GUERRILLA WARFARE IN THE BORDERLANDS

DURING THE CIVIL WAR

APPROVED:

[Signatures]

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GUERRILLA WARFARE IN THE BORDERLANDS
DURING THE CIVIL WAR

THESIS

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By

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CHAPTER I

NATURE OF GUERRILLA ACTIVITY

Nearly every war in history has had the attendant evils of misery, destruction, and social upheaval following along in its grim wake. Each war too, has had its military genuises and its tide-turning battles which helped influence the outcome of the conflict. These last named factors have for some time been a source of particular inspiration for the military historian. Most historical accounts will devote a considerable amount of space and coverage to the primary battles and leaders of any given war as well as devoting some tie to the evaluation of certain elements of strategy which, if handled in a manner quite different from the one in which it was originally handled, would have paid off in a more rewarding fashion. Most of these volumes may be found to include an examination of the accompanying economic and social problems that may have accompanied the war. These too, are usually thoroughly documented and fairly accurately presented by the objective social historian.

The lesser events and happenings in any war are a bit more difficult to find in these works. This is
especially true of the war of the shadows, or as it is more
commonly known, guerilla warfare. Generally in past wars,
guerilla bands actually did very little to greatly influ-
ence the outcome of battle. This could have been one
valid reason for their activities being overlooked or
partially ignored by the military historian. In spite
of this literary snub, the life of the guerilla was (and
is) often pictured as one of valor and glamour. This, of
course, was a slightly overdrawn picture, as guerilla
life was often more dangerous and monotonous than it was
picturesque and glamorous. For all his lack of real
glamour, the guerilla was a genuine bother and danger to
his enemy. His primary function was (and is) the conduct-
ing of raids and harassing movements behind the enemy's
lines. If these raids were executed with just the right
degree of preparation and skill, they would achieve their
purpose of keeping any enemy from being able to coordinate
his supply lines and rear areas efficiently. The value of
this is too obvious to be slighted.

Guerilla warfare has been described as "the war of
the shadows." This is a fairly accurate description of
this mode of warfare. The hit-and-run technique of war-
fare was employed to the hilt by the guerilla. With his
missions of harassing enemy communications and supply
lines, stealing arms, destroying railroad bridges, etc.,
the guerilla depended on that all important factor, the
element of surprise. Usually, large guerilla bands were the exception rather than the rule. This relative paucity of numbers made it imperative to have the element of surprise in their favor, especially in those areas where the enemy could bring a large force of troops to bear against them. The hidden war was well adapted to those men who pursued its delicate art. The average guerilla warrior and leader had to become accustomed to living with the possibility of sudden death at any moment. Becoming hardened to this sobering likelihood produced a breed of soldier quite unlike his brother on the more formal battle fronts of war.

Virtually every war in past history has had its share of guerillas and their tactics in varying degrees and forms. The numerous revolutions in Mexico during the first quarter of the twentieth century, actually were little more than life-and-death struggles between organized guerilla bands and the government which happened to be in power at the time. The grim struggle between white man and red man in the early years of the American West was witness to a guerilla type of warfare practiced by the Apache, Sioux, and other Indian tribes locked in mortal combat with United States cavalry. It could truthfully be said that the guerilla is the stepchild of war, following along in his stepparent's grim wake.
The guerilla himself may best be described as something of a freebooter, if a fairly loose choice of words can be allowed. His life, by necessity, was certainly a perilous one. The hazards of his existence were heightened by the fact that the guerilla's life was generally forfeit for his deeds in the event of his capture. Still, this unsavory possibility failed to keep the irregular warrior from conducting his raids, plunderings, sackings, or other depredations. This robust mode of life made it necessary for him to live off the land in the area in which he was operating. This included taking his food and rations where he found them in its most literal sense. This warrior is as old as war itself, and can be as capable of its cruelties. In the minds of some, the guerilla assumes a picture of heroic stature and noble deeds as only a glamorous figure can have. To the eyes of the less romantic, he was visualized as a rather unprincipled fellow who much preferred his own brand of stealthy warfare to the more honorable style of combat of the regular soldier. This difference truly set him apart from the regular soldier.

Guerilla bands and their peculiar brand of warfare have been present in nearly every war of consequence that has been waged on this planet. This holds true for American wars as well as it does for any other war fought
in other lands. The Civil War was especially rife with this brand of activity. In few previous wars did the guerilla come into his own as he did in this internal struggle. Not only were there organized guerilla bands along with scattered outlaw bands profiting by the chaotic conditions, but also certain elements of both the Union and Confederate Armies (usually cavalry) conducted a guerilla type of campaign behind enemy lines with varying results. Geographical boundaries seemed no barrier toward keeping guerilla warfare out of an area.

There were at least three bodies or units of armed men carrying out guerilla-type operations at this time. The purely military unit, a regular part of the field army which from time to time carried out a guerilla-style campaign against the enemy, was quite prominent throughout the war. John Hunt Morgan, of the Confederate Army, perhaps best exemplifies this category of operations. This dashing cavalry commander more than once carried the war straight to the Federals deep in their own territory. Tearing up railroad lines and crippling Union communications was the trademark of this mounted raider. Also, the ability to successfully elude large parties of determined pursuers, was a further trademark that served to identify John Morgan and his cavalry band. Of a similar stripe was J. E. B. Stuart, who also served the Confederacy with a swift cavalry raiding party. Between them, Stuart
and Morgan did very little to ease the troubled minds of any Federal officer who might be opposing them at the moment. Despite the methods they employed in carrying out their mission, these men could not truthfully be placed on the same level as the conventional guerilla.

The operations of such units were concerned with a systematic harassing of the enemy with enough of a striking force to render his movements as difficult as they could be made. A constant repetition of these cavalry raids would serve to keep any enemy from completely regaining his equilibrium. Aside from their value in keeping enemy forces off balance by their fast moving raids, cavalry forces were sometimes employed for scouting purposes behind the enemy's lines. Both of these services brought the cavalry into its own as a vital part of the organized military machine.

Less well organized and disciplined than the regular army raiders were the ranger units organized by the Confederacy for the purpose of operating behind enemy lines in guerilla style operations. These ranger units were given official Confederate government sanction on April 28, 1862, by the Partisan Ranger Act. The machinery for the act actually started rolling with the

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issuance of General Orders Number Thirty. Through these orders, President Jefferson Davis was authorized "to com-
mise such officers as he may deem proper with authority
to form bands of partisan rangers in companies, battalions,
or regiments to be composed of such numbers as the President
may approve." In the months following the issuance of
these orders, requests for authority to organize and train
ranger units came in from various points of the Confederacy.
Some of these units were not well organized or at least
were in the formative stage until 1863, although the ranger
companies were authorized during the previous year.

Some idea of the task assigned these companies is
disclosed by the wording of a dispatch sent by Sam J.
Melton, Assistant Adjutant General of the Confederacy, to
Major M. J. Wicks authorizing him to raise a battalion of
rangers to be composed of men drawn from behind enemy
lines. These troops were to operate near the Mississippi
River in "obstructing the communication and transportation
of the enemy thereon." From this dispatch, it was evident
that the Confederate strategists placed a good bit of
emphasis on disrupting enemy communication and transportation
flow, a goal they constantly tried to attain through
cavalry raids as well as through ranger companies.

\[2^{\text{Rbid., I, 1094-95.}}\]

\[3^{\text{Rbid., II, 139.}}\]
By September, 1862, some ninety-seven companies of partisan rangers had formed in the states of Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, Louisiana, North Carolina, Virginia, Florida, and Mississippi. The ranger units were designed to function in conjunction with the regular armies in the field, both during periods of action and periods of relative quiet and inaction. Any arms captured by the rangers in their raids and skirmishes were to be turned over to the Confederate military authority at a pre-designated spot in accordance with the orders of the commanding general. It was further stipulated that the rangers were to be paid the full value of any arms they might capture from the Federal forces, the price to be determined by the judgment of the Secretary of War.

For an organization on that was launched with such hope and expectations, the Partisan Rangers were a grave disappointment. If the rangers had functioned with a little more efficiency and effectiveness than they did during the war years, perhaps they would have made a more lasting contribution to the Confederate war effort. Some ranger companies, such as Mosby's unit, carried out operations that proved of significant value to the Confederate military. But Mosby was intensely loyal the

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4 Ibid., p. 82.
5 Ibid., Series IV, II, 499.
aims and policies of the Confederacy, other companies and commanders of rangers did not share this degree of loyalty. In some sections of the Confederate states, they were really more of a burden and a liability than they were an asset. Henry T. Clark, governor of North Carolina, in a dispatch to Secretary of War, G. W. Randolph, in July, 1862, complained of the problem of the young men of military age in his state joining ranger companies to avoid regular military service. This bothersome situation was further aggravated by the disturbing fact that some of the ranger commanders were actively interfering with the machinery of conscription in that state. North Carolina was not the only state in the South faced with a problem of this nature. Indeed, the situation was fast approaching a crisis in the various Confederate states, when the Secretary of War cleared up the muddle somewhat by specifying through a general order that only men over the age of thirty-five were eligible to join the ranger companies in their home states. Doubtless, this ruling went a long way toward unsnarling the bothersome muddle the ranger situation had gotten into.

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6 Ibid., p. 4.
7 Ibid., p. 498.
It may well be argued that such an act helped rob the
rangers of a good reservoir of man power from which to draw
their personnel. This would be a significant change if the
rangers had been more of an asset to the Confederacy than
they actually were. The rangers managed to bring trouble
upon themselves by these and other acts perpetrated by
their bands. Furthermore, the lure of ranger life served
to bring an increase in desertion from regular ranks and a
consequent criticism from high ranking Confederate leaders.
More and more, the life of the irregulars with their un-
orthodox mode of warfare began to weave a fascination for
the war-weary soldiers of the regular Confederate Army.
Also, their reasonably free access to plunder and booty
was a further factor which made the rangers and other ir-
regular units the objects of envy in the eyes of the
regular soldiers. Many soldiers returning home for a
furlough, became so obsessed with a sense of self-pre-
servation, that they quickly sought to join some ranger
or even some guerilla unit to avoid going back to the
front lines. Regular deserters from Confederate ranks
also added their numbers to the ranger bands. It soon
became quite difficult to separate the actions of the
ranger groups from those of the many guerilla and outlaw
bands infesting the areas in which they were operating.

\[9\text{Virgil C. Jones, Ranger Mosby (Chapel Hill, 1944), (Hereinafter referred to as Jones).}\]
Robbery of citizens, horse stealing, a glaring lack of discipline; these were just a few of the indictments hurled at the partisan rangers. With these charges being hurled at their irregular comrades in arms, Confederate military leaders began looking askance at this tactical brain child of which so much had been expected. The desertions to guerilla and ranger ranks were hurting the Confederate military machine to an alarming degree. General Lee’s once great army was dwindling from its former numbers to quite a low ebb. He lost a good many of his troops in Richmond where they met and joined John Morgan’s cavalry command. Lee was so concerned over this serious matter, that in a letter to President Jefferson Davis he argued that "you will see if this conduct is allowed that all discipline is destroyed and our armies will be ruined." The rangers as well as other irregular bands had been drawing criticism previous to Lee’s declaration from fairly high placed men in the Confederate military hierarchy. This was a radical change of events from the 1861-1862 period when the partisan rangers were considered the very symbol of the fight for Southern Independence. Criticism against these ranger bands grew steadily. It remained for Brigadier-General Thomas L. Rosser to sum up the regular army officers’ case against

10ibid., p. 173.
the partisan ranger organizations with words that spared no details of the partisan's wrongdoings:

Without discipline, order or organization they roam broadcast over the country, a band of thieves, stealing, pillaging, plundering and doing every manner of mischief and crime. They are a terror to the citizens and an injury to the cause. They never fight; can't be made to fight. Their leaders are generally brave, but few of the men are good soldiers and have engaged in this business for the sake of gain.\(^{11}\)

This letter passed through the chain of command all the way up to the Secretary of War. General Lee agreed wholeheartedly with the views expressed by Rosser and went even further in advocating the abolishment of the law which had originally established the partisan rangers.\(^{12}\) Acting on the opinions expressed by the best military minds of the Confederacy, the Confederate Congress formally repealed the bill which had given birth to the Partisan rangers. This repeal was drafted by Secretary of State Seddon.\(^{13}\) Only Mosby's and McNeill's command were retained, and these on the advice and recommendation of General Lee.

More notorious than even the partisan rangers had become, were the numerous guerilla bands operating in practically every state of the Union and Confederacy during the war. These bands conducted their activities

\(^{11}\)Ibid., p. 173.  \(^{12}\)Ibid., p. 174.  \(^{13}\)Ibid., p. 174.
in bands of varying sizes and with varying qualities of armament. As mentioned above, these men lived off the land where they operated, having no permanent base of operations. Indeed, bases were not really possible to maintain due to the necessity of much rapid movement, and sometimes with enemy troops hard on their heels. If the guerillas were difficult to find and track down, even more difficult was the prospect of determining the question of their loyalty to either North or South. Usually they would be functioning in behalf of either one side or the other behind enemy lines, performing much the same type of action as ranger bands. If any guerilla leader and his band was operating in the name of the Confederacy, this was not a cast-iron guarantee that the band would be averse to stealing a fine string of horses from a Southern sympathizer as well as from a Unionist. The finer points of sectional loyalty made little inroad on the conscience of a guerilla bent on a mission of horse stealing. In some cases, a guerilla leader played the dangerous game of playing both sides of the fence, speaking and acting in behalf of one side or the other, according to what seemed expedient and healthy at the given moment. The problem of what role to play at a given moment was naturally an exacting one that called for a keen alertness that only an environment of war could bring about.
The term "bushwhacker" was commonly associated with that of guerilla during the war years. In later years, the word became closely identified with Confederate guerillas in general, although in the war period it had a distasteful connotation referring to a breed of men who preferred to wage their war from the protective covering of bushes and other forms of concealment. Even as the war wore on, the bushwhacker was mentioned whenever any news of plunderings and robberies came to light. Primarily, the bush warrior was a sniper when he operated singly. When operating in bands, he often became an outlaw, his misdeeds as harmful to one side as to another. The motive for plunder and easy booty was just as irresistible to the guerilla and bushwhacker as it was to the partisan rangers in some cases.

Guerilla operations and organizations have for some time been linked with the Confederacy. It may be true that there were a sizeable number of guerilla bands operating in the name of the Confederacy, but this was too often in name only. In a territory infested by guerillas, the Southern sympathizer was no safer from their raids and activities than was his Union counterpart. It is true that certain guerilla bands operating for the Confederates actually did cause Union troops some source of worry, but likely as not, Southern residents of the area found them to be equally a nuisance and a danger. As they were
independant of the army, so it seemed the guerillas were independent of any restricting cords of discipline and a clearly marked loyalty to either the North or the South. Loyalty, as such, oftentimes played a minor role in comparison to the preference for plundering and allied affairs.

At times it became quite an undertaking to make fine distinctions between the activities of ranger bands and the more disorganized guerilla bands. Although there were many guerilla units forming and operating in their behalf, the Confederate government and high command declined to recognize guerilla forces as a part of their military scheme of things. On April 29, 1862, J. P. Benjamin, Secretary of War, declared that any guerilla companies were not to be recognized as a part of the Confederate military organization and could not be authorized by his department. In fact, the depredations of guerillas should not be wholly laid at the door of the South; Union authorities were in the practice of allowing and encouraging parties of "scouts" to raid and harass in their behalf, quite like the partisan rangers.

Almost as soon as war broke out, guerilla bands began their raidings and other activities. These bands were active in most parts of the country committing daily hit

\[14\] Official Records, Ser. IV, I, 1008.
and run attacks. As Union or Confederate armies pushed into an area, elements unsympathetic to their cause would organize into bands and carry on a bushwhacking campaign against the troops. As these worrisome campaigns intensified, harried military authorities had no choice but to hunt the bushwhackers down. Hence, these independent bands became outlaws quite early in the war. As these desperate elements literally fled for their lives, they developed a morbid liking for the hectic life of the bushwhacker. In its own strange way, living with death held a fascination for these outlawed elements. It was for this reason alone, that a good many men took up the pursuit of guerilla life. An opportunity to come by easy plunder motivated still others to take up the hidden war of the shadows.

As the war progressed, guerilla activity increased to keep in step with it. Soon, the problem began to get serious. As this happened, military authorities found it necessary to resort to all sorts of methods to keep the guerilla problem from getting out of hand. Captured guerillas were promptly hanged by the military authorities for deeds committed by guerillas still at large. Needless to say, a large number of innocent persons died as a result of accelerated justice. Still, these extreme measures did

16 Ibid., p. 369.
17 Ibid., p. 370.
very little to appreciably slow down or lessen the intensity of guerilla raids and sorties in any locality. As one measure after another failed to completely erase the guerilla menace, Union military officials in territory plagued by guerillas, adopted the policy of assessing a monetary penalty from property holding secessionists in the community in order to compensate for the losses suffered by loyal persons from guerilla attacks. Even this monetary pressure did little to clean out guerilla bands; the guerillas themselves suffered no discomfort in this case.

A rather sordid sidelight to the regular guerilla activity in the country, was the practice adopted by a good many persons of settling grudges through the convenient agency of guerilla warfare and bushwhacking. Just how many men were killed in this manner is not definitely known, but many deaths blamed on guerillas were undoubtedly the work of such individuals.

The lack of complete success in cleaning guerillas out of localities did not soften the cries for more stern measures on the part of concerned military officials. Brigadier-General G. B. Brown, commanding the Department of Southwest Missouri, an area infested with guerilla organizations, was one who raised his voice in support of sterner measures against bushwhackers in general in that area of Missouri. He maintained that "Mercy to these outlaws is cruelty and death to the Union men of the Southwest." 19

General S. R. Curtis, also a commander in Missouri, advocated the putting into effect of machinery which would set up a commission always ready to determine and execute guerrillas on the spot. Measures such as this were, while strict and extreme, considered only pertinent to the situation in the guerrilla-ridden Kansas-Missouri border area.

The ruse of wearing the uniform of the enemy while carrying out raids against him, seems to have been in wide practice during the war. Union General Order Number 10, issued January 26, 1863, dealt with this state of affairs. It specified that any guerrillas or Southern soldiers captured in Federal uniform were to be regarded as organized bodies of the enemy and placed in close confinement and held for action by the War Department. If these men were captured behind Union lines, they were to be regarded as spies and shot. This also applied if they were caught in civilian garb. This policy was further clarified in April when orders were issued for dealing with irregular soldiers captured in the field while in any uniform or dress which would divest them of the appearance of soldiers. Prisoners fitting into this category would be regarded as public enemies by their captors. This order served to strip

\[\text{Ibid.}, \text{ p. 411.} \quad \text{Ibid.}, \text{ p. 215.} \quad \text{Ibid.}, \text{ p. 591.} \quad \text{Ibid.}, \text{ p. 677.}\]
the guerilla of any vague military designation he may have enjoyed. This stern approach was replaced by one even more strict in July, 1864. General Orders Number 231, July 18, 1864, authorized an act to provide for the speedier punishment of captured guerilla marauders. The commanding general of any military department was to have the authority to carry out this order to the letter. The Federal forces were apparently of a frame of mind which justified the fighting the fire of the guerilla menace with a firmer fire of their own. In their zeal to punish the guilty parties involved in guerilla raids, Federal authorities too often were not cautious in their naming of the guilty. The exact number of innocent persons who paid for deeds committed by guerilla bands is still unknown, but with the stern Union policy of reprisal, the total must have been a sizeable one. In the urgency of the guerilla situation, Federal authorities were not drawing fine lines of distinction between guilty and innocent in their prosecution of guerilla marauders.

As the Federal attitude toward the capture and punishment of guerilla prisoners gradually became harder and sterner through the war years, so too did their attitude toward guerilla prisoners of war in relation to prisoner exchange. Lincoln's amnesty proclamation was adopted by the commanders of Federal prisons in March 1863.

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Ibid., Ser. III, IV, 505.
The decree provisions were sent by letter to the commanders of Union prisons. It provided for the release of all non-commissioned Confederate prisoners-of-war providing they would swear an oath of allegiance in good faith. Doing this, the prisoners would be paroled and allowed to return to their homes. This privilege was not extended to guerrillas or to other irregular soldiers. These last named could only be released on the recommendation of the governor of their home state. A somewhat humorous sidelight to all this was the revelation that numbers of Union soldiers were inactive in the Carolinas and the Kentucky-Tennessee area, due to their capture and subsequent parole by bands of guerrillas. The Federal government had no recourse but to admit these paroles were binding and due recognition by the Union soldiers involved.

Two months later in May, 1863, something of a boon was granted guerrilla prisoners of war in regard to normal prisoner exchange. The machinery for exchange of prisoners was inaugurated by a dispatch from the commanding-general of prisoners, W. Hoffman to Major-General J. M. Schofield, commanding the Department of the Missouri. This dispatch was sent May 23, 1863. Prisoners held in the military

26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., p. 359.
prisons at St. Louis and Alton, Missouri, were to be forwarded to City Point, Virginia, for the purpose of prisoner exchange with the Confederates. This order embraced captured guerillas if any of the cases against these men were of a nature so that it was difficult to definitely determine their guilt.

The amnesty program was not without its snarls however. A bitter letter from General S. G. Burbridge in Kentucky, to J. Holt, Judge Advocate General, complained of trouble caused by returning Confederate soldiers released under the Amnesty Proclamation. Among these trouble-makers, Burbridge found definite traces of guerilla elements. In his call for authority to deal with the internal enemy, Burbridge felt "My authority to punish this class should be in coexistence with my authority in regard to the rebels." In all fairness, it must be pointed out that not all such troublesome citizens were actually guerillas nor were they necessarily closely associated with active guerilla bands. In some areas guerilla bands were of such strength as to force returning soldiers into un-welcome collaboration.

Problems involving released Confederate prisoners eventually caused a tightening of regulations governing the release and exchange of guerillas held as prisoners in Federal prisons. A dispatch to Lieutenant-Colonel

\[Tid., VII, 155.\]
J. H. Taylor Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff, Alexandria, Virginia, denied the privilege of prisoner exchange to several men identified as guerillas of a bad character. These men were further ordered to confinement in a prison remote from Virginia. This ruling was backed more firmly in February, 1865, with an authorization for the release of guerilla prisoners among the very last elements freed.

This then, was the life of the guerilla during the years of the Civil War. Living with death, thriving on unrest, asking no quarter, and certainly giving none, he waged his stealthy brand of warfare, sometimes for a definite cause, though sometimes for the added thrill of easy plunder.

Scarcely any area of the country escaped the maraudings of guerillas and bushwhackers. Also most regions were accustomed to raids made by cavalry detachments of both sides who employed a guerilla style in their actions. Due to their location away from the principal centers of action, the borderlands were the scene of a considerable amount of guerilla activity and prowlings. In those states of the borderland allied with the South, guerillas were as much a problem and source of danger to Confederate sympathizers as they were to Union sympathizers and soldiers. In some sections, such as the Kansas-Missouri border area, and the

29 Ibid., p. 112.
30 Ibid., VIII, 317.
Kentucky-Tennessee sector guerilla activity was at its heaviest; but there was no section of the borderlands that was completely free of the problem of roving, raiding guerillas. The conflict between some of these bands and hard-pressed military officials was at times almost akin to a separate theatre of war. Just how the states of the border strove to overcome the danger of bushwhacking elements in their midst is a story that to the careless reader may seem quite similar to a blood and thunder historical novel. The bushwhacker and his war was the concern of both North and South; both sides felt his sting on more than one occasion. In areas where there was very little loyal sentiment to one side or the other, guerilla activity continued unabated up to the time peace was finally restored to the state.
CHAPTER II

GUERRILLA TACTICS IN THE LOWER NORTH

One characteristic of the borderland states during the Civil War was severe internal disorders, usually involving marauding by guerilla or other irregular bands. The three states of the lower north, Indiana, Illinois and Ohio, were fortunate enough to escape some of the worst phases of this problem, but by no means were they completely free of it. Unlike their neighbors to the south, the states in this area suffered no extensive war damage. However, this relative freedom from the ravages of war was to prove very insignificant in maintaining internal morale security.

