Strategic Voting and Insider Ownership Metadata

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Title

  • Main Title Strategic Voting and Insider Ownership

Creator

  • Author: Marquardt, Blair
    Creator Type: Personal
    Creator Info: University of North Texas
  • Author: Myers, Brett W.
    Creator Type: Personal
    Creator Info: Texas Tech University
  • Author: Niu, Xu
    Creator Type: Personal
    Creator Info: Stockton University

Publisher

  • Name: Elsevier Science Ltd.
    Place of Publication: Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Date

  • Creation: 2018-05-18
  • Submission Date: 2017-06-22
  • Acceptance Date: 2018-05-09

Language

  • English

Description

  • Content Description: This article outlines a model of strategic shareholder voting that allows outside shareholders to mitigate the influence of insiders.
  • Physical Description: 59 p.

Subject

  • Keyword: shareholder voting
  • Keyword: strategic voting
  • Keyword: insider ownership
  • Keyword: management proposals

Source

  • Journal: Journal of Corporate Finance, 2018. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier

Citation

  • Publication Title: Journal of Corporate Finance
  • Volume: 51
  • Page Start: 50
  • Page End: 71

Collection

  • Name: UNT Scholarly Works
    Code: UNTSW

Institution

  • Name: UNT College of Business
    Code: UNTCOB

Rights

  • Rights Access: unt
  • Rights License: by-nc-nd

Resource Type

  • Article

Format

  • Text

Identifier

  • DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2018.05.002
  • Archival Resource Key: ark:/67531/metadc1234366

Degree

  • Academic Department: Accounting

Note

  • Display Note: Abstract: Manager incentives are viewed as being better aligned with those of shareholders when they have an ownership stake in the firms they manage. However, manager ownership can exacerbate agency problems by better enabling managers to pass shareholder resolutions. We outline a model of strategic shareholder voting that allows outside shareholders to mitigate the influence of insiders. Consistent with our model, we find empirical support for strategic voting by outside shareholders and that strategic voting is more apparent when management-sponsored proposals are controversial or complex, when votes are close, or when other agency risks are greater.
  • Display Note: This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. Reprinted with permission from Elsevier B.V., all rights reserved. The final definitive version is available here: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2018.05.002.