


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**REACTIONS TO THE GERMAN OCCUPATION
OF SOVIET RUSSIA**



Air University
Human Resources Research Institute

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

December 1952


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Technical Research Report
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HRRI PROJECT
"An Analysis of the
Soviet Social System"



REACTIONS TO THE GERMAN OCCUPATION OF SOVIET RUSSIA

by

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Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
December 1952

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SHORT SUMMARY

31 March 1952

REACTIONS TO THE GERMAN OCCUPATION OF SOVIET RUSSIA
Alexander Dallin

A Report Submitted to the Director
Human Resources Research Institute, Air University

This paper constitutes an interim qualitative report on research in progress on popular attitudes and behavior under the German occupation of the Soviet Union during the Second World War. This occupation constituted for the Soviet government a major test of its ability to attract and hold the loyalty of its people. To the Germans it represented a unique challenge and demonstrated most clearly their failure in holding the support of the Soviet population under them. It provided the eighty-odd million Soviet citizens in occupied territory with their first opportunity in twenty years to make a choice. This period therefore offers the student of Soviet affairs a rewarding insight into the social dynamics of Soviet society.

Subject to later testing, certain hypotheses emerge from this study. No deep allegiance to the Soviet system was evident. The reactions of the population varied: (1) the peasantry constituted the largest cadres of mass opposition but had difficulty in bridging by itself the hiatus between socio-economic grievances and a programmatic political-ideological formulation; (2) the intelligentsia, the most politically articulate group, showed no particular attachment to the Soviet cause; (3) as between the Soviet system and what the German occupation offered, the population favored a compromise alternative of a populist nature.

Certain conclusions may be drawn from the experiences of the German occupation: (1) the material factor, i.e. the ever-present need for food, played a large role; simple slogans bearing on this need were more significant for the rank-and-file than intricate ideological arguments; (2) appeals by "natives" were more persuasive than those by Germans; (3) among the prime determinants in the attitude and behavior of the indigenous population was the influence of the lower echelons, the local soldier, the local commandant, the German agricultural "advisor" or the German Sonderführer in a military unit.

In projecting trends that became apparent in World War II to potential future conditions, one should note among elements which might arouse the hostility of the Soviet population, the following: (1) a "capitalist" crusade; (2) a policy of dismemberment rather than self-determination; (3) the participation of German and Japanese troops on occupied soil; (4) emphasis placed on the territorial irredenta and reparations demanded by East European border states of the USSR fighting with forces aligned against the Soviet Union; and (5) publicity of plans for the future possession of such resources as the Caucasus oil fields by the nations opposing the Soviet Union.

Also significant in the projection of trends is a change in the elements of Soviet society toward the increasing extinction of "right" non-Communists as well as the fact that the effects of World War II were sometimes contradictory i.e. the war antagonized large groups against nationalistic extremes but also intensified national sentiments.

If another crisis should arise similar to that which the Soviet state faced in 1941, much may depend upon the specific circumstances accompanying it. Under the most favorable conditions for the Soviet regime, the loyalty of the population can be secured. Under the most favorable conditions for its external foe the bulk of Soviet society can become an ally of the forces fighting the Soviet system. Such an alliance is the sine qua non of defeat of the Soviet regime from without.

SUMMARY
31 March 1952

REACTIONS TO THE GERMAN OCCUPATION OF SOVIET RUSSIA

(Interim Report)

by

Alexander Dallin

The attached interim report on popular attitudes and behavior in the areas of the Soviet Union occupied by the Germans during World War II is presented by Mr. Alexander Dallin as a set of hypotheses subject to further testing.

In addition to published German and Soviet material, the author utilized the following sources: seventy-four interviews with Soviet DP's in Germany and a written questionnaire administered to nearly 100 former residents of German-held Soviet territory (part of the Harvard Refugee Interview Project in 1950-51), interviews with twenty-four German officials concerned with German occupation policy in Russia (research in Germany under a 1950-51 Social Science Research Council grant), and files of German documentary evidence collected by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.

The sample represented by the population under German occupation cannot be considered representative mainly because of the absence of the top Soviet officialdom and skilled workers who had been evacuated and of segments of the male population who had been drafted. The remaining population consisted largely of peasantry and the lesser and middle intelligentsia. The emergence of spontaneous forces was facilitated during the interregnum when the German armies had not yet arrived and during the early period of the occupation when German controls were not yet firmly established. The initial reaction of the peasantry was appropriation of collective farm equipment; looting of Soviet offices also occurred in the towns. The early popular sentiments were a mixture of fear and hope. Although there was general relief at the replacement of stringent Soviet controls by looser German rule, sympathy wavered when the pragmatic military administration was succeeded by dogmatic civilian measures and was completely alienated by brutal acts of German units such as the SS. German troops were met with genuine enthusiasm only in territories annexed by the U.S.S.R. in 1939-40 - the Baltic States, Bessarabia and Eastern Poland.

A role disproportionate to their numbers was played in the occupation society by younger men, careerists who had held high administrative and economic posts under the Soviets as well as men with limited education and formerly low status who now became "operators." Other foci of collaboration were provided by older groups who had been anti-Soviet - former kulaks, members of pre-revolutionary privileged strata, released

inmates of forced labor camps and jails. Collaborationists may be divided politically into "rightists," the clergy, kulaks and old gentry opposed to the principles of the revolution, and "leftists," ex-Communists who had become disillusioned with the regime's perversion of "pure Communism." Those who sought public offices on a local level during the occupation were motivated by material advantages in a bare subsistence economy, prestige previously denied them or a desire to clear themselves of previous Communist associations by taking positions of trust under the Germans. Social idealism when present rarely took the form of genuine espousal of Nazism, the characteristic political outlook of the population generally being a kind of "populism" opposed both to German and Soviet controls. This "third force" also embraced most of the nationalist groups, even those such as the Vlasov movement, forced to enter a verbal marriage of convenience with the Germans. Autonomy was a slogan, too, of the MTS Solidarists, the only Russian political party allowed by the Germans, which provided a channel for rising to administrative posts. While Soviet partisans attracted followers by propagandizing liberal measures enacted or pending in the Soviet Union, many populist bands were organized around an anti-Soviet, anti-kolkhoz program.

To a population which had had little contact with any ideology but Communism and was now hampered in the development of a substitute ideology by German controls, economic interests assumed primacy over political desiderata. The peasantry, freer from direct control in their isolated communities than urban dwellers, proved most desirous of change. Their behavior forms manifold variations on a common theme - opposition to the collective farm, which they tried to break up as soon as possible. Equipment and livestock on the kolkhoz was divided first, sometimes through appropriations by the most dexterous, at other times by orderly division. Soil, which was in comparative abundance, was often maintained under collective ownership; when allotted, generally distributed equally per household or according to the number of "souls." Sovkhoz and MTS's engendered less opposition. In rural areas there occurred partial revivals of pre-kolkhoz customs, such as strip-farming and administration by a village assembly headed by an elder [starosta]. Peasant hostility was fostered by German requisitions as well as partisan raids. Procrastination of German policy which on the whole kept the kolkhoz intact led to further popular resentment, as did brutal German retaliations, at times razing whole villages, for aid given to the partisans. Kulaks were accepted into rural society, but former landowners brought back by the Germans met with overt hostility.

Economic conditions were of paramount importance, too, for the urban population which was worse off than the countryside. Starvation was the norm, and unemployment was widespread due to closed Soviet offices, wrecked factories, shut schools and disrupted public utilities. Since urban conditions were markedly poorer than under the Soviets, the city-dwellers were more hostile to the Germans than the peasantry. Town administrations, active politically and dominated by graft, underwent frequent turnovers following German arrests of officials - another factor in deteriorating relations with the Nazis. When farmers stopped selling produce for paper money of dubious value, many features of the NEP became evident. There was a general migration to the safety and food of the villages, including a return of villagers who had moved to towns during industrialization.

Urban residents swarmed to the countryside to barter for food, while speculation and black-marketeering ran rampant, especially among persons with access to German supplies and often with the complicity of the local police. The new local authorities were chosen by the Germans and the population on the basis of efficiency rather than political factors and, with powers circumscribed, enjoyed little prestige. The police, which comprised lower elements, was especially looked down on for its arbitrary procedures. Factories were sometimes spontaneously reorganized by the workers and there was less looting of property not considered private than on farms. No demand arose to alter public control of utilities which remained in local government hands. Another echo of the NEP was the rise of speculators and merchants who opened business requiring little outlay of money - e. g., stores reselling goods of formerly well-to-do urban residents for food.

The sphere in which gains over the Soviet era were undisputed was religion. The Church received an unprecedented influx of believers as it became a symbol of improvement and, in some cases, the only licit means to express nationalist aspirations. National feelings were strongest in the non-Slavic areas whose autonomy was abolished by the Soviets at the end of the war - the Kalmyk, Crimean and Chechen-Ingush ASSR's, the Karachai and Balkarian areas. The qualified support offered Ukrainian nationalists was given them as the only "native" alternative open to the population. The latent possibility of separatism was demonstrated, if actively propagated and connected with material benefits. Although anti-semitic attitudes were current, the extent of German atrocities brought about a revulsion by the population, proffering sympathy and aid to persecuted Jews. Monarchism found few adherents. A more successful tendency was Bonapartism, a type of native leadership which fused alliance with the Nazis and popular demagoguery. Unprincipled conduct of these proto-Fascist military formations and pillage of resisting areas alienated the support garnered by the movement's early appeal.