Although the states of this section remained loyal to the Union, their loyalty was definitely not an undivided and unquestioning one. An organization in Indiana, the peace democrats, who in the pre-war years had favored compromise with the South, even tried to stir up a narrow sectional prejudice against other parts of the North, particularly the New England area. Nor was Indiana the only state in this section that produced cause for doubt regarding her loyalty. On July, 1863, when a meeting was

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1Smith, p. 322.
being held in southern Illinois celebrating Union victories, an opposition meeting was being conducted nearby. At this gathering, cheers were sounded for John Morgan and his cavalry company, then carrying out their famous raid into southern Indiana and Ohio.

Indiana was the state which gave the Unionists of the lower north the most cause for concern. A secret organization, one of many in that area, was scrutinized very carefully by concerned Union officials in Indiana. The Knights of the Golden Circle had supposedly evolved from a parent stem in one of the Confederate states. The discovery of the organization prompted the energetic governor of the state to order the state militia placed on a war footing.

The loyalty question in Indiana came to a head in May, 1862. On that date, a train wreck in Sullivan county took the life of Miles J. Fletcher, state superintendent of education. Governor Morton was also a passenger on the ill-fated train. Once safely back in his capital, the Indiana governor asserted that certain Indiana traitors, working in conjunction with Kentucky guerilla bands on the border, may have been responsible for the destruction of the train. This smoldering question was further aggra
vated two months later in July, 1862, during the Confederate


3 Kenneth M. Stamp, Indiana Politics During the Civil War (Indianapolis, 1949), p. 149.

4 Ibid., p. 150.
raid on Newburgh. It was reported after this raid that
disloyal citizens actually aided the enemy in accomplishing
his mission. A thorough man like Governor Morton would
scarcely allow a situation such as this to go by without
taking steps to remedy it.

Southern Illinois and Ohio on the other hand were
sympathetic for slavery as an institution but in the face
of the common danger, remained loyal to the Union. The
defense measures by these two states, particularly in
Ohio, were hampered somewhat by the urgent need for men in
the early stages of the war. Illinois solved her problem
in March, 1863, with the formation of Home Guard units to
keep order in the state, particularly in the southern
section of the state. All the states of that section were
concerned about the adequate defense of their southern
borders. Governor Morton and the citizens of Indiana per-
haps entertained the most concern about the possibility of
Confederate invasion and raiding parties. This fear by
Indiana citizens was felt even in 1861 when Kentucky was a
"neutral" state. Governor Morton, on April 23, 1861, in a
letter to Simon Cameron, Secretary of War in Washington,
expressed the belief that his state needed some 20,000
stands of arms plus artillery in order to prevent any raids

5Ibid., p. 150.
7Ibid.
the Confederates in Kentucky may be planning. He requested a militia body to protect the southern boundary on June 6, 1862. This request was finally granted and as a result, the Indiana Legion was born. This body was formed to protect citizens against marauding bands from Kentucky and other points south. Indiana's concern was further heightened by the early Confederate seizure of Bowling Green, Kentucky, which brought an abrupt end to that state's "neutrality." It was in the border counties of Indiana that this concern was felt the strongest.

As time was to prove, the fears over a Confederate invasion were a little overdone; the lower north was quite untouched by any major military action during the war years. But still the necessity of having internal protection was considered quite important. In the summer of 1863, war came briefly to the hills of southern Indiana; reminders from Confederate raiders that the war had not completely forgotten that state. The conduct of the people in this general area did help modify somewhat the Republican claim that the citizens of the southern counties were flagrantly disloyal. In June, 1863, Captain Thomas Hines, Confederate cavalry commander, wrote an introductory chapter

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8Ibid., II, 109-10.
9Smith, p. 176.
10Stamp, p. 203.
to Morgan's more dramatic venture, with a raid of his own. This expedition was launched for the undramatic purpose of horse stealing. Hine's force, estimated at between 20 and 300 crossed the Ohio River on the seventeenth of June, at Leavenworth, ten miles below the city of Cincinnati.

A considerable bit of speculation concerning the cavalry's goal was raised by the fact that they seemed headed directly toward the New Albany railroad. This apparent goal prompted the military to make arrangements to send 100 troops down the Ohio by boat in an attempt to cut the raiders off. Where other raids had failed and been smashed by Federal troops, the one led by Hine seemed destined for some measure of success. During the course of this raid, General Ambrose Burnside, in a letter from Cincinnati, expressed some question as to the loyalty of the state of Indiana as a whole. He expressed this view by saying, "Kentucky is today a more loyal state than either Indiana, Ohio, or Illinois." Burnside was only echoing the opinion of a good many military men. Hine and his command succeeded in eluding their often numerically superior enemy for three days. Eventually, the company was run down and captured by local Legion units and home guards. Hine and a few of his staff


12 Ibid., pp. 397-98.
as well as certain members of the command escaped capture; others were either killed or captured, or else wounded. Hine's swift movements and the resultant confusion regarding the exact number of his party helped somewhat to aid his primary mission, horse stealing. Thus did the Confederate military strive to adopt guerilla tactics to military operations in a region of doubtful allegiance.

If the Lower North escaped armed invasion on an organized basis, it did not completely escape raids in some strength by Confederate cavalry units. The most notable raid in this section was one made by John Hunt Morgan which carried him through southern Indiana and Ohio in July, 1863. This was the most serious action of this sort the Lower North was subjected to.

John H. Morgan, son of a Virginia merchant, was born in Huntsville, Alabama, in 1825. His early life was spent in Lexington, Kentucky. In 1846, Morgan entered military service during the Mexican War where he saw action at Buena Vista. John Morgan apparently foresaw the dangers of possible civil war when he organized the Lexington Rifles in 1857. This force was the nucleus, later, of Morgan's unit when he cast his lot with the Confederacy in the fall of 1861. He had scarcely begun his career as an officer when he began to attract attention to himself by his exploits. His Tennessee and Kentucky raids cost the

Federals hundreds of prisoners and enormous stands of weapons. Morgan may be given credit for having practically fathered the concept of "mobile cavalry" during his operations in the war. General William S. Rosecrans had good reason to remember Morgan because his advance against Confederate forces was held up by Morgan's raids against his communications. For this action, Morgan received the rank of brigadier-general.

Of all his daring and smashing raids, perhaps Morgan's most noteworthy one was his sweep through southern Indiana and Ohio in the summer of 1863. It was in this raid that Morgan's tactics most resembled those of the guerilla. In the summer of 1863, General Braxton Bragg and his army were in the vicinity of Tullahoma while his cohort, General Samuel Buckner was in Eastern Tennessee, an area rife with Unionist sentiment. Ordering General Judah to guard against Confederate raids, Federal General Ambrose E. Burnside was planning an invasion of East Tennessee. With Rosecrans' force confronting him, Bragg could spare no help to Buckner who was faced by an equally large force. General Bragg saw that only a timely retreat could keep his army from a crippling blow. Morgan was ordered to stage one of his swift raids through Kentucky in

15 Ibid.
order to draw the enemy away from Bragg’s positions. With Rosecrans occupied with trying to run down Morgan, Bragg would then retreat across the Tennessee River and safely on to Chattanooga. Morgan disagreed with this bit of strategy. Instead, he favored an attack through Indiana, and in so doing, carrying the war home to the Federals. General Bragg refused him permission to do this. Morgan told one of his subordinates he intended to cross the Ohio River anyway against Bragg’s orders and bring the enemy a taste of war. Accordingly he first occupied Brandenburg July 7, 1863, on the southern side of the Ohio. Using two captured steamers, Morgan ferried his force across the river and then onto Indiana soil where he headed toward Croydon, some fifteen miles to the north of the landing spot. Troops of the Indiana Legion fell back at Morgan’s approach to a point within six miles of Croydon. On the morning of the eighth, Croydon surrendered to Morgan’s cavalry. The town was turned over to the troops for plunder. On a more businesslike note, several horses were seized to serve as fresh mounts when and if the necessity arose.

Southern Indiana was thrown into a state of panic by the sudden appearance of this mounted company. This panic tended to make the estimates of the size of Morgan’s force

much larger than it actually was. Although his force was made up of some 2000 cavalrmen, some shaken observers in the first hours of the raid placed Morgan's numbers as high as 6000. Governor Morton was ill when Morgan's raiders entered his state, but this did not prevent him from taking charge of the efforts to halt the raid and punish the invaders. Like his fellow citizens in the southern districts, Morton let his much milder case of panic dictate his actions rather than sound judgment. Indiana was very poorly defended when Morgan launched his raid; a good many of her troops had been sent to Kentucky. The Indiana Legion was not the type of body to deal effectively with smashing such a raid in force. As Morgan made his way across Indiana, homes were quickly abandoned in the path of his march, so complete was the panic that state's citizens were feeling. Morton ordered out the state militia and even encouraged citizens to form vigilance companies to halt the invasion of their state. On July 10, he went so far as to close all Indianapolis business houses in order that all men would be free to join the militia companies. In line with this arrangement General Orlando Wilcox was placed in command of the civilian

17 Stamp, p. 206.

18 Ibid.

19 Smith, p. 174.
units, General Henry B. Carrington was placed in command of the Indiana Legion, and General Milo S. Hascall was entrusted with the defense of Indianapolis.

One the same day Morton closed up the Indianapolis business houses, Morgan and his forces entered and took possession of the town of Salem. Here, as in Croydon, there was plundering, but nothing of any real value was actually taken. Morgan was pursuing an east, northeastward course through the state toward Versailles and Vernon. Any towns lying in the path of march were subjected to plundering; citizens from those towns fled before the raiders with as much personal property and effects as they could carry. Any railroad bridges along the way were burned; railroad tracks were torn up. In Salem, the pattern of looting was one without reason; this served to laden the men down unnecessarily, although at the moment that did not seem a serious worry.

The scattered companies of Indiana Legionaires did their best to halt Morgan but with no appreciable results. In the meantime, General Edward H. Hobson was taking up Morgan’s trail with his cavalry and pursuing him deliberately. The alleged “Northern wing” of the Confederate army failed to materialize among Indiana’s "disloyal"

20 Stamp, p. 207.

elements in the southern part of the state. If anything, Morgan's raid served to unite them with the rest of the state in a common cause. The indiscriminate looting of Republican and Copperhead alike created an animosity toward Morgan's company among almost the entire population of the state.

Meanwhile, General Burnside determined not to move so long as Morgan was still free and loose in Indiana. Burnside felt, "It would not do to move our mounted force into East Tennessee and leave him in Kentucky to break up our railroad communications and capture our wagon trains."

Apparently feeling the urgency of the situation, General J. D. Cox, at headquarters, District of the Ohio, ordered Major Keith Hamilton to do all possible to blockade roads and obstruct the progress of the rebel raiders. Major Hamilton was assured that a larger force was on the way from Indianapolis. This group was sent July 13. The United States War Department also realized the problem Morgan and his force were creating. In a letter to the governors of Ohio, Kentucky, and Illinois, as well as to Morton, Secretary of War Stanton advocated the imposition of martial law until the existing emergency and threat was

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24 Ibid., p. 742.
dealt with. Morton felt that martial law was not necessary in a situation which he felt could best be handled by state militia troops. Despite Morton's objections, martial law was established in Cincinnati, Covington and Newport. All business was suspended until further notice. Citizens in these towns were required to organize themselves as directed by state and municipal authorities.

By July 12, Morgan's men were quite exhausted. General Hobson and his company of cavalry were slowly closing the gap that separated them from Morgan's unit. In his search for an escape route, Morgan carried his troops across the border into Ohio. Learning that Morgan had made his way across the Ohio, Morton tendered the services of Indiana militia men to aid Ohio in clearing out the rebels. Following the acceptance of his offer, Morton sent General Carrington with three regiments to Hamilton, Ohio. This order was not carried out as promptly as Morton wished, however, as Carrington, visiting with friends, became intoxicated and was unable adequately to see the organization of his militia forces. As it was, the Indiana troops arrived too late to be of any service. They were ordered to Cincinnati where they remained until 23 Morgan's capture on July 26.

25 Ibid., p. 728.
26 Ibid., p. 745.
27 Stampp, p. 209.
28 Ibid., p. 209.
By one o'clock in the afternoon of the thirteenth, Morgan had reached Harrison, Ohio. On reaching this point, he began maneuvering to outwit the Federal commander at Cincinnati. There was a strong Federal force quartered in Cincinnati at the time. Hoping, perhaps, to confuse his enemy, Morgan headed his column toward Cincinnati, in a move calculated to put the enemy on the defensive. Morgan's second-in-command, Basil Duke, stated that Morgan intended to by-pass the city itself but hoped to create enough of an impression of force to keep the enemy off balance. Colonel Duke pointed out that in the years following the war, Morgan was criticized for not actually seizing Cincinnati. His critics seemed to feel he showed a lack of enterprise in not executing this maneuver. It must be remembered that Morgan's troops were very weary and their effective number had dwindled from 2460 to a number close to 2000. Too, if Morgan had entered Cincinnati, it would have been necessary to scatter his troops over the city and further limit their strength.

At four in the afternoon, the raiders reached Williamburg, a town twenty-eight miles east of Cincinnati. They had been on a steady march since they left Summamsville.

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29 Duke, p. 325.  
31 Ibid.  
30 Ibid.  
32 Ibid.
Indiana; more than ninety miles had been covered in thirty-five hours. Morgan determined to spend the night at this point in order to give both men and horses a much deserved rest. During the course of this tortuous march, companies of militia had hung on the flanks and rear of the column, wounding several and killing one man. Added to this harassment, the enemy was busying himself with felling trees, tearing up bridges, and impeding Morgan's progress in every conceivable manner. The utilization of rapid railroad and telegraph communication was one advantage the enemy exploited to the hilt. The obstacles to his progress became so numerous that Morgan was forced to equip his advance guard with axes to chop away barriers erected in the path of march. As militia troops were reinforced by regular forces Morgan's difficulties increased.

On the afternoon of the eighteenth, the jaded column arrived at Chester and made a halt for one and a half hours. This was to enable the column to close up and if possible to find a guide as Morgan had said he would not march much further without one. This halt was, in the long run, to hurt Morgan and his chances for getting his command out of Ohio intact. Apparently Morgan had difficulty in obtaining a guide, for he resumed his rapid

march and by nightfall was at Buffinton Ford, the opposite bank of the Ohio temptingly visible to the weary eyes of the troops. Darkness made it necessary to postpone the crossing until it became lighter.

Not to ford the river at that time could prove fatal to Morgan. If there was enough of a delay, the Federals could rush troops by river and throw a tight cordon around the invaders. The road from Pomeroy to Buffinton was in excellent condition for the Federals to send troops in pursuit of their foe. A night crossing would further have required a night attack on the earthwork guarding the ford. Such an attack against an untested position, which might conceal an undetermined number of troops, was not an action any cautious commander would be eager to risk.

While they were marking time in the evening, the raiders were planning the strategy that would be necessary to effect their escape. Again a delay played against Morgan. When troops of the First and Sixth Kentucky Cavalry moved forward to attack the earthwork guarding the ford, they found it completely abandoned. They later learned that the troops holding this position had left it at two in the afternoon of the eighteenth. Had the night crossing

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34 Ibid., p. 330.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., p. 332.
been made, there was a possibility that a good portion of the division would have succeeded in making it across the river onto Confederate soil and safety. This negligence cost Morgan dearly. As it was, the delay allowed the Federals to bring up their pursuing forces closer and closer to their quarry. Colonel Smith, along with the First and Sixth Kentucky cavalry, were sent out along the Pomeroy road. Along this route, the combined forces met the advance guard of Judah's strong unit. When he learned of the approach of this considerable force, Morgan detailed Colonels Duke and Richard Morgan to hold the advancing Federals at bay until the bulk of the command had reached safety across the river. Faced by just this group, Morgan might have made a smoother retreat than he did. But adding their numbers to Judah's troops, came General Hobson's cavalry from Chester. To further complicate and hinder the escape of the Confederates, gunboats were observed coming up the river to join the fight. In addition to the fire of the two Federal units opposing them, Duke and Morgan were undergoing shell fire from three different directions. An appraisal of the men aligned against them was more than enough to dishearten the men of Morgan's command. Duke and Morgan held off this double assault for more than half an hour, while John Morgan and the bulk of his command had successfully begun the fording the

37 Ibid.
river. Through all the actual fighting, the men in Duke's and Morgan's command behaved quite well under fire. Only when they discovered there were only two avenues of escape open to them did they display panic. The high shots being fired from the gun boats did much to heighten this feeling of panic. Seizing this opportunity, the Federal cavalry charged pell mell into the wavering ranks of the raiders. In the melee that ensued, 600 to 700 prisoners were captured. On July 20, the prisoners were marched to the river bank and loaded on transports bound for Cincinnati and prison.

With about 1100 men of his command, Morgan had managed to get to the middle of the river in safety, while Duke and Richard Morgan were holding the Federal troops at bay. His lieutenant, Duke, states that when Colonel Morgan saw the rear guard force cracking before the Federal onslaught, he abandoned the immediate plans for his escape and chose to remain in enemy territory with his command.

The next six days was a constant scramble by Federal troops in their efforts to capture the elusive John Morgan and those of his command still free. Rapid methods of communication, the telegraph and the railroads were utilized by the Union authorities to track their quarry down and to finally capture him later. As he pressed his retreat,

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38 Ibid., p. 336.
39 Ibid.
Morgan was constantly hounded by his pursuers. However, by some miracle, the Federal troops and cavalry kept barely missing opportunities of bringing their quarry to bay. This run of fortune stayed with Morgan until he found himself in extreme eastern Ohio. While in Eastern Ohio, Morgan learned the sobering news of General Lee's retreat from the battlefield of Gettysburg. Morgan may have had hopes of linking up with Lee's troops in that area, but this bit of intelligence wrote an end to that hope. The next move, after all else had failed, was to contact a Union command in that area and ask for terms of surrender. The Union officer, Captain Burbeck, at first agreed to give Morgan escort to the Pennsylvania border but later events in that state brought a later decision to accept Morgan's surrender. Under the terms granted to Morgan by Burbeck, the officers and men were to be paroled by their captors, and the officers were to be allowed to keep their sidearms. This boon, which Burbeck had so handsomely granted, was countermanded by Shackleford, Hobson's second-in-command. Morgan's "surrender" to Shackleford, was settled on July 26, 1863. Shackleford did allow his prisoner to keep his sidearms however. Burnside in the meantime intervened, and through his orders, the privates

\[40\text{Ibid.}, p. 340.\]
\[41\text{Ibid.}, p. 341.\]
\[42\text{Ibid.}, p. 336.\]
of Morgan's command were sent to Camp Douglas while the
officers were sent to Johnson's Island, and later to
Allegheny City, Pennsylvania. Morgan and his immediate
staff were sent to the prison at Columbia, Ohio. About
seventy officers shared Morgan's imprisonment. On
September 30, the prisoners were turned over to the insti-
tution's authorities.

The success or failure of Morgan's raid through
Indiana and Ohio was subsequently a matter of considerable
speculation. Morgan's lieutenant, Duke, was of the belief
that Morgan's venture was a success as it allowed General
Bragg to make his retreat unmolested. Duke was further
of the opinion that the distraction of this raid delayed
the final fall of East Tennessee for perhaps a matter of
weeks. More critical observers found little accomplishment
in the campaign. They pointed out that the venture de-
prived Bragg of the services of a cavalry division at the
time when he had a desperate need for one. The military
value of the raid itself was further held up to question
by critics who pointed out Morgan's failure to seize any
military posts North of the Ohio. Like the guerrilla,

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43 Reid., p. 14.

44 Duke, p. 341.

45 Eugene H. Roseboom, The History of the State of
Illinois (Columbia, Ohio, 1944), p. 423.
Morgan used the hit-and-run method of attack in his raid, keeping the enemy sufficiently off balance and off guard to effect the element of surprise. Unlike the guerilla organizations, there was a form of discipline in Morgan's company that kept the raiders from any wholesale program of looting and plundering. This was only one of the few times that Morgan borrowed copiously from the guerilla units in regard to tactics and mode of attack.

With the Confederate raiders safely behind bars, the Federal authorities in the lower North had some opportunity to breathe easier. But even while behind bars, the Confederates were making plans for their eventual escape. Thomas Hine, a subordinate in this Indiana raid, was the person given most of the credit for devising the plan of escape the prisoners hoped to execute. Almost immediately following his lock-up, Hine began to survey his grim surroundings, hoping to find a chink in the seemingly impenetrable walls of the prison. Noting the dryness of the cell he was locked in, Hine felt there must be some type of air chamber designed to let out moisture that might accumulate in the cells during the day. Following through on this possible lead, Hine reasoned that it might be possible, by removing the cement and bricks in one of the cells to find a cavity providing air and an opening to

46 Reid, p. 14.
possible freedom. To facilitate their excavation project, Hine and his cell mates obtained two case knives to chip away the concrete and mortar sealing the way to the hoped-for air shaft. While they were working, the prisoners devised a code system of warning should the guards be spotted coming in their direction. One rap with the knife signified that it was safe to continue the work of chipping a hole through the cell floor. Two raps with the knife signaled the worker to stop his tapping lest the guards should hear it and come to investigate. Three knocks with a knife signified that the worker was to stop his activity and come out. The hole as it was widened, was covered by a strategically placed bunk under which it had been dug. Soon the patience and hope of the prisoners paid off. An air chamber was discovered; a passage sixty feet long, three feet wide, and three feet high. To these desperate prisoners, this spelled a way to escape and freedom. To gain access to this chamber, it was necessary to chip through twelve feet of solid masonry, fourteen feet of fine stone and cement, and five feet of graved earth. The narrow passageway led directly into the yard of the pen, outside the cell walls. The arduous task of "tunneling out" was completed on November 26, nearly a month after it had been started.

47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
The time for the escape had been set for the evening of November 27. On that evening, shortly after midnight, a length of rope let Morgan, Hine, and six companions down into the air shaft. The other prisoners had previously agreed to remain behind while Morgan and Hine made their escape attempt. They apparently felt that in this case, there was no safety in numbers. Once through the shaft and into the prison yard proper, Hine tossed a length of rope with a hook at the end over the wall, grabbing a firm hold for the climb over the wall. The sentries could not have been more cooperative. Even a watch dog, coming to investigate the sounds that had disturbed his sleep, backed off and lay back down to resume his slumber.

Once outside the prison proper, Morgan and Hine put on disguises designed to aid them in eluding capture, and the other prisoners scattered in opposite directions. Making their way through enemy lines, the pair found themselves at the Cincinnati railroad depot. Finding they lacked the proper amount needed to carry them closer to the Kentucky border, Hine very boldly asked a young woman standing close by if she would oblige him in making up the slight difference he and his companion needed to pay their train fare. This request was graciously granted. Continuing their hazardous

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49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid., p. 15.  
51 Ibid., p. 16.
journey, the escapees found themselves finally opposite the Kentucky shore, the city of Covington visible across the way. A young Negro boy furnished them transportation across the river in a rowboat he had been using for that purpose. After losing a good portion of his command in a raid he undertook against his superior’s orders, John Morgan was once again safely behind Confederate lines. Those prisoners who participated in the Morgan raid, and who were still in Federal prisons, were still to be regarded as prisoners in a military sense of the word and not in the same class as guerillas or bushwhackers. This was by order of the United States Secretary of War.

