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ASSESSMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST ARMS RACE 1968.



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Washington D.C.

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
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## ASSESSMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST ARMS RACE

### Introduction

By definition, the term "arms race" assumes that opposing sides are accumulating weapons so that they might either destroy their enemy, protect themselves from enemy aggression or reach a balance where neither side will realize an advantage. The race could end if and when the two sides in the dispute reached a balance point where their respective forces would approximately cancel each other and both sides then decided it would be futile to try to outstrip the other. The obvious difficulty is in reaching a point where both decide they are equal in strength and feel relatively secure from attack. In the Middle East, it might be possible to measure the armed capabilities of the nations in the region and decide that, as far as men in uniform and military hardware were concerned, some kind of balance had been achieved, but there are several intangible factors in the Middle East that tend to make a political acceptance of a concept of military parity difficult or impossible.

Like steel mills, hydroelectric projects and commercial airlines, the possession of a modern armed force is a sign of prestige and modernity among many of the less developed nations. Many nations use the facade of a well equipped armed force to suggest to the world that the whole nation is equally modern and well equipped. There is also a feeling of total independence in knowing that the nation is fully capable of defending itself, without the assistance of a "colonial" power.

### I. Regional Problems and the Arms Race

The Middle East arms race is further confused by the number of potential enemies. While the tendency is to assume that an arms buildup by Arab countries is directed against Israel, differences between Arab states and within Arab states also contribute to the arms race. It may be said of Jordan, for example, that it not only fears Israel, but also Syria, and possibly Iraq. Iraq opposes Israel and has sent forces to the Jordanian front, but the Iraqis also are engaged in a civil war with the Kurdish tribes of the north and are "on guard" against the Iranians to the east. The United Arab Republic was involved in the Yemen civil war during the hostilities against Israel in June 1967.

It is possible that a nation may use the arms race and the conflicts of the Middle East to avoid other problems and divert attention from other failings. By creating a "wolf at the door" atmosphere, unsolved economic and social problems, and domestic political quarrels can be brushed aside in the interest of a national emergency. One example might be Syria where the population has been mobilized against the Israeli threat with domestic political and economic crises temporarily forgotten. Israel has been able to arrest an economic recession during the "emergency" period that has lasted since May 1967. The government of Jordan may have prolonged its life by rattling the saber against Israel and thus appeasing several dissident factions in the country.

Israel's dilemma is compounded because while it cannot hope to win a decisive victory, unless a settlement is reached, Israel will be faced by the prospect of decades of intermittent war. To avoid the possible disastrous results of a defeat, the Israelis tend to overarm and attempt to eliminate even the slightest prospect of a weak link in their armor. The Arabs also tend to overarm in preparation for what they believe to be the inescapable battle with Israel and to insure that when the battle comes, they will be fully capable of redeeming the Palestinians and rectifying past humiliations. Many Arab leaders have also expressed fear of what they call "Israeli expansionism." Jordan fears that another war will result in the annexation of the remainder of the Jordanian territory by the Israeli state. Thus, two of the states, Jordan and Israel, believe that to sustain a defeat will mean the end of their nations.

There is also a tendency on the part of recipients to look to the suppliers of arms as allies, under the assumption that once the supplier has agreed to furnish arms, he is then committed to the defense of the recipient nation. It has been suggested that one of the reasons that the Israelis are so insistent upon the United States' furnishing the F-4 Phantom jet aircraft is that the act will appear to be a commitment on the part of the United States to support Israel in the event of another war. Some observers have suggested that Jordan "blackmailed" the United States into furnishing tanks and planes by threatening to go to Moscow for arms. But there are also concrete examples that arms suppliers have not lived

up to these nebulous and hoped-for "commitments." Several of the Arab states apparently assumed that the Soviet willingness to sell modern arms also meant unlimited support of the Arab cause against Israel, a misconception that left more than a little disillusionment in the early hours of June 5, 1967, when the Russians did not rush to the aid of the Arab states. Another example might be the Israeli change of attitude toward France when the French embargoed a shipment of jet planes already on order.

