; and at the same time, the natural connection between private and public interest was directly improved by that marvellous instinctive social economy by which each industrial member is constantly employed in devising and carrying out new methods of serving the community--every private operation assuming the character of a public function, and the broad old division between the two becoming indistinguishable.

... The industrial movement abolished the system of caste by setting up against the ancient superiority of birth that of wealth acquired by industry.

Although Comte regards positive-industrial society as the great end toward which man should strive, he is not unaware of the abuses of industrialization under capitalism. These he regards, however, not as the result of the industrialization process, but as the result of the

54 Ibid., p. 332.  
55 Ibid., p. 326.  
FAILURE OF A SCIENTIFIC MORALITY TO KEEP PACE WITH INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT.

Thus he sets forth a theory of cultural lag which anticipates by a century that of Osburn.

Again, if we observe only town industry, we see that, owing to the spread of individualism and speciality, the moral development is far in the rear of the material, though we should suppose that the more man acquires new means of action, the more moral control is requisite at the same time, that he may not use his new powers to the injury of himself or society. As the whole industrial province lay outside of religious regulation, never having been contemplated in the theological scheme, it was tacitly abandoned to the antagonism of private interests, except that some vague general maxims were preached that there was no power to enforce. Industrial society was thus destined, from its modern beginning, of all systematic morality which could regulate its various common relations. 57

Comte firmly believes that industrial society in the future is destined to be systematized and reorganized by rational principles, for "the industrial evolution has been thus far only preparatory, introducing valuable elements of genuine and permanent order, and now awaiting the reorganization which will perfect it." 58 To direct the process of reorganization Comte offers a new science—sociology. 59

Herbert Spencer.—Although Spencer denies that he is indebted to Comte for some of his basic theoretical ideas, the close correspondence between the two at many points can hardly be explained as pure accident. Particularly their theories of types of society are virtually identical.

In place of Comte's dichotomy of theological-military and positive-industrial

57 Ibid., pp. 272-273. 58 Ibid., p. 274. 59 Comte's belief in the necessity of providing a new science comprehensive enough to guide the process of social and industrial reform is also derived from the theory of Saint-Simon, who was once a teacher and close friend of Comte. Saint-Simon, however, called the new science science politique, and presumably for this reason alone the title "Founder of Sociology" has been awarded to Comte rather than to Saint-Simon. See Barnes and Becker, op. cit., pp. 565, 571.
WITH A TRANSITIONAL STAGE OF CRITICAL-METAPHYSICAL, SPENCER USES A
dichotomy of militant and industrial societies. Spencer, however, con-
verts Comte's theory of rationally directed progress into a theory of
social evolution which proceeds according to its own laws of development
if not inhibited by man's well-meaning but ineffectual efforts to control
the process. Spencer defines evolution as "... a change from an
incoherent homogeneity to a coherent heterogeneity, accompanying the
dissipation of motion and integration of matter." Society, he main-
tains, has passed through an evolutionary development from a state of
incoherent homogeneity to be found in the primitive warlike or militant
society to a state of "coherent heterogeneity" to be found in peaceful
industrial society. In the case of the militant society "... the
structures carrying on external [military] actions are largely developed;
the sustaining system exists solely for their benefit; and the activities
are militant." In the industrial society, on the other hand, "... there
is predominance of the structures carrying on sustenance; offensive
and defensive structures are maintained only to protect them; and the
activities are industrial." Spencer does not distinguish the industrial
type of society from the militant solely by the amount of industry being
carried on, for he believes that militant states may be very industrious
too. The real contrast is to be found in the degree of personal freedom
allowed in each:

60 Herbert Spencer, FIRST PRINCIPLES, SIXTH EDITION, P. 332.

61 Herbert Spencer, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY, THIRD EDITION,
Vol. 1, P. 556.

62 Ibid., pp. 556-557.
Societies may be grouped as militant and industrial; of which the one type in its developed form is organized on the principle of compulsory cooperation, while the other in its developed form is organized on the principle of voluntary cooperation. The one is characterized not only by a despotic central power, but also by unlimited political control of personal conduct; while the other is characterized not only by a democratic or representative central power, but also by limitation of political control over personal conduct.

Thus the industrial society operates according to the principle of laissez faire and gradually and peacefully evolves toward a third and higher stage devoted to ethical improvement as well as material production.

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63 Ibid., pp. 595-597.

CHAPTER III

EUROPEAN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORISTS

If you wish to treat yourself in the best way possible,
Do not rest on yourself alone,
But follow the mind of a master;
Under his leadership even error brings you gain.

Goethe

FERDINAND TONNIES: GEMEINSCHAFT AND GESELLSCHAFT

INTRODUCTION.—One of the best known and most influential dichotomies of societal types is that of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft elaborated by Ferdinand Tonnies in 1887.¹ Tonnies was born and spent his early years in the Frisian region of Schleswig-Holstein in Germany, an area where serfdom had never developed and in which many of the characteristics of the ancient Germanic rural community were preserved. During the latter part of the nineteenth century, however, the influence of cities and urban values was extended to this region, with the result that the traditional way of life in the area was profoundly modified. Tonnies, who later moved to the cities of Germany for university education and for professional work, was struck by what seemed to him to be the tremendous difference between urban society and the society in which he had spent his youth. This contrast in ways of life which he had observed personally was probably one of the factors which led him to a

¹Ferdinand Tonnies, Fundamental Concepts of Sociology, translated and supplemented by Charles F. Loomis.
SYSTEMATIC CONSIDERATION OF THE PHENOMENON AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A
DICHOTOMY OF SOCIETAL TYPES. As has been pointed out in Chapter II, the idea of two kinds of social life was certainly not original with Tonnies, but he was the first theorist to formulate the dichotomy clearly and to trace the implications of the theory. In fact Heberle suggests that it would have been impossible for any person before the time of Tonnies to arrive at a similar conclusion, because the dichotomy was in part based upon the romantic theory of the state and society and the knowledge of the social life of primitive peoples, which resulted from the development of cultural anthropology, comparative philology, and comparative law in the nineteenth century. Because of the central importance of Tonnies' theory in the whole tradition of dichotomous typologies of society, the basic theoretical ideas of his system will be traced in some detail.

PURE SOCIOLOGY AND THE NORMAL CONCEPT. Tonnies makes a distinction between special sociology and one of its subdivisions, general sociology. General sociology includes special sociology, social biology, social psychology, and demography, whereas special sociology is confined to the study of "social entities." Little attention is given to general sociology by Tonnies, but special sociology is further subdivided into


3 Ibid., p. 232.

THREE SEPARATE DISCIPLINES: (1) PURE OR THEORETICAL (REINE, THEORETISCHE) SOCIOLOGY, (2) APPLIED (ANGEMANDE) SOCIOLOGY, AND (3) EMPIRICAL (EMPIRISCHE) SOCIOLOGY OR SOCIOGRAPHY. IT IS IN THE AREA OF PURE SOCIOLOGY THAT THE CORE OF TONNIES' SYSTEM AND METHODOLOGY MAY BE FOUND.

Pure sociology is a logical system of "normal" or "ideal" types of "social entities" in a static condition. Applied sociology, on the other hand, consists of the application of these "pure" concepts to concrete historical cases in order to interpret the process of historical change. Thus, whereas pure sociology represents a static approach, applied sociology is by its very nature dynamic and in this respect is similar to Comte's conception of sociology as a scientific philosophy of history. Pure sociology utilizes a constructive approach, in contrast with the essentially deductive nature of the approach in applied sociology. The object in the latter case is to systematize and interpret empirical data according to a principle of evolution from GEMEINSCHAFT, one normal concept of society, to GESELLSCHAFT, another normal concept of society. Tonnies' idea of the role of pure sociology is clearly revealed in the following passage quoted by Heberle:

As such sociology is mainly concerned with concepts... It has to formulate these concepts, i.e., make them ready for use... so as to hang upon them like on nails or to seize as with clamps, the facts of experience. In this realm, it is not so much its task to perceive facts but to construct the handiest, the most useful implements for their perception; a task of supreme importance, which is, frequently to their own disadvantage, not much appreciated by the mere empiricist.

5 ibid., pp. 231, 247. "Pure sociology" in this sense corresponds fairly closely to the term "general sociology" which has gained acceptance among American sociologists. This must not be confused with "general sociology" in Tonnies' sense, however.

6 ibid., p. 247. Translation from Tonnies' Soziologische Studien.
The elaboration of type constructs is not an end in itself. These constructs must be applied

with the aid of sociological terminology and theory, applied sociology could follow the course of the European ... development in its fundamental phases up to the present hour. Thus it will end up with the inquiry into present day social life, a research that should be as thorough as possible. 8

This latter task, however, is the special job of empirical sociology, which uses the inductive method in the study of society. 8

The idea of the normal concept deserves further consideration, since it has been extremely influential in the development of contemporary sociological theory. 9 In the first place, Tonnies makes it clear that normal concepts do not correspond exactly with any particular empirical facts. They are not "normal" in the ordinary sense of being representative of a class or group of entities. They represent rather logical norms from which every concrete case differs. It is the very complexity of societies which makes it necessary to analyze them in terms of the degree of their correspondence to or difference from the normal concepts. The normal concepts are arrived at not by studying particular societies or even by finding some kind of average of the characteristics of societies. As Tonnies puts it in discussing the two normal concepts of human will,

7 Ibid. Translation from Tonnies' Einführung in die Soziologie.
8 Ibid.
9 The concept "ideal type," which is usually associated with Max Weber, is essentially the same as the "normal concept," which was used by Tonnies several years earlier. Tonnies also used the term "ideal type" occasionally, however. See Tonnies, op. cit., p. 16. The concept will be considered in further detail in connection with Weber.
The concepts of the forms of will are nothing but products of thought, tools devised in order to facilitate the understanding of reality. The great qualitative variety of human willing is made comparable by relating it to these normal concepts as common denominators.10 These normal concepts, because they are simply the "free and arbitrary products of thinking," can be made mutually exclusive, so that each normal concept represents a separate entity. No amount of empirical study and observation need bring to light a society which corresponds to one or the other normal concept in every respect. In fact, such a society cannot exist.11 What we must look for are tendencies in a society or institution toward one of the extremes, the normal concepts. Elements of both extreme types may coexist and even serve each other within the same society or institution, but they tend to contradict and oppose each other in the crucial matter of power and control. In the transhistorical sense, then, it is possible to determine the gradations of societies and institutions in terms of the normal concepts. The normal concepts may also be used for historical purposes, for it becomes possible to study the same society or institution at historical intervals to determine the trend from a society or institution dominated by the characteristics of one extreme type to a society or institution dominated by those of the other.12 Tonnies cautions, however, that "... the artificial, even forged, character of these abstractions must always be kept clearly in mind..."13

10 Ibid., p. 162.

11 This type of concept has been used very fruitfully in the natural sciences. Absolute zero, for instance, even though it has no empirical existence, serves as a useful normative reference point.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid., p. 257.
RATIONAL WILL AND NATURAL WILL. 14—TONNIES BASES THE DICHOTOMY OF GEMEINSCHAFT AND GESELLSCHAFT ON A FURTHER DISTINCTION BETWEEN RATIONAL WILL AND NATURAL WILL. 15 NATURAL WILL IS A TYPE OF HUMAN VOLITION WHICH SERVES AS A BASIS FOR ORGANIC UNITY OF THE GROUP AND ITS VALUES. AN ACTION IN THIS CASE IS WILLED NOT AS A MEANS TO AN END, BUT AS AN END IN ITSELF. THE TRADITIONAL VALUES OF THE GROUP ARE BEYOND QUESTION AND ARE ACCEPTED WITHOUT ANY RATIONAL CONSIDERATION OF THEIR TRUTH, GOODNESS, OR UTILITY. TONNIES BELIEVES THAT THE SOURCE OF NATURAL WILL IS INHERITED HUMAN NATURE, AND NATURAL WILL IS INSTINCTUAL.

Specific natural will is inborn in the human being in the same way as in any species a specific form of body and soul is natural. Every individual natural will arrives at its complete and mature existence in the same way as the organism which it represents, by gradual growth developing from an embryo or tender bud which contains the eugenic as well as physical form as it has been predetermined and originated by the union of cells derived from the


15 ACTUALLY TONNIES' DISCUSSION OF SOCIETAL TYPES PRECEDES HIS DISCUSSION OF TYPES OF WILL IN GEMEINSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT, BUT HE ADMITTED IN THE INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST EDITION OF THE BOOK THAT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF SYSTEMATIC TREATMENT, THE TWO SHOULD HAVE BEEN REVERSED IN ORDER. SEE CHARLES P. LOOMIS, "TRANSLATOR'S APPENDIX" IN TONNIES, OP. CIT., P. 280. THE FACT THAT THESE CONCEPTS DO OCCUR IN THE ORDER THEY DO SEEMS TO INDICATE THAT THE CONCEPT OF RATIONAL AND NATURAL WILL WAS PERHAPS DEVELOPED AS MORE OR LESS AN AFTERTHOUGHT. THUS, THE FOUNDATION APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN PROVIDED AFTER THE HOUSE WAS ALREADY BUILT. FOR THE SAKE OF CLARITY, HOWEVER, THE LOGICAL LINE OF DEVELOPMENT WILL BE FOLLOWED IN THIS AND IN THE FOLLOWING SECTION.
PROCREATORS. ACCORDING TO THIS ORIGIN, NATURAL WILL HAS TO BE UNDERSTOOD AS INBORN AND INHERITED. 16

Thus there is an instinctive sympathy among biologically related individuals, growing out of the innate natural will. Within the close-knit biological group, therefore, there is complete unity of purpose and action. This is only the prototype of natural will, however, for the unity derived from biological ties develops into a unity organized around a locality, such as a village or town. It may develop even further into a community of mind, organized around some common belief, such as an acceptance of a deity. 17 This spreading out of the natural community from the biological group is accompanied by an increasing degree of rationality in natural will; for rational elements are in greater abundance in the volition of a group organized around a common value than in a group organized around kinship. Natural will develops from its purely irrational prototype, blood-relationship, through neighborliness to friendship. 18

16 TONNIES, OP. CIT., P. 121. THIS IDEA MAY BE TRACED BACK AT LEAST AS FAR AS THE ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHERS. Cf. ARISTOTLE'S NOTION OF MAN AS A SOCIAL ANIMAL. SEE ALSO THE THEORY OF THE 'BLOOD BOND' OF GUMPLOWICZ AND RATZENHOFER.

17 Ibid., P. 48.

18 HEBERLE AND BECKER EVIDENTLY DISAGREE IN THE INTERPRETATION OF TONNIES ON THIS POINT, FOR BECKER STATES THAT NATURAL WILL "... IS PRACTICALLY EQUIVALENT TO NON-RATIONAL..." (HARRY ELMER BARNES AND HOWARD BECKER, SOCIAL THOUGHT FROM LONE TO SCIENCE, P. 888.) HEBERLE SAYS, HOWEVER, THAT NATURAL WILL "... IS BY NO MEANS NECESSARILY IRRATIONAL. ON THE CONTRARY, ONE CAN DISTINGUISH BETWEEN DEGREES OF RATIONALITY OF THE WESENWILLE AND OF THE 'COMMUNITIES' WHICH DERIVE THEREFROM." (HEBERLE, OP. CIT., P. 233.) HEBERLE'S INTERPRETATION SEEMS TO BE MORE IN ACCORD WITH TONNIES' WRITING, BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW NATURAL WILL CAN BE AN IDEAL TYPE AND AT THE SAME TIME CONTAIN SOME OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OPPOSITE IDEAL TYPE. THE IDEAL TYPES ARE SUPPOSED TO BE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE. TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE IDEAL TYPICAL METHODOLOGY, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO REGARD AS NATURAL WILL ONLY THE INSTINCTIVE, COMPLETELY IRRATIONAL UNITY ANDliking of biologically-related individuals.
Rational will is contrasted to natural will in that it is concerned exclusively with the rational determination of the best means toward an end. Thus, whereas natural will is the instinctive, organic form of volition which drives human activity according to the customs and habits of the past, rational will is purposive and arbitrary and is oriented with regard to an expected future. Natural will makes no distinction between means and ends, for they are identical, but rational will divorces means from ends and considers means from a rational standpoint. Means must be judged solely as to whether they will contribute toward the realization of the ultimate end, for all other considerations are irrational and beside the point.\(^{19}\) Since secondary ends tend to be subservient to a more general end, these secondary ends are themselves reduced to the status of mere means. There is, then, in the ideal case of rational will, a hierarchy of ends and purposes, with each end leading to a higher and more general end.\(^{20}\) This ultimate end is itself determined by rational thought, however, and in this respect rational will is completely different from natural will. In the case of rational will it is possible \(^{21}\) to derive or explain all phenomena of volition from ulterior thoughts.

19Tonies, op. cit., p. 15.  
20Ibid., p. 138.  
21Ibid., p. 139.
They do not possess any reality except through the creating and conserving thought.\textsuperscript{22}

In actual practice the indifference toward considerations other than that of the end itself, which is necessary for rational behavior, may be attained only by overcoming a considerable amount of resistance, for elements of natural will influence every person to some degree.

The purely rational outlook which adjusts means to ends may be regarded with feelings of reluctance, fear, anxiety, aversion, or remorse, for such behavior is regarded as unscrupulous and immoral from the point of view of natural will. Tonnies quotes Goethe as saying that the acting man is always "without conscience."\textsuperscript{23}

To summarize the concepts of natural and rational will, Tonnies makes the following statements:

\begin{quote}
\ldots on the one hand there is the simple emotional \ldots and, therefore, irrational volition and action, whereas on the other there is the simple rational volition and action in which the means are arranged, a condition which often stands in conflict with the feelings.\textsuperscript{24}
\end{quote}

Natural will and rational will are ideal types or normal concepts, since all human behavior takes place between the two extremes. There are some elements of rational will in all actions, just as there are also some elements of natural will. The crucial question is what is the degree of correspondence of a particular human action to either of the ideal types. The ideal types \ldots should serve as standards by which reality may be recognized and described.\textsuperscript{25}

Tonnies believes that not all human beings within a society are

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{22} ibid.
\textsuperscript{23} ibid., p. 16.
\textsuperscript{24} ibid.
\textsuperscript{25} ibid.
\end{flushright}
ALIKE IN THEIR DEPENDENCE UPON NATURAL WILL OR RATIONAL WILL. THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES AMONG GROUPS. THE FIRST AND MOST IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE IS THAT BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN. MEN ARE LED MORE BY RATIONAL WILL, WHEREAS WOMEN ARE LED MORE BY NATURAL WILL.

IT IS AN OLD TRUTH—but just for that reason important as the outcome of general experience—that women are usually led by feelings, men more by intellect. Men are more clever. They alone are capable of calculation, of calm... thinking, of consideration, combination, and logic. As a rule women follow these pursuits ineffectively. They lack the necessary requirement of rational will.

Tonnes implies, however, that he believes the difference is not completely inherited, for the activities of men tend to necessitate and develop rational will. A second difference is found between the young and the old. The young in this case tend to be governed by natural will and the old by rational will. Thus, a young woman is the true woman, and an old woman tends to have masculine qualities. A youthful man, on the other hand, tends to have some feminine characteristics, and it is the old man who is the true man. A third difference is present between the common people and the educated classes, with natural will predominating in the former case and rational will in the latter case. Tonnes admits, however, that this division is flexible, for there are constant changes of persons from one group to another and intermediate gradations can be isolated.

**Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft**—The core of Tonnes' theoretical

26 ibid., p. 174.
27 ibid.
28 ibid., p. 179.
29 ibid., p. 181.
30 These two terms are usually translated as "community" and "society," but since the English words carry an incorrect connotation, it is customary to use the original German words.

TONNIES DEFINES A GEMEINSCHAFT AS ANY KIND OF ASSOCIATION IN WHICH NATURAL WILL PREDOMINATES AND A GESSELLSCHAFT AS AN ASSOCIATION WHICH IS FORMED AND CONDITIONED BY RATIONAL WILL. BOTH OF THESE TERMS REPRESENT POSITIVE RELATIONSHIPS OF PERSONS, FOR THEY BIND THEM TOGETHER TO FORM A SOCIAL GROUP WHICH FUNCTIONS WITHOUT CONFLICT. NEGATIVE RELATIONSHIPS

31 ALBERT SALOMON, "GERMAN SOCIOLOGY," TWENTIETH CENTURY SOCIOLOGY, EDITED BY GEORGES GURVITCH AND WILBERT E. MOORE, PP. 594-595.
32 IBID., P. 595.
33 FLOYD NELSON HOUSE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGY, P. 195.
34 TONNIES, OP. CIT., P. 17.
ARE CHARACTERIZED BY CONFLICT AND A TENDENCY TOWARD THE "DESTRUCTION OF
THE OTHER WILL OR LIFE."
TonNIES SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDES ALL NEGATIVE
RELATIONSHIPS FROM HIS STUDY AND CONSEQUENTLY FROM HIS DICHTOMOUS TYPOL-
LOGY: "THIS STUDY WILL CONSIDER AS ITS SUBJECT OF INVESTIGATION ONLY
THE RELATIONSHIPS OF MUTUAL AFFIRMATION."
THE POSITIVE RELATIONSHIPS
MAY BE OF EITHER A REAL OR AN IMAGINARY NATURE, HOWEVER. THE POSITIVE
RELATIONSHIPS CHARACTERISTIC OF THE GEMEINSCHAFT ARE REAL AND ORGANIC;
THOSE CHARACTERISTIC OF THE GESSELLSCHAFT ARE IMAGINARY AND MECHANICAL.

THE GEMEINSCHAFT IS A UNION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH COMPLETE SOLIDARITY
SPRINGING FROM COMMON VALUES AND INTERESTS. INDIVIDUAL SELF-INTEREST IS
SUPPRESSED BY THE COMMUNITY WILL, AND THE GROUP IS GOVERNED BY HABIT AND
TRADITION RATHER THAN BY RATIONAL CONSIDERATION OF PROJECTED ENDS. THE
ORIGIN OF GEMEINSCHAFT MAY BE FOUND IN THE ORIGINAL AND NATURAL UNITY OF
HUMAN WILLS, AND THIS UNITY IS LATER PRESERVED TO FORM THE BASIS OF LESS
NATURAL GROUPS. THE NATURAL CONDITION OF UNITY OF WILLS IS FOUND PRIMA-
RILY IN THE FAMILY, WHICH SERVES AS THE Prototype OF ALL GEMEINSCHAFT
RELATIONS.

THERE ARE THREE TYPES OF RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE FAMILY
WHICH REPRESENT THE CLOSE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF PERSONS IN ITS MOST INTENSE
FORMS: (1) THE RELATION BETWEEN A MOTHER AND HER CHILD IS ROOTED MOST
DEEPLY IN INSTINCT. NOT ONLY IS THERE AN INSTINCTIVE LIKING BETWEEN
MOTHER AND CHILD, BUT ALSO THERE IS A PURELY PSYCHIC BOND WHICH DEVELOPS
AS THE RESULT OF THE SHARING OF EXPERIENCES, THE FORMATION OF HABITS,
THE EXPRESSION OF GRATITUDE BY THE CHILD FOR THE MOTHER'S CARE, AND SO
FORTH. THUS, EVEN AFTER THE NECESSITY OF THE MOTHER'S PHYSICAL CARE

35bid., p. 37. 36bid. 37bid. 38bid., p. 42.
DISAPPEARS, THE BOND BETWEEN MOTHER AND CHILD REMAINS. (2) THE RELATION BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE IS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT FROM THE FIRST TYPE OF RELATIONSHIP, FOR INSTINCT PLAYS A LESS SIGNIFICANT ROLE. THE SEXUAL INSTINCT, FOR EXAMPLE, DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT A MAN AND WOMAN LIVE TOGETHER IN A PERMANENT UNION. THIS TYPE OF RELATIONSHIP IS BASED UPON A CULTIVATED LIKING OF AND HABITUATION TO ONE ANOTHER. THE COMMON POSSESSIONS AND HOUSEHOLD, AS WELL AS COMMON RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CHILDREN OF THE UNION, ARE ALSO FACTORS TENDING TOWARD MUTUAL AFFIRMATION. (3) THE RELATION AMONG BROTHERS AND SISTERS IS ALSO DEPENDENT ONLY SLIGHTLY ON INSTINCT. A SHARING OF COMMON EXPERIENCES AND LOYALTY TO THE FAMILY GROUP PRODUCE A SPIRIT OF SOLIDARITY IN THIS CASE TOO. 39 Tonnies also discusses a fourth kind of family relationship, which, he says, involves less intimacy but is still related to the other three types. This relationship is that between father and child. Instinctive liking between father and child is much less pronounced than in the case of mother and child, and the relationship tends to be similar to that among brothers and sisters. 40 There is a crucial difference, however, in that the relationship between father and child is tempered by authority based on age, force, and wisdom. Authority in this sense does not imply possession and use of the child for the benefit of the father. On the contrary, it implies education and instruction, that is, "... sharing the fullness of one's own life and experiences with the children who will grow gradually to reciprocate these gifts and thus to establish a truly mutual relationship." 41 The relation between father and child is the prototype for all authoritarian relationships in the

39 Ibid., pp. 42-43. 40 Ibid., p. 44. 41 Ibid., p. 45.
GEMEINSCHAFT, and thus exploitation of others by virtue of superior power is alien to this type of group. The authority of the religious leader tends to be of this sort, for instance, and in the Roman Catholic Church the title Pope means literally "father." 42

The original GEMEINSCHAFT of blood found in the family is developed and differentiated into GEMEINSCHAFT of locality based upon a common habitat. This is further differentiated into GEMEINSCHAFT of mind, which is based upon common acceptance of values and goals. Whenever persons are related to one another organically by natural will, GEMEINSCHAFT of one or another of the three types will be present. An organic relation is always based upon kinship, neighborhood, or friendship or any combination of the three. 43

Definite patterns of social organization correspond to each of the types. Kinship relations are organized around the household, for physical proximity and nearness are necessary to fulfill the desire for love. Neighborhood refers primarily to the rural village, in which the proximity of dwellings, the communal fields, and the contiguity of holdings necessitate close and intimate contacts among members of different households. Friendship is independent of both kinship and neighborhood, for it develops usually as the result of common work and of a common intellectual attitude. Usually it takes the form of friendship between those of the same craft or calling, but since frequent meetings are necessary, this type of social relationship is found most frequently in the towns. Belief in a common deity may also create a community of feeling, for the believers feel themselves to be united with all other believers by a spiritual bond. 44

42 Ibid., p. 22. 43 Ibid., p. 48. 44 Ibid., p. 49.
Tonies summarizes what he calls "the great main laws" of Gemeinschaft:

1. Relatives and married couples love each other or easily adjust themselves to each other. They speak together and think along similar lines. Likewise do neighbors and other friends. 
2. Between people who love each other there is understanding. 
3. Those who love and understand each other remain and dwell together and organize their common life. ... The real foundation of unity, and consequently the possibility of Gemeinschaft, is in the first place closeness of blood relationship and mixture of blood, secondly physical proximity, and finally—for human beings—intellectual proximity. In this gradation are, therefore, to be found the sources of all kinds of understanding.

In the Gesellschaft, in sharp contrast with the Gemeinschaft, there is no behavior which rests upon the fundamental organic unity. It resembles the Gemeinschaft only superficially, since in so far as the individuals do live together peacefully, they are united only by considerations of self-interest. There are no actions whose origins may be traced to an a priori existing unity of interests in the Gesellschaft, and no actions are undertaken by an individual which will be of benefit only to others. All persons are isolated from one another, and a state of tension exists between an individual and all other persons. Spheres of activity are strictly limited and every person refuses to all other persons admission to his sphere. If an intrusion should occur, it would be regarded as a hostile act. Still the persons in the society are dependent upon one another, for they are helpless to reach their ends through individual activity. A rational form of cooperative activity with each person pursuing his own individual interests therefore develops. The prototype of all Gesellschaft relations is the trading relationship in the market. Basic elements in this relationship are described by Tonies in the following passage:

Such concord of wills as may exist in the Gesellschaft is the mere resolution of tensions, and this resolution may be seen most clearly in the contract, which is "... the resultant of two divergent individual wills, intersecting in one point."

Involved in the contract situation is the assumption that all human beings are rational persons and free agents. Since equality of human beings is a necessary corollary to these assumptions, slavery has no place in the Gesellschaft society. With a system of slavery a contract is not necessary for the performance of some task, for the traditions of the community already have determined the slave's sphere of activity. Thus, in the Gemeinschaft the status of a person determines his activities. All workers are theoretically free in the Gesellschaft, and they are free to choose their actions in such a manner that they will result in the furtherance of their own interests. Actually many workers are deprived of working tools, and they are free only to sell their labor to merchants and capitalists, but even in this case they themselves are free merchants of a sort. Power in the Gesellschaft, then rests not in the hands of those with high status, but in the hands of the merchants or capitalists who own the capital and the means of production of the society. With their resources they are

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46 Ibid., p. 74.  
47 Ibid., p. 82.  
48 Ibid., p. 96. Tonnis' discussion of this point is essentially the same as that of the classical economists and Marx.
ABLE TO CONTRACT FOR THE LABOR AND SERVICES OF OTHERS. THE AUTHORITY OF
THE CAPITALISTS, HOWEVER, IS NOT EXERCIZED FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE WORKER.
THE ONLY CONSIDERATION IS THE MAXIMIZATION OF PROFITS FOR THE CONTRACTOR.

The authority of the capitalists is grounded in general and natural law, the purest form of which is commercial law. Law has developed, however, only in so far as the traditional mores of the community have ceased to be influential. For example, there were simultaneous trends in the Roman Empire, one toward the elaboration, universalization, and codification of law, and the other toward the decay of the family and social life. Tonnies believes that the two trends were concomitant.

The organization of society most typical of Gesellschaft in general is the city, particularly the commercial town, in which capital is the means for the appropriation of products of labor and for the exploitation of workers. The city is made up of free persons who contract with one another without any consideration of anything but self-interest. Persons cooperate without the existence of a community of interests to which individual wills should be subordinate, and the result is that hostile and antagonistic interests underlie every external contact. This is particularly true of the relations... between the rich or the so-called cultured class and the poor or the servant class, which try to obstruct and destroy each other. The city is not the only type of Gesellschaft organization, for the nature of trade creates markets which go far beyond the city. The state and the nation, therefore, are merely broader extensions of urban Gesellschaft. It is only in the world market, however, in which the Gesellschaft reaches its

49 Ibid., pp. 95-96. 50 Ibid., p. 234. 51 Ibid., p. 266.
FULFILLMENT, FOR ALL OTHER MARKETS ARE DEPENDENT UPON IT.  

Tonnies ventures into the realm of applied sociology, as he defines it, by relating his dichotomous constructs to actual periods in history. Thus, there are two contrasting periods in the history of a highly developed culture: a period of \textit{Gemeinschaft} gradually gives way to a period of \textit{Gesellschaft}.  

There are several epochs within the \textit{Gemeinschaft} period. Originally the clan was the predominant type of social organization, and it was organized around kinship relations. It was characterized by understanding and concord, and the will of the people (\textit{Volk}) was the real controlling agent. Later, with the development of agriculture, village organization became possible, with cooperative activities guided by the folkways and mores. Even with the development of town life, \textit{Gemeinschaft} relations continued for religion and other common values tended to preserve the unity of the group. With the development of city life, however, the unity of values disappeared and rational consideration of self-interest became its dominant characteristic. Law replaced custom as the agent of social control.  

Tonnies apparently views the trend toward \textit{Gesellschaft} with some alarm. The following passage, which reflects the influence of Marx on Tonnies, also clearly expresses Tonnies' feelings:

\begin{quote}
\text{City life and \textit{Gesellschaft} down the common people to decay and death; in vain they struggle to attain power through their own multitude, and it seems to them that they can use their power only for a revolution if they want to free themselves from their fate. \ldots The state, to them, is an alien and unfriendly power; although seemingly authorized by them and embodying their own will, it is nevertheless opposed to all their needs and desires, protecting property which they do not possess, forcing them into military service.}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 265.  \textsuperscript{53} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 271.  \textsuperscript{54} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 270-272.
FOR A COUNTRY WHICH OFFERS THEM HEARTH AND ALTAR ONLY IN THE FORM
OF A HEATED ROOM ON THE UPPER FLOOR OR GIVES THEM, FOR NATIVE SOIL,
CITY STREETS WHERE THEY MAY STARE AT THE GLITTER AND LUXURY IN
LIGHTED WINDOWS FOREVER BEYOND THEIR REACH! THEIR OWN LIFE IS
NOTHING BUT A CONSTANT ALTERNATIVE BETWEEN WORK AND LEISURE, WHICH
ARE BOTH DISTORTED INTO FACTORY ROUTINE AND THE LOW PLEASURE OF THE
SALOONS... THE MASSES BECOME CONSCIOUS OF THIS SOCIAL POSITION
THROUGH THE EDUCATION IN SCHOOLS AND THROUGH NEWSPAPERS. THEY PRO-
CEED FROM CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS TO CLASS STRUGGLE. THIS CLASS STRUGGLE
MAY DESTROY SOCIETY AND THE STATE WHICH IT IS ITS PURPOSE TO REFORM.
THE ENTIRE CULTURE HAS BEEN TRANSFORMED INTO A CIVILIZATION OF STATE
AND GESELLSCHAFT, AND THIS TRANSFORMATION MEANS THE DOOM OF CULTURE
ITSELF IF NONE OF ITS SCATTERED SEEDS REMAIN ALIVE AND AGAIN BRING
FORTH THE ESSENCE AND IDEA OF GESELLSCHAFT, THUS SECRETLY FOSTERING
A NEW CULTURE AMIDST THE DECAYING ONE.

TONNIES BELIEVED THAT THE NEW CULTURE MIGHT BE FOSTERED THROUGH THE
COMBINATION OF COOPERATIVE AND TRADE-UNION MOVEMENTS WITH STATE SOCIALISM.
IN FACT, HE REGARDED SOCIALISM AS THE LOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF A GESELLSCHAFT
SOCIETY, AND HE SPOKE OF THE "... TRANSITION FROM AN ORIGINAL, SIMPLE,
FAMILY COMMUNISM AND VILLAGE-TOWN INDIVIDUALISM BASED THEREON, TO AN
INDEPENDENT, UNIVERSAL, URBAN INDIVIDUALISM AND, DETERMINED THEREBY, A
SOCIALISM OF STATE AND INTERNATIONAL TYPE."

CRITICISM.—THE MOST OBVIOUS WEAKNESS IN TONNIES' THEORETICAL SYSTEM
IS HIS RELIANCE UPON A PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF WILL WHICH HAS SINCE BEEN
THOROUGHLY DISCREDITED. THE DOCTRINE OF NATURAL WILL, WHICH ASSERTS THAT

55 Ibid., pp. 269-270.
56 Ibid., pp. 273-274. Salomon remarks that Tonnies not only accepted
socialism as the logical outcome of the developments in modern society,
but he also accepted the economic and sociological ideas of Marx and inte-
grated them into his theory. Yet Tonnies' work was not welcomed by the
Marxists. They practically ignored it, probably because their dogmatism
prevented them from accepting a sociological formulation of Marxian ideas.

57 General criticisms will be reserved for the final chapter. This
procedure will be followed in the case of each theorist.
There is an instinctive liking among biologically related persons, cannot be accepted. Becker, for example, takes a tolerant attitude, pointing out that Tonnies wrote *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* more than sixty years ago, a time when instinct psychology was widely accepted. He believes that it is necessary only to substitute certain words for "natural will". Tonnies really means by 'objective will' and similar terms only the urges, habits, etc., expressed as actions not accompanied by clear-cut consciousness of rational purpose. Salomon maintains that Tonnies' doctrine of natural and rational will is not a psychological doctrine fundamentally, but rather a kind of social phenomenology avant la lettre. Underlying his sociological analysis is a philosophical assumption that human nature is fixed and unchanging within the shifting conditions of social life. It was this philosophical background, with the conception of sociology as "... the modern scientific type of the law of nature..." which produced the theoretical isolation of Tonnies. Other sociologists refused to accept his philosophical assumptions, and a "school" never grew up around Tonnies. Even though Tonnies based his dichotomy of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* upon the doctrine of natural and rational will, most sociologists have tended to discard the will theory and to accept the dichotomy of types of social life, at least in its broad outlines. Parsons, for example, ignores natural and

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60 Salomon, "In Memoriam Ferdinand Tonnies," p. 354.
RATIONAL WILL IN HIS EXTENDED NOTE ON TONNIES, and most other writers pay only scant attention to the theory.

Tonnies' distinction between pure sociology and applied sociology does not hold up in actual practice. While theoretically a normal concept is defined without reference to concrete historical cases, in practice Tonnies' Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft are largely descriptive of the communal life of peasant society on the one hand and of the market relations of a capitalistic society on the other hand.

Tonnies frequently confuses German culture patterns of the nineteenth century with universal human characteristics in his discussions of various points. This is particularly true in the sections which deal with the differences between men and women. His insistence, for example, that women are governed by natural will because they are incapable of calculating or engaging in abstract thought is obviously a mere reflection of the position of the woman in German society at the time when Tonnies was writing. Again, his description of the husband-wife relationship in the Gemeinschaft family reveals his lack of cultural perspective: "Marriage" does not lead so much to a fixed mutual relationship as to one-sided subjugation of the woman, who, weaker by nature, can be reduced to an object of mere possession or to servitude.

Becker comments that "the significant thing about Tonnies' work is

63 Tonnies, op. cit., p. 43.
THE CLOSE ASSOCIATION IT ESTABLISHES BETWEEN PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE, THUS ANTICIPATING BALDWIN, COOLEY, DURKHEIM, MEAD, AND A NUMBER OF RELATED THINKERS. There can be no dispute with the point that Tonnies believed that personality and social structure are related, but the type of relation in Tonnies' case is so much different from the type of relation in the case of the other theorists mentioned that they can hardly be compared. Tonnies based social structure upon the psychological forms of natural will and rational will, whereas the later group tended to reverse the process and derive personality from the structure of society. Tonnies' entire theoretical system is basically psychological in so far as the will theory is retained, and it is significant that in a review of Durkheim's Les Regles de la Methode Sociologique he agreed that Tarde was right in criticizing Durkheim for constructing sociological concepts without psychological foundation.

One of the most persistent criticisms of Tonnies has been that there is in his system an implicit value judgment that Gemeinschaft is good and that Gesellschaft is evil. His critics have called him a pessimist and even a romantic. In this light the publication history of Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft is interesting. When the first edition was published in 1887 it attracted almost no attention, for there was at the time in Germany an academic opposition to autonomous social sciences. Twenty-five years passed before a second edition was published, but this time it enjoyed an enthusiastic reception, principally because it was greeted by students in the rising youth movement as a scientific

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64 Barnes and Becker, op. cit., p. 889.
Expression of their own antirationalistic romanticism. Tonnie's, however, expressly denied that he had any such intention of portraying Gemeinschaft as superior to Gesellschaft, and he claimed that he simply described the irreversible course of social evolution from an objective point of view.

