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MASTER

RESPONSES OF INFLUENTIALS TO NEGATIVE CONTINGENCIES

Sue Berryman Bobrow

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Director's Division
CIVIL DEFENSE RESEARCH PROJECT

RESPONSES OF INFLUENTIALS TO NEGATIVE CONTINGENCIES*

Sue Berryman Bobrow

NOVEMBER 1967

OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY
Oak Ridge, Tennessee
operated by
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION
for the
U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

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RESPONSES OF INFLUENTIALS TO NEGATIVE CONTINGENCIES*

Sue Berryman Bobrow**

ABSTRACT

This report is divided into five sections: (I) Introduction, where we try to give the reader an intuitive understanding of our intellectual questions; (II) Independent and Dependent Variables, where we talk about the parameters of the phenomenon we want to explain; (III) Hypotheses, where we state some of the ideas we now have about why different individuals and groups start at the same point and come out at sometimes the same, sometimes different, points; (IV) Intervening Variables, where we talk about the variables which are involved in the hypotheses and have to be differentiated so we can design measures of them and thus test the relevance and power of our hypotheses; and (V) Theory of Action and Person and Group Differences, where essentially we just refer to, not discuss, work on an analytic system for talking about what persons and groups do and what kinds of persons and groups they are.

* This report is not written for professional social scientists, and this fact is reflected in our presentation and inclusion decisions. For example, we do not locate our problems formally and explicitly in relevant intellectual traditions in the different disciplines or talk about the very fruitful translations that can be made back and forth between them--e.g., to the North et al. or Hermann work on crisis decision-making, to the studies of fear-arousing communications in social psychology, to the sociological and anthropological studies of social change and innovation (including innovation in large organizations), to the work on disasters, to the sociological studies (especially Smelser's) on collective behavior. We also do not try to develop sections IV and V, although section V is particularly exciting to us and has occupied a fair amount of our time. For readers interested in a more technical presentation of the project, we are preparing a formal monograph on the topic.

** The individuals directly involved in this project have been Dr. Keith Davis (Institute of Behavioral Sciences and Department of Psychology at the University of Colorado), Dr. Davis Bobrow, and Sue Berryman Bobrow. We are indebted to Dr. Lewis Dexter for many stimulating and provocative ideas.

INTRODUCTION

In our report last year we noted that our intellectual interest was in how a certain group of people in the American political system (influentials), handle an event (nuclear war on the homeland), which most members of the society agree to be a negative contingency (a bad thing that might happen sometime). We differentiated our work from that on crises (bad things that will almost inevitably happen) and disasters (bad things that have happened), although we noted that in all cases of negative contingencies small numbers of people in the society see them as crises.

To communicate the richness--if not the precision--of our interests, we can see this as a project in what Withey (1964) calls the zigzags of threatened men.

"Some people make the threat of nuclear war manageable, for them, by regarding themselves as outside of a probable target area. Some of them are probably right but others are most probably wrong.... Those who favor shelter programs tend to overestimate their worth somewhat, and those who oppose such programs tend to underestimate their value somewhat. Those who own shelters tend to feel that shelter programs operate as a slight deterrent. Those who do not own shelters tend to feel that a shelter program is irrelevant to deterrence....

"Many of these perspectives, advocated policies, and behaviors are rational and adaptive. The point is that for an individual they tend to show a sort of logic, consistency, harmony, and cohesion. Some of these perspectives and their attendant behaviors may turn out to be successful in stopping or minimizing the danger.... Some may not lead to anything more than intrapsychic escapes. But much of the raw material of interpretations of events, forecasts of trends, evaluations of potential hazard or security can be manipulated - they are not certainties - and they are manipulated in the effort to make the threat socially and personally manageable. There is evidence, however, that the interpretations, judgments, and commitments of positions regarding the threat of nuclear war are not well tested in experience.... Perhaps the very sequences of reactions that have got us to this point have developed committed positions and complexities that are as difficult to handle as the core threat of nuclear attack itself."
(pp. 112-114)

What Withey is saying here is that when men experience a sustained threat, the effects, targets, and probabilities of which are uncertain, they attach to the threat and possible means to handle it a set of

meanings. These meanings differ from person to person or group to group, but they are patterned for these individuals and these groups, and they have a logic, even if it is not the one people assume it to be. David Schneider, an anthropologist, documents a concrete instance of this phenomenon among the Yaps of the West Caroline Islands (1957). Although the Yaps are remote from us in culture, their responses to sustained threat are very similar to ours.

During his fieldwork among the Yaps Schneider explicated the meanings which the Yaps attach to typhoons. The Yaps are subject to the chronic threat of typhoons, as residents of "tornado alley" in the United States are subject to tornados. On Yap, typhoons can cause loss in lives, canoes, houses, and food resources. In the past they have caused minor injuries, but not deaths, and have damaged houses, canoes, and some food crops. However, since much of Yap is above sea level, even tidal waves do not destroy major proportions of the food.

After Schneider arrived on Yap, they experienced four typhoons: two in November, 1947, one in December, 1947, and one in January, 1948. After each of these typhoons Schneider assessed the amount of damage to individuals and their property. At the conclusion of all four typhoons, the total amount of damage was: no deaths, a few minor injuries from flying objects, no canoes damaged, 60% of the houses collapsed, 100% of the houses still standing seriously damaged, bananas badly damaged (bananas are not a staple food), coconuts affected (a shortage would not develop for 3-6 months, and even then it would not be serious), fish disturbed, but not significantly; and taro (staple food) unaffected. The curious thing about this damage was that the Yaps were fairly unconcerned about the extensive damage to their homes, but very worried about the damage to their food. They lamented to each other, Schneider, and the head civil administrator, "Alas, there will be no more food! No coconut, no taro, no yams, no bananas, nothing to eat, nothing to drink!" In other words, in spite of the relatively manageable damage to their food resources, they saw the situation as one of NO FOOD. Their anxiety convinced the head civil administrator to wire Guam for relief supplies. Since they were not objectively even close to starvation, one wonders

whether they just wanted to augment their normal diet with luxury supplies. However, they obviously believed among themselves that there was "no food" and even when they were holding food in their hands, they would say anxiously, "Alas, there is no food."

As Schneider continued his fieldwork, he began to discover what system of meanings the Yaps were attaching to typhoons:

- food is involved in almost all forms of human interaction on Yap, ceremonial or secular. Marriages, funerals, even lovers' meetings, are not complete without the exchange of food. A husband's role is defined in terms of his food obligations to his wife's kingroup. What is most important for us is that social discord and social breakdown are considered situations of no food.
- the Yaps consider a typhoon, not a natural phenomenon, but an event sent by a chief who is angered at the people. The chief is not seen as a good parent or good god who punishes the bad children, his people. The relationship between the people and their district chief is reciprocal. Both are believed capable of bad behavior in relation to the other, and both are believed capable of bringing about deserved and undeserved punishment of the other party. But wherever right and wrong may lie, typhoons are indicative to chiefs and people alike of a breakdown in human relations, particularly in political relations between the people and one of the chiefs.
- finally, Schneider noticed that the Yaps spent a great deal of energy trying to influence the supernaturals, either not to send the typhoon or not to send another one. These supernaturals are not considered the cause of typhoons, but the mediators between human beings in times of social distress.

In other words, to the Yaps typhoons mean that a breakdown in social relations has occurred, and when a breakdown in social relations occurs, it is seen as a situation of NO FOOD. The fact that their anxiety about food had little to do with their actual food resources does not mean that they are stupid, neurotic, or childish. It does mean that when a group of people experience a chronic threat, they attach to that threat a whole network of meanings over and above the physical effects of the disaster

and specific steps designed to cope with these effects. By the time the disaster occurs, or people think seriously about coping with its occurrence, they will be responding to far more than the literal effects of the disaster. An unanticipated threat, such as a freak tropical storm in Oregon, does not collect this complicated set of meanings. An anticipated threat, such as deterrence failure, does, and these meanings tend to affect what people think up for coping with the threat and the positions they take on it, as much as the actual evidence on the threat and its solutions.

The object of this project, then, is to

- map quantitatively the system of meanings or appraisals
- which influential individuals or groups assign to a communication
- about the possibility of nuclear war and a continental defense against it
- so that the responses of individuals and groups to the communication (their decisions about how to treat it) derive explicitly and logically from their appraisals of it.

INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Since last year we have modified the independent and dependent variables we want to work with: cut the number of independent variables and increased the number of dependent.

We are now working with only three independent variables: threat verbalizer, threat, and solution. The threat verbalizer, the person who brings a threat and possibly a solution to the attention of another person or group, can be a news commentator, Secretary McNamara, a proponent or opponent of a particular solution, the President, a RAND strategic analyst, or in our research, an interviewer or experimenter. We treat the verbalizer as an independent variable because we assume that a human communicator is always a stimulus of some sort, no matter how neutral he tries to be. What an audience thinks of the communicator affects how they handle the communication. Although this interaction is explicitly included in communications research where the communicator is obviously not neutral, work by e.g., Hyman (1954) and Kahn and Cannell (1957) on

interviewer bias in survey research and by Rosenthal (1963), Rosenthal and Fode (1961), Orne (1962) and Rosenberg (1965) on experimenter bias in social psychology experiments recommend that presumably more neutral communicators such as interviewers be treated as stimulus objects. The threat variable is nuclear attack on the United States (cause, agent, targeting, time, etc. unspecified). The solution variable is continental defense (passive or civil defense and perhaps active defense). We have dropped other independent variables, such as threat agent, because we are not just interested in who the subject thinks might attack the United States, but also in whether a social agent even enters into his thinking about nuclear war and ways to handle it.

As the reader can see in Table 1, we are now working with a differently organized set of dependent variables. These represent outcomes, places where we anticipate subjects will end up in response to a communicator's, e.g., interviewer's, question about nuclear attack and a continental defense solution. The distribution of the people of interest to us (universe) across these outcomes and the reasons for this distribution are our research challenges.

