MASTER

RESOLVING COMMUNITY CONFLICT IN THE NUCLEAR POWER ISSUE

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RESOLVING COMMUNITY CONFLICT IN THE NUCLEAR POWER ISSUE

ABSTRACT

This is the second of a two part discussion the purpose of which is to demonstrate that a frankly structural, or network, approach to the analysis of community decision-making allows an observer to anticipate and manage community response to specific policies. Using the siting of nuclear facilities as an illustrative policy, part one (Burt, 1978) derived hypotheses predicting what types of communities could be expected to become embroiled in conflict over a proposed facility and the process that conflict escalation would follow. My purpose here is to extend the argument to include conflict resolution. I draw on available research in order to outline a structural approach to the resolution of community conflict over specific policies. The conflict resolution techniques proposed are intended to reverse the social parameters of conflict escalation and compensate for deficiencies in a community structure so as to transform a community high in potential for conflict into a community with low conflict potential. The discussion concludes with general principles for the resolution of community conflict in the nuclear power issue.

I. INTRODUCTION

In part one of this discussion (Burt, 1978), I sought to demonstrate that a frankly structural, or network, approach to the analysis of community decision-making allowed an observer to anticipate community response to specific policies. I used the siting of nuclear facilities as an example. Hypotheses were derived predicting what types of communities could be expected to become embroiled in conflict over a proposed nuclear facility and the process that conflict escalation would follow.

My purpose here is to extend the argument to include conflict resolution. Using the analysis of the nuclear power issue given in the earlier discussion, I here draw on available research in order to outline a structural approach to the resolution of community conflict. My position is strictly one of an observer. In contrast to work on conflict which suggests optimum strategy for one party or the other toward the goal of "winning," I am concerned only with having the parties in conflict reach some agreement equitable to both under the circumstances and preventing the conflict from escalating out of control by either party.¹ The discussion assumes familiarity with the social parameters of conflict escalation given in the previous discussion and concludes with general principles for the resolution of conflict in the nuclear power issue. Let me begin with a word of caution.

II. LIMITATIONS OF AVAILABLE RESEARCH

At the outset I should emphasize that there is virtually no research comparing the relative efficacy of alternative community conflict resolution techniques. Once a conflict emerges and polarizes a community into factions, very little definitive knowledge is available on resolving the conflict. A

variety of good reasons can be advanced to account for this gap in available research if one considers the amorphous nature of the participants, relations, and conditions involved in community conflict. These reasons, however, are quite beside the point. The question remains; "What can be said based on available research?" Based on research on conflict in other contexts, some useful statements can be made;² however, the reader should be aware at all times here that community conflict resolution is an area uncharted by articles in well established professional journals. Inferences from available research are accordingly tentative. The research that is available on conflict resolution techniques has focused on relatively simple contexts; some in the real world, some in the laboratory.

In the real world, there are numerous works on negotiations between corporate groups; either between nations or between labor unions and business firms. While these works have the advantage of studying actual conflict among responsible adults, they have the disadvantage--at least in reference to community conflict--of studying clearly defined parties to a conflict. In contrast to negotiations between corporate groups, community conflict tends to involve unincorporated social groups whose membership need not unanimously agree to the terms of some agreement. In the nuclear power issue in particular, the public hearing context makes it possible for a small splinter group of extremists to hold up the licensing process even if all other parties to the conflict over a particular facility have agreed to some prior settlement. This point is discussed in detail below under the question of mobilization in the issue network.

-----Table 1 About Here-----

In the laboratory, there is an extensive literature on negotiations between individuals--usually students ranging from kindergarten up through

TABLE 1

REWARD MATRIX FOR A GAME OF PRISONER'S DILEMMA

Player B	Player A	
	Cooperative Move	Competitive Move
Cooperative Move	A and B each earn a low number of points	A earns a high number of points and B loses a high number of points
Competitive Move	B earns a high number of points and A loses a high number of points	A and B each lose a low number of points

college. This is the source of evidence that is most extensively developed on conflict resolution and the one on which I must rely most heavily. Typical of this line of research is the prisoner's dilemma game in which two parties, A and B, each of whom is instructed to obtain a maximum number of "points", are placed in the laboratory such that they can not communicate. Each party has a choice between two options; one termed a cooperative choice, the other termed a competitive choice. The different choices entail different rewards in terms of "points" earned and are illustrated in Table 1. If both A and B take the cooperative move, then they both earn a low number of points. If one takes the cooperative move while the other takes the competitive move, then the one taking the competitive move earns a high number of points while the other loses a high number of points. If both take the competitive move, then they both lose a low number of points. A variety of modifications on the prisoner's dilemma game and a variety of games intended to capture the mixed motive of bargaining (i.e., the mixture of a motive to cooperative and a motive to compete) have been used in laboratory research, however an understanding of the prisoner's dilemma game is sufficient to illustrate the essential aspects of laboratory research relevant to the purposes here.³ Bargaining effectiveness in this research can now be measured in two manners; the extent to which the parties tend to make cooperative rather than competitive moves and the total number of points obtained by the two parties.

III. BASIC PARAMETERS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Just as there are basic social parameters in the escalation of conflict, so there are parameters in its deescalation or resolution. I have described the processes of mobilization, polarization and generalization within the issue network depicting a community conflict (Burt, 1978: Section II).

I now want to describe techniques for containing and/or reversing these parameters. What the discussion here will demonstrate is that conflict resolution techniques for the nuclear power issue are intended to reverse the social parameters of conflict escalation and compensate for deficiencies in a community structure so as to transform a community high in potential for conflict into a community with low conflict potential. Since the generalization of the content of conflict is determined by mobilization and polarization in the issue network as the form of conflict (see Burt, 1978: Figure 1), I shall begin the discussion at the end of the causal process with the content of conflict.

IV. ADDRESSING THE GENERALIZATION OF THE CONTENT OF CONFLICT

Assume for the time being that there is an opposition relation between the parties in conflict. Part one describes the process by which the content of conflict--the substance of the questions being debated between the parties--generalizes as conflict escalates. Initial differences over specific questions first multiply into differences over an increasing number of questions and secondly the questions themselves become more abstract. The generalization of the content of conflict thus involves changes in the complexity and multiplicity of the questions being debated. These two dimensions are presented in Table 2 as a fourfold table. Cell A of the table refers to bargaining situations where the content of conflict consists of a few concrete questions. Cell B of the table refers to a bargaining situation where conflict is over many concrete questions. Cell C refers to bargaining situations where conflict is over a small number of abstract questions. Cell D refers to bargaining situations where conflict is over many abstract questions. These four ideal types of content are differentially amenable to bargaining effectiveness. The most effective bargaining occurs

when the content of conflict consists of a few concrete questions. This is cell A of Table 2. The generalization of the content of conflict consists of moving out of cell A and accordingly lowers the bargaining effectiveness for participants in the conflict. The differences in relative bargaining effectiveness under the four ideal typical contents in Table 2 can be attributed to two causes.

-----Table 2 About Here-----

First, being able to debate more than a single question at a time gives opponents greater flexibility in exchanging concessions on particular points. One gives up some combination of demands in exchange for the other giving up some combination of demands. Both Ikle (1964:218-224) in his discussion of "package deals" and "tie-ins" and Fisher (1964:91-109) in his discussion of "fractionating" conflict emphasize the improved bargaining effectiveness of nations when they have multiple separate disagreements that can be juggled simultaneously in negotiations. Similarly, Froman and Cohen (1970) found greater bargaining effectiveness resulted when individuals were allowed to exchange concessions on multiple issues being simultaneously resolved than when issues had to be resolved one at a time. In analyzing bargaining behavior of students in a university class, Kelley (1966) found that there was a decided preference among participants to be able to negotiate the full set of their differences simultaneously rather than one at a time. In a related vein, Pilisuk et al. (1965, 1967) found that cooperative moves were significantly increased when the number of alternative choices in the prisoner's dilemma game was increased from two to twenty-one.⁴

A second reason for the differences in bargaining effectiveness under the four ideal typical contents in Table 2 stems from the extent to which the questions being debated are clearly understood by both parties. While there appears to be no association between measured I.Q. and bargaining

TABLE 2
IDEAL TYPICAL CONTENTS OF CONFLICT
AND THEIR EXPECTED LEVELS OF BARGAINING EFFECTIVENESS*

Abstraction of Questions Being Negotiated	Number of Questions Being Negotiated	
	Low	High
Low	A (highest)	B (low)
High	C (low)	D (lowest)

*The generalization of the content in an issue network as described in Burt (1978) involves movement from cell A to cell D of the table.

behavior,⁵ there is a significant tendency for cognitively noncomplex, dogmatic, individuals to be aggressively competitive in bargaining.⁶ Assuming that this finding is due to the increased difficulty such individuals might have in empathizing with the opponent, it would be expected that as the content of conflict becomes abstract and accordingly difficult to understand, the tendency to compete rather than cooperate will increase. This appears to be the case. Ikle (1964:7-16) emphasizes that more lasting agreements between nations are likely if agreements are stated unambiguously. When the prisoner's dilemma game is presented in a complicated abstract form rather than a simplified concrete form, there are significantly more competitive moves between opponents (see Evans and Crumbaugh, 1966; Crumbaugh and Evans, 1967; Orwant and Orwant, 1970). In an innovative approach to linking trust and communication complexity, Suedfeld and Rank (1976) content analyzed archival records on communications from nineteen revolutionary leaders in order to test the hypothesis that leaders wishing to retain their positions of power after a successful revolution would need to replace the prerevolution abstract ideology with a postrevolution concrete, multifaceted view. The eight leaders who lost their positions failed to make the correct decrease in the abstraction of their communication while the eleven leaders who retained their positions did make their postrevolution communication more concrete.