The majority of the population cannot be classed as "collaborators" for their lack of open resistance to the Germans when they had no practical choice but to make the best of bad conditions. Their uncrystallized resentment to the Germans was swelled by: the Nazi view of Russians as inferior beings, German agricultural measures interpreted as an effort to maintain the kolkhoz, mistreatment of prisoners of war, extermination of the Jews, atrocities against innocent civilians, a change in the tide of war, deterioration of living standards around 1943-44, German methods of intimidation, physical humiliation and disregard for local customs. Lower echelons of the occupant rather than top-level German planning determined popular reactions. "Native" appeals were shown effective where German directives could only intimidate. The harsher German measures, the faster did popular sentiment turn against the Nazis. While attachment to the Soviet regime was not strong, it could be weaned away only by a satisfactory alternative. The unformulated, disunited "populism" embraced the peasantry and urban intellectuals. Its outlook was inherently democratic and envisaged a welfare state with free education, medical services, social security and control of public utilities, but excluding any elements of terror. If the trends that became apparent in World War II were projected

to potential future conditions it is worthy of comment that certain elements are particularly calculated to arouse the hostility of the Soviet population: (1) a "capitalist" crusade; (2) a policy of dismemberment rather than self-determination; (3) the participating of German and Japanese troops on occupied soil; (4) emphasis placed on the territorial irredenta and reparations demanded by East European border states of the USSR fighting with forces aligned against the Soviet Union; and (5) publicity of plans for the future possession of such resources as the Caucasus oil fields by the nations opposing the Soviet Union.

Also significant in the projection of trends is a change in the elements of Soviet society toward the increasing extinction of "right" non-Communists as well as the fact that the effects of World War II were sometimes contradictory i. e. the war antagonized large groups against nationalistic extremes but also intensified national sentiments. In addition, in the post-war period, material conditions have improved, certain pre-war tensions such as the church question have eased and, in general, Soviet society has been welded together by World War II. However, 80-odd million people have been acquainted with political alternatives under the occupation, as have millions of Soviet soldiers on occupation duty.

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INTRODUCTION

This paper constitutes an interim qualitative report on research in progress on popular attitudes and behavior under the German occupation of the Soviet Union during the second World War.

The author has been engaged in research on German occupation policy in Russia and conditions under the occupation for the past several years.

The sources on which this paper is based include the following:

- (a) Interviews with 74 Soviet DP's in Germany, as part of the Harvard Refugee Interview Project, 1950-51;
- (b) Interviews with 24 former German officials concerned with German occupation policy in Russia, as part of research under a Social Science Research Council grant, in Germany in 1950-51;
- (c) Published German sources, newspapers, books, and monographs;
- (d) Published material, including memoirs, in Soviet publications;
- (e) Material published in the Russian, Ukrainian, and Byelorussian emigré press, as well as 34 original manuscripts based on first-hand experience of the authors;
- (f) Captured German documentary material, largely collected in connection with the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg;
- (g) A written questionnaire administered to nearly 1,000 former residents of German-held Soviet territory as part of the Harvard Refugee Interview Project in 1951 in Germany, Belgium, and the United States.

The generalizations set forth below are hypotheses, some of which need to be tested further. In particular, it is hoped to utilize more fully captured German material and further analysis of the written questionnaires. This work may or may not necessitate alterations of individual hypotheses.

POPULAR ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR UNDER THE GERMAN OCCUPATION, 1941-44

I. PREMISES

Between June 1941 and July 1944 large parts of the Soviet Union found themselves under German occupation. For the Soviet government this occupation constituted a major test of its ability to attract and hold the loyalty of its peoples. To the Germans it represented a unique challenge and demonstrated most clearly their failure in holding the support of the Soviet population under them. To the eighty-odd million on German occupied territory the war years provided for the first time in over twenty years an opportunity to choose, and in one way or another virtually every individual was compelled, as Lenin used to say, to "vote with his feet."

To the student of Soviet affairs the years of German occupation of the U. S. S. R. can provide unique insight both into the attitudes of the Soviet population and into the lessons of German occupation. It is primarily with the first problem that we shall be concerned here.⁽¹⁾

Our efforts at probing into the social dynamics of Soviet society are complicated by the overlay of new controls imposed by the Germans on more or less spontaneous forces which for the first time had an opportunity to manifest themselves overtly. In many respects therefore it is the initial reaction of the population that is most significant. With the course of time the bulk of society in the German-held areas was caught, as it were, between the hammer and the anvil. Increasingly hostile to the occupying power, the population by and large did not

(1) German goals and policies in occupied Russia are the subject of a doctoral dissertation by this writer (Columbia University, 1952). On the same subject, cf. Wallace Carroll, "It Takes a Russian to Beat a Russian," in Life, December 19, 1949, and Peter Kleist, Zwischen Hitler und Stalin (Bonn, 1950).

hopefully look forward to re-occupation by the Red Army if only because of the retribution for "collaboration" which it feared.

Certain facets of popular behavior remain to be investigated more thoroughly by specialists. Thus the light which this period sheds on personality problems could be significantly amplified. Suffice it to say that in this as in so many other regards the German occupation demonstrates the absence of one more or less homogeneous type of "Soviet man." Some individuals were able to operate with considerable success and ingenuity under the new and rather unfamiliar circumstances. Others neither attempted nor succeeded in showing any marked initiative. It is my impression that on the whole it was the younger Soviet-trained men, especially those of urban background, who were most successful in becoming "operators". This category did, however, include both individuals who had held fairly responsible administrative and economic positions under the Soviets as well as men with limited education and little privilege or responsibility.

The same diversity in popular behavior becomes evident with regard to virtually every other facet of life under the occupation.

It is important to note that collaboration and defection are no test of the intensity or prevalence of anti-Soviet feelings. There are numerous and symptomatic exceptions known in both directions. On the one hand, a considerable number of individuals who collaborated with the Germans and occupied positions of trust can in no way be considered as anti-Communists on the eve of the war. On the other hand, there are many instances of individuals whose anti-Soviet views are beyond any question, who refused to work with the Germans; most of these being intellectuals and army officers. Likewise one must not assume that the absence

...and policies against the Germans constituted an endorsement of the
...policies. Just as it is unfair to judge anti-Soviet
...of the absence or presence of disloyal acts in the Soviet
...is impossible to gauge the extent and intensity of anti-Nazi
...the absence or presence of anti-German acts under the occu-
...tion.

III. COMPOSITION OF POPULATION

It is essential to correct a popular misconception with regard
...the population that remained under the Germans. In all fairness, it
...cannot be considered entirely representative of Soviet society as a whole.
...first, a considerable part of the male population was drafted
...for service in the army. Furthermore in virtually all areas the top
...Party officials, Party officials and the cadres of the NKVD
...were evacuated eastward (or in smaller numbers left behind for subversive
...strategies). Moreover, after the first months of the occupation we must
...exclude the Jewish population from that which remained at large. Finally
...special attempt seems to have been made by the Soviet authorities to
...evacuate certain ethnic groups such as Germans and some of the Moslem
...nationalities. Even if the rapid progress of military events frustrated
...this intention in large measure, this fact remains none the less signifi-
...cant for Soviet policy and the way in which Moscow viewed potential dis-
...loyalty in other than strictly social terms.

Considerable differences in the degree of evacuation by the
...Soviet population remain to be pointed out. While for instance the
...area of Leningrad was evacuated so rapidly that over 90 per cent of the popu-
...lation departed for the spot (excluding evacuees), more than 25 per cent

remained in the Donbas when the Germans reached it in the summer of 1942. In addition to officials, a special effort was made to evacuate industrial specialists and skilled labor. This policy, just as the evacuation of industrial installations and machine-tractor stations, was carried out according to detailed advance "mobilization plans."

Thus the population that remained under the Germans consisted overwhelmingly of two elements: one, the peasantry, and two, the lesser and middle-intelligentsia. It may be pertinent to draw attention to the fact that the other major pool of Soviet defectors -- prisoners of war in Germany -- represented by and large a different section of Soviet society. In many respects they were much more typically "Soviet" and representative of the younger generation. This fact must be kept in mind when later analysing the major political and ideological orientations during the war. On the whole, the movements which arose from among prisoners of war were of a more "pro-repressive" or "leftist" hue than those on occupied soil.

If there was a shortage of younger people and males in the occupied areas, there was, if not in quantitative terms, so in the role they played in public life, a disproportionately high place assigned to various elements which (either as individuals or because of their social background) had become victims of the Soviet regime. Former kulaks, members of the privileged strata before the revolution, former inmates of Soviet labor camps, generally those referred to as "repressed" emerged again.

Another group which played a disproportionate role was criminals jailed under the Soviets. As the evacuation eastward was being carried out almost invariably the inmates of Soviet jails and labor camps were

removed. The number of examples from independent informants from widely scattered points creates the impression that there must have been official Soviet directives to the effect that whenever the evacuation of prisoners could not be carried out, they were to be shot. In the chaos of retreat a considerable number of prisoners remained behind; evidently only the evacuation of "politicals" was carried out more or less thoroughly. As a result, many criminals were at large under the Germans, usually posing as victims of the Soviet regime.