In an article published in 1932 Tonnie's answered his critics, particularly Wieso and Oppenheimer, by comparing the history of societies to the life-cycle of human beings. It is not possible to say whether youth is "better" than old age, for there are certain advantages to be found in each. Tonnie's as an ardent rationalist himself was the first to recognize that the development of Gesellschaft brought progress and enlightenment and the development of freedom and civilization. In spite of Tonnie's disclaimers, however, it is almost impossible to read his work without getting the impression that he regarded Gemeinschaft more highly than Gesellschaft. Heberle, Tonnie's son-in-law, makes the following comments:

Tonnie's was, however, a man of firm judgment and, on many things, he held rather fixed opinions. Thus it cannot be denied that antipathy toward many features of capitalism and industrial society crops out quite obviously in his writings. But, if he had written on feudal society, he would not have failed to condemn in no less cogent fashion certain features of precapitalistic society. There was, however, no reason for such criticism in Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, since this book was intended as a critique of the present and not of the past.

It should be recognized that Tonnie's adverse reaction to Gesellschaft.

66 Salomon, "In Memoriam Ferdinand Tonnie's," pp. 349, 351.
68 A statement to this effect may be found in his preface to the fourth and fifth editions of Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, in which he also disclaimed any intended pessimism or romanticism. He specifically objected to the theories of Spengler. See ibid., p. xi.
TAKES THE FORM OF AN ATTACK ON CAPITALISTIC INSTITUTIONS AND NOT ON
INDUSTRIALISM AS SUCH. TONNIES UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD HAVE WELCOMED
GESSELLSCHAFT ORGANIZED ON A SOCIALISTIC BASIS RATHER THAN ON A CAPITALISTIC
BASIS.

MAX WEBER: COMMUNAL RELATIONSHIPS AND
ASSOCIATIVE RELATIONSHIPS

THE IDEAL TYPICAL METHOD.—IN THE WORK OF MAX WEBER MANY OF THE
CONCEPTS DEVELOPED BY TONNIES WERE REFINED, MADE MORE SYSTEMATIC, AND
STATED IN DIFFERENT TERMS. THIS IS TRUE OF TONNIES' CONCEPTS GEMEINSCHAFT
AND GESSELLSCHAFT, BUT WEBER'S CHIEF CONTRIBUTION WAS IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF A METHODOLOGY UTILIZING IDEAL TYPES, OR NORMAL CONCEPTS AS TONNIES
CALLED THEM.

WEBER DEFINES SOCIOLOGY AS THE SCIENCE WHICH ATTEMPTS TO DETERMINE
THE CAUSAL EXPLANATION OF THE COURSE OF SOCIAL ACTION. IN ORDER TO
ISOLATE CAUSAL FACTORS, HOWEVER, IT IS NECESSARY TO EMPLOY THE IDEAL
TYPICAL METHOD. THIS METHOD INVOLVES THE CONSTRUCTION OF CERTAIN ELEMENTS
OF REALITY INTO LOGICALLY PRECISE CONCEPTS WHICH REPRESENT THE EXTREME
LIMITING CASES. WEBER CALLS SUCH CONCEPTS "IDEAL TYPES," BUT "IDEAL"

70MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, TRANSLATED BY A. M. HENDERSON AND TALCOTT PARSONS, EDITED BY T. PARSONS, P. 88.

71DON MARTINDALE HAS POINTED OUT THAT THE NATURE OF THE IDEAL TYPE
MAY PERHAPS BE MORE CLEARLY SEEN BY CONSIDERING WHAT IT IS NOT: (1) IT
IS NOT A STEREOTYPE, ALTHOUGH BOTH ARE ARTIFICIALLY SIMPLIFIED MODELS.
AN IDEAL TYPE IS RATIONALLY CONSTRUCTED AND IS WITHOUT POLEMICAL BIAS.
(2) IT IS NOT AN AVERAGE, FOR IT REPRESENTS AN EXTREME CASE. (3) IT
IS NOT A SCIENTIFIC LAW; IT IS ONLY AN INSTRUMENT TO BE USED IN ARRIVING
AT THE LAW. (4) IT IS NOT A HYPOTHESIS, THAT IS, A PROPOSITION ABOUT
CONCRETE REALITY WHICH CAN BE VERIFIED. (5) IT IS NOT AN ESSENCE OF A
CONCRETE INDIVIDUAL PHENOMENON, FOR IT HAS A LOGICAL RATHER THAN AN
EMPIRICAL NATURE. (6) IT IS NOT A FORMULATION OF THE CHARACTERISTICS
COMMON TO A CLASS OF CONCRETE THINGS. (UNPUBLISHED LECTURES, UNIVERSITY
OF MINNESOTA.)
In this case has no reference to values.\textsuperscript{72} They are simply the rationally pure forms of social action, and precisely because of their pure constructed nature, they seldom correspond to reality. Weber draws an analogy by pointing out that in the sciences of physics certain physical reactions are calculated on the assumption of an absolute vacuum, a type construct which has no correspondence with reality.\textsuperscript{73} The ideal type is essentially a heuristic device intended to institute comparisons. It is used as a standard against which all social phenomena can be measured to determine the degree of their correspondence to the ideal type. Thus, for the purposes of sociological analysis, all irrational behavior may be treated as factors of deviation from a conceptually pure type of rational actions.

\textbullet\textbullet\textbullet A panic on the stock exchange can be most conveniently analyzed by attempting to determine first what the course of action would have been if it had not been influenced by irrational affects; it is then possible to introduce the irrational components as accounting for the observed deviations from this hypothetical course. Similarly, in analyzing a political or military campaign it is convenient to determine in the first place what would have been a rational course, given the ends of the participants and adequate knowledge of all the circumstances. Only in this way is it possible to assess the causal significance of irrational factors as accounting for the deviations from this type.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{72} Gerth and Mills make the following comment concerning this point:

"The term 'ideal' has nothing to do with evaluations of any sort. For analytic purposes, one may construct ideal types of prostitution as well as of religious leaders. The term does not mean that either prophets or harlots are exemplary or should be imitated as representatives of an ideal way of life." (H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, "Introduction: The Man and His Work," from Max Weber, Essays in Sociology, translated by H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, p. 39.) Possibly because of the incorrect connotations of the word "ideal" the term "constructed type" is being used with increasing frequency by present-day theorists.


\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., p. 92.
COMMUNAL RELATIONSHIPS AND ASSOCIATIVE RELATIONSHIPS--In so far as Weber develops a generalized system of theory, it is most explicitly stated in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, in which he distinguishes ideal types of social action and ideal types of relationships. In defining sociology as the "... science which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action..." Weber shifts the frame of reference of traditional sociology by substituting the pivotal concept "social action" for "society." Consequently, Weber does not speak of societal types in the development of the theory, but only of types of social action and types of social relationships.

Weber constructs four ideal types of social action: (1) rationalistic social action, (2) evaluative social action, (3) affective social action, and (4) traditionalistic social action. Rationalistic social action...

75 Weber did not believe that it was possible or desirable to formulate a permanent generalized theory. See Talcott Parsons, "Max Weber's Sociological Analysis of Capitalism and Modern Institutions," *An Introduction to the History of Sociology*, edited by Harry Elmer Barnes, pp. 299-300.


77 Ibid., p. 88.

78 Martindale and Monachesi, after pointing out the weaknesses of the term "society" for use in sociological analysis, state that "society" can be redefined in terms of social actions. "Society" is "... the total of a relatively independent series of social actions." (Martindale and Monachesi, op. cit., pp. 191-192, 203.) Apparently this is essentially what Weber did, even though he made no explicit statement on the problem.

79 Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, p. 115. Parsons prefers to leave "rationalistic social action" and "evaluative social action" in their original German forms, *zweckrational* and *wertrational*, for he maintains that there are no English equivalents. The English translation used by Martindale and Monachesi, however, will be used in the following discussion, since the terms "rationalistic" and "evaluative" convey the general meaning intended. See Martindale and Monachesi, op. cit., p. 179.
ACTION IS ACTION WHICH INVOLVES THE RATIONAL CONSIDERATION OF BOTH ENDS AND MEANS. THIS INVOLVES THE WEIGHTING OF ALTERNATIVE MEANS, BUT ALSO THE CONSIDERATION OF THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF VARIOUS ENDS. ENDS IN THIS CASE ARE NOT DETERMINED BY A RATIONAL ORIENTATION TO AN ULTIMATE SYSTEM OF VALUES, FOR ABSOLUTE VALUES ARE THEMSELVES ALWAYS IRRATIONAL. THE GUIDING RULE IS THE PRINCIPLE OF EXPEDIENCY WHEREBY SUBJECTIVE WANTS ARE ARRANGED IN A SCALE OF CONSCIOUSLY ASSESSED URGENCY, AND THE RATIONAL PERSON ORIENTS HIS ACTIONS IN SUCH A WAY THAT HIS WANTS ARE SATISFIED IN ORDER OF URGENCY. EVALUATIVE SOCIAL ACTION, ON THE OTHER HAND, ALTHOUGH IT INVOLVES RATIONAL CONSIDERATION OF MEANS, IS BASED UPON AN ABSOLUTE END WHICH IS ACCEPTED WITHOUT QUESTION. AN EXAMPLE OF EVALUATIVE ACTION MAY BE SEEN PARTICULARLY IN RELIGIOUS CONDUCT BUT IT IS ALSO PRESENT IN AESTHETIC AND MANY OTHER TYPES OF CONDUCT. IN EVERY CASE THERE ARE DUTIES AND COMMANDS WHICH THE INDIVIDUAL FEELS OBLIGATED TO FULFILL AND OBEY WITHOUT ANY REGARD TO PERSONAL COST. AFFECTIVE SOCIAL ACTION, UNLIKE RATIONALISTIC AND EVALUATIVE SOCIAL ACTION, IS COMPLETELY IRRATIONAL, FOR THE ACTOR REACTS EMOTIONALLY TO SPECIFIC STATES OF FEELING AND ACTS UNDER THE IMPULSE OF STRONG EMOTION, SUCH AS LOVE, ANGER, FEAR, OR HATE. SOCIAL ACTION IS TRADITIONAL WHEN IT INVOLVES THE HABITUATION OF LONG PRACTICE. NEITHER ENDS NOR MEANS ARE RATIONALLY CONSIDERED, AND THE ACTOR FollowS THE SOCIAL CUSTOMS AND TRADITIONS SIMPLY BECAUSE EVERYONE HAS ALWAYS DONE SO. WEber CAUTIONS THAT IT WOULD BE VERY UNUSUAL TO FIND CONCRETE CASES OF ANY OF THESE TYPES OF ACTION IN THEIR PURE FORMS, BUT THE FUNCTION OF THESE IDEAL TYPES IS MERELY TO SERVE AS A STANDARD AGAINST WHICH TO MEASURE THE DEGREE OF RATIONALISTIC, EVALUATIVE,

AFFECTIVE, OR TRADITIONALISTIC ORIENTATION OF A PARTICULAR SOCIAL ACTION.

Although Weber makes a four-fold distinction of types of social action, in contrast with the bipolar types of "rational" and "traditional" used by Tonnies, in his discussion of types of solitary social relations-
ships Weber adopts a dichotomous typology. Communal social relationships
are based upon the subjective feelings of persons that they are bound
together either traditionally or affectively. Associative social rela-
tionships, on the other hand, are based upon the rationally motivated
adjustment of interests with regard either to absolute values or to
reasons of expediency. Thus two of the types of social action are
grouped together in the formation of each of the types of social rela-
tionships. Communal relationships involve traditional and affective
social actions; associative relationships involve rationalistic and
evaluative social actions.

Communal relationships may rest upon affectual, emotional, or tradi-
tional bases, but in any case the distinguishing characteristic of this
type is the close bond uniting the persons of the group. The clearest
example of communal relationships is found in the family, but similar
ties are present in the cases of religious brotherhoods, erotic relation-
ships, personal loyalties and friendships, esprit de corps of a military
unit, and in many other types of intimate relationships. The communal
relationship is the most radical antithesis of conflict, but even in

81 Ibid., p. 117.
82 Ibid., p. 136. The German terms for "communal social relationship" and "associative social relationship" are VERGEMEINSCHAFTUNG and VERGESSELLSCHAFTUNG. Tonnies' influence on Weber is obvious, since Tonnies' terms have been only slightly altered.
THE CASE OF THE MOST INTIMATE COMMUNAL GROUPS, SUCH AS THE FAMILY, COERCION
OF THE WEAKER MEMBERS IS A COMMON PRACTICE.\(^3\) WEBER DISAGREES WITH TONNIES
AS TO THE ORIGIN OF COMMUNAL RELATIONSHIPS OR GEMEINSCHAFT. TONNIES HAD
ASSUMED THAT THE BONDS UNITING THE GROUP DEVELOPED ALMOST AUTOMATICALLY
BECAUSE OF THE HOMOGENEITY OF THE GROUP. WEBER INSISTS, HOWEVER, THAT
"IT IS BY NO MEANS TRUE THAT THE EXISTENCE OF COMMON QUALITIES, A COMMON
SITUATION, OR COMMON MODES OF BEHAVIOR IMPLY THE EXISTENCE OF A COMMUNAL
SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP."\(^4\) FOR EXAMPLE, PERSONS BELONGING TO THE SAME RACE
OR TO THE SAME LANGUAGE GROUP DO NOT NECESSARILY ENJOY COMMUNAL RELATION-
SHIPS WITH ONE ANOTHER. IT IS ONLY WHEN CERTAIN CONDITIONS GIVE RISE
TO THE MUTUAL ORIENTATION OF THE BEHAVIOR OF EACH OF THE PERSONS INVOLVED
AND TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FEELING OF BELONGING TOGETHER AMONG THESE
PERSONS THAT COMMUNAL RELATIONSHIPS CAN EXIST.\(^5\)

WEBER LISTS WHAT HE CONSIDERS TO BE THE PUREST CASES OF ASSOCIATIVE
RELATIONSHIPS:

- \(\text{a}\) RATIONAL FREE MARKET EXCHANGE, WHICH CONSTITUTES A COMPROMISE OF OPPOSED BUT COMPLEMENTARY INTERESTS;
- \(\text{b}\) THE PURE VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION BASED ON SELF-INTEREST, A CASE OF AGREEMENT AS TO A
  LONG-RUN COURSE OF ACTION ORIENTED PURELY TO THE PROMOTION OF SPECIFIC ULTERIOR INTERESTS, ECONOMIC OR OTHER, OF ITS MEMBERS;
- \(\text{c}\) THE VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION OF INDIVIDUALS MOTIVATED BY AN ADHERENCE TO A
  SET OF COMMON ABSOLUTE VALUES, FOR EXAMPLE, THE RATIONAL SECT, IN SO

\(^3\) \textit{\textsuperscript{83}}\cite{weber1}, p. 137. THIS POINT SEEMS TO BE RATHER INCONSISTENT WITH
WEBER'S EARLIER DEFINITION OF AFFECTIVE SOCIAL ACTION, WHICH INCLUDED BY
IMPLICATION ACTIONS BASED ON THE EMOTION OF HATE. IF COMMUNAL RELATION-
SHIPS ARE DEFINED IN TERMS OF AFFECTIVE SOCIAL ACTION, HATE AND CONFLICT
WOULD SEEM TO BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF COMMUNAL RELATIONSHIPS, JUST AS LOVE
AND COOPERATION ARE.

\(^4\) \textit{\textsuperscript{84}}\cite{weber1}, p. 138.

\(^5\) \textit{\textsuperscript{85}}\cite{weber1}, pp. 138-139. WEBER GIVES NO SPECIFIC DETAILS CONCERNING THE
PROCESS WHEREBY THE COMMUNAL BONDS ARE ESTABLISHED, SO HIS POSITION IS
ACTUALLY LITTLE DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF TONNIES.
FAR AS IT DOES NOT CULTIVATE EMOTIONAL AND AFFECTIVE INTERESTS, BUT SEeks ONLY TO SERVE A "CAUSE."\footnote{86}\footnote{IBID., P. 136.}

ASSOCIATIVE RELATIONSHIPS most commonly rest on the rational agreement to certain actions by two persons or by a group of persons, and there exists an obligation on the part of all parties to live up to the agreement.\footnote{87} This agreement represents, however, only a compromise between rival interests, and it is seldom that the underlying conflict among persons is completely eliminated. Associative relationships develop only when the \ldots PARTICIPANTS ENTER INTO AGREEMENTS IN ORDER TO BETTER THEIR COMPETITIVE SITUATIONS, OR \ldots THEY ALL AGREE ON RULES FOR THE PURPOSE OF REGULATING TRANSACTIONS AND OF SECURING FAVOURABLE GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR ALL.\footnote{88}

FROM A HISTORICAL POINT OF VIEW Weber sees the gradual encroachment of rationalistic social actions on the great body of traditionalistic or affective social actions. He speaks of this process as "RATIONALIZATION" but he also quotes Schiller's phrase, "THE DIENCHANTMENT OF THE WORLD," with full approval.\footnote{89} Rationalization consists of the \ldots SUBSTITUTION FOR THE UNTHINKING ACCEPTANCE OF ANCIENT CUSTOM OF DELIBERATE ADAPTATION TO SITUATIONS IN TERMS OF SELF-INTEREST.\footnote{90} Gerth and Mills point out that Weber's view of rationalization embodies some of the elements of liberalism and of the enlightenment philosophy which held that man is making progress in a unilinear development. Weber makes the statement that "Thus far the continuum of European culture development has known
NEITHER COMPLETED CYCLICAL MOVEMENTS NOR AN UNAMBIGUOUSLY ORIENTED 'UNILINEAR DEVELOPMENT' BUT GERTH AND MILLS STILL FEEL THAT WEBER CLEARLY IMPLIES THE UNILINEAR CONSTRUCTION IN HIS IDEA OF THE BUREAUCRATIC TREND. THE IDEA OF "CHARISMA," HOWEVER, SERVES AS A BREAK TO THE CONSTANT TREND TOWARD RATIONALIZATION AS REPRESENTED BY BUREAUCRATIZATION, WITH THE RESULT THAT THERE ARE DISCONTINUITIES IN HISTORY.9

EMILE DURKHEIM: MECHANICAL SOLIDARITY AND ORGANIC SOLIDARITY

INTRODUCTION. -- EMILE DURKHEIM SET FORTH A THEORY OF DICHOTOMOUS TYPES OF SOCIAL LIFE IN DE LA DIVISION DU TRAVAIL SOCIAL,92 PUBLISHED IN 1893, SIX YEARS AFTER THE PUBLICATION OF TONNIES' GEMEINSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT. DURKHEIM'S THEORY, ALTHOUGH APPROACHING THE PHENOMENON FROM A DIFFERENT POINT OF VIEW, IS IN MANY RESPECTS SIMILAR TO THAT OF TONNIES. THE LATTER'S WORK UNDOUBTEDLY WAS AN IMPORTANT INFLUENCE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF DURKHEIM'S THOUGHT, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT DURKHEIM GAVE NO RECOGNITION OF HIS DEBT TO TONNIES. THE REASON FOR THIS ACADEMIC SLIGHTING IS PROBABLY THAT DURKHEIM FELT THAT TONNIES HAD ADDED VERY LITTLE TO THE THEORIES FROM WHICH THE SYSTEM HAD BEEN DERIVED AND THAT HE HAD MADE THE SAME MISTAKES AS HIS PREDECESSORS. THUS, IN A REVIEW OF GEMEINSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT WRITTEN IN 1889, DURKHEIM ATTACKED TONNIES' THESIS THAT PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES ARE MORE "ORGANIC" THAN MODERN URBAN SOCIETIES. AT THE SAME TIME HE POINTED OUT THE RESEMBLANCE OF PARTS OF TONNIES' THEORETICAL SYSTEM TO THE THEORIES OF MAINE, HEGEL, SPENCER, BENTHAM,

9 (GERTH AND MILLS, OP. CIT., PP. 51-52.

92 THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY, TRANSLATED BY GEORGE SIMPSON.
AND OTHERS.\textsuperscript{93} DURKHEIM EVIDENTLY REGARDED TONNIES\textsuperscript{1} WORK AS OF A SECONDARY NATURE.

\textbf{MECHANICAL SOLIDARITY AND ORGANIC SOLIDARITY.}--DURKHEIM\textsuperscript{1}5 PRINCIPAL CONCERN IN \textit{DE LA DIVISION DU TRAVAIL SOCIAL} IS THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN CIVILIZATION AND ITS CONTRASTS TO PRIMITIVE SOCIETY. HE AGREES WITH SPENCER AND THE UTILITARIANS THAT ONE OF THE GREATEST CONTRASTS BETWEEN PRIMITIVE AND CIVILIZED SOCIETIES IS IN THE AMOUNT OF THE DIVISION OF LABOR OR THE DEGREE OF SPECIALIZATION OF FUNCTIONS. HE MAINTAINS, HOWEVER, THAT SPENCER, BECAUSE OF HIS PREOCCUPATION WITH PURELY ECONOMIC MATTERS, HAD NEGLECTED THE FAR MORE IMPORTANT MORAL AND LEGAL CHANGES WHICH RESULT FROM THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIALIZATION.\textsuperscript{94} DURKHEIM BELIEVES THAT THE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PRIMITIVE AND CIVILIZED SOCIETY IS FOUND IN THE TYPE OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY WHICH PREVAILS. THUS HE SETS FORTH HIS DICHOTOMOUS TYPES NOT AS TYPES OF SOCIETIES BUT AS TYPES OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY CHARACTERIZING SOCIETIES. ON THE ONE HAND THERE IS MECHANICAL SOLIDARITY, WHICH IS FOUND IN THE PRIMITIVE SOCIETY; ON THE OTHER, ORGANIC SOLIDARITY, WHICH IS A CHARACTERISTIC OF MODERN CIVILIZATION.\textsuperscript{95}

\textbf{MECHANICAL SOLIDARITY IS THAT WHICH EXISTS IN SOCIETIES WHICH ARE RELATIVELY HOMOGENEOUS AND POSSESS ONLY A RUDIMENTARY DIVISION OF LABOR. SOLIDARITY ARISES OUT OF THE LIKENESS OF ALL PERSONS, AND A "COLLECTIVE CONSCIENCE" COMPLETELY ENVELOPS AND COINCIDES WITH THE BELIEFS AND VALUES OF THE COMPONENT MEMBERS OF THE SOCIETY. INDIVIDUALITY DOES NOT EXIST, FOR "THE INDIVIDUAL CONSCIENCE ... IS A SIMPLE DEPENDENT UPON THE}

\textsuperscript{93}LOOMIS, "TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION," TONNIES, \textit{OP. CII.}, P. XVIII.
\textsuperscript{94}DURKHEIM, \textit{OP. CII.}, PP. 200-206.
\textsuperscript{95}\textit{Ibid.}, PP. 130-131.
COLLECTIVE TYPE AND FOLLOWS ALL OF ITS MOVEMENTS, AS THE POSSESSED OBJECT FOLLOWS THOSE OF ITS OWNER. Durkheim adopts the term "mechanical solidarity" in order to suggest the analogy between this type of social solidarity and the molecular organization of inorganic matter.

The social molecules which can be coherent in this way can act together only in the measure that they have no actions of their own, as the molecules of inorganic bodies. That is why we propose to call this type of solidarity mechanical. The term does not signify that it is produced by mechanical and artificial means. We call it that only by analogy to the cohesion which unites the elements of a living body.

In so far as society is characterized by pure mechanical solidarity...

... the individual does not appear... "

Durkheim devotes much of his analysis to a study of legal systems in the belief that law is one of the best indices of the two types of solidarity: "since law reproduces the principal forms of social solidarity, we have only to classify the different types of law to find therefrom the different types of social solidarity which correspond to it." The legal form which corresponds to mechanical solidarity is repressive or criminal law. An act is criminal when it offends the collective conscience of the society, that is, the totality of beliefs and sentiments of average persons in the society. Crime, then, is not simply the disruption of serious interests; it is rather an offense against a transcendent authority, which is the collective moral force. The verification of this is seen in the fact that the violation of the collective conscience is met through the agency of punishment, which is

96 ibid., p. 130.
97 ibid.
98 ibid.
99 ibid., p. 68.
100 ibid., pp. 79-80.
Essentially a passionate reaction. In primitive societies, for example, punishment is inflicted as an end in itself. The criminal is punished for the sake of making him suffer, and those who impose the punishment are not concerned with seeking any advantage for themselves through their actions. Each act of punishment serves as a reaffirmation of the ideals and solidarity of the group itself. Even in modern civilizations which presumably use punishment to defend society have merely modified their conscious intentions, and the real function of punishment, vengeance against the violators of the collective conscience, is preserved.

Organic solidarity is based upon the division of labor in a society, and, in sharp contrast with mechanical solidarity, it rests upon the foundations of human differences and individuality. Thus, whereas mechanical solidarity is possible only in so far as the individual personality is absorbed into the collective personality, organic solidarity is possible only if each one has a sphere of action which is peculiar to him, that is, a personality. The more that specialization of labor takes place, the more dependent each individual becomes in relation to society and other individuals. The solidarity which results from the division of labor, says Durkheim, resembles that which is found among the higher animals, in which case each organ has a specialized function. Yet all the organs are interdependent, even though they are not dominated by an external and superior force, as in the case of the inorganic constituent parts of an object. This analogy leads Durkheim to adopt the term "organic solidarity" to describe the sort of

101 Ibid., p. 85.  
102 Ibid., p. 86.  
103 Ibid., p. 87.  
104 Ibid., p. 131.
Solidarity which exists under the impact of specialization of functions. Durkheim says that the complaint is often made that the division of labor makes each of us an impersonal, incomplete being and consequently results in a diminution of individual personality. This is not true, he says, for "to be a person is to be an autonomous source of action." Man becomes autonomous only in so far as he acquires some quality which individualizes him and sets him off from others, so "... far from being trammelled by the progress of specialization, individual personality develops with the division of labor." The division of labor brings greater individualizations.

As we advance in the evolutionary scale, the ties which bind the individual to his family, to his native soil, to traditions which the past has given to him, to collective group usages, become loose. More mobile, he changes his environment more easily, leaves his people to go elsewhere to live a more autonomous existence, to a greater extent forms his own ideas and sentiments.

In order to reach the fullest development of personality, Durkheim advises that a person must contract his horizons and immerse himself completely in a definite task rather than to enjoy the pleasures of dilettantism. He even states that it is a person's duty to specialize and further the division of labor. As already suggested, however, greater individualization does not result in greater independence and freedom. "Far from serving to emancipate the individual, or disengaging him from the environment..."

105 Ibid., pp. 131-132. It is interesting to note that Tonnies and Durkheim gave the terms "organic" and "mechanical" opposite meanings. Whether or not Durkheim intentionally reversed the meanings just to be in opposition to Tonnies, as Sorokin suggests (Sorokin, op. cit., p. 491), both usages are logically valid in their respective contexts. Tonnies' usage has, however, gained wider acceptance.

WHICH SURROUNDS HIM, IT HAS, ON THE CONTRARY, THE FUNCTION OF MAKING HIM AN INTEGRAL PART OF A WHOLE, AND, CONSEQUENTLY, OF DEPRIVING HIM OF SOME LIBERTY OF MOVEMENT. 110

DURKHEIM'S CONCEPTION OF THE TYPE OF SOLIDARITY EXISTING IN MODERN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY DIFFERS SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THAT OF TONNIES, WHOSE "POSITIVE RELATIONSHIPS OF HUMAN WILLS" SEEMS TO CORRESPOND TO DURKHEIM'S "SOLIDARITY." TONNIES LOOKS UPON PERSONS IN THE GESELLSCHAFT AS ISOLATED INDIVIDUALS WHO CONTRACT WITH ONE ANOTHER IN EACH INSTANCE WITH NO OTHER CONSIDERATION THAN THEIR OWN INTERESTS. DURKHEIM INSISTS, HOWEVER, THAT THERE IS A PREVIOUSLY EXISTING SYSTEM OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES WHICH UNDERLIES ALL RELATIONS IN A MODERN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY AS WELL AS IN A PRIMITIVE SOCIETY: "JUST AS SOCIAL SIMILITUDES GIVE RISE TO A LAW AND A MORALITY WHICH PROTECT THEM, SO THE DIVISION OF LABOR GIVES RISE TO RULES WHICH ASSURE PACIFIC AND REGULAR CONCOURSE OF DIVIDED FUNCTIONS." 111 IN THE CASE OF ORGANIC SOLIDARITY, HOWEVER, IT IS NOT CRIMINAL LAW WHICH PRESERVES THE FUNCTIONING OF THE SYSTEM; IT IS RESTITUTIVE LAW, WHICH INCLUDES CIVIL LAW, COMMERCIAL LAW, PROCEDURAL LAW, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 112 RESTITUTIVE LAW DIFFERS FROM REPRESSIVE LAW IN THAT IT IS NOT EXPIATORY BUT SEeks ONLY TO RESTORE CONDITIONS TO THEIR NORMAL ORDER. SOME OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF RESTITUTIVE LAW ARE DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING PASSAGE:

SUFFERANCE PROPORTIONATE TO THE MISDEED IS NOT INFlicted ON THE ONE WHO HAS VIOLATED THE LAW OR WHO DISREGARDS IT; HE IS SIMPLY SENTENCED TO COMPLY WITH IT. IF CERTAIN THINGS WERE DONE, THE JUDGE REINSTATES THEM AS THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN. HE SPEaks OF LAwS HE SAYS NOTHING OF PUNISHMENT. DAMAGE-INTERESTS HAVE NO PENAL CHARACTER; THEY ARE ONLY

110 [IBID., P. 398. 111 [IBID., P. 406. 112 [IBID., P. 69.]
A means of reviewing the past in order to reinstate it, as far as possible, to its normal form. Peaceful and beneficial relations among the various functioning parts of a specialized labor force are possible only if there exists a framework of laws to regulate the relations. In the absence of regulation the division of labor may become anomie, in which case solidarity ceases to exist. Examples of this kind of situation include class conflict and industrial crises, but Durkheim regards these as abnormalities resulting from a lack of regulation of the relations between production and consumption and of the relations between management and labor. Ordinarily the greater the division of labor becomes, the greater will be the degree of interdependence and solidarity.

Durkheim states that the historical trend in the development of societies is from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity for the reason that the division of labor has constantly assumed greater importance. He disagrees, however, with the utilitarians as to the causes for the increase of differentiation and the resulting gains in economic productivity. They had assumed that the division of labor resulted very simply from the conscious desires of individuals to increase their happiness by providing a higher standard of living. Durkheim maintains that this supposes that man really does become happier with an increase in the division of labor, but actually, nothing is less certain. Happiness is a relative thing, for human beings have only a limited and moderate capacity to enjoy economic goods. Social health, which is intimately connected with happiness, is imperiled by excesses of every sort, and an overabundance

113 Ibid., p. 111.  
114 Ibid., p. 111 et passim.
OF MATERIAL GOODS MAY NOT RESULT IN HAPPINESS. GREAT SOCIAL CHANGES
WOULD BE INVOLVED WHICH WOULD DISRUPT SETTLED HABITS, CREATING IN THE
PROCESS MUCH SUFFERING. ** Furthermore, the person who lives in a primit-
itive society certainly seems to be as happy as the person who lives in
civilized society. In fact, in some respects he is probably happier,
as is indicated by the much higher incidence of neuroses and suicides
in civilized society than in primitive society.** Having disposed of
the psychologistic theory of the development of the division of labor
to his satisfaction, Durkheim turns to an explanation which is based on
changes in the social structure, which in turn develop because of changes
in the "material and moral density" of the population. Population tends
to increase naturally and this brings about an increasing amount of
competition among the persons of a society. They are forced to specialize
in order to survive. Thus Durkheim formulates the following propositions:

The division of labor varies in direct ratio with the volume and
density of societies, and, if it progresses in a continuous manner
in the course of social development, it is because societies become
regularly denser and generally more voluminous.**

**Criticism:**—Although he never discusses it explicitly, Durkheim
implies that he is using ideal types or normal concepts in his analysis
of social solidarity. Thus, "even as the solidarities develop in inverse
ratio to each other, of the two corresponding social types, one regresses
while the other progresses, and the latter is that fixed by the division
of labor."** His lack of full awareness of the method, however, leads
to an inconsistent use of the typology. In some cases he even seems to

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117 I[bid.], p. 262.
118 I[bid.], p. 192.
MISUNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF IDEAL TYPES, EVEN THOUGH HE IS FAMILIAR WITH Tonnies' discussion of normal concepts. For example, he makes the following statement in his discussion of a society characterized by complete mechanical solidarity:

IT IS TRUE THAT WE HAVE NOT YET, IN ANY COMPLETELY AUTHENTIC FASHION, OBSERVED SOCIETIES WHICH, IN ALL RESPECTS, COMPLIED WITH THIS DEFINITION. WHAT GIVES US THE RIGHT TO POSTULATE THEIR EXISTENCE, HOWEVER, IS THAT LOWER SOCIETIES, THOSE WHICH ARE MOST CLOSELY AKIN TO PRIMITIVITY, ARE FORMED BY A SIMPLE REPETITION OF AGGREGATES OF THIS KIND.\textsuperscript{119}

From this statement it seems that Durkheim thinks that it is necessary for the extreme types in the typology to correspond with actually existing entities, whether or not they have yet been found. There is also a hint of the comparative method whereby social origins are deduced from an analysis of present-day primitive societies.

Durkheim, unlike the majority of the other theorists who have written about dichotomous types of social life, cannot be accused of being biased in favor of the type of social relations which prevails in primitive or folk societies. On the contrary, he seems to be biased in the other direction, that is, in favor of the type of social relations in modern industrial civilization. Unlike Tonnies, Durkheim centers his discussion not upon capitalism but upon the division of labor, and this may account for his more favorable outlook on industrial society. He discounts ethical judgments as to the value of mechanical solidarity as opposed to organic solidarity in the following terms:

Accordingly, there is no necessity for choosing between them once for all nor of condemning one in the name of the other. What is necessary is to give each, at each moment in history, the place that is fitting to it.\textsuperscript{120}

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., p. 174.  
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., pp. 397-398.
In spite of this appeal to objectivity, however, Durkheim makes it very clear that he regards the increase in the division of labor and organic solidarity as highly desirable. It is only through the development of organic solidarity that individuality can come into being, and the individual personality will reach its full flowering only when each person concentrates upon his specialized tasks. Since Durkheim values individuality and personal development, he is hard pressed to maintain an objective and value-free approach. His attitude toward modern industrial society is so optimistic that he regards those cases in which solidarity doesn't exist—class conflict, business crises, and so forth—as abnormalities rather than as the results of the social structure itself.121

Durkheim is correct in attacking the rationalistic explanations of the utilitarians for the growth of the division of labor, but his own argument against them is very weak. His central point is that the seeking of happiness has not brought about the division of labor, for man today is no happier than he was in primitive society. This is obviously a flagrant non sequitur, for failure to reach a goal cannot be taken as evidence that efforts toward that goal have been lacking. His conception of human nature in De la Division du Travail Social as static and easily satisfied in its desires is also in direct contrast to his later conception of human nature in Le Suicide as insatiable in its desires.122

121 Sorokin, who views the development of modern civilization with some distaste, particularly objects to Durkheim's optimism: "His claim that a great division of labor results in an increase of freedom, independence, solidarity, hearty cooperation, unvariable mental progress, and so on, is more than questionable..." (Sorokin, op. cit., p. 479.)

122 See Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology, translated by John A. Spaulding and George Simpson.
In developing his own explanation for the growth of the division of labor, Durkheim is right in looking for the cause in the realm of the social rather than in the realm of the individual, but again his specific explanation is unsatisfactory. In the first place, there is no universal tendency for population to grow, and most primitive groups, through the use of abortion, infanticide, and other devices, maintain a stable population. The size of the population is determined by a great many cultural factors, not all of which tend toward a population increase. Durkheim ignores the possible alternatives to the division of labor even in those cases where population does grow. Emigration or war might be used, for instance. Since there are several alternatives, the choice of the division of labor is not automatic. Durkheim is thus backed into the same sort of teleological position for which he criticized the utilitarians; division of labor is selected as a preferable alternative to other methods of meeting the problem of overpopulation. What Durkheim fails to recognize is that population increases because of the division of labor and not the reverse.

Finally, Durkheim's belief that criminal law characterizes primitive societies in contrast to the restitutive law of modern societies appears to be contrary to the evidence gathered by anthropologists. Sutherland points out that the practices of primitive peoples involve restitution rather than punishment for offenses: "In these primitive


124 Emile Benoît-Sullyyan, "The Sociologism of Emile Durkheim and His School," An Introduction to the History of Sociology, edited by Harry Elmer Barnes, p. 530. See also Barnes and Becker, op. cit., pp. 833-834.
GROUPS, THEREFORE, WE FIND CERTAIN MOTIVES AND ATTITUDES THAT PRECEDED PUNISHMENT BUT WERE NOT, IN THEMSELVES, PUNISHMENTS: DESIRE TO ANNihilATE THE ENEMY OF THE GROUP, SACRIFICE TO APPEASE OR FEND OFF THE WRATH OF THE GODS, SOCIAL HYGIENE MEASURES TO RID THE COMMUNITY OF POLLUTION, SELF-REDRESS IN CASES OF PRIVATE INJURY, AND SURPRISE AND DISGUST AT THE PERSON WHO INJURED HIS OWN FAMILY.\textsuperscript{125}

CHAPTER IV

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORISTS

Ye proceed according to laws, and certainly would ye hit the mark if the postulate could be granted, and if the corollary were true.

Goethe

Early American Sociologists

Introduction.—The early American sociologists, whose most important works appeared around the turn of the century, recognized dichotomous societal types, chiefly because of their concern with the problem of social evolution. In most cases the distinction was not made explicit and the lack of systematic development of the typologies is in sharp contrast to the ideal types utilized by Tonnies, Weber, and Durkheim. Early American sociology stemmed primarily from Spencer, Comte, and the conflict theorists, and Tonnies, Durkheim, and Weber had comparatively little influence on American sociology until much later. Consequently, the typologies developed by Lester F. Ward and Franklin H. Giddings tend to reflect the Spencerian dichotomy of military and industrial societies. The theory of E. A. Ross, however, tends to be developed along a somewhat different line.

Lester F. Ward.—Ward is particularly concerned with social evolution, which he equates with progress. He theorizes that there are three general stages in man's development, but since the second stage is merely
TRANSITIONAL TO THE THIRD AND HIGHEST STAGE, HIS SYSTEM TENDS TO REVOLVE AROUND DICHTOMOUS TYPES OF SOCIAL GROUPS. WARD BELIEVES THAT MAN HAD A MONOPHYLETIC ORIGIN AND THAT THE ORIGINAL TYPE OF HUMAN GROUPING WAS THE HORDE, A COMPLETELY HOMOGENEOUS AND UNDIFFERENTIATED UNIT. As the horde became larger, however, it broke up into numerous family and kinship groups, and the new groups scattered. After a long period of separation from one another, the hordes and clans began to develop different languages, different customs, different ceremonies and religious practices. In spite of the process of differentiation between tribes, the tribe itself remained homogeneous and unified through the single bond of kinship.

The period of differentiation was characterized by peace, for each tribe was able to migrate into an isolated area in which it could live peacefully and comfortably. With the proliferation of tribes isolation became less possible, and whenever two tribes came into contact conflict and war resulted. Ward enthusiastically agrees with Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer that the genesis of society has come about through the struggle and conflict of social groups. This process is described in the following quotation:

The first step in the struggle of races is that of conquest of one race by another. . . . Success in conquering weaker races . . . and the art of organizing armies received special attention. Such armies at length used to make war on remote races, who were thus conquered and held under military power. Here the conquered would so greatly outnumber the conquering that extermination would be

1Lester F. Ward, Pure Sociology, p. 200. Ward takes the belief of the primacy of the horde from Durkheim and Gumplowicz.

2Ibid., p. 201.

