Strategic Voting and Insider Ownership

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Description

This article outlines a model of strategic shareholder voting that allows outside shareholders to mitigate the influence of insiders.

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59 p.

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Marquardt, Blair; Myers, Brett W. & Niu, Xu May 18, 2018.

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This article is part of the collection entitled: UNT Scholarly Works and was provided by UNT College of Business to Digital Library, a digital repository hosted by the UNT Libraries. More information about this article can be viewed below.

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UNT College of Business

One of the largest business schools in the nation, UNT College of Business strives to prepare global business leaders and scholars in an intellectually stimulating and engaging community through preeminent teaching, research, and service. The college offers degree programs at the bachelor's, master's, and doctoral levels, along with certificate programs in a variety of disciplines.

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This article outlines a model of strategic shareholder voting that allows outside shareholders to mitigate the influence of insiders.

Physical Description

59 p.

Notes

Abstract: Manager incentives are viewed as being better aligned with those of shareholders when they have an ownership stake in the firms they manage. However, manager ownership can exacerbate agency problems by better enabling managers to pass shareholder resolutions. We outline a model of strategic shareholder voting that allows outside shareholders to mitigate the influence of insiders. Consistent with our model, we find empirical support for strategic voting by outside shareholders and that strategic voting is more apparent when management-sponsored proposals are controversial or complex, when votes are close, or when other agency risks are greater.

This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. Reprinted with permission from Elsevier B.V., all rights reserved. The final definitive version is available here: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2018.05.002.

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  • Journal of Corporate Finance, 2018. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier

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Publication Information

  • Publication Title: Journal of Corporate Finance
  • Volume: 51
  • Page Start: 50
  • Page End: 71

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UNT Scholarly Works

Materials from the UNT community's research, creative, and scholarly activities and UNT's Open Access Repository. Access to some items in this collection may be restricted.

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Creation Date

  • May 18, 2018

Submitted Date

  • June 22, 2017

Accepted Date

  • May 9, 2018

Added to The UNT Digital Library

  • Aug. 30, 2018, 9:08 a.m.

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Marquardt, Blair; Myers, Brett W. & Niu, Xu. Strategic Voting and Insider Ownership, article, May 18, 2018; Amsterdam, The Netherlands. (digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1234366/: accessed November 19, 2018), University of North Texas Libraries, Digital Library, digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT College of Business.