The repercussions of Morgan's escape were being felt rather strongly by prison administrators who had been responsible for his safe keeping. A report by C. A. Mack blamed negligence on the part of prison authorities as being responsible for the complete success of Morgan's escape try. This same report also included an account by a Captain Lamb, aide-de-camp, which revealed that a lieutenant Judkins furnished Hine and his companions with saws and other tools when they asked for them. No questions were asked as to why the prisoners needed such tools. Certainly, it would be safe to assume that the prison at


53Ibid., pp. 727-29.
Columbia underwent a radical revamping, stressing a tighter security system in regard to the activities of prisoners within the walls.

Although Morgan's raid and escape furnished the most spectacular example of raiding activity in the Lower North, smaller independent guerrilla bands also continued to cause alarm among citizens and federal officials. The unsettled internal conditions, as well as the divided loyalties of the inhabitants of these three states, produced a fertile breeding ground for the formation of guerrilla bands and leaders. Although the guerrilla was hardly as active and in such great numbers and strength as in other states in the borderlands, his activities still created a grave problem that had to be met and dealt with. Guerrilla problems increased with each passing day in this area. State by state, the problem became more acute and presented a growing challenge.

The period between December, 1862, and July, 1863, witnessed the steady rise of guerrilla bands in the Southern portion of Illinois. These bands were spreading a wide path of terror and intimidation through their activities in that region. Of the several bands in existence at that time, the John Carlin band and that of one Clingman were perhaps the most notorious. 54 Other bands, though not so well known as

54 Wood, Gray, The Hidden Civil War (New York, 1942), p. 120.
these two, were in their way further contributing to a break-
down of internal morale and security.

A good many Illinois citizens held a sobering fear
that the guerillas springing up in the southern areas of
the state were in direct contact with similar forces in
Missouri. This was one fear which Illinois citizens found
difficult to allay. 55 Illinois at the outbreak of the war,
had feared a marked degree of trouble on her southern border.
The fear that Confederate raiding parties would make armed
forays in strength into the state was a persistent one, as
was the one concerning possible guerilla depredations from
Kentucky and Missouri. Rumors of a strongly disloyal ele-
ment in southern Illinois, gave rise to a fear that these
secessionist elements would bend every effort, along with
persons of a similar view in Missouri and Kentucky, to make
southern Illinois a direct theatre of war.

These persistent fears inspired Union sympathizers in
that area to raise four regiments of able-bodied men over
forty-five years of age for a period of one year's anti-
guerilla service in Kentucky, Missouri, and Illinois. This
request was made at a time when the guerilla bands in the


southern counties had not reached such a significant size and organization. The anxious citizens of southern Illinois were informed a day later, August 12, 1862, that before any such request could be considered, the state would have to fill its quota of men for the President's call for troops. Until that quota was filled the Union sympathizers in southern Illinois would have to live with the nightly robings and raids of the guerillas, arranging for their own defense as best they could.

Indiana, too, had her own problems and worries over guerilla bands forming and operating in her southern portion in increasing numbers. In August, 1864, General Carrington, commander of the district of Indiana, reported that in three days' time, from the sixth to the ninth, several bands of guerillas had risen and were operating in the state.

Indiana guerillas, instead of devoting their efforts toward acts of sabotage or allied fields, directed most of their activities toward sniping and preying on Federal soldiers whenever and wherever the opportunity presented itself. At times, these bands included as many as two hundred men. This type of war was not carried to Federal soldiers exclusively; soon, anyone who worked for the Federal government in any capacity was subject to reprisal attacks by

guerillas. Indians guerillas also went to great lengths to interfere with the machinery of conscription in that state, by various means, both violent and otherwise. Apparently these bands had never officially declared their allegiance to the Confederacy, but to a good many citizens of the areas where they were on the prowl, this allegiance seemed assured. Apparently there was no visible connection between the guerilla bands and any of the secret societies that flourished in that particular section of the country.

Guerilla activity in Ohio was of a less organized nature. One of the few incidents of importance occurred in June, 1863. In that month some nine hundred men made a dash into Holmes City, Ohio. On the outskirts of the city, the raiders were met by a body of 450 soldiers armed with four howitzers. A quick volley from the howitzers dispersed the raiders who retreated before they could accomplish any appreciable damage.

A feeling of resentment against the Union army was rife in parts of Ohio, but especially in the southern portion. This animosity was created by the Union army's failure to advance in Kentucky in the campaign of 1863. The proximity of the southern counties to Kentucky, made that section vividly aware of a possible threat from the South. In their own way, these elements were in rebellion.

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against the Union army just as much as the guerillas were. From these disloyal elements, the guerillas could quite possibly have received aid and comfort.

With disloyal blocs of citizens in the southern portions of the Lower North, and the resultant divided loyalties, it is surprising that guerilla warfare in this section had not developed into a more formidable force. The organization and maintaining of a fairly large body of home guard units in the three states, quite possibly had a retarding effect on the growth and success of guerilla bands. The governors of the three states making up the Lower North were all generally energetic and competent and worked very zealously to keep the disloyal elements from gaining too much of a foothold in their respective states. This was especially true of Governor Morton of Indiana. The zeal displayed by this man made the uninterrupted growth of guerilla parties more than difficult. When compared with the activities of guerillas in other sections, the activity of irregular bands in the lower North was of a negligible nature. The mass guerilla campaigns feared so on the southern borders of these states did not materialize; the bulk of trouble in this region came from within in the form of secret societies. The problem of the secret society was of a much more acute nature than were the prowlings and misdeeds of guerilla bands. The guerilla did very little to seriously hamper the
Union war effort in this region, a region where such hamperings would have been more than welcome by hard pressed Confederate commanders.
CHAPTER III

GUERILLAS ON THE MIDDLE SOUTHERN BORDER;
KENTUCKY AND TENNESSEE

Kentucky and Tennessee were two states that figured very prominently in the Civil War. Their location, close to the center of the no man's land between the two warring sections, made their terrain a bitter battleground on more than one occasion. This central location also incurred a large number of guerilla raids in varying degrees of strength. There was marked degree of agreement regarding secessionist and Unionist sentiment prior to the actual outbreak of war. This was even more true in Tennessee than in Kentucky. Eastern Tennessee remained a thorn in the side of the Confederacy throughout the course of the war.

Kentucky's feelings changed somewhat after Lincoln's first call for troops to quell the rebellion. Attitudes following this request for soldiers from the state, caused a slight swing toward secessionist sympathies. Still, there was a large number of Kentuckians who strongly favored the state's remaining in the Union and maintaining loyalty to the Lincoln government.¹ The governor of Kentucky, Beriah Magoffin, held to this latter belief in opposition

¹Smith, p. 120.
to any move as rash or final as secession. In an effort to keep the war from crossing into Kentucky's borders, Magoffin declared his state neutral and in so doing, hoped that both the Union and Confederate commands would respect that neutrality. This state of neutrality was terminated abruptly by the Confederate seizure of Bowling Green. The strategic location of the state probably had a large part to do with this Confederate move. This piece of strategy was countered by the Union Army when General Ulysses Grant moved his forces into Kentucky and set up Federal posts at Paducah and Smithland.

The position of Confederate sympathizers in Kentucky was aggravated then shaken somewhat by the annoyance of bushwhacker bands who were rapidly springing up in eastern Kentucky following the Federal counter-invasion of the state. These bands however were mostly private citizens rather than any formally organized group of bushwhackers.

More formally organized bands of gangs of bushwhackers or guerillas gave the citizens and military authorities of Kentucky a great share of trouble and constituted a real menace to the internal social organization of the state. Guerilla bands and organizations were prominent in Kentucky from the early days of the war on up to the period of final Southern collapse.

\[\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 121.}\]
The early symptoms of the developing guerilla trouble did not go unnoticed by Union military officials now in control of the state after driving the Confederates out. In March, 1862, General Henry W. Halleck expressed a strong uneasiness concerning the possibility of widespread guerilla warfare in Kentucky. He notified General Don Carlos Buell that several organized guerilla bands were forming in his section of the state. Buell himself saw this danger two months later in May, 1862, and contended in a dispatch to the War Department, that at least three regular, experienced, regiments were needed to guard against the possible danger that might arise from guerilla attacks. This possible danger became vividly real by the end of 1862. In Northern and Eastern Kentucky, scattered bands of guerillas were systematically robbing, plundering, and intimidating citizens loyal to the Union cause in that area. In their raids and plunderings, the guerillas spared no person. Guerilla operations in Kentucky were on the whole a matter of grim and brutal conduct of plundering; with no quarter asked for, where the brutal law of survival reigned paramount. As they expected no quarter if caught, the guerillas were not too often prone to show any of their own. A good many of the recruits for these bands came as deserters from the ranks of both the Confederate and Union armies. Many Kentucky guerilla leaders such as Sue Munday, alias

Jerome Clark, became generally notorious through their operations in their own particular spheres of influence.

In Kentucky, as well as in Tennessee, railroads and railroad bridges seemed to furnish an inviting target for preying guerilla bands and sometimes for unattached bushwhackers. On one occasion, a band of guerillas celebrated Independence Day, July 4, 1863, by firing the Rocky Hill depot, situated on the Louisville-Nashville railroad. Military authorities concerned with bringing about the capture of the guerillas, were further disturbed by the complacency shown by citizens in the area who did nothing whatsoever to prevent the deed. 4

There was nothing unique about the deeds or tactics utilized by the guerillas in Kentucky. What was unique was the widespread prevalence of guerilla warfare especially after the Confederate army lost control of the state, and the guerilla band's ability to continue its activities even under the heaviest of repressive measures. The activities of guerillas in Kentucky were of such a nature as to cause alarm to both Union and Confederate sympathizer alike.

One event of guerilla warfare in Kentucky which was of especial importance centered around the notorious Missouri guerilla leader, William Clark Quantrill. It was in this state that Quantrill met his death during a skirmish with

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4Ibid. XXX, Pt. III, 130-83.
a force of anti-guerilla forces commissioned by the Federal authorities. Prior to Lee's surrender in April, 1865, Quantrill had led his band into Kentucky after a brief stay in Texas. While in Kentucky conducting raids and plunderings, his whereabouts became known to a commander of anti-guerilla troops patrolling Western Kentucky. Learning of Quantrill's boarding at a farm house near his patrol area, the commander of the anti-guerilla forces led his troops on a sudden dash on Quantrill's position one morning shortly after dawn. In the attempt at flight that followed, Quantrill was struck by a rifle ball, paralyzing him below the arms. While he lay painfully wounded in the farmhouse where he had made his headquarters, Federal authorities appeared before the house, to convey Quantrill to the military prison hospital in Louisville. Twenty-seven days later, June 6, 1865, William Clark Quantrill died of his wounds.

Each counter-measure adopted to curb guerilla depredations was found to be short of the solution to the problem after it had been tried for a time. Stronger and stronger measures of reprisal were constantly being urged by both military and civil authorities in Kentucky. When, by September, 1865, the guerilla problem in the state had steadily worsened, it was only too certain that very definite steps would have to be taken to halt the tide of guerilla successes. The pressing need for troops by the Federals
in the important battle areas made it undesirable to have regular army forces employed in chasing or hunting guerillas, a foe they could very rarely bring to bay anyway.

General S. A. Hurlbet found what he considered the solution to this problem with his idea for the formation of the Kentucky Home Guards. In a general order, Hurlbet stated that officers commanding divisions in Kentucky or Tennessee were to actively encourage the organization of home guard units for internal protection. While these units were being formed and organized, the military commanders were to continue to furnish the citizens in their districts protection against the guerillas until such time as the home guard units were ready to assume that duty on their own. 5

In accordance with the general order issued by Hurlbet, the Kentucky Home Guards were formally organized in 1863 and charged with protecting the citizens of the state from guerilla depredations. This newly created police force was to be held accountable to the appropriate military authority in any given district of operation. 6 As is inevitable in wartime, internal confusion and disintegration raged through Kentucky. As the military command turned its attention more and more toward the problem of bolstering internal security, and less and less toward the activities of the

5Ibid., p. 621.

6E. Herton Coulter, The Civil War and Readjustment in Kentucky (Chapel Hill, 1925), pp. 228-29.
home guards, that organization steadily began to become more independent in its activities. Soon any restraint the military had on the home guards was lessened. Relative independence and lack of adequate supervision in their movements, served to allow the various guard units to adopt a series of practices which very quickly killed the faith and trust that had been placed in them earlier. They first took it upon themselves to set up an arbitrary set of standards that they expected the citizens in their various counties to measure up to. These standards usually included the particular concept of loyalty each home guard commander thought citizens in his county should conform to. Such an arbitrary system naturally was rife with abuses which made a shambles of any concept of citizen's rights. Too often, citizens were arrested by the home guards solely on the suspicions that they might possibly be guilty of disloyalty. Personal malices and grievances also played a role in arrests made by the citizen police. Any person who had at any time angered, or otherwise incurred the wrath, of a home guard commander or his subordinates could expect to find himself under arrest on suspicion of disloyalty regardless of any evidence presented. As each person was arrested, the guards ordered the confiscation of his land and property as they did not anticipate his release from imprisonment at any early date. This policy came under the close scrutiny of General Stephen Burbridge, commander of all
Union forces in Kentucky. In an effort to halt the rising tide of adverse public opinion against the home guards, Burbridge ordered the restoration of all property seized by the guards in their arbitrary arrests. By this time, however, the citizens of Kentucky had had more than enough of the once respected home guards. Even the promise of returned property by the order of Burbridge, failed to still the feelings of indignation strongly felt against the citizen police force. At least one observer felt that the arbitrary tactics adopted by the home guards in their campaign against guerillas and disloyalty, gave rise to such a deep feeling of resentment that the rise of the guerilla bands in the state was rendered much easier by this very resentment.

Once the guerillas became well organized in Kentucky, they proved a source of constant concern on the part of Union military authorities. In the summer of 1862, when Confederate armies were driven out of Kentucky, guerilla bands remained behind. Union military commanders then found themselves confronted with an even more dangerous and much more deadly enemy than before. One of these commanders, J. T. Boyle, fully realized the possibilities of unlimited guerilla warfare and the perhaps disastrous results such unbridled warfare might have on his own troops. In his first move to limit the effectiveness of guerilla

7Ibid.
war, Boyle promised punishment to any citizen who might be caught giving aid to guerilla bands in any way. Boyle gave this statement further strength by adding that all damage suffered by loyal citizens due to guerilla raids or attacks, would be made up at the expense of secessionist citizens living in the district where the raid occurred. This ruling was to be enforced by a military commission. The new ruling soon went into effect following a raid on Union property holders near Caseyville, Union County. A $35,000 assessment was levied on secessionist citizens living in the area.

Measures of this stern nature were succeeded by even more harsh attempts to bring an end to guerilla troubles in strife-torn Kentucky. As the plan evolved by the military had failed to curtail guerilla activities in the state, the executive arm of the Kentucky government took steps on its own initiative to attempt to bring about an end to the guerilla problem. Early in 1863, Governor H. Bramlette stated that "The state shall be free of its murderous foes though every arm be required to aid in their destruction." For a time, at least, Bramlette simply talked about what should be done to ease the guerilla problem. Bramlette then voiced a recommendation of his own to be used along with the military's tougher police. This proposal advocated the holding of hostages for guerilla deeds committed; preferably, these hostages would be drawn from close relatives of known

3Ibid., p. 230.  
9Ibid., p. 231.
guerillas participating in any raids. As time passed, Bramlette became even more zealous in his efforts to punish the civilian collaborators of the guerillas in the state. In 1864, efforts to punish citizens collaborating or sympathizing with guerillas were redoubled. A law passed in February, 1864, provided for double indemnity to be paid by disloyal citizens in order to compensate Union citizens who suffered losses due to guerilla raids. Bramlette strengthened this edict with the addition of a six-month's prison sentence plus a $100 to $1,000 fine to be assessed against any person detected aiding guerillas in his neighborhood.

If Bramlette seemed zealous in his efforts to punish guerillas and their collaborators, the military authorities in Kentucky were even more so. Often measures adopted by the military were harsh and perhaps, even brutal. Prior to Bramlette's proclamations, General Burbridge had set up a five-to-one ratio to be used in dealing with captured guerillas. Under this measure, five guerillas were executed in exchange for every one Union soldier or citizen killed in Kentucky. By the summer of 1864, this was modified somewhat by the adoption of a four-to-one ratio. The selection of guerilla prisoners to be executed under this system was

10 Ibid., p. 232.  
11 Ibid.  
13 Coulter, p. 232.
too often erratic and grossly inefficient. On more than one occasion, Confederate prisoners of war were among those selected for reprisal executions by Union authorities. This was perhaps due to a haphazard manner of housing all types of prisoners of war together in a common enclosure. The execution of four such prisoners of war created a widespread series of repercussions which proved most embarrassing to Federal authorities. These four prisoners were housed in a jail in Lexington, Kentucky, awaiting transport to a prison camp further north. Jail officials escorted the military officials through the cell blocks, selecting men for execution in reprisal for a raid committed by guerillas earlier in the region near Lexington. The four Confederate prisoners must have been housed in the jail with little thought being given to their actual status as military prisoners of war rather than bushwhackers or outlaw guerillas. The resulting wave of public opinion that swept through some sections of Kentucky, served to place the Federal military authorities in that state in something of an unfavorable light in the eyes of those people not entirely blinded by the intense emotionalism of war hatred.

An effort was undertaken by the Kentucky legislature to bring intervention by the President in the serious guerilla problem existing in the state. A special commission was sent to Washington to attempt to convince Lincoln to

14 Ibid., p. 233.
intervene and bring peace to Kentucky. This effort met with failure as the President was preoccupied with more pressing matters elsewhere.

The failure of the state legislature to bring real relief to the stricken citizens of Kentucky, prompted both civil and military leaders to seek new and more efficient methods to deal with the guerilla problem, still unsolved by any of the previously adopted anti-guerilla techniques. The military authorities were perhaps a bit more anxious than the civil authorities to bring an end once and for all to the dangerous state of affairs brought about by the guerillas and their deeds. General William T. Sherman had a solution of his own which he felt would greatly cut down the prospects of a concerted continuance of the guerilla campaign. Sherman advocated shipping whole families of guerillas down the Mississippi river to a colony set up for them, preferably somewhere in the Carribbean area if that could be arranged.

General Burbridge, never a lenient man in his administration as military commander in Kentucky agreed with Bramlette's program of punishing the collaborators who aided the guerillas as well as their outlawed allies. Burbridge argued for the forced deportment from the United States of any person suspected of being a Southern sympathizer,

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15 Ibid. 16 Ibid., p. 235.
who resided within five miles of any area visited by guerilla raiders.\footnote{17} This proposal very soon became an actual law. This piece of legislation was supplemented by a ruling which stated that any person connected with, or actually helping Confederate bands in the state, would be subject to trial for treason. If found guilty and convicted of the charge of spying or treason, the guilty person would suffer the death penalty.\footnote{18} General Ambrose Burnside felt an even tougher policy was needed to deal with Confederate sympathizers. Burnside felt that there had been entirely too much open support for the Confederate cause by Kentucky citizens. He stressed the advisability of either trying such persons for treason or else, deporting them behind Confederate lines.\footnote{19}

The tightening of security measures behind Union lines created a stiff prohibition against the carrying of firearms unless duly authorized by the proper authorities. The hit and run raids of John Morgan through Kentucky brought about a further stiffening of the already strict firearms edict. Military authorities apparently felt that if the guerrillas could not be destroyed as a functioning body of men, then by depriving them of their arms supply, which had on occasion been smuggled to them by citizens, eventually they

\footnote{17}{Ibid., p. 236.}\footnote{18}{Ibid.}\footnote{19}{Ibid.}
would weaken and lose their marked effectiveness. It was
plainly an effort at a small-scale blockade of the guerillas
and their source of supply, an ambitious project if nothing
else.

Harsh retaliatory measures had failed in their object
to rid Kentucky of guerilla bands. With guerilla bands still
in operation throughout the state, it was plain to all ob-
servers that the situation had grown acutely dangerous. In
July, 1864, the President finally intervened, and in an
attempt to restore order to strife-ridden Kentucky, placed
the state under martial law. This order was not rescinded
until the end of the war. This was not the first time
Kentucky had been placed under martial law, but it was the
first extended period of time.20

Martial law however, failed to remedy the guerilla
problem any more effectively than had other measures. In
December, 1864, a group of prominent Kentucky citizens
sent a letter to Secretary of War, Stanton in Washington,
briefing him on the troubled conditions in their state.
First, they stated that no one even remotely connected with
the Union army or government was safe from harm from a guer-
rella band if visited by one. The letter went on to point
out that even citizens of the state were arrayed against
one another in the matter of loyalties. Second, the letter

complained about the quality of the troops sent to guard the citizens against guerillas. These troops were poorly trained, poorly armed, and very poorly organized. The third portion of the letter stressed the absolute necessity of crushing the guerilla bands once and for all. The citizens' committee felt this could be adequately accomplished by placing one hundred men in each county in the state. Preferably, due to the shoddy condition of the troops already in Kentucky, these forces would come from out of state.

There seems to still be a good bit of speculation concerning the role of the Confederate government in relation to guerilla bands in Kentucky. Generally, the Confederates would encourage the formation of irregular bands to contribute to the discomfort and harassment of their enemy, but on the whole, the Confederate government did not recognize the various guerilla bands in operation as forming a regular part of the Confederate army. There were occasions where the Confederates actually used their troops in conjunction with citizen home guard units when their own interests were threatened. In this manner, Major Walker Taylor used his troops in connection with Kentucky home guard units to aid in the dispersal of guerilla bands in Breckenridge County, in 1861. The disastrous experiment of the partisan rangers served to make the Confederate military heads more than a bit cautious in actively encouraging any more irregular

\[21\text{Ibid.}, \text{XLV, Pt. II, 95.}\]
bands of armed troops operating in their behalf. More often
than not, guerilla bands did as much harm to Confederate
sympathizers as they did to Union sympathizers in Kentucky.

With the relative inability of Federal troops to disperse the guerilla bands once they scattered into the
mountainous regions of the locales where they were operating, guerilla warfare in Kentucky continued through the war.
The stricter the reprisals against them, the more the guerillas seemed to flourish. By the early part of 1864, they
were literally swarming over the state. The divided loyalties of the citizens of the state, set up a fertile
ground for the growth and flourishing of unrestricted guerilla war. Only Kansas and Missouri surpassed Kentucky in
the sheer savagery of her guerilla operations and raids.

John Morgan and his cavalry borrowed heavily from guerilla tactics and strategy in their operations in Kentucky
and Tennessee. Like the guerilla, Morgan’s strategy was
the hit and run method, perfected to a fine degree of polish.
Although his operations were strictly military in nature and motivation, Morgan in his raids, could very easily have been
likened to a guerilla chieftan. It was during the course of one of his spectacular raids through Kentucky and Tennessee
during the middle of 1864, that Morgan was finally downed
and killed in battle. He was struck by a bullet during the
course of a withdrawal in the face of superior numbers.
Tennessee, like most of the border states, was divided in her loyalties following the outbreak of war. But, on June 24, 1861, she made her decision to join the cause of the Confederacy against the Union. Still, this action did not have the unanimous backing and approval of every section and county of the state. Especially in eastern Tennessee was there a marked degree of Unionist sentiment. Eastern Tennessee actually had little in common with the other sections of the state. The plantation system which flourished over the other sections of the state and the rest of the South, never really gained any foothold in that part of Tennessee. Terrain played a major part in this respect. The mountainous character of the country shut it off somewhat from the other sections of the state. The difference in economy and the relative isolation was coupled with a feeling of separatism encouraged by a move some twenty years before to form a separate state of eastern Tennessee. When war finally came, eastern Tennessee sent some 35,000 men to the ranks of the Union army. In many cases, brother actually fought against brother in the years of conflict that followed.