3Ward does not use the term "society" to describe the horde, clan, or tribe. "Society" in this case is equivalent to civilization.
IMPRACTICABLE. The practice was then to preserve the conquered race and make it tributary to the wealth of the conquering race. The development of slavery as a necessary consequence of war was the first step in the development of a society based on differentiation. Gradually, however, the caste system and military subjugation gave way to a legal system which defined the rights and duties of the various people within the society. Thus the social group which was highly differentiated in its parts became integrated, and a relatively peaceful industrial society became possible.

It was therefore in militarism that the foundations of industrialism were laid in social adaptation. There seems to be no other way by which mankind could have been prepared for an industrial era.

Evidence of this may be seen in the fact that those primitive tribes which remained isolated and peaceful did not progress, for "... the condition of peace is a condition of social stagnation." Ward's societal typology is similar to Spencer's particularly in the case of "industrial society." Spencer's "militant society" also corresponds to Ward's intermediate and transitional stage, but Ward's concept of the original type of human group is more closely akin to the mechanically solidary group described by Durkheim. Little of Ward's conception of the process whereby society evolves has been accepted in subsequent anthropological and sociological theory.

Franklin H. Giddings. Giddings, even more than Ward, takes over the conception of societal types from Spencer. Natural or military-religious society is thus described as "... a population that is composed of "

4 Ibid., pp. 204-205. 5 Ibid., pp. 205, 272. 6 Ibid., p. 238.
LIKE-MINDED INDIVIDUALS WHO KNOW AND ENJOY THEIR LIKE-MINDEDNESS, AND ARE THEREFORE ABLE TO WORK TOGETHER FOR COMMON ENDS.\(^7\) THE PRINCIPLE OF "CONSCIOUSNESS OF KIND" IS THE ORGANIZING AND UNIFYING FORCE OF NATURAL SOCIETY, AND COOPERATION GROWS OUT OF THIS FORMAL LIKE-MINDEDNESS. INTEGRAL OR LIBERAL-LEGAL SOCIETY, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS COMPOSED OF HIGHLY DIFFERENTIATED GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS, AND LIKE-MINDEDNESS DOES NOT DEVELOP SIMPLY FROM THE SIMILARITY OF ALL THE INDIVIDUALS. A CONSCIOUSNESS OF COMMON ENDS DEVELOPS, HOWEVER, SO THAT A KIND OF RATIONAL LIKE-MINDEDNESS COMES INTO EXISTENCE TO HOLD THE GROUP TOGETHER. THE INTEGRAL SOCIETY IS MADE UP OF MANY CONSTITUENT SOCIETIES, WHICH ARE ARTIFICIAL ORGANIZATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE COME TOGETHER IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE COMMON ENDS. EXAMPLES OF CONSTITUENT SOCIETIES ARE A BUSINESS CORPORATION, A POLITICAL PARTY, A CHURCH, A SCIENTIFIC ASSOCIATION, AND A CLUB. THEY ALL EXIST BY VIRTUE OF A DIVISION OF LABOR AND CONSEQUENTLY ONE COULD NOT FUNCTION WITHOUT THE OTHERS IN AN INTEGRAL SOCIETY.\(^8\)

GIDDINGS SPEAKS OF THE TREND AWAY FROM NATURAL SOCIETY TO INTEGRAL SOCIETY AS "THE HISTORY OF PROGRESS," AND HE TRACES THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIBERAL-LEGAL SOCIETY IN WESTERN CIVILIZATION.\(^9\) HE DESCRIBES THE CONTRIBUTIONS WHICH LIBERAL-LEGAL CIVILIZATION HAS MADE TO HUMAN WELL-BEING IN THE FOLLOWING PASSAGES:

FIRST, APPRECIATION OF THE VALUE OF AS MUCH UNLIKE-MINDEDNESS AS IS CONSISTENT WITH SOCIAL STABILITY; SECOND, THE GROWING SUPREMACY OF REASON OVER IMPULSE AND FORMALITY; THIRD, THE APPRECIATION OF CRITICISM; FOURTH, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM, OF LEGALITY, OF VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATION, AND OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT; AND

\(^7\)FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS, THE ELEMENTS OF SOCIOLOGY, PP. 6-7.
\(^8\)IBID., PP. 7-8.
\(^9\)IBID., PP. 299-300.
FIFTH, THE INTRODUCTION OF FLEXIBILITY, NOT INCONSISTENT WITH UNITY AND STABILITY, IN THE SOCIAL CONSTITUTION.10

The optimism of both Ward and Giddings is probably an extension of the general point of view of evolutionary thought of the nineteenth century with its faith in progress. Much of the pessimism of the twentieth century, particularly in German theory, probably represents a reaction to the optimism of the nineteenth.

In his later work Giddings tended to classify societies as either instinctive or rational. The instinctive groups "... are held together by instinct and not by rational comprehension of the utility of association."11 Only herds or flocks of animals correspond to the purely instinctive group, for in all human societies there is some degree of rational comprehension of the utility of association. There are many gradations, however, and Giddings distinguishes at least eight basic types of society which extend along the instinctive-rational continuum. Two of these types bear a striking resemblance to the Gemeinschaft and the Gesellschaft described by Tonnies. The first is the "sympathetic society":

There is a homogeneous community of blood-relatives, composed of individuals that from infancy have been exposed to a common environment and to like circumstances, and who, therefore, by heredity and experience are alike. Always conscious of themselves as kindred, their chief social bond is sympathy.12

The second type is the "contractual society":

10Ibid., p. 301.
11Franklin H. Giddings, Civilization and Society, p. 10.
12Ibid., p. 11.
SOCIETY of THIS type is deliberately created by agreement. The utility of association has been perceived, and a compact of cooperation is entered into for the promotion of the general welfare. The social bond is a covenant or contract.  

E. A. Ross—The typology developed by Ross corresponds very closely to Tonnies' Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. Ross admits the similarity, but he states that he had worked out his own system long before he became acquainted with Tonnies' work. The distinction which Ross makes is that between community and society, the former consisting of "living tissue" and the latter of "structures held together by rivets and screws." The sharp difference between the two may be seen in the type of social order in each case.

In the community the secret of order is not so much control as concord. So far as community extends people keep themselves in order, and there is no need to put them under the yoke of an elaborate discipline. The lively sense of a common life enables mates, kinsfolk, neighbors, and comrades to love and understand one another, to yield to one another, and to observe those forbearances and good offices that make associate life a success. In such a case the group does not make the ties; the ties make the group.

With the development of society, however, the common life disappears, and persons no longer feel themselves bound together.

Edward Alsworth Ross, Social Control, p. 432.

Ross' terms are similar to MacIver's, but there are important differences in meaning and should not be confused. See the discussion of MacIver below.

Edward Alsworth Ross, Social Control, pp. 432-433.
with one another. Even while we are welding it, the social mass laminates. Everywhere we see the march of differentiation. Everywhere we see the local group—the parish, commune, neighborhood, or village—decaying, or else developing beyond the point of real community. 17

In society, then, man is dependent upon artificial agencies of control, such as law. Ross says that one "... may shudder at the thought of modern society precariously rearing its huge bulk above the devouring waves of selfishness like a Venice built on piles," but, after all, "... it is perhaps no worse than man's depending upon cultivated instead of wild fruits..." 18

From the passages which have already been quoted it is evident that Ross does not welcome the decay of community and the development of society, and he displays the same kind of nostalgia for the past that is present in Tonnies' work. Even more striking in this respect is the following passage:

Something of the mournfulness and even disgust with which we look upon the shrivelling of the female breast with the advent of the patent baby-food, the decay of the teeth with the perfecting of dentistry, the degeneration of the eye with the improvement of spectacles, and the dermal decadence that follows in the train of scientific clothing,—something of this seizes us when we contemplate the great agencies of law, public opinion, education, religion, and literature speeded to their utmost in order to fit ignoble and paltry natures to bear the moral strains of our civilization, and perhaps by the very success of their work cancelling the natural advantage of the noble over the base, and thereby slowing up the development of the most splendid qualities of human nature. 19

This attitude is in marked contrast to the optimism of Ward and Giddings who, like Spencer and Comte, regarded the development of modern industrial civilization as unmitigated progress. Possibly the reason for the difference in attitude is that Ross focuses upon modern capitalism as

17 Ibid., p. 433. 18 Ibid., p. 436. 19 Ibid., p. 437.
THE RESULT OF INDUSTRIALIZATION AND POINTS OUT THE EVILS WHICH ARE INHERENT IN THE CAPITALISTIC SOCIETY. WARD AND GIDDINGS, ON THE OTHER HAND, CONCENTRATE ATTENTION ON INDUSTRIALISM AS SUCH AND PAY VERY LITTLE ATTENTION TO THE PARTICULAR CAPITALISTIC PATTERNINGS OF INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY. WHERE ROSS SEES MORAL DECADENCE, WARD AND GIDDINGS SEE INCREASING RATIONALITY AND HUMAN FREEDOM.

CHARLES HORTON COOLEY AND ASSOCIATES:
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY GROUPS

INTRODUCTION.—CHARLES HORTON COOLEY IS USUALLY CONSIDERED TO BE ONE OF THE "FOUNDING FATHERS" OF THE AMERICAN BRANCH OF SOCIOLOGY ALONG WITH WARD, GIDDINGS, AND ROSS, BUT HIS INFLUENCE ON PRESENT-DAY SOCIOLOGY FAR EXCEEDS THAT OF THE OTHERS. COOLEY IS NOTED PRIMARILY FOR HIS CONCEPT OF THE PRIMARY GROUP, WHICH BEARS A VERY CLOSE RESEMBLANCE TO TONNIES' GEMEINSCHAFT. COOLEY HIMSELF DID NOT DEVELOP THE COMPLEMENTARY CONCEPT OF THE SECONDARY GROUP, BUT HIS ASSOCIATES, ROBERT C. ANGELL AND LOWELL J. CARR, SYSTEMATIZED COOLEY'S THEORY AND ADDED THE SECONDARY GROUP CONCEPT AFTER COOLEY'S DEATH.20 THE PRIMARY GROUP-SECONDARY GROUP DICHOTOMY IS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT FROM THE DICHOTOMIES OF SOCIETAL TYPES, SUCH AS THOSE DEVELOPED BY TONNIES AND ROSS, IN THAT IT IS CONCERNED WITH CONSTITUENT GROUPS OF A LARGER SOCIETY. SINCE SOCIETY MAY BE CHARACTERIZED, ON THE ONE HAND, BY "PRIMARY-LIKE" RELATIONS, OR, ON THE OTHER HAND, BY "SECONDARY-LIKE" RELATIONS, THE PRIMARY GROUP-SECONDARY GROUP DICHOTOMY IS ACTUALLY CLOSELY AKIN TO THE GEMEINSCHAFT-GESELLSCHAFT DICHOTOMY.

THE PRIMARY GROUP.—COOLEY DEFINES THE PRIMARY GROUP AS AN ORGANIZATION

20 See CHARLES HORTON COOLEY, ROBERT C. ANGELL, AND LOWELL J. CARR, INTRODUCTORY SOCIOLOGY.
OF FROM TWO TO FIFTY OR SIXTY PERSONS WHICH IS CHARACTERIZED BY INTIMATE FACE-TO-FACE CONTACT AND A FUSION OF PERSONALITIES.

BY PRIMARY GROUPS I MEAN THOSE CHARACTERIZED BY INTIMATE FACE-TO-FACE ASSOCIATION AND COOPERATION. THEY ARE PRIMARY IN SEVERAL SENSES, BUT CHIEFLY IN THAT THEY ARE FUNDAMENTAL IN FORMING THE SOCIAL NATURE AND IDEALS OF THE INDIVIDUAL. THE RESULT OF INTIMATE ASSOCIATION, PSYCHOLOGICALLY, IS A CERTAIN FUSION OF INDIVIDUALITIES IN A COMMON WHOLE, SO THAT ONE'S VERY SELF, FOR MANY PURPOSES AT LEAST, IS THE COMMON LIFE AND PURPOSE OF THE GROUP.21


21 CHARLES HORTON COOLEY, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION, P. 23.

22 Ibid.

23 See CHARLES HORTON COOLEY, HUMAN NATURE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER FOR COOLEY'S THEORY OF THE SOCIAL NATURE OF THE SELF. BRIEFLY, A SELF-IDEA INVOLVES FIRST, A PERSON'S IMAGINATION OF HIS APPEARANCE TO OTHERS; SECOND HIS IMAGINATION OF THE OTHER PERSON'S JUDGMENT OF THAT APPEARANCE; AND THIRD, SOME SELF-FEELING, SUCH AS PRIDE OR SHAME. SINCE THE FAMILY IS THE ORIGINAL GROUP WITH WHICH A CHILD COMES INTO CONTACT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SELF IS INTIMATELY TIED UP WITH FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS.

24 COOLEY, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION, P. 34.
IMPORTANT TYPE OF PRIMARY GROUP IS THE PLAY-GROUP OF CHILDREN. HERE AGAIN IS A UNIFIED GROUP IN WHICH, IN SOME CASES, A PERSON'S SYMPATHY, AMBITION, AND HONOR ARE ENGAGED EVEN MORE THAN IN THE FAMILY. COOLEY REFERS THROUGHOUT THE BOOK ON SOCIAL ORGANIZATION TO GANGS OF ADOLESCENT BOYS AND THE HIGH DEGREE OF LOYALTY TO THE GROUP THAT THESE BOYS FEEL. THE PLAY-GROUP'S UNITY IS NOT BASED MERELY UPON LOVE AND HARMONY, HOWEVER, FOR IT IS DIFFERENTIATED AND USUALLY COMPETITIVE UNITY WHICH PERMITS SELF-ASSERTION AND APPROPRIATE PASSIONS, BUT

* * * THESE PASSIONS ARE SOCIALIZED BY SYMPATHY, AND COME, OR TEND TO COME, UNDER THE DISCIPLINE OF A COMMON SPIRIT. THE INDIVIDUAL WILL BE AMBITIOUS, BUT THE CHIEF OBJECT OF HIS AMBITION WILL BE SOME DESIRED PLACE IN THE THOUGHT OF THE OTHERS, AND HE WILL FEEL ALLEGIANCE TO COMMON STANDARDS OF SERVICE AND FAIR PLAY. SO THE BOY WILL DISPUTE WITH HIS FELLOWS A PLACE ON THE TEAM, BUT ABOVE SUCH DISPUTES WILL PLACE THE COMMON GLORY OF HIS CLASS AND SCHOOL.16

THE THIRD IMPORTANT TYPE OF PRIMARY GROUP IS THE NEIGHBORHOOD GROUP OR COMMUNITY OF ELDERS. HISTORICALLY RESIDENCE IN CLOSE PHYSICAL PROXIMITY HAS RESULTED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A BOND OF SYMPATHY AMONG THE NEIGHBORS. IN THE MIDDLE AGES, FOR EXAMPLE, THE VILLAGE COMMUNITY WAS THE CHIEF SPHERE OF SYMPATHY AND MUTUAL AID. IT IS ONLY WITH THE RISE OF INDUSTRIAL CITIES IN MODERN TIMES THAT THE ROLE OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD GROUP IS DECLINING IN INFLUENCE.26 THE FAMILY, PLAY, AND NEIGHBORHOOD GROUPS ARE BY NO MEANS THE ONLY PRIMARY GROUPS, HOWEVER. THEY ARE SIMPLY THE MOST INFLUENTIAL, SINCE THEY ARE THE ASCENDANT GROUPS IN THE LIFE OF THE CHILD, WHOSE PERSONALITY IS BEING FORMED. PRIMARY GROUPS MAY SPRING INTO EXISTENCE WHENEVER THERE IS COMMON INTEREST AND CONGENIALITY AMONG SEVERAL PEOPLE.

IN AMERICAN SOCIETY, FOR EXAMPLE, PEOPLE READILY FORM CLUBS AND FRATERNITIES WHICH MAY GIVE RISE TO REAL INTIMACY. WHERE THERE IS A LITTLE

COMMON INTEREST AND ACTIVITY, KINDNESS GROWS LIKE WEEDS BY THE ROADSIDE.\textsuperscript{27}

One of Cooley's principal points is that human nature is not something which is pre- or supra-social. It is rather a product of the primary group, for human nature "... is developed and expressed in those simple, face-to-face groups that are somewhat alike in all societies; groups of the family, the playground, and the neighborhood."\textsuperscript{28} This conception differs sharply from the point of view of Tonnies, who believed that Gemeinschaft is based upon natural will, the instinctive liking of biologically related individuals. Cooley reverses the proposition in effect, for he believes that human instinct is not of great importance and that man does not have human nature at birth. Since human nature is a product of the primary group, Cooley argues, it naturally reflects the ideals of the primary group. Human nature "... means, particularly, sympathy and the innumerable sentiments into which sympathy enters, such as love, resentment, ambition, vanity, hero-worship, and the feeling of social right and wrong."\textsuperscript{29} Because primary groups such as the family exist universally in all groups and in all historical periods, human nature is a comparatively stable element of society: "Always and everywhere men seek honor and dread ridicule, defer to public opinion, cherish their goods and their children, and admire courage, generosity, and success."\textsuperscript{30} Cooley believes that the ideals of the primary group, such as love,

\textsuperscript{27}Ibid., p. 26. Sociologists such as Warner, Mayo, and Bales have recently "rediscovered" the primary group in studies of communities, factories, and small groups.

\textsuperscript{28}Ibid., p. 30.

\textsuperscript{29}Ibid., p. 28.

\textsuperscript{30}Ibid. See Cooley, Human Nature and the Social Order for an extended discussion of "human nature."
FREEDOM, JUSTICE, SELFLESS COOPERATION, AND SO FORTH, ARE ENDURING CRITERIA BY WHICH THE TYPES OF LARGER ASSOCIATIONS SHOULD BE JUDGED.

Thus, institutions such as democracy and Christianity, which are based upon the primary ideals, are more human and of more enduring value than institutions which are not. The primary group qualities of democracy and Christianity are described in the following passages:

The aspirations of ideal democracy—INCLUDING, OF COURSE, SOCIALISM, AND WHATSOEVER ELSE MAY GO BY A SPECIAL NAME—are those naturally springing from the playground or the local community; embracing equal opportunity, fair play, the loyal service of all in the common good, free discussion, and kindness to the weak. . . . And Christianity, as a social system, is based upon the family, its ideals being traceable to the domestic circle of a Judean carpenter. God is a kind father; men and women are brothers and sisters; we are all members one of another, doing as we would be done by and referring all things to the rule of love. In so far as the church has departed from these principles it has proved transient; these endure because they are human.31

Cooley is acutely aware that the institutions of modern society for the most part fail to measure up to the primary ideals, and he explains the failure partly as a result of moral weakness of a personal character, but mostly as the result of a lack of organization to make good intentions effective.32 Instead, we are led to create institutions "... which, though good in certain aspects, may brutalize or ossify the individual, so that primary idealism in him is almost obliterated.33 A particular danger, says Cooley, is formalism, including, among other things, bureaucracy. Formalism and disorganization of society are inevitably

31COOLEY, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION, PP. 51-52.
32Ibid., PP. 52-53. The placing of the blame partly on personal moral weakness seems to be inconsistent with Cooley's general theory, since it implies an independent personality. If personality is really a social product of the primary group, the fault must be traced back to the primary group itself.
33Ibid.
CONNECTED, FOR "FORMALISM GOES VERY NATURALLY WITH SENSUALITY, AVARICE, SELFISH AMBITION, AND OTHER TRAITS OF DISORGANIZATION, BECAUSE THE MERELY FORMAL INSTITUTION DOES NOT ENLIST AND DISCIPLINE THE SOUL OF THE INDIVIDUAL, BUT TAKES HOLD OF HIM BY THE OUTSIDE, HIS PERSONALITY BEING LEFT TO TORPOR OR TO IRREVERENT AND RIOTOUS ACTIVITY."\(^34\) THERE IS IN MODERN SOCIETY NOT ONLY A FAILURE TO EXTEND PRIMARY IDEALS TO LARGER ASSOCIATIONS, BUT ALSO A BREAKDOWN OF PRIMARY GROUPS THEMSELVES. THUS, IN MODERN CITIES THE CROWDED TENEMENTS AND THE GENERAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONFUSION HAVE WEAKENED THE FAMILY, AND THE INTIMACY OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD HAS ALSO DISAPPEARED. WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, PEOPLE ARE NO LONGER LIMITED BY GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS IN THE FORMATION OF THEIR FRIENDSHIPS. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT THING, HOWEVER, IS THAT FRIENDSHIP AND BROTHERHOOD NO LONGER DEVELOP AS A MATTER OF COURSE AMONG MEN WHO COOPERATE: "IT IS PERHAPS ONLY IN MODERN DAYS, ALONG WITH THE GREAT AND SUDDEN DIFFERENTIATION OF ACTIVITIES, THAT FEELING HAS FAILED TO KEEP UP, AND THE IDEA OF COOPERATION WITHOUT FRIENDSHIP HAS BECOME FAMILIAR."\(^35\) THESE DEVELOPMENTS OF MODERN SOCIETY ARE ANTITHETICAL TO HUMAN NATURE, COOLEY ARGUES, AND THEREFORE IT IS MANKIND'S "GREAT HISTORICAL TASK" TO CREATE MORAL ORDER ON AN EVER-GROWING SCALE BY EXTENDING THE IDEALS OF THE PRIMARY GROUP.\(^36\)

**THE SECONDARY GROUP.**—EVEN THOUGH COOLEY DID NOT USE THE TERM "SECONDARY GROUP," THE CONCEPT IS IMPLICIT IN HIS DISCUSSION OF PRIMARY GROUPS. IN CONSIDERING THE BREAKDOWN OF PRIMARY GROUPS HE REFERRED TO "LARGER ASSOCIATIONS." ANGELL AND CARR MAKE THE CONCEPT OF THE SECONDARY

\(^{34}\text{Ibid., p. 349.}\)  
\(^{35}\text{Ibid., pp. 26-27, 40.}\)  
\(^{36}\text{Ibid., p. 53.}\)
GROUP EXPLICIT, and in so doing, they show less bias in favor of primary
groups than Cooley did. Angell and Carr define "secondary groups" as
"... groups wholly lacking in intimacy of association and usually in
most of the other primary and quasi-primary characteristics," such as
face-to-face association, small numbers, and unspecialized purpose.37
There are several kinds of secondary groups: status groups; nationality
groups; residence groups; attention, interest, and purpose groups; bio-
logical groups, including age groups, sex groups, and racial groups; and
casual groups, such as crowds, mobs, and audiences. The business cor-
poration is an excellent example of a secondary group, since it does not
involve face-to-face association of the stockholders, small numbers, an
unspecialized purpose, or intimacy in relationships.38 Angell and Carr
point out, just as Cooley did, that the primary group is declining in
importance and that modern civilization, particularly in the United States,
rests on non-primary forms of association to an extent unknown in any
previous culture. The differences between primary groups and secondary
groups are described in terms of human association in the following passages:

In primary groups people meet as persons, i.e., unconstrained
by artificiality, special purpose, limited contact, and the like. In
secondary groups, on the other hand, they are functioning units in an
organization, or mere acquaintances at best. Secondary association
is partial association. It is association narrowed down by special
purpose, by communication at a distance, by rules, by social barriers,
or by the casual nature of contact. This means that under such
conditions associating personalities present only special facets of
themselves to one another. They cannot meet as whole persons.39

Angell and Carr believe that there are both advantages and disadvantages
in the secondary type of association. The chief advantages are

37 COOLEY, ANGELL, AND CARR, OP. CIT., P. 210.
38 Ibid., pp. 210-211. 39 Ibid., p. 214.
(1) Specialization and the division of labor, which makes possible an advanced civilization, (2) impersonality on the part of functionaries in dealing with people and things, resulting in greater efficiency, (3) greater reach, which makes possible vast organizations over a large area, and (4) continuity of organization, since persons die, but functionaries are merely replaced. On the other hand, there are corresponding disadvantages: (1) the social illiteracy of the narrow specialist, resulting in an inability to communicate with others, (2) the functionary's tendency to disregard human values, and (3) the inertia of great organizations, resulting in a readjustment lag, as in a business depression.

Criticism—The basic difficulty with Cooley's theoretical system is its lack of perspective. The reason for this lack may perhaps be traced to Cooley's methodology. Even though he was not dogmatic on questions of methodology, he was suspicious of the statistical method, since he believed that all social phenomena are mental. He believed that sociology is essentially "systematic autobiography" and he used introspection and sympathetic insight as his basic methods of approach to problems. This method is similar to Weber's method of "understanding" (Verstehen), but Cooley is perhaps even closer to Dilthey's method of "living oneself into" (Nachleben) events or eras. Cooley made much less of an effort than Weber did, however, to be wertfrei, and consequently his theoretical system reflects too much his own personality, his own environment, and his own experiences. He generalized from his specific case to all mankind, and the results were not always satisfactory.

Cooley's conception of human nature was a peculiarly narrow one.
SINCE IT EXCLUDED BY DEFINITION A LARGE NUMBER OF ACTIONS WHICH ARE CULTURALLY DERIVED BUT WHICH DO NOT FIT IN WITH WHAT HE BELIEVED TO BE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIMARY GROUPS, HE ATTEMPTED TO AVOID THE PROBLEM BY DEFINING CERTAIN ACTIONS AS ANIMAL NATURE: "IN THEIR CRUEDEST FORM SUCH PASSIONS AS LUST, GREED, REVENGE, THE PRIDE OF POWER AND THE LIKE ARE NOT, DISTINCTIVELY, HUMAN NATURE AT ALL, BUT ANIMAL NATURE, AND SO FAR AS WE RISE INTO THE SPIRIT OF FAMILY OR NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION WE CONTROL AND SUBORDINATE THEM."\(^{41}\) IN THE LIGHT OF PRESENT-DAY SOCIO-Psychological knowledge such a point of view is untenable. Cooley was also mistaken in assuming that primary groups universally and necessarily give rise to specific "primary ideals." Men do not universally admire generosity and cherish their children. Among the Mundugumor of New Guinea, for example, relations between parents and children are characterized by hostility in the normal situation. Similarly a Mundugumor who is generous is not respected but is considered to be an eccentric fool, and all other persons try to take advantage of him.\(^{42}\) George H. Mead remarked appropriately that Cooley's sociology "... was in a sense an account of the American community to which he belonged, and pre-supposed its normal healthful process."\(^{43}\) Not only did he fail to see the provincialism of his system, but he also failed to recognize the primary group as a source of conflict as well as a source of unity.

\(^{41}\)Cooley, Social Organization, p. 36.

\(^{42}\)See Margaret Mead, Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies.

\(^{43}\)George H. Mead, "Cooley's Contribution to American Social Thought," American Journal of Sociology, XXXV (March, 1930), 705.
AND COOPERATION. Consequentially his whole theory was pitched on an extremely optimistic tone. Cooley argued that all we must do to perfect society is to extend the ideals of the primary group to other types of association. Such a course of action is neither practical or desirable. As Angell and Carr later suggested, primary group relations may actually intrude in a disorganizing manner in society, as when personal considerations result in political corruption and nepotism. Cooley did not analyze the functions of the secondary group, and consequently he failed to realize that it is impossible to organize a corporation in the same way that a family is organized. In fact, "paternalism" is antithetical to good economic organization.

Cooley's personality throws some light upon his bias in favor of primary groups. He was partially deaf, he had a speech impediment, and he was painfully shy. He was extremely uncomfortable in the presence of a large number of strangers, and he much preferred the intimacy and security of a small circle of old friends—in other words, a primary group. Arthur E. Woods, one of Cooley's former students, has made the following observation on Cooley's behavior:

''In company with a small group of students, or at our department luncheons his whole personality glowed with friendly warmth."

44 This point has been made by several persons but most clearly by Hiram J. Friedsam in unpublished lectures in social theory. Not all sociologists object to Cooley's "sweetness and light," however. Hamilton, for example, makes the following comment:

"It is to Cooley's lasting credit that his own work has already become a bit 'old fashioned.' He could hardly escape the evangelical world in which he was brought up; today many persons are superiorly tolerant of the sweetness and light and betterment to be found in his pages." (Walton H. Hamilton, "Charles Horton Cooley," Social Forces, VIII (Dec., 1930), 187.)

IF IN SMALL GROUPS, OR WITH INDIVIDUALS HE WOULD THUS REVEAL HIMSELF, IN MISCELLANEOUS SOCIAL GATHERINGS HE WAS NOTICEABLY ILL AT EASE. HE WAS TOO SHY AND SENSITIVE TO STAND THE IMPACT OF SUCH OCCASIONS; AND HE HAD NO SMALL TALK WITH WHICH TO COMPETE WITH THOSE WHO YEARN TO SHINE "SOCIALLY."  

R. M. MacIver: Community and Association

Community and Association.—The concepts of community and association of R. M. MacIver are to some extent a further development of the Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft dichotomy of Tonnies, but there are also some significant differences. Community and association, unlike the terms used by Tonnies, are not ideal types at opposite ends of a continuum, and they are not, as such, societal types. MacIver points out that he believes that Tonnies' terms represent a difference in degree, whereas his own terms represent a difference in kind.

The most general concept which MacIver uses is "society," which he defines as "... the system of social relationships in and through which we live." It is an all-inclusive term for all willed relationships among men, but willed relationships are possible only in so far as there is some degree of "consciousness of kind." That is, only when there is a sufficient degree of likeness and consciousness of likeness to bring a mutual recognition of belonging together. Within society are found both community and association.

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48 Ibid., p. 8.

49 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
OF A COMMUNITY: (1) IT IS A GROUP OCCUPYING A TERRITORIAL AREA, WITH LOCALITY GIVING IT A CERTAIN DEGREE OF COHERENCE. (2) THE PERSONS LIVING TOGETHER IN THE COMMUNITY SHARE THE BASIC CONDITIONS OF A COMMON LIFE AND NOT VARIOUS SPECIFIC INTERESTS:

ALL THE LAWS OF THE COSMOS, PHYSICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL, CONSPIRE TO BRING IT ABOUT THAT BEINGS WHO LIVE TOGETHER SHALL RESEMBLE ONE ANOTHER. WHEREVER MEN LIVE TOGETHER THEY DEVELOP IN SOME KIND AND DEGREE DISTINCTIVE COMMON CHARACTERISTICS—MANNERS, TRADITIONS, MODES OF SPEECH, AND SO ON. THESE ARE THE SIGNS AND CONSEQUENCES OF AN EFFECTIVE COMMON LIFE.50

IT IS POSSIBLE FOR A PERSON TO LIVE WHOLLY WITHIN A COMMUNITY, WHEREAS IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO LIVE WHOLLY WITHIN AN ASSOCIATION SUCH AS A BUSINESS ORGANIZATION. EXAMPLES OF COMMUNITIES ARE A PIONEER SETTLEMENT, A VILLAGE, A CITY, A TRIBE, AND A NATION. THE COMMON CHARACTERISTIC IS THAT THERE IS SOCIAL COHESION WITHIN THESE UNITS WHICH GIVES THEM A COMMUNITY CHARACTER. MACIVER ADMITS THAT THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SMALL SELF-CONTAINED COMMUNITY, SUCH AS A PRIMITIVE SOCIETY OR A RURAL PEASANT VILLAGE, AND THE LARGER COMMUNITY, SUCH AS A NATION, BUT HE BELIEVES THAT THEY ARE ESSENTIALLY ALIKE IN THAT COMMON LIVING AND COMMUNITY OF SPIRIT ARE PRESENT IN BOTH.51 HE SHARPLY DISAGREES WITH TONNIES THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN SOCIETY HAS LED TO THE DISSIPATION OF THE SENSE OF COMMUNITY, FOR HE BELIEVES THAT COMMUNAL LIFE "... EXPRESSES ITSELF IN OTHER WAYS AND ATTACHES ITSELF TO OTHER AND LARGER UNITIES, SUCH AS THAT OF THE NATION."52 DISTINCT FROM THE COMMUNITY FORM OF ORGANIZATION, THOUGH NOT ITS OPPOSITE, IS THE

50Ibid., P. 23.
51MacIver, Society: A Textbook of Sociology, pp. 8-10.
52Ibid., P. 245. See also R. M. MacIver, The Web of Government.
ASSOCIATION, which MacIver defines as "... a group organized for the pursuit of an interest or group of interests in common." It does not replace the community, since it is an organization within the community. A community itself is not an organization, but rather the matrix of organization. The most significant difference between community and association, however, is that the association is organized for particular purposes, and membership in an association has only limited significance. The community, on the other hand, is not consciously formed to serve a special purpose and it is all-comprehensive. "We are born into communities, but we create or are elected into associations."54

In his classification of types of associations, MacIver makes a further distinction which corresponds more closely to that made by Tonnies. There are two kinds of specialized interests which serve as the basis of most associations. The first is primary common interest, which does not depend upon more basic underlying interests. A thing or action is valued as an end in itself and not as a means to some other end. The second type is secondary common interest, in which the thing or action in itself is valued only as a means to another end. Thus a man may seek the welfare of others because of the glory or advantage which it brings to himself. In almost every situation both types of interests play a part, but one type may have a predominating influence.55

Associations which are based for the most part on primary common interests include the family, the club, and the church. The business and the state, on the other hand, are based primarily on secondary common

53MacIver, Society: A Textbook of Sociology, p. 11.
54Ibid., pp. 11-12. 55MacIver, Community, p. 104.
The primary interest association thus corresponds fairly closely to Tonnies' *Gemeinschaft* on the one hand and to Cooley's primary group on the other; the secondary interest association corresponds to Tonnies' *Gesellschaft* and to Angell and Carr's secondary group.

**Social Evolution.**—In discussing social evolution MacIver tends to abandon the use of the terms "community" and "association" and to turn to the second distinction between primary and secondary types of interest. Thus he distinguishes between primitive and civilized societies primarily in terms of the fusion or separation of means and ends. In primitive society very little distinction is made between objects and actions which are utilitarian and objects and actions which are valued in themselves. The fusion of means and ends is present in all areas of primitive life:

Ritual is as important as craftsmanship in the making of a canoe or in the cultivation of the soil. Prayers are as important as arms in the conduct of war. Religion is compounded with magic and cannot be divorced from the business of living. The dance is as much a means of warding off evil spirits or of inducing fertility as it is a mode of social recreation. The success of a fishing expedition is as much endangered by a woman's touching the fishing tackle as by unfavorable weather.

With the development of modern Western civilization there has been an increasing divorce of means from ends, and efficiency has tended to replace cultural values as the basis for evaluating objects and actions. MacIver believes that the typical development may be seen in the factory systems.

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A modern factory or transportation system is operated purely as a utility, as a means of making profits or earning dividends from the point of view of the shareholders... as a means of providing wages from the point of view of the employees, as a means of supplying goods or services from the point of view of the consumer of these utilities. A factory, or a mechanism like the printing press or the ring spindle, does not count among the things that people enjoy or venerate or dance around or sing songs to or in any sense "live for." It is thought of solely as a productive mechanism. Its efficiency is its sole and sufficient justification.

Corresponding with the differentiation of means and ends as society evolves from its primitive to its civilized forms is a change in the kind of unity or solidarity of the people within the society. The totalitarian unity of the primitive society, which is governed by conformity to the traditions of the group, gives way to a unity based upon integrated functions. Individuality emerges, since "the individual has to choose his cultural loyalties, to maintain his own values, to decide his own attachments, in far greater measure." MacIver attempts to be objective in considering social evolution, and he devotes much space to a disavowal of the equation of social evolution with social progress. He takes a relativistic point of view, pointing out that "different people may look on the same social changes, and to some they may spell progress, to others decadence." In answer to Comte and Hobhouse, however, he takes special pains to make the point that "... many of the conditions on which depend important human values, such as contentment or abiding faith or economic security or freedom from over-heavy stress and strain, are not obviously realized

59 Ibid., p. 483. MacIver quotes Tonnies and Durkheim on this point apparently with full approval.
60 Ibid., p. 510.
MORE ADEQUATELY IN THE MORE EVOLVED SOCIETY. ..

CRITICISM—MacIver's typology of community and association is not of great value in the analysis of social phenomena, since he seems to have fused the concept of community with that of society. His definitions of the two do not make the distinction clear, and he used the term "community" in much the same way as other sociologists use "society." It is perhaps significant that he defined sociology in his first book as the study of community, whereas most other sociologists at the time considered it to be the study of society. There is little to be gained in substituting one concept for the other. MacIver intended for the concept of community to play approximately the same role as Tonnie's Gemeinschaft, but the definition which he gave the term is too broad to make crucial distinctions. A wide variety of types of human relationships are included under the rubric "community," so that it is possible to find even Gesellschaft-like relations within the community. The typology is essentially ahistorical also, since all societies are characterized by community relationships as he defines them. MacIver implicitly recognized these difficulties with the terms by turning to other distinctions for more precise analysis. The terms "primary common interest" and "secondary common interest" cut across the community-association typology, since both groups may be characterized by either. The distinction of types of interest as the basis for action and association is actually a synthesis of the concepts of Tonnie's, Durkheim, and Cooley, and MacIver added very little to their basic ideas concerning dichotomous types of social life.

61 Ibid.
62 MacIver, Community, p. 48.
Howard Becker's Sacred Society and Secular Society

Introduction.—The work of Howard Becker represents the most systematic and logically consistent development of a dichotomous typology of societal types to be found in modern social theory. His work is significant not only for his development of the sacred-secular dichotomy of societal types, but also for his more general contributions to the methodology of historical or comparative sociology. Becker first became interested in dichotomous types of society as a graduate student at the University of Chicago in the late 1920's, and the terms sacred and secular were probably first used in Robert E. Park's seminar there. Although Becker's dichotomy has been less influential than that of many other theorists, possibly because of its higher degree of abstraction and its greater complexity, it is likely to become more influential in the future.

63. "Comparative" in this instance should not be confused with the older so-called "comparative method" used by Morgan, Spencer, Frazer, and others. Becker points out that these theorists actually employed the "illustrative method," whereby "facts" were collected to support a pre-conceived evolutionary theory. Becker follows in the tradition of Weber in the use of the comparative method. See Howard Becker, "Interpretive Sociology and Constructive Typology," Twentieth Century Sociology, edited by Georges Gurvitch and Wilbert E. Moore, p. 93.

64. Don Martindale and Elio D. Monachesi, Elements of Sociology, Howard Becker, "Sacred and Secular Societies," Social Forces, XXVII (May, 1950), 361-376. Robert Redfield also became interested in the dichotomy under Park's influence, but he modified the terminology. See Chapter V below for a discussion of Redfield's theoretical system. Although Park used the dichotomy of sacred-secular in his seminar, he apparently used the concepts very little in his published work.