It has become another stereotype that the Germans were met with well-nigh universal enthusiasm by the population. This picture needs to be corrected, though in degree rather than in kind. Genuine and widespread enthusiasm appears to have been limited to those areas which the Soviet state occupied and annexed in 1939-40, that is the Baltic states, Bessarabia, as well as Eastern Poland (Western Byelorussia and Western Ukraine). These regions appear indeed to have looked upon Soviet rule as forcibly imposed from the outside. The old Soviet territories, on the other hand, appear to have reacted in a somewhat different manner. This distinction, which is also of paramount importance for an understanding of the so-called nationality question, is borne out by both interviews with displaced persons from the U.S.S.R. and German sources, documentary and alive. The attitude towards the Germans at the moment of their arrival appears to have varied from fear to hope. Indeed, not infrequently it was a combination of both elements. Initially there appears to have been considerable respect though less sympathy for the Germans. Many elements engaged in watchful waiting, wishing to see the Germans in action before throwing in their lot. Inevitably, however, by the very inertia of continuing to live and work within a state that remained totalitarian they became unwitting collaborators.*

It is important again to stress the fact, even more true for Soviet-trained individuals than for many others, that overt behavior (in this case, continuing work, which was objectively of benefit to the Germans) need in no way correspond to inward attitudes. More than that, even published speeches and articles dating back to this period are in no way a guide to the feelings of men and women reared under the practice of modern totalitarianism.

If the initial attitude can be considered as ranging from neutralist to pro-German, by 1942 (the process appears to have lasted from the fall of 1941 to the spring of 1943, depending on the areas and social groups involved) the attitude of the population had undergone a decided reversal. This change was the result of interaction of popular aspirations and German policies.

III. MATERIAL NEEDS OF POPULATION AND ATTITUDES TOWARD PROPERTY

One of the most revealing moments is the brief interregnum after the departure of Soviet troops and the assumption of active control by the Germans. This period varied from a few hours in some instances to prolonged stretches of time in others. In some areas German control remained nominal throughout the entire war period. This was particularly true of villages located far from the main arteries of communication. It must be stressed that the occupation of a country as vast as Russia cannot under any circumstances be as thorough as that of Germany or Japan. Inevitably therefore, even in those areas where German strong points and offices were established, the population had considerably more leeway in expressing opinions and acting independently of German directives than might otherwise be assumed. For the same reason the population was prone to consider even the more stringent facets of German

occupation as bringing a certain amount of relief from the well-oiled and thorough Soviet state machine. This feeling was intensified by the fact that initially the Germans did not have an extensive network of indigenous informants and that the population could, unlike under the Soviets, easily single out the representatives of the new order by uniform and language and felt relatively more immune in the expression of opinions among friends.

Understandably, perhaps, the initial interests of the population converged on material questions. Indeed, questions of an ideological nature or political programs attracted strikingly little attention in the occupied territories (in strong contrast with the situation among the movements that arose in the prisoner of war camps in Germany or more generally among Soviet refugees abroad). This basic preoccupation with material questions seems to have been due in part to a similar Soviet heritage. In part, it can be traced to the worsening of material conditions, especially in the towns, under the Germans. It is further due to the relative isolation of each individual community on occupied soil and to the impossibility under German control of expressing a variety of political beliefs. Moreover, the lack of acquaintance with political or ideological alternatives to the Soviet system rendered more difficult the articulate formulation of programs once Soviet controls were removed. Finally, the absence of the leading intellectuals from occupied soil (in part, because nearly all surviving or active political theorists or social scientists were Communists) imposed a further handicap in this regard.

All this must not lead to the belief that latent dissatisfaction with Soviet conditions had no political overtones. Indeed under totalitarian conditions even strictly material wants assume a political coloration. It remains true that the major efforts of the population consisted in the

removal of certain facets of Soviet life rather than in the systematic construction of a new order. In the towns as in the country the immediate reaction to the removal of the Soviet symbols of authority was the outbreak of looting. Only few instances have been established where the population passively sat by and awaited their "liberators." In the towns almost all the elements that remained, with the significant exception of the more impractical intelligentsia (teachers rather than government officials), but especially the poorer layers of society, promptly began absconding with sacks of flour, textiles, barrels of vodka, plush carpets from the office of the NKVD, and victrolas from the apartments of evacuated Party officials. It was especially food that attracted their interest. In most villages collective farmers began appropriating carts, horses, cows, various agricultural equipment and what machinery the Soviets had failed to take along.

This spontaneous and nearly universal activity on the part of the population contradicts the thesis which seeks to portray Soviet society as inherently inert. Much rather, this initial response to the removal of authority was a nearly anarchical manifestation of a strong surviving sense of private property and an even more elemental quest for satiety. Almost nowhere was any semblance of public order established during the brief interregnum. Only in very few instances did an individual on his own assume the initiative of "making order," issuing directives, and informally assuming authority.

IV. DIVERSITY OF GERMAN POLICIES

The population was unaware, as indeed the German troops were themselves, of the long-range goals of German high-level policy in the

East. They usually saw only combat units rapidly moving through their community, perhaps other units being billeted there a few weeks later, a German official assuming the role of local commandant, and then the organization of a local administration in accordance with his directives.

It will help an understanding of conditions under the occupation to stress the diversity of German policies on occupied soil. In the view of the population it was the SS units who behaved worst. Unlike many other examples, military government was preferred to civilian government. This was largely due to the fact that the army officials had a more pragmatic, utilitarian approach, while civil government was directed by dogmatic and often fanatical Nazis. A comparison of popular reactions to German policies in different areas of occupied Russia shows interesting gradations. While the most brutal rule, rather than cowing the population into blind obedience, provoked the most determined opposition (Ukraine), a more humane policy at least postponed the about-face in indigenous behavior. Probably the best example of pro-German feelings was the Northern Caucasus, where several factors conspired to produce a more favorable result: shorter duration of the occupation; exclusively military rather than civilian government; the prevalence of non-Slavic and especially Moslem groups; a fortuitous combination of more far-sighted and relatively more humane German commanders; and a certain amount of German consideration for the reaction of neighboring Turkey.

On the other hand, German rule in Byelorussia, though slightly more adroit than in the Ukraine, was not sufficiently better to produce a different popular reaction.

On the whole, dissatisfaction with German rule set in earlier in the towns than in the country. Likewise one might say that dissatis-

faction with Soviet conditions was by and large more intense in the rural than in the urban areas.

The Germans never appear to have resolved the problem of whether or not they should lean on any one group or class of the population. In this regard, as in the nationality question and in the overall view of the Russian as a "subhuman," German practice revealed infinite shades of variations not foreseen by the planners in Berlin.

As a result the persons who assumed authority, took office, or showed initiative under the occupation cannot easily be identified with any single group of society. If their selection depended in part on the wishes of the occupying power (and thus gave disproportionate stress to such elements as the ethnic Germans), genuine popular activism and leadership can be traced to certain more or less specific groups.

V. CATEGORIES OF COLLABORATORS

Two prevalent attitudes must be stressed to understand the general atmosphere of passive or active collaboration. The first is the universal desire to adjust to any existing set of conditions. A general human phenomenon, it is more highly developed under Soviet conditions and carries over into a non-Soviet milieu too. Its by-product is the flourishing of mimicry, not as an evidence of moral degeneration but rather of moral indifference.

The second widespread though often inarticulate attitude was one of having had enough and wishing a change. "Let it be worse -- so long as it is different," a Ukrainian proverb says.

One can distinguish roughly four categories of collaborators. The first of these consists of elements who had already, albeit silently,

espoused an anti-Soviet position before the German occupation. Some of these men had been anti-Communist ever since the Revolution; others had become disillusioned or in one way or another injured by the regime. By and large these were the older groups. At the same time many of the more principled representatives of these categories refused to cooperate with the Germans, as they had refused under the Soviets.

A second and more numerous group was that of turn-coat activists. Some of these had been sincere Communists until the war. Many more had tried to advance within the Soviet administrative apparatus without particular concern about political theory and ideology. Now these careerists found little difficulty in shedding the Communist veneer and becoming, outwardly at least, as devoted to the new regime as they had been to the old one heretofore. All in all, these Communists-in-reverse probably represented the most numerous segment of the collaborators, often not at all aware of the fact that many of their attitudes had remained basically Soviet.

A third group can briefly be characterized as the scum of Soviet society. Speculators and thieves, criminals and corrupt officials found local government under the occupation a particularly convenient place in which to put their talents to profitable use.

Finally one must mention one group which could never be identified except as individuals: these are the Soviet agents intentionally planted behind enemy lines. One could paint a striking picture of the intricate network and the numerous individuals who on Soviet orders managed to occupy positions in virtually the entire occupied area, from charwomen in the residences of German officials, to mayors of the largest towns.

It is obvious that numerically the political collaborators were in a minority. Moreover, only an insignificant fraction of these

can in any sense be considered as properly National-Socialists; the latter group attracted far more support from the opportunists. A better understanding of the politically-minded minority, who did after all play a more significant part than the numbers would suggest, would be arrived at if this category were divided into two distinct groups.

For the sake of convenience I label them the "left" and "right" opposition to the Soviets. This nomenclature must not be confused with the "leftist" and "rightist" deviations within the Communist Party. The rightists I have in mind were those elements who objected to the very ideals and symbols of the Bolshevik Revolution. They included those strata of society which, like the old gentry and the clergy, had found themselves disenfranchised by the Communists. The largest single group that was later added to these rightists consisted of the millions of kulaks. By and large, this was the older generation.

The left, in this terminology, consisted mostly of men and women who had at one time or another been idealists, Communists or close to their cause. By different processes they had become disillusioned and had turned against the regime. If the right rejected 1917, the left had maintained a pride in the revolutionary tradition and was more prone to accuse Stalin (and sometimes Lenin too) of having "betrayed the Revolution." (This group must, however, by no means be identified with Trotskyism, which for most of these men was a meaningless term.) By and large the left also picked up all other elements of Soviet-generated opposition (as contrasted with that lingering ever since the Revolution).

