COORDINATION OF FEDERAL EFFORTS TO CONTROL ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFIC

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ISSUE DEFINITION

How best to coordinate the Federal government's multi-agency efforts to curb illicit traffic in dangerous drugs has once again become an issue of major interest to the Congress. Critics of the current Administration's anti-drug program contend that it lacks an overall strategy and that it suffers from the absence of a central mechanism for the formulation of general policy as well as for the broad direction of operations. A number of bills pending in the 98th Congress are designed to remedy the perceived deficiency, through the establishment of an agency with explicit authority over the development and implementation of all Federal government efforts to control drug traffic. Frequently described in the press as "drug czar" proposals, these measures are opposed by the Reagan Administration on the grounds that such an agency is unnecessary and would be potentially disruptive.

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I. Immediate Background

On Jan. 14, 1983, President Reagan exercised a pocket veto on an omnibus crime control bill passed during the closing hours of the 97th Congress. His principal objection to the measure was that it contained a provision for a so-called "drug czar" office, to be known as the "Office of the Director of National and International Drug Operations and Policy." The agency, the director and deputy director of which were to be subject to Senate approval, would have been authorized to:

(A) develop, review, implement, and enforce U.S. Government policy with respect to illegal drugs;
(B) direct and coordinate all U.S. Government efforts to halt the flow into, and sale and use of illegal drugs within the U.S.;
(C) develop in concert with other Federal entities concerned with drug control the budgetary priorities and allocations of those entities with respect to illegal drugs; and
(D) coordinate the collection and dissemination of information necessary to implement U.S. policy with respect to illegal drugs.

In connection with the drug czar provision, the President's memorandum of disapproval stated:
The creation of another layer of bureaucracy within the Executive Branch would produce friction, disrupt effective law enforcement, and could threaten the integrity of criminal investigations and prosecutions -- the very opposite of what its proponents apparently intend.

He contended moreover, that "although [the provision's] aim -- with which I am in full agreement -- is to promote coordination, this can be and is being achieved through existing administrative structures."

The President's assertion that coordination is being achieved under the present system is challenged in a report recently issued by the General Accounting Office. (Federal Drug Interdiction Efforts Need Strong Central Oversight; GGD-83-52; June 13, 1983). Focusing on drug interdiction, the GAO found that, although the level of cooperation among the principal agencies concerned has been increasing, the fragmentation of authority and responsibility "has a certain amount of inefficiency and interagency conflict built in." In particular, the GAO points out, "congressional oversight and executive branch resource allocation decisions relative to drug interdiction are difficult under these circumstances." Accordingly, the agency recommended that the President ---

-- direct the development of a more definitive Federal drug strategy that stipulates the roles of the various agencies with drug enforcement responsibilities and

-- make a clear delegation of responsibility to one individual to oversee Federal drug enforcement programs.

II. Historical Perspective

For close to 100 years the Federal government has been involved in efforts to curb the non-therapeutic use of dangerous drugs. Beginning in 1887, with enactment of a law that forbade the importation of opium into the United States by subjects of the Emperor of China, a long series of statutes has created a major Federal role in the regulation of drug commerce and in the enforcement of restrictions designed to prevent the abuse of drugs.

As a matter of course, the responsibility for administering and enforcing Federal drug control laws has been divided. Since many of the most restricted drugs enter the country illegally from abroad, the agencies charged with policing the national borders -- the Customs Service, the Coast Guard, and the Border Patrol -- have an important part to play. Regulation of the domestic drug industry is the province of both the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Food and Drug Administration, while in addition the DEA has authority for the investigation of violations involving dangerous drugs and for liaison with foreign law enforcement officials in matters pertaining to dangerous drug control.

Other agencies with drug control responsibilities are: the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters in the State Department; the Federal Aviation Agency; the Internal Revenue Service; the Office of Justice Assistance, Research and Statistics (OJARS); the Agency
for International Development; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; and the Department of Agriculture. Additionally, there is the necessary participation of the Criminal Division of the Justice Department and of U.S. Attorneys.

Especially during the past 15 years, the level of the Federal commitment to control of drug abuse has increased substantially. Spending for "law enforcement" related to this purpose rose from $37 million in FY 1969 to approximately $1.05 billion in FY83. The same years saw the initiation, or significant increase, of Federal programs to reduce the demand for drugs — through treatment, education and primary prevention.