65. Already many of Becker's former students have made further contributions to Becker's sacred-secular theory, particularly Don Martindale, W. L. Kobay, and Roy G. Francis. Martindale, for instance, in collaboration with Monachesi, has produced an introductory sociology text organized around the central concepts of sacred society and secular society. (Martindale and Monachesi, op. cit.) Barnes and Becker have also written what is one of the most important histories of social theory, Social Thought from Lore to Science, with the sacred-secular dichotomy as an important unifying theme.
CONSTRUCTIVE TYPOLOGY.—Becker believes that it is necessary to use constructed or ideal types in sociological research because of the nature of the data. It is manifestly impossible to manipulate human beings in experimental situations in the same way that a chemist manipulates atoms, for cultural values prevent such a practice. The data cannot be handled objectively and impersonally for long periods of time, even in totalitarian societies. Whether or not it may be desirable to manipulate persons and situations entirely at will, sociologists certainly do not have the power to do so. Even claims made to "experimental analysis" by sociologists such as Murphy and Newcomb in Experimental Social Psychology are not realistic, since these studies "...lack anything remotely approaching experimental control." The result is that "almost any practitioner of a genuine experimental science would turn up his nose at the loose and haphazard way in which our psycho-sociological and sociological 'experimenters' go about their work." The proper course for sociology then is not in the pursuit of the methods of the experimental sciences. Becker suggests that if an analogy must be drawn, sociology corresponds much more closely to geology than to any other of the natural sciences. The purpose of the geologist is to predict where certain ores will be found, where earthquakes might occur, and so forth, but the geologist does not use experiments in any real sense of the term. Just as the geologist is confronted by a series of strata which were laid down...
Without any thought that geologists would some day study them and make use of them, so also is the sociologist confronted by "socio-cultural deposits" already in existence. The problem in both cases is to study the existing structures in order to discover principles which will make prediction possible. 68

Becker argues that the tool which is of greatest importance to sociology is the constructed type, which bears a close resemblance to the ideal type of Weber. 69 A constructed type is nothing more than a logical construction out of a number of empirical instances so that the basic and underlying characteristics of the data are isolated from irrelevant details. It is a logically pure concept which represents an extreme or limiting case, and it serves as a standard which may be used in the comparison of empirical data. At the same time, however, the constructed type must be "objectively probable." Even though there is little likelihood that a concrete case will correspond exactly with the constructed type, it is still necessary for that possibility to exist.

"Examination of the empirical evidence must always enable the researcher to say, 'The probability that this type will ever be matched in reality is very slight, but the probability is not inherently nil." 70 On this

68Ibid., pp. 26, 28, 31, 33.

69Becker, after using "ideal type" originally in his work, abandoned it in favor of "constructed type" in order to avoid certain misunderstandings. As will be pointed out later, he wished to distinguish his own concept involving "objective probability" from Weber's "ideal type" involving "objective possibility." He also wished to avoid connotations of perfection or of Berkeleyan idealism. See ibid., p. 30.

POINT BECKER DISAGREES WITH WEBER, WHO HAD INSISTED ONLY ON "OBJECTIVE POSSIBILITY." "OBJECTIVE POSSIBILITY," BECKER THINKS, CAN MEAN MERE LOGICAL POSSIBILITY. VIHNINGER'S FICTIONS IN HIS PHILOSOPHY OF "AS IF," FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE LITTLE OR NO EMPIRICAL PROBABILITY, AND "SOME OF MAX WEBER'S LESS GUARDED METHODOLOGICAL STATEMENTS SOUND MUCH LIKE VIHNINGER'S. . . . 71 THE CONSTRUCTED TYPES WHICH ARE USED IN SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH ARE NOT "JUST ANY" FICTIONS; THEY MUST BE CLOSELY RELATED TO EMPIRICAL PHENOMENA.

CONSTRUCTED TYPES POSSESS WHAT BECKER CALLS "NEGATIVE UTILITY," IN THAT THEIR USEFULNESS STEMS FROM THE LACK OF CORRESPONDENCE TO PARTICULAR CASES. THE LOGICAL PATTERN FOR TESTING HYPOTHESES IS "IF P, THEN Q" AND "IF Q, THEN P." IN THE CASE OF CONSTRUCTIVE TYPOLOGY, P STANDS FOR THE TYPE AND Q STANDS FOR THE CONSEQUENT. THE CONSTRUCTED TYPE IS NOT A HYPOTHESIS IN ITSELF, FOR A HYPOTHESIS MUST INVOLVE THE RELATION OF A TYPE TO A CONSEQUENT. IN ACTUAL PRACTICE Q Seldom IF EVER FOLLOWS EMPIRICALLY FROM P, AND THUS P IS "FALSE" IN A CERTAIN SENSE. THE ACTUAL CASE INVOLVES P AS THE ANTECEDENT AND Q AS THE CONSEQUENT, ALTHOUGH IN EMPIRICAL OBSERVATION Q APPEARS PRIOR TO P. IT IS PRECISELY THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN Q AND Q WHICH IS SIGNIFICANT, FOR "... THE 'FALSENESS' OF Q IS NOT AN ACCIDENTAL 'FALSENESS,' BUT A SPECIFIC ONE RESULTING FROM A NECESSARY AND NOT A CHANCE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TYPE AND THE EMPIRICAL INSTANCE." 72 IT IS THEN POSSIBLE TO DISCOVER THE SPECIFIC FACTORS WHICH ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DIFFERENCE. IT IS CLEAR THEN THAT CONSTRUCTED TYPES IN SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS ARE VALUABLE ONLY IN SO FAR AS THEY DO NOT CORRESPOND TO GIVEN CASES:
Someone is always saying, "Your constructed type is no good because several exceptions to it can be found." The obvious reply is, "You can never expect anything other than exceptions. If construct and "reality" exactly correspond, you are in the morass of the particular. You are talking about this thing at this time in such a way that explicit comparison with anything else becomes virtually impossible." The belief that the constructed type is rendered useless because exceptions to it can be found is childishly naive. Exceptions must be found.

The constructed type is thus a fiction, which differs from the constructs used by historians, such as "the medieval Papacy," "Calvinism," or "the national state system," only in that it has been constructed planfully, deliberately, and with full awareness. The constructed type as used in sociological research bears a close relation to the heuristic fictions which have been so profitably employed by the natural scientists. The physicists, for example, utilize two different theories of the nature of light. As the physicist puts it, "On Monday, Wednesday, and Friday we use a wave theory of light, and on Tuesday and Thursday we use a particle theory." These fictions, even though it is safe to assume that they don't correspond to "reality," are useful for the specific purposes for which they were intended, for they procure prediction. Similarly, the fictions used in sociological analysis procure prediction, although this prediction may be retrospective as well as prospective. "In other words, we may verify or refute our hypotheses and constructs by searching the record of the past for setups in which the 'if and when' proviso is fulfilled."

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74 Ibid., p. 43. Becker apparently confuses a theory with a type in this illustration. The wave theory of light and the concept of absolute zero in physics are completely different types of fictions.

75 Ibid., p. 33.
Sacred society and secular society.--In defining the sacred and secular constructed types of society, Becker first states explicitly what they are not. Sacred and secular are not synonymous with holy and profane, religious and irreligious, folk and urban, rural and urban, nonliterate and literate, primitive and modern, folk and state, communal and associational, primary group and secondary group, and so forth. They have no correspondence with the first two paired concepts, and they represent a more general case of most of the other concepts, this resulting in more universal applicability.76

The basic criterion for Becker's definitions of societal types is the resistance to or capacity for change. Thus "a sacred society is one that elicits from or imparts to its members, by means of sociation, an unwillingness and/or inability to respond to the culturally new as the new is defined by those members in terms of the society's existing culture."77 A secular society, on the other hand, is just the opposite. It is a society which endows its members with readiness and/or capacity to change. A sacred society sustains an impermeable value-system, whereas a secular society embodies a permeable value-system. An impermeable value-system is dependent upon an absence of effective intersocietal communication, and consequently isolation marks the sacred society and accessibility marks the secular society. There are three types of isolation and accessibility. The first type is vicinal, which denotes

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76 Becker, "Sacred and Secular Societies," Social Forces, XXVIII (May, 1950), 362. See Becker's diagram of the interrelations of these concepts in ibid., p. 366. Most of the concepts emerge as subtypes of the sacred-secular dichotomy.

77 ibid., p. 363.
The absence or presence of communication growing out of sheer physical opportunity for contact with other societies. Second, the social type denotes the absence or presence of communication at the level of social relations between members of societies in physical proximity. Third, the mental type denotes the absence or presence of communication with members of other societies who are present both physically and socially at a level of a "common universe of discourse."78

The sacred society has all three kinds of isolation to the nth degree, and all parts of the social structure are sacred in the sense that they are valued in and of themselves. Everything is unique, concrete, and personal; and comparison, classification, analysis, and abstraction are not practiced. The organism is adjusted to motor habits and attitudes which have been inculcated in childhood so that there is an almost superstitious fear of change. Social life is based almost entirely upon tradition and ceremonial, and every situation is defined in customary and sacred terms. In short, the folkways and the mores govern social actions, and there is little individuation and rational criticism of existing institutions. Even activities which are of the most utilitarian character, such as the gaining of a livelihood, are conditioned fundamentally by the folkways and the mores, which may hold that the herd animals and the soil are sacred. The economy of the sacred society is self-sufficient and is completely independent of foreign trade, and consequently there is little chance that pecuniary valuation and detached economic attitudes will intrude. Division of labor is simple, and there is no town, urban, or metropolitan economy. The basic kinship

78 Ibid., pp. 363-364.
GROUP IS THE LARGE FAMILY, WHICH IS COMPLETELY UNDER THE CONTROL OF SACRED SANCTIONS. ALTHOUGH THERE IS LITTLE INDIVIDUALITY AND DEVIATION FROM NORMS, THERE IS A MINIMUM OF SOCIAL CONTROL BY PHYSICAL FORCE, SINCE GOSSIP, GENERAL AVERSION, AND INDIGNATION ARE SUFFICIENT TO MAINTAIN ORDER. IRRATIONALISM AND SUPERNATURALISM ARE COMPLETELY DOMINANT, AND RATIONAL SCIENCE IS UNKNOWN.79

THE SECULAR SOCIETY IS ACCESSIBLE VINCINALLY, SOCIALLY, AND MENTALLY TO THE NTH DEGREE, AND ALL PARTS OF THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE ARE SECULAR IN THE SENSE THAT VALUES ARE NOT DETERMINED BY CUSTOM AND TRADITION. EVERY RELATIONSHIP IS CONSIDERED ONLY AS A MEANS TO AN ELUSIVE END OF HAPPINESS AS DEFINED IN TERMS OF THE STRICTLY EGOISTIC WISHES OF THE INDIVIDUAL. IN OPPOSITION TO THE SACRED SOCIETY, THE UNIQUE, CONCRETE, AND PERSONAL ARE SET ASIDE; AND COMPARISON, ANALYSIS, CLASSIFICATION, AND ABSTRACTION ARE HABITUALLY PRACTICED. TRADITION AND CEREMONIAL HAVE NO INFLUENCE IN ORIENTING HUMAN ACTIVITY, FOR EVERY SITUATION IS DEFINED RATIONALISTICALLY IN SECULAR TERMS. INSTEAD OF THE INABILITY TO RESPOND TO THE NEW, THERE IS INABILITY TO REFRAIN FROM RESPONDING TO THE NEW, AND A PREMIUM IS PUT UPON CHANGE AS SUCH. THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTION IS SUBJECTED TO RATIONAL CONSIDERATION, AND CHANGES IN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ARE MADE WHENEVER RATIONAL ANALYSIS SHOWS IT TO BE NECESSARY.80 HERD ANIMALS AND THE SOIL ARE NOT REGARDED AS SACRED; THEY ARE PECUNIARILY EVALUATED. THE SECULAR ECONOMY IS HIGHLY DIFFERENTIATED AND MARKETS ARE PRESENT ON A METROPOLITAN


80 "RATIONAL" IN THIS CASE IS USED IN THE SAME SENSE AS WEBER USES IT. SEE THE DISCUSSION OF WEBER IN CHAPTER III.
AND EVEN WORLD LEVEL, SINCE THERE ARE NO POLITICAL BARRIERS SUCH AS PROTECTIVE TARIFFS OR IMMIGRATION RESTRICTIONS. THE STRANGER IS FREE TO COME AND GO AS HE WILL, SINCE EVERYBODY IS MORE OR LESS A STRANGER, AND COSMOPOLITANISM ACQUIRES HIGH PRESTIGE VALUE. THE KINSHIP GROUP IS THE SMALL BIOLOGICAL FAMILY, AND THE ECONOMIC AND EDUCATIONAL FUNCTIONS OF THE FAMILY ARE LARGELY TAKEN OVER BY OUTSIDE INSTITUTIONS. THERE IS VERY LITTLE INFORMAL SOCIAL CONTROL SUCH AS THAT FOUND IN THE SACRED SOCIETY, AND OFFENSES AGAINST THE LAWS OFTEN INVOLVE NO SOCIAL OSTRACISM. CONTROL TAKES THE FORM OF A RATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM IN WHICH THE "GUilt-PUNISHMENT" EQUATION HAS FULL SWAY. INSTEAD OF THE UNWRITTEN AGREEMENT AND "UNDERSTANDING" CHARACTERIZING SACRED SOCIETY, FORMAL, LEGAL, SECULAR CONTRACTS ARE THE RULE, TO THE EXTENT THAT EVEN THE MARRIAGE RELATIONSHIP TAKES THE FORM OF A CONTRACT BETWEEN TWO INDIVIDUALS. IN THE SECULAR SOCIETY RATIONALISM AND NATURALISM ARE DOMINANT, AND GENUINE SCIENCE IS HIGHLY DEVELOPED AND ENJOYS GREAT PRESTIGE. 81


81 Ibid., pp. 224-225.
BODY OF DOGMA WHICH CALLS FORTH, SETS UP, OR MAINTAINS A TOTALITARIAN FORM OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE. PROMINENT EXAMPLES OF THIS SOCIETAL TYPE ARE THE GENEVA THEOCRACY OF CALVIN, THE JESUIT STATE OF PARAGUAY, AND, AT LEAST BY INTENTION, FASCIST ITALY, NAZI GERMANY, AND SOVIET RUSSIA. VICINAL ISOLATION IN THESE CASES MAY RESULT FROM RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL AND COMMUNICATION, WHICH IN TURN BRING ON SOCIAL AND MENTAL ISOLATION. THE NAZIS, FOR EXAMPLE, PROMULGATED THE SLOGAN, "WE THINK WITH OUR BLOOD," WITH SUCH SUCCESS THAT IT BECAME VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR OUTSIDERS TO ESTABLISH ANY MUTUALLY INTELLIGIBLE UNIVERSE OF DISCOURSE WITH A LARGE PART OF THE GERMAN POPULATION. THIRD, THE PRINCIPLED-SECULAR SOCIETY POSSESSES A "BICYCLE-LIKE STABILITY OF MOVING EQUILIBRIUM," FOR ALTHOUGH THE NEOPHOBIA CHARACTERISTIC OF SACRED SOCIETIES IS NOT PRESENT TO A GREAT DEGREE, THE NEOPHILIA OF NORMLESS-SECULAR SOCIETIES IS HELD IN CHECK BY SOME SYSTEM OF PRINCIPLES. VICINAL AND SOCIAL ACCESSIBILITY, WITH CERTAIN ALTERNATIVES SUCH AS TREASON TO THE STATE REMAINING FUNDAMENTALLY OUT OF CONSIDERATION. FOURTH, THE EXTREME TYPE OF THE SECULAR SOCIETY IS THE NORMLESS-SECULAR. IN THIS CASE THERE IS COMPLETE ACCESSIBILITY VICINALLY, Socially, AND MENTALLY, AND SACRED OR PRINCIPLED NORMS OF BEHAVIOR COMPLETELY DISAPPEAR. THIS TYPE OF SOCIETY IS TO BE FOUND IN CENTERS OF CULTURE CONTACT, AND THUS MOST FREQUENTLY ARE LOCATED IN LARGE CITIES AT THE CROSSROADS OF COMMERCE AND COMMUNICATION. IT IS INCORRECT TO EQUATE URBAN WITH SECULAR, HOWEVER, FOR THERE ARE MANY CITIES WHICH ARE BASICALLY FOLK-SACRED, SUCH AS LHASA, BENARES, AND MECCA, OR PRESCRIBED-SACRED, SUCH AS FASCIST ROME, COMMUNIST MOSCOW, AND NAZI NURNBERG. REDFIELD'S FOLK-URBAN DICHOTOMY IS VALID, THEREFORE, ONLY IN SO FAR AS REFERENCE IS MADE TO ONE TYPE OF CITY, THE HIGHLY
BECKER FURTHER SUBDIVIDES THE FOUR TYPES OUTLINED ABOVE. Thus, the folk-sacred society is divided into indigenous and exogenous subtypes. Under the indigenous classification in the case of the prescribed-sacred society are two subtypes, articulated and devised; under the exogenous classification are enforced, transplanted, imposed, and quasi-nativistic. The classification of subtypes of secular societies is even more complex, involving the following in the case of the principled-secular society: eliminative, substitutive, promulgational, crisis-ensuing, rationalizing, adoptive, and conquest-ensuing. The normless-secular type includes the following: segmental-elicited, segmental-elective, decadent-residual, decadent-distilled, demoralized-interclass, demoralized-intraclass, nonmoral-familial-neglectful, nonmoral-familial-impotent, catastrophe-ensuing, mutinous, attributional, mimetic, collisional, and evocative. The secular society subtypes are also classified according to indigenous-exogenous and mutational-incremental categories.

BECKER does not believe that all social change results in a shift from a sacred type of society to a secular type of society, even though much of his work has been concerned with the problem of secularization of sacred societies. His doctoral dissertation, for instance, described the secularization of ancient Greek culture following the disorganization

82BECKER, "SACRED AND SECULAR SOCIETIES," SOCIAL FORCES, XXVIII (MAY, 1950), 364-365, 376. See also Howard Becker, "INTERPRETING FAMILY LIFE IN CONTEXT," FAMILY, MARRIAGE, AND PARENTHOOD, EDITED BY HOWARD BECKER AND REUBEN HILL, P. 21 ET PASSIM.


84IBID., P. 374.
OF OLD TRADITIONS IN THE IONIAN MIGRATION. Becker states that "... there is ample evidence that societies once strongly secular may be poured back in sacred molds," and he cites the case of the development of Nazi Germany as an example of a change from a principled-secular society to a prescribed-sacred society. He is consequently opposed to irreversible dichotomies, such as primitive-civilized, preliterate-literate, ancient-modern, folk-state, and so forth.

CRITICISM. Becker's contention that it is necessary to limit constructed types to "objectively probable" constructs is decidedly weak, since many of his own statements seem to conflict with this point of view. At one point he states that no constructed type "... will ever be found concretely exemplified," and "the reason such a type can't be found in external 'nature' is because it has been made in the investigator's mind." Again, he states, "You never can expect anything other than exceptions." He is, of course, correct in emphasizing the point that constructed types must be abstracted from concrete empirical data and that they are not "just any" fictions, but there is no logical reason to require some possibility of correspondence, no matter how remote, between the construct and reality. After all, the constructed type is merely a measuring standard, and the difference from the construct is

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85 See Barnes and Becker, op. cit., pp. 134-176 for a discussion of the process of secularization in Greece.


87 Ibid., p. 366.


89 Ibid., p. 39.
THE SIGNIFICANT THING. BECKER FAILS TO SEE THE COMPLETE ANALOGY WITH THE
CONSTRUCTS USED BY THE NATURAL SCIENTISTS. THE CONCEPT OF A PERFECT
VACUUM, FOR INSTANCE, IS A FICTION WHICH IS USEFUL BUT WHICH IS IN NO
SENSE "OBJECTIVELY PROBABLE." BECKER'S CRITICISM OF WEBER'S TERM
"OBJECTIVELY POSSIBLE" SEEMS TO BE LITTLE MORE THAN PLAYING WITH WORDS,
SINCE ACTUALLY "OBJECTIVELY POSSIBLE" COMES CLOSER TO EXPRESSING BECKER'S
MEANING THAN "OBJECTIVELY PROBABLE," WHICH IMPLIES THAT A CONSTRUCTED
TYPE IS LIKELY TO CORRESPOND EXACTLY WITH AN ACTUAL CASE. IN PRACTICE,
AND TO A CERTAIN DEGREE IN DEFINITION, THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN WEBER'S "IDEAL TYPE" AND BECKER'S "CONSTRUCTED TYPE." 90

IT IS ALSO QUESTIONABLE AS TO HOW VALUABLE BECKER'S BEWILDERING
ARRAY OF SUBTYPES OF SOCIETIES IS. IT IS HIGHLY PROBABLE THAT MANY OF
THE SUBTYPES HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTED LOGICALLY RATHER THAN ABSTRACTED
FROM EMPIRICAL DATA, AND THUS BECKER'S OWN DEFINITION OF THE CONSTRUCTED
TYPE MAY HAVE BEEN VIOLATED. IN AT LEAST SOME CASES BECKER ALSO SEEMS
TO HAVE FALLEN INTO THE USE OF THE "ILLUSTRATIVE METHOD" WHICH HE SO
STRONGLY CRITICIZES, FOR HE OFFERS NOTHING BUT EXAMPLES TO SUPPORT HIS
VARIOUS SUBTYPES. IT IS PROBABLY SAFE TO ASSUME THAT LITTLE USE WILL
BE MADE OF THE SUBTYPES AS DEVELOPED BY BECKER. IN FACT ONE IS TEMPTED
TO INTERPRET HIS CONSTRUCTION OF SUBTYPES AS A "DEAD-PAN" SATIRE ON THE
PRACTICE OF CONSTRUCTING TYPES OF LITTLE EMPIRICAL VALUE, WHICH SEEMS TO
BE A POPULAR PASTIME AMONG MANY SOCIOLOGISTS.

BECKER'S CONCEPTION OF THE SOURCES OF SOCIAL CHANGE ALSO SEEMS ONE-
SIDED. HE ASSUMES THAT CHANGE COMES ONLY THROUGH CULTURE CONTACT AND

90 BECKER FINALLY ADMITS THAT "... THE CONSTRUCTED TYPE IS AN IDEAL
TYPE CLOSELY SIMILAR TO, AND PERHAPS IDENTICAL WITH, THE MAX WEBER
MODEL." (IBID., P. 30.)
Thus ignores completely the possibility that some of the seeds of change may lie within a society itself. It is obvious that even in the case of two cultures in contact the problem of isolating the particular causes of change still remains. Becker's analysis of change remains on a superficial, descriptive level, and he ignores the basic problem of change.

American Rural Sociologists: Rural Society and Urban Society

American rural sociology, for the most part, has not been unified by a theoretical system, for its function in the past has been conceived largely as "practical." Its raison d'être has been to provide a practical guide in the solving of particular administrative problems. The lack of theoretical orientation and the uneven quality of the vast amount of research which has been done under the impetus of government subsidization has hindered the establishment of rural sociology as a scientific discipline, but in recent years the scientific level of rural sociology has been raised. Most rural sociologists make use of a dichotomy of rural society and urban society, but not so much for theoretical purposes as for the purpose of justifying the existence of rural sociology as a separate field of sociology. From the very first rural sociologists have realized the difficulty of drawing a line between rural and urban, but at the same time they have felt that a more or less absolute distinction between the two is necessary. Gillette, for example, who wrote the first textbook in rural sociology, admits that there is no hard and fast line between the two, but on the other hand "there are some aggregations of populations . . . which could never serve as country
AND SOME COUNTRY REGIONS WHICH COULD NEVER SERVE AS CITY." Consequently, there has been an attempt by rural sociologists to set up more or less mutually exclusive rural and urban types of society.

More often than not, definitions of the terms "rural" and "urban" have taken the form of listings of the characteristics of the rural society and the urban society, that is, there has been a tendency to assume that all rural societies are essentially the same and that all urban societies are also virtually identical in nature. A large number of the rural sociologists apparently have regarded "rural" and "urban" as classificatory terms for actually existing societies. There is an increasing realization at the present time, however, that "rural" and "urban" are ideal types and that very few, if any, existing societies correspond exactly with the ideal types. Loomis and Beegle recognize the great variations within rural society in pointing out that the characteristics of rural life vary "... in rural society from social class to social classes, from type of farming area to type of farming area, from generation to generation, and in many other ways." Suggesting a continuum from rural to urban, Smith observes that "instead of being purely rural or purely urban, one community merely has more urban or more rural characteristics than another."94

The rural-urban dichotomy which has been developed by rural sociologists

91 John W. Gillette, Constructive Rural Sociology, p. 10.
92 For example, see Charles J. Galpin, Rural Life and Gillette, op. cit.
SCARS ARE VERY CLOSE KINSHIP TO THE DICHTOMIES SET FORTH BY TONNIES, DURKHEIM, BECKER, AND THE OTHER THEORISTS DISCUSSED UP TO THIS POINT. NELSON, IN ONE OF THE MOST RECENT TEXTS ON RURAL SOCIOLOGY, HAS SUMMARIZED THE CHARACTERISTICS OF FARM, VILLAGE, AND URBAN SOCIETIES. 

First, the farm community is very small in size and social contacts are few and personal. Primary groups predominate and the folkways and mores are the chief agents of social control. There is comparatively little social stratification, and much of the status differentiation which does exist rests upon personal acquaintance. Spatial mobility and social mobility are at a minimum. Work skills are general and diverse, and the family works together as a unit. Rural institutions are relatively small and simple. Second, on the other extreme, urban society is much larger in size and social contacts are numerous and mostly impersonal. Secondary groups tend to assume greatest importance, and with the resulting impersonalization, law becomes the chief instrument of social control. Urban society is stratified to a high degree on the basis of non-personal criteria such as occupation and wealth, but there is a fairly high degree of social and spatial mobility. Work skills are highly specialized and the family almost never works together as a unit. Urban institutions are just the opposite of the rural institutions; they are large and complex. Third, the village or town contains some elements of both rural-farm and urban societies, and thus it represents a case more or less at the mid-point on the continuum from rural to urban. 

95LOWRY NELSON, RURAL SOCIOLOGY, P. 24.

96There is a vast literature on rural-urban differences. For further references consult the bibliographies in Smith, op. cit., and Nelson, op. cit.
OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RURAL AND URBAN TYPES TO THOSE OF THE
IDEAL TYPES OF OTHER THEORISTS IS OBVIOUS. THE RURAL SOCIETY IS ROUGHLY
EQUIVALENT TO TONNIES' GEINSCHAFT, DURKHEIM'S MECHANICALLY SOLIDARY
SOCIETY, COOLEY'S PRIMARY GROUP, AND SO FORTH; URBAN SOCIETY IS, OF
COURSE, EQUIVALENT TO THE OPPOSITE TYPES OF THE ABOVE. IN AT LEAST ONE
RURAL SOCIOLOGY TEXTBOOK, THE TERMS RURAL AND URBAN ARE EXPLICITLY
IDENTIFIED WITH THE DICHOTOMIES DEVELOPED BY TONNIES AND SOROKIN.97
ON THE ONE HAND "RURAL" IS ROUGHLY EQUATED WITH FAMILISTIC GEINSCHAFT,
AND ON THE OTHER, "URBAN" IS EQUATED WITH CONTRACTUAL GESELLSCHAFT.
THROUGHOUT THE BOOK BEEGLE AND LOOMIS DETERMINE THE RELATIVE POSITIONS
OF VARIOUS SOCIAL SYSTEMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR CORRESPONDENCE TO
OR DIFFERENCE FROM ONE OR THE OTHER OF THE IDEAL TYPES.

SURPRISINGLY ENOUGH, RURAL SOCIOLOGISTS HAVE BEEN CRITICIZED BY
HEBERLE FOR EMPHASIZING THE GESELLSCHAFT-LIKE CHARACTERISTICS OF RURAL
SOCIETY TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE GEINSCHAFT-LIKE CHARACTERISTICS.98
IT IS TRUE THAT RURAL SOCIOLOGISTS HAVE UTILIZED THE TRADE AREA IN
DEFINING THE RURAL COMMUNITY, AND HEBERLE IS CORRECT IN MAINTAINING THAT
"THE SERVICE AREA METHOD REMAINS AT BEST A DEVICE TO OBTAIN INSIGHT
INTO THE GESELLSCHAFT RELATIONS."99 HEBERLE OVERTOPS, HOWEVER, THE
STRONG EMPHASIS BY RURAL SOCIOLOGISTS UPON THE MORE "NATURAL" UNITS OF

97 LOOMIS AND BEEGLE, OP. CIT.
98 RUDOLF HEBERLE, "THE APPLICATION OF FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS IN RURAL
COMMUNITY STUDIES," RURAL SOCIOLOGY, VI (SEPT., 1941), 203-215. EDMUND
DES. BRUNNER CRITICIZED HEBERLE'S ARTICLE IN "GEINSCHAFT AND GESELLSCHAFT
IN RURAL COMMUNITIES," RURAL SOCIOLOGY, VII (MARCH, 1942), 75-77, BUT HIS
CRITIQUE IS VITIATED BY HIS OWN MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE FUNCTION OF IDEAL
TYPES.
99 HEBERLE, OP. CIT., P. 209.
SOLIDARITY. The striking thing about most of the literature in the field of rural sociology is precisely its concern with the "RURAL WAY OF LIFE," which bears a much closer resemblance to GEMEINSCHAFT than to GESELLSCHAFT. Redfield has suggested that American rural society should not be conceived as a polar type but rather as a special case along the continuum from folk society to urban society. He takes the point of view that GEMEINSCHAFT-like characteristics and GESELLSCHAFT-like characteristics are more or less evenly balanced in American rural society.¹⁰⁰

In most of the writings of the rural sociologists there is at least an implicit value bias which takes the form of extolling the virtues of the "RURAL WAY OF LIFE" or of deploiring the trend toward urbanization and secularization of the rural people.¹⁰¹ Galpin even stated in 1918 that there is a "LAND INSTINCT" which results in man's "... peculiar liking for the stretch of broad acres, his hunger for soil contact, and his primal satisfaction in the idea of land ownership."¹⁰² It is implied that urban life is disorganized to a certain degree by the frustration of this basic instinct. Nostalgic idealized thoughts of the rural life of the past are not limited to the early rural sociologists, however.

In an introduction to one of the most recent rural sociology texts:


¹⁰¹ This value bias is particularly interesting in light of the fact that probably most of the rural sociologists have come out of rural backgrounds and that they themselves have left the rural life in favor of urban university life. As George Vincent said in an introduction to Gillette, OP. CIT., "CITY PEOPLE PRAISE A LIFE CLOSE TO NATURE BUT AVOID THE LIFE ITSELF." One wonders whether rural life is as idyllic as some of the rural sociologists claim.

¹⁰² GALPIN, OP. CIT., P. 37.
Baker makes the following comments:

I believe the hope of the nation lies, first, in the retaining of their culture by the rural people, particularly of the family as an institution for continuing the race and transmitting wealth and culture. Secondly, I believe the nation's hope lies in retarding and, if possible, reversing the direction of rural-urban migration... I hope these agricultural extension workers, especially youthful home demonstration agents, who have lived in the urban environment which exists in most of our agricultural colleges, or who have so imbibed the subtle propaganda of our popular magazines, particularly the advertisements, that they no longer respect or perhaps even know the native values of rural life, will at least read enough of this book by Professor Lindstrom to pause and ponder before they lead the rural youth in their custody along the path that tends to extinction of the family and the race. 103

Pitirim A. Sorokin: Ideational Culture and Sensate Culture

Introduction.—Although Tonnies, Cooley, MacIver, and others tended to be biased at least implicitly against the developments of contemporary civilization, they at least recognized some advantages inherent in these developments. The writings of Pitirim A. Sorokin represent an extreme romantic reaction against modern culture. Present society is explicitly condemned, and Sorokin foresees a return to the principles which governed Western society during the Middle Ages. The similarity of parts of Sorokin's system to the ideas expressed by Augustine is striking, and Speier is led to remark that "Sorokin's basic philosophy may be regarded as a modern vulgarization of early Christian thinking." 104 Sorokin's system is also closely akin to the large-scale cyclical theories of social change of Spengler and Toynbee, and the latter theories will be briefly


CONSIDERED FOLLOWING A DISCUSSION OF SOROKIN'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY.

**Ideational Culture and Sensate Culture.**—Sorokin's system is organized around the concepts of two profoundly different types of cultural integration, one of which he calls "ideational" and the other, "sensate." An ideational culture is one in which the unifying theme is the belief that true or ultimate reality is supersensory and that the "reality" detected by the organs of perception is illusory. A sensate culture is just the opposite; the unifying theme is the belief that the only reality is that revealed by sensory perception. Sorokin believes that cultures are tangibly integrated "logico-meaningfully," that is, functionally; and therefore each part of the culture reflects the dominant theme of that culture. The central principle "... permeates all the components, gives sense and significance to each of them, and in this way makes cosmos of a chaos of unintegrated fragments." From the dominant themes it is possible to deduce logically the characteristic details which may be expected to be found in an ideational culture or a sensate culture. Each of the systems of culture has its own mentality; systems of truth and knowledge; philosophy; religion; systems of right and wrong; forms of art and literature; mores, laws, and code of conduct; forms of social relationships; form of economic and political organization; and type of human personality.

To take but one example, Sorokin devotes the bulk of the first

105 Sorokin also discusses a third type of culture which he calls "idealistic" but it is essentially merely a harmonious combination of elements from the extreme types.


VOLUME OF **Social and Cultural Dynamics** to a consideration of the contrasting forms of art. Ideational art is predominantly religious in its subject matter and is thus otherworldly, ascetic, and anti-sensual. This type of art deals very little with concrete historical events, with satire or comedy, or with individual portraiture of real persons; it is rather concerned with transcendent reality. There is very little nudity portrayed, and the little which is present is ascetic and non-fleshy. Ideational art is sacred, and its value is not to be judged by connoisseurs according to aesthetic standards, but rather by a censor who judges whether or not the work is compatible with religious values. Sensate art, on the other hand, is predominantly secular in its subject matter, and it deals most often with the everyday events, deeds, and actions of the sensate world. It tends to be visual, sensual, realistic, naturalistic, impressionistic, and singularistic. Nudity is a common subject, and it is almost always of an erotic, sensual, voluptuous, and fleshly nature. The function of sensate art is to give pleasure and entertainment to increase the sensate happiness of sensate human beings, and the value of a particular work is determined by its success in fulfilling this function. 108.

Sorokin employs in his work a quantitative method whereby certain characteristics of cultures are counted in an effort to determine whether that culture is ideational, sensate, or idealistic, a cross between the former two types. These characteristics serve as indexes to the culture as a whole, since all the elements of the culture are functionally integrated. In his consideration of forms of art, for example, among

OTHER THINGS WHICH ARE COUNTED IS THE NUMBER OF PAINTINGS OF NUDES PRODUCED BY A PARTICULAR CULTURE. IN GENERAL, THE MORE PAINTINGS OF NUDES THERE ARE, THE MORE SENSATE THAT CULTURE IS LIKELY TO BE. SOROKIN FINDS THAT A QUALITATIVE DISTINCTION IN TYPES OF NUDES IS NECESSARY, HOWEVER, SO HE MAKES A DISTINCTION AS TO WHETHER THE NUDES ARE ASCETIC, NEUTRAL, OR EROTIC. 109 BY USING THE SAME SORT OF QUANTITATIVE PROCEDURE WITH A LARGE NUMBER OF OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, SOROKIN DETERMINES WHETHER A CULTURE IS BASICALLY IDEATIONAL OR SENSATE. THE SIMILARITY BETWEEN SOROKIN'S POLAR TYPES AND THOSE OF OTHER THEORISTS IS EVIDENT, BUT THERE IS AT LEAST ONE MAJOR DIFFERENCE. OTHER THEORISTS, SUCH AS TONNIES, DURKHEIM, WEBER, AND BECKER, HAVE EMPHASIZED THE NONRATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE TYPE OF SOCIETY CORRESPONDING TO SOROKIN'S IDEATIONAL, WHEREAS SOROKIN EXPLICITLY STATES THAT THE IDEATIONAL CULTURE IS RATIONAL IN NATURE, AS CONTRASTED WITH EMPIRICAL.

FAMILISTIC AND CONTRACTUAL SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS.--THE PART OF SOROKIN'S SYSTEM WHICH CORRESPONDS MOST CLOSELY TO THE TYPLOGIES DEVELOPED BY THE ABOVE THEORISTS IS HIS CHARACTERIZATION OF THE TYPES OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS TO BE FOUND IN IDEATIONAL AND SENSATE CULTURES. THE FIRST TYPE, WHICH IS PRESENT IN THE IDEATIONAL CULTURE, IS THE FAMILISTIC TYPE OF RELATIONSHIP. IT IS FOUND MOST OFTEN IN THE FAMILY RELATIONSHIP, AND THUS ITS NAME IS DERIVED FROM THE FAMILY, BUT IT IS ALSO PRESENT IN SUCH RELATIONSHIPS AS THOSE BETWEEN DEVOTED AND CLOSE FRIENDS, BETWEEN MEMBERS OF A RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION, AND EVEN BETWEEN THE MEMBERS OF THE STATE. THE WHOLE CIRCLE OF LIFE ACTIVITIES OF PERSONS IN A FAMILISTIC RELATIONSHIP IS INVOLVED IN THE PROCESS OF INTERACTION, AND "... THEIR

109 Ibid., pp. 422-428.
WHOLE LIVES ARE THROWN TOGETHER AND ORGANICALLY UNITED INTO ONE "WE".\textsuperscript{110}

THE ATTITUDE OF "IT DOES NOT CONCERN ME," "IT IS NONE OF MY BUSINESS," AND "MIND YOUR OWN AFFAIRS" IS NOT PRESENT, FOR WHAT CONCERNS ONE PERSON CONCERNS THE OTHER. IN THE FAMILISTIC RELATIONSHIP . . . THERE IS A SPONTANEOUS INTERNAL UNITY BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUALS; THEIR SPONTANEOUS GRAVITATION TO ONE ANOTHER; THE DEEPEST SOLIDARITY OF THE Merging of their 'Selves' in ONE COLLECTIVE 'WE'.\textsuperscript{111} Contractualism in the familistic relationship is out of place, since the contractual formula of "NO MORE AND NO LESS" is superfluous in a situation in which each individual spontaneously does and is expected to do his best, even to the extent of sacrificing his life for the group.\textsuperscript{112}

The second type of relationship, the contractual, is found in the sensate culture, and it reflects the general sensate values. Persons contractually related interact only in a superficial way, for the interaction is based upon only one or a few interests and not upon the whole lives of those involved. There is a kind of solidarity in the contractual relationship as well as in the familistic relationship, but it is of an entirely different nature. Solidarity in the former case is based upon "egotistic—bargaining solidarity of rationally computed profit." "The other party is important, not so much as an associate, and is not sought for itself, but as an agency or instrumentality which may render some service, enjoyment, utility, or profit."\textsuperscript{113}


\textsuperscript{111}ibid., P. 26.

\textsuperscript{112}ibid., P. 27.

\textsuperscript{113}ibid., P. 30. THIS IS THE SAME SORT OF DISTINCTION MADE BY ARISTOTLE BETWEEN REAL FRIENDSHIP AND PSEUDO FRIENDSHIP.
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP, UNLIKE THE FAMILISTIC, IS ALSO LIMITED IN DURATION, AND EVEN WHEN IT IS DURABLE, ITS DURATION IS DETERMINED BY THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT. THE CONTRACT ALSO SPECIFIES THE EXACT DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS TO BE MET, FOR SINCE EACH PERSON IS PURSUING HIS OWN INTERESTS WITHOUT CONCERN FOR THE INTERESTS OF OTHERS, "... THERE CANNOT BE, AS A RULE, A FAITH, A CONFIDENCE, OR A TRUST THAT ONE PARTY WILL NOT TRY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OTHER IF THEIR COVENANT IS NOT SPECIFIED AND DEFINITELY AGREED UPON."\textsuperscript{114} THE CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP IS FOUND MOST OFTEN IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES, BUYERS AND SELLERS, AND OWNERS AND TENANTS, BUT IT IS ALSO FOUND IN MANY RELIGIOUS, POLITICAL, STATE, OCCUPATIONAL, EDUCATIONAL, ARTISTIC, SCIENTIFIC, AND EVEN FAMILY GROUPS AND ASSOCIATIONS.\textsuperscript{115}

**HISTORICAL FLUCTUATION.**—AFTER APPLYING QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN THE STUDY OF CIVILIZATION FOR THE LAST TWENTY-FIVE HUNDRED YEARS, SOROKIN COMES TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE HAS BEEN NEITHER PROGRESS OR CYCLICAL MOVEMENT. ALL THAT HISTORY REVEALS IS FLUCTUATION BETWEEN THE TWO EXTREME TYPES OF CULTURE, THE IDEATIONAL AND THE SENSATE. OVER A PERIOD OF TIME A CULTURE MAY CHANGE FROM ONE TYPE TO THE OTHER, "BUT IN EVERY SWING IN A GIVEN DIRECTION THERE IS A LIMIT, AFTER WHICH THE DIRECTION OF THE CHANGE REVERSES."\textsuperscript{116} SOROKIN SPECIFICALLY DISAGREES WITH LINEAR THEORISTS SUCH AS TÖNNIES AND DURKHEIM, SINCE HE BELIEVES THAT DIRECTIONS

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., p. 32.