Although we do not care if the response tree is logically complete, we do want it to include the important empirical response differences. The reader should remember that each of the response types (branch points) can be used to describe: (1) how an observer perceives that a subject is actually handling the communication; or (2) what the subject says he has decided about it; or (3) what the subject says he would decide about it if he had any real powers of decision.

As the Table shows, we expect that a subject will take one of four basic orientations (initial branches) to the solution: he will accept it to some degree; he will not be able to reject or accept it; he will reject it to some degree; or he will see it as irrelevant. The different ways he can take any of these orientations represent the branch systems associated with each of the initial branches. The reader will notice that the fourteen basic responses are called "non-committal," and by this we simply mean that they do not commit us to one rather than another of the reasons stated in the Variant 1 and 2 columns. They are not non-committal in the sense of excluding nothing. In fact, from the moment that we know a person or group has essentially decided to reject rather

Table J. Response Possibility Tree

UNIVERSE OF POSSIBILITIES

BASIC ORIENTATION TO SOLUTION	NON-COMMITAL RESPONSE TYPE	VARIANT 1: Response restricted to evidence about problem and/or solution or to their implications for the person's or group's social position	VARIANT 2: Response restricted to considerations not relevant either to problem and/or solution or to their implications for the person's or group's social position.
ACCEPTANCE (P OR G ACCEPT SOLUTION IN SOME DEGREE)	1. postpone action (e.g., have a conference, do more research, hold hearings, send to committee).	1a. P* or G** are not sure that the solution is that good and want to keep their option of rejecting it later.	1a. P or G are disposed to be afraid of making mistakes (the solution might not be that good) which are punishable.
	2. minimal commitment (very few resources allocated to the solution)	1b. P or G believe, and others not involved with the solution concur, that the chances of getting the necessary support for the solution at a later date are better than now.	1b. P or G are afraid that they cannot get what they want, i.e., they will fail, and others do not see what in the situation causes them to be afraid.
	3. plan (allocate sufficient resources to the solution to implement it properly over time)	1c. P or G believe, and others not involved with the solution concur, that the chances of getting the necessary support for the solution at a later date are better than now.	1c. P or G are involved compulsively with another problem(s) which others do not see as that compelling.
	4. crash program	2a. P or G believe they should "muddle through" the problem for which the solution is designed and/or the solution have significant uncertainties associated with them, no other solution is more certainly desirable, and it is preferable to allocate resources to the solution "by ear" -- i.e., to make small, incremental decisions.	2a. P or G want to be safe, do not know how, and use the solution ritually to assuage the anxiety aroused by "not doing anything;" and others who are not as afraid and do not see the solution as particularly effective have sufficient control over resources to limit their allocation to P or G.
MIDPOINT (P OR G NEITHER ACCEPT NOR REJECT SOLUTION)	5. postpone action	2b. P or G do believe and others not involved with the solution agree, that only limited resources are available.	2b. P or G are afraid to take risks others see as reasonable.
	6. resignation (P or G want to solve problem and thus want to accept the proposed solution but do not feel that this solution or any other is adequate to the problem)	3. P or G have or can get adequate resources with the solution and the problem with the solution designed to cope with it are both felt to be sufficiently "understood" (or understandable) to justify the complex decisions associated with: --systematic reduction of the problem --systematic implementation of a (especially a complex) solution.	3. P or G have a compulsive need for order and certainty and enough others concur with them to support the larger allocation of resources necessary to support a planning response.
SOLUTION IRRELEVANT (P OR G DO NOT EVEN SEE THE "POINT" OF THE SOLUTION AND THEREFORE THE QUESTION OF ACCEPTING/REJECTING SOLUTION DOES NOT ARISE.)	7. no problem (and therefore no need for a solution)	4. P or G believe and most people concur that the chances for coping with the problem if it can be coped with, will rapidly decline within a short period of time -- i.e., either the problem and/or the chances of coping with it are agreed to have reached crisis proportions.	4. P or G believe that the chances for coping with the problem, if it can be coped with at all, will rapidly decline within a short time, but others do not agree that either the problem or chances of coping with it have reached crisis proportions.
	8. no problem as far as P or G are concerned	5a. P or G believe that problem and/or proposed solution have significant "empirical" uncertainties ("what are they like?") and therefore feel unable to decide whether solution is basically effective or ineffective.	5a. P or G are dispositionally afraid of making mistakes and therefore unable to bring themselves to make decisions.
	9. problem already met	5b. P or G believe that problem and/or proposed solution have significant "value" incompatibilities ("how do I feel about what they are like?") and that they have inadequate information to determine the power of the "bad" aspects relative to the "good" aspects.	5b. P or G are dispositionally afraid of sinning against personal and/or group values, and are therefore unable to make decisions in what they see as moral dilemmas.
	10. attack solution openly (parallel to "crash program")	6. P or G believe and others concur that the problem is essentially unhandleable.	6. P or G have excessive feelings of powerlessness.
REJECTION (P OR G REJECT SOLUTION TO SOME DEGREE)	11. Under-nourish the solution and/or its proponents by limiting the allocation of resources to them. (parallel to "minimal commitment")	ASSUMED: Problem and/or solution doesn't "connect" either with what the person or group "see" as problems and solutions or with their social position.	ASSUMED: Problem and/or solution "connect" in some way for the person or group, but it is too dangerous for them to admit that they do.
	12. postpone action (e.g., "shelving," "sidetracking," "ignore" proponents-- "Don't call me, I'll call you")	7. P or G are members of a culture or sub-culture which does not structure reality in ways that allow them to "see" that there is a problem.	7. P or G deny that there is a problem because they don't believe that anyone can handle it and the problem is frightening to them.
	13. encourage proponents and/or opponents to kill solution off (e.g., "booby-trap" solution by letting proponents make fools of themselves; give responsibility for judging or implementing solution to opponents; let opponents and proponents cut each other up and cancel each other out)	8a. P or G see a problem, but buck-pass responsibility for it because they are not held centrally responsible for handling it by others and don't want to bother with it.	8. P or G deny that there is a problem for them, even though they can be assumed to have some responsibility for and ability to handle it, because they feel incapable of handling it themselves.
	14. Reline the situation A. divert attention to something else (e.g., "X isn't our problem; Y is")	8b. P or G see a problem, but buck-pass responsibility for it because they feel they don't have the authority necessary to handle it.	9. P or G deny that problem isn't adequately handled because they can't afford for various reasons to admit that it is not.
	B. discredit the solution and/or its advocates by associating them with negatively valued objects.	9a. P or G believe, and a fair number of other people concur, that the culture is already adequately "programmed" to handle the problem--the precedents are adequate.	ASSUMED: Solution endangers person or group in some way
	C. change the "point" of the solution.	10a. P or G believe that solution is obviously poor (there is consensus) and that they needn't resort to less direct means for killing it.	10. P or G are engaged in a "hostile outburst" they are afraid (excessively) of what will happen if the solution is not rejected; are hostile toward the solution and/or its opponents for making them afraid, and are unable to restrain their hostility.
		10b. P or G believe, and others not involved with the solution concur, that the chances for stopping the solution will rapidly decline within a short period of time.	11a. P or G are afraid that they will be punished (hurt) now or in some future time if they don't give some resources to the solution
		11a. P or G don't want to close off the option entirely.	11b. P or G are sadistic and enjoy "playing" with people and programs.
		11b. P or G decide not to appear flatly opposed to the solution because: --they think they have more "staying power" than the proponents, and --they want to keep the proponents from mobilizing by "giving them a little hope," and/or --they don't want to tangle with the values of those not now committed to the solution.	12a. P or G are afraid of conflict or negative behaviors.
		12a. P or G feel solution isn't that bad and want to keep their options open.	12b. P or G are fearful of making an error-- the solution may not be that bad.
		12b. P or G believe that it will no no harder to stop the solution at a later date, and they have better things to do now.	12c. P or G are afraid they will not be able to accomplish what they want to do and therefore postpone acting, although others see no reason to delay action.
		12c. P or G believe that it will be easier to stop the solution at a later date.	13a. P or G are afraid of being responsible for conflict and negative behavior.
		13. P or G don't want to be seen as responsible for rejecting the solution, and they believe: a. that opponents are stronger than and as motivated as proponents; b. that proponents can't make a convincing case to those not opposed particularly to the solution; or c. that arguments between the opponents and proponents will be so extreme that they will alienate the powerful middle group from the solution ("plague on both your houses")	13b. P or G delight in "pulling strings" to get others to do their "dirty work" for them.
		14a. (i) P or G think they have to do or talk about something else to create "noise" in the channels which the proponents are using to communicate about the solution because they believe, and others agree, that the proponents are being too effective.	13c. (If engaged in booby-trapping or letting both sides slug it out) P or G enjoy humiliating others.
		(ii) P or G believe this is an appropriate time to get attention for another problem or solution of concern to them because they sense that those listening to the proponents want to think about something else or because the proponents have created a receptivity to what P or G want.	14a. P or G are extremely concerned about another problem or solution and are essentially unable to think or talk about any thing else.
		14b. P or G believe and others agree that the solution and/or its proponents are sufficiently "acceptable" that either or both will have to be discredited if the solution is to be stopped.	14b. (i) P or G believe, but others do not agree, that the solution and/or its proponents are sufficiently "acceptable" that either or both will have to be discredited if the solution is to be stopped (P or G feel powerless)
		14c. (i) P or G believe that they cannot reject the solution and that the only way to control it at all is to cripple it.	(ii) P or G are disposed to degrade or "tar" obstacles in their way
		(ii) P or G believe that the solution is not useful or that the problem it meets is minor, but that it can be subverted to get something that P or G want.	14c. (i) P or G delight in machiavellianism--in outwitting the other guy.
			(ii) P or G feel hostile toward the solution and/or its proponents, and look for ways of hurting it or them ("spite").
			(iii) P or G are disposed to destroy.

* P = Person
** G = Group (Organization, Family, etc.)

than accept the solution, for example, we have excluded a whole set of possible reasons for his response. When we learn that he not only rejects the solution, but does so by, e.g., postponing action rather than attacking the solution openly, we have excluded still other reasons.

