AN INQUIRY INTO THE FACTORS AFFECTING THE OUTCOME
OF THE 1948 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WITH THE
SITUATIONS IN THE STATES OF ILLINOIS,
OHIO, AND CALIFORNIA SUBJECT TO
SPECIAL EMPHASIS

APPROVED:

H W Kamp
Major Professor

Minor Professor

Simon McAlister
Director of the Department of Government

Dean of the Graduate School
AN INQUIRY INTO THE FACTORS AFFECTING THE OUTCOME OF THE 1948 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WITH THE SITUATIONS IN THE STATES OF ILLINOIS, OHIO, AND CALIFORNIA SUBJECT TO SPECIAL EMPHASIS

THESIS

Presented to the Graduate Council of the North Texas State College in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of

MASTERS OF ARTS

By

180150
Buell C. Raupe

Denton, Texas

August, 1950
Any attempted study of the multitudinous factors bearing upon Presidential elections, with the end in mind of determining why they resulted as they did, is handicapped from the very start in several ways. First of all, one is confronted with the problem of deciding which of the hundreds of factors bearing on that election were of sufficient strength to merit consideration. Secondly, having chosen, one is faced with the practically impossible task of determining the extent to which each of these chosen factors played upon the outcome. Also, it is realized that when the field of study is narrowed, as was done in this case, it usually is too narrow for a thorough study of all the factors in all the pivotal states and too broad for a scientific study of all the factors within those chosen states. With these things in mind the reader will realize that a study of this sort can only show "probable" reasons and factors and never "absolute" causes.

In spite of the above limitations, the author felt that this election, which has been heir to so much conjecture and so little comprehensive analysis, presented a rich field for research and much was to be gained from a study of this sort. The following material is presented in as unbiased a manner as possible.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. VITAL FACTORS WHICH WERE NATIONWIDE IN SCOPE</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. SITUATION IN ILLINOIS</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. SITUATION IN OHIO</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. SITUATION IN CALIFORNIA</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Results of the 1946 Congressional Elections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Pre-election Lineup of States According to the Gallup Poll</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Final Result of the 1948 Election -- By States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Electoral Votes By States -- In 1948 Election</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Summary of Expenditures Influencing Presidential Elections -- 1940, 1944, and 1948</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Approximate Number of Federal Employees Per State</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Comparison of Illinois Urban Returns with Returns from Typical Rural Counties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Final Returns on the Popular Vote in Ohio, Illinois, and California</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Comparison of Ohio Urban Returns With Returns from Typical Rural Counties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Comparison of California Urban Returns With Returns from Typical Rural Counties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the spring and summer of 1948 the United States went about its business as usual, paying only token attention to the fact that this was a Presidential election year. The incumbent party was apparently torn with strife and likely to take a licking at the polls in November. The other party had a fair program, two good but not excellent leaders, and it was expected to win without much trouble. But until late August no real issues were raised; personalities seemed to be at a low ebb; the old drama which had surrounded the Roosevelt elections was gone; and the people apparently just couldn't get excited. In July the Democratic National Convention had nominated (after much opposition) Harry Truman to lead their ticket in the coming election, with Alben Barkley as his running mate. For several reasons this pair was given little chance of success. Their party was split in three directions. The once "Solid South" had bolted the convention because of the civil rights issue and gone to Birmingham, Alabama to nominate their own candidates for President and Vice-President. An extreme left-wing block of the party had formed another party under Henry Wallace and was expected to take away from the Democrats their "big city" vote. Thus we
see the two main props which had supported Roosevelt so long, the "solid south" and the "big city" vote, being drawn away. In addition to this, the Republicans apparently had a good chance of getting the western vote by nominating a westerner, Earl Warren, as Vice-President. Though this should certainly have been enough to beat the Democrats, it wasn't all. The trend of the country apparently was back to the conservative side. The 1946 Congressional elections had returned a Republican majority for the first time in fourteen years. Had Roosevelt still been at the head of the Democrats the outlook would have been different. But his magnificent voice and general political magnetism were gone and had been lacking in Democratic circles for three long years. His place had been taken by a modest little man who was forever bungling and getting his foot in his mouth and who had succeeded in alienating practically every segment of the once powerful Democratic party. Even the middle ground of this broken party was not reliable. Labor was antagonistic to Truman and some parts were actively supporting Dewey. Even that small portion of the press which had supported Roosevelt was switching to Dewey.

This being the case in the spring and summer, we find that in November this same woefully weak Democratic party achieved

1See Appendix A.

2"Defection Roll Call," Newsweek, XXXII (November 8, 1948), 17.
a smashing victory at the polls and even recaptured Congress with a stronger majority than they had held four years earlier when the incomparable Roosevelt had been their leader. This change-about, this upsetting of all the time-honored principles of political trends is why 1948 presented a problem different from any other Presidential election year.

On the basis of the 1946 elections and the opinion-sampling polls, the Republicans had been expected to receive the electoral votes of twenty-two of the states, including all the large pivotal states, New England, and the mid-west, thus leaving only parts of the broken South and sporadic western states for the Democrats. It is true some states were held in doubt before the election, but the combined total of electoral votes of these states would not have been sufficient for Truman to win even should he be able to carry these. The pivotal states of California, Illinois, and Ohio were not even considered to be in doubt.

The extent to which political writers and the public in general thought Dewey would win is further evidenced by the following opinions which were published prior to the election. Raymond Moley, political analyst for Newsweek, had this to say: "Prediction is not the major purpose of this review, because this year the Presidential race can be taken for granted. . . ."4

---

3See Appendix B.

Moley went on to say that the waning of the Wallace movement and the assurance of three or four states for the Dixiecrats definitely proved the "clime" of opinion in the United States was shifting back to the conservative side. He further committed himself by contending that the campaigns by the Presidential aspirants were doing no good whatsoever and that Dewey would win by the same majority he had shown on the polls in August.  

The United States News & World Report went on record to say that the "trend in the U. S. now is to sit tight, [from November to January] not to rock the boat in days of drift between administrations." They said the danger period would be between administrations and that Truman, being a "Lame-Duck President", might deliberately gum up operations in the White House.

David Lawrence, writing on the forthcoming election, had this to say about Truman:

If President Truman were able to . . . convince the people he could manage a war if we had one? that factor would surmount all others in the minds of many voters. But Mr. Truman has not created that impression. He . . . has no capacity for dramatizing issues.

---

5Ibid.

6"Drift Period Until Inauguration," The United States News & World Report, XXV (November 5, 1948), 11.

7Ibid.

8David Lawrence, "The Curve of Discontent," Ibid. (October 29, 1948), 34.
Herbert Hoover, speaking at a banquet in Iowa, said that almost any Democrat but Mr. Truman would have been in a position to win in 1948 on a platform of peace and prosperity and with the support of a bureaucracy of more than 2,000,000 civilian employees. Hoover said that Truman spoiled his chance by offending Southerners and by action that encouraged Henry Wallace to set up a third party.9

A poll of reporters and correspondents in October revealed that that group which is generally supposed to have the best access to the facts unanimously said that Dewey would win more than 376 electoral votes to Truman's 116. These reporters gave as their reasons for believing that the country would vote Truman out such predictions as: there was a general desire for a change; Truman was inadequate; the Democrats were split up too much; etc.10

George Gallup, political analyst and pollster, said in October that his findings revealed that Dewey would receive 46½ per cent, Truman would receive 39 per cent, Wallace would receive 3½ per cent, and Thurmond would receive 2 per cent of the vote. Gallup left 9 per cent undecided.11

9Herbert Hoover, "Democrats Should Win," U. S. News, XXV (October 1, 1948), 64.

10"Election Forecast," Newsweek, XXXII (October 11, 1948), 20.

Thus we see samples of what practically the entire press was telling the people -- Truman did not have a chance; the question was not who would win but how bad Truman would lose. Only one authoritative and statistically documented pre-election prediction said that there would be a great Democratic resurgence. Louis Bean, in July, showed how the Republican trend had reached high-tide in 1946 and the Democrats probably would even recapture the House of Representatives as well as the Senate in 1948. This was considered so ridiculous in light of all the apparent trends and portends that it was largely ignored.12

The final wind-up of the election and a count of the Democratic victories show Mr. Bean's analysis to have been amazingly accurate.

Dewey carried only sixteen of the states which he had been expected to, and he lost in states where he had been considered a cinch. Truman carried twenty-eight states, including three of the large pivotal areas which had been considered safely within the Dewey column. Wallace did not carry a single state, but Thurmond took four of the "Solid South" states. Truman garnered 304 electoral votes from his twenty-eight states, and Dewey received 189 from his sixteen states. In popular votes Truman lead his opponent around 2,000,000

12Louis Bean, How To Predict Elections, Chart 1, p. 15.
votes with something like a million apiece going to Thurmond and Wallace. These statistics would have been enough in themselves, but the Democratic victory also swept the Republicans from the Congress, giving the victorious party comfortable majorities in both houses.13

Following the election the great majority of the forecasters, pollsters, predictors, and Republicans just didn't even try to explain why they had been so wrong, finding it much more convenient and easy to just "eat crow" and let it go at that. Since that time, however, much has been said as to just what did happen that upset the expected outcome so completely. A few sample comments will show how some tried to explain the Republican debacle.

Henry Hazlett blamed Dewey's strategy for what happened. He said:

... He avoided making all the little errors only by making the one tremendous error that defeated him... He repeated high sounding truisms about national unity... and failed to debate the issues of a single major issue...14

Elmo Roper, who publishes Fortune's poll, said he had been wrong because he had failed to take into consideration the fact that the United States is normally Democratic and not normally Republican; that some 40 per cent of the people polled

13See Appendix C.
who claimed to be backing Dewey were either Democrats or independents. Nation's Robert Bendiner said the election results could all be attributed to the record of the Eightieth Congress. Bendiner praised Truman's political acumen for recognizing an issue and driving it home to the people. Bendiner also recorded this tidbit of self-criticism:

It seems incredible that millions of us should have taken it for granted that while our fellow-Americans liked Harry Truman . . . they would troop to the polls and vote for Thomas E. Dewey, whom they neither liked nor trusted; that they favored Truman's policies -- even the Roper polls showed that they did -- but would under some strange compulsion, cast their ballots for his opponent.

George Gallup, who was nearer to the true outcome than others but who was blamed the most because of his notoriety, said he had been wrong in assuming the undecided vote would split itself in the same proportion that the decided vote had done. He said that the undecided vote practically all went to Truman.

Finally, the Communist Daily Worker, after four months of preaching that Truman represented the "Wall Street war party", abruptly declared that the President's victory had


16Robert Bendiner, "Two and Two Make Four," Nation, CLXVII (November 13, 1948), 541.

17Ibid., 540.

been because the American people want peace, greater social security and more democracy.19

These opinions, antidotes, and superficial observations are all interesting, and they probably contain some basis in fact, but it will be the purpose of this paper to try to get beneath surface semantics and eulogies and attempt to isolate those areas and those factors which were actually responsible for the election results.

A look at the electoral votes coming from all the various states shows that of all the pivotal states five stand out as states which carry enough electoral strength to seriously influence an election outcome one way or another.20 Of these five states New York and Pennsylvania, while presenting interesting sidelights to the election, are not pertinent for consideration here because they both went to Dewey. Thus, we have three states, all pivotal in nature, all of large strength, and all of which went to Truman in the election. Furthermore, these three states went Republican either in 1944 or 1946, and should they all have done so in 1948 Dewey would have won.21 These factors taken into consideration, it will be the purpose of this paper to limit the scope of specific study to these three areas -- Ohio, Illinois, and California.


20These are New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, and California. See Appendix D.

21Ibid.
Though Ohio, Illinois, and California will be subject to specific investigation, certain factors of a general nature exerted much influence on the election outcome, and these cannot be confined to their effect on the pivotal areas. These will be taken up in a special section of this study devoted especially to vital factors of a general nature. Following this chapter on general, nation-wide factors will be chapters devoted to the situations as they existed in Ohio, Illinois, and California.

The factors which will be taken up are, of course, not a complete list of all those influences on the election but will be those which appeared most frequently in writings on the subject and those which, in the writer's opinion, exerted the strongest influence.

By combining specific studies of the three large pivotal states, with the investigation of general factors affecting the election, it is believed that certain rather definite conclusions can be drawn concerning what happened in the country as a whole. These, it is believed, should be subject to a minimum margin of error and valuable as a key to the election upset.
CHAPTER II

VITAL FACTORS WHICH WERE NATIONALWIDE IN SCOPE

Comparison of Major Party Platforms

The first factor to be considered which has a significance beyond the scope of the three states outlined for later specific study is party platform comparison. Just how did the Republican's set of basic promises and principles differ from those of the Democrat's?

It should be remembered that the Democrats were considered to have little to lose, and, as a result, their platform was much more specific on most all the issues. However, the Republicans, hoping to hold what they were already conceded to have, tried to straddle the fence. Their promises were much more vague and general in nature than were those of the Democrats.¹

The Democratic and Republican platforms were largely the same except for the aforementioned specificity of the Democrats' document. On farming and farm problems the Democrats directly pledged themselves to increased benefits to the farmer. They incorporated the Brannon Plan for price subsidies to keep farm

¹"The Party Platforms, A Plank By Plank Comparison," Scholastic, LIII (October 6, 1948), 11-A.
incomes high; they promised parity prices for commodities; and they told the public that if they were elected the rural electrification program would be intensified. In comparison, the Republicans kept to generalities and vague, nebulous promises. They promised to reorganize the farm support plan and said they would eliminate waste and "abolish the flagrant abuses" of the present system. The GOP did, however, commit themselves definitely to a vigorous soil conservation program.

On the labor question, the Democrats called for outright repeal of the Taft-Hartley Labor Law, saying that it was an "odious" piece of legislation and one which was "repugnant" to the system of free labor. They further called for restoration of the strength of the Labor Department which they accused the Republican Congress of shearing away from that Department. On the other hand, the Republicans defended the Taft-Hartley Law as a "healthy readjustment" on the labor program "in the light of public health and safety."

These two points of difference are the only sharp conflicts between the two documents, the other provisions being very similar to each other. This was the case with civil rights, foreign policy, etc. However, the Democratic stand on practically every plank persisted throughout in being much more definite and concrete than did the Republican stand.2

2Vital Speeches, XIV (August 1, 1948), 636. All direct comparisons of party platforms are taken from this reference.
Growth of Unions — Their Part in the Election

One is prone to minimize the labor activity and its part in Truman's election on first glancing at the returns, which show the Democrats' strength down in the urban areas and up in the rural areas. However, a thorough investigation must go deeper. Labor union strength was at an all-time high in the fall of 1948. Union membership had increased from around 14,000,000 in 1944 to over 16,000,000 in 1948. The American Federation of Labor had 7,700,000 members, the Congress of Industrial Organizations 6,000,000, and the various independent unions combined had a total of 2,400,000. The over-all strength of organized labor had risen by 500,000 in the first six months of 1948. Thus it can be seen that labor could, if it so desired, be an extremely potent political force.

Labor's apparent inactivity was loudly noticed by politicians and the press. The Political Action Committee of the C. I. O. was not campaigning for Truman at all, or at least not as they had done for Roosevelt in 1944. This apparent laxity on the part of labor was deceptive, however, because the P. A. C. was campaigning, and hard, but this time not with all the "hoopla" and boisterousness which had accompanied their

---

3See Appendix D.

4"Continued Boom for Unions," U. S. News, XXV (October 1, 1948), 42. All statistics on labor union membership came from this source.

5"The Odds Against Mr. Truman," ibid. (October 8, 1948), 22.
1944 debut into political action. They were working from the grass-roots level; precinct by precinct they campaigned for the retirement of those congressmen who had voted for the Taft-Hartley bill. And since the Taft-Hartley repeal was one of Truman's talking points, he was the indirect recipient of much help from the P. A. C. Also, on the surface, the main body of the C. I. O. officially was supporting Truman. In addition to the C. I. O.'s Political Action Committee, the A. F. of L.'s Labor League for Political Education, whose purpose was much the same as that of the P. A. C., was organized. In this, the A. F. of L.'s debut into political activity, the league spent over $1,000,000 expressly to defeat Taft-Hartley congressmen.

Also, in trying to evaluate labor's part in the election outcome, one must keep in mind that Wallace was drawing most of his votes from labor's domain, and the unions were having to fight both the Republicans and the extreme left-wingers who were trying to split the Democratic vote.

The bulk of the A. F. of L. and the C. I. O. was backing Truman either officially or unofficially, and this support is estimated at around 12,000,000 of the 16,000,000 union members. Parts of the A. F. of L., such as the Building-Service

---

6"Who Backs Whom," Newsweek, XXXII (October 18, 1948), 38.
Employees (175,000) and John L. Lewis's miners (600,000), were officially backing Dewey. But the figures on Lewis's miners are deceptive because they have a habit of voting about as they please, and many of them seem to have probably voted for Truman. Some left-wing and radical unions, such as the Electrical Workers of America (C. I. O.), Harry Bridges' longshoremen, and some locals in the fishing and farm equipment industries were all supporting Wallace. These last totaled approximately 1,000,000.

Thus it can be seen that a good three-fourths of America's organized workers were officially behind Truman.

Expenditures of Major Parties

Though the Federal Government has attempted to control expenditures of political parties with legislation such as the Hatch Act, it is a well-nigh impossible task. Money spent by the major parties is very difficult to control or even to estimate. This is in part due to the untold hundreds of unreported contributions (in both money and services) made by labor unions, "non-partisan" leagues, "educational" committees, federated clubs, the press, etc. The situation is further

9Irwin V. Shannon, Southeastern Ohio in Depression and War, 1943, pp. 8f.
10"Who Backs Whom," Newsweek, XXXII (October 18, 1948), 38.
11Louise Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, pp. 3f.
complicated by the belief that these efforts and contributions probably carry more weight in the election outcome than the efforts and money spent by the national organizations as such.\textsuperscript{12} This being the case, it is still necessary for the reported expenditures to be given some consideration.

The Republican party spent $2,736,000 by their national committees in 1948, as compared to the Democrats' $2,127,000. This represents a sizable increase over Democratic expenditures in 1944 but is almost equal to what they spent in 1940. The Republican expenditures represent a decrease from 1944 but about $500,000 increase over 1940.\textsuperscript{13} In each case it should be noted that Republican expenses are well above those made by the Democrats.

Expenditures by state and local committees and those by independent organizations are not as yet reported for 1948, but they are believed to be comparable to the figures for 1940 and 1944. If this is the case the Republicans spent anywhere from twice as much to four times as much as did the Democrats.\textsuperscript{14} However, they are not likely to have spent very much more than did the Democrats in 1948 because the Republicans had a more difficult time getting funds this time than they had had in

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., pp. 25f.

\textsuperscript{13}See Appendix E.

\textsuperscript{14}Hugh A. Bone, American Politics and the Party System, first edition, p. 622.
many years. The best efforts of Harold S. Talbott, an industrialist who had been raising money for Dewey's political enterprises for years, brought in only $1,400,000 from January 1 to October 1. Many former heavy contributors to the Republicans are said to have felt that "it's in the bag anyway, so why should I shell out." Probably the unsensational nature of the campaign did the rest to discourage donors.

The ways in which the money was spent by the two parties were essentially the same, with one exception. In years past both parties had used their radio time in much the same manner. This year, however, the Republicans' budget for radio time was practically all spent for spot announcements of less than thirty seconds in duration. These announcements carried on their theme of not committing themselves. They went something like this: "Dewey gets things done; remember November 2 and vote for the man who gets things done. Vote for Dewey-Warren on November 2, the team that gets things done." The Democrats, on the contrary, followed tradition and bought time for longer, more detailed speeches which were delivered by party leaders or by Truman himself. Apparently the nation's electorate preferred the party which told them something instead of one which was only advertising.


