DEFENSE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES

1952-1973

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If we could first know <u>where</u> we are and <u>whither</u> we are tending, we could better judge <u>what</u> to do and <u>how</u> to do it.

--Abraham Lincoln
Springfield, Illinois
June 16, 1858

BACKGROUND, PURPOSE, AND SCOPE

America's defense architects and responsible critics, liberal and conservative alike, all have the same purpose in mind: to provide the United States with proper protection at appropriate costs.

There is little controversy over our most basic security interests, but contention perennially arises over what must be done to satisfy those interests, how it should be done, what resources are required, and what expenses are admissible. The thrust of U.S. national defense thus undergoes continual change as situations develop and new groups of decision-makers gain the upper hand.

Alterations in the U.S. defense environment and in this nation's responses have occurred rapidly and have been immense since the Truman Administration. It is not surprising, therefore, that fundamental trends, documented in this study, reveal a profound transformation in policy and posture during the last two decades:

--Twenty years ago, this country occupied the pinnacle of world power, secure at home and strong overseas.

--Since then, U.S. armed forces have improved immensely in absolute terms, aided by a technological transformation of unprecedented proportions.

--Paradoxically, however, the preeminent feature affecting U.S. national security has been the relative decline of American military capabilities in comparison with the Soviet Union.

--For the first time since the American Revolution, a competitor has the capability to destroy this nation, if it chooses to run reciprocal risks.

--To guard against that eventuality, the United States now depends on mutual vulnerability, diplomacy, and arms control measures to guarantee nuclear deterrence.

--Should a nuclear exchange nevertheless occur, we are exposed to its full effects, having repudiated strategic defenses that could limit U.S. casualties and damage.

--The prevailing nuclear stalemate magnifies the importance of limited and revolutionary wars, which in some instances could affect our security acutely.

--Despite that development, this country has cut its active general purpose forces by more than one-third since 1969, although U.S. treaty commitments remain unchanged.

--To safeguard its national interests, the United States therefore must rely heavily on reserve components, whose readiness is questionable, and on a global alliance system that exhibits significant cracks.

--The diminishment of U.S. military capabilities ironically has been accompanied by ever-increasing defense budgets.

The implications of such developments are debatable. Some observers discern impending disaster for the United States. Their impulse is to reinforce our military establishment immediately. Others see less cause for concern. In their estimation, there is little fear that nuclear deterrance will fail or that regional developments in Europe, Asia, or the Middle East will endanger U.S. security. A military machine of the magnitude that America has maintained for the past 20 years thus seems unnecessary.

This study subscribes to neither brief. It simply identifies, analyzes, and interrelates processions of pertinent events as dispassionately as possible. The purpose is to provide a tool that could help U.S. leaders determine whether they should ratify, reinforce, retard, or repeal dominant defense trends.

The survey period 1952-1973 covers the Administrations of four Presidents, two of whom were Democrats, two Republicans. Nearly every significant contemporary defense trend had its genesis during those years, which bracket two major wars, and thus afford illuminating comparisons.

The methodology examines ends and means in conjunction with the pressures that prompted change and the choices that conditioned responses. Reviewing the bent of U.S. defense efforts in such context facilitates the isolation of causes, effects, inconsistencies, and synergistic consequences.

Much of the text is keyed to bar graphs that trace cogent developments during the past two decades. Dotted lines indicate formative, fading, and transitional stages. Discussion relates each chart to its predecessors in ways that highlight interactions.

No attempt has been made to plumb any topic in depth. The aim is to portray patterns.

EVOLVING BASIC INTERESTS

The United States has numerous national security interests, both regional and worldwide. The most basic of these, which buttress our way of life, are reasonably constant, but even so have recently experienced significant changes in emphasis.

SURVIVAL

The irreducible national security interest of every state is survival, under conditions that preserve independence, fundamental institutions, and values intact. This concern was academic throughout most of our history, because the United States was so splendidly insulated by oceans that no foreign power could imperil its existance. America's survival in modern times has been seriously threatened for fewer than 20 years, since the U.S.S.R. acquired the first increments of its long-range nuclear strike force.

PHYSICAL SECURITY

Safeguarding individual elements of the national entity, particularly geographic integrity, key population centers, and productive capacity, was (like survival) largely a self-satisfying U.S. interest until the past decade. Physical security of the United States, however, can no longer be taken for granted.

PEACE

When potential opponents began to brandish mass destruction weapons, the United States entered an era in which even limited strife involving associates of great powers conceivably could escalate to general nuclear war. "Peace...

without sacrifice of individual rights or national sovereignty, but not peace at any price,"[1] then became a central U.S. interest. President Nixon confirmed that assertion in his 1970 State of the Union message: "When we speak of America's priorities, the first priority must always be peace."[2] The aspiration for peace subsequently became the theme for his annual foreign policy reports to the Congress.

INTERNAL STABILITY

An abiding U.S. interest in "domestic tranquility" originally was certified in the Preamble to the Constitution, and has endured ever since. No national defense plan or program, however sensible it may otherwise seem, can flourish for long if it contradicts that end. Many adjustments in America's military policies and posture over the past five years were prompted by internal unrest that caused U.S. leaders to alter defense priorities.

NATIONAL CREDIBILITY

Credibility is an indispensable asset for any nation that aspires to international leadership, or hopes to function effectively as a global power. It comprises demonstrable capabilities, intentions, fortitude, and integrity, without which no deterrent or defense program can command the respect of opponents, allies, or the uncommitted. This country's interest in credibility increased by orders of magnitude after World War II (immediately

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1/ U.S. Congress. House Armed Services Committee. Doc. No. 600, Unification and Strategy. 81st Congress, 2d Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Office, 1950, p. 14. Quotes General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2/ Nixon, Richard M. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union. January 22, 1970. Public Papers of the Presidents, 1970. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Office. 1971, p. 8.

before the period covered by this study), when American military might became the Free World bulwark.

FREEDOM OF ACTION

Finally, freedom of action overlaps all other U.S. interests. It is the key to strategic initiative, without which this country would be compelled to react, rather than act. This interest was propelled to the fore when the United States became a world power. We have been increasingly conscious of its importance since competitors began to exhibit military capabilities comparable to our own.

PRESSURES FOR CHANGE

Several compelling pressures for change condition U.S. defense policies, plans, and programs devised to satisfy the fundamental security interests sketched above. Some such influences are well within our capacity to govern as we see fit. Others are beyond our control (Graph 1).

INCREASINGLY AMBIGUOUS THREATS

External threats are growing evermore ambiguous. Ten years ago, there was little question in the minds of U.S. leaders, or among the mass of the American people, that international communism, controlled by Moscow, was on the march. That simplistic conclusion has been discredited. The dissolution of what once was portrayed as a monolithic Sino-Soviet Bloc produced an entirely new set of defense problems for the United States, vastly more complex than those that prevailed earlier.

Since the split between Peking and Moscow, identified in this country during the early 1960s, threats to the United States have been less explicit and more diffuse. Our rivals now accent a subtle blend of political, military, economic, and psychological powers, rather than armed confrontations. Indirect strategies replace conclusive conflict as the preferred instrument. Proxy wars, particularly "people's wars" and "wars of national liberation," came into high fashion, then seemed to regress. Soviet activities in NATO Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Indian Ocean Basin exhibit a less pugnacious posture than Khrushchev projected 10 years ago. Even Brezhnev's threat to intervene unilaterally in the Middle East on October 25, 1973, was low key in comparison with probes that directly endangered U.S. and Free World security in earlier periods.

GRAPH 1

CHANGES IN THE DEFENSE ENVIRONMENT



The sharp shift in modi operandi exhibited by competitors complicates U.S. threat estimation processes. The Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to predicate their conclusions largely in terms of enemy military capabilities,[1/] but top-level assessments also must divine the opposition's probable courses of action. That process demands some feel for political as well as military intentions. Otherwise, there is no way to predict the imminence or intensity of prospective perils. The results are confusing, since various authorities often read identical indications differently. Those observers who regard detente as perishable still see significant threats; those who diagnose detente as inevitable see little residual danger.

None of the findings can be proven. It is possible, for example, that the mammoth Soviet military machine may be exclusively for deterrent and defensive purposes, with no aggressive designs. Conversely, it may constitute the underpinning for political and military offensives. Chinese Communist (CHICOM) missilery may soon be an active threat to the United States, although many contend that it will merely menace the Soviet Union. A consensus thus is difficult to obtain.

1/ Official, unclassified threat appraisals are contained in Schlesinger, James R. Annual Defense Department Report to the Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget and the FY 1975-1979 Defense Program, March 4, 1974, p. 3-13, 45-49, 83, 87-91, 93-94; and Moorer, Thomas H. United States Military Posture for FY 1975. Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, February 7, 1974, 92 p.

CHANGING INTERNATIONAL POWER RELATIONSHIPS

The outlines of a multipolar world have taken shape in recent years, President Nixon, in his first annual foreign policy report to the Congress noted that "the whole pattern of international politics [is] changing. Our challenge [is] to understand that change, to define America's goals for the next period, and to set in motion policies to achieve them."[1/]

A brace of trends constitutes controlling factors:

--The Sino-Soviet schism, first sensed in the early 1960s, has widened and deepened.

--U.S. dominance of the Free World has faded.

The bipolar world we have known for nearly 30 years still remains in a modified form. No country or coalition of countries can yet compete militarily with the United States or the Soviet Union, whose armed forces possess capabilities that are awesomely disproportionate to all the rest. However, the two superpowers derive a good deal of their strength from nuclear weapons, which neither displays any proclivity for wielding. As a result, the emergence of Communist China, Western Europe, and Japan as supplementary centers produces a pentagonal world for national security purposes. Lesser luminaries, such as India, Brazil, and Iran, create a polycentric situation.

The changing pattern calls previous U.S. defense policies and practices into question. When Sino-Soviet solidarity prevailed, we pursued an undifferentiated tack toward communist countries. When U.S. consorts were less effective, we relied almost exclusively on our own prescriptions and resources. America is now accommodating to the new environment.

1/ Nixon, Richard M. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Office, February 18, 1970, p. 1.

THE IMPACT OF VIETNAM

The Vietnam War exerted urgent pressures that were manifest within a few months after we "Americanized" operations.

U.S. military personnel in Vietnam, all in advisory and support roles, totalled 23,000 on New Year's Day, 1965. In the next 12 months, the contingent burgeoned eight-fold to 184,000, as U.S. combat forces assumed primary responsibility for prosecuting the conflict. The influx finally peaked at 543,000 in April, 1969. Direct financial war costs zoomed from $103 million to more than $21 billion annually during that four-year period. U.S. combat deaths in all of 1964, just before the buildup, totalled 147; more than 500 Americans were killed each week at the height of Hanoi's 1968 offensives.1/

After the first year or two of indecisive hostilities, war in Indochina became increasingly unpalatable to the American people, who questioned whether the mounting costs and casualties were commensurate with prospective gains. Public opposition was muted at first, but became strident as frustrations mounted. The U.S. sense of purpose wavered. Antimilitarism began to abound. The national consensus began to break down. Broad Congressional support for our defense policies began to disintegrate.

Mass protests and violence became commonplace. By March 31, 1968, anti-war activities had become so intense that President Johnson was prompted to announce:

1/ Statistics extracted from Cooper, Bert H. Statistics on U.S. Participation in the Vietnam Conflict, with addendum. Washington, Congressional Research Service, August 15, 1972, p. 3, 15; and MACV weekly summaries for January-June, 1969.

> A house divided against itself...is a house that cannot stand... /Consequently,/ I do not believe that I should devote an hour or a day of my time to any personal partisan causes or to any duties other than the awesome duties of this office.... Accordingly, I shall not seek, and I will not accept, the nomination of my party for another term as your President. 1/

Incoming President Nixon acted quickly to reverse that trend as soon as he took office the following January. "Vietnamization" was immediately in vogue. More than 61,000 U.S. troops were withdrawn from Vietnam in 1969. American combat deaths were cut by more than 35 percent that year.2/

Nevertheless, the situation got much worse before it got better. Roughly one-third of all U.S. fatalities in Vietnam occurred during 1969-70. The number of POWs accumulated. Direct war costs tallied $50.4 billion from 1969 through 1971.3/

Displays of discontent by antiwar activists culminated in the Vietnam Moratorium of October 15, 1969 and the massive rallies one month thereafter (the latter involved an estimated 250,000 participants in Washington, D. C. alone). Demonstrative dissent was finally dampened down, but disenchantment increasingly permeated segments of middle America that earlier had registered apathy or approval of official policy. No national canvass concluded that a majority of the American people would countenance "defeat," but as late as October 1971, Louis Harris announced that U.S. citizens by 3:1 favored terminating "all forms of military involvement in Viet Nam" within six months.

1/ Johnson, Lyndon B. Public Papers of the Presidents, 1968-69. Book I. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Office, 1970, p. 475-476.

2/ Statistics drawn from Cooper, Bert H. Statistics on U.S. Participation in the Vietnam Conflict (updated informally), p. 3-4.

3/ Ibid., p. 4, 15.

An impressive 53 percent of those polled advocated accelerated withdrawal of U.S. troops, versus 26 percent two years before.[1]

Congress reflected the national temper. Measures aimed at restricting or ending U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia came to a vote more than 100 times between 1966 and 1972. Most notable were a Cooper-Church amendment, which proposed barring funds for U.S. military operations in Cambodia after July 1, 1970; the McGovern-Hatfield amendment, which sought the complete extrication of U.S. troops from Indochina by December 31, 1971; and three Mansfield amendments, which prescribed short-term deadlines for withdrawal, dependent only on the release of American prisoners of war.[2]

Congress rejected most binding restrictions, although the Senate did rescind the Tonkin Gulf Resolution by a 57-5 roll-call vote on July 10, 1970. However, estrangement sharpened between the Executive Branch and the Congress, whose leaders were not always consulted before major defense and foreign policy decisions were reached.[3] A serious war-powers controversy ensued. The entire U.S. alliance system and most foreign aid programs came under fire. In October 1971, the Senate temporarily refused to appropriate funds for military assistance, before it decided to support existing commitments through a series of continuing resolutions.[4]

1/ The Harris Survey: As Nixon Nears Troop Decision, Public Favors End to Viet Nam Role. Chicago Tribune, November 8, 1971, p. 22.

2/ The Power of the Pentagon: The Creation, Control, and Acceptance of Defense Policy by the U.S. Congress. Washington, Congressional Quarterly, 1972, p. 70-78, 112-113.

3/ Ibid., p. 40-45, 71-73, 81.

4/ Foreign Aid: Authorization Cleared After Long Delay. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, January 29, 1972, p. 221.

An Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam was signed in Paris by all belligerents on January 27, 1973. Congress later clamped a lid on the conflict in Cambodia. Those actions relieved the clamor for defense reforms, but scarcely expunged the legacy of experience, which apparently will continue to condition U.S. defense policies and procedures for a good many years.

THE DOLLAR DEBACLE

Financial anomalies constitute another category of pressures compelling change. Our Gross National Product (GNP), which passed $1 trillion in 1971, is by far the largest of any nation. American society is the most affluent in the world. Associated trends nevertheless denigrate efforts to create a credible U.S. national defense structure that matches current policy goals with costs acceptable to the Congress and the public.

Inflation is generally identified as the most pressing economic problem in the United States today. Serious problems began in 1965, when rising costs, sharp increases in federal spending for defense and domestic programs, reduced revenues as a result of tax cuts, and excessive monetary stimulation generated serious overheating.[1/]

From 1965 through 1972, consumer prices rose by more than 29 percent, or about 3.8 percent compounded annually. A series of economic controls, the first of which were applied in August 1971, caused inflation to subside temporarily,[2/] but prices in 1973 increased almost 9 percent, the most serious upsurge in more than 20 years.

1/ U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Price and Wage Control: An Evaluation of Current Policies. Hearings, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session. Part 2, Studies of Selected Aspects. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Office, 1972, p. 389.

2/ Ibid., p. 364-365, 389, 393.

The United States also has been plagued with severe balance of payments problems. We invited deficits in the late 1940s and 1950s so that Free World countries whose economies had been shattered by World War II and its aftermath could accumulate surplus dollars and rebuild reserves of hard currency. However, as time passed without significant readjustment of foreign exchange rates to account for reconstruction progress, this country began to experience a pinch. By 1967, cumulative deficits had reduced U.S. gold reserves from $26 billion (1949) to $14.8 billion. Four years later, our liabilities to official foreign institutions were four times greater than our holdings in gold.[1/]

America's unfavorable balance of payments, which results in part from military expenditures overseas, primarily reflects trade inequities. During the decade between the early 1960s and early 1970s, an average annual $5 billion surplus became a $6.8 billion loss. U.S. dealings with Japan accounted for nearly half of the total deficit in 1972.[2/]

Depreciation of the dollar overseas has been one outgrowth. Devaluation became inevitable. A 7.9 percent cut-back in terms of gold resulted from the Smithsonian Agreement of December 1971. Other countries also declared new exchange rates at that time. Results were less favorable than anticipated. Consequently, the dollar was further devalued 10 percent in February 1973. By mid-March, however, that fixed reduction in value was

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1/ Nixon, Richard M. International Economic Report of the President: Together With the Annual Report of the Council on International Economic Policy. March 1973. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Office, 1973, p. 18-19.

2/ Ibid., p. 19-20.

abandoned and the dollar allowed to float free in relation to supply and demand. Further depreciation in relation to most foreign exchanges followed--about 6 percent in NATO countries, for example. American buying power sagged.[1/]

Any one of the financial trends outlined above would have exacerbated U.S. defense budget problems. In combination, they impact resoundingly on all efforts to reshape our military establishment into a compact, modern, versatile, all-volunteer force.

TECHNOLOGICAL COMPETITION

Moscow's military technology has received huge emphasis since World War II. Soviet scientists, possibly with outside assistance, exploded their first nuclear device in 1949. They then confounded Free World forecasters by producing a fusion weapon within the next four years, a scant 10 months after U.S. physicists succeeded. SPUTNIK electrified the international scene in 1957, when it demonstrated a spectacular potential that presaged the early development of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Technological progress in the U.S.S.R. is still causing U.S. official concern to mount. Former Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird expressed the mood precisely when he mourned "the already large and rapidly growing military-related [research and development] effort of the Soviet Union," and cautioned that "nothing could be more detrimental to our future...than to neglect our technological base."[2/] Many members of Congress share those sentiments.

1/ Ibid., p. 18, 22-23.

2/ Laird, Melvin R. Statement Before a Joint Session of the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees on the FY 1971 Defense Program and Budget, February 20, 1970, p. 66-68.

There is considerable evidence that our once-taken-for-granted scientific supremacy may be slipping away in some respects. The President of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, for example, singles out Soviet accomplishments in certain aspects of physics and molecular biology for particular praise.[1/] The United States apparently maintains a solid lead in computer technology, integrated circuitry, telecommunications, ship and submarine noise suppressants, and super-strong composite materials. The U.S.S.R. clearly excels at chemical warfare, high-performance integral rockets and ramjets, special purpose vehicles to cope with cold weather and tight terrain, and aircraft maintainability. Soviet scientists "are quite capable of matching their U.S. counterparts" in other areas. The day has passed when we could be smugly sure of unquestioned scientific and technological superiority, which has sustained this country in the past and is the key to future capabilities.[2/]

THE ENERGY CRISIS

Planners in the Department of Defense (DOD) were preoccupied throughout 1973 with the possibility of a nation-wide energy shortage. In May and June of that year, Deputy Secretary William P. Clements, Jr. initiated several conservation measures and announced specific goals for reducing DOD

1/ U.S. Scientist Says Soviets Closing Gap. The Washington Post, July 4, 1973, p. A24.

2/ Foster, John S. Jr., The Department of Defense Program of Research, Development, Test and Evalution, FY 1974. Statement Before the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, March 28, 1973, Section 2, p. 6.

petroleum requirements in FY 1974. The following September, a Defense Energy Task Group was formed to analyze all aspects of the problem.[1] Studies proliferated, but few emphatic policy or force posture changes were immediately forthcoming.

The Arab oil embargo, invoked in October 1973, provided a sudden catalyst. Saudi Arabia soon ordered ARAMCO and its affiliates (Standard Oil of California, Texaco, Exxon, and Mobil) to withhold Arabian products from U.S. armed forces around the world. When Riyadh threatened to deprive refineries in Singapore and the Philippines, those sources cut off supplies to our Pacific Command. Similar actions took place elsewhere.[2] Within a matter of days, DOD was short 40 percent of its normal petroleum input.[3]

That economic warfare wedge, calculated to isolate Israel from U.S. and other sympathizers, pinched this country painfully. It shook our global security system and caused contention with stanch allies, whose dependence on petroleum exceeded their interests in Israel. Less immediate implications of such sanctions involved their potential for disrupting U.S. defense industries and degrading our military mobility.

1/ Cooper, Bert H. Oil Shortages and the U.S. Armed Forces. Washington, Congressional Research Service, April 16, 1974, p. 3.

2/ An Oil Threat to the U.S. Military. Business Concedes Denying Oil to U.S. Military Since October. New York Times. Jan. 26, 1974. p. 14. Getler, Michael. Arab Oil Embargo Reduces Pacific Fleet's Operations. Washington Post, Nov. 15, 1973. p. A26.

3/ Finney, John W. Schlesinger Testifies Fuel Allocations to Military Must Be Raised This Spring. New York Times, Feb. 1, 1974. p. 46.

Prompt and positive countermeasures were compulsory. Numerous DOD administrative and operational restrictions went into effect, with as yet undisclosed effects on readiness. Routine training and field exercises, for example, were drastically reduced. POL consumption for the second quarter of FY 1974 dropped 16 percent, as one result.[1/]

Even so, DOD found it necessary to invoke the Defense Production Act of 1950 to requisition 19.7 million barrels of petroleum products from civilian sources. The Emergency Fuels and Energy Allocation Act of November 27, 1973 (P.L. 93-159) went into effect just after New Years Day, 1974. And the role of Naval Petroleum Reserves was subjected to close scrutiny during Congressional hearings.[2/]

All efforts to the contrary, however, the energy squeeze will not be easily resolved. Its continuing impact on defense trends is therefore certain to be pervasive and severe. Future financial costs will likely be extravagant.

1/ Cooper, Bert H. Oil Shortages and the U.S. Armed Forces, p. 1, 12.
2/ Ibid., p. 24-25.

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR AND CBR TRENDS

EVOLVING THREATS

Soviet Nuclear Capabilities

Three salient trends characterize the maturation of Soviet nuclear capabilities:

-- The offensive force structure has magnified immensely since the Cuban missile crisis, and continues to improve at a rapid pace.

-- The emphasis has shifted from manned bombers to ballistic missiles.

-- The Soviets have curtailed the deployment of an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) shield, although R&D efforts continue.

The U.S.S.R. is the only country in the world that has sufficient strength to vie with this country militarily on a global basis or seriously harm our home base. Its capacities in such regard have inflated manyfold in recent years.

The United States continued to enjoy an absolute monopoly of nuclear weapons that could be delivered transoceanically until the Kremlin began deploying medium-range BADGER bombers in 1955, which could have flown one-way suicide missions. Long-range BEAR and BISON aircraft appeared the following year. Soviet progress during the remainder of that decade and into the early 1960s was relatively modest. ICBM development was impressive, but deployments were not great.

There was indeed a capability gap at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, but it was in our favor. Russian leaders, being realists, reluctantly backed down. However, Moscow's Deputy Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov predicted in an oft-quoted remark that "this is the last time you Americans will be able to do this to us." Soviet programs accelerated rapidly thereafter. Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, evaluates the consequences as they are perceived by U.S. net assessment groups:

> While this nation spent the greater part of the 60s in a costly war, the Soviet Union dedicated its resources in a drive to expand and modernize every sector of their strategic and conventional forces. The Soviet goal was to shift the military balance and they succeeded in doing so.1/

The numerical realignments reflected on Figure 1 have far-reaching ramifications. Before the big buildup, Moscow's nuclear strike force featured manned bombers. Our air defenses were impressive at that time. Soviet first-generation ballistic missiles were few, and primitive by present standards. By the mid-1960s, however, quantitative and qualitative improvements in its ICBMs and sea-launched missiles gave the U.S.S.R. an indisputable assured destruction capability against this country.2/

1/ Moorer, Thomas H. Address Before the American Ordnance Association. Washington, News Release, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (PA), May 17, 1973, p. 2.

2/ McNamara, Robert S. Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the FY 1969-73 Defense Program and the 1969 Defense Budget January 22, 1968, p. 46.

Figure 1

THE SHIFTING STRATEGIC FORCE BALANCE
U.S. vs. U.S.S.R.

	1962		1973	
	U.S.	U.S.S.R.	U.S.	U.S.S.R.
ICBM	294	75	1,054	1,527
SLBM	144	some	656	628
Heavy Bomber	600	190	400	140
Medium Bomber	940	1,000	-60	700
ICBM/SLBM Warheads	438	75	3,428	2,053
Bomber Weapons	5,500 (+ -)	1,200 (+ -)	2,450 (+ -)	250 (+ -)

Source: Tables compiled from multiple publications, primarily the Military Balance, 1973-74 London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973, p. 69-71.