Given the number of agencies that have in some way become involved in drug control during recent years, and the inevitable conflicts generated in consequence, it would be surprising if calls for coordination had not been sounded previously. Indeed, along with a number of other approaches, the "overlord" system itself has already been tried — in a structure established, in 1971, by former President Richard Nixon.

In declaring a "War on Drug Abuse" President Nixon was responsible for a number of initiatives to alleviate the problem that was at the time causing such a high degree of public concern. Among them was the creation of the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention (SAODAP); headed by a director which the press at that time labelled "the drug czar." Placed in the Executive Office of the President, the agency was authorized to supervise and be responsible for all Federal drug abuse programs involving prevention, education, treatment, training and research.

In initial discussions at the White House, the Nixon drug czar plan had envisioned the inclusion of law enforcement functions within the scope of the office's concerns. However, reportedly it was argued with persuasion — by the Justice Department and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs — that a director who would have the necessary stature in both the law enforcement and the treatment-prevention communities could not be found. It was further argued, also with effect, that of these two general areas the treatment-prevention side was at that time in greater need of central direction.

In 1972, the year following Presidential establishment of the new agency, Congress provided a statutory base, for a 3-year period, through the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act. Two key congressional findings noted in the legislation were as follows:

The effectiveness of efforts by State and local governments and by the Federal Government to control and treat drug abuse in the United States has been hampered by a lack of coordination among the States, between States and localities, and throughout the Federal establishment.

Control of drug abuse requires the development of a comprehensive, coordinated long-term Federal strategy that encompasses both effective law enforcement against illegal drug traffic and effective health programs to rehabilitate victims of drug abuse.
Although finding substantial support for the addition of law enforcement efforts to the coordinative jurisdiction of SAODAP, a fact reflected in the above findings, Congress acceded to the Administration view that the office should have no effective power over drug law enforcement agencies. The exclusion of such authority continued, during the years of the agency's operation, to draw criticism.

Despite the existence of SAODAP, conflicts and the lack of a unified objective continued in evidence, and in 1973 -- 2 years after the coordinating agency had been created -- the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse could still find that in SAODAP's designated sphere of operation "the fragmentation of authority threatens to defeat its attempt to organize federal and state activities into an integrated response, under clear and understandable policy guidelines."

The National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, established by an act of Congress and partially appointed by President Nixon, had been given the task of conducting two comprehensive studies -- one on the country's marihuana problem and what to do about it and the second on the problem of drug abuse in general and the appropriate national response. In its detailed report on the general drug problem, the Commission described the development, during the preceding five years, of a "drug abuse industrial complex" -- marked by duplication of effort, uncertainty of direction and a lack of interagency coordination." Above all, the Commission noted the emergence of a large Federal drug bureaucracy, "displaying the common propensity of bureaucratic infrastructures to turn short-term programs into never-ending projects."

Despite the fact that coordination and a unified policy were still eluding the government when the National Commission wrote its report, the panel gave SAODAP credit for making progress in that direction. However, the Commission recommended a far more radical approach to the coordination problem than any proposed before or since: the creation of a single agency with responsibility for all primarily drug-related functions, both for the formulation of policy and for actual day-to-day operations. The recommendation envisioned that the agency director would have sub-cabinet rank but would nevertheless report directly to the President.

Although supporting the concept of a single drug control agency -- with the suggestion that it be called the Controlled Substances Administration -- the National Commission acknowledged two alternatives:

(1) that the system in effect at the time might be continued "in the hope that SAODAP will more effectively utilize its statutory authority to bring some order out of administrative chaos" or

(2) that SAODAP could be retained but given specifically detailed program authority as well as the budgetary control it already had.

The 3-year authorization for SAODAP expired in 1975. The Ford Administration took the position that the agency's duration should not be extended. The emergency situation that had called for the extraordinary measure no longer existed, the Administration maintained, and therefore the business of directing Federal treatment and prevention efforts should be left
to the National Institute on Drug Abuse, which had been established by the same statute as SAODAP. General policy concerning all drug matters were to be developed by several Cabinet committees as well as by the Strategy Council on Drug Abuse, also created by the SAODAP law.

In spite of the Ford policy, SAODAP never entirely faded away. In 1976, Congress amended the SAODAP statute to establish a successor agency -- the Office of Drug Abuse Policy (ODAP) -- on a scaled-down basis, the new office being smaller in size than SAODAP and lacking its powerful tool of budget review.