This intense feeling of separatism on the part of east Tennesseans created a good bit of suspicion concerning loyalty to the Confederacy. Many high-placed Confederate

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officials in Tennessee voiced a feeling of distrust toward the citizens of east Tennessee and east questioning glances in the direction of that section's possible disloyal acts should war come to the state. Landon C. Hayes, Confederate senator from Tennessee, held a grim outlook for the future if Unionist sentiments held in east Tennessee. Haynes feared that a civil war within the borders of the state was quite possible with the views and sentiments held by the majority of east Tennesseans. He backed this grim warning up by quoting from a statement printed by Parson Brownlow, a vigorous anti-secession editor of the Nashville Whig, that internal civil war in Tennessee was inevitable.  

To add fuel to his argument, Haynes cited the act that some 10,000 armed Unionists were holding daily drills in the interior areas of the section.  

Supporters of secession in the other sections of the state feared for the fate of the important railroad bridges threading that dangerous section of the state. Senator Haynes felt that only a strong force of Confederate troops sent into eastern Tennessee would protect the interests of the Confederacy in that region.

Other expressions of apprehension over the loyalties of east Tennessee followed that of Haynes. One such statement brought out the fact that due to such strong Unionist

\[25\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ 560.\]
\[26\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ 561.\]
sentiment in east Tennessee, any Federal army could move without any trouble from the Georgia border to the Cumberland Gap; there would be no staunch Confederate patriots to halt their march.\textsuperscript{27} This particular story was borne out in June 7, 1861, when a rumor started in eastern Tennessee that the Confederate army was coming to Bradley county to disarm and discipline all Unionists in that area. So thorough was Unionist organization in that county, that in scarcely more than twelve hours, 1,000 men had been raised and armed to combat the feared invasion.\textsuperscript{28} The insistence on the part of the more staunch secessionists in Tennessee that the east Tennesseans join the ranks of the Confederate army was a contributing factor also to the animosity citizens of that section felt toward the Confederate cause.

Apparently wishing to capitalize on this feeling of animosity toward the Confederates, a good many Union sympathizers began to pour into east Tennessee from the surrounding areas. In an effort to halt this mass immigration, Confederate troops in eastern Tennessee began placing pickets from the base of the Blue Ridge mountains to the slope of the Cumberlandreaching into middle Tennessee. These precautions failed to halt the influx of Unionists into the state. They either slipped through the mountain passes when the guards dozed or else, came through

\textsuperscript{27} Georgia Lee Tatum, Disloyalty in the Confederacy (Chapel Hill, 1934), p. 144.

unknown passes unblocked by the Confederates. The intensity with which this effort was pushed, resulted in a great amount of resentment being harbored against the loyal Confederate citizens of the section.

This feeling of resentment and animosity soon erupted into acts of violence. The situation became so critical that by October, 1861, the matter threatened to get out of hand. A group of loyal Confederate citizens were soon compelled to appeal to the governor of the state for protection against bands of Unionist sympathizers who were spreading terror and destruction among loyal citizens. It was learned that these bands were being led by Tennessee Unionists who were serving as pickets for the Federal army at Albany, Kentucky. The pickets would arrange a rendezvous with these bands and then lead them to the Tennessee border some six miles distant.

The main leader of these marauding bands from Kentucky was said to be Jim Ferguson. Ferguson spent a good deal of time searching for his brother who had joined the Confederate army. Ferguson had earlier voiced an intent to kill his brother. This leader as well as several of his guerilla lieutenants carried names of prominent secessionist citizens of Tennessee on a black list, names of persons they were determined to kill.

\[29\] Tatum, p. 145.
\[30\] Ibid., p. 145.
A large number of the Unionists in Tennessee crossed over into North Carolina and made periodic forays across the Tennessee border during the war years. By November, 1861, they had assumed more than the stature of a band of nuisances, by that time their depredations became a common source of danger for secessionist citizens in eastern Tennessee. The hostile attitude of the Confederate military in blockading the mountain passes in the region and trying to impress the citizens into the army created a good bit of this dangerous situation existing on the Tennessee border. For the time being anyway, the Unionist bands raided the property and homes of the Confederate citizens, making no effort at first to strike at the vital railroad bridges so essential to the transportation network of the Confederate army. The bitterness felt by the Unionists helped make their raids take on the savagery familiar in guerilla war during that era.

While these reprisal raids were being carried out against Confederate sympathizers in eastern Tennessee, plans were being hatched in Washington for the destruction of a considerable number of the highly strategic railroad bridges in that same region. William Blount Carter, a prominent Unionist citizen of eastern Tennessee was in Washington conferring with President Lincoln, William H. Seward, and General George B. McClellan, over the possibilities and advantages of the simultaneous destruction of all the
railroad bridges spanning the railroad line between east Tennessee and Georgia, for a distance of 270 miles. Also included in the targets marked for destruction was a large bridge over the Tennessee river at Bridgeport, Alabama, on the Memphis-Charleston railroad. Nine bridges in all were chosen for destruction. As the bridges were being destroyed, a Federal army was to move into east Tennessee and with the cooperation of Unionists in that region, who were to rise in revolt, drive the Confederates out of that part of the state. Lincoln and McClellan voiced their approval of the plan and gave Carter $2500 to accomplish this goal. The evening of November 8, 1861, was chosen as the date for the bridge burnings and Federal invasion of east Tennessee. The destruction of these particular bridges would greatly hamper the Confederate supply line in Virginia. The Unionists in east Tennessee were now putting all their hopes in a Federal invasion to back them up in their revolt. It was now more than just an idea in the planning stage, it could easily be a significant blow toward restoring Union control in eastern Tennessee.

Prior to the burning of the bridges, telegraph lines between Knoxville and Chattanooga, and Knoxville and Bristol were cut by Unionist guerillas. On the evening of the

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32 Tatum, p. 146.

33 Ibid., p. 147.
eighth, five of the nine bridges chosen for destruction, were actually burned and put out of commission. The remaining four were too closely guarded by Confederate sentries. The plan for the Unionist uprising received a sharp disappointment. The Federal invasion of east Tennessee was abruptly postponed until a future date; the Union-guerillas in that area, too involved now to turn back, had their support cut from beneath them.

Carter had arranged the bridge burnings so skillfully, that not even the closest neighbors of the persons involved in their destruction were aware of their role in the venture. For all his planning, Carter's scheme hurt the Unionist cause much more than it aided it. When the Confederates discovered that a large body of persons were in arms against them, they felt that decisive action was imperative. Once they learned of the full magnitude of the east Tennessee uprising, the Confederate authorities in the state began a series of mass arrests; soon, Confederate prisons in Tennessee were filled. The more dangerous Unionists were sent to prisons further south. The next move on the part of the Confederates was to send troops to quell the uprising that threatened to get completely out of hand, and if possible, to capture as many of the bridge-burners as possible, for apparently the mass arrests had

\[34\text{Ibid.}\]
turned up only leaders of Unionist communities rather than the men who took an actual part in the sabotage of the bridges. The serious nature of the east Tennessee uprising became vividly apparent when on November 11, 1861, R. L. Owens, president of the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, reported to Confederate Secretary-of-War Benjamin that a force of four hundred Unionists was in camp only five miles from Bristol. This report was only the forerunner of a series of reports of a similar content. The Confederates had little trouble breaking up and dispersing these Unionist camps. After a harrowing lapse of time, the Unionist uprising in east Tennessee was finally put down, save for mopping-up operations, but its possible consequences lingered in the minds of the Confederate military command for a considerable time afterward.

Those who had been captured by the Confederates were allowed to return to their homes provided they took an oath of allegiance to the Davis government. Those who managed to evade capture, fled to the nearby mountains where they presumably continued their private warfare with the Confederate army. Colonel W. B. Wood, in a report to Secretary Benjamin, was against releasing any of the arrested Unionists. In defending his argument, Wood stated, "To release them is ruinous, to convict them before a court at this time, next to an impossibility, but if they are kept in prison for six

35 Ibid.
months it will have a good effect." From their prisoners, the Confederates learned of the proposed Union invasion of east Tennessee in support of the Unionist uprising.

Benjamin felt rather strongly that an example should be made of those captured bridge burners in order to make future saboteurs shy away from any such bold action. Benjamin ordered that all prisoners who could be identified as bridge burners should be hanged immediately to set a grim example for any future bridge burners in east Tennessee. Benjamin offered clemency to those Unionists who surrendered voluntarily, allowing them to return to their homes if they took an oath of allegiance to the Confederate government. By the end of the year, the revolt had been quelled, but the bulk of the population in eastern Tennessee still remained loyal to the Union.

The suppression of the rebellion in east Tennessee did not lull the Confederate military authorities into any sense of false security. In fact, they seemed even more vigilant toward the admittedly disloyal citizens of the eastern counties, than earlier in the war. Brigadier-General W. H. Carroll in a dispatch to General Albert S. Johnston, informed Johnston that a great effort had been exerted to organize the disloyal elements of east Tennessee in an alliance with similar elements in the border counties of...

37 Tatum, p. 149.
North Carolina. This move would put organized hostile forces within Tennessee as well as on her borders, forces which would furnish any invading Federal army with aid and cooperation in the event of Union attack. Carroll asked for more arms and ammunition to meet this growing danger near the Tennessee border. 38

Following the abortive uprising in 1861, the Unionist elements in eastern Tennessee did not give up their resistance to Confederate control of that region. A secret organization, the Order of the Heroes of America, was formed for the purpose of fostering acts of subversion and sabotage against the Confederate control of the area. Pilots or guides were chosen by this organization for the purpose of guiding those men who wished to join the Union army through the Confederate pickets at the mountain passes. 39 The ebbing of Confederate prestige following their reverses in 1863, caused an increase in hostile acts against Southern control of eastern Tennessee. This loss of military prestige caused other citizens besides guerillas and secret society members to cast a jaundiced eye at Southern capability to wage a successful war. By the end of August, 1863, the number of conscripts from Tennessee had fallen off so rapidly that Brigadier-General George G. Pillow reported that there would be no more use to attempt to draw conscripts from that state, so strong had grown the spirit of defiance following Confederate military reversals.

38 Ibid., p. 150. 39 Ibid.
East Tennessee was not the only portion of the state where guerilla war raged. The rugged, mountainous, topography of the state made it an ideal terrain for the development and conduct of guerilla warfare. The virtually inaccessible mountain regions abounding in the state furnished excellent hideaways and bases of operation for guerilla bands, both large and small in numbers. The activities of guerilla bands and partisan ranger bands in Tennessee were often of such a similar nature, that harried Union commanders made no distinction between the two organizations, labeling both as lawless guerilla bands. In this belief, they may have been justified. Despite the failure to clearly draw a line between the operations of guerilla bands and the organized companies of partisan rangers, several guerilla leaders made enough of an impression on Union military commanders to warrant a large share of notoriety. In lower Tennessee, the bands of Henon Cross, Duval McNair, and James McLaughlin evidently had well-organized bands that created a large amount of trouble for the Union army units stationed in that region. Cross was identified as the son of a prominent Memphis professor; McNair was identified as a native of Memphis also, while McLaughlin reputedly came from Maryland. After the fall of Nashville, a good many of the guerilla leaders in lower Tennessee formed the nucleus of their own commands and began
a frontier-type warfare against the victorious Federals as they moved in to occupy the region.

Other bands operating near the Kentucky border were stragglers from Forrest's cavalry command. Needless to say, cavalry tactics were paramount in this band's operations. Stragglers from Morgan's command also made up a large part of the guerilla ranks in the Tennessee back country area.

The collapse of civil authority resulting from the chaotic conditions of war provided a state of confusion and perpetual unrest which proved a strong catalyst for the formation of guerilla bands throughout the state. There were just as many Unionist bands as there were bands operating in the name of the Confederacy in Tennessee at this time. 40 Efforts to halt rapid spread of guerilla bands were greatly hampered by the lack of an adequate number of trained and capable troops. 41

Once organized, there seemed nothing could be done to combat the serious raids and operations being carried out by the bushwhackers. Once guerilla attacks were launched, there seemed nothing could really be done to stop them from spreading. Union forage trains were often the target of prowling bands who found these targets especially vulnerable. 42 Passenger trains were also prime targets for guerilla ambushes and derailings. Stragglers from Morgan's command

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41 Ibid.
were the chief exploiters of this style of attack. Sixty
to seventy-five of these bands periodically cut the rails
of the railroad line some sixteen miles from Richland,
Tennessee. A passenger train using this line was derailed
and made helpless in the face of the guerilla attack that
followed. The guerillas in ambush began firing into the
passenger cars, not apparently caring what they hit.
Scattering for safety, the passengers left the train to the
mercy of the hidden assailants. Seeing the passengers flee-
ing the train, the guerillas came forward to pilfer the
baggage car. Several mail bags and a large amount of money
were seized. When the train robbers were on the verge of
making their escape after paroling several Union officers
they had captured, a company of Federal cavalry appeared,
putting them to flight. The guerillas left a good part of
the money and mail behind them. As usual, they made good
their escape without suffering any great loss of men by
death or capture.\textsuperscript{43}

With the almost daily increase of guerilla activity in
Tennessee, the Federal authorities took immediate and ap-
propriate steps to at least contain the steadily rising
guerilla offensive. These steps usually amounted to military
expeditions designed to ferret out guerilla camps and destroy
them. Much valuable time and many troops were occupied with

\textsuperscript{43}Ibid., XXIII, Pt. I, 148.
flushing out guerillas in order to disperse them and destroy their organization. In the Cumberland area, one such expedition, lasting five days, netted forty-six guerilla captives, a most successful expedition, as guerillas in Tennessee were not usually taken alive. Generally when being pursued, the guerillas would split into parties of two or three in order to make the trailing of the whole band a virtual impossibility. In order to make their detection more difficult, certain guerilla bands equipped themselves with Federal uniforms. This created a situation in which Federal soldiers found it impossible to tell friend from foe. Confederate troops had their share of dealing with Unionist guerilla bands in efforts to break the units up and disperse them. Organized Union guerillas were spreading destruction and fear among Confederate citizens in all sectors of the state.

A large-scale effort was undertaken to rid the troubled areas of these bands once and for all, in January, 1864. The military expedition through guerilla infested areas of the state consumed three months, a period which saw nothing accomplished in the dispersal of the guerilla bands being sought out. The guerilla's ability to seemingly melt away into the mountains where he usually made his camp, made his capture and destruction a gigantic undertaking which neither the Union nor Confederate armies were adequately equipped for.

\[44\] Ibid., XX, Pt. I, 10-11.

\[45\] Ibid., XXXII, Pt. I, 416.
Clearing any area in Tennessee of Guerillas was literally a hill-by-hill fight, each rise of ground having to be taken individually. This perhaps, is one reason why the guerillas were able to continue in force in Tennessee until the final Confederate surrender in 1865.

Union shipping on the Tennessee River was a constant target for guerilla and bushwhacking bands up and down the waterway. When attacks against the shipping continued to grow along the river, the Union naval authorities adopted the practice of sending gunboats down the river to protect the shipping and if possible, to fire on the guerillas in the region and clear them from the banks of the river. Soon, the gunboats themselves became targets for guerilla raiders and snipers. The attacks on the Federal gunboats continued to increase in intensity and frequency until the Union naval command was forced with providing protection for the gunboats and their crews. Some of the sniping parties carried artillery pieces with them and constituted a genuine menace for Federal shipping at certain points along the river. Troops were placed aboard the crafts to furnish protection for the crewmen and, if the occasion demanded, land and pursue the snipers when they were sighted. In these incidents however, the guerillas usually melted away in the thick trees and bushes and undergrowth lining the river banks.
When Commander C. H. Davis succeeded Captain Andrew H. Foote as commander of the Union Western Fleet, he provided the vulnerable shipping on the river with iron-clad draft boats generally equipped with one to two infantry companies to pursue guerilla parties should any be sighted along the banks. Even the addition of more troops on escorting boats did very little to lessen the dangers created by now unlimited guerilla attacks on Union shipping and gunboats plying the Tennessee river. In order to cut down on the damage being inflicted on their gunboats and crews, the Federal naval authorities issued a general order laying down certain security measures which they hoped would cut down on the possibilities of the gunboat crews running afoul of guerilla parties through carelessness or through surprise attack. All boats operating on the Tennessee river were cautioned to take no chances on blundering into a guerilla ambush. To lessen this danger, the boats were warned not to tie up along the banks at any time. Each gunboat was to keep its guns loaded and ready at all times and was also ordered to carry a supply of small arms for use in repelling boarders. Doubtless, the guerillas were receiving aid in their river operations from citizens living in the vicinity of the river. The new general order left little doubt as to how it regarded this aid to guerilla bands.

46 Davidson, pp. 30-31.
When any of our vessels are fired on, it would be the duty of the commander to fire back with spirit and to destroy everything in that neighborhood within reach of his guns. There is no impropriety in destroying houses supposed to be offering shelter to rebels, and it is the only way to stop guerilla warfare. Should innocent persons suffer, it will be their own fault and teach others that it will be to their advantage to inform the government authorities when guerillas are about certain localities.\(^{47}\)

The addition of the troops on the escorting gunboats and draft boats had at first seemed a fine idea and the ideal remedy to the guerilla problem. But an inter-service rivalry between the soldiers and the crews manning the gunboats soon rendered their effect negligible. An undertaking was then launched to create a more effective force for dealing with the guerilla menace. Toward this end, the Mississippi Marine Brigade was formed. This unit, under the command of Brigadier-General Alfred Ellet, was to be furnished with a fleet of seven steamers fitted to carry 125 cavalrymen and horses along with 250 infantrymen. The infantry, which on some occasions carried artillery pieces, was to furnish the cavalry support in the event of a clash with a sizeable guerilla band. The Marine Brigade, like the partisan rangers proved more of a disappointment than an asset. A high-placed Union naval officer volunteered the information that they were principally interested in their duties solely for money-making purposes. This strong statement was backed up by

\(^{47}\)Ibid.

\(^{48}\)Hamer, p. 620.
reports that Marine Brigade members were selling Union military equipment to Confederate agents. All of this disturbing intelligence reached U. S. Grant in his headquarters. Thoroughly disgusted with the Brigade, Grant tried, without success, to have it disbanded. The Marine Brigade continued to serve throughout the course of the war. In their only recorded engagement, at Duck River Shoals, they were thoroughly defeated and demoralized by an artillery barrage laid down by a strong body of guerillas they tried to rout.

The guerilla bands preying on Union shipping drew a considerable amount of attention toward themselves for their activities against Federal shipping. General Sherman particularly felt a pressing need to erase the guerilla menace from the Tennessee river banks and clear the river for safe passage. General Sherman, as no other Federal general, felt the strong need for a free and unhampered waterway down the Tennessee. Sherman on one occasion following a particularly heavy attack on Federal gunboats remarked, "For every shot at a steamboat, I would shoot a thirty-pound Parrott shell into even helpless towns." In his tireless efforts to halt the attacks against Union shipping, General Sherman ordered General Canby to hold Southern civilians directly responsible for the attacks in his district. Despite efforts as strong as Sherman's heavy attacks on the Federal shipping continued, until Federal forces had wrested complete control of that area from the Confederate.

49 Ibid., p. 83.
50 Ibid., p. 32.
51 Ibid., p. 33.
There has been a good bit of speculation over whether the guerilla war against the gunboats was a carefully planned Confederate campaign or if it was simply a spasmodic, disorganized, effort on the part of individuals. The Confederate congress had authorized the formation of volunteer companies charged with local defense, but no provisions had been made for river traffic. It is more likely that the attacks on Union shipping were on a hit or miss basis rather than along the lines of any carefully laid plan.

On the whole, guerilla war in both Kentucky and Tennessee was of a savage nature, much like that in Kansas and Missouri. The effectiveness of irregular bands in those two states was quite considerable if the efforts of both Union and Confederate military commanders to stamp them out are accepted as valid evidence. But more often than not the effectiveness of the guerilla was sharply marred by his plunderings and maraudings against relatively inoffensive civilian populations. This black mark against the guerilla in Tennessee and Kentucky was an indelible one.
CHAPTER IV

GUERRILLA WAR IN KANSAS AND MISSOURI

The two states, Kansas and Missouri, had fought one another some years before the great sectional conflict of 1861. Like the greater struggle, the Kansas-Missouri border war of the 1850's was fought primarily over the controversial institution of slavery. Kansas, dominated by the free-soilers, was the object of a good bit of hatred from the Missouri pro-slavery elements. This antagonism continued through the years and by the outbreak of war, had reached a high degree of intensity. Before the war, a man from Kansas could hardly expect to go over into Missouri and travel with any degree of safety through that state. This animosity toward Kansas was felt more deeply in western Missouri than in the other sections of the state. ¹ Due to this bitterness felt by both Kansans and Missourians, the border area between the two states became a bitter battle ground—a no man's land of mutual hatred. The memories of the border war days were too deeply rooted to be easily forgotten.

Full-scale war came as something of a surprise to Missouri citizens who had hoped for a peaceful settlement or a compromise of the impending split between the two sections. Through the days of mounting tension, Missouri citizens saw no real necessity for taking sides with either North or South. This was the citizens' policy as distinct from that of the border ruffians who had fought the Kansans in the bitter days of the 1850's. In the southeastern counties, and in those areas near the Kansas border, the people closely allied themselves with the pro-southern element in their district. This region near the Kansas border was the one which had suffered the most from raids by parties of Kansas Jayhawkers in the border war days. The greatest feelings of hatred toward Kansas naturally came from those individuals. Many forays were conducted against Unionists by their neighbors in the southeast portions of the state. Those citizens did not need the catalyst of war to urge them on against their Kansas neighbors.

If the citizens of Missouri hated Kansas, the state's governor hated that state and its citizens with the same degree of strong feeling. On March 30, 1855, Claiborne Jackson, future governor of Missouri, led a force of Missourians in an invasion of Lawrence, Kansas, and took

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2Smith, p. 221.  
3Ibid., p. 222.  
4Ibid., p. 221.
possession of that city. This indignity to Kansas was further multiplied by the appointment of a bogus legislature to replace the one elected in the voting held shortly before the raid. Jackson never forgot his animosity toward the neighboring state of Kansas throughout the entire course of the war. In reply to Lincoln's call for troops following the firing on Fort Sumter, Jackson indignantly stated he would not comply with the President's request, thinking more about Kansas than of the Union administration.

Your requisition in my judgment, is illegal, unconstitutional, and revolutionary in its object, inhuman and diabolical and cannot be complied with. Not one man will the State of Missouri furnish to carry on any such unholy crusade.\(^6\)

Jackson made it plainly evident that he intended to support the secessionist movement in his state, and work energetically toward that end. On February 23, 1861, a convention which was advocated by Jackson, convened to consider the possibility of Missouri's secession should North-South relations deteriorate any further, as they seemed certain to do. This convention defeated the secession moves advocated by Jackson and Sterling Price. To those who were familiar with Jackson, it was felt that he would not, more than ever, expend a greater effort to discredit and create trouble for the Union throughout the

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\(^5\)Richard Cordley, *A History of Lawrence, Kansas (Lawrence, Kansas, 1985)*, p. 177.