This is not to say that an increasing number of concrete as opposed to abstract questions as the content of conflict always results in increased bargaining effectiveness. This would be a move from cell C to cell B in Table 2. Suedfeld and Tetlock (1977) found that international crises resulting in war rather than peaceful settlements were characterized by communications with many fine distinctions rather than global abstractions. They argue that maintaining a large number of fine distinctions in communications

between opponents leads to an information overload in decision-making that can easily result in war. This argument is the same one used to explain the lower bargaining effectiveness associated with abstract content. Namely, when communication is poorly understood, competitive moves are more likely than cooperative moves. Abstracting a debate is one method of ensuring poor understanding. Presenting too many details is another method of ensuring poor understanding. Yet a third method of ensuring poor understanding is to present multiple, concrete questions being debated via an inappropriate communication channel. Chaiken and Eagly (1976) demonstrate that individuals have a difficult time understanding a complicated message when it is presented by videotape rather than in written form. It is not surprising, therefore, to observe that those individuals who obtained their information from a newspaper regarding an exchange of gunfire between police and a meeting of black separatists--an event fraught with important details of timing and participation such as who shot first and why--tended to be less likely to see the races as polarized by the event than did individuals who obtained their information from television (Warren, 1972).

Consider Table 2 in regard to the nuclear power issue as outlined in part one. The opponents of a nuclear facility are concerned about relatively abstract safety and environmental issues. They therefore have a natural tendency to communicate in terms of the content in cell C; a few abstract questions. The supporters of a nuclear facility are concerned about relatively concrete economic and legal issues. These issues, when explained in their full technical detail, can be highly complex in the sense of many fine distinctions being considered simultaneously. They therefore have a natural tendency to communicate in terms of the content of cell B; many concrete questions. In short (and as was argued in the earlier discussion, but on

different grounds), the natural content of communication between opponents in the nuclear power issue will tend to create competitive rather than cooperative relations between the supporters and opponents of a nuclear facility.

In order to transform this natural conflict tendency to one of cooperation, communication will have to be deliberately translated from cells B and C of Table 2 into cell A. In other words, points being debated should be concrete questions rather than abstract principles. This means that the abstract safety and environmental concerns of a facility's opponents should be distilled into more tangible points. Secondly, more than one--but not too many--concrete questions should be considered simultaneously. This means that the myriad economic and legal concerns of a facility's supporters should be codified into a few concrete points. How many concrete points should be considered simultaneously? While not bearing directly on this question, there is research demonstrating that the average human mind can simultaneously process an upper limit of five to seven pieces of information (Simon, 1974). This suggests that a tentative range of between three and five separate questions should be considered simultaneously for optimum bargaining effectiveness.

V. ADDRESSING THE MOBILIZATION OF FACTION SUPPORT AS THE FORM OF CONFLICT

For the moment, continue with the assumption that there is an opposition relation between the factions in conflict. Part one describes the process by which the form of conflict--the patterning of relations among the participants in the conflict--changes through mobilization. Each faction in the conflict seeks to recruit neutral actors to their own side and develop coordinating support relations among the actors within the faction. This process

of mobilization facilitates the generalization of content so that faction ideology and stereotypical images of the opposition develop. Coordinating support relations within a faction provide a social environment of like-minded individuals able to protect one another from external influences that might create beliefs that deviate from the faction ideology. The development of internal coordinating support relations within a faction and the simultaneous development of group pressure to conform to faction ideology are two dimensions of mobilization that are presented in Table 3 as a four-fold table. Cell A of the table refers to bargaining situations where there is both low group pressure to conform to a faction ideology and low coordination within a faction. Cell D is the exact opposite situation; high group pressure and high coordination. Cell B refers to bargaining situations where there is high coordination within a faction but low group pressure to support faction ideology. Cell C is the exact opposite situation; low internal coordination and high group pressure. As indicated in Table 3, these four ideal typical situations are differentially amenable to bargaining effectiveness. The process of mobilization involves movement from cell A to cell D of the table, however, the most effective bargaining occurs in cell B of the table and the least effective occurs in cell C. In contrast to the generalization of content, a process largely detrimental to conflict resolution, the mobilization of faction support within the issue network serves both to facilitate and inhibit conflict resolution.

-----Table 3 About Here-----

The development of coordinating support relations among actors in each faction facilitates conflict resolution by making it possible for representatives to negotiate for factions. Without such coordinating relations, negotiation would have to involve all individuals and groups participating in a

TABLE 3

IDEAL TYPICAL FORMS OF CONFLICT
AND THEIR EXPECTED LEVELS OF BARGAINING EFFECTIVENESS:
MOBILIZATION*

Group Pressure to Conform to Factional Ideology	Coordinating Support Relations Within Opposing Factions	
	Low	High
Low	A (low)	B (highest)
High	C (lowest)	D (moderate)

*Mobilization in the issue network as described in Burt (1978) involves movement from cell A to cell D of the table.

conflict. As the number of participants in negotiation increases, the probability of them agreeing in any one question decreases exponentially.⁷ For example, Marwell and Schmitt (1972) found that cooperative moves were significantly more difficult for three players to establish in the prisoner's dilemma game than for two players.

The absence of coordinating relations among the opponents to a nuclear power facility are particularly problematic for the facility's supporters. Since any affected citizen can petition to intervene in public hearings on a facility's licensing, the absence of coordinating relations among the facility's opponents means that even if supporters reach some agreement with opponents prior to a hearing, licensing can still be delayed by some other opponents who do not feel bound by the agreement. After its defeat at the hands of citizen opposition groups over the Bodega Head nuclear power plant, for example, Pacific Gas and Electric negotiated with the Sierra Club over the proposed site of the next plant. A compromise was reached in which the utility agreed to build on a site other than their first choice since their first choice was a beautiful coastal area the Sierra Club wished to preserve. In exchange, the Sierra Club agreed not to intervene against the utility's plans to build a nuclear facility on an alternative location. The utility went on to gain the support of a number of other conservation groups and state agencies for the alternative location by negotiating with each group and agency separately. Despite the agreement, however, there were some who did not feel bound by the earlier negotiations. A citizen opposition group was formed to intervene in the public hearings and another licensing fight began.⁸

While this strategy appears useful in the nuclear power issue, it need not be useful equally in resolving all conflicts. In particular, where

formal negotiations are held between coordinated factions and binding contracts are the end product of negotiation, it is in the interest of one faction to prevent the mobilization of the other faction. This strategy a variation on the old adage "divide and conquer", is termed "whipsawing" in negotiations between labor unions and business firms. In responding to the increasing centralization of separate business establishments within a single labor bargaining negotiation committee, labor unions having separate contracts with each establishment have attempted to pool their own resources in a single "coordinated" or "coalition" negotiation committee. As discussed by Schwarz (1970), this coordination is to the advantage of the labor union since they increase the crippling power of a strike against an entire business firm by being able to simultaneously strike at all its separate establishments. Accordingly, business management looks unfavorably on such "coordinated" negotiation and will usually strive to conduct separate negotiations with labor unions at each separate establishment. If a strike is called at one establishment the other establishments can still function so management is under much less pressure to give in to labor demands. The position of labor unions here is very similar to that of the idealized "weak" parties in a triad who have been shown to usually form a coalition against an idealized "strong" party in the triad.⁹

In contrast to the nuclear power issue, however, the labor unions negotiating with separate establishments can be bound by clear contracts. Citizen groups intervening against a nuclear facility have no such limitation in negotiating with the NRC and the company proposing the facility. The NRC and the company are open to repeated intervention no matter what the result of prior negotiations. Although there is a clear difference in the power of the NRC and company proposing a facility in comparison to the power of local and

national citizen opposition groups, especially where power is stated in terms of financial capabilities, the balance of power in terms of ability to impose bargaining costs on one's opponent is clearly in favor of the opposition groups.

Returning to Table 3, and in contrast to the above facilitating effects of mobilization, the development of group pressure to conform to factional ideology that is created by both mobilization and polarization inhibits conflict resolution. It does so in three manners; 1) by encouraging the systematic misperception of the opposing faction(s) in terms of stereotypical images, 2) by increasing the need for negotiators to "save face" in the bargaining process, and 3) by limiting the bargaining flexibility of faction representatives.¹⁰

As discussed in part one (Burt, 1978: Section II), mobilization facilitates each faction's misperceptions of the opposing faction(s) in terms of stereotypical images. This effect is particularly strong if mobilization occurs--as it tends to--among individuals and groups already connected by social relations (Burt, 1978: Section III). Blake and Mouton (1961:b) argue that conflict resolution is made difficult when negotiators identify with their faction because such identification inhibits negotiator ability to correctly perceive the position of the opposing side. In a penetrating discussion of the Arab-Israeli conflict, White (1977) shows how internal support within each faction serves to maintain systematic misperceptions of the opposition. Both sides see the other as a continuing aggressor. Both sides see the four wars as being initiated by the other side. Both sides fail to see the extent to which their own perceptions and actions in keeping with those perceptions are to a large extent producing the other side's perceptions and actions. Even if the content of conflict is restricted to a few

concrete questions so that understanding is facilitated, bias is possible. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) show that global evaluations of a speaker determine the evaluation of specific attributes of the speaker. Further, subjects seemed not to be aware of this "halo effect."