Variants 1 and 2 differentiate between reasons a person or group might have for selecting one rather than another response. As the legend implies, Variant 1 refers to reasons which others see as related to evidence about the threat or solution or to their implications for the person's or group's social position. Variant 2 refers to reasons which others see as related to things other than these two.

The reader is cautioned not to interpret Variant 1 as the "rational" response and Variant 2 as the "irrational" response. The question of rationality is not at issue here. What is at issue are the considerations to which the subject is responding. We may assess these considerations as more or less relevant to what we see as the situation. Members of societies tend to see the reasons stated in Variant 1 as relevant or "reasonable." We tend to see responses based on evidence about the situation (in this case, threat and solution) as "disinterested," "objective," or "statesman-like" responses. However, we also tend to accept as "reasonable" those responses determined by a person's or group's location in the social system. For example, if a person is an important member of the USAF, we can see why it might be "reasonable" for him to reject passive defense if he thinks it will cut into the USAF share of the budget. Although he has obligations to a social community larger than the USAF, we also see that he has obligations to his organization, one being to keep it "flush." We may say he is being "selfish," "just a politician," or "shortsighted," but we accept reasons of this sort as "reasonable" and "relevant."

Members of a society are much less apt to accept Variant 2 reasons as "reasonable" and "relevant," although we often handle them by saying, "Well, we're all human." However, members of a society are just that, participants in a set of beliefs about what is "reasonable" and "relevant." If we look at response 7, Variant 2, we might say that it is "unreasonable" to deny that there is a problem (probability) of nuclear attack. This might be a "reasonable" position for us to take if in fact there might be some way to limit the damage from a nuclear attack which makes more than a marginal difference. If there in fact seems to be no way, we can ask who is being more "reasonable": the

person who saves himself psychological pain by denying the possibility of a frightening event or the person who is fooling himself into thinking that something can be done. The crux of the point here is the "in fact," because the "in fact" is always determined by members of a social system. Members of this social system tend to believe that you can do what you want to do, thus disposing them to assess the person who chose response 7, Variant 2, as "unreasonable" because "in fact" we might be able to do something. However, it is not inconceivable that we can meet situations about which we can do little or nothing.

HYPOTHESES

In the last section we talked about where, given our research interests, our subjects start and can end up. Here we talk about reasons why persons and groups start with the same stimuli and end up at the same or different places. The reader should keep several points in mind:

- These are hypotheses about why persons and groups end up at the same or different places. The empirical task ahead of us is to find out whether any of these are relevant to our question, and if so, for what kinds of persons and groups and in what ways (e.g., how central or peripheral are they in determining response).
- The hypotheses stated below are presented only as examples, not as a complete statement of the kinds of reasons we anticipate will account for major variations and similarities in response.
- At this point our hypotheses about the reasons of individuals acting as persons are more highly developed than are those about the reasons of individuals acting as members of organizations and about the reasons of groups. The first set of reasons represent those which enter into an individual's "personal view" about the stimuli. The second set are much more restricted and derive from the individual's membership in some collectivity, such as the State Department. The third set of reasons derive from the interactions of different members' considerations.

Although our hypotheses about the second and third types of considerations are much less elaborated than those about the first type, the reader should remember that considerations which an individual uses qua person often lap over into those he uses qua member, and vice-versa. For example, individuals who have very little confidence in themselves as persons and occupy positions of leadership in an organization often do not behave the way we expect "leaders" to behave, e.g., are very indecisive. Although all of us get irritated or distressed when people "can't seem to keep their roles straight," the fact remains that human beings do go back and forth between considerations relevant and irrelevant to the particular position they are occupying. Consequently, we have to watch for moves of this kind and be able to handle them theoretically. We should also remember that if the group is very small or relatively authoritarian in structure, the personal or membership considerations of the dominant figure in the group can significantly determine the considerations of the group.

The persons and groups which our hypotheses are about, i.e., the influentials in whom we are interested, are: those individuals and groups who have assumed or have been allocated central, peripheral, or potential responsibility for particular solutions (especially the continental defense solution) to the nuclear threat. Although variations in power to implement responsibility is an important dimension along which to discriminate individuals and groups and affects their responses, we do not have to use that dimension here. Obviously, the source and type of responsibility which a person or group has to continental defense are suggestive of some, rather than other, reasons for their responses to it. Several of our hypotheses are framed in terms of these different implications. Very roughly, the variables of source and type of responsibility produce these interesting aggregates* and groups:

* Aggregates are simply collections of persons or groups which have some attribute(s) in common, e.g., all members of the aggregate are highly anxious persons. Unlike members of a group, members of an aggregate do not participate in any activity or social practice together over time.

- (1) Extreme opponents and proponents of active and passive defense. These are the "activists," "agitators," and "fanatics" that usually attach themselves to issues which have certain emotion-provoking properties for certain kinds of people. They are small in number, but highly vocal and public. They usually assume responsibility for the issue, rather than being formally allocated it by virtue of being members of particular organizations.
- (2) Groups to which a superordinate agent has allocated central responsibility for a particular solution (in this case, active or passive defense). ARPA, U.S. Army Military Operations, and WSEG are examples of such groups for the active defense solution; OCD, for the passive solution. These groups have relatively little choice about whether to "work at" their responsibility; not to do so means that they lose one of their major raison d'etre.
- (3) Groups to which a superordinate agent has allocated peripheral responsibility for some solution or aspect thereof. For example, the Department of Agriculture has been allocated responsibility to provide food stocks for emergency mass feeding, but this is not their central responsibility. Consequently, they have more de facto choice about whether to "work at" this responsibility.
- (4) Groups to which a superordinate agent has allocated a central responsibility within which a particular solution can be expected to fall (potential responsibility). For example, the Defense Department is allocated the central responsibility of defense of the nation. Although the Department has relatively little choice about whether to "work at" this responsibility, they have more about the different routes they can take to implement it--e.g., offensive as opposed to a defensive route, active defense as opposed to a passive defense, etc.

Our first six hypotheses have been developed in relation to members of the first group (in some cases, aggregate), i.e., extreme proponents

and opponents.* This does not mean that we anticipate that these will apply to all members of that group, or that they might not be relevant to some individuals in other groups. It does mean that we anticipate that they will apply to a higher density of members of the first group.

Hypothesis 1

The extreme proponents and opponents of active and passive defense are in a state of emotional crisis (Janis' "high anticipatory fear" -- 1958) about the threat of nuclear attack, i.e., treat the threat as if it were in a crisis, not a negative contingency, stage (as if it will soon and almost inevitably occur, not as if it might occur sometime in the future). The logic of being in a state of emotional crisis, i.e., what it means about someone to say that he is in that state, is as follows:

* Social science readers familiar with McPhee's Formal Theories of Mass Behavior (1963) will recognize that what we are trying to do in this project is build a complex system, i.e., a theory about the meaning systems which different kinds of influential persons and groups assign to a particular kind of communication--their responses to the communication simply representing the logical implications of having made certain kinds of appraisals of the communication. This kind of a system is what McPhee calls a "big configuration" or a "spectacular" (like a special purpose computer program) and, as such, tends to be particular and unique, just as a theory of the political system of a particular university or national economic sector tends to be complex and unique. To make the complexity tractable and to minimize the costs in generality which a theory of a unique system involves, we anticipate building our "special purpose program" (theory of our specific case) out of what McPhee calls "modules" or "sub-routines." The modular approach essentially involves building models of aspects of the case which represent recurrent social phenomena. These models are like general purpose computer programs and are useable in many other unique cases. The theory of our unique case is built by plugging together these models, i.e., a "special purpose program" is built by putting together certain "general purpose programs." For example, the first six hypotheses in this report involve extreme proponents and opponents of active and passive defense. Suppose we drop the case-specific content out of Smelser's verbal theory of collective behavior and treat the logic of the emotional state concept as a statement about the implications of saying that the extreme value of an "emotional arousal" (anxiety, etc.) parameter is operable. We can then begin to see some of the processes emerging which, when stated economically and related to one another, can be expected to produce a theory of extremism relevant at least to the class of negative contingencies and possibly to many issues.

- (1) P (Person) believes that he is in great danger.
- (2) P feels that he can/has to do something about the danger, i.e., decides to handle it, as opposed to, for example, being resigned about it or denying it.
- (3) P believes that there is little time in which to affect the danger.
- (4) P attends primarily to limited aspects of the threat, limited solutions, and to limited aspects of these solutions and does not take into account objects, states, processes, and events which P's who are not in a state of emotional crisis about the threat think possibly relevant to defining the nature of the stimulus and potential solutions. Bahnson (1964) has talked about this as the "shrinking of the field" phenomenon; the disaster studies frequently report a "stripping down to basic priorities," where property is traded for life; damaged life is traded for no life; a genuinely safe place to go is traded for any place to go; traditional antagonisms (e.g., class, race, religious) are traded for co-operative pulling together.
- (5) P attends to some aspects of the threat and possible solutions, not in terms of analyzing or trying to learn about them, but in terms of searching for familiar stable perceptual organizations which for one reason or another (e.g., are thought to have proved reliable in the past) satisfy P's desire to say what the problem is.
- (6) After P has committed himself to (made up his mind about) some course of action (either a general "direction" or specific sub-routine), he will tend to develop a dogmatic belief structure about that course of action, i.e., refuse to accept evidence which P's not in an emotional crisis find sufficiently compelling to warrant modifying or abandoning their chosen courses of action.

- (7) P tends to trust his "hunches," "feelings," or "intuitions" in making decisions rather than the products of reasoning, investigation, or analysis, i.e., tends to act as if the risks are too great to rely on anything other than compelling affects.
- (8) P tends to resort to abnormal (e.g., extra-bureaucratic, "straight to the President") channels of communications.

Corollary 1: If P is a first or only born, he will tend to handle his emotional state by affiliating with other P's whom he perceives to be in a similar state and to share his opinions.

