

EUROPEANIZATION AND THE RISE OF EXTREMIST PARTIES

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The research question addressed by this study is: what is the relationship between Europeanization and the rise of extremist parties? In particular I examine the impact of Europeanization on the rise of extreme right parties in Europe from 1984 to 2006.

Europeanization in this paper is defined as a process whereby the transformation of governance at the European level and European integration as a whole has caused distinctive changes in domestic politics. This process of Europeanization is one part of a structure of opportunities for extremist parties (which also include social, economic, and electoral factors). Although this study finds that Europeanization does not have a statistically significant effect it is still an important factor when examining domestic political phenomenon in Europe.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Recently Europeanization (and its effects) has emerged as an exciting new area of research in European political studies. Europeanization as a field of study is rooted in the scholarly realization about the growing influence of the European Union. Since its foundation as the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, the transnational organization now known as the European Union has grown ever stronger and more powerful (despite the current fiscal crisis).

Europeanization as a process affects in some way almost every aspect of domestic politics, including the workings of political parties, and as I argue, is enhancing the number and electoral strength of extremist parties. Though there has been extensive work on European political parties in the extant literature, little has been done to investigate the role of Europeanization in political party development. This is rather surprising when one considers the growing literature that has emerged on the effects of the Europeanization on Euroscepticism, the organization of political structures, and the changing role of the nation-state. This study aims to help fill this gap in the literature and to gain new knowledge of the nature of extremist party growth and success.

Over the past several decades the number of extremist parties in Europe has been on the rise. With parties such as Jean-Marie Le Pen's Front National becoming major contenders in presidential and parliamentary elections in France, the need to understand this rise of extremism has become an important issue. The question thus becomes what has caused this surge in extremist parties? What has changed in the political climate that would cause voters to turn to parties that previously had been on the distant margins of the political scene? The answer is

important to understand the modern political environment in Europe as well as to predict the future course of public policy within Europe, such as the future of European integration and the European Union (where many extremist parties have taken extreme pro or anti-European stances). Even though these extremist parties are often small they still have the ability to influence national policy, for “particularly in multiparty systems, small parties can weigh (heavily) on national policies and social values, even if in (semi-)permanent opposition” (Mudde 2007: 2).

The main research question this study poses is what has caused the rise of extremist parties in recent years in the industrialized, modern countries of Europe? Although often cited factors such as electoral factors and level of unemployment do have an effect on the number and strength of extremist parties within a country, another factor gaining greater currency in the literature is Europeanization. This thesis seeks to empirically assess the impact of Europeanization on the political success and strength of extremist parties in Europe.

Europeanization has loosely been defined by previous scholars as a process where European politics affects domestic politics (Börzel and Risse 2000; Buller and Gamble 2002). Europeanization, however, is much more than just this. In this thesis Europeanization is considered as a new branch in the structure of opportunities for extremist parties vying for a place in domestic and European politics. Extremist parties will be defined for the purposes of this study as those parties of the extreme right that are traditionally considered radical parties (those who are classified as such by The Chapel Hill Expert Survey) mainly nationalist parties and right/populist parties.

Though some effects of Europeanization on political parties have been studied (Ladrech 2002; Mair 2000) Europeanization has not been examined as a possible cause of the rise of

extremist parties within and across Europe. Certainly, there have been studies that have examined the impact of economic and social factors on the rise of political extremism, including GDP per capita, level of unemployment, percentage of immigrants as a proportion of the population, and type of electoral system (single-member district versus proportional representation) (Jackman and Volpert 1996; Golder 2003; De Vries and Edwards 2009). However not one study of which I am aware has examined the impact of transnational processes like Europeanization and the rise of extremist parties in either number or electoral strength, the innovation in this study.

In testing the effects of Europeanization on domestic politics I expect to find that as Europeanization grows so will the number and strength of extremist parties, especially those that are opposed to further European integration. This idea implies that more than just the commonly cited factors, such as level of unemployment and immigration, GDP per capita, and electoral system have effects on the number and vote share of extremist political parties of the radical right, and even more importantly it implies that Europeanization itself has an effect on even the most basic of domestic political features.

In the case of political parties, this process could result in more and/or stronger extremist parties, which could have enormous effects on the political system of every European country. For example, mainstream parties might be forced to acknowledge issues that extremist parties prioritize and may begin rethinking their stances on several key European-wide issues such as immigration and European Integration. As Meguid states (2005) “by adopting either an accommodative or an adversarial strategy, the mainstream party is prioritizing the niche party's issue dimension and including it within the mainstream political debate” helping the single- issue niche party (Meguid 2005: 357; see also Jackman and Volpert 1996). A greater number of

politically strengthened extremist parties could also mean more political instability for Europe which would have obvious economic ramifications, particularly in these troubled economic times. Thus extremist parties, especially in connection with Europeanization, must be considered a new and important research agenda that future scholars should continue to and even more intensely study.

This thesis is thus organized in the following manner--- chapter 2 discusses the background material including a short history of the European Union, what it means to be an extremist party, and the history of extremism in selected cases; chapter 3 consists of the literature review and theory sections where the literature on Europeanization, Euroscepticism, and extremist parties is analyzed then incorporated into a theory that attempts to explain the connection between Europeanization and extreme right parties; chapter 4 includes the design and methodology used to quantitatively test the two hypothesis put forth; and chapter 5 provides the summaries, conclusions and implications of the study.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND BASIC CONCEPTS

Before turning to the theoretical elements of this thesis an understanding of the background behind the institutions and actors involved is essential. History can often provide many clues and insights to current phenomenon that might seem unexplainable by current factors alone.

Before turning to the empirical analysis of the hypotheses laid out in chapter 1, it is necessary to first provide some historical context with regards to the changing political environment brought about by Europeanization, as well as to conceptualize and operationalize the elements of the theory presented in chapter 1.

First one must understand the history of the European Union itself, the founding organization that created the process of Europeanization as it is known today. The European Union is this year celebrating the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Paris, the document which officially launched the European experiment of international governmental integration. Over 50 years much has changed within this organization with each of these changes making the European Union stronger and helping to enhance its growing influence. To understand the organization's history is to better understand its influence, especially over domestic politics and in this case extremist parties in particular.

A Short History of the European Union

The beginning of the European Union itself starts with the end of World War II. Europe in 1945 had seen two catastrophic wars in less than half a century, both of which involved the historic adversaries, France and Germany. Robert Schuman, Jean Monnet and the other founders

of what would eventually be called the European Union, believed that the best way to prevent another devastating war from occurring would be to unite the economies of those former enemies. This would be a slow process, but they knew if successful, would make it almost impossible (or at least economically unfeasible) for the nations of Europe to go to war with each other again (EU 2011). The first step of this process, based on the Schuman Plan, was the European Coal and Steel Community, signed into creation in 1951, via the Treaty of Paris, with the six founding nations of France, West Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany), the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Italy (EU 2011). But it was the Treaty of Rome (1957) and the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom that really signaled the beginning of something new, something truly substantial. The objective of this new body, the EEC, was to “integrate trade with a view to expansion” (EU 2011b) These two treaties, the Treaty of Paris and the Treaty of Rome formed the basic “constitution” of what would eventually be known as the European Community and later the European Union (Mahant 2004: 25).

Part of what these communities were designed to do was take away some sovereignty and nationalism from the feuding powers. The founders and other elites felt that “the European nation-state appeared to have failed the Europeans, or worse led them astray” and that the “excesses of nationalism had led to indescribable crimes and destructive wars” (Mahant 2004: 10). By creating this economic union (and eventually a political union) it was believed that these vices could be avoided and peace permanently restored to Europe, but they (founders such as Jean Monnet) knew it would be a long process, one that would take decades to see through to fruition. Each new treaty and each enlargement deepened and widened the Community, with each stage leaving behind it a larger more powerful institutional structure than before.

The next major step towards European unification after the Treaties of Paris and Rome came with the accession of three new member states in 1972, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark. The French, under de Gaulle, had long fought the admittance of the United Kingdom into the European communities (likely due to the French fear of another major and often conflicting regional power influencing the actions of the union), but the eventual admittance of the UK was ultimately inevitable if the union was to grow and truly become an 'ever closer union' as proposed in the Treaty of Rome (EU 2011 b). The Community again increased its membership in 1981 with the accession of Greece and in 1986 with the accession of Spain and Portugal. The next expansion would not occur until 1995, introducing Austria, Finland, and Sweden as new members of the European Union. As more and more nations applied to become members the reputation and importance of the union grew not only in the eyes of Europeans but the world.

Another major step for the EC was the direct election of representatives to the European Parliament which occurred in June of 1979 (EU 2011). This step was one of the first towards the goal of reducing the democratic deficit that had plagued the EC in the minds of the public. Even with these direct elections the people did not have much actual say in the day to day happenings of the EC, for Parliament lacked much real power, until the passage of the Single European Act in 1986 with the creation of a cooperation procedure (EU 2011b). The Single European Act (SEA) was the single largest reform treaty up until that point. With this treaty's goal of a single market, as well as the "extension of qualified majority voting, the growth of the European Parliament, and the expansion of Community powers, notably in the economic and monetary fields, the environment and research." The SEA changed the European institutional structure profoundly (EU 2011b). With each additional treaty came additional powers and responsibilities

as well as influence for the European Community/Union among the member nations. The next major advancement toward true European unification was not too far off, coming in 1992.

One of the most important events in the history of the European Union was the Maastricht Treaty (1992). It changed the entire structure of the EU and added new institutions to what had formerly just been the EC (European Community), marking “the changeover to the political dimension of European construction” (EU 2011b). The pillar system was created with this treaty where the pre-existing communities were the first pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) the second, and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) the third. The Maastricht Treaty formally renamed the EEC the EC and created the name of the European Union for this new larger supranational institution (EU 2011b). The treaty also created a new monetary unit, the Euro and established European citizenship among other innovations (EU 2011b). This treaty paved the way for what the European Union is today, a supranational institutional unlike any other in the world. The European Union became an organization whose official influence covered not only the economic matters of Europe, but also domestic political matters as well, and eventually (if inadvertently) even affecting domestic political parties within the member nations themselves.

