U.S. Reactor Containment Technology: a Compilation of Current Practice in Analysis, Design, Construction, Test, and Operation, Volume 1 Page: 1-54
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table does not consider multiple containment systems nor should all com-
binations listed be regarded as comparably safe, since many have not been
evaluated by licensing and regulatory authorities.
In using the information of Table 1.12, the following limitations
should be kept in mind:
1. Some combinations may involve safety features or philosophy whose
acceptability has not been evaluated by U.S. regulatory authorities.
2. The reactor and containment system combinations considered do not
include military or production reactors.
3. The evaluations are based on U.S. experience where available;
where not, the most comparable foreign experience was considered.
The table is intended to apply only to the systems described in Sec-
tions 1.3 and 1.4 above. Many variations, modifications, adaptations,
or combinations of the general containment systems listed, either with
each other or with other engineered safeguards, could have been reflected
in the apparent compatibility rating given in Table 1.12, but, obviously,
it is not feasible to consider all such combinations in a tabulation of
Some further definition of the basis for the apparent compatibility
classification is also necessary. This classification was generally ar-
rived at for a particular type of reactor by considering the suitability
or appropriateness of each of the five containment systems and then desig-
nating the "most-effective" containment system "A" and the others, as
appropriate, in descending order. This yardstick, however, is misleading
in situations in which the reactor mca might not produce high pressures
(e.g., organic-moderated and fused-salt-fueled reactors) and thus the re-
actor would be well matched with low-pressure containment, or in which
pressure containment would be inherently capable of greater protection
than the reactor accident could conceivably require (e.g., university
1. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 100, Reactor Site Cri-
teria; see also Federal Register, April 12, 1962.
2. C. K. Beck, Engineering Out the Distance Factor, AEC press release,
September 25, 1963.
3. R. O. Brittan, Reactor Containment, Including a Technical Progress
Review, USAEC Report ANL-5948, Argonne National Laboratory, May 1959.
4. J. J. DiNunno et al., Calculations of Distance Factors for Power and
Test Reactor Sites, USAEC Report TID-14844, March 23, 1962.
5. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Sections I, III, and VIII,
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, United Engineering Center,
345 East 47th Street, New York, N.Y.
6. Power and Test Reactors, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Federal
Register, 24(10): 4184-4185 (May 23, 1959).
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Cottrell, William B. & Savolainen, A. W. U.S. Reactor Containment Technology: a Compilation of Current Practice in Analysis, Design, Construction, Test, and Operation, Volume 1, report, August 1965; Oak Ridge, Tennessee. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc101033/m1/82/: accessed March 22, 2019), University of North Texas Libraries, Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.