President Ford, who was defeated in 1976 in his bid for re-election, declined to implement the ODAP amendment. In March 1977, Ford's successor -- President Jimmy Carter -- filled the vacant ODAP Director position with Dr. Peter Bourne. Dr. Bourne was confirmed by the Senate in late May and installed in office in June. A month later, President Carter submitted a plan for the reorganization of the Executive Office of the President, which included a provision for the abolition of ODAP. The plan (Reorganization Plan No. 1, 1977) was not disapproved by Congress, and ODAP went out of existence in early 1978. In all the successor agency to SAODAP was in operation for little more than a half-year.

After ODAP's demise, however, Dr. Bourne became a presidential assistant for international health and drug abuse and, as such, oversaw the operations of a drug policy unit within the Domestic Policy Staff. After Dr. Bourne's resignation, in mid-1978, the unit was supervised by the former Deputy Director of ODAP, Lee Dogoloff. The Reagan Administration has continued roughly the same arrangement, and in June 1982 the President issued an Executive order (No. 12368) officially designating the unit the "Drug Abuse Policy Office", and naming a director (Dr. Carlton Turner) to be "primarily responsible for assisting the President in formulating policy for, and in coordinating and overseeing, international as well as domestic drug abuse functions by all Executive agencies."

III. Alternatives to a Drug Czar

If we accept the proposition that the various Federal drug law enforcement efforts, or the drug abuse prevention and treatment efforts, suffer from a lack of coordinated policies and goals, is a super-agency -- i.e., a drug czar -- the only solution? Certainly, other ways of approaching this problem have been conceived and tried during the past ten years.

First, the same legislation that established SAODAP also created a Strategy Council, comprised of the department and agency heads who had the greatest interest in the drug problem, the SAODAP director, and other officials "as the President may deem appropriate." The mandate of the Council is to develop a "comprehensive, coordinated long-term Federal strategy for all drug abuse prevention functions and all drug traffic prevention functions" of any agency of the Federal Government. The strategy is to be reviewed and revised at least once a year. It is intended to cover both broad policy objectives and operational matters. Certainly the case could be made that in the policy-making area, the Strategy Council could perform much of the function of a drug czar. The question is, after a strategy has been framed and promulgated, who will follow up? Those who support the super-agency idea maintain that continual monitoring is required to see that a strategy is implemented. (Note: although the legislation
requiring the establishment of the Council has never been repealed, the one strategy prepared by the Reagan Administration, for 1982, involved participation by government agencies only, without the members of the public specified by amendments enacted in 1976).

The second alternative -- in the law enforcement field -- is embodied, at least partially, by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) itself. Established by Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, the agency was intended by President Nixon to be the final answer to those who were charging that enforcement was in disarray due to inter-agency rivalries and lack of cooperation. Absorbing the manpower of three separate organizations, along with all Customs personnel who specialized in drug law enforcement, DEA was meant -- by embracing the majority of enforcement people within one organizational structure -- to provide a "unified command" in the "counteroffensive" against drug abuse. Despite this move, which did not involve the narcotics control efforts of the State Department or the Coast Guard, the rivalry problems have continued, according to many observers. Cited most frequently as the biggest trouble area is the relationship between DEA and Customs. Also, until the recent shift within the Justice Department (Jan. 21, 1982) that gave the FBI concurrent jurisdiction with DEA over drug law enforcement, the former agency was inactive in the field, thus providing its agents with little incentive to share intelligence or otherwise cooperate with their DEA brethren.

The third coordinating mechanism that has been tried -- by Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Reagan -- is the inter-agency committee. The Ford Administration argued against the extension of SAODAP on the grounds that the agency had achieved its purpose as an emergency measure and that the time had come to return to normal institutional structure and procedure. In answer to the contention that a continued White House-level agency was necessary to give the anti-drug effort the needed "clout," Administration defenders pointed out that if this line were followed with respect to every important Federal undertaking, there would be an overwhelming number of White House agencies. Furthermore, it was held that a more effective and appropriate way to achieve coordination was the one recommended by a special task force of the President's Domestic Council in the fall of 1975 and subsequently taken by President Ford: creation of a Cabinet Committee on Drug Abuse Prevention and a Cabinet Committee on Drug Law Enforcement. The members of the latter were the Attorney General and the Secretaries of the Treasury and of Transportation, with the DEA Administrator acting as Executive Director. The two committees were modeled on the Cabinet Committee for International Narcotics Control, created by former President Nixon, which the Domestic Council group evaluated as having been "quite successful."