## II. Outside Powers and the Arms Race

The achievement of peace in the Middle East, coupled with an end to the arms race, also depends upon the aims and objectives of the nations supplying the weapons. It may be helpful to summarize briefly the Middle Eastern goals of the outside powers in order to determine the possibility of their cooperating in some form of multilateral arms limitation for the region.

### A. The Soviet Union

The Soviet Union plays a major role in the Middle East. Russian interest in the area is rooted in geography and history, politics and ideology, and, to an increasing extent, strategic necessity.<sup>1/</sup> Soviet policy toward the Middle East, as it is generally toward the emerging,

<sup>1/</sup> Most important from a geographical point of view is the fact that the southwest Asian states of Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan border immediately on the predominantly Muslim southern fringe of the USSR.



underdeveloped areas of Asia and Africa, is aimed at achieving <sup>influence</sup> ~~dominance~~ in the area by the use of political and economic/military assistance and at gradually removing Western influence. The long-term goal apparently is to transform the regimes into socialist and, ultimately, Communist models whose interests would presumably be symmetrical with those of the Soviet Union. <sup>1/</sup> The Middle East appears to present an ideal probing ground for Moscow because of its general instability, and past Soviet practice does not provide convincing evidence that the preservation of peace is Russia's main concern in the area.

Greater ideological weight has been given in the 1960's to the revolutionary role of the national military elite and other non-Communist elites as instruments for radicalizing a nation and building socialism. For the Middle East, this has meant a close alliance with Arab nationalism. Unlike most Western powers, the Soviet Union has had no imperial holdings in the Middle East proper and thus has not borne the burdensome stigma of colonialism. Since the late 1950's, the Soviet government has concentrated on establishing good relations with individual Middle Eastern states, thus abandoning its plan to manipulate Arab affairs as a whole and adopting a more cautious policy.

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1/ For a complete, detailed study of Soviet policy in the Middle East, see the multilith put out by the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, November 26, 1967, F-271 by Joseph Whelan entitled "The Soviet Union and the Middle East: A Survey and Analysis."

Extensive economic and military assistance programs have been a principal Soviet instrument<sup>1/</sup> for establishing a presence in the Middle East, with greater emphasis placed on the more dynamic military aspect. The major recipients of Soviet arms, the UAR, Syria, and Iraq, have received MIG fighters, light and medium bombers, submarines, destroyers, anti-tank and anti-plane missiles, and a vast supply of small arms and other military equipment. In addition, the Soviet Union provides training in military strategy and tactics and in the use and maintenance of the weapons it furnishes. The June 1967 Arab defeat may have revealed some shortcomings in the Soviet training programs.

On the whole, military assistance has become the primary vehicle for the Soviet offensive in the Middle East, enabling the USSR to achieve a position of influence in some areas very important to Western interests and to make an immediate impact on regional balances of power. Once fully equipped with Soviet arms, the UAR and the other Arab countries involved will have less and less leverage, depending on the Soviet Union for training, maintenance and replacement, and will face nearly insurmountable costs in shifting to self-financing if politics or necessity requires this.

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<sup>1/</sup> In addition, the Soviet Union has used commercial treaties, cultural exchanges, scholarship programs and development projects such as the Aswan Dam in its overall policy.

The Arab defeat has given the Soviets substantial political leverage in dealing with Egypt and Nasser and has permitted deeper Soviet penetration into Egypt. Under the new terms for giving military assistance to Egypt, the Soviet government reportedly demanded in return for their weapons that Soviet military advisers be stationed with Arab troops and be given increased guidance over the direction of Arab military affairs; that closer consultation between Arab and Soviet political leaders be instituted to prevent any rash action that could provoke Israel again; and that the Egyptian command be shaken up to eliminate "anti-revolutionary elements."<sup>1/</sup> Egypt, because of its desperate need for armaments, has accepted rising Soviet influence, including a significant increase in the number of Soviet technicians and other advisers.<sup>2/</sup> Egypt is less receptive to Communist ideology than is Syria, where the once banned Communist party is now operating openly and Soviet advisers and technicians apparently occupy an even stronger role.

