WHAT HAS DAMASCUS TO DO WITH PARIS? A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF IBN TAYMIYYA AND GREGORY OF RIMINI: A FOURTEENTH CENTURY AND LATE MEDIEVAL REJECTION OF THE USE OF ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC IN THE LEGITIMIZATION OF DIVINE REVELATION IN THE CHRISTIAN AND ISLAMIC TRADITIONS

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This thesis is a comparative analysis of Ibn Taymiyya of Damascus and Gregory of Rimini within their respective religious and philosophical traditions. Ibn Taymiyya and Gregory of Rimini rejected the use of Aristotelian logic in the valorization of divine revelation in Islam and Christianity respectively.

The translation movements, in Baghdad and then in Toledo, ensured the transmission of Greek scientific and philosophical works to both the Islamic world during the ‘Abbasid Caliphate and the Catholic Christian European milieu beginning in the eleventh century. By the fourteenth century both the Islamic and the Catholic European religious traditions had a long history of assimilating Aristotle’s *Organon*. Ibn Taymiyya and Gregory of Rimini rejected the notion, adopted by the *kalam* and scholastic traditions respectively, that logical demonstration could be used to validate religious doctrine as taught in the Qur’an and the Bible. Ibn Taymiyya rejected demonstration completely but Gregory accepted its qualified use.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Partly because of empire, all cultures are involved in one another; none is single and pure, all are hybrid, heterogeneous, extraordinarily differentiated, and unmonolithic.

Edward Said

Samuel P. Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations” was originally a response to Francis Fukuyama’s 1992 book, *The End of History and the Last Man*. Huntington, a political scientist, proposed that people’s cultural and religious identities will be the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world. His theory was originally formulated in a 1992 lecture that was delivered at the American Enterprise Institute. Huntington expanded his thesis for a 1996 book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. Bernard Lewis used the term in an article in the September 1990 issue of *The Atlantic Monthly* entitled “The Roots of Muslim Rage.” The former Iranian president Mohammad Khatami introduced the idea of dialogue among civilizations as a response to the theory as espoused within “Clash of Civilizations.” The expression “dialogue among civilizations” became better known after the United Nations adopted a resolution to name the year 2001 as the year of Dialogue Among Civilizations.

Here is the summary of “The Clash of Civilizations” from Huntington’s summer of 1993 article in the *Foreign Affairs* magazine:

World politics is entering a new phase, in which the great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of international conflict will be cultural. Civilizations—the highest cultural groupings of people—are differentiated from each other by religion, history, language and tradition. These divisions are deep and increasing in importance. From Yugoslavia to the Middle East to Central Asia, the fault lines of civilizations are the battle lines of the future. In this emerging era of cultural conflict the United States must forge alliances with similar cultures and spread its values wherever possible. With alien civilizations the West must be accommodating if possible, but confrontational if
necessary. In the final analysis, however, all civilizations will have to learn to tolerate each other.¹

Whatever one may think about Huntington’s thesis, there is an urgent need for the European and the United States policy makers, political scientists, historians, philosophers, and religious studies experts to come to terms with the issue of religion in their diplomatic, economic, and cultural studies. This issue becomes distinctly clearer when Stephen P. Lambert’s study is examined.

Major Stephen P. Lambert, an officer in the United States Air Force, wrote a study entitled *The Sources of Islamic Revolutionary Conduct*. His study is unique because of his particular appreciation for the theological, philosophical, and metaphysical aspects of the subject matter that he addressed. This is the gist of what he has to say:

Why? This is the key question that has so far gone unanswered in the current struggle, the United States’ so-called global war on terrorism. It is the “why” questions that can be notoriously difficult to answer….the “who-what-when-where-how” questions seem rather straightforward; they involve description, characterization, classification, or basic fact-finding. But the “why” question is in a category all of its own…In terms of human behavior, it probes deeper and requires the writer to explore such concepts as meaning, truth, falsehood, intent, passion, and belief. It demands a completely different scope and level of reasoning….it requires analysis. In the fields of study that address human interaction—for example in ethics, political, international affairs, warfare—answering “why” questions involves penetrating the underlying cultural and metaphysical belief structures that serve to guide both individual and collective behavior. While “who-what-when-where-how” questions more often lend themselves to measurement, “why” questions inevitably reach beyond the scope of data collection and processing. The latter explore the strategic high ground that forms the basis for understanding humanity in all its shades, customs, cultures, and conflicts.

Yet few thoughtful analyses have merged that rise to the strategic scope of explaining why the collective enemies of the United States continue to perpetuate their violence…One primary reason for the absence of his strategic de bate is that today’s policy and academic elites are intimidated by passionate religious faith—and current war unavoidably connected to religion. *Whatever one thinks of the metaphysical realm, one cannot escape the fact that one side clothes itself in religious rhetoric, and often seems driven by metaphysical passion.* But in the realm of American policy and academic

elites, religion is persona non grata. To these elites, religion seems antiquated, troublesome, pedestrian, and unsophisticated. Their Zeitgeist is defined by the empirical rather than by metaphysical phenomena.  

This very insightful section of Lambert’s introduction fuels my study of the theological underpinnings of the traditionist’s or traditionalist’s rejection of rationalist and metaphysical accretions into Islamic orthodoxy; an orthodoxy that was already in the process of protest in the years of the ‘Abbāsid Caliphate. One need only note the persecution of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal in the ninth century. In the fourteenth century Ibn Taymiyya, a Hanbali jurist and orthodox Sunni theologian, had a more thorough and yet nuanced critique of the Aristotelian logical corpus, especially the Posterior Analytics. It should be noted that with him one sees the traditionist rejection of rationalist attempts to modify, re-write, or even critique the Qur’an, the Sunna, and the Ahadith. The traditionists believed (and their descendants still do) that the Qur’an is divinely revealed and hence unimpeachable. The European Catholic scholar and Augustinian friar general and theologian, Gregory of Rimini, had a similar distrust for the Thomist synthesis of the Aristotelian logical and metaphysical program with Biblical revelation.

In the fourteenth century these two theologians grappled with the issue of whether or not theology in their respective religious traditions could be treated as knowledge in the strict, Aristotelian sense. They were both struggling with the idea of the separation of faith and reason, of the belief in two systems of truth; that of natural knowledge as divine revelation. This thesis is a comparative historical analysis of Gregory of Rimini and Ibn Taymiyya. It deals with how these men arrived at their positions on the legitimacy of using logical demonstration in the valorization of religious belief and practice, the development of their

2 Stephen P. Lambert, Major, The Sources of Islamic Revolutionary Conduct (Joint Military Intelligence College, Washington, D.C., April 2005), 1, 2. Emphasis mine.
respective epistemological perspectives, and their individual approaches on “right religious knowledge” and how it can lead to “pious” living.

I decided to write a comparative historical analysis of Gregory of Rimini and Ibn Taymiyya because I wanted to highlight the fact that they both lived in the fourteenth century and they both, on some level or another, came to reject the scholastic and realist views which were the theological trends prior to their time. Furthermore, not only did these two men come from disparate geographical locations and cultures, but also they represented two different religious traditions. Before doing this, I give a broad introduction to Aristotle and his *Organon* in chapter II. I then focus the attention more narrowly from the larger philosophical foundation to the phenomenon known as medieval nominalism. The philosophical position or body of ideas that came to be referred to as medieval nominalism was labeled as such by neither the Catholic Christian philosophical (scholastic or dialectical) nor the Arabo-Islamic kalām traditions. Rather, in both religious traditions and in the pedagogical programs instituted by them, it was understood to represent a rejection of rationalist trends in religious discourse. Gregory of Rimini embarked on a systematic critique of Roman Catholic scholasticism including other nominalists, while Ibn Taymiyya rejected the rationalist philosophical agenda of the Arabo-Islamic falsafa but also the practitioners, the *mutakallimun*, of kalām (speculative, dialectical or scholastic theology), whether Mutazillite or Asherite.

Both men rejected what they believed to be excessive reliance upon the Aristotelian logical program as elucidated in the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*. They were, in particular, wary of the Greek metaphysical baggage that came with the Aristotelian epistemological and cognitive program. These metaphysical constructs were seen by both traditions as being embodied in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* and other related works. The issue of faith and reason came
to the forefront for both men. They believed that the discerning adoption of the mainly Aristotelian form of ratiocination carried with it the too high price of the Aristotelian metaphysical accretion into both religious traditions’ doctrinal foundations.

Gregory of Rimini’s approach was to differentiate the use of Aristotelian logic as it was applied to natural knowledge, on the one hand, and on the other, to special revelation. Ibn Taymiyya found a more absolutist approach by rejecting outright the claims of arriving at certainty through the problematic syllogistic methodology of logical demonstration elucidated by Aristotle’s work in the Prior and Posterior Analytics. He did not reject the syllogistic method of reasoning per se (he used it in usul al-fiqh – principles of legal theory), rather, he rejected the idea that divine or special revelation could be validated by a purely human and Greek (and hence non-Arabic) syllogistic construct or process of ratiocination.

Both men believed that only the process of (faith) belief and assent to divine revelation could produce certitude or certainty which could then be authenticated through acts of obedience. Neither man advocated an irrational or anti-rational approach; theirs was the rejection of rationalistic tendencies, within the theological enterprise. For both men, it was not the rejection of reason, as they saw it, and as seen in fatalistic acts of blind fideism, rather it was the simple act of trust when confronted by a divine revelation from outside human experience and, therefore, beyond any valid process of verification.

As mentioned above, not only do I, in chapter II, give a short dumbration of what constitutes Aristotle’s Organon, but I also define nominalism itself and as a religious movement of protest, mostly within the European Catholic tradition, i.e. within the larger tradition of Aristotelianism and its adoption in the scholastic movement within Roman Catholicism. But what of the transmission of such ideas within the Islamic Empire, or should I say the Arab sphere
of influence, which includes the Arabic speaking Christian, Jewish, Berber, and Persian cultures for instance? In order to trace some of these spheres of influence and dissemination, this thesis includes, in chapter III, a brief account of the Graeco-Arabic translation movement in Baghdad led by Ishaq Ibn Hunayn (among others) and his school during the 8th – 10th centuries. What then follows, in chapter IV, is a discussion of the Arabo-Latin translation movement of the 11th – 13th centuries led by men like Gerard of Cremona and Gundissalinus in Toledo, Spain and its growth and evolution prior to and especially after the influx of Arabic translations and commentaries of Greek scientific and philosophical corpus into the Catholic Christian West. Medieval nominalism as the predominantly and theologically motivated movement of protest against the rationalizing tendencies of Aristotelian logic as applied to the incorrectly categorized science of theology will then be discussed. Chapter IV will also include a section comparing the educational systems and curricular development of both the Islamic madrasah and the European Catholic cathedral schools initially and then the more secular universities (secular in the sense of being more autonomous than the cathedral schools). This chapter also includes a discussion of scholasticism as a method of approach to scientific inquiry especially in the Islamic sphere as applied first to Islamic law (shari’a) and the study of jurisprudential theory (usul-al-fiqh), and in the Catholic West, as applied to the study of and creations of summae or systematic studies of theology and canon law as well. All of these variegated and seemingly disparate subjects come together in the thesis conclusion and general theme as necessary components to the thesis as a whole giving it a historical, social, philosophical, and linguistic context.

In chapters V and VI, given the above creation of a contextual basis for understanding, I give the reasons for Ibn Taymiyya’s and Gregory of Rimini’s adoption, adaptation, and rejection of the Greek philosophical paradigms. Prior to that, a brief biography followed by their major
works in theology and philosophy is given. After a short but thorough presentation of their individual beliefs, epistemologies, cognitive frameworks, and ideas concerning faith and reason, concluding remarks follow about the contributions overall of these ideas to their own programs. Finally, in chapter VII in a comparative analysis I highlight the similarities and dissimilarities between Gregory of Rimini’s and Ibn Taymiyya’s attitudes and approaches to how they both dealt with the issues of faith and reason. The conclusion includes the idea that these two men were the image bearers of their individual cultures’ struggle with scientific or natural knowledge and, in opposition to that, what comes from what they considered divine revelation which in their minds lay outside the pur view of human ability to validate (or invalidate as the case may be) with the ordinary and finite tools of human ratiocination.

In a survey of the sources on Ibn Taymiyya, it is perceptible how “evocative” he is to those who have some familiarity with the fourteenth-century theological and philosophical climate in Europe. Also, let it be noted, that there are very few writings of Ibn Taymiyya’s that have been translated into English. Even Yahya Michot’s translations of Ibn Taymiyya at the University of Oxford are from Arabic to French! Most fortuitously, for aspiring scholars of Ibn Taymiyya, more and more research on him is becoming available. This thesis will be drawn from the various sources including dissertations and theses proving that research on Ibn Taymiyya continues to be pursued and our knowledge of Ibn Taymiyya and his milieu continues to increase. Furthermore, learning Arabic is the first and most challenging hurdle for those who are interested in pursuing academic studies in the area of intellectual history involving the European and Islamic periods of interaction including our own. Even though there are a small number of scholars who have attempted to make a comparative study of the Islamic and Christian traditions, fewer still have actually engaged the theologians (as opposed to studies done
in philosophy) of both traditions. The names that immediately come to mind are Majid Fakhry, David B. Burrell, Harry A. Wolfson, William J. Courtenay, George Makdisi, and Fazlur Rahman. It is my opinion that some of David B. Burrell’s work tends to confuse because of the irenic and ecumenical approach he has taken; the topics that he discusses in all three of the so-called Abrahamic faiths, the Christian, Judaic, and Islamic are blended together rather than arranged separately and clearly elucidated on their own terms.³ It would be more helpful if Burrell’s work could have been more explicit and if he had kept separate the theological, philosophical, and ideological distinctives of the three so-called Abrahamic faiths as is the format of this thesis.

Furthermore, it seems to me that even Middle Eastern scholars in the history of ideas approach tend to make the same generalized criticisms of ideas, dogma, or doctrines that they disagree with philosophically; this is analogous to the European scholars who are so often labeled Orientalists, which have been in some instances a pejorative sobriquet, sometimes fairly and sometimes not. For example, Fazlur Rahman, late of the University of Chicago, has made disparaging (not very objective) statements about the “determinism” inherent in Sunnite beliefs which renders their adherents “numb” (“benumbed”) and incapable of ethical distinctions when faced with certain moral choices.⁴ Majid Fakhry, notwithstanding his remarkable assimilation and synthesis of both traditions including that between Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd, and al-Ghazali on the one hand and Thomas Aquinas on the other, has made statements to the effect that because Ibn Taymiyya had rejected both the Mutazillite and Asherite parties as rationalist approaches to Quranic revelation, Ibn Taymiyya was irrational and by implication not to be

taken seriously. Majid Fakhry has also described the God of the Islamic traditionalists as the “God-Despot”\(^5\) and one wonders what others choice similes he has reserved for Christianity’s rich tradition on predestining God of Augustine and Atramnus, down to Luther and Calvin!

However, as George Makdisi has pointed out in an influential two-part article written for *Studia Islamica* (1962-1963)\(^6\), a rejection of rationalist approaches in *kalām* was not necessarily a rejection of the right use of reason. William J. Courtenay has also made some valuable contributions by comparing the works of al-Ghazali to that of others like William of Ockham.\(^7\) But his work needs to be evaluated on the basis of an objective appreciation for the traditionalist and/or orthodox religious or theological positions of both religions. Finally, Harry A. Wolfson made the decision to prepare a volume, “on the *kalām* in which certain problems peculiar to the *kalām* would be dealt with in their relation to similar problems as dealt with by Philo and the Church Fathers, within the Catholic Christian tradition, in their common attempt to interpret Scriptures in terms of philosophy and to revise philosophy in conformity with Scripture.”\(^8\) The problems that Wolfson selected for discussion were chosen on the basis of similarity with problems discussed by the Church Fathers and Philo, which are the following: the Attributes of God (in the Christian tradition this would include the doctrines of the Trinity and divinity of Christ, in the Islamic tradition this would be almost exclusively the debates on

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anthropomorphism), the Scriptures (Bible for Christians, Qur’an for Muslims), Creation (ex-nihilo — for both religious traditions), Atomism, Causality, Predestination and Free Will (including Foreknowledge).

As seen from the previous mention of Wolfson’s work, the areas covered by *kalām* (speculative theology) include “predestination” and “free will,” and in the area of the traditionalist Islamic approach, doubts expressed on the validity of the use of syllogistic reasoning and logical demonstration as methods of verifying the truth-claims of divine revelation. Ibn Taimiya is not the first and only person to broach this subject within his tradition or within the Christian tradition, but his particular critique of the Greek logicians was unique and telling. Gordon Leff’s work *Gregory of Rimini: Tradition and Innovation in Fourteenth Century Thought* is particularly enlightening with regard to Gregory’s work on knowledge, God and his attributes, the new cosmology, free will, grace, predestination, and sin. However, his article “Faith and Reason in the Thought of Gregory of Rimini (c. 1300-1358)” for the *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* is the best single source for Gregory of Rimini’s thoughts on the subject. This article is based completely on the *Prologue* to Gregory’s lectures on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, translated from the Latin by Gordon Leff.

Therefore, this thesis encompasses a comparative study, which gives a brief rendition of both areas of thought or opposing sources of authority, the Greek and especially Aristotelian philosophy must be compared with the Bible and the European Catholic tradition, as exemplified by Gregory of Rimini. The Greek and Aristotelian philosophy must also be compared with the Qur’an and the Islamic traditionalist account as exemplified by Ibn Taimiya. Then the

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Christian and Islamic reactions are compared. Take note that most studies undertaken today concern Islamic philosophy and not Islamic theology, which in my opinion biases the approach against the traditionalist leaders of Islamic religious dogma and jurisprudential theology. The same can be said about modern day approaches to the study of European Catholic scholastic theology and Christian (Protestant as opposed to Roman Catholic) scholarship since the Protestant Reformation. Since that time much ink has been spilt by critics over the narrowly religious focus of innumerable Protestant theological works. This is because those critiquing them did not bother to ask the correct theological questions or read the highly polished prolegomena written by the authors of those works.¹¹

The quotation of Edward Said is included in the beginning of the Introduction because it so clearly illustrates my ideas concerning the involvement of Christian, Judaic, and Islamic cultures with each other. These cultures, or in the words of Huntington, these civilizations, are not single, and they are not pure; they are hybrid. They are hybrid from the centuries leading up to and including the fourteenth, as is so evidently the case with the ‘Abbāsid Caliphate during the two and a half centuries of the translation movement. By Ibn Taymiyya’s time, the Mongols had already sacked Baghdad and continued to be a threat. In the case of Catholic Christian Europe, and of the centuries leading up to and including the fourteenth of Gregory of Rimini’s milieu, there were similar “threats” in the form of the waning of and challenges to the age of Thomism and the ascent of rationalist attempts at synthesis (in the form of subalnation). There was also a translation movement that had Catholic Christian canons and archdeacons, with the permission of the arcbishops, cooperating with the Arabic speaking Jews and Christians and Muslim scholars as well in the process of translation from the Arabic to the Latin. And yet despite the

¹¹ Prolegomena are written in order to explain the theologian’s philosophical, theological, and pedagogical presuppositions.
fact that the European Christian and Islamic civilizations “were heterogeneous, extraordinarily differentiated, and unmonolithic,”

\[12 \text{ Said, xxv.}\]

they still cooperated with one another in the fields of trade, commerce, scientific and philosophical endeavor. Their religious beliefs were fundamentally theistic and their theologies had similar evolutionary developments, notwithstanding the real and substantive differences they had in doctrine and worship.

\[12 \text{ Said, xxv.}\]
CHAPTER II
GREEK SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

According to scholars like C. H. Haskins in his *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century*\(^\text{13}\) the discovery of Aristotelian writings that were, as yet, unknown in the largely Latin West, contributed in great measure to the formation and evolution of medieval scholastic theology. The early medievalists had some limited knowledge of Plato and Aristotle. It is the received opinion that Saint Augustine, the bishop of Hippo, was influenced by Plato. The *Organon* of Aristotle was all that broke through to the West in the early period. More precisely, only the *De Interpretatione* (*Peri EJrmhneiva*)\(^\text{14}\) and the * Categoriae* (*Kathgorivai*)\(^\text{15}\) were well known. These works formed the core of what was later referred to as the “Old Logic” of the early medieval educational curriculum. By the twelfth century more and more scholars were coming into contact with the Greek writings by way of two major sources. They are: 1) Arab manuscripts which originated in Syriac Christian communities of former Byzantine provinces; and 2) Greek manuscripts conveyed to southern Italy, Spain, and Sicily as a result of commercial activities and travel itineraries brought about by the Crusading activities of the Norman Franks. One scholar has asserted that the Arab texts handicapped the Latin scholars because not only were these texts transmitted by way of several tongues (Syriac, Persian, Arabic, and sometimes Spanish); they were “purveyed by an alien religious culture.”\(^\text{16}\) However, notwithstanding any concessions to the above statements, we can still point to the careful collaborative work of translators toiling in

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\(^\text{14}\) About or concerning hermeneutics: dealing with the relationship between language and logic.

\(^\text{15}\) Aristotle’s *Categories* enumerates all the possible kinds of things which can be the subject and predicate of a proposition.

Toledo under the superintendence of the famous Bishop Raymond Lull, by Western Latin, Arab, and Spanish scholars. Along with the considerable interest stirred up in the Latin West, there was some initial resistance as well; the University of Paris prohibited the study of Aristotle in 1210, to no avail.

The perceived danger evolved around the idea that Averroes’ interpretations of the writings of Aristotle threatened Christian beliefs. These interpretations include, first, that the Aristotelian Weltanschauung (world and life view) called into question the concept of “radical contingency of the created order”; second, that they raised questions about the “free and spontaneous nature of God”; and third, that they “challenged the idea of personal immortality by denying the reality of an individual active intellect in man.” That these interpretations were Averroist was not the only and main objection made by the authorities at Paris (the banning of Averroist teachings by Bishop Tempier); however, even when translations and interpretations were made directly from the Greek by Christian scholars like William of Moerbeke, they still had other concerns. One of these concerns involved the Aristotelian notion that the world was eternal. Even though these authorities and guardians of Catholic orthodoxy were much attracted to the all-embracing system of thought presented by Aristotle, nevertheless, they were puzzled because Aristotle, even though an infidel, was still able to articulate, in their judgment, a complete and unified system of reality. This unified system of reality, with its methodological rationality and “epistemological priorities” appealed to the students in that they were given more praise and encouragement for the logical subtlety of their arguments than for the erudition of

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17 These works of Aristotle include the New Logic (consisting of Prior and Posterior Analytics, Topics and Sophistici Elenchi) which is bundled together with his Metaphysics.

18 Ferguson, 7, 8.

19 On March 7, 1277, the Bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, prohibited the teaching of 219 philosophical and theological theses that were being discussed and disputed in the faculty of arts under his jurisdiction. The online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/condemnation/.
their persuasive oratorical devices. Ferguson suggests (quoting L. J. Paetow at Berkeley) that the traditional seven liberal arts gave way to those methodologies and priorities exemplified in Aristotle’s system, and that grammar and rhetoric declined in the face of interest in Aristotle and the dialectical program. Ferguson also suggests that “the appearance of Aristotle’s entire corpus had two major effects: 1) it undermined the prestige of the theological discipline; 2) as indicated above, it raised serious doubts about basic Christian teachings.”21 Perhaps this is a little overstated, but it cannot be emphasized how vital an impact Aristotle made to both the Catholic Christian and, as I show in this thesis, Islamic milieus. This popularity of the Aristotelian corpus of writings and his unified system in the schools led to their being adopted into the studies of masters and doctors.

Ferguson contends that his “rediscovered” and now popular Aristotelian corpus was incorporated into theological studies (doctrinal development) and that a concerted effort was made to bring about a synthesis of both streams of ideas. The result of this synthesis led to the classification of theology as a science (or scientia). Not every theologian who called Catholic Christian theology a science meant, like Aquinas, every nuance of the term. Nevertheless, Aristotle’s theories of cognition or “his epistemological approach to reality” set the standard by which all future discussions of theological activity and pedagogical projects would be tested.22 Among the theologians who found Aristotle’s corpus enormously significant, influential and thought-provoking were Thomas Aquinas, who was able to synthesize Aristotle’s logic (his method of logical demonstration) and Christian scriptures, the Old and New Testaments. By way of anti-thesis, I will also discuss some aspects of William of Ockham’s rejection of

20 The Trivium consisted of grammar, rhetoric, and logic and the Quadrivium consisted of arithmetic, geometry, music, harmonics, or tuning theory, astronomy, and cosmology.
21 Ferguson, 8.
22 Ibid., 9.
Aquinas’ theological project. The prior adumbration of the above theologians’ views serve as the necessary background to the discussion of Gregory of Rimini’s position which, according to Damasus Trapp, was extremely nuanced and important all by itself and not just as a part of a larger neo-Augustinian theological revival. However, before any discussion of the medieval Catholic Christian assent of and dissent from the project of Aquinas, it is vital to have some idea of what Aristotle himself said. One thing has been noticed by scholars, of Aristotle in particular and of philosophy in general, is that the medieval Catholic Christians and the Arab and Muslim scholars differ somewhat in their interpretations and explanations of various aspects of Aristotelian epistemology, cognition, and metaphysics. It is incumbent upon scholars of the medieval theologians and their work, to make sure that Aristotle himself is heard from his own works and not from pseudo-Aristotelian writings and neo-Platonic interpretations of Aristotle.

According to Sir David Ross, the Prior Analytics present Aristotle’s theory of syllogism, while the Posterior Analytics present his theory of scientific knowledge. Aristotle’s opening statement in his Posterior Analytics is: Πάσα διδασκαλία καὶ πάσα άριθμος διάνοιξις εἵκτι προοπου&παρουσία γίνεται γνώσεως. [All instruction and all learning through (or by way of) discussion proceeds from (or comes out of) what is known already (or more accurately – pre-existing knowledge).]

The mid to late medieval term scientia is not the equivalent of the word science as it is understood today. Scientia properly meant knowledge, and knowledge was attained as the result of logical demonstration (in the Latin, and subsequently English, it was derived from Greek and it was called apo deictic or apodictic) ἀποδεικτικός, which meant a

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23 Ferguson, 9.
25 Ibid., Posterior Analytics, book 1, line 71.
proposition that was capable of demonstration. The Arab and Islamic scholars would call it *al-burhan*. In western Catholic scholasticism the idea of demonstration and its leading conventions were drawn from the writings of Aristotle and properly defined. According to “the master of those who know” (Aristotle the Stagirite)\(^{27}\), knowledge in its proper meaning, *demonstratio* (logical or scientific demonstration or *al-burhan*), “was possible only if an argument met four basic conditions: (1) the principles upon which the entire argument rests must be self-evident; (2) the argument’s propositions must have necessary objects; (3) what is to be known must be caused by evident causes; (4) the conclusion must be reached through flawless syllogistic reasoning.”\(^{28}\) I will now examine each of these prerequisites in more detail below.\(^{29}\)

The basic propositions (known as first principles by some) that make up the foundation for an argument must be information that is shared by everyone and not truth from special revelation shared by only an elite group (e.g., a religious elite). First principles are inherently self-evident (described by Aristotle as “those premises of which it cannot be demonstrated that they are the case”\(^{30}\)) and must be so apparent and undeniable that anyone who has the intellectual competence to comprehend the language in which it is articulated will see instantly the truth of the matter. And since these premises or first principles are incapable of being demonstrable, to then be useful in logical arguments, they must be presupposed.\(^{31}\) Aristotle here gives the example of the triangle, that is, every triangle has three sides must be presupposed or assumed.

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\(^{27}\) From Canto IV of Dante Alighieri’s *The Inferno*.

\(^{28}\) Ferguson, 10.

\(^{29}\) I have scrutinized the commentary made by Renford Bambrough based on the translations by his colleagues, J. L. Creed and A. E. Wardman that is used by Ferguson against the original Greek language copy as revised and commented upon by W. D. Ross (who is unquestionably the authority) and that of Richard McKeon.


\(^{31}\) Ferguson, 10.
Aristotle goes on to say that self-evident first principles must be cautiously differentiated from universally acknowledged opinions which, although shared by the larger general public, are nevertheless not self-evident. As long as one legitimate objection can be raised against the truth or necessity of a proposition it will not qualify as the first principle for a scientific demonstratio. In other words, “it is not necessary” is a statement we append to a premise (or so-called first principle) that can be shown to be different in another case or that it might be inapplicable to a particular argument.\(^\text{32}\) This is not the same thing, however, as saying that universally held opinions cannot be used as propositions in a syllogism. Furthermore, as Bambrough says, “A discursive argument in syllogistic form is possible even with propositions stemming from opinion.”\(^\text{33}\) Aristotle made the following observation: “From truths you can make a syllogism without actually making a demonstration; but the only syllogism you can make from necessary truths is by way of demonstrating. This is the function of demonstration.”\(^\text{34}\) Therefore, the correct structure of a syllogism does not warrant the incontestable truth of its conclusion. Rather its correct structure combined with universally agreed upon propositions can result in useful knowledge and even truth of a certain kind. That is truth of a probable nature and not certainty.\(^\text{35}\)

The propositions used must be necessary, or, as Aristotle states it, “The object of absolute knowledge cannot be otherwise than it is. Therefore, the object of demonstrative knowledge must be necessary.”\(^\text{36}\) These necessary propositions or objects of demonstrative knowledge must convey a condition or a set of conditions which cannot possibly be otherwise than what is

\(^{32}\) Bambrough, 169.

\(^{33}\) Ferguson, 11.

\(^{34}\) Aristotle (Bambrough), 172.

\(^{35}\) Ferguson, 11.

\(^{36}\) Bambrough, 167.
predicated of the subject. Furthermore, the predication must be universally true or as Aristotle says, “We mean by universal that which is always and everywhere the case.”

To quote Aristotle further:

Since demonstrations are universal, and universals cannot be perceived, it is clear that scientific knowledge cannot be obtained by receiving. And, clearly, if we could perceive that triangles have angles equal to two right angles, we would still look for proof. We would not have knowledge, though some people say so. Perception must be perception of particular things, but knowledge is getting to know the universal.

Because, according to Aristotle, what man(kind) knows comprehensibly is always “man” distinct from “this” or “that man” or even “these” or “those men.” This is so since individuals within a class or species are excluded from consideration in necessary propositions (or objects of demonstrative knowledge).

Subsequently, from the above, the observation follows that universal predication also excludes deliberation on accidental qualities. Again we let Aristotle speak:

So in the example that Ferguson gives of a triangle as a brass, isosceles triangle that has three angles equal to two right angles, “three angles equal to two right angles” is predicated (affirmed or asserted, if you will, of the subject, a triangle) in a primary (universal and eternal) sense of

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37 The term “predication” is technical jargon and cannot be replaced with words like “affirmed” or “asserted.”
38 Ferguson, 12; Bambrough, 209.
39 Ibid.
40 Ferguson, 12.
41 In studies on Aristotelian logic predication means something affirmed or denied about something else or the subject. It is different from the definition of predication in modern classical (Russell-Frege) logic.
42 Ferguson, 12. Accidental is also technical jargon in the field of Aristotelian logic and the medieval logic based on it.
43 Bambrough, 175.
triangle a lone and not of the triangle which has the added accidental qualities of brass and isosceles. Therefore universal predication excludes accidental qualities in demonstrative arguments. Furthermore, any statement made about an accidental quality will be true only so long as the accident, itself, takes the form, shape, and character that are predicated about it. Thus an isosceles triangle has two sides equal in length and two angles equal in size and since it is still a triangle it has three angles equal to two right angles. However, such accidental qualities are not eternal; they cannot be used in necessary propositions. That is, a triangle can cease to be an isosceles if it no longer has two equal length sides and two equal angle sizes but it will not cease to be a triangle because it still has three angles that equal two right angles. In the case of individual men, they are born, grow, develop, and change during their lifetimes, and then perish eventually. But the universal man continues as an eternal, necessary object. Aristotle’s scheme of thought, because he treated all species and genera as eternal, considered “man” an universal object of knowledge.44

Demonstration should also produce knowledge by way of knowing the causes of things. Actually, to know something is to know its cause. In the Aristotelian scheme, the idea of causation or of cause has two distinctives which are crucial to the creation of knowledge and for understanding them in relation to their effects. Causes must be prior to the effect, and they must be better known.45 If not an effect would be in the improbable position of being superior (better than the first or ultimate and universal principles) to its cause, which is unfeasible, and coming prior to what produces it, which is likewise impossible. As Aristotle put it, “Complete demonstrative knowledge requires not only that we have better knowledge of the starting points

44 Ferguson, 13. Footnote 11. This Aristotelian notion has metaphysical repercussions for Christianity and Islam since man is considered eternal and not a finite creature, created by God and hence contingent and dependent upon God. I will return to this problem in various parts of this thesis.

45 Ferguson, 13 and footnote 12 which is the quote from Aristotle.
and more conviction about them than about the conclusion.... A syllogism that creates knowledge will be made up of propositions which are necessary and are structured in a particular manner so that not only will they put forward a conclusion but also present the reason why the conclusion must be revealed as such. Once again, according to Aristotle:

When the conclusion is necessary, there is nothing to keep the middle term of the demonstration from being not necessary. It is possible to reach a necessary conclusion from premises that are not necessary, just as a true conclusion can be drawn from untrue premises. But when the middle term is necessary, so, too, is the conclusion, just as true premises always lead to true conclusions...For demonstrative knowledge, there must be necessary facts. Clearly, then, the middle term of the demonstration must be necessary too. If not, we will not know why something is the case, or that something is the case, or that something must necessarily be the case. Either we will think we know when in fact we do not, if we suppose that something is necessary when it is not; or else we will not even think we know, whether we ‘know’ the fact through middle terms or ‘know’ the reason why through immediate premises.

In doing what is described above, the syllogism reveals the cause and thus creates real knowledge, or scientia. Ferguson gives as an example (as everyone else has since Aristotle), the classical syllogism, “All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore, Socrates is mortal.” The middle term (Socrates is a man) operates as the cause and shows the reason for the conclusion (Therefore, Socrates is mortal) which follows necessarily from the premises noted above. The middle term “man” operates as the link which ties together the other two principal terms of the syllogism, “mortal” and “Socrates.” It is here that I have difficulty with what Ferguson says:

Because we know self-evidently through an explanation of the terms that Socrates is a man and that every man is mortal, it necessarily follows that the fact that Socrates is a man is the cause of his being a mortal.

If the terms of the syllogism are self-evident and their relationships are perceived or

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46 Bambrough, 165. This is from Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, Book I, section 2. Ferguson, 14.
47 Ferguson, 14.
48 As quoted in Ferguson, 14. This is from Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, Book I, section 6. Bambrough, 173.
49 Ferguson, 15. Emphasis mine.
grasped, I do n’t believe that any explanation of the terms is needed if Aristotle is understood correctly. Hence in Aristotelian terms, to recognize this causal relation is to have knowledge, and to do so in the structure of a positive syllogism whose premises are obviously apparent, whose middle term (man) forms the subject of the first premise (All men are mortal) and the predicate of the second (Socrates is a man), is to make demonstration. Thus, knowledge understood as demonstration (the Medieval Latin *demonstratio*), is what the medieval scholastics meant by *scientia*, knowledge understood in its strict sense.

Demonstration involves a syllogism which produces knowledge in its strict sense which is referred to as *scientia*. A syllogism consists of two premises, one major and one minor, whose meaning must be self-evident to the perceiver who grasps the truth of these premises. Both of these premises must deal with objects which are necessary, universal and eternal, not contingent, and these two premises must guide the mind of the perceiver to the conclusion with such irrefutable necessity that when the conclusion is examined with reference to the premises it cannot be in doubt. Thus, when all of these prerequisites are met the result is demonstration which is the highest form of knowledge, *scientia*, possible for mankind.

It must be noted here, that Aristotle does not disallow other kinds of knowledge. For example, one can surmise a subsequent from a previously known premise, a supposition which follows from that premise with the greatest force. The conclusion in this case even may be true and necessary, but does not amount to a demonstration, because it fails to present us with the

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50 In fact this is where Ibn Taymiyya gives his most trenchant criticisms against the demonstratio of Aristotle. It is in the area of defining the terms of the syllogism. His criticisms anticipate those of the positivist school.

51 Ferguson, 15.

52 Bambrough, 163. Aristotle states here that “...I say here and now that we do know by demonstration. By ‘demonstration’ I mean a syllogism such that we know by grasping it.”

53 Ferguson, 15, 16. From Aristotle Book I, section 2, Bambrough, 163.
form of a basic syllogism, two premises and a conclusion.\textsuperscript{54} It is also possible to know something through an immediate rational intuition of the mind, without recourse to any sort of process of ratiocination. Such rational intuition can legitimately be called knowledge, but not demonstration. Demonstration requires a discursive process but not all discursive processes lead to demonstrations; they lead to probability and not to scientific certainty. Lacking the discursive process (as discussed in Aristotle’s Metaphysics), knowledge may be possible, but not knowledge in the strict, Aristotelian sense which is \textit{scientia}.\textsuperscript{55}

In conclusion, if a syllogism consists of two premises based upon self-evident (universal and eternal) propositions and if a conclusion follows necessarily from these two premises and if the mind of the perceiver grasps the necessity of and the reasons for the progression of argument from premises to conclusion, then only then, has a demonstration been constructed and knowledge, in its strict sense, been procured. This previous section should stay in the foreground as it is an alert to the reader as to how knowledge in this strict sense is being used and as to how demonstration (\textit{al-burhan}) is defined. The majority of (if not all) the scholastic theologians considered the question of \textit{theologia qua scientia} (theology characterized and taught as a science) with this, essentially, strict definition of \textit{demonstratio} (knowledge) and hence \textit{scientia} in mind. There were, of course, modifications and a certain use of nuance in some aspects of the strict understanding of knowledge from \textit{demonstratio}, in order to meet the special concerns raised by Catholic Christian and even Islamic theological assumptions.\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{54} Ibn Taymiyya states that the form of a syllogism is not necessary because people don’t actually form conclusions in this way; they form conclusions based on inference, and hence the Aristotelian idea of demonstration is too prolix and confusing. It is a foreign and artificial human construct; foreign to Islam and the typical human method of reasoning.

\textsuperscript{55} Ferguson, 16.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 16, 17.
Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*

This section deals in part with the other aspects of Aristotle’s Philosophy writings. The section above dealt directly with that aspect of his *Organon* called *Posterior Analytics* in which he deals with the issue of Demonstration (or Demonstratio). During the writing of this thesis a question arose concerning Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. It seems on the surface that a contradiction arises in Aristotle’s method of gaining knowledge; in the *Metaphysics* it seems that it is through a process of induction rather than demonstration. In chapter four of Ernest A. Moody’s book, *The Logic of William of Ockham*, which explicates the Categories of Aristotle, a section is devoted to Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*.

According to Moody, two significant results can be extricated from the idea that “being” (*ens*), and the transcendental (within the range of knowledge but independent of human experience) terms translatable with it, cannot, as Aristotle proves, be a *genus* or in a *genus*. The first is that metaphysics cannot be a demonstrative science, and second is that the principles of the demonstrative sciences are not demonstrated by metaphysics. The first conclusion results from the fact that every demonstrative science demonstrates “particular qualities” of its subject through “*middle terms that are prior, in the sense of being more universal than, its subject.*” But the subject of metaphysics is “being,” and there is no term or concept prior to, or more universal than, “being” and hence “man” as was discussed above. In addition, there are no metaphysical “conclusions” divergent from metaphysical principles; “for metaphysics is the science of first principles as such, and first principles, by the very fact that they are first, are indemonstrable.”

The second conclusion, that the principles of the demonstrative science are not demonstrated by metaphysics, so that the discursive sciences are not related to metaphysics as subalternate or

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subalternant is likewise evident from the character of the subject of metaphysics. First, a science that is indemonstrable is unable to demonstrate the basic assumptions of another science; and secondly, since “being” and the other metaphysical terms are not genera nor included under a genus, they cannot be the middle terms of any demonstration in a discursive (or rational) science.58

Demonstrative sciences show how things that are differ in their being; but being as such, with which metaphysics is involved, cannot be a principle of demonstrating differences in being, and hence metaphysics cannot generate the principle of any demonstrative science. On the other hand, since every speculative science is concerned with things that are, the principles and terms of every such science must exemplify metaphysical concepts and metaphysical truth; and since metaphysics is the science of first principles as such, the recognition by the demonstrative scientist of his principles will involve the recognition of his metaphysical principles as demonstrated and displayed in the subject genus of his science.”59

Medieval Nominalism

According to Heiko A. Oberman, in the search for the essence of nominalism and its concept of man we must not limit ourselves to Ockham, but rather put our questions to the truest representatives of his entire movement.60 He suggests that we discern four schools in nominalism. The first, the English school, mainly represented by Robert Holcot (d. 1349) and Adam Woodham (d. 1358), is best defined as the “left wing” school of nominalism. As clearly

58 Moody, 118, 119. In the section above on Aristotelian Demonstration, it stated that syllogistic reasoning can lead to a discursive argument; however, all demonstrations are discursive arguments but not all discursive arguments are demonstrations.

59 Ibid., 119.

as the other schools, and as Ockham himself, it clearly shows the centrality of the idea of God’s omnipotence – applying it, however, in a most extreme way. Its logic leads to skepticism: its theology to the remarkable combination of determinism and Pelagianism (sounds like a paradoxical Mutazillite theological construct!). The moral freedom of man is stressed, but at the same time, God’s government appears so immediate that He has to take more than customary responsibility for man’s sinful deeds. An echo of the English school can be heard in Nicolas de Autrecourt and Jean de Mirecourt. Oberman claims to recognize here the same combination of skepticism, determinism, and – in a lesser degree – Pelagianism. A direct line between Woodham and Holcot on the one hand and Autrecourt and Mirecourt on the other has been indicated elsewhere. The Church’s condemnation of the two Parisians in 1346 and 1347 is responsible for the fact that their influence is negligible.

In the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the second school finds its representatives mainly at the University of Paris. Oberman proceeds to call this the Parisian syncretistic school. Here the influence of Scotus and Ockham is merged in such a way as to make it very difficult to decide what the first loyalty of its representatives is. John of Ripa (c.1355) and Peter of Candia (d. 1410) can be mentioned in this connection. John Gerson, who repeatedly expressed his impatience with this particular tradition, should not be assigned to this school.

The third school can best be called the right-wing, and it is represented by Gregory of Rimini (d. 1358) and Henry of Oyta (d. 1394). Thomas Bradwardine (d. 1349) shares most of its characteristics, though for a long time – actually since the fourteenth century itself – he was mistakenly grouped together with Ripa and Mirecourt. This school takes an Augustinian stand, in contrast to the Pelagian trends which Oberman observed in the English left-wing. It tries, as
much as do the other schools, to bring out the autonomy of man as regards the natural world, and to prove the compatibility of the freedom of the will with God’s sovereignty.

The theology of the fourth school is a typical “Vermittlungs-theologie [“mediating” theologies or “middle ways”].” John Gerson and Gabriel Biel have both done much to make Nominalistic theology acceptable: Gerson by including mystical warmth in his theological formulations, Biel by neutralizing the extreme positions of the left-wing. The textbooks of Biel especially brought the via moderna to many German universities.

As pertinent and satisfying as this delineation of Oberman, there still arises within my’s mind a nagging question. That is, are these designations “right-wing” and “left-wing” even valid and does defining any one person’s theology as Realist (as has been claimed for Thomism), while, at the same time, his or her philosophy as nominalist even safe, accurate or satisfying? Furthermore, Oberman suggests that “nominalist theology is not merely an automatic conclusion drawn out of its philosophy; but, on the contrary, nominalist philosophy is the reflection and echo of its theology and, in particular, of its concept of God’s potentia absoluta.”61 However, even this attempt at defining the movement of nominalism is, to my mind, not satisfying. According to Ernest A. Moody, for Ockham, Realism in metaphysics entails nominalism in logic. The alternative is to efface the distinction between logic and metaphysics by locating the measure of truth, and the principles of being and of reality, in the processes and products of human thinking itself.62 The above statement by Moody then requires us to answer a further question via more definitions. What are Realism, Idealism, deduction, induction, and conceptualism?

61 Ibid.
CHAPTER III
THE GRECO-ARABIC TRANSLATION MOVEMENT AND THE ARABIC AND ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION

Dimitri Gutas' work on the Graeco-Arabic translation movement is a vital prelude for any study and understanding of the Islamic or more properly the Arabo-Islamic philosophical tradition. It is not quite accurate to call the tradition Islamic philosophy because there were groups or individuals who were Muslims, Syriac Christians, Nestorians and Monophysites, Jews, and others who lived within the political hegemony of the Islamic state. It is also inaccurate to name the tradition Arabic because there were Persians, Greeks, Indians, Berbers, and others who resided within the Islamic and Arabic speaking regions. Therefore, it is more accurate to call it the Arabo-Islamic philosophical tradition. By 732 the Islamic empire extended from Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent to Spain and the Pyrenees with the core of the new civilization resting in the hubs of ancient civilizations, from Persian through Mesopotamia and Syro-Palestine to Egypt. According to Gutas the translation movement proper began with the ‘Abbāsid Caliphate’s rise to power. The translation movement was mostly centered in Baghdad which was the new seat of the ‘Abbāsid Caliphate. Gutas disagrees with the two main theories, prevalent to this day, that account for the movement. The first theory states that the translation movement “was the result of the scholarly zeal of a few Syriac-speaking Christians who, fluent in Greek (because of their particular education) and Arabic (because of their historical circumstances), decided to translate certain works out of altruistic motives for the improvement

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64 Ibid., 11.
Widespread in mainstream historiography, the second theory states that the translation movement can be attributed “to the wisdom and open-mindedness of a few ‘enlightened rulers’ who, conceived in a backward projection of European enlightenment ideology, promoted learning for its own sake.”

Gutas elaborates with five points why the translation movement was an “astounding achievement” which “can hardly be grasped and accounted for otherwise than as a social phenomenon (the aspect which has been very little investigated).” His points are:

The Graeco-Arabic translation movement lasted, first of all, well over two centuries; it was no ephemeral phenomenon. Second, it was supported by the entire elite of ‘Abbāsid society: caliphs and princes, civil servants and military leaders, merchants and bankers, and scholars and scientists; it was not the pet project of any particular group in the furtherance of their restricted agenda. Third, it was subsidized by an enormous outlay of funds, both public and private; it was no eccentric whim of a Maecenas or the fashionable affectation of a few wealthy patrons seeking to invest in a philanthropic or self-aggrandizing cause. Finally, it was conducted with rigorous scholarly methodology and strict philological exactitude – by the famous Hunayn ibn-Ishaq and his associates – on the basis of a sustained program that spanned generations and which reflects, in the final analysis, a social attitude and the public culture of early ‘Abbāsid society; it was not the result of the haphazard and random research interests of a few eccentric individuals who, in any age or time, might indulge in arcane philological and textual pursuits that in historical terms are proven irrelevant.

It should also be noted that the translation movement was supported across most of the conceivable lines of differentiation; the ethnic, tribal, linguistic, religious, and sectarian. Gutas, while acknowledging the importance of studies on social stratification and advantages brought about by the Arab conquests like urbanization, literacy, and economic prosperity, rejects the suggestion of scholars who, too quickly, looked to the “new middle class” as the impetus for the translation movement. Gutas gives the reason for his lack of conviction; it has been shown, that

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65 Ibid., 2.
66 Ibid., 2, 3.
67 Ibid., 2.
68 Ibid., 2. Note here the contrast between this paragraph and the description given in chapter IV.
on occasion, no such translation movement developed in societies and during certain periods having the same advantages as described above. In other words, rather than allowing the concrete facts that arise from the historical and social underpinnings of an intellectual undertaking as comprehensive as the translation movement to inform us, some scholars find it necessary to implement an intentionally speculative approach to viewing and analyzing these very facts. The adoption of such ahistorical assumptions about cultures, rooted in expressions like the ‘Greek spirit of scientific rationalism’ or the ‘Arab need for intellectual and political order’ should alert us to the “background and ideological orientation of the scholar using such theoretical constructs and nothing about the subject under discussion, they belong to the sociology or history of knowledge in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries rather than to the historical investigation of the subject.”

Gutas goes on to state that the Graeco-Arabic translation movement should appear to the observer as a very multifaceted social, and I would add historical, occurrence where “no single circumstance, set of events, or personality can be singled out as its cause.” He goes on to state that a variety of factors was involved in the advancement and sustainment of the translation movement. One of these factors was the introduction of paper-making expertise and equipment into the Islamic world by Chinese prisoners of war in 134 A. H./751 C.E. This new medium, paper, was to quickly displace every other type of writing medium during the first decades of the ‘Abbāsid Caliphate, when its use was vigorously promoted and even decreed by the ruling elite. Another factor was the termination of barriers between the territories east and west of

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69 Ibid., 5, see footnote 6.
70 Ibid., 6, 7.
71 Ibid., 7.
72 Ibid., 13. See also the Introduction to the *Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, 2, 3.
Mesopotamia which had inadvertent but very beneficial cultural outcomes. It unified regions and peoples that for a thousand years had been exposed to the process of Hellenization since the days of the Macedonian Alexander the Great “while it isolated politically and geographically the Byzantines, i.e., the Greek-speaking Chalcedonian Orthodox Christians.” Gutas finds this noteworthy for a couple of reasons. First, the exclusive theological policies and praxis of Byzantine Orthodoxy, as articulated in Constantinople, only served to create religious schisms in which on the one hand pushed Syriac (a branch of Aramaic) speaking Christians to the point of religious disintegration; and on the other hand, in the case of the Nestorians, drove them into Persia. It was the impartial Islamic state, according to Gutas, that led to unification through the removal from Islamic polity (Dar al-Islam) of this source of conflict and cultural disintegration. It led the way to greater cultural collaboration and interaction. Second, with the expansion of the Islamic empire, the Byzantines became politically and geographically inaccessible; this resulted in Christian communities and all other Hellenized peoples in the Islamic territories being shielded “from the dark ages and aversion to [pagan] Hellenism into which Byzantium slid in the seventh and eighth centuries.”

Gutas takes the cautious approach and advises others to do so as well, at this admittedly preliminary stage of studying early ‘Abbāsid society, to pay attention to and to comprehend the sources as proficiently as possible and to read them and to deduce their signs, and I would add, discuss issues like discourse analysis. Hopefully, this approach would then lead to the development of more refined diagnostic and analytical tools.

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73 Ibid., 13. Italics used by Gutas.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., 7.
further claim, which I will only tentatively accept at this preliminary stage:

...that the translation movement had very much to do, on one hand, with the foundation of Baghdad and the establishment there of the ‘Abbasid dynasty as the managers of a world empire, and, on the other, with the special needs of the society in Baghdad as it was forming itself both under the manipulation of the ‘Abbāsid dynasty and elite and through its own special and, in many ways, unprecedented configuration.77

Notwithstanding Gutas’ main thesis and larger concerns, it is appropriate to draw on his research to get some idea of when, and which, and by whom, Aristotelian works were translated into Arabic. The Chalcedonian Christians were embroiled in debates over the legitimacy of iconography in worship and competing with each other in the refutation of pagan beliefs. At the same time, however, Syriac speaking Christians, who were, after the Arab conquests, doctrinally and politically separated from the Chalcedonian Christians, evolved along diverse cultural positions. Syriac speaking Christians had by this time fully incorporated secular Greek learning which had become well-established in the foremost centers of Eastern Christianity throughout the Fertile Crescent. Centers like Edessa in the west, Mosul in northern Mesopotamia, to Gundisabur (or Gundishapur) in western Persia were among the most famous.78

The same environment of learning and assimilation persisted among the Monophysites and the Nestorians throughout the region. This can be clearly seen by the appearance of scholars during the early period of the ‘Abbāsid era. They had real credentials in the field of Greek scientific and philosophical scholarship. For instance, Abu-Bisr Matta ibn Yunus, the founder of the Aristotelian school in Baghdad (ca. early tenth century), studied and taught at a thriving Nestorian monastery located on the Tigris River south of Baghdad (Dayr Qunna). The renowned Hunayn ibn-Ishaq, whose hometown was al-Hira, which is close to the Euphrates River in

77 Ibid.
78 Ibid., 14. The Fertile Crescent is the area of fertile land in Southwest Asia reaching from Israel to the Persian Gulf and incorporating the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in Iraq. The ancient Babylonian, Sumerian, Assyrian, Phoenician, and Hebrew civilizations arose here.
Southern Iraq, did a comparison, among other things, between the curricular procedures in Alexandria in the distant past and those in his own day.

Due to the arrival of Islam, all the centers of scholarship that were extant, secular and religious, were integrated politically and administratively by the central governing body. Most significantly, scholars from all of these centers were allowed “to pursue their studies and interact with each other without the need to pay heed to any official version of ‘orthodoxy,’ whatever the religion.” 79 Of significance is that these scholars, under the new circumstances created by the Arab conquests and the revoking of pre-existing political and religious obstacles, represented an extant scientific tradition. They were experts in their particular fields, and because they were multilingual, not only could they draw on the scientific literature written in languages other than Greek, but they could also disseminate the new knowledge without translation. Furthermore, they kept in contact with each other in person or through travel and correspondence. According to Gutas, this extant scientific tradition is the only probable explanation for

...the appearance, almost overnight, it would seem, of the numerous experts in the court of the ‘Abbāsids once they made the political decision to focus the efforts of the available scientists and sponsor the translation of written sources. 80

The intellectual leanings of the Arab empire changed radically because of the ‘Abbāsid revolution, the founding of Baghdad, and the relocation of the seat of the caliphate to ‘Iraq. Within Baghdad, there developed a new multicultural, multilingual, and multi-religious society independent of the Byzantine influence which had developed in Damascus, with its “disparaging attitude toward Hellenism.” 81 This new multicultural orientation was due to a mixture of diverse human populations in ‘Iraq. This population was comprised of a) Aramaic speakers, Christians,

79 Ibid., 15.
80 Ibid., 16.
81 Ibid., 18, 19.
and Jews, who formed the preponderance of the established population; b) Persian-speakers, gathering primarily in the cities; and c) Arabs partly sedentary “and Christians, like those at al-Hira on the Euphrates, and partly nomadic, in the grazing grounds of Northern ‘Iraq.”

On the one hand, the Umayyads had to depend on the resident Byzantines and Christian Arabs in Damascus for their administration, while, on the other hand, the early ‘Abbāsids, had to depend on the resident Persians, Christian Arabs, and Syriac Christians (Aramaic) for the same. The culture of the people employed by the ‘Abbāsids was Hellenized, without the hostility directed against classical Greek learning, as it was by those within the Orthodox Christian Byzantine circles, influential in the Umayyad court. It is therefore paradoxical that even though the caliphate was transferred from Damascus to Baghdad, from a Greek-speaking to a non-Greek-speaking area, it nevertheless ensured the perpetuation of the classical Greek scientific and philosophical heritage which was all but excised by the Orthodox (Chalcedonian) Christian Byzantines.

There is, according to Dimitri Gutas, a prevalent fallacious argument:

...in the majority of works dealing with the transmission of Greek knowledge into Arabic that this was affected on the basis of pre-existing Syriac translations, in the sense that the truly significant job of studying, selecting, and translating the Greek classics into a Semitic language had already been accomplished in the Syriac schools and that all that was needed to be done, for the Arabic versions, was merely the mechanical task of rendering the Syriac translations into a cognate Semitic language under the patronage only of an Arabic elite.

Nothing could be further from the truth. Before the advent of the ‘Abbāsids, comparatively a small number of secular Greek works had been translated into Syriac, other than Porphyry’s

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82 Ibid., 19.
83 Ibid., 20.
84 Ibid., 21.
Eisagoge and the first three books of the Organon; there were works on medicine and some on astronomy, astrology, and popular philosophy. It should be noted that the majority of the Greek scientific and philosophical works were translated into Syriac during the ninth century as a component of the ‘Abbāsid translation movement. Additionally, the Syriac-speaking Christians provided a large part of the essential methodological expertise for the Graeco-Arabic translation movement. However, this does not diminish the role played by the early ‘Abbāsid societal context; namely the motivation, scientific objectives, and organization of the translation movement provided by them.

It was the Christians and Jews, though not a threat politically, who were nonetheless, redoubtable intellectual opponents with centuries of polemical experience in inter-faith exchanges. As the Muslims cast about for a handbook in the art of argumentation (i.e. debate and logical reasoning) and more properly disputation (disputatio) or formal academic debate; Al-Mahdi’s advisors suggested the Aristotelian work that began it all, Aristotle’s Topics. Al-Mahdi was, according to al-Ahbari, not only the first to pioneer but also vigorously defended both the methodology and the social demeanor of disputatio for resolving or sponsoring religio-political debates. The most noteworthy of sweeping results appears to be the ascendancy of the law as the principal expression of Islamic religiosity.

According to the extant research on the translation movement, four complexes of translations exist. It is enough for the purposes of this thesis that this approach to the study of the translation movement is superior to the other methods like the chronological or “schools of

85 They are 1) Categories, 2) On Interpretation, and 3) Prior Analytics.
86 Ibid., 22.
translation” approaches. One of the complexes of translations that concern this paper is the complex of translations of the Aristotelian *Organon.*

Although probably requiring a book, the full assessment of this complex would have to take into consideration the diverse stages of its progression; that is, from the earliest Syriac translations to the concluding stage as represented in the scholarship of the Baghdad Aristotelians. The Paris manuscript of texts representing this concluding stage of scholarship contains the nine treatises of the Alexandrian *Organon* which consists of the 1) *Eisagoge* (or Isagoge) of Porphyry; 2) *Categories*; 3) *On Interpretation* (or Hermeneutics); 4) *Prior Analytics* (or Syllogism); 5) *Posterior Analytics* (or Demonstration); 6) *Topics* (mentioned in the previous paragraph); 7) *Sophistic* or *Sophistical Refutations*; 8) *Rhetoric*; and 9) *Poetics.* According to Gutas:

They were all copied from the autograph of al-Hasan ibn Suwar (d. ca. 421/1030), who had copied some of them from the autograph of his teacher, Yahya ibn ‘Adi (d. 363/974), who in turn had collated his own copy of the *Categoriae* and *De Interpretatione* with the autograph of the translator, Ishaq ibn Hunayn (d. 298/910).

As far as the translation movement in Baghdad and the complex of the Baghdad *Organon* is concerned, an encyclopedic work can be done on the one hundred year history of Arabic logic in Baghdad; but it is enough for my purposes to delineate how early the Aristotelian logical corpus was available to Ibn Taymiyya and his traditionist predecessors.

Christina D’Ancona states that according to Porphyry, Plotinus having opened his school, taught orally recording nothing for ten years. Plotinus then began to write treatises till his death in 270 C.E. Thanks to Porphyry, historians of philosophy knew the precise chronology of Plotinus’ works. Apparently Plotinus’ treatises were out of order and were baffling to his students and to Porphyry himself who composed summaries and notebooks and even a sort of

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88 Gutas, 141-149.
89 Ibid., 147.
companion to Plotinian metaphysics. In fact the *Enneads*, an edition of Plotinus’ treatises that Porphyry compiled about 13 years after Plotinus’ death, is according to D’Ancona, a replication of Andronicus of Rhodes’ systematic arrangement of Aristotle’s works, as Porphyry himself admits. According to Christina D’Ancona, Porphyry was responsible for more than just simply reshaping Plotinus’ thought.\(^90\) Porphyry also included Aristotle’s works, and especially the logical treatises comprising the *Organon* (*Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics*, and *On Sophistical Refutations*). This decision would have paramount importance to the history of medieval thought in both the East and the West. Not only that but Porphyry also produced an introduction to Aristotle’s logic, the famous *Isagoge* (or *Eisagoge*) which became part of the *Organon* of Aristotle at the Alexandrian school and was included by the Arabo-Islamic philosophers in their so-called Baghdad *Organon*. D’Ancona goes on to state that Porphyry deliberately disassociated himself from Plotinus over the issue of the latter’s opposition to a few critical “doctrines” of Aristotle’s thought. This may also explain why Porphyry later moved from Rome to Sicily. Also, this is probably the explanation for the reason that Boethius does not begin with the works of Plato in his ambitious plan to translate and comment on the works of both Plato and Aristotle. Instead he begins with Aristotle’s *Organon* with its introduction by Porphyry’s *Isagoge*. This also happened during the early phase of Graeco-Arabic translation movement that occurred during the ‘Abbāsid Caliphate. Even in the time of Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), the *Isagoge* of Porphyry was considered the beginning of philosophical instruction.\(^91\)

After the first decades of the fifth century the Platonic studies at Athens were renewed

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\(^91\) Ibid., 15.
especially during the time of Syrianus, the teacher of Proclus, by which time a full-fledged curriculum of philosophical studies had been developed. The curriculum included the work of both Plato and Aristotle. In fact, studying Aristotle was the prelude that led from logic to physics to metaphysics, and the succeeding elucidation of the highest theological truth was entrusted to Plato. By the fifth to the sixth century, Athens had become a center of philosophy guided by a canon of authoritative texts which included both Aristotle and Plato. The climax of the philosophical curriculum was no longer metaphysics but theology; it was “a philosophical discourse about the divine principles,” whose sources were established firstly and for the most part, “in the revelations of late paganism and then in Plato’s dialogues, allegorically interpreted as conveying his theological doctrine.”

Proclus not only commented on Plato’s main dialogues (e.g. Timaeus, Parmenides) but he also wrote a massive treatise on systematic theology, the *Platonic Theology*. He also collected all the theological truths, in the form of axioms, into a companion text which he modeled on Euclid’s *Elements of Geometry*, calling it the *Elements of Theology*. After 529 C.E., the year that a ban was pronounced on the public teaching by philosophers of pagan commitment, it would have been foolhardy to deliver lectures “on the theological dialogues by Plato, whose interpretation, especially after Proclus, was strongly committed to polytheism.” The surprising truth, based on the initial facts of the matter, that late Neoplatonism is mostly focused on commenting on Aristotle, rather than on Plato, may be explained by the indispensable role played by Aristotle in the debate between pagans and Christians. The argument between Simplicius and John Philoponus, over whether the cosmos is eternal or created, best illustrates

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92 Ibid., 16.
The impact of this debate on the formative period of the falsafa in Arabo-Islamic philosophy cannot be exaggerated. Firstly, John Philoponus’ anti-eternalist arguments were to have an overriding importance for al-Kindi. Secondly, according to D’Ancona, the polemics involved proved that philosophical debate even in the last stages of the Neoplatonic schools had Aristotle as a major focus. By the end of antiquity, shortly before Alexandria came under Islamic rule, “Aristotle was seen as the unexcelled master of scientific learning in logic, physics, cosmology, natural science, and psychology.” D’Ancona goes on to state:

According to D’Ancona, under the ‘Abbāsid dynasty a “proper movement of translation began and developed into a systematic assimilation of Greek scientific and philosophical learning.” Gerhard Endress has given historians of the movement a wide-ranging description of the scientific fields covered by the activity of the translators, of phases of integration of Greek philosophical studies, and of the different styles of translations. Alongside this backdrop, the role of Greek Neoplatonism appears to be central; among the first works to be translated into Arabic were the Enneads of Plotinus and Proclus’ Elements of Theology. This had long-standing ramifications for the entire development of falsafa. The same group that translated these works also produced the first Arabic translations of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and De Caelo; this group

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93 Ibid., 16, 17.
94 Ibid., 17.
95 Ibid., 18.
97 Ibid., 21. I don’t know if D’Ancona is using falsafa to mean the “philosophers” or in the sense of “philosophy” which would be falsasifa. There is some confusion that the editor did not correct.
was identified by Endress as the “circle of al-Kindi” in Baghdad in the ninth century. Endress was able to single out a group of early translators by way of a set of identifying features. Apparently, all of them were linked in some way or another to al-Kindi, and they produced many crucial texts on Greek cosmology, psychology, metaphysics, and theology. Some general suppositions typical of this first integration of Greek thought into an Islamic setting would remain the distinctive characteristic of *falāsifa*, both East and West:

... (1) philosophy is a systematic whole, whose roots lie in logic and whose peak is rational theology; (2) all the Greek philosophers agree on a limited, but important, set of doctrines concerning the cosmos, the human soul, and the first principle; (3) philosophical truths do not derive from the Qur’an, even if they fit perfectly with it.  

All this resulted from the combined reading of Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Plotinus, and Proclus, whose works are meant to convey a consistent set of doctrines. In fact the Aristotelian commentaries that have survived down to our time adhere to the post-Plotinian tradition of reading Aristotle’s logic and cosmology as matching exactly with Plato’s metaphysical doctrine.

Actually it is Aristotle, the first teacher, who is credited with a rational theology. This is apparent not only in *Theology of Aristotle*, but also in the reorganization of the Arabic translation of Proclus’ *Elements of Theology*, the *Book of Aristotle’s Exposition of the Pure Good (Kitab al-idah li-Aristutalis fi al-khayr al-mahd)*, whose origin within the circle of al-Kindi has been established by Endress. This very reorganization,

...which has been credited to al-Kindi himself, will become in twelfth-century Toledo, thanks to Gerard of Cremona’s translation into Latin, the *Liber Aristotelis de Expositione Bonitatis Purae (Liber de Causis)*. The Latin Aristotelian corpus too will then culminate in Neoplatonic rational theology.

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98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid., 17.
101 Ibid., 26.
The ascription of a Neoplatonic rational theology to Aristotle has its derivation in post-Plotinian Platonism, and in the preponderance that the Alexandrian commentators gave to Aristotle without forsaking the main Neoplatonic doctrines regarding the One, Intellect, and Soul. For this reason, falsafa cannot be appropriately understood if its ancestry in the philosophical thought of Late Antiquity is not taken into consideration.102

With the ascendance of the Baghdad Peripatetics, manifested by the activities of Abu Bishr Matta ibn Yunus (d. 940 C.E.) and al-Farabi (d. 950 C.E.), the logicians began to focus closely on the *Organon* itself. Al-Farabi wanted to clear away the misinterpretations of the Aristotelian text, many of which were due to the summaries done by the Syriac scholars, and to “reviving true Peripatetic doctrine after a period of rupture.”103 The Baghdad Peripatetics carried on the work of Abu Bishr and al-Farabi and by approximately 1000 C.E. were able to produce a solidly annotated version of the *Organon* which was precise enough for concentrated exegesis. This tradition of al-Farabi, which lasted both in Baghdad until the mid-twelfth century and in Spain where it ended up somewhat after the time period of Averroes (d. 1198 C.E.), would always be involved with this kind of exegesis. While the final version of the Arabic *Organon* was being accomplished, the young Avicenna (d. 1037 C.E.) from Khurasan was in the process of changing forever the course of Islamic philosophy.104

According to Tony Street, “the leaders of the Heroic Age of Arabic logic, al-Farabi and Avicenna, dealt with the books of the *Organon* one by one.”105 However, by the time al-Katibi

102 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
wrote the *Shamsiyya*, at the peak of the Golden Age of Arabic logic, the discipline had changed from extending all over the topics covered in the *Organon* to focusing on assiduously formal questions. Like everyone else at the time, al-Katibi wrote on those questions as they had progressed from the pen of Avicenna. No matter the end result, how did the *Shamsiyya* come to be studied in the madrasa? How did it come about that Islam embraced the science of the Greeks at its intellectual center of gravity, the madrasa? The debate which took place in the 930s between the grammarian, Abu Sa’id al-Sirafi and a leading Baghdad Peripatetic, Abu Bishr Matta was emblematic of the antipathy to logic in Muslim intellectual circles. Al-Sirafi ridiculed Abu Bishr along the lines that the world existed before and after Aristotle’s logic and that one could dispense with the ideas of the Greeks as well as the language of the Greeks. Al-Farabi’s response to the humiliation of al-Sirafi was to set about displaying how logic complemented the Islamic sciences. He did this by proving (in his mind) how logic supported and “guaranteed the arguments deployed in theology and law.”

In al-Farabi’s book *The Short Treatise on Reasoning in the Way of the Theologians*, he “analyses the ‘paradigmatic argument,’ the argument used by Muslim theologians called ‘reasoning from the seen to the unseen,’ and the ‘juristic argument’ itself.” According to Street, the famed Muslim jurist Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058-1111) adopted al-Farabi’s systematic defense of logic. Al-Ghazali went on to write a preamble to “his most famous juristic digest with a short treatise on logic,” stating that knowledge of logic was essential for the proper management of jurisprudential science (or theory—*usul al-fiqh*). Logic was subsequently broadly acknowledged as an essential part of the scholar’s instruction, this led to various scholars of logic to set apart at least a section of their manuals on logic to the simplification of juridical forms of

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106 Ibid., 252, 253.
disputation to the syllogism (al-qiyaṣ). The “Farabian strategy,” according to Street, succeeded in making logic a universally studied branch of learning, but the voices of protest could still be heard. The following two quotes are apropos. The famous condemnation of logic issued by Ibn al-Salah (d. 1245) shows “how pious doubts arose” about that branch of learning:

As far as logic is concerned, it is a means of access to philosophy. Now the access to something bad is also bad. Preoccupation with the study and teaching of logic has not been permitted by the Lawgiver. The use of the terminology of logic in the investigation of religious law is despicable and one of the recently introduced follies. Thank God, the laws of religion are not in need of logic. Everything a logician says about definition and apodictic proof is complete nonsense. God has made it dispensable for those who have common sense, and it is even more dispensable for the specialists in the speculative branches of jurisprudence.107

Street goes on to state that as a formal system, logic is inoffensive, and a significant jurist and prominent desipser of logic, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), was ready to make a concession to the point, although rather sardonically:

The validity of the form of the syllogistic is irrefutable...But it must be maintained that the numerous figures they have elaborated and the conclusions they have stipulated for their validity are useless, tedious, and prolix. These resemble the flesh of a camel found on the summit of a mountain; the mountain is not easy to climb, nor the flesh plump enough to make it worth the hauling.108

Therese-Anne Druart, notwithstanding D’Ancona’s article above, states that Greek sources are not enough to explain some developments no matter “how carefully and creatively the falāsifa or Hellenizing philosophers used the various Greek sources.”109 She goes on to state that Richard Frank (in 1979) argued that falsafa is not impervious to the influence of kalām or Islamic speculative or di alectic theology, which had shaped a sophisticated ontology of its

107 Ibid., 253.
108 Ibid., 254.
own. More recently, Frank has argued that even al-Ghazali, the celebrated author of the Incoherence of the Philosophers and steadfast defender of orthodox Sunni Islam, was himself deeply affected or swayed by Avicenna. The falāsifa, as well, failed to differentiate the issues, because some of them namely, al-Farabi, ibn Tufayl, and Averroes especially, “claim that there is one philosophical truth reflected in a plurality of simultaneously true religions.” What this meant is that the great philosophers held to essentially the same philosophical doctrines and that philosophy reached its crest with Aristotle.

Al-Ghazali is famous for his attack against the falāsifa in his Incoherence of the Philosophers and demonstrates great philosophical acumen. And yet he may have been more swayed by the falāsifa than he may have ever recognized. In his subtle and intricate appraisal of philosophy based on the Incoherence, he discredits al-Farabi’s assertion that philosophers used demonstrative reasoning, as well as the latter’s catchphrase that Plato and Aristotle essentially said the same thing. Ghazali further states that if the philosophers’ arguments (or propositional statements) were truly demonstrative (in the technical sense) “they would not disagree among themselves.” Their differences separated them approximately into three categories:

1. materialists who denied the existence of the omniscient Creator; (2) naturalists who, impressed by the marvel of nature, discovered the existence of the omniscient creator, but reduced humans beings into a mix of humors and ended up denying the immateriality and immortality of the soul as well as the possibility of resurrection; and (3) theists who accepted both the existence of a knowing Creator and the immortality of the soul and refuted the two previous groups.

Furthermore, even the theists disagreed among themselves, since Aristotle rebutted Socrates and Plato. Their differences of opinion are a sign of the flaws of their arguments. Interestingly, as far as al-Ghazali (who championed the cause of the Sufis) was concerned, it was al-Farabi and

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110 Ibid. Falsafa is the Arabic Transliteration of the Greek term for philosophy. Falasifa are philosophers.
111 Ibid., 327, 328.
112 Ibid., 342.
Avicenna mainly, who proposed the falsafa and Aristotelianism. Al-Ghazali, in a rather prolix discussion, was unhesitating in his support for both logic and mathematic (including geometry). He warned that rejecting these fields in the name of religion would damage the reputation of Islam. However, he was also anxious that the excellence of their proofs (mathematics and logic), which indeed are true demonstrations, may have the effect of misleading people into assuming that the other distinct parts of “philosophy are as intellectually rigorous.” In the field of metaphysics, Ghazali indicated that the philosophers, being unable to provide a pondeictic (or a podictic) argument, ended up with conflicting ideas and fell into countless errors. Consequently metaphysics gave rise to the three philosophical claims that should have been rejected as unbelief, namely, the eternity of the world, the denial of God’s knowledge of particulars, and the dismissal of corporeal rewards and punishments in the afterlife. The reason why he highlights these three claims of metaphysics, is that they originate from the philosopher’s conception of causation.\textsuperscript{113}

For Ghazali, in his strictures against aspects of metaphysics, “true agency requiring both knowledge of particulars and will is God’s privilege.”\textsuperscript{114} According to Ghazali there is only a solitary agent, God, and all other created beings are not gifted even with a derived “causal power” (or secondary causality which in the Averroist and Thomist schemes are derivative in ways more than in just words).\textsuperscript{115} Druart claims that regardless of the assertions of some scholars as to the desertion of occasionalism by al-Ghazali, what concerns her here is his avowal that the central “difference between the ontological commitments of the falāsifa” and the mutakallimun (practitioners of kalām) rests in their conceptualization of causation and its

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 342, 343.

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.

repercussions. For al-Ghazali then, all the unorthodox stances of the main falāsifa obtain from their notion of agency, as emphasized in the *Incoherence*.⑩⁶

The philosophically sophisticated attacks by Al-Ghazali on al-Farabi and Avicenna were enormously influential. So much so, that Averroes took them very seriously and answered them each in his *Incoherence of the Incoherence*. Even so, his alert reading of Aristotle led him to discard the emanationism that had existed in diverse forms in al-Kindi, al-Razi, al-Farabi, and Avicenna and to endorse a more authentic Aristotelianism. Averroes, slowly goaded by al-Ghazali’s cues and by more meticulous readings of the Aristotelian corpus, disparaged Avicenna for contaminating falsafa and promoted, like a zealous convert, a return to true Aristotelianism cleansed from Neoplatonism and the accretions caused by the *mutakallimun*.⑩⁷

It has been my experience that most attempts to elucidate “Arabic” or Islamic logic has been limited to the work of Islamic philosophers or falsafa or to those who are considered philosophical or speculative theologians or practitioners of kalām. One rarely sees any mention of the traditionalist theologians like Ibn Taymiyya and if so only in passing. Wael B. Hallaq has already been lauded, and rightfully so, for his efforts in bringing to light the essence of Ibn Taymiyya’s works “against the Greek logicians.”⑩⁸ It must be noted that Hallaq’s work is really a translation of the work by Al-Suyuti⑩⁹ who is responsible for editing Ibn Taymiyya’s two major works (really one – *Al-Radd ala’ al-Mantiqiyyin*) against Greek logic. It was Al-Suyuti who understood the importance of aggressively refuting the perceived need for the use of Greek logic in the study of Islamic Jurisprudence. He saw to it that Ibn Taymiyya’s core arguments

⑩⁶ Druart, 343, 344.
⑩⁷ Ibid., pp. 345, 346.
⑩⁹ Al-Suyuti’s abridgement: *Jahd al-Qarīha fi Tajrīd al-Nasīha*.
against the Greek logicians were carefully mined from his often prolix and tangential oeuvre.

Nicholas Rescher, in his books on Arabic logic and philosophy, will be my main reference point for my brief account of Arabic, or as some scholars insist, Islamic philosophy in general and Islamic logic in particular.\(^{120}\) Tony Street’s is a more modern approach, notwithstanding his precautionary statements, is on some level an attempt at making some comparative observations between the Western (Catholic Christian) tradition and the Eastern (Syriac and Islamic) variegated tradition. Using both of these sources, at least, I will give a somewhat brief account of the Arabic or Islamic tradition of adopting, adapting, and even modifying the Greek logical tradition. It is important to remember that Nicholas Rescher wrote his book *Studies in the History of Arabic Logic* in 1963. His opening broadside is:

Arabic logic, like the rest of medieval Arabic science and philosophy, is entirely Western and has nothing to do with “Oriental Philosophy.” It developed wholly in the wake of the classical Greek tradition as preserved in, and transmitted through Hellenistic Aristotelianism. The present account traces briefly the evolution of Arabic logic from its inception in the late 8th century to its stultification in the 16th century…\(^{121}\)

Notwithstanding Rescher’s “Orientalist” and some would say “Western chauvinist” attitudes, the Arabic or Islamic tradition (via “Averroes” – Ibn Rushd) was put to good use by the Western scholastic tradition until the early 17th century.

Rescher makes the observation, that, when the Arabs left the Arabian Peninsula and conquered the Syro-Iraqi territory, they came into contact with Greek learning. Thus Greek learning was still being preserved by the various Christian sectarians who were considered heretical by Orthodox Christianity. The Nestorians and the Monophysites (Jacobites) had introduced the Hellenistic scholarship of Alexandria through centers of learning like Edessa and Nisibis. Rescher goes on to state that the initial written works on logic in Arabic were produced

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by Syrian Christian scholars. It was their tradition of linking their long-term study of logic to their investigations into medicine that was introduced to the Arab linguistic milieu which in turn led to the foundation of Arabic logic. The Syriac scholars wrote detailed descriptions and discussions of Aristotelian logic and their standard arrangements are as follows: *Isagoge* (by the Neo-Platonic scholar Porphyry), *Categoriae, De Interpretatione, Analytica Priora, Analytica Posteriora, Topica, Sophistici Elenchi, Rhetorica* and *Poetica*. They were considered the nine works which comprised the distinctive branches of logic. These distinctive branches of logic were each thought to be linked to a canonical text. This faulty construction of Aristotelian logic was supposedly taken over by the Arabs and resulted in the following arrangement of the subject matter of logic:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>Arabic Name</th>
<th>Basic Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) “Introduction”</td>
<td><em>al-isaghui</em></td>
<td><em>Isagoge</em> (Porphyry)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Categories</td>
<td><em>al-maqulat</em></td>
<td><em>Categoriae</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Hermeneutics</td>
<td><em>al-‘ibarah</em></td>
<td><em>De Interpretatione</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Analytics</td>
<td><em>al-qiyas</em></td>
<td><em>Analytica Priora</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Apodeictics</td>
<td><em>al-burhan</em></td>
<td><em>Analytica Posteriora</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Topics</td>
<td><em>al-jadal</em></td>
<td><em>Topica</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Sophisticus</td>
<td><em>al-mughalitah or al-safsatah</em></td>
<td><em>Sophistici Elenchi</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Rhetoric</td>
<td><em>al-khitabah</em></td>
<td><em>Rhetorica</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Poetics</td>
<td><em>al-shi’r</em></td>
<td><em>Poetica</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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These books, known collectively as the *Organon*, were referred to as the “nine books of logic.” Or they were sometimes called the “eight books of logic” when the *Poetica* or even the *Isagoge* is excluded from the above compilation. 122

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According to George Makdisi, in order to arrive at some sort of agreement or consensus (ijma in Arabic) on matters of doctrine or practice, any disagreements had to be dealt with and resolved. The method of arriving at a resolution was to be found in a number of features of the Aristotelian logical corpus, the Organon or Instrument, in particular the Topics. In the second half of the third A.H. / ninth C.E., all logical works of the Organon, which formed the basis of dialectic and the further development of disputation (or disputatio), had already been learned, assimilated, and translated into Arabic: both the Prior and the Posterior Analytics (al-qiyas and al-burhan in Arabic), the Topics, and the Sophistical Refutations of Aristotle. The scholastic method along with all the training that it required was neither the product of philosophers, nor of the philosophical theologians (as it was thought the case in Catholic Christian Europe); it was the creation or the product of the jurisconsults. The institutions of higher learning, the schools that fashioned the scholastic method, were named the madrasah and before that, the masjid-khan complex (somewhat like the cathedral schools); they were devoted to legal studies and not to philosophy (falāsifa) and philosophical theology (kalām).

The khilaf, or sic et non, was one of three basic fundamentals of what came to be called tariqat al-nazar (method of disputation or disputatio), or the scholastic method; the other two fundamentals were jadal or dialectic, and munazara or argument proper. The second and third fundamentals existed in the West prior to the twelfth century, and in the Islamic East much earlier, albeit at less sophisticated levels of development in both areas. The notion that Aristotle was the father of the scholastic method is a notion that is not true but not entirely false either. J. Endres, a scholar Makdisi recognizes as an authority in the field, has concluded that the

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scholastic method as a product of scholasticism itself and not a product of Aristotelian philosophy. \(^{124}\)

\(^{124}\) Makdisi, 245.
CHAPTER IV
THE ARABO-LATIN TRANSLATION MOVEMENT AND THE
EUROPEAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION

Charles Burnett, in his article for the Warburg Institute, London,\textsuperscript{125} gives a reassessment of the reasons why Toledo achieved prominence as a center for the translation of works from the Arabic to the Latin languages in the second half of the twelfth century. Toledo had already been the site for earlier efforts at translation. He suggests that the two principal translators, Gerard of Cremona and Dominicus Gundissalinus (or Gundisalvi), concentrated on different areas of knowledge. Gerard apparently followed an agenda in the works that he chose to translate.\textsuperscript{126} The philosophical works of Aristotle were not his primary area of interest but he is recorded as having done some work in that area.

According to Burnett, Toledo is justifiably famed for its preeminent position in the Arabo-Latin translation movement; that is the translation of scientific and philosophical texts from the Arabic language into Latin beginning in the twelfth century but also continuing into the thirteenth century\textsuperscript{127}. There are several factors which contributed to this preeminence. Firstly, there was the linguistic amalgamation of Toledo’s population. When, the Catholic Christian, Alfonso VI of Castile recaptured Toledo from the Arab Muslims in 1085\textsuperscript{128} (part of the process


\textsuperscript{126} This is made known principally in the Vita and the “commemoration of his books” drawn up by his students after his death. Burnett concludes to his article, with a new edition of the \textit{Vita, Commemoratio librorum} and \textit{Eulogium}, based on all the manuscripts.

\textsuperscript{127} It is therefore also most likely that the work of the Arabs in translating from the Sanskrit, Syriac, Greek, and Persian languages beginning in the eighth century, was also transmitted indirectly to the West via the Arabo-Latin translation movement.

\textsuperscript{128} This is almost twenty years after the Norman conquest of Anglo-Saxon England and the consolidation of the Norman feudal system and the writing and completion of the Domesday book.
of “Reconquista”), the city surrendered without a bloodbath, with the result that its inhabitants were allowed to remain and retain their property and liberty. In a moment of magnanimity, Alfonso claimed the title, “the “king of two religions.” From what can be gathered, however, the majority of the Muslim ulema emigrated, whilst “the common people converted to Christianity in great numbers.”

As an aside, there have been innumerable allusions (in Islamic studies) to an “elite” group of people called the ulema or ulama. However, not much is really known about their make-up. R. Stephen Humphreys dedicates an entire chapter of his book, Islamic History: A Framework for Inquiry, on the issue of identifying who, the ulema or ulama, were. He comes to the conclusion that they were “members of a whole socio-cultural system and our task must be to determine the totality of the social relations and cultural relations into which they entered.”

Humphreys makes clear that he rejects the idea of the ulama “as a closed group, one whose members interact chiefly with one another.” If this is true then it is quite probable that the idea of ijma or “consensus” (theological, legal, etc.) really came from this group and not the ummah from which, it has been claimed, a mythical consensus arising whenever there were controversies of any sort. The ummah, after all, were considered ignorant and unlettered by the mutakallimun.

Even though the Jews were periodically subject to pogroms, they chose to remain in the city. The Mozarabs were the most noteworthy population group; they were “Arabized” Christians who purportedly preserved the liturgy of the Visigothic church and whose numbers were enlarged by Muslim converts to Catholic Christianity. The majority of the population

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129 Burnett, 249. Burnett uses Rubiera Mata 1991, 75-91 as his source.
131 Ibid.
spoke Arabic which was the language of religion and culture along with a Romance dialect (most likely Castilian). Secondly, Toledo was considered a paramount center of scientific learning even before the bloodless surrender to Alfonso VI. The Qadi of Toledo, Sā`īd a l-Andalusi (1029-1070), wrote a history of science (The Categories of the Nations), and also patronized scientific research. The exodus of the Muslim ulema may not have prevented the maturing of a scientific tradition. Burnett maintains that, notwithstanding the exodus, scientific expertise and, especially, libraries of books remained among the Arab speaking scholars in Toledo. In support of the essential correctness of the above statement, he further maintains that the translator Gerard of Cremona was attracted to Toledo at the beginning of his career as a scholar, as early as the 1130s. Gerard knew that he would find there Ptolemy’s Almagest (in Arabic). Another supporting piece of evidence is that some time before 1140, al-Zarqallah’s astronomical tables were translated into Latin as “The Toledan Tables.” The drawing up of astronomical tables was often associated with an important event like the coronation of Alfonso VII as Emperor in 1135. However, Burnett speculates that these tables were already in existence and so the coronation was probably the occasion for an update.

It is not until the 1130s, however, that there is any evidence in Toledo of an interest in translating Arabic texts into Latin; this should not surprise anyone because translations can only be made if there is an interested audience or clientele who do not know the original language of the Arabic (or for that matter Greek) texts. The Cluniac clergy were the only real audience in the decades directly after the reconquista of Toledo, and they were brought in by the French archbishops, Bernard of Sedirac (1086-1125) and his successor Raymond de La Sauvetat (1125-

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132 Burnett, 249.
133 According to Burnett, after the breakup of the Caliphate in 1031, the kingdom of Toledo came under the dominium of the Banu Hud.
134 Burnett, 250.
Their chief interest, however, was in reforming the Catholic Church rather than in the advancement of science. Furthermore, and of more concern, they were hostile to the indigenous Mozarabic parties who could have been the ideal intermediaries in the Cluniacs’ introduction to Arabic science. Notwithstanding these inauspicious beginnings, it is within the framework of the Cathedral, as the only prominent section of Toledan society that did not know Arabic, where, according to Burnett, one might find the beginnings of the Arabo-Latin translation movement in Toledo.  

Evidence of this begins when John of Seville and Limia (a region in Northern Portugal) translated Qusta ibn Luqa’s *On the Difference between the Soul and the Spirit* dedicating it Raymond de La Sauvetat. John of Seville, in his search for a patron, dedicated a translation of the regimen of health from “Aristotle’s” advice to princes (*Secretum secretorum*) to Queen Teresa, his compatriot, the natural daughter of King Alfonso VI, and first ruler of the kingdom of Portugal. John’s earlier dedication of a translation to La Sauvetat was shrewdly selected because its subject matter was relevant to Catholic theology and “puts into context the prominence given to ‘spirits’ in the new medical learning taken from Arabic texts in Italy, which posed a threat to Christian doctrines on the immortal soul.”

It is not known if the above dedication was a success for John’s of Seville’s ambitions. Towards the 1150s the situation, it seems, changed when Toledo became (after the initial fits and starts) the foremost center for Arabo-Latin translations. According to Burnett, the following factors contributed to the ascendancy of Toledo. Firstly, the last of the Banu Hud in 1140, Ja’far

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135 Ibid.
136 Not Raymond Lull (1232-1315).
137 John of Seville was originally from Portugal and active there, earlier on, as a translator.
138 Burnett, 250.
Ahmad III Sayf al-Dawla, had a library which may have been part of the royal library (a speculation on the part of Burnett) which was subsequently used first by the translators of the valley of the Ebro and then probably by Gerard of Cremona when it was moved to Toledo. Secondly, the ascendancy of the fervently Islamic Almohad regime in North Africa and their expansion to Islamic Spain in 1147 caused the Arabic Christians and Jews (Mozarabs) to go into exile. Toledo became their new place of domicile. Under archbishop Castellmoron (1152-1166), more open lines of communications between the Mozarabic community and the Frankish clergy occurred than was the case during the first decades after the conquest. Thirdly, the constant arrival of Frankish clergy included among their ranks other European nationals along with the development of a Frankish quarter in Toledo, guaranteed that translations from Arabic would not only receive an audience locally but that they would be disseminated abroad.139

Abraham Ibn Daud was probably known as Avendeuch (or Avendauth) Israhelita by the Catholic Christian scholars. He was one of the refugees from Almohad Cordoba (or Cordova) and settled in Toledo by 1160, where he penned works in both Arabic and Hebrew on subjects like philosophy, astronomy, and the history of the Jews in Spain. Avendeuch, in a letter of introduction, announced the fact that he planned to translate the philosophical encyclopedia authored by Ibn Sinna (or Avicenna), the Shifa’. In that letter, probably to Archbishop John, he included a specimen of his translation. The letter is seems was successful and he gained the help of the archdeacon Dominicus Gundissalinus (who also knew John of Seville and Limia). Together they translated a whole book within the Shifa’, the one on the soul. Avendauth wrote the dedication to the Archbishop John. In it, he describes how he did the initial translation from the Arabic of Avicenna into the vernacular language (whether the colloquial Arabic of Toledo or

139 Ibid., 251.
the local Romance dialect), which a cleric, educated in the Latin schools (in this case archdeacon Dominicus Gundissalinus), would then translate from the intermediate language (most likely the Castilian dialect) into good Latin. This is a description of what became the standard operating procedure.\footnote{Ibid., 252.} In fact some have claimed that this process helped along the growth and development of the vernacular Romance languages, in the case of Spain, Catalan and Castilian to name a couple.

The most productive of the Toledan translators was the great Gerard of Cremona (1114-1187) who left no dedication linked to his name. He lived and died in Toledo and his students and colleagues, the \textit{socii}, called him “the glory of the clergy” (\textit{gloria cleri}). Over seventy translations are ascribed to him on topics as wide-ranging as mathematics, medicine, and even Aristotelian philosophy. The above pattern of the patronage of archbishops and the collaboration of archdeacons continued to the next generation of translators. Mark of Toledo and Michael Scot were both, like C remona, canons of the cathedral at the turn of the century to the next (thirteenth). Michael Scot continued the work of Gerard of Cremona on the works of Aristotle and even “added those of commentaries by [Ibn Rushd] Averroes (d. 1198), Gerard’s near contemporary in Cordoba.”\footnote{Ibid., 252-253.} At the request of an archdeacon of Toledo, Mauritius, Mark translated the Qur’an and the profession of faith of Ibn Tumart (d. c. 1129-1130), the ideological founder of the Almohad movement and dynasty.\footnote{Ibid., 253. See Richard C. Taylor, “Averroes: religious dialectic and Aristotelian philosophical thought” in \textit{The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy}, eds., Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor.(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 180.}

It is to Gerard of Cremona though that we return. The translation of the Arabic works in Toledo follows a two-fold arc, one of which follows Gerard of Cremona. The list of his...
translations is recorded by his *socii* after his death. Gerard would have understood the line up or agenda of the falsafa from a l-Farabi’s *On the Classification of the Sciences*, which he had previously translated. Here, in this work, al-Farabi lists each of the main divisions of learning, from grammar and logic, through mathematics, natural philosophy, and metaphysics, to politics, jurisprudence and theology. Furthermore, the relevant books by Aristotle are pointed out. However, as a preparation for the study of Aristotle’s natural philosophy, Gerard translated the Posterior Analytics and titled it *The Book of [the] Demonstration* which was its expressive title (*al-kitab al-burhan*) commonly used by in the Arabic tradition.\(^\text{143}\)

Michael Scot resigned from his canonship in Toledo before 1229 and ended his career (and died) working for Frederick II Hohenstaufen in Sicily. It was Herman the German who continued the process of translating Averroes’ commentaries. Herman completed one of the commentaries on June 3, 1240 in a chapel that has been identified with the monastery of St. Trinity, in the Frankish quarter (mentioned above) next to the Cathedral. The monastery had been founded after 1195 and was expressly for the purpose of rescuing Catholic Christian captives in Islamic territories. The brothers were taught Arabic in order to negotiate with Islamic authorities, and it is here, ironically, that Herman, in all probability, found linguistic help for his translation work. Burnett also mentions that up to the departure of Michael Scot, the translation activity was associated with the Cathedral as opposed to any other institution in Toledan society. Of interest to note is the change of European nations from which archbishops were chosen. They were French until 1180, and the cathedral chapter remained predominantly Frankish until the early thirteenth century; that is why the archbishop who Michael Scot accompanied to the

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Fourth Lateran Council in Rome in 1215 was a certain Rodrigo Jimenez, a Spaniard.\textsuperscript{144}

For the most part, despite the contributions made by local scholars (e.g. a Mozarab called Galippus helped Gerard translate Ptolemy’s Almagest, and a Jew, Abuteus helped Michael Scot translate a text on cosmology), the trend of the translation project remained in the possession of outsiders and was a product for trade to clients abroad and not one for the local community. Not only were these translations sent abroad, but also scholars like a certain Thaddeus came from Hungary and made copies of Gerard’s translation of the Almagest in 1175. Roger of Fournival, a Frenchman and the court astrologer of King Philip Auguste, copied the same text. One conclusion that can be taken away from the study of the Arabo-Latin translation movement in Toledo is that it was, for the most part, “determined by what was required in the newly burgeoning European universities, which were outside of Spain.”\textsuperscript{145}

Not only was Toledo a center for the translation of Greek scientific works but the field of philosophy was also quite well mined. Translations were done on the various works of the Neo-Platonist and Aristotelian corpus. Thus in the field of Aristotelian philosophy in Toledo especially, it has become apparent that in the mid- to late-twelfth century: there was an incredibly rich assortment of, on the one hand, the original texts of the Aristotelian corpus along with supplementary works by Alexander of Aphrodisias, a-l-Kindi, and a-l-Farabi; and on the other hand, the works of Avicenna (Ibn S inna) and Al-Ghazali (al-Ghazali). It is the received opinion of scholars in Arabo-Islamic philosophy that Ibn S inna and a-l-Ghazali were more representative of who or what Arabic and Jewish scholars were reading and studying. However, it must be pointed out that Ibn Taymiyya, in his strictures against the Sufis, the Mutakallimun,

\textsuperscript{144} Burnett, 253.

\textsuperscript{145} Burnett, 154. See also the Warburg publication \textit{Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts: The Syriac, Arabic and Medieval Latin Traditions}. Ed. by Charles F.S. Burnett.
the falsafa, and the Shi‘a, blames the rapid decline of Islamic doctrinal purity (as he and others before and after him saw it) on the wholesale adoption of Aristotelian metaphysics brought about by the adoption of many of the methodologies and presuppositions elucidated within the Organon of Aristotle.

The sudden outgrowth of an interest in the works of Aristotle among a group of Arab scholars in Cordoba in the late twelfth century, though an isolated event as far as what was left of the Islamic empire in the West (the Iberian Peninsula), had significant ramifications in the Catholic Christian West. It was through the translations made on commentaries written by Ibn Rushd, mentioned above, that had an impact on the Western Aristotelian tradition till even the seventeenth century and even among the Protestant scholastics. The link between Cordoba and Toledo in this instance may be weak or non-existent during the time of Gerard of Cremona, however, there is still a possibility that such a link existed and refugees from Almohad Cordoba were able to bring with them copies of Ibn Rushd’s commentaries. Unfortunately, Gerard of Cremona’s work on Aristotle was not significant and he had other interests. Furthermore, his work and others in the Arabo-Latin translation movement was eventually replaced by the Graeco-Latin translations first by James of Venice and then by Burgundy of Pisa. Finally, towards the end of the thirteenth century William of Moerbeke’s translations eclipsed those of Gerard’s on not only Aristotle but those on Arabic commentators on Aristotle, and the other supplementary works were replaced by the great commentaries of Ibn Rushd. In fact Thomas Aquinas used the Graeco-Latin translation of Moerbeke, and he referenced the commentaries of

147 This is well documented by Richard A. Muller in his four volume work, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics on the Protestant codification of Reformed Theology in the seventeenth century. See also Protestant Scholastics ed. Trueman and Clark, Paternoster Press and Reformation and Scholasticism ed. van Asselt and Dekker.
148 Burnett, 266.
Ibn Rushd and Ibn Sinna as well.\textsuperscript{149}

Burnett, in his article, “Arabic into Latin: the reception of Arabic philosophy in Western Europe”\textsuperscript{150} states that in the history of Western philosophy the role played by texts written in Arabic is crucial. He goes on to state that “the barrier between Arabic and Latin scholarship was more porous than it had ever been”\textsuperscript{151} during most of the thirteenth century. First, in Spain Arabic had become the language of the intellectual classes of Toledo and of the nobility, thanks to the influence of the Mozarabic community. Second, in Sicily and southern Italy, Arabic-speaking scholars were encouraged to collaborate with Jews and Christians, thanks to the support of Frederick II and the intellectual vibrancy of his court. Third, the popes for the first time showed an active interest in promoting scholarship of the highest kind, whether in Rome or in Viterbo. Finally, throughout the Mediterranean as a whole there was a greater exchange of ideas than there had ever been before.\textsuperscript{152}

As a result, instead of simply making a literal translation of a solitary text from Arabic, Latin scholars used an extensive range of Arabic texts (which they had read in Arabic) to create their Latin works. Some examples might be insightful. Gonzalo Perez “Gudiel” (d. 1299), of Mozarabic descent and an Arabic speaker, in his appointments as bishop of Burgos, archbishop of Toledo, and cardinal at Rome, and finally founder of the university of Alcala de Henares (1294), not only assigned “translations of parts of the Shifa’, but also collected Arabic manuscripts and Latin and vernacular translations of Arabic texts.” He was accompanied by

\textsuperscript{149} See Majid Fakhry, \textit{Islamic Occasionalism: and its Critique by Averroes and Aquinas} (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1958). He notes that Thomas Aquinas rejects the occasionalism of the mutakallimun because of his close reading of Ibn Rushd’s commentaries on Aristotle and his adoption of Ibn Rushd’s position on secondary causality which led to both rejecting the mutakallimun \textit{kalaam} concept of \textit{kasb}.

\textsuperscript{150} Burnett, “Arabic into Latin.” 370.

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., 381.

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid.
Alvaro of Toledo, who translated an Arabic astrological text, and wrote commentaries and glosses on other Latin translations of Arabic cosmological and astrological texts which show that he was able to read Arabic texts directly (including probably, al-Ghazali’s *Tahafut al-Tahafut al-falāsifah*). Alfonso X is the superlative example of this process. He (el Sabio “the Wise”) who, even before he became king of Leon and Castille in 1252, was financially supporting translations of texts from Arabic, and collections on individual subjects based on a broad range of Arabic texts. His primary “interests, however, were in astronomy, astrology, magic, and Islamic law codes.” Many of the Arabic texts used by Alfonso X may have come into his custody after the fall of Cordoba (1236) and Seville (1248). He even attempted to set up a school of “Arabic and Latin” in the latter.153

According to Burnett, the translations of Averroes’ commentaries display a predominantly “clear example of internationalism.” These works of Averroes arose within the socio-cultural context of Andalusian Aristotelianism, in respect to the translation program of Gerard of Cremona as already sketched above. Inside an unexpectedly brief period of time after Averroes’ death “his works were being translated by both Christian and Jewish scholars, subsidized by Frederick II.” Michael Scot translated Averroes’ Long Commentary on Aristotle’s *De Caelo*. In particular the writings of Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas’ mentor, reveal an acquaintance with several Arabic philosophical texts, where there exists evidence to show that they were not entirely translated into Latin. They include such works as al-Farabi’s commentaries on Aristotle’s logic and physics, which, according to Burnett, “may have reached him [Albertus Magnus] through the process of seepage through a porous wall, and a similar situation can be observed in the case of his fellow Dominican Arnold of Saxony.”

153 Ibid.
The distribution of Arabic philosophical works in the thirteenth century, as substantiated by their existence in various libraries, has been documented elsewhere.\textsuperscript{154} The dominance of Arabic sources for Western philosophy can be observed by the fact that, when Giles of Rome criticized the errors of the philosophers, all of the philosophers named are Arabic or wrote their philosophy in Arabic like Moses Maimonides, with the exemption of Aristotle himself. Even in the case of Aristotle, Giles uses the Arabic-Latin translations of the Physics, Metaphysics, and De Anima, “since he took them from the lemmatized texts in the Long Commentaries of Averroes....”\textsuperscript{155}

Thomas Aquinas, according to Burnett, argued that theology is essentially a speculative discipline, dealing first and foremost with God as its object; the mutakallimun would have agreed with him. Since the viator\textsuperscript{156} cannot know God in his essence, and man’s natural knowledge comes only through the senses (Ibn Taymiyya agrees), the viator is severely limited as to his knowledge of God. Some natural knowledge of God, however, is possible. Consequently it is limited by the source of human knowledge, sense experience. A major assumption of Thomas and other realists is that “God as primary cause leaves evidence of his causation just as any cause leaves traces of itself in its effect.”\textsuperscript{157}

This process of working back from the signs left in the effects to a sort of understanding of his nature constitutes a type (or in medieval parlance, a genus) of theology which falls under the direction of metaphysics. This kind of speculation is valuable for apologetic purposes as a first step (whereby a common ground for debate is established) in the dialogue with systems of

\textsuperscript{154} Harald Kischlat according to Burnett but I have yet to find a source for this information.
\textsuperscript{155} Burnett, “Arabic into Latin”, 382, 383.
\textsuperscript{156} Viator was someone who was on the “path” to salvation. He or she was a wayfarer or traveler (the original Latin meaning during Roman times).
\textsuperscript{157} Ferguson, “The Debate Over Scientific Theology,” 17.
thought that do not share the presuppositions of Christianity and Judaism. However, such knowledge is not adequate for soteriology (or the doctrine of salvation). For this reason, according to Thomas, theology must include other dimensions of knowledge which will guarantee man’s eternal beatitude. Theology for Thomas must also involve the study of the articles of faith (major heads of doctrine) as preserved in the Scriptures and taught by the Catholic Church. This knowledge alone, rooted in Scripture and Tradition (for Ibn Taymiyya and other traditionists, it was the Qur’an, the Sunna, and the Ahadith), is adequate for salvation. But the question is whether or not this knowledge is *scientia*. Gregory of Rimini and Ibn Taymiyya would have said no.\(^{158}\)

Thomas deals with the issue of whether or not knowledge is *scientia* in part I, question 1, and article 2 of the *Summa Theologiae*. He maintained that sacred theology is knowledge (in the strict Aristotelian sense) with a significant feature observed as to the nature of *scientia*. The genus, *scientia*, is to be understood on two levels. In a major sense (or primary level) it incorporates those ways of knowing illustrated by the disciplines of mathematics or geometry. These systems are erected upon self-evident principles available to all, leading to conclusions that must (unhesitatingly) be accepted. In a minor sense (or secondary level) there are those sciences which do not arise from self-evident premises directly, but which receive their first premises from the conclusions of the higher sciences which are erected upon self-evident premises. It can be upheld, therefore, that the secondary level of knowledge does have its roots in self-evident principles, but only indirectly. In this manner second level knowledge is able to fulfill one of the essential necessities of *scientia*, having a foundation in self-evident principles. According to Thomas, by way of example, as music relates to mathematics, and as perspective

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\(^{158}\) Ferguson, 18.
relates to geometry, is such an association. The secondary level of knowing is “subalternated” to the primary level.¹⁵⁹

Thomas Aquinas held that theology as a derived science, by way of analogy, relates in the same association to a higher science as music to mathematics and perspective to geometry.¹⁶⁰ That higher science is the knowledge or scientia of God and the Blessed. God’s knowledge of himself is self-evident to himself and clear and direct to those that surround him. Therefore, it has the same characteristics as the first principles of mathematics. When some of that so-called primary level knowledge of God is revealed to the viator, it takes the form of the “articles of faith” as recorded in the Scriptures. In their turn, these “articles of faith” “make up the first propositions of theological discourse.” Note that these articles that make up the first propositions listed above, are not self-evident on their own but they are instead grounded in self-evident principles in a secondary way, forming the basis for a subalternated form of knowledge. Therefore knowledge revealed by God forms the foundation for syllogistic arguments which make up the discipline of theology.¹⁶¹ Is this confused language or a sleight of hand perpetrated by Thomas?

Some things need to be cleared up first. The knowledge God has of himself and the vision of God shared by the Blessed correspond to the self-evident principles of scientia as defined by the Aristotelian notion of demonstratio. The articles of faith which are deduced from the revelation of this primary vision are the first principles in the subalternated discipline known as theology, or sacra doctrina. Once the articles of faith are established, the procedures of

¹⁵⁹ Ferguson, 19.
¹⁶⁰ Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (Ottawa, 1941), Part I, q. 1, art. 2: “Et hoc modo sacra doctrina est scientia, quia prodeicit ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, quae scilicet est scientia Dei et beatorum. Unde sicut musica credit principia tradita sibi ab arithmetic, ita doctrina sacra credit principia revelata sibi a Deo.”
¹⁶¹ Ferguson, 20.
argument through syllogism apply just as rigorously as if discursive content were ratios or angles. The outcome of this process is scientia or knowledge in its strict sense. No, it is not a sleight of hand on the part of Thomas. The only true scientia is God’s knowledge of himself. This vision of God is shared by the Blessed (I am thinking that these were originally the prophets and apostles). The articles of faith are deduced from the revelation (scriptures) of this primary vision and are the first principles in the subalternated discipline known as theology or sacra doctrina.  

The classical formulation assumes that the same knower knows both self-evident premises and the logically necessary consequences that follow from them. Thomas’ treatment forces the existential question, how can the self-evident knowledge of another be knowledge for me? It is true that the musician can do investigations into mathematics and the architect can do the same with geometry; however, such empirical investigation is not open to the Christian in regard to the articles of faith. It appears that Thomas in his initial formulation has already departed from the strict notion of scientia as demonstratio. This particular understanding of self-evident principles was an object of attack by Thomas’ critics.  

Thomas, as a Christian theologian, presupposes that the articles of faith are infallibly true. Demonstration of the falsity of the articles of faith is impossible because it is not possible to demonstrate the contrary of what is true. The inability of opponents to demonstrate their falsity is a guarantee of their already accepted truth. It appears, however, that the Christian is in no better position than his adversary because he also cannot demonstrate their truth. In the end the viator can only “prove” the truth of the articles of faith, and that only to one who already shares

\[162\] Ibid., 21.  
\[163\] Ibid., 23.  
\[164\] Ibid., 24.
her presuppositions.\textsuperscript{165} The best it appears that Thomas can do is to affirm the necessity of the principles upon which theology builds, a necessity that is guaranteed by the fact that the principles are derived ultimately from the revelation of God.\textsuperscript{166} Both Ibn Taymiyya and Gregory of Rimini arrive at this same conclusion.

Duns Scotus rejected Thomas’ basic position that theology (\textit{sacra doctrina}) is a subalternated science. From being forced to answer Thomas’ arguments, Duns Scotus went on to reformulate the problem which became a new direction for understanding \textit{utrum theologia sit scientia}.\textsuperscript{167} In his treatment of the question, Scotus clarifies a couple of points which are present in Thomas’ writings, although not specifically elaborated. First there is a careful explanation of terms, that is, how \textit{scientia} in its strict sense was going to be understood from the outset. The conditions he sketches are those of the Aristotelian model. Second, a careful distinction is made between God as he is known to himself and God as he is known to the \textit{viator}.\textsuperscript{168}

What is important to note is that Scotus makes a distinction (not found in Thomas) between the nature of the knowledge God has of himself, and the knowledge the Blessed has of him. According to Scotus, God’s knowledge of himself satisfies all the conditions for \textit{scientia} strictly understood, with the exception of the last one on Scotus’ list, discursiveness (remember not all discursive arguments are demonstrations but all demonstrations are discursive in nature). God’s knowledge of himself and of his creatures is immediate; \textit{he does not need the syllogistic process to know himself}.\textsuperscript{169} However, it is different from the \textit{beatus} or the Blessed. She has discursive knowledge of God because of the habit of knowing he has already learned as a \textit{viator};

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{165} Ibid., 25.
\item \textsuperscript{166} Ibid., 26.
\item \textsuperscript{167} Ibid., 29.
\item \textsuperscript{168} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{169} Emphasis mine.
\end{itemize}
hence, his knowledge can be understood as *scientia* in the strict sense (*demonstratio*). This distinction is not made by Thomas.\textsuperscript{170} Scotus rejects the idea that the higher knowledge which God and the Blessed possess serves as the first principles in the science of theology. In summary, it can be said that Scotus’ contribution to the basic question is two-fold: (1) his rejection of theology as subalternated science, making it impossible for *demonstratio* in any sense to be part of the theological enterprise; (2) his reformulation of the notion of theology as *sapientia*, with its accompanying benefits for Christian thinking: a) preservation of the idea of contingency; b) restructuring of the idea of necessity; c) emphasis upon the practical dimensions of the faith.\textsuperscript{171}

Thomas Aquinas represents those who insist on the scientific nature of theology in its proper and strictest sense. Not only did he attempt to synthesize Aristotelian and Christian ideas, but he also tried to make a case for theology which would put it on an equal footing with Aristotelian methodology, and on the latter’s terms. His theory of theology as a subalternate science is an attempt to hold theology within the framework of the most prestigious level of knowledge accepted by the scholars of his day.

The second major group is represented by Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. They still found the knowledge classification of Aristotle helpful for categorizing Christian theology, but they rejected the characterization of theology as knowledge in the strict sense (*demonstratio*). Both Scotus and Ockham moved toward greater precision in the use of terms along with a conscious effort to define the terms used in their discipline of scholastic theology. They both manage to move the basic framework of the entire discussion of *theologia qua scientia* (theology

\textsuperscript{170} Ferguson, 30, 31.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid., 36.
as science) so as to preserve the competitive advantage of Christian theological ideas in the face of an attractive but alien point of view (Aristotelian logic and metaphysics).
CHAPTER V
GREGORY OF RIMINI AND PARIS

The biographical information for Gregory of Rimini is given by Christopher Schabel in an excellent article in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. The other major sources which I have used include Gordon Leff and Heiko Augustinus Oberman.\(^{172}\) Gordon Leff has written at least a book each on William of Ockham, Gregory of Rimini, and Thomas Bradwardine, Archbishop of Canterbury. Heiko Oberman has written a booklet length study on Thomas Bradwardine, edited a book length compendium of studies by different European authors on Gregory of Rimini. Oberman has also written various books on topics like the period leading up to the Protestant Reformation, including *The Harvest of Medieval Theology* and *The Dawn of the Reformation* in which he mentions Gregory of Rimini. Christopher Schabel has given historians an excellent introduction to Gregory of Rimini beginning with a letter by Pope Clement VI, dated 12 January 1345, who requested Gregory's promotion to Master of Theology at the University of Paris:

Gregory of Rimini, of the Order of Friars Hermits of Saint Augustine, Parisian bachelor of theology, has now studied for twenty-two years, namely six straight years at Paris, and afterwards, returning to his native soil, he held the main chair at Bologna, Padua, and Perugia, and it has now been four years since he returned to Paris to lecture on the *Sentences* [of Peter Lombard], lectures he has completed there commendably.\(^{173}\)

According to Schabel, much of the biographical information for Gregory of Rimini comes from the letter by Pope Clement VI. From the letter, it can be surmised that Gregory first

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studied theology at Paris from 1322 or 1323 until 1328 or 1329 thereabouts. Furthermore, it can be reckoned from the details given in the papal letter that Gregory was born in Rimini around 1300, he eventually joined the mendicant order of the Hermits of Saint Augustine (OESA), and received his basic education prior to travelling to Paris. There his intellect was opened to the most recent advances in philosophical theology (or as the Muslims would call it, speculative theology or *kalām*), particularly those of the Franciscan Peter Auriliol, who died (or who had already died by) in the first part of 1322. Schabel, assuming that the papal letter is strictly chronological, makes the following observations.

Gregory taught theology at various Augustinian *studia* in Italy, first at Bologna, where he was confirmed as *lector* in documents of late 1332, 1333, and early 1337. At the Augustinians' General Chapter meeting in Siena in 1338, he was probably transferred to Padua. And from thence, in turn, he was transferred to Perugia. It is most likely, that while he was in Italy, Gregory came into contact with the works of Oxford scholars from the 1320s and 1330s, in all likelihood William of Ockham, Adam Wodeham, Richard Fitzralph, and Walter Chatton. The Pope's letter goes on to suggest that Gregory returned to Paris in late 1340 or in 1341 for the purpose of lecturing on the *Sentences*, but according to Schabel, perhaps the "four years" refers to the date of his order's General Chapter of Montpellier, 1341, which may have been the juncture at which Gregory was instructed to return to Paris for an assignment or mission. The widespread view is that Gregory was sent to Paris in 1342 for a year in order to prepare for his lectures on the *Sentences*. He delivered those in 1343-44, but there is a degree of uncertainty because the records of these lectures have been subject to revision by historians. Gregory most probably became Master of Theology in 1345, according to what can be ascertained from the

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174 A lector is someone who read passages from the Bible or theological works to a congregation or a religious community or as a lecturer (as permitted in some universities). A lector can also be the designated reader of church documents that are purely administrative in nature.
pope's letter; he held at least one *quodlibetal disputationes* at Paris, but he constantly revised his written *Sentences* commentary up until 1346, "removing certain passages that were formerly considered later *additiones*." In late 1346 Magister Gregory was in Rimini and the following year found him teaching again in Padua, where he stayed until 1351 when the General Chapter at Basel posted him back to Rimini to teach at the already thriving *studium*. He remained there at least until late 1356. However, on 20 May 1357, he was elected the Augustinians' prior general at the General Chapter in Montpellier succeeding the late Thomas of Strasbourg. Toward the end of 1358, Gregory died in Vienna.

Gregory's most important writings are his commentary on the first two books of the *Sentences*. Twenty complete manuscripts on Book I have survived intact, while only about a dozen on Book II have as well. Although there have been a few printings of his commentary, it has finally received a modern critical edition in six volumes in 1979-84 (Rimini 1979-84; Bermon 2002). Sections of his commentary have been or are being translated into French, German, and English.

Many problems have plagued the historiography of fourteenth-century scholasticism; consequently, any assessment of Gregory's place in the history of philosophy (and philosophical theology) has been difficult. According to Schabel:

...he flourished at a time that has been judged by historians as one on the whole decadent, fideistic, and radically skeptical, in contrast to the period in which, for example, Thomas Aquinas worked (d. 1274); this historical viewpoint already made difficult an objective evaluation of Rimini.

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175 Schabel, 2.
177 Schabel, 2.
178 Schabel, 3. See also Oberman in *The Dawn of the Reformation*, 4, 5. He has called this the myth of the Thomist Phalanx. There were always objections to Thomas Aquinas' program of synthesis and subalternation; this is a picture unlike that created by Thomist scholars.
The most fundamental component of Gregory of Rimini’s thinking and his ability to sway others was, perhaps, “his adherence to Augustine and the nature of that adherence.”\textsuperscript{179} It is believed by Schabel that Gregory read the works of Augustine more meticulously and comprehensively than most of the theologians before him. Gregory was able to cite Augustine more accurately than any of his opponents such as Peter Auriol and Francis of Marchia. It is his interest in the works of Augustine that has been considered essential to the development of a “historico-critical” method in philosophical (or scholastic, or speculative) theology, and particularly in the Augustinian Order, partly prefiguring modern scholarly methodologies. Along with his historico-critical method, Gregory was also part of a general attempt to establish reliable texts of Augustine and to separate authentic works from pseudo-Augustinian corpus.\textsuperscript{180}

Moreover, when Gregory quoted Augustine, it was with great accuracy. As a result when others were not quoting Gregory directly, they were using (some say plagiarizing) his commentary on the Sentences as a source for genuine and precise Augustinian quotations.\textsuperscript{181}

Schabel states that Gregory’s epistemology has received much attention but only up to twenty years ago. The last major work which he fails to mention but is included in his bibliography is Gordon Leff’s book on Gregory of Rimini.\textsuperscript{182} Gregory sustained a non-realist position that universals are formed by the soul and only after the mind has previous apprehensions of singular things. Thus sensory experience plays a substantive role in mental

\textsuperscript{179} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{180} Ibid. Interestingly enough, on the one hand, this prefigures the work of Valla, and on the other hand, it post-dates the work of the ninth century Carolingian deacon, Florus of Lyon. Florus of Lyon also pointed out the pseudonymous works of Jerome and Augustine.
\textsuperscript{181} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{182} Gordon Leff, \emph{Gregory of Rimini: Tradition and Innovation in Fourteenth Century Thought} (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1961).
According to Gordon Leff, it might be that:

...the greatest driving force in the development of medieval thought during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries had been the confidence that the truths of faith were accessible to human understanding and rational demonstration. It had nurtured a diversity of summae and systems, designed to incorporate the conclusions derived from the ac cumulating wealth of natural, mainly Aristotelian, knowledge into a Christian framework; it also led to some of the greatest works of Christian apologetics, including Thomas Aquinas’s *Summa contra gentiles*, with the purpose of convincing the unbeliever and the infidel.184

During the late thirteenth through the fourteenth century, however, the growing misgivings over such a union were given complete and resolute articulation. Theology was conceived as an autonomous pursuit to be separated from natural knowledge in the strict sense. Theology was believed to be “a self-contained corpus with its own tenets and principles.” It was also held that theology could not be considered as just another field of scientia determined by laws which were universally applicable to knowledge, for, as instituted upon divine revelation (sacred and revealed truth), it was dependent on faith, not natural knowledge (i.e. through experience). These thinkers were so preoccupied by the contingent nature of all creation that they refused to tolerate even the possibility of arriving at “a knowledge of God through creation.” They did not believe that there could be any meeting between (a knowledge of God and creation) since God “in the full freedom of his will could override all natural causality and,

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183 Schabel, 9.


185 With deference to Gordon Leff, I must disagree with his statement. The union referred to above is that between the wealth of Christian knowledge with an Aristotelian framework. Using the cognitive tools of Aristotelian philosophy irresponsibly is what caused all the problems in Islam and Christianity during the Middle Ages. It is the careless adoption of Aristotelian and/or Neo-platonic metaphysics that has caused all the problems. It was the Protestant Scholastics (the children of the Protestant Reformers) of the late sixteenth through the seventeenth century that truly walked the fine line between the use of the Aristotelian cognitive framework while at the same time not being careless about adopting some of the aspects of Neo-platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics.
with it, the finite order of things from which natural knowledge was drawn.”186

Both Duns Scotus and William of Ockham customarily devoted the prologues in their Commentaries (on Lombard’s *Sentences* or *Sentitiae Petri Lombardi*) to defining the nature of theology and the means by which its truths could be made known. According to Leff, the fact that Ockham’s *Prologue* was a pointed refutation of Duns Scotus’ has sidetracked the attention of historians “from the significance of the fact that they held a common attitude towards the indemonstrability of theological propositions!”187 In his article and subsequently in his book, Gordon Leff’s concern is to outline the main lines of the argument which Gregory pursued (in the prologue to his commentary on Peter Lombard’s *Sentences*) in explicating the nature of knowledge in general and theology in particular. Gregory’s intention was to arrive at an understanding of the nature of knowledge and of theology, and then to consider the special conditions of theology.188

The first feature in Gregory’s treatment is to verify knowledge by experience. He criticizes Ockham’s assertion that the object of demonstrable knowledge lies in the conclusion of a syllogism. Gregory, alternatively, insists that the significance of the conclusion itself must be completely understood. In the second feature, he regards as unequivocal, the separation between theology and knowledge. Theology begins with faith and hence it is impossible to reach its truths without the attitude of belief. Theology is founded exclusively upon divine revelation (“Holy Scripture” or the Bible containing the Old and New Testaments); nothing apart from the established canon of scriptural texts can be accepted as theological truth. In the third feature, Gregory states that even theology cannot enable us to know God as God absolutely i.e. the very

186 Leff, 88.
188 Ibid., 89, 90.
essence of God in Himself. We can only know Him, Leff states, as creator and as providence; that is, from the aspect of creation and not as He exists in His own nature.\textsuperscript{189} This concept is further expressed by Gregory in his division between God’s absolute power (\textit{potentia absoluta}) and His ordained power (potentia ordinate). His ordained power was inscribed in scriptural truth and provided the authority for belief and Christian practice. His absolute power concerned God in His omnipotence: what He was and is able to do rather than what He had decreed for this world. What is remarkable is that Gregory of Rimini was “able to remain faithful to God’s decrees and yet never try to circumscribe Him by them.” He does not try to advocate one at the expense of the other like Ockham and Bradwardine.\textsuperscript{190}

According to Gregory of Rimini, the object of knowledge is not the direct observation (or grasping) of external objects but “the result of a rational demonstration in which a conclusion can be reached about what is known.” As a result all knowledge is the property of the syllogism or proposition. Objects in and of themselves are unable to give true knowledge because they represent only what is contingent (conditional or dependent); therefore to be limited to them would result in never being able to reach the immaterial (insubstantial) and necessary truths which exist beyond them. Furthermore “immediate awareness” of an object does not signify a comprehension of it or involve deliberation (or rumination) upon it. This is possible only by means of a rational proposition “in which, by affirmation and negation, a conclusion over what has been perceived can be reached.”\textsuperscript{191}

Thus the foundation of genuine knowledge (\textit{scientia}) is called complex knowledge, “knowledge by means of propositions as opposed to simple knowledge where an object is seized

\textsuperscript{189} Ibid., 90.
\textsuperscript{190} Ibid., 90-91.
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid., 91.
immediately” without deliberation (contemplation or rumination as some Islamic scholars have called it). Gregory further states that not every proposition satisfies “the conditions necessary to provide true knowledge, and Gregory again distinguishes three different kinds of propositions belonging to two categories.” There are, first of all, types of mental images or things resembling spoken words or statements, from which they are abstracted. According to Leff these vary according to the language in which they are expressed whether Greek, Latin, and for the purpose of this thesis Arabic. Since they are images, they can be created either in the mind or without words. The second type of image consists in the purely mental concepts which have no association to words; they are the same for all men and women, non-variegated by differences of language. These mental concepts, therefore, precede all words, for they comprise the natural signs which words are intended to signify. Leff goes on to say that, “Of these mental images, one group derives from experience whether direct or indirect.” Regardless of how such mental propositions are produced they are all in the end based “upon knowledge of external things.” Conversely, the other group is not based upon knowledge of external things; it is based on a verdict upon what is already known in the mind, without making a declaration on its reality. For that reason it comes within the area of belief and opinion which is not knowledge. The value of this concept for the thesis cannot be overstated.

This three part division of mental propositions determines Gregory’s view of knowledge. It has the result of separating “the statement from its truth and both from the assent necessary to any demonstration.” Therefore:

The first category is concerned only with the words of a proposition, devoid either of knowledge or judgment; the second comprises both knowledge and assent to what is known; the third is merely assent divorced from knowledge and applies equally to dissent

192 Ibid., 91-92.
which is the negative aspect of the act of assent. None of these propositions implies the other.\textsuperscript{193}

Gregory goes on to conclude that mental propositions do not necessarily entail assent to what is known; that not all propositions comprise knowledge; and that assent does not entail knowledge. As a result, strict knowledge (in the Aristotelian sense of demonstration) is not identical with the syllogism \textit{in se} (i.e. in itself). It has to be a combination of those elements which together comprise “not only a mental demonstration but one which conforms to reality.” As a consequence, Gregory rejected Ockham’s argument that “the object of knowledge is the conclusion of a mental demonstration.” A statement, in and of itself, does not provide an assurance of its verity “any more than the geometer’s demonstration that the sides of a triangle are equal or doctor’s diagnosis of a disease,” do so alone (without additional verification). These can be mere words (a statement) that can be either false or true; hence the conclusion to any proposition cannot offer certainty. Certainty can only be found in complete verification of the conclusion. It involves the actual knowledge “of that to which the conclusion refers and mental assent to the conclusion.” Gregory characterizes this aggregate (composite) “act of statement, cognition, and assent the \textit{significatum totale}. It is the object of knowledge.”\textsuperscript{194}

According to Gregory, this aggregate nature of this act of statement, cognition, and assent is the center-piece (or central dogma) of his treatment of it. As Gordon Leff states:

\begin{quote}
Strict knowledge must combine direct experience of what exists with due mental reflection upon its nature. Together, as embodied in a mental demonstration, knowledge is produced. Gregory stresses in particular the importance of verification. Although, as we have seen, direct apprehension of an object cannot in itself lead to understanding or knowledge in its strict sense, it is indispensible to it.\textsuperscript{195}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{193} Ibid., 93.
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid., 93-94. I substituted Leff’s use of knowledge in his aggregate (as to what constitutes the act of knowledge) to cognition.
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid., 94. I changed Leff’s use of knowledge in his aggregate to cognition as above.
Gregory, continues Leff, called upon Aristotle in support of his argument that if the diverse “elements of which make up the act of knowledge, statement, cognition, and assent were separated” cognition would be of primary importance. Realistically, however, all must be present together because by assent we are able to judge that the understanding, which has been acquired by acts of cognition (or reflection), is from a valid demonstration. Accordingly the conclusion is itself the result of assent; for without a conclusion there would be no syllogism and in turn there would be no demonstration, and without assent there would be no conclusion.\footnote{Ibid., 94-95.}

To sum up, the underpinning of Gregory’s analysis of knowledge is the aggregate nature of the proposition, with cognition and assent to what is known as the preconditions of a true demonstration and if knowledge is to result, no single element can stand alone. Furthermore, while the self-evident perception of what exists is the essential (or even indispensible) condition of truth, it must be merged with judgment and understanding. The effect of this combination is extensive. In addition, knowledge not ultimately founded upon direct apprehension (because of its function) cannot warrant the truth. It is the product of the mind and hence confined to principles. When the axiom (knowledge must be founded upon direct apprehension) above is combined “with the dictum that the object of knowledge lies in total signification (significatum totale) of the conclusion, it means that neither the subject nor the object can stand by itself, for they are not separable from the rest of the proposition.” This conception of Gregory’s allows him to refute Ockham’s claim that the conclusion in any proposition is the object of knowledge as such; but even more consequential, Gregory’s denial that knowledge of the subject of a proposition gives rise to knowledge of its properties, allows him to undermine the elaborate foundations of Duns Scotus’ view of theology. In effect, “Gregory has made knowledge of both
subject and object equally derivative from experience.” In his analysis as to what establishes a true de demonstration, Gregory “has shown that opinion and assent, on the one hand, and knowledge on the other are not synonymous, and that although knowledge requires assent and opinion, opinion and assent do not imply knowledge.” He then carries forward the same distinction as above (between knowledge needing assent and opinion but that opinion and assent not implying knowledge) to make faith no longer dependent upon knowledge (gained by way of demonstration).

According to Gordon Leff, there are three facets to Gregory of Rimini’s treatment of theology. One facet is the nature of theology in general; more particularly its relationship to natural knowledge, science, and opinion. The second facet is over the subject of theology, and the third deals with the significance of theological comprehension, whether it is practical or speculative or both.

Gregory of Rimini uncompromisingly dismisses all non-theological principles as aids to theological understanding. This is because to Gregory, theology must derive, in its entirety, from scriptural truth. That is, only the knowledge contained in the Bible (i.e. the Old and New Testaments) can qualify as the speech acts of God to man. His self-contained body of revealed truth results in the plain differentiation of theology from natural knowledge. Let it be made clear, though, that theology, according to Gregory, is not synonymous with simple faith. The act of believing is not the same thing as being versed in the unrelenting discipline of long theological discussion and debate, but as Gregory goes on to show, it is indispensable to it.

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197 Ibid., 96-97.
198 Ibid., 96-97.
199 Ibid., 97.
200 The Bible (Old and New Testaments) is “theupneustos” or God-breathed and hence is divine revelation, that is, inerrant, notwithstanding the instrumentality of men in the process of divine revelation which is supra-rational. Furthermore the Bible contains true truth not exhaustive truth.
Theology may stand between divine revelation and natural reason (\textit{demonstratio} or knowledge), but it does not span the chasm between both extremes. This is Gregory’s “argument against those who regard theology as accessible to reason, or as knowledge in its own right.” It is the late thirteenth to fourteenth century theologians like Gregory of Rimini, Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus and Ockham, who confront us with the utter impossibility of the apologetic theology and program. According to them, there is no means to getting around the disjunctives of faith and infidelity. Theology can have no significance to the infidel, just because, if it were open to everyone equally regardless of whether they believed or not, it would be futile. Quite the reverse: the entire validation of theology lies in the exclusivity of its doctrines. Gregory repeatedly returns to the argument above. Whereas the thirteenth century theologians (i.e. Thomas Aquinas) attempted to make revelation comprehensible or intelligible to reason, the theologians of the fourteenth century looked to the defense of revelation. He goes on to state that revelation was fortified behind the barriers of faith; hence, theology, far from constituting knowledge in the strict sense, it could only be approached through faith. Therefore, there is no substitute for the absolute necessity of the instrumentality of faith (including assent and obedience) in the acquisition of theology\textsuperscript{201}.

The scriptures as the supporting structure of theology is of the paramount significance for Gregory of Rimini’s handling because not only does it rule out any autonomous operations of reason, but it also bars speculation either about matters not contained in the Bible or about God in his transcendent nature. It only allows for the treatment of God as creator, that is, in his immanence, as He reveals Himself in scriptures. This led Gregory to a much more restricted view of God as the subject of theology (i.e. Theology proper), as well as to limit the discussions

\textsuperscript{201} Leff., 97-98.
of matters of theological content to what God has ordained. Gregory defines theology in one of
two ways. It can be “understood as the habit or habits by which we know the sense of
scriptures, “and by which we can prove and infer one truth from another, including those not
formally contained therein.” The Protestant reformers of the sixteenth century and the
Protestant scholastics of the seventeenth century in Europe and England used this very principle
of scriptural analogy. According to Leff these two definitions or connotations of theology have
an important difference even though they are both based upon the same canon or standard of
beliefs; they bear a different relation to natural knowledge and opinion.

Theology, in the first sense or connotation, as a habit (refer to definition in footnote 148)
or state generated by ratiocination is compatible with actual knowledge, or habit of knowledge,
in one and the same man and over the same object; that is it is possible for strictly scientific
knowledge and theological knowledge to coexist. However, taking theology in the second sense,
in which the act of assent arises, cannot stand with the act of knowing, nor the state, or habit, of
assent stand with the state or habit of natural knowledge. Conversely the habit or state of one
can exist with the acts of the other. In brief, where theological assent or assurance (conviction)
is concerned there is not scope for an equivalent state or act of natural knowledge. This is an
authentication of what Gregory considers “as the exclusive nature of theological truth.” Even
supposing rational means can be allowed in explicating its conclusions, the conclusions
themselves must stand alone. As was indicated previously, natural knowledge and assent were

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202 The scholastics understood habit or habits as a disposition or an inclination or a state, either engendered in the
soul by the repetition of particular actions or supernaturally infused. Once acquired, a habit helps towards further
actions; thus the habit of knowing derives from acts of knowing and, in turn, facilitates new acts of knowing.


204 Ibid., 99-100.
not synonymous, and in the case of theology, they are mutually exclusive.\textsuperscript{205}

Opinion, as well, has a number of combinations in its connection to theology. Leff goes on to explicate the connections between opinion and theology thusly:

> When opinion is used to mean probability, it is compatible with theology, both as a process of reasoning and as assent. However, when opinion itself denotes assent, it cannot be joined with theological assent, even though, as in the case of natural knowledge and opinion, an additional act of either does not necessarily drive out the previous habit.\textsuperscript{206}

According to Leff, these subtle differences have an important relevance for the position of theology. They are equivalent to “a definition of the boundaries between natural knowledge and opinion on the one hand, and theology on the other hand.” They display, firstly, that theology when taken for a body of truths arrived at through a process of ratiocination, does not clash with knowledge as such, for they have in common the state, or habit, of knowledge and the actual knowledge which springs from that state. Secondly, however, when theology is considered or judged as assent to scriptural truths, there can be no common ground between theology as considered above and knowledge in that there cannot be both knowledge and belief about the same object.\textsuperscript{207}

Knowledge can indicate an awareness that something exists. Faith, however, deals with the unknowable; where knowledge is based upon the presence of the object known, faith is set aside for that which exceeds all expectations for understanding. Faith and knowledge, therefore, are juxtaposed by their very nature and to combine them would in effect be to join knowledge to the absence of knowledge, which is an impossibility. According to Gregory, then, “if faith and knowledge were united, their union would persist through the beatific vision, as assertion which

\textsuperscript{205} Ibid., 100.\textsuperscript{206} Ibid.\textsuperscript{207} Ibid., 100-101.
contradicts authority, since, once true knowledge has been attained in the next kingdom, faith is no longer necessary.”

This affirmation of the autonomy, certainly the transcendence, of faith is an essential characteristic of Gregory of Rimini’s attitude to the claim that theology is knowledge in the strict sense. Furthermore, Gregory denies that all the articles of faith are self-evident or apparent, that they comprise knowledge or “that they can be deduced or demonstrated as self-evident.” Gregory goes on to state that if scriptural verities were open to demonstration, faith would not be necessary for assent to them, a set of circumstances which would not only make faith redundant but expose sacred revelation to the unbeliever. Theology, therefore, unlike knowledge, calls for (or expects) assent to belief and is not obligated to natural experience. Once again, for Gregory the act of faith behaves as the bulwark against the unbelief of the infidel or unbeliever. Theology as a condition of belief has no need of either demonstration or of doubt, but rather, of faith alone. Theology is a long way from being redundant or without purpose; it is instrumental in increasing the strength of faith and in defending it against detractors.

From this brief examination of Gregory of Rimini’s Prologue (to his lectures on Peter Lombard’s Sentences) one can see that he comes to the considered judgment that there is a pointed differentiation between faith and reason which disallows theology from receiving the treatment rendered to natural knowledge. Gregory joins the company of men like Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, Godfrey of Fontaines, to name only some of his predecessors, “in returning to the older view of theology as the preserve of the faithful.” And yet like Duns Scotus and particularly Ockham, he does so for the most part because of the thorough standards that he affixes to knowledge itself. Verification is the foundation of knowledge, and

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208 Ibid. 101.
209 Ibid., 101-103.
210 Ibid., 105.
according to Gordon Leff, “in the third distinction of the first book of his Commentary Gregory explicitly adopts with modifications, Ockham’s division into intuitive knowledge and abstractive knowledge.”

Leff goes on to show that Gregory has followed this division in the Prologue to illustrate that, whereas “all complex reflective knowledge needs to be founded upon immediate intuitive knowledge,” immediate intuitive knowledge does not comprise knowledge “in the sense of providing a demonstration.” Like Ockham, Gregory of Rimini insisted “that each term must be founded in reality” and this led to his demolishing both Duns Scotus’ “view of the subject of theology and the Thomist concept of subalternation.” Leff goes on to make the observation that Gregory of Rimini is “far more concerned with being able to erect his own structure, rather than to demolish whatever he sees.” Indubitably, what materializes from his deliberations is a highly traditional formulation of theology which is determined precisely by biblical truth. For Gregory of Rimini, theology is for the love of God as creator; it is the possession of those who believe. He, therefore, understands “theology as a positive pursuit;” and already in his avoidance of frivolous conjecture and his persistence toward the spiritual purpose of theology, one captures “the breath of fresh air, very different from much of the critical atmosphere of his day.”

With regards to the objections that Gregory of Rimini had with Francis of Marchia, the fourth tidily concludes the ideas in this section of the thesis. Gregory’s fourth objection reveals his discriminations between knowledge, opinion, and faith and their respective habits. Each distinct sub-grouping has its own unique objects, its own propositions, and results in a type of “knowledge” unique to itself. Knowledge, in its strict sense concentrates upon self-evident principles; opinion concentrates upon probable statements; theology concentrates upon

211 Ibid., 112.
212 Ibid., 112.
statements of faith found in Scriptures. Mixing of these sub-groupings is not permitted because each has its own unique habit. Hence, the habit of knowledge is engaged when pursuing scientia; the habit of opinion when working with probabilities; the habit of faith when seeking theological conclusions. The activity related to concluding a demonstration, by virtue of the uniform nature of premise and conclusion (see discussion in Chapter II), will promote the growth of the habit of knowledge; suppositions and probable premises will bring about the habit of opinion; theological principles, the habit of theology. Observed from this standpoint, argument and habit share the same common feature as premise and conclusion: they are homogeneous or uniform.  

For Gregory, theology cannot be indistinguishable from either the product of demonstration or the totale significatum of a conclusion from probable premises because neither one brings about a habit that can be called truly theological. If theological truth is the objective and the totale significatum of theological conclusions is the focus of the soul, then their source must be coherent with that purpose. However, theology, does share a mutual component with other ways of “knowing” (which is exactly what Ibn Taymiyya says); the process of acquiring information and logical reasoning which is no different from what is done when self-evident or probable propositions are reflected upon by the intellect. “In this sense the habit of theology and the habit of knowing share the same characteristics.”

Gregory makes a distinction, however, when it comes to the matter of as sent to propositions, in order to keep theology, knowledge, and opinion in their suitably distinct sub-grouping. As soon as a believer assents to the totale significatum of a theological proposition, there is a discontinuation of any similarity between the habit of theology and the habit of

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213 Ferguson, 105, 106.
214 Ferguson, 106, 107.
knowledge or opinion. This does not mean, though, that the same person “cannot know something, suppose something, and believe something at the same time.” The habit of assent to a theological proposition, however, “cannot coexist with the habit of knowledge or the habit of opinion toward the same theological proposition.” Neither can the habit of theology coexist with the habit of knowing “in regard to a self-evident proposition.”

Gregory is not the scrupulously strict constructionist of Scripture to the point of ignoring what the human intellect might have to contribute to theological argument. He has a high esteem for the established methods of reasoning accepted and practiced by the scholastic theologians with whom he debated and labored. He accepted the epistemological belief system (context or Weltanschauung) rooted in sense experience and acknowledged that scientific demonstration is possible within the limits of what is knowable by human reason. For him though, theology does not happen to all within those limits. Gregory skillfully delimited the areas of knowledge, opinion, and faith. When the question of assent is in jeopardy, there cannot be a way in which the habit of one method of comprehending can coexist with another method of comprehending. Self-evident propositions can give demonstrative proofs or arguments, which is knowledge in the strict sense; probable propositions engender probable conclusions; the Sacred Scriptures engender theology, understood primarily as belief (and/or faith and confidence) and only secondarily as “knowledge.” “Theology in its proper sense excludes knowledge in its proper (or strict) sense.”

215 Ferguson, 207, 208.
216 Ferguson, 108
Ibn Taymiyya was born on Monday, January 22, 1263 C.E. which in the Islamic calendar is 661 A.H. (Anno Hijra – which is in reference to Muhammad’s forced “migration” from Mecca to Medina) five years after the fall of Baghdad, in Harran (a small town in northern Mesopotamia near Urfa, in what was to become north-eastern Iraq, or more recently identified as in the southeastern part of modern Turkey). He lived in an era when the Islamic world was being afflicted from external aggression and internal discord. The crusaders had not been completely expelled from the Holy Land, and the Mongols almost entirely destroyed the eastern Islamic empire when they captured Baghdad in 656 A.H. / 1258 C.E. In Egypt, the Mamluks had just risen to power and were in the process of establishing their hegemony over Syria. His whole family left Harran when he was five years old, in 667 A.H./1268 C.E., migrating to Damascus to get away from the marauding Mongols. His full name is Taqi al-Din Abu ’l-’Abbas Ahmad ‘Abd al-Halim ibn al-Imam Majd al-Din Abi al-Barakat ‘Abd al-Salam Ibn Abi Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd Allah Ibn Abi al-Qasim Ibn Muhammad Ibn al-Khudr Ibn Abd Allah Ibn Taymiyya al-Harrani. He died in 728 A.H./1328 C.E.\textsuperscript{217}

Within the Islamic world, some of the Sufi orders were spreading ideas, beliefs and practices that were not approved by orthodox ulama (the religious leaders), while the traditionalist (orthodox) schools of usul al-fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) were moribund in religious thought and practice. It was this milieu of disorder and divergence that caused Ibn

Taymiyya to construct “his views on the causes of the weakness of the Muslim nations and on the need to return to the Qur'an and Sunna (practices) as the only means for revival.”  

Ibn Taymiyya, as a prime example of traditionalist (orthodox Sunni) views, defended Sunni Islam based on the stringent adherence to the Qur'an and authenticated Sunna (practices) of the Prophet Muhammad. The Sunna included up to six major collections of Hadith including the Musnad of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal and that of Al-Bukhari. He believed that these major sources contain all the religious and spiritual guidance necessary for the salvation of Muslims here on earth and after death. He rejected the arguments and ideas of the philosophers, both the mutakallimun (practitioners of kalām) and the adherents of falsafa (philosophical theology), who were the falāsiṣa (philosophers) on one hand and the more extreme and heterodox of the Sufis (Islamic mystics of various tarīka or schools of Sufism) on the other hand, regarding religious knowledge, spiritual experiences and ritual practices. He believed that formal logic (al-mantiq) is not a consistent means of attaining religious truth and that the intellect of man must be subservient to the revealed truth embodied by Scripture.  

He also disagreed with and sometimes violently clashed with many of his fellow Sunni scholars because of his rejection of the rigidity of the schools of jurisprudence in Islam. He disagreed with the blind acceptance of prior juridical decision called taqlid and called for the continued practice of the mujtahid, that is ijtihad, which meant a careful and concerted application of personal and strenuous research into the only two sources of legal precedent, the Qur’an and Sunna. This should not be misunderstood as fresh and innovative decisions, but rather a return to the previous practices of the traditionalist mujtahid. He believed that the four

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219 Ibid.
established (and widely acknowledged) Sunni schools (*madhhāb*) of jurisprudence (Hanbali, Shafi‘i, Maliki, and Hanafi) had become stagnant and sectarian, and also that they were being improperly influenced by aspects of Greek logic and thought as well as Sufi mysticism. His challenge to the leading scholars of the day was to return to an understanding of Islam in practice and in faith, based solely on the Qur'an and Sunna.\(^{220}\)

Ibn Taymiyya was born into a distinguished Hanbali family. His father was a scholar of Hadith who faithfully followed the tradition of the Hanbali madhhāb in advocating a somewhat unyielding form of Sunnism. The center of Hanbalism remained Baghdad, the home of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, the eponym of his particular *madhhāb* (school of jurisprudence, the other three being Maliki, Hanafi, and Shafi‘i). It later moved to Damascus, because of the movement of reform (some would say commotion) begun by Ibn Taymiyya (Joseph Schacht is Majid’s source).\(^{221}\) “Hanbalism was recognized by the Sunni Muslim community as one of the four schools of law (*madhāhib*)...”\(^{222}\) However, according to Majid, (Hodgson is his source), it was “more comprehensive and radical in nature, advocating social and religious reforms in a puritanical direction all along its history.”\(^{223}\) The Hanbali minority was confronted by the majority of Muslims who, despite their formal adherence to Sunni practice, were theologically ambivalent. This became obvious to Ibn Taymiyya when he noticed that they allowed all sorts of un-Islamic beliefs and practices to run rampant in the community. Despite the popularity and capability of prominent religious leaders like al-Ghazali, the excessively superstitious tendency

\(^{220}\) Ibid.


\(^{223}\) Ibid.
of the popular religion went unchecked.\textsuperscript{224}

Ibn Taymiyya was shocked by the pervasiveness of superstition and fatalism which he believed were the corollaries of popular Sufism, warranted by the religious leaders (ulema) on the basis of the consensus of the Muslim community (ijma). As a result, he started a program of reform in which he emphasized that true religion is only that Allah and His Prophet had prescribed in the Qur’an (holy book – al-kitab) and the Tradition (al-Sunna), while proscribing or even condemning whatever beliefs and practices that existed outside the authority invested in the Qur’an and Sunna. Such beliefs and practices were condemned as illegitimate innovations (bid’a). Ibn Taymiyya’s program of reform provoked violent opposition during a period of Islamic history when Muslims were growing evermore intolerant towards what they perceived as attacks against their traditional beliefs and practices. According to Nurcholish Majid, his reforms were,

\text{…civically minded, implicating not only the purely religious aspects of the community but also the worldly invested interests of the ulama, particularly those who worked with the government supporting a certain school of law (madhhab) or a particular theology. Conflict with some governmental authorities was unavoidable.}\textsuperscript{225}

Ibn Taymiyya, having proved himself a resourceful, creative, and productive polemicist, was involved in a number of arguments and debates, printed and oral, public and private. His program of reform grew increasingly critical of the religious leadership, especially those who served the rulers in power. In the aftermath of his reform movement, his turbulent relationships with many scholars and governmental authorities of the time resulted in his incarceration on a number of occasions until the final imprisonment in Damascus which probably contributed to his death.

\textsuperscript{224} N. Majid, 47-52.
\textsuperscript{225} Ibid., 53-54.
During these debates and polemical exercises, Ibn Taymiyya came to the realization that most of the community’s heretical practices (as he saw them) were embedded in the doctrines of scholastic or speculative theology, *kalām* and the “pseudo-Islamic Hellenism, falsafa (the Arabized version of the Greek *philosophia*).\(^{226}\) For Ibn Taymiyya and the anti-rationalist traditionalist Shafi’i and Hanbali schools of *fiqh* (jurisprudence), the doctrines entailed the idea that reason is needed to understand religious principles, with the implication that “reason is superior to revelation, since reason has the right, if not the duty, to interpret revelation’s ambiguities.”\(^{227}\)

Ibn Taymiyya’s program of reform became focused on the task of disproving these claims of reason’s dominion over divine revelation. He advocated the superiority of divine revelation over reason (or more properly, rationalism), since the Qur’anic teachings are supra-rational. His major and ongoing premise was that there can be no antagonism between faith and intellect, that faith is always reasonable and logical (but not in the Aristotelian sense), or that *nass* (Qur’anic text) and ‘*aql* (human reason) are not intrinsically irreconcilable. The end result of his program for reform was that he had to engage more explicit, tangible issues like the Greek philosophical elements (more accurately, metaphysical) in the *kalām* arguments including the Asherite occasionalist doctrine of *qasb* (a denial of secondary causality or contingency), the falsafa idea of the eternity of the world, and the use of Aristotelian formal logic as the rationalist framework of the Islamic religious sciences. Ibn Taymiyya was especially critical of the falsafa whom he perceived as the main source of “deviationist” trends in Islam.\(^ {228}\) Simply put, to him,
the falāsifa (philosophers) were heretics. According to him, Ibn Rushd (Averroes) and Abu ‘l-Barakat, were moderates; and al-Farabi and Ibn Sina (Avicenna) were deviationists (bid‘a); and Babak al-Khurrami and Abu Said al-Jannabi were extremists in their heresy. Moreover, the falāsifa’s adoption of Aristotelian formal logic had communicated a false idea about the nature of cognition and the use of reason.229

Ibn Taymiyya’s a version to the speculations of kalām and falsafa shaped his civic-minded program of reform and purification, leading him to one form or another of social and political positivism. However, that did not mean the completion of a reform at all. His original program to make Sharia (Islamic law or jurisprudential theory) more relevant to the innumerable situations of the socio-political milieu of the Islamic community (umma). This was, after all, his original program to make religion relevant to the living community with its ever-evolving demands while at the same time reforming it and making it more conformable to the standards as set out in traditionalist Sunni Islam. His program was to cleanse and at the same time to revivify Islam. His main instrument was the creed of Sunnism, which for him was the only way to comprehend Islam, and the moderator (wasat) in the midst of all the types of extremities in the existing sects, schools of thought, and madhhab(s). Nurchoelish Majid states that,

The moderating group, was known as the laikat a l-sunna o r a hl a l-sunna w a ‘l-jama’a, o r s imply a hl al-jama’a, names that emphasized not only the importance of Traditions as the basis for authenticity and orthodoxy, but, as had been always the case with the ideology of Jama‘ism from the early time of Islamic history, also the primacy of social harmony and solidarity of the majority of Muslims, if not the whole community.230

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Ibn Taymiyya did not approach the depth and creativity of al-Ghazali or to the latter’s enormous literary flair, according to Laoust. According to other scholars like Ibrahim Madkour however, Ibn Taymiyya’s critique of Hellenism in general, and Aristotelianism in particular, was the longest and most detailed, but tended to be repetitious and digressive, besides being not always soundly based, and moreover, he was also more dogmatic than rational. Even these criticisms though, forget the historical context of Ibn Taymiyya’s writings and his religious motivations. Montgomery Watt states that Ibn Taymiyya’s critique of Aristotelian logic was “extremely acute and well founded, notably his Refutation of the Logicians.” Joseph Schacht, one of the pioneers of Islamic jurisprudence, says that from the perspective of the development of the Hanbali School (madhhab) of law, Ibn Taymiyya’s intellectual contribution was “one of the highlights of a brilliant period in the history of the school,” although as a well-read alim (student) of kalām and falsafa, he was atypical of traditionalist Hanbalite scholarship. More importantly, is the influence that Ibn Taymiyya’s thought has on the Islamic world in modern times. He has influenced the likes of men like Muhammad Abdu, Rashid Rida, and Said Qutb who all belonged to various reformist and revivalist groups in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia, financed by the seemingly inexhaustible petro-dollars, have been instrumental in spreading Ibn Taymiyya’s reformist and revivalist agenda throughout the world where there are at least small communities of Muslims.

The theological - jurisprudential agenda of Ibn Taymiyya and that of other traditionalists of Sunni Islam have often, according to Laoust, been adjudged, in modern times,

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233 James Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford, 1964) as found in N. Majid, 66, also 64.
as being too “conservative” (whatever that means) in comparison to the spirit of the modernists. He goes on to state that it would be unfair and to me unwise to exclude Ibn Taymiyya from any such study. It should be noted though that the modernists are under fire today for their perceived lack of faith and betrayal of Islam. One has only to peruse the literature of the Salafiyya and Wahhabiyya reformist and revivalist groups.\textsuperscript{234}

Ibn Taymiyya’s repudiation of the falāsifa’s \textit{weltanschauung} constitutes the most fundamental part of his appraisal of Islamic Hellenism. It is his unwavering belief that the falāsifa, because of their belief in the eternity of the world, have contributed most to the erroneous or innovative trends among certain groups in Islam like the “free-thinkers” (\textit{zandaqa}) and the monistic (\textit{ittihiadiyya}) tendencies among the Sufis. His refutation of logic (\textit{al-mantiq}) is the most wide-ranging and methodical of his critiques of falsafa. To accomplish this aspect of his program, he wrote two works, \textit{al-Radd ‘ala al-Mantiqiyyin}\textsuperscript{235} and \textit{Naqd al-Mantiq};\textsuperscript{236} the first one being the more voluminous than the second but close to identical in content. Al-Suyuti made an abridgement of the work he had and titled it \textit{Kitab Juhd al-Qariha fi Tajrid al-Nasiha}. His intention was to make Ibn Taymiyya’s work easier to understand, since it is “unfortunately trackless and barely accessible.”\textsuperscript{237} This abridgement was later translated into English by Wael B. Hallaq. It is the purpose then of this thesis to give an account of one of the ways that Ibn Taymiyya attempts to tackle what he perceives to be threats to Islam. This thesis will include an account of how Ibn Taymiyya attacks the very framework if not foundation of the falsafa and

\textsuperscript{234} Henri Laoust, “Le Reformisme d’Ibn Taymiyya”, \textit{Islamic Studies} (Karachi) 1 (September 1962), 42.
kalām rationalist agenda, that is, the Aristotelian logical syllogism or logical demonstration.

Ibn Taymiyya’s preoccupation with Aristotelian formal logic was completely warranted. According to Gustave E. von Grunebaum, among the functions of Hellenistic philosophy in Islam was, predominantly, to afford the Muslims logical forms of reflection and systematization, to provide them with rational procedures, methods of generalization and conceptualization, and principles of categorization.\textsuperscript{238} The core contribution of Hellenistic philosophy was syllogistic logic (‘ilm al-mantiq), which is the theory of proper analysis which the falāsifa believed to be the foundation of the entire philosophical structure.\textsuperscript{239} Nurcholish Majid states (as does Nicholas Rescher) that like the rest of Islamic science and philosophy, Islamic logic is essentially Greek, and, as Ibn Taymiyya correctly argued, has little to do with the original Islamic doctrines. The Muslims reorganized Aristotelian logic, sorting it by its subject matter as al-Isaghuji, (Porphyry’s Isagogue or Introduction), al-Maqulat (Categories), al-‘Ibara (Hermeneutics), al-Qiyas (Analytics), al-Burhan (Apodeictics or Demonstration), al-Jadal (Topics), al-Mughalata or al-Safsata (Sophistics), al-Khataba (Rhetoric), and al-Shi‘r (Poetics).\textsuperscript{240} In an article by Nicholas Rescher, he states that the Muslims made some original contributions to the Aristotelian system through the work of al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, and Ibn Rushd. The West then later appropriated their ideas and further explicated them into what became known as the important “innovations” of Medieval Latin logic.\textsuperscript{241}

Ibn Taymiyya begins his critique of logic with a summary of the basic tenets of the falāsifa in the theory of science. The falāsifa divided all scientific knowledge into either


\textsuperscript{240} N. Majid, 183-184.

concepts (tasawwur) or judgments (tasdiq). These forms of knowledge can be either self-evident (badihi) or discursive (nazari). Inference (qiyas) and definition (had) are said to be the two methods for arriving at true knowledge. Definition as a mode of analysis of reality is made by identifying the qualities of the defined object which are essential to it (haqiyyat or dhatiyyat) and others which are accidental (’aradiyyat). There is a complexity of reality that follows from a form but it is not part of it and therefore it is not the task of definition to explain it. Inference (qiyas) is the method of uncovering that complexity, as it results in the judgment of reality.

The dialectical qiyas or inference has a premise which is acceptable to the interlocutor. The rhetorical inference or qiyas has a premise which is widely known or generally accepted. The demonstrative is the deduction with a premise said by the falāsifa to be definitely true. Syllogism is the deductive logic which consists of three parts, each a declarative sentence (jumla khabariyya). Each of the first two is called the premise (al-muqaddima), and the third is the conclusion (al-natija). The subjects and the predicates of the three sentences are called terms (hudud). Thus there are six terms in the syllogism, as each of its parts has a subject and a predicate. However there are only three kinds of terms, the middle term (al-hadd al-awsat), the major term (al-hadd al-akbar), and the minor term (al-hadd al-asghar). The middle term appears in both premises, the major term is the predicate of the conclusion, and the minor term is its subject. The premise with the major term is called the major premise (al-muqaddimat al-kubra), and the one with the minor term is the minor premise (al-muqaddimat al-sughra). The conclusion is the logically true consequence of the two premises.

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242 N. Majid, 184.
243 Ibid., 186.
Ibn Taymiyya did not question the validity of the deductive process leading to apodictic (or “apodeictic”) proof. He only wanted to maintain that the concept of demonstration is mostly groundless. He did not want to dispute that the two premises of a syllogism, if they are conceived and ordered in a correct way, would certainly benefit knowledge through a conclusion. Ibn Taymiyya takes as an example a story included in the Hadith in which, the Prophet Muhammad said: “All intoxicant is wine (khamr), and all wine is unlawful (haram),” implying that any intoxicating beverage is included in the designation of the word “wine” that God has made unlawful to drink, ordained in the Holy Book of Islam. Ibn Taymiyya agrees with the falāsifa that these Prophetic traditions (Ahadith) are included in the designation of syllogistic proof. However, he refuses to accept their claims that the Prophet also used formal Aristotelian logic. He insists that such a method of making proof is innate or intuitive (fitri), that man knows it without formal learning like being able to do the rudiments of counting. In his “Naqd”, he says that “the falāsifa put the theory of syllogism in lengthy discussions, and make it strange to minds.”

Ibn Taymiyya distrusts the validity of logic, by revealing the problems relevant to the concept of universals. The falāsifa had asserted that syllogisms will not give true knowledge apart from the “means of positive and universal propositions.” According to them, a syllogism should have at least one proposition that is positive and universally all-inclusive, and it cannot be formulated with two negative propositions, or of two particulars, a claim with which Ibn Taymiyya agreed. Nonetheless, among all the demonstrative propositions there is none which is really free from problems, with the exception of the primary ‘self-evidents’ (al-badihiyyat al-245 Majid Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy, second edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970) 317.
246 Ibn Taymiyya, Naqd, 204 and 200-201; al-Radd, 349.
ula) which he allows may hold some type of general truth. These ‘self-evidents’ are meant to give images of external realities, which means, that for the falāsifa, there are without a doubt realities analogous to such universalized perception. But according to Ibn Taymiyya, there are no such things as universals in the world of reality, because the external and internal senses (al-hiss al-zahir wa’l-batin) of man recognize only the particular objects that he has direct access to, which are substantial to him.  

True to his conception of fitra, Ibn Taymiyya asserted that “knowledge is intuitive and particular.” Knowledge is information which entails involvement by human beings through their sense perceptions. Demonstrative science or knowledge, therefore, is obtained primarily by the activity of the senses. Additionally, it is through the senses that man arrives, after ratiocination, at the universal appraisal. This is particularly true of the experimental or empirical (al-mujarrabat). It is the mind, then, that makes rulings on the similar facets of the objects experienced, by associating them with other objects. This, according to Ibn Taymiyya, is simple analogical reasoning (qiyas al-tamhil) not syllogistic demonstration (burhan).

Instinctual or intuitive truths (al-hadasiyyat) are the same as the “experientials, only the latter are more direct.” One of the methods leading to knowledge supported by intuitive truth is said to be observation, observation, however, is less direct than experience, for example, the lunar observations made for the purpose of calculating the dates of the month. Observation, then, is a kind of experiment without directly experiencing the object. The result of observation, like the result of any experiment, is “specific and particular and cannot be generalized into a

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247 Ibn Taymiyya, Naqd., 204 as cited in N. Majid, 190-192.
249 N. Majid, 193.
universal concept except by means of analogical reasoning."\(^{250}\) The *falāsifa* explained self-evident truths (*al-badihiyyat*) as those most important propositions implanted by God into the human mind elementally and directly, as, for example, in the knowledge of mathematical truths. Ibn T aymiyya recognized the validity of such self-evident truths, but he rejected their signification of any real knowledge, maintaining that “real knowledge is that which is specific and particular and based on external existence.” Mental awareness is no more than analysis or interpretation of actualities one has already known through one’s internal as well as external sense perceptions, “and of the general and special qualities of those actualities.”\(^{251}\)

Thus the process of reasoning or analysis, by which universals are envisaged, is inconceivable without sense perceptions, either external or internal. This is true then of all cases of the *falāsifa*’s universals, that is, “the simple mathematical notion that one is half of two, the geometrical notions of the straight line, the curve, the triangle, the rectangle, and the philosophical notions of the necessary, the possible, the probable, and their inverse.” Whether or not those assumptions (of universals) correspond to the actual world is known only by sense perception. If sense perception and reasoning (or analysis or interpretation) merge, as in the case of one’s visual sense perception with the activity of the mind, it is possible then to envision the “existing specific realities” and to infer their general nature by identifying their points of similitude and differentiation. Once again this is, according to Ibn T aymiyya, simple analogy, not demonstration.\(^{252}\)

One the one hand, if sense perceptions were to work alone, they would conceive of only particulars, and never universals. On the other hand, if conceptual or abstract reasoning were to

\(^{250}\)Ibn T aymiyya, *Naqd*, 204.

\(^{251}\) N. Majid, 194.

\(^{252}\) Ibid., 202-205. Quoted by N. Majid, 195.
work alone, it would conceive of only the universals already imagined or supposed in the mind, “which may or may not have external reality.” Thus the principal, self-evident premises of the falāsifa’s claim are no more than intellectual presuppositions and not necessarily suggestive of external realities. If those primary self-evident universals (al-kulliyat al-badihiyyat al-ula) do not indicate anything except mentally envisaged universals and other abstract notions or ideas, and if all other resources (mawadd) of the demonstrative syllogism (internal and external sense perceptions, irresistible reports, experiential, and intuitive truths) generate only particulars, it is then unfounded to claim that deductive logic consisting of these premises is “the scale [or measuring stick] of all universal and demonstrative sciences.” Ibn Taymiyya then goes on to say that, if those resources indicate truth at all, such truths can be determined by means other than demonstrative syllogism; that is by intuitive, rational or coherent, conventional, religious, and discursive means. According to Ibn Taymiyya then, it is clear that if a demonstration (burhan) should be based on a universal premise, “the premise should only be in the form of a rational, self-evident proposition.” But by being solely rational, or rather, by the process of ratiocination, such a proposition never informs us about reality, so that its use for demonstration is useless or inadequate. It is recognized that demonstration is impossible and that the “structured deductive inference” of syllogism is unsustainable and hence, does not prove anything of the real world of human existence.

Ibn Taymiyya rejected the falāsifa’s contention “that analogical reasoning (al-qiyan al-tamthili) is less convincing than demonstration (burhan) through the inference of subsumption” or based on syllogism (qiyan al-shumul). He insisted that analogy is not only the more

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253 Ibid.

254 Sabih Ahmad Kamali, Types of Islamic Thought, (Aligarh, India: Institute of Islamic Studies, Aligarh Muslim University, n.d.), 58. As far as Ibn Taymiyya is concerned, this could be seen as the logical consequence of his
universal method of reasoning among human beings, but that it provides us with “the more dependable method of discerning religious faith (al-‘aqida) in a way which is no doubt more convincing than deductive logic.” Given that Ibn Taymiyya rejected the universality of a proposition or premise in a syllogism, and because, for him, the three terms (middle, major, and minor) “of syllogism are all particular species such a view is quite consistent.” Therefore the syllogism is actually the same as analogy and, thus also, syllogism is always a redundancy, as has been suggested. If the points of similitude between two objects are previously recognized, deduction is not needed any longer. Moreover, the species is better recognized by analogy or observation than by syllogism.

According to Ibn Taymiyya, God even gives special knowledge to whoever He chooses, as is the case with the prophets. However, the falāsifa claimed that the prophets themselves were constrained to apply syllogistic reasoning; in truth even God Himself knows about the dealings of His creatures through the process of syllogistic reasoning. Consequently, it was the responsibility of the falāsifa to prove that their declaration was warranted. Ibn Taymiyya argued further, that even if it could be admitted that the principles of the falāsifa concerning internal and external sense perceptions, self-evidents, experiential, and intuitive truths would benefit mankind with valid certainty how did they know that valid certainty could not be obtained by some other method. Ibn Taymiyya was not talking about scientific knowledge per se.

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256 N. Majid, 198.

257 It is interesting to note that Nurcholish Majid contradicts himself in his conclusion on the discussion of Ibn Taymiyya’s rejection of demonstration and deductive logic and turns the latter on his head! I corrected it above, see the italicized section.
Finally, Ibn Taymiyya concluded his criticism of formal logic by accusing the art of being suspect in its rejection of at least religious truths if not the actual legitimacy of divine revelation. He also accused “its supporters of being obstinate, atheistic, and hypocritical.” He went on to state that “whoever is sympathetic towards logic and its authorities and does not have religious and intellectual provisions that would keep him on the right track, will have his mind and faith despoiled.”

Alternately, the man who has a reliable reason and faith would, out of need, be in conflict with the logicians in their dismissal of religion. He then came to the crux of his repudiation of demonstration by saying that “many outstanding Muslim scholars find that logic is like mathematics and some other sciences: it could not prove or disprove the truth of Islamic religion.” And interestingly enough this is one of the main tools that Ibn Taymiyya used in reading the Qur’an in the fourteenth century while he taught and preached in Damascus, Syria. It was his idea of scriptural analogy also called scriptural inference or qiyas which is different from the qiyas he used in describing inference in the Aristotelian sense. To not understand this is to misunderstand Ibn Taymiyya’s own discussions on the legitimacy of using deductive logic or demonstration (burhan) when dealing with divine revelation as embodied in the Qur’an. This is the same point made by Ibn Taymiyya, that Allah but be believed and obeyed as creator.

According to Wael B. Hallaq, Ibn Taymiyya judged his mission of tearing down the methodological foundations of philosophy to be unfinished without illustrating the weaknesses

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258 N. Majid, 201.
260 Jon Hoover, *Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy of Perpetual Optimism*. Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science: Texts and Studies, volume LXXIII. (Boston: Brill, 2007). Jon Hoover has written an excellent book based on his dissertation that addresses the issue of theodicy in Ibn Taymiyya’s thought. He pours contempt on the Asherite mutakallimun (scholastic theologians (kalām) of Islam) for making God so transcendent as to be unreachable to the common man.
intrinsic to the syllogism and, more specifically, in syllogistic demonstration (*qiyaṣ al-burhani*). Aristotle’s theory of syllogistics and demonstration, which is positioned primarily in his *Organon*, endured principally among later Arabic and non-Arabic philosophers. Ibn Taymiyya set out to counter a number of the primary rules which preside over this theory. It is Ibn Taymiyya’s hypothesis that aside from revelation all human knowledge begins with particulars. Such knowledge does not come into existence in isolation from the particulars found in the phenomenal (the opposite of the Kantian “noumenal” world) world. This notion concurs with Ibn Taymiyya’s fundamental principle that knowledge of the particulars occurs in the mind prior to the knowledge of the universal, for one knows that “ten pebbles is twice the number of five pebbles before knowing that every number is divisible by two and that any number is two times as large as either one of its halves.”

According to Ibn Taymiyya, the syllogism is open to denigration on more than one account, and as one can see, the supposed universality of the syllogistic premise seems to be more open to attack. Ibn Taymiyya hypothesized that a complete induction of all particulars in the external world is impossible, and thus cannot lead to an essentially universal premise or to certainty. The problematical qualities intrinsic to the syllogism make it barely superior to analogy, “since however valid the syllogism may be, it cannot, by virtue of form alone, lead to certain conclusion.” It is the matter under discussion of the argument and not its form that determines the truth of the conclusion. If the form is extraneous, and if the supposed universal premise in the syllogism is not really so, then how does the syllogism vary from analogy? Ibn Taymiyya answers that it does not. The syllogism is not differentiated from analogy except in form, and form, it has been mentioned, is irrelevant to the attainment of knowledge. Both

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analogy and the syllogism yield certitude when their matter under discussion is a verity, and they result in mere probability when their matter under discussion is uncertain. In other words, “a syllogistic mode of reasoning will not result in a certain conclusion by virtue of form alone.”

Ibn Taymiyya, it seems, does not trust the syllogism with the facility “to bring about certitude any more than he does analogy.” It seems to the observer, at first, that he seems to fail to notice the generally held principle that even if the premise in a syllogism is not universal, it rests, “on the scale of probability, superior to analogy.” If Ibn Taymiyya did not lend his support to this principle it is because he, like all his fellow jurisconsults, “refused to limit analogy to an inference which proceeds from one particular to another.” Apparently, Islamic juridical theory had already advanced an assortment “of methods and procedures through which the cause of the judgment in the original case is established.” In comparing legal precedent with the methods of syllogistic reasoning, the following can be observed:

The difference, if any, between analogical and syllogistic verification is that in the latter the universal subject and predicate are completely abstracted from the particulars, while in the former the predicate is affirmed of the subject in so far as one actual case (particular) is concerned, though an affirmation is possible only through an examination of a certain number of other relevant cases. The process may be different but the result is identical.

Finally, it can hardly be overstated to say that for Ibn Taymiyya the challenge facing the logician does not lie in the examination of forms, figures, and moods, which he repetitively castigates as entirely too verbose and ineffective, “but rather in arriving at the truth and certainty of propositions.” The simplicity of our minds, he persistently maintained, cannot establish certainty and truth in the natural world. The only source of truth and certainty is revealed knowledge, knowledge conveyed to us by the prophets. In closing, here are quotes from Ibn Taymiyya:

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262 Hallaq, Introduction, xxxv.
263 Hallaq, Introduction, xxxviii.
These philosophers, however, did not follow this path. Instead they followed the path of relativity, and thus held demonstrative propositions to be that which the reasoner knows with certainty. Other propositions they have held to be non-demonstrative, though another reasoner may know them [with certainty]. Accordingly what is demonstrative for one person or group may not be so for others. Thus, apodictic propositions cannot be given an exhaustive and exclusive definition (hadd jami mani), because they differ according to the state of mind of the person who knows or does not know them....The prophets have communicated truthful propositions which distinguish between truth and falsehood, right and wrong. Whatever contradicts the truth is false, and whatever contradicts right is wrong. This is why God made the Book which He revealed a judge amongst people in their disputes.\footnote{Hallaq, 171. Paragraph 315.}
CHAPTER VII
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Ibn Taymiyya believed that his mission was to tear down the methodological foundations of philosophy and that he would start by displaying the weaknesses intrinsic to the syllogism and more specifically in syllogistic demonstration. Most scholars when dealing with Ibn Taymiyya’s rejection of the Greek logicians deal with one of two major aspects of his critique of Aristotelian syllogistic demonstration. The two major aspects are, first, demonstration itself, and second, definition.

He agreed emphatically with the priority of divine revelation, the Qur’an, and the Hadith along with the Sunna of the Prophet, Muhammad. It was Ibn Taymiyya’s hypothesis that apart from divine revelation, all human knowledge begins with particulars. Such knowledge does not come into existence in isolation from the particulars found in the phenomenal world. This notion of his concurs with his fundamental principle that knowledge of the particulars occurs in the mind prior to the knowledge of the universal.

Ibn Taymiyya also theorized that a complete induction of all particulars in the external world is impossible and thus cannot lead to an essentially universal premise or to certainty. However, valid the syllogism may be, it cannot, by virtue of form alone, lead to certain conclusions. What determines the truth of the conclusion is, according to Ibn Taymiyya, the matter under discussion of the argument and not its form. Therefore, if the form is extraneous, and if the supposed universal premise in the syllogism is not really so (universal, that is), then how does the syllogism vary from analogy? Ibn Taymiyya said that it does not.

Furthermore, the syllogism is not differentiated from analogy except in form, and form, it was found, is irrelevant to the attainment of knowledge. Both analogy and syllogism then were
found to be capable of certitude if the subject matter under discussion were true. However, they result in mere probability when their matter under discussion is uncertain. In other words, a syllogistic mode of reasoning will not necessarily result in a certain conclusion by virtue of form alone.

Ibn Taymiyya rejected the falasifa’s contention that an alogical reasoning is less convincing than demonstration through the inference of subsumption or based on syllogism. He insisted that analogy is not only the more universal method of reasoning among human beings, but that it provides us with the more dependable method of discerning religious faith in a way which is no doubt more convincing than deductive logic. Given that Ibn Taymiyya rejected the universality of a proposition or premise in a syllogism, and because for him the three terms (middle, major, and minor) of syllogisms are all particular species, such a view is quite consistent. Therefore, the syllogism is actually the same as analogy and, thus syllogism is always a redundancy, as has been suggested. If the points of similitude between the two objects are previously recognized, deduction is not needed any longer. Moreover the species is better recognized by analogy or observation than by syllogism.

Ibn Taymiyya believed that the better way was already in the Qur’an – Allah’s method of reasoning laid out for man. By way of example he gives the story of a question put to the Prophet Mohammad on drinking intoxicating drinks. By analogy anything that was intoxicating was excluded and not just wine. According to Ibn Taymiyya, it is the man, who has a reliable reason and faith, who, out of necessity, will be in conflict with the logicians in their dismissal of religion.

Gregory of Rimini saw the writing of his commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard as an opportunity to explicate his Prolegomena which of course was an exploration of his
epistemology. It outlined his ideas on faith and reason. It highlights the continuity and discontinuity between himself and William of Ockham’s Nominalistic challenge to the Thomist synthesis of Greek metaphysics and logic (as embodied in the *Organon*) with Christian scriptures (Old and New Testaments). Gregory sustained a non-realist position that universals are formed by the soul and only after the mind has apprehension of singular things (or as Ibn Taymiyya states – particulars). Thus sensory experience plays a substantive role in mental cognition – again notice the same things that Ibn Taymiyya states about experiential and sense perception in the process of observation.

Theology, conceived as an autonomous pursuit, was believed to be a self-contained corpus with its own tenets and principles, and it was also believed not to be just another field of *scientia*. As instituted upon divine revelation (sacred and revealed truth), it was dependent upon faith, not natural knowledge (i.e. through experience). Both Duns Scotus and William of Ockham both held a common attitude towards the indemonstrability of theological propositions. In his *Prologue* to the *Sentences*, Gregory’s own treatment was to verify knowledge by experience which is exactly what Ibn Taymiyya agreed with but believed was unnecessary. Gregory actually criticizes Ockham’s assertion that the object of demonstrable knowledge lies in the conclusion of a syllogism. Gregory goes further by saying that the significance of the conclusion itself must be completely understood. He also regards as unequivocal the separation of theology from natural knowledge. Nothing apart from the established canon of scriptural texts can be accepted as theological truth.

Gregory seems to develop the idea of analogy as well as Ibn Taymiyya; however, he does NOT point to the concept in quite the same manner. Gregory defined theology in one of two ways. It can be understood as the habit or habits by which we know the sense of scriptures, and
by which we can prove and infer one truth from another, including those not formally contained therein (we see this in Ibn Taymiyya in his reference to intoxicating substances being applied not just to alcohol). This in effect is the use of scriptural analogy.

Gregory of Rimini was able to delineate his epistemology within the limits of God’s ordained power and the two truths approach. There is the truth of natural knowledge and the truth of sacred knowledge. Like Ibn Taymiyya (tawawuff), he came to the conclusion that sacred knowledge must be acknowledged and acquired with faith in the presence of belief and assent in order for there to be certitude. With natural knowledge we can only approach probability with our unaided human reason.

So what did these men have in common? They both believed that theology, or more appropriately, divine revelation as given in their respective religious traditions’ sacred texts, was not appropriated and could not be understood apart from faith as instrument and apart from the process of analogical reasoning. Analogical reasoning was not the process of syllogistic reasoning, rather the process is that by which we can prove and infer one truth from another. However, there were some differences in the way they approached their criticisms of the syllogistic or demonstrative process. It seems that Gregory never seemed to really reject the methods used to appropriate natural knowledge. He did differentiate between natural knowledge, theology as knowledge, and from both, theology or “doctrine from the scriptures.” It suggests that he uses the form of demonstration or syllogistic reason to create a summa or system of theology but he differentiates that from actual doctrinal revelation from scripture garnered by the process of analogy. However, unlike the traditionalist Muslim approach (I include Ibn Taymiyya), when the great systems were created by the Catholic Christians (and later Protestant scholastics), the very process of systematication is what Gregory was trying to differentiate
between theology as having similar properties with natural knowledge where the process of demonstration is used and doctrine where scripture is approached with the process of analogy (for pithy saying and sermons of isolated doctrines) elucidating the latter methods of “biblical theology.” Even though, in the Islamic Sunni tradition, no great systems of theology were created, there was nevertheless a traditionalist orthodox doctrine or imaan. Instead of systems of theological studies, the Muslims had system of jurisprudence. In Sunni Islam, there was not central governing body that determined orthodoxy like the pope and the Roman curia in the Catholic Christian religion.

Gregory did not attack the Aristotelian scheme of logic per se. However, Ibn Taymiyya wanted to attack the very foundations of Greek philosophy which is logic, merely syllogistic or discursive, and “scientific demonstration.” Gregory came at criticisms of demonstration by returning to an earlier period before Greek logic and more specifically demonstration becomes available to the West; theology in general was established by the authority of the Church and the canonization of Christian scripture. Ibn Taymiyya wanted to delimit any legitimate use for demonstration in particular and syllogistic or discursive reasoning in general. Ibn Taymiyya said that the techniques of Greek logic were unnecessarily prolix and complex and that people do not normally think by that process anyway. He wanted to return to a time when the very methods of thought in everyday life, doctrine, and law were directly gathered from the analogous reasoning process as given by God and already existing in the Qur’an.

Finally, there seems to this author, a different dynamic that makes its appearance. In Islam, from the perspective of Ibn Taymiyya, the act of obedience demonstrates the faithfulness of the Muslim – faith, in and of itself, has no real instrumentality. However, in Catholic Christianity, at least according to Gregory, faith is the instrument by which men approach divine
revelation in the form of sacred theology. This instrumentality of faith is part of the process that God uses to reveal himself in his word. However, it is his word that points to the Word incarnated. For the Muslim the word is the Qur’an which is God inscripturated through the Prophet Mohammad. This is why, perhaps, that the Qur’an is venerated more, at least these days, than the Christian Bible.
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION

It is now possible to draw together the main ideas of this thesis. This thesis was conceived as a comparative analysis of Gregory of Rimini and Ibn Taymiyya. However, there needed to be a context for these two fourteenth century theologians. Therefore I included a philosophical context with the second chapter. Aristotelian logical or syllogistic demonstration has been of paramount importance in this thesis. Therefore a brief summing up of some ideas will be appropriate.

As long as one legitimate objection can be raised against the truth or necessity of a proposition it will not qualify as the first principle for a scientific demonstration. This is not saying, however, that universally held opinions cannot be used as propositions in a syllogism. Furthermore, a discursive argument in syllogistic form is possible even with propositions stemming from opinion. Aristotle made the following observation: “From truths you can make a syllogism without actually making a demonstration; but the only syllogism you can make from necessary truths is by way of demonstration. This is the function of demonstration.”

Therefore, the correct structure of a syllogism does not guarantee the incontrovertible truth of its conclusion. Rather its correct structure combined with universally agreed upon propositions can result in useful knowledge and even truth of a certain kind. That is truth of a probable nature and not certainty.

It is my belief that both Ibn Taymiyya and Gregory of Rimini did raise objections against the truth and necessity of the propositions found among the secular philosophers and philosophical theologians of their respective cultural milieus. They also held that universally

265 Aristotle (Bambrough), 172.
held truthful opinions could be used in discursive arguments, and that for Gregory of Rimini, this did become the basis of the writing of *summae* or systematic theologies. They also understood that, the correct structure of a syllogism does not guarantee the incontrovertible truth of its conclusion. In other words, it did not prove the truth or falsity of the discursive argument. If this was truly the case then there were other patterns or forms of arguments found in the sacred scriptures that could provide doctrine and teaching; hence the use of analogy in both traditions.

The propositions used must be necessary, or, as Aristotle states it, “The object of absolute knowledge cannot be otherwise than it is. Therefore, the object of demonstrative knowledge must be necessary.”266 These necessary propositions or objects of demonstrative knowledge must convey a condition or a set of conditions which cannot possibly be otherwise than what is predicated of the subject. Even when correct structure or form is used with universally agreed upon propositions, all we get are truths of a probable nature and not certainty. Instead, as stated above and understood by both Ibn Taymiyya and Gregory of Rimini, the propositions must be necessary and the object of demonstrative knowledge must be necessary. However, both men were medieval Nominalists and theologians and so they could only accept that God’s creation is contingent and hence changeable and what is necessary in one place or instant may be different in another; one truth might not be so in different contexts; or that God might change the way he behaves in different situations or contexts. And so, this highly contingent world cannot provide necessary, universal and true propositions at all times, every time or eternally.

In the third chapter, I introduced the work of scholars of culture, language, linguistics, education and the socio-political milieu of the ‘Abbāsid Caliphate. I wanted to point out that it is

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266 Bambrough, 167.
not quite accurate to call it the “tradition of Islamic philosophy” because there were groups or individuals who were Muslims, Syriac Christians, Nestorians and Monophysites, Jews, and others who lived within the political hegemony of the Islamic state. It is also inaccurate to name the tradition Arabic because there were Persians, Greeks, Indians, Berbers, and of course Arabs who resided within the Islamic religious and Arabic language speaking regions.

One of the reasons for my adding this chapter needs to be reiterated. At first it was my opinion that Nicholas Rescher was being unreasonable by saying that there was no such thing as Islamic philosophy.267 On second thought there is much truth to the statement. The preservation of Greek philosophical, scientific and logical works (the Organon) was achieved with the help of the Syriac Christians, Nestorians, Monophysites, and Jews. The transmission of techniques and the early efforts of scholars enhanced the efforts of the translation movement on Baghdad. Even in the early stages of translation the Syriac speaking (a dialect of Aramaic) scholars already had a genuine history of translation, and they were willing to share their experiences beginning at the time of the Umayyad Caliphate in Damascus. More importantly the translation movement, as it was shown above, was a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, and multi-religious movement with contributions or rather collaborations made by different people with each other during the different time periods. Whether or not it is true, according to Gutas, the ‘Abbasid Caliphate actually not only moved to Baghdad in order to inaugurate a new Caliphate but also to house a new translation movement that was funded by the state and had the full participation of the ulama – the elite of ‘Abbasid society. However, as a reminder, it should be noted that the majority of the Greek scientific and philosophical works were translated into Syriac during the ninth century as a component of the ‘Abbasid translation movement. In addition, the Syriac-

267 Rescher, Studies in Arabic Philosophy, 147-149. See chapter X, “The Impact of Arabic Philosophy on the West.”
speaking Christians provided a large part of the essential methodological expertise for the Graeco-Arabic translation movement. However, this does not diminish the role played by the early ‘Abbāsid societal context; namely the motivation, scientific objectives, and organization of the translation movement provided by them.268 It should be noted then, that by the time Ibn Taymiyya appeared on the scene in the late thirteenth century, over a century of Arabic logic, as elucidated by the “Baghdad Organon,” had already existed and been studied and commented upon. It was part of Ibn Taymiyya’s educational curriculum, and whether he wanted to admit or not, he was a theologian with a deep background in Aristotelian philosophy, and it was after the fact that he brought about his program of disassociating Islamic doctrine of imān from its thralldom.

My inclusion of D’Ancona’s work on Neoplatonism was to demonstrate how the early actions of some can have an impact of future generations. Porphyry had made the decision to add an introduction to Aristotle’s *Organon* called the *Isagoge*. Because of this Boethius, in his plan to translate the works of Plato and Aristotle, began not with Plato but with Porphyry’s *Isagoge* instead. This along with the fact that the Alexandrian *Organon* included Porphyry’s *Isagoge* along with the Rhetoric and Poetics meant that both the Islamic East (including Spain) and the European Catholic West came to include Porphyry’s *Isagoge* to the *Organon* as well as the Rhetoric and Poetics. Even during the time of Avicenna (Ibn Sīnna), the *Isagoge* of Porphyry was considered the beginning of philosophical instruction. The work of Proclus called the *Elements of Theology* was also highly influential in both the Arabo-Islamic philosophical schools and the Catholic Christian West. As stated in page 41 above, it was Aristotle, the first teacher, who was credited with a rational theology. So ironically, it was the Neoplatonists that

268 Ibid., 22.
made Aristotle a teacher of a rationalist “secular” theology which was established within the school of al-Kindi. Ibn Taymiyya then came to excoriate the teachers and teachings of his rationalist pagan theology along with the methodology of the falasifa.

As far as the Arabo-Latin translation movement, as centered in Toledo, Spain, is concerned, it was for the most part, “determined by what was required in the newly burgeoning European universities, which were outside of Spain.” In other words for the most part, despite the contributions or collaborations made by local scholars, the trend of the translation project remained in the possession of outsiders, and the works being produced were a product for export to clients abroad. The works that were being produced by the translation movement in Toledo were not for the consumption of the local community. Scholars were also traveling from abroad with the same intention that brought Gerard of Cremona to Toledo.

It became apparent that in the mid- to late-twelfth century, in the field of Aristotelian philosophy in Toledo especially, there was an incredibly rich assortment of, on the one hand, the original texts of the Aristotelian corpus along with supplementary works by Alexander of Aphrodisias, al-Kindi, and al-Farabi and on the other hand, the works of Avicenna (Ibn Sīnna) and Algazel (al-Ghazali). It is the received opinion of scholars in Arabo-Islamic philosophy that Ibn Sīnna and al-Ghazali were more representative of what Arabic and Jewish scholars were reading and studying. However, it must be pointed out that Ibn Taymiyya, in his strictures against the Sufis, the Mutakallimun, the falsafa, and the Shi’a, blames the rapid decline of Islamic doctrinal purity (as he and others before and after him saw it) on the wholesale adoption of Aristotelian metaphysics, as represented by the Aristotelian rationalist and secular theology.

269 Burnett, 154. See also the Warburg publication Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts: The Syriac, Arabic and Medieval Latin Traditions. Ed. by Charles F.S. Burnett.
brought about by the adoption of many of the methodologies and presuppositions elucidated within the Baghdad *Organon* of Aristotle. According to Burnett, in his article “Arabic into Latin,” the role played by texts written in Arabic is crucial to the history of Western philosophy. He goes on to state that “the barrier between Arabic and Latin scholarship was more porous than it had ever been” during most of the thirteenth century. In Spain Arabic had become the language of the intellectual classes of Toledo and of the nobility, thanks to the influence of the Mozarabic community.

In the next couple of chapters I gave the brief accounts of the lives and accomplishments of both Ibn Tamiyya and Gregory of Rimini. The historiography of fourteenth-century scholasticism has been plagued by many problems; consequently, any assessment of Gregory’s place in the history of philosophy (and philosophical theology) has been difficult. According to Schabel:

...he flourished at a time that has been judged by historians as one on the whole decadent, fideistic, and radically skeptical, in contrast to the period in which, for example, Thomas Aquinas worked (d. 1274); this historical viewpoint already made difficult an objective evaluation of Rimini.270

The most fundamental component of Gregory of Rimini’s thinking and his ability to sway others was, perhaps, “his adherence to Augustine and the nature of that adherence.”271 It is believed by Schabel that Gregory read the works of Augustine more meticulously and comprehensively than most of the theologians before him. Gregory was able to cite Augustine more accurately than any of his opponents such as Peter Auriol and Francis of Marchia. It is his interest in the works of Augustine that has been considered essential to the development of a “historico-critical”

270 Schabel, 3. See also Oberman in *The Dawn of the Reformation*, 4, 5. He has called this the myth of the Thomist Phalanx. There were always objections to Thomas Aquinas’ program of synthesis and subalternation; this is a picture unlike that created by Thomist scholars.

271 Ibid., 4.
method in philosophical (or scholastic, or speculative) theology, and particularly in the Augustinian Order, partly prefiguring modern scholarly methodologies. Along with this historico-critical method, Gregory was also part of a general attempt to establish reliable texts of Augustine and to separate authentic works from the pseudo-Augustinian corpus.272 I will not repeat here, what has been already stated elsewhere in this thesis, concerning his treatment of Catholic Christian epistemology.

Ibn Taymiyya, as a prime example of traditionalist (orthodox Sunni) views, defended Sunni Islam “based on the stringent adherence to the Qur’an and authenticated Sunna (practices) of the Prophet Muhammad. He believed that these major sources contain all the religious and spiritual guidance necessary for the salvation of Muslims” here on earth and after death. He “rejected the arguments and ideas” of the philosophers, both the mutakallimun (practitioners of kalām) and the adherents of falsafa (philosophical theology), who were the falāsifa (philosophers) on the one hand and the more extreme and heterodox of the Sufis (Islamic mystics of various tarika or schools of Sufism) on the other hand, “regarding religious knowledge, spiritual experiences and ritual practices.” He believed that formal logic (al-mantiq) is not a consistent means of attaining religious truth and “that the intellect of man must be subservient to the revealed truth” embodied by Scripture. He also disagreed with the blind acceptance of prior juridical decision called taqlid and called for the continued practice of the mujtahid, that is ijtihad, which meant a careful and concerted application of personal and strenuous research into the only two sources of legal precedent, the Qur’an and Sunna. This should not be misunderstood as fresh and

272 Ibid., 4. Interestingly enough, on the one hand, this prefigures the work of Valla, and on the other hand, it post-dates the work of the ninth century Carolingian deacon, Florus of Lyon. Florus of Lyon also pointed out the pseudonymous works of Jerome and Augustine.
innovative decisions, but rather a return to the previous practices of the traditionalist mujtahid. He believed that the four established (and widely acknowledged) Sunni schools (madhāhib) of jurisprudence (Hanbali, Shafi‘i, Maliki, and Hanafi) “had become stagnant and sectarian, and also that they were being improperly influenced by aspects of Greek logic and thought as well as Sufi mysticism. His challenge to the leading scholars of the day was to return to an understanding of Islam in practice and in faith, based solely on the Qur’an and Sunna.”

In the final chapter I give an account of what I believe to be the similarities and differences between what Ibn Taymiyya and Gregory of Rimini taught and wrote. Each man had very similar beliefs concerning the larger picture of what they conceived to be the weaknesses of the Aristotelian doctrine of universals and the too restraining principles behind the construct of syllogistic demonstration. They also agreed that the system of analogy inherent in their respective religious texts served as well if not better than syllogistic methods. Indeed like Ibn Taymiyya, what emerges from Gregory of Rimini’s deliberations is a highly traditionalist conception of theology which is governed strictly by scriptural truth. For both of them, theology is for the love of God as creator; it is the property of those who believe. Gregory and Ibn Taymiyya, therefore, conceived of theology as a positive pursuit, and they both eschewed idle speculation and insisted upon the spiritual function of theology properly founded upon divine revelation and which was bound to the assent of mind and heart and which was demonstrated in obedience. Theirs was a reaction to the speculative theology of the scholastics or mutakallimun who took divine revelation out of the purview of those whom they considered as less capable intellectually and made of it the playground of the intellectual elite.

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274 Jon Hoover, 29-44.
Returning to Major Stephen P. Lambert’s question regarding why the West, that is, the nations of Europe and the United States remain unwilling to ask the right question. This paper, beyond its main thesis and theme, is my contribution at answering the question of “why.” As Lambert said:

In the fields of study that address human interaction—for example in ethics, politics, international affairs, or warfare—answering “why” questions involves penetrating the underlying cultural and metaphysical belief structures that serve to guide both individual and collective behavior.275

My intent was to start as far back as possible in an attempt to begin answering the questions that concern our “underlying cultural and metaphysical, [philosophical and theological] belief structures that serve to guide both individual and collective behavior.” I added the concepts of philosophy and theology to the belief structures of Islam and the West. Part of the problem of communication between the West (which includes the United States and Israel) and the Muslim countries (e.g., Turkey) and Islamic nation states (e.g., Saudi Arabia) is that:

...today’s policy and academic elites are intimidated by passionate religious faith—and current war unavoidably connected to religion. Whatever one thinks of the metaphysical realm, one cannot escape the fact that one side clothes itself in religious rhetoric, and often seems driven by metaphysical passion. But in the realm of American policy and academic elites, religion is persona non grata. To these elites, religion seems antiquated, troublesome, pedestrian, and unsophisticated.276

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275 Stephen P. Lambert, Major. The Sources of Islamic Revolutionary Conduct. (Joint Military Intelligence College, Washington, D.C., April 2005), 1, 2.
276 Ibid. Emphasis added.
APPENDIX A

MEDIEVAL ARABIC GLOSSARY
The information given here is taken from the website linked from the Journal of Islamic Philosophy online and in print.

**Al-Arghanun:** The *Organon* (the organ or instrument for acquiring knowledge): a name given by the followers of Aristotle to the collection of logical treatises. The Organon originally consisted of six treatises: * Categoriae* (*Qatighuriyas*); *De Interpretatione* (*Bari Irminiyas*); *Analytica Priora* (*Analutiqa*); *Analytica Posteriora* (*Analutiqa Thani*); *Topica* (*Tubiqa*); and *Sophistici Elenchi* (*Sufustiqa*). The Muslim philosophers, following the example of those in Alexandria however, included three more treatises in their Arabic version of the Organon, viz *Isagoge* (*Isaghuji*), an introduction written by Porphyry (*Firfuriyus*); *Rhetorica* (*Rituriqa*), Aristotle’s treatise on the art of public speaking; and *Poetica* (*Buyutiq*), a work on the art of Poetry.

**Al-Isaghuji:** Arabicized form of the Greek word *Eisagoge* or *Isagoge* meaning "introduction", sometimes translated as *al-Madkhal*. It is originally an Introduction to Aristotle’s logical treatise on Categories (*al-Qatighuriyas*) composed by Porphyry (*Firfuriyus*). It deals with the five predicates (*al-alfaz al-khamsah*) and also with the terms of speech and their abstract meanings. This little treatise, first translated into Arabic by Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ has been commented on a number of times. Besides the adaptations and epitomes of this work, many independent works on logic by Muslim philosophers have been entitled as *al-Isaghuji*, the most famous of them being one by *al-Abhari* (c.597-664, c.1200-1265).

**Al-Qatighuriyas:** *Categoriae* or the Categories, the first book of Aristotle’s *Organon* (*al-Arghanun*) on logic. It deals with the ten categories (*al-maqulat al-‘ashr*), viz. substance (*jauhar*), quantity (*kamm*), quality (*kaif*), relation (*‘idafah*), time (*mata*), place (*aina*), position (*wad’*), possession (*milk*), passion (*‘inf’al*) and action (*fi’l*).
**Al-Sufistiqa:** *Sophistici Elenchi*, Aristotle’s sixth book on logic, also entitled as *al-Maghali* or *al-Hikmat al-Muwawmah* in Arabic; it deals with the fallacies of logical reasoning, intentional or otherwise.

**Al-Tubiqa:** *Topica* or the *Topics*, Aristotle’s fifth book on logic, also entitled as *al-Jadal* or *al-Mawadi’al-Jadaliyah* in Arabic; it deals with the truth and falsity of the statements of the two opponents involved in a disputation (*al-jadal*).

**Analutiqa or Al-Qiyas:** *Analytica Priora* or the *First Analystics*: Aristotle’s third book on logic; other variants are *Anulutiqa* and *Analutiqa Awwal*—also entitled as *al-Qiyas* in Arabic; it deals with the combination of propositions in the different forms of syllogism (*qiya*s).

**Analutiqa Thani or Al-Burhan:** *Analytica Posteriora* or the *Second Analystics*: Aristotle’s fourth book on logic; other variants are *Abuditiqta* (apodeiktikos — apodeictic) or *Afudiqtiqi*, also entitled *al-Burhan* in Arabic; it deals with the conditions to be fulfilled by the premises of a valid demonstration and thus distinguishes a sound syllogism from an unsound one.

**Aristatalis:** Aristotle (384–322 B.C.) pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander. Almost all of the works of Aristotle except his Dialogues (about 27) were available to the Muslim philosophers in their Arabic translation. They called Aristotle *al-mu’allim al-awwal*, i.e. the “first teacher”, and keenly studies his works either directly or through his commentators such as Alexander of Aphrodisias (*Iskandar Ifrudis*), Themistius (*Thamistiyus*), Simplicius (*Simbliqiyus*) and others. Muslim Philosophers are not to be blamed for being not altogether able to distinguish between the genuine and apocryphal works of Aristotle. More important of the later current among are: “The Theology of Aristotle” (*Uthulujiya Aristatalis*), Liber de Causis” (*Kitab Khair al-Mahd*) and Secreta Secretorum (*Sirr al-Asrar*)
Bari Irminiyas: *De Interpretatione* (Peri EJrmhneivaV – On Hermeneutics), the title of the second of Aristotle’s book on logic, also named as *al-‘Ibarah* or *al-Tafsir*; it deals with the formation of different kinds of propositions through the combination of simple ideas or terms. It deals with the issue of hermeneutics or interpretation or meaning of a text.

Buyutiqa: The Arabicized title of Aristotle’s *Poetica* or the Poetics, (the other variant being *Butiqa*), in Arabic entitled also as *al-Shi’r*; generally considered by Muslim philosophers to be one of Aristotle’s books on logic, i.e. the last part of the logical *Organon* (*al-Arghanun*) which deals with the fine art of stirring the imagination and soul of the audience through the magic of words.

Firfuriyus: Porphyry (233–c. 304 C.E.), Neo-Platonic philosopher, disciple, biographer and editor of Plotinus (*Fulutin, also called al-Shaikh al-Yunani*). Brought up in Tyre, he studied at Athens and from 263 under Plotinus at Rome. He wrote commentaries on Aristotle and Plotinus which seem to have reached the Muslim philosophers. Around a score of his numerous works survive in whole or part, including Against the Christians (fragments), Lives of Pythagoras and Plotinus, commentaries on Homer, Plato’s *Timaeus* (fragments), Aristotle’s *Categories*, and Ptolemy’s Harmonica. His chief source of fame, however, comes from *Eisagage* (*Isaghuji*) which has been preserved in Arabic in its complete form that quickly became and long remained a standard textbook and used for centuries both in the East and in the West as the clearest and most practical manual of Aristotelian logic. The so-called “Tree of Porphyry” traces a species (commonly man) from its summum genus (substance) through differentiae (e.g. corporeal) that yield successive subgenera (e.g. body). The Muslim tradition ascribes to him a commentary on Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, but the work seems to have been lost now. He wrote a history of philosophy in four books which was known to the Muslim philosophers, but of which only the
Life of Pythagoras is extant. It is interesting to note that according to Ibn Rushd’s estimation of him, Porphyry cannot be counted among the most subtle of the philosophers.

**Qiyas:** Syllogism, i.e. a form of mediate inference in which a conclusion (natijah) necessarily results from the two given propositions taken together, one of which is the major premise (al-muqaddamat al-kubra) and other the minor premise (al-muqaddamat al-sughra), because of a connection (qarinah) between the two premises wherein they are united through a common, i.e. middle term (al-hadd alausat). The conclusion, because it necessarily follows the premises, is also sometimes called ridf, i.e. the consequent. The major premise is that in which the major term (al-hadd al-akbar) occurs, and this is the one which occurs as a predicate (mahmul) in the conclusion; while the minor premise is that in which the minor term (al-hadd al-asghar) occurs, and this is the one which occurs as subject (maudu) in the conclusion. Thus in the stock syllogism: "All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; hence Socrates is mortal", "All men are mortal" is the major premise, "Socrates is a man", the minor premise which together lead to the conclusion: "Socrates is mortal."

**Rituriqa or Al-Khabah:** Rhetorica or the Rhetoric: Aristotle’s seventh book on logic, also entitled as al-Khabah in Arabic; it deals with the art of persuading through oratorical devices.
APPENDIX B

DIAGRAM ILLUSTRATING SOURCES AND INFLUENCES
Greek Philosophy
- Neo-Platonic: Plotinus, Porphry, and Proclus
- Aristotle: Organon (Eisagoge, Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics, Sophistic Refutations, Rhetoric, Poetics), Metaphysics, Physics, De Anima etc.
- Stoics: Logic

Arabo-Islamic Philosophy
- Falsafa: Al-Kindi, Ibn Farabi
- Mutakallimun: Asherites, Mutazillites, Ibn Sinna (Avicenna), Ibn Rushd (Averroes), Al-Ghazzali
- Traditionalists: Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, Al-Shafi, Ibn Taymiyya, Al-Suyuti

Syriac Christian Philosophy (Neo-Platonic)

Medieval Catholic Christian Philosophy
- Thomas Aquinas (Thomist synthesis)
- Duns Scotus (Scotist counter-synthesis)
- William of Ockham (Anti-thesis and Nominalist)
- Gregory of Rimini (Augustinian Nominalist)

Medieval Jewish Philosophy
- Saadia Gaon
- Moses
- Maimonides

Persian

Chinese

Indian
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