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., p. 34. SOROKIN DISCUSSES A THIRD TYPE OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP WHICH HE CALLS "COMPULSORY," BUT IT DIFFERS LITTLE FROM THE CONTRACTUAL TYPE EXCEPT IN THAT THE CONTRACT IS IMPOSED RATHER THAN ENTERED INTO FREELY.

OF CHANGE REVERSE THEMSELVES. HE ALSO DISAGREES WITH CYCLICAL THEORISTS
AND STATES THAT CHANGE IS TRENDLESS, FLUCTUATING, AND OSCILLATING IN NO
SYSTEMATIC, PREDICTABLE FASHION. HE ADMITS, HOWEVER, THAT CERTAIN
ELEMENTS ARE RECURRENT AND REPEAT THEMSELVES, AND IN SO FAR AS THIS IS
TRUE, HIS THEORY IS SIMILAR TO A CYCLICAL THEORY. Fluctuation does
NOT TAKE PLACE BECAUSE OF THE INFLUENCE OF SOME EXTERNAL FACTOR, AS
IN Tonnies' theory of the influence of trade or Durkheim's theory of
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DIVISION OF LABOR. IT CHANGES ACCORDING TO ITS
OWN INTERNAL PRINCIPLES:

ACCORDING TO THIS PRINCIPLE, WHEN THE UNIT IS INTEGRATED THE CHANGE
IN THE DIRECTION OF THE PROCESS IS CAUSED NOT ONLY AND NOT SO MUCH
BY THE INTERFERENCE OF EXTERNAL FORCES BUT BY THE INNER FORCES OF
THE PROCESS ITSELF AND BY THE NATURE OF ITS UNIT. JUST AS THE LIVING
ACTIVITY OF AN ORGANISM BREEDS ITS DEATH, REGARDLESS OF ANY EXTERNAL
ACCIDENT OR EXTERNAL FORCES, SO ANY SOCIOCULTURAL PROCESS OCCURRING
IN AN INTEGRATED UNIT AND MOVING IN A CERTAIN DIRECTION GENERATES,
BY VIRTUE OF THIS ACTIVITY, "FORCES" OR "CAUSES" WHICH CHANGE THE
UNIT OF THE PROCESS AND ITS DIRECTION. 118

Sorokin believes that he detects with the aid of his quantitative
method two basic fluctuations in Western society. The first took
PLACE IN GREEK CULTURE, WHICH WAS IDEATIONAL BEFORE THE SIXTH CENTURY
B.C. AT THE END OF THE SIXTH CENTURY, HOWEVER, SENSATE VALUES BEGAN
tO REPLACE THE IDEATIONAL, WITH THE RESULT THAT THE FIFTH CENTURY WAS
IDEALISTIC AND FINALLY THE FOURTH CENTURY AND THEREAFTER WAS PRIMARILY
SENSATE. SENSATE VALUES CONTINUED TO BE DOMINANT THROUGH ROMAN CIVILI-
ZATION UNTIL ABOUT THE THIRD CENTURY A.D., WHEN THE TREND BEGAN TO BE
REVERSED. BY THE SIXTH CENTURY IDEATIONAL CULTURE AGAIN WAS DOMINANT
AND IT REMAINED SO UP TO ABOUT THE END OF THE TWELFTH CENTURY. FROM THE

117 Sorokin, Fluctuations of Forms of Art, p. 187.
118 Ibid., p. 188.
Fifteenth Century to the Present Sensate Culture has been Dominant.

Sorokin personally believes that ideational culture is much to be desired over sensate culture, and he speaks of the "sensate sewers" of contemporary society. He believes, however, that sensate culture has passed its peak now and that ideational culture will begin to replace what he considers to be a corrupt and decadent society:

...the sensate culture is clearly approaching the end of its career, indeed, it is rapidly crumbling under our very eyes. In its present decadence phase, characterized by increasing wars and revolutions, by the perversion of science in the interest of even more lethal weapons of destruction, by progressive sensualism and the like, it has begun to menace the further existence of humanity. If civilization is not to perish, our moribund sensate supersystem must be replaced by a new ideational or idealistic supersystem. Sooner or later such a supersystem will emerge, destined to continue the creative role of the superorganic on this planet.

Sorokin prides himself on being an "anti-Spenglerist," since he himself takes a more "optimistic" position in claiming the decline of contemporary culture but not its end or decay.

Criticism.—Sorokin's insistence that his system does not represent a cyclical theory of change is rather difficult to understand, since this statement is largely contradicted by the system as a whole. Becker has remarked that Sorokin's theory is a cyclical theory which its originator prefers to call a theory of trendless fluctuations, clustering about an 'ideational-idealistic-sensate' triad.

Sorokin's methodology bears a close resemblance to the methods

119 Pitirim A. Sorokin, Society, Culture, and Personality, p. 706.

120 Sorokin, Summary of Social and Cultural Dynamics, Barnes and Becker, op. cit., p. 706.

121 Becker, Historical Sociology, Barnes, Becker, and Becker, op. cit., p. 535. Martindale and Monachesi also classify Sorokin's theory as cyclical. See Martindale and Monachesi, op. cit., p. 593.
employed by those whom he criticizes the most, the unilinear evolutionists. Both use the "illustrative method," that is, historical data are approached with a preconceived theoretical system, and an attempt is made to find illustrative examples of certain points to "prove" the theory. Goldenweiser has criticized Sorokin for tearing events out of historical context to fit his own "systems" of cultures. "As all the cultures he examines are highly complex and shot through, more or less, with those inconsistencies of which history holds so many examples, his success, on the face of it, depends on what is left out or permitted to remain, on what is slurred over and what emphasized." In addition to these methodological sins, Sorokin falls prey to a pseudo-statistical approach, which, in such a context, proves practically meaningless. Becker has pointed out that no first-rate statistician has a kind word to say about Sorokin's so-called "quantitative" presentation. When it is used genuine cultural comparison is not practiced, for the method "... tears the cultures studied into such minute bits that the resulting mosaic presents no pattern that anyone following a method of culture case study proper would recognize." Sorokin also seems not to recognize that his forms of culture are ideal types, for there are passages in his work in which the types are handled as ontological entities, that is, "really" existing. His formulation of a special idealistic type of culture as an intermediate form between the sensate and ideational types also seems to indicate that he


BELIEVES THAT THE TYPES OF CULTURE ARE OBJECTIVELY EXISTING ENTITIES. IN OTHER PASSAGES, HOWEVER, HE DOES NOT MAKE THIS MISTAKE.124

SOROKIN HAS BEEN MUCH CRITICIZED FOR HIS INCONSISTENCY IN USING THE VERY "SENSATE SCIENCE" THAT HE ATTACKS TO PROVE HIS THEORY. MORE IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, IS THE POINT THAT IF SCIENCE IS RELATIVE TO GIVEN CULTURAL CONFIGURATIONS, AS SOROKIN AFFIRMS, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT ANOTHER CULTURE OR EVEN ABOUT DIVERSE SYSTEMS OF KNOWLEDGE OCCURRING WITHIN ONE'S OWN CULTURE. THE PERTINENT QUESTION TO ASK SOROKIN, THEN, IS "HOW DO YOU KNOW THAT WHAT YOU SAY IS TRUE?"125

IN PERHAPS NO OTHER SYSTEM OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY HAS VALUE BIAS DISTORTED SCIENTIFIC PROCEDURE AS MUCH AS IN SOROKIN'S CASE. HIS SYSTEM MAY BE REDUCED TO A SIMPLE CLASSIFICATION OF HISTORICAL PHENOMENA ACCORDING TO WHETHER THEY WERE GOOD (IDEATIONAL) OR BAD (SENSATE). SPEIER MAKES THE FOLLOWING REMARK CONCERNING SOROKIN'S SYSTEM:

MUCH AS THE HISTORIAN MAY BE AT A LOSS TO RECOGNIZE THE MERIT OF SUCH PROCEDURES AND RESULTS, THE MORALIST MAY RESERVE HIS JUDGMENT UNTIL HE UNDERSTANDS PRECISELY WHAT SOROKIN'S SCALE OF VALUES IS. • • • EVERYTHING SENSATE IS DEFINITELY BAD. CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY IS BAD, BECAUSE THE VALUES EXTERNALIZED IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY ARE HEDONISTIC, UTILITARIAN, AND RELATIVISTIC. SOROKIN LIKES TO DWELL ON THE SYNDROME OF THE CONTEMPORARY CRISIS OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION IN BOTH AMERICA AND EUROPE, IN ORDER TO PERSUADE HIS READERS THAT THEY HAVE MADE A MESS OF EVERYTHING NOBLE, DECENT, AND GOOD. HIS ELOQUENCE IS THAT OF A PROFESSORIAL ABRAHAM, A SANTA CLARA.126

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124 SOROKIN, FLUCTUATION OF FORMS OF ART, P. 67. "THE PROBABILITY IS THAT NEITHER THE IDEATIONAL NOR THE SENSATE TYPE HAS EVER EXISTED IN ITS PURE FORM; BUT ALL INTEGRATED CULTURES HAVE IN FACT BEEN COMPOSED OF DIVERS COMBINATIONS OF THESE TWO PURE LOGICO-MEANINGFUL FORMS." UNFORTUNATELY, SOROKIN IS NOT CONSISTENT.

125 See BECKER, "HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY," BARNES, BECKER, AND BECKER, OP. CIT., P. 538; BARNES AND BECKER, OP. CIT., P. 707.

126 SPEIER, OP. CIT., P. 893.
Without a doubt Sorokin's theoretical system represents one of the most magnificent and systematic elaborations of a religious prejudice ever written.

Related theorists.—As has already been pointed out, Sorokin's theoretical system closely resembles those of Toynbee and Spengler, in that they each utilize contrasting types of society but also represent a romantic reaction against contemporary society. Toynbee, for example, argues that there are two basic kinds of societies, primitive societies and civilizations. The essential element in all societies is mimesis, a kind of social imitation, but the nature, direction, and form of mimesis are variable. In a primitive society, mimesis is directed toward the older generation and dead ancestors who stand, unseen but not unfelt, at the back of the elders, reinforcing their prestige.\(^\text{127}\)

In civilization, on the other hand, it is directed toward creative personalities who command a following because they are pioneers. It is Toynbee's principal thesis that civilizations always die, following a loss of command over the environment, a failure of self-determination, the development of schisms in the body politic, and the rise of militarism. He believes that contemporary civilization is on the decline, principally because of its rejection of Jesus and the "True Faith" and its failure to overcome the devil of temptation.\(^\text{128}\)

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\(^{128}\) For further discussion and for criticism of Toynbee see Martindale and Monachesi, *op. cit.*, pp. 184, 589-590; Sorokin, *Social Philosophies in an Age of Crisis*; Harry Elmer Barnes, "Arnold Joseph Toynbee: Orosius and Augustine in Modern Dress," Barnes, editor, *op. cit.*
Spengler also sets forth a dichotomy of societal types. He distinguishes the peasantry, which is eternal and historyless, from civilization, which creates history and is represented by the culture of cities. The former belongs to destiny, the latter to time. The peasantry binds individuals to the soil and to other men; civilization frees the individual from every bond. The peasantry creates art; civilization creates science. Civilization inevitably follows the course of creating outward mechanical forms from which the inner creative spirit has melted away. Each civilization passes through a cycle of youth, vigor, maturity, senility, and decline, and each is followed in turn by another civilization which trods the same predetermined path to cultural death. 129

CHAPTER V

AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORISTS

There is no use in reproaches,
Just let it stand as it is.
I, however, am not one hair's-breadth
Further along
Than I was.

Goethe

THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL TRADITION

Introduction.—Following the great epoch of discovery and European expansion into Asia, the Americas, Oceania, and Africa, there developed a widespread interest in the modes of behavior of non-European cultures. The writings of explorers, merchants, and missionaries revealed a tremendous variety of customs which seemed strange and bizarre to the Europeans of the time. Previous to the "discovery"—an ethnocentric term in itself—of isolated societies in the "New" Continents, there had been little consideration of cultural variation, although European culture had been in limited contact with the Moslem and Chinese cultures for many centuries. A popular distinction between savage or barbaric society and civilized society came into general use, and this distinction was later adopted by the founders of modern anthropology. During the greater part of the nineteenth century savage society was explained as the result of degradation after the Biblical "Fall of man," and presumably European society had escaped degradation by following the "true
THE EARLY LITERATURE IN ANTHROPOLOGY REFLECTED THE POPULAR ETHNO-
CENTRISM, AND IT WAS REPLETIE WITH ANALYSES OF "SAVAGE" AND "BARBAROUS"
WAYS OF LIFE. THE TERMS "SAVAGE" AND "BARBAROUS" WERE LATER SUBSUMED
UNDER THE TERM "PRIMITIVE," ALTHOUGH "SAVAGE" CONTINUES TO BE USED BY
many BRITISH ANTHROPOLOGISTS AS A SYNONYM FOR "PRIMITIVE." THE FIRST
SYSTEMATIC USE OF THE CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIETIES AS EITHER PRIMITIVE
OR CIVILIZED IS FOUND IN THE WORK OF THE EARLY THEORISTS OF SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL EVOLUTION. THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT POINTS OF DIFFERENCE IN THE
EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES OF COMTE, SPENCER, TYLOR, MORGAN, MAINE, AND OTHERS,
BUT THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT AMONG THEM ON AT LEAST TWO POINTS.\(^2\)
FIRST, EACH OF THE EXONENTS OF CULTURAL EVOLUTION HELD THAT THE HISTORY
OF MAN REPRESENTS A UNILINEAR SEQUENCE OF INSTITUTIONS AND BELIEFS AND
THAT MANY HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF UNILINEAR PROGRESSION REFLECT THE PSYCHIC
UNITY OF MAN. TYLOR, FOR EXAMPLE, WHO CHARACTERISTICALLY STATED HIS
POSITION MORE CAUTIOUSLY THAN MOST OF THE OTHER CULTURAL EVOLUTIONISTS,
MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

THE THESIS WHICH I VENTURE TO SUSTAIN, WITHIN LIMITS, IS SIMPLY
THIS, THAT THE SAVAGE STATE IN SOME MEASURE REPRESENTS AN EARLY
CONDITION OF MANKIND, OUT OF WHICH THE HIGHER CULTURE HAS GRADUALLY
DEVELOPED OR EVOLVED, BY PROCESSES STILL IN REGULAR OPERATION AS
OF OLD, THE RESULT SHOWING THAT, ON THE WHOLE, PROGRESS HAS FAR
PREVAILED OVER RELAPSE.\(^3\)

THE SECOND POINT OF SIMILARITY HAS BEEN THE USE OF THE COMPARATIVE METHOD,

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\(^{1}\) For a discussion of the early uses of the terms "SAVAGE," "BAR-
BAROUS," and "PRIMITIVE" see Melville J. Herskovits, Man and His Works,
pp. 70-71, 467 et passim.

\(^{2}\) See Chapter 11 above for a discussion of Comte, Spencer, and Maine.

\(^{3}\) Edward B. Tylor, Primitive Culture, p. 32.
WHEREBY AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO ESTABLISH EVOLUTIONARY SEQUENCES BY COMPARING THE INSTITUTIONS AND BELIEFS OF PRESENT-DAY SOCIETIES. THESE SOCIETIES WERE ASSUMED TO BE THE LIVING MANIFESTATIONS OF EARLIER STAGES OF CULTURE THROUGH WHICH THE MORE ADVANCED SOCIETIES HAD ALREADY PASSED. IT IS FROM THIS CONCEPTION OF SAVAGE MAN AS CIVILIZED MAN'S "CONTEMPORARY ANCESTOR" THAT THE TERM "PRIMITIVE" WAS DERIVED. AS LONG AS THE EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH DOMINATED ANTHROPOLOGY, "PRIMITIVE" WAS EQUATED WITH "PRIMEVAL," BUT LATER THE TERM WAS DIVORCED FROM ITS EVOLUTIONARY CONNOTATIONS. WHETHER OR NOT THE TERMS ARE GIVEN AN EVOLUTIONARY BENT, THEY BEAR A MARKED RESEMBLANCE TO THE GEMEINSCHAFT-GESELLSCHAFT TYPE OF DICHOTOMY. EVEN IN THE CASE OF THE ANTI-EVOLUTIONARY ANTHROPOLOGISTS THE PRIMITIVE-CIVILIZED DICHOTOMY IS CLOSE TO THE DICHOTOMIES OF Tonnies AND OTHERS IN THEIR STATIC, TYPOLOGICAL ASPECTS.


4 See Herskovits, op. cit., for a discussion of evolutionary theory in anthropology.

5 Lewis H. Morgan, Ancient Society, p. 7.  

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COMMENCED THEIR CAREER AT THE BOTTOM OF THE SCALE AND WORKED THEIR WAY UP FROM SAVAGERY TO CIVILIZATION THROUGH THE SLOW ACCUMULATIONS OF EXPERIMENTAL KNOWLEDGE.\(^6\) AS IS INDICATED IN THE LATTER PART OF THE PREVIOUS QUOTATION, MORGAN BELIEVES THAT THE KEY TO MAN'S PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT IS TO BE FOUND IN THE ADVANCEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY, WHICH INCREASES MAN'S CONTROL OVER HIS ENVIRONMENT AND PARTICULARLY OVER HIS MEANS OF SUBSISTENCE. Thus, "... the great epochs of human progress have been identified, more or less directly, with the enlargement of the sources of subsistence."\(^7\)

MORGAN CONSTRUCTS A THEORY OF EVOLUTION IN WHICH SPECIFIC PERIODS OF CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT ARE DISTINGUISHED ACCORDING TO TECHNOLOGICAL CRITERIA. THERE ARE THREE GENERAL PERIODS, SAVAGERY, BARBARISM, AND CIVILIZATION. THE LOWER PERIOD OF SAVAGERY GAVE WAY TO THE MIDDLE PERIOD OF SAVAGERY WITH THE ACQUISITION OF A FISH SUBSISTENCE AND A KNOWLEDGE OF THE USE OF FIRE, AND WITH THE INVENTION OF THE BOW AND ARROW THIS IN TURN GAVE WAY TO THE UPPER PERIOD OF SAVAGERY. THE PERIOD OF BARBARISM ALSO HAD THREE STAGES: THE LOWER PERIOD WAS CHARACTERIZED BY

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\(^6\)IBID., p. 3.

\(^7\)IBID., p. 19. MORGAN'S CONTRIBUTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM, ALTHOUGH PRECEDED BY THE STATEMENT OF A SIMILAR THEORY BY MARX, HAS LED WHITE TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING ENTHUSIASTIC COMMENTS:

"MORGAN DID FOR SOCIOLOGY WHAT DARWIN DID FOR BIOLOGY—INTRODUCED AND ESTABLISHED AS A FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPT THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. AND, IF ANYTHING, MORGAN'S ACHIEVEMENT IS EVEN GREATER THAN DARWIN'S, FOR MORGAN WAS ABLE TO SHOW WHY CULTURES EVOLVE, AS WELL AS TO DESCRIBE THE WAYS IN WHICH THE DEVELOPMENT COMES ABOUT. DARWIN WAS ABLE TO SHOW HOW EVOLUTION OCCURS AS A CONSEQUENCE OF ORGANIC VARIATIONS, BUT HE WAS NOT ABLE TO EXPLAIN HOW AND WHY THE VARIATION APPEARED IN THE FIRST PLACE." (LESLIE A. WHITE, "LEWIS HENRY MORGAN: PIONEER IN THE THEORY OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION," AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF SOCIOLOGY, EDITED BY HARRY ELMER BARNES, P. 140.)

Morgan depends upon the same type of comparative method that the other evolutionists used, however, to "prove" that his theory of the stages of development is valid. First of all, he assumes the psychic unity of mankind: "SINCE MANKIND WERE ONE IN ORIGIN, THEIR CAREER HAS BEEN ESSENTIALLY ONE, RUNNING IN DIFFERENT BUT UNIFORM CHANNELS UPON ALL CONTINENTS, AND VERY SIMILARLY IN ALL THE TRIBES AND NATIONS OF MANKIND DOWN TO THE SAME STATUS OF ADVANCEMENT."  

If this is true, Morgan argues, "IT MAY BE FURTHER OBSERVED THAT THE DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS OF THE BARBARIANS, AND EVEN OF THE SAVAGE ANCESTORS OF MANKIND, ARE STILL EXEMPLIFIED IN PORTIONS OF THE HUMAN FAMILY WITH SUCH COMPLETENESS THAT, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE STRICTLY PRIMITIVE PERIOD, THE SEVERAL STAGES OF THIS PROGRESS ARE TOLERABLY WELL PRESERVED."  

By studying these "survivals," then, it is possible to reconstruct in detail the historical development of civilization. To this end Morgan classifies primitive societies according to their position on the historical scale: "... THE ARYAN NATIONS WILL FIND THE TYPE OF THE CONDITION OF THEIR REMOTE ANCESTORS, WHEN IN SAVAGERY, IN THAT OF THE AUSTRALIANS AND POLYNESIANS; WHEN IN THE LOWER STATUS OF BARBARISM IN THAT OF THE PARTIALLY VILLAGE INDIANS OF AMERICA; AND WHEN IN THE MIDDLE STATUS IN THAT OF THE VILLAGE INDIANS."
Morgan's general distinction of savage society and civilized society bears some resemblance to the dichotomous types of Tommies and others. The resemblance becomes even greater with Morgan's further distinction of types of social organization associated with savage and civilized societies. There are two great categories. The first Morgan calls Societas or ancient society; the second, Civitas or modern, civil society. The Societas "... is founded upon persons, and upon relations purely personal..." whereas the Civitas "... is founded upon territory and upon property...". In the Societas then a person's role in social life is determined by personal relationships to others, who are usually regarded as kinfolk, so that ancient society is regulated primarily by ties of kinship. The clan and the tribe are the characteristic units of the Societas, and all men within the group are free and equal. In the Civitas, on the other hand, a person's role is determined by his place of residence—deme, township, state, etc.—and by his relationship to property. The relationships in modern, civil society therefore tend to be impersonal, and the political state is the most characteristic unit of the Civitas. Unlike the Societas, which is completely democratic, the Civitas involves class distinctions: masters and slaves; the rich and the poor; lords, vassals, and slaves. Morgan evaluates modern, civil society negatively, as is revealed in the following passage:

Since the advent of civilization, the outgrowth of property has been so immense, its forms so diversified, its uses so expanding and its management so intelligent in the interests of its owners, that it has become, on the part of the people, an unmanageable power. The

12 Ibid., p. 6. 13Ibid., pp. 6-7, 535 et passim.
HUMAN MIND STANDS BEWILDERED IN THE PRESENCE OF ITS OWN CREATION. THE
TIME WILL COME, NEVERTHELESS, WHEN HUMAN INTELLIGENCE WILL RISE TO THE
MASTERY OVER PROPERTY, AND DEFINE THE RELATIONS OF THE STATE TO THE
PROPERTY IT PROTECTS, AS WELL AS THE OBLIGATIONS AND THE LIMITS OF THE
RIGHTS OF ITS OWNERS. . . . A MERE PROPERTY CAREER IS NOT THE FINAL
DESTINY OF MANKIND, IF PROGRESS IS TO BE THE LAW OF THE FUTURE AS IT
HAS BEEN OF THE PAST. . . . DEMOCRACY IN GOVERNMENT, BROTHERHOOD IN
SOCIETY, EQUALITY IN RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES, AND UNIVERSAL EDUCATION,
FORESHADOW THE NEXT HIGHER PLANE OF SOCIETY TO WHICH EXPERIENCE,
INTELLIGENCE, AND KNOWLEDGE ARE STEADILY TENDING. IT WILL BE A
REVIVAL, IN A HIGHER FORM, OF THE LIBERTY, EQUALITY AND FRATERNITY
OF THE ANCIENT GENTES. 14

MORGAN IS DETERMINEDLY OPTIMISTIC: "AS A QUESTION BETWEEN EQUAL RIGHTS
AND UNEQUAL RIGHTS, BETWEEN EQUAL LAWS AND UNEQUAL LAWS, BETWEEN THE
RIGHTS OF WEALTH, OF RANK AND OF OFFICIAL POSITION, AND THE POWER OF
JUSTICE AND INTELLIGENCE, THERE CAN BE LITTLE DOUBT OF THE ULTIMATE
RESULT." 15 THE INFLUENCE OF MORGAN'S POINT OF VIEW IS REFLECTED IN
THE WRITINGS OF MARX, TONNIES AND, TO A CERTAIN DEGREE, DURKHEIM, FOR
ALL OF THEM SHARE A DISTASTE FOR MODERN CAPITALISTIC SOCIETY BUT ALSO
EXPRESS A HOPE FOR A NEW TYPE OF INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY IN THE FUTURE. 16

ALTHOUGH MORGAN'S GENERAL THEORY OF EVOLUTION AS THE RESULT OF
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT IS PROBABLY SOUND, HIS USE OF THE COMPARATIVE
METHOD IS NOT ACCEPTABLE. THE METHOD IS NOT USED TO DISCOVER EVOLU-
TIONARY SEQUENCES; IT IS USED RATHER TO ILLUSTRATE A PREDETERMINED SCHEME
OF DEVELOPMENT WHICH THE THEORIST HAS CONSTRUCTED FROM HIS ARMCHAIR. AS
TYLOR HAS CANDIDLY ADMITTED, THERE IS AN ETHNOCENTRIC BIAS IN THE WAY

14IBID., P. 561.

15IBID.

16WHITE REPORTS THAT TONNIES QUOTED THE PASSAGE ABOVE "MORE THAN
ONCE." MARX WAS ALSO MUCH IMPRESSED BY MORGAN'S CONTRIBUTIONS. HIS
DEATH PREVENTED HIS WRITING A BOOK ABOUT MORGAN'S WORK, BUT THE CONTEM-
PLATED BOOK WAS EVENTUALLY WRITTEN BY ENGELS. MORGAN'S ANCIENT SOCIETY
HAS BECOME A MARXIST CLASSIC, AND EVEN TODAY IN THE SOVIET UNION MORGAN
IS THE MOST HIGHLY REGARDED ANTHROPOLOGIST. SEE WHITE, OP. CIT.,
PP. 150, 153.
IN WHICH THE SEQUENCE IS SET UP: "THE EDUCATED WORLD OF EUROPE AND AMERICA PRACTICALLY SETTLES A STANDARD BY SIMPLY PLACING ITS OWN NATIONS AT ONE END OF THE SOCIAL SERIES AND SAVAGE TRIBES AT THE OTHER, ARRANGING THE REST OF MANKIND BETWEEN THESE LIMITS ACCORDING AS THEY CORRESPOND MORE CLOSELY TO SAVAGE OR TO CULTURED LIFE."\(^{17}\) THE COMPARATIVE METHOD IS BASED UPON THE ASSUMPTION OF THE PSYCHIC UNITY OF MANKIND WHICH RESULTS IN THE PARALLEL DEVELOPMENT OF ALL SOCIETIES, NO MATTER HOW ISOLATED. THIS UNDERLYING PROPOSITION ITSELF, IN THE SENSE IN WHICH IT HAS BEEN USED, HAS BEEN DISCREDITED. THE ASSUMPTION FELL FOR THE SAME REASON THAT THE INSTINCTIVIST SCHOOL OF PSYCHOLOGY FELL, BUT ALSO BECAUSE THE CONCEPT OF DIFFUSION PROVIDED A BETTER EXPLANATION FOR CULTURAL SIMILARITIES THAN DID INDEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT ALONG PATTERNED LINES. MORGAN'S STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVILIZATION DO NOT SEEM TO BE IDEAL TYPES, BUT RATHER EMPIRICALLY EXISTING ENTITIES TO WHICH SOCIETIES AT A GIVEN MOMENT WILL CORRESPOND MORE OR LESS EXACTLY. THUS MORGAN ARGUES THAT THE POLYNESIAN AND THE AUSTRALIAN SOCIETIES ARE SAVAGE SOCIETIES AND NOT THAT THEY MERELY REPRESENT DEGREES OF CORRESPONDENCE TO AN IDEAL TYPE OF SAVAGE SOCIETY. IN SPITE OF THE SHORTCOMINGS OF HIS THEORETICAL SYSTEM, MORGAN REMAINS ONE OF THE FEW THEORISTS TO OFFER AN ADEQUATE EXPLANATION FOR THE CAUSES OF CULTURE CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT.


\(^{17}\)TYLOR, OP. CIT., P. 26.

18 QUOTED IN WHITE, OP. CIT., P. 149.
"While the general evolutionary scheme is no longer tenable, the problem of progress remains." 19

With the decline of the doctrine of social evolution in anthropology there has been a corresponding change in the definition of the word "primitive." The connotations of primevality and inferiority have been dropped from the term, and "primitive" today is used simply to refer to any society outside the stream of Western culture which does not possess a written language. A number of substitute terms have been suggested to avoid confusion with the older evolutionary concept, but none of them has gained universal acceptance. "Nonhistoric" has been used by some anthropologists, but this is a rather unfortunate term implying that the absence of written history is equivalent to having no history at all. "Preliterate" has been used more frequently, but it also implies an evolutionary sequence. Herskovits has argued in favor of the use of the term "nonliterate" since "... it is colorless, conveys its meaning unambiguously, and is readily applicable to the data it seeks to delimit." 20 In the work of most anthropologists the dichotomy of primitive society and civilized society or nonliterate society and literate society is used only to make certain general distinctions, and it is not used as an analytic tool. Herskovits has explicitly stated the difference between the literate-nonliterate dichotomy and the ideal typical dichotomy of societal types:

The ideal type of any phenomenon, as most of those who work with such concepts point out, cannot by definition fit any particular case.


20 Herskovits, op. cit., p. 75.
THE GREATER THE NUMBER OF CRITERIA, THE MORE DIFFICULT WILL BE THE APPLICABILITY TO ANY GIVEN INSTANCE. WE MUST AGAIN INDICATE THAT THIS FOLLOWS FROM THE FACT THAT IN SUCH SYSTEMS THE ORIENTATION IS IN TERMS OF CATEGORIES BASED ON FORM, RATHER THAN PROBLEMS PHRASED IN TERMS OF PROCESS. HEREIN LIES THE REAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CONCEPT OF "FOLK SOCIETY" AND OF "NONLITERATE" PEOPLES. THE FIRST IS A CATEGORY WHICH DOMINATES THE DATA; THE SECOND IS MERELY A CONVENIENT HANDLE TO DESCRIBE MATERIALS DESTINED TO BE EXAMINED IN THE LIGHT OF DIFFERING SITUATIONS THAT HAVE ARISEN OUT OF THE HISTORIC PROCESS. 21

A. L. Kroeber: Folk Society and Sophisticate Society

FOLK SOCIETY AND SOPHISTICATE SOCIETY.—A. L. Kroeber, who stands as a transitional figure between the older and the newer developments of anthropology, elaborates a folk-sophisticate dichotomy of societal types which bears a close resemblance to the Geamschaft-Gesellschaft and the mechanical-organic dichotomies of Tonnies and Durkheim. A folk or tribal society is small, isolated, and close-knit, and person-to-person relationships are prevalent, particularly on a kinship basis. "Primitive democracy" is a characteristic of the folk society, since there is a maximum of equality coexisting with a minimum of authority or control from political institutions. Control over individual actions is strong, however, since the folkways and mores of the society are strengthened and enforced by the strong integration and solidarity of the group. As a result there is a strong moral and religious sense; the people in the folk society "... believe in the sacred things; their sense of right and wrong springs from unconscious roots of social feeling, and is therefore unreasoned, compulsive, and strong." 22 The folk people are bound to the soil of their locality emotionally by habit

21 Ibid., pp. 606-607.


WITH THIS DILUTING AND SPREADING OF THE FERVID INTENSITIES OF ATTACHMENT, IT IS INEVITABLE THAT RELIGIOSITY, PIETY, REGARD FOR THE SACRED THINGS, SHOULD TEND TO EVAPORATE WITH CIVILIZATION. SHRINES BECOME SHOW PLACES RATHER THAN SPOTS OF WORSHIP. CRITICISM AND RATIONALISM GROW. AS BELIEFS FADE THAT HAVE RESTED LARGELY ON THE SOCIAL DICTATION OF A HOMOGENEOUS SMALL GROUP, EMPIRICAL AND ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE COMES TO SEEM MORE DESIRABLE, AND ACCUMULATES. FAITH IN THE SUPERNATURAL AND THE MAGICAL GIVES WAY TO FAITH IN SCIENCE. THE CULTURE AND THE LIFE ARE SECULARIZED.24

KROEBER POINTS OUT THAT HIS FOLK-SOPHISTICATE POLARITY IS NOT AN "EITHER-OR" SEGREGATION. "RATHER WE MUST CONCEIVE OF A LINE OR AN AXIS ALONG WHICH SOCIETIES AND CULTURES, OR THE PART-CULTURES OF SEGMENTS OF

23Ibid.

SOCIETIES, CAN BE RANGED FROM THE ONE EXTREME OR POLE OF GREATEST FOLK-
LIKE OR TRIBAL BACKWARDNESS TO THE OPPOSITE POLE OF GREATEST SOPHISTIGATION.25
Thus, present-day Western society is near one polar end—the sophisticated—and the society of the Australian natives is near the other—the folk.

Within Western society, however, the urban components correspond much more closely to the sophisticated ideal type than do the rural components. The peasant society occupies a place somewhere between the polar types, since it has some characteristics of both.26

Kroeber believes that there is a general trend in history from folk society to sophisticated society, although the trend is not universal and irreversible. Thus, whereas the development of contemporary American culture may be taken as an example of the general trend, there are a number of cases in which the trend was apparently reversed. The breakdown of Hellenic culture following the disintegration of the Roman Empire and the overturn from the Indus Valley civilization to that of the Vedic Aryans are cited as examples. In spite of these reversals, however, the net drift of total human culture seems to be toward the sophisticated polar type. Kroeber sees at least four causes for this general trend:

WRITING . . . GREATLY REINFORCES POPULATION SIZE AS A JOINT CAUSE OF THE GROWING IMPERSONALIZATION OF HIGHER CIVILIZATION. SO DO LARGE-SCALE URBANIZATION AND MECHANICAL INDUSTRIALIZATION. THE FOUR CONSTITUTE A SET OF INTERDEPENDENT CAUSES, AND OF INTERCORELATED EFFECTS AS WELL.27

"PROGRESS" RECONSIDERED.---Kroeber is one of the few anthropologists since the anti-evolutionary reaction who has had the courage to "take the bull by his horns" and attempt to find a scientific justification

25 Ibid., p. 261.
26 Ibid., pp. 283-284.
27 Ibid., p. 297.
FOR THE CONCEPT OF PROGRESS IN CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT, IT IS RATHER SURPRISING THAT THE CONCEPT DOES NOT OCCUPY A MORE SIGNIFICANT PLACE IN ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY, SINCE, AS KROEBER REMARKS, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THERE HAS BEEN PROGRESS IN HUMAN CULTURE IN THE LAST QUARTER-MILLION YEARS: "WE ARE UNDENIABLY 'HIGHER' OR 'MORE ADVANCED' CULTURALLY THAN THE ACHEULIANS, IN MUCH THE SAME WAY THAT A MAMMAL IS HIGHER THAN AN ORDOVICIAN SPONGE OR BRACHIOPOD." KROEBER AGREES WITH THE CRITICS OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION THAT THE EMOTIONAL AND APRIORISTIC ELEMENTS IN THE IDEA OF PROGRESS MUST BE ABANDONED, BUT HE MAINTAINS THAT THERE IS A SOLID CORE OF SCIENTIFIC JUSTIFICATION IN THE CONCEPT. PROGRESS MAY BE MEASURED OBJECTIVELY IN FOUR WAYS. FIRST, THERE IS A QUANTITATIVE EXPANSION OF THE CONTENT OF TOTAL HUMAN CULTURE, BECAUSE CULTURE BY ITS VERY NATURE TENDS TO BE CUMULATIVE. SECOND, THERE IS AN ATROPHY OF MAGIC AND SUPERSTITION BASED ON PSYCHOPATHOLOGY. THIRD, THERE IS A DECLINE IN THE OBTRUSION OF PHYSIOLOGICAL OR ANATOMICAL CONSIDERATIONS INTO SOCIAL SITUATIONS: SUCH THINGS AS SEGREGATION OF WOMEN DURING MENSTRUATION AND PUBERTY CRISIS RITES TEND TO DISAPPEAR. FOURTH, THERE IS A GROWTH IN TECHNOLOGY, MECHANICS, AND SCIENCE, FOR THESE HAVE A TENDENCY TO GROW CUMULATIVELY. ALTHOUGH KROEBER CONSIDERS THE CONCEPT OF PROGRESS SEPARATELY FROM THE TREND FROM FOLK SOCIETY TO SOPHISTICATE SOCIETY, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE TWO ARE SIMILAR AND POSSIBLY IDENTICAL. THE VERY THINGS WHICH ARE TAKEN TO BE THE CRITERIA OF PROGRESS ARE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOPHISTICATE SOCIETY. KROEBER, UNLIKE MANY OTHER ANTHROPOLOGISTS, FIRMLY APPROVES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIETY TOWARD THE SOPHISTICATE TYPE.

28 Ibid., pp. 297-304.
Robert Redfield's Folk Society and Urban Society

Folk Society and Urban Society. — One of the most widely used dichotomies of societal types is that set forth by Robert Redfield. It is in most respects similar to the dichotomy of Becker, but Redfield prefers the terms "folk" and "urban" to "sacred" and "secular." The similarity undoubtedly stems from the fact that both Becker and Redfield were students of Robert E. Park at the University of Chicago and received from him their central interest in dichotomous types of society. Although Becker's and Redfield's dichotomous typologies are virtually identical, their methods of approach and concentrations of interest are different. Becker is primarily interested in analyzing the historical records of a particular culture to discover the causes and patterns of change. Redfield, on the other hand, is interested in field work among existing folk societies to discover the characteristics which distinguish the folk society from the modern urban society. He attempts to construct an ideal type of folk society by studying a variety of tribal and peasant groups and by generalizing upon them in the light of contrast provided by modern urban society. The ideal type, says Redfield, is a mental construction, but it depends upon intimate knowledge of concrete folk societies: "The ideal folk society could be defined through assembling, in the imagination, the characters which are logically opposite those which are to be found in the modern city, only if we had first some knowledge of non-urban peoples to permit us to determine what, indeed, are the characteristic features of modern city living."