Despite the many advantages the Soviet Union possesses in pursuing its Middle Eastern policy, the Soviets are faced with formidable obstacles. To begin with, Soviet policy is evidently based upon the questionable assumption that Communist ideology can successfully restructure, socialize and eventually Communize traditional Arab-Muslim societies. To achieve

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<sup>1/</sup> The Washington Post, July 30, 1967, P. A21, as cited in Whelan, op cit.

<sup>2/</sup> The New York Times reported on October 22, 1968, that some senior American officials were becoming increasingly concerned about the role of Soviet military advisers in the UAR. Some 2000 to 3000 advisers are now assigned down to the battalion level in the army and fly with each air force squadron, and they oversee all aspects of training. American analysts say, according to the article, that the USSR has poured about \$2.5 billion worth of modern arms into the Middle East in the past sixteen months. These have replaced nearly all the jets, tanks, artillery and other weapons lost by Egypt and have more than replaced the losses of Syria and Iraq. Equivalent weapons reportedly would cost the U.S. some \$4 billion.

such goals the Soviets must contend with such powerful counterforces as Arab nationalism, pan-Islamism, the deep-rooted traditionalism in most countries and the many intra-Arab and intra-Muslim conflicts endemic in the Middle East. National liberation movements have proven to have their own particular dynamism and the nations concerned have their own particular policy preferences which may only temporarily coincide with those of the Soviet Union. A further obstacle is the Western presence in the Middle East:

(1) the oil-producing countries depend on the West for continued prosperity and

(2) the Western presence is evident not only in the economic sphere but also in the political and military spheres. This is particularly true in the case of Turkey and Iran, which are bound to the West by a system of pacts and by a common concern for the potential danger to their interests that Soviet power presents.

The United States presents the greatest obstacle to an increase in Soviet influence in the Middle East because of the relationships between the U.S. and some of the nations of the region. Soviet policy in the Middle East has been based on the assumption that a direct military confrontation with the United States was to be avoided and that Soviet goals were to be pursued at a lower threshold of danger, notably through client states and programs of extensive military and economic aid.)

Another obstacle for the Soviet Union is the deeply ingrained attachments, and economic ties, which some Middle Eastern nations have with other states which would be difficult to sever. Algeria might serve as an example of a country which has retained strong cultural and commercial ties with the former colonial power, in this case France, which will serve as a barrier to Soviet dominance.

#### B. The United States

[The major US objectives in the Middle East are to insure the stability of the area, to prevent Communist subversion or Communist aggression against the states of the region, to offer particular protection for US friends, to insure the continued freedom of transit through the Middle East, and to protect American interests in the states of the Middle East.] In May 1950, the United States, France and the United Kingdom signed the Tripartite Declaration which placed limits on arms traffic to the Middle East and which suggested the guarantee of the territorial integrity of all states in the region.<sup>1/</sup> Since 1950, the United Kingdom and France have withdrawn their adherence to the Declaration but it remains the foundation of US policy for the Middle East.

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<sup>1/</sup> Excerpts from the Declaration follow: "The three Governments...declared their opposition to the development of an arms race between the Arab states and Israel...assurances have been received from all the states in question...that the purchasing states do not intend to take any act of aggression against any other state...The three Governments (declare) their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in that area...(and) should they find that any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation." Department of State Bulletin, June 5, 1950, p. 886.

To stop the spread of Communism, the United States formulated, in 1957, the Eisenhower Doctrine which offered assistance to any nation threatened by Communist aggression. The US has participated in the Central Treaty Organization, a defense alliance which incorporates the "northern tier" concept.<sup>1/</sup> Turkey and the United States are also allied under the NATO agreements. U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East, in addition to assistance in maintaining the security of friends and allies, include the continued availability of oil to Western Europe and Japan.<sup>2/</sup>

U.S. involvement in the Middle East arms race incorporates these interests: keeping the oil producing states strong enough to withstand challenges from Communist subversion and other quarters, keeping the area stable so that the communication and transportation routes will remain open, and insuring that the friends of the U.S. maintain their sovereignty and do not succumb to Communist aggression or to internal Communist subversion. Secretary of State Rusk in July 1967 said the U.S. would sell arms to some Arab nations in order to avoid an east-west polarization in the Middle East.