Growing out of the two cabinet committees created by President Ford was the so-called "Principals Group," comprised of the chiefs of the operating agencies having the greatest responsibility for drug abuse control. The group was at one time given high marks for resolving conflicts and promoting cooperation, especially among the enforcement agencies. (An expanded version of the Principals Group is still functioning, under the designation "White House Oversight Working Group," meeting once a month. A separate entity, the "Working Group on Drug Supply Reduction" is concerned with law enforcement only.)

Finally, the Reagan Administration has established its own versions of the cabinet committee: the Cabinet Council on Legal Policy, chaired by the Attorney General, and -- in connection with the President's new anti-drug trafficking task force initiative -- a Cabinet Committee on Organized Crime.
also chaired by the Attorney General.

IV. Summary Discussion

The argument over the drug czar proposals reflects a disagreement over the value and appropriateness of various kinds of government mechanisms. Neither side denies the need for coordination, both in policy-making and in operations, although there is disagreement over the degree to which it has been achieved by the Reagan Administration under the present system.

Essentially, the opponents of the czar concept see it as hostile to the cabinet system of government. That system allotls authority and responsibility to various departments along reasonably coherent jurisdictional lines, they argue, and when areas of responsibility overlap -- as frequently happens -- the appropriate mechanism for achieving coordination is one of an inter-cabinet nature. A special "overlord" agency of any kind depreciates the system, opponents say.

On the other side, proponents have been dissatisfied with the inter-cabinet and inter-agency structures tried in the past. While many of them may agree that the czar solution does violate the logic of the cabinet system, they make the case that the drug problem is special -- that the dimensions of the threat and the necessary complexity of the government's response demand a departure from "business as usual." They hold that only an entity with direct access to the President -- and one with budget review authority as well as the power to influence actual agency operations -- can successfully overcome the inherent impediments to coordination of effort among Federal agencies.

To what extent does past experience offer guidance for judging the above positions?

Although appraisals made both by Members of Congress and executive branch officials are available, it is difficult to form a clear idea of the results of the various approaches taken. In one of the few outsider assessments of SAODAP, a political scientist -- writing in 1981 -- examined the agency from the aspect of the light it shed on styles of Presidential management. While noting certain early successes, G. Larry Mays pointed to an eventual failure in meeting original expectations (The Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention: Drug Control During the Nixon Administration. International Journal of Public Administration, v. 3, 1981). The reason he cited was an apparent loss of confidence in the agency's director, Dr. Jerome Jaffe, by influential presidential aides and thus, presumably, also by the President.

Crediting President Nixon with a genuine interest in the drug problem, Mays noted that Dr. Jaffe's contact man in the Nixon White House was Egil ("Bud") Krogh, a trusted high-level aide who could guarantee that the SAODAP director would have ready access to the President. However, Mays stated, "after Jaffee waived on the matter of replacing Dr. [Bertram] Brown of the National Institute of Mental Health, Krogh was no longer his contact and he was relegated to dealing with one of the many junior aides in the White House." This, Mays concluded, marked "an end to Jaffe's effective contact with the President and consequently a loss of influence." Under the next director, Robert DuPont, the agency was moved physically out of the Executive Office of the President (EOP) and located in Rockville, Maryland, and was generally perceived as further diminished in terms of its impact on the
process of Presidential decision-making.

Professional employees of the agencies directly responsible for dealing with the drug problem offer varying informal evaluations of SAODAP. While many appear to welcome any move that highlights the drug problem and that projects the image of a higher level of priority, others express the doubt that any formal entity, such as SAODAP or the proposed drug czar office, can accomplish what is intended. According to the latter, to the extent that there indeed remain coordination difficulties -- after all of the consolidating moves of the past 10 years -- what is needed is not a new overlord office but rather (1) a definite and sustained interest in the problem on the part of the President and (2) one high-level Presidential aide who has access to the President, to monitor the operating agencies and to bring important conflicts to the President's attention. One veteran enforcement official has commented privately, "We've already had a drug czar, the only kind that works, and that was Bud Krogh." (See above.)