Redfield admits his debt to Maine, Tonnies, and Durkheim, but he also implies that his own method of approach through field studies of folk societies is of greater scientific validity than that of the others. 30

Redfield, because of his anthropological background, is almost exclusively concerned with the folk ideal type rather than the urban ideal type. Only the former is dealt with explicitly, for Redfield presumably feels that the urban ideal type does not require special attention, since it is necessary only to reverse the characteristics of the folk type to find the urban type. Redfield discusses the folk type at great length and enumerates its more important characteristics.

1. The folk society is very small, and there are no more people in it than can come to know each other well. (2) It is isolated from other societies, and in its ideal form there is no communication whatever with outside peoples. (3) The isolation is for the most part the result of physical immobility, although isolation may be of a purely social nature in the case of some migratory peoples, such as the Gypsies. (4) As a result of isolation, there is intimate communication among the members of the society. (5) Communication in the folk society is entirely by word of mouth, since there is an absence of writing and books. The folk society is isolated then not only from other contemporary societies but also from a large part of its own past. Oral tradition has no check, for knowledge of the past extends no farther back than the memories of the elders of the society. Without written records the members of the folk society can have no historical sense, no theology, and no science. Outside the realm of material tools, the only form of

30 Ibid., pp. 294-295.
ACCUMULATION OF EXPERIENCE IS THE INCREASE OF WISDOM WHICH COMES AS THE INDIVIDUAL GROWS older. As a result old people have prestige and authority in the folk society. (6) The members of the folk society are much alike, both in physical appearance and in behavior. Somatic homogeneity comes about as the result of prolonged inbreeding. The isolation of the group from outsiders also produces similar habits and patterns of behavior too, for "since the people communicate with one another and with no others, one man's learned ways of doing and thinking are the same as another's."31 What one man knows and believes is the same as what all men know and believe, and personal habits and customs are identical. Actually, of course, such a situation exists only ideally, but Redfield believes that most folk societies correspond fairly closely to the ideal type in this respect: "... it is near enough to the truth for the student of a real folk society to report it fairly well by learning what goes on in the minds of a few of its members, and a primitive group has been presented, although sketchily, as learned about from a single member."32 Not only is there similarity between members of one generation, but there is also a close similarity between different generations. In other words, there is little change in the society, and young people go through almost the same socialization process that their parents and grandparents went through. (7) In the folk society there is a strong sense of belonging together, for the intimate communications of its members with one another creates strong bonds of sympathy and solidarity. In Sumner's terms, they constitute a "we-group," as against all outsiders, who are characterized as a

31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
"THEY-GROUP." IN SUMMARY UP TO THIS POINT, THE FOLK SOCIETY IS SMALL, ISOLATED, NONLITERATE, AND HOMOGENEOUS, WITH A STRONG SENSE OF SOLIDARITY.33

(8) REDFIELD HESITATES TO MAKE A FLAT STATEMENT THAT THE FOLK SOCIETY IS CHARACTERIZED BY A SIMPLE TECHNOLOGY, SINCE HE IS IMPRESSED BY THE COMPLEXITY OF THE TOOLS OF THE ESKIMO, BUT HE DOES MAKE A FEW GUARDED NEGATIVE STATEMENTS: "... SECONDARY AND TERTIARY TOOLS—TOOLS TO MAKE TOOLS— ARE RELATIVELY FEW AS COMPARED WITH PRIMARY TOOLS; THERE IS NO MAKING OF ARTIFACTS BY MULTIPLE, RAPID, MACHINE MANUFACTURE; THERE IS LITTLE OR NO USE OF NATURAL POWER."34 (9) BEYOND THE DIVISION BASED ON SEX, THERE IS LITTLE DIVISION OF LABOR IN THE FOLK SOCIETY, AND ALL PERSONS OF THE SAME SEX DO APPROXIMATELY THE SAME THING.

(10) THE FOLK SOCIETY IS ECONOMICALLY INDEPENDENT OF ALL OTHER SOCIETIES; THE FOLK PEOPLE PRODUCE WHAT THEY CONSUME AND CONSUME WHAT THEY PRODUCE.35

(11) THE MOST IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE FOLK SOCIETY, REDFIELD BELIEVES, IS THAT IT IS CHARACTERIZED BY A CULTURE, WHICH IS AN ORGANIZATION OR INTEGRATION OF CONVENTIONAL UNDERSTANDINGS. AS THE RESULT OF LONG INTERCOMMUNICATION WITHIN THE SMALL GROUP, CONVENTIONALIZED WAYS OF BEHAVING BECOME INTERRELATED SO THAT THEY CONSTITUTE A COHERENT AND SELF-CONSISTENT SYSTEM. "IN THE FOLK SOCIETY THIS INTEGRATED WHOLE, THIS SYSTEM, PROVIDES FOR ALL THE RECURRENT NEEDS OF THE INDIVIDUAL FROM BIRTH TO DEATH AND OF THE SOCIETY THROUGH THE SEASONS AND THE YEARS."36 THE INTEGRATION OF ALL OF THE SOCIETY'S ELEMENTS RESULTS IN AN ALMOST IDEAL STATE OF AFFAIRS, REDFIELD BELIEVES. THE FOLLOWING PASSAGE

33 Ibid., pp. 295-297. 34 Ibid., p. 297.
35 Ibid., p. 298. 36 Ibid.
INDICATES HIS REJECTION OF THE BELief THAT A PERSON IN A FOLK SOCIETY IS
AN AUTOMATON BOUND UNMERCIFULLY BY CUSTOM.

WITHIN THE LIMITS SET BY CUSTOM THERE IS INVITATION TO EXCEL IN
PERFORMANCE. THERE IS LIVELY COMPETITION, A SENSE OF OPPORTUNITY,
AND A FEELING THAT WHAT THE CULTURE MOVES ONE TO DO IS WELL WORTH
DOING. THERE IS NO DRABNESS IN SUCH A LIFE. IT HAS ABOUT IT ALL
THE ALLUREMENTS OF PERSONAL EXPERIENCE, VERY MUCH ONE'S OWN, OF
COMPETITIVE SKILL, OF THINGS WELL DONE. THE INTERRELATIONS AND
HIGH DEGREE OF CONSISTENCY AMONG THE ELEMENTS OF CUSTOM WHICH ARE
PRESENTED TO THE INDIVIDUAL DECLARE TO HIM THE IMPORTANCE OF MAKING
HIS ENDEAVORS IN THE DIRECTIONS INDICATED BY TRADITION. THE CULTURE
SETS GOALS WHICH STIMULATE ACTION BY GIVING GREAT MEANING TO IT.37

REDFIELD CLEARLY IMPLIES THAT IN ACTIONS IN SUCH A SOCIETY THERE IS
LIKELY TO BE MORE MEANING AND ENJOYMENT THAN IN A MODERN URBAN SOCIETY.

(12) BEHAVIOR IN THE FOLK SOCIETY IS TRADITIONAL, SPONTANEOUS, AND
UNCritical. ENDS ARE TAKEN AS GIVEN, AND WHAT IS DONE IN THE FOLK SOCIETY
IS DONE NOT BECAUSE SOMEONE DECIDED THAT IT SHOULD BE DONE, BUT RATHER
BECAUSE IT SEEMS TO FLOW NECESSARILY FROM THE VERY NATURE OF THINGS.

THE ENDS ARE NOT SET FORTH AS STATED DOCTRINES BUT ARE IMPLIED IN TRADITIONAL ACTIONS, AND THERE IS NO DISPOSITION TO CONSIDER THESE ACTIONS
OBJECTIVELY AND CRITICALLY. FOLK PEOPLE ACT WITH REFERENCE TO ONE ANOTHER
BY TACIT AND TRADITIONAL UNDERSTANDINGS, AND SUCH THINGS AS CONTRACTS,
LEGISLATION, AND LAW HAVE NO PLACE IN THE SOCIETY. THE RIGHTS AND OBLI-
GATIONS OF A PERSON ARE NOT DETERMINED BY SPECIAL AGREEMENTS OR CONTRACTS;
THEY ARE LARGELY PRESCRIBED AT BIRTH AS A PART OF THE STATUS WHICH A
PERSON OCCUPIES. THESE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS CHANGE WITH AGE, BUT THEY
CHANGE IN PATTERNED TRADITIONAL WAYS DEFINED BY THE SOCIETY. (13) ALL
SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS IN THE FOLK SOCIETY ARE PERSONAL, AND OTHER PERSONS
ARE NEVER DEALT WITH "THING-FASHION," THAT IS, IN TERMS OF UTILITY IN

37BID., P. 300. FOR A SIMILAR POINT OF VIEW AND A SIMILAR DEFINITION OF "CULTURE" SEE THE DISCUSSIONS OF SAPIR, TUMIN, AND LINTON BELOW.
serving one's own ends. Not only are relationships personal, but they are also familial in nature. Kinship is extended outward to include almost every person with whom an individual comes into contact, and the individual finds himself fixed in a constellation of familial relationships: "The kinship connections provide a pattern in terms of which, in the ideal folk society, all personal relations are conventionalized and categorized." (14) The ways of the folk society are not only folkways, but they also tend to be mores, in which notions of moral worth are attached to traditional ways of behaving. The value of these actions is not something to be called into question, and doing so is highly resented. The folk society is thus a sacred society, in which "all activities, even the means of production, are ends in themselves; activities expressive of the ultimate values of the society." (19)

Redfield points out that no existing society corresponds in all ways to the ideal type of the folk society, and indeed the ideal type is useful only in so far as it can be used to investigate variations from the type construct. He believes that it is only by studying contemporary societies with reference to ideal constructs that social change may be analyzed in detail, for "there is doubt that the documents and the artifacts will ever yield decisive information on such problems as changes in the kinship system, on forms of courtship and marriage, or on the steps by which some of the saints were incorporated into the pagan pantheon while the pantheon in other respects also was changing its

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38 Ibid., p. 301. This point is similar to that of Maine, who held that a primitive society is organized in terms of kinship rather than territory.

39 Ibid., p. 304.
Historical inquiry then must be pursued through study of present-day communities.

Although Redfield recognizes that all folk societies correspond only to a greater or lesser degree to the ideal type, he believes that the characteristics of the folk society are in large part interdependent or linked variables. A change in one area of social life brings a change in all the others, and the differences among societies are to be explained in terms of differential rates of change along this patterned line of development. Thus he assumes that originally all folk societies were in a like condition but that at the present time each occupies a separate point along a unilinear pattern of development. The pattern of development which Redfield sees is almost inevitably away from the folk type of society in the direction of the urban type of society, with its attendant disorganization of culture, secularization, and growth of individualism. These developments grow out of the increase of contacts of the society with other societies, for decreasing isolation brings about the borrowing of other cultural elements which tend to disorganize the culture of the borrowing society.

What is borrowed are particular tools, modes of conduct, and ideas; these in turn do things to the lives of the borrowers so that the total result is a kind and degree of disorganization. The appearance of opportunities to make a livelihood in ways other than agriculture causes some men in the community to give up agriculture. Having given up agriculture, they do not participate in agricultural rituals. In this way they cease to share in the attendant understandings as to, for example, the relations between agricultural ritual and disease. But meanwhile the pressure of city opinion has made it difficult for the shaman-priest to practice his calling in the town community. So he moves away, and the people of the town are without his immediate and frequent example and instruction.

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At the same time new ways of treating illness, without reference to agricultural piety and ritual conformity, are introduced from the city. So far as these are followed the individual is in this way also led aside from the interrelated patterns of thought and action which characterized the older way of life.41

**Empirical Applications.**—Redfield is one of the few social scientists who has used a folk-urban dichotomy as the organizing principle for empirical studies in the field. He has made two principal studies, one in Tepoztlan, Mexico and one in Yucatan in Mexico. Each will be considered briefly below.

Redfield’s **Tepoztlan, a Mexican Village** is famed not so much for its theoretical formulation of the folk-urban dichotomy as it is for its pioneer work in forging a new approach to studies of peasant communities. The folk-urban dichotomy is present, but only implicitly for the most part. Redfield’s definition of “folk” in this work is narrower than that which he later gave the term; for in it he conceives of the folk society occupying a position intermediate between that of modern urban society and that of primitive society. Thus he makes the folk society roughly equivalent to the peasant society. In distinguishing the folk society Redfield places greatest stress on the presence of folklore and folk song, and in answer to the question of what the “folk” is he says that “... it is a group which has folklore and folk songs.”42 He discusses some of the other characteristics of the folk society which are found in connection with the presence of folklore and folk song and then proceeds to describe the folk society of Tepoztlan, with particular attention being given to the formal, ritualistic, and artistic aspects.


42Robert Redfield, **Tepoztlan, a Mexican Village**, p. 1.
of Tepoztecan life. The picture which emerges is that of a homogeneous, well-integrated, smoothly-functioning, isolated society composed of contented and well-adjusted people. Evidence of violence, disruption, cruelty, disease, suffering, and maladjustment is glossed over lightly, and there is very little consideration of the economic problems and political schisms of the community. The Revolution of 1910 in fact is discussed merely as the source of folk literature dealing with revolutionary heroes. Redfield also stresses cooperative activities in the villages, such as the Cuatesquitl or cooperative working party, and he points out that the communal lands are a unifying force among the villagers.

Redfield's study of four communities in Yucatan, The Folk Culture of Yucatan, represents the first explicit application of "folk society" and "urban society" as ideal types to a field study of communities. In this study Redfield chose four communities which he felt would represent various points on the social gradient between Spanish, modern, and urban characteristics on the one hand and Maya, archaic, and primitive characteristics on the other hand. The communities selected include Merida, the only large city in Yucatan; Dzitas, a town situated on a railroad; Chan Kom, a peasant village; and Tusik, a tribal village in the forest hinterland. Just as he expected when he selected the communities, Redfield finds that Tusik, the tribal village, corresponds most closely to the folk ideal type and that Merida is farthest from it. Dzitas and Chan Kom occupy intermediate positions, with the former closer to the urban type and the latter closer to the folk type. From a consideration of the characteristics of each, he derives a hypothesis in which isolation
AND HOMOGENEITY ARE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND DISORGANIZATION OF CULTURE,
SEcularization, AND INDIVIDUALIZATION ARE DEPENDENT VARIABLES: TO THE
DEGREE THAT A SOCIETY BECOMES LESS ISOLATED AND LESS HOMOGENEOUS, TO
THAT DEGREE IT WILL ALSO BECOME DISORGANIZED CULTURALLY, BECOME SECU-
LARIZED, AND BECOME INDIVIDUALISTIC.43 REDFIELD DOES NOT CLAIM THAT
DECREASING ISOLATION AND DECREASING HOMOGENEITY ARE THE ONLY CAUSES OF
THE OTHER PROCESSES, BUT THEY ARE SUFFICIENT CAUSES IN AT LEAST THE
CASES WHICH HE HAS EXAMINED.

THE URBANIZATION PROCESS OF FOLK SOCIETIES HAS THREE PRINCIPAL
ASPECTS ACCORDING TO REDFIELD, AND THESE ARE CLEARLY ILLUSTRATED BY
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE YUCATECAN COMMUNITIES. FIRST, CULTURE, IN THE SENSE
OF AN INTEGRATED SYSTEM OF CONVENTIONALIZED WAYS OF BEHAVING, BECOMES
DISORGANIZED: "... THE WAYS OF LIFE ARE LESS CLOSELY INTERRELATED;
GROUP-HABITS EXIST MORE IN TERMS EACH OF ITSELF, AND DO NOT TO THE
SAME DEGREE EVOKE A BODY OF CLOSELY ASSOCIATED AND DEFINITIVE ACTS AND
MEANING."44 DISORGANIZATION OF THIS TYPE MAY BE ILLUSTRATED BY REFERENCE
TO THE FAMILY IN YUCATAN:

AS ONE GOES FROM TUSIK TOWARD MERIDA THERE IS TO BE NOTED A RE-
DUCTION IN THE STABILITY OF THE ELEMENTARY FAMILY; A DECLINE IN THE
MANIFESTATION OF PATRIARCHAL OR MatriARCHAL AUTHORITY; A DISAPPEARANCE
OF INSTITUTIONS EXPRESSING COHESION IN THE GREAT FAMILY; A
REDUCTION IN THE STRENGTH AND IMPORTANCE OF RESPECT RELATIONSHIPS,
ESPECIALLY FOR ELDER BROTHERS AND FOR ELDER PEOPLE GENERALLY; AN
INCREASING VAGUENESS OF THE CONVENTIONAL OUTLINES OF APPROPRIATE
BEHAVIOR TOWARD RELATIVES; AND A SHRINKAGE IN THE APPLICABILITY OF
KINSHIP TERMS PRIMARILY DENOTING MEMBERS OF THE ELEMENTARY FAMILY
TOWARD MORE DISTANT RELATIVES OR TOWARD PERSONS NOT RELATIVES.45

THE CITY AND TOWN HAVE ALSO BECOME MORE SECULARIZED THAN THE TWO

43REDFIELD, THE FOLK CULTURE OF YUCATAN, P. 344.
44IBID., P. 346. 45IBID., P. 211.
VILLAGES, AND REDFIELD LISTS SOME OF THE EVIDENCES OF SECULARIZATION IN THE FORMERS:

... THE SEPARATION OF MAIZE FROM THE CONTEXT OF RELIGION AND ITS TREATMENT SIMPLY AS A MEANS OF GETTING FOOD OR MONEY; THE INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF SPECIALISTS WHO CARRY ON THEIR ACTIVITIES FOR A PRACTICAL LIVELIHOOD RELATIVE TO THOSE THAT CARRY ON TRADITIONAL ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE REGARDED AS PREROGATIVES AND EVEN MORAL DUTIES TO THE COMMUNITY; THE CHANGE IN THE CHARACTER OF THE INSTITUTION OF GUARDIA WHEREBY FROM BEING AN OBLIGATION, RELIGIOUSLY SUPPORTED, TO PROTECT A SHRINE AND A GOD IT BECOMES A MERE JOB IN THE TOWN HALL; THE ALMOST COMPLETE DISAPPEARANCE OF FAMILY WORSHIP; THE DECLINE IN THE SACRAMENTAL CHARACTER OF BAPTISM AND MARRIAGE; THE CONVERSION OF THE PAGAN CULT FROM WHAT IS TRULY RELIGIOUS WORSHIP TO MERE MAGIC OR EVEN SUPERSTITION; THE DECLINE IN THE VENERATION ACCORDED THE SANTOS; THE CHANGE IN THE NOVENA IN WHICH FROM BEING A TRADITIONAL FORM EXPRESSIVE OF APPEAL TO DEITY IT BECOMES A PARTY FOR THE FUN OF THE PARTICIPANTS; THE ALTERATION IN THE FESTIVAL OF THE PATRON SAINT IN WHICH IT LOSES ITS PREDOMINANT CHARACTER AS WORSHIP AND BECOMES PLAY AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO PROFIT; THE SEPARATION OF IDEAS AS TO THE CAUSE AND CURE OF SICKNESS FROM CONCEPTIONS AS TO MORAL OR RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS.

SIMILARLY REDFIELD LISTS SOME OF THE EVIDENCES OF THE GREATER INDIVIDUALISM TO BE FOUND IN THE CITY AND THE TOWN:

... THE RELATIVE DECREASE IN IMPORTANCE OF SPECIALIZED FUNCTIONS WHICH ARE PERFORMED ON BEHALF OF THE COMMUNITY AND THE RELATIVE INCREASE OF SPECIALTIES DISCHARGED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL'S OWN BENEFIT; THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN LAND AND IN FAMILY ESTATES; THE DIMINUTION OR DISAPPEARANCE OF COLLECTIVE LABOR AND OF THE EXCHANGE OF SERVICES IN CONNECTION WITH CIVIC ENTERPRISES AND RELIGIOUS WORSHIP; THE DECREASING CONCERN OF THE FAMILY OR OF THE LOCAL COMMUNITY IN THE MAKING AND THE MAINTAINING OF MARRIAGES; THE BECOMING LESS COMMON OF THE EXTENDED DOMESTIC FAMILY; THE LESSENING OF EMPHASIS AND OF CONVENTIONAL DEFINITION OF THE RESPECT RELATIONSHIPS AMONG KIN. ...

CRITICISM. REDFIELD'S METHODOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS ARE HIGHLY QUESTIONABLE, FOR HE POSES A HISTORICAL PROBLEM AND THEN ATTEMPTS TO

46 *IBID.*, P. 352.
47 *IBID.*, P. 355.

48 A SPECIAL CRITIQUE OF THE EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS OF REDFIELD'S DICHOTOMY AS WELL AS GENERAL CRITICISMS WILL BE RESERVED FOR CHAPTER VI. FOR AN EXCELLENT CRITICISM OF REDFIELD'S TEPOTZLAN STUDY SEE OSCAR LEWIS, LIFE IN A MEXICAN VILLAGE.
solve it on a non-historic level. His method of reconstructing a historical process from the differential positions of four communities on a hypothetical folk-urban continuum is in many respects highly similar to the discredited comparative method of the social evolutionists. In both cases a preconceived theoretical system is illustrated by finding examples through a highly selective process. Even in those examples which are selected only that part of the data which is consistent with the theoretical framework is used and the rest is largely ignored. Redfield's assumptions that all the societies were somewhat similar at one time and that all of them are changing along the same pattern of development but at different rates may be at least partially true, but it is impossible to demonstrate this without turning to the historical materials which Redfield feels no need to utilize.

Redfield's discussion of the causes of social change is, for the most part, superficial, for he fails to uncover the basic forces behind change. He maintains that at least in Yucatan there are two independent variables which may be considered as the causes of changes: decreasing isolation and decreasing homogeneity. These two factors, he maintains, cause the dependent factors to vary: disorganization, secularization, and individualization. Obviously, what Redfield describes as independent variables are no more independent than the other variables, for something must produce the decreasing isolation and the decreasing homogeneity. Redfield hints only briefly that this "something" is technological development.

Finally, throughout Redfield's writing there is an implicit system of value judgments in which folk society is judged as good and urban
SOCIETY IS JUDGED AS BAD. ALL FOLK SOCIETIES ARE ASSUMED TO BE INTEGRATED
AND URBANIZATION IS SEEN AS THE GREAT DISORGANIZING FORCE. THE VERY USE
OF THE TERM "DISORGANIZATION" RATHER THAN "REORGANIZATION" IN THE URBANIZATION
PROCESS SHOWS THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE VALUE JUDGMENTS INFLUENCE
THE ANALYSIS. FURTHERMORE, THE TERM "CULTURE" IS RESERVED ONLY FOR FOLK
SOCIETIES, SINCE REDFIELD BELIEVES THAT URBAN SOCIETY BY ITS VERY NATURE
IS UNINTEGRATED. EVEN IN HIS MOST RECENT WORK THE VALUE BIAS IS PRESENT,
AS IS SHOWN BY THE FOLLOWING QUOTATION:

THE PEOPLE OF CHAN KOM ARE, THEN, A PEOPLE WHO HAVE NO CHOICE BUT
tO GO FORWARD WITH TECHNOLOGY, WITH A DECLINING RELIGIOUS FAITH
AND MORAL CONVICTION, INTO A DANGEROUS WORLD. THEY ARE A PEOPLE
WHO MUST AND WILL COME TO IDENTIFY THEIR INTERESTS WITH THOSE OF
PEOPLE FAR AWAY, OUTSIDE THE TRADITIONAL CIRCLE OF THEIR LOYALTIES
AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITIES. AS SUCH THEY SHOULD HAVE THE
SYMPATHY OF THE READERS OF THESE PAGES. 49

THEORISTS OF GENUINE CULTURE AND SPURIOUS CULTURE

INTRODUCTION.—ALMOST ALL THE SOCIAL THEORISTS WHO HAVE SET FORTH
DICHTOMOUS TYPES OF SOCIETY HAVE SHARPLY CRITICIZED MANY OF THE DEVELOP-
MENTS OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION AND OF CAPITALISM IN PARTICULAR. WHEREAS
MANY OF THE THEORISTS, SUCH AS MARX, MORGAN, TONNIES, AND DURKHEIM, HAVE
PLACED HOPE IN A SOCIALISTIC SOCIETY OF THE FUTURE, OTHERS, SUCH AS
ROUSSEAU, SOROKIN, SPENGLER, TOYNBEE, AND MANY OF THE RURAL SOCIOLOGISTS,
HAVE CALLED FOR A RETURN TO THE CONDITIONS OF SOCIAL LIFE IN THE PAST.
PARALLELING THE REACTION OF THE LATTER THEORISTS, THERE HAS ALSO BEEN
A MOVEMENT OF "CULTURAL PRIMITIVISM" IN ANTHROPOLOGY WHICH HAS EMPHA-
SIZED THE VALUE OF THE PRIMITIVE "WAY OF LIFE" AND HAS CRITICIZED AT
LEAST IMPLICITLY THE "DISORGANIZATION" AND "DECADENCE" OF MODERN

49 ROBERT REDFIELD, A VILLAGE THAT CHOSE PROGRESS, CHAN KOM REVISITED,
P. 178.
CIVILIZATION. Redfield stands among the cultural primitivists, but there are other important figures in the group too.

Edward Sapir. — One of the most important of the cultural primitivists is Edward Sapir, whose distinction between genuine culture and spurious culture has had great influence on anthropology. First of all, Sapir distinguishes civilization from culture and gives the latter term a narrower meaning than that used by most anthropologists. The development of civilization refers simply to the progressive sophistication of a society under the impact of the growth of science and knowledge. Sapir does not deny that there is progress of a sort in civilization's development, but he adds that "... there can be no stranger illusion— and it is an illusion we nearly all share—than this, that because the tools of life are today more specialized and more refined than ever before, that because the technique brought by science is more perfect than anything the world has yet known, it necessarily follows that we are in like degree attaining to a profounder harmony of life, to a deeper and more satisfying culture." Culture, as Sapir uses the term, embraces "... those general attitudes, views of life, and specific manifestations of civilization that give a particular people its distinctive place in the world." The term does not emphasize what is done and believed by a people, but rather how what is done and believed

50 For examples of the idealization of a particular primitive society see Margaret Mead, Coming of Age in Samoa and John Dixon Copp, The Samoan Dance of Life.


52 Ibid., p. 405.
FUNCTIONS IN THE WHOLE LIFE OF THAT PEOPLE TO GIVE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE TO ALL ACTIONS.

Culture may be genuine or spurious, Sapir argues, no matter how high or low the level of the civilization may be. He describes genuine culture as inherently harmonious, balanced, and self-satisfactory:

It is the expression of a richly varied and yet somehow unified and consistent attitude toward life, an attitude which sees the significance of any one element of civilization in its relation to all others. It is, ideally speaking, a culture in which nothing is spiritually meaningless, in which no important part of the general functioning brings with it a sense of frustration, of misdirected or unsympathetic effort. It is not a spiritual hybrid of contradictory patches, of water-tight compartments of consciousness that avoid participation in a harmonious synthesis. If the culture necessitates slavery, it frankly admits it; if it abhors slavery, it feels its way to an economic adjustment that obviates the necessity of its employment.

The ideal of a genuine culture has no necessary connection with efficiency. A society may be well organized so that most actions are planned in accordance with the ends of maximum utility, but such a society may be—and very likely is—an inferior culture bearer. For genuine culture to exist each member of the society must directly satisfy his own creative and emotional impulses; he must be considered an end in himself, not as a mere cog which exists only in subservience to a collective purpose of which he is only vaguely aware. "The great cultural fallacy of industrialism, as developed up to the present time, is that in harnessing machines to our uses it has not known how to avoid the harnessing of the majority of mankind to its machines." Thus the mechanical work that a telephone girl does is highly efficient, but that work answers to no spiritual needs of the girl herself. The economic life of the

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53 Ibid., p. 410. 54 Ibid., p. 411.
INDIANS IS CULTURALLY MUCH MORE GENUINE. "The Indian's salmon-spearing is a culturally higher type of activity than that of the telephone girl or mill hand simply because there is normally no sense of spiritual frustration during its prosecution, no feeling of subservience to tyrannous yet largely inchoate demands, because it works in naturally with all the rest of the Indian's activities instead of standing out as a desert patch of merely economic effort in the whole of life." \(^{55}\) Sapir does not discuss spurious culture in detail, but its nature is implied in the summary above. It is simply the opposite of genuine culture: devitalized social habits replace spiritually meaningful actions, and inconsistent and conflicting values result in social and spiritual maladjustment.

Sapir regards the culture of Western civilization and of American society in particular as highly spurious, and he contrasts American culture, with its spiritual discord and devitalized "dry rot of social habit," with Athenian culture of the Age of Pericles. Sapir "instinctively" feels that the latter was a great culture and a healthy spiritual organism. \(^{56}\) He points out that "it is easier, generally speaking, for a genuine culture to subsist on a lower level of civilization; the differentiation of individuals as regards their social and economic functions is so much less than in the higher levels that there is less danger of the reduction of the individual to an unintelligible fragment of the social organism." \(^{57}\) The spread or growth of civilization in fact usually brings a breakdown in genuine cultures. Sapir's point of view, as

\(^{55}\) Ibid., pp. 411-412.  
\(^{56}\) Ibid., p. 410.  
\(^{57}\) Ibid., pp. 413-414.
EXPRESSED IN THE FOLLOWING QUOTATION, HAS BEEN SHARED BY A LARGE NUMBER
OF ANTHROPOLOGISTS:

"The ethnologist cannot but admire the well-rounded life of the
average participant in the civilization of a typical American Indian
tribe; the firmness with which every part of that life—economic,
social, religious, and aesthetic—is bound together into a signifi-
cant whole in respect to which he is far from a passive pawn;
above all, the molding role, oftentimes definitely creative, that
he plays in the mechanism of his culture. When the political in-
tegrity of his tribe is destroyed by contact with the whites and
the old cultural values cease to have the atmosphere needed for
their continued vitality, the Indian finds himself in a state of
bewildered vacuity... What is sal about the passing of the
Indian is not the depletion of his numbers by disease nor even
the contempt that is too often meted out to him in his life on the
reservation, it is the fading away of genuine cultures, built
though they were out of the materials of a low order of sophisti-
cation."

MELVIN TUMIN—Melvin Tumin has extended Sapir's distinction between
genuine culture and spurious culture and has drawn conclusions which
logically stem from Sapir's point of view. Tumin remarks on the close
similarity between the conceptual categories of folk culture and
secular culture and Sapir's categories of genuine culture and spurious
culture: "... most of the cultures which would be judged genuine by
Sapir's criteria likewise fulfill the qualifications by which a culture
is identified as folk; and, those characteristics of a culture which
render it spurious in Sapir's sense of the term are precisely some of
the attributes which we have come to consider as necessary consequences
of the secularization of a society." Tumin then formulates the implied
value judgment into an explicit hypothesis that "to the degree that a

58 Ibid., p. 414.
59 Melvin Tumin, "Culture: Genuine and Spurious: A Re-Evaluation,"
American Sociological Review, X (April, 1945), 199.
CULTURE IS FOLK IT IS ALSO GENUINE; AND, TO THE DEGREE THAT A CULTURE DEPARTS FROM ITS FOLK ATTRIBUTES, TO THAT DEGREE IS IT MOVING TOWARD A CONDITION OF SPURIOUSNESS. 60

To test his hypothesis Tumin makes an analysis of two radically different cultures existing side by side in Guatemala. The first is the culture of the LADINOS or white, non-Indians, who are concentrated in or near the larger cities, particularly Guatemala City. The second is the culture of the Indians, which, although it has become fused with Spanish culture in some parts of Guatemala, has remained rather well preserved. The LADINO culture is urban and secular; the Indian culture is rural and folk. Tumin believes that the LADINO culture is also highly spurious.

IT IS NOT AN IMPUTATION OF THE STUDENT BUT A CLEARLY DISCERNIBLE FEATURE OF THE LIVES OF THE LADINOS THAT THEY ARE MARKED BY AN INCOHERENCY OF THE VARIOUS FACETS OF THOSE LIVES. IN PARTICULAR, WHAT THE LADINO DOES WHILE HE EARNS A LIVING HAS LITTLE MEANINGFUL REFERENCE TO OR POSITIVE SIGNIFICANCE FOR OR SUPPORTING CONNECTIONS WITH WHAT HE DOES WITH THE REST OF HIS TIME. 61

The Indian culture, on the other hand, is genuine.

In the Indian way of life . . . everything seems to find a natural lodging. There is a unity of purpose and a coherence of parts which are not only clearly observable by an outsider but readily voiced and felt by the Indians themselves. The Indian sees his MILPA, his family relations, his religious affiliations, his ritualistic involvements, his political and social status as a necessary part of his own definition of himself as a natural creature in a natural universe supervised by an omniscient and indefeasible set of both good and bad forces. 62

Tumin believes that "... societ al science should seek to render possible the conditions which promote the development of genuine cultures."

60 I B I D., p. 204.
61 I B I D., p. 205.
62 I B I D., p. 205.
AND TO ELIMINATE THE CONDITIONS WHICH PROMOTE SPURIOUS CULTURES... 

To this end he draws a number of tentative conclusions from his study of Guatemalan cultures and calls for further study of other cultures to validate or refute his conclusions. His first conclusion is that there are two factors contributing to the Indians' sense of natural fulfillments: (1) the feeling that there is a divine will which interpenetrates into all parts of their lives, and (2) a systematic minimization of desires, which guarantees a minimal disparity between levels of aspiration and levels of achievement. From this a more general conclusion is derived: "If, through the processes of continuously reinforced mental isolation there can be produced in a society a tendency toward minimization of desires rather than maximization of achievements, and if that is accompanied by a feeling of a divine guarantee of the fitness and correctness of the operations of the way of life, then the people of the society in question will sense a unity and coherence of the parts of their life way, and a meaningfulness in each of their activities." Since science must seek to promote genuine culture, the crucial question arises as to whether genuine culture is exclusively related to a minimization of desires and a sense of all-pervading divine will. In other words, is it possible for a culture to retain a sense of purpose and of coherence and unity while it is undergoing a process of secularization? Tumin clearly believes that it is not possible; that genuine culture is incompatible with secularization. This leaves Tumin with a final conclusion which is paradoxical. Since folk culture and science are mutually exclusive by definition, as he himself recognizes, science must seek to

63 Ibid., pp. 205-206.  
64 Ibid., p. 206.
ESTABLISH A SOCIETY IN WHICH SCIENCE HAS NO PLACE

IF SCIENCE OFFERS NO EVIDENCE TO CONTRAVENE THE PROPOSITION THAT GENUINE CULTURE IS POSSIBLE ONLY ON A FOLK LEVEL, IT IS COMMITTED TO THE ALTERNATIVES OF EITHER (1) ACCEPTING THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE OF THE PRESENT WHICH SUPPORTS THIS HYPOTHESIS AND THEREBY DENIES SCIENCE ANY ROLE IN A GENUINE CULTURE; OR, (2), IN TOKEN OF THE SCIENTIFIC CREED, IT IS COMPULSORY TO BE SILENT ABOUT AND THEREBY RENDER TACIT ABSENT TO THE DISMISSAL OF THOSE WHO, LIKE T.S. ELIOT, FEEL THAT "... IF THE ARTS ARE AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN CULTURE, AND IF CULTURE IS NECESSARY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HIGHEST SPIRITUAL CAPACITIES OF A PEOPLE, IT MUST NOT BE FORGOTTEN THAT WITHOUT A RELIGION THERE CAN BE NO CULTURE."65

RALPH LINTON.—IN THE WORK OF RALPH LINTON THE GENUINE—SPURIOUS DICHOTOMY IS FORMULATED DIFFERENTLY, BUT THE IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LINTON'S THEORY ARE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS THOSE OF SAPIR AND TUMIN. LINTON'S CENTRAL DISTINCTION IS BETWEEN UNIVERSALS AND ALTERNATIVES. THE FORMER TERM, AS LINTON USES IT, DOES NOT REFER TO THOSE FORMS OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR WHICH ARE UNIVERSAL IN THE SENSE THAT THEY ARE PRESENT IN ALL CULTURES. IT REFERS RATHER TO "... THOSE IDEAS, HABITS, AND CONDITIONED EMOTIONAL RESPONSES WHICH ARE COMMON TO ALL SANE, ADULT MEMBERS ..." OF A PARTICULAR SOCIETY.66 "ALTERNATIVES," ON THE OTHER HAND, REFERS TO THOSE TRAITS WHICH MAY BE SHARED BY CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS BUT WHICH ARE NOT COMMON TO ALL MEMBERS OF A PARTICULAR SOCIETY.

ALTERNATIVES REPRESENT DIFFERENT REACTIONS TO THE SAME SITUATIONS OR DIFFERENT TECHNIQUES FOR ACHIEVING THE SAME ENDS. ALL CULTURES INCLUDE BOTH UNIVERSALS AND ALTERNATIVES, BUT SINCE ALTERNATIVES LACK CONSISTENCY AND INTEGRATION BY THEIR VERY NATURE, IT IS THE UNIVERSALS WHICH FORM THE CORE OF A CULTURE AND GIVE IT FORM AND PATTERN.67 FROM THE ABOVE

65Ibid., p. 207.
67Ibid., pp. 273-274, 282.
It appears that Linton's use of the term "universal" is roughly equivalent to Sapir's "genuine culture"; similarly "alternative" corresponds to "spurious culture."

The chief difference between folk cultures and modern civilizations, Linton argues, is that folk cultures have a larger core of universals, whereas modern civilizations have a larger number of alternatives.

Folk cultures are borne by small, closely-integrated social units or by aggregates of such units which have already worked out satisfactory mutual adjustments. In such cultures, new items are not appearing with any great frequency and the society has plenty of time to test them and to assimilate them to its pre-existing patterns. In such cultures the core constitutes almost the whole.

Modern civilization presents a different picture: "... closely integrated social units are being broken down, giving place to masses of individuals who are much more loosely interrelated than the members of the former local groups and classes." Moreover, there is a trend toward the breakdown of folk cultures. Rapid social change which grows mostly out of technological advance reduces the number of universals within the culture, and the alternatives come to overshadow the universals. As the core of universals is reduced, the culture tends increasingly to lose pattern and coherence. This has disastrous effects upon the social life of the community.