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<sup>1/</sup> The members of CENTO are Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom. The United States sits as an observer and participates as a nonvoting member of various councils of the organization, contributing advice and financial support.

<sup>2/</sup> During the June 1967 war, much was made of the oil boycott imposed against the United States, the United Kingdom and West Germany, but the effort was largely one of propaganda and not of much substance. For Europe, Middle East oil is almost vital: at least two-thirds of Europe's oil comes from the area. The Arab countries concerned, however, cannot replace the oil revenues, as illustrated by the UAR request to American oil companies operating in Egyptian oil fields to remain despite the rupture of diplomatic relations. Another U.S. ally, Japan, receives about 90% of its oil from the Persian Gulf states.

The United States has also been a supplier of arms to Israel; negotiations are underway in October 1968 for delivery of F-4 Phantom jets to Israel. Israel represents a special case since the U.S. was instrumental in the creation of the state, has supplied a major portion of financial assistance to the state, and is the home of a large Jewish community which supports Israel both financially and emotionally. The American people feel a particular attachment to Israel because of the historical connections of Christianity and Judaism, the extermination of Jews by Nazi Germany, and the close relationship of Israeli culture to Western culture. U.S. commitments to protect Israel have been expressed by government and civic leaders, although there are no formal treaty arrangements to support the commitment.

According to the annual report prepared by the Agency for International Development for the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the United States has furnished military assistance to the following Middle Eastern countries for the years 1946-1967: Iraq, \$46.7 million; Israel, \$41.6 million; Jordan, \$7.4 million; Lebanon, \$8.8 million; Saudi Arabia, \$258.4 million; and Syria, \$ 0.1 million.<sup>1/</sup> The weapons have ranged from Hawk missiles to Israel and Saudi Arabia to officer training for Syria. The largest array of weapons has gone to Saudi Arabia and Jordan, each of which has received tanks, jet aircraft and transport planes, small arms, artillery, trucks, communications equipment, and in the case of Saudi Arabia, coastal ships.

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<sup>1/</sup> The UAR has received no military assistance from the U.S.

More U.S. weapons are scheduled to be sent to Tunisia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel and Lebanon under agreements temporarily suspended by the June 1967 embargo. It has been reported that Jordan will receive about \$100 million in tanks, planes and small arms in the near future.

C. Other outside involvement

France has been a regular supplier of weapons to both sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict and to several quarters in the intra-Arab struggles. It would appear that the French hope to capitalize on their arms policies by improving their economic position in the area, as for example, the acquiring of major oil interests in Iraq. France has a substantial interest in the flow of Middle Eastern oil, as does Great Britain. The United Kingdom was a dominant colonial power in the Middle East until World War II and retains some ties to former colonies, Kuwait for example, although most of them have since gained full independence.

There is some traffic in used arms or in arms exchanges. Algeria became a supplier for the United Arab Republic during the hostilities of June 1967. Pakistan recently sold two Hunter jet aircraft to Jordan, and West Germany has supplied American tanks to Israel as part of the reparations payments.

The United Nations and several of its affiliated organizations have acted as mediators and arbiters in Middle Eastern disputes and are thus indirectly involved in the arms race. One suggestion offered for the reluctance of the United States to supply the F-4 Phantom aircraft



requested by Israel is the fear that the role of the UN mediator would be compromised by an increase in the fighting potential of Israel. The UNRWA has been accused of harboring guerrilla bands among the refugees and of contributing to the regional unrest by allowing the terrorists sanctuary in the camps. Arab terrorists compromise the UNRWA by using the camps and by recruiting refugees to their cause.

