AFRICAN FAMINE: U.S. RESPONSE
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In 1985, Africa faces another year of severe food shortages. While the crop situation in southern Africa has improved somewhat, and while rain has fallen in eastern Africa, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations continues to identify 21 African countries as seriously affected by food emergencies. In January 1985, a UN official estimated that 30 million Africans had suffered from the effects of these emergencies. As of May 1985, the FAO regarded food emergencies as particularly acute in six countries: Chad, Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Mozambique, and Sudan. Most reports of widespread malnutrition and deaths from starvation were coming from these countries. The food situation in Sudan was "deteriorating rapidly," according to the FAO.

The African famine raises the issue of whether -- at a time of budgetary restraints affecting many U.S. domestic programs -- U.S. emergency assistance to Africa should be increased and by how much. Other famine-related issues include the adequacy of U.S. measures for monitoring and anticipating food emergencies, and the scale and nature of U.S. agricultural development programs intended to prevent future famines.

BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS

The background section of this issue brief is as follows:

Current food problems
African famine and U.S. interests
Immediate sources of Africa's famine
Long-term factors
Approaches to resolving Africa's famine problem
Responses to the African famine
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Current issues

Current Food Problems

FAO has provisionally estimated that 1984 grain production for 21 drought-affected countries dropped 12%, or 3.2 million metric tons, below the drought-reduced output of the previous year. Grain import requirements are estimated to be 12.2 million metric tons in 1984/1985, 5 million metric tons more than the 7.2 million metric tons imported in 1983/1984. If commercial imports reach 5.3 million metric tons as expected by the FAO, then the food aid requirements of the 21 countries would total around 6.9 million metric tons. Against this total estimated food aid need, donors have pledged, as of March 1985, 5.7 million metric tons, leaving an estimated 1.2 million metric tons uncovered. Of the pledged amount only 2.4 million tons have been delivered as of the end of March 1985, leaving almost 60% of the pledges undelivered.

Of the 21 countries facing the most serious difficulties in 1985, FAO identifies 6 with particularly serious food emergencies. These are the East African nations of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan; four countries of the West African Sahel: Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger; and Mozambique in southern Africa. Together, these 8 countries account for nearly two-thirds of the
Ethiopia. The most severe food problems are currently in Ethiopia, where as many as 7 to 10 million people, out of a total population roughly estimated at 42 million, could be affected by food shortages. Large numbers of Ethiopians fleeing the drought-affected provinces of the North and West of that country have concentrated in refugee camps and feeding centers run mainly by private voluntary organizations. Despite the food aid and medical attention the refugees are receiving, deaths from starvation or related diseases, according to many on-site observers, have occurred at the rate of 40 per day. Most of these are children. Recent rains have raised hopes for better crops in future months, but food relief supplies stored in the open have been damaged and the delivery of food aid has been hampered. [For further information on Ethiopia, see CRS Issue Brief IB85061, Ethiopian Famine: U.S. Response, by Lafayette Barnes.]

Sudan. Geographically Africa's largest nation, Sudan is troubled by drought, a large population of refugees from neighboring countries, and a civil war. The northern part of war. The northern part of Sudan is in its second year of drought and some starvation has been reported in isolated areas. Agricultural production elsewhere has been cut by drought, while wide areas of the South are in turmoil because of a rebellion being waged by black, Christian elements against the Arab, Islamic government. The FAO, in May 1985, estimated that 8 million people in Sudan were in need of assistance and that the lives of 1 million children were at risk.

Chad. The 1984 harvest in drought-stricken Chad, a nation of some 4.8 million people, was reportedly only enough to meet about half the country's needs. Some starvation has been reported in Chad, and it is believed that the situation in much of the country is, or soon will be, as grave as in the worst-affected parts of Ethiopia. The country is landlocked, and the bulk of food aid deliveries must travel overland through Cameroon. Nigeria has reportedly closed one of its main ports to food aid bound for Chad. Roads inside Chad, where they exist, are poor, and it is believed that many of the hungry are unable to reach feeding stations.

Mozambique. Mozambique, a nation of some 13 million people, has suffered critical food shortages because of drought, guerrilla activities, and economic problems resulting from the revolutionary war which ousted Portuguese colonial rule in 1975. Some starvation took place in 1983 and early 1984, and crops suffered serious damage in a cyclone in February 1984. The food supply situation has again reportedly become critical in some parts of the country, and some observers anticipate that starvation will again begin to occur.

Mali. This vast country of the Sahel, with a population of 7.5 million, continues to suffer from a drought that began in 1983. Total crop failures have been reported over wide areas. The landlocked country's poor highway system makes it difficult to deliver all of the needed food aid unless exceptional measures, such as airlifts, are undertaken.