Two other important treaties following Maastricht were the Treaties of Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2001). The Treaty of Amsterdam focused mainly on creating “a high level of employment and the coordination of employment policies,” but it also reinforced the expanding powers of Parliament and maybe most importantly “provided for the opening of new negotiations paving the way to the institutional reforms necessary with a view to enlargement” (EU 2011b). The Treaty of Nice was in essence an extension of the Treaty of Amsterdam wrapping up the institutional issues connected with EU enlargement that were not settled in 1997

(EU 2011b). With all this preparation it was undoubted that the Union would soon be greatly expanding in size.

Soon after Nice the admittance of ten new countries into the European Union occurred (2004), eight from central and eastern Europe (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia) and two Mediterranean countries (Malta and Cyprus) (EU 2011). This was by far the largest expansion to date. Only three years later the last and most recent expansion of members occurred in 2007, with the admittance of Bulgaria and Romania as new members of the European Union (EU 2011). Each expansion brought with it several challenges especially the 2004 expansion which included ten new member countries, raising the total number of members dramatically. After each expansion several changes had to be made to the basic structures of the main institutions and policies of the European Union so as to be able to support the needs of these countries and to make sure that the European Union worked as efficiently as possible. Most recently, the Lisbon Treaty of 2007 was meant to streamline those workings of the European Union after the recent expansions. The failed constitutional attempt of 2004 had spurred this development of the Lisbon Treaty, a treaty whose purpose was and still is to fill in the gaps the failed constitution left.

From its very beginnings the European Community/European Union, was a very ambitious project. Jean Monnet, the founder of the European Union, had great expectations for Europe stating that “la création des Etats-Unis d’Europe a commencé,” (the creation of a United States of Europe has commenced) (Monnet, 1964). By the end of 2010 the European Union has grown to heights only dreamed of by its founders. It is a constantly evolving body whose influence has spread far and wide. The EC/EU was created with the intention of ensuring peace, but it became much more than a peace treaty, it became an organization that would unite Europe

economically and increasingly politically as well. But the system is far from perfect, there are still several areas of improvement that can be made such as with the CAP, parliamentary powers (decreasing the somewhat still present democratic deficit), and other areas related to efficiency.

It has become conventional wisdom that “it was the ideas of the French and German political elites which dominated the negotiations of the original Treaty of Rome, and that these ideas, passed on to succeeding generations of political elites in these same two countries, have continued to dominate not just the thinking, but the institutions and policies of the EC/EU” (Mahant 2004: 15-16). The history of the EU is of French and German led growth and expansion, and this is likely where its future is headed. These two countries are not only the historical founders of the Community, but are also the future of the European Union. The history of the European Union is vital to keep in mind whenever doing current research such as this for although “the EC/U is not completely chained by its history...it is fair to say that it carries its history around with it somewhat like a ball and chain” (McAllister 2010: 6). With its influence constantly growing, it is important to understand the past behavior of the European Union and the possible effects it could have not just in a global economy but on its own member nations’ domestic political affairs.

Table 1. EU Membership by Year	
Year of EU Expansion	New Member States
1952	France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg
1973	United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark
1981	Greece
1986	Spain, Portugal
1990	Germany (united)
1995	Austria, Finland, Sweden

2004	Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia
2007	Romania and Bulgaria
Source: http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/index_en.htm Note: Although expansions occurred in 2004 and 2007 these countries are not included in the quantitative analysis since they are outside the boundaries of this study.	

For convenience a table and map are presented of the years of European expansion and a map of the European Union as of 2004, including all the countries in this study.

Figure 1. Reference Map of EU as of 2004



Source: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/eu/>

As the European Union has grown so has the process of Europeanization. This growth in influence has caused political parties to change and adjust and I argue has caused the number of and strength of extreme right parties to grow. What is ironic is that one of the hoped for side-effects of this union was to deter political extremism, for it was believed that prosperity “in turn was vital both to underpin postwar welfare states and to fend off political extremisms of left and right” (McAllister 2010: 2). As it has deepened and widened in influence and membership over

time, the European Union has become a compelling force that has affected the everyday lives of European citizens and even affected (if inadvertently) the parties that attempt to represent them whether mainstream or extremist. In order to understand how this history of European integration and Europeanization can so affect extremist parties in particular one needs to understand what it means to be extreme, what differentiates extremist parties, both from mainstream parties and from each other. That is what is attempted in the rest of this chapter.

What Does It Mean to Be 'Extreme'?

Like any scale the political spectrum has extremes. For the political spectrum these extremes are most commonly labeled the extreme left and the extreme right where the extreme left mainly consists of communist and former communist parties as well as neo-anarchists and Trotskyites (Harrison 2007a: 213), while the extreme right includes a range of parties from nationalist parties to xenophobic parties and so on (Harrison 2007b: 218). Parties of the extreme left were once the rulers of almost half of Europe while the Iron Curtain was still up, but since its fall over two decades ago most of these parties have either dissolved or become highly weakened, forced to reinvent themselves in order to survive (Harrison 2007a: 213). As such they are not seriously thought of as major contenders in most modern European elections. The extreme right on the other hand has prospered in recent decades and has become a contending force in many European national elections.

For the purposes of this study it is the extreme right to which I pay attention. While the extreme left has shrunk after the end of the Cold War, the extreme right has seen at least some success in both Western and Eastern Europe (Mudde 2007: 3). Mudde argues in his 2007 book that “there are clearly political parties on both sides of the former Iron Curtain that share a

similar ideological core, which we refer to here as populist radical right, justifying their inclusion in one study” (Mudde 2007: 4). The same cannot be said for those parties of the extreme left.

What then is an extreme right party? What are its characteristics? One could use a minimalist definition meaning that one would “describe the core features of the ideologies of all parties that are generally included in the party family” (Mudde 2007: 15). Cas Mudde argues that the core concept of a minimalist definition of a radical right party is nationalism, or more specifically nativism which he defines as “an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state” (Mudde 2007: 19). This concept is one that fits with most of the parties considered extreme, especially the infamous *Front National*. Bonnie Meguid also offers a list of qualities of the radical right stating that “radical right parties followed ... demanding the protection of (patriarchal) family values and a nationally oriented, immigrant-free way of life” (Meguid 2005: 348). Other proposed features include authoritarianism (“the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely”) and populism (where nothing is more important than the “general will” of the citizenry) (Mudde 2007:23). Another frequently found feature (though not a required feature) is a Eurosceptic stance on European integration. This feature is of interest to this study, but extreme right parties were not excluded if they did not possess this feature.

The extreme right parties in this study are identified by the widely used Chapel Hill Expert Survey. While authors such as De Vries and Edwards define extremist parties as those parties which are “one standard deviation below or above the mean left/right ideological position of all parties in a country” (De Vries and Edwards 2009: 11), this definition is too broad for this

study. To say that a party is extreme just due to its 'overall' distance from an arbitrary point is theoretically and conceptually inadequate. For the purposes of this study, to be extreme the party in question should contain at least some of the features described by Mudde and/or Meguid and must be included in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey conducted from 1984 through 2006 by several notable academics including Leonard Ray, Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks as well as several others. Only those parties of the radical right will be included in this study.

It would a mistake to assume that the extreme right has not developed and transformed over time. Piero Ignazi suggests that there are have been historically two types of extreme right parties, the traditional right-wing parties, including the Italian MSI, and the new postindustrial extreme right, including parties such as the French FN, where these new postindustrial parties are defined as postindustrial "because they are byproducts of the conflicts of postindustrial society, in which material interests are no longer so central and bourgeoisie and working class are neither so neatly defined nor so radically antagonistic" (Ignazi 2002: 27). Prior to the 1980s there was really only one kind of extremism well-known in the political arena, that of neo-fascism, since the "only relevant party which declared itself as representing the 'extreme right' up to then- the Italian Movimento Social Italiano (MSI)(Italian Socialist Movement)-openly exhibited a direct lineage with pre-war fascism" (Ignazi 2006: 1). It was during the 1980s when everything changed according to the scholar Piero Ignazi. This was when the number and strength of extreme right parties began to change where "The number of Western European extreme right parties which had entered the national or European parliament had passed from 6 at the beginning of the 1980s to 10 by the end of the 1980s, then arriving at 15 in the mid-1990s" (Ignazi 2006: 1). The success of extremist parties seemed to parallel that of the European Union itself as it grew in power, importance, and influence.

In was in the 1980s that this new kind of extremist party emerged, the postindustrial extreme right which “instead of revving the ‘palingenetic myth’ of fascism, provide[d] an answer to those demands and needs generated by-post industrial society which traditional parties ha[d] failed to address.” (Ignazi 2006: 2) These post-industrial needs and demands converged “in the defence of the natural community, at national or sub-national levels, from alien and polluting presence-hence racism and xenophobia- and respond to the identity crisis produced by atomization at the societal level, by globalization at the economic level, and by supra-nationalism at the political level” (Ignazi 2006: 2) It was also at that time in the 1980s that the European Union began to gain a new level of strength and authority in Europe which it had previously lacked. The European Union or European Community had even then a sizeable effect on the economy and other international issues of importance such as immigration (an issue which had formerly been handled domestically by each state). According to scholars Martin Schain, Astride Zolberg and Patrick Hossay this breakthrough by the radical right has “been explained by several large transformations in social and economic relations that have taken place in every country in Western Europe, the most important of which are changes in the economy, resultant attitudinal patterns, and immigration and the presence of immigrants” (Schain, Zolberg, and Hossay 2002: 9-10). Piero Ignazi suggests the historical connection between economic and industrial development and the rise in extreme right parties when he states:

The post-industrial development of Western societies and their most recent supranational tendencies, both economically and politically, have displaced a growing constituency of people whose lack of confidence in the face of such development has been the reason for their embracing an anti-liberal (authoritarian), anti-pluralist (monistic), and anti-egalitarian (xenophobic) world-view. It is precisely the view that is offered by extreme right parties. (Ignazi 2006: 218)

Unlike the fascist parties of old, these new radical right parties were not what would have been considered anti-system or anti-regime though “by focusing on a radical reinterpretation of

what constitutes the nation, they do challenge accepted notions of the political community” (Schain, Zolberg, and Hossay 2002: 8). These parties want to work within in the system for the most part and not completely dismantle it as did the extreme parties of old. Though their own individual histories vary each country in Europe has seen some sort of change in the number and strength of extreme right parties, especially since the 1980s when this new type of extremist party appeared. In the next section the cases of particular importance will be addressed.

Some National Examples

Each country has its own experiences with the extreme right. To illustrate some of these patters of development I examine in the following section the experiences of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy.