### III. Difficulties in Comparing Military Strength of Middle Eastern Countries

Actual comparisons of the armed strengths of the Arabs and the Israelis are difficult because of the absence of accurate information, the use of propaganda to distort strengths and weaknesses, the effect of the intangibles already discussed, and the many complex political problems involved. Aside from the physical capabilities of the two sides, other important factors are morale, strategy, training, and leadership. In sheer numbers, the Arab states have the obvious advantage since they have a much larger population to draw from. Of course, mobilizing the whole Arab population is impossible because of the expense, the low educational level and the logistical and political problems involved. For example, Iraq has been reluctant to include members of the Kurdish minority in its armed forces since there is a fear that the Kurds would use the training and weapons to establish their own state. The Jordanian government relies on desert tribesmen rather than the Palestinian population for the bulk of its armed forces because the tribesmen remain loyal to the King while the Palestinians are more interested in war with Israel.

The Israeli armed forces are better trained, better equipped, and better educated than their Arab counterparts. Israeli soldiers know that their nation cannot sustain a defeat; thus they are determined not to concede even the smallest advantage to their enemy. The Israeli army is led, not directed or driven into battle, a factor that contributes to the overall morale of the armed forces. The Israeli army has a flair for the unexpected and has, whenever it has been necessary, performed far better than a paper analysis of their capability would indicate. During the June 1967 war, it was reported that the Israelis mobilized every available plane but three, thus leaving the nation without air defense, and concentrated the whole of the Israeli air power in the attacks of June 5. To air strategists, the act approached foolhardiness, but to the Israelis, it was a calculated risk<sup>k</sup> so that their first strikes would be totally successful.

In many of the Arab countries, the principal function of the armed forces is to keep the existing regime in power. In Iraq, Algeria, and Yemen, the army is the government, while in the UAR, Syria, Jordan and South Yemen, the army is the foundation of power. Armies so heavily engaged in politics cannot concentrate on building up the well-trained, well-equipped, well-motivated military force necessary to defend their nations or to defeat the extremely efficient Israeli armed forces.

The relative strengths of the armed forces of the region are difficult to determine because of conflicting reports of the number and types of

weapons. The Air Force and Space Digest, for example, describes some of the aircraft as "first line" but does not define the term. The Institute of Strategic Studies recently described aircraft as "combat aircraft" but did not give details of the differences between combat aircraft and those planes that were not combat aircraft. A February 1967 Near East Report Special Survey of the arms race counted among the Israeli arsenal A-4 Skyhawk aircraft that had been ordered but not delivered. These aircraft were not actually delivered until a year later. Generally, too great a reliance has been placed on sheer numbers without adequate consideration being given to the capabilities of the planes or of their pilots.

To illustrate the importance of complete and concise information on the capabilities of the weapons, Iraq is usually included in most comparisons of the Arab-Israeli balance but the fact that the MIG-21 has a combat radius of less than 400 miles severely restricts their use from Iraqi airfields against Israeli targets. Israel's ships are often listed but their locations are not, a rather important consideration since the Israeli fleet must defend two unconnected coasts. In another example, the armored forces of Iraq and Saudi Arabia are doubtful quantities in the Arab-Israeli struggle since they would have to travel over great stretches of desert on only three roads of doubtful quality. The fact that Israel does not have enough trucks to transport its army and must rely on taxi-cabs and school buses is usually viewed as romantic or humorous and not as the strategic restriction that it is.

The extent of the rearmament of the Arab states after the Israelis destroyed so much equipment in June 1967 remains unclear. Israeli sources as early as July 1967 were saying that the UAR has been re-equipped to within 80% of the pre-war capacity while other sources suggested that the figure was lower. Some sources said the planes being sent to the UAR were MIG-21's while other sources said the planes were MIG-15's, 17's, and 19's. Planes ordered by the Israelis from France were described both as Mirage III-C and as Mirage V. The New York Times gave the number of US A-4 Skyhawks going to Israel as 36 in September 1967, as 48 in December 1967, as 68 in July 1968, and as 80 in October 1968.

Further confusion on the rearmament problem comes from the gap between the time the equipment is ordered, the time it is delivered and the time the recipient nation is capable of using it. It has been estimated in several sources that the Egyptian air force will not have sufficient numbers of trained pilots for their new aircraft until 1969 or 1970. Other sources suggest that the F-4 Phantoms sought by Israel will not be delivered until the same time. The question of parity between the UAR and Israel over the MIG's and Phantoms is not an immediate one, but one of two years hence. A similar case arose over the F-104 Starfighters "delivered" to Jordan before the conflict of June 1967. According to various reports, there were either five, six, or a squadron of planes being used either for training or for combat, and they were either flown to the United States, Saudi Arabia or Turkey by American or Jordanian pilots before the hostilities began.