A second manner in which the factions created by mobilization inhibit conflict resolution is by heightening the extent to which faction representatives seek to save face by appearing strong and competent to their constituencies. White (1977) also points out the importance to Arabs of the return to "all" the territory occupied in 1967. Having staked honor and manhood on this word, it must be incorporated into any lasting agreement in order for the Arabs to save face. B. R. Brown has pursued face-saving as an effect of audiences in the laboratory setting. When exposed to systematic exploitation by a preprogrammed opponent, and subsequently exposed to feedback from an audience of peers indicating that subjects either; 1) performed well in the negotiation because they played fairly, or 2) looked foolish and weak in the negotiation because they allowed themselves to be exploited, those subjects exposed to ridicule had a significantly higher tendency to retaliate with noncooperation in subsequent trials even if the retaliation involved "costs" in the sense of obtaining lower monetary income from their action. This observation of retaliation following public humiliation was replicated when controlling for the competence of the negotiator (Brown, 1970), and was increased if the negotiator had strong social relations to members of the audience (Brown and Garland, 1971). Face-saving efforts by negotiators with visible audiences have also been observed by Frey and Adams (1972) and Kogan et al. (1972). A further finding in Brown's (1968) study was that negotiators were sensitive to the level of public disclosure of the basis for their actions. Retaliation was highest where subjects were told that the audience

would not be informed of the increased costs retaliation had imposed on bargaining effectiveness. In a related vein, Davis et al. (1976) found that mock injuries were significantly more likely to move away from a guilty verdict toward the end of deliberation if they were told that their deliberations would be made public in the sense of being queried by a panel of experts. When controlling for the strength of a group's basis for arguing a position in mock labor-management negotiations, however, Rabbie et al. (1974) found no significant difference in the subjects preferences for public or private negotiations.

A third manner in which group pressure to conform to factional ideology inhibits conflict resolution is by limiting negotiator flexibility. Specifically, there is a demand by the faction that its ideology be adhered to in the negotiations. Analyzing an open-ended problem, forty-six groups of executives and sixteen groups of college students were asked to come up with the "best" solution to the problem during a human relations training program (Blake and Mouton, 1961:a). In the course of ten to twelve hours of discussion among members of each group separately, each group prepared a written statement with its solution. Separate groups were then brought together to negotiate the differences between their solutions. The authors found that sixty of the sixty-two groups refused to give up their own group's solution in favor of the opposition group's solution--although impartial judges found the solutions to be of varying quality. Loyalty was stronger than logic. Similarly, Hornstein and Johnson (1966) found that negotiators with strong identification with their faction were more competitive in bargaining than were negotiators with weak faction identification. Vidmar (1971) found that discussion groups were more effective in resolving an issue than were negotiations between groups. Lamm and Kogan (1970) found that when two factions

composed of three individuals elected a representative to negotiate with the other faction, the elected representatives took longer to reach agreement than the individuals not elected as representatives. These audience inhibitions on negotiator bargaining flexibility are also noted by Blake and Mouton (1971:a); Gruder (1971), and Shure et al. (1965). The increased competition that visible audiences seem to inspire is likely to be increased if there is competition within the audience for the position of negotiator. McKersie et al. (1965) document the pressures exerted on labor and management negotiators by their respective constituencies in the sense that negotiators felt they could be replaced easily if they failed to obtain concessions from the opposition. More recently, Rabbie et al. (1974) show that negotiators tend to bargain more competitively if they represent factions in which there is high competition among faction members as opposed to cooperation among faction members.

To summarize the above discussion, conflict resolution is both inhibited and facilitated by mobilization in the issue network. On the positive side, there are strong incentives for each side in a conflict to facilitate the mobilization of the other side; bringing together the various opponents into coordinated factions so that their differences can be clearly addressed and efficiently resolved. On the negative side, there are known pressures on representatives of factions to appear competent and strong in advancing their faction's position and demands. Toward the end of conflict resolution therefore, there are strong incentives for each side in a conflict to be sensitive to the ostensible dignity of one another. Perceived insults, real or imaged, can be expected to bring emotional retaliation and thereby lower bargaining effectiveness.

VI. ADDRESSING THE POLARIZATION OF FACTIONS AS THE FORM OF CONFLICT

The final social parameter of conflict escalation--and the parameter that has been researched most extensively--is polarization in the issue network. Polarization involves the development of antagonistic opposition relations between factions in conflict and a concomitant increase in the distance between the factions in the sense that actors in each faction have increasingly different relations; support relations developing within factions and opposition relations developing between factions.

It seems reasonable to expect that just getting opposing factions to communicate with one another will increase their bargaining effectiveness in comparison to the natural course of polarization. Indeed, research is available to document the finding that opponents who are isolated tend to be more competitive than those who are able to communicate with one another--everything else being constant.¹¹ However, everything else is rarely constant. In particular, if communication between opponents is merely available (as opposed to compulsory), opponents tend not to use it. If communication is compulsory and threats are available to both factions, communication tends to lower bargaining effectiveness. The communication channel is used to transmit threats rather than concessions.¹² In short, the absence of communication between opposing factions can significantly lower bargaining effectiveness but its presence need not increase effectiveness. Where opposing factions have antagonistic opposition relations with one another, the availability of free communication between the factions will lower bargaining effectiveness (cf. Deutsch, 1973:248; Rubin and Brown 1975:92).

More important than whether or not there is communication between opposing factions is the manner in which the factions actually conduct

communication. Research on conflict resolution addressing the polarization of factions has considered both the development of opposition relations and distance between factions as determinants of the manner in which factions communicate with one another. These two determinants are discussed separately here.

Defining the Opposition Relation Between Factions

In order to increase the bargaining effectiveness of inter-faction communication by manipulating the opposition relation between them, research has considered; 1) the optimum level of hostility in the opposition relation, 2) the timing of demands and concessions to be communicated, and 3) the optimum level of equity between factions in terms of their power to determine the bargaining. These three variables are crudely measured as dichotomies of high versus low in Table 4 to create an eightfold table of bargaining situations.

-----Table 4 About Here-----

The rows of Table 4 distinguish low versus high levels of hostility in the opposition relation between factions. In fact, this dichotomy condenses a continuum ranging from support relations as occur between allies within a faction to simple cooperation between factions, to simple competition between factions, and on up to the opposite extreme of hostility with threats between factions. The high-hostility cells of Table 4 (cells, C, D, G, and H) refer to bargaining situations in which opponents threaten one another and take available opportunities to benefit from one another's losses. The low hostility cells (cells A, B, E and F) refer to bargaining situations in which opponents offer concessions to one another and take available opportunities to help one another profit in the bargaining.

The second dimension of Table 4 concerns the extent to which each faction times its demands and concessions during bargaining with the demands

TABLE 4

IDEAL TYPICAL FORMS OF CONFLICT

AND THEIR EXPECTED LEVELS OF BARGAINING EFFECTIVENESS: POLARIZATION IN OPPOSITION RELATIONS*

Level of Hostility in the Opposition Relation Between the Factions	Level of Equity Between the Factions in Terms of their Abilities to Determine the Bargaining Outcome			
	LOW EQUITY		HIGH EQUITY	
	Responsiveness of Factions to One Another's Concessions		Responsiveness of Factions to One Another's Concessions	
	Low	High	Low	High
Low	A (low)	B (moderate)	E (low)	F (highest)
High	C (lowest)	D (low)	G (lower)	H (low)

*Polarization in the issue network as described in Burt (1978) involves movement from cell E to cell C of the table.

and concessions of the other faction. The low responsiveness cells (cells A, C, E and G) refer to bargaining situations in which opponents pursue a course of bargaining without considering the opposition's actions. The high responsiveness cells (cells B, D, F and H) refer to bargaining situations in which opponents make demands and concessions that are contingent on the opposition's immediate demands and concessions.

The third dimension of Table 4 concerns the extent to which each faction has equal power to determine the bargaining outcome. The low equity cells (cells A, B, C and D) refer to bargaining situations in which one faction is more able than the other faction to determine the bargaining outcome. These cells refer to token bargaining where one faction's input is more for appearance's sake than for its actual impact on the bargaining outcome. The high equity cells (cells E, F, G and H) refer to bargaining situations in which both factions are equally able to determine the bargaining outcome.

The nature of the opposition relation between factions prior to conflict can be in any one of the eight cells in Table 4. Therefore, conflict escalation can involve any combination of the eight cells. In terms of the issue network discussed in part one, however, opponents become activated so as to be able to determine the outcome of conflict, with low responsiveness to one another and low hostility to one another. This is cell E of the table. As polarization increases from the preissue to the preconfliction to the aftermath stages of conflict, the hostility between opponents increases, one or the other becomes more able to determine the outcome of conflict and so become a "victor", and by so doing the victor becomes insensitive to the demands of the vanquished. This ideal typical situation is represented by cell C of the Table. In an ideal typical sense, polarization in the issue network involves movement from cell E to cell C of Table 4. As indicated in

the table, this movement decreases the effectiveness of bargaining. Table 4 will be useful here for organizing the extensive research on bargaining effectiveness as determined by the three dimensions in the table.