16 "Radio-Television," Newsweek, XXXII (November 1, 1948), 52.
The Major Candidates' Campaigns and Personalities

Campaign Strategy

Republican strategy.-- Herbert Brownell, Jr. is the man who shaped Dewey's campaign strategy of, as he put it, "coasting into the Presidency." He shaped Dewey's campaign around three basic factors which he considered essential:

1. Nothing should be done that would create dissension in the country for which Dewey already felt himself responsible;
2. Nothing should be done to upset delicate negotiations abroad; and
3. All possible assistance should be given to GOP senatorial candidates. Brownell thought this could best be done by sticking to well-rounded generalities and by avoiding the clenched-fist tactics and personal slugging which had probably defeated Dewey in 1944.17 The following quotations from two magazines, which are considered to be of opposite points of view politically, very aptly illustrate the Dewey type of campaign. Newsweek had this to say:

Thomas E. Dewey wasn't yet President but . . . Dewey's campaign managers considered that their man was 'in'. He didn't have to win votes; all he had to do was avoid losing them. He was the candidate who was nonpartisanly appealing for national unity, who was voicing statesmanlike warnings to the Soviet Union, who was extorting the people to give him a friendly Congress.18

In another issue of this magazine the following was said: "... at times, he even magnanimously absolved the [Truman] Administration of blame for certain developments, calling them inevitable."^{19}

Nation, commenting on Dewey's campaign, said:

Serenely confident of victory, Dewey has already wrapped the dignity of office about him, discarding the vulgarity of the campaigner for the Olympian detachment of the national leader. Not for him to mention Mr. Truman's name in his speeches, or even to notice him by criticism. He has soared above the plane of charge and counter-charge, and come upon that rarefied atmosphere where only the noblest platitudes are to be found; ...^{20}

The extent to which the Republicans were confident was further pointed out when, in the closing days of the campaign, Dewey strategists gave orders to local and precinct workers specifically that there was to be no "belittling of Harry Truman," and that the name of Franklin Roosevelt should not be brought into the argument.^{21} The Republicans were confident and obviously were trying to stop anything which even might stir up reaction to Dewey. The aforementioned Nation magazine, commenting again on Dewey's "high-level" campaign, heartily concurred with him when he said, "I will not offer

^{19}"The Dewey Calm," Newsweek, XXXII (October 4, 1948), 19.

^{20}"Issues and Platitudes," Nation, CLXVII (October 9, 1948), 387.

^{21}U. S. News, XXV (October 22, 1948), 72.
one solution to one group and another solution to another group.\textsuperscript{22} Nation contended that Dewey had "offered no solution, to any group, on any question."\textsuperscript{22}

Thus we see the confident, non-committal, high-level type of campaign that Dewey waged, one which was not calculated to get votes but which was designed to keep what he was supposed to have already had. Selected and typical excerpts from Dewey's major speeches can be found in chapters III, IV, and V.

Democratic strategy. -- Harry Truman's campaign manager and assistant strategist was J. Howard McGrath, then Chairman of the Democratic National Committee. Truman's party platform, his speeches, and his over-all campaign strategy were constructed on the tenet that he had everything to gain and nothing to lose by campaigning hard, committing himself irrevocably to "New Deal" philosophies, and by blaming the country's ills on the Republican Congress.\textsuperscript{23} He never failed to grasp anything he could get his hands on that would cast aspersions on the Republicans. He did not overlook a single Republican statement that could in any way be twisted to reflect on the Republicans' record. He took bold chances, accusing Dewey of having Fascist leanings, bringing up Dewey's war record, etc.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{22}"Cautious Tom," Nation, CLXVII (October 16, 1948), 416.

\textsuperscript{23}The Truman Program -- Addresses and Messages by President Harry S. Truman, edited by M. B. Schnapper, pp. V-VII.

\textsuperscript{24}Ibid., pp. 18, 22, 27, and 60.
each time with the dire prediction by most political observers that these things invariably backfired because they were considered too dirty. However, Truman followed the advice of his speech writers and assistants, the most noticeable of which was Clark Clifford, and continued his all-out attack. He unqualifiedly promised more benefits to farmers, continued help to labor unions, lower prices to consumers, and continued prosperity if he were returned to office along with a new Democratic Congress.25

Truman appealed to the left-wing splinters to rejoin the Democrats "to halt the resurgence of reaction"; and, to further woo these voters back, he proposed peace talks with Stalin and he cut military expenditures (to appeal to the pacifists). He also rejected the Bernadotte proposal for partition of Palestine (as an appeal to the Jewish minority).26

This type of desperate, hard-hitting strategy typified Truman throughout the campaign and was in complete contrast to Dewey's non-committal, "tread-easy" sort of strategy.

Campaign Activity -- Number of Speeches, Etc.

Republican activity. -- On election day Dewey had campaigned for a total of just six weeks, and even part of that

26U. S. News, XXV (October 29, 1948), 60.
was spent in illness at Albany. He had made approximately 170 speeches and appearances in most of the key states, but the majority of this figure includes the many times he merely made appearances and did not make speeches. In all, he had traveled about 16,000 miles, through the mid-west to the Pacific coast and as far south as Oklahoma.  

**Democratic activity.** — When the polls opened on November 2, 1948, Harry Truman had just completed probably what constituted one of the most vigorous and single-handed campaigns ever made for the Presidency. He had actively traveled and campaigned for over eight weeks with hardly a single respite, leaving the task of running the government in the hands of cabinet members. In this eight weeks Truman had traveled over 31,500 miles and had made over 350 speeches and appearances. He had drawn enormous crowds wherever he went, and apparently no whistle-stop was too small for him to appear and say a few words. During the course of his campaign *Time* magazine estimates that he shouted out some 560,000 words. Even on election eve Truman broke all precedents. "While Dewey was calmly and piously urging the people to get out and vote, Truman was urging the people to get out and vote for Democrats."  

---

Personalities of the Candidates

Personality of Dewey. — Dewey proved not to be a popular candidate in many of the pivotal areas.\(^{31}\) He was noted far and wide for his success as a relentless prosecutor when he was District Attorney in New York City. His administration as Governor of New York was outstanding for its efficiency and lack of corruption. However, he failed to get down to the people in his campaigning. He assumed that he was already elected, and, as one observer put it, "He had the bad habit of going around thanking the people for electing him."\(^{32}\) His record was flawless, and so was his suave manner and appearance, but these same admirable attributes undoubtedly worked against him in the mid-west and in most rural areas.

Personality of Truman. — Truman's personality and "slam-bang" oratory proved to be extremely popular, as is evidenced by the monstrous crowds that turned out everywhere to see and hear him. His speech was down to earth, plain, and easy to understand, and his manner kept up the "folksy" atmosphere. This was his planned strategy, but it also came natural to this little Missouri politician. In contrast to

\(^{31}\)See Chapter III and IV.

Dewey's spectacular rise to fame, Truman had begun as a small cog in Tom Pendergast's machine in Kansas City and had been thoroughly schooled in the vote-attracting business. He knew how to convince the people that he was one of them. Truman proved to be popular even in Republican strongholds, a fact which pleased him considerably, causing him to remark immediately prior to the election when referring to the large crowds that had turned out for the appearances that "there has not been a dud in the lot."34

Effect of Press and Poll Predictions

Underdog Sentiment

The nation's press, which was predominantly Republican, did not help Dewey's candidacy. They continually talked of what Dewey would do when elected to office, whom his cabinet members would be, how he would handle foreign policy, and generally what the country could expect in the next four years. These comments and this air of absolute confidence in how the election would go appear throughout September and October issues of such periodicals as Life, Newsweek, Time, U. S. News, Saturday Evening Post, Fortune, etc. Such tactics of ignoring the collapse of the Wallace strength and Truman's large crowd appeal were undoubtedly calculated to create the

33McNaughton and Hehmeyer, Harry Truman -- President. This is a biography of the early life of Harry Truman.
34"If I Hadn't Been There," Time, LII (October 25, 1948), 23.
"bandwagon" effect on the voters. But at the same time it worked against Dewey by dramatizing Truman's "lone" efforts and definitely placing him as the underdog in the race. This made Truman the recipient of much sympathy that worked to his advantage at the polls. Space will not permit inclusion of any real representative number of these quotes, but the following, taken from *U. S. News*, are typical:

Warren is to be kept quite busy with his Senate duties, but is dissatisfied with the present salary of Vice-President, because he is now making $25,000 a year and favors increasing the Vice-President's salary to $40,000. Warren is to have difficulty finding housing space in Washington, *and* favors the government providing him and his family with a house.35

Mr. Dewey's approach to U. S. international relations is to be much more calm and collected, much less excitable than the Truman approach.36

Mr. Dewey will have a short honeymoon after he takes over the White House on January 20.37

It is not difficult to see the harm to Dewey's cause that this sort of assumption making probably caused on the undecided voters.

**Over-All and Significant Shift in the Farm Vote**

The shift of the farmers in the great mid-west is one of the significant reasons why Truman won, in spite of losing so

36Ibid.
37Ibid., (October 22, 1948), 72.
much strength in the cities. No small part of the credit for
this shift of the farmers is due to Truman himself. Truman
and his Secretary of Agriculture made exhaustive speeches
throughout the mid-western farm belt condemning the record of
the 80th Congress. They blasted the Republicans for pigeon-
holing the international wheat agreement and for cutting off
the Commodity Credit Corporation's authority to acquire grain
storage space with which to handle the bumper grain crop of
1948. They pointed out that Stassen and Taft were speaking
for Dewey when they criticized the farm-price support program.
With wheat down to a dollar a bushel and cattle, corn, and
dairy prices breaking the farmers thought they were being
crucified when they saw no corresponding drop in city prices.
Charles F. Brannan, Secretary of Agriculture, alone, made
eighty speeches in thirteen farm states in the last two months
of the campaign.38

The Republican candidate, running true to form, evaded
the farm question and completely failed to take the stirrings
in the rural sections seriously. Dewey made only one major
farm speech, and Earl Warren, his running mate, publicly
urged that agricultural policy, like foreign policy, be taken
out of the campaign.39 This sort of action, or inaction, is

38"Decisive Farm Vote," Newsweek, XXXII (November 15,
1948), 25. For specific facts concerning the farm vote shift
see Chapters III and IV.

39Ibid.
hard to understand when one sees that this ignoring of the issue was coming right in the face of the above-mentioned accusations of Truman and Brannan.

The farmer simply saw no reason to believe that the GOP was interested in him. The farmers began to realize that they were really pretty well off as they were and that they had not done badly in the past sixteen years. In 1932 the farmer received only twenty-nine cents out of the retail food dollar, while the middle-man was getting seventy-one cents. The farmer's share rose to an average of forty cents in the first four years of the New Deal, until 1935. From that year until 1939 it continued to average about forty cents out of each retail dollar. The outbreak of World War II sent it to forty-eight cents in 1942 and fifty-four cents in 1945-46.\footnote{Ibid.}

It was at this height of fifty-four cents on each retail dollar that the 1946 Congressional elections were held. The farmer's share rose to the all-time high in 1947 of fifty-five cents. It began to fall, however, in early 1948, and it reached a low of about fifty cents on the dollar in the summer of 1948.\footnote{Ibid.} Truman was vigorously telling the farmers that this was the fault of the 30th Congress, and he had the figures on his side. Whether the drop was really the fault of the Republicans is open to much doubt, but it is only the

\footnote{"Farmer's Share of Retail Food Dollar," U. S. News, XXV (September 17, 1948), 31.}
purpose of the writer here to point out how the statistics were completely in line with Truman's argument that things started going bad when the Republicans captured Congress.

Following are some other reasons why the farmer might have been prone to vote Democratic: (1) Checks received by farmers for following soil-conservation practices were lower in 1948 than they were in 1947 because Congress in 1947 cut the amount of money available for the soil-conservation program; (2) Wheat prices had dropped because Congress had killed an international agreement assuring an export market for the farmer's wheat. Wheat had dropped in 1948 from about $2.80 per bushel to $1.00; and (3) The 80th Congress had clamped down on generating plants for R. E. A. co-operatives.\(^{42}\)

Finally, when considering the shift in farm support, it must be remembered that both Truman and Barkley were from the farm belt (Missouri and Kentucky), while Dewey represented the industrial east and Warren came from the far-off west coast.

**Lesser Factors of a General Nature**

**Absentee Ballots of Government Workers**

As was pointed out in Chapter I, Herbert Hoover said that Truman surely should be able to win this year, giving as a

---

reason the 2,000,000 federal employees. Figures to show how federal workers voted are extremely rare and the only evidence available on this score is the records kept by the Absentee Voters Committees of the principle parties. However, on a basis of these figures it would be very difficult to prove Hoover's assertion. Republicans as well as Democrats went after the votes of government workers. The absentee voting was not one-sided. The Democratic Absentee Voters' bureau, directed by Ethel Black, reports that 73,000 Democratic ballots were processed in her bureau. Besides these, help was given to about 25,000 other Democratic voters who were in Washington as federal employees. Similarly, Faith Gwynne Fisher, director of the Republican Absentee Voters' bureau, says that the Republicans processed 70,100 ballots, while thousands of other Republican ballots were mailed independently.\footnote{43} If these figures are indicative of how federal workers voted throughout the states it may be assumed that the Republicans were benefited about as much as were the Democrats by a large bureaucracy. In many of the key states the federal ballots going to the Republicans actually exceeded those cast for Truman.\footnote{44}

Loyalty of Negro Vote

In the large industrial cities of the north and east the Negro vote, as well as other minorities, turned out strong for


\footnote{44}For further information on federal workers influence see Chapters III, IV, and V and Appendix F.
Truman. It has been estimated by one Negro leader that for every Negro vote Dewey got two went to Wallace and eight went to Truman.\textsuperscript{45} This was especially true in cities like Chicago where the large block votes of Negroes, Jews, and other minorities constituted more than Truman's margin of victory over Dewey in these states.\textsuperscript{46} The one exception was in New York where the Negro block votes and those of other minorities went to Wallace.

With this we have the picture, however sketchy, of the most important nationwide factors that played upon the election outcome. The next three chapters will be devoted to the states of Illinois, Ohio, and California, in that order; and it will be the purpose of these chapters to study what happened within these states and to consider as specifically as possible all the factors of importance bearing upon the Democratic victory within these specified areas.

\textsuperscript{45}"The Truman Strength," U. S. News, XXV (November 12, 1948), 16.

\textsuperscript{46}Stanley Frankel and Holmes Alexander, "Arvey of Illinois," Colliers, CXXIV (July 23, 1949), 1, 9f.
CHAPTER III

SITUATION IN ILLINOIS

Though some Republicans still contend that Illinois is "normally" a Republican state, even the most die-hard of these are being forced to admit that many Illinois citizens are acquiring a rather strong affinity for the Democratic party. It is true that from 1872 through 1928 the state voted Democratic only twice (in 1892 and 1912). However, the Republicans may as well face facts. In each of the last five Presidential elections the state's twenty-eight electoral votes have gone for the Democratic candidate. All this is by way of saying that the state of Illinois is pivotal in nature, and the state is usually considered capable of going to either of the major parties.

Prior to the election Illinois had been considered to be a cinch for Dewey. In an article in Newsweek the following was said of Illinois:

. . . Republicans are talking of winning the state by from 350,000 to 400,000 votes, and while the Democrats contested this estimate, they did so only half-heartedly. . . . Now they [Illinois Democrats] conceded that Dewey, who lost Illinois to Franklin D. Roosevelt by 140,000 votes in 1944, would sweep it this year.2

---

1949 World Almanac and Book of Facts, p. 68.

2"Democrats at Twilight," Newsweek, XXXII (October 18, 1948), 36.
George Gallup, political analyst, predicted that Dewey would get 49 per cent of the vote and Truman would get 40 per cent, with about 11 per cent undecided.³

Another publication pointed out that Roosevelt had carried Illinois by only 51.7 per cent of the vote and that Wallace was certain to draw more than this away from the Democrats in Chicago, thus giving the state to the Republicans even if the electorate voted otherwise.⁴

Dewey's sweep of the state was expected to carry in the incumbent Senator Wayland (Curley) Brooks and the Republican Governor Dwight Green. It was admitted that these candidates would not poll the same plurality that Dewey would, but it was confidently expected that Brooks would beat Paul Douglas, the Democratic candidate, by over 250,000 votes and that Green would outstrip the Democrats' Adlai Stevenson by something like 100,000 votes. Democrats did not deny these figures.⁵

Newsweek's article of October 25, 1948, called "The Doubtful Ten," listed the Senate races that were in doubt, and Douglas's threat to Brooks was not even considered worthy of mention.

³Ibid.

⁴"How the Candidates Stand Now," U. S. News, XXV (October 8, 1948), 23. In this assumption U. S. News completely overlooks the fact that Wallace was not even on the ballot in Illinois.

⁵"Democrats at Twilight," Newsweek, XXXII (October 18, 1948), 36.
Some other reasons given for supposing that Douglas and Stevenson would lose in Illinois, and as a result, Truman, were: (1) Labor appeared antipathetic to the Democrats; (2) The Chicago Democratic machine was remaining lifeless; (3) Colonel McCormick's powerful Chicago Tribune was whole-heartedly behind Brooks and Green; (4) Chicago's popular Democratic Mayor Kennelly was remaining non-partisan in the race and supporting no one; and (5) Dewey and Warren had both campaigned for the local Republicans. 6

The last reason listed above, in which Dewey and Warren were considered comparable to the touch of Midas, and all the rest of these portends were rendered ridiculous in November. When the returns were in Truman had polled 50.7 per cent of the Illinois vote, with a total of 1,991,715 votes as compared to Dewey's 1,961,103.7 True, Truman's vote was down from what Roosevelt had received in 1944 and Dewey's was up. But this margin of 33,612 votes was still a far cry from losing the State "by from 350,000 to 400,000 votes."

Adlai Stevenson defeated Dwight Green for Governor by the most impressive margin in the State's history, winning by 572,067 votes. He had not only swept every ward in Chicago and rolled up a 540,000 vote landslide in Cook County, but he

6"Hope Against Hope," Ibid., 38.
71949 World Almanac and Book of Facts, p. 68.
had even carried traditionally Republican Downstate Illinois by 25,000 votes. Paul Douglas was not far behind Stevenson with an edge of 407,728 over C. Wayland Brooks. Douglas's votes came less from rural areas and more from Chicago than did those of Stevenson however.8

In counties, Truman carried only twenty-five of Illinois's total of 102, leaving seventy-seven for Dewey. Though Truman's number of counties was less than Dewey's, Cook County went to Truman, and this one county has half the state's entire population. Stevenson carried forty-nine counties, against fifty-three for Dwight Green.9

In most states the local candidates almost always receive more votes than do national candidates, and especially was this true in Ohio in 1948; but Illinois was exactly the reverse. In this state there were 27,000 more votes cast for President than were cast for Governor, yet Stevenson's plurality was about 500,000 votes more than Truman's. Thus, the practice of ballot-splitting cost the President dearly. And further, if the 27,000 people who went to the polls to vote exclusively for President had not gone Truman would have won by only about 6,000 votes.

Explanations and figure juggling being what they may, the one point to establish here is that after being written off

8Ibid.

completely Truman won Illinois by a clear majority, and his running mates on the State ticket completely devastated two entrenched Republican incumbents. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to consideration of factors that could have wrought this upset.

**Local Issues and Peculiarities**

**Reapportionment of Legislative Districts**

Illinois actually consists of two entirely different domains -- Chicago and Downstate. The population is about equally split between these two areas, with Cook County having a little over 50 per cent and the remaining 101 counties having about an equal number of persons. Rural-urban struggles exist in most of the states in our country, but in none is it so pronounced as in Illinois. Even the social and economic make-up of the two areas is different. In Chicago just about 34 per cent of the inhabitants are native born, the rest being immigrant, while in Downstate over 70 per cent are "native white of native parentage."10 In religion the Downstaters are predominately Protestant, while in Chicago Catholics are in the majority, along with a large Jewish block.11 The State government is almost completely controlled by the Downstate rural element because of the failure of the Legislature to

---


11 Ibid.
carry out a constitutional provision to redistrict the State every ten years. This has not been done since 1901, resulting in rural Republican legislatures headed by urban Democratic governors. Chicago invariably goes Democratic, with Downstate usually voting Republican. The farmers are afraid to redistrict for fear that the radical element and foreigners in Chicago will ruin the State, and the legislators, who are supposed to do the job, are loath to destroy their own jobs. The struggle between Chicago and Downstate for control of the State government became so intense several years ago that a bill was introduced in the House to divide Illinois into two states. Nothing came of the measure however.

Stevenson and Douglas did not campaign for this reform, but they at least did not mention it. On the contrary, Brooks and Green actively campaigned against the reapportionment, thus succeeding in isolating themselves completely from most Chicago voters.