The absence of clarity on these points makes rational policy decisions extremely difficult since those who would support or oppose a particular policy must base their opinions on the incomplete information available.

Recently, there have been two US policy decisions involving the shipment of arms to the Middle East: sending planes and tanks to Jordan and supplying F-4 Phantoms to Israel. For either question, good cases may be made for both sides on military and political grounds. It would appear that taking a stand on one side or the other of either case becomes a matter of: 1) what source one is willing to trust as authentic or as approaching authenticity, 2) one's conception of the ultimate goals of the United States in the Middle East, and 3) the possible diplomatic reactions to announcements of decisions regarding arms policies.

In summary, an analysis of the Middle East arms race necessitates accurate information on the numbers of weapons, the capabilities of the weapons, the technical skill of the personnel operating and maintaining the weapons, and the timetable of when all weapons will be operational. Emotional arguments must be recognized as such, propaganda must be discounted, and appeals based on limited perspectives should be balanced against the larger context. The short and long term goals of the belligerents as well as the suppliers of armaments should be considered and arms policies should take into account not only the conflict between the Arabs and the Israelis but the conflicts among the Arab states as well. And finally, the future prospects of the whole region should be considered: will the policy of the moment contribute ultimately to peace or war?

The purpose of the following tables is to illustrate the variations among available sources, emphasizing not their differences but the lack of precise information and the difficulty this presents in analyzing the alternatives. Sources were chosen for comparison only, and no attempt is made to discredit or champion any one source.

IV. TablesCOMPARISONS OF RELATIVE STRENGTHS DURING THE PERIOD OF THE JUNE 1967 CONFLICT  
TOTAL AIRCRAFT (NOT NECESSARILY AVAILABLE FOR COMBAT)

SOURCE	COUNTRY:	IRAQ	JORDAN	SYRIA	UAR	ISRAEL
<u>PRE-WAR</u>						
Institute of Strategic Studies, 1966-1967		*	*	*	550	350
Middle East Forum, 1966		300	52	100	(350)	350-400
Near East Report, Feb 1967		200	80	150	550	350
Washington Post, May 25, 1967		215	72	233	750	590
New York Times, June 6, 1967		200	50	150	434	450
<u>LOSSES IN JUNE 1967</u>						
Air Force and Space Digest, July 1968		*	<u>1</u> /	60	350	*
New York Times, Oct 12, 1967		12	<u>1</u> /	36	300	40
<u>POST-WAR</u>						
ISS, 1967-1968 (as of Jun 30, 1967)		170	0	25	225	230
ISS, 1968-1969 (Sep 1968)		215	20	150	400	273

COMPARISON OF RELATIVE STRENGTHS DURING THE PERIOD OF THE JUNE 1967 CONFLICT  
 TOTAL TANKS (DOES NOT INCLUDE SELF-PROPELLED GUNS, AS FAR AS CAN BE DETERMINED)

SOURCE	COUNTRY:	IRAQ	JORDAN	SYRIA	UAR	ISRAEL
<u>PRE-WAR</u>						
Institute of Strategic Studies, 1966-1967		*	*	*	1200	800
Middle East Forum, 1966		800	200-250	400	1200	1000
Near East Report, Feb 1967		300	250	600	1400	800
Washington Post, May 25, 1967		300	250	600	1400	800
New York Times, Jun 6, 1967		400	*	400	1200	650
<u>LOSSES IN JUNE 1967</u>						
(Various sources)		*	150	*	500-700	<u>2/</u>
<u>POST-WAR</u>						
ISS, 1967-1968 (as of Jun 30, 1967)		600	100	400	370	990
ISS, 1968-1969 (Sep 1968)		575	230	490	700	800



