The Myth of Strategic Superiority: Us Nuclear Weapons and Limited Conflicts, 1945-1954

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The nuclear age provided U.S. soldiers and statesmen with unprecedented challenges. the U.S. military had to incorporate a weapon into strategic calculations without knowing whether the use of the weapon would be approved. Broad considerations of policy led President Dwight Eisenhower to formulate a policy that relied on nuclear weapons while fully realizing their destructive potential. Despite the belief that possession of nuclear weapons provided strategic superiority, the U.S. realized that such weapons were of little value. This realization did not stop planners from attempting to find ways to use nuclear weapons in Korea and Indochina.

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Morse, Eric May 2012.

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  • Morse, Eric

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The nuclear age provided U.S. soldiers and statesmen with unprecedented challenges. the U.S. military had to incorporate a weapon into strategic calculations without knowing whether the use of the weapon would be approved. Broad considerations of policy led President Dwight Eisenhower to formulate a policy that relied on nuclear weapons while fully realizing their destructive potential. Despite the belief that possession of nuclear weapons provided strategic superiority, the U.S. realized that such weapons were of little value. This realization did not stop planners from attempting to find ways to use nuclear weapons in Korea and Indochina.

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  • May 2012

Added to The UNT Digital Library

  • Nov. 6, 2012, 3:03 p.m.

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  • Nov. 16, 2016, 5:38 p.m.

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Morse, Eric. The Myth of Strategic Superiority: Us Nuclear Weapons and Limited Conflicts, 1945-1954, thesis, May 2012; Denton, Texas. (digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc115124/: accessed October 16, 2018), University of North Texas Libraries, Digital Library, digital.library.unt.edu; .