Aircraft weaponry is complicated to compute, since it can include a mix of air-to-surface missiles and gravity bombs. Payloads vary widely, depending on type targets and the range to those targets. The figures displayed are for order of magnitude comparative purposes only.

U.S. B-47 medium bombers possessed refueling capabilities that would have enabled them to engage Soviet targets in the early 1960s. Our FB-111 aircraft enjoy similar advantages today. Soviet TU-16 medium bombers, in service since 1955, are supported by such a limited tanker force that only a few could undertake two-way intercontinental missions, but Kamikazi-type attacks are perfectly feasible. U.S. Air Force strike plans commonly assigned such missions in the 1950s.

Soviet SLBMs for 1973 include 66 on diesel-powered submarines.

Since then, the Soviets have had the power to obliterate the United States as a 20th Century society, if they care to risk national suicide.

That development is unprecedented. Our survival has not been at stake since we gained our independence. Even if the Union had lost the Civil War, a truncated United States would have survived. Hitler lacked the amphibious assault and logistic capabilities to span the English Channel during World War II, much less the broad Atlantic.

Fortunately, fears that the U.S.S.R. might maliciously trigger a general nuclear war seem far-fetched, since the Soviets lack an effective ABM defense, and we possess impressive reprisal powers. Accidental initiation by either of the superpowers is implausible, considering the stringent safeguards they employ. A continuing dialogue and emergency measures, such as the Washington-to-Moscow hot line, reduce the likelihood of misunderstanding. Past behavior patterns by Soviet leaders suggest that the probability of irrational acts is low. Miscalculation in time of tension thus remains the most pressing concern, although purposeful adventurism cannot be ruled out.

Chinese Communist Nuclear Capabilities

The People's Republic of China (PRC) as yet represents no direct danger to the continental United States. Chinese threats are largely local, of greater concern to the U.S.S.R. and our Asian allies than to this far-distant country, but the PRC is inching toward capabilities that soon will permit its leaders to project military power far beyond China's periphery.

The Chinese have been amassing a nuclear arsenal since October, 1964, when they touched off their first atomic device. They now are perfecting

an ICBM delivery system that could impinge on the continental United States by 1976 or 1977. Its range, carrying a three-megaton warhead, appears to be about 6,000 nautical miles, sufficient to reach virtually all major U.S. targets."[1]/ That assessment, however, is tempered by estimates of Peking's intentions. Improved Sino-American relations, plus U.S. deterrent powers, seem to make Chinese nuclear aggression against the United States a rather remote possibility,[2]/ although PRC nuclear options will increasingly constrain U.S. actions in Asia as this decade progresses.

U.S. NUCLEAR DETERRENT GOALS

Evolving Soviet nuclear capabilities have encouraged successive Presidents to alter most objectives that underwrite the irreducible U. S. interest in national survival (Graph 2).

--The deterrence of nuclear attacks on the United States still overrides all other aims.

--However, we no longer seek to "win" if deterrence fails. The goals now are to:

  --Limit escalation.

  --Restore stability.

  --Devastate the aggressor's homeland, if other methods of terminating the conflict fail.

--Limiting civilian casualties and damage has ceased to be a fundamental concern.

1/ Moorer, Thomas H. United States Military Posture for FY 1974, p. 26, and for FY 1975, p. 38.

2/ Kissinger, Henry A. Question and Answer Session After a Briefing. Washington, Office of the White House Secretary, June 15, 1972, p. 7.

GRAPH 2

U.S. GENERAL WAR OBJECTIVES



The deterrence of atomic attacks on our homeland became a vital U.S. objective in the mid-1950s, when the Soviet Union acquired the ability to engage multiple targets in this country. The avoidance of a nuclear exchange with the U.S.S.R.has dwarfed other U.S. defense considerations since that time.

If deterrence had collapsed in the 1950s, U.S. leaders planned to "win" the ensuing conflict by disarming the opposition. One of President Truman's momentous decisions, in the opinion of General Nathan B. Twining, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1957-1960, was "to build up U.S. strategic nuclear forces--both as a deterrent to Communist aggression and as a war-winning capability." The succeeding Eisenhower Administration "never wavered" in its determination to win "if general war were thrust upon us."[1/]

"Winning," however, soon ceased to be a realistic aim, in the opinion of U.S. decision-makers. We lost our credible first strike capability shortly after the Cuban crisis, as the Soviets hardened their missile silos and increased their seaborne missile fleet which, like our own, is relatively invulnerable. In January 1964, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara announced that successful U.S. counterforce operations would be "simply unattainable," even if they were desirable.[2/] For the next few years, America's primary objective if deterrence failed was simply "to destroy the aggressor

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1/Twining, Nathan B. Neither Liberty nor Safety. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966, p. 146-147.

2/McNamara, Robert S. Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Subcommittee on DOD Appropriations on the FY 1965-69 Defense Program and the 1965 Defense Budget, January 27, 1964, p. 31

as a viable society."[1] That vengeful aim remains as a last-ditch option if all other efforts to restore stability prove fruitless, but escalation control and diplomatic bargaining to conclude any nuclear conflict expeditiously on acceptable terms have both become high priority objectives.[2]

The contraction of our SAFEGUARD antiballistic missile programs, the progressive deterioration of our air defense screen, and the impotence of U.S. civil defense efforts corroborate the absence of any goal to confine civilian casualties and damage. A decade ago, McNamara concluded that "none of the [ABM] systems at the present or foreseeable state of the art" could prevent American casualties in the "tens of millions". Consequently, ABM "defense of our cities against a Soviet attack...would be a futile waste of our resources."[3] No one in authority has refuted that judgment.

U.S. NUCLEAR DETERRENT POLICIES

Primary U.S. nuclear deterrent policies that guide strategic planners in their pursuit of ways and means to satisfy vital objectives have been revised over the years to reflect our altered aims The change has

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1/McNamara, Robert S. Statement Before the House Armed Services Committee on the FY 1966-70 Defense Program and 1966 Defense Budget, February 18, 1965, p. 38.

2/Nixon, Richard M. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's. May 3, 1973, p. 182-184.

3/McNamara, Robert S. The Essence of Security. New York, Harper and Row, 1968, p. 63; and McNamara, Robert S. Statement on the FY 1969 Defense Budget, p. 63.

been characterized by:

--A reduction in retaliatory options

--The rejection of strategic defenses.

--Increasing reliance on arms control.

Three distinct stages of development stand out in bold relief (Graph 3).

The Era of Assured Ascendancy

When the Atomic Age was in its infancy, America excluded preemptive or preventive wars as an instrument, and elected a second-strike strategy. Even so, our evident edge encouraged decisive concepts. Policy in the 1950s was therefore predicated on what might have been termed "Assured Ascendancy".

Counterforce operations of all kinds were a conspicuous ingredient, designed to deliver crippling blows against attacking waves of hostile aircraft and suppress the foe's defenses. A multifaceted warning and defense network complemented U.S. offensive systems. The intent was to protect our homeland, and pave the way for swift and sure Massive Retaliation against Moscow's capacities to wage offensive war. The aggregate solidly enhanced America's deterrent across the nuclear spectrum, by guaranteeing that we could wage a general war "victoriously", and handle atomic contingencies with aplomb. Arms control played an unprepossessing part in U.S. deterrent policy during those days. It was simply an adjunct.

The Era of Assured Destruction

The United States abandoned Assured Ascendancy in 1963-64, and substituted Assured Destruction. The reasoning was elemental: U.S. leaders concluded that the surge in Soviet nuclear capabilities made effective counterforce operations impractical, if not impossible.

GRAPH 3

U.S. NUCLEAR DETERRENT AND CBR POLICIES



Soviet sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which then had a range of about 400 nautical miles, were beginning to pose an impressive potential threat to U.S. coastal cities. They were (and still are) virtually invulnerable. Our nuclear arsenal lacked the requisite blend of accuracy and yield to eradicate Moscow's intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which were being encased in hardened silos. We could have developed the capability to crush hard targets, perhaps at the expense of an accelerated arms race, but neither the means to eliminate hostile submarines nor to install effective antiballistic missile defenses seemed to be forthcoming in the foreseeable future. Apparently, nothing we could do within existing states of technological art would prevent the devastation of this country if we engaged in a general nuclear war.

Consequently, U.S. leaders remolded Massive Retaliation, fashioned in the 1950s to fulfill multiple functions, and focused it on city targeting, designed to "ensure the destruction, singly or in combination, of the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the communist satellites."[1/] Efforts to protect the American people from atomization were allowed to languish, on the assumption that the power "to destroy an attacker as a viable twentieth century nation...provides the deterrent, not our ability to partially limit damage to ourselves."[2/] Strategic defenses thereafter were structured primarily to preserve U.S. retaliatory forces, not cities.[3/]

1/ U.S. Congress. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1965. Hearings, 88th Congress, 1st Session, Part 4. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Office, 1965, p. 25-28.

2/ McNamara, Robert S. See section on strategic defenses and damage limitation in annual DOD posture statements to the Congress, F.Y. 1965-1969. Final quotation from Statement on the 1968 Defense Budget, p. 38-39.

3/ McNamara, Robert S. Statement on the 1969 Defense Budget, p. 62.

This country's general war deterrent stayed sound through the 1960s, but the comparative decline of American military might soon dispelled convictions that we could dictate the terms of limited nuclear combat if preventive measures collapsed. When Massive Retaliation lost credibility as the sponsor of Free World security, U.S. proscriptive powers were dulled, and our anguished NATO ally had to recast its concepts.[1/]

The absence of flexibility derived from our specialized stance emphasized demands for diplomacy and negotiation. Arms control, which previously played a peripheral role, became an inseparable part of U.S. strategy, despite vociferous condemnation by skeptical conservatives.

In an effort to strengthen deterrence, cut costs, and curb the holocaust if nuclear war should ensue, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, activated in 1961, took on a compendium of projects. During the brief span from 1963 through 1968, these culminated in the establishment of a Washington-to-Moscow "hot line", whose expressed purpose was to lessen the dangers of war resulting from error or misunderstanding; a limited test ban treaty that banned experimental nuclear detonations in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water; a treaty that prohibits the emplacement of nuclear weapons in outer space; a treaty that designates Latin America a nuclear-free zone (a similar accord addressed Antarctica in 1959); and a treaty impeding the proliferation of nuclear weapons among nations not already members of the "Nuclear Club."[2/]

1/ NATO Facts and Figures. Brussels, NATO Information Service, October 1971, p. 92.

2/ Arms Control Achievements, 1959-1972. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Office, 1972.

The Era of Assured Anxiety

Assured Destruction concepts, adopted a decade ago because U.S. spokesmen perceived no practical alternative, were enshrined as dogma until President Nixon asked an oft-quoted rhetorical question shortly after he assumed office:

> Should the President, in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans? Should the concept of assured destruction be narrowly defined, and should it be the only measure of our ability to deter the variety of threats we may face? 1/

In answer to that question, the incumbent Administration is seeking to supplement Massive Retaliation with more adjustable responses. "Given the range of possible political-military situations which conceivably could confront us, our strategic policy should not be based solely on a capability of inflicting urban and industrial damage presumed to be beyond the level an adversary would accept," the President postulates. "We must be able to respond at levels appropriate to the situation."2/

After a searching reappraisal, the Administration confirmed Assured Destruction as our last-ditch stand, but sought divers counterforce capabilities to deter and, if need be, deal with nuclear challenges at lower levels. Requests are on record or under review to MIRV more MINUTEMEN, modify them to carry larger loads, develop warheads that can deal adroitly with hard targets, and perhaps augment the U.S. triad with a stable of cruise and mobile missiles.3/

1/ Nixon, Richard M. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, February 18, 1970, p. 122.
2/ Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, February 9, 1972, p. 158.
3/ Schlesinger, James R. Annual Defense Department Report to the Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget, p. 49-66.

That course sparked a nation-wide debate over nuclear deterrence, unduplicated in the past decade.[1] However, even if sufficient funds were soon forthcoming to cover all proposed programs (by no means a foregone conclusion), practical improvements in U.S. retaliatory capabilities would still be many months in development.

Paradoxically, the delving for versatility applies only to retaliatory policies. By formally repudiating strategic defense, U.S. decision-makers in this decade have actually excised options, instead of adding alternatives. Mutual vulnerability, an outgrowth of the SALT I ABM treaty, allegedly enhanced America's general war deterrent by emphasizing the futility of a full-scale nuclear fusillade. Unfortunately, it also opened up new opportunities for rivals to test our resolve in limited nuclear combat. That possibility currently causes queasiness in the U.S. defense establishment and among concerned citizens in every walk of life.

This country now enters the Era of Assured Anxiety, wracked by deep uncertainties. The sapping of our nuclear strength has far-reaching implications for a U.S. foreign policy predicated on partnership and negotiation.[2] The inability of the United States to provide a nuclear shield for the Free World, as promised by the Nixon Doctrine,[3] threatens to undermine our global security system. It is difficult to persuade allies that coalitions are still to <u>their</u> advantage, as well as <u>ours</u>, when we cannot produce. Nuclear proliferation

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1/ A comprehensive review of associated problems is contained in Collins, John M. Counterforce and Countervalue Options Compared: A Military Analysis Related to Nuclear Deterrence. Washington, Congressional Research Service, December 7, 1972.

2/ Nixon, Richard M. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, February 18, 1970, p. 4-13.

3/ Nixon, Richard M. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, February 25, 1971, p. 13-14.

may eventually be induced, to America's detriment. Furthermore, the spectacle of unusable U.S. nuclear power has diluted our diplomacy. We are increasingly hard put to convince the Kremlin that negotiated compromise is preferable to coercion or one-sided deals that serve Soviet ends at U.S. expense.

To redress imbalances and reverse such trends, the United States now engages in an enormously expensive and seemingly endless arms race that causes tensions to mount. As a result, reciprocal arms control accords, which once were strategic adjuncts, assume crucial proportions. U.S. national security quite literally depends to a high degree on cooperation by a canny competitor, whose incentives to collaborate are slight.

SALT I ameliorated an appalling shift in the nuclear balance toward the Soviet Union, by freezing selected offensive forces for a full five years. That temporary injunction left this country in better shape than otherwise would have pertained, but still at a disadvantage.[1/] U.S. SALT II negotiators now strive to ensure enduring equilibrium. Success thus far has surely been scant, and the issue stays in doubt.[2/]

U.S. NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURE TRENDS

A nuclear deterrent posture second to none has been the ultimate U.S. force goal throughout the past two decades. Without credible capabilities, we would be hard pressed to retain the confidence of our friends, the respect of our foes, or our own self-assurance in times of crisis. Today, more than ever, the need for American military strength is tied to a deterrent policy

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1/ U.S. Congress. Senate. Message From the President of the United States Transmitting the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement and Associated Protocol. 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, Executive L., Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Office, 1972, 16 p.

2/ More limited Moscow Pact Seen by U.S. Washington Post, April 13, 1974, p. A-1, A-4. Quotes Secretary Kissinger as saying "We will not have a permanent agreement [in 1974]. Whether there can be an agreement on part of it really is not clear yet."

which hopes to convince competitors that negotiation is more attractive than naked aggression. The question is, "how many forces are enough?"

Three basic policies set the style (Graph 4):

--Our mixed retaliatory force concept remains constant.

--Strength criteria for U.S. offensive forces have shaded from superiority through parity to "sufficiency" and "essential equivalence."

--U.S. defense assets have declined.

The Mixed Retaliatory Force Concept

"Flexibility" is a prime Principle of War.[1/] The experience of many millenia has confirmed that it is rarely wise to rely too heavily on a single weapons system, regardless of its attributes. The United States therefore has long maintained diversified forces designed to enhance the credibility of our deterrent by guaranteeing this country a valid second-strike capability under worst-case circumstances.

Beginning in the 1950s, when long-range aircraft comprised the only U.S. intercontinental nuclear delivery means, we settled on a Triad of manned bombers, ICBMs, and ballistic missile submarines. Each component exhibits unique capabilities, measured in terms of reliability, range, accuracy, penetration potential, pre- and post-launch survivability, simplicity, adaptability, responsiveness, control, research and development prospects, and cost. The three elements are essentially complementary, rather than competitive.

1/ The Principles of War comprise many different lists. The British subscribe to 10, the Russians to half that many. Flexibility, oddly enough, is disregarded in American versions. Collins, John M. Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices. Annapolis, Maryland, U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1973, p. 22-28.

GRAPH 4

U.S. NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURE POLICIES



Congress put its seal of approval on the mixed force concept by appropriating R&D funds in the 1950s. Variegated forces have supported our deterrent policy ever since, although an articulate opposition opposes the present degree of redundancy, alleging that it is neither necessary nor cost-effective. Some critics argue that aircraft are obsolete in the missile age. Increasing Soviet capabilities to destroy hard targets cause others to scorn ICBMs in concrete silos. A few would limit our retaliatory force to POLARIS submarines, whose survivability seems assured for the present. Thus far, however, the Nixon Administration has resisted all such pressures, partly because it is convinced that salvation lies with the mixed force concept, partly because it views unilateral disarmament as diplomatically improvident.[1/]

Strength Criteria for Retaliatory Forces

Superiority. Bald quantitative and qualitative nuclear supremacy backed U.S. deterrent objectives at the onset of the Atomic Age. Until 1955, the United States enjoyed a monopoly of nuclear weapons that could be delivered intercontinentally. We retained unquestioned superiority into the succeeding decade. Assured Ascendancy was predicated on that advantage.

Parity. Parity replaced superiority as the U.S. force structure standard by 1964, in obeisance to the belief that relative strengths were meaningless--the mission of Assured Destruction was merely to cover essential urban targets with a high degree of confidence. "Excess" strength, defined as "overkill", was considered unnecessary and undesirable.[2/]

1/ Nixon, Richard M. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, May 3, 1973, p. 201.

2/ U.S. Congress. House. Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee. Hearings on Department of Defense Appropriations for FY 1960. 86th Congress. 1st Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1959, Part I, p. 58.

The quantity of launch vehicles was rated less important than "the number of separately targetable, serviceable, accurate, reliable warheads."[1/] That conjecture strongly influenced the decision to equip existing U.S. missiles with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV) as a counterbalance for burgeoning Soviet capabilities, instead of bolstering our inventory of bombers and ballistic missiles.

U.S. retaliatory force structure in recent years has reflected those determinations (Figure 2).

Figure 2.

U.S. NUCLEAR RETALIATORY FORCES
1964 - 1973

	Long-Range Bombers	ICBM	SLBM
1964	630	834	416 *
1965	630	854	496
1966	630	904	592
1967	600	1054	656
1968	545	1054	656
1969	560	1054	656
1970	550	1054**	656
1971	505	1054	656**
1972	455	1054	656
1973	442	1054	656

* First multiple reentry vehicles (MRV).

** First multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV).

Source: The Military Balance, 1973-74, p. 71.

1/ McNamara, Robert S. Statement on the FY 1969 Defense Budget, p. 52

As a result, the United States lags well behind the Soviets in total numbers of delivery systems (see Figure 1 for comparison), although the U.S. inventory of nuclear bombs and warheads exceeds theirs by approximately 3:1.[1/] However, that lead may be challenged shortly. In August, 1973, Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger announced that Moscow for the first time had successfully flight-tested MIRVs aboard at least two experimental ICBMs. Operational models could augment the Russian arsenal in about two years.[2/] Should the Soviets choose to go that route, MIRV competition probably would act to their net advantage, since their missiles carry a much greater payload than ours. American incentives to negotiate MIRV restrictions during SALT II thus have been intensified.

Sufficiency. The policy of parity persisted for about four years in its purest form (some say it shaded into subparity), until President Nixon substituted "sufficiency", an ambiguous appellation geared to his conviction that superiority is no longer attainable, but inferiority would be unacceptable.[3/] As he explained,

> There is an absolute point below which our security forces must never be allowed to go. That is the level of sufficiency. Above or at that level, our defense forces protect national security adequately. Below that level is one vast undifferentiated area of no security at all. For it serves no purpose in conflicts between nations to have been almost strong enough. [4/]

1/ Schlesinger, James R. Annual Defense Department Report to the Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget, p. 50.
2/ MIRV Warheads Seen Successful in Soviet Tests, Washington Post, August 18, 1973, p. 1.
3/ Nixon, Richard M. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, May 3, 1973, p. 8.
4/ Nixon, Richard M. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, February 25, 1971, p. 167.

Melvin R. Laird identified four criteria for nuclear sufficiency when he was Secretary of Defense:

> Maintaining an adequate second strike capability to deter an all-out surprise attack on our strategic forces.
>
> Providing no incentive for the Soviet Union to strike the United States first in a crisis.
>
> Preventing the Soviet Union from gaining the ability to cause considerably greater urban/industrial destruction than the United States could inflict on the Soviets in a nuclear war.
>
> Defending against damage from small attacks or accidental launches. 1/

Those force posture guidelines, essentially deterrent and defensive in nature, were calculated to preserve the foundations of Assured Destruction, which remains the terminal U.S. retaliatory option; to enhance stability; and to "prevent us and our allies from being coerced". 2/

Propaganda notwithstanding, the ostensibly sliding scale of sufficiency neither fostered flexibility nor appreciably affected U.S. force posture during its brief life span. Requirements for ICBMs and sea-launched ballistic missiles were treated much alike, despite the radically dissimilar attributes of those two systems.

1/ Laird, Melvin R. Statement on the FY 1972 Defense Budget, p. 62.

2/ Nixon, Richard M. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, February 25, 1971, p. 70.

Essential Equivalence. "Sufficiency" has now been succeeded by "essential equivalence" as the standard for sizing U.S. strategic retaliatory forces.[1/] The origins of this criterion can be traced to the Joint Congressional Resolution approving the SALT I accords, which specifically stipulated that SALT II should "not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior" to those of the Soviet Union.[2/]

As Defense Secretary Schlesinger explains it, the term essential equivalence in no way means "that exact symmetry must exist between [U.S. and Soviet] offensive forces. The United States is willing to tolerate the existence of assymmetries provided that, in an era of alleged parity, they do not all favor one party" [emphasis added].[3/] In short, essential equivalence and parity are virtually synonymous, since both visualize overall capabilities that are approximately equal in effectiveness.

Limitations on Offensive Weapons

The SALT I accords, which expunged most U.S. and Soviet ABM defenses, present and projected, also applied temporary brakes to some aspects of the strategic offensive arms race, pending efforts to conclude a permanent treaty.

In essence, the interim agreement prohibits the United States and Soviet Union from deploying selected delivery systems in excess of prescribed limits during a five-year freeze period from mid-1972 through mid-1977 (Figure 3).

1/ Schlesinger, James R. Annual Defense Department Report to the Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget, p. 6.

2/ U.S. Congress. Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees. Joint Committee Print concerning Legislation on Foreign Relations. With Explanatory Notes. 93d Congress, 2d Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., March, 1974, p. 1173-74.

3/ Schlesinger, James R. Annual Defense Department Report to the Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget, p. 43.

Figure 3

SALT I OFFENSIVE ARMS LIMITATIONS

	U. S.	U.S.S.R.
ICBM Launchers		
Deployed mid-1972	1,054	1,527
Projected 1977, if no freeze	1,054	2,868
SALT ceiling	1,054	1,618
If max conversions elected	1,000	1,408
Modern Ballistic Missile Submarines		
Deployed mid-1972	41	25
Under construction	0	16-18
Projected 1977, if no freeze	41	80-90
SALT ceiling	41	41-43
If max conversions elected	44	62
SLBM Launchers		
Deployed mid-1972	656	430
Projected 1977, if no freeze	656	1,200
SALT ceiling	656	740
If max conversion elected	710	950

Source: Figures compiled mainly from Moorer, Thomas H. United States Military Posture for FY 1974, p. 6-10.

All estimates of future Soviet force strengths are straight-line projections that made no effort to forecast whether production rates would accelerate or abate.

Long-range bombers, land- and carrier-based tactical aircraft with strategic missions, intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles were excluded. Both countries are free to improve authorized forces qualitatively, using conventional technology. The Nixon Administration has made it clear that the negotiation of a more comprehensive pact is a high priority matter. Failure to do so before 1977 could jeopardize "U.S. supreme interests", in the opinion of arms control spokesmen.[1/]

The interim agreement barred both countries from military ICBM launcher construction after July 1, 1972. No "light" ICBMs (undefined, but interpreted to include all missiles smaller than a Soviet SS-9) or heavy models deployed before 1964 may be converted into or exchanged for up-to-date ICBMs. Those restrictions did not affect the United States, since the last TITAN II was installed in December 1963, and we had no plans to augment our 1,000 MINUTEMEN. However, the Soviets were building ICBMs at an estimated rate of 250 per year. Without the freeze, their arsenal could have numbered nearly 2,870 land-based launchers by 1977, as compared with 1054 for the United States.[2/]

1/ U.S. Congress. Senate. Message From the President of the United States Transmitting the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement and Associated Protocol. 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, Executive L., Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Office, 1972, p. xvi-xviii. 5-7, 10-16.