## COMPARISON OF NUMBERS AND TYPES OF WEAPONS DURING THE PERIOD OF THE JUNE 1967 CONFLICT

## IRAQ

WEAPON	SOURCE:	ISS 1966-1967	Middle East Forum Autumn 1966	Near East Report Feb 1967	ISS 1967-1968 (as of Jun 30, 1967)	ISS 1968-1969 (Sep 1968)
TANKS - - Total		*	800	300	600	575
T-54		*	*	30	*	300
T-34		*	*	100	*	180
Centurion		*	*	120	*	55
Chafee		*	*	40	*	40
PLANES - - Total		*	300	200	170	215
MIG-21		*	*	20	50	60
MIG-17/19		*	*	30	34	45
Hawker-Hunter		*	*	45	50	50
TU-16		*	*	16	6	8
I1-28		*	*	28	10	10
T-52 Trainers		*	*	*	20	20
SU-7		*	*	*	*	20

## LRS-22

## COMPARISON OF NUMBERS AND TYPES OF WEAPONS DURING THE PERIOD OF THE JUNE 1967 CONFLICT

## JORDAN

WEAPON	SOURCE:	ISS 1966-1967	Middle East Forum Autumn 1966	Near East Report Feb 1967	ISS 1967-1968 (as of Jun 30, 1967)	ISS 1968-1969 (Sep 1968)
TANKS - - Total	*		200-250	250	100	230
M-47/48 Patton	*		100	200	50	110
Centurion	*		*	50	50	105
Charioteer	*		*	*	*	15
PLANES - - Total	*		52	80	0	20
Hawker-Hunter	*		25	25	0	12
Vampire	*		15	*	*	*
F-104 Starfighter	*		12	36	*	20
F-86F Sabre	*		*	*	*	4

## COMPARISON OF NUMBERS AND TYPES OF WEAPONS DURING THE PERIOD OF THE JUNE 1967 CONFLICT

## SYRIA

WEAPON	SOURCE:	ISS 1966-1967	Middle East Forum Autumn 1966	Near East Report Feb 1967	ISS 1967-1968 (as of Jun 30, 1967)	ISS 1968-1969 (Sep 1968)
TANKS - - Total		*	400	600	400	*
T-54/55		*	*	250	150	250
T-34		*	*	250	200	150
SU-100		*	*	100	*	60
"German"		*	*	*	50	30
PLANES - - Total		*	100	150	25	150
MIG-21		*	20	45	*	60
MIG-19		*	20	*	*	*
MIG-15/17		*	60	60	*	70
TU-16		*	*	24	*	*
Il-28		*	*	4	*	*
SU-7		*	*	*	*	20

## COMPARISON OF NUMBERS AND TYPES OF WEAPONS DURING THE PERIOD OF THE JUNE 1967 CONFLICT

## THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

WEAPON	SOURCE:	ISS 1966-1967	Middle East Forum Autumn 1966	Near East Report Feb 1967	ISS 1967-1968 (as of Jun 30, 1967)	ISS 1968-1969 (Sep 1968)
TANKS - - Total		1200	1200	1400	370	700
JS-3		60	50	60	20	20
T-54/55		450	450	550	250	500
T-34		350	350	500	70	100
Centurion		30	32	30	30	10
AMX-13		20	*	20	*	20
PT-76		*	*	50	*	50
SU-100		150	*	200	*	*
PLANES - - Total		550	(350)	550	225	400
MIG-21		130	100-120	130	100	110
MIG-19		80	80	80	45	80
MIG-15/17		150	150	150	60	120
SU-7		*	*	*	*	40
TU-16		30	30	30	*	10
Il-28		40	40	40	20	40
"Jet trainers"		*	*	24	150	150

## COMPARISON OF NUMBERS AND TYPES OF WEAPONS DURING THE PERIOD OF THE JUNE 1967 CONFLICT

## ISRAEL

WEAPON	SOURCES: ISS 1966-1967	Middle East Forum Autumn 1966	Near East Report Feb 1967	ISS 1967-1968 (as of Jun 30, 1967)	ISS 1968-1969 (Sep 1968)
TANKS - - Total	800	1000	800	990	800
M-47/48 Patton	200	200	200	225	130
Sherman	200	400	200	175	200
Centurion 5/7	250	30	250	250	225
AMX-13	150	200	150	140	125
T-54/55 (captured)				200 <sup>2/</sup>	120 <sup>2/</sup>
PLANES - - Total	350	350-400	350	230	273
Mirage III-C	72	72	72	65	65
Super Mystere	18	24	18	25	15
Mystere IV-A	40	60	40	25	35
Magister	60	*	60	50	65
Ouragan	40	*	40	50	45
A-4 Skyhawk	*	48	48	*	48
Vautour	*	25	15	15	15
"Jet trainers"	*	40	*	*	*