Hypothesis 2

The extreme opponents and proponents of active and passive defense are in states of emotional crisis less for reasons of the objective threat than for reasons of unresolved internal conflicts. As Wolfenstein (1957) notes: "There is considerable clinical evidence to suggest that those who are apprehensive about remote dangers, or more terrified than others about less remote hazards, are so not because of a more realistic attitude towards the world but rather on the basis of emotional factors." Wolfenstein notes the following types of conflict which can be responsible for excessive dread of what will happen in the future ("high anxiety," "high anticipatory fear," "emotional crisis state"):

- (1) P is afraid of the punishment he will experience if he expresses his aggression, and the aggression is sufficiently intense and insufficiently sublimated to aggravate the fear of punishment.

"The individual's own impulses or fantasies of punishing agencies are projected on the external world. Take, for example, the situation in New York City during World War II, when there were regular air raid drills in the schools. For most of the participants apparently these drills were either a dull routine or a brief respite from chores, with little thought being given to the not very imminent danger to which they were related. Some children, however, and also some adults, became acutely anxious in this situation, with fears of bombs exploding and houses being blown to bits. A therapist in a child guidance clinic observed among patients who showed this reaction an emotional predicament which constituted the real though unrecognized danger. These were

individuals who in their family relations experienced intense hostility together with great fear of retaliation if they expressed it. They felt that they would be precipitated into great danger if the hostility which they inhibited precariously and with great effort were to break through. This, then, was the explosion which they dreaded, the image of which became projected on the outer world. The danger of bombs exploding thus seemed imminent to them though it did not to others in the same external circumstances." (pp. 7-8)

- (2) P has a great deal of unresolved hostility towards other people and focuses on threatening objects, processes, events, and states in order to communicate about them, thereby "hurting" other P's by frightening them.
- (3) P selects a threatening object, process, event or state as a defense against unresolved fear: if he can face a contingent threat, then it is not he, but others, who are afraid (counter-phobia).
- (4) P feels that in some way he "caused" or increased the probability of the threatening event and wants to make restitution to the people who will suffer from the event, i.e., to save or restore a threatened world.
- (5) P feels unresolved guilt for some event in his life and watches the environment for the punishment which he feels he deserves and makes no effort to stop it.

Hypothesis 3

The extreme opponents of passive defense are engaging in a specific type of "magical" thinking (or generalized belief) which Smelser (1963) calls the "hysterical" belief, requisite for but not sufficient for panic behavior. The negative anticipations of British officials about the effects of German World War II bombing on the British population represent an example of an hysterical belief. Like all generalized beliefs, the hysterical belief has a definite process and structure and appears recurrently in societies under certain kinds of circumstances. The process and structure are these:

Stage 1:

- (a) P thinks he perceives an event, object, process, or state which might be dangerous to him, i.e., in this case, a state of nuclear threat.
- (b) P is uncertain that the situation is dangerous (e.g., will the threat ever materialize?), and if it is, he is uncertain about the kind and degree of danger involved.
- (c) the situation is sufficiently relevant to P that he cares about whether it is dangerous, and if so, in what ways and to what degree.

Stage 2:

- (a) P attends exclusively to the negative possibilities of the objectively ambiguous situation, i.e., becomes anxious. The anxiety is unbounded because P is unable to determine the limits of the negative aspects, either because he does not have the ability to reason them out or cannot afford to face them sufficiently to do so.
- (b) P experiences the unbounded anxiety as a belief in unlimited, undifferentiated negative powers or causes.

At the conclusion of stage 2, we can say that P is now treating an uncertain (in the sense of occurrence probabilities), perhaps dangerous situation as an uncertain, definitely and diffusely dangerous situation.

Stage 3:

P decides that the bad thing is almost certainly going to happen, i.e., has become a crisis, as we have conceived of it. Although this decision means that P is now very frightened, it also means that he has resolved the pervasive uncertainty associated with the objective threat. This decision is made because of and concretized by some precipitating object, event, process, or state--in our case, by the prospect of a significant passive defense system, which the opponents see as the "straw" which turns the negative contingency into a crisis. In other words, by stage 3 P has decided that an uncertain, definitely and diffusely bad situation is a certain, definitely and diffusely bad situation. In the course of developing this hysterical belief, P has

moved from a situation which is uncertain (in the sense of occurrence probability), perhaps dangerous, and if dangerous, to an unknown extent and in unknown ways, to a situation which is certain, definitely and diffusely bad. Obviously, P's final structuring of the situation bypasses many logical and empirical contingencies. As Smelser notes:

"Because of these exaggerations, it is unlikely that the account of affairs involved in an hysterical belief is a true account. Because the initial situation is itself realistically ambiguous, it is logically possible - though seldom empirically the case - that the actual course will be the same as that given in the hysterical belief. It is more nearly accurate, then, to say that hysterical beliefs are 'unverified' rather than 'untrue'." (p. 94)

Hypothesis 4

The extreme proponents of passive defense are engaged in what Smelser calls the "wish-fulfillment" belief, requisite, but not sufficient, for craze behavior. An example of the wish-fulfillment belief is the belief of many Americans during World War II that if we could just win the war, everything would then be all right. The process and structure of this belief are:

Stage 1:

P develops an hysterical belief, as this is described above. The object to which the proponents are reacting is the same as the opponents -- threat of nuclear war. The belief is similarly unverified.

Stage 2:

- (a) P decides that a diffusely dangerous situation, which is almost certainly going to happen (hysterical belief) can be or must be handled.
- (b) P attends almost exclusively to the positive possibilities of handling the danger, i.e., he becomes hopeful. This hope is unbounded for the same reason that the anxiety is unbounded in an hysterical belief -- P is unable to determine the limits of the positive aspects of the solution, either because he doesn't have the abilities to do so or because he can't afford to find out that there are limits.

- (c) P experiences the unbounded hope as a belief in unlimited, undifferentiated good powers or causes, capable of overpowering the unlimited bad powers of the hysterical belief.

Stage 3:

P decides that the good thing is imminently going to save us, i.e., P enters into a salvation crisis. This decision is precipitated and concretized in our case by P fastening onto a specific solution, e.g., defensive as opposed to offensive systems, active defense as opposed to passive defense or vice-versa, a particular kind of a shelter system as opposed to others, or a particular ABM system as opposed to others. As in the hysterical belief, the possibility of "over-powering" the danger and the relevance of P's specific solution for doing this are both unverified beliefs.

Hypothesis 5

Certain extreme proponents and opponents are engaged in the "hostile" belief, requisite for, but not sufficient for hostile behavior. An example of a hostile belief is the belief about the Jews in which genuine Nazis participated. The process and structure of this belief are:

Stage 1:

P develops an hysterical belief, as this is described above.

Stage 2:

- (a) P decides that the diffusely evil powers of the hysterical belief are in fact responsible agents.
- (b) P attends almost exclusively to the hostile possibilities of these agents, i.e., becomes resentful and hostile toward them for wanting to hurt him. Like the anxiety of the hysterical belief and hope of the wish-fulfillment belief, this aggressiveness toward the agent is unbounded.

Stage 3:

P decides that these agents are imminently going to attack him, i.e., enters into an aggression crisis. This decision is precipitated and concretized in our case by P's opponent (depending on whether P is

an opponent or proponent of active and/or passive defense, his opponent can be for what he is against or against what he is for) taking some action, e.g., engaging him in debate, winning the support of important government personnel for his proposal, etc.

Stage 4:

P develops a wish-fulfillment belief, as this is described above, where he has unbounded hope about the efficacy of his aggressive solution for dealing with the evil agents and enters into a salvation crisis.

Hypothesis 6

We have just talked about the structure of the hostile belief. The behavior which is associated with this belief, the "hostile outburst" as Smelser calls it, also seems relevant to elucidating the behavior of some of the extreme opponents of (especially) passive defense. (Although it is not our concern here, we can note that some of the extreme proponents of passive defense seem to engage in similar "hostile outbursts" against arms control and disarmament.) Many of us who have observed the social history of civil defense in this country have noticed that the opposition to passive defense has an element of "landing on" a policy, where the policy becomes the target for generalized disaffection, alienation, and discontent, just as the fluoridation issue became a target for other kinds of P's and for different reasons. The attacks on passive defense, particularly in recent years, are reminiscent of the scape-goating phenomenon all of us have seen so frequently in interpersonal and group relations. The more ghastly examples are the Nazi "final solution of the Jewish question" and Shirley Jackson's grim literary account of ritual scape-goating in "The Lottery." Less awesome examples are the "blame" episodes which nearly always follow local disasters (e.g., criticism of the dam employees after the Florence flood) or the circle of bored, suburban housewives who select a particularly masochistic member to attack and destroy her. If we accept for the moment that some of the attacks on passive defense represent hostile outbursts, the "structure" (as opposed to "content") variables of which Smelser presents, we have these questions: (a) why do these P's select passive

defense as a target ("structural conduciveness"); (b) what is the source of their disaffection ("structural strain"); (c) how does the hostile belief grow and spread; (d) what precipitates the scape-goating; and (e) how do the scape-goaters mobilize for action?