On the whole, the "right" was more strongly represented in occupied territories, while the "left" prevailed among the prisoners of war. In terms of the selectivity of each group by age and background this

differentiation is entirely plausible. For their attitude towards the Germans it is important to remember that the right took considerably longer to turn against the occupants than did the left.

VI. MOTIVES FOR SEEKING PUBLIC OFFICE

One can distinguish four separate motives to explain why individuals sought public office. It will be well to bear in mind that such positions, because of the very nature of German control, were limited to local government, the police and the press. Only in a few instances, especially where a greater degree of independence from the occupying power could be hazarded, was political activity, properly speaking, possible.

The first important motive to keep in mind was material. The combination of Soviet experience and the difficulties under the Germans raised the value of material benefits, from the gaining of mere sustenance for survival to the quest for comforts and luxuries, to an unusually high position in the scale of values of the population.

A second factor was that of fear. In some cases former officials and Communists preferred to whitewash themselves by assuming supposed positions of trust under the Germans. On the whole, however, the factor of fear played a larger role in the initial stages. More important, as the occupation progressed, was the general reaction which combined inertia with fear so as to induce individuals who already were filling public office to stay on the job.

A third factor needs reiteration although it is clearly apparent from what we have said before that qualitatively it was of lesser significance. Social idealism as a motive for coveting public office remained restricted largely to individuals who either were completely convinced of

the progressive nature of National-Socialism or else tried to carry out independently a third alternative.

More typical for many of those who became mayors, chiefs of police and heads of villages during the war was the search of prestige in compensation for stored-up frustration of many years under the Soviets. This geltungstrieb was particularly prevalent among the rural and first-generation intellectuals.

However, one should not create the impression that all those elements who were capable of assuming positions of responsibility (and only a relatively small percentage remained in the German-held areas) were eager to do so. One also finds numerous instances of Soviet-bred reluctance to accept public office in fear of future punishment for making mistakes.

In those areas where the assumption of administrative and economic authority can be traced more or less spontaneously, that is, with a minimum of German imposition, three social groups stand out as carriers of the new authority. (1) Army officers inevitably played a leading part in political movements which arose in prisoner of war camps. (2) The formerly "repressed" intellectuals and peasants come to occupy numerous positions. (3) The only group that could rival them were former Soviet and Communist administrators. While a small segment of the population appears to have favored a rejection of all and every Soviet official, the bulk does not seem to have condemned them in toto. The German attitude towards them was contradictory. But it is clear that the cadres of the Communist Party provided many capable officials, technicians, and administrators, most of whom had become genuinely anti-Communist once the complex of Soviet controls was removed.

A few other characteristics may be worth noting. For the majority of collaborators, especially the urban ones, a striking lack of moral scruples is characteristic. Perhaps a natural product of Soviet conditions, this feature at times paradoxically concealed another and also widespread phenomenon: a profound feeling of fraternity, with the almost proverbial Russian hospitality and willingness to help and feed and house a needy stranger regardless of whether he was escaping from the Germans or the Soviets.

As in general the moral evaluation of collaboration of Soviet-trained people must differ from that in the West, one must also stress the wide spread of mental reservations with regard to the new masters which the new indigenous holders of power (fictitious though it may have been) cultivated. The measure and the contents of these reservations varied, depending on the particular outlook and motives of the individual.

The new local authority seems generally to have been obeyed by the bulk of the population except at moments of particular crisis. Yet its prestige in the popular mind was limited -- not so much because it was a puppet regime but because its own authority in the face of the Germans was severely circumscribed. More particularly the police was held in low esteem, partly because of the lower elements it attracted and partly because its arbitrary activities inevitably aroused the hostility of the population that suffered from it.

It may be significant that in those instances where larger segments of the population participated in the selection of officialdom, it was not political factors that were usually decisive but much rather efficiency. Administrative experience and literacy were more important in the selection of a new village elderman than the distinction between

the Soviet training of a kolkhoz brigadier and the labor camp background of a returned kulak.

VII. AGRARIAN REACTIONS

Of the three large classes of Soviet society the peasantry was unquestionably the one most firmly desiring a change. Its outlook was determined by what has at times been called a property instinct, and at the same time a striving for the abolition of restraints.

The specific circumstances of the occupation, which isolated each community from the other, created for the peasant a narrow universe in which, however, he could operate more independently of central authorities than could his urban brothers.

One finds numerous and striking variations in the form which spontaneous peasant action assumed. Certainly accidental factors, such as the presence or absence of individuals capable of taking things into their hands and the personal idiosyncracies of the German commandant, help explain some of these variations. However, there may very well be an underlying pattern of socio-economic and perhaps ethnic-religious factors, which proper statistical analysis of our material will yet bare. One thread runs through all peasant activity, whatever the distinctions in form and detail: opposition to the collective farm. Almost universally, whether in the Leningrad region or in the Northern Caucasus, the population strove to break up the collective as soon as an opportunity arose. In the chaotic days before the Germans were firmly established, in many instances farm equipment and cattle were grabbed by whoever was the strongest or had more dexterity in appropriating them. In other cases the partition of equipment and the assignment of cattle and horses proceed in an orderly fashion. In some instances the "reprivatization" was corrected with a

deep sense of fairness and equalitarianism after the new order was established. In many instances the land was not promptly divided. In general the partition of land seems to have been a less urgent problem for the peasant than the appropriation of livestock and equipment. Moreover the partition of soil was often complicated by the impending harvest and the realization that the crops belonged to the community as a whole. Finally, in the absence of a large part of the working male population, given the shortage of tractors and fertilizer and the confiscation of the horses, relatively small areas only could be harvested, so that there was usually sufficient land for everyone not to quarrel over it.

In some areas the partition of the land was followed by the reestablishment of certain pre-collectivization customs. In a few areas the division of the soil proceeded on the basis of land holdings before the kolkhoz was established. Much more frequently it involved a distribution into equal plots on the basis of households or the number of "souls" in the household. Curiously enough, the obsolete strip system was revived in many areas, evidently out of a sense of fair play and perhaps because of the absence of a profit motive.

Somewhat less opposition seems to have manifested itself against the sovkhozy and MTS. In most cases the Soviets had during the evacuation taken along the tractors and other valuable equipment of the MTS or, where this had been impossible, wrecked them before leaving. It is interesting that one of the few available examples of outright battles between neighboring villages was caused by a dispute over the possession of the one tractor remaining in the area. On a small scale, conflicts arose over the possession of utensils and livestock. Occasionally force had to be applied to settle them. But on the whole, in the case of shortages cooperative arrangements were easily agreed upon, by which, for instance,

two or five neighboring households would share or rotate a horse until enough were available for each to have his own.

With the re-establishment of pre-kolkhoz customs there also emerged the village assembly as a widespread phenomenon, though with the admixture of distinct features borrowed from the local soviets. Here too variations could be observed. While in some assemblies only the males could vote, in others all adults had equal rights, and in still others each household had one vote.

The villages were usually headed by a starosta, or elder. It is not clear whether the German sanction of this practice was responsible for its revival or merely came in confirmation of an accomplished fact. The authority of the village elder appears to have been limited. His social distance from the bulk of the peasantry was clearly smaller than that of the city magistrates from the urban population. In general the village officials were considered as "ours" by the peasants. Often, and especially in those cases where an efficient individual was not available to increase the prestige of the office, older men were elected or appointed to this necessary chore.

In general the peasants gave evidence of considerable common sense in their approach to matters with which they were familiar. In spite of their basic non-political outlook they were hostile to the Germans when the latter began confiscating food on a large scale, just as they opposed the partisans when they embarked on similar practices. To find curious examples of extensive areas which for considerable amounts of time were in the twilight of German-partisan rule. During the day the area would be German-controlled, while at night partisans would raid the villages for food. If the Germans found the people cooperating with

the partisans, they would shoot the elder and threaten the village with annihilation; not infrequently entire villages were burned down. If at night the partisans arrived and found the population cooperating with the Germans, they would mete out equal punishment and again the population would be the one to suffer. In some cases the peasants would cleverly appoint two elders--one who would act as elder under the Germans and the other under the partisans. In still other cases where the hazard of the position was particularly great it was rotated among the adult males as a form of compulsory service.

German policy in the agrarian question was characterized by procrastination and indecision. Fundamentally it suited German colonial ends to keep the collective farm system intact. For purposes of propaganda, however, the anti-kolkhoz appeal was too powerful a slogan to be forgotten. As it developed, the German agrarian reform was little more than nominal and failed to satisfy peasant aspirations. Whether or not from the point of view of sheer economic efficiency a more rapid abolition of collective farms would have been possible under the circumstances, only systematic economic investigation may reveal.⁽¹⁾ At any rate, the German failure to implement the promises to end kolkhoz "bondage," coupled with their confiscation not only of produce but even of "the last private pig" was an important element in the change of popular attitudes towards the Germans.

I must add a few words on the reaction of the peasantry to the kulaks and the former land owners who returned. Generally the kulaks were accepted as part of the peasant community, though numerous examples of friction over the return of their former property are reported. However, the old landowners who had been expropriated during the Revolution and

(1) A competent German study (Otto Schiller, "Agriculture in Occupied Russia," Food Research Institute, Stanford University) is not entirely convincing on this question.

returned from abroad under the Germans were universally met with overt hostility, which in several instances at least led to their assassination and forced a number of others hurriedly to leave what had been their estates and what had become collective farms.

