ETHIOPIAN FOOD SITUATION: INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

UPDATED 06/28/85

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ISSUE DEFINITION

In Ethiopia, nearly eight million people are affected by famine. As of Feb. 4, 1985, reports indicate that an estimated 2.5 million are living in immediate danger of death because of the critical food situation. Relief officials have reported that at least nine of Ethiopia's 14 regions have severe food shortages. The most seriously affected regions are located in the northern parts of the country.

In November 1984, the international community launched a massive relief operation to assist the suffering people in Ethiopia. Private citizens, governments, and international organizations have sent emergency relief aid to Ethiopia. The nation's underdeveloped transport infrastructure and internal armed conflicts have limited the inland distribution of relief assistance.

The United States has donated the largest share of the world-wide relief effort. Members of Congress have passed legislation, the African Famine Relief and Recovery Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-8), authorizing emergency relief assistance to Ethiopia and other famine-stricken countries. Some observers favor trying to remove restrictions that prohibit long-term agricultural development assistance and other forms of economic aid to Ethiopia, but many continue to believe that aid to this Marxist-oriented nation should be limited to humanitarian relief. The Ethiopian food situation will probably remain a central issue among U.S. lawmakers and relief officials during the 99th Congress.

BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS

Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam remains head of the Marxist Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), also called the Dergue, which governs the country. Ethiopia has a total land area of 471,000 square miles -- about the combined size of Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Texas. The country consists of 14 administrative regions. Two of the most populated regions are Gondar in the northwest and Shewa in the central part of Ethiopia, site of the nation's capital and center of the Amhara people who have long dominated the country's political system. The least populated regions are Bale and Hararge in the southeast. According to the latest census report, Ethiopia has a total population of about 42 million people. The country ranks sixth among the world's poorest nations with a per capita income of $110 per year. The nation has a long history of civil wars, droughts, and famines.

Overview of Food Situation

In 1974, an estimated 200,000 Ethiopians were killed by a famine in the north central region of Wello. Haile Selassie, the former emperor, has been accused of allowing the deaths to occur because he reportedly neglected to inform or to request assistance from international relief donors. The famine was a contributing factor in the overthrow of Emperor Selassie and in the rise to power of Colonel Mengistu.

Ten years after the coup, Ethiopia is facing the worst famine in its modern history, brought on by the decade-long drought which has most
seriously affected the northern regions of Ethiopia. In all of 1984, the northern region of Tigray reportedly had rainfall in only three consecutive weeks. The lack of adequate rainfall together with the extreme heat has caused the soil in Tigray and other northern regions to parch, making it impossible to plant food crops.

The deforestation of Ethiopia's land area has also contributed to the decline in the country's food production. In the early 1900s, Ethiopia reportedly had about 40% of its land in forest but the forested portion has dwindled to about 4% of the total land area. The sharp decline in forested area has seriously denuded the steep slope farmlands of the northern highland regions. These barren slopes have had massive landslides during heavy rainfalls. Some environmentalists have reported that Ethiopia loses nearly one billion metric tons of vital topsoil each year because of erosion.

Political factors have also helped produce the current food crisis in Ethiopia. Critics note that the Ethiopian government has demonstrated a greater interest in military expenditure than in food production. In the period 1983-84, the government disbursed about 40% of its national budget on military defense: agriculture and industry received only about 4% of the national expenditure for 1983/84.

### Ethiopia's Projected Current Budget Expenditures for 1983/84 ($ Million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Amount ($ Million)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Defense</td>
<td>420.09</td>
<td>40.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education &amp; Culture</td>
<td>121.73</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Debt</td>
<td>93.04</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Order &amp; Justice</td>
<td>84.05</td>
<td>8.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organs of State</td>
<td>78.11</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health &amp; Social Welfare</td>
<td>65.79</td>
<td>6.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, Commerce, Industry &amp; Mining</td>
<td>46.81</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Works &amp; Communication</td>
<td>30.53</td>
<td>2.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>101.63</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,041.76</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Some observers suggest that Ethiopia's military expenditures are understandable since the country faces rebellion in at least two regions and (with Soviet and Cuban assistance) fought off an attack from Somalia in 1978 and 1979. But another view is that the Dergue uses its armed strength to keep itself in power and has missed opportunities for negotiated settlements with the opposition. In any event, Ethiopia's military power is costly. Since 1977, the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) has acquired an estimated $3.5 billion military debt with the Soviet Union.