(a) At least these attributes of civil defense make it conducive to being treated as a target of hostility:

- it purports to handle the "structural strain" to which these P's are reacting, but is seen by them as an ineffective solution;
- while offensive weapons involve the premise that they will keep nuclear war from coming to this country, defensive weapons (especially civil defense) can involve the premise that nuclear war has come to this country. Aside from the fact that the second premise is objectively a more frightening one to confront, it also implies confronting more of the possible realities of the nuclear threat. This in itself is frightening if P believes that it is simply the emotional horror of (the intellectual inability to think about) nuclear war which keeps national leaders from using their nuclear weapons, i.e., nuclear war may not yet be a fact because it isn't treated as a fact.
- active and passive defense solutions involve talking about nuclear war, and some P's can feel that if no one says anything about the event, it will never happen. (This is a much more magical version of the belief in the last hypothesis, the reasoning in which is not without empirical support.) During World War II target populations of an air raid sometimes found themselves whispering to each other and walking very softly, as if magically hoping that if they were very quiet, the bombs wouldn't know they were there and couldn't hurt them.
- the civil defense program and OCD are not politically powerful, i.e., they can be "gotten at";
- the civil defense program is now associated with the Department of Defense, the activities of which are believed by

these P's to continue, rather than resolve, the "structural strain" to which they are reacting (Janis -- 1958 -- has an interesting hypothesis which may be relevant if P thinks defense activities exacerbate the nuclear threat because they are provoking to the enemy:

"Any objective threat of body damage, even though consciously appraised as an event that cannot be influenced by one's own behavior, will tend to be unconsciously assimilated to childhood threats of parental punishment for bad behavior: The individual will strive to mitigate his fate in the same way that, as a child, he succeeded in mitigating the parent's punishment--primarily by controlling his aggression and by making sure that he gives no cause for provoking the maximum penalty." (p. 197)

- like the fluoridation issue and unlike most defense programs, civil defense is admitted to be relatively subject to an informal national referendum, simply because it cannot function properly without the cooperation of the public, i.e., the public is relatively given a chance to "get at" the program;
 - several P's now antagonistic to civil defense at one time saw it as their salvation (see Wohlstetter, 1962, for history of civil defense positions from 1946-1962). The advent of ICBM's seems to have communicated to these P's that there was now no defense except taking everyone's weapons away; their salvation (CD) was in fact no salvation, and just as a loved person can become a hated person, so a loved object which disappoints can become a hated or disliked object.
- (b) the important sources of their disaffection ("structural strain") seem to be these:
- the prolonged strain of the threat of nuclear war is probably the most important;
 - the inability of the society (and specific social programs) such as civil defense) to assure those P's most reactive to the prolonged nuclear threat of safety; (Rosenman, 1956, p. 193, notes that when one's own father-surrogate -- in this case, the society or particular social groups, such

as the government -- is "bested by the alien and vicious father" -- in this case, prolonged threat of nuclear destruction -- "a common, if sometimes fleeting reaction is anger at one's own father, both for falling short of his claimed omnipotence, and for leaving one at the mercy of the hellborn ones." Janis, 1951, notes in Air War and Emotional Stress that residents of the most heavily bombed areas of Britain - residents under the most stress - directed the hostility aroused by the bombing frequently as much toward the home authorities and fellow citizens as toward the Germans.)

- the enormous expenditure by the society on objects which these particular P's feel prolong, if not increase, the nuclear war threat.

- (c) As Smelser (1963) notes, "Before collective action can be taken to reconstitute (a) situation brought on by structural strain, this situation must be made meaningful to the potential actors. This meaning is supplied in a generalized belief....." (p. 16) The generalized belief in our case is, obviously, a hostile belief. As Smelser talks about this belief, he notes that some intra-group aggression exists in all societies, and although it can be free-floating, it tends to be structured in terms of traditional antagonisms, e.g., criminals are hostile to authorities; Protestants are hostile to Jews and Catholics, etc. In the case of the extreme opponents and proponents of continental defense (especially passive defense), the particular hostile belief which is appropriated from the "cultural store" of these seems to be the traditional model of right-wing/left-wing antagonism.
- (d) the important precipitating events for the current vocal antagonisms on continental protection seem to be these:
- as Wohlstetter (1962) notes, during the period between Joe I/Korean aggression and Sputnik in 1957, the individuals now against continental protection were for continental

protection, particularly active defense, civil defense, and dispersion. These were seen as deterrents, not as destabilizing. The individuals now for continental protection were against it during this period, calling for elaborate offensive abilities at the expense of defensive abilities. The rearrangement of positions seems to have been triggered, at least for the current opponents of continental protection, by the implications of the ICBM's (warning time seems to have been crucial here, since the current opponents partly based their earlier support of continental defense on the fact that technical innovations had extended the warning time from minutes to 6 hours), and perhaps by the frightening offensive build-up in this country and in Russia. The result of these and probably other events was that the group that supported continental defense after Joe I returned to the position that they held between the end of World War II and Joe I: there is no defense and the only way out is arms control and disarmament (a variant on the world government idea espoused after World War II). Defensive systems are now seen as destabilizing.

- another precipitating event is the rapid technological progress on ABM and impending (for 2 or more years now) deployment decisions;
 - a third precipitating event is the vocal discussions about and pressure for civil defense by its proponents.
- (e) Some of the mobilization bases for the opponents of active and passive defense are media coverage of individuals who support their position, shared professional responsibilities, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and other professional research societies and journals devoted to peace research and propaganda.

The concept of being in an emotional state and Wolfenstein's and Smelser's ideas promise to be fairly powerful in helping us to explicate the system of meanings in which many members of the extreme opponent/proponent aggregates are participating. (For example, it is suggestive

to describe the behavior of the extreme proponents in terms of the craze behavior associated with the wish-fulfillment belief.) However, the "personal" reasons of members of the other three groups are less obvious because these individuals are much less vocal and have quite legitimate organizational reasons which obscure the interaction between their appraisals of the communication as persons and as members of their organization. The threat and solution (especially the passive defense one), though, do have attributes to which Americans might be expected to react. The following hypotheses are about the implications of some of these attributes for P's cost-gain appraisals of the communication.

Hypothesis 7

Depending on his images of civil defense shelters, P may be appraising shelters as a member of a class of institutions which Goffman (1961) calls "total institutions."*

"When we review the different institutions in our Western society, we find some that are encompassing to a degree discontinuously greater than the ones next in line. Their encompassing or total character is symbolized by the barrier to social intercourse with the outside and to departure that is often built right into the physical plant, such as locked doors, high walls, barbed wire, cliffs, water, forests, or moors." (p. 4)

Few, if any, total institutions have positive images or associations in this society, e.g., orphanages, mental hospitals, leprosaria, prisons, concentration camps, POW camps, or, from the point of view of slave residents, Southern plantations. To the extent that P associates civil defense shelters with institutions of this sort, he will tend to regard

*We want to thank Lewis A. Dexter for initially suggesting the relevance of the Goffman concept to us. We might also note that HRB-Singer, Inc. (1965), in a creative study of psycho-social problems that might be expected to arise in a civil defense shelter, used as variables many of the properties which Goffman attributes to total institutions. However, to our knowledge they were not aware of the parallel between their work and Goffman's, and they used these properties to try to get a handle on what might actually happen in a shelter, not as aspect of people's images of shelters which might affect their appraisal of a civil defense solution.

shelters with a vague, unspecified aversion. The specific attributes of this class and their possible implications for how P reacts to civil defense shelters are stated below. The reader should remember that for any of the following hypotheses to prove fruitful, we have to demonstrate not only that P associates that particular attribute with shelters but also that it affects him in the way(s) we suggest.

Physical Confinement:

This concept refers to not being able to go where you want to go and when you want to go. Having a quite large "territory" or domain" within which one can move relatively at will is intimately associated with one's status as a responsible, able-bodied human being. To the extent that P anticipates that living in a shelter will vastly curtail his territory and affect the times and ways he can move even within that, he can be expected to appraise shelters less positively than he would otherwise. Also, relative to other cultural groups, Americans value a doing activity orientation very highly: "Let's get things done," "Let's go do something about it," etc. It is conceivable that those Americans who particularly subscribe to this orientation associate being able to act it out behaviorally with being able to move, to stalk physically about the life-space fixing this, enlisting the help of that person, etc. For those P's who are particularly dynamic, "doers," "activists," "being cooped up" can interfere with their traditional patterns and self-concept. Physical confinement can also be expected to distress younger P's who have quantities of physical energy, athletic P's, and restless, "high-strung" P's who handle their "nerves" by physical motion.

Lack of Space:

The question of what is "too crowded" for the psychological and physiological health of the human animal is a highly complex subject (see Hall, 1966 and the studies referenced by Hall). Certainly what people think is "too crowded" varies drastically by culture and sub-culture -- a Boston brahmin, a lower-class Negro, and a middle-class Italian will have very different requirements. However, relative to most peoples of the world, the American middle-class is unused to crowded conditions, except in very high density population centers.

We can suggest that lack of space might be quite troublesome to P's whose visual world involves enormities of space and horizon, e.g., residents of the Rocky Mountain, Southwestern, and maybe Plains states.

Loss of Autonomy:

This concept refers to the necessity of having to submit to a "batch living" regimen and perhaps to leaders who have authority comparable to that of a ship's captain at sea. Relative to other cultural groups, Americans prefer individualistic, as opposed to collateral or lineal, orientations. Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) note:

"When the Individualist principle is dominant, individual goals have primacy over the goals of specific Collateral or Lineal groups: This in no sense means that there is license for the individual to pursue selfishly his own interests and in so doing disregard the interests of others. It means simply that each individual's responsibility to the total society and his place in it are defined in terms of goals (and roles) which are structured as autonomous, in the sense of being independent of particular Lineal or Collateral groupings. For example, the man who joins a business firm in the United States is expected, in pursuing his own goals of money-making and prestige, to be cooperative with other similarly oriented fellow workers and, in addition, is expected to have a positive attitude toward the overall goals (purposes) of the organization. Yet is it not expected that this man will remain in cooperation with these particular workers or dedicated to the goals of the particular firm if he receives an offer from another firm which will increase his salary or prestige.

"A dominant Collateral orientation calls for a primacy of the goals and welfare of the laterally extended group."
(pp. 18-19)

The lineal orientation involves the assumptions that continuity of the group through time and ordered positional succession within the group are crucial. Although organizing group relations in terms of a powerful leader and his assistants is only analogous to the lineal principle, it is closer to this principle than to either the collateral and individualistic principles, in that a hierarchy of ordered positions is involved. One reason Americans who subscribe to individualistic relations dislike hospitals is that they have to shift from individualistic to lineal relations, where they are expected to take orders from the doctors and his agents (nurses) and are unable to give orders to anyone.

