Strategic Voting and Insider Ownership Metadata
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- Main Title Strategic Voting and Insider Ownership
Author: Marquardt, BlairCreator Type: PersonalCreator Info: University of North Texas
Author: Myers, Brett W.Creator Type: PersonalCreator Info: Texas Tech University
Author: Niu, XuCreator Type: PersonalCreator Info: Stockton University
Name: Elsevier Science Ltd.Place of Publication: Amsterdam, The Netherlands
- Creation: 2018-05-18
- Submission Date: 2017-06-22
- Acceptance Date: 2018-05-09
- Content Description: This article outlines a model of strategic shareholder voting that allows outside shareholders to mitigate the influence of insiders.
- Physical Description: 59 p.
- Keyword: shareholder voting
- Keyword: strategic voting
- Keyword: insider ownership
- Keyword: management proposals
- Journal: Journal of Corporate Finance, 2018. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier
- Publication Title: Journal of Corporate Finance
- Volume: 51
- Page Start: 50
- Page End: 71
Name: UNT Scholarly WorksCode: UNTSW
Name: UNT College of BusinessCode: UNTCOB
- Rights Access: unt
- Rights License: by-nc-nd
- DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2018.05.002
- Archival Resource Key: ark:/67531/metadc1234366
- Academic Department: Accounting
- Display Note: Abstract: Manager incentives are viewed as being better aligned with those of shareholders when they have an ownership stake in the firms they manage. However, manager ownership can exacerbate agency problems by better enabling managers to pass shareholder resolutions. We outline a model of strategic shareholder voting that allows outside shareholders to mitigate the influence of insiders. Consistent with our model, we find empirical support for strategic voting by outside shareholders and that strategic voting is more apparent when management-sponsored proposals are controversial or complex, when votes are close, or when other agency risks are greater.
- Display Note: This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. Reprinted with permission from Elsevier B.V., all rights reserved. The final definitive version is available here: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2018.05.002.