Southern Illinois -- Downstate

Though Downstate is predominantly rural and tends to vote Republican, there are two major exceptions -- the block of counties in which coal is mined and the counties where oil is the chief occupation. The five counties where coal mining is

12Harold F. Gosnell, Grass Roots Politics, National Voting Behavior of Typical States, p. 92.
the main occupation are predominantly Democratic; these counties even went to Al Smith in 1928. The stability of these counties for the Democratic party is undoubtedly due to the strength of labor unions there. The United Mine Workers is very strong in this region, where even the farmers are sometimes part-time coal miners. The people of these counties were involved in the Depression in the coal industry and have many times looked to the relief rolls for help, thus adding to the Democrats' prestige. The oil boom in southern Illinois during the Thirties had political repercussions. The Democrats polled their maximum vote in this region in 1932, and, though the predominance of Democrats has decreased since then, it still has gone to the Democrats each time. It was pointed out by Gosnell in his study in Illinois that some 5,000 Oklahomans with Democratic leanings migrated to this area during the Thirties, and many of them remained. The relief burden of these counties was not as heavy as in the coal counties, but it exerted some influence in maintaining the popularity of the New Deal. These two sections where coal and oil are produced are the only exceptions in solidly Republican Downstate Illinois. These two areas probably have been the balance of power that gave the State to the Democrats in the last two elections.14

13 Ibid., pp. 100-101. These counties are Franklin, Macoupin, Perry, Saline, and Williamson.
14 Ibid.
Downstate as a whole, while being Republican, has much less party regularity than does Chicago. The farmers are not so concentrated and they are prone to vote more according to their own thinking of where their best interests lie than as some machine tells them to. Also, economic status plays a much less significant role in voting habits than in Chicago. Poor farmers have cast their ballots for Republicans when they saw fit, and some of the more wealthy land-owners have supported the Democrats.15

Urban Chicago -- Upstate

Having seen it [Chicago] I urgently desire never to see it again. It is inhabited by savages. Its air is dirt.

Rudyard Kipling

Chicago had a population of 3,396,808 in 1940. It is the fourth largest city in the world and the second largest in the United States. John Gunther, in his book Inside USA, describes the Metropolis as a "kind of state . . . including parts of Wisconsin, Indiana, and even Michigan." Actually, though Cook County contains most of Chicago, the city influences the whole area of northern Illinois and the Great Lakes region. Chicago contains the largest block of minority voters (Negroes, Jews, Italians, Poles, etc.) of any city in the United States with the one exception of New York City. It has from 350,000 to 400,000 Negroes, whole wards with 99 per cent Jewish

15Ibid., p. 102.
populations, and thousands of foreign born of various nationalities. These conditions make the city very susceptible to machine control, and the Democratic machine has from time immemorial taken advantage of these conditions. These minorities are crowded into the worst slums existent anywhere in the United States. This need for housing is so vital that in one instance fifty-four families have been forced to live in an apartment house originally intended for eight families.16

People living in such surroundings care little for good government but will vote as the "ward heeler" tells them, as long as he continues to get them out of "jams" when they have a brush with the law. An example of how well the Democrats have the city under control is that in two of Chicago's fifty wards (these two contain 250,000 Negroes) the vote is made "en bloc" for the Democratic ticket.17

Also Chicago follows the pattern of most big cities in that it has the most extreme elements of both parties within its limits. The outlying high rental areas of Chicago are solidly Republican and are little influenced by the machine. This is true also of the surrounding counties, where a definite Republican bias is found. Throughout the Rooseveltian period these areas remained strongly Republican, a fact which can

---

16 John Gunther, Inside USA, pp. 370-380. All general descriptions of Chicago are from Chapter XXIII of this book.

17 Ibid., p. 384.
probably be attributed to the influence of the powerful Republican newspapers.18

Thus we see the picture -- a state which has a Republican bias in over 99 per cent of its land area, but which has voted Democratic in the last five Presidential elections. The Democrats' strength has always rested on the Party's ability to deliver the Chicago vote practically in mass to the Democrats; at least this was the supposition until 1948. As will be brought out, 1948 was thought to be the Republicans' year, mainly because of the supposition that the Chicago machine was weak. This supposition proved to be wrong for two reasons, which will both be considered later.

Miscellaneous Local Issues and Peculiarities

One prominent political expert says that 1948 was just a continuation of the tendency of the last few years to vote against instead of for candidates. In 1946 the anti-O. P. A., anti-control, etc. sentiment had sprung up just before election time, and here, as elsewhere throughout the country, the GOP had won. The Republicans carried fourteen of seventeen Cook County offices, a truly remarkable record for the GOP in Democratic Chicago. In 1947 the same sort of "anti" sentiment was used in ousting the corrupt old Kelly candidates and electing a reform mayor, Martin H. Kennelly, who won by a

---

18 Gosnell, Grass Roots Politics, p. 100.
landslide. In 1948 the same reaction took the form of anti-Green sentiment. The reform spirit was goaded on by the corruption of Green's machine and Brooks' poor record.\textsuperscript{19}

Another incident which played no small part in the election was the Centralia Mine tragedy in early 1947. In this disaster 111 miners lost their lives after vainly appealing to Governor Green to do something about forcing the mine operators to install safety features in the dangerous mine where they worked. At the same time that it occurred Green's machine was out soliciting funds from the mine operators to finance his campaign for a Republican Mayor of Chicago. "Obviously the pay-off for these donations would be indifferent enforcement of the mine safety laws."\textsuperscript{20} Green had even had the audacity to authorize state mine inspectors to collect the funds for him. Following the disaster a legislative committee investigated and its report severely condemned Green's administration. The committee reported that the Centralia Mine had been allowed to operate "under such hazardous conditions that even a common layman could see that a catastrophe could happen."

Stevenson drove conditions like this home to the people during the campaign. Here are a few other issues he dwelt on:

\textsuperscript{19}Personal letter from Charles B. Cleveland, Political Editor, Chicago Daily News, March 12, 1950.

\textsuperscript{20}Robert S. Allen, editor, Our Sovereign States, p. 197. Date on Centralia Disaster came from this source.
(1) Why was the State payroll upped from 21,000 persons in 1940 to 38,000 in 1948, yet State services had been reduced?; (2) It cost Illinois $57,000 to build a mile of highway, against $27,000 in Iowa, because of kickbacks to contractors, etc.; (3) The State bought the Burnham Building in Chicago for $6,000,000 after giving up an option to buy it for only $3,375,000; and (4) Why did State institutions buy second grade food at prices higher than good food on the retail market? This sort of open corruption that Stevenson showed the people was potent political ammunition, much of which was left unanswered by Green.21

Wholesale forgeries in the nominating petitions of the Republican candidate for Treasurer were also exposed, not only by Stevenson, but with a vengeance by the nominally Republican Chicago Daily News.22

In addition to all the Republicans' other difficulties, the voters were energetically aroused by the St. Louis Post-Dispatch's vigorous campaign against Green. The Post-Dispatch was into the race completely after Peoria gamblers, who allegedly had Green's protection, kidnapped a Post-Dispatch reporter. This liberal Missouri paper ran full-page advertisements in newspapers throughout Illinois, causing many papers

22Allen, Our Sovereign States, p. 199.
within the State to take up the cry against both Green and Brooks.23

Finally, one seldom mentioned factor took place in Chicago that undoubtedly hurt Dewey. He had defended the record of the 80th Congress, a part of which was the killing of effective rent control. In terribly over-crowded Chicago large numbers of landlords sent out notices of rent increases right prior to election day. This, in the closing days of the campaign, corresponds to the time when most analysts say the switch back to Truman began.24

Significant Shift in the Farm Vote

In practically every state the shift in voting habits of the farmers was significant, but in none was this shift more spectacular than in Illinois. The farm vote shift might be considered analogous to the role of a dark horse in the Democratic victory. From the first the Republicans had figured that all they had to do to take the State was to catch the Chicago Democratic organization in a weakened condition and victory was theirs. In 1948 the Chicago organization was weak, but the Republicans made the mistake of thinking that

23 Ibid., p. 198. Just how effective the Post-Dispatch's campaign was is shown by the Illinois returns. In strongly Republican Peoria County, where the attack was concentrated, Stevenson won a substantial plurality.

they would carry the rural areas in the same strength that they had formerly. True, Truman's Chicago vote was about 60,000 under Roosevelt's total, and Dewey was up some 91,000 over his total; but throughout the small rural areas Truman was up over Roosevelt's showing and Dewey fell far below what he had polled in 1944. In all, Dewey lost 53,000 votes which he had received in 1944 from the farm areas. In counties, Truman carried twenty-five in southern Illinois as compared to only seventeen for Roosevelt four years earlier.

The reasons for this shift are generally the same as those given in Chapter II. There was a bumper crop of corn in 1948, totaling over 3,649,510,000 bushels, by far the largest harvest in history. "Farmers' barns, cribs and even unused school houses were overflowing." Illinois is second in the nation in corn acreage and these farmers were being forced to sell their enormous crops for just sixty-seven cents per bushel when they had sold 1947's crop for $2.60. Other grain prices were far below parity because the Commodity Credit Corporation was unable to buy surplus corn. (This was for reasons outlined in Chapter II.) Not only grain but total farm income had fallen far below 1947 levels, and a corresponding drop in farm costs had not accompanied the drop in incomes.

---

25See Appendix G.

26"The United States Harvests a Record Corn Crop," Life, XXV (November 22, 1948), 42.

27U. S. News, XXV (December 10, 1948), 52.
Farmers were beginning to realize that they had done pretty well under the New Deal, and, as Truman was telling them, the low price of farm goods did not look like the Republicans could do any better for them, so why change. One rural resident put it this way:

I talked about voting for Dewey all summer, but when voting time came, I just couldn't do it. I remembered the depression and all the good things that have come to me under the Democrats. When I arrived in Illinois with my wife and child in 1932, I had exactly two dollars and a quarter in my pocket. Now I have a farm, all paid for, a new car, a herd of cows, money in the bank. That's what the Government did for me.28

Truman could conceivably have carried Illinois without the shift of farmers in rural areas, but the margin would have been dangerously uncomfortable and would have been totally insufficient had Wallace been on the Illinois ticket.

Local Candidates and Their Campaigns

As has already been pointed out, the Democratic slate in Illinois was carried by two exceptionally able and dynamic men, Paul Douglas for Senator and Adlai Stevenson for Governor. Not only were these men extraordinarily competent and agile politicians, but they were opposed by men who were just as extraordinarily incompetent. The Democrats' campaign paralleled Truman's in their energy and hard-hitting qualities, and, as has also already been pointed out, neither Douglas nor

---

Adlai Stevenson was a rank amateur as far as politics was concerned when he received the Democratic nomination for Governor in 1948. Though this was his first formal venture in politics, he had already run up an impressive record of public service. In 1933 and 1934 he had been assistant to Republican George M. Peck of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, following which he served for several years as Assistant Secretary of the Navy under Republican Frank Knox. In 1945 he had served as special assistant to Secretaries of State Edward R. Stettinius and James F. Byrnes and as an American delegate to the United Nations General Assembly.29 In short, he was a political amateur as far as running for elective office was concerned, but he had eminently proven his mettle as far as his ability was concerned. It was expected that Stevenson would prove to be a conservative counterbalance on the ticket to offset Douglas's liberalism.

Many of the old-line Democrats scorned the Party's choice of candidate for Governor, saying, "What does a blue-blooded cooky pusher, an intellectual, and a stuffed shirt know about

practical politics?"30 His answer was to begin his campaign as early as February and to keep "barnstorming" right up to election night. He traveled around in a rented Chevrolet, spurning the offers of Cadillacs from his wealthy friends in Chicago, and it is said that "this earnest, friendly candidate visited almost every lunch wagon, curbstone, and Little Egypt in Southern Illinois to the North Shore along Lake Michigan, making as many as a dozen speeches a day." His strategy, as he put it, was "to aim at honest, decent Republican votes in Downstate and rely on Jake Arvey to turn out the Democratic vote in Chicago for him." In addition to this vigorous type of campaigning Stevenson was aided by the best of Lieutenants -- James W. Mulroy, William I. Flanagan, and Frank Millhouse -- all former newsmen and seasoned political strategists. They must be credited with a great deal in the Stevenson landslide. He campaigned on a definite program of reform in the corruption in the Green Administration, plus certain other benefits, such as modernization of the constitution, passage of an FEPC law, strengthening of civil service, consolidation of welfare activities, etc. Undoubtedly Stevenson's best strategy was his turning some light on the corruption in the Green machine.31

He had so upset the pre-campaign predictions of the pessimists that Time, which was predicting an otherwise

30Ibid.

31Allen, Our Sovereign States, p. 201.
Republican clean sweep in Illinois, said, "... But the Republicans... Dwight Green is facing real opposition from... Adlai Stevenson."  

Green answered Stevenson's charges of graft and corruption with contempt, referring to Stevenson as a striped pants diplomat. The Chicago Daily News was unable to find a picture of Stevenson in striped pants, but it did uncover one of Green wearing them. Stevenson promptly declared that he would be glad to wear striped pants if Green would lend him a pair.

The above incident typifies the kind of opposition that Dwight Green provided for Stevenson. Not only did his oratory sometimes backfire, but he was not supported well by his own party. Republican party leaders were furious at how Green had apparently bribed his opponents for the nomination to drop out of the race in the last few days on obviously trumped up excuses. Green would charge Stevenson with conducting a smear campaign, but, as one writer put it, "... it could be seen that the Republicans were smearing each other with gusto."

Also, his own party was antipathetic toward him because of increased taxes during his administration, his bungling attempts to land the 1948 Vice-Presidential nomination, and his running for a third term after severely condemning Roosevelt for doing the same thing.

---

33 Allen, Our Sovereign States, p. 195.
34 Ibid., pp. 199f.
Green conducted his campaign much as Dewey was doing, keeping to high-level oratory and answering all the charges of corruption and malfeasance with "as a good Governor I have given Illinois a place of leadership and dignity among the states." He rarely ever mentioned Illinois affairs but "noisily assailed President Truman, the late FDR, the no-longer-existant OPA, and other distant subjects." He refused to answer the charges of Stevenson right up to the end, and he steadfastly refused to debate any issue whatsoever with the crusading Stevenson.

**Senatorial Race**

Paul Douglas, the Democratic standard-bearer for the Senate in 1948, had long been active in civic affairs. He is the author of several books on economics and labor and was a professor of economics at the University of Chicago for several years. Before the war he served on the Chicago Board of Aldermen one term and authored many liberal and progressive reform measures. He has a record of being considerably left of center politically, but even that arch-Republican newspaper, the Chicago Tribune, admitted he was no communist. During the war he served, at fifty years of age, as a marine on Okinawa and there was wounded by machine gun fire. His wife, Emily Taft Douglas, probably helped spread his name around the state.

---

considerably by getting elected as Congresswoman-at-Large from Illinois in 1945 and 1946.36

Douglas's campaign was based more on national affairs than was Stevenson's, but, except for this, the two Democrats' campaigns were almost identical. Like Stevenson, Douglas campaigned as much on the Republicans' bad record as on his own platform. He attacked Wayland Brooks' record of isolation as making him the tool of McCormick and demanded that Brooks explain his voting record on such measures as F. E. P. C., C. P. A. extension, broadened social security, and other of Truman's measures.37 He went down the line for Truman's program, openly campaigning as a "New Dealer". He publicly dared Brooks to debate him on the same stand, and when Brooks refused he toured the entire state debating with an empty chair on the platform with him. He made hundreds of speeches, many from the top of the jeep that he drove throughout his campaign.38

Hardly any political analysts predicted that Douglas would be successful in unseating Brooks. Mainly because of Brooks' outspoken conservatism and his strong backing by the State's press, it was thought that he was impregnable. It was believed that the national trend was conservative and that

36"The Good Men," Newsweek, XXXII (October 18, 1946), 36-37.
38 Allen, Our Sovereign States, p. 196.
this bellwether of the conservative right-wing would win hands down. The contest between these two provided an excellent example of direct clash of ideologies. Brooks defended the Taft-Hartley Law vigorously, and he came out for other acts of the Republican Congress which Truman and Douglas were attacking. He conducted his campaign on the same high level that Green did; he enthusiastically received Warren and Dewey when they were in the state and generally acted as though Illinois, as well as the nation as a whole, were in the bag for the Republicans. His oratory was largely barren of specific issues and he refused to even consider Douglas's offer to debate these issues. He attacked Douglas as a radical and a communist sympathizer because Douglas was reported to have been associated with certain Communist Front organizations.39 No where, in any of the election contests in 1948, was the voter offered a more clear-cut choice between old-guard and standard Republicanism and the Truman-Roosevelt type of New Dealism. The issues involved and the types of campaigns waged by the two participants in this 1948 Senatorial battle probably contained some interesting lessons for victory-hungry Republicans.

To most observers it seems obvious that Truman's slim margin was the result of the landslide victory of local

39 "Key To Control of Senate," U. S. News, XXV (October 1, 1948), 12.
candidates in the election, but Charles B. Cleveland differs with the majority by saying it was the other way around. He reasons this way:

It is my hunch that the resultant landslide proportion of the vote for Stevenson -- and in a lesser sense for Douglas -- was the logical extension of the fact that Truman carried the state. It resulted in a snowballing effect, benefiting Stevenson and Douglas. It is difficult for me to comprehend sufficient numbers of voters who would have voted for Stevenson and Douglas -- and hence for Truman. Conversely it is easy to understand voters who cast their ballot for Truman who also would vote for other Democrats on the ticket.40

This reasoning on Cleveland's part sounds much more logical if the fact is remembered that the total vote cast for Presidential candidates exceeded those cast for state candidates by a substantial margin.

National Candidates -- Campaigns in Illinois

Truman's Campaign

Harry Truman's campaign in Illinois was as impressive as it was in all the other states, and much more so in the final stages of the campaign. He made dozens of speeches throughout the state, and everywhere he was received by enormous crowds who greeted his charges at Dewey and the Republicans "with unmuffled whooping."41 He used his same down-to-earth type

41 "Truman's Acres," Newsweek, XXXII (October 25, 1948), 27.
of oratory, taking up issues and telling the people what he wanted to do about them. Following are some excerpts from the speeches and talks that he made in southern Illinois:

On his first trip through Illinois on September 30, Truman had this to say at Rock Island:

You know the issues in this campaign are not hard to define. The issue is the people against the special interests, and if you need any proof of that, all you have to do is to review the record of the 80th Congress. . . . Dozens of times -- I won't say that -- at least half a dozen times I'll say -- I asked the Congress to give us a price control bill that would gradually release the controls as production caught up with consumption and prevent a runaway inflation. You were informed by the National Association of Manufacturers that within one year prices would adjust themselves. They adjusted themselves. They have gone all the way off the chart. It has not been in the interests of the common man either. It has been in the interests of the special interests who want to control this country again.

Now, in order to prevent that, you must elect men like Senator Douglas here in Illinois. . . .

In Herrin, Illinois he said:

Now, you're interested in mining and agriculture here in this community. There are people who work for wages here, there are people who work the soil to produce things to eat . . . and every single segment of that population ought to have its fair share of the national income. . . . I'm trying to save that program [the New Deal] because a lot of you stayed at home in 1946 and you elected that do-nothing 80th Congress. You were to blame for it because you didn't vote.

---

The first thing the Republicans did, just as soon as they could get settled in that Congress, was to pass the Taft-Hartley Act, which was intended to take some of the rights away from labor. . . . The next thing they did was to pull the road from under the farmer. . . .43

In El Dorado, Illinois the President plugged for the local Democratic ticket and attacked the Republicans' price support record:

I want to see Illinois come back into the fold and go Democratic, as it should. I want to see you elect John Upchuch here to the Congress . . . and Paul Douglas to the United States Senate. . . . And you ought to elect Adlai Stevenson to be Governor of Illinois. . . . He is a good administrator, and I am sure you can't do better than to make him Governor of Illinois.

Then, on the price support program, they 60th Congress/ almost wrecked it by a joker which they put into the re-charter of the C. C. C., which does not allow the Government to furnish storage space for the grain on which they make loans. Corn, right now, is selling 45 per cent below the support price just for that reason. . . . And it isn't fair. It isn't right.44

This sort of plain spoken oratory was duplicated throughout the Downstate rural areas. Many times he stopped for just a short time, or as he put it, "Just to say howdy to you."45

At these times he usually spent his time boosting the local tickets. He plugged for congressmen as well as for Douglas,

and many times he got the districts mistaken and plugged for a congressional candidate from another district altogether. Sometimes he didn't even bother remembering where the candidates were from, just saying, "I want Kent Keller to come to Congress, as well -- but I don't know whether he is in this District or the next District." 46

He made prolonged speeches at which he carried out this same kind of attack on the Republicans at such places as Marion, West Frankfort, Mount Vernon, Carbondale, Decatur, Tolono, Danville, and Mattoon, Illinois. 47 These do not include the numerous stops at which he made only short appearances and merely a few remarks. 48

The speeches were made on each of his three trips across the state, with his largest and most eloquent attack on the Republicans reserved for his rally in Chicago on October 25, 1948. Following are some excerpts from that major speech:

I hope that the people of Illinois will do all they can to bring back the same high ideals of government . . . by electing as your Governor, my good friend, Adlai Stevenson. And if Illinois is to be properly represented in Washington, you'll want to elect to the Senate that able and outstanding liberal, Paul Douglas.