When many think of extremist party success in Europe they often think first of the Front National in France which until recently was headed by Algerian War veteran Jean-Marie Le Pen. In the past several elections this party has shown more national success than almost any other in Europe though its seats in either the European or national Parliament still remain limited. Although the party was founded in 1972 its real success did not start until the 1980s (Hossay 2002: 326) The Front National or National Front (FN) has historically had a program that focused on “the typical populist issues of immigration, law-and-order policies, Euro-skepticism, support for the free market, and tax reform” (Hossay 2002: 328). Despite Le Pen’s lieutenant Bruno Megret eventually splitting the party in 1998 (taking the majority of the party’s cadre with him), Le Pen has still proved more popular overall with respectable showings in recent presidential elections including a second round election appearance in 2002 against President Jacques Chirac (Hossay 2002: 328-329). Though other parties that could be considered extreme

do or have existed in France, the *Front National* is the only French extreme right party to see any real success.

Germany is currently one of the most economically successful countries in Europe and as such is of more importance in the political happenings in Europe than most. In Germany there has been no party quite like the National Front of France in terms of singular success. The extreme right parties of Germany have a history of fragmentation and uneven success. Prior to unification there were mainly three parties and this trend continued even after the end of the Cold War and the establishment of a unified Germany. In Germany the extreme right “gained some support in the wake of unification, although the three right-wing parties in Germany [the Republicans, the National Democratic Party, and the German People’s Union] remained fragmented and marginal at the federal level” (Hossay 2002: 330). Support for these extreme right parties has gone up and down over the past two decades affecting at times different areas of national policy such as policy on asylum seekers and immigrants but they have failed to ever hold a strong electoral presence in united Germany (Hossay 2002:330-331). The Republicans or the REP have historically been the largest right-wing party of the three but their popularity has waned in recent years and has thus left an opening for other extreme right parties to take the lead in the future.

The United Kingdom is a unique case in many ways, considering themselves connected yet separate from the rest of the European continent. With their single-member district electoral or “first-past-the-post” system extreme parties of either the left or right have been allowed little success. In the UK “the extreme-right has been largely constrained to the fringe of British politics in recent years” (Hossay 2002: 344) One extreme party of some historical importance in Britain was the National Front (NF), created in 1967 as an alliance of several extreme factions

(Hossay 2002: 344-345). Along with the growth in other extremist movements of the 1980s throughout Europe, the British National Party was created as a breakaway party from the National Front in 1983 (Hossay 2002: 345). Most extreme parties in Britain have received little to no electoral success even at the height of extremist movement in the 1980s and 90s.

Italy was one of the founding members of the EU (along with France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). Italy has a unique party system in that it has several parties which are truly competitive in national and regional elections including a “diverse and influential collection of forces on the radical right” (Hossay 2002: 333). As mentioned earlier the only strong extreme right force prior to the 1980s was the Movimento Social Italiano or MSI. Today the MSI retains “the most clear links to Italy’s fascist past” even though it officially changed its name in the 1990s to the Alleanza Nazionale (Hossay 2002: 33-34). Two of the most powerful right-wing forces in Italy today are the Forza Italia (probably the single most influential) and the Lega Nord (made up of a coalition of northern regionalist associations) (Hossay 2002: 335).

Other countries as well have seen some extremist party success such as Austria and the Austrian Freedom Party or FPÖ which has shown to be the most electorally successful party in Europe (Hossay 2002: 318) and Belgian parties growing off the rising regional tensions between the Dutch speaking Flemish region and the French speaking Wallonia region. As Peter Merkl noted, “a host of extreme right-wing phenomena... are on the march all over Europe,” not just in the countries of interest in this study but *all over* Europe (Merkl 2003: 3). There is a strong possibility as I state in my theory that the number and strength of extreme right parties will if anything continue to grow, but as Martin Schain, Astride Zolberg, and Patrick Hossay state “even if the upstart party of the radical right does not endure, its impact can be important both in

terms of the policy agenda and the organization of the political system” (Schain, Zolberg, Hossay 2002: 14).

Chapter Summary

The history of the European Community and the European Union is in many ways connected to the history of extreme right parties in Europe. Though the body that would eventually become the European Union was started right after the end of WWII its importance to the greater European region at large grew exponentially mainly from the 1980s and forward. With the admittance of three new member states in the 1980s and an additional three in the 1990s as well as the passage of the Single European Act (1986), the Maastricht Treaty (1992), and the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) the European Community and larger European Union grew into an international force not only unlike any other in its previous history in its structure but in its influence. The influence of the European Union can be seen in several policy areas that were previously entirely domestic in governance, such as immigration policy (asylum seekers), monetary policy (The European Central Bank, the creation of the Euro), and even security (with the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defense Policy, see europa.eu). These areas of influence were intentional, but I argue that the European Union and Europeanization also have the ability to influence domestic institutions in unintended ways such as political party formation and even such parties’ electoral success. With membership in the European Union come many economic gains but also many limitations on national sovereignty and a certain pressure to conform to a ‘European way’ of handling governance and domestic institutions.

In the following chapter this background information is utilized to better understand the academic literature on Europeanization, extremist parties, and Euroscepticism and to create a

theory that attempts to explain the process of Europeanization and its effects on the number and strength of extreme right parties in Europe.

CHAPTER 3

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY

Literature Review

The underlying research question of this study is whether Europeanization can be used to explain the rise in both the strength and number of extremist parties within Europe in recent years. In the search for answers to such a multifaceted research question literature from many different but related fields and subfields involving Europeanization, political parties (both mainstream and extremist), and Euroscepticism must be addressed.

In order to discuss the effects of Europeanization on political parties, both mainstream and extremist one must first define Europeanization. There are several scholars who attempt to define Europeanization, although each tend to highlight different dimensions of the concept. Buller and Gamble's (2002) and Maarten Vink's (2002) definitions of Europeanization is a good place to start.

Buller and Gamble in their 2002 article summarize the various definitions of Europeanization found throughout the literature, specifically pointing out five different common definitions. The first definition they describe as "the development of institutions of governance at the European level" (Buller and Gamble 2002:10). The second, "to refer to examples where distinct European forms of organisation and governance have been exported outside Europe's territorial boundaries" (Buller and Gamble 2002:10). The third being "used to denote the achievement of the political unification of Europe" (Buller and Gamble 2002:11). The fourth they state as "a process whereby domestic politics becomes increasingly subjected to European policy-making" (Buller and Gamble 2002:13). And finally the fifth as being "the process whereby certain actors at the domestic level will encourage or at least acquiesce in European

integration as a way of either implementing domestic changes, or legitimising the status quo at home” (Buller and Gamble 2002:15-16). Buller and Gamble take from each of these common definitions to create their own definition of Europeanization as “a situation where distinct modes of European governance have transformed aspects of domestic politics” (Buller and Gamble 2002: 17). For the purposes of this research I will use their final definition; Europeanization is a process, one that must occur within Europe. The other definitions refer to other processes where a “Europe” is involved, but in a much different way than how the term is increasingly being used. This broad definition is best for it includes all the ways in which the broader European governance can affect the national politics of a country, while more simply limiting itself to one simple top-down direction. A more minimalist definition would inevitably exclude important aspects of European governance that could significantly affect the national politics of a member state and thus leave out important information vital to any thorough analysis of Europeanization. This definition is also not so expansive as to include aspects of and processes related to national and European governance that are not relevant to this study such as the effects of national politics on the broader European governance.

Maarten Vink is another well known scholar of European politics who attempts to define Europeanization. He first briefly defines Europeanization in his 2002 article “as domestic change caused by European integration” (Vink 2002: 1). Here Europeanization is not just considered a change in “the output of political systems (public policies) but also in the underlying structures and identities” (Vink 2002: 5). Importantly what Europeanization is not, is convergence, harmonization, or political integration. What is especially significant, he notes, is that the process of Europeanization is a cyclical process whereby domestic politics affects European politics (and the process of European integration) and European politics in turn affects domestic politics both

through the actions of policymakers and institutions as a whole. Though undoubtedly national politics do affect European governance and European governance in turn affects national politics, only the top-down part of this cycle is relevant to the study being conducted here.

For the purposes of the research agenda of this paper Europeanization will be defined in a way similar to the definition offered by Buller and Gamble and Vink above, as a process *where forms of governance at the European level and European integration as a whole have caused distinctive changes in domestic politics*, while keeping in mind Vink's assertion that Europeanization is a cyclical process. The definition presented here is closer to a maximalist definition of Europeanization. While a minimalist definition of Europeanization would involve simply "a response to the policies of the European Union", a maximalist definition would involve "structural change...exhibiting similar attributes to those that predominate in, or are closely identified with, 'Europe'" (Featherstone 2003: 3). A maximalist definition of Europeanization suits this study best since it would encompass broader effects on political parties and public opinion than would a minimalist definition.

So what domestic effects does Europeanization have on the national political scene? Börzel and Risse in their 2000 article establish two conditions required for change (as the result of Europeanization) to occur, "some degree of misfit" between domestic and European levels of politics and "some facilitating factors...responding to adaptational pressures" (Börzel and Risse 2000: 1). Börzel and Risse focus in this article on two pathways to domestic change grounded in two forms of institutionalist theory, rational and sociological. Rational institutionalists believe that new opportunities and constraints created by these new European institutions empower actors who have the capacity to exploit these opportunities and constraints (for example extremist parties). Sociological institutionalists on the other hand suggest that "Europeanization

leads to domestic change through a socialization and collective learning process resulting in norm internalization and the development of new identities” (Börzel and Risse 2000: 2). These two approaches are not mutually exclusive and mostly likely both explain part of what is going on in Europe. This general process which they lay out here can quite easily be applied to the study of the Europeanization of mainstream political parties and the subsequent rise of extremist parties that has occurred recently in Europe. One can see this by looking at extremist parties as rational actors willing to exploit the opportunities given by the effects of Europeanization on governments and mainstream political parties, while socially Europeanization has made it seem to much of the public that Europe is first and their nation second, escalating fears for their national identities. Mainstream parties are also guilty of norm internalization related to Europeanization where they have internalized the norms of the larger political union at the cost of close relations with their domestic publics. This disengaged relationship between mainstream parties and the public is possibly a potent cause of the rise of extremist parties in Europe. These two approaches likely explain much of the effect of Europeanization.