VIII. URBAN REACTIONS

The towns under the German occupation were considerably worse off than the country-side. Already in the winter of 1941-42 starvation in the larger cities, such as Kiev, Kharkov, and Smolensk, reached frightening proportions. At the same time, unemployment was high until compulsory labor for the urban population was introduced. This unemployment, coupled with general disorganization, was due in part to the evacuation of government agencies and administrative bodies, leaving their former employees and clerks jobless, in part to the evacuation or wrecking of industrial enterprises by the Soviets, which again deprived the remaining workers, engineers, and foremen of their work. Unemployment was increased by the closing of schools and the disruption of public utilities. At the same time, the transportation of food supplies from the country was interrupted, and the peasantry, rid of Soviet institutional and moral pressure, promptly stopped selling grain and other products to the towns in return for paper money whose value they now suspected. The bulk of the urban population appears to have fared somewhat better under the Soviets, and therefore dissatisfaction with the regime had been, by and large, more dormant than among the peasantry.

As a result, the urban population was less friendly to the Germans than the peasantry. Nonetheless, here too little difficulty was experienced by the new rulers in finding personnel to take charge of

local government and the press. At the same time, German control tended to be more direct than in the villages but could not, because of the larger numbers of people involved in the cities, control the activities of the rank-and-file as well as in the villages, where everyone's doings were more open to observation and scrutiny. Moreover, the criminal element which, as we have seen, came to the fore, clustered around the towns and cities rather than the countryside. The upshot was a prodigious development of graft and corruption in municipal government.

The combination of this corruption with more intense political activity on the part of the urban officials (especially, because of the initial German orientation, of national separatists in the Ukraine and Byelorussia), the turn-over of officialdom was stupendous. In Kiev, for instance, at least three complete "shifts" of city administrators were arrested in turn. In smaller towns, examples of six successive mayors were not infrequent. The high rate of arrests generally helped increase urban dissatisfaction and further contributed to a deterioration of relations between the Germans and the population.

A special problem that arose out of the atmosphere of starvation and persecution in the towns was the sizable outward migration. Large numbers of urban residents -- both manual and white-collar workers of peasant origin, and intellectuals without rural ties -- left their urban domiciles, either permanently or temporarily, to seek safety and food in villages. At the same time, many men and women who had under Soviet industrialization moved to town, no longer found themselves attached to their new residences and therefore went "home." The magnitude of this internal migration was greater than might be suspected. It was further complicated by a German effort to put a stop to it. In analyzing

the scope of the "inner DP" problem, one must also point to the many millions who sought to return to their earlier homes from more distant areas: Red Army men and prisoners of war; kulaks long exiled or hiding in urban areas; inmates of labor camps; former landholders returning to claim their former property; families which had more or less voluntarily migrated as greater opportunities seemed to open in the 'thirties in other areas but now sought to "come home." At a time of rural reorganization, breakdown of transportation, and large moving armies, the domestic migration problem is surely one that has received inadequate attention so far.

In addition to those who tried to move their very homes to the village, there were many more (virtually all urban residents except the most "impractical" intellectuals) who on a personal basis sought to buy food from the peasants. German roadblocks notwithstanding, an observer would have encountered long treks of city dwellers on the highways to and from the villages, trying to barter goods for grain, potatoes, or vegetables. This, like many other "autonomous" aspects of the occupation, was reminiscent of the days of the NEP.

Special attention must be paid to what remained of Soviet industry. Only little, it is true, was in condition to resume operation after the evacuation of equipment and personnel, and the destruction of the remaining installations. Here and there, however, factory districts had been overrun by the Germans too rapidly to permit their removal (especially in the Western parts of Soviet Byelorussia). Generally, it was the older workers who had remained as well as women. Unskilled labor remained in larger numbers than the specialists and engineers.

German plans called for no revival of basic, and especially heavy, industries in Russia. As a result, until the war necessitated

German mobilization of local resources for production of carts, weapons, and the repair of cars and tanks, industrial units worked only if the local government took things into its own hands. Despite the tremendous difficulties, such efforts did occur, and the evidence indicates that the workers showed considerable ability and ingenuity in the reorganization and management, so long as the Germans did not interfere. In one case (the Stalin plant at Bobruisk) the workers themselves gathered at the abandoned plant and decided to convert to the production of consumers' goods -- pots and pans. They appealed to the rural population in the neighborhood to bring in parts of planes shot down in the surrounding forests, who in return for the aluminum turned in, received the goods produced at the plant. The profits of the enterprise were to be shared on a cooperative basis. It may be significant that the workers accepted the foremen as "theirs" while looking with skepticism on the remaining engineers, whom they prevented from taking a leading part in the new organization. The entire effort was short-lived as the Germans soon took over the plant for their own purposes.

In general, there seems to have been far less looting of factories or public utilities in the towns than of either government and army stores and depots or collective farm property. While the evidence is still inadequate, one may speculate about the hypothesis that this fact has political significance: the workers did^{not}/consider the factories as much of a misappropriation of their private property by the government as collective farm holdings; nor did they wish to destroy the plants they had themselves built and operated; while they approached "outright" government depots with a feeling of unmitigated hostility.

Nowhere does there seem to have been voiced a demand to put an end to public (municipal or cooperative) ownership of control of public utilities. Generally, medical and educational services and even public baths and markets remained in the hands of local government as a matter of course. So did electric and water supply systems.

IX. PARALLELS WITH NEP

If, not unlike the period of "war communism," during the initial phase of the German occupation many grievances were explained away by the temporary exigencies of the war, and hopes remained high for a rapid improvement thereafter, the war years outside of Soviet control indeed show interesting parallels with the NEP period. It went deeper than the succession of the "enrich yourself" phase by the new "scissors crisis."

The evidence of the German occupation seems to provide the answer to the long dispute over the question whether or not the Soviet population is capable of reverting to private initiative in the economic domain. We have already referred to one facet: the spontaneous effort of the peasantry to ^{obtain} private possession of at least certain phases of agricultural economy. The second aspect has also been hinted at: the revival of the barter activities between towns and country by the large numbers of meshochniki. In spite of the limits placed upon such rudimentary commercial activities, there was no shortage of individuals who took things into their own hands to try and make themselves a little fortune by exchanging anything, from family silver and collections of classical books to fur coats and grand pianos, for a suitable (or, rather, highly modest) amount of food. (1)

(1) For a contrasting view, stressing popular "inertness," cf. George Fischer, Soviet Defection in World War II (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1951).

The new NEP-man had little or no opportunity to engage in large-scale operations, except through distinctly shady use of German army supplies or food stores for distribution to the public. The bulk of the new merchants and speculators went into other activities. Despite the German controls and constraints, as soon as the Soviets had left, a variety of stores and shops began to open. Commissary stores, specializing in the resale of second-hand goods of urban residents (especially formerly well-to-do persons) now in need of funds and food, were lucrative business, as the owners charged high percentages for arranging the resale of the furniture and clothes, which now made their way to the peasants. Barber shops, luncheonettes, candy shops, small-scale soap factories, illegal stills of home-made vodka, photographic laboratories were among the new NEP-men's activities. One enterprising young man for a token fee rented the grand hall of the NKVD building, where he established a dance hall, to which he charged admission. Another man hired three boys to shine shoes at a street-corner in Kiev, pocketing the money and paying the boys a modest wage. Obviously, it was those economic activities that required little capital investment that flourished most. The men who engaged in them were largely (1) former Soviet economic officials, administrators, and especially khozyaistvenniki, and (2) speculators and others with personal experience from pre-Five Year Plan days.

Many of these "trades" represented a combination of honest dealings with distinctly unfair and illicit activities. Speculation and black-marketeering assumed significant proportions, and graft and favoritism was particularly rampant among those who had direct access to German supplies. A significant part in these operations was also played by the

police, whose complicity and assistance could usually be bought at a modest rate, and at times also by individual German soldiers and officials not averse to enriching themselves.

A particularly striking example of the NEP atmosphere is found in the one area where far greater popular spontaneity could find its expression -- in the Rumanian-occupied area of "Transnistria," in the Odessa region. Here in an atmosphere of considerable "laissez-faire," both economic and cultural activities experienced a significant elan. In the midst of widespread corruption but also lassitude among the occupying forces, private economic enterprise -- in the best and in the worst sense -- flourished in a measure unseen on Soviet soil since the mid-'twenties.

X. NATIONALITY PROBLEM

It would lead ~~one~~ too far to examine the nationality problem under the occupation in its full scope. For one thing, German policy on this question was far from homogeneous. Furthermore, the evidence presented by DPs who resided there at the time, differs more strongly on this point than on any other. Finally, there was never a free choice offered to the population to pick between different non-Soviet variants of solutions to the nationality question -- notably between a federal solution and one aiming at sovereign statehood for the individual ethnic groups.

What evidence **exists**, supplemented with material from German sources, indicates (1) the falsity of both extreme claims -- one denying the existence of a nationality problem, the other insisting on overwhelming popular support for the minority chauvinists; (2) definite gradations in the degree of national consciousness and nationalism of various groups. While further study is required to substantiate this

hypothesis, it might be asserted that on the whole, national problems were subordinate to socio-economic grievances. This fact is of considerable importance. Moreover, the national often merged with other questions, such as the religious. Thus, strongest ethnic-religious opposition to the Soviet regime was apparent in the Moslem areas, as among the Chechens or Balkarians. Yet one must beware of necessarily equating such anti-Soviet feelings with "anti-Muscovitism" or a desire for separate statehood.