46 Ibid.
47See Press Releases from Democratic National Committee of Truman's speeches in each of the towns mentioned.
It was in this major speech in Chicago that Truman made his widely-heralded accusations and charges of the Republicans being Fascists. He said, following disparaging remarks about Colonel McCormack:

The real danger to democracy does not come only from these extremes. It comes mainly from the powerful reactionary forces which are silently undermining our democratic institution. . . . Who are these forces that threaten our way of life? Who are the men behind them? They are the men who want to see inflation continue unchecked. They are the men who are striving to concentrate great economic power in their own hands. . . . they are blinded by the glitter of gold. . . . In our own times we have seen the tragedy of the Italian and German peoples, who lost their freedom to men who made promises of unity and efficiency and security.49

Following this obvious reference to Dewey, Truman went on to point out that the money spent by the lobbyists in the 30th Congress was comparable to the money put up by the industrialists in backing Hitler's rise to power. He spoke of the "door being partly open" to the entrance of Fascism and that it must be stopped by "slamming that gate shut on November 2, with an overwhelming vote for the Democratic party."50

And in his finale he made this invective-laden swipe at Republicans in general:

. . . And the whole country knows, also, that the Republican administration . . . has been reactionary, feeble, and against every piece of forward legislation. Such is the spirit behind government by Republicans. . . . In that spirit, democracy can be destroyed and tyranny born.51


50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.
Thus we see the sort of campaign waged by our Chief Executive in an effort to retain his job and to secure a Congress more compatible to his views.

Dewey's Campaign

Dewey's campaign was in direct contrast to that of Truman's in Illinois as well as elsewhere. He made only one major speech in the three times he toured across the state, plus three or four minor, back-platform talks. He did not take the trouble to campaign hard in southern Illinois because he considered that this area was safe in the Republican fold anyway. His minor speeches and talks were so small and few that the Republican National Committee kept no record of them, and their text is not available. Newsweek commented on these, however, in an article dated October 25. They said that in his latest swing through the rural areas of Illinois he made a few appearances, and his talk kept to the broad generalities and appeals for unity that he had exhibited in all his major speeches. Dewey spent most of his talking time appealing for the voters to elect GOP senators, because this was considered to be the one phase of the election in which the Democrats were expected to make gains.


53 "New Mood," Newsweek, XXXII (October 25, 1948), 28.
Dewey whole-heartedly supported Wayland Brooks and Dwight Green during his speeches in Illinois. This tended to make the people associate Dewey with Green and Brooks, both of whom were being subjected to a great deal of smear, as has already been pointed out. In addition, Charles B. Cleveland points out that Dewey failed completely to exploit his remarkable record as a New York governor in his speeches and talks in the state. Cleveland also points out that Dewey did not prove to be a popular or likable candidate in Illinois because of his attitude of absolute confidence that he would be elected.\textsuperscript{54}

Following are some excerpts from Dewey's one major speech in Illinois, the one delivered in Chicago. In an obvious retort to Truman's speech given two days before, he said:

The present administration has failed. . . .

And now, faced with failure, with their party split in all directions, its candidates have spread fantastic fears among our people. They are openly sneering at the ancient American ideal of a free and united people. They have attempted to promote antagonism and prejudice. They have scattered reckless abuse along the entire right of way from coast to coast and have now, I am sorry to say, reached a new low of mud-slinging. . . . This is the kind of campaign I refuse to wage.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{54} Personal letter from Charles B. Cleveland, Political Editor, \textit{Chicago Daily News}, March 12, 1950.

Speaking on price supports for the farmer, Dewey endorsed the Aiken-Hope Bill, which he contended was the only proposed, and the first long-range, support program the country had ever had. Dewey lapsed, however, quickly back into his habit of vagueness and generalities when he said:

We want to lighten the burdens of men and women on the farm, increase the comfort, the educational opportunities, and broaden the security of the farm families of our country. We want to see the day when the young people on the farms of America will want to make their careers in farming.

On labor Dewey specified only that American labor "is a cornerstone of our free society." He accused the Truman administration of being anti-labor because of Truman's alleged threat "to draft railroad men into the Army." He defended the Taft-Hartley act this way:

We will not follow the example of the present administration which publicly says it wants to go back to the days of chaos -- of unbridled industrial strife. . . . This administration wants to repeal the law giving union members the right to a report on their organizations' financial transactions; it proposes to repeal the ver law it used seven times to settle disputes in the interests of the public health and welfare. . . . Those reactionary interests are against the interests of the American people and more particularly against the interests of American Labor. Your next administration will not retreat from any advances which have been made for labor and for the American people.

56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
Actually, these excerpts are more the exception than they are the rule with Dewey's normal campaign oratory. Seldom did he become as specific as he did in the above quotes on Truman's slandering and on the Taft-Hartley law. His specificity here was probably due to his ire over Truman's linking him with Fascism in his speech in the same city only two days before. Most of his speeches more nearly resembled this quote taken from near the end of his Chicago speech:

... We believe in a united, decent America where agriculture, labor and business alike -- every last one of us -- is entitled to his human rights as a free American and the respect and fair treatment of a friendly government. ... When we get a government which honors and respects every American ... they [our children] can be sure of a nation united in the power that comes from freedom, working with all its great power to bring peace and progress to the world. 59

With these two divergent types of campaigning in mind, it is not difficult to see why Truman proved to be the more popular. Whether one's own particular bias runs toward the Democrats or Republicans, it is plain that Truman's "earthy", plain-spoken plea for votes would be more likely to be favorably received than would Dewey's confidence and lofty platitudes.

Support of State and Local Organizations and Groups

Republican Party

The Illinois State Republican organization was, as has been alluded to before, badly disorganized in 1948. Contributions

59 Ibid.
to the state party organizations were low because many of the wealthy Republicans were so dissatisfied with the Green Administration. Party workers and leaders were not solidly behind the ticket because of the suspicious disappearance of Green's opposition before the primary. Two candidates had filed against him. They were Lieutenant Governor Hugh W. Cross and former Republican State Treasurer Warren Wright, both of whom withdrew early in the race. Cross quit on the excuse that promised support had failed to materialize. Immediately afterwards Wright withdrew on the excuse that Green had promised to support a veterans' program, and this, he said, was his only excuse for running.60

Efforts to hold the rural areas were not even attempted by the state organizations. Replies to the Truman, Douglas, and Stevenson accusations were made only half-heartedly, and it might even be supposed that many Republicans were actually enjoying seeing Green beaten. It was not supposed that this "mud-slinging" would be effective against the national ticket; and Green was probably thought to have it coming after his pompous arrogance in striving for the Vice-Presidential nomination and his underhanded method of becoming renominated for Governor.

The Republican party as such is not of vital importance in Illinois, however, because Republican candidates depend for

60 Allen, Our Sovereign States, pp. 199f.
their support on the scattered rural areas where the voters are less susceptible to party organization. These areas usually vote Republican regardless of whom the nominee is, and probably by choice rather than as a result of party activity.

Democratic Party

Democratic circles were at a low ebb in the spring of 1948. Continuous bickering marked the state nominations. Douglas wanted to run for Governor, but the Democratic leaders did not like his outspoken liberalism and chose instead Adlai Stevenson. Douglas was disappointed but consented to accept the nomination for the Senate. The Republican ticket looked unbeatable. Dewey was expected to sweep the whole state, Green and Brooks were considered "in" because of their long-time control of patronage, and many of the party leaders were openly predicting defeat for Truman.61

The Democratic party depends very strongly on the activity of party organization, and especially is this true in Chicago. Jacob Arvey,62 as head of that organization, had bolted the convention and plugged for Eisenhower for the Democratic Presidential nomination. Because of Arvey's defection from

---

61Ibid.

62An excellent description of Chicago politics, the Democratic organization in Chicago, and Arvey's life can be found in Stanley Franskel and Holmes Alexander's, "Arvey of Illinois," Colliers, CXXIV (July 23, 1949), 9f.
the Truman backers, it was believed that the last leg of the floundering Democratic party in Illinois had fallen away.

Arvey, however, made an about-face during the late summer and began to work for the Democrats' national ticket. He and his organization worked hard for Truman as well as for the rest of the Democratic ticket, and they climaxd their work by a gigantic torch-light parade in Chicago on October 25, at which some 500,000 persons lined the streets to see candidate Truman parade to Chicago Stadium. This rally and show of force undoubtedly impressed many undecided voters that Truman was not beaten, at least not yet. Though many may minimize the effect of Arvey's change of attitude towards Truman and the work that he did in Truman's behalf, Truman himself definitely did not minimize it. Following is the body of a personal letter addressed to Colonel Jacob Arvey from Truman:

I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for all your efforts during the campaign.

It was a great victory and you may be sure that I fully realize the part you played in bringing it about.

Thus we can see that the Democratic party, which had been so run-down and lifeless in the spring and summer, really began to function and show some spirit and life in the closing weeks of the campaign.

---

63 "Forever Fighting," Newsweek, XXXII (November 8, 1948), 23.

Labor Support

Organized labor in Illinois showed almost complete indifference to the Presidential election right up until the closing days of the campaign. Deciding, rather belatedly, that Truman, Stevenson, and Douglas had a chance to win, the various unions met in Chicago on October 6, and made plans to co-ordinate their efforts. Though they had not exhibited much interest in the Presidential race, it is not to be assumed that the unions were not active or were poorly organized. They had been actively campaigning for congressmen and other local candidates in Chicago and elsewhere, and the newly organized Labor League for Political Education was considered to be better organized and more capable of turning out the vote in Cook County than in any other big city in the country. Once they began to take an interest in the election and to co-ordinate their efforts to work for Truman the unions were exceptionally effective. In Illinois the A. F. of L. and the C. I. O. unions combined put 17,000 members in the field, ringing doorbells and getting out the vote. Of these, some 10,000 were members of the A. F. of L., 5,000 were members of the C. I. O., and the remainder were members of various smaller unions.

65 "Hope Against Hope," Newsweek, XXXII (October 18, 1948), 38.
From these figures, it is evident that Labor, though a late starter, was a prime factor in getting out 82 per cent of the qualified voters in Chicago, as compared to just 72 per cent for Downstate.69

Press Support

The Illinois press is predominantly Republican in any election year and in 1948 was even more so. Papers that had supported the Democrats steadily all through the Roosevelt campaigns were switching to Dewey. Of special note in Illinois was the Lindsey chain, which controls seven dailies scattered throughout southern Illinois; they switched to Dewey after having supported Roosevelt in 1940 and in 1944.70 In Chicago the press, led by Colonel McCormack's Chicago Tribune, supported Dewey down the line. The one exception was the Chicago Sun-Times, which was the only important paper in the state to back the entire Democratic ticket, including Truman. Of the ninety Downstate dailies less than ten supported Truman, and only a few more supported Stevenson. The same proportion is estimated for the some eight hundred weekly papers throughout the state. Even the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, which carried on the vigorous campaign against Green, was supporting Dewey.71

70"Defection Roll Call," Newsweek, XXXII (November 1, 1948), 17.
Though the Chicago Tribune is undoubtedly very effective in molding public opinion in Illinois, it did not help Dewey's cause by linking together and supporting the entire Republican ticket. Colonel McCormack, the Tribune's owner, vigorously attacked the popular Stevenson in editorials, saying he was "pinkish" and that he wanted to levy an income tax on the people. It should also be noted that it was through the Tribune's approximately 900,000 outlets that Stassen and Taft were attacking the Farm Price Support program. None of these, even coming through the Tribune, could be considered to have won votes for Dewey.

Minority Support

Early in the campaign many political experts predicted that Truman couldn't take Illinois because Chicago's large minority vote was almost sure to go to Wallace. However, Wallace was not successful in getting on the Illinois ballot, and the enormous Negro, Jewish, and other minorities went to Truman instead.

Chicago's second ward, where Representative William Dawson, a Negro, is ward committeeman, gave Truman more votes than did any other ward in the city. Dawson himself received some 92,000 votes as compared to less than 5,000 write-ins.

---

72 Ibid.

for the Wallace candidate. It is estimated that nine out of ten Negroes in Chicago gave their vote to Truman.74

Truman's repudiation of Secretary Marshall's endorsement of the Bernadotte plan for partition of Palestine, issued on October 24, just a week prior to election, eased the Jewish feeling against him. An indication of how this stroke won Truman many votes is shown by the fact that Zionists put up some of the $45,000 needed to give Truman an additional radio network and a mid-west television hookup the same night that he rejected the aforementioned proposal.75

Miscellaneous Support for Democrats

In addition to the support of the major groups that have been taken up, Paul Douglas lists the following organizations of lesser significance that were supporting him: various Douglas for Senate clubs; Americans for Democratic Action; about 1 to 5 per cent of the press; and scattered student organizations.76 Though the Republican candidates undoubtedly had similar groups supporting them, a list of such groups is not available. Stevenson lists these specifically as having supported him: League of Women Voters; Independent Voters of


75"Forever Fighting," Newsweek, XXXII (November 8, 1948), 23.

Illinois; By-Partisan Stevenson for Governor committees throughout the state; and numerous federated clubs.77

Miscellaneous Factors

Large Number of Federal Employees

Illinois's 91,000 federal employees constitute an enormous block of potential voters, should they be afraid of losing their jobs; and some believed Truman's margin of victory came from these employees.78 The only guide available as to how these voters cast their ballots, as has already been stated, is records kept by the Absentee Voters bureaus for federal employees living in Washington, D. C. A look at the figures on how Illinois absentee voters cast their ballots will, however, give a rough sort of guide as to how the other federal employees in Illinois voted. These figures seem to bear out Hoover's thesis that the bureaucrats would help the incumbent party for over twice as many of these voters cast their ballot for Truman as did for Dewey. There were 16,500 ballots mailed by Democrats to Illinois and only 8,300 sent by Republicans.79 If these figures are an indication of how the rest of Illinois's 91,000 federal employees voted, then most certainly Truman's slim margin of 31,000 can be attributed to this source.

77 Personal letter from William I. Flanagan, Superintendent, Division of Department Records, Springfield, Illinois.

78 See Appendix F.

Democrats Guard Polling Places

Many Democratic leaders in Chicago believe that Truman's victory was aided by the victories of Stevenson and Douglas in this way: These candidates having piled up tremendous early leads and practically cinching carrying the state, the Democratic party saw that Truman might have a chance of winning the state after all. They rushed party officials into Downstate counties to oversee the counting of ballots. Chicago Democrats believe the Downstate GOP folks would have stolen enough votes to swing Illinois to Dewey "if they hadn't gotten in there fast to prevent such shenanigans."30 This factor is largely the result of supposition, however, and its validity cannot be depended upon.

Southern Illinois Railroad Incident

Though on the surface the railroad incident in southern Illinois doesn't seem important, it attains added significance when it is remembered that the Brotherhood of Railroad Engineers was one of the few labor unions that were backing Dewey. Here is Time's account of what happened when the Dewey Victory Special had stopped briefly in Beaucoup, Illinois:

"... Engineer Lee Tindle, who improved the time at these Railway siding stops by taking on water, had overshot the water tank. Without realizing what he was doing, he backed the Victory Special into a gathering of admirers at the rear end. The crowd fell back in panic. Dewey, startled, yelled"

---

"Whoops!" But the train moved only a few feet and Dewey, smiling wryly, addressed himself to the microphone. "That's the first lunatic I've had for an engineer," he declared.

Engineer Tindle, asked by newsmen to comment on Dewey's remark, observed mildly: "I think as much of Dewey as I did before and that's not very much."

This story was widely publicized throughout the country, and though unwarranted, it probably crystallized many peoples' already suspicious attitude towards Dewey.

Late Shift to Truman -- Republicans Hurt

There is evidence that the shift of voters from Dewey to Truman came late in the election. The Chicago Sun-Times conducted a straw poll during the campaign, and it showed Dewey always with a comfortable margin. However, in the last two or three days before the election Truman began showing tremendous gains and actually overtook Dewey. Their poll of churches the Sunday before the election on Tuesday resulted in figures that were practically identical with the election results. If this were the actual situation, and there is no reason to believe otherwise, then the Republican candidates who had been banking heavily on the poll predictions were badly handicapped. Consistently the large polls had shown that they were leading; this had lead them to modify their campaigning.

81 "Don't Worry About Me," Time, LII (October 25, 1948), 21.
82 Personal letter from Charles E. Cleveland, Political Editor, Chicago Daily News, March 12, 1950.
and tone down their oratory for fear of losing what votes they were already conceded to have. The shift, coming so late in the campaign, obviously left them with little time to campaign effectively. If this is to be considered a factor, then one must assume that the Republicans would have been capable of stemming the rising Democratic tide had they had time; that this was so is extremely doubtful.
CHAPTER IV

SITUATION IN OHIO

"Ohio is normally a strong Republican state."¹ This statement by John Gunther is one much more easily substantiated than are similar references to Illinois. It has been referred to as the Mother of Presidents; the writer who penned that name might better have said the Mother of Republican Presidents. Ohio has produced more Presidents from point of view of birthplace than any state except Virginia -- seven; and everyone of these have been "Old Guard" Republicans.²

Ohio, however, began to change its political complexion during the early Thirties and is now universally considered to be one of the large pivotal states. The state has shown definitely that it is capable of going to either of the major parties. In 1932, 1936, and 1940 Ohio went to Roosevelt and the Democratic party. It reverted back into the Republican fold in 1944, only to change again in 1948 and go to Truman. Harold F. Gosnell says that Ohio is the most typical of all the states. It almost invariably goes as the rest of the nation

²1949 World Almanac and Book of Facts, p. 106. These Presidents were Grant, Harrison, Hayes, Garfield, McKinley, Taft, and Harding.
goes, with almost the same percentage going to each party as on the national average. "Ohio comes closer to approximating the national trend than any of the other forty-eight states." It will be the intent of this phase of the study to determine, if possible, why this state went to the Democrats in 1948 after having rejected that Party in 1944 when they had the dynamic Roosevelt as a leader. Just what caused Ohio, in an apparently conservative year, to reverse all predictions and give its electoral votes to a man who was obviously not equal to the personality they had rejected four years before?

Before the election Ohio was considered a "dead cinch" for Dewey. U. S. News even listed Ohio as one of those states that Dewey could count on for sure, and one to form a nucleus upon which Dewey could build. Most of the magazines did not even devote time to consideration of the situation in Ohio because the state had gone to Dewey in 1944, and the Gallup Poll predicted Truman to have but 42 per cent of the state's vote. It was generally thought that it would be impossible for Truman to carry a state that Roosevelt had failed to carry.

On the morning following election day it was found that Truman had polled 49.7 per cent of the entire state vote and


had beaten Dewey by the narrow margin of 7,107 votes. He
had received 1,452,791 to Dewey's 1,445,684, with 37,596
going to Wallace.6

Of all the upsets registered on November 2, 1948, none
exceeded that in Ohio. Dewey had steadfastly refused to concede
the election all night, but when he received the official
returns from Ohio the following morning he knew that he had lost.
If such a pre-election favorite as Ohio had fallen to the
Democrats, there was no longer any doubt that all was lost.

Truman had won Ohio by approximately 7,000 votes while
Roosevelt had lost the state by 12,000 in 1944. The vote in
Ohio was lighter this year than previously. In 1940 all
Presidential candidates received 3,320,579. In 1944 the figures
were 3,153,056. But this year the total vote cast for President
was only 2,936,071. This total was 82,218 less than was cast
for both Thomas Herbert and Frank Lausche, the candidates for
Governor. Lausche had beaten Herbert, the Republican candidate,
by 221,261 votes, polling 1,619,775 as compared to Herbert's
1,398,415.7

Truman had fallen far below Roosevelt in the nine large
industrial centers, but he was up in the agricultural areas.
Truman carried the same number of these large industrial

6See Appendix H.
71949 World Almanac and Book of Facts, p. 94.
counties as did Roosevelt, but he came out of them with a plurality of only 87,279 votes as compared to Roosevelt's 178,232. In light of the fact that Truman carried the state and Roosevelt lost it, these figures are very interesting. This is partly explained by the fact that 120,435 voters refused to vote for either of the Presidential candidates in 1948 and the fact that around 100,000 more ballots were invalidated for numerous other reasons. However, even this taken into consideration, the returns plainly indicate that the farm vote was exceedingly important to the Truman victory.

The nine counties that have the industrial vote provided 55 per cent of Ohio's total, and Truman's share of this vote consisted of 58.7 per cent of his total statewide vote. These percentages tend to show that, contrary to the figures in the preceding paragraph, the labor and industrial vote should not be minimized.

The extent of the Democratic victory in Ohio is emphasized still further by the shift in Congressional delegates. Before the election the Democrats had four delegates and the Republicans had nineteen; following the election they held twelve Congressional seats as compared to eleven for the Republicans.

---


What had happened? Following are some opinions offered as to why Ohio betrayed all precedent and went Democratic.