2/ Moorer, Thomas H. United States Military Posture for FY 1973, p. 7-9; and Kissinger, Henry A. White House Press Conference. Moscow, Office of the White House Press Secretary, 01:00 A.M., May 27, 1972, p. 1.

SLBMs and "modern" ballistic missile submarines (typified by U. S. POLARIS and Soviet Y-Class models) must be limited to those that were operational or under construction on May 26, 1972. ICBMs deployed before 1964 and SLBMs on obsolescent Soviet G- and H-Class submarines may be converted to SLBMs on "modern" vessels on a one-for-one basis. The United States is authorized a maximum of 710 SLBMs and 44 "modern" boats; the Soviet ceiling is 950 and 62 respectively. "Modern" SLBMs on any type submarine will be counted against those totals.1/

The United States had no programs to augment its ballistic missile submarine force during the freeze period. The U.S.S.R., however, was building eight or nine new boats annually. If the freeze had not gone into effect, its complement of "modern" submarines might well have been more than twice as large as ours by 1977.2/

Congress approved the SALT I interim agreement with a joint resolution, signed into law (P.L. 92-448) on September 30, 1972. SALT II, which is concerned with qualitative as well as quantitative limitations, opened in November, 1972. Little substantive progress has been yet been recorded.

The Demise of Strategic Defense

Antiballistic Missile Defenses. The U.S. shield against land- and sea-launched ballistic missiles thus far has been confined to an alert network. The present assemblage, progressively augmented and upgraded since the

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1/ Moorer, Thomas A., United States Military Posture for FY 1973, p. 10-12; Kissinger, Henry A. and Smith, Gerard C. White House Press Conference. Moscow. Office of the White House Press Secretary, 10:05 P.M., May 26, 1972, p. 10-11; Kissinger, White House Press Conference, May 27, 1972, p. 1-4.

2/ Ibid.

Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) was completed in the early 1960s, is a sophisticated gridiron that now hinges heavily on satellite sensors.

No ABM sites are yet operational. The U.S. Army already was prosecuting an "aggressive anti-missile program" in the mid-1950s,[1] despite widespread skepticism, but Secretary McNamara consistently opposed deployment throughout most of the Kennedy/Johnson years. In his opinion, any conceivable system could easily be saturated by "an enemy's simply sending more...warheads, or dummy warheads, than there are defensive missiles."[2] He postulated that a "nuclear-armed offensive weapon which has a 50/50 chance of destroying its target would be highly effective, but a defensive weapon with the same probability of destroying incoming nuclear warheads would be of little value."[3] Improved offensive capabilities ostensibly could cancel out any defense.

The first reluctant steps in the opposite direction resulted from a significant shift in the strategic situation. When Mao's China began to emerge as a nuclear power, McNamara reversed his stand. In 1967, he conceded that there were "marginal grounds" for erecting a modest ABM screen as a precaution against "miscalculation" or "irrational behavior" by the Chinese.[4] Active preparations began that year.

1/ U.S. Congress. Senate. Hearings on Study of Airpower before the Subcommittee on the Air Force, Armed Services Committee. 84th Congress, 2d Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1956, p. 726.
2/ McNamara, Robert S. The Essence of Security, p. 63-66.
3/ McNamara, Robert S. Statement on the FY 1969 Defense Budget, p. 42.
4/ Ibid., p. 164-166.

The original 17-site SENTINAL program, which would have developed a thin area defense of the Continental United States, was supplanted in 1969 by 12 SAFEGUARD complexes, whose phased introduction was intended to:

1. Protect U.S. land-based retaliatory forces against a direct attack by the Soviet Union.

2. Defend the American people against the kind of nuclear attack which Communist China could mount within the decade.

3. Hedge against accidental attacks from any source.[1/]

As things turned out, however, U.S. antiballistic missile deployment programs virtually ceased on May 26, 1972, when the SALT I ABM treaty went into effect. Each signatory to those accords renounced the right to erect an area defense of its homeland, and agreed to restrict regional defenses to a pair of sites at least 800 miles apart, one centered on the capital city, the other on an ICBM field.[2/]

Our sole remaining SAFEGUARD installation, which presently shields MINUTEMAN silos in North Dakota, is important primarily as a functioning R&D facility. Its overall defensive value to the nation is minimal. The second site, proposed to cover the National Command Authorities (NCA) in Washington, D. C., is being held in abeyance. The Congress withheld funds requested by the Department of Defense for FY 1973, pending further debate, and the matter was dropped from the FY 1974 budget request, except $5 million

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1/ Nixon, Richard M. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, February 18, 1970, p. 126.

2/ Message from the President Transmitting the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement, p. V-XIV, 1-4, 9-16.

for research and development.[1] As a result, U.S. antiballistic missile defenses will be minute, as long as the ABM treaty remains in effect.

Air Defenses. Working hand-in glove with Canadian neighbors, the United States installed a multifaceted air defense system in the 1950s. Arrangements comprised a comprehensive surveillance network associated with point and area defenses. The results were impressive, although not impenetrable.

Even at that early stage, however, the U.S.S.R. was starting to transfer its energies from bombers to ballistic missiles. Intelligence estimates soon indicated that the air-breathing threat would be somewhat less severe than originally was assumed.[2] The peril was still considered significant, but in June, 1959, the Defense Department reviewed U.S. continental air defense plans and began to concentrate its attention less on antiaircraft facilities and more on means of coping with missiles.[3] The stage thus was set for progressive reduction of our air defenses.

Reductions in force over the past decade have been drastic (Figure (4) The residue is antiquated in terms of projected Soviet capabilities, particularly the new BACKFIRE bomber. None of this country's remaining weapons systems has been in service less than 15 years. All are the products of programs based on obsolescent technology. Nevertheless, further slashes are in progress, for reasons reviewed by Defense Secretary Schlesinger:

1/ Murphy, Charles H. The Anti-ballistic Missile Defense of Washington: A Continuing Issue. Washington, Congressional Research Service, February 7, 1973, p. 20-23.

2/ U.S. Congress. House Document No. 432. United States Defense Policies in 1959. 86th Congress, 2d Session, Washington, U.S.Govt. Print. Off., 1960, p. 38-39.

3/ U.S. Congress. House Document No. 207. United States Defense Policies in 1960. 87th Congress, 1st Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1961, p. 55-56.

Figure 4.

DECLINING U. S. AIR DEFENSE ASSETS

	Peak Strength in 1960s	Present Strength 1973
Interceptor Squadrons		
Active	67	7
Air National Guard	55	20
SAM Batteries		
Active	228	21
Army National Guard	52	27
Control and Surveillance		
EC-121 Aircraft	67	18
DEW Line Stations	81	31
Long-range Radars	188	105
Gap Filler Radars	137	0
Radar Picket Ships	32	0

Source: Murphy, Charles H. The Decision to Curtail Strategic Air Defense Programs in FY 1975: Rationale and Implications. Washington, Congressional Research Service, April 5, 1974, p. 6.

> Without effective ABM defenses, air defenses are of very limited value against potential aggressors armed [mainly] with strategic missiles.... As long as there was some chance that we might deploy at least a thin nationwide ABM defense, it made sense to keep open the option to deploy a complementary air defense. Now that the ABM Treaty [limits] both sides... we cannot in good conscience postpone any longer the basic adjustments in **our** air defense program. 1/

According to current plans, all 48 NIKE-HERCULES missile batteries assigned to the Army Air Defense Command (ARADCOM) are to be deactivated during FY 1975. The 27 interceptor squadrons assigned to the Aerospace Defense Command (ADC) will be reduced to 21 during that same period, but may be stripped to 12 in FY 1976, by eliminating all F-101 and F-102 aircraft. The remnants would be primarily responsible for ensuring the sovereignty of U.S. air space, with a secondary mission of fending off small-scale bomber attacks. 2/

In addition, DOD recommends drastic curtailment of modernization programs, except for over-the-horizon backscatter (OTH-B) radars. The Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) will be allocated to a general purpose "pool", available in limited numbers on call. Neither the Improved Manned Interceptor (IMI) nor SAM-D surface-to-air missiles will be procured especially for air defense of the United States. 3/

Should this country feel compelled to abrogate the SALT I ABM treaty, as authorized, the question of bomber defense might well be reopened. Meanwhile, we retain a sword but scorn a shield.

1/ Schlesinger, James R. Annual Defense Department Report to the Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget, p. 66.
2/ Murphy, Charles R. The Decision to Curtail Strategic Air Defense Programs in FY 1975, p. 1; 25-27.
3/ Ibid., p. 31-37.

Civil Defense. Passive protection of the U.S. population and industrial base is the purview of civil defense, which never has achieved lasting prominence in the United States. Programs languished in the 1950s, even after the Kremlin unveiled its long-range nuclear strike force; shone momentarily in the spotlight as a result of the Cuban missile crisis; then lapsed into lethargy, where civil defense remains for lack of public support and high-level emphasis.[1/]

U.S. CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL POLICIES

Chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) policies, like those related to nuclear deterrence, have the potential for producing mass casulties. Despite that association, however, the trends are quite different (return to Graph 3).

The United States has shunned the use of lethal CBR weaponry as a matter of policy since World War I. We maintained capabilities for deterrent and retaliatory purposes, but the subject received little attention during most of the 1950s. The Army, then as now, was charged with R&D programs and training responsibilities for all military services. However, funds for those purposes consumed less than 0.1 percent of its total FY 1960 budget.[2/]

Interest picked up in 1959, responding to Soviet experimentation with nerve gases (first developed in Nazi Germany), mental and physical incapacitants,

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1/ Funds are still forthcoming, at less than one third of the 1962 rate, but the spark is gone. Annual Statistical Report, FY 1972. Washington Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, 1973, p. 5.

2/ U.S. Congress. House Document No. 432, United States Defense Policies in 1959. 86th Congress, 2d Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off. 1960, p. 20.

and micro-organisms that produce diseases highly resistant to existing vaccines and antitoxins. The whole proposition was intriguing, since it proferred prospects of overcoming enemies without risking property damage and, in the case of incapacitants, without fatalities. Unfortunately, CBR warfare, like its nuclear associate, would also be very hard to regulate, and if out of hand could cause consequences beyond estimation. For several years, therefore, CBR warfare has been a topic of intense interest to American arms controllers.

After protracted negotiations, the United States and Soviet Union concluded a convention on April 10, 1972, prohibiting the production and stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons, and prescribing their destruction. More than 100 countries have signed since, although only one has ratified the accords.[1/] We are actively seeking a corollary agreement to control chemical ammunition. The problem, unfortunately is somewhat more complex than that related to biological warfare. "Several nations may have [chemical] weapons, and the capacity to produce them is widespread. It is exceedingly difficult to verify existing stocks, let alone monitor their reduction, or to distinguish between civilian and military production."[2/] Nevertheless, the United States continues to press for a suitable solution, convinced that alternatives appear unattractive.

1/ Arms Control Achievements, 1959-1972, p. 98-107. Several countries have signed the Bacteriological Convention since this document was published.

2/ Nixon, Richard M. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, May 3, 1973, p. 207-208.

GENERAL PURPOSE TRENDS

EVOLVING THREATS

Potential non-nuclear threats to U.S. national security, posed by expanding Soviet and Chinese Communist military capabilities, are both global and regional in nature. Four salient trends stand out:

--Soviet armed forces have broken out of their traditional continental cocoon by means of a "blue water" navy.

--Chinese Communist conventional threats are still confined to Eurasia.

--Both of those powers have become less bellicose toward the United States.

--Nevertheless, the U.S.S.R. still contributes to several unstable situations which imperil world peace.

The Rise of Soviet Sea Power

Soviet armed forces traditionally have been dominated by a mammoth army, organized, trained, and equipped to defend Mother Russia and to support overtures on adjacent land masses. That instrument, together with companion air forces, has been cumulatively upgraded since the early 1950s. It is modern, diversified, and far larger than its U.S. counterpart, but in the absence of intercontinental mobility still is of immediate concern mainly to Moscow's neighbors. Soviet ground forces and tactical air arms can jeopardize our alliance system, but not our homeland.

The recent proliferation of Soviet sea power is altering defense equations, although in what ways and to what extent is a contentious matter. In a recent dialogue, for example, Senator William Proxmire accused the

Defense Department of "systematically distorting" the threat. Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, the Chief of Naval Operations, strongly demurred.[1/]

Most authorities concur that the United States retains a commanding quantitative and qualitative lead in many respects, although the Soviet Navy now is the world's second largest. The U.S. inventory of carrier aircraft constitutes unparalleled striking power that will remain paramount for a long time to come. We have nuclear-powered surface combat ships unduplicated by the U.S.S.R. Our amphibious forces are by far the finest of any nation, even though their capabilities have withered steadily since World War II. No other country can duplicate our shore-based support facilities at home and abroad, plus under-way replenishment vessels, which give the United States singular staying power on the high seas. Finally, the U.S. Navy enjoys command/control, surveillance, and communications systems that are infinitely superior to those employed by its Russian rivals.[2/]

The Soviets, however, have nearly three times as many attack submarines as the United States. Only about one-fourth are nuclear-powered at present, but that percentage is increasing rapidly. Several classes of submarines and surface craft have an impressive cruise missile capability against Free World naval combatants and merchant shipping. This country has no comparable weaponry. In addition, the Soviets are

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1/ Proxmire, William. The Soviet Fleet is no Match for the U.S. Fleet--Reply to Admiral Zumwalt's Letter of June 2, 1972. Remarks in the Senate. Congressional Record, June 12, 1972, p. S9179-S.9195..

2/ Schlesinger, James R. Annual Defense Department Report to the Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget, p. 11-13; and Moorer, Thomas E. United States Military Posture for FY 1975, p. 69-77.

upgrading and diversifying other forces rapidly. Their well-coordinated maritime program involves the balanced and integrated development, not just of the Navy's global reach, but of merchant fleets, shore establishments, professional oceanic education, and research.1/

Gross comparisons, however, are misleading, since U.S. and Soviet sea power serve dissimilar purposes. Admiral Zumwalt submits a sweeping analysis:

> Both navies are designed in part for nuclear deterrence. To that extent, our tasks are similar. Beyond that point, however, U.S. Naval forces are designed to support distant U.S. forces overseas, and, under the Nixon Doctrine, when required, the indigenous armies of our allies, neccesitating forward defense, sea control, and the ability to project power ashore... We have, in addition, a logistic defense requirement of vast proportions.
>
> The Soviet Navy, by contrast... is designed largely for /counterforce and political purposes. Its/ units have been optimized... for strong initial striking power, with relatively limited reload and endurance and hence less tonnage per unit and little need for nuclear propulsion...
>
> They have built cruise missile armed submarines and surface ships...to combat our fleet. We have built carriers in order to be able to control the sea lines of communication as well as to project tactical air power overseas from flexible, mobile, air bases.2/

Geographic constraints compel the Soviets to subdivide their navy into four widely-separated fleets, based in the Baltic and Black Seas, in the European arctic and the Far East. Those components lack mutual support and operate from areas that (except for Murmansk) are ice-bound

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1/ Ibid.; and Soviet Sea Power. Special Report Series No. 10. Washington, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1969, p. 3.

2/ Zumwalt, Elmo R., Jr. Letters to Senator William Proxmire, June 2 and 8, 1972. Reproduced in Congressional Record, June 12, 1972, p. S.9186-S.9187, S.9193-S.9195.

part of each year and are vulnerable bottlenecks. Nevertheless, Soviet sea power has made such spectacular progress during the past decade that Jane's Fighting Ships, an impartial witness, recently announced that "the Soviet Navy has given the victory sign to the world."1/

Jane's pronouncement may be unduly sensational, but henceforth and hereon Moscow's ocean-going fleets can, if desired, impinge on all U.S. plans that demand secure sea lines of communication. Free movement of our raw materials, finished products, military men, and materiel is no longer guaranteed. That fact of life qualifies what we can do and where we can do it when U.S. and Soviet interests fail to coincide.

Chinese Communist General Purpose Force Trends

There is nearly universal concurrence in the U.S. official establishment and in academia that Communist China, despite its Brobdingnagian proportions, is a "paper tiger" that exerts non-nuclear strength only within its own borders and along its perimeter.

Given that disparaging appraisal, however, China's general purpose capabilities unquestionably have improved considerably since Mao intervened in Korea with massed manpower and little more. Current estimates indicate that mainland China maintains a three million-man army (the world's largest), whose accoutrements are impressive, although not up to superpower standards. Chinese tactical air forces, now being fitted with modern, locally-manufactured jet fighters, are improving rapidly, but even

1/ Jane's Fighting Ships, 1972-73. Edited by Raymond V. B. Blackman. London, Sampson Low, Marston and Co., Ltd., 1972, p. 76.

so are still "far behind the U.S. and U.S.S.R. both quantitatively and qualitatively." The PRC navy "is quite small, but growing." Guided missile destroyers are joining the fleet, and medium-range attack submarines, some possibly nuclear-powered, are in production. Capabilities for action on distant seas thus exist, but the Chinese Navy is expected to remain primarily a coastal defense force for the rest of this decade.[1/] All three CHICOM services exhibit serious logistic shortcomings that will take a long time to erase. Meanwhile, the Chinese, preoccupied as they are with Soviet threats on their borders, could confront the United States effectively in few regards.

Regional Disturbances

Regional threats to world peace have been significantly reduced since militant communism was on the march following World War II. The Soviets and Chinese both have scrupulously avoided head-on military clashes with the United States and middle-ranked powers for more than ten years, even in areas where they have inveterate interests. Except for Sino-Soviet incidents, little "saber-rattling" occurred between 1962, which saw the Cuban missile crisis and the Sino-Indian border dispute, and October 1973, when Brezhnev threatened to intervene between Israel and Egypt. Predelections in Peking and Moscow to support so-called "peoples wars" and "wars of national liberation" are less pronounced, although neither country has abandoned that proclivity. Detente distinguishes relations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. Despite continuing black-white confrontations,

1/ Moorer, Thomas H. United States Military Posture for FY 1974, p. 34-50; and Jane's Fighting Ships, 1973-74. Edited by John E. Moore. London, Sampson, Low, Marston and Co., Ltd., 1973, p. 78.

disturbances in Africa draw the United States into fewer delicate disputes than they did a decade ago. Latin America is less inclined to Castroism.

Nevertheless, U. S. and Soviet interests still seem to differ in several trouble spots that have the potential to destroy world peace. Two tinderboxes could trigger catastrophe. President Nixon identifies the Middle East as a cancerous problem with great "potential for drawing Soviet policy and our own into a collision that could prove uncontrollable."[1/] In addition, the Arab World, by its future actions, can attenuate or accentuate the impending U.S. energy crisis. The Sino-Soviet impasse, which could grossly disrupt the present global balance of power however it is resolved, conceivably could trigger World War III.

U.S. GENERAL PURPOSE GOALS

Against that backdrop of evolving threats, proven and potential, the United States has scaled down its general purpose aims in recent years (Graph 5).

--The goal of curbing communist aggression universally has given way to selective containment, which is linked to our search for a stable balance of power.

--Since America no longer strives to serve as the Free World's "policeman," its demand for intervention capabilities has shrunk considerably.

--The prevention of regional wars thus emerges as the preeminent U.S. aim.

---The maintenance of sufficient military strength to attain desired deterrent and defensive ends remains a constant objective.

1/ Nixon, Richard M. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, February 25, 1971, p. 122.

GRAPH 5

U.S. GENERAL PURPOSE OBJECTIVES

Solid Trends

Formative, Fading
And Transitional Stages



Reluctance to risk a nuclear holocaust has caused U.S. leaders to amend their approach to containment profoundly since the onset of the Cold War. The original objective, which persisted from 1946 into the 1960s, was "to contain Communist aggression...without resorting to total war, if that be possible to avoid" [emphasis added].[1] We meant to draw the line everywhere, at all costs if necessary.

The ideal, of course, did not always match reality. Lebanon was conveniently situated for the execution of containment policy, as was Taiwan, where the U.S. Seventh Fleet stood guard, but there was no practical way for the United States to apply military power effectively in Tibet, when Mao brutally suppressed a popular uprising in 1959. Rebellions against Soviet control in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary in the 1950s elicited no military retort from the United States, partly because containment policy contained no provision for retaking territory seized by the U.S.S.R. Increasing communist influence in Indonesia, which peaked in 1965, provoked no armed reaction by this country for several reasons: the threat was ambiguous; neither the U.S.S.R. nor China was directly involved; and U.S. leaders already were preoccupied with Vietnam. Such exceptions, however, did not invalidate the goal of ubiquitous containment.

The transition to selective containment was prompted first by improved Soviet nuclear capabilities, which made it evident that the costs of even a limited conflict might well exceed gains, and by the Vietnam War, which convinced U.S. decision-makers that indeed there are realistic limits to

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1/ Marshall, George C. Statement Before the Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations on the Military Situation in the Far East. 82d Congress, 1st session, 1951, p. 365-366 (known as the MacArthur Hearings.)

intervention. In particular, the latter revelation applied to revolutionary wars, which the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations viewed as "a challenge we must meet if we are to defeat the Communists."[1] Few responsible officials today feel compelled to implicate this country in squabbles overseas simply to frustrate communism.

The goal now is to deter armed conflict at all levels.[2] The President proposes that we assist Free World defense only "where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest."[3] In essence, he seeks a stable balance of power, devoid of "maneuvering for marginal advantages over others," which could precipitate an unwanted war.[4]

Increased emphasis on obviating, rather than coping with, regional wars has been accompanied by less expansive war-fighting objectives. During the heyday of Massive Retaliation, the United States preferred to engage principals, not proxies, if deterrence failed. Our general purpose forces therefore were merely tasked with "putting out brush fires."[5] Throughout most of the 1960s, however, the ambition was to

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1/ McNamara, Robert S. Statement Before the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee on the FY 1963-67 Defense Program and 1963 Defense Budget, February 14, 1962, p. 20.

2/ Laird, Melvin R. Statement Before the House Armed Services Committee on the FY 1972-76 Defense Program and the 1972 Defense Budget, March 9, 1971, p. 1.

3/ Nixon, Richard M. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, February 18, 1970, p. 6.

4/ Nixon, Richard M. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, May 3, 1973, p. 232.

5/ Eisenhower, Dwight D. The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956. New York, Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1963, p. 452.

amass armed forces that could cope simultaneously with major conflagrations in Europe and Asia, while holding sufficient assets in reserve to handle an isolated contingency (2½ wars in popular parlance).[1] President Nixon telescoped that goal to 1½ wars as soon as he took office. He planned to provide forces that could staunch serious attacks in Europe or Asia, assist allies against non-Chinese threats in the Orient, and contend with a lesser emergency elsewhere.[2]

Regardless of their other aims, the last three Administrations all identified solid general purpose force capabilities as an obligatory objective. Weakness, they believed, might tempt would-be aggressors to make dangerous miscalculations. In addition, American military strength (now more than ever) has buttressed our proclivity to negotiate. Without it, this country would be hard pressed to convince competitors that they should forego armed force for finesse.

U. S. POLICIES RELATED TO REGIONAL DEFENSE

The United States has adjusted its general purpose policies to reflect the foregoing objectives (Graph 6).

--Flexible Response has replaced Massive Retaliation as the U.S. rejoinder to non-nuclear aggression.

--Collective security still is preferred to unilateral defense.

--Underwriting world order has been supplanted by the Nixon Doctrine. That change has been characterized by:

--Increasing responsibilities and authority for U.S. allies.

1/ McNamara, Robert S. The Essence of Security, p. 79-80.
2/ Nixon, Richard M. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, February 18, 1970, p. 129.

GRAPH 6

U.S. GENERAL PURPOSE POLICIES

Solid Trends

Formative, Fading And Transitional Stages



Massive Retaliation

Flexible Response

Tactical Nuclear Weapons

- Primarily For Defense
- Primarily For Deterrence

Collective Security

- Underwrite World Order
  - U.S. Patronage Prevails
  - U.S. Commits Great Conventional Power
  - Forward Defense Stressed
  - Counterinsurgency Stressed*
  - Military Aid Expansive
- Nixon Doctrine
  - Partnership Prevails
  - Allies Commit Most Conventional Power
  - Forward Defense Declines
  - Counterinsurgency Declines
  - Military Aid Selective

Conventional Arms Control Slighted

*Beginning 1961

--More selective applications of U.S. military force.

--A review of U.S. military aid requirements.

Massive Retaliation Bows to Flexible Response

This country maintained modest conventional capabilities in the 1950s, but the threat of massive nuclear retaliation was construed to be our primary deterrent to minor as well as major provocations. There never was any intention "to turn every local war into a global war," Dulles explained, but "local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power. A potential aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe battle conditions that suit him."1/

Events, however, indicated that U.S. leaders lacked the stomach to trip atomic triggers in local altercations, even in the early days when we were immune from direct reprisal. The ends simply failed to justify the means. President Truman, in fact, refrained from using nuclear weapons in Korea on any scale, although General Twining, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the late 1950s, later expressed regrets shared by many others who watched the subsequent proliferation of regional wars which our policy was impotent to prevent:

> In retrospect I have often thought that had we dropped one A-bomb on a tactical target during the Korean War... there might have been no Chinese invasion... Furthermore, Dien Bien Phu might not have happened, nor would Vietnam have been partitioned.2/

1/ Dulles, John Foster. Address to Council of Foreign Relations, January 12, 1954. Department of State Bulletin, Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Office, January 25, 1954, p. 108; and Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 19, 1954, p. 4, 5.