Niger. Niger's population of 6.3 million has been severely affected by a drought that has destroyed virtually all pasture land in the northern and central regions, setting off a migration to the South. Food stocks are reportedly at a dangerously low level. Shipments of the food relief through Nigerian ports have reportedly encountered delays.
African Famine and U.S. Interests

The threat posed by the African famine to the lives and health of so many millions challenges the humanitarian instincts and programs of the United States in providing famine relief. The United States has long been the world's leading donor of food assistance. It has supplied, for example, between 56% and 60% of total worldwide food grain assistance since 1980. Moreover, the United States took the lead in summoning the 1974 World Food Conference, which following the language of Secretary of State Kissinger's opening address, pledged that "within a decade no child will go to bed hungry." This history of leadership on food and famine issues, some argue, gives the United States a special responsibility to respond to the current crisis. AID Administrator M. Peter McPherson recently said that the United States should provide 50% of Africa's food aid needs, which he described as the "traditional" level of U.S. support.

The extent of American responsibility to provide agricultural development assistance and other forms of aid aimed at preventing future famines is more controversial. As noted below, some observers strongly believe that the long-term solution to Africa's famine problem lies in policy reforms that must be undertaken by African governments in order to boost the output of African small farmers. From this perspective, there is a limited amount that the United States can do, through economic assistance, to meet the long-term famine threat. Another view, however, is that the United States should become much more deeply involved in agricultural development programs in Africa in order to try to prevent a recurrence of famine.

The African famine has strategic implications for the United States. Three seriously affected countries, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan, are in the strategically located Horn of Africa. This region lies on the southern flank of the Middle East and along the strategic shipping lanes between the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean. Sudan, the leading recipient of U.S. economic assistance in sub-Saharan Africa, enjoys a particularly close relationship with the United States. Kenya allows the U.S. military to use its ports and airfields, providing access to local repair facilities and supplies of fuel. U.S. Navy crews have liberty privileges in Kenya. Consequently, U.S. policymakers would not like to see famine contribute to political instability in either of these countries.

Ethiopia is an ally of the Soviet Union and has entered into a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with that country. Soviet military advisors and Cuban troops, now estimated at 5,000, are in Ethiopia. Thus, most analysts see U.S. food aid to Ethiopia strictly as a humanitarian gesture and not as an instrument that would advance other U.S. interests in the near term. Indeed, one concern of American policymakers is that we provide aid in ways that do as little as possible to strengthen the position and legitimacy of a government that is hostile to the United States. Some observers do hope, however, that the U.S. role in Ethiopian famine relief will leave a favorable impression on the Ethiopian people, perhaps creating a basis for improved relations in the more distant future. For further information, see CRS Issue Brief IB85061, Ethiopian Famine: U.S. Response, by Lafayette Barnes.

Southern Africa is another region of some strategic importance to the United States that has also been affected by food supply problems. Its strategic significance derives both from its mineral wealth and from the fact that supertankers voyaging from the Persian Gulf into the Atlantic must pass along its shores. Food aid, many believe, can play an important role in
promoting regional stability in southern Africa. Moreover, observers believe that Mozambique, which entered into a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1976, is ready to form closer economic ties with the Western nations. From this perspective, generous levels of food aid can help to wean Mozambique from Soviet influence.

Immediate Sources of Africa's Famine

Drought. The food crisis in Ethiopia and food difficulties throughout sub-Saharan Africa dramatically illustrate the region's vulnerability to erratic rainfall patterns. For the most part, African agriculture is highly dependent on rainfall; irrigation, with only a few exceptions, is not widely practiced. Thus, when the rains fail or are delayed, crop failures are virtually inevitable. The effect of successive years of drought is not only to reduce crop production, but also to cause stocks to be drawn down with little possibility of replenishing them. Drought can be particularly hard on nomadic peoples, who depend on their livestock herds for food. Cattle losses make nomadic peoples heavily dependent on cereals, thus creating both higher import requirements and logistical and delivery problems.

Civil unrest. The current food situation in sub-Saharan Africa is also complicated by civil war. Continuing armed conflict in Chad, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Mozambique, four of the most seriously drought-affected countries, puts additional burdens on these already vulnerable countries. Unsettled political conditions have triggered refugee movements that add to the logistical and delivery problems of making emergency food supplies available. The problem of Ethiopian refugees into the already troubled Sudan has been noted earlier.