## ARMS DELIVERIES TO MIDDLE EAST NATIONS DURING THE PERIOD OF THE JUNE 1967 CONFLICT

SOURCE	COUNTRY	DATE OF DELIVERY	TANKS	PLANES
Christ. Sci. Mon., Feb 16, 1968	Jordan	(Since Jun 1967)		3 Hawker-Hunter from UK 2-3 Hawker-Hunter from Pakistan
Wash. Post, Mar 29, 1968	"	(Start Mar 1968)	100 M-47 from US	16-18 F-104 from US
London Times, May 3, 1968	"	(May 1968) On order		11 Hawker-Hunter from UK 8 Hawker-Hunter from UK
New York Times, Sep 15, 1968	"	July 1968	54 Patton from US	
NYT, Jun 18, 1967	UAR	(Since Jun 1967)		200-225 fighters and 60-100 bombers from USSR
Wash. Post, Jun 30, 1967	"	(Since Jun 1967)		100-200 from USSR
NYT, Jul 11, 1967	"	(Since Jun 1967)	100 from USSR	30 MIG-21 ) 70 MIG-15/17 ) from USSR 12 Il-28 )
NYT, Jul 19, 1967	"	(Since Jun 1967)	100 from USSR	100 MIG's from USSR
NYT, Sep 28, 1967	"	(Since Jun 1967)	200-250 from USSR	150 from USSR
NYT, Oct 12, 1967	"	(Since Jun 1967)	200 from USSR	180-240 from USSR 50 from Algeria
Time, Oct 20, 1967	"	(Since Jun 1967)	230 from USSR	25 bombers from USSR
Wash. Post, Dec 21, 1967	"	(Since Jun 1967)	800 T-54/55 from USSR	120 MIG-21 ) 55 SU-7 ) from USSR 50 others )

## ARMS DELIVERIES TO MIDDLE EAST NATIONS DURING THE PERIOD OF THE JUNE 1967 CONFLICT

SOURCE	COUNTRY	DATE OF DELIVERY	TANKS	PLANES
Air Force & Space Dig July 1968	UAR	From Jun 1967 to Mar 1968		140 MIG-21 ) 60 SU-7 ) 20 TU-16 ) from USSR 55 others )
Wash. Post, Jul 26, 1967	Israel	June 1967	200 T-54/55 from UAR <sup>2/</sup>	
NYT Dec 19, 1967	"	Start Dec 1967		48 A-4 Skyhawk from US
Wash. Post Jan 9, 1967	"	Jun 3, 1967		20 Mirage from France
CSM Feb 16, 1968	"	Aug 1967		24 Fouga Magister from France
NYT Jul 7, 1968	"	On order		20 A-4 from US
NYT Oct 10, 1968	"	Under negotiation (probably 1970)		50 F-4 Phantom from U.S.

NOTES

The name of the publication used in the tables is for identification only and does not suggest that the source is or is not in agreement with the author of the articles quoted.

\* Not listed.

( ) Bracketed numbers and dates are estimated.

1/ Most sources agree that Jordan's loss was almost total. The Christian Science Monitor of February 16, 1968, stated that Jordan lost all 20 of its Hawker-Hunters. The same paper the next day said Jordan had 2 Hunters left after losing 22-24 of their pre-war fighter strength. Time magazine, October 20, 1967, said the Jordanian air force was totally destroyed.

2/ Israel captured 100 operational T-54 tanks from the UAR and another 100 T-54's that required minimal repairs, according to the Washington Post of Jul 26, 1967, and the New York Times of the same day.

SOURCES

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