Of the areas occupied by the Germans, national feeling appears, as we have said, to have been strongest in the non-Slavic (or non-Orthodox) areas. All of these -- the Kalmyk ASSR, the Crimean ASSR, the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, and the Karachai and Balkarian areas -- were abolished by the Soviets at the end of the war, a fact worth keeping in mind if we wish to project wartime trends into the present and future. Of the remaining areas, there was virtually no "sovereign" aspiration to be found among the Cossacks, even if many of them aspired to some distinctiveness; and very little virulent nationalism among the Byelorussian population. Only in the Ukraine was the problem more acute. However, there as in Byelorussia, the seat of chauvinism -- anti-Russian, anti-Polish, and antisemitic -- was in Galicia, the Western part annexed to the USSR after the occupation of Poland in September 1939.

There is considerable evidence that the Galician nationalists who went to the Eastern, or "Greater," Ukraine with the Germans during the war, ^{were} met there with unconcealed hostility. In terms of the different past of the two regions and even the dialectal differences, this friction seems scarcely surprising. There is no doubt that the nationalist groups did pick up a certain amount of popular support under the occupation. This

growth, however, is no certain index to popular aspirations at Ukrainian statehood. It can be in large measure attributed to the following factors: (1) on the part of those elements who wished to ingratiate themselves with the Germans initially, an effort to identify themselves with what was presumed to be a pro-German movement -- the OUN; (2) later on, the nationalist partisans as the only rallying point which was neither Nazi nor Communist but, in line with the prevalent mood in the Ukraine and everywhere else, including the Russian areas, in search of a third solution. (3) A point which I shall develop further elsewhere in this paper: the nationalist OUN was the only "native" alternative offered to the population (except, in a limited way, the autocephalous church). At a time when people fervently sought an integrated alternative to Bolshevism -- and increasingly one that was not German-tainted -- any movement (and this holds equally true of the OUN as of the Russian VTS) was bound to draw a certain measure of support.

Among the prisoners of war, where other nationalities, and especially Turkic and Tartar peoples, were strongly represented, the evidence tends in the same direction. Even the nationalist leaders agree that the prisoners "arrived" without distinctively separatist aspirations. However, exposed to from three to six months of nationalist propaganda in the PC camps and in their German-sponsored "national legions," and aware of the better treatment accorded to the non-Russian groups, the majority of the former Red Army men either rationalized or sincerely adopted a pronounced national orientation. It might therefore be fairest to say that, especially in the case of the non-Slavic groups, national feeling is clearly latent, and that its future virulence or form depends in large measure on the role which is assigned to it from the outside. If

a foreign power and emigrés (as in the case of the second World War) wish to propagandize separatist "anti-Muscovite" arguments in a clever fashion, they can thereby attract a certain segment of the non-Russian population, particularly if material benefits are connected herewith; if, on the other hand, no such propaganda is engaged in or promoted, there is little evidence that anti-Soviet feeling will overwhelmingly take an anti-Russian or separatist form in the nationality regions. It might be added that in my view it is on the nationality question (and perhaps the religious issue) that the DP population is least typical of Soviet society. Finally, the evidence of the second World War confirms the logical deduction that a pro-nationality orientation inevitably antagonizes even distinctively anti-Communist elements among the Great-Russian population, just as the propagation of ideas of indissoluble unity of the Russian State is bound to antagonize large elements of the nationalities.

Finally, one must touch on the question of popular anti-semitism. Again the evidence is contradictory and needs further study. There is clear indication that both extreme attitudes were present during the occupation: on the one hand, complicity in the extermination of the Jews; on the other hand, compassionate revulsion at the atrocities and assistance in hiding individual Jews, especially children. While anti-semitism appears to have existed, especially in parts of the Ukraine, among the poorer urban groups and elsewhere, the German treatment clearly went beyond what the population, or even its anti-semitic elements, would have wished to see. Moreover, Jewish officialdom had fled with the rest of the Soviet dignitaries, and only the poorer Jewish elements against whom there had been far less resentment, remained on the spot. Finally,

the extermination of the Jews was often interpreted as a warning vane for coming mistreatment at German hands of the rest of the population. On the other hand, there is little doubt that the German-held areas as a whole had absorbed a measure of German anti-semitic propaganda (also abetted by some of the nationalist groups) by the time the Soviet Army returned.

XI. POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY OF THE SOVIET POPULATION

In discussing the political and socio-economic ideology of the Soviet population, as it became evident under the Germans, I must refer back to my earlier statement that political attitudes were generally less articulate than others. For present purposes, it will be well to consider together those attitudes evidenced in the occupied areas and those shown in Germany by prisoners of war, "legionnaires," and forced laborers.

Above all, one must keep in mind that the formulation of "ideologies" was not only a particularly difficult matter under conditions of Nazi control, especially for men who by their Soviet background had had no previous exposure to, or even more than nominal acquaintance with, non-Communist systems of thought; but that in general few individuals were either prepared to embark on such matters or had physically the relative leisure to be able to cope with them. Thus the bulk of the population in both the occupied areas and in the PW, Ostarbeiter, HiWi, and ROA camps within the German sphere, were little more than passive observers or objects of propaganda.

Among the small minority who dealt with political-theoretical problems, one group stands out in its effort either to cater to Nazi ideas, or else sincerely to espouse fascist concepts. While some of its leaders (the whole range of its influences was distinctly limited) seem

to have been sincere (Soshalski), the bulk were decidedly opportunists (Mal'tsev, Kaminsky, Bobrov). There is no evidence that their ideas fell -- qua ideas -- on any fertile soil.

A second group, of far greater importance, was the solidarists ("Natsional'no-Trudovoi Soюз," or NTS). The sole political party of Russians accepted by the Nazis in 1941, this was a group of second-generation White emigrés, whose concepts represented an amalgam of Italian-style fascism and Slavophilism. In spite of its elitist and chauvinistic features, solidarist ideas carried a certain appeal to the younger military and intellectual elements, largely because of its combination of national slogans (particularly successful at a moment of national humiliation at the hands of the Germans) and social consciousness. (Both the "National" and "Social" elements, we have to bear in mind, were in line with "National-Socialist" dogma.) Moreover, the activism and younger age of the solidarists and above all the fact that they among the Russians (just as the OUN among the Ukrainians) represented the only political group tolerated by the Germans, gave them an opportunity to recruit members from the new Soviet generation. Placing special emphasis on the recruitment of chiefs of police, mayors, editors of newspapers, NTS attracted several thousand men, largely leading Russian collaborators in the occupied areas and German-trained personnel, into its ranks. Its position was fortified by the fact that, with the support of the German authorities, its men controlled the assignment of new "trainees" to jobs in the occupied areas, to propaganda positions and in the military units (Austra school and elsewhere).

However, already in 1944 NTS was beginning rapidly to lose members -- a trend that continued after the end of the war. While some

of its members exerted an influence in the Vlasov movement, the bulk of the people in the occupied areas never heard of NTS, while most members of ROA battalions and forced laborers in the Reich shied back from it for a variety of reasons -- including its control by old emigrés, its "aristocratic" features, its "Soviet-type" secretiveness and discipline, its "bluffing," and its antisemitism. Only in the last year of the war did NTS become a victim of the Germans itself, just as the OUN was temporarily persecuted by the Germans after it sought to advance its own interests -- but before the end of the war both NTS and OUN were back in the good graces of Berlin. In terms of political ideas, it must be stressed, NTS succeeded in attracting considerable elements that can in no way be considered ideological solidarists.

Outright monarchist ideals, including social and economic restorationism, as promoted by a large segment of the older Russian (and Ukrainian) emigration in the Reich, found next to no support whatever from Soviet elements. The rejection of the landlords on the spot, and the considerable friction between the "old" and "new" emigrés in wartime Germany is indicative of this fact. The only type of monarchism that found -- again very small -- support was a vague nostalgia for a "better past." Generally, it was in the most backward areas, and especially among elements accustomed to paternalistic treatment (for instance, in parts of Byelorussia or among the Kalmyks) that some such diffuse feelings thrived -- yet invariably they had little resemblance to pre-1917 monarchism, for even its few advocates favored popular sovereignty and the maintenance of many "accomplishments of the Revolution." Only a few individual "inner emigrés" -- men who had been monarchists and had managed to withdraw from public life throughout the Soviet period could be properly labeled monarchist in political sentiment.

political

The basic/pathos of the Soviet population, as it became apparent under the limited and distorted light of German overlordship, was one of a "third solution" -- seeking a path neither pro-Bolshevik nor pro-Nazi. (We speak here of political ideas and not of day-to-day adjustments to the powers-that-be.)

It is impossible here to go into the complexity of its composition and attitudes. One cannot help finding that objectively the Vlasov movement was of some (modest) service to the Germans -- more propagandistically than militarily. But one must also recognize most firmly that its personnel can, with few exceptions, in no way be termed pro-Nazi or even pro-German. There is considerable evidence that the bulk of its leadership as well as the rank-and-file accepted their status as one of an uneasy marriage of convenience -- to the point of naively weaving designs for their own victory in the face of Nazi defeat and, in the last days of the war, combating on the side of the Czech population of Prague against the SS.