Statistically speaking, hostility in the opposition relation tends to elicit competitive rather than cooperative moves so bargaining effectiveness is lowered. This finding has already been discussed in regard to community structure and polarization (Burt, 1978: Section III). Existing opposition relations in a community facilitate the development of subsequent opposition relations. In regard to bargaining, the manner in which one faction bargains with the other will tend to elicit the same manner of bargaining from the other faction. This feedback effect of bargaining has been analyzed in a variety of manners. First, a cooperative approach is more effective in bargaining than is a competitive approach; opponents tend to obtain higher outcome values.¹³ Second, continued cooperation by one bargainer tends to elicit cooperation from the other bargainer although in some cases this effect is negligible.¹⁴ This seems to be particularly true when bargaining begins in a cooperative fashion. There is support for the idea of a "locking-in" effect whereby initial cooperation results in reciprocated cooperation and is subsequently "locked-in" as the dominant mode of bargaining between opponents. Experiments based on mixed motive games show that the initial move is crucial in determining subsequent moves to characterize bargaining; the subsequent move being cooperative if the initial move is cooperative.¹⁵ A third consideration here is the use of promises to cooperate versus threats of retaliation and competition. While the use of threats does tend to elicit more compliance with initial requests from one's opponent than is the case if promises are used, overall cooperation between opponents and the likelihood of a mutually favorable bargaining outcome are greater if promises rather than threats are used by opponents.¹⁶ For example, Rubin et al. (1973)

conducted an experiment in which subjects were "workers" and given a series of anagrams to decode as a task where the experimenter was to play the role of a "supervisor." Anagrams were either "difficult" or "simple" to decode. The supervisor's pay for having workers decode a difficult anagram was twice that of having a simple anagram decoded. The supervisor could send each worker one of three types of messages; a "threat" message that said the worker's fee would be reduced by forty percent if simple anagrams were decoded, a "control" message that simply asked the worker to decode difficult anagrams without specifying any costs or benefits for such behavior, or a "promise" message that said the worker's fee would be increased by forty percent if difficult anagrams were decoded. Rubin et al. found that subjects chose to work on difficult anagrams most when promises were sent, least when threats were sent and an intermediate amount when the control message was sent. In other words, cooperation was higher when no message was sent than when the subjects were threatened. It was higher still when promises were made to the subjects. This consideration of promises versus threats is related to the finding that competitive moves are lower if there are unambiguous costs associated with competitive rather than cooperative moves.¹⁷ This work usually involves a comparison of cooperation when subjects play for real as opposed to imaginary money. For example, Gallo (1966) found that subjects in a mixed motive game with real and large payoffs (up to sixteen dollars) were up to five times more likely to cooperate than subjects playing the same game but with imaginary payoffs. Where costs for competitive moves are ambiguous, in contrast, the reward for cooperation might not be sufficient to create cooperative moves between opponents. In investigating the effect of real versus imaginary rewards, Gumpert et al. (1969) found that subjects playing for imaginary dollars cooperated more than those

playing for real dollars. The reward for cooperation was ambiguous, however. Subjects playing for imaginary dollars were given four dollars and told they could keep the money no matter what happened in the experiment. Subjects playing for real dollars were given ten dollars, told to keep the money in their pockets and "to attach great importance to winning or losing this money" but were not told that they could keep the money obtained during the experiment. While the subjects playing for imaginary money had a clear reward for their behavior, those playing for real money did not.

Given the fact that the hostility in an opposition relation by either faction will tend to elicit similar hostility from the other faction, there are still other considerations to bear in mind. Cooperation for its own sake will not always lead to reciprocated cooperation. Again speaking in a statistical sense, cooperation in the sense of making concessions to one's opponent tends to elicit competition if it is not contingent on the opponent's demands and concessions. Consistently pacifistic or "turn the other cheek" bargaining strategies that involve unwavering cooperation and concessions to an opponent tend to elicit competitive moves from the opponent.¹⁸ The pacifist is exploited. A variety of studies support the finding that acting as if your concessions are contingent on the other's demands is more likely to elicit cooperation than simply being cooperative.¹⁹ Not surprising, the best bargaining outcomes resulting from the manipulation of one bargainer's cooperation tends to occur when cooperation is low initially and gradually increases over the course of bargaining; more concessions being made at the end of the bargaining than at the beginning of the bargaining.²⁰

A series of experiments discussed in Deutsch (1973:314-347) serve to illustrate these empirical generalizations. Subjects were placed in a mixed motive game against bargainers who were the experimenter's accomplices.

Subjects were confronted with a pegboard divided into two areas: a resource area and an allocation area. The game consisted of a series of trials in which the subject selected a peg from the resource area and placed it in the allocation area. By strategically selecting pegs from the resource area, the subjects could increase their initial thirty cents to some higher amount of money that they could keep after the experiment. A subject's resources consisted of five types of pegs and two types of markers. Black pegs earned the subject six cents regardless of the peg the other player chose. White pegs earned the other player seven cents and the subject nothing. Blue pegs earned the subject one cent unless the other player simultaneously chose a blue peg whereupon both players received nine cents. An orange marker indicated an attack. If the subject chose an orange marker, then the number of red pegs he had was compared to the number of green markers the other player had. If the numbers were equal, neither player profited. The subject won six cents for every red peg he had in excess of the number of green pegs his opponent had. The subject lost six cents for every red peg he had less than the number of green pegs his opponent had. The beige marker indicated disarmament. If the subject chose a beige marker, it meant that he had destroyed all the red pegs he had accumulated up to that point in the game. The experimenter's accomplices were instructed to play in one of four basic strategies. The pacifist or "turn the other cheek" strategy consisted of consistently using blue pegs except that white pegs were used in response to the subject's use of the orange marker. In other words, the pacifist strategy consisted of never threatening the subject and always reciprocated an attack by the subject with a concession in the form of a payment. The "nonpunitive" strategy consisted of responding with a blue peg if the subject used a blue or green peg or a beige marker, responding with a green peg if the subject used

the orange marker, responding with a white peg if the subject used a white peg and responding with a black peg if the subject used a black peg. In other words, the nonpunitive strategy consisted of always acting self-protectively rather than with counter threats or counterattacks when the subject attacked and reciprocating cooperative moves by the subject. In contrast, the "deterrent" strategy consisted of threatening the subject when he acted noncooperatively and attacking the subject when he attacked. This strategy involved using a blue peg if the subject used a blue or white peg or the beige marker, responding with a red peg if the subject used a black, green or red peg, and responding with an orange marker if the subject used an orange marker. Finally, Deutsch considered varieties of a "reformed sinner" strategy that consisted of the accomplice choosing red pegs and orange markers for the first fifteen trials the beige marker on trial sixteen, then a nonaggressive strategy for the remainder of the trials. In other words, the reformed sinner strategy consisted of an unwavering belligerence in the beginning of the game and a drastic shift to cooperation for the remainder of the game.

-----Table 5 About Here-----

Deutsch's four strategies conform to some extent with the cells of Table 4. The match of strategies to cells is given in Table 5. The pacifist turn the other cheek strategy contains a low amount of hostility and low responsiveness to the subject as an opponent. The deterrent strategy contains high hostility and high responsiveness to the subject as an opponent. Finally, the reformed sinner contains high hostility in the beginning of the game and a subsequent response to the subject as an opponent by a dramatic shift to cooperation. In fact the deterrent strategy is a little more responsive than the pacifist strategy, and the reformed sinner strategy is a little less res-

TABLE 5

EXPERIMENTAL BARGAINING STRATEGIES AS THEY FIT INTO TABLE 4*

Level of Hostility in the Opposition Relation Between the Factions	Responsiveness of Factions to One Another's Concessions	
	Low	High
Low	PACIFIST	NONPUNITIVE
High	DETERRENT	REFORMED-SINNER

*The pacifist strategy refers to cells A and E of Table 4, the nonpunitive strategy to cells B and F, the deterrent strategy to cells C and G, while the reformed-sinner strategy refers to cells D and H. Accordingly, the highest bargaining effectiveness should occur under the nonpunitive strategy and the lowest bargaining effectiveness should occur under the deterrent strategy.

ponsive than the nonpunitive strategy, however, for the purposes here Table 5 is of adequate accuracy. According to the above discussion from which the levels of bargaining effectiveness in Table 4 are derived, the lowest bargaining effectiveness should be in the responsive, hostile cell of Table 5; viz., the deterrent strategy. The highest bargaining effectiveness should be in the responsive, nonhostile cell; viz., the nonpunitive strategy. The other two cells should be of intermediate bargaining effectiveness. These are the results obtained in the Deutsch experiments. The lower payoffs for subjects and accomplices together were obtained when the deterrent strategy was used. The highest payoffs for accomplices and the second highest payoffs for subjects were obtained under the nonpunitive strategy. The highest payoffs for subjects were obtained when the pacifist strategy was employed. Not surprisingly, this strategy yielded the accomplices their lowest payoffs. The pacifists were exploited. The reformed sinner strategies yielded the greatest changes in payoffs. Both subjects and accomplices received the lowest payoffs in trials during the hostility stage of the reformed sinner strategy and subsequently received the highest joint payoffs of all strategies after the accomplice switched to the cooperative stage of the strategy. After a variety of modifications on this basic experimental game, Deutsch found that the effectiveness of the nonpunitive strategy varied least. In none of the other experiments was the nonpunitive strategy less effective in eliciting cooperation and reducing aggression than the other strategies.

While the Deutsch experiments bring together and support findings from a variety of other studies, among the questions left unanswered is the timing of responses to one's opponent. The above discussion emphasizes the importance of timing demands and concessions so they appear responsive to the to the opponent's demands and concessions. But what of the time dimension?