2/ Twining, Nathan B. Neither Liberty Nor Safety, p. 117.

Those views were rejected by a sizeable body of skeptics, who recommended a more versatile policy. Prominent among them was General Maxwell D. Taylor, then Army Chief of Staff. He wrote:

> The strategic doctrine which I would propose to replace Massive Retaliation is called...Flexible Response. This name suggests the need for a capability to react across the entire spectrum of possible challenge...It is just as necessary to deter or win quickly a limited war as to deter general war. Otherwise, the limited war which we cannot win quickly may result in our piecemeal attrition or involvement in an expanding conflict which may grow into the general war we all want to avoid.1/

That thesis was repudiated when it came to a vote by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in March 1956, but was resurrected by President Kennedy five years later. It has been in effect ever since. The term "Flexible Response" is no longer fashionable, but the policy still is to maintain a "full range of options."2/

The Role of Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear weapons, originally suitable only for strategic bombardment purposes, were adapted for battlefield use in the 1950s. Land- and carrier-based tactical aircraft, tube artillery, free rockets, a variety of guided missiles, and atomic demolitions all put in an early appearance as delivery systems.

First-generation tactical nuclear weapons, designed primarily for NATO usage, were deployed to Europe during the Eisenhower Administration, when Massive Retaliation was still in full flower.

1/ Taylor, Maxwell D. The Uncertain Trumpet. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1959, p. 5-7.

2/ Nixon, Richard M. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, February 25, 1971, p. 179.

The expressed purpose at that time was to offset NATO's apparent inferiority in conventional combat power.[1] As long as the United States enjoyed nuclear ascendency, that ploy was plausible. Initially, we had no fear of nuclear retaliation by the U.S.S.R., against targets in the United States. Even after the Soviets developed strategic delivery systems, U.S. superiority remained so pronounced for several years that we still could put a cap on any escalation resulting from tactical nuclear exchanges.

After Moscow achieved an Assured Destruction capability against this country, NATO retained tactical nuclear weapons in its inventory, but the rationale for their use was revised to reflect the strategic standoff. If purely conventional resistance crumbled, NATO still intended to "go nuclear" after consultation among members, but the objective became mainly deterrence, rather than defense. That distinction may seem excessively subtle, but in fact the nuclear threshold was raised. McNamara, recalculating the balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, concluded that friendly forces need not necessarily resort to the early use of tactical nuclear weapons, and plans were revised to reflect the spirit of Flexible Response.[2]

That concept remains in effect today. Theater nuclear forces not only serve "as a deterrent to full-scale Soviet attack on NATO Europe

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1/ Proxmire, William. Excellent Report on Tactical Nuclear Weapons by Senator Nelson. Remarks in the Senate. Congressional Record, July 20, 1971, p. S.11626.

2/ Ibid., p. S.11626-11627; and NATO Facts and Figures, Brussels, NATO Information Service, October, 1971, p. 92.

/but to a/ Chinese attack on our Asian allies."[1] However, U.S. policy once again seems on the verge of transition. Sharp reductions in force (see subsequent sections) that followed the Vietnam War have revived interests in smaller, "cleaner", more discretetactical nuclear weapons, whose timely employment in emergency might counterbalance U.S. manpower shortages.[2]

Critics decry that incipient trend for three reasons.

First, strict regulation might well be impossible. Nuclear weapons could be administered very selectively (for defensive purposes only; on friendly territory only; against military targets only; using air bursts or atomic land mines only; and low yields only), but none of those restrictions would be as readily distinguishable by the enemy as the "firebreak" between nuclear and conventional combat. And we could ill-afford to risk losing control, having relinquished strategic nuclear superiority.

Secondly, neither Soviet nor Chinese ordnance or tactical target acquisition capabilities are well-suited for discriminating nuclear combat. Whether delivered by aircraft, intermediate-range, or medium-range ballistic missiles (IRBM, MRBM), the relatively high-yield weapons possessed by those countries would be most effective against area targets, such as airfields, ports, logistical bases, and command/control installations. Indeed, the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China would find it difficult to fight a limited nuclear war if they wanted to, much less

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1/ Nixon, Richard M. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, February 18, 1970, p. 129.

2/ Beecher, William. Over the Threshold: "Clean" Tactical Nuclear Weapons for Europe, Army, July, 1972, p. 17-20.

one in which collateral damage and civilian casualties were minimized, except in lightly-populated regions.1/

Finally, manpower requirements for tactical nuclear warfare could exceed those needed for conventional combat. Friendly forces would have to be strong enough to make the enemy mass. Otherwise they would find few profitable targets. Moreover, U.S. attrition rates might be very high if the opposition reciprocated in kind. Eventual dominance thus could fall to the side with the greatest reserves of trained manpower and materiel.2/

Any tendencies to substitute tactical nuclear firepower for personnel under conditions that presently prevail therefore bear careful scrutiny.

Collective Security Characteristics, Through 1968

Collective security has been a pillar of U.S. defense policy since World War II, although interpretations have undergone a marked metamorphosis in recent years. The concept is increasingly restrictive.

When our ambition was to contain communism universally and to deter or deal successfully with all manner of regional wars, U.S. collective security policy was calculated to underwrite world order. The pattern established by President Truman was perpetuated by Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. The keynote was best expressed in the Truman Doctrine,

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1/ Enthoven, Alain C. and Smith, K. Wayne. How Much is Enough? New York, Harper and Row, 1971, p. 127; and Wolfe, Thomas W. Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970, p. 197-199, 203, 209, 211, 456-458.

2/ Enthoven and Smith, How Much is Enough?, p. 125.

which was expounded before a joint session of Congress on March 19, 1947, shortly before the period covered by this survey:

> Totalitarian regimes imposed upon free people, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States....I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.1/

Our alliance system started with the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance in 1947 and the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) in 1949. It continued to spread throughout the 1950s and into the early 1960s. Eventually, the United States put together a global security skein that incorporated eight mutual defense pacts, whose membership totalled 42 countries. Pledges and agreements linked us in one way or another to 30-odd more.2/

During those days, U.S. patronage prevailed. America not only provided a strategic nuclear shield for the entire Free World, but the lion's share of materiel support, funds, and (in many cases) conventional forces as well. That trend, established when our most effective allies were still recovering from the ravages of World War II, was little altered after they regained full strength.

In consonance with the policy of forward defense, American bases proliferated along the Sino-Soviet periphery. Discounting peaks during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, we habitually positioned approximately a

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1/ Truman, Harry S. Public Papers of the Presidents, 1947. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Office, 1963, p. 178-179.

2/ Global Defense: U.S. Military Commitments Abroad. Washington, Congressional Quarterly Service, September 1969, p. iv, 3-14.

quarter of our armed forces outside the Continental United States through 1968, afloat and in 30 some foreign countries. More than half were dedicated to or associated with NATO. Most of the remainder were in the Pacific and around the rim of Asia.1/

To buttress the military capabilities of our allies, we sponsored expansive military assistance programs (MAP), beginning in 1947. Grant aid in the form of free arms, equipment, training, and services was originally bestowed on "forward defense countries", but 78 states eventually were recipients, despite charges that many of them were only remotely associated with U.S. national security needs.

Grant aid costs crested at $3.95 billion in FY 1953, then subsided sharply. Nevertheless, gratuitous contributions consumed $33.05 billion between Fiscal Years 1952 and 1968, even though direct sales and credits increasingly replaced largess as Europe revived from its post-World War II slump and other states improved their capacity for self-help. Moreover, those figures were incomplete. Assistance to Vietnam and Laos has been budgeted in a separate category since 1967. Economic aid, calculated to strengthen U.S. allies and seduce or sooth the uncommitted, swelled the grand total of grant aid and loans to $133.5 billion from the birth of all programs though 1968.2/

In short, foreign assistance in a variety of forms was a highly visible, and eventually a highly controversial, component of U.S.

1/ Murphy, Charles H. and Evans, Gary Lee. U.S. Military Personnel Strengths by Country of Location Since World War II, 1948-73. Washington, Congressional Research Service, November 13, 1973, p. 1-10.

2/ Global Defense, p. 37-44.

collective security. By the late 1960s, that trend was on a collision course with the Congress, whose manifest dissatisfaction had been mounting for more than 10 years.

Collective Security Characteristics, 1969 to Present

About the time that unequivocal containment of communism expired as an American security objective, a collection of other compelling pressures -- most notably the Vietnam War and excruciating economic problems -- also prompted immediate and incisive changes in U.S. collective security policies. Our self-imposed obligation to act as this planet's "policeman" thus gave way to the Nixon Doctrine.

The President stated his philosophy as follows: "There are lessons to be learned from our Vietnam experience... But there is also a lesson not to be drawn: that the only antidote for undifferentiated involvement is indiscriminate retreat." In his judgment, "America cannot live in isolation if it expects to live in peace." Participation in world affairs is imperative, not because we have commitments, but because we have important interests. To identify what shape future collective security policy should take, he therefore chose to review U.S. commitments "in the light of...our own national interests and those of other countries, of the specific threats to those interests, and of our capacity to counter those threats at an acceptable risk and cost."1/

The U.S. alliance system remains intact, despite the increasing divergence of interests among its various members, but four fundamental changes ensue, all related to the search for a balance of power that

1/ Nixon, Richard M. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, February 18, 1970, p. 6-7, and February 25, 1971, p. 16.

could preclude global or regional hegemony by any potentially hostile country or coalition.

Steps to redistribute Free World defense burdens delineate the central theme. In place of patronage, we now strive to institute genuine partnerships. America will no longer conceive all the plans, design all the programs, and execute all the defense under any conditions. In conformance with U.S. efforts to impede the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Administration promises to "provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security", but "in cases involving other types of aggression... we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense." That is not to say that the United States will arbitrarily abstain from committing armed forces in such conflicts. The policy still provides for U.S. military participation whenever "our interests dictate, but as a weight -- not the weight -- in the scale."[1/]

Adjustable forward defense policies have derived from those guidelines. The Administration proposes to continue a strong U.S. presence in Europe until mutual force reductions can be negotiated with the Soviet Union, although the Departments of State and Defense recently unleashed broadsides against several of our NATO partners who refused to cooperate with the United States during the Middle East crisis in October, 1973.[2/] By

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1/ Nixon, Richard M. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, February 25, 1971, p. 13-14.

2/ U.S. Scores Mideast Role of NATO Allies. Washington Post, October 27, 1973, p. A-1.

way of contrast, our military silhouette in Southeast Asia, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines shrank significantly in the early 1970s.1/

Security assistance retains an authoritative role under the Nixon Doctrine. Indeed, if we are to reduce our military presence overseas without undercutting crucial U.S. interests, the need to strengthen friends and allies may be even greater than in earlier eras, when our power to act independently was somewhat more reliable. However, there are cogent differences. Whereas U.S. bounties once were broadcast with abandon, present outpourings match three main objectives: "to provide a foundation of stability... among East Asian countries... to preserve the balance of military power in the Middle East.../and/ to strengthen the southern flank of NATO at a time of increased Soviet military presence in the Middle East and the Mediterranean."2/ The termination of grant aid to Taiwan, Greece, and Liberia and reduced assistance to Pakistan exemplify the changing pattern.

Equally important, a shift in the slant deemphasizes aid that primarily benefits individual countries and stresses assistance that will "contribute to regional security arrangements.../and in the process/ avoid expensive redundancy in defense procurement, especially in costly air and naval weapons sytems."3/

1/ Murphy, Charles H. and Evans, Gary Lee. U.S. Military Personnel Strengths by Country of Location, p. 4-8; and U.S. Military Strengths Outside the United States, as of March 31, 1973. Washington, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Directorate of Information Operations, undated.

2/ Rogers, William P. The Fiscal 1972 Budget Request for Development Assistance and Security Assistance, Department of State Bulletin, September 27, 1971, p. 336-338.

3/ Laird, Melvin R. Statement on the 1972 Defense Budget, p. 109.

Perhaps the greatest alteration of all involved counterinsurgency policy, which had been evolving since the early 1960s, when President Kennedy responded to challenges issued by Khrushchev and Mao. Vietnam, which provided our only direct experience in coping with so-called "people's" wars, left an indelible imprint. There is some evidence that no amount of money, manpower, or materiel provided by outsiders can deter or defeat determined revolutionaries in a conflict that is primarily political, economic, social, and psychological. Success hinges on steps by beleaguered governments to eradicate causes and rally the populace to their side. "Americanization," stressing military actions, is not only enormously expensive, but can be self-defeating.

In an endeavor to redefine relationships between helpers and the helped, President Nixon announced that direct U.S. military participation in future insurgency operations will be somewhat more circumspect than in the past:

> The best means of dealing with insurgencies is to preempt them through economic development and social reform and to control them with police, paramilitary and military action by the threatened government.
>
> We may be able to supplement local efforts with economic and military assistance. However, a direct combat role for U.S. general purpose forces arises primarily when insurgency has shaded into external aggression or when there is an overt conventional attack. In such cases, we shall weigh our interests and commitments, and we shall consider the efforts of our allies, in determining our response.1/

1/ Nixon, Richard M. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, February 18, 1970, p. 127.

That policy prefaced the phased withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam. It also prompted the 1973 U.S. bombing campaigns in Cambodia, where guerrilla offensives by the Khmer Rouge were coupled with external aggression by North Vietnam. Congress and the public applauded the former action. The latter was assailed. The key word in the Nixon quotation is "we". The Congress clearly intends to participate in the weighing of interests and commitments that determine whether any "direct combat role for U.S. general purpose forces" would be advisable in the future.

Conventional Arms Control Trends

Defense policy-makers in the United States placed little emphasis on conventional arms control at any time during the period reviewed by this survey. Congress recognizes that "the danger of smaller scale wars has been fueled by the failure of the superpowers to reach agreements limiting arms shipments to client states,"[1/] but despite increased interest in the subject, there is scant evidence that any impressive change in the trend will soon be forthcoming.[2/]

1/ U.S. Congress. House. Report by the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments concerning National Security Policy and The Changing World Power Alignment. 92nd Congress, 2nd Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972, p. 4.

2/ For corroboration, see Arms Control Report: 12th Annual Report to the Congress by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973, p. 17-18.

The sole important exception concerns U.S. efforts to arrange mutual (not necessarily balanced) force reductions in Europe.1/

Those endeavors date from November, 1965, when a U.S. arms control committee, composed of distinguished private experts, expressed its belief that "the United States should encourage an examination of the problem of parallel troop reductions in...Germany by the United States and Soviet Union." The group recommended equitable adjustments on both sides "which would preserve the balance at less cost and strain for each."2/

Congress held hearings on that subject in 1966. Two years later, on June 24, 1968, the Foreign Ministers of 14 NATO countries (less France) invited the Warsaw Pact to initiate negotiations. That demarche was significant, since it was the first Western offer to separate force reduction matters from Europe's political context, including the reunification of Germany. Moscow ignored NATO's overture for two years, during which time Soviet leaders pressed for an all-European security conference and crushed Czechoslovakia. On June 22, 1970, the Kremlin finally responded, but fencing persisted until the May, 1972 summit conference between President Nixon and Soviet Premier Brezhnev. At long last, both principals proclaimed

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1/ For a survey, see Lampson, Edward T. Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, Washington, Congressional Research Service, February 2, 1973. 56 p. The original intent to attain mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) has been supplanted. "Balanced" reductions are no longer a U.S. goal. See Text of Joint Communique, May 29, 1972. The Department of State Bulletin, June 26, 1972, p. 901-902.

2/ Report of the Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament of the National Citizen's Commission on International Cooperation, November 28, 1965. Documents on Disarmament, 1965, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966, p. 570.

that "agreement should be reached as soon as practicable between the states concerned on the procedures for negotiations on this subject in a special forum."[1/] Preliminary discussions began in Vienna on January 31, 1973.

Progress has been painfully slow, partly because of procedural disputes and partly because the problems are extremely complex. Deleting stipulated percentages of U.S. and Soviet forces would favor the communists, who have substantially greater numbers of troops, aircraft, and divisions in the European Theater than we do--the larger the reduction, the greater the disparity. U.S. negotiators are particularly concerned that the U.S.S.R. could concentrate to attack at times and places of its choosing while NATO's forward defenders would be stretched thin along a lengthy front. The United States would find it difficult to regenerate combat power in emergency, since its contingents would have to be repositioned in North America. Soviet forces would simply withdraw a few hundred miles to Western Russia. Measures to control the reintroduction of U.S. and Soviet elements into Central Europe for maneuvers must be worked out. Mobilization potentials on both sides, which condition how rapidly pre-reduction levels could be restored, are cogent calculations.

Acceptable solutions to such problems must be devised before reductions can occur. The prognosis for an early reconciliation of differences is pessimistic.

1/ Department of State Bulletin, June 26, 1972, p. 901-902.

U.S. GENERAL PURPOSE FORCE TRENDS

General purpose forces, by definition, must be able to function effectively in the furtherance of deterrent and defense objectives across the full conflict spectrum, from general war to low-intensity operations that fall short of armed combat. Some Air Force and Navy tactical fighter squadrons, for example, would act as a supplement to or extension of our long-range aerial strike force in event of a global nuclear exchange. However, the requirement for general purpose forces is related not so much to the defense of our own territory as it is to the support of allies and attachments around the world.

Since World War II, five successive Presidents have charted an active course for the United States in international security affairs, on the supposition that strong participation is in our national interest. Many members of Congress and citizens in private life increasingly challenge that conclusion. In consequence, there is no solid consensus concerning the significance of general purpose force posture trends displayed on Graph 7.

Essentially, the United States is in the process of swinging full circle, back to a situation reminiscent of the late 1950s:

--U.S. regular forces have been reduced precipitously.

--Land power has been downgraded.

--Modernization measures lag.

GRAPH 7

U.S. GENERAL PURPOSE FORCE TRENDS

Solid Trends

Formative, Fading And Transitional Stages



--The All-Volunteer Force has hit serious snags.

--Reserve components resume critical roles.

--Allied forces assume unprecedented importance.

--Tactical nuclear weapons are again being eyed as a substitute for manpower

--The U.S. military presence overseas is diminishing.

--Strategic mobility assets to reestablish that presence in emergency continue to decline.

Changes in Size and Structure of U.S. Active Forces

President Eisenhower's "New Look", which set the style for the 1950s, featured a highly specialized force posture. It underscored nuclear firepower for "deterrent and destructive" purposes across the full conflict spectrum. General purpose forces, were "to be modernized and maintained... but with decreases in numerical strength. Supporting reserves in the United States, while important, were given a /still/ lower priority." Not only did the New Look indorse a single weapons system, it stressed a single service. Ground forces and, to a lesser extent, the Navy were downgraded in favor of the Air Force.1/

That policy involved far more than rhetoric. A dramatic change in priorities occurred, as Figure 5 indicates.

1/ Eisenhower, Dwight D. Mandate for Change, 1953-1956, p. 451-454.

FIGURE 5

THE IMPACT OF THE "NEW LOOK" ON GENERAL PURPOSE FORCE POSTURE

	June 30, 1953	June 30, 1958	Percentage Change
Army	1,534,000	899,000	- 40%
Navy	794,000	641,000	- 19%
Marines	249,000	189,000	- 25%
Air Force	978,000	871,000	- 11%
Total	3,555,000	2,600,000	- 27%

Source: Selected Manpower Statistics, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), April 15, 1973, p. 7. Figures rounded off to nearest thousand.

Funds for operation, maintenance, and modernization were even more revealing. The Army dropped from $12.9 to $8.8 billion between FY 1954 and FY 1955. Air Force allocations swelled from $15.6 to $16.4 billion during the same period.1/

That solution to U.S. defense problems eventually proved deficient, because we lacked sufficient latitude to support our containment goals and policies. After the advent of Flexible Response in the early 1960s, this country maintained diversified land, sea, and aerospace combat forces that could function effectively in every environment, together with the logistic apparatus needed to provision them in distant locales. The Golden Age of general purpose forces ensued during the six-year period 1965-70, when we were preoccupied with Southeast Asia.

U.S. leaders began to reverse the trend about 1970, in compliance with pressures generated by inflation and the Vietnam War, and in conformance

1/ Eisenhower, Dwight D. Mandate for Change, 1953-1956, p. 453.

with the Nixon Doctrine, which tolerates a less versatile posture than previous containment policies. In contrast with reductions that followed the Korean War, however, the drawdowns were drastic, even though the Administration acknowledges that constraints on the use of nuclear weapons have "increased the importance of maintaining [conventional] deterrent forces capable of coping with a variety of challenges,"[1] No service escaped the knife, as the Air Force did in the 1950s. The Army was sliced in half (Figure 6). Further curtailments are pending.[2]

FIGURE 6

CONTEMPORARY TRENDS IN GENERAL PURPOSE FORCE POSTURE: MANPOWER

	June 30, 1968	Dec. 31, 1973	Percentage Change
Army	1,570,000	782,000	-50%
Navy	765,000	556,000	-27%
Marines	307,000	189,000	-38%
Air Force	905,000	674,000	-26%
Total	3,547,000	2,201,000	-38%

Source: Laird, Melvin R. Statement on the FY 1972 Defense Budget, p. 187; and Military Strength Figures for January, 1974 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) February 25, 1974. Figures rounded off to nearest thousand.

The resultant retrenchment affected combat power as well as personnel levels, as Figure 7 shows.

1/ Nixon, Richard M. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, May 3, 1973, p. 186.
2/ Schlesinger, James R. Annual Defense Department Report to the Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget, p. 237.

FIGURE 7

CONTEMPORARY TRENDS IN GENERAL PURPOSE FORCE POSTURE: COMBAT POWER

	Peak Vietnam June 1968	Current June 1973	Percentage Change
Ships			
Attack Carriers	15	14	-7%
ASW; Attack Submarines	379	252	-33%
Fleet Air Defense	75	73	-3%
Amphibious Assault	148	65	-44%
Attack and Fighter Squadrons			
Air Force	103	71	-31%
Navy	80	70	-13%
Marine	27	25	-7%
Ground Force Divisions			
Army	18 1/3	13	-29%
Marine	4	3	-25%

Source: Nixon, Richard M., U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, May 3, 1973, p. 188.

The intent was to constitute a smaller force which modernization measures would endow with greater capabilities than its predecessor. However, retraction began well before refurbishment could take place. Size, therefore, was reduced without concomitant increases in strength. That situation will persist for some time to come, inasmuch as lead times for the principal items of oncoming equipment are measured in terms of years. Moreover, the higher performance of new systems does not always compensate for the severe reduction of flexibility caused by fewer numbers.

The end results currently tend to degrade the credibility of our active general purpose forces as a deterrent, and deplete their combat capabilities to support stated defense policies if deterrence should fail.

Combat/Support Ratios

Scales which long ago balanced combat forces and the backup establishment have sagged steadily under the weight of support elements in the past 20 years, reflecting a persistent trend that dates from the Civil War. That phenomenon has been a matter of chronic concern to the Congress.1/

Just trying to identify a point of departure for attacking associated problems is difficult. The Department of Defense identifies three tiers of support -- organic, direct mission, and central support -- then proceeds to segregate "combat" and "support" increments into seven separate categories responsive to individual needs of the military services. The Navy and Air Force, for example, are weapons systems oriented. Combat/support ratios

1/ For example, see U.S. Congress, Senate. Armed Services Committee Report No. 93-385 to accompany H.R. 9286, on Authorizing Appropriations for FY 1974. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., September 6, 1973, p. 131-141.

in their cases therefore tend to look quite different than those of the Army and Marine Corps, whose strength is mainly in manpower.[1]

The proportion of Army combat troops to organic and direct mission support, which excludes central supply, maintenance, training facilities, and administrative overhead, draws the greatest flak. However, even using the Army's total strength as the criterion, support personnel at the height of the Vietnam War outnumbered combat forces by more than 3-to-1 (77.8 to 22.2 percent). The proportion was 2-to-1 during the Korean conflict.[2]

That dramatic increase can be traced to technological advances and tactical refinements. Progress enhanced combat effectiveness, thereby reducing requirements for front-line soldiers, but concurrently introduced sophisticated weapons and equipment that demand constant attention.[3]

A pair of trends are evident. The Army's battle fatality rate has been cut almost in half since 1952, from 6.4 to 3.6 percent per 1,000 men, since fewer men were exposed to hostile fire and medical coverage was improved. However, support costs climbed simultaneously, until they currently consume anywhere from a quarter to a half of the defense budget, depending on how "support" is defined.[4]

1/ Military Manpower Requirements Report for FY 1973. Washington, Department of Defense, February, 1972, p. 69-73.
2/ U.S. Congress. Senate. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee on Department of Defense Appropriations for FY 1973. Part 5. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972, p. 162-164.
3/ Military Manpower Requirements Report, FY 1973, p. 73-75.
4/ Ibid., p. 75.