Once out of the ~~marasmus~~ of the occupied areas, the new Soviet elements -- again mostly the younger ones, plus the military commanders -- engaged in political debates and even some theoretical soul-searching. The result was a variety of shades of political opinions -- again confirming our earlier statement of the absence of one Soviet type of man. Thus, in the Vlasov movement, boycotted by the extremes -- the Communists among prisoners of war, the extreme separatists among the minorities, the old-style monarchists, and the outright Nazis like Kaminsky and Okta -- one finds all gradations ranging from anti-Stalinist Communism to strong conservatism. If one were to pick out one dominant political trait, one

could speak of a homespun revolutionary fervor, a strong attitude of populism, which, for all its lack of acquaintance or appreciation of what is at times referred to as "formal democracy," can by no means be called anti-democratic. It was no united "movement"; its unwitting followers were themselves divided on many issues. In particular, there was a distinct peasant outline (not unlike the old Social-Revolutionaries) ^{and} another trend especially among urban intellectuals, including disillusioned Communist idealists, that had imbued certain Marxist elements and was closer to the more Western kind of Social-Democracy. Finally, there were various elements which, in an open society, could be classed as proximate to conservatives, 19th-century type liberals, and middle-of-the-roads.

The same prevalence of a populist type can be found among the few other instances we have of relatively free crystallization of political opinions (for instance, among the prisoner of war officers who worked as "advisors" to the Germans in certain towns of Byelorussia).

It has been correctly noticed that this ideology -- nowhere systematized or integrated -- was one of a welfare state, with considerable emphasis on both social services and responsibility, and with an emphatic negation of anything smacking of terror or oppression. In Soviet terms, it was, again, not alien to a NEP outlook. ⁽¹⁾ What was most lacking from the point of view of a Western democrat, was tolerance of heterodoxy, familiarity with parliamentary give-and-take, perception of shades between good and evil or black and white -- all features which, regardless of their origin, one might naturally expect to find in a Soviet-bred generation.

(1) The same conclusion is arrived at by George Fischer in his Soviet Defection in World War II, who is persuasive on this point.

III. TYPES OF NATIVE LEADERSHIP

We have stressed the fact that only a minority, and especially those outside of the oppressive conditions of occupied Russia, could afford to systematize their thoughts. Yet even within the German-held regions one finds interesting variations of political outlook. Virtually all of them fall within the gamut of the "third force." If outwardly many groups collaborated with the Germans and others worked as Soviet partisans, they did not thereby become either Nazis or Communists. In local government political views were least apparent. We find interesting variations of the extent to which the Germans are willing to entrust local government to the "natives," and also of the extent to which the indigenous administration preserves or modifies Soviet practice. Yet where sufficiently capable hands were available, local and even regional government could rapidly be entrusted to the population. As earlier mentioned, personal elements and simply considerations of efficiency often prevailed.

One finds elements of latent political orientation already among the rank-and-file -- escaped prisoners of war, hiding Red Army men, civilians escaping from labor draft -- which increasingly abandoned home and "took to the woods." The iron logic of events sooner or later forced these groups to take sides, and in the face of German persecution, it was often the Red partisans who picked up these groups. Yet the task of these partisans was made immeasurably easier by the prevalent view among them too: that, according to rumors, after the war (in the case of Soviet victory) collective farms would be abolished and other reforms introduced. Rumors among the partisans -- whether planted or not, we cannot tell -- attributed such statements to Zhukov, Ponomarenko, or even Stalin. At the same time, the revival of national symbolism, the reinstatement of

religious tolerance, flags, salutes and officers' epaulettes, and the dissolution of the Comintern had their effect not only on the Western world and the Soviet population east of the German front but even among those who, by grapevine or directly, learned of such a welcome trend, which, especially when the war had turned against the Germans, had hopes for a better tomorrow.

If many non-Soviet groups isolated in the woods and swamps threw in their lot with the Soviets, some others -- especially the ephemeral "peasant republics" far from German-controlled highways -- nominally cooperated with the occupants, at least to the extent of buying their elbow-room by providing the German military with a share of its food. The leaders too (Zuev, Voskoboinik, "Rossone"), just as the more progressive among the nationalist partisans (Taras Bulba, Ismailov) had basically a peasant populist outlook, anti-Soviet and anti-kolkhoz, perhaps more religious than the movements that arose among the defectors from the Soviet Army. These microcosms of a relatively free Russia deserve considerable further attention but because of their very isolation and disappearance, it is most difficult to obtain reliable evidence about them.

Mention should be made of one more type of native leadership that arose -- a type of Bonapartism. More often opportunist than idealist, it became closely associated with the Nazi cause (Kaminsky, Büchler, Gil, Oktan) and, with a clever combination of catering to the population (in the case of Kaminsky, the peasantry; in the case of Oktan, the urban groups) and demagoguery, managed to build movements and military formations of the most unprincipled type, prone to engage in atrocities and pogroms, burning entire villages, abusing its enemies, and developing into either mercenaries

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of the Germans or semi-anarchist, "Pugachev-type" bands. The rest of the population looked upon them with horror and unconditional rejection.

Moreover, at times the dividing line between the two extreme poles from which the population shied away yet between which it had to choose, was tenuous enough. In one village one would frequently find members of the same household divided -- one, in the German-controlled Polizei,⁽¹⁾ and another, in the partisans near-by. Sometimes father and son, or brothers, would be on opposite sides of the local "front." Often it was purely a matter of accident that caused one to go to one side or the other. Just as often people would run over from one side to the other, hoping to find something better if the treatment of the partisans or, say, the behavior of the Kaminsky brigade became too unbearable. We have cases of the same individual changing sides no less than four or five times. At the root of it all there was the profound rejection of both alternatives by the bulk of the population. Its tragedy was the impossibility of a viable "third force."

Into the same search for an open door from a situation without issue belongs the attraction temporarily exercised by the nationalist partisans discussed before.

Before leaving this problem, the main points so far discovered should be reiterated. (1) The peasantry provided the largest cadres of mass opposition but had difficulty in bridging by itself, under the conditions of occupation, the hiatus between socio-economic grievance and programmatic political-ideological formulations. (2) The evidence regarding the working class is too contradictory and thin to permit conclusive deductions. (3) The intelligentsia, even including a part of officialdom

(1) It may be sociologically significant for the deep rejection of the police by the population that the German term, "Polizei," was invariably used rather than its Russian equivalent. Other foreign terms also came into use, such as the plural, Kinderya (from "Kinder") for the babies born to local girls from German troops.

which might be presumed to have a vested interest in the preservation of the Soviet regime, showed no particular attachment to the Soviet cause, especially if it became acquainted with appealing alternatives. (4) The most appealing alternative for the majority of elements was a social-conscious, progressive populism proximate to the concept of a welfare state but laying relatively little stress on its institutional elements and "formal" democratic aspects. (5) Even other alternatives had a distinct appeal if they were the sole non-Bolshevik program with which the population could become acquainted and if from its support they could expect to derive benefits, psychic or material. (6) The greatest islands of spontaneity within the totalitarian sea which might be able to take the initiative in the articulation of political ideas are certain parts of the intelligentsia, notably technicians, teachers, officers, as well as individual peasant leaders and representatives of the nationalities. The last point is not meant to suggest the existence of stronger non-Soviet feelings among non-Russian groups but merely the presence of an additional divisive factor among them. (7) Finally, simple slogans coupled with material, familiar problems were more significant for the rank-and-file (for instance, "Down with terror," "down with the Kolkhoz," "for national dignity," etc.) than intricate ideological arguments. Nonetheless, more so than elsewhere, detailed and convincing criticism in his own terms is required for the conversion of a sincere Communist idealist, whatever his surface behavior.

XIII. NON-POLITICAL ISSUES IN THE FORMATION OF PUBLIC OPINION - RANK AND FILE REACTIONS

Of course issues other than political and immediately material played a role in the formation of public opinion under the occupation.

With regard to many "welfare" issues the public, with strikingly few exceptions, accepted rather unquestioningly and defended, at times vigorously, certain features which were considered "accomplishments" of the Soviet era even by anti-Communist elements: free educational opportunities, free medical service, state control of railroads, social security, high level of artistic and especially theatrical accomplishment. Both interviews of DPs and reports of the few efforts at public opinion polls informally conducted by German officers under the occupation confirm this point.

The church was undoubtedly an element of tension as of 1941. With all its efforts to use religion for its own ends, German policy in practice revealed itself more tolerant of religious activities than pre-war Soviet policy. As a result, the church was overwhelmingly considered the sole area in which German rule brought decided improvement. That attitude remained even after disappointment had set in regarding other grievances. What evidence we have seems to indicate that truly religious fervor was far more widespread among the rural than the urban population, and that it clustered around women and older folks. It was decidedly weaker among the Orthodox prisoners of war (although Moslem P's also seemed open to religious appeals). If the church under the occupation acquired considerable "popularity," one dares suspect that it was not so much because of an inherent faith as because it became a symbol of change and improvement over the Soviet era, and at the same time the only licit focus of national sentiments tolerated by the Germans. Again the "third force" combination seems to explain the phenomenon most satisfactorily.

Among non-political attitudes, one must be pointed out that originally contributed to greater respect for the Germans: admiration

for technical and mechanical accomplishments. Perhaps natural in a country where during the past fifteen years so high a value had been placed on industrialization, large segments of the population appear to have been impressed by German mechanization and equipment -- an attitude epitomized in a (rather exaggerated) remark that the Germans "even transport their horses by truck."

Most important, perhaps, the occupation revealed a particular sensitivity of the Soviet population to symbols of human dignity and striking reaction especially to physical humiliation. It would lead one too far to try to explain this complex phenomenon in terms of pre-Soviet and Soviet experience. One gains the distinct impression, however, that the average citizen **thought** less of a "quiet" arrest by the NKVD than of a public whipping. The Germans clearly misjudged popular temper on this score, or rather disregarded it entirely. Thus, even small and personal insults to the dignity of man were resented most strongly. Incidents ranging from the posting of signs for latrines "Only for Germans" to public hangings of partisans (or suspected partisans) appear to have had a particularly profound impact. Both disregard for local customs and the establishment of brothels, both general high-handedness in dealing with the population and efforts at intimidation backfired promptly and violently. Without exception, the evidence shows that a softer policy succeeded in winning not only law and order but genuine popular support, whereas a policy of terror, such as the arrest and execution of hostages and the summary burning of villages aiding the partisans, not only did not re-establish peace but, on the contrary, led to greater support for the partisans.

XIV. SUMMARY OF MAIN ELEMENTS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO HOSTILE PUBLIC OPINION

Without going into the details of chronology and regional variations, we might summarize the main elements that contributed to the formation of public opinion hostile to the Germans -- a process that began soon after the arrival of the Germans in most areas and reached the decisive turning-point generally around the late winter of 1941-42, and continued to grow in intensity to the very end.

Several issues of a general sort permeate the entire picture. These are notably the German superciliousness and the attitude exemplified in the German characterization of the "Eastern" peoples as Untermenschen. In a more specific way, it was personal or group humiliation that exerted a drastic influence, while among the more political and nationally-conscious groups, the prevention of "indigenous" movements and governments further contributed to this process. Finally, among the peasantry German policy with regard to agriculture antagonized wide groups, since it was, justly or wrongly, interpreted as an effort to keep the collectives intact.

More episodic issues carried great weight in the turning of public sympathy. Chronologically, the first was the mistreatment of prisoners of war, whose fate many Russians had occasion to observe personally and a considerable number of whom found refuge among peasant families. Next there was the extermination of the Jews, of which we have spoken at an earlier point. Generally of far more direct impact in compelling the individual to choose between the two camps was the German recruitment of forced labor on a mass scale. Not infrequently, it was an effort to escape such deportation to Germany that induced the younger elements to "take to the woods." Finally, the atrocities against innocent civilians as part of the anti-partisan campaign (which was a miserable failure) could not but further antagonize the remnants of German-ruled Soviet society.

Nor must one neglect the indirect effect of the change in the tide of war. Surely for any group, but perhaps especially for Soviet "products," it is correct that "nothing succeeds like success." Moreover, with the Soviet advance resuming, many a resident of the occupied areas adopted an overtly anti-German position so as to whitewash himself of future charges of "collaboration with the enemy." That there were other, and more idealistic, elements, however, is well demonstrated by numerous examples -- for instance, by the large numbers of prisoners of war who had remained in the camps throughout the most tragic years and only after the Prague Manifesto (of November 1944) volunteered to join the Vlasov movement, at a moment when it was clearly realized that Germany had all but lost the war.

Finally one can only reiterate the importance of the material element in the shaping of public attitudes. Just as the opportunity to "eat kolkhoz sheep" helped dispose the population of the Northern Caucasus and the Kalmyk steppes in favor of the Germans, so the deterioration of living standards in 1943-44 and the sharp rise in German requisitions had a decisive effect on augmenting the hostility of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian populations. Without denying the paramount importance of the material factor, however, popular attitudes cannot simply be reduced to a function of the availability of food. I have tried to show the role which other, less tangible, factors played. The extent of their importance varied from case to case -- once again fortifying the hypothesis that the Soviets not only had failed to produce a "loyal Soviet citizen" but even the uniform type of the "new man" whose image Orwell's 1984 depicts so vividly.

IV. CONCLUSIONS ON THE EXPERIENCE OF THE GERMAN OCCUPATION

The experience of the German occupation confirms the old dictum that "it takes a Russian to beat a Russian." More specifically, it shows how the Germans started out certain of victory and their ability to dispense with the aid or even active support of the population; and how, to the extent that their military effort failed, they were increasingly compelled to make belated and mostly insincere concessions to an already hostile population. But even such concessions were too little and too late to change the tide; moreover, they were often (from the German point of view of attracting the bulk of the population) the wrong concessions and were coupled with an intensification of a diametrically opposite policy of unmitigated terror. It was of little more than academic interest that large segments of German officialdom protested against the policy pursued in the conquered "East."

The experience also revealed the potency of an appeal by a "native" rather than by a German, when such an attempt was made. One of "theirs" -- svoi chelovek -- could genuinely persuade where a foreign conqueror could merely intimidate. Further, the evidence indicates that there was no strong and unalterable attachment to the Soviet regime by the bulk of its population if, and only if, a viable and satisfactory alternative was offered to it.

There were distinct limits to the activity of anti-Soviet elements until Soviet controls had disappeared. In spite of striking setbacks, not a single successful political uprising was reported from behind Soviet lines even at the moment of greatest defeat and disorganization. (The only exceptions to this are the Chechen revolt, largely unconnected with the war; and the Moscow panic of October 16, 1941 -- overwhelmingly an act of anticipated German entry rather than active political rebellion

against the Soviet regime.) While under Soviet control, both Leningrad and Stalingrad, the two critical outposts, held fire even though their population was evidently no more Communist than that of the German-held areas before the withdrawal of the Red Army.

The effect of long years of Soviet rule must also be kept in mind with regard to other problems. If anti-Nazi and especially national slogans were successful in the second World War, anti-capitalist slogans have potentially no lesser pulling power. More basically, if one can depict the latent struggle of regime vs. people (or large segments of it) as a tug-of-war for spontaneity, with the progressive extinction of the remaining autonomous clusters, one must also bear in mind how easily an occupant can trespass the feelings of a population sensitized to slogans of economic exploitation and territorial-imperialist dismemberment.

The German experience also showed the extraordinary significance of the lower echelons dealing with the people in occupied areas. Much more than the high-level planners who concerned themselves with general problems far from the actual atmosphere of occupation, it was the local soldier, the local commandant, the German agrarian "advisor," or the German Sonderführer in a military unit or editorial office who by his behavior and attitudes determined in large measure the behavior and attitude of the indigencous population. Ignorance of country, language, and mores not only encouraged and objectively aided the infiltration of Soviet agents but did irreparable harm to the prestige of the occupying power. Likewise, ad hoc improvisations and conflicts among various agencies of the new rulers had a fatal effect on public opinion.

XVI. PROJECTION OF TRENDS WHICH BECAME APPARENT DURING WORLD WAR II TO FUTURE CONDITIONS

One may be justified in projecting, in however imperfect a manner, the trends that became apparent during the second World War to any future set of conditions in which again Soviet society may be faced with a similar choice. On the part of another warring power, one can visualize the absence of certain elements decidedly primordial in antagonizing the population: racism, genocide, and an Untermensch attitude, on the one hand; and important economic war aims (such as acquisition of Ukrainian grain), on the other. Yet other contributory factors could be envisaged. Thus, if the United Nations should at some future date be at war with the USSR, elements capable of arousing the hostility of the Soviet population might include some or all of the following: (1) a "capitalist crusade;" (2) basic policy differences with regard to the USSR between, for instance, the United States and Britain; (3) a public and a priori commitment in favor of dismemberment of the Soviet state rather than an appeal to democratic self-determination; (4) emphasis placed on the territorial irredenta and reparations demanded by East European border states of the USSR fighting on the Allied side; (5) the participation of German and Japanese divisions on Soviet soil; (6) publicity of plans for the future possession of such resources as the Caucasus oil fields by the Allies; and others.

On the other hand, the very elements of Soviet society one would encounter in the future would differ in certain significant respects from those of 1941-44. (1) There is an increasing extinction of what we have called the "right" non-Communists, i.e. those elements which are not reproduced by current Soviet impact on its present population. (2) The very effects of the second World War, direct and indirect, tend to complicate our analysis. If on the one hand, Soviet victory in World War II unquestionably tended to weld further together Soviet society, including

some of its latently dissident elements; on the other hand, acquaintance of over eighty million people with the very existence of an alternative under the Germans, and the even stronger impact of service with the occupation army after the end of the war by millions of Soviet soldiers, point in the opposite direction. If the war antagonized large groups against nationalist extremists and led to the extermination of some of the more virulent nationalist areas and groups, the war years also intensified national sentiments both on the Soviet side and under the Germans, while adding to the Soviet state Western Ukraine and Byelorussia, surely the seats of strongest separatism. On the other side of the ledger, suppression of autonomous elements, national and otherwise, has proceeded further since the war than ever before, while (partly at the expense of satellite and occupied countries) material conditions appear to have improved to some extent. Finally, certain pre-war areas of tension, such as the church question, appear to have decidedly lessened since 1941.

It is not for me to weigh the many elements, only some of which have been suggested above. Moreover, one cannot analyze new processes of friction and tension generated behind what has become known as the "Iron Curtain" since the end of the war. If another crisis should arise similar to that which the Soviet state faced in 1941, much may depend on the specific circumstances accompanying it. Under the most favorable conditions for the Soviet regime, the loyalty of the population can be secured. Under the most favorable conditions for its external foe, the bulk of Soviet society can become an ally of the forces fighting the Soviet system.

That the population of the USSR has, after decades of Soviet rule, acquired certain specific features and attitudes is scarcely surprising. That

it can nonetheless become strongly anti-Soviet — and that its support is essential to the successful defeat of the Soviet regime from without — is equally well demonstrated by the tragic experience of the German occupation.

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