Long-Term Factors

Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region in the world where food production per capita has been declining over the past two decades or more. On average, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), food production per capita in sub-Saharan Africa is approximately 20% lower in 1984 than it was in 1960. Moreover, the capacity of most of these countries to generate foreign exchange earnings with which to import food on commercial markets has also remained stagnant or declined. Thus, even in the absence of the current drought-induced emergency, per capita calorie intake for most of the people in sub-Saharan Africa would fall below minimal nutrition standards.

Food demand problems. Sub-Saharan Africa's population growth rate is the highest of any region in the world. This rate has increased from around 2% per year during the 1950s to nearly 3% currently, and it is likely to remain high for the balance of the century. The growth of Africa's population has simply overwhelmed the limited gains that have been made in food production. Rapid rates of urbanization also pose significant demand problems for sub-Saharan countries. Rates of urban growth of 5% or greater have created a demand for such easy-to-prepare foods as wheat, rice, and processed food products which are often difficult to supply from domestic production.

Food supply problems. Much of the African food problem appears to be on the supply side. Slow growth in agricultural productivity has meant that aggregate food production has not kept pace with the rapid rate of population growth. In some countries, aggregate production has actually declined. Grain yields are low, less than one-half those in Asia. Where production has
increased, it has been due to increased area being farmed, and not increased yields. In many parts of Africa, increases in the area farmed have been offset by declining yields. The Sahel of West Africa has experienced significant decreases during the 1970s in both the area under cultivation and in agricultural yields leaving a reduced agricultural base with which to meet the current drought.

Increasing human and animal populations have strained the capacity of the land, damaging soil fertility and productive capacity. Technology in African agriculture is based on human labor and simple hand tools. African farmers make less use of modern, purchased farm inputs than do farmers in other developing areas. Fertilizer use is lower than in Asia or Latin America. Africa has one-twentieth of the irrigated land of Asia and the development of high-yielding varieties of grains has lagged behind other regions.

Government food policies. It is widely held that government policies have contributed to the poor food production performance of African agriculture. Insecure leaders have kept food prices for urban consumers low in order to minimize volatile urban discontent. A major consequence has been food prices at levels that provided little or no incentive for farmers to produce marketable food surpluses. Exchange rates have been overvalued so as to make food and other imports cheaper for urban residents. Investment policies have neglected the food sector. National plans and budgets have tended to channel more investment funds to the minerals, oil, and export crop sectors than to food production. Practically nowhere in Africa has food production been viewed as a principal engine of economic growth.

Approaches to Resolving Africa's Famine Problems

At least four approaches have been proposed for helping Africa resolve its famine problem. These are: better famine preparation, increased food relief, expanded agricultural development assistance, and a stronger emphasis in U.S. and multilateral aid programs on agricultural policy reform on the part of African governments.

Better famine preparation. While it is generally agreed that Africa must dramatically expand its agricultural production if it is to end the threat of famine, many observers argue that such an expansion is unlikely to be achieved in the near future. From their perspective, the likelihood of recurrent famine must be accepted and steps taken to better prepare for famine outbreaks. Recommendations include: improvements in famine forecasting; pre-positioning of food relief at U.S. ports; pre-disaster assessment and repair of ports, airfields, and other critical transport links in famine-prone countries; and provision of training for famine relief personnel in those countries. Some observers are concerned, however, that a full-scale famine preparation program along these lines would encourage the famine-prone nations to become dependent on the United States to meet their emergency needs.

Increased food relief. Food relief is primarily an instrument for meeting immediate or short-run food needs in countries experiencing production shortfalls. Direct food shipments to meet emergency food needs must often be accompanied by other forms of aid, such as medical supplies and blankets, and inputs -- especially seeds and fertilizer -- to help impoverished farmers put in the next year's crop. Some have argued that in view of Africa's apparent chronic food shortage, food aid could also be used to promote longer run development in such food-for-work projects as providing food as wages in
exchange for labor to construct roads, bridges, irrigation works and other forms of infrastructure. Many have pointed to large surpluses of food in the United States which might be used for such purposes. Others, however, believe that there is a potential danger in providing large amounts of food aid, even in emergency situations, because it could lower food prices and reduce incentives for local farmers to produce more food.

Expanded agricultural development assistance. For many observers, Africa can only become free of famine when it has achieved "food independence," producing enough food to feed itself. This will require improving the productivity of African agriculture and increasing aggregate food output through investments in agricultural research, extension services, education, market and storage facilities, and transportation infrastructure. African governments generally have neither the financial resources nor the technical expertise needed for these investments, and most observers acknowledge that foreign assistance will be needed if structural changes are to occur.