It is the common adherence of a society's members to the elements which form the core of their culture which makes it possible for them to function as a society. Without a wide community of ideas and habits the members of the group will not react to particular stimuli as a unit, nor will they be able to cooperate effectively. "... the society is no longer able to feel or act as a unit. Its members may continue to live together, but many forms of social intercourse will be hampered by the impossibility of predicting the behavior of individuals on any basis other than that of their known

68 Ibid., p. 283.
69 Ibid.
PERSONALITIES. ... IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THIS CONDITION PUTS THE SOCIETY AT A MARKED DISADVANTAGE, AND IT IS PROBABLE THAT THERE IS A POINT BELOW WHICH PARTICIPATION CANNOT FALL WITHOUT A RESULTING COLLAPSE OF BOTH THE SOCIETY AND THE CULTURE.\(^7^0\)

Thus Linton agrees with Sapir and Tumin that disorganization is an inherent part of civilization, and he also points out that American culture is becoming more and more disorganized as the material, technological aspects of the culture increase. He believes, however, that after the proliferation of alternatives reaches a certain point, the process will be reversed and an integrated culture organized around a large core of universals will develop once more. Many of his statements resemble those of the cyclical theorists of culture change. The following one, for example, might well have come from the pen of Sorokin: "Unless all history is at fault, our descendants of half a thousand years hence will once more have achieved a consistent, patterned culture and an integrated society."\(^7^1\) Linton outlines the process whereby this might be accomplished:

That our own culture and society will eventually stabilize and reintegrate can hardly be doubted, but two things will have to happen first. We shall have to develop some sort of social unit which can take the place of the old local groupings as a bearer and transmitter of culture and ensure a similar high degree of individual participation. There must also be some diminution in the blood of new elements which are being poured into our culture from the laboratories of the scientists and technologists. The breakdown of our present economic system would solve both problems. The descendants of those who survived would be forced to return, for the most part, to life as peasants in small communities, while research would cease through lack of the economic surplus and trained personnel which it requires.\(^7^2\)

Criticism.—It is rather curious that in the theories outlined above of Sapir, Tumin, and Linton there appear strong currents of irrationalism

\(^7^0\)Ibid., pp. 282-283.  
\(^7^1\)Ibid., p. 287.  
\(^7^2\)Ibid., p. 286.
AND OPPOSITION TO SCIENCE, EVEN THOUGH EACH OF THE THREE UNDOUBTEDLY
REGARDS HIMSELF AS A PRACTITIONER OF SCIENCE. EACH UNDERSTANDS CLEARLY
THE SOURCE OF SOCIAL CHANGE AND SECULARIZATION; IT IS THE CUMULATIVE
GROWTH OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. THEY UNDERSTAND ONLY TOO WELL THAT THIS
GROWTH UNDERMINES THE VERY TYPE OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION WHICH THEY BELIEVE
IS ESSENTIAL TO MAN'S WELL-BEING, AND THEREFORE THEY REACT, PROPERLY,
AGAINST WHAT THEY REGARD AS THE ROOT OF SOCIAL DECAY. MAN'S EATING
FROM THE TREE OF KNOWLEDGE RESULTS INEVITABLY IN HIS BANISHMENT FROM
EDEN.

THE TERMS "GENUINE" AND "SPURIOUS" WHEN APPLIED TO THE ANALYSIS
OF CULTURE APPEAR TO BE NOTHING MORE THAN DELIBERATELY MISLEADING AND
EMOTIONALLY LOADED LABELS WHICH REFLECT THE PERSONAL BIASES OF THE
INVESTIGATOR. IT IS HIGHLY QUESTIONABLE WHETHER OR NOT THE MEANING OF
AN ACTION MUST BE DERIVED FROM THE FEELING THAT THERE IS A DIVINE WILL
WHICH PENETRATES ALL SOCIAL EXISTENCE. IT IS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE THAT
NEW AND MORE VITAL MEANINGS MAY BECOME ATTACHED TO SOCIAL ACTIONS AS
THE PROCESS OF SECULARIZATION TAKES PLACE. THE INDIVIDUAL MAY BE
FREED FROM THE STIFLING CUSTOMS AND TRADITIONS OF THE PAST TO DEVELOP
HIS OWN CAPACITIES TO THE FULLEST. IS THE WORK OF THE SCIENTIST ENGAGED
IN THE PURSUIT OF KNOWLEDGE ANY LESS "MEANINGFUL" THAN THE INCANTATIONS
OF THE SHAMAN IN PROPITIATING THE GODS? THE CRUCIAL QUESTION IS THIS:
ARE CUSTOMS AND TRADITIONS OR ARE SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND TECHNOLOGY
THE TRUE "GENUINE" ASPECTS OF CULTURE? SAPIR, TUMIN, AND LINTON, OF
COURSE, BELIEVE THAT THE FORMER ARE GENUINE. 73

73 FOR AN ALTERNATIVE POINT OF VIEW SEE W. L. KOLB, "THE OBJECTIVE
POSSIBILITY OF AN ORGANIZED SECULAR SOCIETY," THE SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL,
11 (1946), 161-169.
The reason that the cultural primitivists take a position of reaction is probably to be found in their failure to distinguish capitalistic development from industrial development. They focus upon the particularly distasteful features of capitalistic society and assume that industrial and technological development must flow along the same lines in the future and aggravate the already-existing maladjustments. This point of view is radically different from that of many other critics of capitalistic society, such as Marx, Tonnies, and Morgan, who visualize an ideal society in the future based upon the uninhibited use of technology. The cultural primitivists argue that social institutions which are firmly based on tradition are becoming too weak and that they must be strengthened again; the "technologists" believe that the traditional institutions are too strong, for they prevent the reorganization of society on a rational, technological, humanitarian basis. The latter viewpoint seems to be more congenial to science itself. Sapir, Tumin, and Linton seem to be employing medievalism and romanticism in the guise of science to oppose scientific development.
CHAPTER VI

CRITICAL APPRAISAL

That is only the old mess,
Try to become more clever!
Don't tread perpetually on
the same spot,
Travel a little farther!

Goethe

INTRODUCTION

In the preceding chapters the lines of development of theories of dichotomous types of social life have been traced and the dichotomies of selected sociological and anthropological theorists have been examined in detail. Specific criticisms have been made of particular theories in the chapters of exposition. There are a number of general criticisms, however, which apply to the theorists as a group, and for the most part the general criticisms are far more serious than the specific ones. In the following sections the theories are examined critically from a general perspective to determine the utility of the typologies as frames of reference for sociological and anthropological investigation.

Systematic Scotoma

The principal weakness of the dichotomous theories of social life is that they are based upon evidence of the most selective nature. They are dependent upon what might be called "systematic scotoma" in the
Eyes of the theorists, that is, the theorists exercise a blind spot systematically and methodically to avoid the recognition of evidence which does not fit in with their theories. The scotomic effect is self-perpetuating, for after the theory has been constructed it prevents the theorist from seeing evidence which deviates from theoretical expectations.

Most of the dichotomies of societal types considered in this thesis involve interdependent or linked variables, but the evidence of certain patterns of occurrence of the traits is based upon highly selective data. It is assumed that isolation and homogeneity of a social group produce certain related patterns of social life, including a high degree of solidarity, an emphasis upon cooperation and self-sacrifice, and the development of sacred institutions and practices. On the other hand, it is believed that the processes of industrialization and urbanization which result in greater accessibility and heterogeneity also bring about greater impersonality, secularization, individualism, and formalism. Social change is depicted as a process of disintegration and disorganization of the older homogeneous type of society. This dichotomous view of types of social life can be supported only if much of the evidence gathered by anthropologists is disregarded. Even a brief survey of anthropological literature is sufficient to discover many examples of primitive societies which do not fit the theoretical stereotype. In many respects, social life in these societies comes closer to the "urban" type than to the "folk" type in terms of the dichotomy.

One significant example of the inapplicability of the dichotomy to particular cases is the Indian culture of Guatemala studied by Tax.
He reports that the Indian societies of Guatemala are well-integrated and homogeneous but at the same time are also highly secular, individualistic, commercialistic, and impersonal. He summarizes the characteristics and points out the conflict between his evidence and Redfield's folk-urban dichotomy in the following passage:

... the Indians of Guatemala, far from resembling Redfield's typical folk culture, actually fit the criteria by which a city-type is judged. Indian society, even in one municipio, is relatively mobile; individuals and families shift both their economic positions in the community and the respect in which they are held, with comparative ease and frequency. Relationships are surprisingly impersonal, and familial organization is, if anything at a lower point in social control than even among us; the formal organization, as represented by the Indian officials in the town hall, and by the elders of the community ..., is resorted to in all manner of dispute even in the primary family. The activities of life—economic, social, political, and religious—are in a real sense secularized; individuals in all matters which give them relatively free choice act from thought of personal gain, and the necessities of the community must be filled by forcing individuals to contribute. Religious action on the part of individuals is at a minimum, with specialized communal organizations performing almost all rites that are deemed necessary in common belief. The ideas back of Indian relations and activities themselves in most of their aspects are, as Redfield has analyzed them, city-like and civilized.1

Tax's findings have caused Redfield to modify his own position, and he admits that "... besides the long-isolated, heterogeneous society with its characters ..., we may recognize subtypes, or types in which various kinds of compromises or combinations of character are found."2 This admission, however, pulls the rug out from under Redfield's principal arguments that culture traits are interdependent variables which range along a single continuum between folk and urban ideal types of

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2Robert Redfield, The Folk Culture of Yucatan, p. 358.
SOCIETY.

A second example of a society which cannot be considered in terms of a dichotomous theory is that of the Yurok, Karok, and Hupa tribes of Northwestern California. Goldschmidt, after analyzing material on these tribes collected by Kroeber and his associates, has remarked that this society "... reflects in surprising degree certain structural and ethical characteristics of emergent capitalistic Europe." In terms of the folk-urban type of dichotomy, Goldschmidt is saying that a presumably folk society has many of the essential characteristics of the urban type. The capitalist structure of Northwest California society revolves around a system in which the individual is placed by personal acquisition and wealth, which theoretically is freely obtainable by all, instead of by ascribed status. The capitalist nature of the society is also reflected in an ethical pattern which bears close resemblances to the Protestant ethic. There is a moral demand to pursue wealth, to work, and to deny oneself, and more important, there is an individualization of moral responsibility. Goldschmidt discusses the results of this type of ethic on the personality structure of the Indians:

The Northwest Californian is extremely aggressive in his interpersonal relations; he is hostile to his fellow men and expects hostility toward himself; he never relaxes his barriers of suspicion. The myths demonstrate these components which may be observed in the real world--aggressiveness, bickering and drive toward personal success. They also demonstrate certain reaction patterns--compulsive demand to work, withdrawal in the geographic sense and obedience and submission to the absolute powers of the creator gods. ... There was a constant theme of loneliness running through the mythology, and loneliness is an expected concomitant of individualization and hostility.


4Ibid., pp. 517-518.
The theorist of dichotomous types of society is at a complete loss to explain this type of cultural configuration in relation to a primitive society.

Herskovits has pointed out that nowhere in the formulations of dichotomous types of societies are African data taken into account. In West Africa, he maintains, there are many native urban communities ranging from 100,000 to 350,000 inhabitants. Although these cities have complex specialized economies based on the use of money and the profit motive, relationships are highly personal and religion is the focal aspect of the culture. As Herskovits remarks, "In short, here we have the anomaly—analogy, that is, in terms of the concept of the folk society—of urban, sacred, communities." Although theorists of dichotomous types of society have drawn almost entirely upon American and Oceanic materials to support their hypotheses, even in these areas there are numerous tribes which do not support the dichotomy and which have been conveniently overlooked. Besides the Indians of Guatemala and the tribes of Northwestern California, the Blackfoot Indians, the Comanches, and the Kwakiutls of North America, and the Dobuans and Alorese of Oceania may be taken as examples of tribes which deviate from the expectations of the theorists of dichotomous types of social life.

For the most part primitive or peasant societies which have characteristics which do not fit into the schema of the various dichotomies have been ignored. Redfield's study of Tepoztlan is a case in which a society of the above nature has been studied, but because of the use of

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5 Swelville J. Herskovits, Man and His Works, p. 606.
6 Ibid.
The folk-urban dichotomy as the organizing principle of research, Redfield focused his attention only upon those things which he expected beforehand to find. As a result, as Lewis discovered in a restudy of Tepoztlán, the most significant aspects of Tepoztecan culture have been ignored or interpreted incorrectly. Thus Redfield described Tepoztlán as a homogeneous, isolated, smoothly functioning, and well-integrated society, and he emphasized the cooperative and unifying factors of the village which helped to make the people contented and well-adjusted. He passed lightly over evidence of violence, disruption, cruelty, disease, suffering, maladjustments, poverty, economic problems, and political schisms. Lewis, on the other hand, remarks that his own findings "... would emphasize the underlying individualism of Tepoztecan institutions and character, the lack of cooperation, the tensions between villages within the municipio, the schisms within the village, and the pervading quality of fear, envy, and distrust in inter-personal relations."

Lewis found that the outstanding characteristic of Tepoztecan society is the extreme individualism of the people. One of the sources of the individualism, he thinks, is the brutalizing and isolating nature of the farmer's work. He becomes an individualist having faith in his own power alone, and he is very reluctant to seek or give economic aid, to borrow or to lend, or to cooperate with other villagers in either private or public enterprises. Redfield had stressed the role of the communal lands and the Quatequitl or cooperative working party as unifying influences upon the community, and in focusing his attention

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7Oscar Lewis, Life in a Mexican Village: Tepoztlán Restudied, p. 429.
8Ibid., p. 296. The individualism of Tepoztlán is similar to that found in Dobuan society. See R. F. Fortune, Sorcerers of Dobu.
ON THESE, HE FAILED TO PERCEIVE THE BASIC INDIVIDUALISM OF TEPOTZLAN.

LEWIS POINTS OUT, HOWEVER, THAT ALTHOUGH THE COMMUNAL LANDS ARE OWNED IN COMMON, THEY ARE OPERATED INDIVIDUALLY. THESE LANDS HAVE ALSO BEEN THE CAUSE OF MANY BITTER QUARRELS, AND THESE QUARRELS EVEN RESULTED IN VIOLENCE DURING THE YEAR WHICH REDFIELD SPENT IN THE VILLAGE. THE CUATEQUITL WAS A FORM OF FORCED LABOR PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTION OF 1910, AND IT WAS REVIVED AS A VOLUNTARY, COOPERATIVE ENDEAVOR BY A SOCIALISTICALLY ORIENTED POLITICAL GROUP DURING THE TIME THAT REDFIELD WAS IN TEPOTZLAN. SINCE THEN, HOWEVER, THERE HAVE BEEN FEW CUATEQUITLES BECAUSE OF LACK OF SUPPORT.  

REDFIELD PORTRAYED TEPOTZLAN AS A COMMUNITY OF SMALL LANDHOLDERS, AND HE FAILED TO MENTION LAND PROBLEMS OR OTHER ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. IN FACT HE PAINTED A ROSY PICTURE OF THE CONDITIONS OF LIFE UNDER THE DIAZ REGIME BEFORE THE DISRUPTIONS OF THE REVOLUTION OF 1910. LEWIS STATES, HOWEVER, THAT LESS THAN HALF OF THE VILLAGERS OWN LAND AND THAT THERE IS AN ACUTE SHORTAGE OF GOOD LAND, PARTICULARLY IN THE FACE OF GROWING POPULATION PRESSURE. REDFIELD'S DESCRIPTION OF THE CULTURAL FLORESCENCE UNDER DIAZ ALSO FAILS TO POINT OUT THAT THIS WAS LIMITED TO A FEW UPPER CLASS PERSONS AND THAT THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE VILLAGERS WERE "... ILLITERATE, DESPERATELY POOR, LANDLESS, AND LIVING UNDER AN OPPRESSIVE POLITICAL REGIME WHICH FORBADE THEM TO UTILIZE THEIR OWN COMMUNAL RESOURCES."  

TEPOTZLAN WAS ONE OF THE FIRST VILLAGES TO JOIN WITH ZAPATA'S FORCES IN THE REVOLT AGAINST DIAZ; YET REDFIELD ALMOST COMPLETELY IGNORED THE REVOLUTION EXCEPT AS A SOURCE OF FOLK TALES AND FOLK SONGS. SIMILARLY, REDFIELD DESCRIBED LOCAL POLITICS AS A GAME AND...

9*IBID., P. 429.  10*IBID.
Failed to take it very seriously. Lewis found, on the other hand, that politics was a very serious affair which frequently led to violence. It was such a violent political schism that finally forced Redfield to leave the village; yet he failed to mention it in his work.\textsuperscript{11}

Redfield in considering the interpersonal relations of Tepoztecan presented only their positive and formal aspects, such as the forms of greeting and the compadre respect relation. Lewis, who concentrated attention on psychological factors, presents a picture in sharp contrast. There is, he says, much hostility in interpersonal relations in the village. "But much of this hostility is suppressed, or expressed indirectly in the form of malicious gossip, stealing, secretive destruction of property, ridicule, depreciation, and envy, and sorcery."\textsuperscript{12}

In terms of the dichotomies of types of social life, one of the chief characteristics of the isolated, homogeneous community is supposed to be the presence of a large number of primary-group relationships. In Tepoztlan one is struck by the absence of such relationships, as Lewis indicates in the following passage:

Friendships as defined in terms of mutual trust, loyalty, aid, and affection directed toward one individual are few in Tepoztlan, and are avoided rather than sought. Friendship as such is not a

\textsuperscript{11}Ibid., p. 430. Redfield's failure to consider political matters of much importance in his study of Tepoztlan is paralleled by a similar neglect in the works of American rural sociologists. Textbooks in rural sociology, for example, very rarely include sections on agrarian political movements among American farmers. Farmers and peasants have turned to radical political action in times of hardship at least since the time of the Peasants' Revolt in Germany in the sixteenth century, but because of the inconsistency of these movements with the idealized conception of the "rural way of life," they have received little attention from rural sociologists.

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., p. 293.
TEPOZTECAN IDEAL AND IS NOT INSTITUTIONALIZED IN THE FORM OF A
BEST FRIEND OR IN ANY OTHER WAY. CASES OF LIFELONG FRIENDSHIPS
ARE RARE AND ARE ALMOST ALWAYS LIMITED TO THE MORE ACCULTURATED
FAMILIES. FRIENDS ARE VIEWED BY ADULTS AS POTENTIAL ENEMIES, AS
A SOURCE OF TROUBLE, AND AS A WASTE OF TIME. TRADITIONALLY WOMEN
AND GIRLS ARE NOT SUPPOSED TO HAVE ANY FRIENDS WHATSOEVER. WHILE
ONE MAY HAVE FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH INDIVIDUALS IN TEPOZTLAN, THESE
RELATIONS ARE SEGMENTED IN THAT EACH IS LIMITED TO ONE OR TWO
PURPOSES. WITH ONE INDIVIDUAL, THERE MAY BE A WORK EXCHANGE RELA-
TIONSHIP; WITH ANOTHER A BORROWING EXCHANGE RELATIONSHIP; AND WITH
OTHERS, A DRINKING RELATIONSHIP.13

SEVERAL TEPOZTECANS MOVED TO MEXICO CITY DURING THE TIME OF LEWIS'S
STUDY, AND LEWIS REPORTS THAT HE WAS ASTONISHED AT THE TRANSFORMATION
IN THESE PEOPLE: "THEIR FACES HAD BECOME LESS IMPASSIVE; THEY HAD GAINED
WEIGHT; THEY LOOKED HAPPIER AND MORE RELAXED; THEY LAUGHED MORE AND
BEHAVED WITH FAR LESS FORMALITY."14

LEWIS BELIEVES THAT THE QUESTION OF WHY THE RESULTS OF HIS STUDY
ARE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF REDFIELD IS OF GREATER IMPORTANCE THAN THE
DIFFERENCES THEMSELVES. ALTHOUGH HE RECOGNIZES THAT THE PERSONAL FACTOR
AND THE TIME INTERVAL ARE PARTLY RESPONSIBLE, HE MAINTAINS THAT THE
CRUCIAL REASON FOR THE VARIATION IS THE DIFFERENCE IN THEORETICAL
ORIENTATION OF REDFIELD AND HIMSELF.15 REDFIELD WAS INTERESTED ONLY IN
THE STUDY OF A SINGLE CULTURAL PROCESS, THE EVOLUTION FROM FOLK TO URBAN,
AND HE FOCUSED HIS ATTENTION ON THE FORMAL AND RITUALISTIC ASPECTS OF

13IBID., P. 292. TEPOZTLAN IS NOT AN ISOLATED INSTANCE OF INTER-
PERSO

14LEWIS, OP. CIT., P. 295. THIS STATEMENT BY LEWIS IS, OF COURSE,
IMPRESSIONISTIC. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT LEWIS, LIKE REDFIELD, SAW ONLY WHAT
HE WANTED TO SEE IN THIS CASE.

15IBID., P. 432.
life. On the other hand, Lewis was more concerned with creating a well-rounded ethnographic account, and he concentrated on the everyday life and the problems of the people.

Perhaps the grossest case of the ignoring of certain phenomena by the theorists of dichotomous types of society may be seen in the small amount of attention devoted to conflict and the emotion of hate. Tonnies specifically noted that his dichotomy was valid only for positive social relationships. Thus he viewed relationships as cooperative, but with love as the unifying factor in the case of Gemeinschaft and with impersonal, formal organization as the unifying factor in the case of Gesellschaft. The theorists following Tonnies have, for the most part, adopted a love impersonality dichotomy as a frame of reference, but they also have neglected hate and conflict. It is to Tonnies' credit that he acknowledged the existence of conflict relationships even though he did not give them a place in his theoretical system; most of the others apparently have failed to recognize hate and conflict at all. In some cases, however, a rather inconsistent attempt has been made to place both impersonal and conflict relationships in the urban, heterogeneous polar type, while it has been maintained that the love relationship is dominant in the folk, homogeneous polar type. Actually the evidence seems to indicate that conflict plays an important role in both the primary, homogeneous group and the secondary, heterogeneous group. Thus the various dichotomies have tended to prevent the recognition of conflict as a theoretical problem.

In most of the dichotomies the prototype for the Gemeinschaft-like society is the family. It is based upon a family, however, which is

A SOMEWHAT SIMILAR POINT OF VIEW HAS BEEN EXPRESSED IN STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONAL TERMS BY BENNETT AND TUMIN. THEY BELIEVE THAT CONFLICT WITHIN THE FAMILY ALMOST INEVITABLY RESULTS FROM BASIC DIFFERENCES IN ROLE DEFINITIONS OF THE VARIOUS FAMILY MEMBERS. THUS THEY STATE THAT THE ESSENTIAL RELATIONSHIPS WHICH FORM THE STRUCTURE OF A FAMILY HAVE WITHIN THEM THE SEEDS OF DISCORDS MALE-FEMALE DIFFERENCES, PARENT-CHILD DIFFERENCES, DIFFERENCES IN POWER AND AUTHORITY, DIFFERENCES IN ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY AND INDEPENDENCE, DIFFERENCES IN GENERAL SOCIAL STATUS, DIFFERENCES IN LIFE INTERESTS, GENERATION AND AGE DIFFERENCES, AND DIFFERENCES IN BACKGROUNDS AND EXPERIENCES WHICH REFLECT THEMSELVES IN DIFFERENT NORMS AND VALUES WITH WHICH EACH SPOUSE COMES ARMED INTO THE MARRIAGE AND FAMILY SITUATION.

OF COURSE, BENNETT AND TUMIN FOCUS THEIR ANALYSIS ON THE PRESENT-DAY AMERICAN FAMILY WHICH HAS AN EXTREMELY HETEROGENEOUS CULTURAL BACKGROUND.

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16 See Sigmund Freud, The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud, Translated and Edited by A. A. Brill; Patrick Mullany, Oedipus Myth and Complex.

AND ACCORDING TO THEIR THEORY THE FAMILY WOULD BE CHARACTERIZED BY LESS
CONFLICT IN MORE HOMOGENEOUS CULTURE. STILL THEY IMPLY THAT CONFLICT
GROWS OUT OF ROLE DIFFERENCES, AND ROLE DIFFERENCES BASED ON AGE AND
SEX ARE CHARACTERISTIC OF ALL SOCIETIES.

THE DICHTOMOUS THEORIES WHICH SUPPORT THE POINT OF VIEW THAT
THE FAMILY IN HOMOGENEOUS SOCIETIES IS CHARACTERIZED BY LITTLE CONFLICT
AMONG ITS MEMBERS ARE HIGHLY SELECTIVE IN CHOOSING SUPPORTING DATA.
LEWIS, FOR EXAMPLE, FOUND MANY EVIDENCES OF CONFLICT IN FAMILY RELATIONS
IN TEPOTZTLAN WHICH REDFIELD HAD OVERLOOKED IN AN EARLIER STUDY BECAUSE
OF THE STRUCTURING OF THE DATA BY THE DICHTOMOUS THEORY. LEWIS FOUND
THAT ALTHOUGH THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF FAMILY LIFE COUNTERBALANCE THE
NEGATIVE OR DISRUPTIVE ONES IN TEPOTZTLAN ... THERE IS MUCH CONFLICT
AND TENSIONS RESULTING FROM DRUNKENNESS OF THE HUSBAND, ADULTERY OF ONE
OF THE SPOUSES, SIBLING RIVALRY, FAVORITISM ON THE PART OF THE PARENTS,
AND DIFFICULTIES WITH IN-LAWS. TEPOTZTLAN, HOWEVER, REPRESENTS MERELY
A CASE IN WHICH THE CONFLICT WHICH WAS PRESENT WITHIN THE FAMILY WAS
IGNORED IN A COMMUNITY STUDY. EXAMPLES OF SOCIETIES IN WHICH INTRA-
FAMILIAL CONFLICT OCCURS IN MAGNIFIED FORM HAVE BEEN ALMOST ENTIRELY
IGNORED BY THEORISTS CONCERNED WITH A PARTICULAR DICHTOMY. ANTHRO-
POLOGISTS WHO HAVE BEEN FREE OF THE PRECONCEPTIONS OF DICHTOMOUS
TYPES OF SOCIAL LIFE HAVE, HOWEVER, PROVIDED DESCRIPTIONS OF MANY PRI-
MITIVE SOCIETIES CHARACTERIZED BY MUCH PRIMARY-GROUP CONFLICT. DUBOIS,
IN HER DESCRIPTION OF THE ALORESE OF THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES, HAS
FOUND THAT QUARRELING AMONG FAMILY MEMBERS AND RELATIVES IS ALMOST
CONTINUOUS, PARTICULARLY BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. SHE MAKES THE FOL-
LOWING COMMENT CONCERNING FANTAN, HER ALORESE INTERPRETER:

18 LEWIS, OP. CIT., P. 58.
FAKTAM'S MARRIAGE SEEMS TO BE A TYPICAL ALORESE MARRIAGE, WITH CONSTANT JEALOUS QUARRELING AND BICKERING ABOUT PROPERTY. HE IS ALMOST CONSTANTLY ON THE VERGE OF DIVORCING HIS WIFE, REPEATEDLY SEPARATING FROM HER AND THEN BEING RECONCILED. IT IS UNDOUBTEDLY ON THESE OCCASIONS OF SEPARATION FROM TILAMU THAT FANTAN DOES A GOOD DEAL OF HIS PHILANDERING. THE VINDICTIVENESS OF THE WIFE IS VERY CLEARLY SHOWN. SO VIOLENT ARE HER FEELINGS THAT SHE ACTUALLY PLACES A LEPROSY CURSE UPON FANTAN.

DUBOIS REMARKS THAT INTRAFAMILIAL QUARRELS WERE SO FREQUENT THAT HER ATTEMPT TO RECORD ALL OF THEM PROVED TO BE TOO TIME-CONSUMING AND SHE ABANDONED THE TASK. HOWEVER, IN EVEN THE PARTIAL RECORD MADE, EVERY TYPE OF KIN WAS INVOLVED: PARENTS WITH CHILDREN, SIBLINGS WITH COUSINS OF BOTH SEXES, GRANDPARENTS WITH GRANDCHILDREN, AUNTS AND UNCLES WITH Nieces AND NEPHEWS.

FAMILIAL CONFLICT REACHES AN EXTREME AMONG THE DOBUANS SOUTHEAST OF NEW GUINEA, WHO HAVE BEEN STUDIED BY FORTUNE. DOBUAN SOCIETY IS ORGANIZED ON A MATRILINEAL KINSHIP BASIS WITH ALL THE MEMBERS OF A PARTICULAR VILLAGE RELATED BY A FICTITIOUS EXTENSION OF KINSHIP IF NOT THROUGH ACTUAL KINSHIP. WITHIN THE VILLAGE KINSHIP GROUP THERE IS A HIGH DEGREE OF SOLIDARITY WHICH IS COMPLEMENTED BY A STRONG HOSTILITY TO ALL OTHER VILLAGES. A PERSON MUST MARRY OUTSIDE HIS OWN VILLAGE GROUP, HOWEVER, AND THUS IT IS NECESSARY TO MARRY A PERSON WHO HAS BEEN CONSIDERED A LIFE-LONG ENEMY: "ONE MARRIES INTO A VILLAGE OF ENEMIES, WITCHES, AND SORCERERS, SOME OF WHOm ARE KNOWN TO HAVE KILLED OR TO BE THE CHILDREN OF THOSE KNOWN TO HAVE KILLED MEMBERS OF ONE'S OWN VILLAGE."

LIVING IN THE VILLAGE OF ONE'S SPOUSE CAUSES SO MUCH DIFFICULTY THAT AN ATTEMPT IS MADE TO ESTABLISH RECIPROCITY THROUGH A SYSTEM OF ALTERNATING

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20 Ibid., P. 119.
21 FORTUNE, OP. CIT., P. 23.
RESIDENCE, WITH THE HUSBAND LIVING IN HIS WIFE'S VILLAGE OF MATRILINEAL KIN ONE YEAR AND THE WIFE LIVING IN HER HUSBAND'S VILLAGE OF MATRILINEAL KIN THE NEXT YEAR. THE INTER-VILLAGE HOSTILITY IS CARRIED OVER INTO THE FAMILY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE RESULT THAT FEAR, DISTRUST, INFIDELITY, AND JEALOUSY CHARACTERIZE HUSBAND-WIFE RELATIONS.

THE DOBAN HUSBAND NEEDS TO WATCH HIS WIFE FAIRLY CLOSELY FOR FEAR OF INFIDELITY. THE REVERSE APPLIES WHEN THE WIFE IS IN HER HUSBAND'S PLACE. JEALOUSY AND SUSPICION OF ADULTERY ARE SENTIMENTS OF GREAT AND ABNORMAL GROWTH IN DOBAN MARRIED LIFE. FROM THIS CONFLICT IN DOBU COMES A STATE OF MUTUAL WATCH ANDWARD OVER EACH OTHER BY HUSBAND AND WIFE, A STATE GARRIED TO AN EXTREME OF INDIGNITY AS A NORMAL PHENOMENON. FROM THE CONFLICT COMES ALSO FREQUENT ATTEMPTS AT SUICIDE WHICH DO NOT USUALLY EVEN ATTAIN TO THE DIGNITY OF BEING FATAL. 

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN PARENTS AND CHILDREN ARE ALSO CHARACTERIZED BY A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CONFLICT, FOR CHILDREN ARE NOT VERY HIGHLY VALUED BY THE DOBANS. NEITHER THE HUSBAND NOR THE WIFE WANTS TO HAVE CHILDREN BECAUSE OF THE LONG TABOO ON INTERCOURSE DURING THE CONFINEMENT AND NURSING PERIODS. THE WOMAN IS ALSO SAID TO LOSE HER BEAUTY IN CHILD-BEARING, SO SHE FEARS BOTH THAT HER HUSBAND WILL MORE LIKELY BE UNFAITHFUL AND THAT SHE HERSELF WILL BE AT A DISADVANTAGE IN FUTURE LOVE AFFAIRS.

EVEN THOUGH THE MATRILINEAL KINSHIP GROUP POSSESSES GREATER SOLIDARITY AND STABILITY THAN THE BIOLOGICAL FAMILY GROUP, IT ALSO IS CHARACTERIZED BY CONFLICT, FEAR, AND DISTRUST AMONG ITS MEMBERS.

SUSPICION OF SORCERY AND POISONING TACTICS WITHIN THE VILLAGE RUNS VERY HIGH AT TIMES. THE FEAR OF BEING POISONED DOMINATES NATIVE LIFE. FOOD OR TOBACCO IS NOT ACCEPTED EXCEPT WITHIN A SMALL CIRCLE. THE WOMAN OF THE HOUSE WHEN COOKING DOES NOT LEAVE THE POT AND GO AWAY FOR AS LONG AS A HALF MINUTE EVEN. DESPITE THE FEAR OF ACCEPTING FOOD OR DRINK, POISONED,

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22 I BID., PP. 77, 91.  
23 I BID., PP. 273-274.
FROM FALSE FRIENDS, MISTAKES ARE SOMETIMES MADE. . . . OUTWARDLY
THERE IS GREAT RESPECT FOR PERSONALITY SPRINGING DIRECTLY FROM THE
FEAR OF HOSTILE SORCERY OR WITCHCRAFT. BUT SECRETLY THERE IS A
COVERT DESIRE TO DO THE WORST BY NEIGHBORS, SPRINGING ALSO FROM
THE FEAR OF THEIR SORCERY AND WITCHCRAFT. THUS OUTWARD RESPECT GOES
WITH AS MUCH AS CAN BE DONE IN ILL TURNS WITHOUT DETECTION. 24

PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS EVEN WITHIN THE KINSHIP GROUP HAVE A SEVERELY
COMPETITIVE NATURE, AS FORTUNE INDICATES:

IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE HOW OUR DISTINCTION BETWEEN REAL COMPE-
TITION WHERE ONE MAN'S GAIN IS ANOTHER'S LOSS, AND RIVALRY WHERE
ALL MAY GAIN, BUT NOT AT ONE ANOTHER'S EXPENSE, IS NOT MADE IN
DOBU. ALL MATTERS OF ECONOMICS FALL UNDER THE REAL COMPETITION
CONCEPT. . . . THE BLACK ART IS USED AGAINST AN OVER-SUCCESSFUL
GARDENER, SINCE HE IS BELIEVED TO HAVE STOLEN OTHER PERSONS' YAMS
FROM THEIR GARDENS BY MAGIC. 25

IN FINAL PROOF THAT SOLIDARITY IS WEAK IN DOBUAN SOCIETY IS THE FACT
THAT . . . THE MEN OF DOBU FEEL SAFER IN THE TROBRIANDS AMONG A
STRANGE PEOPLE OF A STRANGE SPEECH THAN THEY DO IN THEIR OWN HOMES. 26

FROM THE EXAMPLES OF TEPOTLAN, ALOR, AND DOBU, THEN, IT APPEARS
THAT ISOLATED, HOMOGENEOUS SOCIETIES ARE NOT NECESSARILY CHARACTERIZED
BY A HIGH DEGREE OF SOLIDARITY AND FRICTIONLESS COOPERATIVE ACTIVITY
IN KINSHIP AND FAMILIAL RELATIONS. SUCH AN ASSUMPTION CAN BE MADE ONLY
BY DISREGARDING SOME OF THE EVIDENCE AND BY CAREFULLY CHOOSING EXAMPLES
TO ILLUSTRATE THE ASSUMPTION.

THE EVIDENCE CITED ABOVE OF SOCIETIES WHICH DO NOT CORRESPOND TO THE
EXPECTATIONS OF THE THEORISTS OF DICHOTOMOUS SOCIETAL TYPES SUGGESTS TWO
CONCLUSIONS. FIRST, THE PRESUMED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POLAR TYPES
CANNOT BE REGARDED AS INTERDEPENDENT OR LINKED VARIABLES. CERTAIN
CHARACTERISTICS ARE NOT NECESSARILY FOUND TOGETHER IN ALL CASES, AS THE

24 Ibid., pp. 9, 170-171, 78. 25 Ibid., p. 151.
26 Ibid., p. 176.
Evidence abundantly proves. Whereas it may be legitimate to characterize social change as a movement toward urban, industrial society from rural, pastoral or agricultural society, it is not necessarily true that there are certain other changes related to the movement, such as an increasing impersonalization of social relationships. Gross suggests that the rural-urban dichotomy is too broad and unspecific to be of much use, and he calls for new theoretical frameworks which focus upon an analysis of specific variables: "Viewing societies, then, on continua of sociological variables (for example, cultural isolation) not only may present a clearer and more trenchant analysis of phases of social relationships and human interaction, but on a theoretical level it allows for the embracing of many types of communities, rather than the restrictive rural-urban dichotomy approach." The same comment might be applied to the other dichotomies with equal validity, even though Gross certainly did not intend for it to be applied to Redfield's folk-urban dichotomy, which he believed his own findings to have substantiated.

The second conclusion to be derived from the evidence cited above is that the use of polar types obscures rather than elucidates important cultural differences through the selectivity of only certain traits involved. One of the most important findings of modern cultural anthropology is that there are great differences in ways of life and value systems among various primitive societies. Yet the dichotomous theories group together advanced cultures like that of the Aztecs and simple food-gathering peoples like the Shoshone. Societies which are as different

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Culturally and psychologically as the Arunta and the Eskimo, the Dobu and the Ba Thonga, the Zuni and the Alqorese, the Dahomey and the Navaho are placed in a single category. Similarly, the cities of ancient Greece, Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Rome are placed in the same category with modern American cities, in spite of the profound differences. The dichotomous theories are concerned with categories based on form rather than with problems phrased in terms of process, and these formal aspects of society are not the most crucial for cultural analysis. As Lewis remarks, "indeed, one might argue that the folk-urban classification is not a cultural classification at all since it rides roughshod over fundamental cultural differences, that is, differences in the ethos of a people." The polar types which have been proposed by various theorists are too much of a catchall to be of much use even in the analysis of social change. It is not enough to ask the question of how a folk society changes after coming into contact with an urban society. The investigator must first ask, "what kind of folk society; what kind of urban society; and under what conditions of contact?"

Madness in Method

Besides the high degree of selectivity in supporting data, there are several other methodological points upon which most of the theorists of dichotomous types of social life may be criticized. One of the most common errors of these theorists lies in the abuse of the ideal typical method, for although most of the modern theorists verbally assert that their typologies do not and need not correspond to empirical cases,

Lewis, op. cit., p. 434.
A majority of them lapse into what Whitehead calls the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness" in actual practice. By this Whitehead means simply the error of mistaking the abstract for the concrete. The dichotomous theorists, after abstracting a number of characteristics from particular cases and deducing a system of related characteristics, apparently feel so pleased with their work that they tend to forget that the typologies can be nothing more than heuristic standards from which to measure differences of concrete cases. Forgetting the basic postulate of ideal typical methodology that differences from the ideal type rather than identities to it are the crucial consideration, these theorists search for the ideal type in concrete cases. Their apparent success in finding such cases has, of course, been the result of selectivity in their methods. As has been demonstrated above, particularly in the case of Redfield, the practice has been to force the data into a preconceived mold—the ideal type—while the investigator has ridden roughshod over the crucial differences from the ideal construct.

Many of the theorists of dichotomous typologies have fallen into another pitfall in their use of the ideal typical method. An inordinate emphasis has been put upon taxonomy in many cases and the real raison d'etre of the ideal types—their use in the analysis of social change—has been largely forgotten. Even in those cases in which social change has been considered, the analyses have remained superficial, for they have rarely gone beyond the point of stating simply that there is a trend from one polar type to another polar type of society. This, of

COURSE, NEGLECTS THE BASIC PROBLEM OF CHANGE: WHAT CAUSES A SOCIETY TO CHANGE IN A PARTICULAR DIRECTION? ONLY A FEW OF THE THEORISTS HAVE FACED THE QUESTION DIRECTLY: MARX AND MORGAN HAVE FORMULATED A TECHNOLOGICAL THEORY; TONNIES AND DURKHEIM HAVE OFFERED OTHER THEORIES, FOR THE MOST PART UNACCEPTABLE; MOST OF THE OTHERS HAVE NOT CONSIDERED THE QUESTION EXPLICITLY.