Raymond Moley, commenting in *Newsweek*, said:

> Prosperous farmers, overconfident Republicans, labor concentration on Congressional candidates, better candidates on state tickets, and a light vote were too much for even as good a ticket as Dewey and Warren.12

Richard L. Maher, an expert on Ohio politics, attributed the Democratic sweep in Ohio to two factors: (1) Indifference on the part of the Republicans; and (2) Truman's really getting down to the ordinary man in his appearances in Ohio.13

A high official in the Ohio Democratic organization was less accurate but much more colorful when he said, "... The situation can well be summed up in one statement -- they had the money and we had the votes."14

And lastly, after a thorough post-election survey of the Ohio situation, W. H. Lawrence explained the Republican debacle this way:

> The Truman victory is a result of the 'Pocket-book Nerve'. Housewives remembered GOP promises that after OPA went off the statute books that prices would go down. ... Labor resentment against the Taft-Hartley Law; and the farmers didn't desire a change.15

---


14Personal letter from Eugene H. Kanhart, Democratic State Executive Committee, Columbus, Ohio, March 2, 1950.

With these we have the picture — Ohio upsetting all the opinions and predictions of the pollsters and political experts by going into the Democratic column. Also we have the attempted explanations and excuses offered by men of several shades of political opinion of what they thought happened. With these in mind for possible future reference, the remainder of this chapter will be devoted to actual factors and considerations that brought about the Democratic victory.

Local Issues and Peculiarities

Reapportionment of legislative districts. — The need for a more equitable distribution of representatives in Ohio's Legislature is very comparable to the same problem in Illinois. The main difference is that there are more cities in Ohio upon which the farmers can look with suspicion. Also, the rural-urban struggle is somewhat overshadowed by rivalry between Ohio's numerous urban areas, a minimizing factor that does not exist in Illinois. The disproportion is, however, felt very strongly in Cleveland, where only one representative is allowed for every 70,000 persons, as compared to one being allowed for every 10,000 in certain rural areas.16 Of course, this puts control of the state government in the hands of the rural element, a fact which is bitterly resented by the cities. The cities are agitating for "Home Rule", but this cannot be done.

16 Allen, Our Sovereign States, pp. 168f.
until they have their just representation in the state legislature. The rural dominated legislature is loath to redistrict, and indeed is prevented from doing so without the constitutional amendment.\textsuperscript{17} This problem is pertinent to the 1948 election for two reasons. First, Lausche, the Democratic candidate for Governor, campaigned vigorously for reapportionment. And secondly, the farm areas, for the first time in the history of Ohio, sided with the city labor element to vote for the Democratic slate.\textsuperscript{18}

The urban labor strength, already being very strong (Ohio has nine cities of over 100,000 population), was sufficient with the addition of this rural vote to bring the Democrats the victory. An attempt to decide why the farmers dropped their animosity toward cooperation with the city voters will be found later in this chapter.

\textbf{Industrialization -- many urban centers. --} As was pointed out in the preceding paragraph, though the farm vote shift was vital to the election outcome, labor's strength in Ohio elections is not to be minimized. This is probably because of Ohio's strong concentration of industry and her numerous large cities. Though ranking ninth in agriculture in the United States, Ohio ranks third in industrial development.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{17}\textit{Ibid.} \hfill \textsuperscript{18}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 183f.

Also, Ohio is extremely rich in cities. There are at least fifty-one cities with populations between 10,000 and 100,000, and nine are between 100,000 and 1,000,000. Ohio is exceeded only by Pennsylvania in this category. These cities make Ohio, which is a relatively small state, rank fourth in population.  

All of this shows that, unlike Illinois which is predominantly rural with one enormous metropolis, Ohio is more "normally" constructed, having many urban industrial centers interspersed throughout its original agrarian economy.

Cleveland is the seat of Democratic strength in the state, probably because this city leads the state in industry. Cincinnati also has much industrial development but is generally considered to be more conservative than its northern counterpart because state Republican strength seems to center here. Scattered throughout the state between these two extremes are such other urbanized areas as Akron, Toledo, Youngstown, Dayton, Columbus (the capitol), and Canton.

As was indicated earlier, some 59 per cent of Truman's total statewide vote came from these cities, an impressive figure to be sure. How labor was organized in these areas and what they had to contend with is found later in this chapter.

20Allen, Our Sovereign States, p. 166.

Conservation — effects of strip-mining. — Another issue that was involved in the 1948 election in Ohio is the problem of conservation. Coal is mined extensively in southern Ohio, and most of it is near the surface. These coal veins near the surface are worked by "skinning off" the covering soil. This process leaves deep erosive scars. For decades efforts have been made to make the coal operators cease the practice, or at least to take steps to stop the resulting erosion. The powerful operators lobby at the state capitol has always prevented legislation of this sort from passing, however. In 1948 Lausche used this mal-practice as a major plank in his campaign. He promised to do something about the destructive practice if elected.  

Truman and the Democratic party probably received many votes in the rural areas because of the raising of this issue and because Lausche was on the Democratic ticket.

Effect of lobbyists' activity on Truman. — To attempt to find out who runs Ohio, according to John Gunther, is very easy — it is the lobbyists. However, he goes further to point out that lobbying is about equally divided between the various pressure groups, with teachers, the labor unions, and the farmers all being about equally represented with manufacturing interests.

---

22Allen, Our Sovereign States, p. 174.

23This is indicated because the erosion was hurting the rural areas rather badly. For a thorough study of economic conditions in southern Ohio see Irwin V. Shannon's Southeastern Ohio in Depression and War, a pamphlet.

The problem of lobbying would not be pertinent here except for an incident that took place in 1947. Ed D. Schorr, a powerful and free-lance lobbyist, undertook to rewrite the election code at the instigation of certain Republican clients. His version of the code was adopted in that year and was the method used in 1948. This Schorr code provided that only X marks were valid on ballots; any other mark invalidated them. In centers like Cleveland, Akron, Canton, and Youngstown voters often mark their ballots with a check or cross, or even yes or no. Previously the law permitted such ballots to be counted if the intent of the voter was clear. It is estimated that this technicality cost Truman approximately 100,000 votes, and the Democrats, discovering too late what had happened, were forced to sit impotently by as the illegal ballots were thrown out.25 This serves as another indication that the Truman victory in Ohio was much more impressive than his small plurality shows.

Effect of ballot-splitting on Truman. — The tendency of many voters in Ohio to split their ballot very nearly gave the state to Dewey. He lost to Truman by the narrow margin of only 7,000 votes, and the returns indicate that some 94,000 voters preferred Lausche for Governor and Dewey for President. This is in addition to the aforementioned 120,000 voters who

voted for Lausche but did not even indicate their preference for President.26

Susceptibility of Ohio Republicans to propaganda. -- The final issue, which is peculiar to Ohio, to be considered here is a study conducted by Columbia University in 1944 that sheds some heretofore undiscovered light on the 1948 election. According to this survey conducted in Erie County Ohio during the thick of the 1944 campaign, it was found that many people who are predisposed toward the Republicans vote Democratic when exposed to propaganda. Democrats were found less likely to be affected in this way.27 The Democrats certainly provided most of the propaganda in 1948, and the Republicans replied only with generalities or silence. The area studied was considered to have both rural characteristics and urban characteristics and to be a typical sampling of Ohio's electorate.

Significance of Shifting Farm Vote

The shifting of the rural areas from Republican to Democratic candidates was as equally significant in Ohio as in Illinois. The shift from 1944 was probably even more extreme in Ohio; but it was not so spectacular because many of the rural counties had been known to vote Democratic before.


Counties such as Putnam, Mercer, and Shelby can be considered traditionally Democratic, but they voted against F. D. R. in 1944 because they contain large communities of Catholics of German origin who thought Roosevelt and the war were all wrong. These counties were the chief audience of the anti-Roosevelt line preached by the Detroit Radio Priest, Father Coughlin. Others in these counties disliked Roosevelt because of the third term and because they thought he was abetting Stalin too much. They held no such prejudices against Truman. This does not detract from the Farm vote significance, however. Counties such as Noble, Harrison, Holmes, Paulding, etc. had few or no such voters and they broke precedent and went for Truman also. The contrasts shown in Appendix I between the urban returns and those from the small rural areas definitely show that for some reason many farmers had changed their minds since 1944.

One frequent, and presumably valid, reason given for this shift is the attack carried out by the Republicans on the Price Support program. Senator Taft made several talks and speeches criticizing the program. Also, after a conference with Harold E. Stassen in Albany, Dewey had Stassen issue, on


29 See Appendix I.

September 2, a statement accusing the Administration of doing everything possible to keep prices high. The Secretary of Agriculture immediately blasted back, telling the farmers that this was an attack on the parity system. Following this, Stassen carried on an open attack on the Administration and especially on their bungling of the farm problem. This attack originated in the Chicago Tribune but undoubtedly was reprinted in many of the Republican Ohio sheets.

Another reason offered is the same one already given concerning the lack of storage facilities for grain crops. Truman emphasized to rural Ohio audiences that this was only a taste of what would come under total Republican rule.

Gubernatorial Race

The one local election in Ohio in 1948 that probably carried enough significance for consideration here was the contest between Frank J. Lausche and Thomas Herbert for Governor of the state.

Before the Republicans considered Ohio a cinch they should have taken into account the personality of the man who was that state's Democratic standard bearer. It is true that Lausche was defeated during the great Republican sweep of 1948, but

31 "Decisive Farm Vote," Newsweek, XXXII (November 15, 1948), 25.

a truer indication of his popularity is the 1944 election. In that year he was the only major Democratic survivor as the state went Republican. This is the only instance of victory by a local Democrat where the President was beaten in that year. He outran Roosevelt by 35,000 votes.33

Though Lausche insists that he is not a politician, he is probably the best Ohio has produced in years. Following are some indications of the man's tremendous popularity in Cleveland: when he first ran for Mayor of that city he polled a 61 per cent majority over his opponent; the second time he ran he polled 71 per cent over his opponent; and in his first campaign for Governor he spent only $27,162 throughout the campaign as compared to his opponent's $938,000.34 This was the year he outran Roosevelt.

Lausche gets along about as well with Republicans as he does with his fellow Democrats. During his first term in office he had a Republican legislature. He made special efforts to please the Republicans, consulting them more frequently than he did the Democrats. During the 1948 campaign he avoided all connection with the State Democratic organization, campaigning independently and even refusing to take party offers of financial assistance.35

33 Gunther, Inside U. S. A., p. 426. 34 Ibid.
35 Personal letter from Richard Maher, Political Editor, Cleveland Press, February 27, 1950.
During the early part of the campaign Lausche avoided mentioning Truman's name in any of his speeches. The two candidates traveled together throughout the state, and Truman plugged vigorously for Lausche; however, Lausche maintained a deep silence as far as the President was concerned. But finally, in Akron, before a packed house, Lausche was carried away. He threw caution to the winds and gave Truman an "emotional" and excellent endorsement. The GOP machine "worked overtime" flooding the state with copies of Lausche's words. The Republican newspapers denounced Lausche and proclaimed he "had pulled a prime blunder."\(^3\) Contrary to Republican opinion that the endorsement had worked against him, it probably worked for him. It succeeded in making him look like a sympathizer with the "lonely" President's cause and probably worked to the advantage of both of them.

Tom Herbert had neither the personality nor support to furnish effective opposition to Frank Lausche. He was excessively long-winded, and the people invariably became bored during his speeches. In addition he failed to take advantage of the tradition for a second term that usually goes in Ohio. Instead of campaigning on his own record during his term of office, he blustered against the Truman Administration and generally tried to ride back into office on Dewey's coat-tails.\(^3\) It

---

\(^3\) Allen, Our Sovereign States, pp. 178-179.

\(^3\) "Getting Warmer," Time, LII (October 18, 1948), 26.
should also be remembered that Lausche had cut himself off from labor support by refusing to bow to their demands while in office. Herbert had an excellent opportunity to woo and gain this support, but he spurned their feelers, probably thinking it would do him more harm than good. Also, Herbert did not have the whole-hearted backing of his own party. Lausche had gained the blessings of many Republicans by solicitation during his first term in office; thus, to these Lausche was probably just as desirable as was Republican Herbert.

Thus we see that though some 94,000 voters split their ballots to vote for Lausche and Dewey, a great many more undoubtedly went to the polls to vote for Lausche and "voted 'er straight".

There were other prominent men in Ohio politics who may have influenced the election. Senators Taft and Bricker probably exerted some influence one way or another because it was their record in Congress that was coming under the Democrats' attack. But, in that Bricker did not participate actively in the campaign at all and Taft only indirectly, their activities will not be given special consideration here.

National Candidates -- Campaigns in Ohio

Truman's campaign. -- There need be no long examples or explanations of how Truman campaigned in Ohio because it was almost identical with his work in Illinois. Truman made three
trips into Ohio with major speeches at Cleveland, Akron, and Cincinnati. He made some twenty talks in all, with longer speeches in such places as Toledo, Crestline, Hamilton, Dayton, Sidney, Lima, Ottawa, Deshler, Potosia, Willard, Rittman, and Sandusky. In each he used the same brash and abusive attacks on the Republicans that were exemplified in Illinois. Everywhere the President was received by enormous crowds, with the cities staging giant rallies, Bon fires, and torchlight parades. *Time*, commenting on the Truman crowd-drawing ability, said:

... Dayton turned out more than 50,000 strong. Akron's rubber workers and the Democratic machine put on the biggest political show in the city's history; more than 60,000 stood for two hours along the main streets, cheering wildly as Truman passed by.

As was indicated by the names of the towns where Truman made speeches, he carried his outspoken oratory throughout into the rural areas. This campaigning by the Chief Executive is undoubtedly responsible for much of his election day popularity.

Dewey's campaign. -- Like Truman's, Dewey's campaign in Ohio closely paralleled his campaign in Illinois. He made only one major speech in the entire state, at Cleveland, plus two or three appearances at which he spoke hardly at all.

---

38 See Press Releases from Democratic National Committee of Truman's speeches in each of the towns mentioned.

39 "If I Hadn't Been There," *Time*, LII (October 25, 1948), 23.

40 Personal letter from Richard Maher, Political Editor, Cleveland Press. This is also substantiated by a personal letter from Floyd E. McCooffree of the Republican National Committee.
He carried through on his original plans to remain aloof from the bickering and argumentation of the ordinary campaign. He confined his campaign oratory in his major speech in Cleveland to discussing foreign affairs and how our country needed a stable and sincere hand at the helm of the ship of state. He attacked the Communists, Stalin, and the Chinese Reds, but hardly a word was said in the entire major address that was specific and to the point as to how he planned to achieve peace; or for that matter, nothing was said about how he would rectify any of the mistakes of the Democratic Administration.\textsuperscript{41}

Dewey refused repeated bids from his Ohio Republican managers that he barnstorm the state. He crossed Ohio twice in daylight, refusing to stop for speeches even in a city the size of Toledo, a city, incidentally, that voted for him in 1944 but went for the Democrats in 1948.\textsuperscript{42} Senator Taft was one of those who detected a Democratic shift in the farm counties, but he was unable to persuade Dewey to alter his Cleveland speech and reassure the farmers that their prosperity would not be endangered by a Republican victory.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{41}Speech by Dewey, Press Release from Republican National Committee, Cleveland, Ohio, October 28, 1948.


\textsuperscript{43}Ibid., November 30, 1948, p. 24, col. 1.
Support of State and Local Organizations and Groups

Labor support. — Labor support in Ohio went almost entirely to the Democrats in 1948. Actually the labor unions took over the Democratic party organization at some places and outright directed party activities. Notably in Cleveland, many labor organizers quit their organizing activities and worked full-time for the local Democratic Committees. Many of them gained key positions in the party. Most all sources and authorities point out that labor gives most of its support to the Democrats, and especially is this true in Ohio.

Glen Slaughter of the A. F. of L. reports that the A. F. of L. was better organized on a statewide basis in Ohio than in any other state. To substantiate this, the New York Times reports that:

Veteran Ohio political observers report that the labor political organizations at the precinct level were the best in history.

Taking a page from the books of the big city political machines, the labor groups set up a 'block leader' system. On Election Day they canvassed every voter to make certain his ballot was cast, and where necessary provided transportation to the polls. Baby-sitting by labor canvassers was quite common.

There was little genuine enthusiasm in the ranks of labor in Ohio for Truman or Lausche, but with the campaign build around retirement of the Republican

---

Congressmen, it was easier for the voter to cast a straight Democratic ticket once he was in the polling booth.47

In light of the demonstrations and receptions given for Truman in all the large industrial centers, the Time's last paragraph is probably not too valid. It should be remembered that the labor unions were nationally supporting the Democrats, and this was bound to have held some sway over Ohio laborers. Also, Richard Maher declares that labor was definitely enthusiastically behind Truman, though they were cool to Lausche.48

Finally, in considering labor's part, one must not forget that Henry Wallace's electors were on the ballot in Ohio and that he was drawing much of his strength from labor's domain, the big cities. This might very easily explain the poorer showing of the Democrats in the urban areas; labor was having to fight a two-front battle, against both the left-wing faction and those who favored the Republicans.49

Press support. -- In Ohio the press was just as antipathetic to Truman's candidacy as it was in the other states. About the same percentage of the press was supporting Dewey as in Illinois, part of which had switched from supporting the Democrats in 1944 to the Republicans in 1948. The only

---

48Allen, Our Sovereign States, p. 182.
significant newspaper that had not switched, however, was the leading paper of Youngstown, The Vindicator. This is generally considered to be a "liberal" sheet and had supported Roosevelt all four times.\(^50\) Besides this one large paper there were numerous minor papers that had switched to Dewey after having backed Roosevelt. Approximately 95 per cent of the Ohio press was backing Dewey.\(^51\) Of these, not a single paper of major importance was backing the Truman candidacy.

**Democratic party.** — During the election campaign of 1948 the Ohio State Democratic party was quite ineffective. The party was torn by strife, feuds, and quarrels. Lausche was not having anything to do with the other party candidates, Labor was having to do the precinct organizing because of party confusion, and the party finances were at their lowest ebb.\(^52\) The delegates to the national convention had had a falling out over whom they would support, with some of them plugging for Eisenhower and some remaining loyal to Truman. With Truman expected to lose by a landslide margin, these old wounds were kept open, and bitterness rendered the party efforts largely ineffective.\(^53\) In the matter of finances, the party

---

\(50\)"Defection Roll Call," *Newsweek*, XXXII (November 1, 1948), 18-21.


\(52\)See above, under Labor Support.

spent only $72,649.55 on the entire state ticket, but even this small amount put the party treasury over $10,000 in debt for they had been able to collect only $62,054.00.54

These extremely low figures for party finances are deceptive, however, because, as has been pointed out previously, labor gave enormous sums to the Democratic cause in both money and services. And Frank Lausche campaigned independently, using his own funds.

Republican party. -- A comparable situation to the disruption in the Democratic party, strangely enough, existed also in the Republican camp. According to the New York Times, a feud was going on between the "Old Guard" forces and the "liberal" Republican forces. It also dates back to before the convention when part of the party, led by former Post Master General Walter Brown, a member of the Hoover Cabinet, wanted to give the state's votes to Taft, and the younger members wanted Dewey or Stassen. The Times goes on to point out that Stassen had beaten Taft in several counties in the Republican Presidential preferential primary. Of especial note was the fact that Stassen had carried Lucas County and the city of Toledo in that primary. As a result, in Lucas County alone Dewey received 10,449 fewer votes in the general election that in 1944.55

54 Personal letter from Charles F. Sweeney, Secretary of State, Columbus, Ohio, March 14, 1950.

In a similar article in *New Republic* it is brought out exactly how badly the Republicans were disorganized and impotent. Referring specifically to the county in which Cleveland is found, they said:

Never have Cleveland's Republicans paid so much for so little as they did in the election of 1948. According to official expense accounts, the party ran up bills of $165,000 during the campaign. And in spite of their investment, they elected not a single official to county office. They failed by more than 100,000 votes to carry their county for incumbent Governor Tom Herbert. . . . In addition, they came out of the campaign with a $30,000 deficit.56

In expenses throughout the state the Republicans spent $1,063,203.70,57 as compared to the Democrats' only $72,600.00. This represents over eleven times as much actual money outlay as the Democrats spent.

Though these figures can not be taken as absolutes for reasons already mentioned, they do give some indication of just how impotent the Republicans in Ohio really were.

**Wallace Vote in the Election**

Prior to the election Wallace had been expected to poll at least 2 per cent of the Ohio electorate. Actually Wallace only polled .5 per cent. He received only 37,596 out of 2,936,971 total votes cast.58 The reasons why his showing in

---


57 Personal letter from Charles P. Sweeney, Secretary of State, Columbus, Ohio, March 14, 1950.

58 See Appendix H.
Ohio was so poor are several. Probably the first in importance is the fact that the whole Progressive movement was collapsing as a result of being astigmatized with a "red tinge". The fact that Wallace's name was not on the Ohio ballot because of an election board ruling and his followers were forced to vote for his twenty-five separate electors, is also important.

