Application of SAFE to an operating reactor Page: 3 of 13
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should be supplemented with information gained from site visits as
An essential output of the facility characterization phase is
the various plant layout characteristics, including the barriers,
access points, etc. The targets and vital areas are identified for
specific reactor operational conditions. Three additional sets of
information can be obtained from this process; specific site-
relevant environmental conditions from the environmental reports,
the physical protection system componer.t description and locations,
and the particular guard characteristics which are available from
the security plans.
One major output 1f the facility characterization phase in-
volves the identification of targets and vital areas. Because the
application of the method illustrated herein is a reactor, the pri-
mary concern is the identification and characterization of sabotage
targets. A generalized vital area analysis procedure for LWRs has
been developed and is shown in Figure 3. The generic sabotage fault
trees (GSFT) can be converted to detailed site-specific sabotage
fault trees by utilizing GSFT for LWRs and plant-specific data as
input. A vital area analysis is then performed to determine the
Type I and Type II vital areas. A Type I vital area is an area
in which the adversary tould be required to visit only one area in
the facility in order to successfully compromise components that
would lead to radiological sabotage. Type II areas are those areas
in which the adversary would be required to visit more than one area
in order to compromise components that would ultimately lead to
Vital area analysis has been applied to several different
operating reactor facilities. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has applied this process
to roughly 13 pressurized water reactor (PWR) facilities and 13
boiling water reactor (BWR) facilities as part of their reactor
The second phase of the evaluation process is the facility
representation phase. The objective of this phase is to provide
a basis for the evaluation procedure through a computer representa-
tion of the facility layout. This phase provides an explicit record
of the analyst's assumptions regarding the facility representation.
As shown in Figure 4, the inputs to this phase are the outputs from
the facility characterization phase, the plant layout characteris-
tics, and the target and vital areas for specific operational condi-
tions. The output of the facility representation phase is a specif-
ic computer representation of the facility. For example, a facility
layout or blueprint, as shown in Figure 5, shows a chain-link fence
around the outside of the facility and a main reactor building. In
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Chapman, L.D. Application of SAFE to an operating reactor, article, January 1, 1979; United States. (digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1105741/m1/3/: accessed February 22, 2019), University of North Texas Libraries, Digital Library, digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.