THE NEGLECT OF THE CAUSES OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA BY THE DICHOTOMOUS THEORIES IS PERHAPS MOST CLEARLY REVEALED IN THE FAILURE TO DISCOVER THE DYNAMICS OF WARM, INTIMATE, SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS. USUALLY THE THEORIST MERELY STATES THAT SUCH RELATIONSHIPS GROW "SPONTANEOUSLY" OUT

30 LEWIS, OP. CIT., P. 433. SEE ALSO OSCAR LEWIS, "PLOW CULTURE AND HOE CULTURE—A STUDY IN CONTRASTS," RURAL SOCIOLOGY, XIV (JUNE, 1949), 126-127.
OF THE FACE-TO-FACE RELATIONSHIPS OF THE PRIMARY GROUP. ALTHOUGH IT IS
TRUE THAT THESE RELATIONSHIPS ARE USUALLY FOUND IN CONNECTION WITH PRIMARY
GROUPS, THIS IS BY NO MEANS THE CASE WITH REFERENCE TO PATRIOTISM.
PATRIOTISM IN ITS INTENSE FORMS IS CLOSELY SIMILAR TO OTHER INTIMATE
AND PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS, BUT IT OBVIOUSLY DOES NOT ARISE SPONTANEOUSLY
OUT OF THE FACE-TO-FACE CONTACTS OF EACH PERSON WITH EVERY OTHER PERSON
IN A NATION. THE PHENOMENON OF PATRIOTISM REMAINS UNRECONCILED WITH THE
THEORY OF THE PRIMARY GROUP, AND IT WILL REMAIN SO UNTIL THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES INVOLVED IN ALL WARM, INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS ARE
DISCOVERED. THEORIES OF DICHOTOMOUS TYPLOGIES HAVE TENDED TO LIMIT
ATTENTION TO FORMAL CATEGORIES RATHER THAN TO ENCOURAGE INVESTIGATION
OF PROCESSES UNDERLYING THE FORMS.

ANOTHER METHODOLOGICAL ERROR MADE BY SOME OF THE THEORISTS WHO
HAVE ATTEMPTED TO APPLY DICHOTOMOUS TYPES IN EMPIRICAL STUDIES DERIVES
FROM AN UNWARRANTED ASSUMPTION OF THE HOMOGENEITY OF A PRIMITIVE, FOLK
SOCIETY. ACCORDING TO THE PRECONCEIVED DICHOTOMOUS SYSTEM, THE SOCIETY
BEING STUDIED IS SUPPOSED TO BE HOMOGENEOUS, AND THE FIELD WORKER ASSUMES
THAT IT IS. AS A RESULT, THE FIELD WORKER IS LIKELY TO USE ONLY A FEW
INFORMANTS SINCE HE BELIEVES THAT HE IS LIKELY TO GET THE SAME PICTURE
FROM OTHERS IN SUCH A HOMOGENEOUS CULTURE. ACTUALLY EVEN THE SIMPLEST
PRIMITIVE SOCIETY IS NONE TOO HOMOGENEOUS, AND BECAUSE IT IS HARDLY
ACCEPTABLE SCIENTIFIC PROCEDURE TO ASSUME HOMOGENEITY WITHOUT VERIFYING
IT EMPIRICALLY. TUMIN HAS COMMENTED UPON THE SURPRISING DEGREE OF
HETEROGENEITY TO BE FOUND IN PEASANT COMMUNITIES IN GUATEMALA.

IT MAKES CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCE TO THE OBSERVER WHETHER HE VIEWS
THE SITUATION THROUGH THE EYES OF A YOUNG MAN OR AN OLD MAN, A
FATHER OR A SON, A MOTHER OR A DAUGHTER. ONE DOES NOT GET THE SAME
PICTURE FROM ANY RANDOMLY SELECTED INDIVIDUAL IN THE COMMUNITY. 31

ONE REASON FOR THE RADICALLY DIFFERENT CONCLUSIONS OF REDFIELD AND LEWIS
ABOUT TEPOTZLAN MAY STEM FROM THE FACT THAT REDFIELD USED ABOUT SIX
INFORMANTS WHEREAS LEWIS USED WELL OVER ONE HUNDRED. 32

A COMMON PRACTICE OF THE DICHOTOMOUS THEORISTS IS THE USE OF
CONCRETE AND RECOGNIZED DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TWO SOCIETIES TO LEND
CREDENCE TO THE OTHER SUPPOSED DIFFERENCES. THIS PRACTICE SMACKS OF
SOPHISTRY, FOR ONE MAY SUSPECT THAT THE AUTHOR REASONS THUS: "IF I
CAN CONVINCE THE READER ON THIS POINT, PERHAPS HE WILL NOT DEMAND
RIGOROUS PROOFS OF THE OTHER CRUCIAL POINTS, WHICH I BELIEVE TO BE TRUE
BUT FOR WHICH I HAVE NO CONCRETE SUPPORTING EVIDENCE." USUALLY SUCH
PROCEDURE IS NOTHING MORE THAN IGNORATIO ELENCHI, THAT IS, THE ATTEMPT
TO WIN A POINT BY PROVING A POINT NOT IN DISPUTE. LOOMIS AND BEEGLE,
FOR EXAMPLE, DISCUSS RURAL-URBAN BIRTH RATE DIFFERENTIALS IN AN ATTEMPT
TO LEND SUPPORT TO OTHER ASSUMED DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE FAMILISTIC
GEWEMSCHAFT SOCIETY AND THE CONTRACTUAL GESELLSCHAFT. POINTING OUT
THAT URBAN BIRTH RATES ARE LOWER THAN RURAL BIRTH RATES, THEY MAINTAIN
THAT THIS PROVES THAT RURAL SOCIETY IS CHARACTERIZED BY EMOTIONAL
ACTIVITY AND URBAN SOCIETY BY RATIONAL, PLANNED ACTIVITY: "THE EXTENT
OF BIRTH CONTROL IS USED HERE AS AN INDEX TO RANK THE FAMILY SYSTEMS ON
THE CONTINUUM: ACTIVITY INFLUENCED BY EMOTION VERSUS RATIONAL, PLANNED
ACTIVITY." 33 THE BIRTH DIFFERENTIALS ARE, OF COURSE, INDISPUTABLE, BUT

31 MELVIN TUMIN, "THE DYNAMICS OF CULTURAL DISCONTINUITY IN A
PEASANT SOCIETY," SOCIAL FORCES, XXIX (Dec., 1950), 141.
32 LEWIS, LIFE IN A MEXICAN VILLAGE; TEPOTZLAN RESTUDIED, P. 431.
33 CHARLES P. LOOMIS AND J. ALLAN BEEGLE, RURAL SOCIAL SYSTEMS, P. 73.
IT IS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THIS IS ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO LEAD TO THE MORE
GENERAL CONCLUSION CONCERNING THE DEGREE OF RATIONALITY. IN THEIR ZEALOUS
ATTEMPT TO CONTRAST URBAN AND RURAL WAYS OF LIFE, LOOMIS AND BEEGLE ALSO
OVERLOOK THE FACT THAT THE LOWER-CLASS URBAN POPULATION HAS A HIGHER
BIRTH RATE THAN THE MIDDLE-CLASS RURAL POPULATION. USING THEIR CONTINUUM,
THIS WOULD PLACE A PART OF URBAN SOCIETY ON THE SIDE RESERVED FOR RURAL
SOCIETY AND VICE VERSA.

ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE USE OF CONCRETE SOCIETAL DIFFERENCES TO
SUPPORT MORE GENERAL CONCLUSIONS MAY BE SEEN IN THE PRACTICE OF RURAL
SOCIOLGISTS OF USING DIVORCE RATES TO "PROVE" THAT FAMILY SOLIDARITY IS
GREATER IN RURAL, HOMOGENEOUS SOCIETIES THAN IN INDUSTRIAL, URBAN
HETEROGENEOUS SOCIETIES. DIVORCE RATES ARE TAKEN TO BE AN INDEX TO THE
BREAKDOWN OF SOLIDARITY AND THE DISORGANIZATION OF THE FAMILY. Thus
LOOMIS AND BEEGLE STATE THAT "AS GOOD AN INDEX AS ANY OF SOLIDARY RELA-
TIONS IN THE FAMILY IS THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE FAMILY IS BROKEN, BY
DIVORCE, DESERTION, OR FACTORS OTHER THAN DEATH."34 THE EVIDENCE, THEY
POINT OUT, INDICATES THAT THE FARM FAMILIES HAVE THE LOWEST RATES OF
DISRUPTION DUE TO OTHER THAN PHYSICAL CAUSES, AND THE URBAN FAMILIES HAVE
THE HIGHEST RATES, ALTHOUGH THEY ADMIT THE LACK OF AN ACCURATE STATIS-
TICAL INDEX OF DISRUPTION. Indeed, LOOMIS AND BEEGLE RELY UPON "PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE AND JUDGMENT" TO PLACE SIX TYPES OF FAMILIES ALONG A SOLIDARY-
ANTAGONISTIC CONTINUUM.35 DISREGARDING THIS HIGHLY QUESTIONABLE PRACTICE,
IT APPEARS THAT LOOMIS AND BEEGLE—and MANY OTHER THEORISTS—MAKE THE
FOLLOWING ASSUMPTIONS: (1) DIVORCE OR FAMILY DISRUPTION RATES ARE AN
ACCURATE INDEX OF SOLIDARITY, (2) DIVORCE IS IDENTIFIED WITH FAMILY

34 Ibid., p. 70. 35 Ibid., p. 71. 
DISORGANIZATION AND DEMORALIZATION AND AS SUCH IS CONSIDERED TO BE AN EVIL, AND (3) FAMILY DISRUPTION IS CORRELATED WITH INCREASING URBANIZATION AND HETEROGENEITY.

In the United States it is undoubtedly true that divorce rates are higher in urban than in rural areas, but the conclusion which have been drawn on this factual base appear to be fallacious. First, the conclusion that the mere lack of divorce or desertion indicates the presence of solidarity shows an astonishing lack of understanding of the forces which hold families together. To be sure solidarity, a community of feeling and interest growing out of mutual identification, is important, but it is only one of many factors operating to give cohesion. External forces, such as economic necessity, the pressure of public opinion, and the inflexibility of the laws may keep the family intact in the absence of solidarity from within. If stability of relationships in a group is taken as the criterion of solidarity, it would appear that the Federal prison at Alcatraz is characterized by a high degree of solidarity. This, of course, is not true, for cohesion exists only because it is externally imposed; "externally imposed solidarity" is a contradiction in terms. It is precisely in the cities where the external cohesive forces are at a minimum, and therefore divorce rates are high in the cities, but there is also a high proportion of remarriages among the divorced. In the rural areas where the family has retained many of its economic and educational functions, divorce is less possible because of external factors. It should be noted, however, that divorce rates are comparatively low also for urban middle class families, for economic factors are probably more significant than rural-urban residence.
FOR THE QUESTION OF FAMILY STABILITY. GOODE HAS POINTED OUT THAT THERE IS AN "... INVERSE CORRELATION BETWEEN ECONOMIC STATUS AND RATE OF DIVORCE." IT IS HIGHLY QUESTIONABLE, THEN, WHETHER THE RURAL FAMILY IS CHARACTERIZED BY GREATER SOLIDARITY THAN THE URBAN FAMILY. THE AVERAGE RURAL FAMILY PROBABLY POSSESSES GREATER STABILITY, BUT IS IT NOT POSSIBLE THAT THERE IS MORE HAPPINESS AND AFFECTION WITHIN THE URBAN FAMILY WHERE THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF RECTIFYING AN UNFORTUNATE MARRIAGE?

A SIMILAR POINT OF VIEW IS EXPRESSED BY HILL, WHO DEFENDS THE URBAN, CONJUGAL TYPE OF FAMILY:


Thus the decline in the number of functions of the family and the rising divorce rates in urban, industrial societies do not necessarily mean the end of the family as an institution. As BENNETT AND TUMIN REMARK, A RISING DIVORCE RATE IS SIMPLY AN "... INDICATION THAT THE TRADITIONAL TABOO ON DIVORCE HAS WEAKENED ALONG WITH OTHER SEXUAL MORES, AND THAT MUTUAL ADJUSTMENT AND SUCCESSFUL LIVING TOGETHER ARE HELD TO BE MORE IMPORTANT THAN AVOIDANCE OF THE 'SHAME' OF DIVORCE BY


AN INCREASING NUMBER. . . .

Even the third assumption that family stability decreases as urbanization and industrialization increases is based upon a highly selective study of societies. In many primitive societies which are relatively isolated and homogeneous divorce rates are higher than they are in American cities. Among the Dobuans, for example, it is normal for persons to be divorced at least once and more often two or three times. Fortune makes the following reports:

A man's marriage usually goes on the rocks, as divorce follows infidelity, and fidelity is very very rare. Typically his wife will commit adultery with a village "brother," he with a village "sister." Both will remarry after their divorce. . . . The oldest Dobuan in my main genealogy had had eight successive marriages, one of the youngest men in the genealogy had had four, one other youth three, and this is fairly typical of an overwhelming majority of Dobuans.

Method in Madness

Most of the theories of dichotomous types of social life exhibit a pronounced bias in favor of one of the polar types. The majority of the theorists favor the type of social life found in the folk, homogeneous, or Gemeinschaft-like society, whereas a fewer number favor the opposite type. Both are united, however, in a fundamental opposition to many of the characteristics of capitalistic society. The arguments used by both sides are basically Marxian in their criticism of the exploitation and victimization of the individual and the reduction of

38. Bennett and Tumin, op. cit., p. 565. This point of view has received its clearest statement in William J. Goode, "Education for Divorce," Marriage and Family Living, X (1947), 35-36.

39. Fortune, op. cit., pp. 277, 9. Even in a tribe characterized by moderation and cooperation, such as the Zuni, divorce may occur with some frequency. See Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture, Mentor Edition, p. 67.
ALL SOCIAL RELATIONS TO AN IMPERSONAL CASH NEXUS IN CAPITALISTIC SOCIETY.

The orientation of the two groups, however, is markedly different. To those who look with nostalgia to the past, capitalistic society appears to be the end result of the industrialization process. They fear that further industrialization will bring an aggravation of the abuses already present, and therefore they call for a reversal of the process and a return to the conditions of the past. The other group, including Morgan, Marx, Tonnies, and perhaps Durkheim, also view capitalistic society as the result of industrialization and the growth of technology, but they do not regard it as the end product of the industrialization process. They believe that the trouble with modern society is not too much industrialization with all its concomitants, but rather too little. They envision a society of the future in which men will live in peace, governed by rationality and science, and enjoying the fruits of economic abundance, the pleasures of warm, personal relationships, and the opportunities for full self-development. Whether modern man should pursue a course of reaction returning to medievalism, as Sorokin advocates, or whether he should follow the "dictates of technology" in an attempt to create a better industrial society in the future, as Marx advocated, is a question which involves a fundamental value judgment.

The emphasis upon cultural relativism in social theory today and the valiant if somewhat futile attempts of Lundberg and others to make sociology a "value-free" discipline should not be allowed to obscure the fact that science is not nonpartisan. It is almost a rhetorical question to ask whether science supports the development of a society in which it has no place or whether it supports the development of a
SOCIETY IN WHICH IT OCCUPIES A PLACE OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE AND IN WHICH IT IS FREE TO CONTINUE TO DEVELOP. IT IS DIFFICULT TO RECONCILE THE CLAIMS OF MANY OF THE THEORISTS THAT THEY ARE PRACTITIONERS OF SCIENCE WITH THEIR EXPLICIT OR IMPLICIT BIASES IN FAVOR OF STATIC FOLK SOCIETIES GOVERNED BY IRRATIONAL TRADITION. SUCH BIASES ARE MORE APPROPRIATE TO AN AMOS OR A MICAH, WHO DERIVES HIS INSPIRATION FROM THE SACRED TRADITIONS OF THE PAST, THAN TO A SOCIAL SCIENTIST, WHO PRESUMABLY REACHES HIS CONCLUSIONS ONLY AFTER CAREFUL, RATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE.

A PRIME EXAMPLE OF HOW VALUE BIAS AGAINST URBANIZATION AND INDUSTRIALIZATION AFFECTS THE RESULTING ANALYSIS MAY BE SEEN IN THE ALMOST INVARIABLE ASSOCIATION OF THE WORD "DISORGANIZATION" WITH THE URBANIZATION PROCESS. IT IS TRUE THAT URBANIZATION IS RELATED TO AN INCREASING HETEROGENEITY IN SOCIETY AND TO MANY FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN IT, BUT TO USE A VALUE-LOADED TERM LIKE "DISORGANIZATION" TO DESCRIBE THE PROCESS MERELY BEGS THE QUESTION. THE QUESTION IS THIS: ARE THERE NOT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF ORGANIZATION FOR A SOCIETY AND IS NOT "REORGANIZATION" A MORE APPROPRIATE DESIGNATION THAN "DISORGANIZATION"? 40 GROSS, WHO HAS MADE A STUDY OF FOUR AMERICAN RURAL COMMUNITIES OF DIFFERING DEGREES OF CULTURAL ISOLATION, REMARKS THAT

... WHEREAS IN REDFIELD'S SCHEME EL CERRITO IS CHARACTERIZED BY A HIGH DEGREE OF ORGANIZATION, IT IS FURTHER POSSIBLE THAT THE TWO COMMUNITIES MAY BE MERELY ORGANIZED ON DIFFERENT LEVELS OR PRINCIPLES. THUS, THE ARGUMENT COULD BE DEFENDED THAT WHEREAS THE BASIS OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION IN EL CERRITO IS AN INSISTENCE

40 THIS POINT IS DERIVED FROM THE WORK OF THOMAS AND ZNANIECKI: "SOCIAL STABILITY IS BUT A PROCESS OF CONTINUALLY REORGANIZING A CONTINUALLY DIS-ORGANIZING PLURALITY PATTERN. ... THE STABILITY OF GROUP INSTITUTIONS IS THUS SIMPLY A DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM PROCESS OF DISORGANIZATION AND REORGANIZATION." (W. I. THOMAS AND FLORIAN ZNANIECKI, THE POLISH PEASANT IN EUROPE AND AMERICA, PP. 1129-1130.)
BY THE COMMUNITY THAT ALL VILLAGERS MUST SUBSCRIBE TO THE SAME SET OF NORMS, IN WHEATVILLE THE BASIS OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION IS AN IMPLICIT AGREEMENT AMONG COMMUNITY MEMBERS TO ALLOW DISSIMILAR VALUES AND NORMS TO OPERATE WITHIN THE LOCAL WEB OF RELATIONSHIPS. 41

THAT A HETEROGENEOUS SOCIETY IS NOT NECESSARILY A DISORGANIZED OR UNPLEASANT ONE HAS BEEN POINTED OUT BY MEAD. SHE CRITICIZES THOSE WHO SEEK TO RETURN TO A MORE HOMOGENEOUS TYPE OF SOCIETY AND CALLS FOR AN "EDUCATION FOR CHOICE" 42.

... WE MUST TURN ALL OF OUR EDUCATIONAL EFFORTS TO TRAINING OUR CHILDREN FOR THE CHOICES WHICH WILL CONFRONT THEM. EDUCATION IN THE HOME EVEN MORE THAN AT SCHOOL, INSTEAD OF BEING A SPECIAL PLEADING FOR ONE REGIME, A DESPERATE ATTEMPT TO FORM ONE PARTICULAR HABIT OF MIND WHICH WILL WITHSTAND ALL OUTSIDE INFLUENCES, MUST BE A PREPARATION FOR THOSE VERY INFLUENCES. THE CHILDREN MUST BE TAUGHT HOW TO THINK, NOT WHAT TO THINK. UNHAMPERED BY PREJUDICES, UNVEXED BY TOO EARLY CONDITIONING TO ANY ONE STANDARD, THEY MUST COME CLEAR-EYED TO THE CHOICES WHICH LIE BEFORE THEM. 42

IN SOME OF THE THEORIES OF DICHTOMOUS TYPES OF SOCIAL LIFE, THE CITY IS HELD TO BE A DISORGANIZING INFLUENCE UPON RURAL, FOLK SOCIETY, AND THOSE WHO MIGRATE FROM RURAL TO URBAN AREAS ARE EXPECTED TO BECOME DISORGANIZED. TO ILLUSTRATE THE POINT RATES FOR JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, CRIME, MENTAL ILLNESS, ILLEGENTICITY AND OTHER INDICES OF PERSONAL DISORGANIZATION ARE QUOTED TO SHOW THAT EACH OF THESE HAS A HIGHER INCIDENCE IN URBAN AREAS. FRAZIER, FOR EXAMPLE, IN HIS STUDY OF THE AMERICAN NEGRO FAMILY COMMENTS THAT

... SOCIAL AND WELFARE AGENCIES HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO STEM THE TIDE OF FAMILY DISORGANIZATION THAT HAS FOLLOWED AS A NATURAL CONSEQUENCE OF THE IMPACT OF MODERN CIVILIZATION UPON THE FOLKWAYS AND MORES OF A SIMPLE PEASANT FOLK. EVEN NEGRO FAMILIES WITH TRADITIONS OF STABLE FAMILY LIFE HAVE NOT BEEN UNAFFECTED.


42 MARGARET MEAD, COMING OF AGE IN SAMOA, MENTOR EDITION, P. 161.
BY THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FORCES IN URBAN COMMUNITIES. FAMILY
TRADITIONS AND SOCIAL DISTINCTIONS THAT HAD MEANING AND SIGNI-
FICANCE IN THE RELATIVELY SIMPLE AND STABLE SOUTHERN COMMUNITIES
HAVE LOST THEIR MEANING IN THE NEW WORLD OF THE MODERN CITY.\(^{43}\)

More specifically Frazier states that "... THE CONSTANT FLOW OF SIMPLE
PEASANT FOLK FROM RURAL DISTRICTS TO THE POVERTY AND DISORGANIZATION OF
CITY SLUMS CONSTANTLY RE-CREATES THE PROBLEM OF UNMARRIED MOTHERHOOD."\(^{44}\)

He admits, however, that "ILLEGITIMACY, LIKE OTHER FORMS OF FAMILY
DISORGANIZATION, TENDS TO BECOME SEGREGATED IN THE POORDER SECTIONS OF
THE NEGRO COMMUNITY LOCATED IN THE SLUM AREAS OF OUR CITIES."\(^{45}\) In this
LAST FACT THERE IS A HINT THAT URBAN MIGRATION IN ITSELF MAY NOT BE THE
CRUCIAL ISSUE CONCERNING PERSONAL DISORGANIZATION IN THE CITIES. IT
SEEMS RATHER TO BE A QUESTION OF WHETHER THE IN-MIGRANT IS "INSULATED"
AGAINST CERTAIN URBAN CONDITIONS BY WAY OF EDUCATION, SOCIAL CLASS POSI-
TION, WEALTH, AND SO FORTH. THOSE WHO HAVE SUCH "INSULATION" CAN AVOID
MENTAL JOBS AND SLUM HOUSING, AND THEY HAVE LITTLE DIFFICULTY IN
ADJUSTING TO URBAN LIFE. A POPULAR FIGURE IN AMERICAN LORE IS THE FARM
BOY WHO GOES TO THE CITY AND MAKES GOOD: A LARGE PERCENTAGE OF THE
STABLE, MIDDLE-CLASS PERSONS OF AMERICAN CITIES HAVE RURAL BACKGROUNDS.

THUS URBANIZATION DOES NOT NECESSARILY BRING DISORGANIZATION IN THE
FORM OF ILLEGITIMACY, DELINQUENCY, AND MENTAL ILLNESS. IT CAN JUST AS
WELL BRING A REORGANIZATION OF LIFE ON A DIFFERENT LEVEL. REORGANIZA-
TION IS NOT LIMITED TO THE MIDDLE CLASSES, EITHER. FRAZIER POINTS OUT
THAT A NEGRO INDUSTRIAL PROLETARIAT IS GROWING UP IN AMERICAN CITIES
WHICH IS PROVIDING A STABILITY TO FAMILY LIFE WHICH HAS NEVER BEEN

\(^{43}\) E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER, THE NEGRO FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES,
REVISED AND ABRIDGED EDITION, P. 364.

\(^{44}\) Ibid., P. 260.

\(^{45}\) Ibid., P. 267.
PRESENT BEFORE: "... as the Negro worker becomes an industrial worker, he assumes responsibility for the support of his family and acquires new authority in family relations." 46

The lot of the urban industrial worker today is without doubt much better than many of the theorists of dichotomous types of social life would lead one to believe. They present a picture of exploitation, impersonality, and brutalizing repetitive work on an assembly line. In other words, they have retained the Marxian criticisms of capitalism in the nineteenth century. Martindale and Monachesi represent this point of view.

In a secularized society ... a man must specialize or die. ... As a factory laborer, he assumes a minute position on the assembly line. ... The rest of his possible functions simply atrophy by disuse. ... Nor does he respond any longer to his society as a whole. 47

Martindale and Monachesi are right in pointing out that specialization is a concomitant of industrialization and urbanization, but their implication that specialization results in a dehumanization of the worker and forces him into the role of an impersonal tool may be questioned. In the first place, specialization and industrialization are ordinarily accompanied by the growth of labor unions which are able to force management to improve working conditions, reduce hours, and raise wages. As a result the workers in the more advanced industrial countries of the world today enjoy a relatively high standard of living and have an unprecedented opportunity for personal development. In the second place,

46 Ibid., p. 355.

LIFE IN THE FACTORY SITUATION IS NOT NECESSARILY IMPERSONAL WITH EACH WORKER PERFORMING AS A COG IN A MACHINE. RECENT STUDIES IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIOLOGY HAVE EMPHASIZED THE PRESENCE OF INFORMAL SOCIAL GROUPS WHICH GROW UP SPONTANEOUSLY AMONG INDUSTRIAL WORKERS. INDUSTRIAL SOCIOLOGISTS HAVE MAINTAINED THAT THE ATTITUDES OF THE WORKERS TOWARD THEIR WORK ARE IN LARGE PART DETERMINED BY THE PERSONAL RELATIONS WITHIN THESE PRIMARY GROUPS. THUS, IN MAYO'S FAMOUS HAWTHORNE STUDY IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT EVEN SUCH A PROSAIC AND MONOTONOUS TASK AS ASSEMBLING TELEPHONE RELAYS CONSISTING OF ABOUT FORTY PARTS AT THE RATE OF ONE A MINUTE COULD BE AN INTERESTING AND MEANINGFUL ACTIVITY. SIX GIRLS WHO ASSEMBLED THE RELAYS WERE OBSERVED TO DISCOVER HOW DIFFERENT WORKING CONDITIONS AFFECTED PRODUCTION, BUT IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT WORKING CONDITIONS HAD LESS EFFECT ON PRODUCTION THAN THE QUALITY OF PERSONAL RELATIONS WITHIN THE WORK GROUP. MILLER AND FORM SUMMARIZE THE RESULTS:

By asking their help and cooperation, the investigators had made the girls feel important. Their whole attitude had changed from that of separate cogs in a machine to that of a congenial group trying to help the company solve a problem. They had found stability, a place where they belonged, and work whose purpose they could clearly see. . . . They worked as a team, helping each other, making up each other's work when one of the group was not feeling well, giving parties for one another outside the factory. They squabbled a bit but underneath they were members of the same gang. They had found here some of the clan unity which the machine age had stripped away from so many workers.48

THE MAYO STUDY DEMONSTRATES CONVINCINGLY THAT IMPERSONALIZATION OF RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LOSS OF MEANINGFUL ACTIVITY FOR THE WORKER IS NOT AN INEVITABLE RESULT OF INDUSTRIALIZATION. IT IS ALSO PROBABLY TRUE

THAT THE CONDITIONS OF WORK IN PRIMITIVE AND FOLK SOCIETIES HAVE BEEN IDEALIZED AND THAT THEY ARE NOT AS "MEANINGFUL" AND ENJOYABLE AS THEY HAVE BEEN PICTURED TO BE. 49

CORRESPONDING TO THE NEGLECT OF PRIMARY RELATIONS IN THE INDUSTRIAL SITUATION, THERE HAS BEEN A GENERAL MINIMIZATION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF INTIMATE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN URBAN, HETEROGENEOUS SOCIETY. MARTINDALE AND MONACHESI, FOR EXAMPLE, REMARK THAT IN THE URBAN TYPE OF SOCIETY THE WARM INTIMACY OF SMALL GROUPS TENDS TO DISAPPEAR, AND THEY MAKE REFERENCE TO THE HOME AS NOTHING MORE THAN "... AN OVERNIGHT HOTEL AND LUNCH ROOM." 50 IT IS TRUE THAT IN THE CITY THERE ARE MANY MORE SOCIAL CONTACTS THAN IN THE COUNTRY OR IN FOLK SOCIETIES, AND IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT MOST OF THESE CONTACTS ARE BRIEF, SUPERFICIAL, AND PER-FUNCTORY. THE NEED FOR INTIMATE ASSOCIATION WITH OTHERS FOR HEALTHY PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT IS GENERALLY RECOGNIZED, BUT THESE RELATIONSHIPS ARE PROVIDED PRIMARILY BY ONE'S OWN FAMILY AND BY CLOSE FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATIONS, BOTH OF WHICH ARE AVAILABLE IN URBAN AS WELL AS IN RURAL SOCIETY. AS HAS BEEN POINTED OUT ABOVE, THE URBAN FAMILY IS NOT INDISCRIMINATELY LOSING ALL ITS FUNCTIONS AND IS NOT IN DANGER OF BECOMING AN "OVERNIGHT HOTEL AND LUNCH ROOM," FOR IT APPARENTLY IS GROWING STRONGER IN ITS AFFECTATIONAL FUNCTIONS. THERE IS, IN FACT, SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE URBAN FAMILY IS MORE CONDUCIVE TO GOOD PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT THAN IS THE RURAL FAMILY. LANDIS, FOR EXAMPLE, IN A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL AND EMOTIONAL ADJUSTMENTS OF COLLEGE GIRLS FOUND

49 See Melville J. Herskovits, The Economic Life of Primitive Peoples for a realistic description of the arduous work of some primitive societies.

50 Martindale and Monachesi, op. cit., p. 343.
THAT THE ADJUSTMENT OF THOSE WITH URBAN BACKGROUNDS WAS SUPERIOR TO THE
ADJUSTMENT OF THE GIRLS WITH RURAL BACKGROUNDS.\textsuperscript{51} THERE IS ALSO NO
EVIDENCE THAT CITY PEOPLE HAVE FEWER CLOSE FRIENDS THAN RURAL PEOPLE.

THERE IS A LIMIT ON THE AMOUNT OF TIME WHICH ONE CAN SPEND IN INTIMATE
ASSOCIATION WITH OTHERS, AND IT IS ABSURD TO SAY THAT A FARM VILLAGE
OR A PRIMITIVE TRIBE, IF IT IS MADE UP OF MORE THAN A VERY FEW PERSONS,
CONSTITUTES A SINGLE PRIMARY GROUP. WHAT IS MEANT WHEN SUCH A STATEMENT
IS MADE APPARENTLY IS THAT EVERYBODY KNOWS EVERYBODY ELSE; WHICH IN TURN
MEANS SIMPLY THAT EVERYBODY KNOWS EVERYBODY ELSE'S NAME. IF IT CAME TO
A CONTEST BETWEEN CITY AND COUNTRY PERSONS TO SEE WHO COULD RECALL THE
MOST NAMES OF "FRIENDS," MOST OF THE URBANITES WOULD PROBABLY WIN BY A
WIDE MARGIN. SHOULD "PRIMARY GROUP RELATIONS" BE RESTRICTED TO REFER
ONLY TO ASSOCIATIONS OF REAL INTIMACY, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT SUCH RELA-
TIONS ARE AS PREVALENT IN URBAN, INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY AS IN RURAL OR FOLK
SOCIETIES. THE CITY IS SO ORGANIZED THAT IT CAN PROVIDE FOR THE NON-
FAMILY PERSON TO A GREATER EXTENT THAN CAN RURAL SOCIETY, BUT IT MUST
NOT BE ASSUMED THAT THE NON-FAMILY PERSON IS THE TYPICAL URBAN PERSON.

IN THE CITY AS WELL AS IN THE COUNTRY FAMILY ORGANIZATION IS STRONG.
EVEN IN THE CASE OF NON-FAMILY PERSONS IN THE CITY THERE IS MORE OF AN
OPPORTUNITY FOR CLOSE FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATIONS WITH OTHER NON-FAMILY
PERSONS THAN IN RURAL AREAS.

CUBER MINIMIZES THE DIFFERENCES IN SOCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN URBAN
AND RURAL SOCIETIES, EXCEPT THAT IN CITIES THERE IS IN ADDITION TO THE
BASIC FAMILY AND FRIENDSHIP RELATIONSHIPS A GREATER VARIETY OF OTHER

\textsuperscript{51} PAUL A. LANDIS, "PERSONALITY DIFFERENCES OF GIRLS FROM FARM, TOWN,
RELATIONSHIPS WHICH ONE MAY ENTER INTO

For the "ordinary person" ... who lives and works in the large city, urban living means merely that he must learn a number of specialized techniques required for successful urban living, like learning the folkways of subway travel, being more cautious about exploitation, learning the more formal and superficial "line" of casual conversation, and other folkways all of which make no fundamental difference in the important affairs of life anyway. The present-day dwellers of cities have largely been recruited from the rural areas in the United States, which areas have always created a surplus of population from which city dwellers come. On the whole these persons of rural origin adjust soon and easily to the new demands of urban life. ... It seems that so far as our present knowledge goes, the chief significance of the city to personality lies in the greater opportunities for participation in the more specialized and individualistic groups if one so desires. 52

Cuber is one of the few sociologists to defend the city from the charges directed against it by many theorists of dichotomous types of social life. He admits that cities as they exist today have many undesirable characteristics, but he does not believe that these characteristics are inevitably connected with urban life: "They are no more inherent in the nature of city life than outdoor toilets and folk superstitions are inherent in rural life." 53

Conclusion

Because of the great variety of dichotomous theories considered in this thesis, it is difficult to draw conclusions which apply to each of them. There are three general conclusions, however, which are applicable to most of the theories. First, the use of dichotomous types of social life as a frame of reference results in an artificially

53 Ibid., p. 396.
SIMPLIFIED VERSION OF THE FACTS, DISTORTED BY A HIGH DEGREE OF SELECTIVITY IN SUPPORTING DATA. RATHER THAN GIVING A TRUE PICTURE OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCES OF VARIOUS SOCIETIES, THE DICHOTOMIES TEND TO OBSCURE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES AMONG SOCIETIES. THE PRACTICE OF CONSTRUCTING DICHOTOMOUS SOCIETAL TYPES IS ANALOGOUS TO STATING THAT THERE ARE TWO DIFFERENT TYPES OF DOGS, THOSE WHICH WEAR COLLARS AND THOSE WHICH DO NOT. OBVIOUSLY SUCH A DIVISION OF DOGS TELLS ONE NOTHING ABOUT THE MORE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES PERTAINING TO BREED, SIZE, COLOR, AND SO FORTH. SIMILARLY DICHOTOMOUS TYPES OF SOCIETY OBSCURE AS MUCH AS THEY REVEAL, AND THEY CONSEQUENTLY ARE OF LITTLE VALUE AS GUIDES FOR RESEARCH. THE PRINCIPAL DIFFICULTY WITH MOST OF THE DICHOTOMIES IS THAT THEY ARE SOCIETAL DICHOTOMIES BASED UPON LINKED OR INTERDEPENDENT VARIABLES. CONSEQUENTLY THE POSSIBILITY THAT THERE MAY BE VARIOUS COMBINATIONS OF THE VARIABLES IS RULED OUT FROM THE START. IT APPEARS THAT RESEARCH WOULD BE MORE FRUITFUL IF THE ATTEMPT TO FIND POLAR TYPES OF SOCIETIES WERE ABANDONED IN FAVOR OF THE INVESTIGATION OF PARTICULAR VARIABLES ON A COMPARATIVE OR AN INTENSIVE BASIS. THUS IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO STUDY SUCH QUESTIONS AS WHAT PRODUCES IMPERSONALITY IN SOCIAL RELATIONS RATHER THAN TO ASSUME THAT IMPERSONALITY IS A VARIABLE LINKED TO INDUSTRIALIZATION, URBANIZATION, AND SECULARIZATION IN A PARTICULAR SOCIETAL CONFIGURATION.

SECOND, THE METHODOLOGICAL PRACTICES OF MANY OF THE THEORISTS CONSIDERED IN THIS THESIS ARE HIGHLY QUESTIONABLE. SOME OF THE THEORISTS, EVEN MANY OF THOSE WHO CLAIM TO BE USING THE IDEAL TYPICAL METHOD, TEND TO USE THE POLAR TYPES AS CLASSIFICATORY DEVICES FOR CONCRETE CASES. IN DOING SO, THE "NEGATIVE UTILITY" OF THE IDEAL TYPES
FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF SOCIAL CHANGE IS LOST AND AN INORDINATE EMPHASIS IS PLACED UPON MERE TAXONOMY. TO THE EXTENT THAT SOCIOLoGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY REMAIN ON A TAXONOMIC LEVEL WITHOUT INVESTIGATING UNDERLYING DYNAMIC PROCESSES, TO THE SAME EXTENT WILL THEY BE PREVENTED FROM TAKING THEIR PLACES AMONG THE MORE FIRMLY ESTABLISHED SCIENCES.

THIRD, THE THEORIES OF MOST OF THE SOCIOLOGISTS AND ANTHROPOLOGISTS CONSIDERED IN THIS THESIS ARE DISTORTED BY A PRONOUNCED BIAS IN FAVOR OF THE RURAL, FOLK, PRIMITIVE, HOMOGENEOUS TYPES OF SOCIETY. BECAUSE OF DISSATISFACTION WITH MODERN, URBAN, HETEROGENEOUS SOCIETY, THERE IS IN MOST CASES AN IMPLICIT OR EXPLICIT CALL TO RETURN TO THE CONDITIONS OF THE PAST. IT IS CERTAINLY ONE OF THE TASKS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE TO DISCOVER AND STUDY THE ILLS OF MODERN, URBAN SOCIETY, BUT TO WISH FOR A RETURN TO THE PAST SEEMS TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE NATURE OF SCIENCE.

THE VISION OF SAINT-SIMON AND COMTE OF A SCIENCE TO GUIDE MAN THROUGH A REORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY TO REMEDY SOCIAL EVILS IS A LEGITIMATE ASPIRATION FOR SOCIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY. IT IS FROM THIS UTILITARIAN FUNCTION THAT THESE SCIENCES RECEIVE THEIR ULTIMATE JUSTIFICATION.

THE CRITICAL NATURE OF THIS THESIS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO OBSCURE SOME OF THE POSITIVE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE VARIOUS THEORISTS DISCUSSED. MORGAN AND MARX FORMULATED THE BEGINNINGS OF A TECHNOLOGICAL THEORY OF SOCIAL CHANGE WHICH HOLDS PROMISE, ALTHOUGH IN NEITHER CASE IS THE THEORY OF CHANGE NECESSARILY TIED UP WITH THE DICHTOMOUS FRAME OF REFERENCE. MANY OTHERS HAVE ALSO THROWN LIGHT ON SPECIFIC SUBJECTS IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR DICHTOMOUS THEORIES, AS, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE CASE OF REDFIELD'S DESCRIPTION OF THE FORMAL AND RITUALISTIC ASPECTS OF LIFE IN MEXICAN VILLAGES. SOME OF THE DICHTOMIES ALSO ARE HIGHLY USEFUL.
When applied on the level of specific groups and relationships rather than on a general societal level. Thus Cooley's distinction of primary and secondary types of groups contributes to the understanding of group processes, but if the distinction is extended to primary and secondary types of societies, the concept becomes distorted and its utility is lost. With a few exceptions the positive contributions have been made not so much because of the dichotomous frames of reference as in spite of them. It is only reasonable to expect that even greater contributions would have been made had the theorists not been bound by the artificial limits of their dichotomous typologies. In conclusion, it appears that the use of dichotomous types of social life as a frame of reference in social science is of less value than the use of many other frames of reference. Sociologists and anthropologists must address themselves to the task of making social theory a more useful instrument toward the scientific understanding of social phenomena.
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