Stronger emphasis on policy reform. Many aid donors, including the U.S. Agency for International Development and the World Bank, believe that African government policies must be changed in order to provide increased incentives to farmers to produce marketable surpluses of food. Without such reforms, it is argued, investments in agricultural development institutions and infrastructure will not have the desired payoff in terms of additional food production. Those who make this argument assert that government-set prices for food products in Africa have been too low and can best be raised by reducing the government role in the agricultural economy, allowing greater scope to free-market.

While there is wide acceptance of the view that farm-gate prices need to be raised in many countries, some analysts are wary of a possible over-emphasis on price-induced increases in output. In the absence of improvements in road systems, farming practices, and other factors in agricultural production, they fear that price-induced increases can come only at the expense of reduced production of other crops, notably foreign-exchange earning export crops, such as coffee, cotton, and peanuts. Moreover, they are concerned that rapid increases in food prices could trigger serious political instability. Resolving Africa's food problems, from their perspective, depends not just on price policy reform but on a coordinated mix of agricultural, macroeconomic, and investment policies.

Responses to the African Famine

Food relief. The United States, the Western European countries, Canada, and Japan have provided substantial amounts of food relief in response to the African famine. Other donors include Australia, India, and China (see appendix). According to data released by the FAO at the end of March 1985, Soviet contributions of food relief have been negligible, amounting to less than 1% of total food aid pledged for 1984 and 1985.

The U.S. Food Aid Program

The Food for Peace Program (P.L. 480) is the primary vehicle for food aid to Africa, with most of this assistance provided under Title II of the program. Title II aid consists of regular and emergency food donations. Regular donations include programs for feeding mothers, infants, and children as well as assistance to school and other institutional feeding programs.
Emergency Title II aid, which is allocated on a case-by-case basis according to need, has been heavily used in responding to the African famine, and Congress has been most concerned with issues surrounding this assistance. Title I food aid takes the form of concessional sales of U.S. surplus commodities, with loans for purchase provided at 3% interest rates (with a 2% service charge during grace periods) and up to 40 years to repay. Title III aid consists of forgiven debt arising under Title I, if currencies generated by the local sale of the food aid are used to sponsor development projects aimed at increasing food production.

Requests for assistance under Title II originate with a program sponsor -- the government of the recipient country, a U.S. nonprofit voluntary agency or a consortium of agencies, or inter-governmental organizations such as the World Food Program of the United Nations. AID and the U.S. Department of Agriculture jointly administer the Title II program. AID is generally responsible for program operations, including oversight of the program in the recipient country; while USDA determines commodity availability, as well as the value and volume of the commodities to be shipped. Overall coordination of Title II food aid approvals and operations is through the interagency food aid subcommittee, which includes representatives of AID, USDA, the State Department, the Treasury Department, the Office of Management and Budget, and the National Security Council. USDA arranges ocean transport for all Title II commodities.

In addition to P.L. 480 food assistance, the United States is providing famine relief aid to Africa under the Disaster Assistance program and through Sec. 416 of the Agricultural Act of 1949 which authorizes donations of surplus dairy products and wheat for the assistance of needy persons overseas. The United States can also draw from the Wheat Reserve established by the Food Security Wheat Reserve Act of 1980 to supplement food assistance programs.

U.S. approvals of emergency food aid for FY85 to 22 drought-affected countries (including Cameroon, which does not appear on the FAO list) amounted to $278.8 million through the end of December 1984. Total food-aid commitments, including non-emergency aid, totaled $554.8 million, or 1.7 million metric tons of grain. Including nonfood aid, commitments through March 1985 for FY85 totaled $757.8 million, representing a large increase over relief aid in FY84.

U.S. Famine Relief Commitments in Sub-Saharan Africa
(fiscal year, millions of dollars)

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Further increases in U.S. food aid commitments to Africa can be expected. An additional allocation of 43,400 metric tons (valued at $13.9 million) from the Wheat Reserve is reportedly "in process." Moreover, President Reagan announced on Jan. 3, 1985, that the United States would transfer $175 million from other programs into African famine relief, draw down $25 million from the U.S. Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund to support growing refugee needs in Africa, and seek congressional approval for $235 million in supplemental funding. The supplemental funding would include $185 million in Title II food aid, $25 million in disaster assistance, and $25 million to replenish the emergency refugee fund. These funds, according to the President, would bring total U.S. famine relief, including funds already committed, to more than $1 billion for FY85.

Private donations. The American Council for Voluntary International Action has reported that as of Feb. 15, 1985, its 22 major member agencies had received $81 million for famine relief in Ethiopia. An additional $560,000 has been donated for relief and development projects in Africa.