How Europeanization affects political parties more specifically has also been explored in different ways in the literature, where some look at changes in party organization that occur while others look at changes within party manifestos. Robert Ladrech proposes several areas of future research on Europeanization and political parties. Specifically he notes five areas where the effect of Europeanization on political parties may be seen “(1) policy/programmatic content; (2) organization; (3) patterns of party competition; (4) party-government relations; and (5) relations beyond the national party system” (Ladrech 2002: 396). For the purposes of my research agenda the first of these five areas is of the most interest for I argue that Europeanization has led the mainstream political parties in Europe to become more moderate

and essentially more EU focused and even includes the possibility that Europeanization could cause “increased factionalism or even new party formation” (Ladrech 2002: 400). This article provides a possibility on how to measure both quantitatively and qualitatively the level of Europeanization of political parties or how supportive they are of European integration.

In another article involving the study of political parties in Europe Peter Mair discusses “the impact of Europeanisation on the national party systems of the member states of the European Union” (Mair 2000: 27). The key word is *systems*, for Mair is not intending to analyze any effect of Europeanisation on individual political parties within a given state. Mair finds that “there is very little evidence of any direct impact on these features [their format and mechanics] of the party systems” (Mair 2000: 28), but finds that even if one only considers temporal coincidences that “one may associate Europeanisation with a major enlargement in the number of parties contesting domestic elections and with a quite pervasive change in the formats of national party systems” (Mair 2000: 30). This last point is significant to my research in that it notes that the increase in political parties (including more extremist parties as I argue) is in part possibly due to the process of Europeanization. Later he notes that “European integration increasingly operates to constrain the freedom of movement of national governments, and hence encourages a hollowing out of competition among those parties with a governing aspiration. As such, it promotes a degree of consensus across the mainstream and an inevitable reduction in the range of policy alternatives available to voters.” (Mair 2000: 48-49). This means that the mainstream parties are becoming more similar, clustering tightly around the center, which leaves openings for other outside-the-circle parties (extremist parties) to move in and become alternatives available to voters, which is in essence what I argue here. Though Mair finds evidence against change in party systems he still leaves open the possibility of Europeanization

having an effect on political party competition. This possibility is an important part of what is studied in this thesis.

The effects of Europeanization on political parties may also vary by region. Although mainly Western European countries are included as cases for this thesis, understanding the differences in the political histories of European countries and possible repercussions of such differences is still important. In his 2006 article Ishiyama examines the possible effects of Europeanization on the evolution of political parties in post-communist politics. Ishiyama notes that “Europeanization/European Integration is not simply the process by which greater political integration at the transnational level takes place. It also has something to do with the penetration of the European dimension into national arenas of politics and policy making” and thus is noting the increasing importance of the study of Europeanization (Ishiyama 2006: 5). Eventually Ishiyama finds that “contrary to expectations, a direct relationship exists between a transnational process such as Europeanization and the transformation of domestic political organizations such as political parties” but that “party transformation remains largely a function of domestic, internal factors as opposed to transnational forces” (Ishiyama 2006: 25). Through this article Ishiyama gives insights as to how the structure of modern political parties actually works and how they have the ability to be affected by a process such as Europeanization. With this logically established one can move on to look at how this might cause a rise in the number and strength of extremist parties.

My theory states that mainstream political parties are becoming more ideologically moderate and increasingly supportive of the issue of European integration (counter to the wishes of a growing segment of the population). If this is true some might wonder why this is so. Marks, Wilson, and Ray attempted in 2002 to empirically analyze four well-known arguments for party

position on European integration, including cleavage theory and strategic competition theory. One theory discussed is cleavage theory where cleavages “provide voters with manageable information about parties; they represent reputational investments that sustain a party’s credibility; they described deep-seated ideologies that structure electoral competition; and...they filter the response of parties to new issues that arise on the agenda” (Marks et al. 2002: 586). Part of their argument for the cleavage theory explanation (mentioned in an earlier article) is that “to the extent that orientations towards the European Union (EU) are weakly structured for individual citizens, it is unrealistic to believe that they may serve as powerful inducements for parties in determining their positions on the issue” (Marks et al. 2000: 435). In this they are stating that though the voter is important, they are not the deciding factor in how a party shapes its position towards all issues. I argue in my paper that it is not the public that has made mainstream parties in Europe become more moderate, but instead has been the influence of Europeanization.

The final theory Marks et al. discuss is the strategic competition theory in which parties “seek to defuse the salience of a new issue by taking median positions with respect to it, while parties that are peripheral will attempt to ‘shake up’ the system by taking extreme positions” (Marks et al. 2002: 588). This is what is said to be occurring on the issue of European integration where the mainstream parties adopt the median view while others take extreme pro or anti European integration stances in order to stand out. I add to this by arguing that mainstream parties take the median view also because they were the groups that helped to create the European Union and thus support it mainly, while peripheral parties are popping up more and more to represent the views of increasing numbers of voters that are Eurosceptic. I believe mainstream parties taking the median view often do support integration for those reasons but

cannot afford to be too vocal in their support for fear of offending the masses, who in some areas, compose the majority of citizens. Overall they find that “to the extent that electoral pressures influence party position on European integration, we find that they are filtered through preexisting ideologies” which in turn supports cleavage theory (Marks et al. 2002: 586). Though both these theories likely help to explain a party’s stance on European integration, they do not alone explain the recent rise of extremist parties which I believe Europeanization can help account for.

Another strand of literature must also be examined in order to explain the rise in extremist parties, that of public opinion as it relates to Euroscepticism. The average voter has also been affected by Europeanization, where Europeanization has polarized the opinion of such voters, especially to the side of Euroscepticism. The term Euroscepticism has been used to describe those who are skeptical of European integration whether for pragmatic or ideological reasons. Hooghe and Marks note in their 2007 article that Euroscepticism has existed on some scale for a while but that many including numerous intergovernmentalists have been surprised by the scope and intensity of Euroscepticism in modern public opinion. They discuss in particular three lines of inquiry, “One line of inquiry draws on the psychology of group membership to examine how identities including, above all, national identities, constrain support for European integration”, a second line “suggests that generalized political discontent or institutional distrust feeds Euroscepticism” and finally they “explore how Euroscepticism is cued by elites” (Hooghe and Marks 2007: 120-121). One important argument they make is that “on the political right, Euroscepticism is expressed in the criticism that the EU undermines national identity and national independence” while on the left “it is expressed in concerns about the effect of European integration on social protections and the European social model” (Hooghe and Marks

2007: 125). In this argument the “common thread” is that “the EU is conceived as a threat to the *status quo*” (Hooghe and Marks 2007: 125). Overall they believe that Euroscepticism “results from efforts by political actors to relate European integration to latent public feelings of cultural threat and economic loss” (Hooghe and Marks 2007: 125). This is exactly what extremist parties are doing, using people’s fears against them, especially as these fears apply to European integration and the European Union. Extremist parties often campaign on the promise to relieve unemployment and save the cultural identity of the nation (especially as this involves immigrants). As the EU has grown these perceived threats have grown and thus the number and strength of extremist parties.

Kopecky and Mudde, in an earlier article create a typology of political party support for the EU and/or European integration, differentiating between ‘Europenthusiasts’, ‘Europragmatists’, ‘Eurosceptics’, and ‘Eurorejects’ (Kopecky and Mudde 2002: 303). This article contributes by creating a “two-dimensional conceptualization of party positions on European integration in general, and of Euroscepticism in particular, distinguishing between *diffuse* and *specific* support for European integration” (Kopecky and Mudde 2002: 297). Of particular interest to my research they discuss the case of Poland where they find that political parties defend the accession process while much of the public is very skeptical and as such many ‘Eurosceptic’ parties and factions have shown up (Kopecky and Mudde 2002: 310). This is part of what I argue is happening in some other European countries as well, if on a smaller scale, where extremist parties are popping up to fill the need for Eurosceptic representation among the Eurosceptic masses. Kopecky and Mudde also ask the important question of “is a party’s position on European integration to be changed whenever it is deemed convenient, or is it grounded in the broader party ideology and thus less vulnerable to short-term political

considerations?” (Kopecky and Mudde 2002: 319). They find that strategy does matter to some extent but that ideology plays the main role, meaning that party positions are relatively stable regarding European integration, though not necessarily stagnant. Mainstream parties may still indeed be moderating and if so this could quite possibly cause a clash with the Eurosceptic public, causing the rise in extremist parties.

Extremist parties have also used European Integration as a way to gain power. As mentioned above, many in the population are becoming more and more Eurosceptic, mainly due to two issues, fear for their national identity and immigration. Catherine De Vries and Erica Edwards also describe this in some detail in their recent 2009 article and find that right-wing extremist parties mobilize feeling of national identity in their opposition to European integration, while left-wing extremist parties mobilize feels of economic anxiety in their opposition to European integration (De Vries and Edwards 2009: 5-6).

Hooghe and Marks again help to provide support for my theory in their later 2008 article where they attempt to substantiate three claims: “(a) European integration has become politicized in elections and referendums; (b) as a result, the preferences of the general public and of national political parties have become decisive for jurisdictional outcomes; (c) identity is critical in shaping contestation on Europe” (1). They note that “public opinion on European integration has become a field of strategic interaction among party elites in their contest for political power” (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 9). By this they mean that European integration has become, an issue of interest to the public, through politicization of European integration at the mass level, and that parties are using this to their advantage, including extremist parties. Hooghe and Marks go on to discuss how both the different extremes show a distinctive lack of support for European integration, but for very different reasons; where the right feared European integration believing

that it “undermines national community”, while the left feared changes in social protections (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 18).

Hooghe and Marks state that “a brake on European integration has been imposed not because people have changed their minds, but because, on a range of vital issues, legitimate decision making has shifted from an insulated elite to mass politics” (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 18). This might be why several more extremist parties have come into existence and/or strengthened over the past two decades. The elites are the mainstream parties that have existed for several years and even helped to build the European Union and as such almost automatically support European integration, while much of the public has been skeptical. With more areas of policy now having to go through the European Parliament or national referendum (ex. the Maastricht Accord) to be passed the skeptical public can now slow/speed up integration more as they wish. Since the elites are almost automatically EU friendly (become Europeanized), the public has supported extremist parties, especially those which support anti-European integration policy, to make up for the “elite-public gap” (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 21). Overall they find that “that most mainstream parties are more Euro-supportive than voters, that mainstream parties have tried and failed to depoliticize the issue, that major EU issues are orthogonal to economic left/right competition, and that the heat has been raised mainly by oppositional parties or factions, particularly those on the populist right and radical left” (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 21). This means that the rise in extremist parties that we have seen might be contributable to the effects of the European Union and Europeanization.