The Brookings Institution suggests three possible solutions to the resultant dilemma: reduce the number of active force units and their levels of peacetime activity; reduce the extent and rates of modernization; or reduce the size of the support establishment.[1/] All three courses of action have been and are being exploited to varying degrees. Many of the tradeoffs, which superficially seem simple and attractive, actually are quite complex. Political, economic, bureaucratic, institutional, and doctrinal constraints all impinge.

Just one thing appears certain at this writing. Only positive action by Executive and Legislative Branches in coordination is likely to control this century-old trend. Since the present system does work, despite its defects, both parties should proceed rather gingerly with efforts to restore a "better" balance.

The Transition From Draft to All-Volunteer Force

Problems associated with U.S. efforts to create compact armed services with great capabilities are being exacerbated by the transition from the draft to an all-volunteer force.

Except for a brief respite in 1947-48, the United States has relied on conscription since World War II to assure adequate military personnel strengths in the absence of sufficient volunteers. The Army has been the principal direct beneficiary, but the Marine Corps occasionally accepted draftees when spontaneous supply failed to meet demands. In addition,

1/ Binkin, Martin. Support Costs in the Defense Budget; The Submerged One-Third. Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1972, p. 30.

the draft routinely influenced large numbers of udo volunteers" to enlist in all four services as the "lesser of evils."[1] Callups fluctuated considerably, mainly in response to th my's active duty force demands (Figure 8).

That system was deemed undesirable. In March , President Nixon therefore appointed a Commission on an All-Vo eer Force, under the chairmanship of former Defense Secretary Thomas Gates, Jr. It was tasked "to develop a comprehensive plan for elim ing conscription."[2] The committee submitted its report in February 1970, ncluding that:

> We unanimously believe that the natio interest will be better served by an all-volunte orce, supported by an effective stand-by draft, than by ixed force of volunteers and conscripts...
>
> We have satisfied ourselves that a vo teer force will not jeopardize national security, and.../that it/ will strengthen our freedoms, remove an inequity... promote the efficiency of the armed forces, and enhance their dignity. It is the system for maintaining standing forces that minimizes government interference with the freedom of the individual to determine his own life in accord with his values.3/

President Nixon adopted the Gates Commission report in principle. In January, 1971, he proposed that the Congress extend induction authority to July 1, 1973, but in fact beat that schedule. Draft calls registered zero in January of that year, at which time three decades of conscription ended. The Administration did not ask Congress to renew induction authority. When FY 1974 was ushered in, the All-Volunteer Force was

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1/ Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States on Problems in Meeting Military Manpower Needs in the All-Volunteer Force. Washington, Department of Defense, undated (1973), p. 14-26.

2/ The Gates Commission Report on an All-Volunteer Armed Forces, Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., February, 1970, p. vii.

3/ Ibid., p. 5-6.

FIGURE 8

DRAFT CALLUP TRENDS, FY 1952 - 1972

(IN THOUSANDS)



SOURCE: Selected Manpower Statistics, OASD (Comptroller), April 15, 1973, pp. 52-55

essentially on its own, although the Selective Service System continues to perform most of its functions on a standby basis.[1/]

The withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from Indochina, the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine, budgetary difficulties, and reevaluations of pressing threats have led U.S. leaders to establish FY 1974 manpower requirements at 2.2 million,[2/] but there are serious doubts in some quarters that an acceptable all-volunteer force can match that goal.

General Creighton W. Abrams, Chief of Staff of the Army, the most concerned service, expresses deep-seated reservations. The main problem, as he sees it, "is getting the kind of manpower that we need to man the Army in the numbers we need." That means "150,000 to 180,000 new, first-time enlistees, on the average, over several years." That target has been hard to hit. As of June 30, 1973, the Army "should have had 815,000 men, and /it/ had around 801,000,"[3/] even though stringent steps were being taken to make better use of the basic personnel pool—qualification requirements were under review; many more women were being enlisted; civilianization was being emphasized; and "Mickey Mouse" duties had been reduced.

Some analysts at the Brookings Institution are more optimistic. "Given no unforeseen changes in present trends", they say, enlistments "should be adequate to meet average long-term quantitative needs without any further real increase in costs." Their study recognizes that "a

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1/ Problems In Meeting Military Manpower Needs in the All-Volunteer Force, p. 1-2.

2/ Military Manpower Requirements Report for FY 1974, Washington, Department of Defense, February, 1973, p. 5.

3/ Volunteer Army--Is It Working? Interview with General Creighton W. Abrams, U.S. News and World Report, August 6, 1973, p. 38.

manpower scarcity could develop in three areas: critical skills (including combat arms), reserve forces, and health professionals", but nevertheless predicts that "it should be possible, though more difficult, to maintain qualitative standards."[1/]

The Brookings survey, however, addresses a peacetime environment. The All-Volunteer Force could not handle a widespread shooting war that called for rapid expansion. Indeed, it is moot whether the system could survive a small-scale, but protracted, war in which combat attrition was severe.

Consequently, America expends extensive funds for a modest military establishment that is quite specialized in purpose. Sizeable first-term pay increases and enlistment bonuses remain the most potent incentives. As a result, pay plus related costs presently absorb an astronomical 56-57 percent of defense budget outlays. Those figures do not cover troop housing, recruiting, human relations programs, and various other items, which pushed total expenses for manpower to 67 percent in FY 1973.[2/] If mobilization were mandatory for any reason, costs could shoot out of sight.

A number of other difficulties remain to be resolved. An equitable balance (not necessarily a representative cross-section) between black and white, rich and poor, erudite and uneducated is proving difficult to attain. Some observers are equally concerned that an all-volunteer force

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1/ Binkin, Martin, and Johnston, John D. All-Volunteer Armed Forces: Progress, Problems and Prospects. Report prepared for the Senate Armed Services Committee, June 1, 1973. Committee Print. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973, p. 3.

2/ U.S. Congress. Senate. Hearings Before the Armed Services Committee on FY 1973 Authorizations for Military Procurement, etc. Part I. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972, p. 140-141, 142.

will undermine patriotism by absolving citizens of any moral responsibility to serve their country, or that a mercenary military machine might lose rapport with the American main stream, threaten civilian authority, and damage our democratic institutions.1/

An increasing number of Congressmen register qualmish points of view, but many "on the Hill" are convinced that the experiment can be made to work. Senator John C. Stennis, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, concluded that "it will require two to three years more time to give a full test... Congress is certainly obligated to see that the plan is given a fair trial."2/

At that juncture, U.S. leaders must determine, as the Brookings study indicates, whether the tangible and intangible benefits of an all-volunteer force will outweigh "the social cost of renewing conscription, the financial cost of increasing incentives, or the national security cost of reducing combat forces.3/

Widespread Disciplinary Difficulties

A rash of disciplinary problems plagued all four military services during the final stages of U.S. ground combat operations in Southeast Asia. That

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1/ The Gates Commission Report, p. 12-20.
2/ Stennis, John C. Enlistments in the All-Volunteer Army. Remarks in the Senate. Congressional Record, September 24, 1973, p. S.17405.
3/ Binkin, Martin and Johnston, John D. All-Volunteer Armed Forces, p. 4.

trend was arrested when hostilities ceased. Had it continued unchecked, it could have stymied all efforts to create a cohesive U.S. armed force.1/

Those difficulties, which were linked directly with public opposition to active U.S. participation in Vietnam, were aggravated by racial friction, drug abuse, and a climate of permissiveness, in the community at large and the military establishment. Manifestations ranged from low morale and underground activities opposing U.S. war efforts to physical assaults on established authority. They culminated in murder by "fragging" (the use of fragmentation grenades against commissioned officers and NCOs). The My Lai massacre of March 16, 1968 and similar aberrations could be traced to breakdowns in self-restraint by some leaders as well as the led.

Positive efforts by the Defense Department and military services, combined with the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, have eviscerated or eradicated many of the contributory causes; others have been reduced to manageable proportions.2/ Order and discipline consequently have been restored, although the potential for future problems remains.

Concurrently, disciplinary difficulties of another sort occurred: unilateral actions by a few uniformed officers in violation of established instructions. The Lavelle case, as it came to be called, was the most celebrated example.3/ Numerous concerned observers, including many

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1/ Difficulties confronting each service differed as did solutions. For a representative review, see U.S. Congress. House. Report by the Special Subcommittee on Disciplinary Problems in the U.S. Navy, Armed Services Committee. 92d Congress, 2d Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973, p. 17667-17691.

2/ Richardson, Elliot L. Statement on the FY 1974 Defense Budget, p. 108-115.

3/ U.S. Congress. Senate. Hearings on Nomination of John D. Lavelle, General Creighton W. Abrams, and Admiral John S. McCain. 92d Congress, 2d Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972, 507 p.

Congressmen and their constituents, catalogued those deviations as deliberate attempts by recalcitrant commanders to challenge civilian control, when so doing (in the culprit's estimation) would contribute positively to combat operations. No such intent was ever widespread. Lavelle's alleged disinclination to obey standing orders, like MacArthur's insubordination before him, represented an isolated incident, not an emergent trend.

Increasing Emphasis on the Total Force Concept

The Congress strongly advocated quick-reaction, combat-ready reserve components throughout the period surveyed by this paper. The Executive Branch, by way of contrast, paid little more than lip service in the 1950s and 1960s -- neither the Reserve nor the National Guard received high-priority attention from the Department of Defense. In a similar vein, sweeping U.S. collective security arrangements implicitly acknowledged the value of allies in those days, but even in the NATO area, this country looked to its own armed forces as the primary custodian of U.S. national security interests.

The recent constriction of our regular military establishment has reversed that trend. America now places heretofore unduplicated reliance on what has come to be called "the total force concept," which

> ...emphasizes our need to plan for optimum use of all military and related resources available to meet the requirements of Free World security. [Those include] active and reserve components of the U.S., those of our allies, and the additional military capabilities of our allies and friends that will be made available through local efforts, or through provision of appropriate security assistance programs.1/

1/ Laird, Melvin R. Statement on the FY 1972 Defense Budget, p. 21.

National Guard and Reserves. According to former Defense Secretary Laird, "The credibility of overall effectiveness of the Guard and Reserve suffered badly during the build-up of the active forces in Vietnam prior to 1969." Combat capabilities were "marginal to poor," since much of their equipment was siphoned off to satisfy requirements to Southeast Asia. Army elements eventually were bled white. The ranks were replete with unmotivated men who had joined "because they wanted to avoid the draft" and shirk possibly dangerous duty in a protracted and unpopular conflict.[1]

Corrective action is in progress. Within the total force concept, the Guard and Reserve Components are .... the initial and primary augmentation for the Active Forces." Equipment inventories are being restored to requisite levels at a rapid rate, and modernization is in progress. Training has been intensified. Readiness reportedly is improving. All programs are receiving obvious emphasis from the top, reflected in part by the biggest budget outlays that our reserves have received in history, whether gauged in current or constant FY 1974 dollars.[2]

Nevertheless, a considerable gap remains between ideal and reality. The educational level in reserve components, for example, was high in the late 1960s and early 1970s, partly because many college graduates were

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1/ Laird, Melvin R. Report to the President and the Chairman of the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and of the House of Representatives (P.L. 92-129) on Progress in Ending the Draft and Achieving the All-Volunteer Force, undated (1972), p. 13-14.

2/ Ibid., p. 14-15. Updated telephonically by OASD (Comptroller), September 25, 1973.

among those men who enlisted to escape active service. A sharp slump is already evident. Gross racial imbalances remain, since few blacks are volunteering for duty with our reserves.

Moreover, it proved difficult to fill the rosters with acceptable recruits of any kind after waiting lists of draft-vulnerable applicants disappeared. In FY 1973, the services were generally unable to meet minimum average strengths mandated by the Congress. Manpower floors therefore were lowered the following year to provide a more realistic base.1/ As a result, actual and authorized strengths now conform closely in most cases, as shown in Figure 9, but force levels still fall substantially short of mobilization requirements related to contingency plans.

To attain acceptable quantitative and qualitative standards, the Uniformed Services Special Pay Act of 1972 was introduced in Congress, requesting authority to institute variable enlistment bonuses for the Selected Reserve. Other financial incentives are under consideration. In combination, their adoption probably would alleviate present and projected difficulties, albeit at considerable cost.2/ However, if difficulties continue, conscription for reserve components (already contemplated) could be in the offing, although such action admittedly might cause more ills than it cured.3/

1/ U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. FY 1974 Authorization for Military Procurement... and Selected Reserve Strengths. Part 8, Manpower. 93d Congress, 1st Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973, p. 5728-29.

2/ Laird, Melvin R. Progress in Ending the Draft and Achieving the All-Volunteer Force, p. 40-41.

3/ Laird, Melvin R. Statement on the FY 1973 Defense-Budget, p. 165.

FIGURE 9

SELECTED RESERVE STRENGTHS

MANDATED vs ACTUAL

As of December 31, 1973
(in thousands)

COMPONENT	Mandated Strength	Actual Strength	Percentage Over/Short
Army National Guard	379,144	392,500	+ 4%
Army Reserve	232,591	227,200	- 2%
Naval Reserve	119,231	119,100	-0.1%
Marine Corps Reserve	39,735	33,100	- 17%
Air National Guard	92,291	92,500	+0.2%
Air Force Reserve	49,773	46,200	- 7%
DOD TOTAL	912,765	910,600	- 1%

The Congress enacted a framework of basic legislation in the Armed Forces Reserve Acts of July 9, 1952 and August 9, 1955, which provided an organizational structure and a source of pretrained manpower for National Guard and Reserve combat units. Then, in 1958, Congress mandated strength floors, not ceilings, for certain reserve components. That practice has been elaborated, so that minimum average strengths now are approved annually for each Selected Reserve component.

Source: Daniel, Dan. Department of Defense Recruiting Results for March 1974. Remark in the House. Congressional Record, April 24, 1974, p. H.3189; and Title IV, P.L. 93-155, November 16, 1973.

Given the problems just enumerated, some services are fearing better than others. The Air National Guard (ANG), for example, habitually participates in meaningful missions. Joint exercises with U.S. active armed forces, military airlift programs at home and abroad, and continuous activity related to integrated air defense of the United States are three important examples. The ANG thus is in relatively good shape. Army Guard elements, by way of contrast, lack comparable peacetime activities. Methods of improving that situation still are in experiental stages.1/

For all services, calculated public support is essential, if U.S. reserve components are to fulfill prospective roles in a professional manner. Former Defense Secretary Elliot L. Richardson hammered that point home early in 1973:

> The American taxpayer [must] realize that a well equipped, fully manned, and readily deployable Guard and Reserve is potentially the most economical part of our national defense system--and that without it, his and the Nation's security are in peril. 2/

"To improve public understanding of the Guard and Reserve role...and to enlist the cooperation of those who employ present and prospective members," President Nixon created a National Committee for Support of the Guard and Reserve on June 22, 1972. 3/ The success of its endeavors are crucial. If present problems cannot be resolved, the total force concept could collapse, causing a comprehensive reorientation of U.S. defense policy and force structure.

1/ Laird, Melvin R. Statement on the FY 1973 Defense Budget, p. 165-168.
2/ All-Volunteer Force: A Report, Commanders Digest, April 19, 1973, p. 10.
3/ Laird, Melvin R. Progress in Ending the Draft and Achieving the All-Volunteer Force, p. 42.

Allied Forces. The total force concept enjoins our allies to provide manpower. Technology, materiel, specialized skills, and training assistance are to come from the United States. That approach to burden-sharing is in consonance with U.S. collective security policy, which identifies our international aid programs "as a key instrument of the Nixon Doctrine." Through them, "The Administration seeks to reduce both the total cost of an adequate defense posture and our overseas involvement."1/

That philosophy places important responsibilities on U.S. allies, whose interests must coincide with ours in emergency, and whose resolve must be at least equal to our own if the total force concept is to work. Neither eventuality is a foregone conclusion, when viewed in context with the drastic reduction of our active forces and the low reliability of some U.S. reserves, whose combined capabilities inspire scant confidence among tremulous members of Free World coalitions in which the United States functions as the senior partner.

The Aggregate Impact. In sum, this country now relies extensively on reserve forces that in the main lack responsiveness, and on allies, whose cooperation in time of crisis is beyond our control. The implications of that development are interpreted quite differently by various observers, whose dissimilar views of the U.S. role in international security affairs condition their conclusions.

1/ Laird, Melvin R. Statement on the FY 1972 Defense Budget, p. 34-35.

The U.S. Military Silhouette Overseas

During the 20 years that bracketed the Korean conflict and our involvement in Vietnam, this country consistently maintained outside its territorial limits a military force that approached or exceeded three quarters of a million men. Most of them served NATO, except during periods punctuated by those wars.1/ (See Figures 10 and 11).

Present Administration policies still prescribe a substantial U.S. force posture overseas, as President Nixon indicates:

> The United States cannot protect its national interests, or support those of its allies, or meet its responsibilities for helping safeguard international peace, without the ability to deploy forces abroad.[in President Nixon's opinion].
>
> The specific potential threats we face in Asia or Europe continue to be the primary determinants of the size, composition, and disposition of our general purpose forces. Our principal forward deployments are in these areas.2/

Reductions have telescoped the U.S. worldwide presence, afloat and in foreign lands, by more than 600,000 men in the last five years.3/ Most of that retrenchment reflected our disengagement from the war in Southeast Asia. Those withdrawals, which began nearly four years before the Vietnam peace agreements were signed, were a major manifestation of the Nixon Doctrine and the total force concept.

1/ Murphy, Charles H. and Evans, Gary Lee. U.S. Military Personnel Strengths by Country of Location Since World War II, p. 4-10.
2/ Nixon, Richard M. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, May 3, 1973, p. 186-187.
3/ Murphy, Charles H. and Evans, Gary Lee. U.S. Military Personnel Strengths by Country of Location Since World War II, p. 6.

FIGURE 10

U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT PATTERNS, 1952-1973
(in millions)



Source: Murphy, Charles H. and Evans, Gary Lee. U.S. Military Personnel Strengths by Country of Location. p. 10.

FIGURE 11

U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS, BY REGION, 1952-1973
(in thousands)



Source: Murphy, Charles H. and Evans, Gary Lee. U.S. Military Personnel Strengths by Country of Location. p. 9.

Pressures to accelerate that trend are immense. Senator Mike Mansfield, for example, recently recommended that we "reduce, by not less than 40 per centum, the number of military forces of the United States assigned to duty in foreign countries." No fewer than one fourth of all cuts were to be completed by July 1, 1974, half of the total by the following July, and the remainder by June 30, 1976. That proposition, tacked to an amendment associated with the FY 1974 defense appropriations bill for military procurement, was approved by the Senate on September 26, 1973, but was narrowly defeated later that same day when the amendment was rejected by a vote of 51-44.1/ A compromise proposal by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, calling for the recall of 110,000 U.S. air and ground forces from overseas by the end of 1975, was adopted the following day,2/ although it failed in conference on October 11, 1973.

Europe. The region most subject to criticism is Western Europe, where 260,000 combat and combat support personnel remain on guard, despite the detente that currently prevails. Some 50,000 additional American troops, not assigned to the U.S. European Command, perform specialized missions in that area.3/

Intelligence estimates indicate that the likelihood of an armed invasion of NATO territory by Warsaw Pact forces is extremely low under

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1/ Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1974. Remarks in the Senate. Congressional Record, September 26, 1973, p. S.17636-S.17649, S.17689-S.17696.

2/ Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1974. Remarks in the Senate. Congressional Record, September 27, 1973, p. S.17962-S.17965.

3/ U.S. Congress, House. Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on North Atlantic Treaty Organization Commitments of the Armed Services Committee. 92d Congress, 1st and 2d Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972, p. 13165 and 13167.

present circumstances,[1] but the possibilities of indirect threats to the Atlantic Alliance still persist. Concern therefore permeates some official quarters that powerful Soviet capabilities, which are developing instead of diminishing, could serve as political tools to coerce our friends and undermine U.S. interests if the American military contingent on site in Europe were severely reduced.

As it stands, NATO's armed forces appear to be marginally able to accomplish assigned deterrent and defense missions, although this country has pulled 124,000 men out of Europe during the past decade.[2] However, unilaterally cutting our present combat power by only a few additional percentage points allegedly would leave the Alliance with more U.S. troops than needed to act as a "tripwire", but too few to repel a determined invader.[3]

In the absence of comparable reductions by the opposition, which the Administration hopes to achieve as a result of arms control negotiations,[4] the impact on Moscow's options could be considerable. If the Soviets retain a "big stick", some observers fear they might intimidate West European leaders in ways that cut the United States off from important political, economic, cultural, and technological contacts, degrade our freedom of action, and thereby undercut our security.

1/ Nixon, Richard M. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, February 9, 1972, p. 42.

2/ Lampson, Edward T. The United States and NATO: Commitments, Problems, and Prospects. Washington, Congressional Research Service, July 21, 1972, p. 85.

3/ A concise review of allied strategy for NATO's crucial center sector is contained in Collins, John M. U.S. Military Support for NATO, Washington, Congressional Research Service, April 23, 1973, 37 p.

4/ Nixon, Richard M. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, May 3, 1973, p. 204-207.

Europe reputedly could rectify extensive U.S. troop withdrawals in one of the two basic ways: by encouraging a buildup of German armed forces (no other combination of countries has the wherewithal, except France, which has virtually divorced itself from NATO's defense); or by accommodating with the U.S.S.R. Neither solution seems satisfactory from the standpoint of American interests. The former could encourage instability on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The latter might well isolate us from a primary power center.

Nevertheless, proponents of further unipartite U.S. force rollbacks are both strong and persistent. Like Senator Mansfield, they profess beliefs that "it is time now to respond to the spirit of detente"; that "the U.S. is doing more than its fair share in Europe"; that retrenchment "would yield a very significant savings in resources to the United States"; that this country should not "remain immobilized...for a minimum of two and possibly even four to five years" waiting for an arms control agreement that may never come; and that "unilateral [withdrawals] on the part of the United States might produce surprising and constructive results." In Senator Mansfield's judgment, "one or at the most two lean, mobile divisions" would provide sufficient "insurance against any form of pressure from the East."[1/]

The Congress thus far has proceeded cautiously. It remains convinced "that a significant American presence in Europe is essential to a strong and cohesive NATO," but also believes "that a more equitable share of the burden....must be negotiated." In the conference report accompanying the FY 1974 defense appropriations bill, Congress therefore argued that

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1/ Mansfield, Mike. Statement Before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organizations, p. 18-19, 24, 27, 29, 31.

if our NATO allies failed to offset future balance of payments deficits identified by the Secretary of Commerce in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Comptroller General, the United States should compensate by reducing its military establishment in Europe at a rate corresponding to the percentage of deficit. If, for example, the shortfall were 20 percent, one fifth of our forces would be recalled.1/

Just how that amendment, sponsored by Senators Jackson and Nunn, will affect the Atlantic Alliance is uncertain, but it is predictably controversial in West European capitals.

Asia. The U.S. exodus from Asia began in 1969, which marked the beginning of our disengagement in Indochina. Since then, all of our forces have come home from Vietnam--more than 500,000 men; 23,000 have left Japan; 18,000 have departed from Korea; 17,000 from Okinawa; and 12,000 from the Philippines.2/ "Belt-cinching" in Thailand is now underway.

Studies are in progress to ascertain the implications of progressive withdrawal eastward across the Pacific. Should a grand redistribution of remaining assets become imperative or expedient, America's continued ability to project military power in the Far East and along its rim doubtless would depend on Guam, together with bases elsewhere in the Marianas, Marshalls, and Carolines. If the United States lost free access to those Trust Territories, alternatives would appear less attractive. Australia is a bit off the beaten

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1/ U.S. Congress. House. Conference Report to accompany H.R. 9286, Authorizing Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1974, for Military Procurement, etc. Report Nr. 93-588. 93d Congress, 1st Session, October 13, 1973, p. 45-47.

2/ Murphy, Charles H. and Evans, Gary Lee. Military Personnel Strengths by Country of Location, p. 6.

path. Pearl Harbor has splendid accommodations, but it is isolated from prospective areas of U.S. interest around the Pacific Basin.

Middle East. In contrast with Europe and the Orient, the United States has never maintained sizeable combat forces in the Middle East. The three U.S. Air Force installations in Turkey are affiliated with NATO. Our Middle East Force in the Persian Gulf comprises a trio of small vessels. Only the Sixth Fleet, oriented primarily toward Europe, represents on-the-spot combat power that could cope with regional contingencies in North Africa and along the Levant.

Strategic Mobility Trends

Strategic airlift and sealift assets are not general purpose forces, but they are inseparably related, since their sole function is to move general purpose elements, supplies, and equipment between continents and theaters.

Strategic mobility means were of lesser moment in the 1950s. Massive Retaliation was in vogue and general purpose forces faced fewer demands than they did in the following decade. The decision to bolster U.S. airlift and sealift capabilities coincided with the switch to Flexible Response.

Airlift. Transoceanic airlift came into its own during the Korean War, when the newly-constituted Military Air Transport Service (MATS), dependent on propeller-driven four-engine aircraft, saw yeoman service, assisted by commercial airlines.