Ultimately, in trying to answer the question "Do we need a drug czar?", the Congress is faced with a series of additional questions, of both a theoretical and a pragmatic nature. Is the general principle sound? Does the concept of a super-agency, which would coordinate and direct a group of operating agencies having some common function, do violence to the logic of Executive Branch departmental structure? Is that structure sacrosanct, or does the growth of the White House Staff and the EOP indicate that in many respects it has already been found wanting? To solve a coordination problem in any area, is there a better and more appropriate alternative to creation of a super-agency, such as the cabinet committee or other similar inter-agency mechanism? Alternatively, have such arrangements been fruitful in the past? Assuming that there are indeed exceptional problems that warrant creation of a super-agency, is drug abuse one of them? Are the present organizations and arrangements -- the Reagan Administration's Cabinet Council on Legal Policy, the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Program, the border interdiction task force program under the direction of the Vice President, the Drug Abuse Policy Office in the EOP, and the general lead taken by the Attorney General in the drug enforcement field -- working or not? Have they been given enough time to demonstrate their potential? Can any office such as one of those now proposed be successful if the President in office is not in sympathy with the idea? On the other hand, is it not the responsibility of Congress to create effective government institutions that will survive the preferences and style of a particular administration?

**LEGISLATION**

H.R. 3326 (Shaw)

Establishes the "Office of the Director of National and International Drug Operations and Policy" to ensure (1) the development of a national policy with respect to illegal drugs, (2) the direction and coordination of all Federal agencies involved in the effort to implement such a policy, and (3) that a single high-level official, "accountable to the Congress and the American people," will be charged with the responsibility of coordinating the overall direction of United States policy, resources, and operations with respect to the illegal drug problem. Specifies that there shall be both a Director and a Deputy Director -- the Director to be appointed by the President from among the Vice President and the heads of the executive departments of the U.S. and the Deputy Director also to be appointed by the President but with the advice and consent of the Senate. Provision is made
specifically for the participation of the Office in the development of budgetary priorities and allocations of the operative agencies.

H.R. 4028 (Hughes, Sawyer, Smith of Fla., and Gilman)

Reestablishes an Office of Drug Abuse Policy (ODAP) in the Executive Office of the President. Amends the Drug Abuse Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act to revise the authority (still contained in the statute) of ODAP, to provide for a Deputy Director for Drug Abuse Prevention and a Deputy Director for Drug Enforcement. Sets forth authorities for the Director of the office, which include the establishment of policy and priorities for all Federal drug abuse functions and the coordination and oversight of such functions. Stipulates that the Vice-President may be appointed Director. Among specific powers provided is review of all annual budgets of departments and agencies engaged in drug abuse functions. Authorizes appropriations of $500,000 for FY84 for carrying out the act. Requires the Director to submit a written report to Congress annually on the activities conducted under the statute. H.R. 3664 introduced July 26, 1983; referred jointly to the Committees on the Judiciary and on Energy and Commerce. H.R. 4028, a clean bill in lieu of H.R. 3664, introduced Sept. 29; referred to the Committees on Judiciary and on Energy and Commerce. Ordered to be reported (amended) by the Judiciary Committee and referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce, Oct. 4.

S. 1787 (Biden et al.)

National Narcotics Act of 1983. Creates an "Office of the Director of National and International Drug Operations and Policy", to be headed by a Director and a Deputy Director who are appointed by the President, by and with the consent of the Senate. Provides that the Director is authorized to (1) develop, review, implement, and enforce U.S. Government policy with respect to illegal drugs; (2) direct and coordinate all U.S. Government efforts to halt the flow into, and sale and use of illegal drugs within the U.S.; (3) develop, in concert with the appropriate governmental entities, budgetary priorities and allocations relating to control of illegal drugs; and (4) coordinate the collection and dissemination of information necessary to implement government policy with respect to illegal drugs. Authorizes appropriations of $500,000 for FY84 for carrying out the act. Introduced Aug. 4, 1983; referred to Judiciary. Reported, without amendment, Aug. 4. Written report filed Oct. 25 (S.Rept. 98-278). (Contents of bill added by floor amendment on Oct. 26, 1983, to H.R. 3959, a supplemental appropriation bill that passed the Senate Oct. 27, 1983. Amendment dropped in conference.)