An important piece of the existing literature on extreme right parties is Golder’s 2003 article “Explaining Variation in the Success of Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe”. His is to examine not just what has caused success for extremist parties, but what has caused the

marked variation in the success of certain extremist parties over others. Golder separates extreme right parties into two groups “radical right” and “populist”, testing three hypotheses, a materialist hypothesis, an ideational hypothesis, and an instrumental hypothesis. Golder finds little evidence to support the instrumentalist argument in this case and finds “the effect of unemployment on populist parties is conditional on the level of immigration” (Golder 2003: 460). He attempts to explain the above mentioned variation as a consequence of the effects of “electoral institutions, unemployment and immigration” together (Golder 2003: 432). Thus Golder points to some important control variables to consider.

Although it is true that much of the literature currently in existence focuses only on those parties of the radical right without attempting to answer for the variation on the other end of the ideological spectrum, there is still plenty that can be learned from these studies of extreme right parties. In Jackman and Volpert’s 1996 study “Favoring Parties of the Extreme Right in Western Europe” they find that three conditions are particularly important for the success of extremist parties. They first find that “increasing electoral thresholds dampen the support for the extreme right as the number of parliamentary parties expand” (Jackman and Volpert 1996: 501). Secondly they find that “multi-partism increasingly fosters parties of the extreme right with rising electoral proportionality” (Jackman and Volpert 1996: 501). Lastly they look at the effects of unemployment and find that “higher rates of unemployment provide a favorable environment for these political movements” (Jackman and Volpert 1996: 501). Jackman and Volpert also discuss the effects of extremist parties on politics, mainly on political stability and the political agenda (Jackman and Volpert 1996: 503). In essence I am arguing that though these other factors do play a role in the rise of extremist parties as parts of the structure of opportunities, that

another part to this structure has been created with invention of the European Union, Europeanization.

To understand the rise in extremist parties one must know some of the history of extremism and its causes in the past. Hans-George Betz in his 1993 article titled “The New Politics of Resentment: Radical Right-Wing Parties in Western Europe” discusses not only the history of these extreme right parties, but also the possible causes of these parties. Starting in the 1960’s Betz notes the “resurgence of ideological turbulence in the late 1960’s, rising social conflicts in the 1970’s, and the spread of mass protest by new social movements in the 1980’s were symptoms of a profound transformation of Western European politics” (Betz 1993: 413). Though Betz discusses this history mostly referring to national politics, it is interesting to note that the timeline of resentment he discusses starts in the 1960’s and grew through the 70’s and 80’s, as did the process of European Integration via the European Community. It seems almost simultaneous to this growing resentment by the masses that the European Union grew and as such it seems very plausible (though not studied by Betz here) that Europeanization could also have been a cause to the rise of these extremist parties. Betz discusses how established parties were accused by the radical right as “having constructed, to the detriment of the average citizen, an all encompassing system sustained by interventionism, clientelism, and favoritism” (Betz 1993: 418). These accusations seem to be supported by public opinion which in 1989 said that “almost half of the Italian public and 35 percent of the French thought the established parties were absolutely incapable of representing them on the major issues” (Betz 1993: 419). According to Betz the extreme right has obtained so much support through the differences mentioned above, as well as economic and social bases, attracting both winners and losers of the accelerated modernization process.

Thus the above literature suggests several possible causal factors for the rise of extremist parties, including unemployment, immigration, and other electoral, economic, and social factors. Almost all of these factors are included in my theory as parts of a structure of opportunities for extremist parties, including and most importantly Europeanization. The following section will explain the basic theoretical structure of this thesis.

Theory

Extremist parties have historically been on the fringes of mainstream politics, as outsiders looking in, but recently their fortunes seem to have changed and their influence has grown. As noted above, several scholars suggest that this has something to do with the changing structure of opportunities that has emerged as a result of Europeanization. Europeanization in this paper is defined as a process whereby forms of governance at the European level and European integration as a whole have caused distinctive changes in domestic politics. Europeanization has greatly affected the political climate in Europe, even among political parties. This process of Europeanization is part of the structure of opportunities facing extremist parties. Other factors include economic factors (GDP per capita, unemployment), social factors (immigration, ethnic fractionalization), and electoral factors (mainly district magnitude).

Here Europeanization is seen as mainly a top-down process where pressure is put on domestic groups, such as political parties to become more Europeanized (in the case of mainstream political parties more moderate). I argue that Europeanization has had an ideologically moderating effect on mainstream political parties, clustering them around the ideological center of the left-right spectrum, while simultaneously having a polarizing effect on the voter. The resulting divergence between the mainstream political parties and the average

voter has created a branch of opportunity for extremist parties on both ends of the political spectrum to enter mainstream politics as real competitors to the dominant conventional parties such as the Labor and Conservative parties in Great Britain.

Since many of the current mainstream political parties in Europe are those that helped to create the European Union, they are some of its biggest advocates. This differs from the public who until relatively recently had no direct voice in what went on at the European level and as such feel much less loyalty to this institution. Much of the public has also shown increasing fear of the European Union and Europeanization with their votes for extremist parties who preach about the concerns of unemployment and loss of national identity due to poor policies by Europeanized mainstream parties. As mainstream parties look more and more to the European Union for guidance, those citizens, especially those who oppose the idea of further integration, will feel more and more separated from the traditional parties that they were once members of and begin to look elsewhere for party representation.

Part of what may be occurring with Europeanization and the progressive moderation of mainstream political parties can be explained with a sociological institutionalist approach as described by Börzel and Risse (2003). Sociological institutionalism looks at how social pressures affect the political institutional structure. Börzel and Risse state how one version, an agency-centered version of sociological institutionalism, “focuses on socialization processes by which actors learn to internalize new norms and rules in order to become members of (international) society ‘in good standing’” (Börzel and Risse 2003: 66) where in this study the new norm is a pro-European-integration stance and the international community consists of the those fellow European Union member states. I argue that this might be what is occurring with mainstream parties, where mainstream parties internalize European norms and rules in order to be in good

standing with the larger European political society. This means that they are becoming more moderate than they once were. Mainstream parties cannot afford to be too vocal in favor or opposed to European integration. If they show too much support for integration they will lose the Eurosceptic vote, but if they show too little they will lose favor with the European political forum. The problem is this moderate stance on the issue of European integration leaves out many of the voters, who I argue are increasingly either very pro- or anti-Europe. This gap between the moderate mainstream political parties and the public is part of what helps the extremist parties to emerge.

Through their rhetoric of fear and populism many extremist parties have gained wide audiences of supporters. Extremist parties are of course very different from their mainstream party counterparts. Betz identifies the differences between radical right parties and mainstream parties as being “not only their militant attacks on immigrants but also their pronounced neo-liberal program” (Betz 1993: 417). As regards Europeanization, extremist parties are using these fears of the public (loss of national identity and jobs), especially the Eurosceptic public to gain electoral power and influence. As the EU has grown so have these fears and thus so has the disenchantment the people have with the moderate mainstream political parties. The moderate stance of the mainstream political parties is completely at odds with the increasing Eurosceptic population. Extremist parties are using this gap, claiming to be the true voice of the people, taking extreme stances on European integration, and are thus utilizing Europeanization to gain political prominence.

As mentioned above there are four parts of the structure of opportunity facing extremist parties-- economic, social, electoral systemic, and transnational Europeanization. For the purposes of this study the causal factor of interest is Europeanization, but the other parts of the

structure of opportunity are still important. Though I expect Europeanization to have a strong effect on the number and strength of extremist parties, the other branches of opportunity must be controlled for. As Golder mentioned in his 2003 article, there is a need to examine “the effect of electoral institutions, unemployment, and immigration” on the support of extremist right parties, where each of these becomes a branch of opportunity for extremist parties (Golder 2003: 432).

The economic structure of opportunity opens up for extremist parties when the nation is in recession and unemployment is high. The best measure of economic status of a country for this study is GDP per capita. When GDP is high and thus the basic economic needs of the citizenry are met there is little to no desire to change the system and replace the mainstream parties with those of a radical nature. However if the economy should suffer too much under a recession and unemployment become a major issue then extremist parties are often going to be seen as a valid option for replacement of the unproductive mainstream parties. Unemployment is often seen as a key issue, especially when the economy is seeing a significant downturn. According to Golder and several other authors extremist parties grow in times of high unemployment due to people’s anger and/or disappointment with the actions of mainstream parties to prevent or at least stem the flow of job loss in the country. As it is often said people vote with their wallets. When unemployment is high and/or the economy is bad people look for someone to blame (those in power) and look to outside solutions to solve such a problem (extremist parties). Extremist parties often preach about how they are different from mainstream parties and how they can offer a solution to the problems of the nation that will in essence cure all, including major economic concerns. And when the people become desperate, those formerly moderate citizens will vote for such an extremist party in the false hope that their radical policies will improve their standard of living (even if it is at the cost of the rights of others, often

immigrants). Many extremist parties use unemployment in connection with immigration especially to entice voters to vote for them, De Vries and Edwards note this as well in their 2009 article, though they are talking more about economic insecurities in general. Both a bad economy and its subsequent effect, higher than usual unemployment, will likely have some explanatory effect on the number and strength of extremist parties.

Another opportunity for extremist parties is the social structure where the percentage of immigrants and the level of ethnic fractionalization open up more pathways for extremist party growth. The percentage of immigrants in a nation is especially important and needs to be controlled for as well as the earlier mentioned economic factors, for if there is a large percentage of immigrants in a nation then people may begin to fear for both their jobs and the 'ethnic integrity' of their nation. Extremist parties often look to people's fear of immigrants, of 'outsiders', to frighten the public into voting for them and helping them to gain power within the national government. Here it is possible that people's fear of loss of nationality might be due to the percentage of immigrants instead of Europeanization alone, where Europeanization might also cause people to fear the loss of their national identity due to an increasing pressure to adapt a 'European' identity instead. Another important social factor is ethnic fractionalization. Though ethnic fractionalization is not usually considered important in Europe since most nations are fairly homogenous, several such as Belgium, The United Kingdom, and Spain have at least two or more major ethnic groups which often have ethnic/regional specific political representation at the national level. Here it seems that the more naturally/ethnically divided a country the more likely the support base for mainstream parties will be fractured thus allowing for the growth of extremist parties and thus a social branch of opportunity must also be looked at when studying the rise of extremist parties in modern Europe.