Lack of Privacy:

This concept refers to the inability to seclude or isolate one's self from others at will. Although it is not clear that most Americans value privacy more than other cultural groups, it is true that relative to these other groups Americans have been able to use physical barriers to achieve privacy (e.g., "one's own room"), rather than developing psychological patterns of being alone within a group. Aside from P's possible anticipation that he will have no physical privacy to achieve a sense of psychological aloneness, he may also be concerned about having no physical privacy behind which to carry out acts which many Americans prefer to do in private, or at least not in the presence of strangers, e.g., change clothes, brush teeth, wash oneself.

Lack of Familiar Physical Supports:

This idea refers to not having one's property, particularly those props especially meaningful to P (e.g., his two cars, which allow him to feel that he has "done well;" his wine, which allows him to feel sophisticated; his cologne, which allows him to feel attractive to women; his "Rep" ties, which allow him to feel part of the Establishment; his big, ugly chair, in which he relaxes and feels at one with the world; lights in the dark, which make him feel secure, etc.). To the extent that P anticipates that he will not have his possessions with him in the shelter and this bothers him, the intensity of the "bother" will be affected by whether he believes that:

- (a) going into the shelter means not having his props for the duration of the shelter stay; or
- (b) going into the shelter means leaving behind his props permanently (i.e., he expects them to be destroyed). This belief will probably distress older P's particularly (see disaster literature): objects exist after one's death and thus can accord a symbolic sense of immortality to P ("leaving one's mark in the world"). They can represent to P the tangible fruit of his life's efforts, and P is at a life-stage where he cannot expect to be able to replace the lost objects.

Lack of Familiar Behavior Patterns:

This concept refers to being unable to do the kinds of things (carry out the activities) an individual is used to doing, e.g., bowling, cooking Sunday breakfast, working at the office, going to church, reading his child a bedtime story, watching television. P's who are "set in their ways," "creatures of habit" probably would be most bothered by anticipations of this loss.

Lack of Familiar Interpersonal Relationships:

This idea refers to the loss of contact with familiar individuals in one's life and the inability to re-establish contact if one wants to. The worry of many American P's about "Where will my family be?" indicates that these P's anticipate the possible loss of contact with loved ones. P may also anticipate losses of more peripheral interpersonal contacts, e.g., with his secretary, with a neighbor of whom he is very fond and with whom he likes to discuss rare types of camillias, etc. To the extent that for P going into shelter signals enormous destruction, including great loss of life, his anticipations of losing contact with familiar relationships will probably include fears of never seeing the parties in these relationships again.

Presence of Strangers:

P may not only anticipate that he won't have access to familiar persons, but that he will be with unfamiliar ones. To the extent that he arranges his life in order to avoid members of certain groups, e.g., the poor, the "foreign," Negroes, the "stuck-up," "the conflictful," Jews, the hedonistic, the right-wing, etc., he will probably be distressed by anticipations that he will be in a hole with God-knows-whom.

Loss of Personal Identity:

Our sense of "who we are and where we are," our feeling of anchorage in social life, depends enormously on our ability to have access to certain props, activities, and interpersonal relations. To the extent that P anticipates disruptions in these, he may also anticipate a frightening sense of "drifting."

Loss of Physical Integrity:

This idea refers to physical damage to P because of the immediate effects of nuclear explosions, the delayed effects of radiation, chemical and bacteriological agents, lack of oxygen, heat, starvation, dehydration, and epidemics as

the result of crowding and inadequate or no medical facilities. To the extent that P anticipates loss of physical integrity, probably he will be most apt to anticipate the first two agents -- direct effects and delayed radiation. To the extent that he imagines that being in a shelter involves essentially waiting to see if he survives the explosion and the radiation levels, he might be expected to experience a stifling sense of fear in connection with shelters. This does not mean that he will not also see shelters as a way of increasing his chances of physical integrity.

Lack of a Clean and Odorless Environment:

To the extent that P anticipates a smelly and dirty environment in the shelter, he will probably be more bothered by this if he is a member of the middle class. P will be more apt to anticipate a dirty, smelly environment to the extent that he anticipates:

- (a) ventilation will be limited;
- (b) water for washing will be limited;
- (c) members of groups who he thinks are dirty and smelly will be in the shelter with him;
- (c) the shelter will be crowded and he will be more apt to smell those smells which are around.

Hypothesis 8

Since civil defense is associated with an event of great destructive potential, we suggest that P may associate thoughts of his own death and that of significant others with civil defense and that these thoughts may importantly determine his reactions to civil defense. Specifically, to the extent that thinking about civil defense and its associated events reduces P's abilities to cope with his personal death and the deaths of those he loves, P will feel less positive toward civil defense. To the extent that it helps P by, e.g., making him feel "safe" and "protected," he will feel more positive toward it. The rationale for this hypothesis lies partly in a general consensus in the literature that American death customs are currently very impoverished. Relative to many societies, we have only minimal practices and few "robust" cultural beliefs that help us to face our personal death and to cope with the social and personal shocks of the death of a significant other. Consequently, we can suggest that an idea (in this case, civil defense) which P feels endangers or increases his abilities to cope with death may affect his reaction to that idea fairly powerfully.

Hypothesis 8A

Lifton (1964) suggests that death is anticipated as a severance of the sense of connection -- of our relationships to the various elements, especially people and groups of people, that are most necessary to our feelings of continuity and relatedness. It is leaving the social group, which is all we have ever known, and without it we are nothing. As Lifton notes, we all depend on various avoidances and beliefs to pretend that we will not be separated from the group; if civil defense intersects with these specific avoidances and beliefs, the nature of the intersection will affect P's reaction to civil defense:

- (a) we all depend to a certain extent on psychological denial of our inevitable biological deaths: we don't quite believe that we will die. The shocked emotional state of "near-miss" survivors in disasters derives from the sudden cognizance of biological vulnerability. To the extent that civil defense, e.g., makes it harder to deny our deaths, P will tend to deny it and nuclear war.
- (b) we isolate ourselves from the bodies of the dead as soon as possible -- have them taken away. Members of all societies tend to push away the dead, consider them somehow tainted and unclean, dangerous and threatening, because they remind us of the severance we fear. To the extent that P anticipates that there will be dead bodies in the shelter or they will be strewn about when he comes out, he will find it less easy to think about civil defense.
- (c) all cultures include beliefs that allow us to maintain symbolic connection to The World, and even the most hard-boiled of us depend on one or more of these immortality beliefs:
 - we survive in our children, the tribe, the nation, the human species. To the extent that P depends on this belief, his beliefs about what will happen to human beings in a nuclear war, even with civil defense, will affect it. He may feel that he lives on in his children, but that they might not be able to make it in time, or that they won't be able to have children themselves. He

may feel that the "nation" cannot be saved by civil defense because civil defense protects, not the fabric of the "nation," but isolated groups who, after the attack, become "marauding bands." He may believe that even though civil defense will protect people from radiation death, people will absorb sufficient radiation to cause the species to mutate into some unrecognizable form, etc.

- we live on after death. Lifton notes that if P believes that very few will survive a nuclear war, he will have difficulty in maintaining a belief in an afterlife when there are only a few among the biologically living, only a few who are in life. Civil defense may remind P of an event, the enormity of which raises serious questions of faith for him; it may seem more efficacious to him than to others because he is not as anxious about dying as people who have no after-life beliefs; or it may seem irrelevant (even silly) to him because life on earth is ephemeral and not consequential enough to protect.
- we live on in our or others creative works, objects, influences. To the extent that P thinks civil defense will not protect art, books, his property, the library he started in the town, and to the extent he thinks these will be destroyed by a nuclear attack, civil defense will not help him depend on this sense of immortality.
- we live on through the survival of nature - the trees, land, rivers, etc. To the extent that P thinks that a nuclear war will shrivel the trees, scorch the earth, irradiate the rivers and wild life, and to the extent he does not think civil defense will in any way protect these, civil defense will not help him maintain his sense of connection.

Hypothesis 8B

As Lifton notes, all cultures include beliefs about meaningful ways to die - ways that articulate the significance of our lives. For example, to a (some) Japanese kamikaze death in World War II meant not only that he

died nobly, but that he had lived nobly. To die for the Emperor was to have the privilege of acting out the highest, most significant value in the culture, and to have done that was to have acted out the ultimate meaning of life. Civil defense obviously conflicts with some P's ideas of meaningful death. It poses the dilemma of death-with-honor and life-with-cowardice. To men (particularly) who say, "I'd rather die fighting, with my boots on," life becomes debased if it is preserved at the expense of not acting as one should when "the test comes." Running like a scared rabbit into a hole is the kind of thing that sissies, children, and women do, not men who are men. In a sense, this idea of how one should meet "the test" is an ultimate expression of the American "doing" orientation - the active taking on of the world. To other P's - I suggest mothers, particularly - "going to ground," going someplace safe with their children (and others under their care) is an ultimate expression of their nurturance role. To the extent that they think they won't have a chance to protect those with whom they are entrusted, civil defense will not be attractive to them.

Hypothesis 9

Groups which have ignored or rejected a solution and/or ignored a problem, minimized its probabilities, or treated it as adequately managed, find it expensive to accept this problem or solution subsequently. This is less true if the group:

- (a) can relate the solution to a new problem (e.g., new nuclear threat -- Chinese capability);
- (b) can assimilate the solution to those already accepted (e.g., hard-point ABM defense to missile hardening);
- (c) has no public record on the problem or solution;
- (d) is ordered very publicly to do something about the problem or to implement a solution (e.g., by Congress).

Hypothesis 10

Groups which prefer certain instruments for defense policy problems prefer to handle problems for which these instruments promise to be appropriate or solutions which primarily involve them. More specifically,

- (a) groups which have been oriented toward offensive weapons tend to minimize the probabilities of a contingency which cannot be handled with offensive weapons;
- (b) groups which prefer "complex," "glamorous" military hardware tend to prefer solutions which involve this kind of hardware (e.g., active defense) over solutions which involve "simple," "less interesting" hardware (e.g., passive defense);
- (c) groups which prefer instruments that are manned by professional personnel completely under their control tend to prefer defense systems where the human components are small military crews (e.g., ABM) as opposed to large numbers of civilian sporadically related to the system (e.g., civil defense);
- (d) groups which prefer standardized programs, i.e., similar in all their instances, tend to reject programs which have to be modified extensively accordingly to local conditions (e.g., certain kinds of civil defense programs).