Since those days, U.S. armed services have depended primarily on airlift for the expeditious deployment of personnel and high-priority supplies. The Military Airlift Command (MAC), which superseded MATS on New Year's Day 1966, has amassed an increasingly comprehensive system that comprises multipurpose airframes, a global network of departure, en route, and recovery bases, inflight refueling capabilities, and a stock of war readiness materials that make it possible to meet recurring requirements and emergencies with minimum waste motion. An all-jet active force of C-141 and C-5 aircraft is available, backed by ready reserves, whose mobilization could increase our air mobility by as much as one-third. The active airlift force is further complemented by modern jet transports of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), which are predesignated by commercial carriers and can be called to duty on demand--the CRAF, for example, presently handles nine-tenths of all military passenger flights, plus a small amount of cargo.1/

MAC and the CRAF in combination reputedly own adequate assets to accomplish assigned contingency missions. If war erupted without warning in the NATO area, which exerts the greatest claims, only a part of our military aircraft would be readily available, but analyses based on current airlift operations and the average daily disposition of airframes indicate that requirements could be satisfied.2/ The U.S. airlift of supplies and equipment to Israel between October 13 and November 14, 1973 demonstrated conclusively our ability to cope expeditiously with lesser crises.3/

1/ Annual Air Force Almanac, 1973. Air Force Magazine, May 1973, p. 80-81, 112-113.

2/ U.S. Congress. Senate. Hearings Before the Senate Armed Services. Committee on FY 1973 Authorization for Military Procurement. Part 2 of 6 parts. Authorizations. 92d Congress, 2d session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972, p. 1094-95.

3/ Schlesinger, James R. Annual Defense Department Report to the Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget, p. 157-158.

Sealift. Deploying forces to engage a foe without being able to sustain them could sow the seeds of disaster. Airlift, which still is sensitive to weather and cannot move mass tonnages or outsize items on a grand scale, must be complemented by credible sealift capabilities. Recent experience bears that out. More than 95 percent of all military bulk cargo bound for Vietnam, including aviation fuel for MAC, had to travel by sea.

The United States possessed the world's most impressive maritime machine in the 1950s, as a result of our massive buildup during World War II. However, prophets of bloc obsolescence warned that the day of reckoning was coming, although they had difficulty making their vocies heard.1/ Even during the Golden Age of general purpose forces in the 1960s, sealift was saddled with a low priority. The results are reflected in Figure 12.

The Military Sealift Command (MSC) nucleus ship inventory, which totalled 165 vessels in 1967 at the height of the Vietnam buildup, will very nearly zero out by 1975. The MSC-controlled fleet thereafter will comprise about three roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) craft, a few cargo and stores ships, and two multi-mission ships proposed for construction.

To meet wartime needs, we would have to rely extensively on the U.S. Merchant Marine, whose FY 1975 fleet will exceed 300 ships. About

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1/ U.S. Congress. House. United States Defense Policies in 1958. House Document No. 227. 86th Congress, 1st Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1959, p. 64.

Figure 12

U.S. SEALIFT ASSETS
(Projection of Existing U.S.-Flag Vessels)

	1952	1956	1960	1964	1968	1972	1973
Freighter							
Private	778	666	597	605	640	370	312
Govt. Owned	295	48	36	16	171	23	1
Total	1,073	714	633	621	811	393	313*
Passenger/Cargo							
Private	47	34	34	32	23	7	6
Govt. Owned	25	5	2	1	3	0	0
Total	72	39	36	33	26	7	6
Tanker							
Private	446	338	282	261	265	226	226
Govt. Owned	3	0	0	0	2	6	6
Total	449	338	282	261	267	232	232
Reserve Fleet**	1,756	2,061	2,000	1,738	552	258	254

Source: Status of American Merchant Marine. Washington, U.S. Department of Commerce, as of June 30 for years shown.

* Of the 313 freighters in 1973, 119 were container ships, roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro), and lighter aboard ship barges (LASH).

** Reserve fleet figures exclude tugs, ferry boats, training ships, and other special types.

two-thirds are expected to be break-bulk and non-self-sustaining container ships. The balance will include Ro-Ro, multi-mission, and self-sustaining container craft.[1]

The Merchant Marine can be mobilized on Presidential authority during a national emergency, but marshalling would be a time-consuming process, since the assets normally are widely scattered, and much of its fleet is poorly suited for military purposes. Larger and faster container ships, now replacing the aged break-bulk vessels, are not designed to transport tanks, self-propelled guns, and other outsized or oddly-shaped items. Ro-Ro and multi-mission ships, few in numbers and multiplying slowly, are needed for such missions.

The United States hopes to supplement indigenous sealift with allied shipping. Negotiations to that end are under way with our NATO allies. In certain circumstances, foreign vessels lying idle in U.S. waters when a national emergency is declared may be mobilized in the same manner as the U.S. Merchant Marine.[2] Just how responsive allies would be under contingency conditions, however, is a matter of continuing concern and conjecture in official U.S. circles.[3]

1/ Letter from Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy) to the Congressional Research Service, October 11, 1973.
2/ Laird, Melvin R. Statement on The FY 1973 Defense Budget, p. 104.
3/ Ibid.

BUDGETARY TRENDS

Federal expenditures for the development, procurement, operation, maintenance, and general support of armed forces needed to implement the defense policies discussed in preceding sections have fluctuated like a roller coaster over the past two decades, with apogees during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Dominant features associated with that tendency are displayed below and on Graph 8.

Figure 13

OUTLAYS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE RELATED TO FEDERAL FUNDS BUDGET AND GNP
(In Billions of Current Dollars) 1/

Fiscal Year		GNP	Federal Expenditures		Defense Percentage of	
			Total	Defense	GNP	Total
1948	Lowest since WW II	243.5	33.0	11.8	4.8	35.8
1953	Korea Peak	358.9	74.1	50.4	14.0	68.0
1955	Subsequent Low	378.6	62.3	40.2	10.6	64.5
1965	Pre-Vietnam Low	654.2	94.8	49.6	7.6	52.3
1969	Vietnam Peak	898.3	148.8	81.2	9.0	54.6
1973	Present	1,220.0	186.2	76.1	6.2	40.9

1/Statistics drawn from Brite, George K. Gross National Product (GNP), and U.S. Government Total Budget Outlays (Federal Funds Basis) and Outlays for National Defense Function for Fiscal Years 1939 to 1974. Washington, Congressional Research Service, February 12, 1973. 2 p. Updated for FY 1973. The defense budget was smaller in 1968 than in 1969, but reached 56.3% of the total budget and 9.7% of the GNP in 1968. Defense expenditures include small amount of military assistance trust fund expenses beginning in 1955.

GRAPH 8

DEFENSE PROGRAMS IN CURRENT AND CONSTANT PRICES



SOURCE: Outlays for National Defense Function For F.Y. 1939-74, pp. 1-2
F.Y. 1974 Comparison, DOD Comptroller, Sept. 18, 1973

From those and related figures, it is possible to distill four elemental trends:

> --The U.S. defense budget has doubled in absolute terms since the 1955 low, but has decreased dramatically in relation to total federal expenditures and the GNP.
>
> --The defense budget now occupies a high plateau, but no longer dominates the national economy.
>
> --However, this country presently pays more money for fewer forces than it did in the past, even in constant dollars, although increased effectiveness offsets that disadvantage to some extent.
>
> --The prospects for spectacular future savings without comprehensive curtailments in U.S. defense policy and posture therefore seem slight.

CAUSES

The rising costs of national defense can be attributed in part to inflation, devaluation, the imbalance of payments, and other difficulties that have beset the dollar for several years (see section on the Dollar Debacle). However, two other factors--a prodigious price tag on manpower, coupled with the soaring expense of equipment modernization--exacerbate our difficulties directly.

Money for Manpower

Elliot Richardson, in his sole statement to the Congress on the defense budget, singled out active military manpower as the heart of the dilemma. He tied that factor to the All-Volunteer Force, observing that "as long as men were being drafted, some served unwillingly; and the difference between what [those] men were paid and the salary necessary to have attracted them as volunteers can be considered an imputed tax."

Pay raises since 1964 (Figure 14) have disposed of that tax,

Figure 14

Monthly Rates of Military Basic Pay

Pay Grade	Title	Years of Service 1/	July 1963	October 1973	Percentage Increase
E-1	Recruit (under 4 months)	0-2	$ 78	$ 326	318
E-2	Private	0-2	85	363	327
E-3	Private 1st Class	0-2	99	378	282
E-4	Corporal	2-3	150	415	277
E-5	Sergeant	4-6	205	486	137
E-6	Staff Sergeant	14-16	275	666	142
E-7	Sergeant 1st Class	18-20	340	782	130
E-8	Master Sergeant	20-22	370	899	143
E-9	Sergeant Major	22-26	440	1,079	145
W-1	Warrant Officer	10-12	334	757	127
W-2	Chief Warrant	16-18	393	919	134
W-3	Chief Warrant	20-22	470	1,091	132
W-4	Chief Warrant	26-30	575	1,382	140
O-1	2nd Lieutenant	0-2	222	601	171
O-2	1st Lieutenant	2-3	291	757	160
O-3	Captain	6-8	440	1,100	150
O-4	Major	14-16	570	1,393	144
O-5	Lieutenant Colonel	20-22	745	1,726	132
O-6	Colonel	26-30	985	2,190	122
O-7	Brigadier General	26-30	1,175	2,493	112
O-8	Major General	26-30	1,350	2,866	112
O-9	Lieutenant General	26-30	1,500	3,180 2/	112
O-10	General	26-30	1,700	3,604 2/	112

1/ Longevity pay step of typical military member
2/ Statutory limitation

All figures rounded to nearest dollar.

Source: The Economics of Defense Spending, p. 132; and Federal Register, Washington, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, October 5, 1973, p. 27585-27590.

but in the process have doubled the outlay for manpower in the past decade.[1/] The surge has been stabilized, but the toll in dollars remains huge, and will continue to climb as programmed cost-of-living increases periodically take effect.[2/] In consequence, manpower costs now dominate the defense budget, as the following table indicates:

Figure 15

PAY INCREASES RELATED TO DOD BUDGET AND MANPOWER
(In Billions of Current Dollars)

	FY 64	FY 73	Change
Pay and Allowances	$ 22.0	$ 41.5	+ $ 19.5
Other Operating Costs	6.2	11.2	+ 5.0
RDT&E, Procurement, Construction	22.6	21.2	- 1.4
Total	50.8	73.9	+ 23.1
Manpower	**June 30, 64**	**June 30, 73**	
Active Military	2,685,000	2,253,000	- 432,000
Civil Service	1,035,000	1,031,000	- 4,000
Total	3,720,000	3,284,000	- 436,000

Source: The Economics of Defense Spending: A Look at the Realities. Washington, Department of Defense (Comptroller), July, 1972, p. 2. Updated telephonically by DOD comptroller on September 5, 1973. FY 73 total figure is firm. The breakout is subject to minor adjustment. Further, the FY 1973 total reflects DOD expenditures only. Figure 13 and Graph 8 encompass other defense-related dollars, including those for atomic energy.

1/Richardson, Elliot L. Statement on the FY 1974 Defense Budget, p. 97-98.

2/Public Law 90-207, 90th Congress. H.R. 13510 (81 Stat. 649), Section 8.

Pay for retired military personnel could shortly overload the system if present computation procedures remain in effect, according to a recent Congressional study:

> The cost of the military retirement system is rising rapidly. By 1975, there will be over one million retirees on the rolls and the annual cost will exceed $5 billion. The cost of the present system without change will rise to $21.6 billion annually by the year 2000 (assuming an average annual rate of increase in active-duty pay somewhat less than recent experience).1/

Those prognostications, of course, fail to consider the rapidly expanding U.S. GNP. Even so, no solution to retired pay problems appears imminent.

Money for Modernization

Technological sophistication is the second powerful budgetary pressure. Expenses associated with modernization account for only half of the expenditures caused by pay, but they attract far greater attention from critics concerned with alleged mismanagement and cost overruns.

Prices for new equipment have escalated enormously in recent years. While industrial commodities rose 22 percent from 1961 through 1971, the cost of many functionally equivalent weapons systems skyrocketed 300 percent or more during the same period.2/ The Senate Armed Services Committee glumly observed that:

1/U.S. Congress. House. Report by the Armed Services Special Subcommittee on Retired Pay Revisions, concerning Recomputation and Other Retirement Legislation. 92d Congress, 2d Session. December 29, 1972. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973, p. 17626.

2/Stopping the Incredible Rise in Weapons Costs. Business Week, February 19, 1972, p. 60.

> Fighter aircraft now being developed for procurement in the mid-1970s will cost five to six times more than comparable aircraft at the beginning of the 1960s. The cost of tanks is increasing over fourfold during the 1965-75 decade. ... If the geometric cost increase for weapons systems is not sharply reversed, then even significant increases in the defense budget may not insure the force levels required for our national security.[1/]

Similar problems plague ships and strategic weaponry. One CVN-70 Nimitz Class aircraft carrier will approximate $1 billion, not counting the associated air wing. TRIDENT submarines will cost roughly $1.3 billion a copy--$13.5 billion for the 10-boat program, including missiles and support facilities. MIRVing the remainder of our MINUTEMAN missile force eventually will absorb another $6.1 billion.[2/] And so on. Those estimates could prove to be conservative, depending on a cornucopia of considerations, a good many of which are beyond DOD control.

COUNTERBALANCES

Two events have helped to counterbalance escalating expenses for U.S. national defense: the elimination of most incremental costs engendered by the Vietnam War and sharp cuts in our military establishment. The SALT I agreements, which many concerned citizens hoped would act as a third significant counterbalance, produced few net savings.

1/U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Armed Services Report No. 92-359. Authorizing Appropriations for FY 1972 for Military Procurement, Research and Development, [etc.] to accompany H.R. 8687. 92d Congress, 1st Session. September 7, 1971, p. 17.

2/Will $91 Billions for New Weapons Systems Be Wasted? The Defense Monitor, Washington, Center for Defense Information, May 15, 1973, centerfold.

Reduced Vietnam War Costs

Tabulations in Figure 16 illustrate that incremental costs of the Vietnam War, which totalled $21.5 billion in 1969, have dropped precipitously since that time. Residual outlays are mainly for Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) projects. About half of the MASF monies will be devoted to ammunition and equipment procurement; the remainder is for operations. Post cease-fire programs, including mine clearance activities, U.S. and Korean force withdrawals, the redeployment of materiel, the return of our POWs, and the continuing search for MIAs all demanded sizeable dollar disbursements in 1973.[1/]

Now that the air war in Southeast Asia has been completely suspended, future savings should be even more rewarding. U.S. air wings in Thailand, the principal American forces remaining in the region, already are beginning to withdraw.

Reduced Force Levels

The 37 percent reduction in personnel strength, accompanied by commensurate curtailment in major items of equipment, which took place between 1969 and 1973, also alleviated the budget squeeze to a considerable extent (see section on Changes in Size and Structure of U.S. Active Forces). Suffice it to add here that the trend seems to have stabilized. In the President's opinion, "our ground, naval, and air forces have now reached the absolute minimum necessary to meet our commitments and provide a credible conventional deterrent in an age of strategic parity."[2/] Congress however, really controls the situation by the way it addresses future budget requests.

1/Richardson, Elliot L., Statement on the FY 1974 Defense Budget, p. 49.
2/Nixon, Richard M. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, May 3, 1973, p. 187.

Figure 16
VIETNAM WAR COSTS, DIRECT AND INDIRECT
(In Millions of Current Dollars)

Fiscal Year	Economic Assistance 1/	Food For Peace 1/	Military Assistance 1/	Incremental War Costs 2/	Total
1953-61	$ 1,470	$ 78	$ 509		$ 2,057 3/
1962	124	32	204		360
1963	143	53	258		454
1964	166	57	182		404
1965	225	52	235 4/	$ 103	615
1966	594	143	94 5/	5,800	6,631
1967	494	74		18,400	18,968
1968	398	139		20,000	20,537
1969	314	99		21,500	21,914
1970	366	111		17,400	17,877
1971	388	188		11,500	12,076
1972	387	68		7,200	7,655
1973 (Est.)	313	187		5,300	5,800
1974 (Est.)	475 6/	176 6/		2,900	3,551
Total	$ 5,857 1/	$ 1,456 1/	$ 1,482 1/	$ 110,103	$ 118,899

See following page for notes.

Figures rounded off to nearest million. Totals therefore do not tally exactly. Incremental costs are less than full budgetary costs, which include dollars for routine activities that must be funded whether a war is in progress or not.

Source: Cooper, Bert H. Statistics on U. S. Participation in the Vietnam Conflict, with Addendum. Washington, Congressional Research Service, August 15, 1972. War cost figures amended as of February, 1974.

Figure 16. (Con't)

1/ U. S. Department of State. Agency for International Development. Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination. Office of Statistics and Reports. U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organization - Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945 - June 30, 1971. May 24, 1972. p. 64. The data for Economic Assistance, Food for Peace, and Military Assistance are gross figures representing total new obligations entered into each year and not adjusted for de-obligations. Adjustments for de-obligations during the FY 1953-71 period yield net totals of $4.4 billion for Economic Assistance and $1 billion for Food for Peace (P.L. 480): de-obligations in AID-funded Military Assistance programs during FY 1953-66 (i.e., the annual amounts shown here minus $4.4 million in FY 1963 and $1.7 million in FY 1964 for DOD-funded activities) yield a net total of $1,476,300,000 compared to the gross total shown here of $1,482,400,000. The totals for these three columns as shown in the table are gross totals and, in the case of the first and second columns, they include FY 1972 estimates.

2/ U.S. Department of Defense. Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). July 18, 1972. Also contained in U.S. Department of Defense. OASD (Comptroller). The Economics of Defense Spending: A Look at the Realities, July 1972. p. 149. These incremental war costs include Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) programs as follows: FY 1965-$34 million; FY 1966-$767.5 million; FY 1967-$1.2 billion; FY 1968-$1 billion; FY 1969-$1.6 billion; FY 1970-$1.7 billion; and FY 1971-$1.9 billion. (MASF figures are rounded from data in the AID source cited above.) The original MASF estimate for FY 1972 of $1.8 billion is contained in Senate Armed Services Committee Report No. 92-962, July 14, 1972, p. 171, followed on p. 172 by a revised figure of $2.2 billion for MASF and additional costs attributed to the March-April 1972 invasion of South Vietnam.

3/ Not included in this figure is $1,535,200,000 in U.S. economic and military aid to French Indochina during the FY 1949-54 period prior to partition of the area into North and South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

4/ Excludes $34 million for DOD-funded programs included in incremental war costs shown in fourth column.

5/ Excludes $767.5 million in DOD-funded programs included in incremental war costs shown in fourth column.

6/ U.S. Department of State. Agency for International Development. Office of Legislative Affairs.

SALT I Savings

Former Defense Secretary Laird, addressing the House Armed Services Committee immediately after the SALT I accords were signed, expressed the belief that drastic reductions in our SAFEGUARD system would permit the immediate net deletion of "$550 million [from] the strategic portion of our fiscal year 1973 defense budget." In his estimation, "additional savings over the next five years (1972-1977) could amount to as much as $5 billion."[1/]

That forecast proved overly optimistic. Real savings were realized on the defensive side of the ledger by scaling back SAFEGUARD, although funds for the Grand Forks installation, plus the development of Site Defense and advanced ABM technology, still consumed $513 million in the FY 1974 defense budget. However, the net reduction has been more than cancelled by requests for an accelerated TRIDENT program alone.[2/] As a result, strategic forces will absorb roughly the same amount of money in FY 1975 as they did before the SALT agreements. Strategic arms limitations, therefore, have not yet counterbalanced budgetary pressures in a way that compares with winding down the Vietnam War or reducing the numerical strength of U.S. general purpose forces.

1/U.S. Congress. House. Supplemental Hearings on Defense Procurement Authorization Relating to SALT Agreement, Before the Armed Services Committee. 92d Congress, 2d Session, June 6 and 13, 1972. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972, p. 12098.7

2/Schlesinger, James R. Annual Defense Department Report to the Congress for FY 1975, p. 53-54 and 235.

CONSEQUENCES

It is difficult to determine whether defense policy drives the budget, or vice versa. Each predominates from time to time. In either event, budgets, policies, and force postures have correlated closely over the years.

Shifting Budgetary Emphases

Nuclear deterrent forces were assigned top DOD budget priority from the 1950s until 1964, as Figure 17 shows. Appropriations for those purposes peaked in 1961, then plunged more than $5 billion in the next four years, by which time America had accumulated an impressive stockpile of nuclear weapons, Assured Destruction had been adopted, efforts to retain numerical superiority had waned, and U.S. strategic defenses had started to decline.

Funds to refurbish our World War II vintage general purpose forces began to rise, as dollars for nuclear deterrence diminished. In the late 1950s, budgets for those two categories were roughly comparable, although general purpose forces employ most of our military personnel (in FY 1973, SAC and the Navy's POLARIS/POSEIDON fleet accounted for less than six percent of the total[1/]). Appropriations for the Army, Marines, tactical airpower, and divers forces afloat jumped $4 billion between 1960 and 1962, when President Kennedy adopted the policy of Flexible Response. They soared even higher in reaction to challenges in Vietnam. Intercontinental mobility forces received an increased share during the same period.

1/Ibid., p. 200.

Figure 17
DEFENSE BUDGETARY SUMMARY BY PROGRAM
(In Millions of Current Dollars)

Fiscal Year	Strategic Forces	General Purpose Forces	Airlift, Sealift	National Guard, Reserve	Research & Development
1956	$ 9,293	$ 13,525	$ 829	$ 1,282 (LO)	$ 1,755 (LO)
1957	10,736	12,941	825 (LO)	1,497	2,079
1958	10,514	14,223	869	1,576	2,029
1959	11,283	13,329	1,050	1,547	2,682
1960	9,828	12,775 (LO)	932	1,529	2,905
1961	11,521 (HI)	14,234	910	1,581	3,433
1962	10,876	16,691	985	1,615	4,069
1963	9,822	16,545	1,033	1,551	4,812
1964	8,509	16,497	1,080	1,768	4,857
1965	6,353	17,731	1,277	1,179	4,644
1966	6,128 (LO)	27,283	1,464	2,115	4,708
1967	6,293	29,986	1,762 (HI)	2,463	4,620
1968	7,236	30,375 (HI)	1,756	2,196	4,277
1969	8,497	29,442	1,465	2,141	4,568
1970	7,120	27,433	1,654	2,550	4,846
1971	7,501	24,405	1,318	2,688	5,219
1972	7,486	25,198	1,109	3,318	6,091
1973	7,359	25,694	865	4,008 (HI)	6,526 (HI)

Comparable figures not available for 1952-55 programs.

Source: Brazier, Don R., Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). Statement before the Defense Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations in connection with the FY 1974 Budget estimates of the Department of Defense, May 31, 1973, Table 18.

General purpose forces lost their budgetary priority when U. S. military operations ended in Vietnam. They still absorb nearly four times as many dollars as the nuclear deterrent sector, but more than half of that money goes for pay and allowances--most funds for strategic forces, by way of contrast, are devoted to weapons systems.

Figure 17 is calculated in current dollars. Statistics converted to constant FY 1974 currency are even more revealing. Of the items displayed, only reserve components and R & D register solid increases, despite inflation. That trend still persists.

Additional budgetary tendencies can be gleaned from a cursory analysis of defense spending by branch of service (Figure 18).

All three services were freely funded during the Korean conflict. The Army, which bore the brunt, was allotted the largest share of the military budget--approximately 34 percent.[1/] Post-war "belt-tightening" soon took effect, however, and by 1956 the ground force share had been sliced in half. The Navy lost $2 billion during that retrenchment, but the Air Force, then the custodian of all U.S. nuclear retaliatory weapons and the exponent of Massive Retaliation, actually augmented its absolute and proportionate allowances.

1/United States Defense Policies in 1965, p. 192.

Figure 18

DEFENSE BUDGET SUMMARY BY BRANCH OF SERVICE
(In Millions of Current Dollars)

Fiscal Year	Army	Navy, Marine	Air Force
1953	$ 16,242	$ 11,875	$ 15,085
1956	8,702 (LO)	9,744 (LO)	16,749 (LO)
1957	9,063	10,398	18,363
1958	9,051	10,906	18,435
1959	9,468	11,728	19,084
1960	9,392	11,642	19,066
1961	10,355	12,715	19,887
1962	12,747	14,626	19,573
1963	11,980	14,676	20,430
1964	12,460	14,429	20,002
1965	12,347	14,846	19,402
1966	18,610	19,379	23,480
1967	22,543	21,522	24,708
1968	24,972	20,765	24,917
1969	26,087 (HI)	23,950	27,003 (HI)
1970	24,151	22,710	24,170
1971	22,596	21,886	23,191
1972	22,214	24,094	23,860
1973	21,817	25,635	24,856

Source: U.S. Congress. House, United States Defense Policies in 1965. House Document No. 344. 89th Congress, 2d Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966, p. 192; updated by statements of Defense Secretaries McNamara, Laird, and Richardson on the defense budget. Figures in those documents vary slightly.