The final structure of opportunity for extremist parties is the electoral structure. Traditional electoral factors will be represented here by district magnitude. District magnitude is a major factor that must be accounted for, for the more seats available in a district the larger the number of parties typically and thus the larger the number of extremist parties. Electoral factors help in some ways to explain the variation in the number of total parties (including extremist parties) across states at any given point in time, but since these factors are often stable over long periods of time they are unlikely to explain the growth of extremist parties within a specific country over time all else equal.

There is no one cause of a rise in the strength of extremist parties. Each of these branches in turn explains part of what is going on, but I argue Europeanization has an effect separate from these other branches that might be able to explain what the other branches alone could not. As the European Union has grown and European integration deepened so has the number and strength of extremist parties. In the following chapters I will attempt to show that this is not a simple coincidence, but instead that Europeanization has indeed spurred the growth of extremist parties in Europe.

Two Hypotheses

What causes the number of parties to increase is different from what causes the electoral success of a party, especially those of the extreme right. Two hypotheses are put forth in this study, one relating to the number of extremist parties, the other to the strength of extremist parties (as measured by vote share). In order to understand what affects extremist party numbers and strength one must look at what differentiates these two hypotheses.

What predicts the number of parties in a system? According to Rein Taagepera and

Matthew Soberg Shugart (1993) it is “history, present issues, and institutions...but if one had to give a single factor, it would have to be the *district magnitude* (M), that is the number of seats allocated in an electoral district (Rae 1967).” As is well known district magnitude has a large effect on the number of effective parties in any given district. Duverger’s law states that “one-seat districts tend to lead to two-party systems, while multiseat districts tend to go with multiparty systems,” but even more specifically “since even within the multiseat category, a larger M tends to go with a larger number of parties” (Taagepera and Shugart 1993: 455). Other factors (including Europeanization) can have an effect on the number of parties but it is likely that electoral factors will have the strongest effect.

What causes party growth (increase in vote share) is similar to what causes change in the number of political parties history, present issues, and institutions (including effects on institutions such as Europeanization), but mainly it is issues of high-salience that alter the electoral fortunes of parties, especially extremist parties, rather than electoral factors. The issues of immigration and unemployment are especially high salience issues for modern extremist parties in Europe. Golder finds that both these issues have a strong effect on the strength of populist parties, finding specifically that “although immigration has a positive effect on populist parties irrespective of the unemployment level, unemployment only matters when immigration is high” (Golder 2003: 432). High-salience issues that seem to show weakness on the governing ability of the mainstream parties provide an opportunity for outside parties, often extremist, to become viable electoral alternatives.

Although all of these factors can possibly contribute to the number and electoral strength of extremist parties it is unlikely that all the same factors will be equally significant to both hypotheses. For the number of extremist parties, electoral factors are likely to be the most

important, while the strength in vote share of extremist parties is often more reliant on current issues. In this study I do not argue that Europeanization will have the largest effect on either the number of extremist parties or their vote share, but I do argue that it has a more significant effect than may be realized.

In sum, two hypotheses are addressed by this study. These hypotheses are as follows:

H1: The higher the level of Europeanization the larger the number of extremist parties.

$$Numext = Ezation + polfac + econfac + e$$

H2: The higher the level of Europeanization in a country, the larger the vote share of extremist parties.

$$Numext = Ezation + polfac + econfac + socfac + e$$

CHAPTER 4

DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

To address the above hypotheses, in the following chapter I outline the measurement of the relevant variables, a discussion of the operational measures of these variables, the analytical techniques I employed and a brief discussion of the data.

Variables

In Table 2 I provide measures for the two dependent variables, the number of extremist parties and the strength of each extremist party (as measured by vote share). As illustrated by the fact that the total number of extreme right parties does not change dramatically from year to year but a significant change can be seen over a larger period of time. Vote share on the other hand is quite a bit more volatile and thus has a larger variation. The total number of extreme right parties and the total vote share of all extreme right parties in each country in each year were taken from the Ray and Marks/Steenbergen Party Dataset (1984-1999) and the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (1999-2006). These datasets were previously relabeled to facilitate the creation of a larger cohesive dataset. They have been combined here to expand the time period of this study in order to better understand the far-reaching effects of Europeanization. The data compiled for this study takes on a panel form and is set by country year which is the unit of analysis for this study.

The main independent variable of interest is Europeanization, a concept where forms of governance at the European level and European integration as a whole have caused distinctive changes in domestic politics. For the purposes of this analysis Europeanization will be operationalized using an index comprised of the percentage of trade with EU nations, number of years as a member of the EU, and average party position score towards European integration as

measured by the Ray and Marks/Steenbergen Party Dataset (1984-1999) and the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (1999-2006). Since no available dataset directly measured the percentage of trade with EU nations I took raw data from the Correlates of War Bilateral Trade dataset and combined them to create a percentage of EU trade variable for each country for each year. The number of years of membership in the EU was simply taken from the EU's official website. The most important part of the index is the average party position score. This score tells us what the average position towards European integration was in each by year. Here it is believed that the more Europeanized a country is the more pro-integration the country and the political parties will be. This last part of the index was in order to account for the social aspects of Europeanization. Europeanization is not just an economic or political process, but also a social one. To be truly Europeanized not only must the economy of the country be closely connected with others in the European Union but the beliefs of the leaders must show a positive cohesiveness towards the process of European integration. Data were combined to form an average party position score for each country from the scores given to each political party in a country in a given year by a variety of experts from the survey mentioned above. Each of these variables was then standardized and combined to create the Europeanization index variable (*Eurozindex*) used in this study (ranging from -7 to 5).

The other parts of the structure of opportunity as mentioned in the theory section of this study were used as control variables to ensure that their effects on the dependent variables are kept separate from the effects of Europeanization. These other parts of the structure of opportunities for extremist parties include electoral, economic, and social factors. The electoral factor used in this study is the average district magnitude for a country in a given year as taken from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh).

The economic variables of GDP per capita and general unemployment levels (as measured by their respective national governments) are also taken by country by year from international governmental organizations. GDP per capita was taken from the United Nations data sets as “Per capita GDP at current prices- US dollars” (UN 2011). Unemployment data was taken from the World Bank data sets except the two cases of missing data of which UN data was filled in. The economic variables include GDP per capita and unemployment. GDP per capita was taken from the United Nations data sets as “Per capita GDP at current prices- US dollars” (UN 2011). Unemployment data was taken from the World Bank data sets except the two cases of missing data of which UN data was filled in.

The social factors are ethnic fractionalization and immigration (where immigration is also combined with unemployment as an interaction term). The ethnic fractionalization and the immigration variables were taken from Pippa Norris’ 2009 Democracy Times Series Dataset (2009) with immigration data after 2004 coming from the World Bank as “Migrant Stock (% of population).” The social factor of ethnic fractionalization serves as a measure of ethnic tensions, i.e. the more fractionalized the higher the tensions might be. The social factor of immigration on the other hand measures the percent of the population considered to be immigrants in a given country in a given year. The ethnic fractionalization and the immigration variables were taken from Pippa Norris’ 2009 Democracy Times Series Dataset (2009) with immigration data after 2004 coming from the World Bank as “Migrant Stock (% of population). Economic and social factors are combined in an interaction term between unemployment and immigration as inspired by and shown to be of importance by Matt Golder.

For ease of convenience for the reader I have included at the end of this section a summary table for all the variables utilized in this study as well as the expected results.

Analytical Technique

As far as the analytical techniques to be employed, for each of the hypotheses mention in chapter 3, I use different types of quantitative techniques. For Hypothesis 1 which states that:

The higher the level of Europeanization the larger the number of extremist parties.

$$Numext = Ezation + polfac + econfac + e$$

I employ a Poisson count model. Since these events occurred “independently and with a constant rate” they most likely follow a Poisson distribution and thus make a Poisson regression model a good fit for this study (Hamilton 2009: 327). One issue that arises is the possibility of overdispersion. Since some signs of overdispersion have been found a negative binomial regression will also be conducted as a robustness check (Long 1997, King 1998).

For this model Europeanization, electoral factors, and economic factors will be the factors of most importance as possible predictors of the total number of extreme right parties. Although there is the possibility that social factors will have some effect they are more likely to affect the success of extreme right parties than to affect the total number of these parties. Social factors such as immigration and ethnic issues should in theory have relatively little effect on the number of parties and so not much effect is predicted here. Since electoral factors in particular are such a large determinant of the general number of political parties a closer look is taken on that variable.

Thus for Hypothesis 2:

The higher the level of Europeanization in a country, the larger the vote share of extremist parties.

$$Extvoteshare = Ezation + polfac + econfac + socfac + e$$

For the second hypothesis a simple pooled OLS regression model will be utilized. The

unit of analysis for this model is again country-year, aggregating the vote shares of the extreme right parties by country by year. Though party-year could be used as the unit of analysis it will not be since the multiple observations that would be taken from the same election could create several difficult methodological problems. The percentage of vote share will be the national election most prior to the year of the expert surveys mentioned above. All four parts of the structure of opportunity, electoral factors (mainly district magnitude), economic factors, social factors, and Europeanization will be included in these set of models, for each should have some effect on the electoral strength of a party. The highly-salient economic and social issues of immigration and unemployment will likely have a larger effect than electoral factors alone in the success of extreme right parties since extremist parties often appeal to voters through fear-inducing rhetoric on those issues especially, though electoral factors should still play a significant role.

In order to control for the effects of larger European countries on the overall on extreme right parties and their vote share dummy variables were created for four of the largest countries in the study, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy, of which three are founding members of the European Union. The unit of analysis for all models in this study is country-year and the data set as panel. All models for both hypotheses are tested in panel form (using STATA and xt commands).

Case Selection and Possible Data Issues

The countries studies are the same as those in the expert surveys mentioned above; Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The years analyzed will be from 1984 to

2006, due to data availability. Germany is included only after 1990 (after reunification of East and West Germany) due to data availability and clarity issues creating 315 total observations.