Hypothesis 11

Groups which have established positions of influence and responsibility for current programs will tend to minimize the import of problems and solutions not currently programmed. Groups which are dissatisfied with their current positions of influence and responsibility will tend to maximize the import of problems and solutions not currently programmed. This hypothesis suggests two sub-hypotheses:

- (a) out-of-power groups will often support each other by attending to a particular problem (e.g., deterrence problem) and block each other by advocating different solutions (e.g., arms control versus continental defense; active defense versus passive defense).
- (b) in-power groups accordingly try to divide those who wish to put a contingency on the policy agenda by directing attention to the conflicting proposed solutions rather than to the unhandled problem.

VARIABLES

It is perhaps more correct to call what we talk about in this section, not variables but concepts, since the ideas we discuss are more or less multivariate.

If we are to test our hypotheses, some examples of which we gave in the last section, we have to: (1) isolate the ideas or concepts involved in each of the most promising hypotheses or that are relevant across several; (2) work out the logic of the concepts represented in these, i.e., what is the descriptive relationship of each concept to human behavior; and (3) work out the operational definition of each concept, i.e., how do we measure its presence/absence and how important it is to a person. We have made considerable progress with the first and second tasks, but not with the third (instrument development) task.

Since our space is limited and we assume that the interests of many of our readers are not particularly in the direction of "variables," we will present very restricted examples of our progress here. Accordingly, we list only a fraction of the concepts we have isolated and develop the logic of only a few of those.

Values (for persons)/Priorities (for groups):

A. value or priority accorded time:

1. future time orientation: although the last section does not include any hypotheses specifically relating to person and group variations in time orientations, the very nature of the class of situations to which the research is addressed (bad things that might happen in the future) implies the central import of this idea. We can distinguish personal from group future time orientation notions, a basic difference being whether an individual qua person projects images of alternative stages of the self into the future or qua group member, images of alternative states of the group. Here we will state just the logic of attributing a value on a future orientation to a person:
 - (a) P wants a future state for the self which involves a state different from his present status and from

that status which can reasonably be assumed for P in the future if he does not want and act to achieve an alternative goal.

- we need this concept of different from a future status to exclude the "false" case of future time orientation. This is the "born with a silver spoon in his mouth" case: P is born into a social status that puts him on a "life-rail" which involves his exhibiting behaviors generally considered in our society as characteristic of a "forward-looking" P: going to college, to professional school, getting into a "good" law firm (run by friends of his father's), progressing steadily through the firm, marrying a Wellesley graduate, etc. I argue that this P does not necessarily exhibit a future orientation, as we want to understand it: the "goodies" we associate with having been forward-thinking were all set out for this P as long as he was a moderately good boy. He simply pursued that future state that one would assume for this P, given his accident of birth. There is no indication that he envisioned alternative future states for himself and worked to achieve one that would not fairly automatically "happen" to him.

- (b) the second dimension in the logic of future orientation is anticipated above: the goal which P acts as though he wants is what we, the observers (with our particular biases), think P should want, given P's situation and the possibilities in the culture. This goal may be a handsome husband, "fulfillment," "salvation," money, again depending on our biases and on P's situation (e.g., P is a young, marriageable female and for some observers a marriageable girl could want no more than an attractive husband). What we are stating here is that saying P is future-oriented

involves not only his acting to achieve a state different from P's present state and from future ones that could reasonably be assumed to happen to P, but also acting to achieve what is considered a highly desirable state. I suggest that the evaluation inherent in this dimension is the same as evaluating whether P is or is not "taking account of the consequences" in selecting the goal he has apparently selected.

- (c) P takes steps to achieve the future state he wants which are within the rules of the game, i.e., the ways he selects to get what he wants "take account of the consequences" of the alternative means open to him. These ways can be culturally patterned (e.g., going to college to get a better job) or relatively creative (carving out a role on a newspaper as science writer, right after World War II), although probably beyond some point of idiosyncrasy we would tend to say P "isn't taking account of the consequences."

- (d) P exhibits abilities required in exercising foresight.

We suggest that four variables seem powerful in affecting the extent to which a person or group exhibits future time perspective: level of confidence in the ability of the self to get what he wants; extent of desire for autonomy; level of anxiety and level of education, especially amount of training in what Piaget calls "formal operations" and a broad exposure to the different aspects of the problem.

2. value or priority on past time orientation: this idea involves the notion that P wants a future state for the self which is the same as his present status. Although we will not present the logic of this concept, the reader can get some idea of how it would be developed from the logic of the concept of future time orientation. Obviously, this idea is equally relevant to how persons or groups handle potential (future) problems. It also seems to be relevant to the extent to which P or G

hold images, for example, of the postattack world as a shattered culture (shattered "ways of doing things") and find these extremely upsetting.

B. value or priority on how activity is carried out:

1. "doing" orientation: although we will not develop the precise logic of this idea, it essentially refers to a preference for activities which allow a person or group to accomplish things, as that is judged by members of the society. This orientation may be contrasted to a preference for activities which allow a person or group to be in the process of accomplishing things. (Obviously, at least some members of a group may have to hold the second preference if the group is ever to conceive of and implement long-term plans.) The "doing" orientation is a very common one in Americans and logically involves a very active relationship to the world. We might suggest that this "activeness" is one of the reasons Americans prefer offensive, as opposed to defensive, weapons systems: the former "fit" much more with this American value, in that they are oriented to "doing" as opposed to waiting to have things done to you, to a manipulative orientation toward the environment rather than a passive, accepting one.

C. value or priority on the beneficiary of action:

1. value on securing benefits for the self: we attribute this value to a person or group when he or they try to secure benefits consistently for himself or themselves, particularly on occasions when it would have been "nice," "generous," or "an easy thing to do" to have tried to secure those benefits for the group (in P's case) or for an external collectivity (in G's case). The implications of persons' or groups' having this value are that it is much easier to get them to do things which are highly compatible with what they see as their interests.

2. value on securing benefits for actors outside of the self:
the general idea and implications of this value are the inverse of the one just stated.
- D. value or priority on the rewards of action: here we are talking not about who a person or group wants to get the rewards, but what they want them to be. We mention very briefly several relevant rewards that persons or groups can entertain.
1. autonomy: we attribute this value to a person or group when he or they consistently try to keep others from restricting his or their abilities to initiate action, even in situations not clearly designed to restrict them. A value on autonomy may explain certain cases where a person or group consistently resists efforts to persuade him or them to do something -- the person or group are resisting, not the specific suggestion necessarily, but what he or they perceive as efforts "to organize me."
 2. empire: we attribute a value on building an empire to a person or group when he or they consistently try to bring other individuals, groups, or the means thereto under his or their control, i.e., to make the abilities of other individuals or groups to initiate action depend on the "goodwill" or "generosity" of the controlling individual or group. Persons and groups who value empire will tend to appraise problems and solutions primarily in terms of their political implications.
 3. prestige: we attribute a value on prestige to a person or group when he or they consistently try to gain the respect of others whose opinions of him or them matter for some reason. This concept will be relevant to us if prestige is in fact differentially associated with working on one rather than another weapons system.
 4. affiliation: we attribute a value on affiliation to a person or group when he or they consistently evidence concern over establishing, maintaining, or restoring positive affective relationships with another person or group, even when

the environment is supportive and benign. This concept promises to help us understand a person's or group's consistent preference for "friendly," as opposed to "conflictful" solutions, even when the "friendly" one is not necessarily the most appropriate, or the reluctance of a person or group to act in situations that require "cracking skulls together" or creating some animosity.

5. peace and quiet: we attribute a value on "peace and quiet" to a person or group when he or they consistently try to keep others from getting him or them in a position of having to initiate action, even when doing so would mean adding, not losing control. In other words, the person or group who make this response do so not because they want to be the ones to do the initiating, but because they don't want to do anything different from what they are now doing. Persons or groups who value peace and quiet will tend to regard any proposed solution or new action as "rocking the boat" or "bugging them."

Abilities or skills (for persons)/Resources (for groups):

Again, we mention just a few of the abilities or resources that promise to be conceptually useful and note only the general (not precise) logic of each:

- A. power: we attribute power to a person or group when he or they are observed on a series of occasions to compel others to take a position which we have reason to know they do not prefer. One of the obvious implications of this concept is that persons or groups who have this ability/resource in relation to certain others can determine the response of these others to a proposed solution, regardless of what they themselves think of it.
- B. influence: we attribute influence to a person or group when he or they consistently get others to come to prefer what the persuader wants, and we know that these others: (a) did not originally want what the person or group wanted; (b) are aware of the person's or group's preference; and (c) have no reason to change their preference independent of the person's or group's effect.

C. authorization: we say that a person or group has authorization over a problem and/or solution when official documents accord jurisdiction over the problem and/or solution to them or other persons or groups treat them as if they are responsible for the problem and/or solution. Although a person or group may not have enough power to use this authorization, if and when he does or they do use it, other persons and groups will not fight that use on the basis that the person or group are inappropriate agents.

Feelings (for persons)/Moods (for groups):

It is obvious, just on the basis of those hypotheses listed in the last section, that we need a number of feeling/mood concepts: concepts of fear, anxiety, hope, anger, hostility, grief, guilt, despair, perhaps contempt. We will not even elucidate the general logic for these, since the intuitive, common sense understanding of these ideas is adequate for our purposes in this report. However, we will develop the more precise logic for using the concept of fear to explain what someone is doing:

We attribute fear to a person or group when we can say that he or they:

1. have learned to distinguish some situations as dangerous or threatening -- to do so is to have reason to avoid the situation;
2. have learned some ways of avoiding dangerous situations -- otherwise their efforts to avoid danger would be merely accidental, not intentional; and
3. are inclined to act on the perception of danger without deliberation -- otherwise, their efforts to avoid the danger can be interpreted as instances of cautiousness or prudence. These three conditions express the boundary conditions for the intelligibility of the use of fear as a classification of actions as nondeliberate.