Agricultural development assistance. The Western nations, the World Bank, and other multilateral assistance agencies also devote considerable sums in aid to promote agricultural development in Africa. For example, the World Bank and its affiliate, the International Development Association, made new loans totaling $670.3 million in 1984 to support projects in agriculture and rural development in sub-Saharan Africa. This represented 28% of all World Bank assistance to the region last year.

The development assistance programs of the U.S. Agency for International Development constituted about one-third of all U.S. economic aid in sub-Saharan Africa in FY84, and within the development assistance (DA) account, aid through the Agriculture, Rural Development, and Nutrition program amounted to $146.3 million or 60% of total DA. The other major component of U.S. economic assistance in sub-Saharan Africa falls under the Economic Support Fund (ESF), which totaled $333.1 million in the region in FY84. Much of this aid, directed toward countries with which the United States shares particularly important security or economic relationships, also benefits agriculture. Countries receiving balance of payments support through the ESF, for example, may import agricultural commodities and fertilizers they could not otherwise have afforded. Local currencies generated from such ESF commodity import programs (CIPs) are often programmed to aid the agriculture sector. ESF funds have also been used to support agricultural training and research.

The degree to which U.S. and other agricultural development programs have contributed to increases in agricultural production is a subject of considerable discussion and debate.

Encouraging policy reform. The World Bank, through its lending programs and through a series of reports, has taken a leading role in encouraging African governments to undertake policy reforms that would boost agricultural output.

The United States has also been a leader in this field. In 1984, the Reagan Administration proposed a 5-year program, the Economic Policy Initiative (EPI) for Africa, which would have been used explicitly to promote policy reforms, particularly in the agricultural sector. The program was not
finally approved by Congress, although $75 million -- the amount that would have been used to start the EPI -- was added to the Economic Support Fund specifically for new programs in Africa. AID has requested another $75 million in FY86 to continue this initiative.

In his statement of Jan. 3, 1984, President Reagan also proposed a "Food for Progress" program, which would use food aid to support countries that reform price levels in accordance with market principles; improve rural infrastructure; or undertake other steps to boost agricultural output. A formal request for this new program will be sent to Congress later in the year.

Current Issues

Should we be doing more to encourage policy reform in food-deficit African countries? The President's proposed "Food for Progress" program raises issues about the relationship between food aid and policy reform in African countries. Will food aid be a sufficient inducement to countries to take steps to provide incentives to food producers, improve rural infrastructure, and in general promote increased food and agricultural output? Will the United States provide sufficient food aid for a sufficiently long period to get the leverage it needs to promote policy reform? It may be that food aid will have to be accompanied with large amounts of economic and technical assistance if countries are to make the kinds of policy reform desired by the President.

What is the role of long-term agricultural development assistance in preventing food emergencies in Africa? USDA and FAO specialists in African agriculture point out that even without the widespread drought and crop shortfalls of recent years, many African countries would not be able to produce sufficient food to provide all of their people with adequate diets. The long-term decline in per capita food production noted by both USDA and FAO raises concerns about the nature and scale of U.S. agricultural development assistance in Africa. The need for policy reform by African governments has received the most emphasis, but other aspects of agricultural development assistance may also require attention.

Of particular relevance may be programs of agricultural research, technology development, extension services, natural resource management, and population control. Questions being asked include the following: Are scarce foreign aid funds being spent on too many individual projects while neglecting the need to develop programs in individual countries or regions to foster agricultural research, development or adaptation of appropriate food production technologies, and extension services? Is sufficient attention being given to the education and training of African agricultural scientists and food production technicians? Should special resource conservation and management efforts be made to stop the apparently rapid degradation of Africa's natural resource base because of overcropping and overgrazing? Should more emphasis be given to population programs in African countries?

Can famine crisis situations be averted in the future? Some observers believe that the United States can improve its capacity to monitor the African food situation and anticipate the emergence of famine. If this were done, it is argued, a more timely response could be mounted, perhaps preventing starvation on the scale seen in Ethiopia today. Others argue, however, that the U.S. ability to predict and respond to famine is already well-advanced. The problem in dealing with the Ethiopian situation, from
this perspective, was not lack of warning but rather the uncooperative
attitude of the Ethiopian government, which, they argue, made it impossible
to respond quickly enough to prevent tragedy.