The Air Force remained budgetarily preeminent until the Vietnam War began to heat up. The augmentation of funds for land and sea power in the early 1960s paid perfunctory homage to Flexible Response, which prescribed a more balanced posture than had prevailed in the previous decade, but forces that could give substance to the U. S. "2½ War" policy never were realized.

The present transition portends increasing reliance on sea and air power, in conformance with the Nixon Doctrine. The Army, which measures its strength in manpower, rather than ships or planes, must spend a greater percentage of its money for pay, and thus retains a smaller portion for other purposes. (That trend is becoming more pronounced. The FY 1975 defense budget requested $23,618,000 for the Army, $29,568,000 for the Navy, and $28,029,000 for the Air Force).[1/]

Modest Modernization Rates

The Department of Defense is trying to modernize its armed forces across the board, despite budgetary restrictions. This is an immensely expensive proposition, as Figure 19 indicates. The top 10 programs alone (seven devoted to the Navy) sparked a budget proposal of almost $8 billion in FY 1974. DOD listed more than 50 other "major" systems, whose costs for that fiscal year were estimated to be $10-$402 million each.[2/]

Since each of those packages must compete for limited funds, modernization rates have been sluggish, with few exceptions. President Nixon expounded on possible consequences in his 1973 foreign policy report to the Congress:

1/Schlesinger, James R. Annual Defense Department Report to the Congress on the FY 1 75 Defense Budget, p. 235.
2/Ibid., p. 53-54, 119-120, 145-146; and Richardson, Elliot L. Statement on the FY 1974 Defense Budget p. 55-56, 68-70.

Figure 19

ANNUAL COSTS OF SELECTED MAJOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS
(In Millions of Current Dollars)

	FY 1972 Actual Funding	FY 1973 Actual Funding	FY 1974 Planned Funding
NUCLEAR DETERRENT FORCES			
Conversion of SSBNs to POSEIDON Configuration; Continued Procurement of POSEIDON Missiles and Associated Effort	718	698	313
Development, Procurement and Military Construction Costs of TRIDENT Ballistic Missile Submarine and Missile	105	794	1,435
Continued Procurement of MINUTEMAN III and MINUTEMAN Force Modernization	938	816	730
Continued Development of B-1 Bomber	370	445	449
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES			
Continued Development/Procurement of F-15 Air Superiority Fighter	420	908	1,129
Continued Development and Procurement of F-14 Multi-Mission Fighter	929	628	737
Procurement of CVN-70 Aircraft Carrier	---	299	657
Procurement of DD-963 Destroyers	603	249	612
Procurement of SSN-688 Class Nuclear Attack Submarines	905	1,048	921
Development and Procurement of S-3A Carrier-Based ASW Aircraft	578	618	548

Source: Richardson, Elliot L. Statement on the FY 1974 Defense Budget, p. 55-56, 68-70; and Schlesinger, James R. Annual Defense Department Report to the Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget, p. 53-54, 119-120, 145-146. Funding figures include money for spares.

> Unless we improve management performance...we simply will not be able to maintain the minimum force levels necessary to meet the needs of our security without drawing increasingly on funds required for such essential intangibles as force manning, training, and readiness.1/

The Congress not only concurs that improved management practices are compulsory, but remains convinced that contemporary budget requests are still "padded." Whereas appropriations actually exceeded requisitions at various times in the past, Congress has lopped off funds regularly since FY 1968, for a total that tops $23 billion (Figure 20).

Consequently, DOD must take stringent steps to make ends match means. Several measures were discussed by Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., the outgoing Director of Defense Research and Engineering, in his final posture statement. He first cited a "strategy of incremental acquisition, in which achievement must be demonstrated at established milestones before [any] program proceeds from one major phase to the next." We also are using more prototypes in an attempt to reduce risks and fix realistic costs, before not after programs are initiated. The Defense Department is emphasizing hardware competition at home and abroad, trying to maintain a better balance between cost and capability, and is conducting a crusade against "gold plating"--the addiction to unnecessarily opulent refinements that cause prices to zoom. In addition, the "Hi-Lo" concept comes into play, mixing minimum numbers of sophisticated and costly systems with many cheaper, less expensive counterparts, to avoid excessive acquisition of specialized capabilities.2/

1/Nixon, Richard M. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, May 3, 1973, p. 192.
2/Foster, John S., Jr., Statement on the DOD Program of Research and Development, Test and Evaluation, FY 1974, p. 3-1 to 3-8; and Schlesinger, James R. Annual Defense Department Report to the Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget, p. 223.

Figure 20

Defense Budgets and Appropriations

Fiscal Years 1950-1973

(in thousands)

Fiscal Year	Budget Estimates	Approved by House	Approved by Senate	Appropriation
1973	$79,594,184	$74,577,548	$74,571,698	$74,372,976
1972	73,543,829	71,048,013	70,849,113	70,518,463
1971	68,745,666	66,806,561	66,417,077	66,595,937
1970	75,278,200[1]	69,960,048	69,322,656	69,640,568
1969	77,074,000	72,239,700	71,886,893	71,869,828
1968	71,584,000	70,295,200	70,132,320	69,936,620
1967	57,664,353	58,616,445	58,189,872	58,067,472
1966	45,248,844	45,188,244	46,877,063[2]	46,887,163
1965	47,471,000	46,759,267	46,774,401	46,752,051
1964	49,014,237	47,082,009	47,339,707	47,220,010
1963	47,907,000	47,839,491	48,429,221	48,136,247
1962	42,942,345	42,711,105	46,848,292[3]	46,662,556
1961	39,335,000	39,337,867	40,514,997	39,996,608
1960	39,248,200	38,843,339	39,594,339	39,228,239
1959	38,196,947	38,409,561	40,042,992[4]	39,602,827
1958	36,128,000	33,562,725	34,534,229	33,759,850
1957	34,147,850	33,635,066	34,783,734	34,656,727
1956	32,232,815	31,488,206	31,882,915	31,882,815
1955	29,887,055	28,684,250	29,217,106	28,800,125
1954	40,719,931	34,434,140	34,511,302	34,371,541
1953	51,390,709	46,207,177	46,403,000	46,610,938
1952	57,679,625	56,034,717	61,103,856	56,939,568
1951	13,078,675	12,910,702	13,294,581	13,294,299
1950	13,248,960	13,272,815	12,731,834	12,949,562

1 Original Johnson request was $2.5-billion higher.
2 Senate considered budget estimate of $46,972,811,000.
3 Senate considered budget estimate of $46,486,915,000.
4 Senate considered budget estimate of $38,786,970,000.

Note: *Above amounts do not include any supplemental estimates or appropriations not considered or made in the regular annual Defense Appropriation Acts.*

SOURCE: House Appropriations Committee (1960-1973), Congressional Quarterly (1950-1959)

Most important of all, in Foster's opinion, is the new policy of "designing to cost." In the past, he explained:

> We tried to estimate the cost of a weapons system after its "required" performance had been determined. Seldom were cost and performance correlated during development. We...[can no longer] allow any escalation of "required" performance, with the associated rise in cost. Further, if it should turn out that the performance level calculated from preliminary designs cannot quite be reached, we should hold to the unit cost and trade off performance instead. 1/

CUMULATIVE IMPLICATIONS

Unless improved management techniques and other measures reverse present trends, the Executive Branch and Congress will confront difficult choices in the foreseeable future, as they strive to reconcile national security requirements with financial costs. A better balance between monies for manpower and material may yet prove to be the most pressing of all related issues for the rest of this decade.

1/Foster, John S., Jr. Statement on the DOD Program of RDT & E for FY 1974, p. 3-6 and 3-7.

TRENDS IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

The Executive Branch formulates U.S. national security policy. The President's principal agents--the National Security Council, the Defense Department, and the intelligence community--participate directly in that process. Congress, which controls the purse strings and force authorization, initiates, approves, or precludes statutory change and exercises oversight powers. It therefore exerts indirect (but often dominant) influences over policy decisions (Graph 9).

DEFENSE DECISION-MAKING AT THE PRESIDENTIAL LEVEL

The National Security Council has undergone three sweeping revisions since the early 1950s. Organizational and operational changes during those 20 years have been profound:

--Predominant influence has been vested in the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

--Formal methods have replaced an unstructured approach.

--The emphasis on strategic planning has increased.

The Purpose of the NSC

The basic purpose of the NSC is "to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively." Part and parcel of that prescription is the duty "to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation

GRAPH 9

MILESTONES IN DEFENSE DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES



to our actual and potential military power."[1]

Those tasks have remained constant since 1947, but the NSC has performed them with varying degrees of success, depending on the importance accorded it by successive occupants of the Oval Office.[2]

The Eisenhower NSC

When Dwight D. Eisenhower was invested as President in January, 1953, the National Security Council, as it had developed during the Truman Administration, "provided a convenient mechanism" for staffing and coordinating interdepartmental views, but "its position was still somewhat casual".[3]

President Eisenhower immediately set about establishing a formal NSC system to serve the decision-making process as he practiced it. The organization soon developed clear lines of responsibility and authority. Twenty or more non-statutory participants routinely attended the regular Thursday meetings.[4] Policy formulation followed a formal pattern.

> The neatness and mechanical order of [that] process was praised by its supporters as the most efficient means of transacting the heavy load of business with which the National Security Council concerned itself under President Eisenhower. During his first 3 years in office, for example, the Council met 145 times and took 829 policy actions.... Critics, however, labelled this "mass production, packaging and distribution". ...

1/U.S. Congress. House Armed Services Committee. National Security Act of 1947, as Amended Through September 30, 1973. 93d Congress, 1st Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., October, 1973, p. 2.

2/For a concise comparison of NSC organization and operations during the period 1947-1971 see Falk, Stanley L. and Bauer, Theodore W. National Security Management: The National Security Structure. Washington, The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1972, p. 33-58.

3/Millis, Walter; Mansfield, Harvey C.; and Stein, Harold, Arms and the State: Civil Military Elements in National Policy, New York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1958, p. 255, 388.

4/According to the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, statutory members of the National Security Council now include the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense.

> Basically, they argued, the NSC was a huge committee, and suffered from all the weaknesses of committees... [Its members clung] to departmental rather than national views. Moreover, the normal interagency exchanges and cross-fertilization that should have taken place outside the NSC were cut off in favor of action within the Council system.... The result, as former Secretary of State Dean Acheson charged, was "agreement by exhaustion", with the ponderous NSC machinery straining mightly to produce not clear-cut analyses of alternative courses, but rather compromise and a carefully staffed "plastering over" of differences.1/

Whether or not those allegations were correct, the NSC from 1953 through 1960 conformed to President Eisenhower's habit patterns, which called for structured operations.

The Kennedy/Johnson NSC

John F. Kennedy, impatient with bureaucratic processes, quickly dismantled the elaborate web of standardized procedures, staff relationships, and interdepartmental teams fashioned by his predecessor, and replaced it with much looser, more flexible arrangements. Only the statutory structure survived. Staff work was accomplished mainly by the various departments and agencies. Personal relationships and ad hoc task forces, not the National Security Council, provided the primary input for defense decision-making. In short, as McGeorge Bundy related to Senator Henry M. Jackson, President Kennedy "made it very clear that he [did] not want a large separate organization between him and his Secretary of State." 2/

1/Falk, Stanley L. The National Security Council Under Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy. Political Science Quarterly, September, 1964, p. 423, 424.

2/U.S. Congress. Inquiry of the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery for the Senate Committee on Government Operations. Organizing for National Security. Vol. I, Hearings. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Office, 1961, p. 1337. McGeorge Bundy was Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs at the time.

President Johnson adapted Kennedy's NSC apparatus, modified to match his "rough and ready" approach to the Presidency. His highly personalized way of doing business cancelled what little administrative orthodoxy the Council had retained. By the time he stepped down, the NSC had virtually been replaced by a combination of issue-oriented committees, part-time advisors, and "Tuesday lunches," where current problems were thrashed out in a typically Johnsonian manner.1/

The Nixon NSC

The Kennedy-Johnson design for defense decision-making, which focused on operations rather than policy, suited their purposes, particularly in time-sensitive situations. President Nixon had a different design:

> The most pressing issues are not necessarily the most fundamental ones; we know that an effective American policy requires clarity of purpose for the future as well as a procedure for dealing with the present. We do not want to exhaust ourselves managing crises. 2/

Before his inauguration, therefore, President-elect Nixon, assisted by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, who would become his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, took steps to reestablish the National Security Council "as the principal forum for Presidential consideration of foreign [and defense] policy issues," and gave it a mandate to "clarify our view of where we want to be in the next three to five years [1969-1973]." 3/

1/Falk, Stanley L. The Restoration of the National Security Council. Perspectives in Defense Management, Winter 1972-73, p. 69.
2/Nixon, Richard M. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, February 18, 1970, p. 17.
3/Ibid., p. 17, 19.

Organizationally, the revived NSC mostly closely resembles its Eisenhower ancestor, with which Nixon had become intimately familiar as Vice President, although it consciously avoids the same pitfalls. In President Nixon's words,

> Clear policy choices reach the top, so that the various positions can be fully debated.... Differences of view are identified and defended, rather than muted or buried. I refuse to be confronted with a bureaucratic concensus that leaves me no options but acceptance or rejection, and that gives me no way of knowing what alternatives exist.1/

Whereas the prototype was voluminous, the successor is spare. Procedures have been streamline.2/

Participation in Council meetings during the Eisenhower era had been expansive. Attendance today is generally confined to statutory members, although the JCS has a stronger voice than in the 1960s. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regularly attends Council meetings as an advisor, is included in all six of the senior subdivisions, and provides representation to all six Interdepartmental Groups. According to Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, the incumbent Chairman, "the military viewpoint on all significant issues is made known to the President for his consideration in the formulation of policy for national security and foreign affairs."3/

In his first 100 days, Kissinger assigned 55 National Security Study Memorandums (NSSM). By the end of 1973, the total had reached 190. A

1/Nixon, Richard M. U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, February 19, 1970, p. 22.
2/For current NSC organization and functions, see Nixon, Richard M. U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, February 9, 1972, p. 209-212. Appraisals are contained in Leacacos, John P. Kissinger's Apparatus; and Destler, I. M. Can One Man Do? Foreign Policy, Winter 1971-72, p. 3-41.
3/JCS: Organization and Functions. Commanders Digest, June 14, 1973, p. 2-4.

bewildering variety of subjects were scrutinized, but patterns of preoccupation nevertheless stood out--NATO accounted for more than 20 actions, the Middle East and Southeast Asia for 30-odd more. Arms controls measures and military assistance matters were prominent. A full 240 National Security Decision Memorandums (NSDM) were promulgated by the President (or in his name) as a result of interdepartmental inquiry during that same period.[1] Those pronouncements, with supporting rationale, are the closest approximation to a Basic National Security Policy document since the Eisenhower days.

Inevitably, however, the Nixon NSC displays flaws of its own. It originally was censured for extreme centralization. Even after his appointment as Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger continued to control every critical function, except those assigned to the Under Secretaries Committee, and even there his influence was great (Deputy Secretary Kenneth Rush represented the State Department at NSC meetings; Kissinger wore his "Special Assistant hat").[3] Princeton researcher I. M. Destler delineated the resultant dilemma nicely:

> Those in high places cannot limit themselves to broad decision; they must engage in continuing bureaucratic combat. This...limits the number of issues one man can effectively influence, however great his leverage... The question then becomes whether building strength in the White House is enough, even if Kissinger can dominate the issues on which he can concentrate.[2]

More recently, there have been indications that the NSC is losing

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1/Information provided telephonically to the Congressional Research Service by DOD staff members on May 1, 1974.
2/Destler, I. M. Can One Man Do?, p. 33.
3/Information provided telephonically to the Congressional Research Service by NSC staff members on May 1, 1974.

power. The emphasis seems to be shifting from structured control to personal relationships in the Departments of State and Defense, not altogether different from arrangements in the 1960s.[1/] If so, a new trend is emerging, but it is too early to assess the implications.

DECISION-MAKING IN THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

During the two decades under discussion, decision-making in the Department of Defense has developed from a comparatively simple to a singularly sophisticated procedure. A trio of salient trends is discernible:

--Preliminary deliberation by military men in virtual isolation has given way to cosmopolitan debate before defense decisions are reached.

--A variety of new tools and techniques have been introduced into analytical processes.

--Decision-making by loosely-affiliated, competing armed services has been supplanted by close, continuous, centralized control at OSD level.

The Age of Diffuse Decision-Making

The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) in James Forrestal's day had little authority over the military departments. His activities for practical purposes were restricted to the enunciation of broad policies and general coordination of execution phases. The four services made their own decisions and "ran their own shows." Six successors, from Louis Johnson through Neil McElroy, sought to broaden the SECDEF's role in the interim between the late 1940s and 1961.

1/Nixon Role in Foreign Policy is Altered; Some Assert Kissinger is Now in Charge. New York Times, December 24, 1973, p. 27

Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953, engineered during Charles Wilson's reign, sharpened command lines between DOD and the military departments, enhanced the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and undercut service autonomy, placing the Secretary of Defense in position to exert influences that were beyond the capacity of his predecessors.[1/]

The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, which strengthened SECDEF's strategic planning responsibilities and increased his authority over operational as well as administrative matters, provided the statutory power which that dignitary enjoys today. The Joint Chiefs of Staff became "directly responsible" to him, as were the commanders of unified and specified commands. Service secretaries were removed from the operational chain, although they retained full responsibility for organizing, training, and equipping their respective forces.[2/]

Despite the latitude allowed by such realignments, there was a considerable time lag before any Secretary of Defense began to exercise his full prerogatives. Since President Eisenhower, in tandem with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, tended to dominate defense policy decisions, the SECDEF was relegated to managing the mammoth Defense Department.

In the absence of calculated coordination procedures, decision-making throughout the 1950s remained diffuse. Interservice rivalry was rampant, with chaotic results:

1/U.S. Congress. House Document No. 136. Reorganization Plan of 1953. 83d Congress, 1st Session. Committee Print, Committee on Government Operations, April 30, 1953. 10 p.

2/U.S. Congress. Senate Report No. 1845 to accompany H.R. 12541. Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. 85th Congress, 2d Session. Committee Print, Armed Services Committee, July 17, 1958. 23 p.

> We can imagine many different kinds of wars the United States must be prepared to fight, but a war in which the Army fights independently of the Navy, or the Navy independently of the Air Force, is not one of them.... Army planning, for example, was based primarily on a long war of attrition; Air Force planning was based, largely, on a short war of nuclear bombardment. Consequently, the Army was stating a requirement for stocking months, if not years, of combat supplies against the event of a sizable conventional conflict. The Air Force stock requirements for such a war had to be measured in days, and not very many days at that. Either approach, consistently followed, might make some sense. The two combined could not possibly make sense. What we needed was a coordinated strategy seeking objectives actually attainable with the military resources available. 1/

The impact on budgetary planning was predictable. General Maxwell D. Taylor, writing at that time, painted the following picture:

> Each Service [prepared] its budget in isolation from the others. Although many earnest discussions of uni-service needs took place between the Secretary of Defense, Department Secretaries, and their Chiefs of Staff, at no time to my knowledge were the three service budgets put side by side and an appraisal made of the fighting capabilities of the aggregate military forces supported by the budget. This so-called "vertical" (rather than "horizontal") approach to building the budget....accounts in a large measure for the inability thus far to develop a budget which keeps fiscal emphasis in phase with military priorities. It is not an exaggeration to say that nobody knows what we are actually buying with any specific budget. 2/

Small wonder, then, that open-ended force requirements chronically clashed with fixed funds. In the absence of agreement as to how appropriations should be allocated, the Secretary of Defense and his staff simply "hewed away the fat", which invariably included requests that could not possibly be accommodated.

1/McNamara, Robert S. The Essence of Security, p. 90-91. The sequence has been transposed in this text.

2/Taylor, Maxwell D. The Uncertain Trumpet, p. 70.

The Age of Super-Centralized Control

Enter Robert S. McNamara, determined to centralize authority and to assume the part of active director, rather than umpire, judge, or arbiter.

Beginning in 1961, defense decision-making no longer was dominated by uniformed professionals. Civilians in DOD, contract agencies, and free-lance "think tanks" began to participate in the process as never before. A number of influential men, like Charles J. Hitch, the DOD Comptroller during that period, and Alain C. Enthoven, The Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis, were drawn from those ranks. McNamara soon was under sharp attack for over-reacting and riding rough-shod at the Pentagon.

> He was accused...of forcing the armed services to "speak with one voice"; of establishing super-agencies to take over certain functions that had been handled separately by the individual military services; of down-grading, ignoring and by-passing the military chiefs; of submerging the service Secretaries as well as the uniformed chiefs beneath a hierarchy of Assistant Secretaries under his direct supervision; of overriding the voice of professional experience and "substituting a military party-line"; of establishing what Hanson Baldwin described as "the McNamara Monarchy." 1/

Despite the frictions involved, McNamara pressed on, backed by President Kennedy. His mission, assigned personally by the Chief Executive, was to "develop the force structure necessary to our military requirements without regard to arbitrary budget ceilings" and to "procure and operate this force at the lowest possible cost."2/

1/Raymond, Jack. The McNamara Monarchy. Part of Chapter 6 in American Defense Policy. Ed. by Smith, Mark E., III and Johns, Claude J., Jr. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 2d Ed., 1968, p. 406-407.

2/Enthoven, Alain C. and Smith, K. Wayne. How Much is Enough?: Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969. New York Harper and Row, 1971, p. 325.

McNamara's foremost reform was the fabrication of an apparatus to "provide in a trustworthy and meaningful form all the information necessary for the Secretary to make rapid and sound decisions." For that purpose, he instigated the DOD-dedicated Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and a planning-programming-budgeting system (PPBS) that could interrelate national security objectives, policies, force requirements, and fiscal requisites. Secondly, he began planning along functional lines, rather than in traditional service terms. In effect, he created a Department of Defense that for the first time was an integrated entity, not a loose amalgamation of semi-independent agencies. Finally, he searched ceaselessly for the most economical means of attaining desired goals--through the elimination of waste, unnecessary duplication, and inefficient research, development, procurement, operational, and maintenance practices.[1/]

Secretary McNamara stated the case for those changes strongly and succinctly. "The basic objective of the...system we are introducing and trying to operate is to establish a rational foundation as opposed to an emotional foundation for [defense] decisions."[2/] In his estimation, professional judgements were being supplemented, not superseded, by systems analysis and computers. Neither did he see economy as an end in itself. "Every dollar we spend inefficiently or ineffectively is not only an unnecessary addition to the arms race," he said, "...but an unfair burden on the taxpayer, or an unwise division of resources which could be invested elsewhere" to better advantage.[3/]

1/Falk, Stanley L. and Bauer, Theodore W. The National Security Structure, p. 109-110.
2/Ibid., p. 111.
3/Falk, Stanley L. The National Security Structure, 1967, p. 94.

There never was any great quarrel with that philosophy. Discord derived mainly from McNamara's super-centralized style and opposition to his preoccupation with quantitative analyses. Nevertheless, many of his revolutionary reforms survived his departure from office, and the entire experiment paved the way for more balanced decision-making methodologies in the Department of Defense.

The Age of Participative Management

When Secretary Melvin R. Laird was installed as Secretary of Defense in January, 1969, he began recasting DOD decision-making processes in a participative management mold that featured a greater degree of decentralization and the delegation of authority "under specific guidance."1/ He elaborated at some length on that theme in his first posture statement:

> Ultimately, management of the Defense Department is the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense. I cannot delegate that responsibility.... Decisions are made, however, with the participation of [David Packard's and my] colleagues.... I particularly insist that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Military Departments be given full consideration when decisions are being made that involve their particular expertise and experience.
>
> Except for the major policy decisions, I am striving to decentralize decision-making as much as possible... So we are ... placing primary responsibility for detailed force planning on the Joint Chiefs and the Services; and we are delegating to the Military Departments more responsibility to manage development and procurement programs....
>
> Before decision-making power is delegated, we attempt to define the specific levels and types of decisions to be made by subordinate authorities; to identify precisely the persons [charged]; to set the limits of time, money, schedule and performance for the delegate authority; and to designate the specific monitoring system to measure performance. 2/

1/Laird, Melvin R. Statement on the FY 1971 Defense Budget, p. 76.
2/Ibid., p. 77.

Those policies created an entirely different decision-making climate in DOD than had existed during the preceding eight years. The planning-programming-budgeting system was modified to permit a smoother blend of strategic and financial guidance. Systems analysis was placed in perspective. Organizational emendations were undertaken, including the creation of a second Deputy Secretary of Defense "to enhance civilian supervisory management" (that action necessitated Congressional authorization to alter Chapter 4 of Title 10, United States Code). The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration was replaced by two new positions: an Assistant Secretary for Intelligence, plus another for Telecommunications. In total, the revisions supported SECDEF's decision to decentralize DOD decision-making.1/

General and flag officers infiltrated the upper echelons of DOD during this period as never before.