And finally, not to be overlooked is the work of the labor unions, which worked hard to keep the left-wing voters in the Democratic fold.

Miscellaneous Factors

Large number of federal employees. -- A look at the statistics shows that there are 76,000 federal employees in Ohio. Though not as many as are in some states, they are still plenty to have swung the election one way or the other. Using the same guide previously used, contrary to the situation in Illinois, the Republicans actually benefited from federal employees. Democrats in Washington mailed 7,752 back to Ohio but absentee Republicans in the Capitol returned 9,200 ballots for Dewey. If these figures are an accurate guide as to how Ohio's other 76,000 federal employees voted, then certainly the Republicans benefited from the bureaucracy.

59 See Chapter V.

60 Moley, "Et Tu Ohio," Newsweek, XXXII (November 15, 1948), 100.

61 See Appendix F.

Stay-at-homes helped Dewey. — It has been said that if just one more Dewey voter had shown up at Ohio's 9,500 polling places the state would have gone for Dewey. 63 Raymond Moley also made such a statement in the first of this chapter, intimating that a light vote hurt Dewey. However, Samuel LuBell of the Saturday Evening Post made an on-the-scene survey soon after the election and found the opposite to be true. "In every Cleveland ward, Truman appears to have pulled more of the Republican vote from Dewey." In one precinct he found that Truman polled nine times what Roosevelt had in 1944, and Dewey was down only 400 votes. In personal interviews with persons representing a cross-section of the Cleveland electorate, LuBell found that practically all of the non-voters contended that they would have voted for Truman had they gone to the polls.64 Though these figures reflect to some degree the tendency for everybody to jump on the bandwagon following elections, and hence are not too accurate, it does cast serious doubt on the claims of Dewey apologists.

64Ibid.
CHAPTER V

SITUATION IN CALIFORNIA

Most of the western states have been peopled by a steady influx of settlers from two or three older states. . . . But California was settled by a sudden rush of adventurers from all parts of the world. This mixed multitude, bringing with them a variety of manners, customs and ideas, formed a society more mobile and unstable, less governed by fixed beliefs and principles. . .

Lord Bryce

As will be brought out in the course of this chapter, the above quotation is putting it mildly. To say that California is "more mobile and unstable" is a masterpiece of understatement. If California were unstable during Lord Bryce's visit to this country (1907), then it could probably be referred to as completely erratic today, at least as far as its politics is concerned. The sudden rush into California that Bryce was referring to was the Gold Rush. However, he had no idea of just how inadequate his statement really would become these thirty odd years hence. Today California has, in addition to the early adventurers seeking gold, the literally millions of people who have migrated to this state during the Thirties and during the war boom. Her population has almost doubled since the last census was taken, a fact which probably makes her the most unpredictable state, politically or otherwise, of them all. Gosnell, commenting on this California phenomenon, said:
Nowhere else has there been such a proliferation of religious sects, of naturopaths, of faith healers, and of spiritualists; and the political sphere has not escaped infection. The EPIC (End Poverty in California), Utopian Society, Townsend Plan, $30-Every-Thursday, and Ham and Eggs movements bear ample testimony to the willingness of the California electorate to experiment with the politically bizarre. . . .1

Not only is California unpredictable and prone to the "politically bizarre", but it is recognized by many as a "typical" state despite its extremely dynamic and changing political "climate". John Gunther had the following to say on California:

California holds in microcosm the fundamentals of almost all American problems from race relations to reconversion, . . . If either Fascism or Communism should ever smite this country, it is more likely to rise first in California than in any other state.2

As a result of this shifting, unpredictable, migratory populace, California was one of the first of the states to be regarded as pivotal in nature. As a state which could go either way, California attained real significance in 1916. In that year the state gave its electoral votes to Wilson (by a scant plurality of only 3,806), and these votes provided the deciding number. In 1920 California swung back into the GOP column, as did the rest of the nation, and remained there until 1952. In that year, and ever since, the state has gone

1Harold F. Gosnell, Grass Roots Politics, National Voting Behavior of Typical States, p. 75.

However, the Democratic margins of victory have been diminishing steadily since 1936, and there were some grounds for the Republican hopes that 1948 would be their year again in California. Also, the presence of Earl Warren, California's popular Governor, on the Republican national ticket gave added strength to the GOP claims. Whether these factors justified the following claims, however, is open to some doubt. U. S. News summed up the pre-election situation in California this way:

... Then, Mr. Dewey can count as well upon California. Governor Earl Warren will assure the 25 votes of his state for the Republican ticket on which he has second place.

Raymond Moley was more specific but equally as incorrect when he, on October 4, wrote:

California... has no serious political contests this year. Republicans are confident, perhaps to the point of overconfidence. Neither a Governor nor a Senator is up for election and the present balance of house seats is unlikely to change.

The call for unity by Dewey and Warren is making a hit in California. It seems that President Truman handed them this issue on a golden platter. It appeals to the West with special force. It suggests to employers and to the rank-and-file relief from labor troubles. It offers an alternative to the bitter attacks in Truman's speeches. And it fits the independent, nonpartisan sentiments of Western states, where they believe they vote for the man, not for the party.

---

31949 World Almanac and Book of Facts, pp. 63-64.


5Raymond Moley, "Perspective," Newsweek, XXXII (October 4, 1948), 92.
Toward the end of the campaign publications predicting the outcome of the election began to hedge on their first extravagant estimates of Dewey's prospective victory in California, but only slightly. They predicted his margin would not be a landslide but would probably be slightly less than Roosevelt's 1944 margin of 475,599.

George Gallup had originally predicted that Truman would poll only about 35 per cent in California, with Dewey receiving 49 per cent and 7 per cent going to Wallace. As the campaign progressed Truman began to show substantial gains on the Gallup predictions, with both Wallace and Dewey falling off. His final pre-election poll showed Dewey with 46 per cent, Truman 43 per cent, and Wallace about 5 per cent.

The actual results on November 3 were: Truman 1,913,134 or 47.5 per cent of the total votes; Dewey 1,895,269 or 47.1 per cent of the total votes; and Wallace 190,381 or 4.4 per cent of the total votes. In contrast to the rest of the nation, the California vote was exceptionally high, with 80.54 per cent of the qualified voters going to the polls.

What had happened? California, with its almost undefinable political climate and its thousands of cross currents, is indeed a difficult state to analyze. However, now that the


election is over and the benefit of that invaluable tool of the chronicler, hindsight, is available, certain factors stand out as rather obvious determinants of the election. It will be the purpose of the remaining portion of this chapter to analyze those factors.

Local Issues and Peculiarities

Party Discipline

California, living up to its reputation as being a state of extremes, exhibits a striking example of an electorate being bound by practically no party discipline. This is partly due to its migratory and shifting population and partly to its unorthodox filing system. Both of these peculiarities will be discussed at length later, the point here being merely to point out the almost complete lack of party regularity. The evidence bears out, at least in part, Raymond Moley's statement that Californians vote for men, not parties. A look at the results of elections in California from 1924 to the present bears this out. The fact that the aforementioned experiments in politics could have sprung up so fast and attained such popularity goes a long way to show that a large percentage of the electorate doesn't mind deserting the party. A perusal of these same statistics shows that, when the country as a whole was going Republican, California went violently so; and when the country swung Democratic, none swung quite so far.8

81949 World Almanac and Book of Facts, pp. 63-64.
This lack of party control extends not only to the voters but even is evidenced by the state's elected representatives in Congress. Carey McWilliams, an authority on California politics, points out that this state's congressional delegation is "by all odds, the least disciplined of any state delegation in Congress." He points out that the degree of harmony between voting records and party commitments varies from 44 per cent to 95 per cent in the California delegation.9

This is brought out here as a suggested reason for why this state was predicted so inaccurately in 1948.

Problem of Population Growth

"In 1948, two out of every three people in California were born in some other locality."10 This statement by Carey McWilliams pretty well sums up the population situation in California. Not even New York can boast of a speedier growth in population. In the last hundred years the population of California has registered an increase of about 44.6 per cent per decade, or approximately 3.8 per cent per year. With such growth percentages as these one can see the folly of trying to judge how the state will vote by past voting records. On basis of these figures it can be seen that from one Presidential year to the next approximately 15.2 per cent of the state's

---

9Carey McWilliams, California, The Great Exception, p. 198.
10Ibid., p. 67.
residents are new; and there is practically no way of telling how these people will vote.\textsuperscript{11}

Though California has shown tremendous growth throughout its history, its most spectacular increases have come in the last ten years. Since 1940 the state has increased 45.2 percent with some 3,000,000 new residents moving into the state. Actually about thirty times as many people have come to California in the last decade as came during the Gold Rush decade; some 40,000 people enter the state each month to take up permanent residence.\textsuperscript{12} Most of these new immigrants are former war workers who came to the West Coast during the war to work in airplane and defense plants. This is shown by the fact that the greatest increases came during the war years. In 1940 the state's population was 6,907,387; it had increased to almost 9,000,000 by 1944, and is at present estimated to be just a little over 10,000,000.\textsuperscript{13}

In an attempt to discover what general type of people the immigrants were, a study was conducted on a new city near Los Angeles almost entirely composed of the migrants. This study revealed that approximately 75 per cent of the men were

\textsuperscript{11}Percentages are from Carey McWilliam's \textit{California, The Great Exception}, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{12}McWilliam's, \textit{California, The Great Exception}, pp. 5, 9, 13, and 18.

\textsuperscript{13}Gunther, \textit{Inside U. S. A.}, p. 5.
veterans of World War II. Most of the residents were in the middle class, with extremes of both wealth and poverty being largely absent. For the most part, the men worked in the skilled trades, the professions, civil service, and in manufacturing plants. These voters tended to be about equally divided between Republican and Democratic parties. However, this study did not include the migratory farm workers who are estimated to be approximately 90 per cent Democratic.

Another excellent indication of how the new population votes is found in a comparison of party registrations. In 1924 the Democratic party had only 22 per cent of the total registration by comparison with a 65 per cent Republican registration (the rest were in minor parties); but in 1945 the Democrats had 56 per cent of the total and the Republicans had dropped to 37 per cent. Of course, not all this can be attributed to the immigrants because probably many native citizens just changed their voting habits. But such a tremendous shift to the Democrats certainly indicates that a large majority of the newcomers are Democrats. This preponderance of registered Democrats over Republicans, and the fact that these people were continuing to flow in at the rate of 40,000

---

14 California leads the nation in federal civil service employees. See Appendix F.

15 McWilliams, California, The Great Exception, pp. 15-25.

16 Ibid., p. 195.
per month, was apparently overlooked by the pre-election "doepesters" who considered the state a cinch for Dewey.

These enormous increases in population have created a great many problems, not the least of which is the worst housing shortage in the nation. Though California expended 18 per cent of all the nation spent on new construction in 1948, it was still unable to keep up with demand. Slums were developing abundantly in the metropolitan areas, and as the housing shortage became worse, rents, released from O. P. A. control by the Republican Congress, were going out of sight. In the Democrats' campaigns in California not only did they attack this act of the Republican Congress, but one of the planks in their platform specifically promised federal aid to housing.

Another thing that seemed to aid the Democrats was that, coupled with these giant increases in population, the large aircraft and other defense industries were curtailing production because of the stoppage of large war contracts. This resulted in an unemployment situation in California that was probably worse than in any other state. In June, 1948, the California Department of Employment estimated the jobless at 340,000. In Los Angeles County alone there were 180,000 unemployed. The Democrats' campaign included specific promises of unemployment compensation and an increased minimum wage.


16 Ibid., p. 37.
State Controlled by Two Spheres

**Northern sphere.** — Northern California, with its center at San Francisco, is comparable to most any other Western state as far as politics is concerned. Traditionally this area is more Democratic than its southern counterpart. This is probably due to the long-time strength of organized labor in this area. Party alignments are more clear-cut, with the Republicans maintaining the mildly conservative tradition and the Democrats prone toward change, but not radically so. The Democratic strength in this area is also probably due to the large numbers of foreign born who are usually laborers and tend to align themselves with the Democrats and the labor movement. Farmers are of the traditional sort, small landowners who farm their own land, and usually vote Republican.\(^{19}\)

By and large it might be said that Northern California is much more stable, less radical, and more traditional than is Southern California.

**Southern sphere.** — Southern California, with its center in Los Angeles, is the opposite of its northern counterpart, at least as far as politics are concerned. It is in this area that the great radical movements began, such as the Townsendites, etc., which were mentioned earlier. Though less cosmopolitan

---

\(^{19}\)All information on San Francisco and Northern California is from Gosnell's *Grass Roots Politics*, p. 80.
than San Francisco, this area is much more unstable. It is from here that California's experimenters in the "politically bizarre" largely come. This last is attested by the fact that Wallace drew over 100,000 of his 190,000 votes from Los Angeles County alone. In this area is found the greatest single concentration of Negroes west of the Rockies (320,000); it is an area in which 9 per cent of the population is over 65 years of age (good climate); and finally, it is an area in which is located the city with the largest veteran population of any city in the nation (Los Angeles). Southern California's farmers are in large part merely land-holding corporations, with holdings in the thousands of acres. The rural population is composed mostly of farm laborers, and as a result of this situation, California presents an exception from the normal by being almost entirely devoid of the traditional rural-urban struggle. It is this southern part of the state that is responsible for California as a whole being so unpredictable. This statement is substantiated by the fact that during the Twenties it was a Republican stronghold but has changed so now that it contains the heart of California Democratic strength.

---

20 State of California, Statement of Vote, Frank M. Jordan, Secretary of State, December 10, 1948, p. 5. (pamphlet)

21 See below, under Farm Vote.

22 Carey McWilliams, California, The Great Exception, pp. 18-24. Information on Los Angeles and Southern California is taken from this source.
Cross-filing System

The right of a person to become a candidate of more than one party became law in California in 1913. This procedure is found in five other states besides California, but in these party ties are strong enough to prevent the confusion that the system has wrought in this state. What little party regularity existed in California at that time has since been destroyed by the cross-filing system. An example of how this system has worked is shown by the fact that in 1940 some 55 per cent of the congressional seats were filled at the party primaries. In other words, these seats were filled by candidates who had captured the nominations of both parties. This system even enabled staunch Republican Earl Warren to receive the Democratic as well as the Republican nomination in 1946.

Though the California vote was exceptionally high, this system probably resulted in its being lower than it would have been normally. An example of this is found in Los Angeles's 66th District. The same congressional candidate received both nominations in this district, and, as a result, Truman's vote was down 13,600 from what it was in 1944. These votes would probably not have gone to the Republicans because the district

23 Ibid., pp. 194-195
24 Ibid.
is inhabited mainly by laborers, and further, because the Republicans polled within 100 votes of what they had received in 1944. These figures might also be interpreted, contrary to popular opinion, that the stay-at-homes helped Dewey, not Truman.

The Water Problem and Central Valley Authority

Practically all cities, agriculture, and industry in the Southern California area depend on imported water for sustenance. There has long been agitation for a federal authority in central California, not only to insure Southern California with a steady supply of water, but as a flood control measure. The Central Valley Authority would have cost over two billion dollars, but would have gone a long way toward alleviating the unemployment problem as well as providing other long-term benefits. The C. V. A. was also expected to create a veritable garden out of a 500-mile long desert in central California. This project had been fought bitterly by the large power interests in California because this was an obvious threat to their existence. The Republican party in California had sided with the power interests against the C. V. A. for years, and some GOP candidates talked against it in 1948.

---


27 Carey McWilliams, California, The Great Exception, p. 271.

28 Ibid., pp. 271f.
The issue might not have been pertinent to the election outcome had not an extensive drouth been in progress in 1948. McWilliams gives this description of the drouth:

... streams had been reduced to a trickle in the foothills, gasoline engines were used to pump water for cattle, and water was hauled into some metropolitan areas by truck. The Governor ordered a state of emergency in 26 Southern California counties. The resulting losses ran into the millions for both industries and agricultural interests.29

Truman made good use of the situation. In his speeches in California he campaigned for federal power projects and water conservation. The people had heard the Republicans refer to C. V. A. as "Socialistic", but at the same time they were experiencing a real water crises and there was no insurance that it wouldn't happen again. Great losses had been suffered, and under these conditions it is likely that many switched to supporting Truman instead of Dewey because Dewey remained non-committal on the issue throughout California.30

Farm Vote

Nowhere is the fact that California presents exceptions to the rule borne out so clearly as it is on the farm question. In this state there is almost complete absence of the traditional type of rural-urban struggle. Most of the people in California who live in the country are in reality just people

29Ibid.

30See excerpts from the candidates' campaign speeches below, under "National Candidates".
who work in the cities and live in the country. They do not constitute farmer population. Most of the new immigrants that have flooded into the state, contrary to popular opinion, are not farm immigrants of the "Grapes of Wrath" type, but they are mostly laborers in industries and live in the cities. This is borne out by McWilliams when he reports that from 1860 to 1940 the urban population increased sixty-fold, but the rural population increased only seven-fold during the same period. The rural population is largely made up of immigrants, it is true, but these total a small portion of the state's total growth.

The farms are usually owned in mass blocks by corporate bodies or other wealthy interests who have their offices in the city. The picture of the farm owner in California can best be summed up this way:

The typical farm employer in California is not, in any sense, a "Farmer". The large shipper-growers usually farm by phone from offices in San Francisco or Los Angeles. Many of them travel by plane in visiting their various operations in the field. Although the relationship between these employers and their industrial colleagues is most intimate, their relationship to the land is as casual as that of the migratory workers they employ.

Thus it can be seen that neither the farm owner nor the laborer have any intimate connection with the land. The

---

31 McWilliams, California, The Great Exception, p. 83.
32 Ibid., p. 157.
laborer is merely working for wages in the majority of cases. This peculiar situation has resulted in the rise of a rural population that is more radical than its city counterpart. This is pointed out rather forcefully by the following quotation from Gosnell's study:

Only on two occasions in recent California history have the rural areas voted more conservative than the urban areas. These two incidents were the Upton Sinclair EPIC movement and the anti-picketing initiative in 1938. Actually the rural areas harbor the strongest socialistic and progressive communities to be found in California. Their vote for Roosevelt in 1932, 1936, 1940, and 1944 (also 1948) was always stronger, percentage-wise, than was the larger urban areas.

The reason for this tendency of the rural elements to be more desirous of change in California is probably the lack of any normal conservative ties to the land and the fact that most of the rural laborers are only employed seasonally, and the rest of the time they find difficulty getting work. However, it is not the purpose of this paper to try to isolate reasons for situations being as they are, but it is merely to bring to notice all those situations bearing on the election.

In 1948 the rural areas went solidly for the Democratic Ticket.

---

33 Gosnell, Grass Roots Politics, p. 79.
34 Ibid. See Appendix J.
35 McWilliams, California, The Great Exception, p. 147. The fact is also brought out by this source that the migratory laborers are highly unionized. These farm labor organizations carried out 180 major strikes during the Thirties. Major strikes occurred in thirty-four of California's fifty-two rural counties.
This is shown by such counties as Contra Costa (which gave Truman twice as much as Dewey), Fresno, Placer, Plumas, Tulare, and Ventura, all of which gave Truman overwhelming majorities.36

Thus we see the picture of California's unique rural areas. Never has the Republican party had strong holds on the rural voters, and not since the Twenties has the GOP even carried these areas. In light of this, and the fact that the Democrats practically always had majorities in the cities, it is indeed hard to see just what the Republicans were basing their hopes for 1948 on.

All this elucidation has been entered here primarily to establish the fact that in 1948 there was no "shifting farm vote" in California. The farmers had merely continued to vote as they had done for five straight Presidential elections, for the Democrats.

Local Candidates and Their Campaigns

Though Earl Warren was number two man on the Republican National Ticket, he and his campaign will be taken up here because his popularity and vote-getting ability must all be measured by his past record in California. Until 1939 Californians had known Earl Warren as a professional Republican politician. He had been a product of the Knowland machine in Alameda County and had headed a Hoover delegation

to the Republican National Convention in 1936. In that year he was elected Attorney General, a post which he held until 1942 when he was nominated and elected Governor on the Republican slate. In 1946 he ran up against the no-second-term tradition in California but was nominated for re-election by both major parties and was swept into office by the largest plurality ever received by a candidate for Governor in California. In this election he also received the distinction of being the first governor in history to receive both the Democrats' and the Republicans' nomination, and he was the first California governor in thirty-two years to be elected to a second term. In light of this it is little wonder that the Republicans gave him a post on their national ticket in 1948. It could logically be assumed that he would absolutely assure his own state for the national ticket, and his general vote-getting ability was expected to help elsewhere.