Is it better to respond slowly or quickly? Available research suggests rapid response. Drawing attitude objects (things or conditions about which one can have an opinion) from attitude questionnaires and news type photos, Tesser and Conlee (1975) found that the longer subjects had to think about the attitude objects, the more extreme their opinions on the object became. When this finding is considered in combination with the increasing polarization of factions that tends to occur with conflict escalation over time, it seems reasonable to suggest that the longer one opponent waits to respond to the other's demands or concessions, the more polarized the two opponents will become and the lower bargaining effectiveness will be. Corroborating this suggestion are a variety of experiments demonstrating that significantly higher cooperation between opponents tends to occur when there are time limits on bargaining than when there are no time limits; increasing cooperation occurring as the deadline for bargaining approaches.²¹ This time effect remains uncertain, however, since there is also evidence demonstrating the significant increase in cooperation elicited by a slow to respond opponent (Bixenstine and Gaehlelein, 1971).

Closely related to the issue of being responsive to an opponent's demands and concessions is the extent to which opponents are equally able to determine the outcome of bargaining. This is the third dimension in Table 4. Once again speaking in a statistical sense, bargaining effectiveness tends to be lower when either opponent feels that he is at a disadvantage in ability to determine the outcome of bargaining. This finding can be attributed to two causes.²²

First, when there is a difference in the "power" of opponents, the more powerful tends to exploit the less powerful in the sense of being nonresponsive to the demands and concessions of the less powerful opponent. This

"power" difference effect is observed when the greater power results from basic feelings of control (Rubin and Brown, 1975:175-176), from bargaining on one's own territory (Rubin and Brown, 1975:82-88), from possessing more "resources" relevant to the bargaining than does one's opponent (Rubin and Brown, 1975:221-228)²³, or from having a higher "status" than one's opponent (Rubin and Brown, 1975:214-215); the higher status person exercising ostentatious nondeference toward the lower status person and expecting bargaining payoffs in keeping with the status difference between himself and his opponent.²⁴ This power difference effect has been discussed at a macro level in terms of attempts by an established institution to "coopt" social groups opposed to the institution's goals by incorporating the groups into the institution without changing the original goals. For example, Etzioni-Halevy (1975) describes the manner in which "establishment" institutions in Israel absorb conflict groups so that conflict is neither suppressed nor allowed to bring about substantial changes in the structure of decision-making. Of special relevance to the nuclear power issue, Levenson and Miller (1976) demonstrate that "liberals" tend to become political activists when they perceive an increase in control by powerful others. In other words, competitive moves by "liberals" are elicited when they perceive an increase in control by powerful others; others usually taken to be the opponents of "liberals."

Second, opponents are more likely to cooperate in both reaching and abiding by agreements if they each feel they had a hand in making the agreements. Bass (1966) and Druckman (1967, 1968) demonstrate that discussion sessions between opponents before negotiation begins can result in more cooperative bargaining than is the case when there is no prenegotiation communication between opponents. Wortman et al. (1976) demonstrate that subjects randomly assigned to experimental treatments who latter "accidentally" found out that other subjects could choose their experimental treatment were signi-

ificantly negative toward the experiment. The authors conclude that choice lessens the impact of random assignment and reduces the problem of subject reactivity to treatment. Thibaut et al. (1974) simultaneously considered the extent to which subjects participate in making rules and the extent to which they benefit from adhering to rules to the same extent as the "rule-maker." When subjects and rulemakers are to benefit equally from adherence to rules, subjects were found to be more likely to adhere to rules when they participated in formulating the rules. In contrast, when only rulemakers are to benefit from subjects adhering to rules, subjects were found to be less likely to adhere to rules when they participated in formulating the rules. This finding is related to the observation by Swingle (1970:a) that weak subjects tended to exploit more powerful opponents if the more powerful opponent failed to use his power to punish noncooperation. At a more macro level of analysis, a common reason given by citizen groups for rising in protest against some policy is their lack of input into the making of the policy and their lack of benefit from the policy.²⁵ These findings suggest that the greater cooperation between opponents that is elicited by equal ability to determine bargaining outcomes is linked to an equal profit by both opponents from the bargaining (cf. note 22). If either opponent feels that he has had a bargaining outcome imposed on him or feels that he will derive less profit than his opponent by adhering to the bargaining outcome, then noncooperation can be expected. Thus, Table 4 predicts higher bargaining effectiveness when there is high equity in bargaining (cells E, F, G and H) than when there is inequity in bargaining (cells, A, B, C and D).

Table 4 serves to summarize the above discussion. Whatever the other conditions of a controversy over a nuclear facility, the optimum bargaining strategy to be used by both the supporters and opponents of the facility is

what Deutsch termed a nonpunitive strategy. Threats and attacks should be met with defensive moves rather than counterthreats and attacks. Cooperative moves should be quickly reciprocated. Further, and especially when bargaining is initiated, cooperative moves should be characteristic of one's bargaining (without being over-cooperative to the point of adopting a pacifist strategy). Demands should be structured over the course of bargaining so that the largest demands occur early in the bargaining. This allows for the appearance of increasing cooperation over the course of bargaining in the sense that increasing numbers of concessions and decreasing demands are made as the bargaining progresses. These points have the purpose of keeping the level of hostility between opponents low and maintaining a responsiveness to one another's demands and concessions. In regard to the level of equity in bargaining between a nuclear facility's supporters and opponents, there is already data available for the nuclear power issue. The public hearings were a deliberate attempt to give affected citizens ability to determine the process of establishing a facility. However citizens do not feel that they are actually affecting the establishment of facilities other than by increasing the costs of a facility through licensing delays to the point where it is no longer economically feasible (Burt, 1978: Section II). These findings have led to exploitation of a powerful opponent in the laboratory situation so it should not be surprising to find competitive rather than cooperative moves characterizing the orientation of citizen opposition groups toward the supporters of a nuclear facility. According to the literature reviewed here, this competitive orientation would be changed to a cooperative orientation if; 1) citizen groups felt that they would benefit from the nuclear facility as much as the company proposing the facility (equity in payoffs), and 2) citizen groups had input into the decision to establish a nuclear facility before

development proceeds to the stage of requiring a construction permit (equity in bargaining). These conditions are far easier to state than to implement given the description in part one. The economic benefits of a nuclear facility do appeal to some types of communities but by no means to all communities. Local citizen opposition groups do not exist in the preissue stage of the nuclear power issue so it would be impossible to include them in preissue negotiations. A likely alternative to including local citizen groups in the preissue stage of the nuclear power issue would be to include their representatives. The "leading" citizens of the community could be consulted. The local government officials could be included in preliminary plans for a nuclear facility. However, local civic and government representatives need not be representative of citizen preferences in a community. This is particularly likely where the community's economic elite are segregated in the social structure and/or the political structure is centralized as tends to be the case under a reform government.

Defining the Distance Between Factions

The bargaining strategies covered in the above section are concerned with manipulating the direct interaction between opponents in a conflict. A different approach is through the manipulation of the interaction of opponents with other actors in and outside the conflict. This second approach is particularly useful if the opposition relation between factions in conflict has become highly emotional. Actors with more neutral relations to both factions can be brought into the conflict to lower the level of hostility in the bargaining process. The general purpose of this second approach is to lessen the "distance" between opponents (see Burt, 1978: Eq. 2) by emphasizing the extent to which both factions relate in the same manner to actors not directly involved in the inter-faction conflict. The reasoning behind lessening distance between factions so as to increase bargaining effectiveness is

indirect. First, cooperation is more likely between friends than between enemies.²⁶ Second, friendships and social attractions are more likely between people who have similar relations to others, than between people who have dissimilar relations to others.²⁷ In other words, friendships and social attractions are more likely between people separated by low rather than high "distance." Therefore, cooperation is more likely between people separated by low rather than high distance. In order to increase the bargaining effectiveness of inter-faction communication by manipulating the distance between them, research has considered; 1) making more salient the existing relations involving both factions, as well as 2) creating similar relations by introducing into the conflict situation additional actors as "third parties" who have identical relations to both factions. Both of these strategies serve to increase the similarity of the relation involving both factions thereby decreasing the possible distance between the factions.

The cooperation eliciting capacity of low distance between opponents is illustrated by experiments in which opponents are paired in terms of shared relations to others. Common rudimentary methods of pairing opponents here are in terms of sex, race and nationality. Each of these social categories involves differences in the manner in which individuals have relations with others so that distance is lower between individuals in the same category than between individuals in separate categories. Further, each of these social categories is highly visible so that opponents who fall into the same category immediately perceive the low distance between themselves compared to opponents who fall into separate categories. In other words, two women will perceive lower distance between themselves than will a man and a woman. Two Negroes will perceive lower distance between themselves than will a Negro and a Caucasian. Two people of Mediterranean ethnicity will perceive lower distance between themselves than will an individual of Mediterranean

ancestry versus an individual of Swedish ancestry. Thus, high cooperation occurs between opponents of the same rather than of different race,²⁸ nationality,²⁹ and sex.³⁰

While these findings argue for bargainers being of the same race, nationality or sex, they do little for planning efficient conflict resolution since they are completely determined a priori to any conflict resolution efforts. There are experimental treatments more subject to manipulation, however, that involve making salient the shared relations of opponents.

For example, cooperation increases if opponents believe they will share a common course of action in the future. Marlowe et al. (1966) had subjects play the prisoner's dilemma game against the experimenter's confederate who was playing with a strategy of making a cooperative move on eighty percent of the trials. Some subjects were told that they would meet their opponent after the game to discuss the game. Other subjects were not told that they would meet their opponents. Those who anticipated future interaction were significantly less exploitive of their opponents than those who did not expect to meet their opponents. Slusher et al. (1974) had subjects play one trial of the prisoner's dilemma game and were told that this would be the first of three trials. Again, some subjects were told that they would meet their opponents after the game and would continue to play against the same opponent. The other subjects were told that they would have different opponents who they would not meet. Those subjects who expected to meet and play against the same opponents in the future made more cooperative moves than those who believed they would not have future interaction with their opponents. These cooperation eliciting effects of anticipated future interaction have also been observed by Gruder (1971). The effect is reversed if the subject feels exploited in the initial bargaining, however.

Swingle (1969), Gruder (1971) and Micheline (1971) found that when subjects play against an aggressive, exploitive other, they will be more competitive and have a more negative image of their opponent if they anticipate future interaction with their opponents than if they do not anticipate future interaction.

Similarly, cooperation increases if opponents are led to believe that they share common past actions and attitudes with their opponents. Krauss (1966) presented subjects in a mixed motive game with a personality profile of self ratings by the opponent. Those subjects who believed that they were playing against opponents with profiles similar to their own were significantly more cooperative than those playing against opponents with profiles different from their own. Hall and Williams (1966) had groups of subjects view a portion of the film 12 Angry Men and then discuss among themselves the order in which they expected jurors to switch their initial guilty votes to not-guilty. Half of the groups were composed of members who had previously interacted with one another and the other groups were strangers to one another. The groups who had interacted previously, in comparison to the groups of strangers, reached more creative and more accurate group decisions. Harrison and McClintock (1965) had subjects play prisoner's dilemma where control subjects had never seen one another before and experimental subjects had played a reaction time game previously. The experimental subjects tended to make more cooperative moves than the control subjects even if the prior game had resulted in losing eighty-five percent of the reaction time trials. High versus low similarity conditions in other experiments manipulating past and current experiments have similarly demonstrated the cooperation eliciting effect of a high similarity condition (Bass, 1966; Druckman, 1967, 1968; Pruitt, 1968; Tornatzky and Geiwitz, 1968; Michielini, 1971; Allen and Wilder, 1975; Terborg et al., 1976).

Yet another method of lessening the distance between opponents is to emphasize an actor in the conflict situation who has common opposition relations to both opponents. This is the well known phenomenon of erstwhile enemies becoming allies in order to fight in a common cause. Stein (1976) reviews this literature. A classic experiment to demonstrate this effect was reported by Deutsch (1958, 1973:202-203). Two subjects who were to play the prisoner's dilemma game with one another were first asked to take an "intelligence" test. This test was taken in the company of a third person also taking the test who was told by the experimenter to act in a conspicuously obnoxious and irritating manner. The two subjects were then asked to play ten trials of prisoner's dilemma while the experimenter's confederate played one of a variety of roles ranging from profiting by predicting the winner of each trial to merely observing the game. The cooperative moves of the two subjects exposed to the obnoxious third party were then compared to cooperative moves by subjects who had never been exposed to a third party in their playing. The number of cooperative moves was significantly higher between opponents who shared common exposure to the obnoxious third party.

The most practiced method of lessening the distance between opponents, however, is to introduce a new actor into the conflict situation. The new actor as a "third party" to the conflict has neutral relations to both opponents and can serve a variety of functions ranging from an "intermediary" who carried messages between opponents, to an "expert" who provides "facts" on the issue being debated between opponents, to a "mediator" who guides the bargaining process so as to efficiently arrive at a solution acceptable to both opponents, to an "arbitrator" who weighs the arguments of the opponents and delivers a "just" solution to the conflict.³¹ The role of expert is a difficult one to play here. As discussed in part one, academia has been

neutralized as an expert in the nuclear power issue since the issue is sufficiently vague to allow both sides in the issue to find academic support for their views. Similarly, Raulet (1961) describes the problems health professionals had in keeping neutral in the water fluoridation issue. In merely seeking to present facts to the public, health professionals were subject to charges that they were acting politically by presenting only one side of the issue. This problem is further exacerbated in the nuclear power issue by the fact that the experts for both sides in the issue are usually "hired" consultants and accordingly viewed as nonobjective experts by the opposing faction.

The role of mediator is perhaps most common. Mediator agencies now exist for resolving a wide range of conflicts (e.g., the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, the National Mediation Board, the Office of Environmental Mediation, see Baumgartner et al., 1975; Webster, 1975a, 1975b). A variety of methods proposed by academics have been outlined for mediation such as the "analysis of options" approach in which participants in a conflict are treated as actors pursuing interdependent goals within a game theoretic framework so that optimal solutions under the circumstances can be identified (e.g., Bain et al., 1971; Hipel et al., 1977), or the "controlled communication" approach in which participants in a conflict are advised of the social factors in conflict escalation so that they can avoid unnecessary problems in resolving their differences (Burt, 1969),³² or the closely related intergroup techniques for conflict resolution that bring together groups of representatives of opposing factions together with social scientists as mediators intended to explain the social implications of actions taken by either side (Cohen et al., 1977). These mediation techniques are generally intended to emphasize to both factions in conflict the social aspects of conflict and its resolution as discussed here and in part one.

With the extensive reliance on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Federal courts, third party intervention in the nuclear power issue is most often characterized by the arbitrator role. Supporters and opponents of a proposed facility make their argument before a third party that subsequently delivers a just solution, although the feeling among citizen groups opposed to a facility is that this third party has a bias toward the establishment of facilities (Burt, 1978: Section II). Nevertheless, available research suggest that bargainers prefer the arbitrator role for third parties. Using an unusually varied pool of subjects (undergraduate psychology students, community residents and law students), Lator et al. (1976) compared subjects' preferences for different styles of third party intervention. Five styles were compared. The "autocratic" style involved opponents submitting their preferences to a third party who then made a decision on which preferences would be retained. The "arbitration" style involved opponents explaining and supporting their respective positions before the third party who then made a decision. The "moot" style involved opponents arguing their respective positions before the third party then to one another and then all three would make a decision. The "mediation" style involved opponents arguing their respective positions before the third party who then suggested one or the other set of preferences be retained, whereupon the two opponents decided which set of preferences would be retained. Finally, the "bargaining" style involved no third party at all. Subjects selected the arbitration style of third party intervention as being the most preferable. In descending order of preference the other styles were; moot, mediation, autocratic, and last, bargaining. The preference for arbitration was particularly strong if there were time pressures on the subject to reach their decision. In a related experiment, Bartunek et al. (1975) compared the effects of third party intervention using a "content" style that involved

the third party suggesting a fair settlement between opponents, a "process" style that involved the third party instructing opponents how to paraphrase their demands, and a "passive" style that involved the third party merely calling breaks during the bargaining. For those subjects who felt accountable to a constituency, the greatest bargaining effectiveness between opponents (measured as the number of agreements, the average joint profit, and the speed of conflict resolution) occurred in the content style. In other words, the greatest bargaining effectiveness occurred when the third party acted as an arbitrator. The lowest effectiveness occurred in the passive or bargaining style. In terms of both subject preferences and bargaining effectiveness, the arbitrator style of intervention seems better than the passive style.

To some extent the greater effectiveness of the arbitrator style of third party intervention results from a faith in the fairness of others as third parties. Baker (1974) shows that when placed in the role of third parties, individuals do have a tendency to maintain or create equity between opponents bargaining with one another. Also, Eisenberg and Patch (1976) show that subjects are particularly likely to be influenced by a third party's suggested settlement when the settlement falls within a range of settlements perceived to be equitable.

To a greater extent, however, the clear ordering of the arbitrator over the passive style of third party intervention suggest that third parties are functioning as face-saving devices. Several studies have demonstrated this function by showing a higher number and level of concessions by opponents when there is a third party to negotiations in comparison to the concessions made when no third party is available.³³ As quoted from Pruitt and Johnson (1970:246) by Rubin and Brown (1975:58) in their review "Mediation provides

the negotiator with a face-saving device whereby he can retreat without feeling that he has capitulated. Presumably, this face-saving results from throwing the blame for one's own concessions onto the mediator." Thus, the more directly responsible for final settlement the third party is (without taking over the decision-making process altogether), then the more concessions opponents can make to one another. More than either the mediator, expert, or passive intermediary styles, the arbitrator style of intervention involves the third party taking responsibility for the final agreement between opponents. Thus, there would be a preference for, and higher bargaining effectiveness under, the arbitrator style just as had been observed by Bartunek et al. (1975) and Lator et al. (1976). This also explained the Bartunek et al. finding that only subjects accountable to a constituency had a preference for the arbitrator style of intervention. Nonaccountable subjects did not bargain most effectively under the arbitrator style. Recalling the earlier discussion of the effects of audiences as constituencies for bargainers (Section V), the presence of constituencies make it more difficult for negotiators to make concessions to one another. Thus, it would be when negotiators felt pressure from constituencies that third parties as face saving devices would be most likely to improve bargaining effectiveness by allowing negotiators to make concessions without appearing weak to their constituencies.

Compared to the research on the direct interaction between opponents as the key to conflict resolution, the research on manipulating the distance between opponents is quite small. Nevertheless, it is growing and does suggest two points. First, whenever possible, opponents should be made to feel as if they have a common pattern of relations to others; actors in and out of the conflict situation itself. Common destinies and common past actions for

opponents should be emphasized to them both. Recognition of their common relations serves to elicit a cooperative rather than competitive orientation between opponents. Second and especially where conflict has escalated to the point of antagonist dislike between opponents, third parties can be an effective method of conflict resolution particularly when the arbitrator style of intervention is employed and the third party is recognized as neutral in the conflict. The third party allows faction representatives to make concessions to one another without appearing to have given in to the disliked opposition.