Ethiopia's huge military debt is primarily paid from coffee export revenues. Coffee production earns approximately 70% of the nation's foreign exchange. Over the last five years, foreign exchange earnings have declined because of an estimated 34% drop in coffee output. As a result, the Ethiopian government has had more difficulty with the payment of its military debt. U.S. State Department officials have stated that the Soviet Union has rescheduled Ethiopia's payments on its military aid obligation.
As early as 1977, food production analysts began predicting that Ethiopia would have serious food shortages in the 1980s. They expressed concern about the widening gap between Ethiopia’s food production and population growth rate. The population has increased at a rate nearly two times greater than average food production output. Food analysts have contended that food production would need to increase almost threefold to satisfy the country’s total food consumption requirements.

In December 1984, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) completed a crop assessment study of Ethiopia’s food situation. The study revealed a 28% reduction in the nation’s total harvest output, estimated at 5.4 million tons, for the same year. This decline represented a shortfall of about 1.8 million tons or about the food requirements of between 6.5 to 8 million Ethiopians.

Ethiopia, despite its environmental and political problems, has rich natural resources. The country has many rivers, such as the Abay and the Awash, and abundant arable land (nearly 35.2 million acres) that could offer tremendous growth potential in food production. Only 18.4% of the country’s arable land is cultivated.

Food shortages are currently reported in at least nine of Ethiopia’s 14 regions. The United Nations Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO) has reported the most serious shortages exist in the regions of Wello, Tigray, and Eritrea in the northern parts of the country (see map – appendix I). The regions affected by the famine are listed below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>People Affected</th>
<th>% of Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Wello</td>
<td>2,532</td>
<td>6.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Tigray</td>
<td>1,429</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Eritrea</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>1.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Sidamo</td>
<td>716</td>
<td>1.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Shewa</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>1.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Hararge</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Gondar</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Gamo-Gofa</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Bale</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>1.405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7,325</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Famine Victims

As of April 1985, relief officials have estimated that of the nearly eight million people currently affected by the famine in Ethiopia, over 2.5 million are living in immediate danger of death and more than 2.2 million are homeless. Since April 1984, at least 300,000 Ethiopians have died because of the famine. The United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) has estimated that about 1,000 children die each day from famine related sickness. UNICEF has also estimated that 70% of the nation's infants and children have some form
of malnutrition which can cause diseases such as anemia, blindness, brain damage, and death. The Director of UNICEF has reportedly predicted that almost 500,000 children in Ethiopia will carry the effects of the famine for the rest of their lives.

The Ethiopian Jews represent another segment of the population living in famine-stricken regions of Ethiopia. These Jews reside primarily in the region of Gondar but also in Eritrea and Tigray. An estimated 25,000 Jews once lived in Ethiopia. In November 1984, however, the Israeli government allegedly sponsored the secret airlift (Operation Moses) to ferry these Jews to Israel. They were reportedly airlifted via Sudan and Europe by the Belgian carrier Trans European Airways. Reports have indicated that nearly 10,000 Ethiopians have been ferried to Israel, where the Government's Law of Return grants automatic citizenship to Jewish immigrants. In early Jan. 1985, however, the Sudanese government suspended the airlift because of publicity about the operation and complaints by Ethiopian as well as Islamic officials. At one time, it was estimated that 1,500 Ethiopian Jews were still stranded in Sudan. On Mar. 22, 1985, however, the U.S. Air Force allegedly airlifted some 700 Jews from Sudan to Israel. State Department officials have not confirmed the evacuation mission. The number of Ethiopian Jews still in Sudan is unknown.

Immediate Food Aid Requirements

According to the FAO, in 1985, the Government of Ethiopia will require 1.7 million metric tons of aggregate food imports, of which 1.5 million represents food aid and the remainder is commercial imports. The Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) has requested only 912,000 tons of the estimated total 1.5 million tons food aid requirement for the current year.

The RRC current request for food aid represents about one-tenth of the total world food aid supply for the same period. The U.S. Department of Agriculture's Economic Research Service has reported total world food aid availability at about 9 million tons for this period. Thus, according to relief officials, the major problem facing Ethiopia is not food aid availability but the inland distribution of food aid.