LEGISLATION

P.L. 99-8, S. 689
Providing the same amounts for African famine relief as H.R. 1096, but
containing no provisions related to emergency relief for U.S. farmers.
Called up by unanimous consent and passed Senate Mar. 19, 1985; passed House

P.L. 99-10, H.R. 1239
Makes urgent supplemental appropriations of $802.5 million in emergency
famine relief to Africa, including $400 million in P.L. 480 Title II food
assistance (permits up to $100 million of this amount to be used to finance
in country food and distribution); $137.5 million for emergency relief and
recovery assistance; $37.5 million in refugee assistance program and an
additional $225 million as an Emergency Reserve for African Famine Relief to
be used if other funds under the act are exhausted. Earmarks $2.5 million
for monitoring food and disaster assistance, and requires AID to submit a
country-by-country plan before using funds under the act. Of the amounts
provided, $784 million represented new appropriations. Reported to the House
provided a total of $880 million in emergency assistance. Called up by
unanimous consent and passed in the House Feb. 28. Reported to Senate by
unanimous consent and passed Senate on Mar. 20, 1985; Senate version provided
$669 million assistance. Conference Report (H.Rept. 99-29) filed Mar. 27,
1985; House and Senate agreed to conference report, with amendments, Apr. 2,

H.R. 1313 (Huckaby)
Establishes a "Food for Progress" program to assist countries that
introduce free-enterprise elements into their agricultural economies.
Introduced Feb. 27, 1985; referred to Committees on Agriculture and Foreign
Affairs; comment requested from the executive branch Mar. 12, 1985.

H.R. 100 (Weiss, Leland, Wolpe)
Provides $492 million in emergency food supplies and ocean transport; $177
million for inland transport; $70 million in disaster assistance; $50 million
in refugee assistance; and $80 million in development assistance for
rehabilitation and recovery projects; and $25 million for Project
Outreach/Enhancement grants to support supplemental feeding programs under
Title II of P.L.480. This bill initially called for over $1 billion in
supplementary assistance to Africa. Following the President's Jan. 3, 1985
announcement that he would provide an added 300,000 metric tons from the
emergency wheat reserve, sponsors reduced the amount of additional food
provided under their proposal, bringing the total in supplemental assistance
to$898 million. Introduced Jan. 3, 1985; referred to Committees on
Appropriations and on Foreign Affairs.

H.R. 606 (Roukema)/H.R. 699 (Conte)
H.R. 606 appropriates and H.R. 699 authorizes $495.5 million for emergency
food aid, ocean transport, and one-half the inland transport costs for emergency food relief in Africa (but including an estimated 170,000 metric tons of grain for Bangladesh). Also provides $70 million in disaster assistance funds, $20 million in refugee assistance, and $40 million for agricultural recovery development projects. H.R. 606 introduced Jan. 22, 1985; referred to Committee on Appropriations; H.R. 699 introduced Jan. 24, 1985; referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs.

H.R. 1096 (Weiss)
Authorized $175 million in non-food assistance in response to the African famine; including $137.5 million for relief, rehabilitation, recovery and emergency health projects, as well as $37.5 million for assisting refugees. Earmarked $2.5 million to support planning, monitoring, and supervision of food assistance by the Agency for International Development. Reported to the House by Committee on Foreign Affairs (H.Rept. 99-3) Feb. 25, 1985; passed the House by a vote of 391-25 Feb. 25. Amended in the Senate to include the provisions of S. 457, which provided for the furnishing of assistance by the Defense Department at the request of the State Department or AID; and to include a program of emergency credit for U.S. farmers. Passed the Senate by a vote of 62-35 Feb. 27; vetoed by the President (H.Doc. 99-37) Mar. 6, 1985.

H.R. 2080 (Leland)
Authorizes such funds as may be necessary for continued U.S. participation in the International Fund for Agricultural Development and $100 million (spread over four years) for the U.S. contribution to the Fund's Special Program for Sub-Saharan Countries affected by Drought and Desertification. Appropriates $900 million in P.L. 480 Title II emergency food assistance in FY86 and $25 million as the FY86 U.S. contribution to the Special Program for Sub-Saharan Countries. Introduced Apr. 17, 1985; referred to Committees on Appropriations and on Foreign Affairs.

S. 370 (Melcher et al.)
Provides $395 million for the emergency food supplies and ocean transport, as well as $135 million to support inland transport; $105 million in disaster assistance, $25 million in emergency refugee relief; and $80 million in famine recovery development assistance. Introduced Jan. 31, 1985; referred to Committee on Appropriations.

S. 423 (Kasten, Kennedy)
Provides "such sums as may be necessary" to provide one-half of the unmet emergency food requirements of sub-Saharan Africa through FY86. Also provides "such sums as may be necessary" for emergency disaster aid to Africa, including the furnishing of fertilizer, seeds, and basic agricultural rehabilitation. In addition, provides "such sums as may be necessary" to support emergency refugee requirements in Africa through the end of FY86. The money may be used to replenish the U.S. Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund. Appropriations Committees are to be notified 15 days in advance of obligation of funds. Introduced Feb. 7, 1985; referred to Committee on Appropriations.