HEARINGS


--- Drug Abuse Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act of 1978. Hearing, 98th Congress,

REPORTS AND CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS


Federal narcotics enforcement; interim report.
(94th Congress, 2d session. Senate. Report no. 94-1039)

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Human Resources.
Drug Abuse [Office] and Treatment Act -- 1972;
report together with minority views to accompany
73 p. (96th Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report no. 96-104)

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare. Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act
amendments of 1975; report to accompany S. 1608.
(94th Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report no. 94-218)

----- Drug Abuse Office, Control and Treatment Act of
1971; report to accompany S. 2097. Washington,

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary.
(98th Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report no. 98-278)

U.S. President 1965-1969 (Johnson). Reorganization Plan
No. 1 of 1968 -- creating a new Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs. Message from the President of
the United States. Feb. 7, 1968. (90th Congress,
2d session. House Doc. 249).

No. 2 of 1973, establishing a Drug Enforcement
Administration. Message from the President of the
United States. Mar. 23, 1973. (93rd Congress,
1st session. House Doc. 93-69).

No. 1 of 1977, to reorganize the Executive Office
Off., 1977. (95th Congress, 1st session. House
Doc. 185).

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

11/15/83 -- The drug czar" and drug commission provisions
of the Senate-passed supplemental appropriations
bill were dropped by the House-Senate conference
committee.

10/26/83 -- The Senate added the contents of S. 1787, a
so-called "drug czar" bill, to H.R. 3959, a supplemental
appropriations bill that was subsequently passed by
the Senate on Oct. 27. Also added was a proposal to
create a "Commission on Drug Interdiction and
Enforcement."
09/15/83 -- The House Subcommittee on Crime approved a clean bill to amend Title II of the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act for the purpose of recreating the Office of Drug Abuse Policy in the Executive Office of the President (EOP). Deputy Directors both for Drug Enforcement and for Drug Abuse Prevention would be appointed under the bill's provisions. An amendment accepted in subcommittee mark-up would allow the President to name the Vice President as Director. The bill was introduced Sept. 29 as H.R. 4027.

08/04/83 -- An altered version of the Administration omnibus crime control bill was reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee (S. 1762). A separate bill to establish a "drug czar" office was also reported (S. 1787).

03/23/83 -- The White House announced the creation of a new drug interdiction group headed by Vice President Bush. The National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) was charged with coordinating the work of Federal agencies that have responsibilities for interdiction of sea-borne, air-borne and across-border importation of narcotics and other dangerous drugs -- principally the Customs Service, the Coast Guard, and the armed services.

01/14/83 -- President Reagan withheld his approval of H.R. 3963 (97th Congress), thus exercising a pocket veto. He was especially critical of a provision establishing a "drug czar" office to coordinate Federal drug law enforcement.

12/20/82 -- A scaled-down version of the Violent Crime and Drug Enforcement Improvement Act (H.R. 3963, 97th Congress) was cleared for the President. It contained provisions for the creation of a so-called "drug czar" office to coordinate Federal drug law enforcement.

10/14/82 -- The President announced a major new drive against illicit drug trafficking. Subsequently designated the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement (OCDE) task force program, the initiative involved creation of 12 regional task forces for the investigation and prosecution of major trafficking cases. It was anticipated to require the hiring of 1,200 new investigators and prosecutors.

06/24/82 -- By Executive Order the President established the Drug Abuse Policy Office in the Office of Policy Development (OPD) for the purpose of performing the duties specified under Title II of the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act. According to the order, the Director of the Office would be "primarily responsible for assisting the
President in formulating policy for, and in coordinating and overseeing, international as well as domestic drug abuse functions by all Executive agencies." Dr. Carlton Turner, the President's senior advisor on drug abuse policy, was appointed Director.

01/29/82 -- The President announced creation of the Cabinet Council on Legal Policy, to be chaired by the Attorney General. The Council was charged with the review of matters pertaining to interdepartmental aspects of law enforcement policy, with an initial emphasis on narcotics enforcement and immigration and refugee policy. Subsequently, the Council formed the Working Group for Drug Supply Reduction, under the chairmanship of the Associate Attorney General.

01/28/82 -- President Reagan announced the establishment of a special task force to combat illicit drug traffic in South Florida. Composed of officials from a number of Federal agencies, to work with State and local authorities, the task force was placed under the direction of Vice President Bush.