Obstacles Affecting the Emergency Relief Operations

In Ethiopia, two major obstacles restricting the inland distribution of emergency relief are underdeveloped transport infrastructure and internal armed conflict. The Ethiopian government receives relief imports at the ports of Assab, Massawa, and at Djibouti in the neighboring Republic of Djibouti. The Djibouti port is jointly owned and operated by the Governments of Djibouti and Ethiopia. Relief workers have informed donor organizations about bottleneck problems at all three ports. Port Assab receives the bulk of the country's imports and has a daily off-loading capacity of 3,000 tons.

At Assab, vital relief aid supplies reportedly sat at the docks last year while workers unloaded non-relief aid materials. Some of these materials were reportedly used for the preparation of the Ethiopian Communist Workers Party inauguration on Sept. 10, 1984. Critics of the Marxist Ethiopian government opposed its spending of an estimated $100 million to $200 million on this celebration while so many Ethiopians have continued to starve. The government denied these charges and declared the unloading of relief aid a
top priority at the country's ports.

Another reason for port congestion is the lack of adequate ground transportation between the ports and inland feeding centers. The nation has fewer miles of paved road and fewer vehicles than any other African country. The total road system has roughly 21,000 miles including all-weather and rural roads. Only two major paved roads traverse the northern parts of the country. Many Ethiopians still rely on pack animals for transportation in remote areas.

The lack of adequate transportation limits the delivery of emergency aid to rural areas affected by famine. Relief workers have reported that only one out of every seven victims has access to relief aid, as the majority of victims reside in remote mountain villages. Relief workers are requesting more trucks to transport food and medical supplies to these villagers.

The Ethiopian government has an estimated 6,000 trucks of which the majority reportedly are used to transport its armed forces. In 1983, relief officials estimated the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) had about 117 (12-ton) trucks for transporting relief aid. Only one-third of the RRC's fleet actually operated, while the remainder needed constant repair or were determined inoperative. Many of the transport problems result from the critical shortage of spare parts. In 1984, relief analysts forecast the need for 900 additional trucks to ensure the continuous movement of relief supplies from port Assab to inland feeding centers. According to State Department officials, the Ethiopian government has agreed to release 300 trucks towards the total required to assist RRC transport operations. Recent reports indicate, however, that these trucks are mainly being used for the resettlement of Ethiopians from the north as opposed to the transporting of emergency relief aid. These trucks are also being used to transport fertilizer and seed to Ethiopian farmers who have remained at their farms.

On Apr. 15, 1985, officials of the U.N. emergency operations in Ethiopia indicated that an additional 450 long-haul trucks, valued at $33.5 million, are needed to deliver emergency food aid in Ethiopia. For FY85, the United States has obligated $1 million to purchase new trucks and spare parts for Ethiopia.

The internal armed conflicts in the north between insurgent movements and the Ethiopian government is the second major obstacle affecting emergency relief operations. Most of the fighting is occurring in the regions of Eritrea, Tigray, and Wello, but ethnically based opposition groups have also been reported in the southeast of Ethiopia (see map). Some of the insurgent groups are the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) in Eritrea, the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) in Tigray, the Ethiopian Peoples Democratic Movement (EPDM) in Wello, and the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) in Harerge.

Relief observers in the north have reported that the EPLF and the TPLF guerrilla forces have continually demonstrated the ability to prevent the government from establishing firm political control in Eritrea and Tigray. According to these observers, the government can only move in armed convoys in the contested regions. Some reports have indicated that military convoys consisting of about 100 trucks accompany relief convoys to ensure the delivery of supplies in Tigray. In spite of this protection, in November 1984, insurgent groups reportedly attacked a relief convoy near the Kimbolcha military base in the Wello region. The TPLF and the EPDM have been reported in this region.
Other relief observers have accused the government of diverting vital food aid from opposition controlled areas in the north. They have alleged that food aid has been used as a political weapon to topple resistance forces. In early 1985, Members of a Canadian fact-finding mission to Ethiopia, reportedly found no evidence to prove government diversion of food aid from insurgent controlled regions of the north. Despite their findings, on Jan. 16, 1985, the Ethiopian government seized an Australian freighter, "The Golden Venture", carrying relief assistance (6,000 tons of grains) to Port Sudan for famine victims in Eritrea and Tigray. The government reportedly stated that the relief cargo would be distributed to other famine-stricken regions in Ethiopia.

Famine and war have forced many Ethiopians to abandon their homes and become refugees. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) estimates more than one million Ethiopians have taken refuge in the neighboring nations of Djibouti (14,000), Sudan (600,000) of which 220,000 have arrived since October 1984, and Somalia (700,000). Many of the refugees in Somalia are ethnic Somalis who arrived during the war between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1978-79. According to State Department officials, an estimated 650,000 Ethiopian refugees live in Sudan out of a total refugee population of 915,500 million, while an estimated 460,000 Ethiopians reside in Somalia, and some 13,500 refugees reside in the Republic of Djibouti. Other observers indicate that between 1,000 to 3,000 people per day are fleeing from Ethiopia to Sudan.

In Ethiopia, the inhabitants of the contested and famine-stricken areas of Eritrea and Tigray continue to have little or no access to relief assistance from the government sponsored RRC (see map). Instead, the EPLF and the TPFL have established independent relief agencies. In Eritrea, the EPLF has formed the Eritrean Relief Agency (ERA). In November 1984, the Eritrean Red Cross and Crescent Society (ERCCS) was created. The ERCCS operates independently of the EPLF and the ERA. In Tigray, the TPLF has founded the Relief Society for Tigray (REST).

These ad-hoc relief agencies have not received official recognition from the Ethiopian government nor international relief donors. In spite of their unofficial status, they have requested donor agencies to bypass the Ethiopian government and to furnish direct emergency relief assistance to them. Some relief reports have indicated they are receiving relief aid from donor organizations in Sudan. In general, most donors seem reluctant to supply direct aid to these relief agencies. They fear that direct association with insurgent relief agencies could threaten relief operations already approved by the Ethiopian government.

The International Response

International emergency relief agencies are coordinating emergency relief programs with the Ethiopian government to ensure the optimal level of effectiveness and efficiency in the delivery of relief assistance. Some relief agencies have assigned their representatives to determine the nature of the food situation, to identify the existing food distribution network, and to assess the current food aid requirements. Other relief observers are monitoring the distribution of emergency relief aid from the ports to inland feeding centers, while others have organized planning sessions to coordinate the delivery of aid among donors and to encourage greater cooperation with the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC). This government
agency supervises the relief operations of all donor operations in Ethiopia.

Recent Ethiopian Government Action

On Nov. 1, 1984, Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commissioner Dawit announced in Washington the government's plan to improve emergency relief operations. Relief workers would have more access to all regions, including the contested regions affected by the drought and famine, to distribute emergency assistance. The government also agreed to provide more logistical support to relief agencies. On the other hand, the Ethiopian authorities also need logistical support for their controversial relocation scheme.

On Dec. 11, 1984, the Ethiopian government requested additional logistical assistance from the international donor community. This assistance was required according to the government to support its resettlement policy. The government plans to relocate 1.5 million Ethiopians from the northern famine-stricken regions to the southwestern fertile regions (see map). The resettlement program will cost the government an estimated $5,000 per person. The Commissioner of the RRC estimated an expenditure of nearly $3.1 billion (about 70% of one year's GNP in Ethiopia) to relocate some 625,000 people. The high cost of this program has caused many relief analysts to doubt the viability of the government's resettlement plan.

Some critics of Ethiopia also suspect that the real motive for the relocation drive is to depopulate the north, eliminating support for insurgent movements in these northern regions. Many fear that resettled northerners will be subject to malaria and other diseases in the areas that are being opened up. Insurgent groups that oppose the resettlement policy have reportedly attacked government convoys transporting famine refugees from Korem in Wello. Furthermore, although the Ethiopian government announced that relief workers may have access to all famine areas, the government has rejected a U.N. plan for "safe passage" through the contested regions of Eritrea and Tigray. The plan calls for a negotiated cease fire between all contesting parties to allow the delivery of relief aid to famine victims in these regions. For all these reasons, Western donors have become more suspicious of the Ethiopian government's commitment to provide relief assistance to famine victims in these famine-stricken regions.

International Emergency Assistance

The international donor community has provided massive support to combat the famine in Ethiopia. According to the United Nations Office for Emergency Operations in Africa (OEOA), international donor governments have pledged an estimated 710 thousand tons (nearly 47% of the total requirement) of food aid to the hungry in Ethiopia as of Feb. 22, 1985. Furthermore, an estimated 450,000 tons (or 30% of the total) of food aid is scheduled to arrive between Jan. to Apr. 1985. Members of the donor community have also pledged non-food relief. Italy and Japan reportedly pledged 400,000 blankets towards the one million requested by UNICEF's Emergency Operation Unit for Ethiopia. Some of the donors' food and non-food pledges are listed on appendix II estimates of International Emergency Relief Pledges to Ethiopia 1984/85.

The Western donor community has obligated the largest percentage of emergency food aid, while the Soviet bloc has promised the greatest amount of logistical support. Western officials have criticized the Soviet Union for not contributing more assistance to its ally Ethiopia. Although the Soviet
Union has pledged to send 300 trucks to Ethiopia, only a few have reportedly arrived to transport relief supplies. In general, however, emergency assistance is expected to increase as international donors make additional pledges to Ethiopia in 1985.

Private volunteer organizations are helping to distribute emergency relief assistance throughout the regions affected by the famine. Recent reports indicate that some 225 emergency relief centers are established throughout famine-stricken regions in Ethiopia. Catholic Relief Services has identified 45 of the centers. Thirty-four of the centers are located in the regions of Eritrea, Tigray and Wello in the north (see map). These centers assist an estimated one million Ethiopians. The remaining 12 emergency centers are located in the Shewa and Sidamo regions. They serve an estimated 235,000 people.

According to the Administrator of AID, Peter McPherson, at least 90% of the emergency relief aid is being delivered to famine victims at feeding camps in Ethiopia. Other relief officials indicate that an estimated 1,235,000 Ethiopians receive emergency aid from private volunteer organizations that operate relief centers in the country. This figure represents about 17% of the total population (an estimated 7.5 million) affected by the famine.

Many relief workers are attempting to deliver emergency relief to the majority of famine victims who live in remote villages that are located far from feeding centers. Most of the centers have been established near the major roads and domestic airstrips throughout the famine-stricken regions (see map). According to relief observers, Ethiopians from remote villages travel an average of two days to reach the main roads in route to relief centers. Many of the people living in remote famine-stricken villages reportedly are too weak for the journey. In response, relief analysts at the United Nations have developed a plan called "Operation St. Bernard" to airdrop emergency aid in remote regions affected by famine. On Jan. 28, 1985, pilots from Britain, Ethiopia, and West Germany airdropped 32 tons of food aid on areas in northern Shewa.

United States Emergency Aid

The United States has obligated the largest share of emergency relief to Ethiopia. As of June 6, 1985, the Government had pledged 425,620 tons of food aid worth $214.80 million. According to AID officials, 260,000 tons (includes P.L. 480 title II, Section 416, and Wheat Reserve) will arrive in Ethiopia by June 30, 1985. The table below shows the tonnage and value of U.S. food aid to Ethiopia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
<th>$ Value in Millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P.L. 480 Title II Emergency</td>
<td>193,406</td>
<td>111.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.L. 480 Title II Regular</td>
<td>11,669</td>
<td>5.37*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Section 416 Dairy**  
25,809  
27.71

**Wheat Reserve**  
194,536  
69.94

**TOTALS**  
425,620  
214.80

*Includes freight cost.

By the second quarter of FY85, the United States has contributed more food aid to Ethiopia than in the last four years. From FY81 to FY84 the United States provided 82,243 tons of P.L. 480 food aid (includes emergency and regular aid) valued at $30.4 million (excluding freight cost). During the last six months the United States has obligated nearly five times that amount of food aid tonnage to Ethiopia.

In FY85, Ethiopia will receive approximately 29% of the total 1,463,867 metric tons, which includes 45,000 metric tons for prepositioning food in selected third world nations, valued at $563 million for P.L. 480 emergency food aid to Africa.

On Nov. 2, 1984, the United States agreed to furnish 50,000 tons, about 12% of the total food pledge for FY85, for direct emergency food aid to the Ethiopian government. This was the first time in 10 years that the United States had provided direct government-to-government emergency assistance rather than aid through private volunteer organizations (PVOs). The United States continues to distribute the majority of official relief aid through PVOs operating in Ethiopia. In FY85, PVOs will distribute 365,076 tons of food aid or about 88% of the total. In May 1985, World Vision, a PVO, received an estimated 8,000 tons of food aid (valued at approximately $2 million, excluding freight cost) from AID. For the first time, this aid can be used for its food for work program in Ethiopia.

AID will provide 115,870 metric tons valued at $49.5 million for emergency food aid to Ethiopian refugees in FY85. The State Department's Bureau for Refugee Programs has committed about $3 million to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to assist Ethiopian refugees in Sudan during FY85. In addition, the State Department is authorized to provide $2.5 million for the resettling of Ethiopian Jews in Israel. Further, the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) at AID has approved an estimated $28.3 million for relief operations in Ethiopia for the same period.

The United States has also provided logistical and technical support to Ethiopia. In the first week of November 1984, two United States Hercules C-130 cargo planes landed in Ethiopia to carry relief aid from the ports to inland distribution centers. Since Nov. 6, 1984, the planes have ferried more than 6,000 tons of relief aid. During the last six months, their operational cost has approximately totaled $8.2 million. The planes will remain in Ethiopia with an option to renew their contract for 60 days. During the same month, the United States sent a well-drilling team to evaluate the status of the Ethiopian government's equipment. The United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) has received a $750,000 well-drilling contract for water project development in Ethiopia. The U.S. is reportedly considering another $3 million well-drilling request from UNICEF.

In November 84, the Administrator of AID, Peter McPherson, visited and assessed the food situation in Ethiopia. He has stated that three stages are essential to solve Ethiopia's food problems. First is the response to the immediate food shortage, while the second stage requires the provision of
emergency relief over the next year, and in the third stage long-term development assistance will be needed to correct the fundamental agriculture problems of Ethiopia.

Brooke and Hickenlooper Amendments

Some observers believe that the long-term solution to Ethiopia's food problems lies in providing agricultural development assistance that will make the country independent of food aid. Others oppose any development assistance to the country on the grounds that its Marxist regime is unlikely to use such aid efficiently or in the best interests of its people. In any event, the U.S. Government is currently prohibited from providing funds for foreign assistance to famine-stricken Ethiopia. The United States can, however, provide humanitarian aid, such as food and non-food emergency relief, to this nation. The current prohibition results from the Ethiopian government's failure to repay its outstanding debt owed to American citizens, firms, and the U.S. Government, causing the application of the Brooke and the Hickenlooper amendments.

The Brooke amendment, enacted in 1975, prohibits the use of funds contained in annual foreign assistance appropriation acts for nations that are more than one year in default on the repayment of U.S. foreign assistance loans (P.L. 98-473, U.S. Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act of 1995, sec. 518). The Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) which governs Ethiopia has an outstanding obligation of $4.6 million, excluding late charges, to the U.S. Government. The original bill was $36 million for two Foreign Military Sales (FMS) loans, made to former Monarch Haile Selassie. For nine years the Ethiopian government has failed to make a direct payment on its FMS loans.

The Hickenlooper amendment requires the suspension of foreign assistance to a government that expropriates, nationalizes, or seizes American property without equitable and timely compensation (P.L. 87-195, U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, sec.620(e)). A government has a maximum of six months from the time of confiscation to arrange a repayment plan that would compensate American property owners for their losses. If a nation fails to comply with this requirement, the President of the United States is required to suspend U.S. foreign assistance to that government. In 1974, the Ethiopian authorities nationalized American properties valued at $30 million. The Kalamazoo Spice Company in Michigan claims a loss at about $20 million. The Ethiopian government has not settled its outstanding claims owed to the American private sector.

Although the Brooke and Hickenlooper amendments prevent the U.S. Government from providing foreign assistance (except humanitarian aid) to Ethiopia, the President could waive these provisions. Pursuant to section 614 a(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the President can waive any prohibition contained in foreign assistance legislation, including the Brooke and the Hickenlooper amendments. This provision is rarely used by the President, and only in circumstances that are determined important to the national security of the United States. No President has ever waived the Brooke amendment for any country.

The Hickenlooper amendment contains a provision that allows the President to waive the suspension of foreign aid, if the President determines and certifies that such a waiver is important to the national interests of the United States. The President is required to report immediately such
certification to the Congress.

Although the United States may not provide development aid to Ethiopia, the Congress has enacted legislation that temporarily exempts development funds from the restrictions of the Brooke and Hickenlooper amendments. The African Famine Relief and Recovery Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-8) contains a provision that frees its appropriations from the Hickenlooper amendment, while the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (section 491) releases these funds from the Brooke amendment. Thus, AID will receive funds to provide Ethiopia with small-scale development aid such as: farming tools, seeding for crops, and well-drilling equipment. These appropriations are only authorized until Mar. 31, 1986. At that time, unless the Brooke and Hickenlooper amendments are waived or the Ethiopian government pays its debts, the Congress will be required to enact further exemptions to continue development aid to this famine-stricken nation.

HEARINGS


REPORTS AND CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS


CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

05/09/85 -- In response to protest from Western donor governments and PVOs, the Ethiopian government has agreed to reopen the Ibbet relief camp in Gonder. Refugees have started to return to the camp. The government will reportedly register and provide medical care to these refugees. Western donors have donated food, tents, and medical personnel to assist the returnees.

05/08/85 -- According to the Washington Post, the United States has obligated $1 million towards the purchase of trucks and spare parts in Ethiopia. This assistance will help to improve the delivery of food supplies from Ethiopia's ports to inland feeding centers.

04/30/85 -- Relief workers reported that over 52,000 refugees were forced to leave the Ibbet relief camp in the Gonder region. Ethiopian regional officials only gave two days notice before the burning of huts and evicting of refugees occurred. Many of the refugees reportedly were too weak for the 3 to 6 days walk to their villages.

04/26/85 -- General Abdel Sawar Dahab's (Sudan's new military ruler) representatives arrived in Addis Ababa to meet with Ethiopian officials. The delegates reportedly held discussions on possible negotiations to end support for insurgent groups in Ethiopia and Sudan, and the repatriation of their refugees. The future outcome of these talks may block Western donor efforts to assist Ethiopian refugees from Eritrea and Tigray.

04/20/85 -- The French relief organization "Doctors Without Walls" reported that a cholera epidemic has spread to feeding camps (Alamata, Kobo, and Korem) in Ethiopia's Wello region. The Ethiopian government has reportedly denied that the disease broke out at these centers.

04/04/85 -- The Congress enacted the African Famine Relief and Recovery Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-10) supplemental appropriation bill providing $784 million of emergency aid to Africa for FY85. The act restricts the Ethiopian government from direct control or distribution of the Commodity Credit Corporation's surplus food reserve, some 200,000 tons.

04/02/85 -- The Congress enacted the African Famine Relief and Recovery Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-8) authorizing development and humanitarian aid to Africa for FY85. The act's appropriations are exempt from the
03/25/85 -- According to the Washington Post, the United States Air Force airlifted an estimated 700 Ethiopian Jews from Sudan to Israel. The airlift reportedly occurred on Friday, Mar. 22, 1985, between 6am and 10am. The Ethiopians refugees came from the Tawawa refugee camp located near the town of Gedaref. State Department officials have not confirmed the airlift.

03/04/85 -- According to the New York Times, Kurt Jansson's, UN Undersecretary General for Emergency Operations in Ethiopia, proposal to lead a relief convoy (under the Red Cross flag) in the northern civil war regions was denied by Colonel Mengistu.

03/03/85 -- Nine French citizens were abducted by members of the TPLF or the EPDM insurgent groups in the Wello region. They were taken by the rebels near the town of Lalibela, after their plane had landed to unload its cargo of 8.5 tons of food aid. State Department officials confirmed that all hostages have been released unharmed.

02/23/85 -- The Ethiopian Foreign Ministry accused the governments of Israel and Sudan of unlawfully abducting Ethiopian Jews from its northwestern regions. Ethiopian officials contend that these Jews are resettled in the West Bank to serve as a buffer between Israelis and Arabs. The Government demanded the immediate return of its citizens.

02/17/85 -- The New York Times reported that Senator DeConcini and Senator Trible traveled to Ethiopia (Feb. 13-15, 1985). They toured famine relief centers, Ethiopian Jewish villages, and met with Ethiopian officials.

02/09/85 -- The UN Assistant Secretary General for Coordinating the Relief Response in Ethiopia indicated that the RRC has an estimated 270 large and small trucks in its national fleet. He stated that more short-haul trucks (5-7 tons) are needed to carry food aid from major warehouses to inland feeding centers.

01/28/85 -- British, Ethiopian and West German pilots participated in a joint airdrop of 32 tons of food aid on the northern region of Shewa. The United Nations reportedly organized the airdrop called "Operation St. Bernard."

01/16/85 -- The Ethiopian government seized the Australian freighter, "The Golden Venture," carrying relief aid to Port Sudan for famine victims in the regions of Eritrea and Tigray. According to Australian Foreign Officers, the Ethiopian government will reportedly distribute aid to other famine regions.

01/03/85 -- The Israeli government reportedly acknowledged the airlift rescue mission of over 10,000 Ethiopian Jews. These Jews were taken to Israel
via Sudan from the Gonder region in Ethiopia. The airlift has operated over the last few years.

12/23/84 -- According to the Washington Post, the Reagan Administration authorized emergency relief supplies for Ethiopian refugees in eastern Sudan. The United States will furnish 100,000 tons of sorghum, of which 20,000 tons has already arrived.