THEORY OF ACTION AND PERSON AND GROUP DIFFERENCES

This section addresses activities which have been among the most exciting for us in this project. However, even if all our readers were

behavioral science theory-mongers, the subject is far too complex, it involves too many of the genuine philosophical problems of the behavioral sciences, and our space is too limited to do more than refer hastily to our work here. For readers particularly interested in these problems, we suggest that they look at Ossorio (Vols. I and II, 1966), Ossorio and Davis (1967), and at the lectures and working papers of these two individuals.

What we are working on here is a "theory of . . .," not a "theory about . . ." Ossorio (Vol. I, 1966) talks about the difference:

"In the one case [theory of], X simply comprises the concepts of the theory. For example, in this sense, S-R theory is a theory of stimuli, responses, habit strength, drive, reinforcement, extinction, etc., and the theory provides an account, e.g., of particular responses coming to occur in the presence of particular stimuli....this state of affairs is designed by saying that Theory R is a "theory of" P, where "P" is a surrogate for the theoretical concepts of Theory R. The second case is one in which X is not any part of the theory, but rather is an antecedently known and separately describable phenomenon, so that Theory R provides a second way of talking about that phenomenon. This second state of affairs is designated by saying that Theory R is a "theory about" Q, where "Q" refers to the separately describable phenomenon. For example, S-R theory might be regarded as a theory about learning." (pp. I-14, I-15)

Behavioral science readers probably recognize our work as simply another attack on the problems that concerned, e.g., authors of the papers in Toward A General Theory of Action (Parsons and Shils, 1951). However, we are not working on these problems because we "love to spin theory." Our much more mundane reason is that we wanted to talk about a number of things in non-arbitrary, systematic ways and found that unless we worried about these problems, we could not do so. For example: we wanted to talk about individuals as persons and as members of groups--although we expect that membership in certain organizations is sufficient explanation of many individuals' responses to continental defense, the responses of the extreme opponents and proponents seem to derive more from reasons that have little or nothing to do with the organizations of which they are members. We wanted to talk about individuals and groups--we needed to talk about, not only how differences in the roles of MacBird

and Captain Hook in organization A account for their different responses to continental defense, but also about how differences in the attributes of organizations A and B cause them to respond differently to the solution. We wanted to talk, not only about how individuals and groups engage in social practices, but how the "points" of those which they are supposed to pursue can change so that they are in fact pursuing entirely different practices -- a research group may be engaging less in social practices associated with "research" than in those associated with political survival. For some reason, a continental defense solution might seem very compatible with the first, but not with the second set of practices, and it is this switch in practices which accounts for an otherwise puzzling response to the solution. We wanted to talk about the participation of individuals (qua persons or group members) and groups in a larger culture -- often it is this fact alone, i.e., that an individual or members of a group were raised to believe certain things and participate in certain social practices, that explains why they respond the way they do to continental defense.

Tables II and III, below, indicate some of the concepts with which we are dealing and some of their relationships. As the reader can see, we have used footnote numbers to refer him to brief elaborations on the tables. The reader will also see that our thinking about individuals (persons) is more advanced than that on groups, and that our thinking about institutions and cultures is not sufficiently developed to include in this report. Although we will continue refining our work on different aspects of persons and groups, we do not anticipate having to describe a complete institution or culture (sub-culture) to handle the empirical problems of this project. Consequently, we will probably not work on parallel aspects of institutions and cultures, except to explicate the relationship between these two concepts and the activities and social practices in which persons and groups can engage.

¹Paradigm I is a theory of action and as such applies only to concrete structures capable of making deliberate decisions to do something. Consequently, it applies only to persons and groups, not to analytic structures such as institutions and cultures. Paradigm II is a theory of difference: differences between persons, groups, institutions, and

Table II. Paradigm I: What Is The Person (That Group) Doing?¹

TYPE OF ACTION ²	PERSON	GROUP
<u>Intentional Action</u> i.e., what is he (are they) doing, either consciously or unconsciously, from his (their) point of view?	<u>Structure types:</u> ³ wants ⁴ knows (beliefs, how thats) ⁴ know hows ⁴ overt attempt (performance) ⁴	<u>Structure types:</u> ³ intentions ⁵ information ⁵ capabilities ⁵ act ⁵
<u>Activity</u> i.e., what is he (are they) doing from the point of view of the group, institution, or culture in which he is participating, or of other groups, the institution, or culture in which they are participating?	<u>Structure types:</u> ³ objects: material props positions (roles), whose occupants are expected to engage in certain overt attempts, have certain knowledge, certain know hows, and certain wants iterative relationships between the objects at: one point in time (cross-section) over time (activity phases or stages) no commitment to the "point" or reason of the activity	<u>Structure types:</u> ³ same as for person
<u>Social Practice</u> point of view is the same for social practice as for activity	<u>Structure types:</u> ³ activity "point" or "reason for" the activity	<u>Structure types:</u> ³ same as for person

Table III. Paradigm II: What Is That Person
(That Group, That Institution, That Culture) Like?¹

PERSON	GROUP	INSTITUTION	CULTURE
<u>Structure types:</u> ³ Dispositions ⁶ (traits): values attitudes interests abilities/skills style/manner feelings States: ⁶ moods needs status ⁷	<u>Structure types:</u> ³ Dispositions ⁶ (traits): priorities norms concerns resources style feelings (?) ⁸ States: ⁶ moods requisites social location ⁷	<u>Structure types:</u> ³ Not given for reasons stated in text above. Presumably the struc- ture types for institu- tion would be devised to handle differences in the activities and social practices associ- ated with different institutions.	<u>Structure types:</u> ³ Not given for reasons stated in text above. Presumably the struc- tures types for culture would be devised to han- dle differences in the activities and social practices associated with different cultures.

cultures. By observing what a person or group does (paradigm I), we begin to build up ideas of what this person or group is like and how they are the same as or different from other persons and groups. By observing what activities and social practices persons and groups engage in, we begin to build up ideas of how one institution or culture is different from another.

²We are dealing with three types of action here, only two of which (intentional action and activity/social practice) are fundamentally different from one another. As the reader can see by looking at the structure types for social practice, this action type differs from the activity type only in that it specifies the "point" of the activity. For example, if an Eskimo watches a New Yorker bid at the bridge table and asks, "What is he doing," an activity description by us would be "He's holding three spades." A social practice description would be: "He's bidding three spades because he already has one spade 'on' and only needs three more to make game." Here the point of what the New Yorker was doing is stated. (See Felknor, 1966, for an interesting analysis of some specific activities/social practices.)

³"Structure types" are simply concepts which refer to classes of concepts, without which we could not describe whatever we are trying to describe (e.g., intentional action of a person, group differences) adequately. A structure type concept can take a multitude of content type concepts. For example, the structure type "wants" can have as content types all the variety of things that human beings can want -- money, safety, humiliation, love, a boat, a fishtank, etc. Incidentally, content type concepts can be used in talking about person or group actions, states, or dispositions, although the logic of how each concept is used differs according to what we are trying to say.

⁴Like all the other sets of structure types, the objective of this set is to give us adequate classes of concepts for describing whatever we are trying to describe, in this case an intentional action by a person. Very briefly, these structure types refer to: what the person was trying to get when he did what he did, what he had to know or believe to act thus, what he had to know how to do, and what he seemed to be doing or trying to accomplish (neutral behavior description). Specifying

an overt attempt ("He raised the cup to his mouth") commits us to at least some things the person had to know or believe and some things he had to know how to do (e.g., how to co-ordinate his hand and mouth), but does not commit us to what he was trying to do (wanted) -- he might have wanted to drink poison or simply "wet his whistle."

⁵As the reader can see, the structure types for describing group intentional action are the same in general notion as those for person intentional action. However, this does not mean that the content types for persons and groups will necessarily be the same, and when they are, they will not "work" the same way.

⁶The distinction between "dispositions" and "states" is the following: dispositions refer to what an actor is likely to do and represents a summary of his (their) behavior over time. This series is a hypothetical series, because it is the observer of the actor who makes the hypothesis about similarity along some dimension. A statement that John is a hostile person is a statement about what John is likely to do, i.e., treat people as enemies. States refer to qualities of the person that affect a specific performance. They are descriptive of a person (group) at this point in time, of what's in the world now, and are derived, not from a hypothetical series of actions, but from a single performance. We use state notions to modify our expectations of a person's or group's performance. If you are a doctor and you meet Adam, who is a patient of yours, at a cocktail party, Adam's status is not as patient here, but as party-goer, and as such you expect him, not to take his clothes off, but to chit-chat with you over a scotch. We suspect that we do not have an adequate list of the state structure types for persons or groups -- we may well want to take some structure types now referencing dispositional notions and try to think of their state parallels. In fact, we may want to have a single list of structure types and just note that these may be treated as dispositions or states, depending on how they are used. However, at this time certain notions seem to be state notions only (e.g., although we can say that someone is disposed to get into sulky moods, we tend to use the mood idea in a state way -- to qualify what we expect out of that person's performance).

7The concepts of status and social location are the structure types that let us talk about a person's or group's relationships to a larger community. When we want to talk about the implications of a person's membership in a group, we use some content type of status. The inclusion of status in the list of concepts we use for describing a person qua person lets us handle the frequent, inappropriate "slopping over" of a person's dispositions into one or all of his statuses. (The structure types of the second paradigm "agglomerate": someone can be disposed to be in certain states, can value an ability, have an attitude toward a style, etc.)

8Although we are not particularly committed to the names of several of the structure types for groups, we are particularly uneasy about the "feelings" structure type. Since persons and groups should not be confused, regardless of what we are saying about them, it is preferable to have different words even for structure types which are parallel in idea.

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