Warren's popularity in California is understandable in light of the fact that during his terms in office California was experiencing the tremendous war-time prosperity. Also his record in office shows many advances. During his administrations old-age pensions had been raised from forty to sixty

---

38 1949 World Almanac and Book of Facts, p. 94.
dollars a month; unemployment insurance raised from twenty to twenty-five dollars a week. Workmen's compensation benefits raised from $9.75 to thirty dollars a week, with an outright death benefit of $7,500 to widows. Aid to the blind was increased from fifty to seventy-five dollars per month, and aid to needy children rose from $10.40 a month to $23.80. He pointedly avoided taking sides on labor disputes, thus keeping from making either labor or management his enemy. And lastly, his popularity must be partly based on his jovial, hearty, and honest appearance. In addition, he has his large family with him at most all his appearances.41

In light of these facts it is hard to believe that Warren did not help the Republicans in 1948. His campaign was, like Dewey's, very vague and non-committal,42 but this had been his past strategy and could not be said to have worked against him to any marked degree in California. He made two or three statements and stands in the closing days of the campaign that may have hurt his cause,43 but by and large, it must be assumed that Dewey was helped considerably in California by Warren's presence on the ticket.

41 Mr. and Mrs. Warren have six children.
43 See below, under "Labor Support".
Warren was one principle personage whose influence on the election could be considered local in nature, but many of the lesser candidates exerted such obvious influence in favor of the Democrats that they cannot be overlooked. The following congressional candidates won by such overwhelming majorities for the Democrats that undoubtedly their presence swung many votes to Truman. Truman won Los Angeles County by only about 6,000 votes, yet Democrat Helen G. Douglas beat her opponent W. Wallace Braden by 45,000 in that county's 14th Congressional District. Richard Nixon beat Republican Una W. Rice over 120,000 votes in the 12th District. Gordon L. McDonough beat Maynard J. Omer bert by the overwhelming margin of 131,933 to 27,007. Clyde Doyle beat Willis W. Bradley by the lesser but still impressive margin of 105,687 to 92,721. Chet Holifield won over Republican opponent Joseph Francis Quigley by 40,000 votes. Of the above mentioned races, the most worthy of notice were the wins registered by Douglas and Holifield. The two had been expected to lose badly because their votes were to be split by the Wallace vote; however, in the last two weeks the Wallace candidates withdrew from the race, and as can be seen, the Democrats won hands down. This is definite indication of the last minute collapsing of the California Progressive movement.

Statement of Vote, Frank M. Jordan, Secretary of State, December 16, 1948, pp. 4 and 8. (pamphlet)

See below, under "Wallace Vote."
Many other individuals, such as Jimmy Roosevelt, Sheridan Downey, Robert Kenny, Will Rogers, Jr., Ed Pauley, George Luckey, etc., undoubtedly exerted influence on the Presidential election in this state to some degree, but their influence was so vague and nebulous and hard to evaluate that time and space cannot be devoted to their activities here. Suffice it to say that there were strong personalities in both political camps whose efforts and contributions probably influenced the election outcome in a limited manner.

National Candidates -- Campaigns in California

Truman's Campaign

"Truman's California campaign was as phenomenal as in the country at large. If any carrying was done, he did it." This statement by a close observer of California politics is rather easily substantiated. Everywhere Truman went he vigorously supported the local candidates and attacked the Republicans. The best example of the weight Truman carried is found in what happened to Bertrand W. Gearhart, the Republican incumbent in the 9th Congressional District. In his speech in this district Truman violently attacked Gearhart as "a terrible Congressman," and pleaded with the voters to elect his Democratic opposition.

---


47 Speech by Truman, Press Release from Democratic National Committee, Fresno, California, September 22, 1948.
substantially in 1946, was beaten in 1948 by politically unknown Cecil White by over 11,000 votes.48

In all, Truman made over thirty speeches and talks in his two days in California, with major speeches delivered in San Diego, Los Angeles, Sacramento, Oakland, and San Francisco. Included in the thirty were significant but shorter speeches delivered throughout the state at such places as Oceanside, Burbank, Truckee, and Roseville. In San Francisco, Truman relaxed somewhat from his frenzied attack on the Republicans and gave a rather long, cogent, and statesman-like speech on international relations and American Foreign Policy.49 This exception, however, was the only one. In all the others he blasted Dewey and the Republican Congress incessantly. His attacks so closely parallel the charges already taken note of in former chapters that they do not merit repeating here.

As in Illinois and Ohio, Truman was received by enormous crowds at each of his stops. Everywhere he outdrew Dewey, and his tour reached its climax in the state at Los Angeles, where some 500,000 people lined the streets to greet him.50 It was in this Los Angeles speech that he made a direct appeal for that city's large Wallace following. He charged that "liberals"

48Statement of Vote, Jordan, Secretary of State, p. 7.
50"The Truman Punch," Newsweek, XXXII (October 1, 1948), 21.
must stick together everywhere and that the "Progressive Party is doing much for the cause of reaction in the United States by playing into the hands of the Republican forces of reaction." He pointed out that a vote for Wallace was tantamount to a vote for Dewey and appealed for the voters not to waste their vote.51

The one major incident that happened in California during his campaign, which was considered by many as a political blunder, came in his Fresno speech. Here he made pointed references to Dewey's war record, saying that he (Truman) had volunteered in World War I and had not had to "register as a farmer to escape the draft." This reference may have been a "low blow", but it should be remembered that it came in the same speech in which he appealed for Gearhart's defeat. Also, Truman carried this county of Fresno by over 17,000 votes, outrunning the local Democratic candidate.52

All in all, it cannot be denied that Truman, campaigning hard in the apparent role of the underdog, helped his own cause a great deal in California.

Dewey's Campaign

As was the case in the other states, Dewey did not campaign hard in California. He made only two speeches of

51Speech by Truman, Press Release from Democratic National Committee, Los Angeles, California, September 23, 1948.

52Statement of Vote, Jordan, Secretary of State, p. 4.
importance and a smattering of appearances. The lesser speeches were not recorded, but the Republican party admits that they were few and were little more than stopping places for the people to see Dewey, with little talking being done.53

In his two major speeches he carried out his theme of unity and teamwork. He refrained from speaking on a single issue involved in the campaign in either of these speeches. If anything, he remained more non-committal in California than in his other speeches. Following is a typical statement from his Los Angeles speech:

We and want the same things for America. We are in complete agreement that these crucial months of public discussion should be used to build a new and stronger unity for America... where we can go on toward new peaks of greatness, toward a better life for every one of us, a new sense of security in the world of peace.54

Most of his talk was directed at the menace of Communism, and how Russia was a threat to our "American Way of Life". This was especially in evidence at Los Angeles where, during the course of his speech, he mentioned the word Communist or Communism over twenty different times.55

His San Francisco speech was more down to earth than the one at Los Angeles but was still far from specific. He attacked

53Personal letter from Floyd E. McCaffree, Director, Research Division, Republican National Committee, February 28, 1950

54Speech by Dewey, Press Release from Republican National Committee, Los Angeles, California, September 25, 1948.

55Ibid.
the Administration, but he pointedly omitted telling the people what he proposed in lieu of the Administration's bungling. The following is from that San Francisco speech:

... and the Administration is dropping monkey wrenches into our economic machinery... they are following defeatist policies of fumbling and hesitating.

I propose to be honest with the people. This inflation cannot be cured by any 'trick' devices... The Administration is trying to convince the people that inflation can be cured by some painless, patented, panacea and that -- if it only were not for Congress -- the secret of that cure would be revealed.56

Dewey's defeat in California, in spite of Warren's help, does not seem to bear out Raymond Koley's statement that the Republican appeal for unity was making a big hit with Westerners.

Support of Local Organizations and Groups

Press Support

The California press followed what has become the "norm" for the nation's press during the last twenty years and supported Dewey for President in 1948. Oliver J. Carter, Chairman of the Democratic State Central Committee of California, made a post-election survey of the California press and reported that less than 15 per cent of the entire state press supported the Democrats.57


Actually, the press in California is so conservative and has backed the Republican party for so long that the three largest newspapers in the state are the nominal head of the GOP in California. John Gunther brought this point out when he said:

Generally speaking, the Republican party in California is run by something called the Cameron-Chandler-Knowland Axis, named for three newspaper publishers -- George T. Cameron of the San Francisco Chronicle, Harry Chandler of the Los Angeles Times, and Joseph R. Knowland of the Oakland Tribune. It would be . . . an error to say that they always agree, but their arguments are always which Republican candidate would be the best.58

Gunther wrote his book in 1946, however, and since then the power of the press over California elections has been lessened considerably. Formerly they had been powerful, helping to create the Warren landslide in 1946 and generally controlling state politics.59 Carey McWilliams points out, however, in his treatise on California politics (1949) that the power of the Republican press has lessened considerably in the last few years. He attributes this to the fact that generally the press has agitated for barriers against the influx of migrants, and it has had "no restraints whatsoever in referring to the immigrants as 'undesirable and n'er do wells'."60 He points out that the influx has continued despite

58 John Gunther, Inside U. S. A., p. 36.
59 Ibid.
60 McWilliams, California, The Great Exception, p. 21.
this opposition, and as a result, the new immigrant voters are less likely to respect the opinions expressed in the newspapers.

Labor Support

Labor is exceptionally well organized in California. This state was the spawning ground for many of the early radical labor movements, and the unions have long since established themselves as respectable. The A. F. of L. is undoubtedly the strongest organization in the state. The C. I. O. has not been on the coast but a few years, but it is exceptionally well organized among the longshoremen, oil workers, and miners, generally leaving the more highly skilled tradesmen for the A. F. of L. 61

In 1948 the bulk of West Coast labor went down the line for the Democrats. During the early stages of the campaign Harry Bridges' longshoremen officially supported Wallace, but in the end many of them must have voted for Truman. The C. I. O. -- P. A. C., acting through the C. I. O.'s locals, worked hard for the Democrats. They contributed to Democrat campaign chests liberally and maintained strong and active P. A. C. units for soliciting votes. 62 The A. F. of L. did not work hard for Truman but concentrated most of its attention

62 Ibid.
to defeating Taft-Hartley Congressmen. These efforts were concentrated in Los Angeles and Southern California, and that they met with much success is attested by the statistics mentioned earlier on Congressional returns. The A. F. of L. also spent $140,000 in a campaign to re-apportion the State Senate. Re-apportionment was voted on in a referendum in the November election. At the last minute Dewey's running-mate, Earl Warren, came out against the referendum. This was probably the only issue that Warren took sides on in the whole campaign, and in light of the energy spent by labor to get it passed, it can be assumed that this stand was definitely one stand he should not have made.

Support of a Lobbyist

"I am the governor of the legislature; to hell with the Governor of California." This statement by Arthur Samish just about sums up the strength of California lobbies. Because of the cross-filing system and lack of party loyalty it is next to impossible for political machines of the conventional variety to operate in California. Consequently those who desire special favors have resorted to lobbying. The lobbyists in California are the strongest of any in the United States.

63 Personal letter from Glen Slaughter.
64 Ibid.
65 McWilliams, California, The Great Exception, p. 198.
66 Allen, Our Sovereign States, pp. 375-376.
They are referred to as the "third house", but they would come nearer to being the first house. No bill or statute stands a chance without the approval of Arthur Samish, and other lesser lobbyists. Hyer refers to Samish this way:

No Oriental potentate ever ruled with more effectiveness. With quite becoming modesty, he bills himself simply as a public relations counsel. Privately, he lays claim to more power than the Governor and refers affectionately to the Legislature as 'my baby'.

As in the other states, re-apportionment is a problem in California, but it has not even a chance of passing unless something can be done about the power exerted by the lobbies. These lobbying organizations operate on a state-wide basis. They take orders for bills and see that they get passed, "for a fee." In 1948 they did not actively campaign against Truman, but they probably could have defeated him in California if they had wanted to do so for there is evidence to show that the largest lobbies can make over half of the state's registered voters vote the way the lobbies want them to on most any given issue. Samish, the most powerful lobbyist in the state, is suspected of understanding the true trend of the voters and of having supported the Democrats.

Richard Hyer gives the following on Samish's activities in 1948:

67Ibid.
68McWilliams, California, The Great Exception, pp. 206-207.
69Ibid.
He Samish usually coppers his political bets and in 1948 probably was one of the few men who knew and understood the actual political trend. There is a certain amount of prima facie evidence of this in the fact that he enjoys high favor among key Democratic figures, both those in office and those prominent in party affairs. 70

From this it can be seen that Truman had a powerful ally in the lobbyists, even though these forces remained passive and did not actively campaign for him.

Republican Party

The defeat suffered by the Republicans in California can not be attributed to disorganization within the State GOP. Much of this organization’s activities have already been described. Headed by nominally independent, but really Republican, Earl Warren, the Republicans were in good shape throughout the campaign. They had succeeded in getting their "favorite son" on the national ticket; there was a minimum of internal dissension within the party; and campaign contributions were plentiful.71 They not only had the backing of the big moneyed interests of the state, but the powerful Cameron-Chandler-Knowland Axis was whole-heartedly plugging for Dewey-Warren.72

Figures on expenditures are not available but estimates go as

---

70 Personal letter from Richard V. Hyer.

71 Personal letter from Kyle Palmer, Political Editor, Los Angeles Times, April 19, 1950.

72 See above, under "Press Support".
high as ten times as much as the Democrats spent. The cause of the Republican debacle in California lies elsewhere than in faulty state party organization and efforts.

Democratic Party

Just as the Republican party cannot be blamed for their defeat, neither can the Democratic party get credit for the victory. Truman's chances were considered so poor up to the last moment that the Democratic party ranks were badly demoralized and disorganized. Only a few stalwarts, such as George Luckey, former state senator from Southern California, and George T. Davis, Truman's northern campaign manager, carried the California load. The State Democratic party is divided into several units, each separate from the other; this in itself would normally be enough of a deterrent to effective co-ordination, but, in addition, the party field workers and organizers were antipathetic throughout the campaign. There were no complete records kept as to money spent by the party as a whole, or of what each of its affiliated organizations spent. The only sub-committee keeping accurate records was the Democratic State Central Committee, which spent some $120,000 in both Northern and Southern California. However,
this is such an infinitesimal part of the whole that it is of little value. It might be generalized here that Truman was probably hurt by his party's lethargy in California, rather than being helped by its efforts.

Negro Minority Support

The Negro had never presented much of a problem for California residents up until the war. During and following World War II colored people flooded into the state along with other immigrants. With the over-crowded conditions, segregation began to be practiced in several places, and the race issue has become more important to Californians. There were, in 1948, an estimated 550,000 Negros in California, the majority of whose votes are believed to have gone to Truman. The Democrats' strongly worded civil rights plank and the President's appeals for federal aid to housing and education probably were the strongest influences on these minorities. Exact figures are not available, but it is quite likely that this Negro minority, which seems to be concentrated around Los Angeles, also contributed heavily to the 100,000 votes Wallace polled in this area.

Support of Miscellaneous Organizations and Groups

California has many politically active organizations and groups posing under impressive titles, most of which are too

77 "Crowded California," Newsweek, XXXII (October 11, 1948), 37.
small or too nebulous for consideration here. However, one such organization exerted so much effort and spent so much money that it cannot be overlooked. This organization calls itself the Jeffersonian Democrats. This title is extremely unique because "they have never been known to have supported a Democrat." Organized in the early Thirties, this group has consistently worked hard and long for the Republicans. In 1940 and 1944 they are reported to have spent over $800,000 to finance local Republicans and to smear the Democrats. Figures are not available for 1948, but observers in California estimate that a similar sum was spent that year. One can discount the effect of this organization's activities, however, because their efforts were concentrated against Helen Gahagan Douglas. Yet, as was shown earlier, she overwhelmingly beat her Republican opponent.

Other groups which influenced the election are the Merchants and Manufacturers Association, California's equivalent of N. A. M., which has always contributed heavily to the Republicans; the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, an ultra-conservative body which campaigned actively for Dewey-Warren; the American Legion, a militantly conservative organization which authored "bogus" red scares; and the real estate lobby, which obviously would oppose Truman because of his plans on

79Carey McWilliams, "How Far Will the Pendulum Swing," Nation, CLXVII (October 30, 1948), 491. All information on Jeffersonian Democrats is taken from this source.
public housing. These groups made up the power behind the Republicans. In the Democratic camp were the large block of old folks, who would naturally back Truman because of the Democrats' promises on social security, etc., and the large co-operatives, which own and control much of the Southern California fruit growing industry.80

Wallace Vote

Though Henry Wallace's third party polled 190,000 votes in California this was far under what had been estimated for it before the election. Prior to the election the Progressives had been expected to gather from 300,000 to 500,000 votes from California's large radical population.81 These estimates had been drawn on the September polls and are not in line with the trend the polls took in October. Right prior to Truman's September 23 speech at Los Angeles the polls showed a drop of two points for Wallace, with Truman picking up 6 percentage points.82 With this trend developing as early as a month before the election, the political "dopesters" made a mistake in disregarding it. Following this, it will be remembered, Truman hit hard at the Progressives for breaking away from the

80 Personal letter from Kyle Palmer, Political Editor, Los Angeles Times, April 19, 1950. For more lengthy descriptions of these organizations, see John Gunther's Inside U. S. A., pp. 38, 39, and 42.

81 "Crowded California," Newsweek, XXXII (October 11, 1948), 37.

82 Robert G. Spivack, "Harry Don't Fight Orthodox," Nation, CLXVII (October 9, 1948), 396.
Democrats in his Los Angeles speech. He also, wittingly or unwittingly, drew many Wallaceites back in his proposal for sending Chief Justice Vinson to Moscow on a peace mission. Many of Wallace's followers were former pacifists and this indication on the part of Truman to have direct talks with the Russians undoubtedly undermined Wallace's charges that the two major parties were both warmongers. Truman did not go through with his Vinson to Moscow plan, but the story leaked to the papers and was spread throughout the country. Whether Truman was sincere in his desire for peace and his proposal for this trip to Moscow, or whether the proposal was an out and out political move calculated to draw back the left-wingers, is of course open to conjecture. In any case, the results were the same. This move probably was the weight which finally broke the main strength of the already faltering Wallace movement. This is evidenced by the fact that in his October appearances in Southern California, Wallace drew less than half the audiences that had turned out for him earlier in the campaign. This breaking up of the Wallace strength undoubtedly contributed heavily to Truman's surprise victory in California.

83 "The Misfire of a Mission," Newsweek, XXXII (October 18, 1948), 31. All facts on the Moscow Mission are from this source.

84 "The Breakup," Newsweek, XXXII (October 18, 1948), 35-36.
Miscellaneous Factors

Large Number of Federal Employees

If any of the pivotal states could have gone to Truman on the strength of the votes of federal employees, California would be the one. California has more federal employees than any other state in the union (189,000), with only Washington, D.C. itself outnumbering it. Using the guide, which has become familiar by now, it was found that California goes further toward disproving Mr. Hoover's statement than any of the states considered so far. The absentee voters bureaus show that California Republicans working in Washington mailed back 4,600 ballots to be cast in the California elections; the Democrats turned only 401 in. There being such an extremely wide divergence between the two figures, one is prone to believe that they are inaccurate; however, even though this method of measurement is not the best possible guide in the world, it is the only one available and the figures above are those released by the bureaus. If these figures are to be taken as a guide to how California's federal employees voted, then Hoover's statement must be written off completely.

Heavy Vote

"The real key to the elections in California is the percentage of registered voters who voted. In 1948, 80.2 per cent

85 See Appendix F.

of the registered voters voted. The .2 of 1 per cent represent the Democratic majority. This statement of a high California Democratic official is in direct contradiction to opinions expressed in Chapter I. This fact, that California had the heaviest state-wide voting percentage in the nation and went Democratic, should, of course, not be overlooked. This opinion "jibes" with the generally accepted theory that a heavy vote means a Democratic victory. However, in 1948, to attribute the Democratic victory in California solely to this factor would be to isolate the state's results from those of the rest of the nation. The Democrats' resurgence was evident throughout the states, and in most of these the vote was lighter in 1948 than usual. This being the case, the heavy vote in California, as a determinant of Truman's victory, should not be weighed too heavily.

Dewey Popularity

Another, but much more vague, explanation of why the Democrats won is that Dewey was not popular in California. The following opinion is quoted from a close observer of the California political scene:

... It was the anti-Dewey, not the pro-Truman sentiment, that proved to be decisive. Warren's

87 Personal letter from Oliver J. Carter.

88 1949 World Almanac and Book of Facts, pp. 62-89. This has a comparison of 1948 and 1944 election returns by states.
presence on the ticket unquestionably helped the Republicans, for he is popular in this state; but Dewey is not popular. 89

The validity of this sort of opinion is, of course, hard to evaluate; but in view of the traditional suspicion that Westerners have always exhibited for New Yorkers, it probably is true to some extent.