12/18/84 -- The United Nations General Assembly voted 122 to 5, with 16 abstentions, to spend $73.5 million for a new U.N. conference center in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Belgium, Britain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United States opposed the resolution. They objected because of the scarce resources available to purchase emergency relief for the Ethiopian famine victims.

12/07/84 -- The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) projected Ethiopia's total food requirement at 1.2 million tons for 1985. The country's inadequate transport infrastructure can only absorb 900,000 tons of food imports, of which 90% is food aid.

12/02/84 -- Representative Evans, ranking Member of the House Select Committee on Hunger, returned from a trip to Ethiopia (11/28 to 12/2). He traveled to relief camps, observed the port facilities in the north, and met with the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commissioner.

11/29/84 -- Representative Leland held a press conference to report on the 8-Member delegation's assessment of Ethiopia's food crisis. The delegation visited the country (11/24 to 11/28) to inspect the major ports, tour relief camps, and meet with Ethiopian and international relief officials.

11/28/84 -- An official at the U.S. Department of Agriculture announced that Secretary Block plans to release 300,000 tons of wheat from the wheat reserve for emergency aid to famine-stricken African nations like Ethiopia. The wheat will be available for P.L. 480 emergency food aid and will not interfere with U.S. domestic wheat stocks.

11/26/84 -- The U.S. congressional delegation in Ethiopia cabled President Reagan about the deteriorating food situation there. In response, the President rerouted the freighter S.S. Sam Houston from India to Ethiopia. It carried 10,000 metric tons of soy-fortified bulgar and corn soy milk.

11/19/84 -- According to Africa News, in 1982, if the
international donor community had responded to 
the Ethiopian government's request for food 
aid, the present food disaster could have been 
avoided.

11/15/84 -- Representative Hall, Chairman of the International 
Task Force of the Select Committee on Hunger, 
held a press conference about his recent visit 
to Ethiopia (11/9 to 11/13). Hall requested 
President Reagan to borrow immediately funds to 
increase U.S. disaster relief to purchase non-food 
supplies for Ethiopia. He also urged the 
Administration to increase U.S. wheat reserve 
stock contributions to the nation in accordance 
with section 416 of the Agriculture Act.

-- The Organization of African Unity (OAU) Chairman, 
Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, announced the 
members' decision to form a special famine aid 
fund. The decision was made at the closing 
session of the 20th summit conference in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia.

11/09/84 -- AID Administrator Peter McPherson, returning 
from Ethiopia, reported that "he had not seen 
anything like" the famine situation there. He 
described the children affected by famine as 
people "who were like shrunken little old men 
with no bellies, almost no flesh."

11/05/84 -- Two chartered U.S. Hercules C-120 cargo planes 
landed in Ethiopia to ferry relief aid from the 
ports to inland food distribution centers. The 
planes are chartered for 60 days with the option 
to extend an additional two months. AID 
officials have extended the contract for another 
60 days.

ADDITIONAL REFERENCE SOURCES

African famine: U.S. response. Issue Brief by Charles 
Hanrahan, Raymond Copson, Susan Epstein, Holly Kenworthy, 
and Larry Nowels.

U.S. assistance to Ethiopia: foreign aid facts. 
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Food Assistance</th>
<th>Non-Food Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>4,000 tons</td>
<td>$2.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>12.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>17,600</td>
<td>374,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>57,250</td>
<td>237,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>9.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>26.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>300,000 milk protein</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>201,000</td>
<td>17.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, East</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>5.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, West</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>316,384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>6,900</td>
<td>56,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>300,000 milk protein</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>1,100,000 tablets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>300,000 blankets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>(24) helicopters, (12) planes, (2) trucks, (1100) tents, (363) trucks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>10,050</td>
<td>26.5 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>245.9 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>26,943,670</td>
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<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>415,878*</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>694,674 *</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>4,153,784</td>
<td>26,943,670</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (*) As of 5/24/85. All above pledges are subject to change monthly.

Sources: Africa News, November 19, 1984; P2; Ethiopia Drought 1984, UNPRO Cable SITREP No. 15, December 6, 1984; Donations to Ethiopian Drought Emergency - FY 85, U.S. Department of State, November 3, 1984; House Select Committee on Hunger, Situation Report No. 7, Mar. 1, 1985; and British, Canadian, French, and Swedish Embassies.