Although the data and models have been carefully chosen there are some possible issues regarding the data and analytical models. One possible problem is that there are only 14 countries which limits generalizability of the results. Although most of the data for the variables came from a single source in some cases data was combined from two sources when data for all years was not present in the original data sources. This occurred with the immigration and unemployment variables. In both cases the closest available data was used with no serious issues. One issue was the lack of data availability. Data availability limited the years that could be studied (hard to find data prior to 1980s for several variables). In the case of Germany the years 1984-1990 had to be dropped since many organizations and data bases did not have any data openly available for Germany prior to unification. Another issue is that Europeanization as a process is very difficult to measure and proxies must be used in order to attempt to quantitatively analyze its effects. There is no exact way to measure the direct effects of Europeanization but good proxies can be utilized that will still provide a solid picture as to the extent and strength of the effects of Europeanization on domestic politics. Though the measure created here is not perfect it should provide a fairly accurate portrayal of the effects of Europeanization.

In the following chapter I analyze the data and hypotheses posited in chapter 3.

Table 2: Variables

Variable Type	Variable ID	Description	Expected Effects
Independent Variable	Europeanization	index of % trade with Europe out of total trade, years in the EU, average party position towards European integration	As Europeanization increases so will the number and strength of extremist parties in each country
Dependent Variables	Number of extremist parties	Number of extremist parties in a given country in a given year	Will rise as Europeanization rises
	Strength of extremist parties	Vote share of extremist parties	Will rise as Europeanization rises
Control Variables	GDP per capita	Gross Domestic Product	The higher the GDP the lower the number and strength of extremist parties
	Unemployment	Percentage unemployed in a given country in a given year	The higher unemployment the higher the number and strength of extremist parties
	Immigration	Percentage of population recent immigrants	The higher the percentage of immigrants the higher the number and strength of extremist parties
	Immigration x Unemployment	Interaction variable multiplying the effects of immigration on unemployment	Similar effects as those found in Golder 2003. Somewhat significant.
	Ethnic fractionalization	Level of ethnic fractionalization	The higher the level of ethnic fractionalization the higher the number and strength of extremist parties
	District magnitude	Average number of seats in a district	The higher the district magnitude the higher the number and strength of extremist parties

CHAPTER 5

RESULTS

Again to remind the reader, for this study, two hypotheses are tested. The first hypothesis (*H1*) states that the higher the level of Europeanization the larger the number of extremist parties. Two types of regression models are utilized a negative binomial regression model and a Poisson regression model as a robustness check for *H1*. For the second hypothesis, (*H2*) The higher the level of Europeanization in a country, the larger the vote share of extremist parties, an OLS (ordinary least squares) model is utilized.

For *H1* both models are count models corresponding the dependent variable (number of extremist parties) being a count variable. A Poisson model assumes there is an independent chance of an event occurring (a specific number of extremist parties at a specific time), while a negative binomial model relaxes this assumption. Since the negative binomial model relaxes this assumption that they are independent and since there are signs of overdispersion the negative binomial model will be of more importance than the Poisson for the purposes of this study, though the Poisson does help as a robustness check for the negative binomial results. For each type of regression model (Poisson and negative binomial) I ran two versions of each model one with social factors included and one without. In theory these social factors should have less influence over the number of extremist parties as compared to the other types of factors such as electoral or economic.

Both of these models are count models and probability models. Both models are odds ratio models and as such what matters most is the sign (or direction) of the coefficient and the significance level rather than the actual value of the coefficient itself. According to my theory and some previous research it seems that Europeanization should have some effect on the

number of these extreme right parties such as the Front National in France. However the results of my tests and both of models (both Poisson and negative binomial) show that Europeanization has no significant effect on the number of extremist parties and the direction is negative. The negativity of the variable means that even if Europeanization were to be significant its effect would be in the direction opposite of what was predicted, which means that as Europeanization increased there would actually be less success for extreme right parties instead of more. Since Europeanization is not shown to be significant, the direction of the effect is of much less importance.

In fact the only variables to show any real significance are GDP and district magnitude (both of which happen to be logged variables). It comes as no surprise that economic and electoral factors would be statistically significant with so much previous literature stating that it should be so (Jackman and Volpert 1996, Golder 2003 etc.). These two types of factors logically should have a significant effect for economics has always driven politics in some essence and electoral factors will of course play a role in what parties gain electoral power. Though these facts are well known to have an effect it did seem that there was still a missing factor out there that might be able to help explain the drastic change in electoral consequence of extremist parties over the last few decades, Europeanization but Europeanization in this case does not seem to have any significant effect (as indicated in Tables 3 and 4).

GDP per capita is by far the most significant factor on the number of extremist parties but that is not an unexpected result. Here the coefficient for GDP is actually positive, meaning that the higher the GDP per capita the higher the number of extremist parties. Although I had predicted that the higher the GDP per capita the lower the number of extremist parties, in actuality it is the opposite. It is possible that there are more extremist parties in areas of higher

GDP per capita because these countries are wealthy enough that the people there can afford to look beyond their fundamental needs (food, water, shelter) and at other issues such as immigration and European Integration.

Table 3: Number of Extreme Parties, Negative Binomial Model		
Variable	Model 1: With Social Factors	Model 2: Without Social Factors
Europeanization	-.0508 (.0953)	-.0138 (.0787)
GDP per capita (logged)	.7145** (.3074)	.7082** (.2989)
Unemployment	-.0555 (.0785)	.029 (.041)
Immigration	-.0487 (.0851)	-
Unemployment x Immigration	.0133 (.0104)	-
Ethnic Fractionalization	.7253 (1.911)	-
District Magnitude (logged)	.2565* (.1321)	.2382* (.1345)
Germany	.1792 (1.02)	.4273 (1.077)
France	1.446 (1.074)	1.678 (1.114)
United Kingdom	-.668 (1.162)	-.7222 (1.233)
Italy	1.639 (1.064)	1.209 (1.079)
Constant	10.45 (317.7)	9.016 (593.6)

Significance levels: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.001; standard errors in parentheses
N= 315, Number of groups= 14, Avg. per group= 22.5

It is the idea that the wealthy can afford to have post-industrialist modern values while the poor look to their government mainly for the basics and could care less about larger foreign policy issues etc. Once you have bread you can think about what to do next, but while one is still hungry other issues such as some that extreme parties emphasize are hardly thought of.

Sometimes extremists can appear strong in times of economic hardship as an alternative to the failing mainstream parties but in an overall wealthy continent like Europe this does not seem to be what is happening.

Table 4: Number of Extreme Parties, Poisson Model		
Variable	Model 1: With Social Factors	Model 2: Without Social Factors
Europeanization	-.0508 (.0953)	-.0138 (.0787)
GDP per capita (logged)	.7145** (.3074)	.7082** (.2989)
Unemployment	-.0555 (.0785)	.029 (.041)
Immigration	-.0487 (.0851)	-
Unemployment x Immigration	.0133 (.0104)	-
Ethnic Fractionalization	.7253 (1.911)	-
District Magnitude (logged)	.2565* (.1321)	.2382* (.1345)
Germany	.1792 (1.020)	.4272 (1.077)
France	1.446 (1.073)	1.678 (1.114)
United Kingdom	-.668 (1.162)	-.7222 (1.233)
Italy	1.639 (1.064)	1.209 (1.079)
Constant	-8.509* (3.325)	-8.576** (3.144)

Significance levels: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.00,1; standard errors in parentheses
N= 315, Number of groups= 14, Avg. per group= 22.5

The other variable of importance is district magnitude for *HI* or the log of district magnitude. District magnitude in this study is used as the measure of the influence of the electoral system on the number and strength (vote share) of extreme right parties in Europe. The district magnitude is often different from one district to the next, so the figures used in this study

are national averages. Here we can see that the higher the district magnitude the higher the expected number of extreme right parties. This makes logical sense. The more seats that are available in a district the better the chance of a non-mainstream party being elected. In countries such as the United Kingdom with their single-member districts there is little chance for any smaller party of any nature (especially extremist) being elected and with little chance of being elected there is thus fewer extremist parties, especially any that can consider themselves of any electoral significance. While in countries with larger district magnitudes such as Belgium there has historically tended to be a stronger extremist party presence on the national political scene.

In this case there seems to be little difference in the results of the Poisson and negative binomial models even when comparing the models with and without social factors. In both models neither Europeanization, unemployment, immigration, their interaction term, nor ethnic fractionalization were significant. In theory all these factors should have at least some small effect of some statistical significance on the number of extreme right parties but none other than GDP and district magnitude actually did. The case is not too different for the second hypothesis which instead of asks about the electoral success of extremist parties instead of just the number of extremist parties.

For hypothesis 2, which states that the higher the level of Europeanization in a country, the larger the vote share of extremist parties, a relatively simple OLS model was appropriate. Unlike *H1*, the theory behind *H2* does include social factors as possible important causes in the rise of extreme right parties in Europe. As one can see below not all these factors turn out to be statistically significant or even in the direction predicted.

Here, in model 1, we find that the variables of significance are GDP per capita (as with the models above), the immigration/unemployment interaction term, and the France dummy

variable. It is interesting that although GDP per capita is significant in the OLS model and in the earlier models involving *HI*, that district magnitude is not also significant in both.

Table 5: Europeanization on Vote Share, OLS Regression Model		
Variable	Model 1: With Social Factors	Model 2: Without Interaction Term
Europeanization	.0402 (.2092)	-.0312 (.2103)
GDP per capita (logged)	3.023*** (.6771)	3.302*** (.6825)
Unemployment	.1595 (.1106)	-.01 (.074)
Immigration	.0619 (.181)	-.2251 (.1385)
Unemployment x Immigration	-.0391** (.0172)	-
Ethnic Fractionalization	1.96 (8.064)	2.53 (12.08)
District Magnitude (logged)	-.414 (.4151)	-.5788 (.4158)
Germany	-3.025 (4.261)	-3.722 (6.39)
France	8.123* (4.383)	6.939 (6.499)
United Kingdom	-4.17 (4.329)	-4.679 (6.462)
Italy	5.651 (4.339)	5.607 (6.474)
Constant	-8.509* (3.325)	-26.22*** (7.518)

Significance levels: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.001; standard errors in parentheses
N= 315, Number of groups= 14, Avg. per group= 22.5

It is no surprise that GDP per capita should be significant in explaining vote share when it is significant in explaining the number of extreme right parties. The same reasoning applies that was mentioned above, that the higher the country's GDP per capita the more likely the people are to support post-industrial attitudes and then support parties whose focus is less on providing basic goods and more on ethical and nationality issues. District magnitude seemed likely to

affect both the number of extreme right parties and their voteshare, but in actuality seems only to really have an effect on the number of extremist parties, their voteshare on the other hand is influenced first and foremost by GDP per capita and an interaction term of unemployment and immigration.