VII. SUMMARIZING PRINCIPLES

I have focused on conflict resolution techniques as they address the three basic social parameters of conflict escalation (Burt, 1978:Section II). Table 2 distinguishes alternative strategies for dealing with the generalization of content of communication between opponents. Table 3 distinguishes alternative strategies for dealing with the mobilization of support relations among allies. Tables 4 and 5 distinguish alternative strategies for dealing with the polarization of opponents. The optimum strategy to be pursued within each of these three problem areas has been stated in italics at the conclusion of each section.

As a review of available research on conflict resolution techniques in terms of a structural approach to community conflict, the above discussion is likely to be too detailed to be of use to policy makers. By way of summarizing the discussion and linking it to the earlier analysis of the nuclear power issue, I wish to abstract the literature still further to yield five general principles for resolving conflict in the nuclear power issue. I also wish to indicate where and when each principle is most likely to be useful.

In order to know where and when each principle could be useful, one needs to distinguish types of conflict situations. As stressed earlier, conflict escalates through stages and can occur differently in different communities. Table 6 presents six ideal typical conflict situations distinguished in part one. Three stages of conflict escalation were distinguished. The preissue stage (cells A and B of Table 6) consists of interactions among the NRC, the company proposing a nuclear facility, technical experts, and to varying extents local business and government representatives (cf. Burt, 1978: Table 1). The proposed nuclear facility becomes a controversy, or an explicit issue, within a community with the occurrence of a precipitating event. Such an event in the nuclear power issue consists of three conditions occurring simultaneously; 1) an announcement that a nuclear facility is being or will be constructed, 2) publicity of the potential dangers of such a facility, and 3) a perception on the part of some citizens that they could prevent the construction of the facility by mobilizing in opposition to it. The precipitating event marks the beginning of the preconfrontation stage of escalation in which local citizens mobilize for and against the facility, national opposition groups are drawn into the conflict, and local business and government actors in addition to academia are neutralized (cf. Burt, 1978: Tables 2 and 3). After the conflict has moved through some decision-making process and a decision on the facility has been obtained, the conflict moves into its aftermath stage (cells E and F of Table 6). If escalation has continued to a point of inter-faction hostile antagonism during the preconfrontation stage, the aftermath will be characterized by an increase in antagonism and potentially extra-legal action. Otherwise, the conflict will disintegrate leaving its trace on the social structure of the community but eliciting no further action from local citizens. The columns of Table 6 distinguish communities with a high versus a

low potential for conflict in the nuclear power issue (cf. Burt, 1978: Table 4). Those communities with a relatively high potential for conflict have implicit in their structure a polarized issue network. Such communities will be old, large, densely populated cities that are heterogeneous (in the sense of having clearly segregated economic and social elite groups) with a centralized political structure (in the sense of having a reform government).

Different aspects of conflict resolution are most useful in different conflict situations. The conflict situation in which each of the five principles to be listed is most useful is indicated in each cell of Table 6. There are no principles listed for the aftermath stage in communities with low conflict potential (cell E) since the conflict should be resolved by usual political decision-making procedures in the community.

-----Table 6 About Here-----

Avoid Situations with High Conflict Potential

Given the less than perfect prediction of conflict escalation and resolution in the social sciences, the optimum method of resolving conflict is to avoid it in the first place. In the preissue stage of conflict this involves selecting communities with a low potential for conflict over those with a high conflict potential. Note that consultations with local citizen "representatives" will not be an accurate method of distinguishing the two ideal typical communities (cf. Burt, 1978: Section III). In the preconfrontation stage, the avoidance of conflict involves careful attention to the consequences of one's actions on the opposition perceptions and actions. Knowing the social parameters of conflict as given in part one should sensitize each faction to the potential conflict eliciting consequences of their actions. As emphasized in White's (1977) analysis of the Arab-Israeli conflict, much of

TABLE 6
IDEAL TYPICAL CONFLICT SITUATIONS
AND RELEVANT CONFLICT RESOLUTION PRINCIPLES*

Stage of Conflict Escalation	Community Potential for Conflict	
	Low	High
Preissue	A (1)	B (1,2)
Preconfrontation	C (2,3,4)	D (1,2,3,4)
Aftermath	E	F (5)

*Principles are given by number in parentheses.

the conflict is self-perpetuating as a result of both sides failing to recognize that much of the opposition perception and action is determined by their own actions. This first principle is predominantly a preissue stage activity except in the high conflict potential communities where it also should be a preconfrontation stage activity.

Facilitate the Mobilization of the Opposition

While this need not ameliorate conflict in all types of controversy it should help conflict resolution in the nuclear power issue in two manners. First, as discussed in Section V, bringing together the various concerned parties in the nuclear power issue is essential to reaching a definitive settlement of the issue. Second, facilitating mobilization can correct deficiencies in a community's structure that are eliciting conflict. Recall from part one that two features of a community's structure are particularly likely to elicit conflict over a nuclear facility (Burt, 1978: Section III): 1) the segregation of economic and social elite groups in a community; and 2) the separation of citizens from the individuals with political decision-making authority in a community. Facilitating the opposition's mobilization in a high conflict community would involve bringing together the economic and social elites to form local citizen discussion groups in conjunction with those individuals having decision-making authority. In this manner, facilitating the opposition's mobilization creates a support relation between opponents the absence of which is a primary determinant of conflict escalation. Thus, this second principle is predominantly a preconfrontation stage activity except for high conflict potential communities where it should also be a pre-issue stage activity.

Pursue a Nonpunitive Bargaining Strategy

The evidence reviewed consistently demonstrates high bargaining effectiveness--for both opponents--when they pursue a nonpunitive bargaining strategy.

tegy. When confronting one's opponent, therefore, the optimum strategy is to; 1) respond to threats and attacks with defensive moves rather than counterthreats or counterattacks, 2) quickly reciprocate cooperative moves, and especially when bargaining is first initiated, 3) make cooperative moves characteristic of one's bargaining (without being overcooperative to the point of adopting a pacifist strategy). Further, demands should be structured over the course of bargaining so that the largest demands occur early. This allows greater flexibility in making concessions as the bargaining progresses. It is crucial that the opposition be made to feel that they have some significant impact on one's bargaining behavior. This third principle is concerned with the preconflict stage of conflict, particularly with communities of high conflict potential.

Focus the Bargaining on a Few Concrete Questions

The evidence reviewed in Section IV demonstrates that the generalization of the questions being debated between opponents only serves to inhibit conflict resolution. Points being debated should be concrete questions rather than abstract principles. Avoid tying questions being debated into "bigger" questions. This facilitates clear communication between opponents. Also, more than one but not too many concrete questions should be considered simultaneously. More than one question at a time should be considered so as to allow opponents flexibility in making concessions. Not too many questions at a time should be considered so as to keep the discussion within the limits of understanding. Three to five questions at a time seems reasonable. This fourth principle is concerned with the preconflict stage as was the third principle. Again, it is particularly important to adopt this principle in communities with high conflict potential since it is in such communities where suspicion will be high.

Use Third Parties to Handle Inter-Faction Antagonism

Where conflict has escalated to the point of direct antagonism between factions, the most efficient method of resolving the conflict is to bring in a trusted neutral actor as a third party to the conflict. The difficulty for either faction in controlling conflict when it reaches this level of escalation is discussed in Burt (1978: Section II) and the use of third parties is discussed in Section VI. The third party allows both factions to make concessions without appearing to have given in to the opposition. This fifth principle is by and large concerned with the aftermath stage of conflict in the sense that the usual decision-making procedures have failed to resolve the conflict. It is thus concerned with high conflict potential communities.

FOOTNOTES

¹The classic statements of strategy are Schelling (1960) and Boulding (1962). Rapoport (in Fisher, 1964) provides a penetrating critique of this game theoretic approach to conflict when it is applied in the real world. A comprehensive review of psychological approaches to conflict resolution is contained in Rubin and Brown (1975). Fink (1968) and Deutsch (1973) seek to codify general propositions in the psychological tradition. Commentary review is given in Converse (1968) and a recent special issue of the Journal of Social Issues (Bonoma and Milburn, 1977). Swingle (1970b) and Brickman (1974) are collections of some of the more central studies of conflict and its regulation. Ikle (1964), Burton (1969), Walton (1969) and Schwarz (1970) provide in depth discussion of conflict resolution in actual conflict situations.

²Even such guesses, however, are better than blind faith in resolving conflict as evidenced by their successful application in resolving a long standing environmental conflict over siting a dam in a wilderness area of Washington (see Webster, 1975a, 1975b).

³See Rubin and Brown (1975:19-32) for more detailed discussion of the basic games used in psychology to study conflict in an experimental setting.

⁴In contrast to the Pilisuk et al. findings, Dolbear et al. (1969) increased choices from two to thirty in the prisoner's dilemma game and failed to find a significant change in cooperative moves.

⁵For example, see Fry (1965), Berkowitz (1968) and Wallace and Rothaus (1969).

⁶This point has been demonstrated using measures of Machiavellianism (e.g., Uejio and Wrightsman, 1967; Teger, 1970), authoritarianism (e.g., Wrightsman, 1966; Friedell, 1968; Kelley and Stahelski, 1970b; Berkowitz, 1972; Slack and Cook, 1973), cognitive complexity (e.g., Phelen and Richardson, 1969; Press et al., 1975), and tolerance for ambiguity (e.g., Pilisuk et al., 1965; Druckman, 1967; Teger, 1970).