01/21/82 -- The Federal Bureau of Investigation was given concurrent jurisdiction, with the Drug Enforcement Administration, over the enforcement of dangerous drug laws. Under the new arrangement, the DEA is required to report to the Attorney General through the FBI Director.

07/00/81 -- Dr. Carlton Turner was appointed as President Reagan's "senior advisor on drug abuse policy.

03/00/78 -- The Office of Drug Abuse Policy (ODAP) was terminated. ODAP Director Peter Bourne was designated a presidential assistant for international health and drug abuse and, as such, supervised the operation of a unit of the Domestic Policy Staff charged with formulation of policy on matters pertaining to drug abuse. This arrangement was continued under his successor, Lee Dogoloff.

07/15/77 -- President Carter submitted Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1977 to Congress. The plan proposed a reorganization of the Executive Office of the President, one aspect of which was abolition of the Office of Drug Abuse Policy.

06/00/77 -- Dr. Peter Bourne took office as the director of ODAP, having been previously confirmed by the Senate.

03/00/77 -- President Carter announced that ODAP would be established and that the Federal Drug Abuse
Strategies would be "revitalized."

04/27/76 -- A presidential "Drug Abuse Message to the Congress" announced the creation of the Cabinet Committee on Drug Law Enforcement (CCDLE) and the Cabinet Committee on Drug Abuse Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation (CCDAPTR). Modeled on the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control, established by President Nixon (see below), the two committees were charged with the development and implementation of overall Federal strategy and the strengthening of interagency coordination.

03/19/76 -- Amendments to the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act became law. Among other things, they provided for the establishment of a successor agency to SAODAP, to be known as the Office of Drug Abuse Policy (ODAP), on a scaled-down basis, to be known as the Office of Drug Abuse Policy (ODAP). Subsequently, President Ford declined to implement the legislation and proposed a rescission of appropriations for the proposed agency.

00/00/76 -- The House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control was established, for the purpose of studying and reviewing, from a unified perspective, the problem of narcotics abuse and its control. The initial panel included members from all standing committees with jurisdiction over significant aspects of drug abuse control.

06/30/75 -- The Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention statutory authorization expired. The Ford Administration declined to support extension.

00/00/73 -- The Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA) was established in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare -- comprised of three institutes of equal status: the National Institute of Mental Health, the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, and the National Institute on Drug Abuse. The new agency was subsequently authorized by statute (Title II of P.L. 93-282).

00/00/73 -- The Drug Enforcement Administration was established by Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973. To create the new Justice Department agency, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs was combined with the Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement, the Office of National Narcotics Intelligence, and all Customs Service personnel principally involved in drug law enforcement.

03/21/72 -- The President approved the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act, among the provisions of which were
those (1) providing statutory backing for the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention, with specific authorities and appropriation authorizations for three fiscal years, at the end of which the agency was to be terminated, (2) establishing a Strategy Council, to be appointed by the President, for formulation and continual revision of a "comprehensive, coordinated long-term Federal strategy for all drug abuse prevention functions and all drug traffic prevention functions conducted, sponsored, or supported by any department or agency of the Federal Government." (3) further expansion of Federal treatment and prevention grant programs, including initiation of a program of formula grants to the States, and (4) establishment of a National Institute on Drug Abuse, within the National Institute of Mental Health, to administer all programs and authorities of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare with respect to drug abuse prevention functions.

06/00/71 -- President Richard Nixon appointed Dr. Jerome Jaffe, a psychiatrist, as a special consultant to the President for narcotics and dangerous drugs and in a Message to Congress announced the establishment of the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention, located within the Executive Office of the President, to coordinate and broadly direct all Federal drug-abuse programs concerned with prevention, education, treatment, rehabilitation, training and research.

10/15/68 -- The President signed P.L. 90-574, which contained amendments to the Community Mental Health Centers Act establishing the first program of Federal grants specifically for funding the treatment of narcotic addiction.

00/00/68 -- Under Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1968, the Bureau of Narcotics (Treasury) and the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control (FDA) were combined into the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in the Justice Department.

11/00/63 -- The President's Advisory Commission on Narcotic and Drug Abuse ("Prettyman Commission") issued its final report. Among recommendations was one that the President appoint a Special Assistant for Narcotic and Drug Abuse, from the White House staff, to provide continuous advice and assistance in launching a coordinated attack on drug abuse.
ADDITIONAL REFERENCE SOURCES