\(^6\)Smith, p. 225.

\(^7\)Cordley, p. 177.
state. Jackson's answer to the President's call for men
gave impetus to this fear.

To further his plans for the benefit of the Confederacy,
Jackson turned staunch Union patriot in the early days of
April, 1861. Spreading the belief that Missouri was on the
verge of being grabbed off by some lurking enemy, Jackson
determined to put a battery on Duncan's Island, just across
from the Federal arsenal at Saint Louis. This move was
thwarted, but he did succeed in placing two batteries at
strategic points near the arsenal, one on a levee, some
distance above the arsenal. The patriotic concern Jackson
expressed over the future of the Union cause in Missouri
really deceived none of the Unionists in the state who knew
the governor's true feelings in regard to secession. His
secret intentions were still a bit hard to determine,
although Captain Nathaniel Lyon, furnished the information
that Jackson was in correspondence with President Jefferson
Davis in Montgomery, Alabama. In one dispatch, sent
April 17, 1861, Davis commented on the advantage that would
be gained from the capture of the Federal arsenal and en-
couraged Jackson in that aim. This dispatch was sent on
the same day Jackson made his reply to Lincoln concerning
Missouri's quota in the national call for volunteers.

In playing his role further as the protector of Missouri
against her outside enemies, Jackson instructed General

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3Galusha Anderson, The Story of a Border City During
the Civil War (Boston, 1908), p. 85.
4Ibid., p. 87.
Daniel H. Frost to form and train a militia company entrusted with the defense of the Saint Louis area. General Frost completely shared Jackson's views regarding secession and the Confederate cause. Frost was in favor of putting the militia encampment on a series of bluffs just below the arsenal. This advantageous position had previously been occupied by Federal captain Nathaniel Lyon; Frost then had to transfer his camp site to the western outskirts of Saint Louis. The encampment was christened Camp Jackson in honor of the secession governor. When worried Union citizens began to voice their apprehension they were reminded that the encampment was only for the purpose of training and drilling the militia men. The presence of the camp presented a sinister implication to the Union citizens of Saint Louis who knew only too well how close Frost and Jackson were. Captain Lyon, although he knew the true nature of the militia camp, still wanted to see for himself if it presented a danger that had to be removed by force. This scouting of the militia camp was accomplished by a clever ruse. Donning the garb of Mrs. Alexander, the mother-in-law of Frank P. Blair, Lyon rode around and through the camp. His ruse went unnoticed by the milling militia men who not once questioned his activities.

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10. Ibid., o. 89.
11. Ibid., p. 39.
After his safe return from the camp, Lyon made his report to the Committee of Safety. He told of what he had seen at the camp. He was definitely of the opinion that the camp posed a clear and present danger to the city of Saint Louis and to the Union citizens of that city. Lyon reported that only a firm application of force could stop this danger from developing into anything more serious. Agreement was finally reached, and plans were laid for the coming attack on the militia camp. The camp was surrounded by three detachments of Lyon's brigade, on May 10, 1861. After receiving Lyon's message advising him that he was surrounded by a superior force with artillery, Frost realized resistance on his part was foolhardy, and surrendered his militia company to Lyon. \(^{12}\) For a time at least, the danger to Saint Louis from secessionist sources was minimized. This surrender greatly hampered plans for seizure of the Federal arsenal. The project had to be abandoned.

Jackson was far from inactive following the break up of the strategic militia camp. It was generally recognized that Jackson was a primary source of danger to maintaining Missouri in the Union. Lyon especially was alarmed over his possible counter measures. He felt Jackson should be dealt with quickly before he could do any real damage. One month after the fall of Camp Jackson, Lyon and his troops entered

\(^{12}\) Ibid., p. 95.
the state capitol, forcing Jackson and his staff to make a
hasty retreat from their offices. Jackson had for some time
been insisting that the presence of Union troops in the state,
in reality, constituted an invasion. Following his uncere-
monious exit from the capitol city, he called on the Missouri
State Guards to repel the Federal invasion. These State
Guards had originally been formed for the sake of having an
armed force of secessionists when war finally came.
Jackson's call for the State Guards to resist the Federal
advance, brought a sharp and dangerous splitting of the
state into two hostile armed camps. This internal insta-
bility was not an ideal situation if state-wide order was
to be maintained in the face of growing danger. It was
painfully clear to concerned Union officials in the state,
that some definite steps would have to be taken if the
delicate balance of internal peace was to be maintained in
the state. On June 11, 1861, steps were taken to settle
Missouri's civil strife, and if possible, keep it from
growing any more than it already had. On that date, a meet-
ing was arranged between Governor Jackson and Sterling Price
on one side, and Captain Lyon, and Frank P. Blair on the
other. Of the two parties involved, secessionist representa-
tives made the most direct approach toward attempting to ease
the already unbearable tension between the two factions. It
was Price, not the adamant Jackson, who made the peace

13 E. W. Miller, Missouri's Memorable Decade (Columbia,
Missouri, 1898), p. 51.
overtures to his Unionist opposite numbers. In his proposals to relieve the explosive situation within the state, Price offered equal protection to all citizens in his territory, regardless of their political beliefs. He further proposed disbanding the secessionist Missouri State Guards as well as promising to aid in discouraging Confederate military commanders from launching an invasion of the state. In exchange for these generous terms, Price proposed the ticklish question of disbanding the Union home guards, who had approximately 14 the same duties as did the State Guards.

Lyon was excessively vehement in his rejection of these terms after a heated discussion lasting four hours. Summing up his answer in very warlike tones, Lyon offered to escort Jackson and Price out of his territory as he had formally declared war on them. 15 This killed all hopes for a peaceful solution to Missouri's bitter internal bickering, a bickering which plainly threatened a civil war within the state borders.

Ever impetus, Governor Jackson, after seeing the futility of negotiation, determined to raise a private army if necessary, and meet his enemies with force if that too became a necessity. In the six months following the fruitless meeting with Lyon and Blair, Jackson called for 50,000 troops to resist the invasion of his state by Federal troops. The

14Smith, pp. 252-53.

15Ibid.
overflow enlistments Jackson expected did not materialize. Instead of the anticipated 50,000 recruits, the secessionist governor only received 5,000 volunteers for his army. With a force this small, Jackson realized he would be unable to inflict a serious amount of damage on the Union armies in Missouri. Without a strong armed force to resist the Federals, Jackson only too well realized a direct clash with the Union troops could crush him. Jackson was very soon after this to become a fugitive governor.

The unsettled conditions existing in Missouri did very little to cool the burning hatred many Missourians held for the neighboring state of Kansas. This unsettled, turbulent, atmosphere was to prevail in the state throughout the war.

Across the border, in Kansas, the internal situation, while disrupted by the war, was not nearly so serious as it was in Missouri. Kansas from the start of the war was a free state aligned to the Union cause. The state had had more than its share of war during the border trouble with Missouri. As Missouri had suffered through the raids of the Jayhawsks, Kansas was destined to suffer even more so as a result of raids by Missouri guerilla bands and bushwhackers. Although the land of Kansas was spared for the most part the intrusion of contending armies, the state itself was far from inactive in the persecution of the war effort. Some 20,000 men or over, were furnished by Kansas to the Union army, the largest

16 Ibid., p. 253.
number furnished by any state in ratio to population. From the very outset of war, the border counties of Kansas feared trouble from Missouri raiding parties and border ruffians. This fear caused a good many officers and soldiers as well as a sizeable majority of the civilian population, to regard all Missourians in the light of secessionists.

Top Union military officials shared the concern of these citizens over danger from secessionist bands in Missouri. They fully realized an adequate job of policing the Missouri border area had not been done in the first year of the war. The men and equipment used for this purpose, were inferior in quality. In November, 1862, General G. R. Curtiss, Commander of the Department of the Militia, was in full agreement with Governor Charles Robinson over the lack of adequate defenses on the eastern border. Robinson asked the general for at least five hundred cavalrmen, as well as five hundred infantrymen. Curtiss informed him that until the regular forces in the main war theatres were supplied with their necessary arms and equipment, that the forces guarding the Missouri border area would have to use what equipment they had on hand. Several quasi-military units were organized during this period of waiting to guard the various towns against any sudden attack from

17 Charles C. Howe, *This Place Called Kansas* (Norman, Oklahoma, 1952), p. 35.
Missouri guerilla parties. Throughout Kansas, the main fear was not of Confederate invasion, but rather of depredations from raids across the border. Like Missouri, the home defense forces of Kansas left a good bit to be desired in quality of training and morale. Problems of discipline, training, and equipment plagued Kansas in the early period of the war. The inadequately policed border more than once presented a tempting and vulnerable target to raiding parties from Missouri. This equally was true of Missouri.

The fears on the part of both Kansas and Missouri over destructive raids from the other states were not simply fears produced in the anxious atmosphere of war. Five years of border warfare between free soilers and pro-slavery forces were enough to convince any skeptical Kansan that there would be danger to him on the Missouri border for some time to come; the fact that civil war had placed them in rival camps only served to intensify this danger. The men of Missouri through their deeds in the border wars had made a bad name for themselves in both the North and the South. A few middle grounders in the two states waited almost breathlessly for the inevitable explosion between the two states, the rekindling of the old hatreds of the 1850's. They quite naturally feared for their own lives and property. As the war ground on, their fears became entirely justified.
Fearing a possible move on the part of secessionists in the Saint Louis area, General Henry Halleck declared martial law in this general area and especially in those locations along the major railroad lines, for experience had taught Federal commanders in Tennessee and Kentucky that railroads were irresistible targets for raiding parties and guerilla bands. The order went into effect near the latter part of December, 1862. Martial law scarcely had any effect at all on raids by cavalry units of the Confederates or those by the guerilla bands soon to saturate the state. As in the other theatres of the war, the Confederates used this semi-guerilla style of attack more often than the Union forces.

While Morgan was the particular nemesis of the Union army in Kentucky and Tennessee, John S. Marmaduke filled that role in Missouri. He did not come into real prominence until December, 1862. In December, General Thomas G. Hindman ordered Marmaduke to move rapidly with a cavalry force and strike the enemy in flanking and rear attacks in order to prevent him from massing under General Blunt who was moving toward the Arkansas River. Such a massing of Federal troops would spell ruin to the Confederates in that region. On a spectacular sweep of nearly four-weeks duration through the western portions of Missouri, Marmaduke sought to draw off and divert the Federal units hurrying to

\[20\text{Ibid., Ser. II, I, 115.}\]
join forces with Blunt. In this aim he was successful. A loss of three hundred men killed, wounded, or captured was inflicted on the Federals. Blunt's sizable army of the Frontier counter-marched and back-tracked to save the threatened town of Springfield. It was the favorite strategy of the guerilla to strike the enemy in one spot, make him draw his troops away from another spot, and then manage to keep a safe distance from determined pursuers.

Marmaduke distinguished himself through his guerilla style raids through Missouri and Arkansas. Though most of his raids were of a similar nature, there were some instances where recruitment was the principal purpose of a raid. One such sweep through Missouri netted him 150 new recruits plus a good supply of better grade horses. As before, he managed to stay ahead of his pursuers at a distance to avoid his capture.

Like Morgan and Forrest, his tactics were closely allied with those of the guerilla; unlike Morgan and Forrest, his exploits were not so dramatic as to keep him constantly before the public eye. Too, while Morgan and Forrest operated virtually under no serious restraint from superiors and to all intents and purposes alone; Marmaduke generally operated in conjunction with other units under separate commands. His value as a cavalry raider cannot be

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22 Ibid., p. 297.
minimized, his utilization of the hit and run attack can never be played down or overlooked. Point for point, his contributions to the Confederate war effort, while not so spectacular as Morgan's or Forrest's, were nonetheless, quite significant in his particular theatre of operations.

A testimony to the effect of Confederate cavalry raids in the Kansas-Missouri area was the many rumors springing up concerning impending rebel raids and attacks. Marmaduke and his cohorts did their part in spreading this respect of the Confederate cavalry arm, a most effective weapon in the capable hands of experienced cavalrmen. In the latter part of 1864, rumor had it that two Confederate cavalry bridges and two mounted infantry brigades were being sent into northern Missouri. These were to join forces with a guerilla column coming from the south followed by a volunteer regiment of Missouri secessionist. Rumor further had it that these units were to be aided and abetted by a conspirator's organization in the southern part of the state. By April 30, the rumors bore fruit; rebel raids in the southern part of the state had begun. Jittery citizens of Booneville, in the northeast central portion of the Missouri were already fleeing their homes, carrying personal belongings with them. The situation, while sobering, was made even worse by rumor. Half-rational tales told of Confederate cavalry raising havoc in the southwest part of the state.

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23Anderson, p. 322.
Confirmed rumor told that rebel organizations in Illinois were supplying the Missouri rebels with arms. The fires of fear were fanned even higher with the report that William Quantrill, notorious Missouri guerilla leader, was coming toward Missouri with some eight hundred men. All of these tales were given credence by General Rosecrans, until they could be proved otherwise. What finally materialized out of all of this chaotic situation produced by rumor, was an unknit, loosely organized invasion by guerilla bands and unsavory persons from Kentucky. Still, after this was discovered, rumor had it that Harrisburg with 1,100 men was heading toward Missouri bent on invasion. This invasion failed to come about. Rumors or not, cavalry raids and guerilla prowlings continued with almost no serious molestation.

Union raiders had their day in the Missouri-Kansas area also. When war came, Charles Jennison relished the opportunity to bring revenge to Missouri for the wrongs suffered by his fellow Kansans, as a result of deeds of Missouri border ruffians during the 1850's. He gained this revenge through destructive cavalry raids. Operating usually in forces of from two to ten men in squads to company strength, Jennison made a name for himself in borderland warfare. He

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24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., p. 323.
26 Miller, p. 73.
first came into prominence on February 1, 1862, in destructive raids through Jackson county in the southeastern part of Missouri. Not all of Jennison's acts were motivated by patriotic zeal. In one raid on a Confederate supply train with 150 soldiers clad in Union uniforms, Jennison seized supplies close in value to $1,000,000. There were no readily available records to show just whether or not this property was ever turned over to the Federals or not. This man's destructive raids hammered home an unflinching hatred in Missouri hearts. Jennison is credited with the inspiration of the motto, "Vengeance is in my heart, death in my hand; Blood and revenge are hammering in my head." With such a feeling present in Missouri, the Federal government made a costly mistake in sending Kansas troops to police the territory of their arch enemy. It was this policy which possibly gave Quantrill his most desperate followers. Cavalry raids in this theatre of war were seldom of the nature they were in the other theatres. Revenge played the prime role here. Jennison's band was the most prominent in the state of Kansas. From the deeds of this controversial figure (infamous if the source is Confederate, humane if the source is Union) it would appear that revenge influenced him greatly. While not the wholesale slaughterer that

27 Ibid., p. 74.  
29 Ibid., p. 77.  
28 Ibid., p. 76.
Quantrill was, still the secessionist people he despoiled had good reason to hate him deeply.

Following close behind Jennison in prominence, was Brigadier-General James Lane, Commander of the Kansas Brigade. Several times during the course of war, Lane made movements that seemed to indicate he was going to strike in Missouri. This man, like Jennison, was quite ambitious. He finally received his chance in 1863. Learning that a group of secessionists was at Osceola guarding Price's ammunition train, Lane determined to destroy that train. Summoning his men and forming them hurriedly, Lane made a rapid march toward the town. On the outskirts, he met a small force of Confederates which he quickly defeated after a sharp skirmish. Pushing his way into town, he brought up four pieces of artillery and not only demolished the ammunition train, but destroyed the entire town as well. This action helped bring Lane's name into prominence. Before that date, Lane had been something of a fire eater, eager to invade and lay waste to the secessionist areas of Missouri. His success at Osceola only intensified this desire. Lane's brigade was little different from any guerilla band in its operation techniques. It certainly borrowed enough of the guerilla's tactics to be a guerilla band. Were it not for the dignity of being labeled a brigade, it may have been difficult to define the difference

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30 Britton, p. 147.
between Lane's Kansas Brigade and any fairly well organized band of guerillas. Throughout the war, Lane remained near the border area of the two states, creating uneasiness and waiting patiently for the call from Federal commanders to assist them in an invasion and purging of secessionists from Missouri and the few that might exist in Kansas. With forces such as Jennison's and Lane's operating in Missouri and Kansas, it became increasingly difficult to differentiate between these legitimate units and the more informal, outlawed, guerilla bands. In some instances, there were no clear differences.

At the first shots of the civil war, guerilla warfare was adopted by the rebel element in Missouri. In the early hours of the war, the entire state of Missouri was in a wide state of confusion, a state of affairs that was not wholly remedied through the war years. In this hectic period following the immediate outbreak of fighting, guerilla misdeeds became widespread. Railroad bridges were burned, tracks torn up, trains fired into; all forms of travel became too dangerous to undertake regularly.

As the war grew more organized in the state, the guerillas went into hiding. With Union patrols hunting them down, the guerillas could have found it too difficult to feed and provide for themselves. The citizens in those areas where they had their hideouts, came to their rescue.

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31 Cordley, p. 192.
These persons furnished the guerillas with hay and food for their horses as well as food for the guerillas. With cooperation such as this from the citizens, they could well afford to stay in their hideouts without suffering any great dearth of supplies. They were quite safe in these hideaways as Union cavalry patrols usually pursued no policy of following them into these areas due to the unfamiliar terrain and lack of experience in guerilla style warfare. Near the end of the war, Union cavalrmymen learned the art of the silent war and were quite willing and able to pursue the guerillas to their very hideouts. This gift came too late to really seriously harm the guerilla bands and materially aid the citizens as the guerillas had perpetrated a sufficient amount of damage to make their ventures a success.

Not all guerilla activities in the Kansas-Missouri area were strictly of a military nature by any means. In this area, the border war of the 1850's was still being waged. Personal grudges, memories still rankling over past events; all these factors played a large part in the private war between Kansas and Missouri. Murders and kidnappings became the order of the day. Negroes especially were the targets for this type of activity on the part of certain Missourians. This situation became so serious in 1862, that in May of that year, a Federal general order was issued declaring

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33 Ibid., p. 192.
that if any person were caught in such a deed, he was to be turned over to civil authority where he would be tried and dealt with. If the civil authority involved proved incapable of handling the case, the kidnapper was to be turned over to a military commission who would handle the case. With activities such as these, and others of a more military nature against Federal troops, the guerilla thrived in Kansas and Missouri as he thrived no place else. Efforts to send force against him usually met with failure and the escape of the guerilla bands being pursued. Terrain was of prime importance in concealing the guerilla force from Federal patrols. The topography around Independence, Missouri, was of such a rugged nature, that guerillas were, on more than one occasion, able to take up positions of hiding only two miles from that city. As they were usually well-mounted on the finest horses in the country, obtained mostly from unwilling farmers of the area through the agency of a night raid, the guerillas were able to make their escape. Not infrequently, food and rations were obtained in much the same manner, the consent of the farmer being inconsequential.

The numbers of these guerilla bands varied. When on occasion, the Missouri bands joined forces, they totaled

about three hundred well-mounted men. Coupled with their knowledge of the terrain, these men were expert horsemen. Normally the guerrillas numbered around three hundred men, and the Federals numbered thousands. This wide gulf in numbers was of no significance to the guerrillas who displayed an ingenious ability for avoiding contact with forces which outnumbered their own. Nearly two thirds of the rural population of Missouri had relatives in the Confederate army and so proved willing benefactors to the guerrilla bands in their vicinity. This spirit of cooperation usually soured after the guerrillas took a fancy to a fine horse of their host's and claimed it as their own. 37 Often, Jennison made raids from Kansas against persons suspected to be aiding the guerrillas, and Quantrill in particular. This did not cut down aid to the guerrillas on the part of the rural element. With this large supply force behind them, the guerrillas could at least be assured of existence.

Whether they were of a military nature or not, the activities of the guerrillas in these regions were usually a bit more violent due to the bitter feelings Kansans and Missourians held toward one another. In reality, the civil war, as far as Kansas and Missouri were concerned, was just continuation of the border war of the 'fifties. This mutual

37 Ibid., p. 49.
38 Ibid.
hatred was nursed to a degree of intensity by the guerilla leaders and their followers. As the war increased in fury, so the hatred between the people of Kansas and the people of Missouri increased. The border war of the 'fifties had set the stage for a bitter, brutal, form of warfare between the pro and anti-slavery elements of these two states. The guerillas were to act with great energy in keeping the flames of this past war alive in 1861-1865.

The guerilla was constantly a problem during the war, a problem that was never fully dealt with to any degree of satisfaction on the part of harried Unionist sympathizers and Federal commanders. During the latter part of June and the early part of July, 1862, large numbers of guerillas were swarming into every part of the state of Missouri. Their numbers were estimated as high as 1,000, perhaps due to anxiety over their purpose having a great deal to do with this estimate. At any rate, the guerilla invasion was beginning to take on sinister overtones. Homes were being looted, robbed and burned by roving bands of irregular troops. Union sympathizers were systematically robbed and their farms and villages suffered much damage at the hands of the guerillas. Railroad tracks were torn up, bridges destroyed and burned, and passenger trains fired into as the terror increased day by day.

Attention was next turned to the various military targets in the vicinity. Different detachments of Union militia troops were sniped at constantly. On August 16, 1862, a massed army of guerillas ambushed and defeated eight hundred Federals near Jackson City, catching them completely by surprise. Names such as Porter, Quantrill, Cobb, Poindexter, McBride, and Hughes came into light—names all significant in border and guerilla warfare in Kansas and Missouri.

There was a good deal of speculation over the source of this horde's arms. Illinois was named very frequently as a possible shipping point for these weapons being used by the guerillas. This combined guerilla army was getting a tight, ironlike hold that would be very difficult to break. Force in proper strength seemed to be the only answer. Before the guerillas could gain a death grip on the state, General Blunt crossed the border from Kansas and drove the bands into Arkansas.

The respite from guerilla depredations was short lived. In September, 1862, guerilla bands in strength reappeared in northeast Missouri. This particular invasion was much stronger and greater than the last one. So effective were the guerilla movements, that the entire area of northeastern Missouri, save for adequately garrisoned posts, came under their control. The march of events grew steadily more

40 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
dangerous, as guerillas threatened to spread anarchy over vast areas of the state. In a desperate effort to halt the tide of the guerilla offensive, the Federal military authorities issued a general order which held rebels and those who sympathized with them responsible for the damage inflicted by guerilla bands. They were to be held accountable in both property and in their persons. This strongly worded edict had no immediate effect; the hoped for relief was delayed in coming. The Missouri legislature took steps to remedy this explosive situation. Provisional Governor Hamilton R. Gamble authorized General John M. Schofield, Missouri militia commander, to organize the entire state militia and to order as much of that organization as he saw fit to combat the guerilla menace. Even this effort had no appreciable effect in reducing the merrings of guerilla parties. Once they had gained such a strong foothold in the state, the guerillas were desperately determined to hold grimly on, no matter whether their primary motive was patriotic zeal or a liking for easy plunder.

Prior to the great influx of guerillas into Missouri, General Halleck made the statement that it was a known fact that General Price was giving certain notorious bandits authority to raise and organize guerilla bands. Halleck, after denouncing guerilla war as barbaric, threatened to hang any person detected or caught carrying out guerilla activities, as robbers and murderers. In short, these lives were to

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44 Ibid. 45 Official Records, Ser. II, I, 270.
stone for the damage created by guerillas. The effects of
the guerilla invasion, and the virtual control they exercised
in the northeast part of the state, showed vividly that
Halleck's strong measures did not have the effect he had
hoped they would. The searing hatred between Kansan and
Missourian was too powerful to be turned aside by a mere
Federal commander's efforts to control it.