One important difference between the results for the first hypothesis and the results for the second is that in the second the interaction term combining immigration and unemployment is statistically significant in the OLS model. Golder in his 2003 study finds that “unemployment never helps extreme right parties in an unconditional way” (Golder 2003: 460). Though unlike Golder I find that the interaction term actually has a negative effect on the success of extreme right parties (this may be due to difference of samples of countries and extremist parties), the point still remains that alone unemployment is not going to be significant as it is here. Another important point is that an interaction term is very important factor to include when analyzing the effects of unemployment and immigration on the success of extreme right parties. The interaction term being significant here means that the effect of immigration and unemployment are only important in the strength of extreme right parties (voteshare) in conjunction with each other. This means that a large amount of immigrants and the level of unemployment when taken by themselves have little real effect on extreme parties, but when these factors are analyzed together as related factors there show themselves to be a significant influence on the voteshare of extreme right parties in Europe. When this interaction term is not included the results are not very different. GDP per capita is still very significant and immigration and unemployment are still insignificant. This second model helps to confirm the idea that unemployment is not a significant influence on the success of extreme right parties without a connection to immigration factored in.

The only other variable to show significance is the dummy variable created for France. When the interaction term is dropped in the second model the dummy variable for France loses its significance. France itself a very special case when one considers the success of the Front National and Jean-Marie Le Pen. Though many countries have seen extreme party success at some level, few countries have seen as strong of showings as the Front National. Jean-Marie Le Pen, the leader of the party until recently, has made several bids for the presidency and though not able to receive close to half the vote, still showed very well against mainstream candidates, well enough to hurt the vote share of other more moderate right parties.

What is surprising is that Europeanization has no significant effect on the vote share of extreme right parties. As one can see in figure 2 and figure 3 Europeanization values have risen steadily over time and though voteshare has risen overall over time as well there is no strong correlation between Europeanization and voteshare.

Figure 2. Europeanization over Time





Figure 3. Vote Share over Time



What is significant is not only what was found to be statistically significant but what was found to not be significant at all when it was predicted to be otherwise. In the case of *H2*, several variables were found not to be significant at all (other than Europeanization) when attempting to explain the voteshares of extreme right parties; those were unemployment, immigration, ethnic fractionalization, and district magnitude. This means that although many of these factors seem likely to affect the strength of extremist parties (as measured by voteshare) they in actuality have no significant influence on the parties' fortunes.

Unemployment and immigration are issues often brought up by extreme right parties in their campaigns but by themselves do not help the chances of extremist parties in any significant way. Ethnic fractionalization also does not have a significant effect. It would seem that the larger the level of ethnic fractionalization the better that chances for extreme right parties to be able to take advantage of the ethnic tensions and gain electoral success, but like the variables above does not have a considerable effect on their fortunes at all. District magnitude is an electoral factor

and as such would seem logically to have an effect on the electoral success of parties, but as found in this study that is only true in the support of the number of extreme right parties and not their success via voteshare. This seems counterintuitive but just because a large district magnitude opens up the possibilities for extreme party electoral success it does not mean that these parties will have actual success. The success of parties is based on the actions and policies of the parties themselves and not just outside factors like district magnitude and Europeanization and as such the opportunities of success that these factors help create can be but are not necessarily enough to ensure the success of a party, whether extremist or not.

Conclusions

The main focus of this study has been to examine the effects Europeanization has on the success of extreme right parties in Europe, and although the results did not confirm all parts of my hypotheses on the effects of Europeanization, much can still be learned from this study. The structure of opportunity which had four branches (economic, social, electoral, and Europeanization) did partially influence the number and strength of extremist parties. In particular, the economic and electoral branches were important, but NOT Europeanization. Though it is still possible that the other parts of the structure of opportunities have an effect on the success of parties in general, based on the analysis done here, the strongest direct influence of these factors on extreme right parties is through economic and electoral factors.

With the first hypothesis (involving the number of extreme right parties) I found that GDP per capita (economic) and district magnitude (electoral) were the significant factors. This factor being significant and positive not only supports my theory on its importance to both the number and strength of extremist parties, but supports much previous research as stated before in

the literature review. The other significant factor for *HI* was district magnitude. One scholar that has done much research of the causes of extremist part growth is Matt Golder. Golder also found district magnitude to be of importance in his 2003 study where he finds that “populist parties clearly fare better when the district magnitude is large” (Golder 2003: 461). This makes sense since the higher the district magnitude the more open the electoral system is for smaller parties to gain seats including those parties of the extreme right.

In all models (for both *HI* and *H2*) economic factors showed a large amount of influence (mainly GDP). Though unemployment alone was insignificant in these models the interaction term with immigration was actually significant in the OLS model testing the effects of Europeanization on voteshare. The interaction term’s statistical significance in the OLS model tells us that although alone unemployment and immigration are relatively unimportant to the success of extreme right parties, that when interacted with each other actually do impact the electoral success of such parties to such an extent any future studies on the growth of extremist parties should take these factors into account.

This study does help to support the existing literature on the effects of GDP and district magnitude (at least for the number of parties) and as such is a positive addition to this field of political research, but the most significant addition to the literature that this study provides is the negative finding on the effects of Europeanization itself. I had predicted that Europeanization would be both positive and significant towards the number of extreme right parties and their electoral success via voteshare, but the results of the analysis actually state that the opposite is true.

The fact that the results showed Europeanization to not be a statistically significant factor in the success of extreme right parties is in itself a significant finding. Several of the scholars

mentioned in the literature review above gave compelling arguments in support of the strong influence that Europeanization should or could have on politics in Europe. This finding means that Europeanization is not (at least as of yet) such a powerful force that it can strongly and directly affect the fortunes of domestic political parties. This does not mean that Europeanization has no effect at all, but it does mean that whatever effect it does have is not yet directly observable in these kinds of domestic political matters.

Europeanization itself is a process that is very difficult to directly observe. The continent of Europe has been undergoing a massive transformation over the last several decades, a transformation that continues now and will continue into the future. It is possible that Europeanization does have some substantial effects in other areas of domestic politics and may have even more powerful effects in the future, but for now these effects do not include a large amount of observable influence over the number and strength of extreme right parties in Europe.

As one prominent scholar stated:

We have only the space and resources to skim the surface of evolving phenomena in Europe rather than being able to go into great depths regarding any one movement or aiming at a comprehensive theory to explain a political reality that is still in transition and showing us new faces every day. (Peter Merkl 2003: 4)

Thus it is possible that Europeanization does have an effect on domestic politics, but that is not yet substantial enough to influence the fortunes of political parties, including those of the extreme right ideology. There may be some indirect effects of Europeanization that cannot be easily studied or measured at this time, but hopefully with continued research and time more can be found out about this enigmatic process and what effects (whether direct or indirect) it might have not only on international and domestic politics, but also on the economy and even societal relations.

APPENDIX
DATA SOURCES

Europeanization:

EU years:

European Union. 2011. "The history of the European Union."

http://europa.eu/abc/history/index_en.htm (March 18, 2011).

Percent Trade: COW data

Barbieri, Katherine, Omar Keshk, and Brian Pollins. 2008. Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 2.0. Online: <http://correlatesofwar.org>.

Barbieri, Katherine, Omar M. G. Keshk, and Brian Pollins. 2009. "TRADING DATA: Evaluating our Assumptions and Coding Rules." *Conflict Management and Peace Science*. Forthcoming.

Average position (of all parties within that year): Chapel Hill Expert Survey

Same source as for number of extremist parties (counted if party family=1 radical right) and vote share

Ray-Marks-Steenbergen dataset:

Steenbergen, Marco R. and Gary Marks. 2007. "Evaluating Expert Judgments." *European Journal of Political Research* 46(3): 347-366.

Ray, Leonard. 1999. "Measuring party orientations towards European Integration: Results from an expert survey." *European Journal of Political Research* 36:283-306.

1999-2006 Combined Chapel Hill expert survey:

Hooghe, Liesbet, Ryan Bakker, Anna Brigeovich, Catherine de Vries, Erica Edwards, Gary Marks, Jan Rovny, and Marco Steenbergen. 2010. "Reliability and Validity of Measuring Party Positions: The Chapel Hill Expert Surveys of 2002 and 2006", *European Journal of Political Research*, (4): 684-703

Steenbergen, Marco and Gary Marks (2007). "Evaluating Expert Surveys," *European Journal of Political Research*, 46 (3): 347–366.

GDP per capita:

United Nations. 2011. "Per capita GDP at current prices - US dollars."

<http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=GDP+per+capita&d=SNAAMA&f=grID%3a101%3bcurrID%3aUSD%3bpcFlag%3a1> (March 18, 2011).

Unemployment:

World Bank. 2011. "Unemployment, total (% of total labor force)."

<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?page=5> (July 1, 2011)

Netherlands 1984 & 1986 (Missing data in World Bank dataset): Used registered unemployment numbers

United Nations. 2011. "Unemployment, general level thousands)."

<http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=LABORSTA&f=tableCode%3a3A> (July 1, 2011) used for

Netherlands 1984 & 1986

Immigration:

Pippa Norris data used for immigration until 2004. World Bank data used for 2005 & 2006.

Pippa Norris. 2009. *Democracy Time-series Dataset: Variable Labels*.
Release 3.0 January 2009

World Bank. 2011. "Migrant Stock (% of population)."

<http://search.worldbank.org/data?qterm=foreign+population&language=EN&format=7-1-2011>

United Nations Population Division, Trends in Total Migrant Stock: 2008 Revision.

Database: WDI

Ethnic Fractionalization:

Pippa Norris. 2009. *Democracy Time-series Dataset: Variable Labels*.
Release 3.0 January 2009

District Magnitude:

Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh, 2001. "[New tools in comparative political economy: The Database of Political Institutions.](#)" 15:1, 165-176 (September), *World Bank Economic Review*.

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