Monitoring or moral hazard? Evidence from real activities manipulation by venture-backed companies.

PDF Version Also Available for Download.

Description

Prior literature suggests two competing theories regarding the role of venture capitalists (VCs) in their portfolio companies. The VC monitoring hypothesis argues that VCs effectively resolve the managerial agency problem through close monitoring and restraining managers' earnings management behavior. The VC moral hazard hypothesis argues that VCs aggravate the private benefits agency problem by exerting influence over managers to artificially inflate exit stock price through earnings management. Using a sample of IPO firms between 1987 and 2002, after controlling for the magnitude of accruals manipulation (AM), I compare the magnitude of real activities manipulation (RM) between venture-backed and non-venture-backed companies. ... continued below

Creation Information

Liu, Xiang December 2009.

Context

This dissertation is part of the collection entitled: UNT Theses and Dissertations and was provided by UNT Libraries to Digital Library, a digital repository hosted by the UNT Libraries. It has been viewed 402 times , with 10 in the last month . More information about this dissertation can be viewed below.

Who

People and organizations associated with either the creation of this dissertation or its content.

Author

Chair

Committee Members

Publisher

Rights Holder

For guidance see Citations, Rights, Re-Use.

  • Liu, Xiang

Provided By

UNT Libraries

With locations on the Denton campus of the University of North Texas and one in Dallas, UNT Libraries serves the school and the community by providing access to physical and online collections; The Portal to Texas History and UNT Digital Libraries; academic research, and much, much more.

Contact Us

What

Descriptive information to help identify this dissertation. Follow the links below to find similar items on the Digital Library.

Degree Information

Description

Prior literature suggests two competing theories regarding the role of venture capitalists (VCs) in their portfolio companies. The VC monitoring hypothesis argues that VCs effectively resolve the managerial agency problem through close monitoring and restraining managers' earnings management behavior. The VC moral hazard hypothesis argues that VCs aggravate the private benefits agency problem by exerting influence over managers to artificially inflate exit stock price through earnings management. Using a sample of IPO firms between 1987 and 2002, after controlling for the magnitude of accruals manipulation (AM), I compare the magnitude of real activities manipulation (RM) between venture-backed and non-venture-backed companies. I find that relative to non-venture-backed companies, venture-backed companies show significantly less RM in the first post-IPO fiscal year. The results are robust after controlling for the VC selection endogeneity. The finding supports the VC monitoring hypothesis that VCs restrain managers' RM behavior. Furthermore, I document that venture-backed companies exhibit a significant difference from non-venture-backed companies only in the first post-IPO fiscal year. The difference between the two groups in either the IPO year or the second post-IPO fiscal year is not significant, or at best, is weak. This finding is consistent with the argument that VCs tighten their control during the lockup expiration period when insiders such as managers or founders have strong incentives to inflate earnings. By the end of the second post-IPO fiscal year when VCs exit the portfolio companies, their impact on portfolio companies' RM decreases dramatically which makes the difference between the two groups less significant. In addition, using a sample of venture-backed IPOs from 1987 to 2002, I find that companies backed by high-reputation VCs show significantly less RM than those backed by low-reputation VCs in the first post-IPO fiscal year. The results are robust to alternative VC reputation proxies. This finding is consistent with the argument that high-reputation VCs have more incentives to preserve reputation and better ability to monitor managers than low-reputation VCs.

Language

Identifier

Unique identifying numbers for this dissertation in the Digital Library or other systems.

Collections

This dissertation is part of the following collection of related materials.

UNT Theses and Dissertations

Theses and dissertations represent a wealth of scholarly and artistic content created by masters and doctoral students in the degree-seeking process. Some ETDs in this collection are restricted to use by the UNT community.

What responsibilities do I have when using this dissertation?

When

Dates and time periods associated with this dissertation.

Creation Date

  • December 2009

Added to The UNT Digital Library

  • March 17, 2010, 11:40 a.m.

Description Last Updated

  • Jan. 14, 2014, 1:51 p.m.

Usage Statistics

When was this dissertation last used?

Yesterday: 0
Past 30 days: 10
Total Uses: 402

Interact With This Dissertation

Here are some suggestions for what to do next.

Start Reading

PDF Version Also Available for Download.

Citations, Rights, Re-Use

Liu, Xiang. Monitoring or moral hazard? Evidence from real activities manipulation by venture-backed companies., dissertation, December 2009; Denton, Texas. (digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc12154/: accessed October 19, 2017), University of North Texas Libraries, Digital Library, digital.library.unt.edu; .