In March, 1864, fresh parties of guerillas came into
Missouri, appearing this time in all sections of the state.
On April 3, a lieutenant-colonel of the state militia re-
ported that guerillas were coming into the southern portions
of the state and were being reinforced by secessionist
elements from Illinois. This intelligence concerning
Illinois was of course most disturbing. Somewhat calming
was the news that these newest invaders were working in
smaller numbers than the previous groups. A rumor that
Price was heading toward the state with a huge army did
little to keep the citizens in a rational frame of mind.

These latest invaders were joined by bushwhackers, a breed
of men more feared and held in lower regard than the gue-
rilla by Union sympathizers in Missouri and Kansas. The
majority of the bushwhackers were native Missourians who
made themselves helpful by guiding the guerillas to the

47 Ibid., p. 324. 51 III, 351.
homes of prominent Unionists in certain sections of the state. A large number of bushwhackers were wearing Federal uniforms in order to confuse and deceive intended Unionist victims and any Federal patrols that might cross their path. Many of the bushwhackers harbored grudges against certain members of the Unionist communities; these grudges were often appeased by robbery and then, murder.

From the time of this last invasion, Missouri was drenched with a guerilla war that threatened to surpass even the excesses of the border wars. Complaints of citizens over guerilla raids continued to the end of the war. A citizen's group representing Mexico, Missouri, sent a dispatch to I. H. Sturgeon, assistant-treasurer of Missouri, telling of the terror created by guerilla bands under one Jim Jackson of Texas, robbing and plundering citizens in that area. This dispatch was sent March, 1865. That same month, guerilla bands operating in Ripley, Butler, and other counties, were cited as a danger to the security of the state. It was stated in a dispatch to Major H. Hannabs that the force then in Missouri was wholly inadequate to deal with strong guerilla bands. The author of this dispatch offered the opinion that deportation of the families of bushwhackers would greatly lessen the grave danger of the bushwhacker and guerilla

49 Ibid.
problem. Guerilla trouble in Missouri was existent throughout the duration of the war, threats of reprisals having only negative effect. During the course of this latest guerilla influx, one of Quantrill's lieutenants, Bill Anderson, halted a train of cars traveling on the North Missouri Railroad. Finding a car of twenty-two unarmed, wounded Union soldiers, Anderson ordered them outside the train and shot.

Guerillas were also quite active in Kansas, their activities being very similar in nature with those of their kind in Missouri. In the relentless guerilla campaigns of that state, the towns of Humboldt and Johnston City were completely sacked. Raids, robberies, massacres; all these charges were leveled at the guerillas in Kansas. Some were overdrawn and uttered in the heat of anger, others had a grim foundation of truth.

All guerilla exploits in Kansas, however, were to pale before William Quantrill's bloody raid on Lawrence in August, 1863. Lawrence, Kansas was the seat of intense anti-slavery influence in the Kansas-Missouri border area. Lawrence had previously suffered savage attacks from Missouri during the border wars. This had occurred three times during that bitter struggle. Realizing her danger in the event of an attack in force from her Missouri

52 Tbid., p. 1142.

53 Miller, pp. 97-98.
enemies, Lawrence kept herself armed from the outbreak of war until August 10, 1863, less than two weeks before the Quantrill attack. A good many Lawrence citizens felt that Missouri might take advantage of the war to attempt to accomplish what they had failed to do in 1850, destroy Lawrence. Rumors and alarms over such an attack plagued Lawrence in the early days of the war. One such rumor had it that over fifteen hundred men were marching toward the Kansas border from Missouri. Where the story originated, no one seemed to know; it was not examined that closely. A general panic resulted, farms being virtually abandoned in the face of the rumored enemy. When no large numbers of the enemy put in an appearance, the farms and homes started filling up once again. As the war wore on, rumors of this nature continued to circulate, but by this time, the people had grown used to them and paid less and less attention.

This growing complacency toward rumors and half-truths concerning raiding parties had a dangerous effect on the citizenry of Lawrence. They became lax in their security precautions, a piece of neglect that was to prove fatal later on. In the early months of the war, a guard was kept on until the spring of 1863, after which time it was disbanded. Although they were fairly conscientious in their

54 Miller, pp. 97-98.
55 Cordley, p. 190.
duties, the guardsmen were, nonetheless, not a military unit trained for that sort of function. Not being subjected to any serious military discipline, the citizen guards were too unreliable to be strongly depended upon in the event of any surprise raid by Missouri guerillas.

The disbanding of the citizen guards did not write an end to efforts to provide for an efficient, effective, defense force to protect Lawrence should any serious emergency arise. In the spring of 1863, the election of General George Collamore, as mayor of Lawrence, gave that city a man who was totally conscious of the ever present danger from across the Missouri border. A man of capable executive ability, Collamore's air of self-sufficiency made a good many people stand off from him and not try to help or advise him on important matters. Collamore was acutely aware of the danger to Lawrence from Missouri, and through his tireless efforts, aroused the citizens of the town to some degree of realization of the true danger of their city's position. In time, this realization was fanned into a spirit of cooperation with the mayor in an effort to remedy the city's deplorable state of defense. Collamore was instrumental in pushing through measures for the organization of a fairly capable military organization to protect the city from marauding guerilla bands. This new citizens' army was proved quite effective in its duties, much more so than its predecessors. However, one rule governing the use of the unit's arms tended to

56 Ibid., p. 190.
hinder rather than facilitate their efficiency. Their arms were kept locked up in the local armory. Even though they were a bit more capable than the previous local guards, these new citizen guards were still not too reliable in the opinion of responsible citizens and the mayor Lawrence. Collamore more than anyone else realized the shortcomings of this latest edition of the Lawrence citizen guard.

Fully aware that the citizen's unit would never be able to effectively combat a strong guerilla raid, Collamore asked Federal military authorities for a detachment of soldiers for picket duty around Lawrence. In compliance with Collamore's request, a small force of soldiers was sent to picket the area around the town. Following the arrival of the soldiers, the Lawrence citizens army was disbanded. While the soldiers were stationed around Lawrence and vicinity, there was a reduction in the prevalence of guerilla attacks and sniping forays. This protection, more effective than anything previously tried, was withdrawn; the military assured the citizens of Lawrence that there was no possible danger to their city. This announcement brought on a feeling of false security that completely lulled the city of Lawrence into a dangerous state of complacency. Collamore, aware of the virtually helpless position Lawrence was in now, protested vigorously of the withdrawal of the soldiers, but his objections were over-ruled in deference to pressing needs elsewhere. The citizens, taking the
word and assurances of the military as the last word on the subject, would not be persuaded to form another citizen's guard or any other similar organization to protect the city against guerillas.

Collamore himself became deeply discouraged when the soldiers were withdrawn from Lawrence. His disappointment was too deep to allow him to use his boundless energy to keep his city on the alert against its mortal enemies across the border.

Every citizen of Lawrence, Kansas must have known the deep hatred toward their city felt by many pro-slavery elements in Missouri, a hatred that in the past was intensive enough to attempt the city's destruction. Whether she realized it or not, Lawrence was now resting from the strain of expecting guerilla raids and invasions that had never materialized. She was actually resting from the strain of many months of nervously awaiting raiders that never put in an appearance. This complete relaxing of her guard brought Lawrence to a dangerously low ebb of preparedness. Just what possessed the citizens of this city, after hearing of so much destruction all around them, to completely neglect their own defense is a puzzle which remains unsolved to this day.

57 Ibid.
William Clark Quantrill has been given the credit as the author of the Lawrence raid. Of all the guerilla chieftains operating during the civil war, none has left such a vivid mark as has William Quantrill. About his character much has been said. Most accounts label him as a rather cruel, vindictive, person. The true nature of the man could very possibly have been painted much blacker than it actually was due to the intense emotionalism rampant during that period. In action and deeds, he seemed not too different from other guerilla leaders of the period. Certainly, his deeds were not in any way radically different from those of any other guerilla chieftain, only Quantrill's received more publicity through the years.

Quantrill arrived in Kansas from his Ohio home in 1857, the year the fierce border war with Missouri was raging. At this time, he was about twenty years of age. After being in Kansas a short time, Quantrill moved in with a pro-slavery family, whose master had a profound influence in shaping the young Quantrill's beliefs on the slavery controversy.

Few persons could have stayed in Kansas and Missouri for any length of time without becoming involved in some way in the flaring border war. By 1858, Quantrill had finally become rather deeply involved in the Kansas-Missouri troubles.

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58 William E. Connely, Quantrill and the Border Wars (Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1910), p. 58.
During his stay in Kansas, Quantrill built up a fierce hatred for that state and its people. This feeling inspired him to cast his lot with the Missourians and aid them in their war against his one time adopted state. By July, 1859, Quantrill had become a full-fledged border ruffian. He was soon participating in numerous raids into Kansas and giving a fairly good account of himself in the border ruffians' eyes. Quantrill's decision to fight with the Missourians, did not, however, deter him from participating in raids against Missourians, launched by Kansans. This dangerous practice worked by taking the side of pro-slavery forces in Missouri and then taking the side of the free soilers when in Kansas, a perilous game which appealed to him.

Quantrill was most adept at playing double roles, a hazardous talent he found convenient to employ on more than one occasion. The fact that he was still among the living at the outbreak of the civil war, shows how skilled he was at assuming a given role or belief at a convenient time. Although he was arrested on several occasions for raids he had participated in, Quantrill usually was released without any serious punishment being meted out to him. This could possibly testify to his extraordinary skill in playing any chosen role he deemed necessary to the hilt. Only once was there any real danger to him from these arrests, and on that occasion, a prominent judge pleaded in his behalf, so
convincingly had Quantrill won him over. Following these arrests, he usually returned quickly to his raids and plundering like the other men of similar stripe on the bloody Kansas-Missouri border.

In his prowlings about Kansas and Missouri, Quantrill began to develop a liking for the life of the guerilla, a life he found difficult to reconcile in later years, with regular military life. Quantrill had a brief contact with regular army life under General Price in the action near the Osage river. The opportunity for easy plunder furnished by the unsettled conditions of the border war, was deeply missed by Quantrill who began to chafe under the restricting coils of military regulations. This discontent was remedied by Quantrill's leaving the service of Price after the conclusion of the Osage action. Following his separation from the army forces, Quantrill went out on his own. Just what part Quantrill played in this campaign is a little vague, perhaps he served in the capacity of a scout, or else as part of an allied band of guerillas aiding Price.

Returning to the rough and tumble life of the guerilla warrior that he liked so well, Quantrill soon fell in with a group of Missouri guerillas and bushwhackers who were conducting a series of raids into Kansas. In his first service with this band, Quantrill attracted a degree of attention for his part in the raids. This prestige enjoyed by
Quantrill undoubtedly helped him to influence the other members of the band to follow him, for soon after this, Quantrill was beginning to form the nucleus of the band that would soon fall under his leadership.

Other accounts indicate a desire for revenge was instrumental in forcing Quantrill into the role of border ruffian and guerilla, just prior to the outbreak of war. One account depicts Quantrill and his brother ambushed by a band of Kansas Jayhawkers on their way to California. Quantrill, this narrative says, saved his own life by pleading with the Kansans to spare him. After this, he joined the band and after a period of service with them, he, one by one, killed the men responsible for his brother’s death. He then drew the other members of the band around him, and began organizing his own band.

Like everything else about Quantrill, there is some vagueness concerning the facts about the organization of the first band of men operating under his orders. One thing was, and is certain, he did not immediately come to power in the guerilla hierarchy, but did so by a gradual process. Quantrill, like other leaders of irregular organizations, was hopeful of attaining some degree of prominence by his exploits in the field of guerilla operations. When he assumed command of his own band, it is quite conceivable that he secretly

60 Ibid., p. 201.

hoped for some measure of success to bring his name into prominence before the Confederate military command. Quantrill was serving the Confederate cause due to the fact he was in Missouri when the war broke out; it was therefore, very expedient for him to declare he was a supporter of secession and the Confederacy. Again Quantrill had used his considerable talent at playing double roles to extract himself from an awkward position. If his fellow Missourians had any suspicions about him, Quantrill, by his decision to aid the Confederacy, put all these suspicions aside. There apparently was little known to indicate whether or not the man was sincere in his stand; the prospect of plunder and easy booty could have been a primary factor in his decision.

Shortly after he assumed the role of leader of his guerillas band, Quantrill began a full-scale guerilla campaign. This particular band, like so many others in Missouri, was made up of a good many deserters from Union army units serving in the area of his operations. These deserters usually possessed a burning hatred for the Union cause and were willing to go to great extremes to aid the enemies of that cause.

Quantrill's particular band of guerillas operated between the Osage and Missouri rivers in western Missouri. In its formative stages, the Quantrill band was more of a mob than an organized, semi-military unit. Time saw an
improvement in the organization and rough discipline of the unit. By Christmas of 1861, Quantrill's band had cleared up the troubles that beset their organization and acquired a thin veneer of discipline. After clearing up their difficulties, the band then became a distinct guerilla force operating under a recognized leader. Quantrill and his band immediately launched another major guerilla campaign which produced a major amount of success for the guerilla leader. By February, 1862, Quantrill's activities in Missouri had made his name notorious and dreaded in that state. By March, 1862, his deeds had reached such proportions, that the Federals were moved to officially outlaw his band and label Quantrill as an outlaw.

In his raids and plunderings, Quantrill made use of all the guerilla tactics at his command and added a few more he had learned from a tribe of Cherokee Indians whom he had once taken up with in the course of his early years as a border ruffian.

For his participation in the attack on Independence, Missouri, directed by Confederate General, J. T. Hughes, Quantrill received a promotion to the rank of captain. That promotion also made the Confederate government officially responsible for the acts of Quantrill and his band.

Following his elevation to the rank of captain, Quantrill began to feel that a further climb in rank would be most

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62 Connelly, p. 220. 63 Ibid., p. 236. 64 Ibid., p. 269.
beneficial to him. In November, 1862, he went to Richmond to press his case for promotion to the rank of colonel and to enroll his band under the provisions set down in the Partisan Ranger Act. Quantrill's request for promotion to colonel was denied as was his proposed program of desolating Kansas. It still is not exactly clear whether or not Quantrill ever received the rank of colonel. There was some indication that following his return from Richmond General Price granted him this promotion in rank that the Confederate Secretary of War had denied him. With the failure to achieve promotion, in Richmond, Quantrill's exploits in 1863 lost some of their dash and also a good bit of their success.

It has been suggested by certain writers that Quantrill spent the first half of 1863 not in planning and executing brilliant or damaging raids against the Federals, but rather that he spent his time laying the groundwork for the devastating Lawrence raid. This could account for a noticeable drop in his activity in the following year; this perhaps is a much more feasible theory than that one which would have Quantrill brooding over his failure to receive his promotion and hence suffering a severe lapse in his guerilla campaign in Kansas and Missouri. At any rate, the planning of the Lawrence raid was a lengthy affair and one which was detailed even more minutely than the most vital of military campaigns. As every secessionist in Missouri
could be counted as a bitter enemy of Lawrence, so
William Quantrill could be counted as the most bitter
single enemy that city was to encounter.

On August 19, 1863, Quantrill and his men assembled
at Columbus, Missouri, and after organizing and taking their
roll, moved to Lone Jack, in Jackson County. The Band's
strength at this time was 234 men. The men were next
formed into four companies under the separate commands of
four captains. Any argument that the raid on Lawrence was
carried out for military purposes was generally weakened by
the words Quantrill spoke at the gathering of his men in
Lone Jack. Quantrill reputedly spoke words which completely
removed all military aspects from the impending raid.

The Kansan has been murdering and robbing our
people for two years or more, and burned their
houses by districts, hauled their household plunder,
farming implements, etc. to Kansas, driven off
their cattle, etc., until forbearance has ceased
to be a virtue. Lawrence is the great hotbed of
abolitionism in Kansas. We can get more
revenge and more money there than anywhere else in
the state of Kansas.66

These words would make it appear that the raid was conducted
for scarcely any military purpose. Some have argued that
the raid was launched in retaliation for the burning of the
Confederate supplies in Osceola by Jim Lane and his band
earlier in the year. This is a little doubtful, as any
Missouri secessionist would need very little if any excuse
for attacking a city he hated as much as Lawrence. All the

65 Cordley, p. 199.
66 Connelly, p. 308.
available evidence clearly indicates that the raid was undertaken not for the military value it might bring, but was solely a revenge measure, and not necessarily just for Quantrill's revenge alone. The belief that revenge played a major role in this raid was given further credence by the fact that the raiders carried death lists of certain Kansans they were sworn to kill should they come across them in Lawrence. A few last minute preparations and changes in plan, and the expedition to Kansas was ready to move.

The guerilla force crossed over into Kansas at five in the evening of August 19. The guerillas were sighted by Captain J. A. Pike; as their route carried them near his camp located some few miles from Aubry, Kansas. The guerilla band outnumbered the small detachment of troops at least four or five to one. No attempt was made to interfere with the guerilla advance, probably due to this inequality in numbers. Along their line of march, the guerillas killed one man and burned two houses; still no warning of their approach was sounded. In their invasion route, the guerillas followed a route joining the old Santa Fe trail. They traveled that famous route to a point where the road to Lawrence turned north. All along the route of march, several Union soldiers were observed but were unharmed. Quantrill's men had received strict orders not to waste their ammunition on stragglers but to save it until they reached Lawrence.
Once on the Lawrence road, Quantrill realized the vital necessity of having guides with his group. Although he was familiar with this country from border ruffian days, a confusing maze of creeks and streams made Quantrill realize the convenience and necessity of having a guide through this area, as possible confusion and resultant blunders could plague the guerillas in such a tangled network of streams. The need of guides was immediately settled by the simple expedient of impressing them from convenient farm houses located along the line of march. Progress was hindered somewhat by the murder of several of the guides. Whenever one of the guerillas noticed a guide whom he recognized as a person he had had unpleasant dealings with in the past, he shot him on the spot, no questions asked. Reports later stated that from eight to ten men lost their lives in this manner on the road to Lawrence.

Quantrill's force had by this time, been augmented by the addition of reinforcements gathered along the route of march. Some of these extra forces were drawn from Colonel John D. Holt and his company of recruits who were on their way out of northern Missouri. Holt accepted Quantrill's invitation to accompany him to Lawrence. This force, plus those stragglers who had attached themselves to the guerilla company, gave Quantrill a force of just over 450 men.

When he approached the outskirts of Lawrence, August 21, 1863, Quantrill sent six of his men into the city to

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67 Ibid., p. 325.  
68 Ibid., p. 320.
discover a vulnerable spot of approach for the charge into
the city streets. Impatience or a possible tide of disagree-
ment over the consequences of the impending raid among certain
elements of the guerilla band, prompted Quantrill to launch
his initial charge without waiting for the return of his
spies. It had been scarcely a unanimous decision to attack
Lawrence by any means. It is possible Quantrill's fear of
the potency of these voices of dissent caused him to act as
he did. He rightly felt that the carrying out of the common
goal would greatly lessen the possibility of any symptoms of
dissent from showing. Dispatching a party of twelve men to
the top of Mount Oread, on the outskirts of the city, to watch
for Federal cavalry, or patrols, Quantrill led his men in
their initial rush into the still, sleepy city. As the bush-
whackers thundered into the slumbering town, at approximately
five in the morning, pre-assigned files split from the main
body to picket the city and cut off escape and incoming aid.
The suddenness of this first rush succeeded in overrunning a
block of residences and two companies of half-awake or
sleepy Kansas volunteers. Before the dazed soldiers, many
of them sleeping on house porches, could clear their sleep-
dazed minds, the bushwhackers had surrounded and killed most
of them in the first rush. The greatest majority of these
volunteers were young boys, most even too young to enlist.
The rawness of these troops caused them to panic soon after
the initial shock of surprise had worn off. These two companies were virtually wiped out, only some three to five survivors reported. After clearing what little resistance there was in the city, various parties of the bushwhackers set to the work of firing certain business houses in the commercial section of the city.

One of the first buildings the main body of raiders came to, was the imposing Eldridge House, one of the town's most prominent hotels. The hotel was filled with visitors who had come into Lawrence the preceding days for a conference for the benefit of the Kansas-Pacific Railroad. Captain Alexander Banks, provost marshal of Kansas, also at the hotel, began to feel that any resistance on the part of the persons inside the hotel would be a futile gesture, as the guerilla outnumbered them radically. Banks apparently felt that by talking with the guerilla leaders, he could somewhat ease the lot of people in the hotel. When Quantrill noticed a white sheet flying from one of the windows of the hotel, he called to inquire if that gesture meant the surrender of the city. Banks replied in the affirmative. This was the official surrender of Lawrence to the guerillas. The guests in the Eldridge House were guaranteed safe conduct to the Stone Hotel, not far from the Eldridge House. Conducting his prisoners to the Stone Hotel, Quantrill set up his headquarters in that building and reassured his unwilling guests
that their personal safety would be assured. The fact that most of those persons in the Stone Hotel were from other cities than Lawrence, could have been important in the generous treatment shown them.

Once he had set up his command post in the Stone Hotel, Quantrill sent his men to various sectors of the city in an effort to seal off all possible escape routes still open and in so doing, place the city in a virtually unbreakable grip. The citizens were literally boxed in by a death cordon thrown up by Quantrill's pickets. Quantrill had previously issued orders that only men bearing arms were to be shot or molested in any way; in the ensuing excitement created by the savage attack, many women and children were shot down. Too many of the guerillas then began transferring their deep hatred of Lawrence to any person not a member of their immediate band. While a good many guerillas carried death lists on their persons, others were simply shooting anyone who happened to be within range.

There seemed to be no clear understanding or agreement on just what order Quantrill gave to his men before he set them on the city. The version most often accepted is that Quantrill gave the order to clean and purge the city of the abolitionist elements. With the deadly circle ringed about the city, this latter version seems the more logical of the several offered. After they had ringed the city tightly,

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69 Ibid., p. 343.
the guerillas began firing certain business districts bypassed in the earlier stages of the raid and posting men to shoot down any one who tried to escape a fiery death inside the flaming buildings. In this latter action, no close or distinctive difference was made in regard to age or sex. The firing from the guerillas was becoming less organized and more sporadic; bullets were striking both young and old. This situation was further aggravated by the spirits the guerillas had liberated from the Lawrence liquor stores during the course of the initial stages of the raid. Efforts to escape the deadly hail of lead the guerillas were filling the streets with only met with death.

Practically all of Quantrill's band carried death lists bearing the names of men they would like to meet that day. Ironically enough, those particular persons marked for slaughter, managed to save themselves before the raiders reached the town. Those who perished in the Lawrence Massacre, were for the most part, unoffending citizens. Some of Lawrence's most prominent citizens were among those marked for execution. Governor Robinson saved himself by hiding in his barn which looked so like a fort, the guerilla forces were afraid to run the risk of attacking such a seemingly, heavily fortified position. One of the most sought after men in Lawrence that day was James Lane, who managed to be in a safe location before Quantrill's execution squad came looking for him. Negro slaves and soldiers saved themselves

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70 Cordley, p. 220.
in much the same manner, hiding and eluding the avenging killers. A good many citizens too badly wounded to crawl to safety, perished in the flames of burning buildings where they were trapped. On the whole, these Missouri bushwhackers were generally a fairly hard, uncompromising lot in their dealings with an enemy; the sack of Lawrence only inflamed this lack of scruple, a quality which is conspicuous in its absence during wartime.

With the city completely surrounded and death being widely sown in the streets, the lookouts posted on Mount Oread, sighted a column of Union cavalry from Fort Leavenworth shortly before four in the afternoon. This group was under the command of Major James Plumb. The flames which were darkening the Lawrence skyline were apparently seen by this group which then assembled and rode to the aid of the already doomed city. Quantrill feared a direct clash with the possibly more disciplined cavalrymen, and he ordered one of his lieutenants, William H. Gregg, to round up the stragglers in the command and bring them back to the main body of troops to a pre-selected farmhouse on the outskirts of Lawrence. As a good many of the guerillas were now thoroughly drunk with the earlier liberated spirits, they were very difficult to prod into any kind of motion and retreat. Gregg required a firm assistance from his fellow commanders in eventually rounding up the befuddled bushwhackers. The
withdrawal from the burning city was further complicated by the slow progress of the plunder laden horses the guerillas were either riding or leading. After much anxiety and expectation of the sudden appearance of the Federal cavalry, Gregg guided his charges back to the main body formed around the farmhouse. The guerillas were properly impressed with the urgent necessity of making their retreat from Lawrence before the Federal cavalry should catch them in the open.

Enroute to Lawrence, Major Plumb’s force attracted a large number of armed citizen units eager to help the stricken city. The raw state of training of these unskilled men proved more of detriment than an aid to the Union cavalry-men. It had been Plumb’s plan to push the retreating guerillas mercilessly, allowing them no adequate time for rest or more efficient defensive reorganization. This plan, quite appropriate for this type of pursuit, was kept from working properly by the clumsy hindrance of the citizens’ volunteers who broke ranks and fled whenever the guerillas opened fire on them. Doubtless their numbers added to those of Plumb would have furnished the Federals with more than enough men to effectively bring Quantrill and the bushwhackers to bay. As they retreated, the guerillas steadily rid themselves of any encumbering plunder which might hinder their progress toward the safety of the Missouri border. In spite of hindrance of the citizens’ volunteers, Plumb was
able to push his pursuit quite close to the retreating Quantrill. The pursuit was close enough to his rear ranks to force Quantrill to make a practically non-stop flight to the Missouri border. By constantly and relentlessly driving his men, Quantrill finally succeeded in guiding his now fatigued command across the state line and into the safety of his Missouri base.

The military value of this raid is of course doubtful; it probably was subordinated to the desires of the Missouri guerillas to continue the border wars of the 1850's. The property damage suffered through the raid amounted to around $2,000,000. The toll of lives, while not official, made a smaller but more grim number. The killed, 250, outnumbered the wounded about five to one. In his evaluation of the Lawrence raid, Quantrill expressed genuine admiration for the heroism displayed by the women of that city, but he held its male citizens in contempt for their display of cowardice.

The indignation roused by the Lawrence Massacre was loud, and in some instances, quite vehement. The Federal authorities were almost unanimous in their belief that this raid should be punished, and its participants and those who had aided or sympathized with them should be forced to suffer for their role in that infamous deed. There was an unfortunate tendency on the part of some officials to hold the entire state of Missouri guilty; other more liberal

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elements simply held western Missouri guilty for the raid and its after affects. At any rate it was felt that if the guerillas were deprived of a bountiful area of supply and forage as western Missouri had become, they would eventually be forced into either surrender or withdrawal. This latter feeling in part contributed to the issuance of Order Number Eleven. This order called for the literal transplanting of citizens in three western Missouri counties to other sections of the state as they were suspected of harboring a loyalty toward the guerilla raiders of Lawrence. Order Number Eleven demanded the residents of Jackson, Cass, Bates, and that part of Vernon county included in the district of General Thomas Ewing, author of the order—be removed from their lands to designated points in eastern Missouri. Only those who lived within one mile of army posts were to be exempted from this general order. The order was issued on August 25, 1863; the residents of the four counties of western Missouri directly affected by this edict were given thirty-eight days to vacate their residences. Ewing explained his action by pointing out that on the outbreak of war, some 75 per cent of the population of western Missouri was disloyal to the Union. Ewing further pointed out that those disloyal persons were in all probability aiding, feeding, and furnishing shelter to guerilla bands in the territory and had been ever since the start of the war. Even before the Quantrill raid, Ewing had laid the groundwork for measures to curtail
the activities of guerillas operating in the area and the activities of those civilians actively aiding them. To further place the guerillas in a tight position regarding their supplies and shelter, Ewing also ordered the destruction of all grain and hay not near enough to Union army camps to be removed there. Taking everything in consideration, Ewing felt the order was far from being inhuman, but rather furnished the non-combatants the finest opportunity for returning to the farms and homes they had been driven from by the rebel elements.

In spite of the high feelings aroused by the Lawrence Massacre, not every Union officer of responsibility wholeheartedly endorsed the order as it stood. Wiley Britton, of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, was one of those who opposed the edict. Britton in his views, expressed the concern that the Union elements in Missouri would be the ones who really suffered through the order rather than the rebel sympathizer. Britton pointed out that Missouri had sent some 100,000 men to the Union ranks in the form of regular and militia troops. This, Britton contended, was not to be overlooked by cautious Union commanders. These dissenting opinions were in the minority however, and Order Number Eleven became official Union Policy.

The military power built up in Missouri to enforce Order Number Eleven, as well as to combat the growing guerilla

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74 Miller, pp. 102-3.
menace, often abused its privilege and authority. Civilians were arrested on the suspicion of being vagabonds and camp followers. Anyone who had no adequate employment or other approved pastime to keep himself profitably occupied, was subject to suspicion of aiding the guerillas. Retaliatory measures on the part of Union military commanders became stronger as guerilla operations became more and more savage. General John McNeil resorted to virtually barbaric methods to stem the tide of guerilla murders in his region of Missouri. McNeil advocated the killing of ten southern sympathizers for the murder of any more Union men in his territory. Methods as harsh as this failed to have their desired effect. A conservative estimate concerning the guerilla war in Missouri, stated that in all probability, there were more men killed by guerilla action than there were on the actual battlefields of the Kansas-Missouri area.

So acute was the guerilla problem in northern Missouri, that the Federals employed some 5,000 troops in the region for the sole activity of chasing marauding guerilla bands. These anti-guerilla forces were under the command of General John Pope. With a force of 5,000, General Pope could have conceivably done great damage to guerilla bands. But he actually did nothing to hinder or halt the efforts of the bridge burners and train wreckers flourishing in his district of Missouri. Pope tended to regard Unionist bands

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75 Ibid., p. 106.
as well as secessionist bands with a marked degree of suspicion. When acts of sabotage or pillage occurred in his district, he would hold Unionists as equally guilty with secessionists. His relative inaction in relation to the guerilla bands once inspired a group of bushwhackers to form a camp within a day's march of Pope's forces. Still Pope made no moves against the guerillas.

Guerilla activity at this later date was something of an anticlimax as guerilla bands had been functioning in Missouri since the outbreak of war. In the latter days of 1961, guerillas became so numerous in Howard, Boone, and Calloway counties, that they reached the sobering number of three thousand men. As their members and activities grew, they began to threaten Jefferson City. General Benjamin Prentice rightly felt that some decisive action had to be undertaken against them. Generals John E. Sheffield and John Henderson were ordered to cooperate with Prentice in this operation. The expedition left Palmyra, Missouri, on December 24, arriving at Sturgeon in Boone county, on the evening of December 26. The expedition was made up of five companies of Missouri sharpshooters. On their arrival in Sturgeon, the Federals learned of a force of rebels in the area of the city. One company of cavalry was dispatched to the scene in a move to catch the guerillas by surprise and over-run their position. About two miles south of Sturgeon,

76 Britton, p. 145.
the cavalrymen came upon a force of the enemy, dispersing them and taking nine prisoners. On their way back to join the main body, the cavalry was hit by a superior force of guerillas which completely defeated them, wounding their commander, and taking him prisoner. This was just one of a series of operations launched against guerillas in Missouri in an effort to cut down their effectiveness and influence. On one such expedition to Mingo Swamp, one of the worst bands in southeast Missouri was broken up. Other expeditions against the guerillas were not crowned with such success as was the Mingo Swamp expedition. After a skirmish at Blue Springs, Missouri, in March, 1863, Captain H. B. Johnson expressed the opinion that it was highly improved for United States soldiers to undertake anti-guerilla campaigns unless the Federal government was willing to send an average of ten soldiers for every one guerilla. Captain Johnson further stated that the only way to get guerillas out of any locality would be to destroy their subsistence, particularly in rocky and brushy areas. Expanding his views even further, Johnson advocated sending away the wives and families of known guerillas in any given locality. This latter view was occasioned by the knowledge that a good many wives of the guerilla leaders and warriors were aiding their loved ones in their war against the Union.

77Ibid., p. 133.

In any expedition launched against the Missouri guerilla bands, the usual result was generally a complete escape by those members of the band who survived the initial skirmish. The guerillas usually scattered in the face of a superior enemy and split up into twos and threes, making it very difficult, if not virtually impossible to run them down and bring them to bay. Added to this tactic, was the intimate knowledge of the terrain that many of the guerilla leaders seemed to have.

In Missouri as in no other state, the guerilla was a marked man. Only his life could properly atone for the damage and destruction created. This thirst for retaliation on the part of Union commanders and Federal sympathizers at times reached feverish proportions. Following Quantrill's raid on Lawrence, harsh vengeance was taken on Quantrill's supporters in western Missouri. The greatest bulk of this revenge was taken by Kansas troops in Missouri at the time. These forces initiated a program against guerilla sympathizers, which claimed an uncounted number of lives. Unarmed old men and boys were shot down without any legal or other procedure. Homes were burned, and women and children were turned out to fend for themselves. None of these extra-military activities were curtailed by any responsible military authority, the 79 Kansans did as they willed.

79 Miller, p. 100.
In no other state was the guerilla menace to reach such a state of development as in Missouri. Military and other measures only served to aggravate the serious situation. A general order issued in April, 1862, declared that when any guerilla was found in arms, he was to be shot on the spot if the Federal force bringing about his capture was commanded by an officer. This particular order was also aimed at those civilians who aided the guerillas in any manner whatsoever. These were subject to arrest and to be held until tried by a military tribunal. If those persons arrested would take an oath of allegiance, they would then be released, if not, they would be held until released by proper authority. This general order apparently failed to achieve the results expected of it, for two months later, June 23, 1862, General Schofield issued a general order of his own which authorized each military commander of a division in a district to appoint one man for each county in his district to enroll all residents and property holders who had actively aided and encouraged rebellion. These persons also presumably had rendered aid to guerilla bands and parties, both organized and scattered in their neighborhoods. The wealthier of these property holders were to pay for damages caused by guerillas in their operations. Also added to this penalty, was a five thousand assessment for every Union soldier or citizen killed by guerillas. One to five thousand dollars was to be assessed

for every Union soldier or citizen that was wounded in any
degree by prowling guerillas. Full property value of stolen
or damaged goods was to be paid to the person suffering the
loss by the secessionist citizens in these military divisions
and districts.

As the guerilla problem grew steadily worse in Missouri,
it was Kansas which eventually suffered as a result of this
growth of bushwhacker trouble. In September, 1862, Governor
Charles Robinson of Kansas issued a proclamation calling for
all citizens who were able to bear arms to guard against the
double dangers of guerilla and Indian attacks. The southern
and western borders of Kansas were threatened by hostile
Indian tribes and bands, who still did not prove quite so
troublesome as the guerillas, and the governor's action was
necessary to build up the Kansas militia which had been
crippled by the large number of enlistments into the Union
army one year ago.

Stern measures apparently were not to be the answer to
guerilla war in the Kansas-Missouri border area. The bitter
struggles of the war continued in the memories of both
Kansans and Missourians. A truthful evaluation of the war
in this region requires an evaluation of the fact that
neither Kansans nor Missourians had forgotten the antipathies
of the free soiler days. This mutual feeling of resentment and

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\[\text{Ibid., Ser. I, XIII, Pt. I, 446-47.}\]
hatred survived enough to bring on a sustained guerilla cam-
paign in Missouri and Kansas and to perpetuate it until the
end of the war. Troops, general orders, edicts, proclamations,
executions, etc., had no appreciable effect in diminishing or
halting guerilla warfare on the bitterest and bloodiest
border in the United States during the Civil War.
CHAPTER V

THE GUERRILLA IN THE SOUTHWEST

The southwestern flank of the Confederacy, embracing the states of Arkansas and Texas, and the Indian Territory, was plagued by the guerilla problem as were other areas on the fringes of the more active theatres of the war. While the guerilla problem never reached the proportions it reached in Kansas and Missouri, it nevertheless, was a bothersome state of affairs that had to be met and dealt with. The Southwest was lacking in the past antagonisms of any border wars such as existed between Kansas and Missouri, and this was a major factor which kept the guerilla problem down to its proper perspective in this region. Guerilla war in the Southwest was brought to that region more generally by means of outside infiltration from Kansas, Missouri, or other regions, rather than from any rapid build up of irregular bands within the borders of the area. The proximity of this area to the Kansas and Missouri borders, often invited prowling guerilla parties to make their forays into somewhat newer fields.

Arkansas, more than Texas or the Indian Territory, had guerilla problems with deserting soldiers similar to those experienced by Kentucky. This is understandable in view of the fact that Arkansas was the scene of several significant
battles during the early years of the war. As the two contending armies paused through the state, many of the soldiers dropped out of the ranks in order to live off the land, and avoid the dangers of front-line service. As was inevitable, these men often fell in together and, in the course of time, organized a band which combined their individual talents in living off the land. As soon as these deserters became aware of the opportunities for easy plunder, they were quickly evolved into a functioning guerilla band.

Arkansas was not immediately propelled into secession. She at first resisted the clamor for secession, her population being thoroughly divided in sentiment. However, in May 1861, when Lincoln issued his call for troops from Arkansas, the secession convention was recalled, and this time voted for secession with only one dissenting vote.

With his assumption of command of Confederate forces in Arkansas, General Thomas C. Hindman authorized any citizens who wished to organize into companies for guerilla operations against the Union forces, to do so. Hindman made the offer more attractive by letting the men who volunteered realize that they would be operating completely independently from any army command. 1 Hindman's proposal was acted on rather eagerly by scores of backwoodsmen who understood and appreciated this brand of silent warfare. Still, even with these

1 John C. Fletcher, Arkansas (Chapel Hill, 1947), p. 159.
numbers arrayed into guerilla bands, an acute guerilla problem did not arise until after the battle of Pea Ridge and the subsequent withdrawal of the Confederate forces from the state. The bands that began forming in Arkansas at the time came from several diversified sources. A good many of these men came into Arkansas with General Sterling Price from Missouri. Following the Confederate defeats and Price's withdrawal back into Missouri, a portion of his force was unwilling to return to Missouri. These remained behind in an attempt to live off the land. In time, they had the nucleus of a guerilla organization well on the road to full operation. Other bands, former partisan units, had been driven from Missouri by Union troops, and made their way across the Arkansas border. Being deprived of supplies and any semblance of their former organization, these former ranger-units deteriorated into guerilla bands.

Hindman's withdrawal from northwestern Arkansas in December, 1862, left that portion of the state open to the raids and maraudings of guerilla bands that were springing up over the state more rapidly day by day. While they held control of Arkansas, the Confederates had proved unwilling to furnish adequate protection to the citizens from guerillas

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2William Baxter, Pea Ridge and Prairie Grove, or Scenes and Incidents of the War in Arkansas (Cincinnati, 1864),

3Ibid.
in their vicinity. When control passed over to Union forces, they proved even less cooperative toward protecting the citizenry.

Guerilla activities in Arkansas were much the same as they were in other sections of the country during the war years. Horse stealing, house burnings, sniping forays, and occasional murders of Unionist sympathizers were quite common in wartime Arkansas. Shortly, no fine distinctions were drawn between Unionist and Confederate sympathizers in these guerilla operations; this, of course, was like guerilla war in any other state during the Civil War.

The guerillas in Arkansas were not encumbered by the problem of supply lines, what each guerilla needed in the way of supplies, he simply took. This was apparently due to the belief that every man was the best judge of what he actually needed. A good many guerilla operations were for the acquisition of vital supplies of food, horses, ammunition, etc., in order to carry out their operations. The cooperation on the part of the citizenry was mostly forced and far from spontaneous; Arkansas citizens did not sympathize with the guerillas as did many in Missouri.

The guerilla problem in Arkansas was not all the work of bands functioning within the state borders. Guerilla leaders from Missouri made regular raids across the border.

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for plundering expeditions against Arkansas citizens. Leaders who had made their names notorious in Missouri, often led their bands into Arkansas when the opportunities for plunder in Missouri grew sparse or when the vigilance on the part of Federal patrols became intense enough to require the guerillas to lay low for an indefinite period of time. A good many of these Missouri guerillas had expected to spend their time in Missouri, as part of the Confederate army which they had been induced to join. When the Confederates lost control of that state, they were turned loose on the land to make their individual way as best they could. Failing to do this adequately, they formed into guerilla parties. It was the same story that was being enacted in several states at that time. As Arkansas lay just across the border, it often furnished them with the opportunity for raiding expeditions and other allied depredations. On several occasions, the guerillas sent scouting parties across the Missouri into Arkansas on reconnaissance expeditions. Not wishing to encumber themselves with prisoners, they never burdened themselves with the necessary problems involved in the feeding and caring for prisoners; disposing of them was a much easier method employed by the scouting parties. This practice became so prevalent, that orders were issued to shoot on sight and shoot to kill, any known guerilla or any person suspected of being a guerilla. Still, even this tough policy failed to bring an end to guerilla murders and raids.

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5Baxter, p. 124.
Added to the problem of harboring notorious guerilla bands from Missouri, Arkansas citizens were confronted with still another source of worry from that state. When they learned that guerilla bands had crossed over into Arkansas for safety, certain Unionist citizens who had witnessed the burning of their homes by guerillas followed them across the border to exact revenge for their sufferings. More often than not, they proved just as much of a menace and danger as the bands they were pursuing.

The military at this point, was very reticent in providing protection to the harassed citizens of Arkansas in this time of danger. With such a glaring lack of military supervision of guerilla operations in the state, guerilla and bushwhacker bands in 1862, were able to completely control Fayetteville and the whole of northwestern Arkansas up to August of that year. They departed then of their own accord, and not due to any military pressure being exerted on them in Arkansas. Lack of adequate military protection led a good many Arkansans to believe they had been abandoned by both the Union and Confederacy. Confronted by guerilla foes from within and without the state borders, Arkansas citizens were faced with a dilemma which could have easily swept that state away in a wave of chaos. That it did not was due primarily to lack of coordinated action on the part of the

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^6Ibid., p. 140. \(^7\)Fletcher, p. 157.
guerillas themselves, for the military certainly did very little to ease the threatening situation when it appeared at its most dangerous point. Had there been a fierce border war between Arkansas and Missouri as there had been between Missouri and Kansas, with the resultant animosities, the guerilla picture in Arkansas would have been of a more grim nature.

Like Arkansas, Texas was not wholeheartedly in favor of secession or of casting her lot with the Confederacy. A good many Texas settlers, moving into the state after it had thrown off Mexican rule, brought the institution of slavery across the border with them. As time passed, the institution became a firmly rooted part of Texas life. While the citizens of Texas were not violently anti-Unionist in most cases, John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry hurt the Unionist cause in the state more than any other factor at that time. By February, 1861, a self-appointed convention adopted an ordinance of secession to be carried out if ratified by the people.

But offsetting this secessionist feeling, was a degree of loyalty to the Federal government still felt by a good number of Texans. A number of men prominent in state politics, opposed the idea of secession, and continued to oppose it when the state adopted that drastic measure. At the start of war those persons who supported the Unionist cause changed their loyalties for the sake of convenience and supported the Confederacy as their fellow citizens were doing. As the war wore on, this loyalty, both on the part of loyal Confederates and
converted Unionists, began to cool. Governor Pendelton Murrah, elected in 1863, was particularly provoked due to his own misgivings over military interference from Richmond. Murrah, a strong state-righter, felt this imposition very keenly. The resulting confusion within the state due to the governor's stand, proved to be a fertile ground for lawless elements to spring up and perform their deeds of plundering, raiding, and other forms of violence.

Lawless elements in Texas had excellent opportunities for plundering and raiding during the turbulent war years that followed. In this state as in so many others, civil authority broke down and as a vital force was virtually non-existent. With no effective law enforcement agency to prevent them from carrying out their deeds, these lawless elements had virtual bonanza in Texas. Nor were lawless elements the only source of worry for war-time Texas. In years previous to the Civil War, the white settlers in that state had had a considerable amount of trouble with hostile Indian tribes in the state and on its borders. This old trouble was carried over into the war years. The Indians generally made their raids at night, catching the settlers unawares, and in so doing, creating a wide path of destruction before the settlers could organize themselves effectively.

9Ibid., p. 211.
Trouble with the Indians continued throughout the war and even after the cessation of actual hostilities. The Indians simply seized on the internal confusion created by the war to conduct their campaigns.

Coupled with the Indian troubles were marauding forays by Mexican bandit leaders and free booters. Like the Indians, these men mostly made their raids for the purpose of settling old scores. Still, others recognized the opportunity for easy spoils and plunder and acted accordingly. While they did not prove so dangerous as the Indians, these Mexican free booters were quite a thorn in the sides of Texas citizens.

One of the most notorious of these free booters who gave Texas settlers no end of trouble was Juan Cortina whose raids along the southern border of the state were a constant source of danger and peril. Cortina entertained seriously the prospect of receiving a commission in the Federal army for his services against the Confederate citizens of Texas. Just how he hoped to overcome the citizenship barrier still is not known. Another account states that he was actually promoted to the rank of colonel in the Federal army and given his own command. At any rate, Cortina adopted the practice of unfurling the stars and stripes over the field of battle whenever he staged a successful raid. His actions were doubtlessly much the

\[10^\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 212.}\]  \[12^\text{Ibid.}\]  \[11^\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 209.}\]
same as those of a guerilla chieftan anywhere in the United States during the war years.

One of his more notable feats was the seizure and occupation of Brownsville in the early years of the war. Once safely in possession of the city, Cortina unfurled an American flag and flew it over his headquarters.13 Two armies of Texans converging on him from the north and east convinced Cortina of the advisability of withdrawal before the combined armies could catch him in a pincers movement. Very little is known of his activities after this.

Another band of Mexican bandits was in operation on the Rio Grande border area during the war under the command of Octaviano Zapata. Zapata, it was definitely learned, had been promised a colony by Federal agents in Texas if he would harass Confederate supply lines, and in general, make life miserable for Confederate sympathizers in Texas.14 Apparently, Zapata never received his commission from the Federal army, for on several occasions, Union military authorities protested his unfurling the American flag during the course of his raids. Nonetheless, Zapata proved to be quite a source of trouble for Confederate supply trains traveling through Texas. In December, 1862, he completely destroyed a large Confederate forage train in the southern part of the state. This action earned him the attention from Federal military authorities he so desperately wanted. Early in 1863, Zapata murdered Colonel Jesus Garcia Ramirez, a prominent citizen in the San Antonio area. Rallying

13 Ibid.
a large force, a Confederate ranger organization took up his trail and pursued him across the border and into Mexico. On his flight westward, Zapata was shot down a short distance from the border. In this man, the Federals lost a valuable enemy of the Confederates in Texas. Doubtless, there were other Mexican free booters who preyed on Texas citizens on various occasions during the war, but the activities of Cortina and Zapata attracted the greater amount of attention.

Indians and Mexicans were not the only internal problems citizens had to bear during the war. Lawless elements of nearly every description were to be found throughout the state. Deserters from Confederate army ranks, and from the ranks of the home guard units, formed into bands, and, by their lawless actions, created a really dangerous menace to the internal stability of Texas. These men, although they were not identified as guerillas, could scarcely be distinguished from guerillas through their actions. These loosely organized bands stole, burned, plundered, and even murdered in much the same manner as guerillas in other states were doing. Perhaps the one factor which kept a really intensive guerilla warfare from springing up in Texas was the formation of irregular bands with recruits gathered from the ranks of the army and home guard units. Generally these men had no formal leader as such and did not pursue their war of the shadows ceaselessly as did more formally organized guerilla units in other
sections of the country. Another possibility which could have kept guerilla war from spreading over the state any more than it did, perhaps rested in the necessity of meeting the attacks and dangers of two common enemies, the Indians and Mexican free booters. The serious nature of the Indian attacks made the solution of that problem paramount to all other considerations.

No guerilla chieftan on the same magnitude as Quantrill rose in Texas. Had there been such a man in Texas of the same calibre as Quantrill in Missouri, the guerilla story in Texas would probably have been greatly different. The lack of a positive leadership among the guerillas would tend to keep any irregular brand of warfare from flourishing in Texas as it did in other sections of the country. From the disorganized condition of the home guards, it was apparently more simple for any prospective guerilla or bushwhacker to lead a life of plundering and raiding in the company of a band of men sanctioned by the state government and not with a group branded as outlaws. All of these factors then would tend to greatly hamper the success of a wide-spread guerilla campaign such as was waged in Kansas and Missouri.

Still, organized guerilla bands did operate on a small scale in Texas. But their activities were scarcely of the significance of the more dangerous Indians and Mexican bandits. Like Arkansas, Texas also had a taste of guerilla war brought to her by forces operating from outside Texas. One of
the most notable of those outside invasions came from Missouri in the person of William Quantrill, shortly following his attack on Lawrence, Kansas. Quantrill and his party arrived in Texas, in November 1863, some two months after the Lawrence raid. After scouting around for a convenient camp site, they finally pitched camp about fifteen miles northwest of the present site of Sherman.¹⁷ A good many citizens of Sherman feared that their city was going to suffer the same fate suffered by Lawrence, Kansas, and Quantrill's actions seemed to justify this fear. Shortly after his band had pitched their camp a series of murders began to occur on the border of the Indian Territory; murders of north Texas citizens committed by unknown persons.

While these incidents were taking place on the Texas-Indian Territory border, Sherman citizens were in a state of heightened apprehension. This apprehension threatened to bear tragic fruit when on two occasions, a party of Quantrill's command, somewhat intoxicated at the time, rode through the streets of Sherman discharging their arms carelessly, without regard for life or property damage.¹⁸ Concerned town officials attempted to bolster the shaky morale of their citizens by reminding them that Quantrill was in the service of the Confederacy and therefore was to be regarded as a friend and ally.

Not all guerilla relations with Sherman citizens were on the unpleasant side however. Bill Anderson, one of Quantrill's

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 221. ¹⁸ Ibid., p. 222.
lieutenants, met and married a Sherman girl while the guerrillas were encamped near the city. If the girl's parents felt no serious qualms about the marriage, William Quantrill did. Quantrill voiced his apprehensions to Anderson in a private conversation, the exact content of which is not definitely known. The results of the conversation between Quantrill and Anderson broke the chain of understanding and cooperation that had at one time existed between the two men. After a bitter quarrel with his commander, Anderson left Quantrill, and still nursing his grudge against the Missouri guerilla chief, Anderson wrote to General Ben McCulloch, informing him of Quantrill's deeds along the Indian territory border and in Sherman. McCulloch, without hesitation, summoned Quantrill to his headquarters at Bonham to explain his actions in a Confederate state. After he had failed to explain his activities to the satisfaction of the general, Quantrill was placed under arrest. He was to be held under arrest until the charges against him of waging guerilla warfare in a friendly state could be investigated. Quantrill apparently felt such charges could be proven without too much difficulty for taking advantage of the lax security measures taken to keep him under guard, he slipped out of his cell one night and made his way to freedom. When news of Quantrill's escape reached General McCulloch, he immediately began organizing the pursuit party to run him down. In addition to a cavalry
company sent after Quantrill, Bill Anderson organized a pursuit force of his own to track down his former chief.

Quantrill was not running in blind haste in his flight, however. Sending a rider ahead, he ordered his party to meet him at a point at Colbert's Ferry, near Sherman, where the guerilla party hoped to cross. The guerillas carried out this order with dispatch and efficiency, and when Quantrill met them at the pre-designated point, they were ready to effect a crossing. Before the two pursuit parties could close their trap on Quantrill, he and his entire band had crossed Red River at Colbert's Ferry and over into Indian Territory. After his departure crimes committed by lawless elements in Texas continued to be blamed on Quantrill. On more than one occasion, citizens reported seeing him and his band in several areas in the state. The memory of Quantrill still hung heavy over Texas.¹⁹

The efforts of Texas authorities to cope with the problems raised by lawless elements and Indian and Mexican depredations throughout the state, met with no consistent degree of success. The areas needing protection were generally scattered over the vast range of Texas, an area too large to garrison and protect adequately against such determined enemies as the Mexicans and Indians.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 223.
After the fall of Vicksburg, Texas legislators and citizens alike saw that the Confederacy was in no position to furnish adequate protection of the Texas frontier. They especially feared for the safety of those counties bordering on adjacent Indian country. For the purpose of affording the state protection against enemies, both internal and external, regiments of home guard units were raised to serve as a state militia body. In a short time, these units proved so unsatisfactory that no confidence could be put on them for protection whatsoever. Lacking in discipline, leadership, and training, the home guards usually attracted the more unsavory elements of the state population, men who joined to avoid the prospect of military service. They soon fell into the habits and practices of guerillas, serving in some areas to bring armed resistance against them by injured citizens. In some rare instances, men of the various guard units disguised themselves as Indians when carrying out raids in order to throw the light of suspicion away from themselves. In addition to their guerilla activities, the home guards also conducted a profitable enterprise at the expense of returning soldiers. Any veteran returning to Texas was often stopped by home guardsmen and asked for certain official papers. The guardsmen saw to it that the papers requested would be of such a

20 Ibid., p. 183.  
21 Ibid., p. 184.  
22 Ibid.
nature that the soldier would not likely have them on his person. The veterans would then be placed under arrest for not having these official papers. Following their arrest, close relatives would be informed of the situation and asked to pay a fine for their release. The relatives, anxious to free their loved ones, usually paid the fines imposed by the arresting guardsmen. The amounts of the fines varied from time to time, according to the individual guardsmen’s whim.

When this practice was brought to the attention of the officers of the guard units, they promised action, but apparently never meted out any punishment to their men. On the whole, home guard officers were very lax and inefficient in controlling and disciplining their men. As the years wore on, the home guard units virtually ceased to function in any form resembling their intended purpose. As a cohesive militia body, they never existed at all. Eventually, they were disbanded and written off as a wasted effort to insure internal stability.

As the home guard units were more often than not, unfit for any extensive duty against internal enemies in Texas, other bodies usually had to take steps to clear these enemies out of certain areas. In May, 1861, after home guard units had failed to take any action at all, 2000 Texans under Colonel W. C. Young embarked on an expedition to clear Unionist

Ibid.
bands away from the state borders, and also to handle the marauding Indian bands north of the Red River. This expedition achieved results in clearing the Unionist bands from the state borders, but had only negligible success in the Indian phase of the expedition. In the early years of the war, with the independable home guards more of a hindrance than a help, with an extensive border to defend, the Texas border area was quite vulnerable. A Federal invasion force at that time would have had little or no trouble in crossing the Texas border at many points. 24

All during the war years, Texas had trouble maintaining her internal defense. The highly praised Ranger forces which had served quite well in the pre-war campaigns against the Indians, had sunk to a very low state of training, discipline, and efficiency just prior to the outbreak of war. This deplorable situation was further heightened by the addition of new recruits of questionable character in some cases, who joined the Rangers for the purpose of avoiding military service. Whatever the Texas Rangers had been during the Indian campaigns before the war, they had certainly lost their effectiveness on the outbreak of the Civil War. An effort to bolster the weakened Ranger forces through the creation of units of Minute Men in February, 1861, met with the same dismal failure that the later home guard experiment brought. 25

24 Ibid., p. 213.
25 Ibid., p. 214.
Possibly the best internal defense force Texas had during the war was the Texas Frontier Regiment, organized in December, 1861. This regiment with from fifteen to twenty-five men to a company was scattered over the state in various strategic areas to guard the citizens against attacks from hostile elements. The only hindrance to their more effective organization was the state legislature's inability to handle either Indian or military affairs, two fields in which they were woefully ignorant. In spite of the well meaning but wearisome interferences from the legislature, the Frontier Regiment on the whole served well in the capacity of a state-wide defense body. The protection they furnished the Rio Grande border area was much better than that which they furnished communities bordering the Red River. Shortly after the beginning of 1862, Colonel John S. Ford, of the Confederate army, was sent to Texas to help with the frontier defense of the state. The Regiment immediately took up positions along the Rio Grande in a chain of forts which had been evacuated by Federal forces following the outbreak of the war. The forts did manage to hamper Mexican raiding parties but did very little to cut down the effect of the Indian raiders from the south. The Indians made advantageous use of their knowledge of the terrain to sneak raiding parties through well hidden and unknown mountain passages and gaps. Passing through undetected, they then proceeded to carry out their night raids against white settlers.

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26 Ibid., p. 216.
By 1863, the Frontier Regiment began adding cavalry units to their ranks. In that same year, Colonel J. E. McCord began sorties against Indian bands prowling the southwestern section of Texas. More Indians were killed and stolen horses recovered during this period, then at any other time in the war years. Only in this area however was there any positive relief from Indian pressures.

On the Red River frontier, some four hundred hostile Indians were gathered. These made frequent sorties across the river, spreading a wave of terror through the settled communities where they had passed. When the danger to the citizens of these northern counties became plainly evident to the military command, Colonel James Bourland was dispatched with a cavalry company to aid in the evacuation of the citizenry from those threatened areas. Coming up from the south, Bourland began to lose a sizeable number of men through desertions from the ranks of his command. The rate of desertions rose sharply as each day of the march went by, soon reaching such staggering proportions, that the commanding general of the district ordered that all deserters from Bourland, or any other company be hunted down and shot for their desertion. These desertions served to greatly hinder the work of this relief column to the northern counties. This remedy, as all others in the past, failed to bring any lasting relief from the Indian problem.²⁷

²⁷Ibid., p. 218.
Texas' guerilla problems and her threatened position due to the actions of outside foes such as Indians and Mexicans was an acute one, and one which lasted throughout the war years. Her efforts to combat these enemies met with no great success, mainly due to ineptness on the part of the defense force raised to combat the hostile elements in question. Although no important military action involving Union or Confederate armies occurred on Texas soil, that state was often the battleground for desperate combat between lawless and hostile elements and the hard-pressed citizenry of Texas. Neither Union nor Confederate sympathizers were spared in this grim, uncompromising war within a war waged within the state borders.

Even less than Texas was the Indian Territory troubled by actual military campaigns, though the more irregular brands of warfare found a fertile field there. In reality, a diplomatic rather than military war was waged in Indian Territory at the start of the war. At the outbreak of the Civil War, both the Union and Confederate military commands recognized the desirability of having the various Indian tribes within the Indian Territory as either allies or else, as neutrals. Experiences in Indian campaigns in pre-war years made both sides see the possible disadvantages and dangers in having these Indians as enemies. Besides, having to conduct a campaign against Indians in the Indian Territory, while at the same time conducting a war against a determined white
enemy elsewhere, would create a situation which, through its strain on manpower, would put either army in an extremely awkward and dangerous position.

As far as relations and agreements with the Indians were concerned, the Confederates had much more positive results; having their agents on the scene in the Territory certainly aided them in this respect. The number of slave-holding Indians in the Territory was relatively few; in comparison with the slave-holding elements of the southeastern states, they were an infinitesimal number. But when war finally came, the agents of the Confederacy wasted little time in persuading the Indians to join with them in an alliance with the Davis government. These Confederate agents painted a glowing picture for the Indians, promising them numerous advantages and rewards should they cast their lot with the South. As early as February 1861, Confederate agents from Texas contacted representatives of the Five Tribes for talks over possible alliance with the Confederate states in the event of war. The Choctaws and Chickasaws seemed favorably inclined toward such a treaty. The Creeks after some deliberation did not feel too adverse toward the idea. The Cherokees and Seminoles were a bit more temporizing in their examination of the possible alliance.29

The Federals did not make any serious attempts to draw the Indians within the Territory closer to the Union cause.

29 Ibid., p. 201.
until after the war had actually started. At that time, Caleb B. Smith, Lincoln's Secretary-of-the-Interior, called for United States troops to be stationed in the Indian Territory for the purpose of safeguarding the rights and property of those Indians who were remaining loyal to the Union cause. The purpose of this move was defeated through the Union evacuation of Fort Arbuckle during the early period of the war. This made many of the Indians feel that their former friends were deserting them in the face of danger. This feeling of desertion and betrayal played into Confederate hands in their efforts to insure the cooperation of the tribes in the territory.

The Indian tribes actually did not want to serve either side in the war, but were more or less drawn into the conflict due mostly to determined and ceaseless Confederate efforts. To better facilitate their dealings with the Indians, the Confederate government set up the Office of Indian Affairs to handle all matters pertaining to the hoped-for alliance with the territorial tribes. By the end of May, 1861, Captain Albert Pike, of the Confederate army, was given authority to begin negotiations with the Indians in the Indian Territory for an alliance with the South. He was to be aided in this by the Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Dave Hubbard.

31 Ibid.
The Knights of the Golden Circle through varying means, lent their hand in easing the task facing Pike and Hubbard. While the Choctaws were quite receptive toward an alliance with the Confederacy, the Creeks and Cherokees were divided in their attitudes, a division which presented quick decisions. This reluctance was also shared by the proud Seminoles. Cherokee chief, John Ross was against any such alliance and influenced his sub-chiefs and people in this opinion. The sudden appearance of Confederate troops on the borders of the Cherokee country threw some of the sub-chiefs into great consternation. While John Ross held firm in his resolve, many of his sub-chiefs signed military agreements with the Confederacy mindful of the Confederate troop concentration on the border. Shortly afterwards, in July, 1861, the Lower Creek Nation signed an alliance with Pike. The chief of the Upper Creek nation, Opothleyahola, and his followers, never signed a treaty with Pike and never accepted the one signed by the Lower Creeks as legal and binding. 33 Eventually, the various Indian tribes in the Indian Territory were drawn into the war by the actions of Pike and the Confederate agents working with him. As the war dragged on, the Indians were the ones to suffer more greatly as a result of the conflict.

Although their numbers would have swelled the Confederate ranks in various battle areas, Pike never advocated sending the various Indian regiments into service outside of the

33 Theburn, p. 321.
Indian Territory. At one time, however, he did make a statement that scattered bands of Indians should be sent over the border into Kansas to harass and raid Union supply lines, troops, and Unionist sympathizers.  

This proposal was never given any concerted support or credence, mainly due to the rather disappointing quality of the Indians as regular soldiers. Confined to activities within their own borders for the most part, although some were used in Arkansas, Missouri, and Kansas, the Indians contributed very little of any value to the Confederate war effort. The Indian's indifferent rejection of a soldier's life and discipline left a great deal to be desired. Certain individual Creeks, Seminoles, and Chickasaws actually changed their loyalties several times, aligning themselves first with one side then another, depending on whether the Union or the Confederacy was riding the crest of military success at the moment. 

The battle and results of Pea Ridge, Arkansas, brought a sudden upsurge in Union enlistments among the Indians. This became a common practice among the tribes in the territory.

Internal turmoil in Indian Territory was greatly aided by the break down of police power in the various Indian nations. Only the Choctaw nation, committed to only one side, and as a result of this, united among themselves, was relatively free from the violent internal upheavals and

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35 McReynolds, p. 203.
confusions sweeping through the Indian Territory at that time. In the other Indian Nations; crimes of violence, theft, molestation of women and children, and cattle stealing were only a small part of the serious dangers facing the Indian and white inhabitants of the Indian Territory during the war years. Not a few of the Indians seized the opportunity afforded by the troubled times to conduct raids and allied operations.

One of these in particular achieved prominence through its raids and sudden attacks, the band of the Cherokee Stand Watie. This Cherokee chieftain heavily endorsed Pike's treaty with his people. In his support of the Confederacy he led his warriors in attacks against Union supply and communications after inflicting severe damage. His raids often extended north of the Arkansas River. By 1862, Stand Watie's raids had become so much of a problem and source of danger that Union Colonel William Phillips was ordered to stop the Cherokee's raids before any serious consequences could develop. Phillips before the war had been quite expert in the construction of fortifications. He soon put this talent to work in his efforts to stem the success of Stand Watie. On April 24, 1863, Stand Watie and his band carried out an attack against Fort Gibson, newly fortified by Colonel Phillips. In the ensuing attack, Fort Gibson stood off the Cherokee assaults well, the new fortifications erected by Phillips proving too sturdy for the Indians to breach. After
several futile attempts to breach the walls, the Cherokees made a dignified withdrawal from the fort. 36

Following his repulse at Fort Gibson, Stand Watie then turned most of his attention to raiding north of the Arkansas River, where he was quite active, inflicting heavy damage up to the end of the war. In one such raid he attacked a supply train under General James G. Blunt at Cabin Creek, Arkansas. The convoy of 218 wagons, and forty ox-teams drove the raiders off but not until a serious amount of damage had been inflicted. 37

The unsettled internal conditions in the Territory gave rise to even more violent conditions than existed in the southwest before the war. Lawless raiders made frequent forays into the territory to plunder and rob. Many times, their victims were camps of Unionist Indians. Following one such raid on a band of Unionist Shawnees, a band of about ninety-six Indians, seventy Shawnees and twenty-six Delawares carried out a reprisal raid on the Wichita Agency on Sugar Creek, north of the Washita River. In their sudden, unexpected raid, the raiders killed Indian agent Matthew Leeper and three other white men. A band of armed Confederate Indians, on the agency grounds escaped the raiders before they could be cut down. The Indians gathered some one hundred ponies and $1200 in Confederate currency before they withdrew. No efforts to stop their withdrawal were attempted; their retreat was orderly

36McReynolds, p. 216.

and successful. On their return to Kansas, they caught sight of the Confederate Indian band that had been at the agency prior to their attack. As the group was encumbered with women and children, they were easily overtaken, and butchered. One hundred out of 150 Indians were killed by the Unionist raiders.

Later in February, 1863, the Cherokees repudiated their treaty with the Confederacy, apparently feeling that cause was a lost one. The repudiation of this treaty left only Stand Watie and his band to do the bulk of the scouting and skirmishing activity. This type of warfare appealed to the Cherokees. So adept at this form of activity were the Indians, that Colonel James Cooper recommended that they be employed solely as guerrilla forces. This proposal was never given serious consideration.

Raids by Union bands of Indians within the Territory was not the only trial that Confederate Indians and sympathizers had to endure. Cattle stealing expeditions from Kansas grew quite common. Colonel William Phillips did not approve of this activity and often voiced his disapproval, but his protest was never heeded. In an effort to cut down on the cattle-stealing raids, Phillips issued a general order designed to close the border to the Kansas raiders. This

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38 McReynolds, p. 215.
40 Ibid.
41 Thoburn, p. 356.
This order was also completely effective. The cattle raids continued until the end of the war and for some time afterward.

The more notorious guerillas chieftans did not neglect the Indian Territory in their sphere of operations. William Quantrill operated throughout the Territory during the war. Following his Lawrence raid, in October, 1863, Quantrill ambushed a supply train under General Blunt enroute from Fort Scott at Baxter Springs, Kansas. After finishing his mopping up activity on the supply train, Quantrill guided his force down into the Indian Territory. As they traveled through the Cherokee nation, they killed outright any Indians or Negroes they happened to meet. This move to a pre-designated hiding place near the northern bank of the Canadian River was probably inspired by the execution of General Ewing's Order Number Eleven, then in effect in western Missouri.

This visit to Indian Territory was certainly not the first Quantrill raid. In August and September, 1862, he conducted a series of raids against the herds of horses and cattle held by the Shawnee chieftain, Black Bob, in his lands adjoining the Kansas border. By this time, the Confederate government had assumed responsibility for Quantrill's actions. Still, they made no effort to stop his damaging

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42Abel, p. 304.
43Ibid.
raids against the Shawnees. This attitude seemed strange especially after their efforts earlier in the war to win the Indians over to their side.

The violent internal confusion and turmoil which gripped the Indian Territory following the outbreak of the war, persisted and steadily worsened through 1864. Unionist refugees from Kansas seeking asylum in a relatively quiet theatre of operations found themselves subjected to attacks and raids from Confederate partisan military groups based in the western counties of Arkansas and Missouri. Lawless elements grew in numbers each month, their ranks swelled by deserters and fugitives from the law or guerilla bands. As their numbers grew, so did the conditions of anarchy in the Territory. No concerted military effort was undertaken at any period to remedy this state of affairs.

The raids of Stand Watie persisted through this period. His raids, however, were more of a military character than they were of the hit and miss guerilla strikes. Stand Watie’s operations in behalf of the Confederacy never faltered nor slackened during this latter period of the war. His capture of a Federal steamer at the mouth of the Canadian River, and his raids on Tahlequah and Park Hill following the Confederate reverses at Honey Springs, were his most significant achievements at this time. The swift-moving Cherokee continued his

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44 Ibid., p. 205.

45 McReynolds, p. 219.
raids through 1864, and well into the summer of 1865. When finally brought to bay, he surrendered his band to a Federal force.

Save for the activities of Stand Watie, military activity of any kind on an organized basis was non-existent. Cattle raiders from Kansas, lawless highwaymen, wandering bands of Indians, border ruffians, and occasional guerilla forays from Missouri or Arkansas describes the disturbed picture of the Indian Territory during the closing months of the war. These and similar conditions persisted long after the war when the careers of many western bad men were intertwined with the history of the Indian Territory.

Thus in the Southwest, as in other areas, the guerilla and bushwhacker was a potent force that had to be reckoned with all during the war years. His numbers and activities often created such a severe disruption of internal stability within a state that the efforts to drive him out or else limit his effectiveness often constituted a separate war within a war. The guerilla's contributions to the over-all military effort were virtually nil as he was mostly concerned with the prospects of easy plunder afforded by the troubled times. Efforts to portray the Civil War guerilla as a swashbuckling, romantic, hero are unrealistic and completely out of keeping with the character of most guerilla leaders and warriors. Possibly the only true picture that
could be drawn of the guerilla during the Civil War era would be that of a man who preferred to live by his own wits and off the plunder and booty he managed to take in his raids and ambushes. Far from being the romantic character of historical fiction, the Civil War guerilla was more often than not, an unprincipled person whose dangerous life imbued him with a jungle-like attitude of self-preservation above all else. In that respect he was little different from the common soldier of that or any other time. Guerilla warfare often appears more romantic and dashing when viewed from a distance of many years; at the time it is actually operating however, it is usually viewed in a much less favorable light. This is more true perhaps of the guerilla of the Civil War era than of any other period. Once the romantic filth has been removed from his deeds and activities, the Civil War guerilla appears to be like any other man of that era, perhaps a little more vicious in his brand of warfare, but certainly, by no stretch of the imagination, a dashing hero.
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