S. 960 (Lugar)
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985. Section 308 establishes the Africa Famine Recovery and Development Fund. Authorizes the President to furnish assistance for the long-term agricultural recovery
and development of Sub-Saharan Africa. Encourages support for policy reform, agricultural support, and research for small farmers. Authorizes up to $100 million for these purposes, to be derived from any funds authorized by the Act. Reported to Senate from Committee on Foreign Relations (S.Rept. 99-34) Apr. 19, 1985. Section 303 introduced as a floor amendment by Senator Kasten May 15 (passed by a voice vote). S. 960, as amended, passed Senate May 15, 1985.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

05/05/85 -- The Food and Agriculture Organization reported in a summary assessment that prospects for the 1985 main season crops in some southern African countries were good and that there had been favorable rains in eastern Africa in recent weeks. But the food supply situation remained critical in many countries, the organization stated, "and reports continue to be received of widespread malnutrition and death from starvation in some." The assessment noted that "the position is deteriorating rapidly in Sudan, "where 8 million people were in need of assistance and the lives of nearly 1 million children were at risk.

03/11/85 -- Representatives of 70 nations met in Geneva at a United Nations special conference on the African famine. The United States was represented by Vice President Bush, arriving from a 4,500 mile trip through three famine stricken countries. Bush pledged that the United States would meet 50% of Africa's food needs. (The focus of the UN conference was a 92-page UN report stating that 30 million Africans were living in drought-stricken areas and that 10 million had been forced to abandon their homes.)

02/28/85 -- The FAO released a report identifying Chad, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, and Sudan as the countries most seriously affected by the African famine.

01/14/85 -- Representatives Wolpe and Weiss said in an interview in Mozambique that they had found ample evidence to support their view that the United States should be supplying at least $1 billion in supplemental food and other aid. They charged that the Reagan Administration's proposed allocation of emergency food relief falls far short of the continent's needs.

01/12/85 -- The Congressional Quarterly reported that M. Peter McPherson had said that the $411 million supplemental food aid proposed by President Reagan would fulfill his commitment for the United States to provide at least half of Africa's food needs, which McPherson estimated at 3 million metric tons for 1985. However, aides to the House Foreign Affairs and Select Hunger Committees said the amounts proposed were inadequate. One aide cited estimates that Africa would need 3 to 4 million
tons of food on top of the 2 million tons already provided.

01/03/85 -- President Reagan issued a statement detailing his African hunger relief initiative. The President directed that the U.S. Government add $411 million to current efforts, thereby committing over $1 billion for emergency and regular food aid and disaster relief in fiscal year 1985. He approved a $125 million drawdown from the U.S. Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund in response to appeals by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee for the Red Cross. The President concluded with the announcement of a new food aid policy -- "Food for Progress" -- to be presented to Congress at a future date. The program would provide to countries that have made a commitment to agricultural policy reform. "Today's food emergency in Africa reemphasizes the need to tackle the underlying structural problems of agricultural stagnation in the Third World," the President stated.

-- Representative Weiss introduced a bill (H.R. 100) providing an additional $1.016 billion for famine relief and recovery in Africa. Cosponsored by 63 Members of the House, the proposal included an additional $610 million in P.L. 480 food aid; $282 million in development assistance for logistical support and rehabilitation projects; $70 million for international disaster assistance; $4 million for AID operating expenses; and $50 million for migration and refugee assistance. In a statement at a press conference on the African famine, Representative Weiss stressed that even more funds may be required since many of the private voluntary organizations working with famine victims are concerned that the need for nonfood aid may be greater than originally articulated.

-- Representative Weiss, reacting to the President's Africa relief initiative, called it "three-quarters smoke and mirrors."

12/27/84 -- The Heritage Foundation released a paper entitled "A Plan for Rescuing Starving Ethiopians," expressing the belief that the relief effort must be made more international. The paper blamed the calamitous proportions of the famine on what it said were the inefficient socialist economic policies of the Ethiopian government and the alleged mishandling of famine relief. According to the report, the Ethiopian government must be told that this is the last time that the United States is going to save it or other developing countries from catastrophes that they bring on themselves by policies that are proved failures.

12/08/84 -- Representative Leland, Chairman of the House Select Committee on Hunger, and five other House Members announced that when Congress convened in January, they
would introduce legislation to provide $1 billion in famine relief for Africa. (This amount would include $787 million in food and transportation, as well as funds for medical supplies and refugee resettlement.)

