NEEDS AND MEMBERSHIP IN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

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One key to reducing terrorism may be to understand why individuals join terror groups, and to find ways to meet their needs through alternatives to discourage membership in terrorist organizations. The study introduces the hierarchy of needs framework to capture all previous pieces of explanations on why individuals join terror groups under one big umbrella, in order to see the big picture. It does not do a meta-analysis, but rather tests the framework. This study is designed to find out what perceived needs commonly motivate individuals to join terror groups in general and specific terror groups in particular. The research uses Turkey’s terrorism experience as a case study which is supported with data from real terrorist in Turkey.

Findings of the descriptive analyses show that majority joined a terror group due to social and affiliative needs. The remaining analyses (bivariate, cross-tabulation and binary logistic regression) show that confitents who perceived esteem and recognition were more likely to become members of other/leftist terror groups, and that rightist terror group members in Turkey tend to have higher education. Education mainly affects a confitent’s perception of two needs: social and affiliation and self-actualization. Other demographic variables (age group, region of birth, marital status) die not yield any significant relation with membership in terror groups.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement

Terrorism is a major security concern for our communities. In fact, no single country is immune to terrorist attacks (Arboleda-Florez, 2007). Although terrorism has a long history, it still keeps its position as one of the most important security concerns that scholars need to study in order to provide recommendations for effective counter measures. Many scholars have tried to draw attention to the threat of terrorism in the world (e.g., Sahliyeh, 1990; Kuzman, 2000; Yayla, 2005; Rubbelke, 2005; White, 2006; Teymur, 2007; Palmer, 2007; Kule, 2007; Rogers, Loewenthal, Lewis, Amlot, Cinnirella and Ansari, 2007; S. Ekici and McEntire, 2007; Arboleda-Florez, 2007; McEntire, 2008). However, the threat still requires utmost attention from scholars, policy makers and practitioners. The attention given to understand the threat of terrorism is appropriate, because nations all around the world (e.g., Turkey, India, S. Korea, Ireland, Columbia, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Afghanistan, African countries) still suffer from innocent killings and economic disruption caused by terrorism while this study was written. In addition, European countries and the U.S. remain on alert due to the possibility of new terrorist attacks, especially after September 11, 2001 (9/11).
Most of the studies on terrorism have led policy makers to respond with reactive offensive acts. These actions are necessary but the scope of terrorist activities suggests that these approaches are not enough. The threat of terrorism requires new approaches to supplement what is already being done if we are to become more effective at curtailing terrorism.

Terrorists are known for their killings and other violent acts, and this continued cruelty needs ongoing justification. Therefore, terrorists need encouragement to justify their actions, but that is not an easy task (Silke, 2003; White, 2006). As with soldiers and the police, terrorists must believe that they are doing their task for a valued purpose. Governments use very sacred symbols to recognize and honor the sacrifices in war, terrorists do feel the same social need of recognition for their violent acts (White, 2006). Terrorists also feel that their acts are justified and so they do not see themselves as murderers or criminals. Rather, they view themselves as warriors or soldiers, and think that they are not the people who cause harm to others, but as those who react to abuses and injustices caused by others (Silke, 2003; Arboleda-Florez, 2007). It is now a common understanding that terrorism goes hand in hand with violence to achieve its political goals and to maintain its power against governments, societies and so on (Wardlaw, 1989).

More frightening is the fact that the threat of terrorism is not likely to end soon because terrorists are becoming more dangerous with the help of new technologies and very sophisticated new weapons (Perl, 2003; U.S. Army, 2005).
Prior to 9/11, most terrorists relied on predictable acts, but today the same group of people are trying to achieve more sophisticated, mass targeting attacks (Jenkins, 2001). It is likely that terrorists may use chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons if they acquire the scientific knowledge or technical capabilities to execute their violent ambitions (Hoffman, 2001). And the fear that one of them might acquire or develop a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) frightens the whole world. Unfortunately, people with dreadful intentions are able to reach sophisticated technologies in the modern world as long as they have the capital for it (Anderson, 2002; Garrick, 2002). Eventually, just a few determined people can cause mass destruction once they decide to carry out an attack (Velter and Perlstein, 1991).

The most important thing to note is that the attacks on the World Trade Center on 9/11 were neither the first, nor will they be the last ones to occur in the world (McEntire, 2008). In regard to the period before 9/11, for instance, on October 9, 1983, 21 people were murdered and 48 wounded in South Korea after attacks were carried out by North Korean agents. On February 16, 1999, Kurdish terrorists attacked and occupied Greek embassies and diplomatic facilities in various countries such as France, Holland, Britain, Germany, and Switzerland after Turkey captured the leader (Abdullah Ocalan) of PKK (Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan- Kurdish Workers’ Party).

Terrorist attacks continued after 9/11 as well. For example, in 2002, a car bomb explosion in Bali outside a discotheque killed 202 people and wounded
hundreds, mainly tourists. Al-Qaida took responsibility about the attack (Lu, 2008). In Bogota on November 19, 2003 the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) carried out a grenade attack targeting two bars that were frequently visited mainly by Americans. The attack left behind 1 death and 72 wounded (U.S. Department of State, 2008). Another attack example is from Pakistan. A suicide bombing targeting a police station in the capital city of Islamabad killed around 20 people and wounded dozens of others. A day after that a series of explosions caused to many other casualties in July 2008 (Lu, 2008). Ultimately, as it was in the past, terrorism is very likely to be on our agendas even in the future (McEntire, 2008). Thus, as mentioned earlier, new ways of fighting terrorism are needed if we are to make inroads in this battle.

Due to the continuing risk and threat of terrorism, various scholars from fields such as criminal justice, sociology, political science, economics, history, etc have forwarded theories to explain terrorism and make recommendations on how to diminish it. Yet, preceding terrorism studies do not fully explain why people join terrorist groups. They forward pieces of explanations. Thus, the responses to terrorism, perhaps based on these theories, have resulted in policies that have not been completely effective, and terrorism still threatens the world vehemently. As Yayla (2005) states, reactive offensive policies (e.g. military and/or police operations) “deal only with the consequences of terrorism” (p. 2), or how to counter terrorist attacks because they were targeting the terrorist organization itself. For instance, Turkey has carried out numerous air and ground operations
into Northern Iraq after terrorists came from this region and killed Turkish citizens. Another example is the U.S., when it invaded Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks because it was believed that the core groups responsible for the attacks were in Afghanistan.

Much less scholarly attention has been given to the individuals who are members of terror groups and their needs for joining those groups. Individuals are vital for terror groups in order to remain operational. One set of developing theories is promising and suggests that a focus on the individual may prove useful for understanding, and reducing the spread of terrorism. An example is Palmer (2007) who forwards factors as reasons for why individuals join terror groups. The factors he argues are actually personal needs. He notes how terror groups determine the needs of potential new recruits, and then focus on these to recruit individuals.

Other scholars, (McIntyre, 2002; Teymur, 2007) have considered that individuals might be lacking alternatives for their survival; meaning that they might have joined armed groups, including terror organizations to satisfy their needs. McIntyre and Teymur point out that, individuals who lack economic, political, and social factors needed for their well being are compelled to join such groups. To these arguments, Yilmaz (2008) adds that terrorist organizations recruit any kind of people with different social and economic backgrounds as long as they can serve. Particularly factors such as poverty, religious sensitivities,
ethnical awareness, and other social/structural issues seem to have an impact on a young individual to side with terrorist organizations (Aktan and Koknar, 2002).

In sum, one key to reducing terrorism may be to understand why individuals join terror groups, and to find ways to meet their needs through alternatives to discourage membership in terrorist organizations. Terror groups certainly will have ideological, political or religious goals, but that does not mean that all their members necessarily share the same goals of the terror group. For instance, not all employees in a company (e.g., car manufacturing), which is also an organization, share the goals of the company but they work there to have a regular income and provide for their living.

Therefore, there must be other explanations for joining and maintaining an allegiance to the group. Since, terror groups are also organizations, as Palmer (2007) notes, they are human dependent and need to recruit people to keep their organizations operational. Hence, if we can stop individuals from joining such organizations, then we may also reduce terrorism dramatically.

The Purpose of the Study and the Research Questions

Current reactive offensive policies are not fully effective in preventing or reducing terrorism. For this reason, it is necessary that we continue to develop strategies that are more effective. The proposed study considers the perceived needs of individuals who join terror groups. The study introduces the Hierarchy of Needs framework to capture all previous pieces of explanations on why individuals join terror groups under one big umbrella in order to see the big
picture. It does not do a meta-analysis, but rather tests the framework using data taken from real terrorists in Turkey.

Maslow’s hierarchy of needs framework is used only for identifying and classifying needs. The framework is not being used to explain a clear-cut directional, causal relationship between perceived needs and membership to a terrorist group. The fulfillment of one need of a terrorist does not automatically lead to the fulfillment of the next need. Also, it does not argue that all individuals with needs will join a terror group, but rather, that those who have no alternatives to fulfill their perceived needs may consider joining if membership to a terror group is, or seems to be their only alternative to satisfy their needs. This study is designed to find out what perceived needs commonly motivate individuals to join terror groups in general, and specific terror groups in particular (rightist or other, see Case Study, p. 96).

The purpose is to learn more about why people join, so that interventions might be created that could be used to stop this inflow. Accordingly, security related policy makers (executives and legislators) in all countries will have the opportunity to develop new policies to discourage individuals from becoming members of terror groups. In other words, it is possible that divergent ways can be developed to fulfill the needs of individuals who may be attracted to joining terror groups. In addition, it will help policy makers to determine whether they should counter all kind of terror groups with the same measures or if unique measures should be created for specific groups.
At a conference in Madrid (2005), Jerrold M. Post (a professor of political psychology and international affairs) who teaches graduate courses on terrorism and political violence suggested that field research is required in order to understand the underlying motivation for why individuals join terror groups. In particular, he argued for interviews with terrorists (Teymur, 2007), stating that it is important to talk with these people to get the information directly from the source. Based on that suggestion, this study utilizes secondary data obtained from a survey of actual terrorists. The primary investigator (PI), Ahmet Ekici, who collected the data in 2008 to study community policing on terrorism (see chapter VI) defines the mentioned actual terrorists as confitents in his study because they regretted their previous crimes and wanted to cooperate with the state.

The data is analyzed using the hierarchy of needs framework proposed by Abraham Maslow (1943). This American psychologist maintains that motives drive people to do things. In particular, Maslow asserts that individuals have five types of needs: physiological, safety and security, social and affiliative, esteem and recognition and self actualization. Based on these explanations, then it should be possible to determine the needs of those who join terror groups in general as well as the needs of individuals in specific terror groups. Hence, although it also contains some sub questions, the main questions of this study are:

1. What needs do individual terrorists (confitents) state as being influential for them to join a terrorist organization?
2. Which needs of Maslow’s model are most influential for an individual terrorist (confitent) to become a member of a particular type of terrorist organization (i.e., rightist or other)?

Significance of the Study

This dissertation is significant for several reasons: (1) the study aims to find out the perceived needs that are related with individuals’ motivation for joining a terror group in general and a confitent’s motivation for becoming member of a specific terror group in particular. (2) The study suggests that shifting the focus to individuals provides a new approach for the study of terrorism and for developing more effective counter terrorism policies; (3) the study introduces a framework (Maslow’s hierarchy of needs) for terrorism studies to understand the needs that underlie the reasons why individuals join terror groups. In addition, it captures previous studies, under one big umbrella to show the big picture by utilizing the hierarchy of needs framework; (4) the study contributes to filling a gap that exists due to a lack in terrorism research in Turkey.

The most important contribution of this study is to find out what perceived needs are related to an individual’s motivation to joining terror groups, for purposes of finding new ways to combat terrorism. Previous studies mention some factors for why individuals join terror groups, but they fail to reveal that each factor they note indicates to the perception of a need. Neither do they answer why all individuals living under the same conditions do not join. In
addition, they do not explain why individuals join different terror groups. Hence, using data taken from real terrorists, the study analyses the reasons for joining a terrorist group, and by using Maslow’s framework, the research identifies and classifies the underlying needs in their decisions. In addition, the work adds analysis of whether the demographic variables (age group, region of birth, marital status and education) affect the choice of individuals for joining a terror certain terror group and their perception of a need.

This study is also an important work because it shifts the primary focus of inquiry from the terror organizations as a whole to the individuals who join a terror organization. The focus on the terror organizations and/or their systems (macro level analyses), have resulted with aggressive reactive offensive strategies which have not been fully successful at reducing terrorism effects significantly. It is time to question where the focus of policy makers and counter terrorism practices should be. Therefore, it is necessary to ask whether attention at the individual level can help us to develop more effective policies. Terrorism cannot be reduced dramatically if we do not understand why individuals join terrorist organizations in the first place. The existing terrorism problem in many countries is proof that previous research and resulting policy suggestions have not achieved noteworthy reduction in terrorism incidents, and there is the need for a new approach to counter terrorism.

This work’s another important difference from previous studies is that it introduces a framework (Maslow’s hierarchy of needs) for terrorism studies. The
framework can be used to understand or interpret to what needs, factors analyzed in preceding studies refer to as reasons for joining terror groups. This study captures previous explanations under one big umbrella to show the big picture by utilizing the framework. It classifies previous explanations by using the hierarchy of needs framework. Previous research provided many pieces of explanations; however none was able to provide the full picture as why individuals join terror groups. The hierarchy of needs framework can serve to notice the full picture of reasons why individuals join terror groups.

The study is also important because Turkey has been dealing with terrorism for around three decades, but there is not enough research conducted in relation to this threat (Kule, 2007). Preceding studies are mainly about terrorist organizations in Europe or the Middle East (Koseli, 2006). As a result, this study contributes to the terrorism studies in Turkey and provides an alternative view on how to possibly handle such problems.

In the next sections, some topics are introduced to understand the extent of the problem, the need for initial measures against terrorism and the significance of the solution proposed in this research. These topics include the definitional dilemma in the field of terrorism, types of terrorism, impacts of terrorism, and the need for prevention.

Definition of Terrorism and the Dilemma

Although terrorism has existed for centuries, it is unfortunate that it does not have one objective definition (Crenshaw, 2001). Counter terrorism activities
can be successful only through the understanding of the terrorism phenomenon (McEntire, 2008). Understanding a phenomenon starts with defining it. Clear definition avails researchers a shared term so that they can build upon previous research, studies and guidance to develop counter policies (White, 2006).

It is interesting that people agree that terrorism is a problem, but they cannot agree on what terrorism is (White, 2006). The literature on terrorism contains hundreds of definitions (Schmid, 1983; McCormick, 2003), but there is no single one on which there is a full consensus. The various definitions are due to the fact that the term is “emotionally charged and laden with value judgments” (McEntire, 2008, p. 26) and due to the constant changing meaning of the term terrorism over time (Laqueur, 1999). However, Schmid (1983) notes that it is just not possible to define terrorism because it is not a physical object but rather a concept. It is a common axiom which also bears some truth that “one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter” (Martin, 2003 as cited in McEntire, 2008, p. 26). The statement of “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter explains” why the world could not come up with an acceptable international definition of terrorism (Gold, 2004). That is so because defining somebody or a group as terrorist is degrading to them both politically and socially. Therefore, defining somebody or a group as terrorist is often a matter of who makes the call (White, 2006).

As a result of the variation in the understanding and definition of terrorism, counter activities are slowed down or endangered, especially on the international
arena (Falkenrath, 2001). Even studying terrorism becomes more difficult due to the lack of a clear definition of the crime (Gold, 2004). Scholars, politicians, criminal investigators, public security officers, diplomats, journalists, industrial security experts and all other related people have their own way of understanding of who is a terrorist and who is not (Long, 1990).

Though so problematic, there have been efforts, especially in the international arena, by the United Nations (UN), to establish an internationally accepted definition. Unfortunately, even the efforts of UN since 1937 have not reached an agreement among the member states. The UN held 27 conventions to create an internationally acceptable definition of terrorism, but no consensus has been reached so far (UN, 2008).

There are many definitions, but in this dissertation only some definitions are mentioned in order to display the problem in greater depth. The definition this dissertation suggests will be created after analyzing the common characteristics of the existing definitions. The first definition is from Turkey since the study uses the Turkish terrorism experience as a case study and due to the long lasting terrorism experience the country has.

In Turkey, the anti-terrorism law defines terror as any kind of behavior which is defined as a crime and committed by one or more persons who belong to an organization that aims to;

- change the characteristics of the Republic which are stated in the Constitution;
- change the political, legal, secular, and economic structure of the state;
• destroy the unity of the state and the nation, or to abolish/endanger the state authority and/or to take over the authority; or
• abolish the fundamental rights and freedoms; and endanger the internal and external safety of the state, and public's safety and health (Emniyet Genel Mudurlugu, 2007).

The second definition comes from the United States (U.S.). In the U.S., terrorism is defined under Title 22 of the U.S. Code, Section 2656f(d). “The term ‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (FEMA, 2007).

Nevertheless, some U.S. departments have their own understanding of what terrorism is. For instance, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) defines terrorism as “the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological.” And, according to the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), terrorism is “the unlawful use of force against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in the furtherance of political or social objectives” (in McEntire, 2008, pp.26-27).

Other countries have their own definitions as well. For example, in England, the anti-terrorism law reads that "terrorism is the use of violence for political ends (including) any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public, or any section of the public in fear." In France, terrorism is defined as an act carried out
by individuals or groups to intimidate and terrorize or disrupt the public order (Yayla, 2005, p. 8). Another example, from Canada, defines terrorism as:

an act, either within or outside the national borders, which is defined as an offence mentioned under United Nations (UN) anti-terrorism conventions and protocols, or any offence conducted in order to achieve political, ideological or religious purposes through threatening the public’s safety, or compelling the government to do something by murders or damaging property or any service that will harm the people (Bill C-36, Canada).

The definitions made by various countries and their departments mainly reflect their own interests or values that they want to protect. For instance, the Turkish version strongly emphasizes the well being of the state and then its citizens against harm caused by one or more people with political aims. On the other hand, the U.S. version states that in order for an act to be considered as terrorism, it must contain political motivation and it must target noncombatant targets. Some agencies within the U.S. emphasize slightly varying values in their definitions of terrorism. The DOD sees terrorism as any act threatening governments to achieve political, religious, or ideological goals. The FBI mentions illegal acts aiming to achieve political or social objectives.

Regarding the definition of some countries, the British definition of terrorism is kept simple and short by just mentioning violence for the purpose of achieving political ends. Although it looks straight forward, the definition does cover any kind of violence for political ends which obviously targets the state and its citizens. The French version focuses on the public order and the states’ well-being like the Turkish version. The Canadian version is based on the definitions
used by UN in its anti-terrorism conventions and protocols. Thus, these countries define acts committed both in national and international arenas as terrorism as long as the act fits one of those defined as offense under the mentioned UN anti-terrorism laws and protocols.

The variation concerning terrorism definitions shows differences among scholars as well. For instance, Lodge (1982) sees terrorism as a tactic used by revolutionaries, insurgents or by the state to create fear and political alienation to acquire political goals. McEntire (2008, p. 3) defines terrorism as “the use or threat of violence to support ideological purposes.” Walter Reich (in Whittaker, 2003) argues that terrorism is a strategy to achieve some results through applying fear and intimidation in public. Walter Laqueur, on the other hand, sees it as efforts and illegal acts for political goal achievement through the targeting of innocent people. Brian Jenkins defines the goal of terror in a more general form: anything which uses force or the threat of the use of force which is directed in order to achieve political change (Whittaker, 2003).

Differences are also visible in the definitions provided by scholars. Lodge and Jenkins draw the attention to the fear created by some actors to achieve political goals. On the other hand, McEntire (2008) emphasizes the threat and violence aspect of terrorism for ideological goals while Reich talks about fear and intimidation, though making no differentiation about goals. Laqueur (in Whittaker, 2003) focuses on the illegality of the act and targeting innocent people, which does not make clear who is guilty in this case.
As can be seen, each scholar captures a very important aspect of terrorism, but they seem not to be able to settle on the same kind of act and/or goal orientation, which can lead them to similar sounding definitions of terrorism. Accordingly, a more in depth look into the common characteristics of terrorism might give an idea of what an acceptable definition for the world could be.

**Common Characteristics of Terrorism Definitions**

Schmid (1983) studied more than a hundred (109) definitions of terrorism to see the most common phrases or words used in the definitions. Since it is not possible to mention all the 109 definitions in here, this study only presents the findings of Schmid in order see what issues are emphasized in these definitions. It also provides a new definition with an addition from McEntire (2008).

In his study, Schmid (1983) extracted the words used to define terrorism and calculated their frequency. Schmid found out that the following definitional elements are very common (frequencies above 30%) in the various definitions of terrorism:

- Violence and force are the means terrorists use; it appears in 85% of the definitions
- Threat is another means used by terrorists to achieve their goals (47%)
- Political aim is the end result of the act (65%)
- Psychological effects and anticipated reactions (41.5%)
- Fear and terrorizing are sub-consequences (51%)
- Victims and other targets (37.5%)
On the other hand McEntire (2008) provides a definition almost concurrent with Schmid’s findings, but he mentions an additional element that should be part of a general acceptable definition: terrorism is an act that is performed by an individual, group or state that espouses an ideology.

**Definition of Terrorism**

This research provides a new definition of terrorism. It does that with the hope that it will find acceptance from more scholars and countries and boosts international cooperation against terrorism because it bears the common elements of the existing definitions. Eventually, this study argues that:

Terrorism is an act that: a) is performed by individuals, groups or states against citizens or governments, b) utilizes violence, force and creates fear, c) that results in psychological damage, produces victims and destroys targets, d) sends out messages to pre-determined audiences such as communities, states and/or supporters, e) to reach political, ideological, religious, and/or social goals.

Reaching a possible acceptable definition was quite complicated, and that signals how complex terrorism is and that it may occur in many types.

**Types of Terrorism**

There are various sorts of terror acts in the world. They can be categorized in several ways. For instance, terror acts are categorized in regard to the specific target chosen, to the extent of its structure, the arena it operates in (domestic or international) and according to the form of operational method the terrorist organization uses to reach its goals.
**Target Specific Terror Acts**

In the first group of categorization as *target specific terror acts*, which can be defined as terror acts focused on definite targets, terrorism is grouped as mass terror, dynastic assassination terror, random terror, focused terror, and tactical terror (Gross, 1990 as cited in McEntire, 2008, p. 29). *Mass terror* is the kind of terror act applied by governments against its own citizens. Saddam Hussein's use of poison to kill his own citizens can be described as mass terror. *Dynastic assassination* is terrorism targeting the highest official in the government. For instance, the assassination of President Lincoln fits in this category. *Random terror* has no specific target but any gathering, which is targeted to increase the death toll easily. The terror attacks at crowded locations, such as the train station and the bus stops in Spain in 2004, which resulted in the death of around 200 people, can be described as random terror. *Focused terror* has a clear target such as a specific group of people. For instance the Polish Underground terrorist group (established against German occupation in WW II) targeted only places where Nazi officers hang out. *Tactical terror* targets the government by using various tactical attacks to either achieve a revolution or another goal. The Oklahoma City bombing (Murrah Federal Building) can be defined as tactical terror (McEntire, 2008, p. 29).

**Domestic versus International Terrorism**

There is also a common understanding that terrorism can be categorized as: domestic and international terrorism (White, 2006). Domestic terrorism is the
type of terror act in which its own people carry out terror acts within that country. For instance, the nerve gas released in Japan on March 19, 1995 in a subway by a Japanese religious group called Aum Shinrikyo is an example for this kind of terrorist act (McEntire, 2008). On the contrary, international terrorism is the type of terror act that includes cooperation of different people from different countries (Ozeren, 2005; McEntire, 2008). For example, 9/11 is an example for international terrorism.

_Guerilla versus Asymmetric Warfare_

Terrorism can also be categorized as guerilla and asymmetric warfare based on the operational tactics they apply against their targets. The word guerilla means little war against occupying forces in Spanish. Guerilla type terror acts can be defined as acts that are carried out without long lasting confrontation with the enemy. In other words, they are hit and run type attacks. The attacks that some Iraqi’s carry out against the U.S. forces in Iraq, fall in this category. Asymmetric warfare can be defined as the battle between two unequal military forces. In other words, it includes the attacks from the militarily weaker side against the militarily stronger side (McEntire, 2008).

_Cyberterrorism_

Cyberterrorism is the form of terror acts that operate within the computer infrastructure and attacks its targets (e.g., government and other cites belonging to their enemies) to achieve their political goals (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2003; Ozeren, 2005). Terrorism has changed in recent years. The
change is related to both social and ideological factors, but also to the developments in technology. The term cyberterrorism was coined first by Barry Colin in 1990s (as cited in White, 2006). The weapons of the cyberterrorists are technological innovations (including viruses) that they can use in computer networking systems to harm the enemy to achieve their goal (White, 2006). The harm has impacts, especially at those phases where the virtual world intersects with the real world (e.g., crashing down a state website that provides services to its constituents). The other targets of cyberterrorists are the computers themselves, information storage and data retrieval systems (Grossman, 1999). However, cyberterrorism should not be seen as a completely separate terror act because computers may also be integrated into conventional attacks. Moreover it is a serious threat for which the world is not fully prepared yet (Ozeren, 2005; White, 2006).

Although terrorism is very complex and appears in many forms, it has one undeniable result; it causes great harm and damage. Its impact is certainly something that should not be overlooked in any case.

The Impacts of Terrorism

The harm caused by terrorism is sometimes massive and very long lasting (White, 2006). In fact, the suffering of the Turkish people from terrorism shows how cruel the impact can be (Rodoplu, Arnold and Ersoy, 2003). The impacts were mainly caused by leftist terror groups which uphold Marxist-Leninist ideologies to achieve a communist system. They argue for the proletarians
(workers) to seize the power. Leftist terror groups do not favor any of the bourgeois class, and aim to have the wealth distributed equally among the proletarian (as communism suggests). In addition, rightist terror groups that promote ideas that a certain religious or ethnic group is superior to others caused also much harm (Alkan, 2002). The Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) asserts that 757 terrorist attacks were reported in Turkey between 1968 and September 2003. According to the estimates, between 1970 and 2000, 30,000 to 35,000 Turkish citizens were killed by terrorists (Rodoplu et al., 2003).

In regard to the economic impact, Zalman (2008) categorizes them as short term and long term. The short term impact occurs when terrorism has some direct costs, both on production and products. The cost involved in production occurs through slowing down production, stopping production, or damaging the products. Terrorism, however, may also involve long term costs. These long term costs may include the costs for responding to and recovering from terrorist attacks (Zalman, 2008). For instance, besides the claimed innocent lives (which cannot be expressed with economic values because each one lost life meant the world to their loved ones) the economic losses to Turkey since 1984 are estimated to be at least $125 billion (Ozer, 2006). A more recent study (e.g., Yılmaz, 2008) estimates the economic cost is close to $400 billion. Whatever the amounts, they are increasing because these costs include the costs for the
counter terrorism policies (e.g., police and military operational costs) as well as assisting families whose lives were disrupted from terrorist attacks.

Especially in recent years, the Turkish government has increased financial support to those families who lost a member due to terrorist incidents. In other words, it pays restitution to them. This is an ongoing process, and in addition to that, some non-governmental agencies (NGOs) and government officials are providing consultation and medical support for those who were affected psychologically from such incidents. Therefore, it is not possible to determine when this kind of support can be ended because the threat still exists and, thus the need for restitution and treatment remains.

On the other hand, other countries have been impacted in similar ways from terrorist attacks. For instance, the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. claimed the lives of around 3,000 people (McEntire, 2008) and their direct economic cost was around $22 billion ($21.8 billion). The stock market did not function for around a week due to technical disruption caused by the attacks (Zalman, 2008). The losses of that week and the threat combined may reach massive dollar amounts. Other examples regarding the impact of terrorism can be seen in the attacks in Madrid/Spain 2004, in which 191 people were killed. After the attacks, bonds in this country lost value quickly, but luckily recovered one month after that. The terrorist bombings in London/UK in 2005 claimed the lives of 37 people, and it also affected the market negatively (Cooper, 2005).
Although the above given figures show how disruptive terrorism can be, table -1 has been provided to show other impacts. The table lists incidents, injuries and fatalities caused by terrorism in some African countries between 01/01/1968 - 03/06/2008.

Table 1

*Incidents, Injuries, and Fatalities Caused by Terrorism*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Incidents</th>
<th>Injuries</th>
<th>Fatalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>1726</td>
<td>1189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5196</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhodesia</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base (2008)

Consequently, terrorism keeps killing, harming and damaging our communities. The economic losses can reach billions of U.S. dollars. It also may claim additional innocent lives. The existence of such risks requires more
effective and realistic approaches to diminish terrorism, but initially they indicate the need of prevention of and intervention in terrorism as the initial steps.

Prevention and Intervention

The impact of terrorism clearly indicates the need of developing proper terrorism prevention policies. Prevention can be defined as taking the necessary precautions to avoid or to lessen the harm of a crime, or a possible crime, or an undesired action (Davis, LaTourrette, Mosher, Davis and Howell, 2003), and intervention is the process in which various efforts are displayed to reduced the harms of an existing threat.

Although it is not easy to intervene and prevent terrorist acts, prevention and intervention efforts should be in place because it can reduce the impact of terrorism on our lives and property. Thus, argues Arlikatti (2008), prevention should be seen as the vital component of avoiding or minimizing the impact of disasters, including man-made ones, like terrorism.

Prevention can be done both by individuals and governments. For instance, an individual can educate himself about terrorism to recognize terror threats in advance. Furthermore, citizens can protect themselves, by taking precautions against chemical, radiological, nuclear, and biological attacks (e.g., utilizing the shelter beneath their homes to prevent more harm in case of disasters-including man made) (Davis et al., 2003). The government can educate and setup early warnings signals to protect its citizens from such threats. Just like that, efforts could be in place to prevent possible terrorism threats. A person
can look out for suspicious activities within his/her community and then inform law enforcement agents as a part of prevention and intervention efforts. On the other hand, government prevention and intervention methods may include intelligence gathering; strict control of capital flow to avoid financial support to terrorist organizations; well maintained education systems that do not promote radicalism or an ideology; increasing border security; increasing public awareness and finally military operations and international cooperation. In addition, probably a good long term prevention and/or intervention method would be having policies that serve to stop people from joining terror groups.

Chapter Conclusion

Chapter I argued that terrorism has been on our agendas for a long time but the world has not been able to solve it yet. Individuals are an essential part of terror groups. Previous research provided many pieces of explanations concerning why individuals join terror group. However, they do not study the role of the perceived needs of individuals who are members of certain terror groups (rightist-other). In addition, none was able to provide the full picture; hence, the hierarchy of needs framework can be useful for seeing the full picture of reasons why individuals join terror groups.

Scholars, practitioners and policy makers need to keep in mind that terror organizations cannot be operational when they lack people. That is why practitioners need to find out what needs are motivating individuals to join terror groups. Such a finding will fill the gap in explaining the role of needs as a
motivating factor for individuals in joining a terror group. It will be especially useful in order to find and identify effective policies for providing individuals divergent ways to satisfy their perceived needs, and thus, reducing terrorism.

The remaining chapters are organized as follows: Chapter II introduces the macro explanations, and chapter III presents the micro explanations on terrorism and why individuals join terror groups. Chapter IV introduces Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs framework while chapter V discusses the terrorism experience of Turkey as the case study in the research. Chapter VI explains the methodology of the work, chapter VII presents the findings and chapter VIII presents the analyses of findings. Chapter IX presents the discussions, the research limitations and practical implications, and finally chapter X presents the conclusion of the study.
CHAPTER II

MACRO THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS ON THE CAUSES OF TERRORISM AND WHY INDIVIDUALS JOIN TERROR GROUPS

Introduction

Terrorism studies that focus on the reasons why there is terrorism or why individuals join terror groups can be categorized as macro (focus is on system and/or group) and micro (focus is on individuals) explanations. This chapter presents the macro theoretical explanations and the next chapter presents the micro explanations.

Familiarizing ourselves with such matters will abet policy makers to develop necessary policies to prevent people from becoming members of terrorist organizations, and thus eventually diminish terrorism. Delaying such an approach will cause nothing but more economic and life losses. The macro explanations include arguments related to: ideology, political causes (political system, political functions and political structure), cultural and religious causes, US foreign policy, historical grievances/vengeance and poverty. The chapter concludes with a section that includes remarks on why these explanations fail to explain all cases of why individuals join terror groups or why terrorism emerges.

Ideology

Ideology is a word created from the prefix idea and refers to a set of beliefs that are associated with values, behavior, a way of thinking, and goals
(Plamenatz, 1970 as cited in McEntire, 2008). Ideology is a force which is able to influence masses of people. Achieving ideological goals is the most important aspect of terrorism. According to Combs (2000), Aristotle, for the first time argued that tyrannical leaders do not deserve to be in power or even to be alive if they do not serve their people’s interest. Although, the term “terror” was not pronounced during Aristotle’s time, the action he suggested can be deemed as terror since it contained an ideological aspect.

These theoretical viewpoints often recommend specific political actions to achieve the desired condition. Similarly, a man named Destutt de Tracy in France argued that the King was not divinely selected and that the government neither represented nor served the people’s interest during late 1700s. That is when the word ideology appeared for the first time in the history, and the idea that ideology can be used for political reasons and that it even may lead to political change (McEntire, 2008). Ideology exists in all terrorist organizations. For instance, the PKK (Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan- Kurdish Workers’ Party) in Turkey aims to tear apart the country to establish a Kurdish state in accordance to Marxist-Leninist ideology (White, 2002). Hezbollah (in Turkey) is aiming to destroy the secular regime in Turkey and establish a state based on religious ideology (EGM, 2009). In addition, Florez-Morris (2007) was responded to by 23 former Columbian terrorists that they joined terror groups due to being inspired by Communism, ideas of liberation or by nationalist ideas, meaning that the subject Columbian terror organization’s ideology was based on communism.
Political Causes

(Politics - Political System - Political Functions - Political Structure)

Political causes of terrorism are related to politics, the political system itself, political functions and the political structure; and they may all have some relation to causing terrorism or why people join terror groups.

*Politics* means the distribution of values and resources in an appropriate manner to respective people and organizations in a society. In other words, it is politics that determines who should get what kind of authority and/or resources (Easton, 1953 as cited in McEntire, 2008). And, since values do differ from person to person and one person’s good government might be valued as bad government by another, conflict arises. In brief, values are debatable. For instance, democracy seems to be the best system developed so far to determine who should rule (ruling of the majority). In contrast, many argue that minorities’ rights should be secured and that they should have a say in the system as well, and that democracy is not perfect. This issue is so sensitive that even elections do not resolve the problem; because one perspective sees the election as means for a good government while another emphasizes citizen involvement as the cause for good government (McEntire, 2008).

As some scholars (Croizer, 1960; Hacker, 1976; Philips, 1999; Donelly, 2004; Crenshaw, 2001; Murshed and Gates, 2003; Borum, 2004) argue, an unjust approach and/or treatment may give some feelings of revenge or objection (may be also in the form of terrorism). The theory of relative deprivation (RD)
notes that people who feel they have been deprived of their rights might even create a collective type of violence including, but not limited to, revolutions, riots, terrorism etc (Russel and Miller, 1983). Somebody with a desire for revenge (due to an unjust application imposed on him) may use terrorist means to harm the wrong doer if one feels there is no other alternative for restitution (Anderson, 2005).

Unequal policies and their applications may cause trouble, and such applications occur in the short term and the long term. Short term inequalities are unequal applications that don’t last long; and long term unequal applications refers to long lasting differences between groups (Anderson, 2005). Long lasting injustices or inequalities increase the risk of terrorism in a society. If a group in a society experiences such long lasting problems such as lower political representation, lower economical opportunities or social services, then that society is apt to see terrorist acts from the affected group (Laqueur, 1999; Borum, 2004).

Also social disorganization theory focuses on the relationship between inequality and crime. The theory argues that the heterogeneity in race, ethnicity and residential mobility or in other words the failure of social formation and normlessness, lead to crime (Akers, 2000; Koseli, 2006). That is why communities lacking social capital fail to apply social order compared to communities with high social capital (Sampson and Wilson, 1995; Akers, 2000). Eventually, people join criminal groups, and it is the unwanted social conditions
that cause and pass on antisocial, criminal and delinquent traditions to new generations (Akers, 2000). This factor is an important cause for why people join terrorist groups in Turkey (Koseli, 2006).

Hence, inequality and/or injustice are one of the most important factors that create objections in a community (Croizer, 1960; Murshed and Gates, 2003; Sambanis, 2004; Donelly, 2004; Borum, 2004; A. Ekici, 2008) and this contains the risk of pushing people toward terrorism. These unjust and unequal conditions, according to some (e.g., Philips, 1999; Martin, 2003; Anderson, 2005), should not be understood as limited to wealth or class phenomenon because it also exists between ages, genders, races, or countries.

Political systems may be the cause of terrorism as well. Political systems operate within their own self-contained environments. This self-contained system may lead to terrorism if the system is not able to adjust or react according the preferences of its constituents, which in turn causes frustrations for them. These preferences can be tracked in the system, especially through the feedback loop (control mechanism that serves to meet the desired results, e.g., in policy implementation) that indicates how the public reacts in regard to a policy or implementation. If the feedback is negative, then the political system needs to make adjustments based on that feedback. If that is not considered, then the system may become the cause of terrorism (McEntire, 2008). For instance, it appears that government officials’ erroneous and rude behaviors toward a specific ethnicity may cause some individuals from that ethnicity either to join or
sympathize with a terror organization (A. Ekici, 2008). This indicates that the system either is not able to collect the feedback data or fails to understand its citizens’ expectations provided in the feedback loops. Therefore, citizens think that the law enforcement is against them and so they either join or sympathize with the alternative group (e.g., a terror group that claims to be fighting for their rights).

Political functions may lead to terrorism too. Political functions refer to the functioning of a government. A dis-functioning government may be related to the breeding of terrorism and conflict. For this purpose, Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman’s book, titled The Politics of Developing Areas, is a good starting point to understand the core functions of government. Almond and Coleman mention the four most important functions of the government for the regular operation of the political system. System requirements, include the elections, policy debates, and integration of parts such as political parties to work together. Input functions; refer to activities that influence priorities in a political system (e.g. political parties, agenda setting processes). Output functions, are the end results of the political systems (e.g., policy decisions), and finally maintenance, which refers to the feedback loop established to gather evaluations on policies and implementations from interest groups and constituents (McEntire, 2008). Eventually, understanding the role of a government can give us some idea of whether the governments’ role is associated with terrorism.
From what Almond and Coleman basically assert, we can assume that if these political functions do not put the citizens as the top priority and develop policies to fulfill citizens’ expectations, then some citizens may take initiative in their own hands and try other alternatives (e.g., criminal acts including terrorism) to fulfill their needs. For example, if there were no policies that mandate that all ethnic groups in the community are politically equal, some groups would feel excluded from the community and denied their citizenry privileges and thus may refer to violence to win their rights in their communities.

In order to explain how political functions or systems can cause terrorism, some scholars cite the strain/anomie theory. For instance, Eqbal (2002, as cited in Kule, 2007) argues that people apply terrorist acts if they have no other legitimate means to resolve the pressure on their groups from their community. In other words, Eqbal notes that some choose terrorist acts as a result of the wrong, unjust political or social treatment, or unequal distribution to the means for success and the lack of means to correct these errors. As Akers (2000) notes, it is the condition in which the legal regulations do not meet the values of the community, which is called societal malintegration. For example, if regulations impose religious values on a society that enjoys democratic values and freedoms, then it will cause problems. That is so because the imposed values are likely to be refused by the community, and thus integration becomes impossible. Similarly, Case and Sahliyeh (2008), in their study in which they look at whether the level of political freedom has any relation to the occurrence of
terrorism, found that active or passive limitations on political freedom can make some individuals resort to terrorism acts. That means that if individuals are prevented from using their rights to obtain their goals then they may choose terrorism to gain their rights by force.

The *political structure* is also used to explain the causes of terrorism. The political structure “refers to the organizational relationships within the political system” (McEntire, 2008, p. 48). There are at least four models of political structure that can be mentioned. First, the group *competition model* argues that interest groups compete or cooperate with each other in order to have the government policies passed according to their desires. The U.S. is a good example for this category. Second, the *economic class model* emphasizes the division in society based on the distribution of wealth among citizens (e.g. upper, middle, lower classes), the U.S. and Latin American countries seem to fit in this category. The third model is the *political elite model*, which refers to a system in which an elite group rules over the masses. Iraq, when under the ruling of Saddam Hussein, can be placed in this category. Finally, fourth, the *corporatist model*, defines a system in which the government strives for the integration of various parts of the society into the governing process. Citizen involvement is emphasized. These parts of the society include but are not limited to, businesses, churches, clubs, non-governmental agencies and others (McEntire, 2008).
The political structure argues that if a group in a competition or economic model thinks that the system is not able to meet its needs, or feels that is being exploited by another group, then they might engage in violence or terrorism. On the contrary, in the political elite and corporatist models either the governments sponsor terrorist acts against its citizens or the citizens carry out terrorist activities against their governments to change the distribution of resources in their favor (McEntire, 2008). It is important to note that similar findings were marked in the studies of Eqbal (2002, as cited in Kule, 2007), and (Case and Sahliyeh, 2008). Eventually, they all suggest that if somehow the political system, or one of its components, fails to meet the expectations of the people, or prohibits the freedom of the people to acquire their goals, then terrorism is likely to be experienced in that community since they have no other approach left to overcome the burden.

Cultural and Religious Causes

Although terrorism is not unique to any religion, region or people, culture and religion are considered to be one of the main factors causing terrorism. Culture is the shared values such as the lifestyle, history, language, religion, and moral system of a community. Religion is the belief, including its practices, in the shared spiritual faith seen in individuals or communities. There are vast amounts of arguments asserting that culture and religion are associated with terrorism (McEntire, 2008).
The cultural aspect of terrorism is discussed in particular by Samuel Huntington in his famous study, *The Clash of Civilizations (1993)*. He asserts that conflicts are going to evolve and spread due to the differences in cultures and their clashes during the post Cold War period. He develops his argument for the future by providing examples from historical clashes. He bases the causes of previous clashes on nations’/kings’ desire to hold and/or gain power, safety or wealth, sovereignty and larger territory, as well as the promotion of democracy and other systems, such as communism, around the world. Ultimately, Huntington vehemently argues that the existence of various civilizations in the world, and the economical and militarily difference in countries espousing these cultures, may lead some countries to counter western cultures (such as the U.S.) because they promote individualism, freedom, human rights and democracy.

Also, John Hume (1998 Nobel Prize winner and Northern Ireland politician) draws the attention to various differences between people as the causes of terrorism. Among these he lists differences in religion, nationality, or race. But he also clarifies that these differences are natural and that anybody could be from the other religion, race, or nationality naturally. Thus, differences should be accepted and respected to avoid conflict (Jai, 2001). The markings of Hume are essential in resolving conflict among different cultures. In other words, people from different cultures and countries should understand that some of the individual’s identifying characteristics come from their birth (e.g., culture, country etc).
However, Huntington’s, and similar thinking scholars’, perspective receives serious criticism. Scholars such as John Esposito and Daniel Pipes disagree with Huntington’s argument for the clashes of civilizations. For instance, although Huntington does mention that civilization has more components than religion, probably due to his emphasis on religion, Esposito criticizes Huntington’s claims from two aspects: first, culture and/or civilization do not consist of religion only. Many other factors such as language, history, geography, ethnic factors and social structure are important parts of civilization and/or culture. Thus, it is not possible to talk about clashes of civilizations based just on religious differences. Second, Esposito argues, Islam exists in a very diverse form in the world. There is not only one style of application or understanding of Islam in the world through which one can conclude that Islam opposes western cultures, it is only some portion of this religion that opposes western civilization. To a large extent also another scholar, Pipes, opposes Huntington’s arguments and expands the latter view of Esposito. He argues that the clash is not between civilizations but within Islam itself. The great majority of Muslims seek modernity, but it is the extremist part that causes problems. Modern Muslims also fight those extremists (White, 2006).

Although he agrees somewhat with Huntington, Barnett (2004) looks in the clashes of civilizations from another perspective. Barnett suggests that clashes are in the field of economics, not among whole civilizations. Thus, if a global economy could be established it would end poverty, which eventually would
serve as the founding factor of an international political and financial order. In other words, if the economies (countries) that feel excluded from the global economy could be integrated, then people who use the arguments that the west excludes them would have no ground to motivate people with religious motives to see the west as the enemy.

On the other hand, Kapucu (2007) totally disagrees with Huntington’s claims that there are clashes among civilizations. In his study, he provides examples from actual terrorist attacks around the world which appear to be merely taking place in the areas where non-western civilizations exist. Based on these case studies, he concludes that the clashes, as Huntington claims, are not among different civilizations but rather between different cultures within the same civilization. From one perspective, Kapucu empirically proves the claims of Pipes (in White, 2006), but he does that in regard to terrorism cases which did not include other possible clashes (e.g., economics, politics etc).

Yet, probably one of the most prominent explanations for the cause of terrorism is religion. In fact, in the earlier studies religion was used predominantly to explain terrorism (Carter, 1982; Wilson, 2004; White, 2006; Florez-Morris, 2007). Nowadays terrorists use its rhetoric power (Rogers et al., 2007). Religion is used as a scapegoat by terrorists to prevent anxiety and depression (Weisbach, 2004). Similar developments have been seen in many faiths but particularly in the Christian, Jewish and Muslim faiths. However, “the Holy Qur’an is surely one of world’s most misused books” (Wikan, 2001 p. 126).
Religious terrorism is different when compared with political terrorism because religious terrorism is argued to contain the values that are opposites of secular terrorism. Secular terrorism continues its efforts to replace the system that suppresses them, but religious terrorism sees the world as the place in which the light and darkness are in constant battle. Thus, the enemy must be destroyed; just winning is not the option they want. Such an understanding is particularly created by militants through the conversion and interpretation of faith in a manner that will justify their acts and gain more support (Hoffman, 1995 as cited in White, 2006).

Throughout history, terrorist attacks were being carried out in the name of religion. In regard to Christianity, for instance, the problem between the Catholics and the Protestants in Ireland is quite known in the world. Frequently, both sides have referred to religion to justify their attacks. For both sides, religion was a strong mean to generate support for their acts (White, 2002), either for an independent Ireland or to continue a national association with Great Britain (McEntire, 2008).

Some extreme beliefs may lead to terrorism and conflict as well, because the terror group may see themselves as superior to other races and some may even refuse to accept other races as human. For instance, as White (2002) explains, there are specific groups such as the Aryan Nations, Posse Comitatus, and the American Institute of Theology (also named as Identity Christians, who believe that the white race is superior to other races). According to these warped
Christian beliefs of these groups, there are two sources from which human beings originate: the first source is as direct descendants from God (claims whites are from this source) while Jews are believed to descend from a sexual relation between the devil and the first white women that existed. In addition, they believe that non-white races evolved from animals and are recognized as sub-humans. These Christians also believe that the Bible is there only for the white people.

The Jewish faith also has been associated with terrorist acts. For instance, a Rabbi, Meier Kahane (an American cleric) founded the Jewish Defense League because he felt offended by the violence against Jews in Israel. He wanted to use the organization he created to secure the existence of Israel. To justify his acts and keep his followers, he argued that a contract was made between God and Abraham to secure the biblical lands. His followers carried out terrorist attacks in the U.S. during 1960s. After the assassination of Rabbi Kahane, his son founded a new organization and, in 1994, a member of that organization killed 12 Muslims in a mosque (McEntire, 2008). Another example is from the Jewish group called Bloc of the Faithful (p. 3). They were a very religious group who attempted to destroy the Dome of the Rock Mosque in Jerusalem through a terror attack (Wilson, 2004), based on their understanding that the region belongs to Jews.

Because of extremists, Islam is often associated with terrorism. Most extremists or fundamentalists are from Wahhabism. Wahhabism seeks purity as
defined in Islam. For instance, extremists such as Osama bin Laden manipulate
the Holy Scriptures in the Qur’an to influence their followers and to carry out their
attacks on targets they determine to be evil. A powerful tool they use is the call
for jihad. Extremists interpret jihad as if it means killing all non-believers and
infidels. They try to convince their followers to act together and attack the targets
put in front of them. But jihad actually means “an internal struggle, to pursue
righteousness or a war of self defense” (McEntire, 2008, p. 52; Smith, 2009).
Islam prohibits suicide, the killing of innocents or the killing of fellow Muslims.
That is why radical extremists justify terrorist attacks as. *Iftishad* means
becoming a martyr in the name of faith. So, in other words, they claim that those
who carry out a suicide attack or any other attack, in which they die to kill their
enemies, will become a martyr because that is a self sacrifice in the service of
faith (Post, as cited in McKeeby, 2008). They do such teachings while not
disclosing that the killings are just murders and cannot be identified as a part of
jihad or martyrdom as Islam defines. They neither state that Islam views killing an
innocent similar to killing all human beings, and thus condemns it. On the other
hand, Pipes feels that associating Islam with terrorism and calling it Islamic
terrorism offends Muslims. They feel that western media does that only to
Muslims, but never associates terrorism with other religions (White, 2006; Smith,
2009). For instance, they do not associate it with Christians or Jews and call it
Christian terrorism or Jewish terrorism.
Religious motives are also important factors that lead children to join terror groups. The extremists in Islam especially use religion to motivate children by stating that their sins will be forgiven, and that they will be sent to paradise if they become martyr. The existence of this culture both in the family and in the society makes the children ready for any behavior that will be favored by his family and the society (Singer, 2006). Post argues:

...children are indoctrinated with a message of hatred, either from community leaders or religious radicals whose interpretations of scripture are rejected by the vast majority of the population (as cited in McKeeby, 2008).

There are some common characteristics in the above cases. First, in each one of them, religion is the most powerful tool that is used to justify terrorist acts. Second, religion is the tool that is used by the same people both to recruit people and to carry out their attacks in the name of God. Third, alteration or biased interpretation of sacred scriptures and hiding the facts is very common method used to serve the expectations of the terrorist organization and its leaders. Fourth, there are no attempts in the terror organizations to educate their followers on the actual messages their religion conveys. Based on such indications about the assumed role of religion, it is necessary that people are provided proper religious education that does not promote any kind of radicalism or any specific ideology. This is important because once religion is on stage then many people show respect and obedience. In fact, respect and obedience is what terrorist groups or criminal minds strive for from their followers. When terror groups
realize that their target groups lack proper religious education, they will attempt to control them through using altered religious scriptures.

U.S. Foreign Policy

U.S. foreign policy is used to explain the engagement of some people with terrorism as well. It is emphasized that the foreign policies of the U.S. led to the terrorist attacks within U.S. soils. For instance, Osama Bin Laden explicated certain reasons as justification for their attacks in the U.S. He claims, the U.S. (1) does not understand the actual desires and the history of Middle East; (2) supports colonialism through many bases in other countries; (3) creates and supports puppet governments (e.g. Saddam was supported first and later announced as a brutal leader); (4) founded Israel and created conflicts that continue in Middle East by remaining supportive to Israel but ignoring other nations in the Middle East; (5) ignores and violates human rights in regard to Palestinians and sends troops to the sacred land in the Middle East (McEntire, 2008 p. 44).

Foreign policy seems to be counter acted with terrorism if one side feels that the other country is imposing unfair and unacceptable foreign policies within their country or in the region that also affects their well being. Therefore, based on the previous claims, terrorism may be used if the opponent lacks other efficient means (e.g., diplomacy, economic power, powerful army) to fight the other country.
Historical Grievances/Vengeance

Historical grievance is also an important factor used to explain why people engage in terrorism (Ross, 1993; Addison, Murshed, M. S. 2001; De-Indra, 2002). The historical grievances perspective argues that previous small conflicts between different groups grow in time and generate complaints that turn into the current terrorism problems the world experiences (McEntire, 2008). However, grievances may be social, political, religious, ethnic, and even economic (Ross, 1993).

Sufficient evidence backs up this claim. In the Middle East, the problems between Arabs and Jews alone are a strong verification of this argument. The problems emerged after the establishment of Israel in the Middle East. In addition, the wars between the Crusades and the Muslims provide support to the historical grievances claim. In this case, the Christians, through Crusades and with the endorsement of the Pope, were trying to spread their beliefs and recapture the Holy Land of Jerusalem from Muslims. During these wars Crusaders showed great intolerance and cruelty and that was opposed by Muslims (McEntire, 2008). These historical conflicts remain in the minds of the community and worsen with any other problem that is experienced between the same groups.

If people with grievances cannot get political power, they may apply terrorism since they feel they do not have any other resort. In other words, they feel that there has been and still are problems in the society, and that the
authorities disregard the problems that affect them. Therefore, terrorism seems to be their only solution to overcome the problems (Addison, Le Billon and Murshed, M. S. 2002; De-Indra, 2002; Gutierrez, 2002; Young, 2003; Borum, 2004).

Poverty

Poverty is another common causal explanation for terrorism and many scholars (e.g., Bohm, 1985; Akers, 2000; Sampson and Wilson, 1995; Collier and Hoeffler, 2001; Rodoplu et al., 2003; Sambanis, 2004; Koseli, 2006; Florez-Morris, 2007; McEntire, 2008) have studied the relation between poverty and crime or terrorism. Poverty appears in two forms, absolute poverty and relative poverty. Absolute poverty is the condition in which people lack their basic needs such as food and shelter. Contrary to absolute poverty, relative poverty defines a condition which is more common and is the condition in which some citizens are economically weaker than the other citizens (McEntire, 2008). The engagement of poor people that resort to crime or terrorism is explained by their frustration with their poor conditions and the desire to improve them. Eventually, this frustration, it is argued, leads to joining terror groups or other violent groups (Florez-Morris, 2007).

The Marxist theory explains the cause of poverty and how it may lead people to engage in terrorism or violence. Marxist theory asserts that consistent differences in social status eventually raise the demand for political change because it creates degrading conditions among the workers (Murshed and
Gates, 2003). Croizer (1960) and Donnelly (2004) explain this notion as following; differences among classes nourish terrorism due to complaints about the systems that created the differences in social statuses. Briefly, Marxist theory affirms that crime and terrorism are results of the capitalist organization of a society because it creates competition in making profit and that competition creates conditions contributing to crime by leaving some poor and needy (Bohm, 1985). Also, Desmond Tutu (1984 Nobel Prize winner and Anglican bishop from South Africa) maintains that circumstances such as poverty, in addition to other factors, can fill people with resentment and despair to the point of desperation (Jai, 2001).

In fact, it is not only scholars who emphasize and believe that poverty is associated with terrorism, but also the former president of the U.S., George W. Bush (2002) maintains that as the government they should fight terrorism by fighting poverty. He states that they do so hoping to prevent terrorism, due to the common belief that there is an association between poverty and terrorism. Some studies are in accordance with such claims. For instance, Stern (2000), Berman (2002) and Florez-Morris (2007) found that the recruits of terrorist organizations come mainly from poor economical backgrounds. Especially, Florez-Morris found in his study that the majority of the members of Columbian terror groups he studied joined the terror group because of bad economical conditions. Such findings support the arguments that poverty causes terrorism.
Apparently, higher income results in lower political violence. Therefore, income per capita and the size of the population both have significant association with the political violence. People should be given the opportunity to participate in politics through institutions to which conflict can be channeled and the risk of political violence can be reduced, in addition to providing the means for higher income and educational opportunities (Sambanis, 2004).

On the contrary, some studies claim the opposite in regard to the relation between poverty and crime/terrorism engagement. For instance, Atran (2003) comments that the suicide attacks in the Middle East cannot be explained with economic or educational conditions. In other words, individuals do not commit suicide attacks due to poverty. Similarly, Bechdolt (1975) and Bourge (2002) do not see poverty as the terrorism-increasing factor in underdeveloped countries either.

Also, Jefferson and Pryor's (1999) findings support the idea that there is no significant relation between poverty and violence. They studied whether the existence of violent groups such as the Neo Nazi, Klu Klux Klan and Skin Head groups in the U.S. came into existence in locations where poverty existed. In their findings, the income per capita variable appeared to be insignificant for these groups coming into existence. On the contrary, history, and some advantageous circumstances, seemed to be significantly related with the existence of these violent groups.
Studies on the relation between poverty and crime continue with only a slight specification on the crime itself through the efforts of scholars such as Krueger and Maleckova (2002). Krueger and Maleckova looked into the relation between poverty and individuals participating in political violence. Their study clearly was built upon the study of Jefferson and Pryor (1999). Krueger and Maleckova assumed that there is no association between economic status and engagement with political violence. The terror organization they studied was Hezbollah and the data came from public opinion polls collected from people at West Bank and the Gaza Strip during December 2001. Their study looked for how much the people in these locations favor the attacks against Israel and what the determinants were in regard to the individual's engagement with Lebanese Hezbollah. In addition, they also analyzed data about Jews who got involved in terrorist acts in 1980s. Eventually, they did not find any significant positive relation between terrorism and poverty.

Finally, Berrebi (2003) looked into the relation between desperation, due to poverty, and engagement in terrorist activities. Berrebi utilized secondary data collected from the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hamas members. The study aimed to find out what factors played significant roles in choosing to serve the terrorist organization as a suicide bomber. As result, the study showed that there was no significance between poverty and engagement with terrorism acts (in Berrebi’s case, choosing to become a suicide bomber).
Chapter Conclusion

Chapter II introduced and discussed the macro explanations in relation to why there is terrorism and why people join terror groups. Although previous macro explanations provide invaluable insights, they do not fully explain the causes of terrorism and why people join terror groups. The studies mentioned above provide at times necessary, but insufficient factors. The studies lack the perspective that the macro explanations they focus on may be important for some individuals while they may be less important to others.

The macro explanations (ideology, political causes, cultural and religious factors, U.S. foreign policy, historical grievances and poverty) are all necessary, but insufficient for explaining all terrorism cases and factors causing individuals to join terror groups. Just looking at the facts around us can support this argument. To illustrate, although some may join terror groups or engage with terrorism due to the mentioned reasons, not everybody does that. Not all people with an ideology or who are dissatisfied with politics (including the US politics), and not all from other cultures or religious people choose joining a terrorist group. Not even all religious extremists or all individuals with a grievance or all those who are poor have joined terror groups. Thus, it is necessary to also look into the micro explanations about why there is terrorism and why individuals join terror groups.
CHAPTER III
MICRO THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS ON THE CAUSES OF TERRORISM
AND WHY INDIVIDUALS JOIN TERROR GROUPS

Introduction

Chapter III presents the micro theoretical explanations from previous studies on why terrorism occurs and/or why individuals join terrorist organizations. The micro explanations include arguments related to: identity/belongingness, active socialization, weak family ties, lack of education, rational choice, and terrorist personality and psychology. The chapter concludes with a section that evaluates these explanations and discusses whether they were successful in regard to explaining why individuals join terror groups. The research further notes that, although preceding studies did not use the term need, they provide scattered factors and/or findings which indicate that needs are the underlying reason for individuals to join terror groups.

Identity/Belongingness

Identity/belongingness seems to be associated with terrorism. Identity is important because an individual uses it to identify himself and to seek membership with a group or organization he/she thinks fits his/her identity. In other words, individual’s identity defines to what group the individual belongs to. After membership to a group the persons' individuality ends. In other words, the individual does not need any individuality or uniqueness anymore. The person
feels that he/she is identical with the group he/she is engaged with (Crenshaw, 2001). Freedom of expression can be assessed from this perspective as well. McCormick (2003) and Eqbal (2002, as cited in Kule, 2007) mention freedom of expression as an important component of group identity. The need of freely expressing oneself is in fact identification of one self with others.

The failure to give such a freedom may cause political violence. For instance, neglected group identity may develop in time and if it cannot express itself freely, it may cause terrorism in a society (Post, as cited in McKeeby, 2007). Similarly, Elie Wiesel (1986 Nobel Prize winner) notes that, "the roots of terrorism nest in fanaticism, hatred, and the will to live in ignorance...“(Jai, 2001). Both Wiesel's and Post's arguments clearly indicate the need of recognition and acceptance in the society and that ignoring people from a specific ethnicity/identity may lead to terrorism. McCormick (2003) defines these people as expressionists. Both McCormick and Eqbal (2002, as cited in Kule, 2007) conclude that, these people will express themselves in violent ways if they lack legal means for achieving their goals.

The feeling of belonging should not be ignored; in fact it goes hand in hand with identity. As some scholars suggest (e.g., Luckabaugh, R. Fuqua, Cangemi and Kowalski, 1997; Arboleda-Florez, 2007), that belonging is an important factor for individuals’ engagement with terror organizations. Belonging is felt strongly by individuals who are at the margins of the community (not in or out of the society, on the edge). Eventually, although not based on any data
analyses, in his study on the psychological status of terrorists, Post (1984) argues that the feeling of being alienated leads individuals to join a terrorist organization for the sake of developing a sense of belonging to a group after a long time of rejection from their society.

There is a process where an individual joins with extremist groups such as terrorist organizations. The engagement is established firstly based on family ties, and social bonds with other members within the terrorist organization. Eventually, the terrorist organization easily becomes the extended family of the individual (Post, 1984; Aho, 1990; A. Ekici, 2008). But there is some difference in regard to the process when comparing leftist to separatist or ethnic based terrorist organizations. Organizations that have been established based on ethnic identities recruit new members easily through bringing existing family members into the organization, while the leftist terror organizations have more difficulty because they need to seek people who accept their ideology for recruitment purposes (Aho, 1990).

A similar finding that mentions the role of family members in terrorist organization recruitment processes comes from Sageman (2004). Sageman looked into the process to find factor that caused people join different terrorist organization networks. Among the network groups he looked into are: Osama bin Laden’s Central Staff, Maghreb Arabs, Core Arabs, and finally, the group called Southeast Asians. One hundred fifty subjects (members of these networks) were studied and the findings were quite striking. A majority of the subjects joined
terror groups due to people they considered friends. For instance, around 70% argued that they got into the network through their friends within the network, and 20% stated that they got involved in the network due to their family members within the network. Only 10% mentioned discipleship as their reason for engagement with one of the four mentioned networks.

Active Socialization

Active socialization is another factor used during the recruitment of new people for terrorist organizations. During this process, people engage with terrorists and/or their organizations and learn their behaviors. Socialization may take place anywhere such as in schools, social clubs and prisons (Aktan and Koknar, 2002), and is aided by their peers, relatives, family members, friends, television, internet, etc (Pedahzur, 2005; Aho, 1990; Weimann, 2006; Florez-Morris, 2007; Kule, 2007).

Abuza (2006) defines factors causing people to join terror groups or possibly other criminal groups in two categories, push and pull factors. Individuals either are obliged (push factors) or attracted (pull factors) to join some groups and socialize with them. Some push factors are the economic, social, cultural matters that people lack in their lives (Baccaglini, 1993; Decker and Van Winkle, 1996), and the purpose of protection from other’s threats. In addition, belonging to an ignored minority group, or the feeling of marginality and seeking socialization are other push factors (Vigil and Long, 1990). In this condition,
circumstances of some individuals require them to join after that they socialize with the people who may be members of terror groups.

On the other hand, pull factors (such as friends, family members and kinship) drive the individual to join and socialize with other people. After the individual is pulled in the group, he/she receives education in various environments (e.g., schools, student association, and religious facilities). Then, the individual socializes with the current members of the terrorist organization again through the same friends, family members, and kinship that pulled them into the organization (Shaw, 1986; Abuza, 2006). This is especially valid for the Jemaah Islamiyah (Abuza, 2006).

The learning process during active socialization is explained by differential association and social learning theories. They both are learning theories and there is not much difference in their assumptions. Differential association theory argues that socialization has both normative and behavioral interaction aspects. The first dimension is the condition in which the individual is exposed to values and norms through association. The latter dimension refers to conditions in which the individual directly or indirectly associates with others who engage in certain types of behaviors. Accordingly, in the first dimension there is the exposure factor while the second dimension indicates a direct engagement. On the other hand, social learning theory purports that behaviors (legal or illegal) can be learned through involvement with others (Akers, 2000). Basically, both theories indicate that people socialize in their environments and learn these behaviors and, if they
approve of such behaviors (e.g., violence for achievement of a goal), then they join terrorist organizations.

Other studies by Teymur (2007) and A. Ekici (2008) on terrorist groups in Turkey also indicate that terrorist organizations commonly recruit new members through the family and friends of members within their organization. Both scholars note that the friends factor is used for recruitment. Therefore, it seems that it is quite common that an individual first associates with a terror group through their existing friends or family ties within that group, learns the organization, and then joins it. This notion on socialization and joining a terror group seems to find support in some studies on terrorism and children as well.

Weak Family Ties

Children are more likely to engage in crime, including terrorism, if their ties with their families or loved ones have become weak. It appears that parent-child conflict is the major contributing factor that makes children vulnerable to crime or open to engaging in crime through heading to streets. Yet family remains the best mean to keep children safe (S. Ekici, 2005). The findings of S. Ekici, signal that children can become criminals easily when ties with families or loved ones become weak. More frightening is that, even though it might appear to be unthinkable, many children go beyond regular criminal activities and join terror groups! The institutions where the children spend time and interact with others are places for active socialization. These environments are used by terrorist
organizations to recruit new members through friendship with current members in the institutions.

Children in these institutions are exposed to the values that the terrorist organizations favor, and they are fed with knowledge that will serve the expectations of the organization. For example they teach children that their enemies are westerners, their government officials, and that it is the government that does not provide freedom or other rights. In addition, children are taught the shaming factor. Children are taught to uphold their pride and honor and avoid shaming. In this way, children are convinced easily by the terror group’s claims that somebody or some country had dishonored his people and should be punished (Singer, 2006). Then, the child seeks retaliation and can be directed to cause harm, as planned for a terrorist act.

The facts are actually more shocking if one looks into the age when some children become terrorists. For instance, the youngest reported terrorist is a Columbian boy who was 9 at the time of the incident. Another shocking fact is that a child at the age of 14, who was deployed as a sniper, did the first recorded killing of an ally soldier in Afghanistan. Furthermore, according to estimates there are approximately 300,000 children (Singer, 2006) within all the terrorist organizations in the whole world. Both male and female (all below age of 18) are counted in the given estimate, and 75% of these children serve as combatants in the world’s most unstable areas. Examples of children who got involved in violent acts include the 13 year old sisters in Morocco who were arrested before they
attempted to carry out a suicide bombing targeting a business building owned by westerners. Unfortunately, many terrorist organizations (e.g., Columbian National Liberation Army, Real IRA in Ireland, and the LTTE in Sri Lanka) do have children as their members, including the terrorist organizations with extreme religious ideologies (Singer, 2006).

The theory of low-self control elucidates why children might be socializing with such people or institutions that turn them into terrorists. The theory was developed by Michael Gottfredson and Travis Hirshi in 1990. Gottfredson and Hirshi assert that their theory explains all criminal behaviors at all ages. Individuals with high self-control are less likely to commit crime. On the other hand, those with low-self control are more likely to engage in crime. Low self-control is the result of “ineffective or incomplete socialization, especially ineffective child rearing” (Akers, 2000 p. 110).

Parents who are too attached to their children tend to closely monitor them and apply frequent punishment for their deviant behaviors. And that actually makes the children develop low-self control more easily because children are given less opportunity to act and/or decide by themselves and they are imposed upon by constant fear of punishment. In the end, the family is the main environment where the child develops low self-control. But people with low-self control engage in crime only when the circumstances are appropriate or available, otherwise they may remain crimeless during their childhood, adolescent times, and even adulthood. Thus, low self-control produces crime
when the circumstances are available. However, Gottfredson and Hirshi do not clarify whether it is the lack of or existence of external means that make low self-control produce crime (Akers, 2000).

Lack of Education

There are arguments that terrorism is likely to find root among uneducated people. Hence, individuals with lack of education are viewed as potential candidates for recruitment by terror groups (Yilmaz, 2008), and Basibuyuk (2008) notes in his study about terror incident in Turkey that highly educated communities tend to experience less terrorism with a high significance. Merton (1938) is one of the first scholars who draw the attention to the relation between crime (terrorism in this case) and education. Merton argues that education is an important tool that provides means for individuals to increase their chances for better job opportunities and life standards. In other words, lack of education lowers the chances of getting a good job and a better life. Therefore, such individuals are not able to engage with legal means to attain their needs and they employ illegal means such as political violence to accomplish their goals.

People with higher education play a significant role in diminishing the probability of the emergence of hate groups in their neighborhoods (Jefferson and Pryor, 1999). Moreover, individuals who attain higher education reduce their own risk of engaging with crime (Collier and Hoeffler, 2001). More support for the claims about the negative correlation between higher education and individuals’ engagement with crime comes from Sambanis (2004). Sambanis looked into the
relation between political violence and education in the same study where he also studied the relation between poverty, inequality and political violence. Similar to Basibuyuk’s (2008) finding, Sambanis revealed that highly educated people prefer to participate in legal political matters to solve their problems instead of engaging in political violence. On the other hand, claims about the positive impact of education on reducing engagement in crime or political violence receive their share of criticism. Such claims argue that education does not reduce terrorism.

The positive effect of education on the prevention of delinquency is overestimated because individual’s behavioral patterns are already formed before they reach the school age (Bloch, 1957). In addition to Bloch, O’Neill (2002) questions, why is it that the leaders in many terrorist organizations are well-educated people? In other words, if education attainment has positive effects on preventing individuals engaging with crime, how is it possible that there are terrorist leaders with very high education?

On the other hand, Krueger and Maleckova (2002) found contrasting results with the claims of Merton (1938), Collier and Hoeffler (2001), Jefferson and Pryor (1999) and Sambanis (2004). Krueger and Maleckova could not find any significant relation between education and political violence. In their study they focused on the Hezbollah activities for the period of late 1980s to early 1990s. The same study also analyzed the activities of 27 Israelis who were involved in terror activities (assassination and bombings) against Palestinian
mayors, and found that they were well educated. Although, they did not find any negative significance between schooling and involvement in political violence, Paxson (2002) suggests that schooling can diminish the number of people who accept to become suicide bombers and that Krueger and Maleckova’s study is a specific study that only explains the situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Regarding the relation between education and terrorism, most scholars seem to have overlooked the importance of the content of the education. Whether education decreases terrorism or not is important, but scholars (from both sides) should also discuss the sort of the education individuals should receive to make them stay away from terrorism. Individuals can be made lenient toward terrorism through constant education that tells them that terrorism is the only alternative to protect their people or their rights. On the contrary, individuals can also be given constant messages about how harmful terror acts can be, and that it is a threat to humanity. Briefly, the content of education is important in this matter, and is likely to reflect in the behavior of many.

Rational Choice

There are studies (Crenshaw, 2002; McCormick, 2003; Dugan, LaFree and Piguero, 2005; Rubbelke, 2005) which cite rational choice theory to explain why individuals join terror groups or why there is terrorism. According to the rational choice theory, terrorism is chosen as the better alternative to achieve the political goal and/or increase the benefit. In other words, becoming a terrorist is not an unintended result but rather a chosen one.
Terrorists are lucid and rational people who have chosen terrorism to reach political goals which they cannot reach by conventional means (Ruby, 2002). An individual will engage and remain supporting a terrorist organization until his/her costs (e.g., risking their families, being abandoned by friends, etc) reaches the maximum benefits he/she gets from the organization. In other words, rational individuals are likely to support terrorism as long as the profit is higher than the cost (Rubbelke, 2005). From a psychological perspective, even people who choose to become suicide bombers do that because they believe that they will profit from their action in the afterlife (become martyr and be placed in Heaven) and/or their family will be granted high profits after their death (Silke, 2003; Arboleda-Florez, 2007).

Claims about rationally joining terror groups or choosing terrorism are criticized as well. Contrary to these arguments, Crenshaw (1998b) states that profit based rationality in terrorism is wrong because the costs (e.g., injury, death, capture) of supporting terrorism or joining a terrorist organization can easily surpass the benefit. Thus, although it may look to be providing higher profit, it is not rational to join terror groups (as cited in Rogers et al., 2007).

In addition, other scholars explain why these people may think that joining terror groups or choosing terrorism is the best rational choice, one of which is made by Bandura (1998). Bandura, a social psychologist, argues that people engage in violent crimes because they rationalize their behaviors through:
(a) Moral justification and finding their own explanations (viewing the violent act as necessary).

(b) Attribution of responsibility (holding their targets or others responsible for their acts) For instance, a terrorist may argue that government pressure causes the violence.

(c) Ignoring the consequences (making the consequences less visible, then it is easier to hurt). For example, superiors are often away from active operation areas. They do not witness the results or the killings due to their orders, thus they are less affected).

(d) Dehumanization of the targets (terrorists kill more easily if they do not see their victims as human beings).

However, Simon (1979) totally refuses the idea that individuals can make fully rational decisions. Simon’s bounded rationality theory is a reaction to the classical rational theory of decision making. According to Simon, rational decision making argues that individuals (economic man), can collect all the information. Then, he can assess it, see the alternatives and which consequences are most benefiting, and then order the alternatives in a hierarchical way (determining and using the proper means to reach goals) according to which best provides the desired result. But he argues that a 100% rational decision making does not exist, and that there are limits to rational decision making.

The reality concerning the decision making process speaks about the administrative man (Simon’s introduction) and the initiations embedded in the
decision premises. Administrative man has limited cognitive skills, is not able to collect
coll all the information needed for decision making, and even if he could, he
cannot process all the information to foresee all the consequences of the existing
alternatives. Thus, the administrative man makes his decisions in a limited
environment (bounded rationality) and so we cannot claim that there is a pure
rational decision making premise, because it is just not possible (Simon, 1976).
Consequently, he asserts that individuals make rational decisions based on
limited information and cognitive skills (bounded rationality).

Terrorist Personality and Psychological Status

Since not everybody joins terror groups, factors that cause terrorism or makes individuals join terror groups are obviously effective only on some people
(O'Balance, 1979; Combs, 2000; Cinoglu, 2008). Therefore, it is also important to
know the types of terrorist personalities and their psychological status. Many
scholars (e.g., Hacker 1976, Strentz, 1981; Post, 1984; Ruby, 2002; O'Connor,
2004; Weisbach, 2004; White, 2006; Arboleda-Florez, 2007; McKeey, 2007)
looked into this matter. They studied the personality and/or the psychology of terrorists to see what kind of people they are and how their mental conditions look like.

Individuals in terrorist groups display three types of personality. The first
type is the leader. The leader is the intellectual within the group who understands the theories and the ideology of the terrorist group. Although the leader is aware of the inadequacies of their ideologies and/or their terror organization, he/she
puts the blame on the community for being inadequate, wrong doing, and not able to solve the existing problems. The second type personality is the opportunist. Opportunists often have criminal backgrounds but also high technical knowledge. The organization’s need of their technical knowledge makes up for their antisocial behavior and thus the opportunist becomes the know-how person in the terrorist group. In other words, an opportunity to solve a technical problem for their group encourages them to socialize with others in their group for which they do not have the courage for otherwise. The last type is the idealist. The idealist types are never happy with the routine and seek constant change. They have an immature perspective on social problems and in fact do not understand the real problems of their society (Strentz, 1981).

Hacker (1976) and Arboleda-Florez (2007) categorizes three types of terrorist personalities: criminals, crazies and the crusaders. Hacker asserts that the criminals join terrorist organizations just for profit in monetary means or because they look for vengeance. The second group of people crazies, join terrorist organizations because the life style of the terrorist looks appealing and adventurous for them. And finally the crusaders join terrorist organizations or engage in terrorism because they believe in the cause and they look for achieving ideological goals.

Other scholars define different types of terrorist personalities. The first group includes those that have an “anarchic-ideology” (Post, 1984, p. 243). These are often people who come from dysfunctional families and experienced
maladjustments on serious levels during their childhoods. They often did not have a typical family life or parent child relationship; rather, they had a problematic one. That is why they are rebellious against their parents (mainly their father) and their community. Hostility against authority is a visible attribute of such individuals. The second type personality is called the “nationalist-secessionist” (p. 243). Such individuals feel loyalty to their parents and fight anything (including regime) that seems to harm their parents. Eventually, both types display similar rebellious intentions (Post, 1984).

Thoughts on the mental conditions of terrorists vary as well. However, it is useful to know what goes on in their minds (Ruby, 2002; McKeebey, 2007). There are two main schools of thought concerning the mental condition of terrorists. The first one argues that terrorists are mentally ill people (Hacker, 1976; Ruby, 2002; White, 2006; Arboleda-Florez, 2007; Rasch, 1979, as cited in Arboleda-Florez, 2007). They are also called the “personality defect model of terrorism” (Ruby, 2002, p. 16).

The second school of thought asserts that an average terrorist is not mentally ill (Weisbach, 2004; Arboleda-Florez, 2007; McKeebey, 2008). Terrorist are not dysfunctional or pathological. Such a wrong belief about the terrorist’s mental condition can interfere with proper counter terrorism activities. Actually, they are politically motivated, rational people who choose (rational choice theory) to use violence to achieve their goals do so because they lack the resources to wage an actual war (Ruby, 2002).
This debate goes back some decades. Starting from 1960s until the mid 1980s many scholars asserted that psychological disorders and mental illnesses were common in terrorists (O’Connor, 2004; Arboleda-Florez, 2007). Although there might be some that have psychopathology (Rogers et al., 2007), numerous scholars seem to concur, after many studies on terrorism, that an average terrorist does not have pathological issues. Contrary, it is now very difficult to label terrorists as psychotic people (Ruby, 2002; Weisbach, 2004; McKeeby, 2008) or to state that terrorist are psychologically and emotionally unstable people. As O’Connor (2004) states, thirty years of focus in this matter from the perspective of clinical research has shown that the belief that terrorists are emotionally and psychosocially unstable people is not true. Actually, according to many studies, they appear to be psychologically healthier than the criminals of other crimes. Their activities such as killings, blackmail or sabotage might be identical to other criminals’ but there is a big difference, and that is that terrorists have a broader goal and they are more ideologically motivated (Rogers et al., 2007).

Now we know that the average terrorists are psychologically stable people from a clinical perspective. What is more, terrorist organizations pay attention to screening out psychologically unstable individuals because such people are threats to the safety and well being of their organization. In addition, these psychologically unstable members could stand out in the community and that would risk their operations (O’Connor, 2004; Wilson, 2004; McKeeby, 2008). If
terrorists’ common psychological characteristics could be identified then this problem could have been resolved long time ago by applying special psychological treatments. Although average terrorists are psychologically stable, this problem still requires a psychoanalytic insight into the terrorist mind (Weisbach, 2004).

Studying the psychological changes or process within a mind is very difficult, especially a terrorists’ (Weisbach, 2004). Also, studying a terrorist’s personality is another great challenge because they either die in combat or commit suicide. If they remain alive, they hide. If they get arrested, they are often well trained, and know how to avoid their actual psychological conditions (they are able to pretend as if they are totally healthy and/or nothing is wrong with their acts). And that hinders the collection of adequate data about them (Arboleda-Florez, 2007). Psychological studies are conducted after a terrorist incident occurs or when a terrorist has stopped being active in such activities. However, there is not much information about the psychological processes within the mind of a terrorist during a real moment of true terror activities. This means that we are not able to look into their psychology during their childhood because most of them have no past psychoanalysis and there is no real live data collection (Weisbach, 2004).

For instance, Mohammed Atta could be an important source of information for this kind of studies, but he had no past psychoanalysis and it was not possible to acquire information while he engaged in the cruelty. Wikan (2001) asserts that
nobody can find out anymore what the actual reason was for his involvement in
the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001. Atta flew the first plane into the World Trade
Center and took all the explanations for his involvement in the attack with him.
Everything related to the 9/11 attacks and Atta’s involvement will remain very
blurry to his family and to the rest of the world, because Wikan’s findings about
Atta after his death contradict with the expectations of a terrorist character.

Wikan (2001) collected information about Atta from his parents,
neighborhoods, professors and peers, and it appears that he was a gentle,
brilliant, and shy boy. His parents paid attention not to have him engage with the
brutalities in the streets. He had no political interest and could not even discuss
such issues. As his father puts it, “he was a donkey in politics” (p. 120). He would
only attend his school and some necessary activities and then the family would
close their doors to keep the bad outside the house. He was always thought to
have good manners by his family (Wikan, 2001).

The findings from the parents seem to be confirmed by the statements
concerning Atta from his professors in Hamburg when he was there for his
studies. One of the professors states that, “he was an extremely nice guy. I was
quite fond of him; Mohammed was religious and reserved but highly intelligent,
thoughtful and polite” (Wikan, 2001 p. 120). His two elderly sisters were
professors in Cairo and the only stress causing factor seems to be the similar
high achievement expectations from him, as it was the case for his sisters
(Wikan, 2001). Eventually, the reason for Atta’s engagement in terrorism and especially why he joined Al-Qaeda is likely to remain unknown for all of us.

There are other psychological factors affecting one’s decision to join terrorist organizations, and these underlying reasons could be our defense mechanisms. Individuals have defense mechanisms and hidden feelings. We are not able to handle our true feelings because they cause pain and anxiety. Our defense mechanisms and hidden feelings make life bearable to us. They distort the facts about the real life matters so that we can cope with them and reduce our depression and anxiety. Among the hidden feelings are: anger, sadness, need for love, fear of not being loveable, fear of death, grief, sexual desires, etc (Weisbach, 2004).

According to Karl Menninger (psychoanalyst), anxiety, hidden feelings and defense mechanisms create the triangle of personal conflict. An individual experiencing one or more of these may experience psychological problems. Thus, an individual needs to diminish anxiety through learning how to deal with hidden feelings and that necessitates breaking them down. For instance, the projection method is a defense mechanism and is the condition in which one cannot bear a thought within oneself and places that heavy thought burden on someone else, unconsciously. Projection appears in several ways such as: splitting, the concept of the other, and scapegoating (Weisbach, 2004).

Projection in the form of splitting occurs when one cannot identify something unbearable (e.g., killings) with oneself, and splits the blame with
another party. That is how terrorist organizations look for scapegoats elsewhere because they do not like to be the scapegoat since it brings agonizing burdens (e.g., anxiety, depression). Even using religion as an explanation is a projection of the burden, because they justify their acts by interpreting religion in a fashion that lessens the burden of their actions. Finally, defining those to be harmed as the other, evaporates any feeling or closeness with the perpetrator and lessens the burden. Eventually, these projections leave the terrorists blameless and make them feel better (Weisbach, 2004).

On the other hand, Freud and other theorists from the field of psychodynamics assert that childhood experiences do impact one’s whole life and all its aspects (Weisbach, 2004; Richmond, n.d.). For instance, neglected and abused children are not able to empathize with others, which is a common case in terrorists. In order to further elaborate this example we can look into the following explanation. A young male seeks the affirmation of his father for his behavior, and wants father’s love or protection from threats against him. If this is not achieved, the young man is likely to express rage against an oppressive authority other than his father. This is because, his father might be a hero in the eyes of others but he is actually not like that in the eyes of his son (Richmond, n.d.).

Kaplan (as cited in Ruby, 2002) complements studies that focus on childhood experiences as the root cause of why individuals become terrorists. Kaplan asserts that childhood humiliations and abuses in the hands of
aggressors can cause lack of self esteem and individual failures in the future life of that person. These “soon-to-be-terrorists” (Kaplan, as cited in Ruby, 2002, p. 17) have defective personalities and experience psychological difficulties with managing the stress of life. Eventually, they are likely to join those who experience similar problems. And these similar thinking people will serve also to justify their violent acts, and protect their self esteem and identity (Ruby, 2002).

This cognitive reconstruction helps them to view things they otherwise thought of as immoral as justifiable. This reconstruction is actually almost a total transformation of a person and which requires extensive training, education, and propaganda. The individual is disengaged step by step, so that he/she does not recognize the full transformation, and is brought to the mental condition the terrorist organization desires (Weisbach, 2004).

Chapter Conclusion

Chapter III discussed the previous studies on micro explanations. Subject studies provide constructive findings. However, neither do they fully explain all terror cases or all the cases of why individuals join terror groups. For instance, not all uneducated, not all psychologically disturbed, not all those with weak family ties or all rational individuals prefer terrorism or becoming a terrorist. Finally, not everybody who needs to socialize or feel that they must belong somewhere join a terror group. For example, people socialize within other social groups, friends or other family members. As a result, some join terrorist groups
while others turn their back to them. These findings indicate that individuals display varying approaches to terrorism.

It is true that the reasons mentioned in previous research play a role for some to become a terrorist or choose terrorism. Nonetheless, they fail to indicate that these reasons point to the fact that different people have different needs. Clearly individuals joined terrorist groups for different reasons. A complete study that considers a full range of needs is in order. Thus, it would be useful to look at the same problem by referring to new explanations (frameworks) that reveal what needs influence individuals to join a terror group and why they react different in regard to joining terror groups while confronting similar factors.
CHAPTER IV

MOTIVATION, THE NEEDS FRAMEWORK AND ITS APPLICATION TO TERRORISM

Introduction

Chapter IV introduces the concept of motivation and the Hierarchy of Needs framework. This framework is used in the proposed study to identify needs that motivate individuals to join terror groups in general, and becoming member of specific groups in particular. Abraham Maslow, an American psychologist, conceptualized the hierarchy of needs framework. Maslow’s article, “A Theory of Human Motivation” was published first in *Psychological Review* in 1943, and it has had a profound impact on social science since then. After the introduction of the framework, a brief discussion about the use of Maslow’s theory in the gang literature is provided to show that, due to similarities in gang and terror group memberships, the same framework can be used to understand what needs are important for terror group membership. Then the chapter proceeds with the application of the Hierarchy of Needs framework to terrorism and, ends with the conclusion section.

Motivation Concept

Motivation seems to be important also for individuals who engage with terrorism. Many scholars who discuss motivation (i.e. Gortner et al., 1997; Donadio in Adebayo, 2004; Meyer and Becker, 2004; Krippendorff, 2004) mainly
comment on how to motivate employees in working environments. But Gortner et al., (1997) categorized the theories about motivation in terms of content and cognitive processes. Among these, the content theories explain what motivates people. In other words, content theories seek to explain what solid material, behavioral, or social incentives motivate people to act. On the other hand, cognitive theories explain how people are motivated, which includes the thought process a person goes through before displaying specific actions.

Motivation is an important tool to understand the process of the individual's joining and remaining in an organization (Katz and Kahn, 1982 as cited in Gortner et al., 1997). Since, just like other regular organizations, terrorist organizations need to recruit people, it is important to study what needs motivate individuals to become members of terrorist organizations.

Many scientists have attempted to define motivation. For instance, Maslow (1970) says that it is human needs that motivate people in order to display a certain action. Meyer and Becker (2004) contend that in the heart of the motivation process is goal setting. They argue that consciously motivated behavior is goal-oriented; it does not make any difference whether the goals are set by others or by the individual himself. These goals help the individuals determine their action and the amount of effort they will exert. Eventually their motivated action leads them to satisfaction once they accomplish it. Similarly, Krippendorff (2004) notes that motivation is the reason given for an action to be taken or not to be taken.
Steers and Porter (1991) assert that motivation is a process that energizes and directs behavior. Donadio (1992), on the other hand, maintains that motivation is “the art of stimulating someone to action by creating a safe environment in which their motivation can be unleashed and through providing a reason or incentive for people to produce” (p.40). However, he maintains that at the heart of motivation is decentering - which refers to understanding that different people may be motivated by different means to act, and that individuals may have different perspectives on the same motivators. One need may serve as a motivator while the same factor might not create the slightest interest in another person (Adebayo, 2004).

Probably one of the best explanations on motivation is mentioned by Gortner et al., (1997). Gortner et al., contend that the term motivation stems from Latin and can be interpreted as “to move” (p. 269). They assert that motivation is concerned with the internal states of individuals, and displaying the act as a consequence of fulfilling a need. In other words, it is basically what human beings understand from their internal needs and the behaviors they display as a result of their interpretation. Gortner and his colleagues provide the definition of Bernard Berelson and Gary Steiner in which they argue that, “A motive is an inner state that energizes, activates, or moves (hence ‘motivation’), and that directs or channels behavior toward goals” (1964, p. 240, in Gortner et al., 1997, p. 269) as shown in figure 1.
From all these definitions we understand that motivation is closely related with the will of the individual, which directs his/her behavior in order to achieve a certain goal. Such an understanding prevails that individuals may act to join a terrorist organization if that organization is offering to fulfill a need. Gortner et al., (1997) argues that individual’s needs are internal, but the incentives and rewards are external issues. The individual is willing (motivated) to gain external factors to fulfill his/her needs and whoever provides these external means may be able to control the individual (Gortner et al., 1997).

Gornet et al., (1997) did not study terrorism but their argument on motivation is useful for this study in that, if individuals believe that they have no other alternatives (including the condition that they are not aware of an alternative), they maybe motivated to join a terror organization that they think it offers a way to satisfy a need.
Abraham Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs Framework

Maslow argues that people are motivated by five levels of needs: physiological, safety and security, social and affiliative, esteem and recognition, and finally self-actualization.

Physiological Needs

Physiological needs, according to Maslow, are needs such as oxygen, food, water, sleep, sex and shelter. These are needs that humans are inborn with (Maslow, 1970). These are the needs that must to be satisfied for the survival of the human body. For instance, without food, water or air people cannot live.

Safety and Security Needs

Safety and security needs refer to security of body, of job, of retirement plans, of stability and prevention of unwanted, unpredictable developments. These are needs human beings learn through their experiences, recognizing a threat and seeking a safe environment to avoid harm to themselves (Maslow, 1970).

Social and Affiliative Needs

The social and affiliative needs are those involving relationships with other people. These needs occur once human beings realize the importance of the existence of other people. In this category of needs, the individual is directly affected by the behavior of others. Receiving the feeling of love, intimacy, or belonging to a group are all-important markings for the development of an individual (Maslow, 1970).
Esteem and Recognition Needs

Esteem and recognition needs, or in other words the “ego needs,” denote gaining status, being recognized by others, achievement, or having a positive self-image. These include both self-esteem and esteem from others (Maslow, 1970). Maslow stresses that “award ceremonies, articles in agency newsletters that feature individual accomplishments, praise from a superior or peers, and the respect of other professionals are sources of such rewards” (Gortner et al., 1997, p. 272). Maslow talks about two versions of esteem needs: lower and higher esteem. The lower esteem is the need for being respected by others (e.g., status, fame, glory, recognition, attention). The higher esteem refers to the need for self-respect (e.g., feelings of confidence, achievement, independence, freedom). Self-respect is defined as the higher form of esteem need because self-respect, once achieved, is harder to lose (Boeree, 2006).

Self-actualization Need

Self-actualization need is the fifth level of needs. It defines the highest level of need individuals may feel. This need involves an individual doing anything he/she is fitted for; meaning pursuing for the highest achievement a person feels is able to do. The achievement of this need is the transformation of an individuals’ self into reality, and that achievement provides satisfaction for the individual because the individual sees that as a personal development. Philanthropic achievements fall in this category. However, only a small percentage of the population reaches the level of self-actualization (Maslow,
The self actualization need is also named as the growth motivation and is different than the other needs. Self-actualization need just keeps getting stronger. In other words, it gives the feeling of need of becoming the full-yourself and achieving anything you are capable of (Boeree, 2006). This is a never ending process. For instance, if a person has satisfied the first four levels of needs that Maslow defines and is at the last stage (self-actualization need), then he/she may want to open a shelter for people in poverty. Once he/she does that, same person might feel the need to do more and try to establish a foundation that will aid veterans. One might never feel that his/her self-actualization need is satisfied, and will keep trying to achieve something else (Thompson and Rainey, 2003).

Maslow talks about the first four levels in his hierarchy of needs pyramid in terms of homeostasis similar to the principle of how a thermostat functions. A thermostat starts or stops functioning depending on the temperature it has been adjusted to. The human body, too, gives signals when it feels a need. For instance, it develops hunger when it needs food or develops the feeling of cold when it needs to feel warmth, and then the body takes the necessary action to fulfill that need. In the next step, signals about these needs stop when the body gets enough of it. Maslow extends the operational logic of the homeostatic principle to human needs. According to Maslow, all needs must be fulfilled for a healthy life. They are the survival needs, and are built into humans genetically. In addition, if a stressful condition occurs and one’s survival gets threatened,
human beings may regress to one of the lower needs (Boeree, 2006), just like
the thermostat goes down when the temperature drops. Maslow’s hierarchical
diagram is known as the hierarchy of needs pyramid and is shown in Figure 2

Figure 2. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs pyramid (Adapted from Maslow, 1970).

Maslow’s hierarchy of need framework assumes that human beings are
motivated to satisfy these needs one after another, from the lowest to the
highest. No next or higher step will be considered unless the former one is met.
Satisfying these needs will please humans, whereas lack or hindrance will cause
problems (Thompson and Rainey, 2003).

All individuals naturally want to satisfy their needs. The intention to satisfy
their needs makes the individuals act. When a need is satisfied (satisfaction
levels differ from person to person), it no longer motivates the individual and then
the next higher need is considered (Maslow, 1970). To illustrate this matter, a
look into the gang literature is appropriate. A comparison of gang and terror group membership will ease explaining why hierarchy of needs framework can be applied to terrorism.

Membership in Gangs and Terror Groups

The gang membership literature has many similarities with terrorist group membership literature. Gang membership is also explained with pull and push factors. For instance, Decker and Van Winkle (1996) used the same explanation for the membership to gangs as Abuza (2006) utilized for the causes of an individual’s engagement with terrorist groups. Like Abuza (2006), Decker and Van Winkle (1996) mention pull factors as conditions that bring the individual toward joining a gang and push factors as those that make the individual leave his/her current environment due to disliked conditions and head toward joining a gang. So while in the first condition it is the gang providing attractiveness, the latter condition is the one that forces the individual to go away due to unacceptable conditions. They basically determine that individuals prefer gang membership to satisfy some of their needs which their families or the community could not satisfy (e.g., belonging, socialization).

Gang membership appears as attractive because it provides opportunities for making money to survive through selling drugs. Membership also provides status among peers and friends that makes them stand out (Baccaglini, 1993), and belonging in their group (Slayton, Stephens and Mackena, 1993). Gangs are
offering excitement (Decker and Van Winkle, 1996) and fulfill many of the needs of youth that could not be satisfied in their previous environments (Howell, 1998).

Howell’s study seems to be supported with the findings of Hill, Lui and Hawkins (2001). In brief Hill et al., summarize the reasons for joining gangs as follows:

Every youth has basic needs for feelings of self-worth, identity, acceptance, recognition, purpose, companionship, belonging, and security. When the youth feels that the family, schools, churches, and communities are not meeting basic needs, he or she may turn to the gangs. (p. 8)

Carlie (2002) utilized Maslow’s hierarchy of needs framework to explain youth gang membership. The framework suggests that individuals are driven and motivated by their needs. Carlie (2002) articulates that the interviews he conducted repeatedly concluded that it is the unmet needs that were not satisfied by the community, school or their families causing individuals to join gangs. In his study in the US, Canada, England and the Netherlands common reasons as why gangs are formed were explained as economic, ethnic, material gain, attraction of supportive peer groups, acceptance, security, flight from abusive families, opportunity to build high self-esteem, activity and marginality.

Now it is obvious that needs are important to consider while studying gang membership. And for that purpose, Carlie (2002) referred to Maslow’s framework to explain what needs are influential in this joining process. He concludes that, conventional socializing agents (e.g. families, schools) seem to be ineffective. The conventional adult supervision is mostly not present; adolescents have too
much free time that could not be filled with healthy socialization activities; they have less access to jobs; and they lack a well defined neighborhood where they can congregate.

Although Carlie does not make any clear suggestions in regard to preventing gang membership, based on the remarks of Carlie, one can conclude that adolescents need to be provided with effective socialization opportunities. There must be adequate adult supervision and they should be included in healthy social activities. Adolescents must be provided good job opportunities in order for them to have a stable income and provide for their needs. They must have a neighborhood for congregation in order to satisfy their socialization needs and prevent gang formations and/or gang memberships. Thus, their needs must be met by their families and/or communities, otherwise individuals may try to meet their needs through memberships to gangs. Similarly Livingston (2005) emphasizes the role of the family and the community for comforting the needs of their inhabitants. Livingstone suggests that, if a family realizes that somebody within the family (especially adolescents) seems to be getting interested in gang membership (early signs may include wearing gang clothing; graffiti in bed room, on books; drug use, truancy etc), they should focus on socializing more with that individual. In case the family is not successful, they should ask for assistance from professionals and also from local religious leaders to discourage the person from becoming a gang member.
On the other hand, although not empirically tested, Palmer (2007) summarizes quite a lot of similar needs and how terrorist organizations offer satisfying these needs during recruitment. Palmer, based on his 28 of experience in the British army and numerous contacts with the police, notes that terror groups use family tragedies and the desire for revenge for recruitment purposes. They consider using poverty to convince individuals to join them. In that condition, joining the terrorist organization can be considered as a career choice for these new recruits. Some others are convinced to join because they seek autonomy and an adventurous life and want to be above the law or an outlaw, like some powerful figures in a community. In addition, people join terrorist organizations due to religious and/or political aspirations, injustice and a desire for belonging to a group. He further notes that some individuals are threatened or kidnapped and made members of the terror group. Basically, terrorist organizations use the carrot (positive incentives) and stick (negative incentives) motivation method to pull individuals to their sides. They are aware that different people have different needs and are motivated by different means and they use that for recruitment purposes.

There are serious similarities in gang and terrorist group membership literatures. From Palmer’s suggestions it can be assumed that the framework (Maslow’s hierarchy of needs) Carlie (2002) used to determine needs in gang membership, can also be used to find out what needs influence individuals to join terror groups.
Applying the Hierarchy of Needs Framework to Terrorism

Previous research mentions insufficient factors as to why individuals join terror groups. Previously mentioned factors alone are not able to explain, why not all similar people (e.g., all poor, all religious, or all individuals with an ideology) join terror groups. Maslow’s framework clarifies this condition by explaining that different people may be motivated by different levels of needs and there may also be variation in the levels that satisfies them (economic man vs administrative man). The satisfaction of an individual’s need may vary in time, location, amount, and from person to person. Hence, a person with a need is motivated to look for opportunities to satisfy that need. At the end, if the same person sees terrorism as the only alternative or the only feasible alternative, to fulfill his/her need, he/she might join a terror group. That is the point previous research did not consider.

Although it is not measured in this research and although it does not fully predict membership, Maslow’s framework can contribute to terrorism studies. Particularly to those related to joining terror groups by arguing that those who do not join terror groups may have other alternatives to satisfy their needs or are satisfied with the level of incentives they have. In addition, that needs should be considered in terrorism studies since it captures all pieces of explanations forwarded by previous studies.

To demonstrate this matter, some of the factors (ideology, political causes, foreign policy, religion, historical grievances, poverty, identity/belonging, and
active socialization) which were used in previous studies are discussed again from a different perspective. The decision to join a terror group based on such reasons is a rational choice if there are not other alternatives. This study does not measure whether alternatives existed. However, policy makers can analyze the communities whether alternatives exist, or the status of the existing alternatives.

Ideology was defined as a set of beliefs that are associated with values, behavior, a way of thinking, and goals by Plamenatz (1970 as cited in McEntire, 2008). Basically people develop ideas to solve their problems (satisfy their needs). They then propose a wider, problem-solving ideology. Nonetheless, these problems are related to their needs. For instance, the political system serves them, the education system teaches them, and the free market system provides better and cheaper goods. In that case, when one joins terror groups due to ideology, he does it to make changes in the system or to replace it with another one which he thinks will fulfill his/her needs and make him/her happy (e.g., more democracy and freedom or replacing democracy with communism or religion based regimes). Then, it is not having an ideology that makes people join terror groups, but rather the thinking that terrorism is the only option to make ones’ ideas come true and fulfill their needs.

Political causes play a valid role in terrorism when they fail to reflect and fulfill the needs (e.g., equal representation, equal service delivery, equal social benefits etc) of its constituents, no matter their backgrounds. If the political
components make any distinction between different groups within the community, then some people may become violent because they don’t get what they need or are prevented from acquiring the means to satisfy their needs. Thus, at the foundation is the will to satisfy needs that triggers violence against politics.

Similarly, a country’s foreign policy (valid for those able to affect other countries with their foreign policies, the U.S. for instance), may cause terrorism. A powerful country can prevent people from another country acquire the necessary means to fulfill their needs through their foreign policies (e.g., if they feel their resources are taken away by the powerful foreign country), then they may turn to terrorism in case they feel their diplomacy is not effective or they cannot wage war. In contrast, if the foreign policy of the powerful country does not affect individuals’ needs, citizens would not mind that their country chooses to do tradeoff in some relations with that country. Eventually, needs may also appear as a reaction to some countries’ foreign policies if they disrupt citizen’s needs.

Religion was mentioned as a cause as well. It is true that a majority of individuals feel the need to have a faith. Religious factors can cause individuals to engage with terrorism if people have not been provided an adequate type and correct religious teachings. In other words, their need of obtaining faith related teachings might have been satisfied by wrong hands with manipulated material and information. Therefore, it is not the religion itself that makes people join terror
groups; rather it is the attempts of satisfying the need of obtaining religious
teachings from extremists.

Historical grievances indicate the need of restitution through recognition of
previous mistakes. If people are not able to obtain, through legal and peaceful
means, what was theirs by right in the past, they may use terrorism as their final
resort. Thus, at the base of developing grievance are undelivered rights and/or
injustices. If they had been satisfied in time, the subject community would not
have developed a grievance. Therefore, a grievance in itself is not the reason
why people engage in terrorism but seeing terrorism as the only alternative to
injustices and to satisfy their need of being treated with justice.

Poverty appears when an individual is not able to provide for himself
and/or his family’s living. In other words, poverty is the result of failed satisfaction
of some needs (e.g., stable income, food, shelter). Not all poor join terror groups
because either they have an alternative that provides enough to survive or, they
do not ask for more (Simon’s administrative man) because they know that is the
best they can achieve in their circumstances.

Just like poverty, identity and belonging factors are also direct indicators of
needs. They indicate that people have the need to belong to some group (e.g.,
family, clan, race, etc) and/or identify themselves with that group. In that case,
individuals may join terror groups in case they identify themselves more with the
terror group instead of their families or friends.
Active socialization actually indicates to the need that human beings need to socialize with others. Individuals cannot always be happy by living alone. If they cannot find the social life in their environment, they might be pulled in by the terror groups. Accordingly, it is not active socialization that makes an individual become a terrorist, but rather the need to socialize, and not having another option for human interaction. In this case, if an individual who just needs to be with people with similar thinking could find a social club and become a member of it that would cause them to avoid joining a terror group that only seems to be representing his ideas.

In addition, previous research (e.g., Kule, 2007; Teymur, 2007; A. Ekici, 2008) also argue that family members and friends are significant factors causing people to join terror groups. However, it is not the friends and families within the terror group that make individuals join the terror group. It is the unfulfilled social and affiliative needs an individual has. The friends and family members of the individual serve as means for introducing alternatives that the terror group offers to fulfill needs. Thus, it is the opportunity offered by a terror group which motivates individuals to join them (in case there is no other option), not friends or family members.

Chapter Conclusion

Chapter IV provided arguments about the similarities between gang and terror group membership literatures. Based on the similarities the chapter argued that perceived needs are important underlying reasons why people join both
groups. Since, Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs framework has been used to explain gang memberships, the same framework can be an aid to find out what needs influence individuals to join terror groups.

In the following chapter, a case study is used to show how Maslow’s hierarchy of needs framework might be used to classify important needs influencing individuals to join terror groups. For that reason, terrorism in Turkey has been chosen as the case study because of the available secondary data from real terrorists, as suggested by Jerrold M. Post, and the fact that Turkey has a considerable terrorism experience (three decades).
CHAPTER V
CASE STUDY: TERRORISM AND COUNTER TERRORISM IN TURKEY

Introduction

Before applying Maslow’s framework of needs to terrorism, one must be acquainted with the case study utilized in this research. The chapter first provides an introductory section on the Turkish state and the main types of terrorism in the country. Then, it proceeds with the introduction of the Turkish counter measures and ends with an evaluation of these policies.

The Turkish State

As a country, the Republic of Turkey has a population of around 71 million. Both geographically and culturally, the Turkish state straddles Europe and Asia. Geographically, Turkey is on a very strategic location because, besides connecting Europe and Asia, it is also on the crossroads to the Middle East (Rodoplu et al., 2003). On the other hand, Turkey’s culture represents an exceptional blend of eastern and western civilizations and has witnessed the existence of some powerful civilizations: Hittite, Byzantine and Ottoman Empires.

The Republic of Turkey succeeded the Ottoman Empire and was founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923. The state is a republican parliamentary democracy and the only secular state with a 98% Muslim population. Besides Muslims, other ethnic and religious groups live in Turkey. Among these are Armenians, Greeks, and Jews. For centuries, people from different cultures and
religions lived in harmony (Rodoplu et al., 2003). A map (Figure 3), adapted from the CIA World Factbook (2008) has been provided to display Turkey’s geographical and cultural bridge role between Europe and Asia.

Figure 3. Map of Turkey.

Turkey’s Terrorism Experience

Turkey is probably one of the few countries in the world that has been hit the hardest by terrorism. It has experienced terrorist attacks for nearly three decades in a continuous stream. Since the 1960s terrorist attacks came mainly from three different terrorist groups: Kurdish separatists, Islamic radicals and political leftist terrorists (Rodoplu et al., 2003). These terror groups can also be categorized as leftist terror organizations and rightist religious terror organizations because Kurdish separatists are terror groups that upheld leftist ideologies (e.g., Marxism). Therefore, one can conclude that, based on their goals, especially two types of terrorism were very active in Turkey: leftist (mainly
represented by Kurdish Separatism/Marxism) and rightist religious (mainly represented by radical Islamism) (Alkan, 2002; EGM, 2009).

The fight against terrorism, especially against PKK (Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan- Kurdish Workers’ Party) has been painful (Alkan, 2002; Jenkins, 2008). The consequences of the struggle so far include massive numbers of deaths (McGregor, 2008), and high amounts of economic damages (Ozer, 2006).

It was the 1960s when Turkey realized the terrorism problem within its borders. Between 1960 and 1980, Marxist-Leninist, left-wing terror organizations were on the scene and caused the death of many (Laqueur, 1999; Alkan, 2002; Kule, 2007). Actually, the 1960s and 1970s seem to be the decades in which the foundations of these developments are marked. Starting with the high urbanization and the migration of people to the big cities, in addition to increasing economical burdens (Laqueur, 1999; Rodoplu et al., 2003), the unrest in the Kurdish regions and the leftist and radical Islamic student movements fueled terrorist activities (Rodoplu et al., 2003). In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, separatist Kurdish movements started terrorizing the country and these movements are still considered to be a serious threat to the Turkish state, especially in the south-eastern region. In addition, both right wing and left wing political extremists also caused an increase in terrorist activities, and bombings, shootings and threats that became common in the country. Between 1978 and 1982, the National Security Council recorded 43,000 various terrorist incidents. So far, terrorism in Turkey has claimed more than 35,000 lives, which includes
those of government officials (Alkan, 2002; Kule, 2007; Ozer, 2006). The cost of terrorism to the nation is between $125 billion (Ozer, 2006) to $400 billion, since early 1980s (Yilmaz, 2008).

The unstoppable attacks from terrorists, the rise in the political violence, and the government’s failure to prevent them, lead to the military coupe on September 12, 1980. The army established a new constitution and seemingly created peace and order in the country. But in time, the terrorist groups managed to regroup and commence new attacks. Religiously motivated terrorist groups joined them, increasing attacks in Turkey starting from early 1990s (Rodoplu et al., 2003; Kule, 2007). For that reason, the two main types of terror groups, leftist-separatist and rightist-religious groups require attention from those countering terrorism in Turkey, but particularly leftist PKK (EGM, 2009).

Leftist - Separatist Terror Groups

Leftist terror groups in Turkey accept the Marxist–Leninist paradigm that aims to establish a communist system in Turkey and denounces any religion that seems to fit their life style. Accordingly, they believe that the working class must take over the state power by a revolution against the bourgeois class. Although one, PKK, also uses ethnical arguments to gain public support, it is clear that the main goal of the leftist organizations is to establish a state based on the Marxist-Leninist principles (Barkey and Fuller, 1998; Alkan, 2002; Kule, 2007). Their ethnical arguments are just for the purpose to mask their real intentions and
further public support, because communism lost ground in the world after its collapse in former Soviet Russia. For instance, PKK, for this purpose tries to get land from Turkey (south-eastern part), Syria, Iraq and Iran and to establish an independent Marxist-Leninist Kurdish state (Kurdistan) (Laqueur, 1999; Alkan, 2002). The most well known leftist terror organizations are the PKK, DHKP/C (Revolutionary People’s Party Front), TKP/ML-TIKKO (Turkish Communist Party or also known as Maoist Communist Party - Workers’ and Peasants’ Liberation Army). In addition, there is the TIKB (Revolutionary Communist Union of Turkey), DEV-YOL (Revolutionary Path), and DEV-SOL (Revolutionary Left) (Alkan, 2002; EGM, 2009).

The terrorist organizations have been manipulating the underdevelopment of the south-eastern part of Turkey to achieve their goals. They even received international support from countries such as Iran, Lebanon, and Syria (Rodoplu et al., 2003) and even from some other European countries such as Bulgaria, Greece, and Italy (Yayla, 2005). For instance, the PKK leader was aided to hide in Italy in November 1998 for a while, before he was arrested in Kenya (see Button, 1995; White, 2002; Rodoplu et al., 2003).

In the beginning, communism grew among university students during 1970s and that lead to the creation of two main terrorist organizations. The first one is the TKP/ML-TIKKO, and the second is the DHKP/C. In 1994, DHKP/C succeeded another communist party called Dev-Sol (Rodoplu et al., 2003). Nowadays, both terrorist organizations’ activities have significantly declined.
TKP/ML-TIKKO experienced several divisions in their organization due to failures. DHKP/C made a strategic mistake and tried to expand it activities from the Black Sea region to the Mediterranean region, which lead to the weakening of the organization and resulted with the capture of most of its members (Alkan, 2002; Rodoplu et al., 2003).

Among the leftists, separatist Kurdish terror organizations PKK is the major player and is responsible for the vast majority of terrorism related killings and economic losses in Turkey (Lyon and Ucarer, 2001; Rodoplu et al., 2003: Yayla, 2005, Teymur and Smith, 2008; Durmaz, Sevinc, Yayla and Ekici, 2007). The founder and the leader of PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, accepts that PKK uses violent tactics, but he sees it as a result producing method to establish the Kurdish state. Among its violent acts are the killings of state employees (e.g., police officers, military officials, village guards, teachers, civil servants) (Balli, 1991) and even civilians, including women and children.

After the capture of Ocalan, in January 2002, the European Union included PKK in their list of terrorist organizations. Upon this development the organization changed its name to KADEK (Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress) (N. Ekici, 2006) and then to KONGRA-GEL (Kurdistan People’s Congress). They also used the name Kurdistan Democratic Confederate (EGM, 2009). All these name changes were done to convince the international community that they were a new organization and thus legitimate. Despite the claims about their new identity, their leadership and their members remained the
same. Following Turkey’s diplomatic efforts, the European Union updated its terrorist organizations lists and included both KADEK and KONGRA-GEL in the same list (Turkish Embassy, 2004).

During the early and mid 1990s, the PKK claimed to be in peace with Islam, and that PKK was seeking political resolution within the Turkish borders. But its attempts are not found to be convincing. The belief that PKK still seeks an independent Kurdish state based on Marxist-Leninist ideas remains strong among the people of Turkey and among experts (Barkey and Fuller, 1998). Despite many efforts in the country to eliminate this threat, especially PKK remains active and keeps killing during the time this work was being drafted.

Rightist - Radical Islamic Terror Groups

In essence, rightist terror groups in Turkey mainly consist of radical Islamic terror organizations which oppose Marxist-Leninist ideas and accept religious bases. However, in regard to definitional terms, rightist terror groups are based either on the understanding that a certain religion or an ethnicity is superior to others and thus the people belonging to these specific groups must seize power to meet their own needs. Since religious groups are the primary rightist terror groups in Turkey, their main goal is to abolish the secular Republic of Turkey, and replace it with a state run by religious law (e.g., Sharia law). The well known radical Islamic terror organizations in Turkey are the Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, Hizb-ul-Tahrir (Islamic liberation Party), Islamic Jihad, Islamic
Resistance, and IBDA-C (Great Eastern Islamic Fighters Front) (Rodoplu et al., 2003; Yayla, 2005, Teymur, 2007; EGM, 2009). A common characteristic of the radical Islamic terror groups is that their teachings do not reflect the actual scriptures of the Qur’an. These organizations’ interpretations are made in accordance with gaining the financial and personal support of people with low or no religious education (EGM, 2009).

The Turkish Hezbollah emerged in the Southeastern region of Turkey as a response to the PKK’s religious arguments of creating the Union of Kurdistan Religious People, Union of Kurdistan Imams, and the Kurdistan Islamic Movement. In the beginning of 1990s, PKK started using these religious notions in its propaganda with the aim obtaining public support and to grow to be the biggest power in the region. PKK’s approach resulted in the emergence of Turkish Hezbollah, and the clash of these two terrorist organizations left behind 700 deaths during 1992 to 1995. Five-hundred of the claimed lives were from PKK and the rest were Hezbollah members (Ozeren and Voorde, 2006).

Also the Turkish Hezbollah and other religiously motivated terror groups attacked the secular being of the Turkish state. In 1995, they plotted 86 acts and killed 25 people (Rodoplu et al., 2003). Moreover, just like the leftist organizations, they too dealt with drug trafficking and even robbed banks (EGM, 2009). The state has increased its focus on this organization since 1998 and arrested many leaders and more than 1,000 of its men. Their leader, Huseyin Velioglu, was killed in a combat with the Turkish police in Istanbul on January 1st,
2000. Since then, Turkish Hezbollah is not that active (Rodoplu et al., 2003; Yayla, 2005; Teymur, 2007).

Assessment of the Main Terror Groups and Their Objectives in Turkey

The leftist terrorist organizations (Especially Kurdish) are separatist groups and recognize Marxist-Leninist ideas as their ideological foundation. They seek a separate Kurdish state which they feel is for their well being and try to gain public support by using ethnic based arguments. They justify their violence with the Marxist ideas that liberation cannot be achieved without violence. Their attempts to add a religious aspect into their ideology are just an attempt to gain the support of religious people living in the south-eastern part of Turkey. On the other hand, DHKP-C is also a clear-cut Marxist-Leninist terrorist organization (leftist), focused on overthrowing the secular democratic regime in Turkey and establishing a state, based on communist ideology. Their main difference from PKK is that they seek revolution within the Turkish borders while PKK seeks a separate state through taking land from Iran, Syria, and Turkey.

In contrast, the rightist radical Islamic terrorist groups are founded on religious ideas and goals. They seek to change the current regime in Turkey as well, but with an Islamic state run by Sharia law which they accept as a part of their life style. That is their main difference from leftist organizations such as PKK and DHKP-C. They justify their violence through misinterpreting religious scriptures and faulty teachings of Qur’an, in a manner that serves their needs.
Current Counter Terrorism Policies in Turkey

As can be seen, Turkey is fighting terrorism at many fronts. Among the commonly applied counter terrorism policies at these fronts are: intelligence gathering, military and police operations, village guards, regional governorship and state of emergency, resettlement program, returning home bill, the confessor law, regional economic investment policies and diplomatic efforts. In the following sections, each of these policies is explained, and then an evaluation part is provided to illustrate why these policies did significantly reduce the terrorism problem in Turkey.

Intelligence Gathering

Intelligence is necessary to prevent planned terrorist attacks. The National Intelligence Organization (Milli Istihbarat Teskilati – MIT) is the foremost agency for intelligence gathering. MIT is affiliated directly to the office of the Prime Minister and provides intelligence on any threat to the national security. Beside MIT, the Turkish National Police (TNP) has an intelligence department as well, and this department reports to the General Director of the TNP on any matter related to security, including terrorist threats. The Gendarmerie, who is entitled for enforcement in the rural areas, gathers intelligence too. Even though, the Gendarmerie formally should answer to the Ministry of internal Affairs in peace times, it is commonly supervised by the Turkish General Staff (Jenkins, 2008).
Military and Police Operations

Military and Police forces are used extensively to fight terrorism in Turkey. The army carries out operations in Northern Iraq where PKK has camps. The gendarmerie carries out operations in the rural areas within the borders, and the police operate within the cities to crack down the terrorist organizations. So far, Turkey has carried out 24 ground operations into Northern Iraq and countless operations (by the gendarmerie) within Turkey’s borders. These operations have been followed by many air strikes as well. Militarily, these operations can be evaluated as very successful in regard to destroying predetermined targets but do not provide long term solutions (Ozdag, 2008).

The police also have many successful operations against terrorist cells and attacks within the city limits. For instance, on October 13\textsuperscript{th}, 2003, terrorists bombed two synagogues. A week after that, on October 20\textsuperscript{th}, 2003, they car bombed the English HSBC Bank and the British Consulate in Istanbul (BBCTurkish.com, 2004). The police investigated the incidents from many aspects and, after an intensive collaboration with many organizations and departments, the terrorist were apprehended within a couple of weeks (Polat, 2008). However, neither these operations result with long term solutions.

Village Guards

The Turkish government established the village guards system on March 26\textsuperscript{th}, 1985. The goal was to gain fire power against terrorists from capable citizens in the areas where terror groups were active (Gergin, 2009).
Village guards receive salary from the government and serve under the command of the Turkish General Staff if required. For instance, they supported the Turkish troops during the 2007-2008 Turkish incursions into Iraq. Otherwise, they remain in their villages as guards who provide protection against terrorists. This policy helped citizens in the more remote residential areas as a form of self-protection. They did play a major role in protecting remote areas but, unfortunately, around 1,400 guards were killed by terrorists so far (Gergin, 2009).

The Village Guards system initially got established in 22 provinces and the number reached 35 in 1993. There are temporary and fully employed village guards. The number of temporary village guards is around 58,000, and the fully employed village guards on active duty are around 25,000. Voluntarism is the initial requirement to become a village guard besides other skills that the army seeks (Gergin, 2009).

Regional Governorship and State of Emergency

In 1987, the government decided to have a full oversight in the provinces where terrorism existed. Therefore, they passed a Regional Governorships law considering the south-eastern and eastern regions of Turkey in the same year. The municipalities that were governed by the Regional Governor were those ruled under state of emergency or martial law. Under this law, the region is mainly ruled by the military forces and the civilian police become subordinate to the military. The objective of the policy was to avoid red tape among government agencies (law enforcement, intelligence, military and others) from different
provinces and provide a more effective counter approach to terrorism. The Regional Governor was entitled more power than the regular ones, and he/she could apply his/her decision in all the provinces supervised. Unfortunately, this kind of management restricts the fundamental rights of the citizens and their freedoms (Gergin, 2009).

*Resettlement Program*

Another policy Turkey utilized against terrorism was the resettling program. The Regional Governors were entitled to evacuate and resettle villages that were under the threat of terrorist attacks. They were granted that authority by the Council of Ministers’ decree on July 10th, 1987. Based on the records of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, so far 353,288 people left behind their villages due to security concerns. Furthermore, a total 3,428 villages/hamlets were evacuated due to same reasons, and after security was established, around 127,820 people returned to their homes in the villages between 1994 and 2004 (Gergin, 2009).

*Returning Home Bill*

Another policy enacted by the Turkish government is the Returning Home Bill of 2003. According to this Bill, members of terrorist organizations who did not get involved in any crime could be given amnesty. The Bill remained valid for only six months. Although enacted with a great hope to crack down the terrorist organizations, it did not provide the expected outcome. The belief was that there are 4,500 PKK members in Northern Iraq, and around 2,000 of them did not get involved in any serious crime (other than being a member) (NTV, 2004).
The Confessor Law

The Confessor law, also known as the remorse law, is listed under the Turkish Criminal Law as Title 221. The law reads that terrorists who regret their actions and surrender, and also provide useful and accurate intelligence to state authorities, may be granted partial or full pardon (depending on their involvement in crimes while they were with the terrorist organization) (Aksiyon, 2007). The first confessor law was enacted in 1985 and 157 terrorists enjoyed its benefit. The law was reenacted six more times, and so far a total 2,040 terrorist enjoyed its benefits and got released after they were screened and appeared to be clean (Haberk, 2007).

Upon the low number of surrenders, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has encouraged the police to visit the families of the terrorists in the field and convince them that their children should apply to enjoy the benefits provided by the Confessor Law and the Returning Home Bill. Although these efforts increased the number of returnees they remained insignificant (Haberk, 2007). According to the records of the Turkish National Police, 171 terrorists returned home in the last two years (2007 and 2008) after they started talking to terrorists’ families and ask for their support (Zaman, 2008).

Regional Economic Investment Policies

Another counter terrorism policy the Turkish government implements is the social investments in the south-eastern part of Turkey. The belief that the difference in the living standards between the various regions in Turkey results in
the people in these regions to engage with crime and even terrorism, requires social and economical investment (Euractive, 2008). Surveys show that many people in the region live under the poverty level and there is a serious unemployment rate (Dumanli, 1996). Therefore, the government established the Social Support and Solidarity Fund in 2004 to support people in need. Although previous governments (those before AKP) made attempts to improve the living standards of the region, great majority of the plans ended with failure. The reasons underlying the failures were lack of control on given credits, corruption, and the terrorist attacks that left most investments unfinished.

On the other hand, Turkey has been investing in a very important regional development project for some decades. It is called The South-Eastern Anatolian Region Project (GAP) and is being implemented in the provinces Adıyaman, Batman, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Kilis, Mardin, Siirt, Şanlıurfa and Şırnak. Formally it was called GAP (Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi, in English: South-Eastern Anatolian Project) in 1980, but the initial technical studies related to the project started in 1960s and is considered as one of the biggest important projects in the world. It covers 10% of the size of whole Turkey (GAP Tarihcesi, 2008). The projects’ estimated final cost is around 41 Billion Turkish Liras (around $32 Billion) and, so far, 26 Billion Turkish Liras (around $22 Billion) have been spent and 62.2% of the project has been completed. The project aims to develop the region both socially and economically (Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi, 2008) which can contribute to preventing individuals from joining terror groups.
GAP is an integrated large project and includes around 300 projects. Among these projects are 22 dams, 19 hydroelectric power plants, many wide area irrigation system projects, agricultural projects and lots of infrastructural projects. In addition to these, the project includes some tourism, education, transportation, housing, cultural (e.g., 24 hours Kurdish TV broadcast) and health related projects (GAP Nedir, 2008).

Very recently, in addition to GAP, the current government attempted to make more economic and social investments in the same region. But this time the additional amount is larger compared to previous ones. A total of $12 Billion is planned to be spent in the region to create jobs, build additional dams, and establish a couple of national TV stations which will broadcast in local languages within a five year period (Euroactive, 2008). The government went beyond investing only in the south-eastern region and applied these policies in the whole country to increase the living standards of its citizens.

*Diplomatic Efforts*

Diplomatic efforts can be considered as another very important counter terrorism policy. Terrorist organization cannot stand up and survive against a fully equipped state military and its police forces for decades. Thus, they need international support and that was affirmed in a study by Ozeren (2005). Ozeren argues that terrorism, in order to survive, necessitates international support. For a long time Turkey received pressure from the international arena to open discussions with PKK. Turkey has resisted this proposal because it feared that
such talks would create a risk of recognizing the PKK as a diplomatic counterpart, and legalize the PKK terrorist organization as a political party and/or a sovereign power. Henceforth, Turkey emphasized that the PKK terrorism problem is Turkey’s sole internal security problem (Aktan and Koknar, 2002).

Evaluation of Turkey’s Counter Terrorism Policies

Despite the aforementioned success, military and police based offensive policies do not provide long term results leading to eliminating terrorism. Such policies merely deal with the products (fighting terror incidents, apprehending or killing some members of terror groups etc) instead of targeting the causes of the problem. For instance, some time after the ground operations and the air strikes into Iraq, every time the terrorist organization gained strength, regrouped its members and continued its attacks to the Turkish state (Ozdag, 2008). In other words, the post interventions decrease the impact of terrorism temporarily, especially in regard to death tolls from terrorism, but the number of deaths increases again in summer times once terrorist groups become active again. As a result, such interventions seem not to provide significant long term solutions to the terrorism problem (Eser, 2007).

The regional governorship and state of emergency policies did improve the effectiveness of the offensive operations; however, neither did they achieve the expected goal. Proof for this is that, since 1987 the law has been reinstated many times, but unfortunately, the terrorism problem still exists in Turkey.
The resettlement program was useful in regard to saving the lives of the villagers, but not a solid solution to the terrorism problem. Remote villages were frequently visited by terrorist groups for shelter and food. Even if the security forces became aware of these visits, often terrorists would be gone before security forces reached the village. Abandoned villages were not preferred locations for terrorists anymore because they could not get supply by force and seek for shelter in cold weather. On the other hand, the biggest disadvantage was that it disturbed the life of many villagers and their families. Many had difficulties settling in their new locations, and were looking forward to go back to their normal lives.

The Returning Home Bill did not provide the desired outcome either. According to the General Directorate of the Turkish National Police, the Bill served the members of Hezbollah in prisons rather than cracking down on the active terrorist organizations. After the Bill was enacted, 3,107 people applied for amnesty. Out of that number, 2,419 people were current prisoners, and only 688 active terrorist organization members applied. Among the current prisoners, 1,008 received amnesty and 584 people who were active (but surrendered to enjoy amnesty), were released after their first trials (NTV, 2004). Therefore, this policy too provided only pieces of success, not the result that was intended to be achieved. Also the impact of the Confessor Law remained insignificant in regard to dissolving the terror groups. The law was reenacted six times, and so far total 2,040 terrorist enjoyed its benefits. The same number also includes those (171)
who returned home after the Turkish National Police started talking to terrorists’ families and ask for their support. Nevertheless, in here too there is only partial success, and therefore terror groups remain active in Turkey.

The most recent and delayed counter terrorism policy is the Regional Economic Investment policy. It is being applied with the hope to increase the living standards of the people in the south-eastern region of Turkey. However, the results in regard to preventing terrorism are not predictable because the project is not completed yet.

Turkey can be considered successful in his diplomatic efforts against PKK, especially during the capture of the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in 1999. During this period, Turkey cooperated with the U.S. and Israel, and that cooperation ended with the capture of Abdullah Ocalan (Founder and leader of PKK) in Kenya. Another achievement is that, the diplomatic efforts led to the listing of PKK as a terrorist organization in the US, Europe, Syria, Russia and Iran. Based on these developments, Turkey started receiving some extraditions of terrorists that were in hiding, especially in Syria, Russia and some European countries (Radu, 2001). In addition, PKK experienced problems with its financial transactions as well as raising funds for its activities, especially in the mentioned countries that banned its existence. Turkey had a clear stance that it would not tolerate its neighbors’ support to PKK terrorist activities. Due to this, Iran and Syria have banned PKK existence in their soils. However, this policy by itself is
not enough, if it was, then Turkey would not still be considering terrorism as a
National threat.

Eventually, the mentioned counter terrorism policies are all necessary if
used timely, but it is not clear which policies should be superior (given more
emphasis) and which ones should be applied as subordinate. At the moment
offensive measures seem to be the primary counter terrorism policy in Turkey.
However, we do not know whether that is the correct application to obtain long
term solutions. Such a concern automatically appears since terrorist
organizations are still able to recruit people, operate within the country, and
cause harm to the Turkish Nation. These facts indicate that the existing counter
policies lack the capacity to make the terror organizations become dysfunctional.
Therefore, the primary counter terrorism policy should be determined on the
findings of academic studies.

Chapter Conclusion

Chapter V discussed Turkey’s terrorism problem and the counter
measures. Terrorism in Turkey, as a case study, shows that fighting this problem
has many dimensions. The extent of the terrorism problem, the types of
organizations, the objectives of the terror organizations, and the counter
terrorism policies in Turkey against these threats are quite multifaceted. Although
Turkey applies an assortment of counter measures, they lack the ability to
significantly reduce terrorism in the country. Turkey’s current counter measures
indicate that the primary counter terrorism policies in the country are the
offensive ones. Nonetheless, depending heavily on offensive counter measures seems not to solve the problem. The existing terrorism in Turkey after a struggle of three decades is proof for that.

Eventually, the chapter does not suggest that the counter terrorism policies, particularly those in Turkey, are all unnecessary. Rather it suggests that since terrorism still exists in the country the exiting policies are not sufficient to reduce terrorism to a larger extent. In addition, it suggests that it is necessary to clarify their priority line. That is why new contemporary policies that aim at stopping individuals joining terror groups are necessary. For that purpose, a study is necessary to find out what needs influence individuals to join terror groups.
CHAPTER VI

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Chapter VI introduces the methods, hypotheses, data operationalization, and the analyses used to answer the questions forwarded in the research:

1. What needs do individual terrorists (confitents) state as being influential for them to join a terrorist organization?

2. Which needs of Maslow’s model are most influential for an individual terrorist (confitent) to become a member of a particular type of terrorist organization (i.e., rightist or other)?

The chapter explains what analyses are conducted to answer the main questions and the sub questions forwarded in the research. It further notes that the following four hypotheses have been developed to help answer the second question and examine the influence of needs and a confitent becoming a member of a certain type of terror organization. In addition, the chapter provides discussions on issues such as validity, reliability and concludes with explaining why the research does not need a new Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval for the data used in here.

Hypotheses

Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs framework purports that people are driven by five levels of needs including 1st physiological, 2nd level safety and security, 3rd
level social and affiliative, 4\textsuperscript{th} level esteem and recognition, and finally 5\textsuperscript{th} level self-actualization. The four two-directional hypotheses are related only to the second research question and have been developed to test the impact of various types of needs for a confident to become a member of a specific type of terror organization (rightist or other). First level physiological needs cannot be measured due to lack of variables in the secondary data set, and therefore no hypothesis is developed in relation to the first level of needs.

H1-A *confitent*'s need for self-actualization is significantly related to him/her becoming member of a certain type of terror group (rightist or other).

H2-A *confitent*'s need for esteem and recognition is significantly related to him/her becoming member of a certain type of terror group (rightist or other).

H3-A *confitent*'s need for socialization and affiliation is significantly related to him/her becoming member of a certain type of terror group (rightist or other).

H4-A *confitent*'s need for safety and security is significantly related to him/her becoming member of a certain type of terror group (rightist or other).

Method

The data to be used are taken from a survey conducted in 2008 whose results were partly reported by the primary investigator (PI) Ahmet Ekici. The self administered survey was conducted in Turkey in 9 prisons from 8 cities.\textsuperscript{1} The prisons housed both terrorists and other kinds of offenders. The 132 participants, (*confitents*) constituting the population sample for A. Ekici’s (2008) study were

\textsuperscript{1} The cities are Cizre, Kirklareli, Gumushane, Gaziantep, Ercis, Diyarbakir, Adiyaman, and Ceyhan
former members of terrorist organizations. The *confitents* are the imprisoned terrorists. They either surrendered or were captured by law enforcement agencies, and subsequently decided to cooperate and provide information about their organizations to the state officials. Among those imprisoned terrorists (*confitents*) who did not want to cooperate with the state officials, did not complete a survey (A. Ekici, 2008).

There are several reasons why data acquired from the survey research method is used in this research. Surveys are instruments used by a portion of a population to report their reaction to something or their behavior under a specific condition (Hagan, 2003). Additionally, the survey research method is suitable instrument for exploratory, explanatory, applied research and descriptive studies. It lends itself well to obtaining data from samples that contain individuals as units of analysis (Maxfield and Babbi, 2001); and in this case terrorist prisoners are the units of analysis.

The PI conducted the survey as a part of his Doctoral Dissertation. His study is titled “The Role of Law Enforcement Practices on Terrorist Recruitment: A study of the Impact of Traditional and Community Policing Practices on the Recruitment Process of Terrorist Organization Members.” The goal of his dissertation was to find out how law enforcement practices impact terrorist recruitment. He was concerned with whether rude and/or bad law enforcement practices contributed to an increase in terrorism recruitment. This research uses
part of his dataset, to find out what needs motivated an individual to join a terror
group in general and a specific group in particular.

The permission to use the data from the PI is attached as Appendix A.

This research utilizes secondary data due to the multiple benefits afforded by
doing so. Participants are members of terrorist organizations and surveying them
requires extensive time and effort such as acquiring permissions from the
General Directorate of Corrections which includes prison administrations and the
Ministry of Justice. Thus, using secondary data is easier for the researcher of this
work. In addition, the secondary data was available and it targeted a population
this research is interested in, hence it both saves time and effort. Likewise,
Singleton and Straits (2005) argue that, secondary data can be preferred since it
avoids extra burden for data collection, and is more cost efficient. On the other
hand, there was no guarantee that the researcher of this dissertation would get
the same permissions from the relevant institutions as the owner of the subject
data set. Hence, a data set that could potentially answer the research questions
of this work, but had already received IRB approval, and had been gathered
through the preferred research method (survey), serves the need of this research
very well, and is thus used.

The survey participants are, at the time this study was written, serving
their sentences in the 9 prisons in Turkey after they went through all their trial
and appealing processes. The Sam Houston State University IRB Commission
required the PI to deliver a note to the participants and the prison administrators
that the participants should consist of those who have exhausted all the appealing processes and that they will not lose or gain anything due to their participation in the survey. The confitents, total number (population) is 132, were contacted after special permissions from the Turkish Ministry of Justice and General Directorate of Corrections (Appendix B).

The surveys were handed out by special trained proctors to all of the voluntarily participating confitents and those who participated signed the consent form. The number of the filled and returned surveys is 95. However, four of the surveys could not be used by the PI because they lacked most of the answers. Another four cases (7, 38, 61, and 64) have been excluded from this study because they do not provide any of the answers needed for this study. The remaining 87 were considered in here and that indicates a good survey response rate of around 66% (65.9%); because an in class survey with a response rate of 50% is considered as a good response rate (IAR, 2007).

The proctors were instructed to pay attention to privacy and confidentiality issues set by Sam Houston State University in accordance with the Institutional Review Board (IRB) concerns. Accordingly, the surveys were to take place only when the confitents were given privacy in a room and the guards were outside the room for security reasons only. Those who were illiterate were aided by another confitent while filling their surveys. The surveys had to be returned to the proctors in an envelope which was sealed by the confitents themselves. The IRB approval is attached (Appendix D). The proctors were instructed not to conduct
the survey if there would be any violation of the guidelines set by the university by anybody (participants, prison staff and etc). After the surveys were completed, the proctors collected the surveys and the consent forms and sent them in different envelopes to the researcher. In brief, in no stage was any violation of confidentiality, privacy and instructions of the Sam Houston State University IRB Commission and the Dissertation Committee reported (A. Ekici, 2008).

The survey consists of three main parts (Appendix E). The first part contains questions about involvement in terrorism, the second part contains demographic questions, and the third part is about technology use and terrorism. This study utilizes the data that is pertinent to the needs of individuals which is gathered by the second part of the survey, and the part that collected the demographic answers. The secondary data has been released to use in this dissertation without any identification information about the participants. It only contains the data sheet (the questions posed and the responses of the participants).

Data Operationalization

The survey questionnaire is composed of multiple measures used to operationalize the needs and their influence on a constituent’s decision to joining a terror group. The variables under Question 12, “Who or what has been influential in your decision to join the group? (Please choose those that apply and please number from most to least important, “1” as the most important)” are recoded to create dummy variables. In addition, variables under Question 14, “Have the
behavior of any of the following had an impact in your decision to join the organization?” are also recoded in the same way as in Question 12 for this study in order to see in which level of need they fit in Maslow’s framework. Therefore, the multiple choice answers have been matched in a scale with individual needs based on theoretical and literary explanations from several scholars (e.g., Maslow, 1970; Gortner et al., 1997; Thompson and Rainey, 2003; Boeree, 2006).

A Chronbach’s alpha test is applied to measure the reliability of the scale in order to see whether the same set of variables provides the same response if they were used without recoding. In other words, Cronbach’s alpha test is used to check whether there is internal consistency between the included variables. Henceforth, if a participant has put a number after a given option, for this study, it means that the participant had that need before he joined a terror group. If the participant did not number an option, for this study, it means the participant did not have that need among reasons for joining a terror group. Accordingly, numbered variables are recoded as (yes=1), and unnumbered variables are recoded as (no=0) for this study.

No change whatsoever has been made in the questions. All the variables in Question 12 have been used in here except one. Variable 12s-other, has not been used in the scale because participants provided answers that were already mentioned earlier. The given answers were friends, economics and relatives, and these were already among the choices and are included in the scale. On the other hand, only five variables have been used from the seven possible in
Question 14. Variables 14f (no one had an impact) and 14g (don’t know) were not considered because they did not indicate a need and because of the fact that the secondary data does not contain an explanation about these answers.

Due to the assumption of the theory utilized, that only one level of need motivates an individual at a time, the primary reason of the participants for joining has been determined by looking at those reasons marked with 1. Other variables marked with numbers are also included in the remaining analyses for each need.

**Dependent Variable**

This study has one dependent variable (Dichotomous), type of a terror organization. The odds of a *confitent* becoming member of a certain type of terrorist organization based on his/her perception of needs, is expressed in two categories: (1) “the odds of a *confitent* becoming member of a *rightist* terrorist organization” and (0) is “the odds of a *confitent* becoming member of an *other* terrorist organization.” Thus, rightist =1 and other =0. The secondary data that is used contains terror groups which either fit in the “rightist” terror group category or “leftist” terror group category, according to the classification made by the Turkish National Police Counter Terrorism Department and some scholars (e.g., Alkan, 2002; EGM, 2009). However, there are some non-rightist groups that may or may not be viewed as totally leftist in other research, thus these cases are classified as *other* in this research.
Independent Variables

Since 1\textsuperscript{st} level physiological needs could not be operationalized, this study uses four independent variables based on the other four levels of needs in Maslow's framework. Although one variable (economics), from Question 12 may seem to be usable for measurement of two levels of independent variables (1\textsuperscript{st} level and 2\textsuperscript{nd} level safety and security needs), it fits more in the measurement of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} level needs. In other words, the first level of needs Maslow indicates are those needed for survival (e.g., air, water, food, sex, shelter). But the literature makes little reference to people joining terror groups due to these very basic needs. On the other hand, scholars (e.g., Akers, 2000; Sambanis, 2004; Koseli, 2006) indicate that job, regular income and equal distribution of wealth are factors people want to obtain and may consider terrorism if they lack them. In addition, since variables have to be mutually exclusive (fitting in one category) (Singleton and Straits, 2005), the same variable cannot be utilized to measure both needs; due to the risk that it may cause multicollinearity. In that case there will be a high correlation (0.75 or more, some take 0.70) between two variables (1\textsuperscript{st} level and 2\textsuperscript{nd} level needs as index independent variables). That indicates that two variables are providing the same information, which should be avoided (Research Consultation, 2007). Eventually, the independent variables have been created as following:

X1- \textit{Safety and security needs} are measured by creating an index variable through the sum of six variables which are presented in table 2:
Table 2

Safety and Security Needs

Included Variables from Question 12

- Economic conditions
- Need for protection
- The law enforcement viewed me as a potential terrorist
- The pressure and force of the organization
- Lack of education
- Forced by others

Each of these six items is measured with two dummy variables (1-0). If the variable is marked or numbered, then it means that the need was there (yes=1), if not marked or numbered it means that the participant did not have that need while becoming a member (no=0). The summed responses to this six-item scale turned out to have a Cronbach’s $\alpha = .649$ reliability level, which is an acceptable reliability level because it is possible that some social studies are lenient for a .60 Cronbach’s $\alpha$ reliability level (Miller, 1995), and the fact that the scale consists of low number of items.

These variables were used to measure safety and security needs because Baccaglini (1993) and Decker and Van Winkle (1996) assert that economic reasons are among push factors as why individuals join some groups, particularly violent ones. Teymur (2007) has found out that a great majority of DHKP/C terrorists in Turkey come from conditions of poverty. Koseli (2006) concludes that Turkey needs to increase economic prosperity to prevent terrorism because poverty breeds and feeds terrorism. In addition, Florez-Morris (2007) also found out that some individuals join terror groups in Columbia due to poor economic
conditions and their desire to improve these situations. Some survey participants in the study of Flores-Morris, who were ex-terrorists, clearly stated that they joined the terror group for job opportunities. Hence, based on these findings, the variable *economic conditions* is classified as a safety and security need indicator because it refers merely to the job security and stability need mentioned among the second level needs. It indicates the need to provide for the individual himself and/or the need to provide also for the family.

Virgil and Long (1990) maintain that threats from others, and the necessity of protection from others are factors that push people to join terror groups. Taylor and Quayle (1994) in his study on Irish terrorists and Florez-Morris (2007) in his study on Columbian terrorists argues that security and protection from excessive law enforcement practices is a factor that causes individuals to join terror groups. Therefore, the variable *need for protection* is classified as a safety and security need indicator because it implies that the individual has the need to be protected from others (e.g., protection from law enforcement, from another terror group, from other individuals in the community). Another variable relating to the need for security is the perception of the individual being labeled as a terrorist, which may result in unwanted arrest, interrogation or physical harm. This is referred to as *the law enforcement viewed me as a potential terrorist* variable. Similar justification is valid for the variable, the *pressure and force of the organization*, because it refers to the need of oneself or family members feeling secure from coercion from the terrorist organization. In that case the individual looks for
protection against possible harms from the terror group itself by joining it. Among these harms could be kidnapping, disappearance, physical injuries and even killings.

The variable, *lack of education*, refers to the need for education that impacts an individual’s personal development, obtaining a job and securing his/her future. As Merton (1938) and Brett (2003) note, in an environment where employment is very competitive and unemployment rates are high, a person lacking education has a lower chance for finding a secure job. Similarly, Cuesta and Salverda (2009) in their study in the Netherlands, Denmark, Spain and Italy – through using the European Household panel (1995-2001) – found out that high levels of general education and in job training secures the occupation and increases the chance for a higher paying career. Hence, if somebody states that he/she joined a terror group due to lack of education, it means he/she did that to obtain the means for survival. The variable, *forced by others*, refers also to the need of feeling secure. However, in this case it indicates the threat caused by the integrations of the terror group in the community. These integrated parts of the terror group could be individuals or groups who are recruiting people for the terror group, or terrorists who carry out attacks in cities. A common application in such cases is that the recruiters threaten to kidnap, impose bodily harm and even kill in case the individual remains uncooperative. The harm may be inflicted to immediate family members of the individual as well. Then the individual joins the
terror group in cases where he/she has no other alternative to secure himself and his family members, who may be harmed as well.

**X2- Social and affiliative needs** are measured by creating an index variable through the sum of six variables as shown in table-3:

Table 3

**Social and Affiliative Needs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Included Variables from Question 12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a- My friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b- My school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c- Close relatives (immediate family)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d- Far relatives (Extended family)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n- I was an outcast in my community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p- The environment and culture in which I grew up</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each of these six items is measured with two dummy variables (1-0). If the variable is marked or numbered, then it means that the need was there (yes=1), if not marked or numbered it means that the participant did not have that need while becoming a member (no=0). The summed responses to the six-item scale turned out to have a Cronbach’s $\alpha = .706$ reliability level, which is a good reliability level.

These variables were used to measure the social and affiliative needs because, Shaw (1986) and Abuza (2006) view friends, family members, kinship, schools and student association as parts of the social environment of an individual. In addition, Payne et al, (1990 as cited in Florez-Morris, 2007) notes that individuals may join political activists for social involvement, and White
(2002) argues the same about individuals joining terror groups in order to be with their peers. Florez-Morris, (2007) includes acquaintances and also mentions family members as parts of the social environment of individuals that may cause some to join terror groups. Therefore, the variables *my friends, close relatives (immediate family), and far relatives (extended family)* are classified as indicators of social and affiliative needs because all refer to the social environment of the individual. If these factors have compelled the individual to join, then, that was because the person wanted to belong in that social environment. However, *my school* is an environment (like student associations). It is not the environment that makes the individual join, rather as White, (2002), Kule (2005), Teymur (2007), Florez-Morris (2007) and A. Ekici (2008) argue, it is the people (e.g., peers at school) with whom the individual socializes and leads them to the point to where they join because of the need of belonging and being affiliated with their peers. The variables *I was an outcast in my community* and *the environment and culture in which I grew up*, both indicate the need of belonging. In regard to that, Vigil and Long (1990) state that belonging to an ignored minority group or being a marginal individual in a community may make a person be lenient with marginal groups including terror groups due to seeking socialization and/or belonging. In addition, Baccaglini (1993) and Decker and Van Winkle (1996) draws the attention to the culture people grow in as a factor causing individuals to join terror marginal and/or terror groups. Concurrent with these arguments, Waldman (as cited in, Florez-Morris, 2007) indicates that, for instance, a revolutionary climate
may influence individuals to become members of a terror organization. In other words, the individual who joined due to any of these factors has identified him or herself with the announced characteristics of the terror group because his/her environment has raised him/her in a culture similar to the beliefs of the terror group. Thus, at the end when the individual got the opportunity, he/she decided to join the terror group in order to belong and socialize with like minded people.

X3- *Esteem and recognition needs* are measured with an index variable created through the sum of eight variables. The included variables are shown in table 4:

Table 4

*Esteem and Recognition Needs*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Included Variables from Questions 12 and 14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f- Inequality in the society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g- Behavior of law enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h- Behavior of public officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a- Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b- Gendarme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c- Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d- Municipal Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e- Public Official (non-security and law enforcement)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each of these eight items is measured with two dummy variables (1-0). If the variable is marked or numbered, then it means that the need was there while becoming a member (yes=1), if not marked or numbered it means that the participant did not have that need while becoming a member (no=0). The
summed responses to the eight-item scale turned out to have a good reliability level, *Cronbach’s α* = .737.

These variables were used to measure the esteem and recognition needs because, Honneth (as cited in Leeuwen, 2006) argues that the recognition concept has three aspects. Self-confidence is the ability to state one’s own needs and wishes. Self-respect appears through the sense of having equal rights, and thus being recognized as a person, and self-esteem, is the positive self-image of an individual’s own achievements and capacities. For that reason, any consequent disrespect for each type of recognition can be considered as the violation of the body, the denial of rights and the denigration of a way of living. Thus, people and institutions need to prevent inflicting personal injuries. Therefore, the variable *inequality in the society*, as a reason to join a terror group, indicates to the need for equal treatment to have self esteem and respect from others. In other words, if one joins a terror group because of inequality, he/she joins the terror group because he/she thinks “I am not recognized by the society, but the terror group views me as important and equal.” All the other variables: *behavior of law enforcement officers, behavior of public officials (not security and law enforcement related), police, gendarme, military, municipal officials, and public officials (not security and law enforcement related)* are about rude or disrespectful behavior of different people and different institutions. Therefore, if people and institutions influence an individual to join a terror group, that is because they disrespect the person and do not see him/her as important
part of the community. On the other hand, the terror group welcomes him/her and argues that he/she deserves better treatment and so the individual joins the terror group. Thus, they are related with an individual’s need of self esteem, recognition, and being respected by others.

X4- *Self-actualization need* is measured with an index variable as well. Three variables are summed to create the index and measure the need. The included variables are presented in Table 5:

Table 5

*Self-Actualization Need*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Included Variables from Question 12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i-Political reasons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j-Propaganda of the organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l-Sharing the goal of the organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each of these three items is measured with two dummy variables (1-0). If the variable is marked or numbered, then it means that the need was there while becoming a member (yes=1), if not marked or numbered it means that the participant did not have that need while becoming a member (no=0). Summed responses to the three-item scale turned out to have an acceptable reliability level, *Cronbach’s α*=.649, because it is possible that some social studies are lenient for a .60 *Cronbach’s α* reliability level (Miller, 1995), and the fact that the scale consists of low number of items.

Variables, political reasons, propaganda of the organization and *sharing the goal of the organization* are used to measure the self actualization need.
because if a person is motivated to join a terror group due to any or both of these needs, that means he/she is beyond satisfying the other primary needs that Maslow defines. The individual has satisfied the basic needs, the social and affiliative needs, and esteem and recognition needs. For instance, the PKK argues that its ultimate goal is to establish a Marxist-Leninist independent Kurdish state on lands from Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq in order to promote the rights of Kurds, which they claim are not given (Aftergood, 2004). In addition, Florez-Morris (2007) argues that terror organization’s political propaganda is the fifth motivational factor for individuals to join subversive groups. He basically points out that terror organizations use political propaganda for their recruitment. Therefore, if a person joins a terror organization due to propaganda, that is because of the political propaganda that includes the reasons for their existence as well as their political goals. Hence, a person who joins then is somebody who is in the process of doing the best he/she is capable of (e.g., changing the political system) and is willing to work to achieve the goals of the terrorist organization, which is beyond satisfying the other needs.

To illustrate the matching, a table marked as appendix F has been provided. The table shows all the utilized variables from the secondary data to create the four independent variables. It also illustrates in what section of the theory each variable is based on for its classification. After developing the scale, all independent variables remain as continuous scale variables. The processing of the variables from the secondary data is displayed in figure 4. The letters are
for illustration purpose only. Actual variables are named as they appear in the secondary data as explained earlier.

Figure 4. The Processing of Variables.

Control Variables

This study has four control variables: Age group, region of birth, marital status, and education. They have been included as control variables because of the possibility that age, birth place, marital status and education may affect the perception of needs of the confitents. A higher amount of control variable inclusion is not preferred because the number of cases included in the analyses
is limited naturally by the fact that obtaining data from real terrorists is very
difficult. In addition, some demographic variables could not be used because
there was not enough representation in the secondary data. For instance, there
was only one female, and 28 (32%) of the participants did not provide information
about their income.

X5- Age group: For this study there is the need to find out at what age the
individual joined the terror group in order to determine whether there is any
difference in regard to needs between juveniles and adults for becoming
members of terror groups. The age of the individual while joining the terror group
was calculated by subtracting the year of birth from the year of joining the terror
group. The age group variable consists of two categories: Juveniles and Adults.
The category juvenile includes participants ranging from 1 to 18 years old, and
the adults group has a range of 19 years old and higher. The variable has been
measured by coding Juveniles as 0 and Adults as 1.

X6- Region of birth: The variable is included in this study to find out
whether needs of confitents from different regions differ while becoming a
member of a terror group. Such information will direct the development of policies
with relation to specific regions. The item is measured by first obtaining the traffic
plate number of the birth place of each survey participant and then categorizing
these numbers accordingly. The categorization is made with consideration of the
regions in Turkey by creating a category for those born outside Turkey, and by
including a category for those who did not provide an answer. The secondary
data variable consisted of seven categories: 1- Mediterranean, 2- South East, 3-East, 4- Marmara, 5- Central Anatolia, 6- Syria – Iraq, 7- No answer. However, for this study, the seven categories have been recoded into two groups: Eastern regions (1) and other regions (0), because the descriptive analyses have revealed that majority of the *confitents* are from eastern regions (southeast and east).

**X7- Marital status**: The marital status variable is included in the analyses due to the expectation that married and single people may have different perceptions of needs. The variable is measured by recoding the four different categories (single-1, married-2, widowed-3, divorced-4) in the secondary data as, married (1), and single (0), which includes single, widowed and divorced categories.

**X8- Education**: Education is considered in the analyses for the possibility that people with different level of education may perceive different needs. The secondary data had 10 categories for the education variable: illiterate-1, literate or elementary school-2, some middle school-3, middle school-4, some high school-5, high school-6, some college-7, college-8, graduate degree-9, and doctorate degree-10. The education variable has been recoded for this study and has two categories: Higher education (1) and compulsory/lower education (0). The Turkish National Education law obliges each citizen to obtain the compulsory education that includes 8th grade (until high school - age 14) (EURYDICE, 2008). The categorization is based on the mentioned logic. The government feels that
education until age 14 is necessary for a regular citizen and that higher education should be a matter of choice.

Analyses

This study is a quantitative explanatory research. The first question will be answered with descriptive analysis which has only a descriptive nature. Further descriptive, correlation analyses (matrix), and cross-tabulation analyses are applied. These analyses were done in order to see the effect of the independent and the control variables on the dependent variable (odds of a confitent becoming a member of a certain type of terror group due to perceived needs). It also looks into whether there are any differences in relation to the, age group (adult-Juvenile), region of birth (eastern regions-other regions), marital status (single-married) and the education level (compulsory/lower-higher education) of the participants and their perception of needs for joining a certain terror group.

To answer the second question, the four hypotheses were tested. Therefore, the secondary data is divided into two groups: Individuals who joined rightist terror groups and individuals who joined other terror groups (control group). A binary logistic regression analyses was conducted by using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software to identify the factors (among Maslow’s needs) that significantly contribute to a confitent becoming a rightist or an other terrorist group member. The related four hypotheses were tested with binary logistic regression because there is only one dichotomous DV which has only two categories (1-0), and the study has more than two IVs. Binary
logistic regression analysis is appropriate because it predicts the affiliation with
the target group based on statistical analyses through considering the
combination of the IVs to predict changes on the DV. In other words, logistic
regression predicts “…odds probability of the DV occurring as the values of the
IVs change” (Mertler and Vannatta, 2005). Logistic regression is able to find out
the influence of each independent and control variable on the dependent variable
once they are introduced together into the system. Of course, this does not imply
that the independent variable that appears to be significant in the analyses is the
only factor, but that it is the one or one of the most influencing ones among the
included variables.

The study does not have a predictive nature in regard to an individual
joining a terror group in general due to needs (1st question). Yet, the only
prediction in the study is made while answering the second question to find out
what kind of impact needs may have on a confident for becoming a member of a
specific type of terror group. However, in that case too, one must bear in mind
that the study has only four control variables and that there may be other
variables that affect this selection process of an individual. For instance, type of
religion may be an important factor that may influence the individual but the
secondary data used in this study does not provide any information about the
religious belief of the participants, thus it could not be considered. Though in
social sciences it is never possible to think of and include all variables in an
analysis. In other words, there are always limitations.
Then, three models are created (table-7) to find out the relation between the independent/control variables (X1-X8) and the dependent variable with two categories. The first model contains the four control variables, the second model contains the four independent variables and the third model contains all control and independent variables.

Table 6

Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 1 Control Variables</th>
<th>Model 2 Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 3 Control Variables and Independent Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X5, X6, X7, X8</td>
<td>X1, X2, X3, X4</td>
<td>X5, X6, X7, X8, X1, X2, X3, X4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the other hand, these kinds of studies require considering issues such as reliability, validity and IRB in order for the study to be complete and academically acceptable.

Reliability and Validity Issues

Validity refers to whether we are measuring what we want to (Hagan, 2003) and reliability refers to stability of the study and to obtaining the same results when the steps mentioned in the study are repeated. Another person who repeats the study should find similar outcomes. The collected data must be in accordance of answering our research question. Otherwise the validity of the research might be questioned (Hagan, 2003; Singleton and Straits, 2005).

There are no concerns in regard to the validity of this study because it uses the answers from secondary data which also bears information from
terrorists in regard to how and why they joined terror groups. Thus, the answers in the survey about what influenced people to join terror groups and their demographic information answer the main questions in this study. They can be used to find out the relation between needs and an individual's motivation for joining a terror group in general or a specific group in particular (rightist or other). In addition, since this study used scales to measure Maslow’s five needs, the reliability and validity of these scales are measured with Chronbach’s Alpha tests and they all turned out to be on acceptable levels.

The demographic questions in the survey assist to find out whether there is any difference concerning the needs for joining terror groups in general and specific groups in particular between age groups, level of education, region of birth and marital status. In sum, this research studies individuals. It looks into the relation between needs and the individual’s motivation for joining a terror group. Therefore, the data must come from individuals who are or were members of terror groups. Since the secondary data comes from individuals who were members of terror groups, there are no validity concerns for this study. Furthermore, there is no reliability problem either because the same results can be found if the same study was to be repeated by another scholar because every step in the research is clearly noted here.

IRB Issues

IRB approval is not needed for the data used in this study because it is using secondary data. The data already went through an IRB approval at Sam
Houston State University and its IRB approval is attached as Appendix D. In addition, the researcher asked whether the secondary data on human subjects requires another IRB approval from the University of North Texas and the reply was negative by phone; this has also been confirmed by the IRB Commission in writing. The communication made with a University of North Texas (UNT) IRB Commission member confirms this by e-mail. Appendix C is attached for this purpose.

Chapter Conclusion

Chapter VI introduced the hypotheses, the method, data operationalization, and the analyses sections that are used to find out what perceived needs impact an individuals’ motivation to join a terror group, and the odds of a confitent (an individual who is already a terrorist) becoming member of a certain type of terror group (rightist or an other-leftist in this case). The chapter concluded with the discussions on validity, reliability and the IRB issues.
CHAPTER VII

FINDINGS

Introduction

This chapter presents the findings of the quantitative analyses. Information about the sample data and descriptive analyses are followed by bivariate, cross tabulation and binary logistic regression analyses. The chapter explains that descriptive analyses served to determine the primary need stated for joining a terror group. Bivariate analyses show the association between variables. Cross-tabulation analyses show the variation in a confitent’s membership to a certain type of terror group based on needs and demographics; and to see the variation in their perception of needs based on the same demographic variables. The chapter concludes with the logistic regression analyses which serve to examine the effects of each of the needs and of the demographic variables on a confitent’s membership to a terror group while controlling the effect of the other variables.

Quantitative Findings

The demographic frequencies in relation to the sample population are presented in Table 7. There are a few attention drawing characteristics concerning the survey participants (N=87). There was only one female in the sample, approximately 95% are males; three did not answer the gender question. More than half are single (52%), and two did not answer the marital status
question. Nine percent are illiterate; 30% can read or have obtained some or complete elementary school education; approximately 47% attended some high school or higher education (college or graduate); two participants did not provide an answer to the education level question. None of them mentioned their previous occupation. Approximately 25% of the *confitents* said they earned less than $300 per month before they joined the terror group, while only 18% stated that they made more than $1000 per month. Twenty-eight of the participants did not provide an answer in regard to their income (32%). More than half of them (53%) are from the Southeast regions of Turkey while 11 participants did not mention their location of birth. The majority (63%) mentioned that they were a member of other/leftist, while one person did not answer this question. Finally, it appears that 34.5% (30) of the participants were juveniles and 65.5% (57) were adults (above 18 years) when joining the terror group.

Table 7

*Demographic Characteristics of the Sample Group (N=87)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic Characteristics</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Male</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>95.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marital status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Married</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>44.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Illiterate</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Literate/Elementary School</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Some Middle School</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Middle School</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Some High School</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. High School</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Some College</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. College</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Graduate Degree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(table continues)*
Table 7 (continued)

Demographic Characteristics | N  | %    
--- | --- | --- 
**Income**  
11. Less than $300 | 22 | 25.29 
12. $300-$500 | 9  | 10.34 
13. $500-$700 | 2  | 2.30  
14. $700-$900 | 4  | 4.60 
15. $900-$1000 | 6  | 6.90  
16. More than $1000 | 16 | 18.40  
**Region of Birth**  
17. Southeast | 46 | 52.87 
18. East | 22 | 25.29  
19. Mediterranean | 1  | 1.15  
20. Marmara | 2  | 2.30  
21. Central Anatolia | 1  | 1.15  
22. Syria-Iraq | 4  | 4.60  
23. No Answer | 11 | 12.64  
**Membership**  
24. DHKP/C | 2  | 2.30  
25. TKP/ML | 1  | 1.15  
26. TIKKO | 2  | 2.30  
27. PKK | 55 | 63.22  
28. Hezbollah (Rightist) | 23 | 26.44  
29. Unspecified | 3  | 3.45  
**Age group**  
30. Adult >19 years | 57 | 65.50  
31. Juvenile <18 years | 30 | 34.50  

Table 8 presents the stated primary reason of each survey participant for joining a terror group. The results show that 43 individuals (49.4%) mentioned social and affiliation need as their primary reason for joining a terror group. This was followed by esteem and recognition need which was mentioned by 21 individuals (24.2%), and safety and security need which is reported by 20 people (23%). Finally, self-actualization need was accounted for by 3 people (3.4%) as their primary reason for joining a terror group.
Table 8

\textit{Stated Primary Reason for Joining a Terror Group}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Need Variables</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Safety and Security</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Social and Affiliation</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Esteem and Recognition</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Self-Actualization</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bivariate Correlation

Table 9 shows the Pearson’s correlations between the variables used in the study. The findings show a significant positive correlation between social and affiliation need and safety and security need ($r=0.229$, $p \leq 0.05$). In addition, self-actualization need is positively correlated with both safety and security need ($r=0.285$, $p \leq 0.01$) and esteem and recognition need ($r=0.379$, $p \leq 0.01$), respectively. The Pearson’s correlation shows a positive and moderate relationship for both variables. Education has a positive moderate correlation with social and affiliation need ($r=0.277$, $p \leq 0.01$) and self-actualization need ($r=0.307$, $p \leq 0.01$). Finally, there is also a significant relationship between becoming a member of a rightist terror group and social and affiliation needs ($r=0.374$, $p \leq 0.01$), as well as becoming rightist and the level of educational attainment ($r=0.472$, $p \leq 0.01$). The Pearson’s correlation shows a positive moderate relationship between the variables. There are no other spotted noteworthy relationships between the variables in the correlation matrix.
Table 9

Correlation Matrix

| Variables                      | Mean | SD  | 1     | 2     | 3     | 4     | 5     | 6     | 7     | 8     | 9     |
|--------------------------------|------|-----|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| **Needs**                      |      |     |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 1 Safety and Security Needs    | 1.57 | 1.56| 1.00  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 2 Social and Affiliation Needs | 2.05 | 1.74| 0.23* | 1.00  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 3 Esteem and Recognition Needs| 1.45 | 1.71| 0.05  | -0.21 | 1.00  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 4 Self-Actualization Need      | 0.59 | 0.93| 0.29**| 0.15  | 0.38**| 1.00  |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| **Demographic**                |      |     |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 5 Higher Education             | 0.41 | 0.50| -0.09 | 0.28* | 0.18  | 0.31**| 1.00  |       |       |       |       |       |
| 6 Married                      | 0.46 | 0.50| -0.19 | -0.10 | -0.01 | -0.06 | 0.05  | 1.00  |       |       |       |       |
| 7 Eastern Regions              | 0.78 | 0.42| 0.02  | -0.11 | 0.11  | 0.03  | -0.12 | 0.11  | 1.00  |       |       |       |
| 8 Adult                        | 0.66 | 0.48| -0.11 | 0.01  | 0.11  | 0.04  | -0.08 | 0.19  | -0.21 | 1.00  |       |       |
| **Membership**                 |      |     |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 9 Rightist                     | 0.28 | 0.45| -0.08 | 0.37**| -0.20 | 0.13  | 0.47**| 0.11  | 0.05  | -0.17 | 1.00  |       |

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed)
N ranges from 76 to 87
Cross-Tabulations

Cross-tabulations were conducted with recoded independent variables (yes=1, no=0) to examine the effects of perceived needs and the effects of the demographic variables on membership in a certain type of terror group. The chi-square test was used to measure the statistical significance of the effects in all cross-tabulation analyses in this research.

Table 10 demonstrates the results of the cross-tabulation analyses and the chi-square significance test between needs and membership in a certain type of terror group. The results of the chi-square show that there is a significant relationship between social and affiliation needs and a *confitent* becoming a member of a rightist terror group ($p \leq 0.05$). In total, 77% of the sample population perceived social and affiliation needs. Among this percentage, 64% of the *confitents* who perceived the social and affiliation need chose to become members of other terror groups while almost 36% of the *confitents* who perceived the same need chose to become members of a rightist terror group.

The results of the chi-square test indicate that there is also a statistically significant relation between perception of esteem and recognition need and becoming a member of a rightist terror organization ($p \leq 0.05$). In sum, 56.6% of the sample population indicated their perception of esteem and recognition need. Almost 81% of the *confitents* who perceived esteem and recognition need chose to become members of other (leftists) groups and 19.1% of the *confitents* who perceived this need chose to become members of a rightist group. Remaining
need variables did not yield a statistically significant relationship with becoming a rightist terror group member.

Table 10

*Terrorist Group Affiliation in Relation to Needs*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Needs Variables</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Total Need Perception (%)</th>
<th>Rightist</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes# (%)</td>
<td>No# (%)</td>
<td>(\chi^2)</td>
<td>(P)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety and Security Needs</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>(72.30)</td>
<td>14(23.30)</td>
<td>46(76.70)</td>
<td>2.071</td>
<td>0.150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and Affiliation Needs</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>(77.10)</td>
<td>23(36.00)</td>
<td>41(64.10)</td>
<td>9.446</td>
<td>0.002**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esteem and Recognition Needs</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>(56.60)</td>
<td>9(19.10)</td>
<td>38(80.90)</td>
<td>3.965</td>
<td>0.046*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Actualization Need</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>(32.50)</td>
<td>9(33.30)</td>
<td>18(66.70)</td>
<td>0.632</td>
<td>0.427</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(\text{** } \text{p} \leq 0.01 \text{ ** } \text{p} \leq 0.05\) Notes: Percentages are in parentheses

The results of the cross-tabulation and the chi-square significance test concerning terrorist group affiliation in relation to the demographic variables are presented in Table 11. The table shows that there is a significant correlation between the variable education attainment and a *confident* becoming a member of a rightist terror group (\(p \leq 0.01\)). Almost 40% of the sample has higher education. Among them, 53% of the *confidents* who have higher education joined a rightist terror group and approximately 47% of the *confidents* who have higher education became a member of other/leftist terror group. And 60.5% of the sample has compulsory/lower education. Among this percentage, 10.2% of the *confidents* with compulsory/lower education joined a rightist terror group and 89.8% of the *confidents* who have compulsory/lower education joined an other/leftist terror group. The same table and the results of the chi-square test
indicate that there is no other statistically significant relation between other variables.

Table 11

_Terrorist Group Affiliation in Relation to Demographics_

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic Variables</th>
<th>Rightist</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>( \chi^2 )</th>
<th>( P )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes # (%)</td>
<td>No # (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>17(53.10)</td>
<td>15(46.90)</td>
<td>18.026</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compulsory/Lower Ed.</td>
<td>5(10.20)</td>
<td>44(89.80)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.328</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>12(32.40)</td>
<td>25(67.60)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region of Birth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.666</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Regions</td>
<td>19(28.80)</td>
<td>47(71.20)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult</td>
<td>12(22.20)</td>
<td>42(77.80)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** \( p \leq 0.001 \)

Notes: Percentages are in parentheses

_Logistic Regression Analyses_

Table 12 presents the findings concerning the logistic regression analyses. Logistic regression analyses were used to further examine the effects of the needs variables and the demographic variables on a _confident’s_ terrorist group affiliation. This method helps us estimate one independent variable’s effect on the dependent variable while controlling the effects of the other independent and control variables. Logistic regression has only two assumptions which indicate that the method is sensitive to multicollinearity and outliers. Therefore,
prior to the logistic regression analyses the correlation matrix table has been closely examined for high correlations (above 0.7) between the variables to see whether there is any potential multicollinearity problem. No serious problem has been observed. The same concern is also checked by examining the standard errors for the variables included in the analyses for all three models. None of the demographic and need variables in the three models have a standard error larger than 2.0, which means there is not any serious multicollinearity problem.

Model one includes only the demographic variables (age group, region of birth, marital status, and education). After checking the multicollinearity assumption, the other assumption for the outliers has been checked too by observing and examining the studentized residuals. Studentized residual is a statistical technique utilized to detect outliers in a dataset (Cook, 1982). Using the criteria of studentized residuals greater or lesser than 2.0, four outliers were determined. When including these two outliers, the overall predictive accuracy rate was 79.0%. Since there were four outliers it was necessary to compute a revised model by excluding the outliers. The predictive accuracy rate for the revised model turned out to be 83.1%. Due to the difference over 2% in the predictive accuracy rate, the second model has been used because Schwab (2002) argues that 2% or more difference in predictive accuracy rate shows that outliers can affect the results of logistic regression analyses.

Model one displays the regression coefficients (B), odds ratio [Exp(B)] and significance level. The full model appears to be statistically significant
\( \chi^2 = 34.085, p \leq 0.001 \). The model explained the variance in the *confitents’* membership in a certain type of terror group up to 35.8% (Cox and Snell R Square) and 54% (Nagelkerke R Square). The findings show that one demographic variable, education, has been found to be statistically significant in regard to explaining the variation in the membership of *confitents* in a particular type of terror group \( (p \leq 0.001) \). The probability of the Wald statistic for the education variable is \( p = 0.000 \), less than or equal to the level of significance of 0.01. The null hypothesis that the \( b \) coefficient for education was equal to zero was rejected. The remaining results of the analyses reveal that there was no other demographic variable in the model that has a statistically important correlation with *confitents’* membership in a certain type of terror group.

Model two includes only the four needs variables. The multicollinearity assumption has been checked by looking at the standard errors, and no serious problem has been detected. The other assumption for the outliers has been checked by examining the studentized residuals. Using the criteria of studentized residuals greater or lesser than 2.0, three outliers were determined. When including these three outliers the overall predictive accuracy rate was 73.5%. Since there were three outliers it was necessary to compute a revised model by excluding the outliers. The predictive accuracy rate for the revised model turned out to be 76.2%. Due to the difference over 2% in the predictive accuracy rate the second model has been used.
Model two presents the regression coefficients (B), odds ratio [Exp(B)] and significance level and the full model appears to be statistically significant ($\chi^2=26.374$, $p \leq 0.001$). The model explained the variance in a confitent’s membership in a particular type of terror group up to 28.1% (Cox and Snell R Square) and 41.6% (Nagelkerke R Square). The results of the analyses reveal that three needs variables (social and affiliation, esteem and recognition, and self-actualization) have been found to be statistically significant for explaining the variation in membership of a confitent in a certain type of terror group. Safety and security need is not statistically significant concerning explaining the variations in membership in a group.

Model three includes both the demographic and the needs variables. Using the criteria of studentized residuals greater or lesser than 2.0, four outliers were determined. When including these outliers the overall predictive accuracy rate was 86.4%. Since there were outliers, it was necessary to compute a revised model by excluding the outliers. The predictive accuracy rate for the revised model turned out to be 91%. Due to the difference over 2% in the predictive accuracy rate, the second model has been used in the study.

The full model appears to be statistically significant ($\chi^2=46.268$, $p \leq 0.001$). The Cox and Snell R Square indicates that the model accounts for 44.7% of the variance in a confitent’s membership in a certain type of terror group. However, the Nagelkerke R Square indicates that the model accounted for 66.7% of the total variance in the same variable. This suggests that the set of demographic
and needs variables discriminates between *confitents* becoming a member of a rightist terror group and those becoming members of other terror groups. The prediction success for the cases used in the revised model was relatively high, with an overall prediction accuracy rate of 91%.

Model three presents the regression coefficients (B), odds ratio [Exp(B)] and significance level. The regression table reports two variables: education and esteem and recognition needs appear as statistically significant predictors of a *confitent* becoming a member of a certain terror group ($p \leq 0.01$, $p \leq 0.05$ respectively). In fact, education is positively significant while esteem and recognition shows negative significance. Education has been found to be statistically significant in regard to explaining the variation in the dependent variable ($p \leq 0.01$). The probability of the Wald statistic for the education variable is $p=0.000$, less than or equal to the level of significance of 0.01. The null hypothesis that the $b$ coefficient for education was equal to zero was rejected.
Table 12

**Logistic Regression Results - Confidants' Affiliation with a Terror Group Based on Needs and Demographics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model-1</th>
<th>Model-2</th>
<th>Model-3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demographics</td>
<td>Needs</td>
<td>Combination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Age group (Adult)</td>
<td>-1.450 (0.234)</td>
<td>-0.990 (0.372)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Region of Birth (Eastern Regions)</td>
<td>0.276 (1.317)</td>
<td>0.904 (2.470)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Marital status (Married)</td>
<td>0.531 (1.701)</td>
<td>1.029 (2.797)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Education (Higher)</td>
<td>4.063 (58.164) ***</td>
<td>3.932 (50.986) ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Safety and Security Needs</td>
<td>-0.486 (0.615)</td>
<td>0.128 (1.137)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Social Affiliation Needs</td>
<td>0.620 (1.859) **</td>
<td>0.427 (1.533)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Esteem and Recognition Needs</td>
<td>-0.831 (0.436)*</td>
<td>-0.859 (0.427) **</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Self-Actualization Need</td>
<td>1.156 (3.176) *</td>
<td>0.458 (1.581)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.536 (0.029) *</td>
<td>-1.891 (0.151) **</td>
<td>-4.639 (0.010) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2 log</td>
<td>49.658</td>
<td>63.600</td>
<td>40.341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi sq</td>
<td>34.085***</td>
<td>26.374***</td>
<td>46.268***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox</td>
<td>0.358</td>
<td>0.281</td>
<td>0.447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke</td>
<td>0.540</td>
<td>0.416</td>
<td>0.667</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* \(p = .05\)  ** \(p = .01\)  *** \(p = .001\)

Note: Exp(B) is shown in parentheses.
Chapter Conclusion

Chapter VII demonstrated the findings of the quantitative analyses performed on the date. Descriptive analyses were used to determine the primary need stated for joining a terror group. Cross-tabulation analyses were conducted to see the variation in a confitent’s membership to a certain type of terror group based on needs and demographics; and to see the variation in their perception of needs based on the same demographic variables. Finally, logistic regression analyses were used to examine the effects of each of the needs and of the demographic variables on a confitent’s membership to a terror group while controlling the effect of the other variables.
CHAPTER VIII
ANALYSES OF FINDINGS

Introduction

Chapter VIII presents the analyses of the descriptive, bivariate correlation, cross-tabulation and multivariate statistics. The analyses aid to understand what the descriptive and statistical findings mean for this study. The analyses reveal the primary need stated by the confitents for joining a terror group; explain the differences in a confitent’s membership in a certain type of terror group based on needs and demographic variables. In addition, remaining statistical analyses clarify whether demographic variables effect the perception of a confitent’s needs and whether needs and demographic variables have an effect on a confitent’s choice of terror group for membership.

As the basis of quantitative research, this study relied on secondary data to answer the mentioned questions. As King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) and Singleton and Strait (2005) argue, social science is concerned with obtaining descriptive and causal inferences in relation to the world. In this research the findings are quantitative. The numerical findings are delineated in order to understand what they mean concerning the topic at hand in this study, and to provide answers to the research questions. Hence, only the analyses of descriptive findings, cross-tabulation and binary logistic regression are conducted
and presented in Chapter VIII but the discussion of these findings are presented in the next chapter. The chapter ends with the conclusion remarks.

Analyses

The initial concern of this study was to find out the primary reason why individuals join terror groups by studying their needs. The study also attempted to reveal whether the demographic characteristics of a confident determine the type of terror group he/she will join and whether their perception of needs will differ based on demographic characteristics. Upon these, the last concern was to find out whether unlike terror groups should be countered with different measures.

The demographic frequencies in relation to the sample population were presented earlier in table 8. There is only one female in the sample and that hinders further analyses. The majority of participants identified themselves as members of PKK, which was identified as an other/leftist terror group in this research. This finding was anticipated because there were previous indications in several studies (Teymur, 2007; A. Ekici, 2008; Koseli, 2006; McGregor, 2008; EGM 2009) that PKK is the largest terror group in Turkey, hence their finding is reflected in the sample group of this study, too. The high numbers of PKK members in the sample might be the result of PKK being a very large group and the reality that their members will be more arrested by security forces during field operations because they operate in a wider area than other terror groups. In essence, counterterrorism is constant and their chances of being apprehended increase with their growth in numbers and their attempts to expand their
operational area (i.e., PKK tried to expand its existence also to the Northern regions of Turkey).

A quarter of the *confitents* mentioned that they earned less than $300 per month, and 18% stated they made more than $1000 a month before they joined. Based on that figure, then it appears that, since the gross domestic product per capita (GDP) in Turkey in 2008 was $10,436 (Haber Borsa, 2009), a quarter of these people were making less than the national average while 18% made three times more than the national average before they joined a terror group. However, it is relevant to note that this variable is not used in further analyses because 33% of the whole sample population did not provide their income information.

Another important finding is that a majority of the participants reported their region of birth as one of the Eastern regions. My analysis of this finding is that the Eastern regions bear one or more characteristics that affect their inhabitants’ needs and makes them potential regions for new recruits. A higher number of recruits from Eastern regions was anticipated in this research. Alkan (2002), Teymur (2008) and Koseli (2006) noted that, for instance, underdevelopment, ethnic concerns and lack of education in these regions are used by terror groups as justifications for their acts and to recruit people, hence the higher number of recruits from relevant regions.

Finally, the descriptive findings indicate that most of the participants were adults. My analyses of this finding suggest that, by law, individuals 18 and above are considered adults (UNICEF, 2009) in Turkey. Hence, after that age families
are probably in less control of their children and these people become more open to the influence of terror groups, and that seems to have appeared with higher numbers in the descriptive findings.

Two other thoughts about these findings are that the terror groups probably prefer to recruit more adults because they might be more stable in their behaviors than younger individuals. In addition, the higher chance that adults already had their compulsory military service may have played a role in this. People that already have some understanding of arms and military discipline are more beneficial to terror groups than people who require all the training about weapons and discipline matters, because it reduces the cost and saves time.

The results concerning the primary reason for joining a terror group were presented in Table 8. Accordingly, majority of **confitents** reported that their primary reason for joining a terror group was social and affiliation needs. In other words, most of the participants perceived the need of belonging, love, intimacy and identifying oneself with others when joining a terror group. The second largely stated reason as their primary reason for joining a terror group appears to be esteem and recognition needs and that tells us that the second most important reason for joining a terror group was the need of self-respect (the need to acquire respect from others and recognition).

Another important finding in this research is that the need for self-actualization was not reported with a high number despite the belief among terrorism scholars that ideology, which is an indicator of the self-actualization
need, is a necessary feature of any kind of terrorism. This means that not many of the participants were able to fulfill all of their first four levels of needs and did not reach the last stage of needs (self-actualization). However, this is not surprising because it is in accordance with Maslow’s (1970) argument in which he noted that self-actualization need can be perceived only by a limited number of people in a community.

Bivariate Correlation

The bivariate correlation was conducted to reveal the relationship between variables. There was a significant positive correlation between social and affiliation needs and safety and security needs. The analysis of this finding suggests that when the level of perception of social and affiliation needs increases, the perception of safety and security needs also increases. Another positive correlation is between self-actualization need and safety and security needs. The analysis of such a result implies that when perception of self-actualization need increases, the perception of safety and security will increase too. The next spotted positive correlation is between perception of self-actualization need and the perception of esteem and recognition, whose analysis suggests that when the perception of the first need increases, the perception of esteem and recognition needs also increases.

Among the demographic variables, education has a statistically significant relationship with the perception of social and affiliation need and self-actualization needs. Based on the positive significant correlations, the analysis of
this result suggests that when education attainment increases, perception of social and affiliation needs and self-actualization needs increases as well. The dependent variable in the study (membership in a terror group) and social and affiliation needs also show statistically significant correlation. Analysis of the finding in relation to membership in a certain terror group indicates that the selection of joining a rightist terror group increases when the perception of social and affiliation need increases. In addition, there is a positive correlation between education attainment and membership in a rightist terror group. The analysis suggests that an increase in education attainment also increases the chances of membership in a rightist terror group.

Cross-Tabulations

Cross-tabulations and the chi-square test were conducted to examine the effects of perceived needs and the effects of demographic variables on membership in a certain type of terror group. The findings of the cross-tabulation present only the relationships between two variables without considering the effects of other variables.

The findings of the cross-tabulations and the chi-square were presented earlier in table 9. Based on the findings, it appears that there is a significant relationship between social and affiliation needs and a confident becoming a member of a certain type of terror group when only the two variables are considered. Such a finding can be analyzed as that the perception of social and affiliation needs yielded selection of becoming a member of other terror groups.
In other words, most of the *confitents* (64%) who identified themselves as members of other terror groups perceived social and affiliation needs when joining a terror group.

The results of the chi-square test indicate that there is also a statistically significant relation between perception of esteem and recognition needs and becoming a member of a rightist terror organization. The analysis of the result indicates that esteem and recognition needs determine membership in a certain type of terror group. Hence, a majority of the *confitents* (81%) who reported that they perceived esteem and recognition became members of other/leftist groups.

Similar chi-square test results for terrorist group affiliation in relation to demographic variables were presented in table 11. The findings showed that there is a significant correlation between the variable education attainment and a *confitent* becoming a member of a certain type of terror group. This finding indicates that education attainment influences membership in a certain type of terror group. Accordingly, a great deal of *confitents* (89.8%) with compulsory/lower education joined other/leftist terror groups.

**Logistic Regression Analyses**

Logistic regression analyses were used to further examine the effects of the needs variables and the demographic variables on a *confitent’s* terrorist group affiliation. Consequently, the results of these analyses were displayed in table 12. The multivariate method helped estimate a need’s or a demographic variable’s effect on a *confitent’s* membership in a terror group while controlling
the effects of the other needs and demographic variables. The multivariate analyses were performed in three different models and the findings were presented as model 1: demographic variables; model 2: needs variables; and model 3: combination of all variables. The analyses of the results were presented accordingly.

Model one includes only the control variables (age group, region of birth, marital status, and education). According to the results, education significantly explained a confitent’s membership in a certain type of terror group. The analysis suggests that the odds ratio is the likelihood that confitents with higher education will become members of a rightist group 58.164 times more likely. In other words, the confitents with higher education are 57.2%\(^2\) more likely to become members of a rightist terror group. The remaining demographic variables did not yield any other statistically significant correlation with confitents’ membership in a certain type of terror group.

Model two includes only the four needs variables (safety and security, social and affiliation, esteem and recognition, and self-actualization). The results of the analyses reveal that, except for safety and security need, the other three needs variables were statistically significant in regard to explaining the variation in the membership of a confitent in a certain type of terror group. Yet, it is also relevant to note that esteem and recognition needs show a negative correlation with a confitent’s membership in a certain type of terror group.

\(^2\) This percentage is calculated by subtracting 1 from the EXP(B) and getting the percentage as it is explained by Schwab (2002)
The analysis of the results asserts that the odds ratio is the likelihood that a *confitent* who perceived social and affiliation needs will become a member of a rightist group 1.859 times more likely. Second, the odds ratio is the likelihood that *confitents* who perceived esteem and recognition needs will become members of a rightist group 0.436 times less likely. Third, the odds ratio is the likelihood that *confitents* who perceived self-actualization need, will become members of a rightist group 3.176 times more likely.

Model three includes both the demographic and the needs variables. Table 10 displays that although social and affiliation needs and self-actualization need showed significant correlation in model two, in model three they don’t appear to be significant anymore. In this model only two variables (education and esteem) and recognition needs appear as statistically significant predictors of a *confitent* becoming a member of a certain type of terror group. In fact, education is positively significant while esteem and recognition shows negative significance. The odds ratio is the likelihood that *confitents* who have higher education will become a member of a rightist group 50.99 times more likely. In other words, *confitents* with higher education are 49.9% more likely to become members of a rightist terror group.

The value of 0.424 is the odds ratio for the esteem and recognition need. The analysis of these findings suggests that an increase of one level in the perception of esteem and recognition need decreases the odds of an individual becoming a member of a rightist terror group by 0.424 times, controlling for other
variables. In other words, the odds ratio is the likelihood that confitents who perceived esteem and recognition needs will become a member of a rightist group 0.42 times less likely.

Hypotheses Revisited

This study forwarded four hypotheses in relation to a confitent’s membership in a certain type of terror group based on needs variables. The hypotheses are revisited again for the purpose to show whether they are accepted or rejected.

H1-A confitent’s need for self-actualization is significantly related to him/her becoming a member of a certain type of terror group (rightist or other).

The results of model two in the multivariate analyses showed that self-actualization need was a significant determinant of a confitent’s membership in a particular type of terror group. However, the same analyses contained also model three which countered this result, and did not provide any significant evidence that self-actualization need influences a confitent’s membership in a certain type of terror group significantly when all (demographic and needs) variables are considered in the logistic regression analyses. As a result, H1 has been rejected.

H2-A confitent’s need for esteem and recognition is significantly related to him/her becoming a member of a certain type of terror group (rightist or other).

The second hypothesis has been accepted based on the findings of both models in the multivariate analyses. The hypothesis was two-directional, but the
findings indicated that esteem and recognition need is negatively significant related to a *confitent* becoming a member of a certain type of terror group, which in this study indicates membership to other/leftist terror groups.

H3-A *confitent*’s need for socialization and affiliation is significantly related to him/her becoming a member of a certain type of terror group (rightist or other).

The results of model two in multivariate analyses showed that social and affiliation need was a significant determinant of a *confitent*’s membership in a particular type of terror group. Yet, the third model in the same analyses did not provide the same results; thus, it did not provide any significant evidence that social and affiliation need influences a *confitent*’s membership in a certain type of terror group when all variables (demographic and needs) are considered in the logistic regression analyses. As a result, H3 has been rejected.

H4-A *confitent*’s need for safety and security is significantly related to him/her becoming a member of a certain type of terror group (rightist or other). Findings of model two and model three in the multivariate analyses showed that safety and security need was not a significant determinant of a *confitent*’s membership in a particular type of terror group. Since the findings did not provide any significant evidence that safety and security need influences a *confitent*’s membership in a certain type of terror group significantly, H4 has been rejected. Eventually, the analyses have shown that only one of the hypotheses has been accepted and the other three are rejected.
Chapter Conclusion

Chapter VIII analyzed the findings of the descriptive, bivariate correlation, cross-tabulation and multivariate statistics. Analyses were used to determine the primary need stated for joining a terror group. Then, cross-tabulation analyses were used to see the variation in a confitent’s membership in a certain type of terror group based on needs and demographic variables. Similar analyses were also used to determine whether demographic variables affect the perception of a confitent’s needs. Finally, logistic regression analyses were used to examine the effects of each of the needs and demographic variables on a confitent’s choice of terror group for membership while controlling the effect of the other variables.
CHAPTER IX
DISCUSSIONS, RESEARCH LIMITATIONS AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

Introduction

Chapter IX includes the discussions pertaining to the findings, the research limitations and the practical implications of the research. However, these implications are only in relation to the Turkish case study and are based on data from a specific sample group gathered in Turkey. The chapter comes to an end with the conclusion remarks.

Discussions

This research was conducted in order to answer two main questions:

1. What needs do individual terrorists (confitents) state as being influential for them in joining a terrorist organization?

For this question a majority of the confitents (49.4%) stated that their primary reason for joining a terror group was social and affiliation needs, as the second and third important needs to join appear to be esteem and recognition needs (24.2%) and safety and security needs (23%) respectively.

2. Which needs of Maslow’s model are most influential for an individual terrorist (confitent) to become a member of a particular type of terrorist organization (i.e., rightist or other)?
Concerning the second question, the multivariate analyses have shown that the perception of esteem and recognition need is the most influential predictor of a confitent’s membership in a certain type of terror group.

The study also mentioned that it will try to find out whether the demographic variables have any influence on a confitent joining a rightist or other/leftist terror group; whether a confitent’s perception of needs differs based on demographic characteristics; and whether different terror groups should be countered differently. In relation to the effects of the demographic variables, the three types of analyses revealed that education is a significant determinant of a confitent’s membership in a certain type of terror group, and that, except for educational attainment, a confitent’s perception of needs does not significantly differ due to demographic characteristics.

This study discussed four needs concerning the first question forwarded in the study. The first level of need (physiological need) could not be measured due to lack of data. Based on measurements concerning the remaining four needs, the findings answered the first question.

Prevailing thought is that individuals who considered joining a terror group were more concerned about social and affiliation needs (49.4%), followed by esteem and recognition needs (24.2%), and then safety and security need (23%) and finally self-actualization need (3.4%).

The social and affiliation needs which refer to involving relationships with other people, love, intimacy, feeling of belonging to a group, identifying oneself
with others seem to be important for many participants when joining a terror group. This could be the result of the formal communications terror groups apply. As noted by Laqueur (1999), Alkan, (2002) and Ozeren and Voorde (2006) terrorist organizations tend to hide their dreadful intentions from the public to obtain and keep their support. Their open formal propagandas include more connotations about them fighting for the rights of their people, releasing ethnical or religious messages that suggest others to join them in their struggle and act together. Therefore individuals who were in need of obtaining a group identity and belonging somewhere may have chosen a terror group to be a part of without knowing the terror group’s actual intentions. Basically the terror group appears to be more attractive to such people than their communities because terror groups tell new potential recruits that they are important and are valued in their groups if they join.

Another reason could be the fact that families in Eastern regions have larger families (TUIK, 2009). More than 90% of the families have high numbers of children which range from four to ten in some of the cities in the Eastern regions (Aksoy, 1998). In addition, other family members such as grant parents and aunts may also be living with these families. In large families it might be possible that the family is not able to give all the love, intimacy and sense of being a part of a family to all its members. The larger the family gets possibly the more unattended some members become in the family. Hence, this pertains to the risk that the unattended family members will seek other options to satisfy their
belonging need elsewhere. This is in accordance with Post’s (1984) argument in which it is noted that alienation leads individuals to join a terrorist organization to develop a sense of belonging to a group. On the other hand, Aksoy (1998) argues that in the Eastern regions the Kurdish identity plays a big role in terrorism. Hence, if families fail to give such a sense of belonging and identity, terror groups will pull such people to their side by arguing how valuable they are in their groups and that they are considered as an essential part of themselves which was noted by previous research as well (e.g. Alkan, 2002; Teymur, 2007; A. Ekici, 2008).

On the other hand these findings are not too surprising because some scholars (e.g. Post, 1984; Luckabaugh et al., 1997; Crenshaw, 2001; McCormick, 2003; Sageman, 2004; Palmer, 2007; Kule, 2007; Arboleda-Florez, 2007) noted that belonging is an important factor that may cause individuals to join terror groups. Hence, the descriptive findings of this research appeared to be supporting the findings of the scholars mentioned earlier and also those of Post (1984), Aho (1990) and A. Ekici (2008) who argued that terror groups may become the extended family of individuals whose families are unable to give the feeling that the individual belongs with them (includes giving love).

Basically, these findings show that the two needs (1st and 2nd level), at some point, indicate two related factors, recognition and respect. The affiliation aspect of the first need and the recognition aspect of the second need basically indicate that a certain group of people in Turkey are willing to be known with their
own identities and want to feel that their members are shown respect. Since respect cannot take place without accepting and recognizing these people with their affiliations and/or identities, these two concerns should be taken into consideration as two steps that necessarily follow each other. This is necessary if we want to stop the inflow of individuals to terror groups who seem to make use from community’s failure of satisfying these two needs of these individuals.

These findings are useful because now we know what needs are more important for individuals when joining a terror group. A focus from policymakers and practitioners on these needs and their attempts to provide alternatives for satisfying these needs may reduce the recruitment of new individuals to terror groups and even make current members abandon their groups.

The finding about ideology being less important to individuals for joining a terror group was also anticipated in here because the framework asserted that not many people come to the point of satisfying all the other needs and be in the process of achieving the best they are capable of. Hence, it is natural that Maslow’s assertion is reflected in the findings of this study. However, this is useful information because now we know that a distinction seems to be in place and that ideology may be a must for the existence of terror organizations (Schmid, 1983; Koseli, 2006; Teymur, 2007; McEntire, 2008) but it is not a necessary factor for their members. In other words, some terrorists may not be sharing the ideology and the goals of their organizations but may join to satisfy their needs if there is no alternative. As a result, since they have different motives
and goals than the terror groups, countermeasures that target the individuals in these groups may be more effective in reducing terror incidents.

More importantly, it is a big relief that not many participants mentioned indicators of self-actualization (e.g. political reasons, sharing the goal of the organization) as their primary need to join. Then, it would mean that most were beyond their first four levels of needs and were trying to achieve big changes related to the system (i.e. changing the current regime). They do that in order to solve many of their problems believing is caused by the system to satisfy their needs. Hence, a majority of the participants indicated the other needs which can be satisfied by offering other means. In other words, it means that only a small portion of these people had problems with the regime.

The second question was answered by the findings as well. Confidants who perceived social and affiliation needs are likely to become members of rightist terror groups. According to the bivariate analyses, it seems that perception of social and affiliation need is a common aspect of individuals who are members of rightist terror groups. Similar results show up when we consider the cross-tabulation between perception of social and affiliation needs and the affiliation with the type of terror group. In these analyses too the variation is visible when we consider membership in a certain type of group. However, it is important to note that the similar significance disappears once the multivariate analyses are conducted and other variables are considered, then esteem and recognition need appears as significant.
In addition, one of the sub-questions was about analyzing whether any of the demographic variables has any influence on a *confident* becoming a member of a certain type of terror group. This question was answered as well in this study. The bivariate correlations have shown that education increases the chances of a *confident* becoming a member of a certain type of terror group. Compulsory/lower education was common among members of other/leftists, and rightists seem to have higher education than other/leftists. However, age and the other control (demographic variables did not yield any significant relation with membership to a certain type of terror group.

These are important findings because so far the difference among terror groups’ members’ perception of needs and the effect of education on membership were not discussed notably. These findings are helpful because it suggests that it is possible to develop different countermeasures for different types of terror groups. Hence we can develop specific countermeasures that include alternatives to fulfill individuals’ social and affiliation needs to reduce recruitment of rightist terror groups and even develop special approaches to include education as a tool for counterterrorism as well (discussed under the practical implications section).

This finding is similar to previous findings because Krueger and Maleckova (2002) in their study with Hezbollah members found that its members were highly educated. In addition, another study concerning profiles of terror groups in Turkey, reported by NTVMSNBC (2009) revealed that members of
leftist (other) terror groups have lower levels of education compared to members of rightist terror groups.

An explanation for this finding could be that the sample population used in this study contains a higher number of *confitents* who identified themselves as members of PKK (other/leftist) terror group. As Alkan (2002) notes, PKK recruits new members often from the rural area where education levels are not high. In addition, those with higher education mainly occupy managerial positions in the terror groups hence; their apprehension numbers are likely to be lower than those with lower education. Hence, this may have resulted with higher number of representatives with lower levels of education in other/leftist groups, and that has been reflected in the findings.

Despite the literature, based on my personal experience in counterterrorism activities within the Turkish National Police and during my military service, this finding was a bit less anticipated. The common knowledge about terror groups that favored communism and like systems (other/leftists) was that they have well educated members. Such a finding may be a result of declining interest in communism and like systems due to failures the world has experienced (e.g. collapse of communism in the Soviet Union in 1990s). Therefore, interest in groups with communist leanings may have declined, and interest in groups with religious aspects may have increased as an option.

Another interesting finding was that esteem and recognition needs did not appear to be significant in regard to explaining the membership of a *confitent* in a
certain type of terror group in the first bivariate analyses (correlation-matrix) but appeared as positively significant in the second bivariate analyses (cross-tabulation). However, the same need ended up as negatively significant in the third model of the multivariate analyses in which all variables were considered.

This is an important finding for this study because it tells us that esteem and recognition needs were a determining factor for confitents to join a certain type of terror group. Confitents who perceived this need are less likely to join a rightist terror group. In other words, these needs are perceived more by members of other/leftist terror groups. They were defined by Maslow (1970) as needs that refer to gaining status, being recognized by others, achievement, or having a positive self-image, which includes both self-esteem and esteem from others.

The finding is similar to some other studies’ findings. They also suggested that recognition is an important factor for some people when they consider joining a terror group. For example, A. Ekici (2008) noted that government officials’ erroneous and rude behaviors toward people are significant causes for some to join a terror organization. Also Leeuwen (2006) stated the importance of recognition of individuals. He argued that recognition is the result of having equal rights in the community which aids the development of one’s feelings of self-esteem. Therefore, Leeuwen concluded that disrespect for recognition can be viewed as a violation of the body, denial of rights and the denigration of a way of
living. As a result, people and institutions must be careful in order to avoid inflicting personal injuries.

Such a result is important because now we understand that esteem and recognition plays a significant role for some confident's membership in a certain type of terror group as it was the second most important reason for individuals to join a terror group. It shows that other/leftist members care much about recognition and respect. Holding such information can shape the behavior of government agents and make them perform their tasks more cautiously in order not to create new terrorists due to their rude behaviors. Eventually, practical implications need to focus on acceptable treatment of all individuals and counterterrorism measures that do not harm them.

Research Limitations

It is important to acknowledge that this study has its limitations. First, terrorism studies are always difficult to conduct. Quantitative studies are a challenge because data are often unavailable. Direct access to firsthand data is very rare, and secondary data, which this study used, is the alternative (Yilmaz, 2008). Other limitations of using this data included: limited information to measure all components of the study, data address a specific time and location only, and the data do not contain enough variables to include an equal number of factors to create each index variable. Another limitation is that the sample had only data about one female within it; since it was not representative, gender related information is mentioned only as a part of descriptive statistics and no
other analysis were attempted. This line of research is important for future to understand whether there is any difference in needs between men and women before membership to terror groups. Nonetheless, the data remain useful because they do include most of the information needed for this study, and the data has the capacity to answer the questions introduced in this work.

The second limitation is that data from surveys obtained from real terrorists bears a risk. “Defecting or captured guerrillas have a tendency to say what they think their interrogators want to hear. Even if honest answers were obtainable, it would not be a straightforward process to translate them into utility functions” (Chai, 1994 p. 101). Therefore, although the participants were advised that they would not gain or lose anything from participating in the survey, there still is some risk that they may have provided some answers to please the authorities. This issue cannot be overcome and is typical of survey research. Although some may have lied in their responses, there is no reason to necessarily believe that a majority did or that the data are not, overall, accurate.

Third, lack of variables to use is another limitation. The fact that the secondary data did not contain any variables to measure the first level of needs described by Maslow is a limitation that needs consideration. The study conducted therefore did not measure the first level of needs which could have some implications for this work. For example, one implication is that one or more of the basic needs (air, water, food, shelter, sex) could be among the primary
reasons for individuals joining a terror group or a confitent’s choice of terror group type.

The fourth limitation is that this work uses cases from Turkey only; therefore the researcher cannot generalize the findings and the policy implications to other countries that may also be experiencing problems with terrorism. The sample data used is limited and it may not be representative for wider audiences and policy implications; likewise the data might not be transferable. Basically it is a cross-sectional study that provides information concerning a specific time and location. However, the findings can be generalized to the theory because this study was able to measure four of the needs Maslow defined in his framework. Therefore, it can be concluded that a majority of the assumptions from Maslow’s framework were applied through this study to terrorism in order to explain some reasons why individuals join terror groups and why they choose different type of groups.

Finally, the secondary data did not contain more variables (e.g. religious affiliation of confitents, income information of all confitents) for the multivariate analyses, and the variables in the secondary data could not be dispersed equally because the model (see Appendix F and Figure 4) developed for the study, required them to be classified in a specific form (based on the literary arguments) which could not be determined in advance.
Practical Implications

Despite its limitations the study was able to make contributions (discussed earlier) to the field of terrorism, this study also provided some practical implications. However, it will be useful to remind that these practical implications should be considered only for the region from where the data comes from (Turkey) because the data, and thus the policy implications are not generalizable.

The descriptive findings indicated that social and affiliation needs were noted by the majority of *confitents* (49.4%) as their most important needs to join a terror organization. Such a high percentage implies that those individuals care about belonging to a group that gives them the feeling they are a part of it, so that they can identify themselves with the group.

Therefore, government and/or social projects should continue to send out messages that everyone in Turkey is a valuable member of their communities and the nation. The same message must also clarify that terror groups do not always share their actual intentions with their members, and that they just make use of the recruits to survive as an organization. These messages, for instance, can be sent out through public meetings, governmental newsletters, and with the help of any kind of media (e.g. television broadcasts, newspapers, magazines, radio broadcasts, etc). As Palmer (2007) and Yilmaz (2008) noted, they recruit people from various backgrounds and needs. They use any kind of reason possible to obtain new members, which includes telling people from different ethnic backgrounds (e.g. Kurds) that the government and the rest of the nation
view them as the other. Hence, the concept of the *other* must be scratched out of the minds of all individuals. This can be achieved through governmental projects and civil initiatives (public) by increasing social, cultural, and economic encounters between all regions and ethnic groups in Turkey, which eventually will falsify the claims of the terror groups.

Terror groups (especially PKK) have the advantage of reaching out to people in remote rural areas quite often. This high amount of communication is used by them to feed the locals with their own ideas without displaying the perspective of the state. Therefore, the government must be more transparent and reachable to all its constituents (more governance), which will give the locals a chance to find out about the facts of the country, become aware of all their rights as a citizen, see the alternatives for their needs, learn the opinions of the government and listen to the other side of the story which was told by terror groups.

This can be achieved by inclusion of locals in the projects that are developed for these goals and creating as much as possible open communication channels between the state and the citizens (e.g., technology based e-government; empowered local management-governors, less centralization). In addition, town meetings, open door policies at government offices, regular visits from government representatives to citizen initiatives, NGOs, local businesses and volunteer organizations might also increase information sharing and promote state and citizen collaborations and
understanding of each other. Briefly, a successful application of governance may serve well; as it is being applied in the US to keep various people from many ethnics live happily together and open the doors of the government to everybody in the country. If it requires, just for the purpose of reaching out to constituents, the government should even provide free internet access, newspapers, TV, radio, and other means used as communication tools at locations where people lack the capacity to afford one (e.g., various locations in the Eastern regions).

Moreover, in countries such as Turkey, where traditions are still viewed as important in the community, especially in the Eastern regions, there are natural community leaders who are favored by the locals. The government should request their contribution in these projects to boost the progress and gain more support from the locals. For instance, there is still tribalism in the Northeastern region, and their leaders have the say what and whom to support. Therefore, such people should be included in these projects to strengthen the bond of locals with the rest of the country and make them realize that they are being lied to by terror groups through manipulating the facts about their rights as citizens, the underdevelopment of the region and by using false religious teachings.

To reach such leaders, the government should first organize outreach programs to get to know these people and to meet with them. Therefore, the first step would be visiting neighborhoods and talking to locals in order to find out which person’s name is being pronounced as a respected figure in that area. Then, these people should be contacted and encouraged to participate in
building a peaceful future for the country and the nation by coordinating, controlling the activities of the locals, and educating them about the horrible plans and facts of terror group and their acts in their neighborhood.

Basibuyuk (2008) argues that, at locations where social relations are strong through civic participation (e.g., non profit organizations such as religious institutions and voluntary associations) and cultural activities, terror incidents appeared to be fewer compared to other locations in Turkey. Therefore, it would be useful to encourage and even economically support local communities and volunteer agencies known and trusted by the government to open entertainment centers, fan clubs, sports clubs, libraries, craftsmen centers, cultural centers, social clubs or specifically a center locals may ask for, so that these people can socialize, form groups and develop a national identity rather than a negative and separative one with a terror group. However, in order for these projects to be successful, it is necessary to work closely with families to obtain their support and encourage them to engage in these activities too. It should be noted that acquiring families’ trust and support has become a crucial approach in counterterrorism and in reducing the inflow of individuals into terror groups.

One of the other important findings of this research is the impact of education on a confitent’s decision to join certain types of terror groups and that confitents with higher education levels perceive more social and affiliation and self-actualization needs. The results revealed that education is the strongest indicator of a confitent becoming a member of rightist terror groups.
Hence, we should be talking about two sorts of education in relation to counterterrorism: terrorism awareness education and proper religious education. Counterterrorism approaches need to consider both types. The finding that rightists tend to be more educated indicates that they should be approached by counterterrorism people who attained higher education in order to be convincing in their discussions that they are on the wrong path, and to inform them (e.g., through their families) that there are alternatives in the country to satisfy their needs (social and affiliation and esteem and recognition) and that the terror group held back this information from them. Such confitents should be encouraged, with the help of their families, to embrace new job opportunities and social environments instead of staying with a terror group.

In addition, since higher education is so common among rightists, the national education system should be adapted to provide necessary terrorism awareness knowledge to young pupils in order to prevent them from getting interested in terrorism (e.g. rightist terror) in the beginning of their educational path. In other words, people must be educated in advance about the terrorism types and threats and how terror groups tend to mislead individuals’ and the community’s perceptions about themselves and their rights as citizens. Such an approach will be proactive and will also reduce recruitment, and diminish terror incidents.

Concerning the second type of education, it is necessary that people are provided proper religious education that does not promote any kind of radicalism
or any specific ideology. However, a very relevant note to mention here is that counterterrorism people who are not familiar with other religions should be given adequate education about related religions as well in order to prevent them from creating new terrorists during operations due to their lack of correct knowledge.

For instance, in regard to this risk, Angus (2009) suggests that Western law enforcement agencies often lack proper education in regard to Islam and Muslims. He notes that such problems increase the risk of those agents treating many Muslims as potential terrorists, which he feels is a mistake that may create new enemies of Westerners. On the other hand, terror groups try to benefit from their target groups’ lack of proper religious education, and try to control them through using wrong religious arguments and so-called religious scriptures (White, 2006). Hence, we can argue that proper religious education is necessary both for all citizens and people who counter terrorism because once religion plays a role, then many people show respect and obedience. Since respect and obedience is what terrorist groups or criminal minds strive for from their followers, this issue must be handled with utmost importance, professionalism and care to prevent religion from being a tool for terrorist recruitment.

The role of religion in terrorism was noted by several scholars (Wilson, 2004; White, 2006; Florez-Morris, 2007) too. Since rightist terror groups in this study were those with religious affiliations, this finding indicates that proper religious education can be used in arguments or communications. This will clarify that religion does not support their actions, and that they are provided with
falsified sacred scriptures by the terror organizations. Hence such
counterterrorism efforts with rightist terror group members perhaps may convince
them to abandon the terror group because the literature (e.g. Wikan, 2001;
Wilson, 2004; Hoffman, 1995 as cited in White, 2006) indicated religion is used
by some terror groups for recruitment and to control the acts of their members.

Proper religious teachings should be offered by the government through
the collaborations of the Ministry for National Education and the Higher Council
for Religious Issues which can control the content. The teachings should not be
mandatory, but available for anyone who desires to obtain them. In brief, any
argument that is made available by terror groups to the public should have its
evidenced (e.g. with genuine sacred documents) argument provided by the
government officials so that people can hear both sides of the story.

Such an approach from the government will reduce the influence of terror
groups on individuals, but it carries a serious drawback. Turkey is one of the rare
secular countries in the world. The government getting more involved with
religious issues (teaching in this case) is likely to be opposed by many
constituents who favor secularism as an important characteristic of the republic.
In order not to lose public support, the government must use the argument that
what it is doing is related to national security and explain clearly that it is
necessary to be effective in reducing terrorism; otherwise the policy will be born
dead if it is not accepted and supported by the constituents.
The educations should be conducted by professional practitioners and/or professors who are experts in the field so that they can talk about the arguments of terror groups and contrast them with the arguments of the government, and then reveal the facts. Education should be given anywhere and to all citizens to increase their awareness. This teaching can even take place in prisons with terrorists because they have links through letters and phones with their families and with other terrorists outside. Thus, they may influence others as well. The teachings can be done also during interrogations while obtaining necessary information from apprehended terrorists or suspects. Useful and correct information and evidence can be conveyed to them during these interrogations and prison visits. Teaching can be expanded through broadcasts on TV, radio, internet, books, flyers and with any other possible means to send out the correct information to the public and terrorists, because they follow broadcasts and publications as well. Teaching can be conducted in schools as part of some courses related to national security, public security and personal safety. Teaching can be included in religious preaching (e.g. in churches, mosques, synagogues) and at local meetings.

Basically the goal here is to reach out to the public as much as possible and provide them with the correct information that is deemed essential for their own safety.

Although some promising results can be expected, the major drawback during this teaching will be the problems of additional cost, manpower and
coordination of all the activities involved in such a big project. The other concern would be the possible increase of perception of fear among citizens. A constant stream of messages that talk about terrorism everywhere may cause feelings of insecurity in the community and that is not something practitioners and policymakers would desire. Therefore, the extent and the format of the messages to be released and the format of the educational awareness training should be determined by a board of experts and professionals. The board could possibly include psychologists, terrorism experts, policymakers, sociologists, and local city managers in addition to other people deemed useful to be involved.

The finding that confitents who perceived esteem and recognition needs are less likely to join a rightist terror group can be used in counterterrorism as well. It suggests that this need is perceived more by members of other/leftist terror groups. Then, it is clear that participants were upset with the government officials’ erroneous and rude behaviors toward people. Esteem and recognition needs refer to gaining status, being recognized by others, achievement, or having a positive self-image, which includes both self-esteem and esteem from others. Hence, the problem has been spotted and defined in this research. Then alternatives can be developed.

The alternatives should be projects that promote recognition of these people and provide equal rights in the community and feelings of self-esteem. Therefore, government should take the necessary measures to prevent government agents from disrespecting, violating or ignoring the rights of its
constituents. These measures may be multifaceted. New laws would be needed
to be passed in Parliament, but since the Turkish Constitution (T.C. Anayasasi,
2009) already states that all individuals are equal and no one is superior to
others in front of the Constitution and the Turkish courts, an additional regulation
does not seem to be necessary at this moment. Yet, there is the need for serious
effective oversight during the implementation of laws in relation to the
mishandling and rude behaviors of government agents. There should be zero
tolerance in regard to any possible bad treatment of people in Turkey. As a
result, people and institutions as a whole must be careful in order to avoid
inflicting personal injuries. Government representatives must learn to serve
rather than just rule. In addition, the government should recognize local cultural
festivities and reflect that as a part of the country’s rich culture and suggest local
government officials (e.g., the governor, the mayor, military representatives, the
chief of police), support and attend such cultural festivities. Such an approach will
strengthen the feeling of perceived respect and recognition on the side of the
local people.

Sambanis (2004) noted that people should be given the opportunity to
participate in politics through institutions from which conflict can be channeled
and the risk of political violence can be reduced. This can be viewed as another
option to gain recognition. Therefore, locals should be encouraged to get more
involved in politics and establish or support political parties that legally represent
them and work for their benefit instead of getting involved with terror groups.
Chapter Conclusion

Chapter IX provided the discussions on the findings of the research and mentioned the research limitations we need to be aware before reaching to conclusion based on the information provided in here. The chapter ended with the suggested practical implications for stopping the inflow of individuals into terror groups in order to reduce terrorism.
CHAPTER X
CONCLUSION

Introduction

Chapter X summarizes the reasons why the study was conducted. It elucidates that this study can be considered as one of the pioneers in terrorism research due to the un-orthodox approaches it suggests and the perspective it has introduced for more effective counter terrorism. Despite its valuable contributions, the chapter notes that there is still much to be done and provides suggestions for future studies in order to improve future similar studies.

There are numerous studies in the field of terrorism that inquire the reasons of terror incident and why individuals join terror groups. Despite the large number of such work, the threat still exists because the failed to capture the whole picture! Many theories have been used to explain the cause of the threat but rare studies analyzed the same problem from the perspective of needs. In other words, this work is probably one of the earliest studies that purports that needs are essential factors in terrorist recruitment and should also be essential in counter terrorism in order to cultivate result providing effective policies.

Needs are Essential in Counter Terrorism

There were two main research questions in this study: 1- What needs do individual terrorists (confitents) state as being influential for them to join a terrorist organization? and,
2- Which needs of Maslow’s model are most influential for an individual terrorist (*confitent*) to become a member of a particular type of terrorist organization (i.e. rightist or other)?

The research also wanted to find out whether demographic characteristics (age group, region of birth, marital status and) education of *confitents* (already terrorists) have any influence on their choice of membership in a particular type of terror organization, whether *confitent’s* demographic characteristics are significant determinants of their perception of needs and whether different terror groups should be countered with different measures. The findings of the research answered both the main questions and the sub-questions put forward in the study.

Majority of the *confitents* stated that their primary reason for joining a terror group was social and affiliation needs, and regression analyses have shown that *confitents* who perceived esteem and recognition were more likely to become members of other/leftist terror groups. Also it has been revealed that *confitents* in rightist terror groups tend to have higher education than those of other/leftist terror group members in Turkey. Education mainly effects a *confitent’s* perception of two needs (social and affiliation and self-actualization). Finally, findings suggest that different types of terror groups should be countered with unlike measures and it is essential that policymakers and practitioners focus more on individuals within terror groups rather than on the terrorist organization for countering terrorism.
Although it is probably one of the pioneer works in terrorism that studied needs and recruitment in terror organizations, this study has the capacity to revolutionize counter terrorism practices. This study is important because based on its findings, now one can easily argue preceding work provided scattered factors and/or findings as the underlying reason for individuals to join terror groups. Hence, counter policies based on previous explanations did not yield significant reduction in terror incidents. Fortunately, in here the researcher realized the necessity and therefore gathered those pieces of explanations in order to see the big picture. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs framework served well to embrace previous explanations on terror cases. By utilizing the model introduced in here, it has been clarified that previous explanations are actually indicators of some underlying individual needs. Thus, the study reached the conclusion that since needs play a role in recruitment; they should be important in counter terrorism as well.

The findings uphold that counter terrorism should consider needs. The study has discovered that providing alternatives or making individuals aware of existing alternatives to their needs may be the key to reducing new recruits in terror groups. Previous explanations endowed us merely with offensive policies that provided partial success in reducing terrorism due to being able to explain only some of the terror cases. Therefore it is vital to view the full picture (all potential causes of recruitment), in order to stop the inflow of new recruits through providing alternatives to satisfy their needs.
Based on this study we now also know that the terror organizations should not be the primary focus of counter terrorism but the individuals. Without the individuals (members) terror organizations are destined to dissolve. So far the organizational aspect and the importance of individuals in such organizations were not given the deserved emphasis. Just bearing in mind the idea that an organization cannot survive without its members, elucidates how important the findings of this work are. Briefly, this study also recommends shifting our focus to individuals from the terror groups while countering them as a part of the latest counter terrorism methods.

The research has also provided invaluable findings about the characteristics of the members (i.e. rightists are more educated; other/leftists perceive more esteem and recognition needs) of terror groups. Such kind of information can be used to channel our resources in counter terrorism to develop better policies. Basically, this study provided suggestions that although terrorism is a violent threat, primary counter measures can be non-violent ones (e.g. awareness educations, increasing living standards of citizens, providing alternatives for their needs) and that dissimilar terror organization should be countered with different means.

In a snapshot, individuals must be provided alternatives to satisfy their needs, they must be fed with necessary information about their rights and receive proper education on religion and the facts of their country. Individuals should be encouraged to engage in legal activities to obtain recognition and make the
nation aware of their problems. They should not be left to the reach and influence of terror groups so that terror groups can manipulate the facts, hide information, lie to people and recruit them in their groups! Based on studies like this, counterterrorism is likely to sweep away from its classical militaristic counter policies and give more emphasis to non-violent need based counter policies. On the other hand, although this research has provided such important findings, there is still much work to be done in regard to improving the understanding of counterterrorism from the perspective of needs and how alternatives can be developed.

Suggestions for Future Research

1- Future studies should consider including questions in their surveys to measure the first level-physiological needs which was not possible with the secondary data used in here. New surveys that include questions about whether basic needs such as food, water, air, sex, etc influenced any confitent to join a terror group would improve the quality of the research.

2- The sample contained only one female. Future research should consider a sample with higher number of females in order to find out whether there is any difference in needs between men and women in regard to joining a terror group.

3- Additional studies should obtain larger, more representative data in order to provide more generalizable practical implications for the field of terrorism because this study had a rather unique, but just enough, number of cases to conduct the analyses.
4- Although very difficult, other research should find both a study and a control group in order to test statistically and determine the most influential needs for individuals for joining a terror group.

5- The secondary data provided limited variables for the multivariate analyses; future studies should conduct similar analyses with a higher number of variables.

6- This was one of the earliest studies concerning needs and recruitment in terror groups. Future studies need to explore additional cases beyond Turkey and there needs to be a critical examination of what variables should or should not be included in future studies of need and terrorism.

7- Similar studies should be conducted in other countries to obtain international and national perspectives and understanding of needs and ideological differences and have the chance of comparisons.

8- Finally, if possible longitudinal studies should be conducted to see whether confitents’ perception of need and interest in joining a terror group has changed after their needs that influenced them to join a terror group were satisfied by the government or the community.
APPENDIX A

CONSENT LETTER FROM PRIMARY INVESTIGATOR
I, Ahmet Ekici, Ph.D. hereby state that I give consent to Mr. SIDDIK EKICI to use my data for his own research and dissertation purposes. He is entitled to use partially or the full amount of the survey and the data I have compiled from that survey I developed for my own dissertation on community policing and terrorism at the Sam Houston State University in 2008. In addition, I have granted him consent to make any amendments he deems necessary for an additional survey.

For any further inquiries in regard to this consent form, please contact me at aekici2001@yahoo.com or call me at +90 505 542 3002.

Ahmet Ekici

Address
Emniyet Mudurlugu
Istasyon Caddesi
Malatya/Turkey
APPENDIX B

SURVEY PERMISSION LETTERS GRANTED TO PI
T.C.
ADALET BAKANLIĞI
Ceza ve Tevkifevleri Genel Müdürlüğü

Sayı : B.03.0.CTE.0.00.09-94-70/
Kona : Araştırma İzni.

08.10.2007 085340

CIZRE CUMHURIYET BAŞSAVCILIĞINA


Emniyet Teşkilatı adına American Texas Eyaleti Sam Houston Eyalet Üniversitesiinde doktora yapan Ahmet EKICI’nin, “Toplum Destekli Polislik ve Terör Gruplarına Katılım İlişkisi” türüne hazırlamakta olduğu tez kapsamında Erdal CANPOLAT tarafından Cizre K1 Tipi Kapalı Ceza İnfaz Kurumunda anket uygulannaması talebine ilişkin dilekçe ve ekinde yer alan anket formları inceledi.

Söz konusu çalışmanın, Cizre K1 Tipi Kapalı Ceza İnfaz Kurumunda bulunan hükümlü ve tutukluların nızaları alınarak, çalışma sonuçlarını iki örneği ile CD’sinin de Genel Müdürlüğüne gönderilmesi koşullarıyla, ses kayıhı cihazı kullanılmadan, kuran uzmanların gözetiminde yapılması koşuluya, Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığının belirleyeceği bir tarihte gereklicekletilmesi uygunsuz görülmüştür.

Gereğini rica ederim.

Kenan İPEK
Hâkim
Bakan a.
Genel Müdür

T.C.
ADALET BAKANLIĞI
Ceza ve Tevkifevleri Genel Müdürlüğü

Sayı : B.03.0.CTE.00.09-94-70/

Konu : Araştırma İzni.

08.10.2007 085341

FAKS

KIRKLARELI CUMHURIYET BAŞSAVCIĞINA


Emniyet Teşkilatı adına American Texas Eyaleti Sam Houston Eyalet Üniversitesi'nden doktora yapan Ahmet EKICI'nin, "Toplum Destekli Polislik ve Terör Gruplarına Katılım İlişkisi" üzerine hazırlamakta olduğu tez kapsamına Ergül GÜNAY tarafından Kırklareli E Tipi Kapalı Ceza İnfaz Kurumunda anket uygulanması talebine ilişkin dilekçe ve ekinde yer alan anket formları incelendi.

Söz konusu çalışmanın, Kırklareli E Tipi Kapalı Ceza İnfaz Kurumunda bulunan hükümlü ve tutukluların rızaları alınarak, çalışma sonuçlarının iki örneği ile CD'sinin de Genel Müdürlüğüne gönderilmesi kopyalarayla, ses kayıt cihazı kullanılamadan, kurum uzmanları gözetiminde yapılması koşuluyla, Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığının belirleyeceği bir tarihle gerçekleştirilmesi uygun görülmüştür.

Gereğini rica ederim.

Kenan İPEK
Hakim
Bakan a.
Genel Müdürü
T.C. ADALET BAKANLIĞI
Ceza ve Tevkifevleri Genel Müdürlüğü

Sayı : B.03.0.CTE.00.09-94-70/

FAKS

Konu : Araştırma İzni.

08.10.2007 085342

GÜMÜŞHANE CUMHURIYET BAŞSAVCILIĞINA


Emniyet Teşkilatı adına American Texas Eyaleti Sam Houston Eyalet Üniversitesi'nde doktora yapan Ahmet EKİÇI'nin, "Toplum Destekli Polislik ve Terör Gruplarına Katılım İlişkisi" üzerine hazırlamakta olduğu tez kapsamında Mehmet TÜRK ile Gümüşhane E Tipi Kapalı Ceza İnfaz Kurumunda anket uygulamanın talebine ilişkin dilekçe ve ekinde yer alan anket formlarını incelendi.

Söz konusu çalışmaların, Gümüşhane E Tipi Kapalı Ceza İnfaz Kurumunda bulunan hükümlü ve tutukluların rızaları alınarak, çalışma sonuçlarının iki örneği ile CD’sinin de Genel Müdürülgümüze gönderildiği koşullarıyla, ses kayıt cihazı kullanılmadan, kurum uzmanları gözetiminde yapılmıştır. Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığının belirleyeceği bir tarihle gerçekleştirmesi uygun görülmüştür.

Gereğinirica ederim.

[İmzası]

Kenan İPEK
Hâkim
Bakan a.
Genel Müdürlü
T.C.
ADALET BAKANLIĞI
Ceza ve Tevkifevleri Genel Müdürlüğü

Sayı : B.03.0.CTE.00.09.94-70/

Kona : Araştırma İzi.

GAZIANTEP CUMHURIYET BAŞSAVCILIĞINA


Emniyet Teşkilatı adına American Texas Eyaleti Sam Houston Eyaleti Üniversitesi'nde doktora yapan Ahmet EKİÇİ'nin, “Toplum Destekli Polislik ve Terör Gruplarına Katılım İlişkisi” üzerine hazırlamaktadır tez kapsamında Necmettin KİSAK ile Gaziantep H Tipi Kapalı Ceza İnfaz Kurumunda anket uygulanması tarihine ilişkin dilekçe ve ekinde yer alan anket formları incelendi.

Söz konusu çalışmaların Gaziantep H Tipi Kapalı Ceza İnfaz Kurumunda bulunan hâkimlik ve tutukluların ruhadeler alnarak, çalışma sonuçlarının ikinci örneği ile CD’sin de Genel Müdürügmümzde gözdenlmesi koşullarıyla, ses kayıtları kullanılmadı, kurum uzmanları gözetiminde yapılmıştır, Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığının belirleyeceği bir tarihe gerçekleştirilmiş uygun görülmüşdür.

Gereğini rica ederim.

Keran İPEK
Hâkim
Bakan a.
Genel>M"ütür
ERÇİŞ CUMHURIYET BAŞSAVCILIĞINA


Emniyet Teşkilatı adına American Texas Eyaleti Sam Houston Eyalet Üniversitesi'nde doktora yapan Ahmet EKİCİ'nin, "Toplum Destekli Polislik ve Terör Gruplarına Katılım İlişkisi" üzerine hazırlamakta olduğu tez kapsamında Osman ALKAN ile Erciş Açık Ceza İnfaz Kurumunda anket uygulamanın talebine ilişkin dilekçe ve ekinde yer alan anket formları incelendi.

Söz konusu çalışmalar; Erciş Açık Ceza İnfaz Kurumunda bulunan hükmüllerin nihayetlerini, çalışma sonuçlarının ikinci örneği ile CD'sinin de Genel Müdürlüğüne gönderilmesi koşullanıla, ses kayıt ekipi kullanılmadan, kurum uzmanları gözlemlenin yapıması koşuluyla, Cumburîyet Başsavcılığının belirleyeceği bir tarihte gerçekleştirilmesi uygun görülmüştür.

Gereğini rica ederim.

Kerem İPEK
Hâkim
Bakan a.
Genel Müdür
T.C.
ADALET BAKANLIĞI
Geza ve Tevkifevleri Genel Müdürlüğü

Sayı : B.03.0.CTE.00.09-94-70/
Konu : Araştırma İzni.

08.10.2007 085345

DIYARBAKIR CUMHURIYET BAŞSAVCIĞI'NA


Emniyet Teşkilatı adına American Texas Eyaleti Sam Houston Eyalet Üniversitesiinde doktora yapan Ahmet EKICI'nin, “Toplum Destekli Polislik ve Terör Gruplarına Katılım İlişkisi” üzerine hazırlamakta olduğu tez kapsamında Babatın ALAK ile Diyarbakır E Tipi Kapalı Ceza İnfaz Kurumunda anket uygulanması talebine ilişkin dilekçe ve eklende yer alan anket formları incelendi.

Söz konusu çalışmanın; Diyarbakır E Tipi Kapalı Ceza İnfaz Kurumunda bulunan hükümlü ve tutukluların rızaları alınarak, çalışma sonuçlarının iki örneği ile CD'sinin de Genel Müdürlüğümüzte gönderilmesi koşulana, ses kayıt cihazı kullanılmadan, kurum uzmanları gözetiminde yapılması koşuluya, Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığının belirleyeceği bir tarihte gerçekleştirilmesi uygun görülmüştür.

Gereğini rica ederim.

Kenan İPEK
Hakim
Bakan a.
Genel Müdürü

202
T.C.
ADALET BAKANLIĞI
Ceza ve Tevkifevleri Genel Müdürlüğü

Sayı : B.03.0.CTE.00.09-94-70/
Konusu : Araştırma İzni.

08.10.2007 085347

FAKS

ADİYAMAN CUMHURIYET BAŞSAVCILIĞINA


Emniyet Teşkilatı adına American Texas Eyaleti Sam Houston Eyalet Üniversitesinde doktora yapan Ahmet EKICI’nin, “Toplum Destekli Polislik ve Terör Gruplarına Katılım İlişkisi” üzerine hazırlamakta olduğu tez kapsamında Hasan Hüseyin UYAN tarafından Adıyaman Açık Ceza İnfaz Kurumunda anket uygulanması talebine ilişkin dilekçe ve ekinde yer alan anket formları incelendi.

Söz konusu çalışmanın, Adıyaman Açık Ceza İnfaz Kurumunda bulunan hükümlerinin rızaları alınarak, çalışma sonuçlarının iki örnek ile CD’sinin de Genel Müdürlüğüne gönderilmesi koşullarla, ses kayıtlarını kullanılamadan, kurum uzmanları gözetiminde yapılmasını koşuluya, Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığının belirleyeceği bir tarihte gerçekleştirilmiş uygundur.

Gereğini rica ederim.

Kenan IPEK
Hâkim
Bakan a
Genel Müdür
CEYHAN CUMHURIYET BAŞVACİLİĞİNA


Emniyet Teşkilatı adına American Texas Eyaleti Sam Houston Eyalet Üniversitesi’nde doktora yapan Ahmet Ekici’nin, “Toplum Destekli Polislik ve Terör Gruplarına Katılım İlişkisi” üzerine hazırlamakta olduğu tez kapsamında Ufuk ATEŞ ile Ceyhan M Tipi Kapalı ve Açık Ceza İnfaz Kurumunda anket uygulananı talebine ilişkin dilekçe olarak ekrinde yer alan anket formları incelendi.

Söz konusu çalışmanın; Ceyhan M Tipi Kapalı ve Açık Ceza İnfaz Kurumunda bulunan hükümlü ve tutukluların nüshaları alınarak, çalışma sonuçlarının iki örneği ile CD’sinin de Genel Müdürümüzüze gönderilmesi koşullarıyla, ses kayıt cihazı kullanılmadan, kurum uzmanları gözetiminde yapılmasını koşuloya, Cumhuriyet Başvакülüğün belirleyeceği bir tarihte gerçekleştirilmiş uygun görülmüştür.

Gereğini rica ederim.

Kenan İPEK
Hâkim
Bakan a.
Genel Müdür
APPENDIX C
SECONDARY DATA AND IRB
Thanks for the prompt reply Dr. Sewell,
Have a nice day further.

SIDDIK EKICI
Ph.D. Candidate
Department of Public Administration-UNT

> Kenneth W. Sewell, Ph.D.
> Chair, UNT IRB
> >>> On 6/10/2008 at 4:25 PM, in message
> <28DD31D65B14FB40A94B549F31C24AC735E8529656@GABMB02.ad.unt.edu>, "Herndon,
> Boyd" <Boyd.Herndon@unt.edu> wrote:
> > Boyd
> > Based on my telephone conversation with Mr. Ekici, my understanding is that
> > all data will be fully de-identified before it is provided to him. Please
> > review Mr. Ekici's inquiry below and advise him if it is necessary for Mr.
> > Ekici to submit an IRB application or take any other action relating to the
> > UNT IRB before beginning this research for his dissertation at UNT.
Dear Mr. Herndon,

First of all thank you for returning my call to answer my question. I would be happy if I also could get the same answer in written (e-mail should be fine).

I am a Doctoral Candidate at the Department of Public Administration, UNT. Currently I am working on my dissertation focusing on how to stop terrorism and implementation of effective policies for a safer community. For this purpose, I am willing to use a secondary data.

The original data collector already went through the IRB approval in regard to his survey questions and the method he would conduct the survey, at Sam Houston State University.

The data is collected through surveys from terrorists who have been sentenced to imprisonment in Turkey in various prisons. All kind of local permissions were given to the person who collected the data from the prison wardens and the public prosecutor at the first instance. Upon that and due to he also met all the other required criteria to study human subjects, he has been also granted an IRB approval from his university to conduct his survey (Sam Houston State University), and I have a copy of that IRB approval in my files.

Now my questions is:
Since I do not need to deal with the human subjects to collect the data and, Since I do not have any personal data about the survey participants, and since the data I have been given does not contain any information that can lead anybody else to the interviewees, DO I NEED TO GO THROUGH UNT IRB approval again for the same data?

I thank you in advance and look forward to your answer

SIDDIK EKICI
APPENDIX D

PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECT COMMITTEE DECISION
The decision of your application is given below. If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to contact the chair of the committee, Glen Kercher, College of Criminal Justice, POB 2296, or icc_gak@shsu.edu, at your earliest convenience.

Before trying to print this form, please click on tools at the top of the page and then click on options. Make sure that Print Background Colors and Background Pictures is checked.


PI Name: EKICI, AHMET Email: STDAXE16@shsu.edu

Project Title: The Role of Community Policing Practices on Terrorist Organization

Decision: Approved by Full Committee Review

Concerns:

Conditions:
Training of proctors will be thorough and specific to safeguard anonymity of respondents and confidentiality of the information they provide. You are also to insure that participants freely choose to take your survey without any coercion from anyone.

Reviewed by: Glen Kercher, Chair PHSC
APPENDIX E

SURVEY
1. To which organization did you belong? (Please check all that apply)
   a. DHKP/C
   b. TKP/ML
   c. TIKB
   d. TIKKO
   e. MLKP
   f. DEV-SOL-YOL
   g. PKK
   h. Hezbollah
   i. El Qaeda
   j. Hizb-al-Tahrir (Islamic Liberation Party)
   k. Islamic Jihad
   l. Islamic Resistance
   m. Great Eastern Islamic Fighters Front (IBDA-C)
   n. Others (please specify) ........................................

2. When did you join this organization?
   ......(Year)

3. How many years have you been a member of the organization?
   a. Less than 5 years
   b. 5 years to 10 years
   c. 10 to 15 years
   d. 15 to 20 years
   e. More than 20 years

4. What was your highest status in the organization?
   a. Leader
   b. Militia
   c. Sympathizer
   d. Supporter
   e. Other (Please state)..........

5. Who introduced you or how did you become aware of the organization?
   a. My friends were in the organization
   b. My relatives were in the organization
   c. My spouse was in the organization
   d. I met people who were in the organization when I was in the school (high/college)
   e. I met people who were in the organization when I was in the prison
   f. I met this organization while “surfing” on the Internet
   g. Other (Please state)......................
6. When did your relationship with the organization end?
    ......(Year)

7. Your relation with the organization ended because:
   a. I was caught
   b. I surrendered
   c. Other.....

8. Did the organization meet your expectations?
   a. Absolutely not
   b. No
   c. Don't know
   d. Partially yes
   e. Totally yes
   f. No answer

9. Did governmental decisions and policies have any influence on your
decision to leave the organization?
   a. Absolutely not
   b. No
   c. Don't know
   d. Partially yes
   e. Totally yes
   f. No answer

10. Did the approach or behavior of law enforcement have any influence
    in your decision to leave the organization?
    a. Absolutely not
    b. No
    c. Don't know
    d. Partially yes
    e. Totally yes
    f. No answer

11. In your decision to cooperate with law enforcement, which of the
    following have been influential? (Please number from most to least
    important, “1” as the most important)
    a. ........The organization I was a member of did not meet my
       expectations
    b. ........I realized I had been lied to by the organization
    c. ........I realized that the organization had diverted from the initial,
       actual goal.
d. ........The organization did not fulfill its promises  

e. ........My family wanted me to  

f. ........The approach of law enforcement  

g. ........The law enforcement showed me the reality about the organization  

h. ........Government pardon laws and policies  

i. ........The behavior and practices of law enforcement.  

j. ........Force used by law enforcement  

k. ........Threats made by law enforcement  

l. ........I felt sorry for my deeds  

m. ........The reduction I would receive in my punishment if I cooperated  

n. ........Other (Please state)............  

12. Who or what has been influential in your decision to join the group? (Please choose those that apply and please number from most to least important, “1” as the most important) 

a. ........My friends  

b. ........My school  

c. ........Close relatives (Immediate family)  

d. ........Far relatives (Extended family)  

e. ........Economic conditions  

f. ........Inequality in the society  

g. ........Behavior of law enforcement officers.  

h. ........Behavior of public officials (not security and law enforcement related)  

i. ........Political reasons  

j. ........Propaganda of the organization  

k. ........Need for protection  

l. ........Sharing the goal of the organization  

m. ........The law enforcement viewed me as a potential terrorist  

n. ........I was an outcast in my community  

o. ........The pressure and force of the organization  

p. ........The environment and culture in which I grew up  

q. ........Lack of education  

r. ........Forced by others  

s. ........Other (Please state who or what)......................  

13. Have the behavior of any of the following had an impact in your decision to show sympathy towards the organization? (Please check all that apply)
a. Police
b. Gendarme
c. Military
d. Municipal officials
e. Public officials (not security and law enforcement related)
f. No one had an impact
g. Don’t know

14. Have the behavior of any of the following had an impact in your decision to join the organization?
   a. Police
   b. Gendarme
   c. Military
   d. Municipal officials
   e. Public officials (not security and law enforcement related)
   f. No one had an impact
   g. Don’t know

15. Is there a specific incident that led you to make a decision to join the organization?
   a. Yes
   b. NO
   if YES please explain?

16. Before you joined the organization have you ever been subjected to brutality by the:
   a. Police
   b. Gendarme
   c. Army
   d. Municipal officials
   e. Public officials (not security and law enforcement related)
   f. No I have not been subject to brutality

17. Before you joined the organization have any of your family members been subjected to brutality by the:
   a. Police
   b. Gendarme
   c. Army
   d. Municipal officials
   e. Public officials (not security and law enforcement related)
   f. No one of my family members has been subject to brutality
18. After you joined the organization have any of your family members been subject to brutality by the:
   a. Police
   b. Gendarme
   c. Army
   d. Municipal officials
   e. Public officials (not security and law enforcement related)
   g. No one of my family members has been subject to brutality

19. Would you have reconsidered joining the organization if police/gendarme/army would have (been)? (Please select all that apply)

   Police    Gendarme    Army
   a. Involved in community events   a. Involved in community events   a. Involved in community events
   b. Shared community values   b. Shared community values   b. Shared community values
   c. Shared information   c. Shared information
   d. More polite   d. More polite   d. More polite
   e. More responsive   e. More responsive   e. More responsive
   f. More a listener   f. More a listener   f. More a listener
   g. Supportive of law abiding citizens   g. Supportive of law abiding citizens   g. Supportive of law abiding citizens
   h. Harsh to criminals   h. Harsh to criminals   h. Harsh to criminals
   i. Concerned about community problems   i. Concerned about community problems   i. Concerned about community problems
   j. Other (Please state)............   j. Other (Please state)............   j. Other (Please state)............
   k. No I would not have reconsidered   k. No I would not have reconsidered   k. No I would not have reconsidered
20. Would you have reconsidered joining the organization if municipal and government officials had been...? (Please choose those that apply and please number from most to least important, “1” as most important)

   a. ......Involved in community events  a. ......Involved in community events
   b. ......Shared community values      b. ......Shared community values
   c. ......Shared information          c. ......Shared information
   d. ......More responsive              d. ......More responsive
   e. ......More a listener             e. ......More a listener
   f. ......Supportive to law abiding citizens f. ......Supportive to law abiding citizens
   g. ......Concerned about community problems g. ......Concerned about community problems
   h. ......Other (Please state)......... h. ......Other (Please state).........
   i. ......No I would not have reconsidered   i. ......No I would not have reconsidered

21. Before you joined the organization what were your feelings toward law enforcement officials?
   a. Hated them
   b. Didn’t like them
   c. Neither hated nor liked
   d. Had sympathy
   e. Liked very much

22. Before you joined the organization what were your feelings toward the organization?
   a. Hated them
   b. Didn’t like them
   c. Neither hated nor liked
   d. Had sympathy
   e. Liked very much

23. Do you believe that the methods and means of response by law enforcement against terrorist activities are reasonable?
   a. Absolutely not
   b. I don’t think so
   c. Might be
d. I believe yes
e. Absolutely yes
f. Don’t know

24. If not why not (Please choose those that apply and please number from most to least important, “1” as most important?)
   a. ……They are rude
   b. ……They discriminate
   c. ……They are crime fighting focused and don’t focus on providing service.
   d. ……They use torture
   e. ……They violate laws
   f. ……They don’t respect individual rights
   g. ……They do not respect norms and values of individuals and communities
   h. ……They use military tactics
   i. ……They do not gain support of the people
   j. ……They don’t trust the people
   k. ……They only react, without real intelligence/information
   l. Other, please state.

25. What are your suggestions for law enforcement in preventing terrorism (Please choose 10 that apply and please number from most to least important, “1” as most important?)
   a. ……They should trust the people more
   b. ……They should listen to the concerns of public more
   c. ……They should improve economic conditions
   d. ……They should provide better information to public about groups’ wrongdoings.
   e. ……They should increase contact with people.
   f. ……They should talk more with people
   g. ……They should focus more on providing social service.
   h. ……They should focus more on providing services than fighting crime.
   i. ……They should make the people know they are there to serve and protect.
   j. ……They should be more sensitive to cultural, religious, and customary values.
   k. ……They should increase the number of available jobs.
   l. ……They should be more respectful to citizens.
   m. ……They should be more just in their service giving
   n. ……They should involve the public more in their decision process.
   o. ……They should involve the public more in the solution.
   p. ……They should be more reliable.
q. ……They should focus more on solving problems of local communities.

r. ……They should separate the problem and the public, and not see the people as the problem.

s. Other please state…..

Please rate the following statements.

26. The use of arms as the primary response in the fight against PKK will increase sympathy for PKK.
   a. Strongly agree
   b. Agree
   c. Neither agree nor disagree
   d. Disagree
   e. Strongly disagree

27. The use of arms as the primary response in the fight against terrorist organizations will increase number of people joining those organizations.
   a. Strongly agree
   b. Agree
   c. Neither agree nor disagree
   d. Disagree
   e. Strongly disagree

28. The use of forced migration in order to provide better security will increase sympathy for and involvement with the terrorist organizations.
   a. Strongly agree
   b. Agree
   c. Neither agree nor disagree
   d. Disagree
   e. Strongly disagree

29. The increase of temporary village guards will increase sympathy for and involvement with the terrorist organizations.
   a. Strongly agree
   b. Agree
   c. Neither agree nor disagree
   d. Disagree
   e. Strongly disagree
30. **Law enforcements informational briefings to the public about the terrorist organization will increase sympathy for and involvement with the terrorist organizations.**
   a. Strongly agree
   b. Agree
   c. Neither agree nor disagree
   d. Disagree
   e. Strongly disagree

31. **Law enforcement showing that they take serious all complaints and information from the public will increase sympathy for and involvement with the terrorist organizations.**
   a. Strongly agree
   b. Agree
   c. Neither agree nor disagree
   d. Disagree
   e. Strongly disagree

32. **Law enforcement creating a continues communication channel with the public will increase sympathy and involvement to the terrorist organizations.**
   a. Strongly agree
   b. Agree
   c. Neither agree nor disagree
   d. Disagree
   e. Strongly disagree

33. **Law enforcement helping and initiating the public to get organized in order to solve their problems will increase sympathy for and involvement with the terrorist organizations.**
   a. Strongly agree
   b. Agree
   c. Neither agree nor disagree
   d. Disagree
   e. Strongly disagree

34. **Law enforcement establishing more local service and contact points in the community will increase sympathy for and involvement with the terrorist organizations.**
   a. Strongly agree
   b. Agree
   c. Neither agree nor disagree
   d. Disagree
   e. Strongly disagree
DEMOGRAFIC INFORMATION

1. What is your gender?
   a. Male
   b. Female

2. What year were you born?

3. What is your education level?
   a. Illiterate
   b. Literate or elementary school
   c. Some middle school
   d. Middle school
   e. Some High school
   f. High school
   g. Some College
   h. College
   i. Graduate degree
   j. Doctorate degree

4. What was your occupation before you joined the organization?

5. What is your marital status?
   a. Single
   b. Married
   c. Widowed
   d. Divorced

6. In which city were you born? ......................

7. What was your monthly salary?
   a. Less than $300
   b. $300 - $500
   c. $500 - $700
   d. $700 - $900
   e. $900 - $1000
   f. More than $1000

INTERNET USE

Before your arrest or surrender
1. **How frequently did you use to the Internet?**
   - a. Almost everyday
   - b. 4-5 days in a week
   - c. 2-3 days in a week
   - d. 1 time in a week
   - e. Not at all

2. **How did you access the Internet? (Check all that apply)**
   - a. Personal-home computer
   - b. Work computer
   - c. School computer
   - d. Internet café
   - e. Public wireless system

3. **For what purpose/purposes did you generally use the Internet? (Check all that apply)**
   - a. Check Email
   - b. Using online chat programs
   - c. Using online chat rooms
   - d. Using online gaming
   - e. Reading news, sports, and entertainment sites
   - f. Reaching terror web sites
   - g. Gathering information about places where the attack would be held
   - h. Creating computer viruses
   - i. Sabotaging computer networks (hacking computers or web sites)
   - j. Divulging sensitive data belong to important institutions such as the military or police
   - k. Shopping for goods
   - l. Shopping for arms and other military supplies
   - m. Banking
   - n. Other ........................................

4. **Have you ever searched for terrorist web sites?**
   - a. Yes    b. No

5. **If yes, what kind of information did you seek? (Check all that apply)**
   - a. Information about the organization
   - b. Information about the recruitment process
   - c. Information about motivational knowledge addressing the psychological, social, cultural, and emotional development of individuals
   - d. Information about operational knowledge such as organizing members, finding money, taking action, making bombs, firing handguns, and attacking targets
6. What kinds of barriers did you encounter through the process of seeking information through terrorists’ web sites?
   a. Language barrier
   b. Not knowing all of the web sites
   c. Not contacting anyone within the organization
   d. Other ..................................................

INTERNET USE

Before your arrest or surrender

7. How frequently did you use to the Internet?
   a. Almost everyday
   b. 4-5 days in a week
   c. 2-3 days in a week
   d. 1 time in a week
   e. Not at all

8. How did you access the Internet? (Check all that apply)
   a. Personal-home computer
   b. Work computer
   c. School computer
   d. Internet café
   e. Public wireless system

9. For what purpose/purposes did you generally use the Internet? (Check all that apply)
   a. Check Email
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   c. Using online chat rooms
   d. Using online gaming
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   g. Gathering information about places where the attack would be held
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   j. Divulging sensitive data belong to important institutions such as the military or police
   k. Shopping for goods
   l. Shopping for arms and other military supplies
   m. Banking
   n. Other ..............................................
10. Have you ever searched for terrorist web sites?
   a. Yes
   b. No

11. If yes, what kind of information did you seek? (Check all that apply)
   a. Information about the organization
   b. Information about the recruitment process
   c. Information about motivational knowledge addressing the psychological, social, cultural, and emotional development of individuals
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12. What kinds of barriers did you encounter through the process of seeking information through terrorists’ web sites?
   a. Language barrier
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   d. Other ..................................................
APPENDIX F

THE SCALE-MATCHING THE VARIABLES
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables from Ahmet Ekici (2008)</th>
<th>Maslow’s Five Level of Needs</th>
<th>Matching</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>From question #12</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a- My Friends</td>
<td>1- Physiological needs: oxygen, food water, sleep, sex and shelter. These are needs that humans are “inborn.”</td>
<td>1-Physiological needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b- My School</td>
<td></td>
<td>No Var. available for measurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c- Close relatives (Immediate family)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>d- Far relatives (Extended family)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e- Economic Conditions</td>
<td>2- Safety and security needs: security of body, of job, of retirement plans, of stability and prevention of unwanted unpredictable developments</td>
<td>2-Safety and security needs: Under Question #12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f- Inequality in the society</td>
<td></td>
<td>e- Economic conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g- Behavior of law enforcement officers</td>
<td></td>
<td>k- Need for protection</td>
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<td>h- Behavior of public officials (not security and law enforcement related)</td>
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<td>n- I was an outcast in my community</td>
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<tr>
<td>o- The pressure and force of the organization</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p- The environment and culture in which I grew up</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q- Lack of education</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>From question #14</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a- Police</td>
<td>3- Social and affiliative needs: Receiving the feeling of love, intimacy, frustration, or belonging to their group, identification with others</td>
<td>3-Social and affiliative needs: Under Question #12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b- Gendarme</td>
<td></td>
<td>a- My friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c- Military</td>
<td></td>
<td>b- My school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d- Municipal officials</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5- Self-actualization need</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5- Self-actualization need: The highest level of need individuals may feel. This need involves an individual doing anything he/she is fitted for</td>
<td>5- Self-actualization need:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>l- Sharing the goal of the organization</td>
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</table>
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