Military men originally were excluded from policy-making positions in the Department of Defense. Ten years ago, only three senior officers held the rank of Deputy Assistant Secretary--eleven are so assigned today. Disparate fields such as international security affairs, intelligence, personnel management, research and engineering, telecommunications, Congressional relations, foreign assistance, health and environment have top-drawer military representation. That trend causes concern among some

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1/Laird, Melvin R. Statements on the FY 1972 Defense Budget, p. 113-118 and FY 1973 Defense Budget, p. 131-133.

observers, who wonder whether civilian control could be jeopardized, and question whether our military elite should be "politicized."[1/] However, no imminent danger is discernible in either regard, and most authorities acknowledge that present arrangements have proved beneficial.

THE CONTEMPORARY THRUST

Two replacements have occupied the Secretary's chair since Laird's departure in January, 1973--Elliot L. Richardson, whose stay was 114 days, and James R. Schlesinger.[2/] Richardson left little imprint on decision-making practices during his truncated tenure. Schlesinger, however, already has abridged the policy of participative management to a considerable extent, and is establishing new procedures that still were in the formative stage at close of 1973.

1/Military in Pentagon Posts Once Limited to Civilian. New York Times, January 13, 1974, p. 1.

2/Richardson was confirmed as SECDEF on January 29, 1973. Schlesinger was nominated as his replacement on May 10, 1973, and became Secretary of Defense Designate on the 23d of that month.

CHANGES IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

To be effective, the deliberations that shape U.S. defense policies depend on impeccable intelligence products that reach top-level decision-makers in time to influence plans and actions. The intelligence community, whose contemporary structure is illustrated schematically in Figure 21, is responsible.

The ability of America's intelligence apparatus to accomplish assigned missions in support of the decision-making process has been deeply affected by two countervailing trends:

--Greatly increased capabilities to collect, evaluate, and interpret raw information, and to produce a range of intelligence products.

--Increasing controversy over methods of operation, particularly:

  --The division of responsibilities among intelligence agencies.

  --The desirability of separating intelligence activities sharply from policy-making and paramilitary operations.

Increasing Capabilities

The prototype of our present national intelligence community was still an infant in 1952, at the onset of this survey period. The concept dated to January 22, 1946, when President Truman for the first time in our history created a formal and official focus for U.S. strategic intelligence, by chartering a Central Intelligence Group.[1/] Within 18 months, that institution was converted to the Central Intelligence

1/Kent, Sherman. Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1949, p. 78-79.

Figure 21

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY



CIA: Central Intelligence Agency
State: Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Defense: Defense Intelligence Agency
ASA/CSS: National Security Agency/Central Security Service.
AEC: Atomic Energy Commission
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation
USIB: United States Intelligence Board

Source: Falk, Stanley L. The National Security Structure, 1967, p. 107.

Agency (CIA), under the aegis of the NSC, "for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security".[1] Since then, the community's capabilities have been augmented immensely, quantitatively and qualitatively.

Two new organizations within the Department of Defense have been founded.

Cryptological/communications intelligence and counterintelligence matters, handled by the separate services until the now-defunct Armed Forces Security Agency came into being in 1949, were consolidated in a National Security Agency (NSA) in November, 1952. NSA performs two unique services. The interception, traffic analysis, and cryptanalysis of electronically transmitted messages provides otherwise unavailable insights into the plans, operations, and procedures of friend and foe alike. Beyond that, NSA regulates, supervises, and integrates cryptosecurity activities of those U.S. armed forces and governmental bodies that need to communicate covertly.[2]

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the newest member of the community, was pieced together in 1961, using assets drawn from the four military services. It responds to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, having replaced the J-2 Section on the Joint Staff. The separate services still retain intelligence organs that serve their special needs, but DIA now fulfills nearly all Defense Department demands

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1/Costa, John and Evans, Gary Lee. Legislation Introduced Relative to the Activities of the Intelligence Agencies, 1947-1972. Appendix A. Washington, Congressional Research Service, October 9, 1970 (updated December 15, 1972), p. 52.

2/Kahn, David, The Codebreakers. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967, p. 674-675.

for intelligence at the national level.[1]

A new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, first appointed in 1971, ensures better coordination and tighter control at the top.

The number of personnel providing intelligence support to U.S. defense decision-makers has increased considerably during the 20 years under consideration. More importantly, their caliber is much improved. This country now has a nucleus of career professionals, skilled at an intricate trade. These specialists enjoy substantially better budgetary backing than their predecessors did two decades ago, although reliable statistics have yet to reach unclassified print.

By taking advantage of the technological explosion, U.S. intelligence collection arms have embellished their capabilities immensely since the early 1950s. The U-2 "spy planes" of Eisenhower's era first were supplemented, then virtually supplanted, by reconnaissance satellites, the earliest of which pierced the Iron Curtain in 1961. Successive generations of once "primitive" marvels, equipped with supersensitive sensors, have broadened our grasp immeasurably with regard to target acquisition, early warning, weather analysis, photo mapping, and nuclear test ban monitoring. Almost instantaneous transmission of information via communications satellites is a tandem development.[2] Quantum improvements in electronics, acoustics, optics, and other technical fields have produced comparable triumphs. Last, but not least, the intelligence community

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1/Falk, Stanley L. and Bauer, Theodore W. The National Security Structure, p. 122-124.

2/Klass, Philip J. Secret Sentries in Space. New York, Random House, 1971. 236 p. See especially chapters 8 and 17-20.

owes a debt of lasting gratitude to computers and data-processing devices, which have revolutionized methods of storing, retrieving, and disseminating facts, figures, and finished products.

Regardless of the yardstick used, the intelligence community is better equipped to assist defense decision-makers than ever in the past. That trend is likely to continue.

Uncertain Applications

To exercise their capabilities most effectively, intelligence agencies not only should be unbiased in fact, but should avoid the appearance of special pleading. Commitment to particular policies would prohibit them from providing national leaders with impartial assessments of the strengths, weaknesses, and intentions of foreign powers.

Neither CIA nor DIA satisfies critics in that regard. The former has "axes to grind", being immersed in foreign affairs, and periodically with paramilitary operations, around the world. DIA almost inescapably exhibits varying degrees of military prejudice. Since a certain amount of parochialism seems inevitable, the overlapping of responsibilities and authority, duplication of effort, and extra expenses that have prevailed for years served a useful purpose: dual sources of defense intelligence, analyzing the same basic data, submitted independent findings, along with adequate rationale to assist decision-makers in reaching final judgments.

Dr. Kissinger, who directs U.S. "net assessment" endeavors, has been disappointed for some time with U.S. intelligence products. If, as he proclaims, the test of statesmanship is the ability to anticipate and evaluate threats in time to take appropriate remedial action, the intelligence track record has indeed been spotty.

Part of the problem can be attributed to the absence of appropriate information or accurate interpretation by intelligence officials. Washington, for example, received no advance notice of the 1969 coup in Libya or Sihanouk's overthrow the following year (largely because no CIA agents were authorized in Cambodia, at Congressional insistence). In addition, intelligence estimates sometimes have such a conservative, "cover-all-bets" quality that they are valueless for policy purposes. However, shortcomings also have orginated within the National Security Council, such as the decision to disregard pessimistic reports denigrating long-term prospects for the Lon Nol government and predictions in 1971 that Pakistan probably would be dismembered in an impending war with India.[1/]

Kissinger now is altering established procedures. As step one, CIA's Office of National Estimates, which delivered its findings to five presidents over the span of 20 years, apparently has been replaced by a tighter organization. Little justification has been made public, but the objective ostensibly is to attain a sharper focus.[2/]

Not everyone agrees with the redisposition. Critics decry what they perceive to be a possible trend toward homogenous estimates that would eliminate honest differences of opinion among members of the intelligence community. They cite especially comments by Major General Daniel O. Graham, recently transferred from DIA to CIA, that "the time is ripe for

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1/Leacacos, John P., Kissingers Apparat, p. 18-22.
2/Nixon Zeroes in on CIA unit, Washington Post, September 9, 1973, p. A-1, A-8.

the military profession to reassert its traditional role in...describing military threats to national security," and that "there is no longer a need...to duplicate DIA's efforts in other agencies."[1/]

Whether or not the reported reshuffle will justify hopes or confirm fears remains to be seen. Until interagency relationships and procedures stabilize, the projection of associated trends will remain a risky proposition.

THE RISE AND FALL OF CIVILIAN "THINK TANKS"

Senior U.S. decision-makers, military and civilian alike, are chronically overburdened with current problem-solving. Not many have either the time or inclination to engage in innovative conceptual thinking. As a result, few luminaries like Alfred Thayer Mahan and Billy Mitchell ever accrued international reputations as defense theoreticians until very recent times.

The newcomers, with rare exceptions, were associated with the academic world, government contract agencies, independent "think tanks," and industrial organizations, which provided them with funds, facilities, and provocative forums not available to members of the official establishment.

Many brilliant intellectuals devoted their attention to defense problems in the 1950s and early 1960s: Bernard Brodie, Samuel P. Huntington, Herman Kahn, Henry A. Kissinger, Klaus Knorr, Thomas C. Schelling, Leo Szilard, Arthur Waskow, and Albert Wohlstetter were among them. Such men, and the organizations they represented, were subsidized in whole or

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1/Nixon Zeroes in on CIA Unit, Washington Post, September 9, 1973, p. A-1, A-8; and Graham, Daniel O. Estimating the Threat: A Soldier's Job, Army, April, 1973. P. 18.

in part by federal funds or private philanthropy, as Gene M. Lyons and Louis Morton disclosed in Schools for Strategy:

> For the university centers and institutes, foundation support has been vital to giving them their place within the academic community. Without it, few of the programs would have come into existence or survived, for, with only one major exception, all were and still are largely dependent on funds from one or more foundations...[primarily] Carnegie, Ford and Rockefeller. ...
>
> Government support for national security studies has been largely concentrated in specialized institutes set up by the military services--the RAND Corporation, by the Air Force; the Research Analysis Corporation, working almost exclusively for the Army; the Navy's Operations Evaluation Group; and the Institute for Defense Analyses, set up by the Department of Defense. But the government has also contracted with outside institutions for special military studies...[For example, contracts have been let and grants awarded] to scholars at Princeton, Harvard, and Yale, to groups organized by the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, M.I.T., and Rutgers, to private research agencies like the Hudson Institute and the Stanford Research Institute, and to industrial firms like the Bendix Corporation and Arthur D. Little, Inc. 1/

Civilian theorists a decade ago ranged far and wide in the realm of national defense, but they concentrated on nuclear deterrence, a brand-new and wide-open field. Kissinger's Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Kahn's On Thermonuclear War, and Wohlstetter's "The Delicate Balance of Terror," first published in Foreign Affairs, were enormously influential. A spate of classified studies supplemented open publications. 2/ The cumulative impact on Pentagon policy was considerable.

1/Lyons, Gene M. and Louis Morton. Schools for Strategy: Education and Research in National Security Affairs. New York, Praeger, 1965, p. 7-10.

2/A representative collection of unclassified products is contained in Problems of National Strategy. Ed. by Henry A. Kissinger. New York, Praeger, 1965. 477 p.

Unofficial "think tanks" reached their zenith under Defense Secretary McNamara, despite opposition from professional military men, who deplored the inroads of part-time "amateurs". The period of greatest productivity by civilian intellectuals actually encompassed only a few astonishing years. It declined when the leadership began drifting to other fields. That process was accentuated in 1970, after defense funds for political-military studies were cut as a result of Congressional displeasure with products judged to be overly esoteric and/or inappropriate for DOD probes. When Daniel Ellsberg, then an employee at RAND, leaked the Pentagon Papers to the press in 1971, efforts to obviate additional breaches of security caused controls over contract agencies to tighten stringently, and the budget pinch to intensify.[1/] Major organs are still in operation, but the scopes of civilian strategists outside the official establishment have been markedly circumscribed.

There is some evidence that a new trend may now be manifest. Our Armed Services are beginning to exhibit a serious interest in creative thinking. The National War College established a Strategic Research Group in 1971, dedicated to the development of original theories and concepts that cut across the entire national security spectrum. Other institutions, under the auspices of the JCS and individual services, are experimenting with similar innovations, tailored to suit specialized needs. Each of these embryonic undertakings must overcome enormous institutional opposition and inertia, but the trend seems a step in the right direction.

1/Laird Orders "Crackdown" on RAND Corp. Security. Armed Forces Journal, July 19, 1971, p. 15-17.

CONGRESSIONAL INFLUENCE AND CONTROL

For most of its first 170 years, the United States believed itself either at war or at peace. Those categories by and large were clean-cut. In time of war, the Congress generally acquiesced to Executive Branch demands. In time of peace, national defense attracted just enough Congressional attention to keep costs at a minimum.

The period 1952-1973 affords no such simple distinctions. Hiatuses between armed hostilities have been twilight zones, neither true war nor true peace. We remained always on the alert, and maintained active armed forces whose magnitude and appetite for money, manpower, and materiel were unprecedented. Almost inevitably, the Congress began to concern itself to a greater degree with the details of national defense and associated subjects.

Many consequences have been threaded throughout this study, but a few deserve individual treatment.[1/] The intrinsic trend involves:

--A more complex Congressional matrix.

--A broader Congressional scope.

--Close, continuous, and expanding Congressional influence.

Changes in the Congressional Power Structure

The Senate and House Armed Services Committees, created by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, exerted modest control over DOD budget requests until the early 1960s. They submitted lump-sum recommendations

1/A detailed review is contained in The Power of the Pentagon: The Creation, Control, and Acceptance of Defense Policy by the U.S. Congress. Washington, Congressional Quarterly, 1972. 115 p.

to the Appropriations Committees, which then arrived at specific authorizations, and parcelled out funds for particular programs.[1/]

When a rider to P.L. 86-149 took effect in 1961, the Armed Services Committees began to authorize the procurement of aircraft, missiles, and ships. P.L. 87-436 in 1962 and P.L. 88-174 the following year extended those prerogatives to approve all RDT&E conducted by the Defense Department. Since then, the scope has expanded still farther. The Armed Services Committees presently originate legislation that covers approximately one-third of all DOD expenditures. Once authorizations initiated by those bodies are approved by Congress and are signed by the President, their limits may not be exceeded by appropriations bills, although they can be cut. Beyond that, the Armed Services Committees establish manpower levels and pay scales for all U.S. forces, active and reserve. Their oversight and investigating powers cover nearly every DOD activity.

Two-thirds of the Pentagon's annual budget request are still handled exclusively by the Appropriations Committees. However, those expenditures involve semi-stable constants, rather than contentious variables like weapons procurement: operations and maintenance funds; military pay and allowances; and retirement benefits. Since the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees often have differing viewings, the Executive Branch today must satisfy four reviewing authorities, and thus confronts a much more intricate environment for defense decision-making than it did a decade ago.

1/Title I to Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, [P.L. 601], August 2, 1946.

That fact of life is further complicated by a division of responsibility that places most foreign military aid under jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. In particular, disagreements between the Nixon Administration on one hand and the Senate Committee on the other have a direct bearing on the Nixon Doctrine and the total force concept.

Non-Budgetary Areas of Salient Interest

Manpower Utilization. Manpower procurement matters related to strength levels, the draft and, more recently, the All-Volunteer Force have been consistent Congressional concerns for many years. However, the Congress is exercising increasing oversight responsibilities regarding personnel utilization.

Areas of interest range widely. Investigations and subsequent actions have addressed such diverse subjects as recruiting practices; a whole gamut of policies that affect the retention of career personnel (everything from housing, to family separations, to the use of enlisted men as servants for senior officers); the problem of grade creep, which many Congressmen believe has produced a disproportionate number of "chiefs" in relation to "Indians"; officer/enlisted ratios, which cause similar criticism; student loads for recruit and specialized training, flight schools, professional education in military and civilian institutions, ROTC, and OCS; and the balance between combat and support personnel. Dissension in the ranks, born in part of disenchantment with the war in Vietnam, drug addiction, racial strife, and other indicators of low morale, consumed considerable Congressional energy in the immediate past,

along with the question of amnesty for draft dodgers and deserters. The list is lengthy.

Legislation produces some solutions to undesirable situations. In other instances, pressures generated by Congressional investigations cause the Department of Defense and the military services to intensify their own search for reforms. Since many problems remain unresolved, the Hill can be expected to exert increasing influence on manpower management during forthcoming years.

War Powers. Those prescient officials who framed our Constitution were resolved that no one man should commit this country to war, but constitutional guarantees in that regard are subject to elastic interpretation (Figure 22).

Figure 22

CONSTITUTIONAL WAR POWERS

Art. I, Sec. 8: "The Congress shall have the power to...provide for the common defence...to declare war...to raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years; to provide and maintain a Navy; to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces...to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof."

Art. II. Sec. 2: "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States...he shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls...."

That separation of powers reserves for Congress the right to declare wars, but customary interpretation recognizes that the Chief Executive must be able to respond rapidly in emergency.

The President traditionally has played the dominant role. Since 1789, U.S. forces have participated in scores of clashes overseas, but Congress has declared war only five times: the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, and World War II. Congress often consented to armed actions in ways that fell short of formal declarations, but many adventures were initiated by Presidents without Congressional concurrence.

Controversy over alleged Presidential usurpation of war powers has cropped up in the past--two decades ago, for example, some Congressmen challenged President Truman's unilateral decision to intervene in Korea--but the debates stirred no such passions as presently prevail. By 1969, the Vietnam War and discontent with U.S. containment policies had precipitated a determined struggle by many members of Congress to reassert what they perceived not just as their right, but their Constitutional duty, to participate in deliberations that commit this country to war.[1/]

The House on August 2, 1971 passed a resolution (H.J. Res. 1) that urged the President to consult Congress before involving U.S. forces in armed conflict, and required him to justify his actions in writing if he substantially reinforced our military presence abroad or engaged in combat operations without prior approval.[2/] The Senate, after protracted

1/U.S. Congress. Senate. Legislative History of the Committee on Foreign Relations, January 3, 1969-January 2, 1971. 92rd Congress, 2d Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972, p. 57-59. Discusses the National Commitments Resolutions.

2/U.S. Congress. House. Report No. 92-383 Concerning the War Powers of Congress and the President, to accompany H.J.Res. 1, 92d Congress, 1st Session, July 27, 1971, 8 p.

debate, passed a bill (S. 2956) with stronger provisions on April 13, 1972. It provided procedures whereby Congress could override Presidential decisions to engage in undeclared wars and defined exceptional circumstances in which the President could act on his own.

Neither H.J. Res. 1 nor S. 2956 was adopted by the Congress in 1972. Both were reintroduced in 1973, little changed except for new numbers. The compromise in conference (Figure 23) forbids the President to wage undeclared war for more than 60 days, unless Congress gives its express consent by a majority vote in both chambers. That limitation would prevent minor incidents or emergency actions from developing into large-scale, prolonged hostilities without congressional concurrence. Nevertheless, the phraseology is loose enough to permit the President considerable leeway in situations that seem to call for force or the threat of force.

The War Powers Resolution of 1973 was approved by the Senate on October 10. The House followed suit two days later. President Nixon vetoed the bill on October 24, 1973, calling it "clearly unconstitutional," but was overridden by the Congress on November 7 in an historic action (balloting in the House was 284 to 135, in the Senate 75 to 18, well over the necessary two-thirds majority needed to override the veto).1/

1/ War Powers of Congress and the President -- Veto. Congressional Record, November 7, 1973, p. S20093 - S20116; War Powers Resolution -- Veto Message from the President of the United States. Congressional Record; November 7, 1973, p. H9641 - H9661.

FIGURE 23

HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 542
WAR POWERS RESOLUTION OF 1973
(Extracts)

SHORT TITLE

SECTION 1. This joint resolution may be cited as the "War Powers Resolution".

PURPOSE AND POLICY

SEC. 2. (a) It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.

(b) Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically provided that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

(c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.

CONSULTATION

SEC. 3. The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such situations.

REPORTING

SEC. 4. (a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced—

(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;

(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or

(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation;

the President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writing, setting forth—

(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces;

(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and

(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.

(b) The President shall provide such other information as the Congress may request in the fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and to the use of United States Armed Forces abroad.

(c) Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced into hostilities or into any situation described in subsection (a) of this section, the President shall, so long as such armed forces continue to be engaged in such hostilities or situation, report to the Congress periodically on the status of such hostilities or situation as well as on the scope and duration of such hostilities or situation, but in no event shall he report to the Congress less often than once every six months.

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

SEC. 5. (a) Each report submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1) shall be transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate on the same calendar day. Each report so transmitted shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate for appropriate action. If, when the report is transmitted, the Congress has adjourned sine die or has adjourned for any period in excess of three calendar days, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate, if they deem it advisable (or if petitioned by at least 30 percent of the membership or their respective Houses) shall jointly request the President to convene Congress in order that it may consider the report and take appropriate action pursuant to this section.

(b) Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war as has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States. Such sixty-day period shall be extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the President determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces.

Figure 23 (Con't.)

(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution...

INTERPRETATION OF JOINT RESOLUTION

SEC. 8. (a) Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances shall not be inferred—

(1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before the date of the enactment of this joint resolution), including any provision contained in any appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically authorizes the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and states that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution; or

(2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such treaty is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and stating that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution...

Ambiguities will remain until constitutionality, or a lack thereof, is decided by the courts. Meanwhile, the War Powers Resolution puts on the books a law that sharply limits the President's authority to wage war solely on his initiative.

Intelligence Operations. Congress always has had a comprehensive interest in the entire U.S. intelligence community. Nearly 200 bills have been introduced during the past two decades, dealing with appropriations, expenditures, internal administration, and Congressional supervisory responsibilities.[1/]

Nearly 150 bills have proposed the establishment of a Joint Congressional Committee or other organ to provide close and continuous scrutiny of U.S. intelligence programs. Only two such recommendations ever reached the floor of Congress, one in 1955, the other 10 years later. Both were decisively defeated. Since 1968, three events have strengthened Congressional resolve to exercise greater control: domestic intelligence collection efforts undertaken surreptitiously by the Army to support its internal security missions; the so-called "secret war" conducted by CIA in Laos; and the Watergate affair, which disclosed dabbling in domestic affairs by the CIA, and unsavory practices by other intelligence elements.[2/]

1/Costa, John and Evans, Gary Lee. Legislation Introduced Relative to the Activities of the Intelligence Agencies, 1947-1972. Washington, Congressional Research Service, October 9, 1970. Revised and updated December 15, 1972. p. 57-63.

2/U.S. Congress. Senate. A Report of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights Judiciary Committee, on Military Surveillance of Civilian Politics. 93d Congress, 1st Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973. 150 p.; U.S. Congress. Senate. A Staff Report Prepared for the Use of the Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Foreign Relations Committee, on Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia: January, 1972. 92d Congress, 2d Session. Washington U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972, 39 p.; and Hamer, Joh. Intelligence Community. Washington, Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1973. 22 p.

The upshot has been much intensified Congressional activity in the intelligence arena.

In March, 1970, the Secretary of the Army ordered his service to cease surveillance of civilian political activities, and to destroy associated data banks. A Defense Department directive issued similar instructions to all DOD elements the following year, and provided a Defense Investigative Review Council to insure compliance.[1/]

Spokesmen in both Houses are determined to put a check-rein on all facets of the CIA, which thus far has been privileged to operate without normal legislative oversight. The starting point apparently will be to review and amend pertinent portions of the National Security Act of 1947.[2/] Whatever the outcome, the trend toward closer scrutiny of the intelligence community is likely to endure.

1/Military Surveillance of Civilian Politics, p. 6-7.

2/War Powers Act. Remarks in the Senate. Congressional Record, July 20, 1973, p. S. 14190; and Military Procurement Authorization, 1974. Remarks in the House. Congressional Record, July 31, 1973, p. H.6922-H.6923.

WRAPUP

The basic purpose of this survey, as outlined at the beginning, has been to provide a panoramic perspective of U. S. national security trends.

It would be presumptuous to judge herein which trends are "good" and which are "bad." Each reader must deduce his own conclusions. Nevertheless, several subjects merit close scrutiny. The following list, which is highly selective, concentrates on possible conflicts between emerging or established trends on one hand and basic U. S. defense interests on the other.

INTEREST IN SURVIVAL

--America's loss of strategic nuclear leverage.

--The U.S. repudiation of strategic defense.

INTERESTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY, CREDIBILITY, AND FREEDOM OF ACTION

--The drastic reduction in U. S. general purpose force complements and capabilities.

--Compulsory heavy reliance on reserve components and allies.

--The retardation of force modernization, owing to immense manpower costs.

INTEREST IN PEACE

--The dilution of U. S. deterrence as a consequence of the foregoing trends.

--The continued neglect of conventional arms control.

* * * * * * *

Each entry above is subject to multiple interpretations. Renewed debate on the matters enumerated, with emphasis on imaginative options,

would sharpen the issues. That process, in turn, would help U. S. defense decision-makers to negotiate an historic turning point in our history and to chart a course that matches ends with means to this country's best advantage for the rest of the 20th Century.

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