⁷Take even the extremely simplified situation where participants in negotiations are neutral on some issues; there is a .5 probability of any one individual being for the issue and a .5 probability of him being against the issue. Again simplifying the situation by assuming that one individual's

stand on an issue is independent of every other negotiator's stand (a simplification since it ignores the fact that negotiators are bargaining against one another) the probability of all negotiators being simultaneously for the issue is the product of their individual probabilities of being for the issue. Thus, for two negotiators, the probability of them both being for the issue is $(.5)(.5) = .25$. For three negotiators the probability drops to $(.5)(.5)(.5) = .125$, for four negotiators it drops to .063, for five negotiators it drops to 0.31 and so on.

⁸This example is discussed in Novick (1969:57-58).

⁹This finding is supported by sociologists and psychologists (Vinacke and Arkoff, 1957; Kelley and Arrowood, 1960; Psathas and Stryker, 1965; Cole and Phillips, 1967; Cole, 1969; Caldwell, 1971; Chertkoff, 1971; Walker, 1973; Komorita and Moore, 1976), although the effect may weaken in groups larger than three since Shears (1967) fails to support the finding for groups of four.

¹⁰Rubin and Brown (1975:43-54) discuss the last two of these effects in terms of the presence of "audiences" in bargaining.

¹¹Differences in bargaining effectiveness resulting from free versus no communication between opponents are demonstrated by Wichman (1970), Cole (1972), Swingle and Santi (1972), and Powell and O'Neal (1976).

¹²The basic work here is summarized by experiments described in Deutsch (1973:229-244).

¹³For example, see Crawford and Sidowski (1964), Alexander and Weil (1969), Benton et al. (1969), Wallace and Rothaus (1969), Deutsch and Lewicki (1970), Rubin (1971), Scott and Cherrington (1974). Also see notes 14 and 15 below.

¹⁴The bulk of available research supports the finding that cooperation begets cooperation in return (e.g. Komorita, 1965; Swingle, 1966, 1968; Chertkoff and Conley, 1967; Deutsch et al., 1967; Swingle and Coady, 1967; Komorita et al., 1968; Pilisuk and Sholnick, 1968; Swingle and Gillis, 1968; Tedeschi et al., 1968; Wilson, 1969; Oskamp, 1970; Kleinke and Pohlen, 1971; Gruder and Duslak, 1973; Braver and Barnett, 1976). There are studies, however, that fail to find a significant difference in bargaining effectiveness given a deliberately cooperative bargaining strategy by one opponent (e.g., Phelen and Richardson, 1969). Kelly and Stahelski (1970a) provide one explanation for these contradictory findings by showing that subjects bargain-

ing against a cooperative opponent were less able to indicate their opponent's preferences than subjects bargaining against a competitive opponent. In other words, overcooperation could lead to a misperception of one another's preferences by opponents.

¹⁵This effect has been demonstrated in the prisoner's dilemma game or variations on it (e.g., Pilisuk et al., 1965; Pilisuk and Skolnick, 1968; Oskamp, 1970; Michelini, 1971; Komorita, 1973) as well as in mixed motive games generally (e.g., Deutsch et al., 1967; Sermat, 1967; Brown, 1968; Deutsch et al., 1971).

¹⁶Review of the use of threat in experimental situations is provided by Tedeschi et al. (1971), Deutsch (1973:179-281) and Rubin and Brown (1975:278-288). Recent critiques of that use are given by Tedeschi et al. (1977) and Milburn (1977).

¹⁷While there is a preponderance of support for the finding that the idea of losing real money as opposed to imaginary money elicits cooperative moves from subjects (e.g., Gallo, 1966; Gallo et al., 1969; Hornstein and Deutsch, 1967; Alexander and Weil, 1969; Kelley et al., 1970; Gallo and Sheposh, 1971; McClintock et al., 1973; Shaw, 1976), there are some experiments that fail to find any significant differences in the cooperative moves by subjects playing for different levels of reward (e.g., Axelrod and May, 1968; Oskamp and Kleinke, 1970; Pate and Broughton, 1970; Friedland et al., 1974).

¹⁸The ineffectiveness of pacifist bargaining strategies in experiments is documented and discussed by Shure et al. (1965), Deutsch et al. (1967), Meeker and Shure (1969), Bixenstine and Gaebelin (1971), Ofshe (1971), and Druckerman et al. (1972) to name but a few. Fitzgerald (1975) provides theoretical justification for this finding.

¹⁹Beyond the citations in the above footnote rejecting the pacifist strategy of constant conciliation, a variety of studies have documented the effectiveness of acting as if concessions were contingent on the opposition's demands (e.g., Komorita, 1965; Gallo, 1969; Tedeschi et al., 1968; Wilson, 1969, 1971; Kahn et al., 1971; Baranowski and Summers, 1972; Gruder and Dusslak, 1973; McNeel, 1973; Oskamp, 1974; Esser and Komorita, 1975).

²⁰Several studies have demonstrated significantly higher bargaining effectiveness when one starts tough and gradually compromises rather than being consistently conciliatory throughout bargaining (e.g., Chertkoff and Conley, 1967; Harford and Solomon, 1967; Komorita and Brenner, 1968; Benton et al., 1972; Druckerman et al., 1972; Hinton et al., 1974; Yukl, 1974a,

1974b; Cialdini et al., 1975; Seligman et al., 1976).

²¹The increasing cooperation elicited by time limits on bargaining is substantiated in experiments by Kelley (1966), Komorita and Brenner (1968), Komorita and Barnes (1969), Pruitt and Drews (1969), Benton et al. (1972), Pruitt and Johnson (1970) and Hamner (1974). Friend et al. (1977) specifically focus on the effects of the duration of bargaining on the formation of coalitions.

²²There is an additional support for the proposition that cooperation is significantly higher when opponents believe there will be equal payoffs although there is some evidence to the contrary (see review by Rubin and Brown (1975:218-220). For details see experiments by Kelly et al. (1967), Komorita and Barnes (1969), Tedeschi et al. (1969), Deutsch and Lewicki (1970), Swingle (1970), Holmes et al. (1971), Swingle and MacLean (1971), McClintock et al. (1973), Sheposh and Gallo (1973).

²³For details, see experiments by Hornstein (1965), Grant and Sermat (1969), Komorita and Barnes (1969), Thibaut and Gruder (1969), Tedeschi et al. (1969), Deutsch and Lewicki (1970), Kelley et al. (1970), Swingle (1970a).

²⁴For details, see experiments by Deutsch and Krauss (1960, 1962), Hornstein (1965), Brown (1968), Grant and Sermat (1969), Schlenker et al. (1970), Faley and Tedeschi (1971). Harsanyi (1962, 1966) provides a theoretical analysis of the effects of status differences on bargaining behavior.

²⁵As documented in Burt (1978: Section II), the lack of meaningful input is a common complaint voiced by citizen groups opposed to a proposed nuclear facility. A variety of case studies as well as editorials have decried the absence of citizen input into policy making and recommended methods by which citizen preferences could be taken into account before policy is determined (e.g., Arnstein, 1969; Mogulof, 1969; Fortune, 1970; Borton and Warner, 1971; Hoinville, 1971; O'Riordan, 1971; Amir, 1972; Herbert, 1972; Berry and Steiker, 1974; Kelley et al., 1974; Mitnick and Weiss, 1974; Russell, 1974; Yates, 1974; Yin et al., 1974; Francis, 1975; Llewellyn et al., 1975; Reich, 1975; White, 1976).

²⁶This effect appears to be quite strong over different intensities of friendship. Existing friendship relations tend to elicit cooperation between opponents (e.g., Morgan and Sawyer, 1967; Swingle and Gillis, 1968; Wallace and Rothaus, 1969). Cooperation can be elicited between opponents, however, even by very shallow interaction before entering a bargaining situation (e.g., Gallo, 1969; Gruder, 1971; Michelini, 1971; Allen and Wilder,

1975; Esser and Komorita, 1975; Hensley and Duval, 1976). Cooperation can be elicited even by pointing out to opponents their interdependence on one another (Guyer and Rapoport, 1969; Okun and Divesta, 1975).

²⁷See the work by Laumann (1966, 1973) as well as the experimental work by Leonard (1975), Daher and Banikiotes (1976), Davison and Jones (1976), Hensley and Duval (1976). This effect is also introduced in some of the experimental work on the cooperation eliciting effect of friendship relations (see note 26).

²⁸For example, see Harford and Cutter (1966), Sibley et al. (1968), Baxter (1973) and Blanchard et al. (1975).

²⁹For example, see Swingle (1969, 1970a) although the nationality effect was not observed by Uejio and Wrightsman (1967).

³⁰Sex is an often mentioned variable in social psychology so it often appears in combination with other independent variables in the experiments cited in this paper. For a review of basic sex effects, see Rubin and Brown (1975:169-174).

³¹Alternative theoretical perspectives on third party intervention in conflict are given by Burton (1969), Walton (1969), Fisher (1972), Young (1972), Baumgartner et al. (1975), Rubin and Brown (1975:54-64), and Walker (1977).

³²There is experimental support for the idea of "controlled communication." Erickson et al. (1974) demonstrate that third parties could elicit higher cooperation between opponents by suggesting that they strive to resolve all their differences in a package deal rather than resolving their differences one at a time. Ross et al. (1975) demonstrate that the most effective method of disabusing subjects of erroneous stereotypical perceptions is by explaining the social process through which such perceptions are established.

³³For example, see Krauss and Deutsch (1966), Meeker and Shure (1969), Podell and Knapp (1969), Pruitt and Johnson (1970), Pruitt (1971), Vidmar (1971), Johnson and Tullar (1972).

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