89 Personal letter from Carey McWilliams.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

At the beginning of this study it was pointed out that 1948 was an exceptional Presidential election year. The reason given for this year being an exception was that the Republicans had been considered certain to win in November, but they lost by a landslide. In light of all the material that has been presented here, it is much harder to believe that any real upset occurred. The political analysts and the Republicans had based their predictions for a Republican victory on three general factors: the trend in the United States was to the conservative side; the Democratic party was badly demoralized and split into three splinters; and there was no doubt that the rural areas which had always been Republican would remain loyal to the Party.

The first of these assumptions, that the trend in the United States was conservative, looks like a strong argument to support the predictions. However, this assumption does not stand up to close scrutiny. This idea, which most of the press quoted as being obvious, was in reality based only on two things -- the Republicans had won strongly in 1946, and the Wallace movement was waning. The 1946 elections were obviously an unsound basis for trend predictions for the
simple reason that only thirty-seven million people out of ninety million qualified voters participated in that year. As for Wallace's declining movement, this was undoubtedly more due to Truman's skillful wooing back of the left-wingers and Labor's efforts in the cities than it was indicative of a general, nation-wide conservative trend.

The Republican's second reason was much sounder, when they said the Democrats would lose as a result of the three-way-split within their party. However, even this basis was largely nullified by the work of Labor and by the extremely well-timed moves of the Democrats to bring back the left-wing splinter. In addition, the right-wing Dixiecrats were unable to break the "Solid South" tradition sufficiently to materially hurt the Democrats.

To attempt to explain why the Republicans' third assumption went awry is more difficult. The Republicans had never really believed that they would gain much in the cities, but they had had real hopes for winning many of the large industrial centers because Wallace was expected to split the Democrats' support in these areas. The one thing the Republicans did believe, indeed they never even considered it questionable, was that they would continue to carry the rural areas, especially in the Mid-West. If any upset occurred in 1948, it was the shift of thousands of voters in these farm states into the Democratic fold.
The writer proposes the idea that this shift of farmers was not an upset either, but was merely a continuation of what had been the trend for years. The Mid-West rural areas had long been a GOP stronghold it is true, but it should be remembered New England had always gone Republican prior to 1932. Since that time the Democrats have made serious inroads into that area. Earlier, the Far West was almost certain to go Republican, but in recent years has become a predominantly Democratic area. The gains made by the Democrats in the farm areas are but a continuation of the falling of one Republican stronghold after another into the Democratic fold.

Whether farm price supports are desirable and sound as a policy of our national government is open to question, but if the Republicans are to recoup their losses in the farm areas in 1952, then they are going to have to unqualifiedly embrace these supports, or they must specifically commit themselves as to what they intend to do in lieu of them.

The reasons why the Republicans lost in 1948 are peculiar in many aspects to that year, but they also reflect that party's troubles since 1932. It is hard to believe that Harry S. Truman with his nasal voice and stumbling oratory was more capable of debating the issues than was Thomas E. Dewey. The difference lies in the fact that the Democrats had something to talk about. Truman was able to be specific because his party's whole program was specific. Whether or not one disagrees with the accomplishments of the "New Deal", 
it must be admitted that when a candidate talks of such things as minimum wage laws, social security, and federal aid to housing and education, that candidate is being specific. The simple fact is that these proposals, good or bad, cannot be effectively counteracted by invective-laden charges of Socialism, Communism, "Destruction of our American Way of Life", or with promises of unity and brotherhood. If the Republican party has a basic concept that can be spoken of without references to eulogies, and if they truly have a sound, definite, and specific program, then they should campaign on that principle and program, not on the Democrats' mistakes. If the record of the Republican 80th Congress was actually sound, then Dewey should have whole-heartedly defended that Congress. However, he only referred to it as a "good" Congress, while Truman was picturing the things it had done as being death-knells of everything good that had been accomplished since 1932.

Another factor in the Republican loss was their striking lack of able and dynamic leaders on their local tickets. Dewey was unquestionably hurt by his having to carry with him such undesirables as Dwight Green, Wayland Brooks, Thomas Herbert, etc. Truman, on the other hand, had the invaluable assistance of Paul Douglas, Helen Douglas, Adlai Stevenson, Hubert Humphrey, Frank Lausche, and a whole galaxy of others.

The reasons why the Grand Old Party hasn't developed a comparable array of strong local candidates are probably manifold; but the fact remains that the Tafts, Hallecks, Greens,
Hickenloopers, Martins, and Herberts far outnumber the Lodges, Morses, Warrens, and Deweys in the GOP. If this conservative party is to survive then it is going to have to develop a program, and be specific about it. They also must recruit a whole new group of young, modern-thinking men to be the party's standard-bearers on the local level.

In spite of these weak links within the Republican party the evidence indicates that they should still have been able to win in 1948. Truman's party was split, popular interest was low, and the time was ripe for a reaction against the war-time controls, making the voters desire a change. The strategy of Truman did much to draw together the dissident elements of his party, but it is doubtful if this would have been enough in itself.

The nation's press accomplished what Truman probably could not have accomplished alone. In most of the nation's newspapers and periodicals, confidence of a Republican victory was carried to an extreme that it did not merit. The press utterly failed to take into account the rising Truman popularity, they discounted his crowd-drawing ability as curiosity, and they either ignored or misinterpreted the collapse of the Wallace movement. These tactics on the part of Dewey's tremendous number of supporting journals were undoubtedly calculated to create the "bandwagon" effect on the voters. However, even this worked in Truman's favor for it portrayed him as the "lone crusader", the fighter against all odds, and
definitely placed him in the underdog role. This, combined
with Dewey's benign air of confidence, made Truman the recipient
of thousands of person's sympathy, i.e., votes.

Finally, it should be noted that though the Republicans
had much more money to spend on the campaign the Democrats had
the donated services of labor unions throughout the nation.
These services, in the form of baby sitting, circular delivering,
etc., are services which cannot be effectively purchased no
matter how much money is available.

Findings from this study may well be summarized in only
a few words. The Democrats' victory was a result of having the
unqualified support of labor unions, farmers, and other large
groups and organizations which control huge blocks of the votes.
They also had the immeasurable benefit of a specifically out-
lined domestic program, an excellent politician at their helm,
the underdog sentiment on their side, and finally, the help
provided by an excellent array of local candidates.
APPENDIX A

RESULTS OF THE 1946 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS*

Following are the states in which the Republicans won more than half of the vote. (362 potential electoral votes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>Indiana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>N. Dakota</td>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>Kentucky</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>S. Dakota</td>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>New Jersey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>Conn.</td>
<td>Mass.</td>
<td>Vermont</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hamp.</td>
<td>Maine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following are the states in which the Democrats won more than half of the vote, for only 169 potential electoral votes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>N. Carolina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Mexico</td>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>W. Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Miss.</td>
<td>S. Carolina</td>
<td>Maryland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Is.</td>
<td>Montana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: It was on a basis of these returns that most political writers predicted that the "trend" in the United States was to the conservative side. Note that all five of the large and significant pivotal states went into the GOP column in 1946.

APPENDIX B

PRE-ELECTION LINEUP OF STATES ACCORDING TO THE GALLUP POLL*

**States in which the Republicans were considered sure to win:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>Delaware</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>New Jersey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>Connecticut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Dakota</td>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>Maine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Dakota</td>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**States in which the Democrats were considered sure to win:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>N. Carolina</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**States in which the Dixiecrats were considered sure to win:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>S. Carolina</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Doubtful states - those in which the polls were indecisive:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>W. Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: "The Odds Against Mr. Truman," U. S. News, XXV, (October 8, 1948), 22.
APPENDIX C

FINAL RESULT OF THE 1948 ELECTION - BY STATES*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States which gave their electoral votes to the Republicans:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Dakota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States which gave their electoral votes to the Democrats:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Is.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States which gave their electoral votes to the Dixiecrats:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Total popular vote cast was slightly over 50 percent of the qualified voters, or 48,680,416. Truman received 30\(^{\frac{1}{2}}\) electoral votes from his 28 states, Dewey got 189 from his 16 states, and Thurmond received 38 from his 4 states. Wallace did not gain a majority of the votes in any single state. On a basis of the 1948 returns, the Democrats lost Oregon, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, New Jersey, Connecticut, and New Hampshire to the Republicans. On a comparable basis, the Republicans lost Ohio, Wisconsin, Wyoming, Iowa, and Colorado to the Democrats.

Prior to the election the Congress had 51 Republicans to 45 Democrats in the Senate, and 216 Republicans to 188 Democrats in the House. Following the election the New Congress had 42 Republicans to 54 Democrats in the Senate, and 171 Republicans to 262 Democrats in the House. Also of especial interest is the fact that of the five large pivotal states, the ones under consideration in this study are the only ones switching to the Democrats.

# APPENDIX D

## ELECTORAL VOTES BY STATES - IN 1948 ELECTION*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Dixiecrats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Carolina</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Dakota</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Carolina</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Dakota</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Virginia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** 304 189 36

### APPENDIX E

**SUMMARY OF EXPENDITURES INFLUENCING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS**

1940, 1944, and 1948  
(In Thousands of Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Democratic National Committees</th>
<th>Democratic State Finance Committees</th>
<th>Independent, National and Intrastate Agencies</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>$2,198</td>
<td>$2,786</td>
<td>$872</td>
<td>$5,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>2,056</td>
<td>2,033</td>
<td>3,352</td>
<td>7,441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>2,127</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Democratic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>$2,243</td>
<td>9,111</td>
<td>3,587</td>
<td>14,941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>2,829</td>
<td>9,261</td>
<td>1,106</td>
<td>13,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>2,736</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Republican</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>4,111</td>
<td>11,897</td>
<td>4,459</td>
<td>20,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>4,885</td>
<td>11,294</td>
<td>4,158</td>
<td>20,337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>4,863</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**APPENDIX F**

**APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES PER STATE**
(July, 1948)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>31,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>189,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>37,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>91,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>26,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>36,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>51,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>34,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>19,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>49,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>38,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>171,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Carolina</td>
<td>23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Dakota</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>76,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>28,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>105,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Carolina</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Dakota</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>77,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>19,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>62,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Virginia</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>19,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Washington, D.C. — 196,000

APPENDIX G

COMPARISON OF ILLINOIS URBAN RETURNS WITH RETURNS FROM TYPICAL RURAL COUNTIES*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Truman 1948</th>
<th>Roosevelt 1944</th>
<th>Dewey 1948</th>
<th>Dewey 1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cook (Chicago)</td>
<td>1,216,636</td>
<td>1,275,367</td>
<td>1,015,800</td>
<td>924,659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peoria (Peoria)</td>
<td>31,026</td>
<td>32,937</td>
<td>35,018</td>
<td>34,171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardin</td>
<td>1,358</td>
<td>1,370</td>
<td>1,713</td>
<td>2,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallatin</td>
<td>2,385</td>
<td>2,175</td>
<td>1,789</td>
<td>2,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edwards</td>
<td>1,206</td>
<td>1,197</td>
<td>2,491</td>
<td>3,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massac</td>
<td>1,824</td>
<td>1,758</td>
<td>3,201</td>
<td>3,814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menard</td>
<td>2,943</td>
<td>1,888</td>
<td>2,899</td>
<td>3,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>2,737</td>
<td>2,723</td>
<td>4,544</td>
<td>5,428</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Above figures admirably illustrate the shift in farm voting. Notice how Truman ran far under Roosevelt's vote in the cities, but managed to hold his own or to beat FDR in the rural counties. Dewey's figures show just the opposite.

APPENDIX H

FINAL RETURNS ON THE POPULAR VOTE IN OHIO, ILLINOIS, AND CALIFORNIA*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Truman</th>
<th>Dewey</th>
<th>Wallace</th>
<th>Thurmond</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>1,913,134</td>
<td>1,895,269</td>
<td>190,381</td>
<td>1,228</td>
<td>21,516</td>
<td>4,031,538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>1,994,715</td>
<td>1,961,103</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>28,228</td>
<td>3,984,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>1,452,791</td>
<td>1,445,684</td>
<td>37,596</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>2,936,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>5,360,640</td>
<td>5,302,056</td>
<td>227,977</td>
<td>1,228</td>
<td>49,744</td>
<td>10,952,655</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX I

COMPARISON OF OHIO URBAN RETURNS WITH RETURNS FROM TYPICAL RURAL COUNTIES*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Truman 1948</th>
<th>Roosevelt 1944</th>
<th>Dewey 1948</th>
<th>Dewey 1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cuyahoga (Cleveland)</td>
<td>257,958</td>
<td>330,659</td>
<td>214,889</td>
<td>217,824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton (Cincinnati)</td>
<td>135,290</td>
<td>144,470</td>
<td>151,055</td>
<td>154,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahoning (Youngstown)</td>
<td>62,468</td>
<td>70,102</td>
<td>37,365</td>
<td>35,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrison</td>
<td>3,422</td>
<td>3,381</td>
<td>4,215</td>
<td>5,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monroe</td>
<td>3,873</td>
<td>3,574</td>
<td>2,574</td>
<td>3,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulding</td>
<td>2,512</td>
<td>2,355</td>
<td>3,579</td>
<td>4,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Putnam</td>
<td>5,114</td>
<td>3,145</td>
<td>5,006</td>
<td>8,004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercer</td>
<td>5,928</td>
<td>4,522</td>
<td>5,266</td>
<td>7,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelby</td>
<td>6,939</td>
<td>5,622</td>
<td>5,406</td>
<td>7,084</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Though all the above rural returns show Truman up from the Democrats' showing in 1944, notice the exceptional swing to the Democrats in Shelby, Putnam, and Mercer. These are the results of the German population of these counties voting for the Democrats as usual since Roosevelt was no longer on the ticket.

## APPENDIX J

**COMPARISON OF CALIFORNIA URBAN RETURNS WITH RETURNS FROM TYPICAL RURAL COUNTIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Truman 1948</th>
<th>Roosevelt 1944</th>
<th>Dewey 1948</th>
<th>Dewey 1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>714,733</td>
<td>886,252</td>
<td>702,028</td>
<td>666,441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>165,581</td>
<td>208,609</td>
<td>155,757</td>
<td>134,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alameda</td>
<td>152,275</td>
<td>169,631</td>
<td>146,722</td>
<td>122,982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Dorado</td>
<td>3,493</td>
<td>3,016</td>
<td>2,894</td>
<td>1,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kings</td>
<td>6,909</td>
<td>6,591</td>
<td>4,289</td>
<td>3,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lassen</td>
<td>3,632</td>
<td>3,678</td>
<td>1,960</td>
<td>1,896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madera</td>
<td>4,705</td>
<td>4,276</td>
<td>3,073</td>
<td>2,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shasta</td>
<td>7,196</td>
<td>5,798</td>
<td>5,040</td>
<td>4,023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinity</td>
<td>1,053</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>975</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Of special significance is the fact that both Truman's and Roosevelt's pluralities over Dewey are larger, percentage-wise, in the rural counties than in the larger urban areas.

*Source: 1949 World Almanac and Book of Facts, 63.*
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Articles


Bendlner, Robert, "Two and Two Make Four," Nation, CLXVII (November 13, 1948), 541.

"The Breakup," Newsweek, XXXII (October 18, 1948), 35-36.


"Continued Boom for Unions," U. S. News, XXV (October 1, 1948), 42.


"Crowded California," Newsweek, XXXII (October 11, 1948), 36.

"Decisive Farm Vote," Newsweek, XXXII (November 15, 1948), 25.

"Defection Roll Call," Newsweek, XXXII (November 1, 1948), 17.

"Democrats at Twilight," Newsweek, XXXII (October 22, 1948), 36.


"Don't Worry About Me," Time, LII (October 25, 1948), 21.


"The Good Men," Newsweek, XXXII (October 18, 1948), 37.


Hoover, Herbert, "Democrats Should Win," U. S. News, XXV (October 1, 1948), 64.

"Hope Against Hope," Newsweek, XXXII (October 18, 1948), 38.


"If I Hadn't Been There," Time, LII (October 25, 1948), 23.

"In Politics to Stay," Newsweek, XXXII (November 29, 1948), 19f.


"Issues and Platitudes," Nation, CLXVII (October 9, 1948), 387.

"Key to Control of Senate," U. S. News, XXV (October 1, 1948), 12.


McWilliams, Carey, "How Far Will the Pendulum Swing?", Nation, CLXVII (October 30, 1948), 491.


Moley, Raymond, "Et Tu Ohio," Newsweek, XXXII (November 15, 1948), 100.

Moley, Raymond, "Perspective," Newsweek, XXXII (October 4, 1948), 92.

Moley, Raymond, "Political Rocket Photo," Newsweek, XXXII (November 1, 1948), 28.


"New Mood," Newsweek, XXXII (October 25, 1948), 28.

"The Odds Against Mr. Truman," U. S. News, XXV (October 8, 1948), 22.

"The Party Platforms, A Plank by Plank Comparison," Scholastic, LIII (October 6, 1948), II-A.

"Radio-Television," Newsweek, XXXII (November 1, 1948), 52.


Spivack, Robert G., "Harry Don't Fight Orthodox," Nation, CLXVII (October 9, 1948), 396.


"The Truman Punch," Newsweek, XXXII (October 1, 1948), 21.


"Truman's Acres," Newsweek, XXXII (October 25, 1948), 27.

"The U. S. Harvests a Record Corn Crop," Life, XXV (November 22, 1948), 42.

U. S. News, XXV (October 22, 1948), 72.


U. S. News, XXV (October 29, 1948), 60.

U. S. News, XXV (November 12, 1948), 42.

U. S. News, XXV (December 10, 1948), 52.

Vital Speeches, XIV (August 1, 1948), 636.


"Who Backs Whom," Newsweek, XXXII (October 18, 1948), 38.


Books


Overacker, Louise, Presidential Campaign Funds, Boston, Massachusetts, Boston University Press, 1946.


Shannon, Irwin V., Southeastern Ohio In Depression and War, Columbus, Ohio, Ohio University Press, 1945.

Newspapers


Public Documents


Unpublished Materials

Personal letter from Carter, Oliver J., Chairman, Democratic State Central Committee of California, March 22, 1950.

Personal letter from Cleveland, Charles B., Political Editor, Chicago Daily News, March 12, 1950.


Personal letter from Hanhart, Eugene H., Democratic State Executive Committee, Columbus, Ohio, March 2, 1950.


Personal letter from Maher, Richard L., Politics Editor, Cleveland Press, February 27, 1950.


Personal letter from McWilliams, Carey, Political writer and authority on California economics and politics, March 22, 1950.

Personal letter from Palmer, Kyle, Politics Editor, Los Angeles Times, April 19, 1950.

Personal letter from Slaughter, Glen, Research Director, Labor League for Political Education, American Federation of Labor, April 3, 1950.

Personal letter from Sweeney, Charles P., Secretary of State, Columbus, Ohio, March 14, 1950.

Speech by Dewey, Thomas E., Press Release from Republican National Committee, Chicago, Illinois, October 27, 1948. (mimeographed)

Speech by Dewey, Thomas E., Press Release from Republican National Committee, Cleveland, Ohio, October 28, 1948. (mimeographed)

Speech by Dewey, Thomas E., Press Release from Republican National Committee, San Francisco, California, September 23, 1948. (mimeographed)

Speech by Dewey, Thomas E., Press Release from Republican National Committee, Los Angeles, California, September 25, 1948. (mimeographed)

Speech by Truman, Harry S., Press Release from Democratic National Committee, Chicago, Illinois, October 25, 1948. (mimeographed)

Speech by Truman, Harry S., Press Release from Democratic National Committee, El Dorado, Illinois, September 18, 1948. (mimeographed)

Speech by Truman, Harry S., Press Release from Democratic National Committee, Herrin, Illinois, September 18, 1948. (mimeographed)

Speech by Truman, Harry S., Press Release from Democratic National Committee, Marion, Illinois, September 18, 1948. (mimeographed)

Speech by Truman, Harry S., Press Release from Democratic National Committee, Rock Island, Illinois, September 18, 1948. (mimeographed)

Speech by Truman, Harry S., Press Release from Democratic National Committee, Fresno, California, September 22, 1948. (mimeographed)

Speech by Truman, Harry S., Press Release from Democratic National Committee, Los Angeles, California, September 23, 1948. (mimeographed)

Speech by Truman, Harry S., Press Release from Democratic National Committee, San Francisco, California, September 22, 1948. (mimeographed)