12/05/84 -- President Reagan directed the release of 300,000 tons of wheat, valued at about $50 million, from the U.S. food security reserve. The wheat would form part of a new $125 million emergency assistance package, including another $50 million in food and $35 million in shipping costs, for Ethiopia and other drought-stricken countries in Africa. M. Peter McPherson, administrator of the Agency for International Development (AID), said that the new assistance would assure that Ethiopia would receive 100,000 tons of food a month through February, which was about all the food aid it could handle. "The pipeline is filled," McPherson stated.

11/29/84 -- Representative Leland and other participants in an 8-Member congressional study mission to Ethiopia, held a press conference to report on the starvation conditions they encountered.

11/15/84 -- Representative Hall, returning from Ethiopia, called upon President Reagan immediately to borrow funds, as authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act, in order to increase U.S. disaster relief in Ethiopia.

11/09/84 -- AID administrator M. Peter McPherson, returning from a visit to northern Ethiopia, said he had "never seen anything like" the famine situation there. McPherson reported that he had encountered children "who were like shrunken little old men with no bellies, almost no flesh." McPherson also stated that thousands more seemed certain to die in Ethiopia before relief could reach them; and that logistical bottlenecks were a major problem in getting aid to the hungry.

11/04/84 -- A chartered U.S. transport plane arrived in Addis Ababa to assist in airlifting food and supplies to Ethiopian famine victims.

11/02/84 -- The United States and Ethiopia announced that 50,000 additional tons of U.S. food aid would be sent to Ethiopia. M. Peter McPherson, AID administrator, noted that this aid, worth approximately $12 million, would be distributed by the Ethiopian government rather than by private relief agencies. (The new shipments would bring total U.S. assistance over the previous month to more than 130 thousand tons, valued at $51.2 million.)

10/23/84 -- NBC Nightly News broadcast the first recent BBC films of starvation in Ethiopia.

07/02/84 -- H.J.Res. 492, appropriating additional funds for emergency famine relief in Africa, was signed into law.
by the President. (Controversial funding for covert assistance in Nicaragua had been dropped from the bill at the insistence of the House.)

02/01/84 -- The Senate published Senator Danforth's report on his January 1984 study mission to examine hunger conditions in Africa. (The report described starvation conditions in Mozambique and warned of impending starvation elsewhere.)
Appendix Table 1. Cereal Food Aid Pledges to 21 Affected African Countries known to FAO as of early January 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Wheat</th>
<th>Rice</th>
<th>Coarse Grains</th>
<th>All Cereals (thousand tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>78.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>151.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>171.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China 1/</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>87.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC 2/ of which:</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1,295.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

  - Community action 3/ ... ... ... 477.4
  - National action 3/ ... ... ... 417.9
  - Belgium ... ... ... 18.1
  - Denmark ... ... ... 11.9
  - France ... ... ... 71.1
  - Germany, F.R. ... ... ... 98.2
  - Greece ... ... ... 7.0
  - Italy ... ... ... 55.7
  - Netherlands ... ... ... 120.2
  - UK ... ... ... 35.7
  - Not yet specified ... ... ... 400.0
  - India 4/ ... ... ... 100.0
  - Islamic Committee -- 3.3 -- 3.3
  - Japan 21.8 88.4 -- 110.2
  - LCRS 2.9 -- -- 2.9
  - Norway 15.0 -- -- 15.0
  - OXFAM 12.0 -- -- 12.0
  - Saudi Arabia 3.0 -- 7.4 10.4
  - Spain 6.1 -- -- 6.1
  - Sweden 39.0 -- 2.9 41.9
  - Switzerland 0.7 -- 2.5 3.2
  - Thailand -- 0.1 -- 0.1
  - Togo 1.0 -- -- 1.0
  - United States 5/ 1,131.5 88.2 583.1 2,052.8
  - U.S.S.R. -- 3.5 -- 3.5
  - U.S.S.R. -- 3.5 -- 3.5
  - Viet Nam -- 2.0 -- 2.0
  - World Food Programme 244.2 13.9 113.1 371.2
  - Yugoslavia -- -- 10.0 10.0

**TOTAL** ... ... ... 4,413.1

1/ Includes a pledge of 50,000 tons for which no country or commodity breakdown has yet been provided.
2/ Includes a pledge of 400,000 tons by the EEC and its member countries for which no country or commodity breakdown has yet been provided.
3/ Breakdown between Community and National action has not yet been provided, see footnote 2/.
4/ No country or commodity breakdown has yet been provided.
5/ Includes a pledge of 250,000 tons for which no country or commodity breakdown has yet been provided.

Countries Facing Exceptional Food Supply Problems
(Shown in white)

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations