Human factors review for nuclear power plant severe accident sequence analysis Page: 3 of 17
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The purposes of this project, which was
sponsored by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), were to: (1) support the
nuclear power plant severe accident sequence
analysis (SASA) program, and (2) develop a
descriptive model of operator response in acci-
dent management. The first goal was accomp-
lished by working with SASA analysts on the
postulated boiling water reactor (BWR) antici-
pated transient without scram (ATWS) at Browns
Ferry Unit One and providing a systematic
assessment of critical operator actions. This
assessment demonstrates potential contributions
to SASA analyses from human factors data and
methods. The second goal was accomplished by
developing a function oriented accident manage-
ment (FOAM) model, which serves both as a con-
ceptual structure for identifying needs and
deficiencies and as a method for developing
technical operator guidance in accident manage-
ASSESSMENT OF OPERATOR ACTIONS DURING ATMS
The purpose of this section is to discuss
the approach and results of both the qualita-
tive and quantitative human factors assessments
of operator actions during an ATWS. The human
factors assessment was focused to some extent
by concerns of SASA analysts in their accident
sequence analysis (Harrington and Hodge, 1984).
The SASA analysis considered operator actions
in the context of new symptom-based Emergency
Procedure Guidelines (EPGs). Because the EPGs
were still in the review process, both the SASA
and human factors analyses were limited to
using the best information available on the
EPGs at the time the analyses were conducted.
The following discussions describe the
EPGs with an identification of operator actions
critical to the progression of an ATWS, show
how these critical operator actions underwent a
systematic qualitative review, and summarize a
quantitative human reliability analysis (HRA)
of some of these actions.
Critical Actions in the EPGs
Event-based emergency procedures require
control room operators to first diagnose the
type of transient before taking corrective ac-
tions. The symptom-based EPGs attempt to
reduce the cognitive workload associated with
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Krois, P.A. & Haas, P.M. Human factors review for nuclear power plant severe accident sequence analysis, article, January 1, 1985; Tennessee. (digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1070510/m1/3/: accessed January 23, 2019), University of North Texas Libraries, Digital Library, digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.